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CONTENTS

STUDIES

HISTORICAL FAMILY SYSTEMS AND THE GREAT EUROPEAN DIVIDE: THE INVENTION OF THE SLAVIC EAST

MIKOŁAJ SZOŁTYSEK and BARBARA ZUBER-GOLDSTEIN*

ABSTRACT: *In 1940, almost two years into World War II, the book, Agrarverfassung und Bevölkerung in Litauen und Weißrussland ("Agrarian constitution and population in Lithuania and Belarus"), was published by Werner Conze, a young German historian. The analysis of the data led Conze to detect a difference between West and East. The comparison emphasised the cultural divide between the Germans and the Slavs to the East by postulating smaller family sizes throughout the western or German-influenced part of historic Lithuania, and larger families with more complex structures throughout the Slavic parts of the country. Conze's scientific insights remain present in today's historical-demographic literature, and have become an essential building block of any argument in support of the validity and persistence of East-West differentials in family systems in East-Central Europe. Because of this study's continued importance, it may prove useful to re-examine. Our critical assessment of some of Conze's basic assumptions reveals serious shortcomings in his analysis, which resulted from making unwarranted inferences from non-representative and circumstantial evidence, and from his underlying motivation to search for German-Slavic differences. We will discuss the extent to which the pervading notion of East-West divide in historical East-Central Europe should be revised in response to these shortcomings. By uncovering the inadequacies of Conze's contribution, we hope to pave the way for a better scientific understanding of familial characteristics of Eastern Europe, and to end the perpetuation of certain stereotypes of Slavic populations.*

I. INTRODUCTION

To many, Eastern Europe is a synonym for Slavic Europe. The equation is certainly not new. Hegel (1770–1831) considered "East of Europe" as the house of the "great Sclavonic nation."

Despite its very limited coherence as a distinct region before 1945 (Turnock 1989, 1), 'Eastern Europe' was conceived as a regional concept already during the Enlightenment, when western travellers to eastern Europe invented the idea of the East as a backward, semi-savage realm loosely affiliated with the West (Wolff 1994; Lemberg 1985). European East provided Western Europe also with one of its first model of backwardness. Lands *im Osten von*

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Europa were a semi-developed and not yet quite enlightened world; again, in Hegel's words, a body of peoples that "has not appeared as an independent element in the series of phases that Reason has assumed in the World" (Hegel 1902, 363; also Wolff 1994, 314–315; Curta 2007, 1–35). In the course of the rise of racial discourse and nationalism during the 19th century this framework has been remolded to identify Eastern Europe as a dominantly Slavic realm, giving birth to the view according to which certain Slavic set of ideas, moral principles and religious views (even population behaviours), were determinative of Eastern Europe's further incapacity to advance.[1]

Slavic populations also played an important role in sociological and historical scholarship on demography and family. Within that discourse, a suggestive 'discovery' of Eastern European demographic and familial distinctness took place. F. Le Play was the first to popularize the notion of a gradient of family and household types running from east to west, and to locate patriarchal, patrilocal multigenerational households among "Eastern nomads, Russian peasants, and the Slavs of Central Europe".[2] Independently from Le Play came in-

[1] The "invention of the Slavic East" was a complicated phenomenon with deep roots in the upheavals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (industrialization, urbanization, revolutions, nationalism, etc.), and the Germans were not the sole inventors of the "myth" of the Slavic east. On Eastern Europe's constitutive role in European identity construction, see Neumann 1999. A thoughtful analysis of the symbolic and sociological meanings of east and west in post-Cold War Europe was offered by Melegh (Melegh 2006).

[2] Le Play 1982[1872], 259; see also his mid-19th family model map in Le Play 1879, 683, as well as its reprint in Fauve-Chamoux and Ochiai 2009, 44–45. The North-South fault line suggested by Le Play followed the major political divisions of that time, placing Austria proper and Bohemia to the West; and Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia to the East. More importantly, the axis divided historical territories of the then nonexistent Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into three largely unequal parts. The very western fringes of the Polish Republic were split between Le Play's Northern and Western zones, and, one may presume, they were supposed to carry on the characteristics of the stem family systems. The rest of the historical Commonwealth, including the heartland of present-day Poland with Cracov and Warsaw, like all the territories located more to the East (Red Ruthenia, Ukraine, Lithuania-Belarussia), were lumped together with the Balkans, the Asian part of Russia, and the Moroccan and Syrian families, as all representing the patriarchal family system.

It was Ewers who first claimed that strong lineage systems founded upon the existence of large, extended family collectives, were originally an inherent propensity of all Slavic societies (Ewers 1826).

Long before Le Play, the German Romantic August v. Haxthausen talked extensively about Slavic agrarian constitution and rural organization (Haxthausen 1842, 1846). However, Haxthausen's studies were neither overly concerned with the internal structure of family or household (his prime focus was the rural commune), nor they provided an European-wide typology of family systems organization (see Starr 1968; Dennison and Carus 2003). Even earlier, Malthus compared the affluence of modern Western society to non-Western societies by linking the differential well-being to specific population processes and suggesting dramatic differences in vital demographic rates between the two. However, the

tense discussion among the 19th century scholars of the morphology and social implications of the peculiar family type of *zadruga*, found in some parts of the Balkans, but often believed to encapsulate the very spirit of the Slavic familial tendencies. Although the discussion has never been fully resolved, it provided a powerful, albeit very impressionist, picture of the familial characteristics of the Eastern Europe Slavdom as the place where the relics of kindred groups have often persisted well into the Early Modern times (Leontovich 1867, 1896; Efimenko 1882, 1892; Lutchitsky 1896[1889]; Kovalevskii 1885; Vladimirsky-Budanov 1892; Kadlec 1898; Dovnar-Zapolsky 1909[1897]; Balzer 1899; Peisker 1899).[3] This image would then soon sink deep into collective consciousness and, with time, would condition the framework of debates on the geography of family forms in Europe by equating those archaic forms of communal social organization with supposed propensity to multigenerational coresidence over the whole eastern part of the continent, and among Slavs in particular (Macfarlane 1978, 18–23).[4]

The notion of a uniform Eastern European family system, in which people marry young and live in patriarchal households, continued, and most pervasively advanced in the 20th century by J. Hajnal's 1965 path-breaking article on

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Malthusian binarism was not so much about the difference between Western and Eastern Europe as it was about the divergence of the Far East.

[3] Following Bogišić (1884), nearly all Southern-Slavic literature has deemed *zadruga* a relic of ancient all-Slavic forms of ancestral organization which can be traced back to the era of first settlement. Among the authors preoccupied with East-Central Europe, the following would have signed their name under this theory: Leontovich, Lutchitsky, Kadlec, and Balzer. The view was also embraced by Meitzen (1895). A staunch supporter of systematizing settlement studies into categories of 'ethnic properties', Meitzen distinguished the Slavs' inclination towards patterns of single farmestead settlement (*Einzelhof*) and building household-family communities. Within this framework, a numerous families would jointly preside over the land, as opposed to village forms based on individual property, supposedly typical of the Germans. Kovalevskii and Peisker broke away from the theory of Slavic lineage and the specificity of family communes, determining these as phenomena of a broader, Indo-European metrics. Dopsch (1909) rejected Meitzen's views, claiming that complex family forms were to occur in those regions where, owing to adverse conditions of farming, there appeared a strong need for cooperation between larger collectives.

[4] In Macfarlane's landmark study, a stylized image of the peasantry without individualized ownership (which he derived from the assessment of peasant life in pre-emancipation Eastern Europe and Russia, where the household was supposed to act as the 'unit of ownership'), was linked with the patriarchal nature of those societies, universal and early marriage, and multiple family households. In his another, but barely known paper (Macfarlane 1980), Macfarlane tentatively suggested that that the "demographic structures" uncovered by historians, but Hajnal in particular, were contermínous with broad "cultural regions". He argued that whereas the distinctive features of the north-western pattern were to be found in their purest form in England, "that Hajnal's line seems to follow the Slav/non-Slav division".

marriage patterns in Europe (Hajnal 1965).[5] Hajnal's article on marriage patterns was then followed by another paper in which he distinguished between two kinds of household formation system in preindustrial times. By calling explicitly what he published in 1982 a "sequel" to his famous 1965 essay, Hajnal seemed to suggest that the two supra-national, large-scale family systems he described (the simple and joint household systems) could be spatially conceptualised as referring to territories west and east of his famous line (Hajnal 1982).[6]

Although Hajnal's (as well as Laslett's) works are recognised as formative studies that have made a lasting impact on the field of research, they have, over the years, also been challenged, and have undergone a number of transformations. However, despite having been subjected to severe criticism over the last two decades (Kertzer 1991; Goody 1996; Faragó 1998; Plakans and Wetherell 1997; also Szołtysek 2008a, 2008b, 2009), Hajnal's modelling propositions have recently made a comeback. They have been given new life in the works of M. Mitterauer and K. Kaser.[7] By discussing the Hajnal line in the context of the

[5] Hajnal summarised his theses, developed on the basis of an analysis of aggregate statistics from around 1900, in a very concise statement: "The marriage pattern of most of Europe as it existed for at least two centuries up to 1940 was, so far as we can tell, unique or almost unique in the world. There is no known example of a population of non-European civilization which has had a similar pattern" (Hajnal 1965, 101). The "European pattern", the distinctive features of which Hajnal considered to be a high age at marriage and a high proportion of people who never marry at all, pervaded, according to him, "the whole of Europe except for the eastern and south-eastern portion" (Hajnal 1965, 101). Reiterating Le Play's original spatial excercises, Hajnal introduced an East-West gradient in European demographic behaviours with much greater force, and argued that "the European pattern extended over all of Europe to the west of a line running roughly from Leningrad (as it is now called) to Trieste" (Hajnal 1965, 101). This is how the since so often cited and discussed "Hajnal line" was conceived, soon assuming a truly iconic status. Hajnal's text can also be read as strongly suggesting the incommensurability of early marriage behaviour (ascribed to Eastern Europe) with simple or stem family systems believed to prevail in other parts of the continent.

[6] In Hajnal's account, the crucial element linking marriage ages and family structure was the question of how retirement and the whole process of devolution of property was arranged within the family. Also in this regard, he contrasted "European" with "non-European" patterns, and suggested that the demographic behaviours of Eastern Europeans were not congruous with a "niche system" he ascribed to the West (Hajnal 1965, 133). On the 'otherniza-tion' of Eastern Europe in Anglo-Saxon population discourses, the Hajnal's one including, see Melegh (Melegh 2006, 69–76).

[7] In the field of family studies, Mitterauer gained his high reputation thanks to his investigation into developmental processes of domestic groups, research on youth and service, as well as approaching diversity of family forms through the notion of differences in local ecotypes; see, for example, Mitterauer and Sieder 1983; Mitterauer 1985, 1992. Kaser's work has long been focused on the investigation of variation in household, family and inheritance patterns in the Balkans; see Kaser 1995, 2000, 2002.

regionality problem long known to mediaevalist scholars (i.e., the boundaries between Eastern and Western Christianity, and of mediaeval European colonisation), and by relating the line to the issue of the agrarian regimes widely recognised by economic historians, Mitterauer embedded Hajnal's original reasoning within a much more complex and ambitious framework for explaining family differentials in preindustrial Europe (Mitterauer 1999). Inspired by the explanatory power of Mitterauer's proposition, Karl Kaser of Graz has popularised the notion of a "Hajnal-Mitterauer line" (Kaser 1997).

While it is highly appealing from a theoretical standpoint, the concept of a Hajnal-Mitterauer line has not yet been sufficiently tested on the basis of data from the territories its authors were concerned with. Although Mitterauer and Kaser offer convincing data corpora and analysis of Eastern European family patterns, with an emphasis on Austro-Hungarian data pools, as well as on the Balkans and the South East, a much larger part of the supposed "transitional zone" – i.e., the one that spread across the historical Poland-Lithuania – has not been equally represented in their analysis and available data. Mitterauer balances that deficit by relying on literature, which upon further investigation was found to stretch back almost more than half a century, and is largely based on the writings and research of Werner Conze (Conze 1940). Conze's input into the field has therefore gone largely unexamined until today in the context of historic Eastern European family patterns.

In this paper, our goal will be to critically examine Conze's analysis.[8] By taking a critical approach to Conze's work, we will be suggesting that:

- First his notion of the agrarian change in 16th-century Lithuania was derived essentially from the reading of "official" legal documents designed by the Duchy, while he ignored practical considerations guiding the reform's implementation at the local level (e.g., magnate estates of Belarus) (Conze 1940, 2–3).
- Second both before the agrarian reform and just after, peasant families might have been predominantly nuclear both in the Lithuanian and the Belarusian ethnic territories of the Grand Duchy. By relying on the quantitative and qualitative evidence available to us, we challenge Conze's claim that "in the 16th century the occurrence of the extended family (*Grossfamilien*) spread across Belarus" (Conze 1940, 36).

[8] Conze's ingenious contribution to our understanding of the peasant family structure should not be overlooked, however. Modern family and household history has yet to capitalize more fully on Conze's two substantial insights, namely that (1) agrarian laws and constitutions have a profound impact on rural populations, and on population dynamics; and that (2) historical patterns of settlement provide important clues for the understanding of prevailing family and household structures. During 1970s, Berkner advocated for a similar approach to historical family patterns (see Berkner 1972).

– Third Conze's tentative observation regarding the structurally-complex character of families in Belarus (in particular, in the Polessia area of southern Belarus) needs to be controlled by utilising reliable household data, which allows various kinds of statistical analysis. The same approach should be taken in relation to the supposed differences in family composition between Slavic (Belarusian and Ukrainian) and Baltic (Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian) populations. By referring to an unprecedented collection of historical household listings for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the 1790s, we will show that none of Conze's claims are valid historically.

We organise this paper into the following parts. We begin with Conze's biography, supplemented by his major study's auctorial and ideological context, its methodological procedure, and its empirical content. This is followed by a brief description of Mitterauer's and Kaser's geographic models of family forms in historic Europe, with an indication of the role that Conze played in this theoretical framework. The next and largest section will re-examine *Agrarverfassung und Bevölkerung* using the three critical historical and statistical exercises already mentioned. We will conclude in the final part of the paper by suggesting how the pervading notion of the East-West divide in historical East-Central Europe should be revised. The prospects for establishing a better scientific understanding of familial characteristics of Eastern Europe, free from certain stereotypes about Slavic populations, will also be discussed.

II. W. CONZE AND THE EAST: CAREER AND PROFESSIONAL BIOGRAPHY

Werner Conze (1910–1986) was born in 1910 in Neuhaus in Northern Germany. Because of his father's occupation as a judge, the family moved frequently. After Gymnasium in Berlin, he decided to study art history, and enrolled at the University of Marburg, but later switched subjects to become a historian and changed universities (Dunkhase 2010, chapter 1).[9] During his studies in Marburg, Leipzig, Königsberg and the Herder Institute in Riga, Conze developed strong interests in agrarian history and the history of human settlements (Haar 2000, 89). It was also in these early student years that he joined the elitist and *völkisch*-oriented academic group DAG, or the *Deutsche Akademische Gildenschaft* (German Academic Guildhood). The organisation was part of the greater German *Bund* youth movement popular in the interwar period, which emphasised not only the outdoors, hiking and camping, but also staunch German patriotism (Dunkhase 2010, chapter 1).

[9] We were using an unpublished PhD-dissertation manuscript available from the author. It was finally published when this article was finished.

Conze's teachers in Leipzig included the right-wing sociologists Hans Freyer (1887–1969) and Gunther Ipsen (1899–1984), both outspoken practitioners of *völkisch* and racist population science. Ipsen, in particular, greatly influenced Conze. His *Blut und Boden* (blood and soil) theories, along with his obsession with data, statistics and numeric patterns, left permanent impressions on the young student (Etzemüller 2001, 66).[10]

In 1931, Conze left Leipzig and went to the University of Königsberg in East Prussia (Kaliningrad, today Russia) to look for a thesis adviser who could provide him with a topic. Already then, the traditional focus on mathematics and natural science at the Albertina University was replaced by an emotional mix of nationalism and political agitation heartily supported by various German students' associations which often exhorted their more nationalist-oriented members to spend at least one semester studying in Königsberg to demonstrate their patriotic solidarity. Consequently, Königsberg rose to become one of the most important centres of National Socialist research in the years leading up to WWII.

Conze found himself invigorated by that atmosphere. He became a student of Hans Rothfels (1891–1976), a nationalist and conservative historian whose main interest was in the research of Eastern Europe, who soon became the most influential mentor in Conze's life. From 1929 onwards, he personally oversaw student excursions and field trips to neighbouring Baltic states that were designed to encourage students to conduct ethnographic, demographic and social field research on settlement forms, history and language (Dunkhase 2010, chapter 2). It was on these trips that Rothfels drew Conze's attention to the German

[10] It was mainly thanks to Ipsen's theoretical attempts at rethinking the relationship between population and resources in the light of the *Volkist* theories of race that the Slavs of Eastern Europe came to occupy critical position in the construction of juxtaposed "population regimes". In Ipsen's writings, from Wilhelm Riehl's ethnographies "good peasants" (following impartibility of farms) were invariably presented as unequivocally Germanic, and the "bad peasants" as Slavic (Etzemüller 2001., 50). Consequently, it was claimed that the *Hufenverfassung* ("the hide constitution"), a specific landholding pattern imposed on German and other peasants of Western and Central Europe by the nobility, distinguished "Germanic" rural societies from their Slavic counterparts. In Ipsen's accounts, the importance of the *Hufenverfassung* extended much beyond the specificities of the agrarian organization, since it supposedly captured the essence of the German peasantry throughout history. It prescribed the allocation of standardised units of arables known as hides (*Hufen*) to individual families, imposed the impartibility of holdings, as well as the prerequisites for marriage in the form of available self-sufficient positions or niches, all with the aim of facilitating the "autoregulation of population in the living space". Ipsen's account of Eastern Europe, by contrast, was seen foremost as the locus of the "agrarian overpopulation" caused by the Slavic inclination to the partibility of farms and joint property ownership, facilitating the complexity of residential arrangements and early marriage, in effect leading to an unbounded growth of each family and of the population at large. See Ipsen 1933; also: Schlumbohm 2000, 77; Ehmer 1992/1993, 60–70; Ehmer 1991, 10; Fertig 2001, 18–19.

language exclave of Hirschenhof which became his master's thesis topic (Conze 1934).[11] However, Rothfels was soon dismissed from his post in 1934 because of his Jewish descent, and during its final stages Conze's work was supervised by Gunther Ipsen. In the meantime, young Conze applied for NSDAP membership in the process of joining the SA (*Sturmabteilung*, or Storm Troopers), and his entrance into the party was officially approved in 1937 (Dunkhase 2010, chapter 3.1).

Cronze's further scientific development should be understood in the context of widespread advocacy for what came to be know as German *Ostforschung* (Research of the East). As an academic discipline it had its roots in the late 19th century, although its formation took place around 1914, and was closely connected to WWI. Whereas *Osteuropaforschung* regarded societies and countries of Eastern Europe as autonomous objects of research, *Ostforschung* was concerned with the fight for "Germandom". After Germany's defeat in WWI, it became a chief tool for challenging the Treaty of Versailles. Almost from the initialisation of *Ostforschung* after WWI, the Second Polish Republic became its main focus (it had been re-created as an independent state in 1918, but it was not until 1922 that the frontiers had been established). By the early 1930s, Germany intensified its Polish studies in order to build a "properly armed, broad, defensive front to oppose the Poles" (Burleigh 1988, 51). In 1932, the Prussian Ministry of State got involved and endorsed a plan to centralise the groups concerned with German *Ostforschung*. The result was the creation of a central agency in 1931–1933 and in 1933, shortly after the National Socialists had become in charge of government this administrative unit adopted the title *Publikationsstelle* (Publication Office), and became a public relations institution for *Ostforschung* (Burleigh 1988, 24–75).

There are several characteristics that have been found to be crucial for German *Ostforschung* at that time. First, there was a strong focus on the connection between population and *Lebensraum* ('living space'). Demographic development was understood as a function of the territory available for human habitation. Second, it was widely advised that the concepts of *Volksboden* and *Kulturboden* be adopted. *Volksboden* was defined as areas settled by the Germans, and territories where the German language was spoken. Only two-thirds of this area was within the boundaries of the post-World War I German Reich. *Kulturboden* was defined as constituting areas that had been touched by German cultural influence in the past, and where palpable traces of German culture could still be found. Substantial areas of Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Romania were classified as German *Kulturboden* (Burleigh 1988, 25–27; Penck 1926; also Szołtysek 2005). The perception of the German cultural influence was derived from such parametres as settlement forms, build-

[11] This was a German settlement founded in the 18th century by Russia. In Conze's time, it was in Latvia and went by the name Irši near Liepkalne.

ing styles, family patterns and agricultural habits, and – last, but not least, a specific landholding pattern known as *Hufenverfassung*.

Third, research goals were highly politicised, and were conceptualised as representing long-range historical arguments to challenge Polish territorial acquisitions after WWI. Fourth, an emphasis on pre- and medieval history was encouraged because of the utility of providing arguments for "Germandom" (Dunkhase 2010, chapter 3.1), as well as an interdisciplinary framework merging history, agrarian studies, sociology and archaeology. Fifth, special emphasis was placed on the revaluation of archival mass sources, which were thought to have the potential to become "weapons forged from the sources" (Maschke 1931, 37–39). Finally, researchers were advised to stress continuity over historical change (see Ehmer 1992/1993; Ehmer 2000; Mackensen and Reulecke 2005; Van Horn Melton 1994; Götz 1999). Most of these characteristics can be found in Conze's academic works.

His thesis, *Hirschenhof. Die Geschichte einer deutschen Sprachinsel in Livland* („Hirschenhof. History of a German Linguistic Enclave in Latvia"), was published in 1934.[12] In this study, Conze drew the named distinction between the *Deutscher Volksboden* (Soil of the German Nation) and the *Deutscher Kulturboden* (Soil of German Culture), and placed Hirschenhof into the latter category (Conze 1934, 8–9). He also gave some further details by explaining the differences between the South and the German North East. In Yugoslavia, Bohemia and Austria, Conze agued, German peasants would have settled and turned their surroundings into a permanent German *Volksboden*. The situation would have been different altogether in the North East. Out there, German settlers had taken on an active role as leaders and had become the ruling class. But they remained a minority, and merely infused their surroundings with German culture, thus making the land German *Kulturboden,* instead of demographically converting it into *Volksboden*. Conze's position was a moderate one, given that there were more anti-Slavic views in circulation at the time (Conze 1934, 8–9).[13]

In November 1935 Conze started the habilitation process under the guidance of Ipsen, and was made Ipsen's university assistant. At this time, the two men had already decided on a topic, melding Conze's previous training as a historian with Ipsen's interest in *völkisch* population research. Ipsen recommended Conze's habilitation candidacy to the public administration, along with the observation that Conze had already proved through his Hirschenhof study that

[12] The monograph offered a classical historical structure and did not yet seek to address demographic questions.

[13] The popular assertion was that Slavic settlement in the Northeast was only to be seen as interlude in history because the area had really been Teutonic first.

he was able, in character and scientific training, to participate successfully in the *völkisch* frontier struggle.[14]

Conze worked on his habilitation for five years. His thesis was approved in October 1940 at the University of Vienna, where Ipsen had earlier taken a prestigious teaching position. The habilitation, *Agrarverfassung und Bevölkerung in Litauen und Weißrussland,* appeared in print in Leipzig in the same year (Conze 1940)[15]. The academic community received it with praise, and generally commented positively on the utilisation of its quantitative data. The study was written with a notable absence of political haranguing. Conze seemingly did not share Ipsen's seething racism or his dark visions of ethnic obliteration. Comparatively, Conze's presentation is constrained and dry, taking a decidedly "objective" perspective. Even so, *Agrarverfassung und Bevölkerung* was steeped in German *Ostforschung*. It almost exemplarily followed the movement's most important narratives and theoretical approaches. In addition, the study's academic origin is intrinsically linked to places and organisations, which not only spearheaded German *Ostforschung*, but more or less invented it. Just a few months into working on his habilitation, Conze resigned in Königsberg and accepted a scholarship for *Ostforschung* with the "PuSte", the *Publikations-Stelle* (Publication Office) in Berlin[16]. This was part of a plan to mould the young historian – then aged 26 – into an expert on the "Wilna Region" (now area surrounding Vilnius in Lithuania). Some of his mentors who had written recommendations supporting his acceptance to "PuSte" included Theodor Oberländer (1905–1998), a dyed-in-the-wool National Socialist since the beginning and a trained agronomist and economist, as well as Albert Brackmann (1871–1952), the director of the *Geheime Staatsarchiv*. The scholarship enabled Conze to travel to north-eastern Poland and to Wilna (Dunkhase 2010, chapter 3.2). Back in Königsberg in 1937, Conze embarked on a NODFG-sponsored (abbreviation from *Nordost-Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* – the "North-East German Research Community") research trip to the archives of Wilna, and he was on the payroll of the 1937 "PuSte" founded jour-

[14] Conze's sketchy outline of ideas from 1935 mentioned: "…the development of the old Lithuanian-Belarusian areas … the great agrarian reform of the 16th century… the link between agrarian constitution, social structure, and population growth."; see Dunkhase 2010, chapter 3.1.

[15] As indicated by the double title and the insertion "*Teil 1*" (Part 1), the opus was planned as a two-volume book. But the second part, "Belarus," was never finished. According to the historian Wolfgang Schieder, Conze's student and research assistant during the post-WWII Münster and Heidelberg years, Conze had indeed already started some preliminary research in the 1940s, but the material was most likely abandoned in Königsberg in 1945. And, later, work was not resumed on this topic. Schieder's personal communication with B. Zuber-Goldstein (E-Mail MPIDR, 23.01.2009).

[16] "PuSte" evolved into the central agency for the coordination, endowment and publication of National Socialist research of the eastern regions until 1945.

nal "*Jomsburg*", which was to popularise the fruits of *Ostforschung* to a wider public (Burleigh 1988, 139). The years 1936–1939 brought about an intensification of Conze's German nationalist and anti-Semitic views, and an increasing convergence with National Socialist politics concerning the plans for the "East" (Dunkhase 2010, chapter 3.2).

The habilitation research of W. Conze was meant to provide the most thorough "empirical" support for Ipsen's theories of population by proving the incommensurability of the "Slavic way of life" with the demographic behaviour characteristic of German or non-Slavic communities in the German Baltic *Kulturboden* (Conze 1940, 1–4). Conze used historical materials found in Wilna, Kaunas and Königsberg to examine the demographic effects of introducing the "hide constitution" (*Hufenverfassungssystem*) on rural populations of Belarusians and Lithuanians in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the 16th century up to 1795.[17] Conze claimed that the rates of population growth in early modern times differed significantly between the two groups, since only among the Slavs did population numbers double between the 16th and 18th centuries showing their hierarchical inferiority toward Germans and below them to Lithuanians.[18] He attributed this difference to diverging attitudes towards the newly implemented hide system. The latter was accepted by the Lithuanian population, which complied with the farm size tailored to a nuclear family. On the other hand, the Slavs (Belarusians) of the eastern part of the Grand Duchy refused to accept the system, and continued to follow their "small peasant instincts," as manifested in the real partition of their allocated hides, and worked the land with complex families up to the late 18th century (Conze 1940, 122–123, 140–141, 174, 206). Conze attributed this difference in attitudes between the Lithuanians and the Belarusians to long-term cultural preferences regarding family co-residence and property devolution, as well as to historic settlement patterns.[19] Whereas Lithuanians were displaying less complex familial organi-

[17] The reform led to the following: a compulsory consolidation of the intermixed manorial estates; the equal distribution of the arable land among peasant families and the reorganisation of open-field agriculture into "włóka" (*manus*; hide; 33 morgi or some 60 acres), which then were to be subdivided into three parallel strips or arables; the introduction of a three-year crop rotation; the extension of manors; turning the peasants into serfs; and, the replacement of all older systems of property management by the system of land-holding in return for labour service on the demesne estates. Conze claimed his research referred to the whole of Lithuania within its boundaries of 1569 (Conze 1940, 5–12).

[18] Conze's world view was based on a hierarchic ranking of peoples. There were Germans on the top, then Lithuanians, and only then Slavs. Jewish population was considered to be outside any ranking, not even a population as such, but an overly negative factor in all societies; see Conze 1940, 206; Lausecker 2008.

[19] "The reason why the reforms of the 16th century created bigger [more populated] villages in the Eastern Slavic areas rather than in the Lithuanian ones obviously stems from the difference between Slavic *`Dvorišče'* type of settlement and Lithuanian farmhouses. The *`Dvorišče'* has been more densely occupied than the homestead of the Lithuanian farmer"

sation as early as in the 16th century, large families (*Grossfamilien*) were widespread throughout the whole of ethnic Belarus. Admittedly, extended families also existed in the Lithuanian regions, but in Belarus their size was on average much bigger. The above-average occurrence of extended families, Conze claimed, was detectable especially in the "backward" region of Polessia in the southern marchland area of Belarus. According to Conze, the socio-demographic fault line between these two different agrarian regimes lay somewhere between the southern fringes of the heartland of ethnic Lithuania in Samogitia (Polish: *Żmudź*) and the Grodna area to the southeast. To the north of this area, the "auto-regulative" agrarian system based on nuclear families was supposed to prevail among Lithuanians; while to the south and south-west, a divisibility of holdings, coupled with a propensity towards more communal forms of residence, was believed to be much more prevalent (Conze 1940, 33–36).

Not long after its publication, Conze's work was heavily criticised for not fully acknowledging its inferences to limited source material with substantial holes (especially for the time period of the 17th century), and for its unbalanced geographical distribution. Łowmianski objected to Conze's population estimates for the 16th and the end of the 18th centuries (including his estimates of the mean household size), and also to his uncritical examination of the estate inventories. According to Łowmiański, Conze's attempt at explaining differences in demographic, family and economic characteristics between the households of the Lithuanians and the Slavs in ethno-cultural terms was totally unjustifiable, since such divergences could be explained in purely economic terms.[20] Morzy also claimed that Conze's population estimates were not convincing (Morzy 1965, 4). For Wauker, in turn, equally dubious was Conze's distinction between the populations of the Lithuanians and the Belarusians. He also noted that the body of sources was, in general, a weakness of Conze's study, and asserted that the hide constitution was effectively put to use at an earlier point in time in a much greater number of demesne estates than Conze acknowledged. Wauker also pointed out some blatant errors in Conze's arithmetical calculations, which enabled him to conclude that "Conze's population estimates are completely worthless, while at the same time he was not able to demonstrate sufficiently without doubt, that there is in fact a noteworthy difference

(Conze 1940, 28–29). One of the early reviewers of Conze's work went so far as to claim that it "clearly demonstrated, that there is a stronger biological reproduction of the Slavic population element than there is of the Eastern Balts – and this despite unfavourable social and settlement conditions" (Seraphim 1941).

[20] While Lithuanian areas were more involved in grain production for export, peasant agriculture in Belarus was of a more subsistence nature, with only a marginal share of an export-oriented crop production (see Łowmiański 1947). Equally critical: Zorn 1987; Lausecker 2008, 100.

between the population growth of Lithuanians and Belarusians" (Wauker 2003, 368–373; similarly in Łowmiański 1947; also Zorn 1987, 248).

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The week before the German invasion of Poland in 1939, Conze was drafted, and in April 1940 he was transferred to the 291st Infantry Division later deployed to France for active duty. Wounded, he spent the second half of 1940 in Königsberg, where he put his finishing touches on his habilitation. The thesis defence took place in Vienna in December of the same year. Soon after, Conze returned to active duty, participating in the invasion of Russia from 1941 onwards. In October 1942, he was appointed to a position as a professor at the *Reichsuniversität* Posen, the National Socialist replacement of the previously Polish Piast University in Poznań. During a front leave he delivered his inaugural lecture, once again focusing on his *leitmotif*, overpopulation against the backdrop of land allocation. When World War II ended, he was taken briefly into prisoner-of-war custody by the USSR, but was released soon after. After several years spent in limbo after the war, Conze managed to secure a lecturer position with a steady salary in Münster (1950–51). He then went on to reinvent himself as a highly respected historian of the *Bundesrepublik*.[21] He was even appointed as rector of the University of Heidelberg (the oldest university in Germany) for half a year (1969–1970) before retiring. In his later years, he returned to his research interest of his youth, German history in the East. He died in Heidelberg six years later at the age of 75. Posthumously, Werner Conze and his colleague Theodor Schieder became the centre of a critical controversy at the German *Historikertag* of 1998 in Frankfurt, and this has triggered a new wave of interest in German historiography by younger historians. Nonetheless, Conze's notion of persistent differences in familial organisation between Slavs and non-Slavs of East Central Europe outlived its author.

[21] Conze invented for himself the narrative that his research had been focused on social history and economic history. He rewrote his habilitation lecture (1940) and published it again in 1953 affirming his old opinions: the Slavic farmer avoided the challenges of the *Hufe*, while the Jews invaded the villages, thus blocking the drainage of overpopulation of the rural folk to the cities and small towns (Conze 1953; see also Lausecker 2008, 100–105). Apart from this, Conze published numerous works on German history, many of them becoming standard textbooks, like *Deutsche Einheit* (Münster, 1958); *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* (co-edited by O. Brunner; 8 volumes, starting in 1972); *Deutsche Geschichte. Epochen und Daten* (co-edited by V. Hentschel; Freiburg, 1972); *Der Nationalsozialismus 1919–1933, die Krise der Weimarer Republik und die nationalsozialistische Machttergreifung* (Stuttgart, 1983), and *Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas*, 10 volumes, brought out in a new edition in 1994 by the eminent Siedler Verlag.

III. THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: THE HAJNAL-MITTERAUER LINE AND THE RESTATEMENT OF THE GREAT DIVIDE IN EASTERN EUROPE

Notwithstanding all uncertainties regarding the appropriateness of Hajnal's positioning of demographic regimes in Eastern Europe, his modelling propositions were given a new life in the works of M. Mitterauer (also K. Kaser). According to Mitterauer, it was the *Hufenverfassungsystem* – i.e. the specific landholding pattern based on the impartible *manus* or hide, discussed earlier in the works of G. Ipsen and W. Conze – that had formed the foundation for the unique European household formation pattern in Western and Central Europe, but only in some parts of Eastern Europe. In its origin and disposition, there were two essential features of the *Hufe* system. One was the principle of single-heir impartible farm succession, whereby only one of the sons could inherit and marry. The second was a "one couple-per-farm policy", the rule originating in the Carolingian period which stated that only one married couple with children could live off a particular hide. According to Mitterauer, the uniform populating of *Hufe* with nuclear families and the simultaneous prevention of a numerical accretion of farming families on them, were the results of a systematic policy of the seigneury devised so as to facilitate the most beneficial collection of a tribute (Mitterauer 1999, 204, 211–215; Kaser 2001, 31 ff ; also Mitterauer 2003b, 42–69).[22] However, both features worked against the formation and sustainability of complex families. Although households with co-residing relatives could occasionally also emerge under the *Hufenverfassung* rules, such multi-generational units would differ structurally from complex residential arrangements typical of joint family systems, if only in terms of their exclusively linear extension and the placement of the authority position in the middle generation (Mitterauer 1999, 203–204, 211–216; Kaser 2000, 67–74; Kaser 2001, 39–41; Kaser 2002, 375–395).[23]

[22] Additional rules stemmed from certain characteristic of the *Hufe* system, such as the following: (1) no marriage previous to the succession of property, (2) frequent handing over of farmsteads through remarriage of a widow, (3) retirement (*Ausgedinge*) as a form of maintenance of the parents within a household which has been passed down to younger generation and (4) life-cycle domestic service as a flexible form of labour supplementation according to the individual needs of the farmstead.

[23] For Kaser, the very meaning of social structures created by the *Hufenverfassung* system and, consequently, the importance of the Hajnal-Mitterauer line rests primarily on dividing areas with impartible inheritance (*Anerbenrecht*) from those displaying partible inheritance systems. The original Latin term used to denote a hide on the area of Germanic settlement was *terra unius familiae* ("land of one family"), referring to a unit of land sufficient to support one family group. Interestingly, Bloch (Bloch 1943, 268–269) linked the great *Hufe* with the patriarchal 'great' family and concluded that the occupation of European central regions in the early centuries of the Germanic settlement must have been the work of patriarchal family of several generations and several collateral households living around a common hearth. See also Postan 1973, 16.

Both Mitterauer and Kaser maintained that the *Hufenverfassung* system was spread over part of other Eastern European territories due to the German colonisation movement of the Middle Ages (Mitterauer 1999, 210 ff.; Kaser 2001). Mitterauer, however, rightly took pains to delineate precisely the eastern boundary of this agricultural pattern. Drawing on the German literature on medieval colonisation and rural settlement patterns, he claimed the eastern border of the hide system was to be found in the Baltic provinces, the former East Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia and southern Poland, as well as in large parts of western Hungary, Lower Austria, Styria and Slovenia. The main point that should be emphasised in this context is that Mitterauer's description of the eastern extension of the *Hufen* system, with its characteristics of late marriage, simple household structure and diminished lineage, bears a striking resemblance to the Hajnal line. In the words of Mitterauer, "the extension of the Medieval colonization movement in Eastern Europe corresponds with the border which John Hajnal found for distribution of the *European Marriage Pattern* in 1965 in an obvious way" (Mitterauer 1994, 4; repeated in Mitterauer 1997, 40–41; Mitterauer 1999, 2010; also in Kaser 2000, 67). To the east of this region, it was argued, a sort of "transitional zone" became apparent, an area "in which the settlement pattern may not be exclusively defined by systematic village structures [inherent to the *Hufenverfassung*], but where they are very frequent. This particularly applies to large parts of the medieval kingdom of Poland. In the early modern period, methodical settlement in this region was intensified and partially extended beyond it, for example in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This East Central European zone of planned settlements marks the region that was successively penetrated by patterns of western agricultural form from the high Middle Ages up to the Early Modern period" (Mitterauer 1999, 210).

Mitterauer attributed the limited penetration of the *Hufen* system in Eastern Europe to differences between Eastern and Western Christianity. Homogenous social structures produced by the colonisation movement, he argued, "never went beyond the dividing line between the Western and Eastern Church. Also, the outposts of the colonisation only rarely went further than this border". It was only through the values of Western Christendom that a high marriage age and the overcoming of patrilineal principles of household formation was finally possible within the seigneurial framework. According to Mitterauer, this diverging effect of Western and Eastern Christendom is explained less by differences in family and marriage regulations between the two churches, as by the weaker institutional power of the Orthodox church to control the kinship customs and practices of the pre-Christian substratum (religiously motivated idea of lineage; the Levirate; ancestral worship) (Mitterauer 1994, 3, 11–12; Mitterauer 1996, 394–395; Mitterauer 2003a, 42–43; also Kaser 2000, 65, 69–75). Other factors responsible for sustaining the "non-Western-like" family and

kinship patterns east of the "transition zone" were the isolation with regard to transport, the low degree of urbanisation, the absence of feudal structures and the low penetration by state authorities (Mitterauer 1994).

While it is highly appealing from a theoretical perspective, the concept of the Hajnal-Mitterauer line has not yet been tested empirically with regard to the concerned territories. Although Mitterauer and Kaser offer convincing data corpora and analysis of Eastern European family patterns, with an emphasis on Austro-Hungarian and Bohemian data pools as well as in the Balkans, a much larger part of the supposed "transitional zone" – which spread across the historical Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – has not been equally represented in their analysis and available data (Ehmer 1991; Cerman 2001; Kaser 1997; Kaser 2000). In spite of the fact that Austrian scholars had a good empirical evidence of the variability of family systems in preindustrial Russia, their sense of the familial constitution of the Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian populations derives not from concrete emprical research on demographic patterns, but primarily from the German *Ostforschung* literature. This analysis stretches back almost more than half a century, and is largely based on the writings and research of W. Conze (Mitterauer 1999, 217 ff; Mitterauer and Kagan 1982; Cerman 2002).[24] Referring to the Commonwealth's eastern territories, Mitterauer translated Conze's arguments about differences between Lithuanian/Latvian and Slavonic (Belarusian) settlement and agrarian patterns into modern kinship and household structure terminology. While patterns prevalent among the former were supposed to lead to diminished lineage relationships and nuclear residential patterns among the peasantry, a historically widespread system of "large families" (*Grossfamilien*) based on the collective ownership of land and free divisibility of holdings in Belarus did not permit the concept of single-family farming based on *Hufe* to become widespread (Mitterauer 1999, 217–219).[25]

[24] Only five papers in Polish related to family history were available to the authors, and only one that actually contained a direct empirical investigation of family composition in some Polish territories; see Kaser 2002, 376. Kaser (Kaser 2000, 124) rightly refers to the only available published research on family structure in Lithuania by Višniauskaitė, with, however, no indication that the latter's findings and hypotheses undermine the very argument about Eastern European divergent family developments (Višniauskaitė's research is presented further in the main text).

[25] "The situation in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania after the introduction of the *Hufe* reform by King Sigismund August", Mitterauer concluded, "is a strong argument for the hypothesis that an interrelation exists between east colonisation and the development of the Hajnal line. The Hajnal line runs between the old Lithuanian settlement region and the formerly Rurikid princedoms in White Russia, which had come under Lithuanian rule. It thus corresponds to the deviation between areas of the Grand Duchy where the *Hufe* reform had been successfully introduced and those where this succeeded incompletely or not at all. The rules of household formation drawn up by Hajnal apply for these regions (…)" (Mitterauer 1999, 219).

Still, however, Mitterauer's and Kaser's concept of a transition zone between different family and kinship systems in East-Central Europe does not specify what sort of demographic and family phenomena, and in what proportions, researchers are likely to encounter within the transition areas. Thus, these phenomena should be investigated using "real" data from the concerned regions. More importantly, neither Mitterauer nor Kaser seem to be concerned with debates and controversies surrounding the topic of "German colonisation of the East," and all the related topics so essential to the work of Conze.[26] In addition, neither of them was in a position to verify the validity of Conze's empirical findings.

IV. RE-EXAMINING CONZE

Although a classic form of the three-field system based on hides was introduced into Lithuania as early as the middle of the 15th century, decisive steps to disseminate this method were first taken in mid-16th century (during the so-called "*voloka* reform"; Polish, *pomiara włóczna*). Conze is right in attributing to that agrarian change a decisive role in transforming the family and residence patterns of the East European peasantry. Many researchers, both before and after Conze, have suggested that the main effect of *pomiara* was the decline in "large, mutigenerational households." But, unlike in Mitterauer's contribution, this influence has never been elaborated by Eastern European scholars. Morzy argued that *pomiara* accelerated the already ongoing process of the individualisation of families (Morzy 1965, 122–123; also Kernazhytsky 1931, 123; Rawita-Gawroński 1904, 163; Lubomirski 1855, 220–221). Pochilevich reiterated that argument, but warned that the reform was not fully capable of eliminating joint families from the Belarusian landscape (Pochilevich 1957, 16, 27).

[26] However, as Piskorski put it recently with reference to mainstream historical works on the topic written between 1840–1970 by both Germans and the Poles, the "research on the medieval 'colonization of the east' is (…) a model example of utilitarian conceptions of the past, and is in this sense an excellent illustration of what historiography should not be". Typically, the German way of instrumentalising the "Medieval colonisation" was to argue that East-Central European lands were only able to develop at all from the 10th century onwards thanks to the achievements of German culture. "The arrival of numerous German settlers, importing this culture in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, enabled the countries of east central Europe to enter the family of 'civilized' states. They owed all their later successes to their embracing of German culture, and all their failures to their rejection of it" (Piskorski 2004, 323–325). Walter Kuhn, the author of a classic reference source for the history of German settlement in Central Europe – *Siedlungsgeschichte Oberschlesiens* (Würzburg, 1954), during the early 1940s used his extensive empirical knowledge of German linguistic enclaves in Galizia and Volhynia in resettlement actions in occupied Poland (Burleigh 1988, 106–107, 176–178).

What differentiates these scholars from Conze was their perception of the reform's spatial coverage. French argued authoritatively that "the uniformity with which the three-field system was introduced into Lithuania was remarkable, as was the wholesale nature of the reform. Arable and villages were transformed, in what must have been an upheaval of considerable scale (...). No less was the speed with which the reform was accomplished. By 1569, (...) the work was apparently complete in the three principal [ducal] provinces of Lithuania." He added that "the majority of church and noble landowners followed the royal example, with the consequence that the new regime was introduced over a wide region in a very brief period of time" (French 1970, 106, 118). Many other scholars have suggested that, in the second half of the 17th century, the reorganisation of open-field agriculture into 'włóka" (*voloka*, that is *manus*; hide; 33 *morgi,* or some 60 acres) was widespread in central and western Belarus (Picheta 1958, 228–242; Ochmański 1986, 163–165, 175–183, 187–195; Kozlovskij 1969, 43; Kozlovskij 1970, 209).

Indeed, the reform was not implemented equally easily, or to the same degree, everywhere in Belarus. Conze is certainly right in pinpointing difficulties that the reform's introduction faced in the Polessia region. However, it is difficult to escape the feeling that his arguments about the refusal of the Belarusians to accept the hide constitution represent fallacious testimony resulting from selective and biased treatment of archival resources.

The reform's implementation in Polessia was severely hindered, but this was essentially due to the region's harsh ecological conditions. French offers a reasonable explanation for why the redistribution of the peasant arable lands and their subdivision into three fields in 1557 failed in some dozens of villages in Polessia. "In those areas," he wrote, "swamps were extremely extensive, (...) and they covered many hundreds of square miles and the only dry sites for settlements and fields were tiny 'islets' of sand. Such hostile conditions completely frustrated the overseers; in these great swamps lay the 71 villages not reorganised. Their arable land was scattered about as of old in dozens of minute plots, perched on higher 'islets' of dry ground. In these villages the *dvorishche* remained as the unit of land-holding and the pre-reform scale of tax assessment was continued. Needless to say, in such conditions no attempt was made to establish demesne". Independent accounts of similar difficulties in Polessia have been given by other authors (French 1970, 115–116; French 1969a, 131; Kernazhytsky 1931, 73; Kozlovskij 1969, 43; Kozlovskij 1970, 209; Siekierski 1981; Kosman 1970).

Conze's claim that Belarusians refused to accept the hide constitution is essentially based on scanty evidence, such as a report of peasants' protests against the implementation of the new agrarian order in one district of north-eastern

Polessia (Bobruysk *starostvo*).[27] A more careful look at the circumstances prevailing in the area in question reveals, however, that the peasants' material and economic concerns, rather than their familial orientation, were decisive in the ongoing failure of the reform in that setting. The goal of the reform was a decisive redesign of the basic structure in the immediate environment of peasants, and it thus imposed strong coercive pressures on the villagers. The hide constitution not only forced them to abandon the arable pieces of land they had been cultivating for decades in favour of the new ones allocated to them by the supervisors, it also demanded that peasant houses and premises be relocated. The latter, understandably, implied the expenditure of enormous amounts of material and human resources, which had to be generated by individual families or domestic collectives (Kernazhytsky 1931, 89–90). Given such material and economic pressures, it is possible to imagine that the peasants' refusal to follow the new rules could have easily arisen regardless of concerns about intergenerational and kin co-residence.[28] Last but not least, the results of the peasant resistance in *Bobruyskie* could not change dramatically the villagers' post-reform residential patterns. In the 1930s, Kernzhytsky applied a formal typology of domestic groups to the listing of families, which was part of the area's inventory that was taken shortly after the reform had been fully implemented. He found that, in 1639, over 58% of all domestic groups were households of individual families (Kernazhytsky 1931, 126–133; French 1969a, 52).[29]

Another factor overlooked by Conze was the role of local agency, namely local landlords, in the reform process in a given place, and the flexible ways in which local estate managers and owners responded to the general patterns of the new order. There is abundant evidence suggesting that Eastern European landlords were customarily concerned with their peasants' residential arrangements. They often required the latter to be modified, and usually had the real power necessary to implement their wishes (Bieńkowski 1959, 69–70; Kapyski and Kapyski 1993, 44–45; Pawlik 1915, 48, 133–134; Łysiak 1965, 161–162). Estate instructions from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth suggest that, in all parts of its entire territory, the maintenance (or, if necessary, the restoration)

[27] Conze admitted himself that apart from Bobruysk starostvo cases of the peasants' open defense against the reform are not reported in the sources [sic!] (Conze 1940, 122).

[28] In fact, the reconstruction of many village sites in Bobruysk District was quite hampered and many villages remained 'as of old'. This happened, however, not necessarily due to the villagers' resistance, but more because of adverse ecological conditions (see French 1969a, 52–54).

[29] Using the 1639 cadaster, French estimated that only 6 out of at least 46 villages that belonged to the Bobruysk *starostvo* were not converted to the *voloka* system. Nevertheless, contrary to western Belarus, even in those settlements in Bobruysk District where the reform was implemented, a standard layout of the arable rearranged in three contiguous fields was only partially introduced, and in some villages fragmentation of arable differed little from the pre-reform pattern of scattered parcels (see French 1969b, 38–44, 55).

of tax-or labour-capable family units was part of the landlords' most explicit economic interests. At the same time, the reform created strong incentives for neolocal household formation among the subject farmers (Szołtysek and Zuber-Goldstein 2009). Usually, however, these "neolocal incentives from above" were subjected to an ecological sustainability test. This can be illustrated with several examples.

As early as during the first wave of the *voloka* reform in the southern or Polessian part of Belarus of 1557 (*Pinsk* starostvo), an interesting alteration in the general policy towards peasant residential rules can be observed. This aspect went unnoticed by Conze, despite his otherwise extensive use of the same archival material. As in many other places where *pomiara* was taking place, in the Polessia area surrounding the town of Pinsk, estate administrators relocated peasant families and domestic groups so as to create peasant landholdings equally equipped with manpower. Interestingly, after having faced a spatial pattern of highly dispersed arables in the Pinsk area (caused by the prevalence of swamps and marshes), the inspectors decided to follow the rule that each holding of an equal size of *voloka* should be cultivated either by a father with an adult (married) son, or by two married brothers (Kosman 1970, 132). This pattern of restructuring "from above" was responsible for sustaining a large number of multigenerational or otherwise joint-family households in that area. The cultural inclinations of the peasantry did not seem to play any role at all in this process.More generally, in Belarus, where the mid-17th-century wars caused severe population losses, and where a substantial amount of non-cultivated arable land existed until the very end of the 18th century, the serf-owners' perennial desire to repopulate deserted holdings on their estates by splitting up large farms and supporting individual families was often hindered by place-specific agricultural conditions. Despite the abundance of land which was suitable for re-cultivation by the rural classes, the scarcity of labour and the almost complete lack of a market for hired labor, coupled with the low levels of agricultural development typical of Belarus, made the effective multiplication of the numbers of labour-capable household units on the basis of nuclear households unlikely in the "east" (Szołtysek 2009, 81; also French 1969b, 46–48). Lithuanian-Belarusian landlords seemed to have been well aware that certain socioeconomic and ecological conditions imposed constraints on their otherwise more-or-less "western" economic orientation. The *Instructions* suggest that Belarusian seigneurs understood quite well that, given the poor agricultural conditions of Belarus and the often limited resources available for supporting individual families, a temporary co-residence of several (usually two) family units might help to prevent the creation of economically unviable households. "The estate manager should not allow family households to split", one of the *Instructions* stipulated, "unless there are two male adults in the sub-unit wishing to stay where it was before, and at least one adult son in the

branch is intending to become independent (...)". This is "because singletons [single householders] split between two households are likely to fall into poverty due to the lack of sufficient manpower" (Grodzienska Crown estate, 1777). Another *Instruction* provided even more details regarding such practices among the landowners: "(...) it is a duty of a peasant supervisor (*dziesiętnik*) to make sure that none of the peasant householders having only two persons capable of working the corvée ("osoby zgodne do roboty" - adults) will not split apart to occupy a separate dwelling, unless they have children sufficiently grown up to provide support in all household tasks" (Grodzienska Crown estate, 1777) (Pawlik 1915, quot. from 134, 167; also 47, 53, 277).[30]

Such a policy could have been effective enough to create a relatively high quota of extended and multiple-family households in Belarus. Reading *Instructions* and other archival materials of that time, one can easily get an impression of the landlords' persistent attempts to cope in a highly flexible way with Belarus' economic disparities relative to other parts of the Commonwealth (Szołtysek and Zuber-Goldstein 2009). The cultural or economic preferences of Belarusian peasants for any specific type of residence can hardly be detected from available sources. Łowmiański must have been right when he argued – in stark disagreement with Conze – that all differences in demographic, family and economic characteristics between the households of the Lithuanians and of the Slavs in the Grand Duchy can be satisfactory explained in purely economic terms. The ethno-cultural explanations suggested by Conze are too far-reaching, and do not seem to be justified.

One of the major problems with Conze's reasoning regarding Lithuanian and Belarusian demographic regimes was that it never operated with a precise typology of family or households arrangements. This is not an unusual situation, even with regards to more contemporary investigations on familial organisation of the inhabitants of the historical Polish Commonwealth. For instance, Soviet scholars who attempted in the second half of the 20th century to reconstruct the agrarian regimes and the material conditions of the lives of the peasantry on its eastern fringes either did not touch upon the issue of family systems at all, or refrained from exploring the question after few cursory remarks (Guldon and Krikun 1979, 181–186; Krykun 1977, 92–103). Interestingly enough, Pochilevich argued that what characterised the Belarusian peasantry was the "*balshoya zlozhonaya semya*" (large joint family) made up of both distant relatives and unrelated persons. According to Pochilevich, families of this type

[30] Since landlords made an effort to stipulate rules prohibiting separation of single nuclei, there must have been a peasant practice (or an inclination) favouring splitting up and household independence that would have encouraged such laws to be put forward. If that had been the case, then we will have proof of the existence of "atomistic" principles of household organisation among the population traditionally thought to have adhered to collectivism and familism. See Verdon 1998.

supposedly expanded even to the size of a tiny village ("*dworzyszcza*"), remaining organised on a scheme of land and duty sharing. Up until the mid-16th century, the existence of such large families, often comprising 10 to 20 males, was necessitated by labour requirements inherent to the situation of peasants occupying large holdings (one *voloka*). Only during the second half of the century did family arrangements of this sort gave way to patterns of small individual families. By the mid-17th century, large joint families were most likely already vanishing from Belarus, except from its most eastern part, where the process unfolded with up to a century of delay (Pochilevich 1952, 338, 386–87; Pochilevich 1957, 15, 27; Pochilevich 1958, 745; Pochilevich 1973, 63; also Morzy 1965, 122–123). However, Pochilevich's reasoning, like that of many others, suffered from relying on circumstantial and non-systematic evidence, and therefore can be of little help to us in investigating the validity of Conze's claims.

However, with recourse to estate inventories from various areas of ethnic Lithuania from the period between the 16th and the end of the 19th centuries (overall, data for 1,083 households were used), Višniauskaitė demonstrated that the "grand indissoluble family" (*bolschoya nerazdelennaia semya*), a Russian term which is equivalent the "joint family" term commonly used in the West did not constitute a dominant household form in any of the time periods under scrutiny (Višniauskaitė 1964). By transposing the Lithuanian data from 1594–1700 onto Laslett's typology, we get the percentage of simple households estimated at 81%, with only a very slight contribution of multiple-family domestic groups, valued at 6.9%.[31] As Višniauskaitė puts it, this highly nuclear family system was a direct consequence of two connected processes: the decomposition of the lineage relationship, which affected the Balts as early as in the 13th and 14th centuries, and the marked decline in family communes (*semeyna obschina*) that followed. According to Višniauskaitė, both of these processes were additionally strengthened by the agrarian reforms of the mid-16th century, which Conze, Mitterauer and Kaser were all concerned with. Moreover, she notes that the later periods–especially the 18th century, which brought about a significant increase in peasant obligations due to manorialism and the compulsory labour it inflicted upon the peasants–led to a drastic rise in the number of multiple family households in Lithuania: between 1700 and 1800 they already constituted 33% of all domestic units. Following this thread, the change in residential patterns of the Lithuanian peasantry was supposedly caused by economic factors, such as the accumulation of family labour on the holding. The latter tendency acquired the status of the most significant local familial strategies, which brought forth the imposition of restraints on neolocal household

[31] Aggregated data for 15 estates with 791 households (see Višniauskaitė 1964, 8–12).

formation. This, in turn, meant that the division of larger household communes became less frequent (Višniauskaitė 1964, 4–5).

What may present itself as a perfect validation of Conze's notion of the specificity of the Lithuanian demographic and familial conduit is actually contradicted by similar evidence from various Belarusian territories. Zinovy and Boris Kopyski processed data for 252 settlements, for which the estate inventories ascertained kin relations between co-residing males (5,663 households or *dyms*). They concluded that, on average, one household in the territories under scrutiny comprised no more than 1.2 marital-family units. Moreover, 85.6% (4,741) of the total households had only one such a unit (including, potentially, some extended coresident relatives), and the remaining 14.4% were of the joint type. Out of the latter, 745 households (10.6% of the total number) contained two small families co-residing, whereas only 266 cases (3.8%) consisted of three and more family units. In line with Višniauskaitė's assertions pertaining to Lithuania proper, Kopyskis also argued that in Belarus the transition from the 16th to the 17th centuries was marked by an increasing simplification of peasant residential patterns. It is generally acknowledged that, between the end of the 16th and the mid-17th centuries, one-family households came to make up the majority of domestic units throughout the Belarusian territory (Kapyski and Kapyski 1993, 43).

V. Golubev, in turn, has estimated somewhat smaller figures. True, he saw Belarusian landlords of the second half of the 16th century as actively pursuing the process of splitting multiple-family units into individual households (Golubev 1992, 63), a phenomenon Conze also mentioned. By the end of the century, along with the introduction of peasant compulsory labour within the manorial system, individual families operating on one holding started to play a decisive role in Belarus. However, according to Golubev's estimations based on the inventories of church estates (1,700 peasant domestic units), only 73% of all households consisted of individual families (some of which may have actually contained individual extended relatives). The share of the latter would, however, decline on a trajectory of movement to the east of Belarus (only 46.5% of total households in eastern Belarus) (Golubev 1992, 88).

V. Nosevich, who analysed micro-census data for several communities of central Belarus (north from the city of Minsk) between the mid-16th century and the 1850s, went even further. He asserted that, at least according to the 16th-century data, there was no reason to draw a sharp distinction between domestic group structures in Eastern and Western Europe. With recourse to estate inventories, Nosevich demonstrated that nuclear family households (heads living with or without sons) dominated in Belarus between 1545 and 1596 (between 70% and 89% of total households), whereas in some places, such a pattern developed even before the great agrarian change brought about by the *voloka* reform (Nosevich 2004, 81–87). However, in accordance with the earlier

framework put forth by Višniauskaitė, he also pointed out the emergence of a more distinct and more complex family pattern in central Belarus during the 18th and the 19th centuries, linking it to the gradual increase in feudal obligations imposed on the peasantry by the landlords (Nosevich 2004, 157–176). Even so, however, over almost the entire 18th century, as long as agricultural population in Belarus remained relatively free from the most exploitative forms of serfdom control, it followed a rather moderate pattern of household complexity. Towards the end of the 18th century, particularly after the annexation of Belarus-Lithuania by the Russian Empire, the family pattern in Belarus gradually transformed into more communal forms where the share of multiple families was significantly above 50%. It was this 19th-century phenomenon, but not its various antecedents, that made the distinction between family structures in Eastern and Western Europe so attractive to Western scholars (Nosevich 2007).[32]

The above-mentioned studies are certainly not free of drawbacks, and the data they present should be accepted with certain limitations.[33] However they surpass Conze's contributions in several respects, such as data collection or geo-spatial awareness. This is why we argue that they can be preliminarily taken as refuting Conze's claims regarding the persistence of extended family predominance across early modern Belarus.

Another drawback inherent in Conze's homogenising approach to the Belarusian family system was that he neglected the region's internal demographic variation. This problem can now be elaborated by referring to more reliable statistical information on household composition and structure, which is available from an unprecedented collection of historical household listings for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the 1790s. The statistics for the Lithuanian-Belarusian territories used in this subsection derive from the Russian fifth "soul revision" of 1795, or micro-censuses listing all individuals by residential units.[34]

[32] There have only been a handful of studies for Russia, that together suggest substantial variation in household patterns within Russia in the cross-section, as well as change over time (Polla 2006, 2007; Mironov and Eklof 2000, vol. 1, 130–131.

[33] In the estate inventories of Lithuania-Belarus of that time, single widows and widowers in the population, and sometimes even retired parents, were frequently not registered.

[34] Designed as periodic tax censuses to be used by the central government to assess the poll tax to which all male peasants in Russia were liable, they were drawn on the eastern outskirts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth first in 1782, after the annexion of these territories a decade earlier. However, it was not before 1795 when the first comprehensive survey has been conducted to cover the Belarussian heartland of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania after the second partition of Poland. However, the character of the 1795 Belarussian censuses cannot be simply equated with other Russian "soul revisions" discussed so far in the literature (e.g. Dennison 2003, 35–41). All available evidence suggests that in the 1795 Belarussian revision the definition of the household was much closer to the traditional Polish

This body of data forms a part of a much larger data collection designed to enable the analysis of household structure and composition of communities located both west and east of Hajnal's and Mitterauer's lines (Map 1)[35]. More than 90% of those listings come from the period 1766–1799, while all precede the abolition of serfdom in the territories in question. If reference were made to historic Polish boundaries just before 1772, then the 234 parishes would form a long belt spread over the eastern parts of Prussian Silesia (reg. 7) and the western fringes of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (regions 1 to 5). The coverage would then run through the western outskirts of the province of Lesser Poland (reg. 6) and stretch in the eastern direction towards the historic area of Red Ruthenia (reg. 8), central (Minskie voivodship) and southern Belarus (Polessia region) (reg. 11N and 11S respectively), and, finally, towards present-day western Ukraine (reg. 9 and 10).

concept than to the official Russian principles of taxation (e.g. the population was enumerated by residential groups that were classed by 'houses' or 'huts' (Polish *dom*; *chałupa*) in the Polish version of the revisions (see more in Szołtysek 2008a, 228–229). The data comes from National Historical Archives of Belarus in Minsk (microfilms in the possession of Family History Library, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA, were used). The earlier versions of the database considered here have so far become the basis for several analytical studies in international and Polish literature. Therefore, at this point we might omit the majority of methodological and source-related issues, as well as socio-economic characteristics of the investigated communities, since the above-mentioned studies have already covered them exhaustingly. See Szołtysek 2008a, 226–236; Szołtysek 2008b, 391–397.

[35] Since the publication of early results in 2008, the corpus of census micro-data for the Lithuanian-Belarussian territories was extended from 1259 to 7262 households leading to a change in the grouping of regions (comp. Szołtysek 2008a, 2008b). Acquisition of data from a random sample of 19 parishes from the Żytomierski district in the former Kiev voivodeship in northern Ukraine (a total of 2100 households) has in turn enriched the spatial distribution of objects in the south-east direction (the former 'middle-east cluster'). In the present analysis, however, the Ukrainian data play but a secondary role.



Source: *CEURFAMFORM* Project Database. Reference is made to historic boundaries of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth before 1772 and its administrative divisions into voivodships. West of the 'line': 87 parishes, 11.638 households, population of 66.571 persons. East of the 'line': 149 parishes (or estates), 15.014 households, population of 89.236 persons. Region 11N (Vilayka, Minsk, Slutsk districts of Belarus): 37 estates, 3.378 households, population of 19.146 persons. Region 11S (Polessia; David-Gorodok, Mozyr, Bobruysk districts of Belarus): 42 estates, 3.884 households, population of 25.332 persons. (Map drawn up by M. Szołtysek).

Map 1

Spatial distribution of data within Poland-Lithuania (ca. 1772), and the supposed division of family systems in East-Central Europe, late eighteenth century

In our first exercise we used a very simple indicator (the relationship between the proportion of simple households and the proportion of multiple-family households) to plot the distribution of different family patterns among

location points west and east of Hajnal's line (Figure 1). Contrary to the highly condensed distribution of score points for communities located to the west of the line, the east reveals striking diversity in the arrangement of the values of the selected variables. Although we may agree that a relatively homogenous pattern of nuclear household structure existed west of the supposed transition line, to claim that a similar uniformity in living arrangements existed for the eastern areas would be entirely misleading. Approximately one third of the communities from the east revealed compositional characteristics more like the western pattern, and their substantial number would probably be undistinguishable from the latter in structural terms. Others, however, leaned towards a strikingly different direction. Still, households in the eastern territories were generally of a more complex structure than those in western Poland.



Source: *CEURFAMFORM* Project Database. Data as in Map 1.

Figure 1
Proportion of simple households related to the proportion of multiple-family households West and East of the Hajnal line in East-Central Europe, late eighteenth century

In order to remove the effects brought into Figure 1 through the data on Ukrainian and Red Ruthenian communities, we repeated the same exercise with Belarusian and western data alone (Figure 2). The close resemblance of some eastern and western communities observed previously has now disappeared: The majority of locations in Belarus exhibited more complex patterns of household structure than the west. However, the basic pattern of large-scale dispersion has been retained for Belarus. This high variability in the share of nuclear and multiple households suggests that those 90 Belarusian communities represented in Figure 2 varied enormously in their families' propensity towards different types of residence. The steady and even gradient of the value of the two variables between the extreme poles on the scale (from some 60%–70% of nuclear households and 15%–25% of multiple ones, to the absolute domination of joint units with only a 20% share of simple domestic groups), makes it very plain how inappropriate it would be to attribute one common family system to late 18th-century Belarus. This argument holds true even if Belarussian households were generally more complex than in the western part of Poland-Lithuania.



Source: *CEURFAMFORM* Project Database. Data as in Map 1.

Figure 2
Proportion of simple households related to the proportion of multiple-family households West of the Hajnal line in East-Central Europe and in Belarus, late eighteenth century

Indeed, additional statistical experiments performed on the 1795 micro-censuses corroborate that picture. The results of analysis of variance and pair-wise multiple comparison procedures revealed significant differences on six out of eight selected variables between northern and southern Belarus (regions 11N and 11S respectively) (Table 1).[36] This suggests that two distinct family systems existed in northern and southern Belarus. More careful comparison of statistics on household and individual level variables for those two regional patterns would be meaningful (Table 2).[37]

[36] On multiple comparisons using the *Holm-Sidak* method see Westfall et al 1999, 31.

[37] The socio-economic distinctiveness of Polessia (*Bobrujski*, *Mozyrski* and *Dawidgrodzki* districts of the region "11S" in the *CEURFAMFORM* database used here) has been receiving continual attention from scholars, researchers and authors who have all pointed out variations in the range, scope and consequences of the *voloka* reform, as well as

Table 1

Results of pairwise multiple comparison (the Holm-Sidak method) for two Belarusian regions (11N and 11S), 1795

Factor	Diff of Means	t	Unadjusted P	Critical Level	Significant?
% nuclear households	13,852	5,397	0,000000274	0,007	**Yes**
% multiple households (overall)	20,23	7,352	1,38E-11	0,006	**Yes**
% 'zadruga'-like multiple households	10,122	5,819	3,73E-08	0,006	**Yes**
% males ever married (20–29)	25,331	7,709	2,39E-12	0,005	**Yes**
% females ever married (20–29)	7,564	1,912	0,058	0,009	No
% CFUs in multiple hhs	20,709	7,165	3,79E-11	0,006	**Yes**
Coresident kin as % of all household members	7,618	5,429	0,000000236	0,007	**Yes**
% households with servants	2,713	2,38	0,0187	0,013	No

Overall significance level = 0,05.

Source: *CEURFAMFORM* Project Database. Data as in Map 1. (Micro-censuses for some estates had to be excluded as not suitable for reliable estimations).

'Nuclear' and 'multiple' households refer to household types 3a-3d and 5a-5f respectively of the Hammel-Laslett scheme (see Hammel and Laslett 1874, 73–109).

The 'zadruga'-like multiple households= households with secondary unit(s) of sibling(s) or other lateral kin disposed sideways from head (with or without head's parental generation), of which some may have their own downward extension, plus those with widowed heads co-residing with at least two conjugal family units of the offspring, siblings, or grandchildren on one level.

CFU= conjugal family unit (marital couple with or without children; lone parent with a child).

"Ever married" persons were considered those living in conjugal relationship, widowed or – in case of unspecified marital status – those co-residing with at least one child.

First, the revealed regionalisation partly corroborates Conze's insights into family patterns in historic Belarus. Both in his accounts, as well as according to the results produced by our experiments, the region where family households were most densely inhabited by co-resident kin was Polessia (reg. 11S). In this area, the mean household size was close to 6.5 persons, but almost a quarter of the whole population lived in domestic groups consisting of 10 persons or more. Out of almost 4,000 households, less than 35% had a simple structure, whereas more than half of them were multi-generational, multiple-family do-

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the area's distinct environmental characteristics. The cultural autonomy of Polessia has been advocated by Jeleńska 1891, 290–331, 479–520; Rawita-Gawroński 1904; Dovnar-Zapolsky 1909[1897]; Bondarczyk et al. 1987; Obrębski 2007.

mestic groups. All in all, 67% of the total population in the Polessian sample lived in multiple-family households in the census year.

Table 2

Summary characteristics of family systems: southern (Polessia) and northern Belarus from 1795 compared

	Polessia (region 11S)	Central Belarus (region 11N)
Mean household size	6.42 (6.58)	5.46 (5.69)
Mean houseful size (incl. lodgers)	6.51 (6.69)	5.69 (5.97)
% population in households ≥ 10	24.6	12
% population in multiple family households	67.7	41.4
% nuclear households	33.9	50
% extended households	10.9	16.4
% multiple-family households	54.6	31.1
CFU per one household (mean)	2.1	1.5
% hhs with CFUs of 2+	54.8	31.3
Offspring per household (mean)	2.34 (2.51)	2.26 (2.44)
Relatives per 100 households	331	215
Coresident kin as % of total population	32.7	25.6
% households with servants	1.7	3.7
Servants as % of total population	0.2	0.8

Source: *CEURFAMFORM* Project Database. Data as in Map 1. (Micro-censuses for some estates had to be excluded as not suitable for reliable estimations).

'Nuclear' and 'multiple' households, as well as CFU (conjugal family unit) defined as in table 1.

Values in brackets refer to estimates adjusted after the exclusion of parishes with suspected underregistration of population aged 0–14.

Polessia can, however, by no means be considered representative of the whole of Belarus, and its peculiarity extended much beyond the specific unfavourable ecological conditions that prevailed in this remote area (see above). Not surprisingly, areas located more to the north, while still confined to Belarusian (or, East-Slavic, to be on safer ground) ethnic territories, displayed decidedly different family patterns. Data referring to the Minsk, Vileyka, Nowogrodek and Sluck districts of central Belarus (reg. 11N) all point to visibly more moderate levels of kin-related household complexity. In those areas, half of all households in the census year were of a simple structure, and the share of multi-generational units was nearly 50% smaller than in Polessia. The percentage of the population living in particularly large households was also visibly smaller, making up only half the proportion seen in southern Belarus. Living in a multiple-family environment was significantly less widespread in the centre, where it was experienced by only slightly more than 40% of all

persons registered in the census. All in all, although levels of household complexity in central Belarus unquestionably remained far above those typical for Western European societies, they still differ from the patterns seen in the southern, Polessian part of the region. Beyond any doubt, these non-negligible differences in the numerical value of household- and individual level variables point to the existence of different family systems in historic Belarus.[38]

The standardised form in which the data on household structure and composition are presented in Table 2 makes them amenable to cross-regional comparisons at least to some extent. The issue of supposed differences in household patterns between Lithuanians and Belarusians has been already touched upon in the previous sections. Here, our intention is to extend comparative procedures so as to include other representatives of the Baltic ethnic groups.

Table 3
Belarusian and the Baltic household structure in comparison

Household type	REGION or settlement						
	Central Belarus (reg 11N), 1795	Polessia (reg. 11S), 1795	Urvaste, Estonia, 1752	Urvaste, Estonia, 1797	Vändra, Estonia, 1683	Karuse, Estonia, 1782	17 Couralnd estates (Latvia), 1797
Solitaries	1.1	0.2	0	2.7	3.8	0	–
No family	1,3	0.4	0.1	0.6	0.7	0	–
Simple households	50.0	33.9	30.9	41.2	65.2	48.0	33.3
Extended household	16.4	10.9	8.3	15.4	6.8	13.2	8.3
Multiple-family households	31.1	54.6	59.6	39.9	23.5	38.8	58.3

Hammel-Laslett scheme.

Source: two Belarusian regions - *CEURFAMFORM* Project Database (data as in Map 1); Urvaste – Waris 2004, 348; Karuse and Vändra – Palli 1983, 211–215; 17 Kurland estates – Plakans 1975, 644.

In Table 3, the available data related to household typology in the Baltic are compared with two Belarusian files. The results are striking, but not surprising. No clear-cut differences between Slavic and non-Slavic households patterns, as postulated by Conze, can be detected in the data covering the 17th and 18th cen-

[38] Other household related variables also exhibited significant variation throughout historical Belarus. Mean household size, for example, ranged enormously from 4.3 persons per household to 8.8 persons among 90 Belarusian locations. Median MHS was 6.3 persons per household, Q_1 (the lower quartile) equals 5.2, and Q_3 (upper quartile) was 7.

turies. This evidence of moderate household complexity in central Belarus is generally similar to data from two Estonian localities of the late 18th century. However, both in Urvaste in 1797, as well as in Karuse some 20 years earlier, shares of multigenerational households always exceeded the respective proportions of domestic groups in central Belarus. Seemingly, those two Estonian localities exhibited household systems that lean more towards kin-co-residence than was the case among Belarusian Slavs. This pattern is illustrated to an even greater extent by the comparison of Slavic data with mid-18th-century data from Urvaste, and with Courland files from 1797. Again, household complexity (proportions of multigenerational domestic units), is higher in the latter two files than in Belarus, regardless of whether the northern or southern parts of the latter region are compared. The complexity of the Polessian family pattern, so distinct within Belarus of the 18th century, is very much paralleled (or even exceeded) by data from Baltic areas.[39]

We can argue that, even though Cozne rightly attributed a strong propensity towards co-residence with kin to the Polessian part of Belarus, he still wrongly assumed that pattern to be very different from tendencies observed among the Balts.

V. CONCLUSION

Regardless of the reception of this fact among academically active demographic *mainstream*, the last two decades were marked by questioning the view according to which demography – as a sub-discipline of social sciences – represented a purely value-free science, impervious to processes of ideological influence, politicization or ethnocentrism. A turn to epistemological reflection occurred which – stimulated today by most scholars engaged in anthropological demography and 'critical demography' – allowed to shed light on extra-scientific factors involved in the production of demographic knowledge, leading eventually to the placement of demographic studies within specific power relations (Hodgson 1983; Szreter 1993; Greenhalgh 1996; Riley 1999; Horton

[39] Comparing means for larger groupings with means from single communities may be misleading, however. Standard deviations for proportions of multiple-family households in Belarussian regions tell us very clearly that in none of them are the various examples tightly clustered around the mean (reg. 11N = 16.2; reg. 11S = 13.9). However, 95% confidence intervals suggest that in central Belarus, the probability of observing a share of multiple-family households outside the confidence limits of 29.7 and 38.2 was less than 0.05. Respective data for Polesia were 50.4 and 58.1. This suggests that, even if during various sampling procedures the excess of complexity in the Baltic relative to the Belarusian settlement locations were to diminish, an overall similarity of Slavic and non-Slavic patterns would be retained.

1999; Riley and McCarthy 2003, esp. 61–80; Szreter, Sholkamy, and Dharmalingam 2004, 3–33; Thornton 2005; Melegh 2006).

Sociological and demographic studies of the family have also been exposed to the threats of instrumentalisation. F. Le Play's or W. Riehel's classic works, regarded today as milestones in the development of sociological discourse of the family could not be distilled from their authors' value systems, and were actually more than purely scientific observations and recordings of social facts – they constituted the weapon which facilitated the fight for a subjectively desired social order (Adamovsky 2003, 424–425; Mogey 1955, 314; Mogey 1957, 310–315; Schlumbohm 2009, 81–85)[40].

Studies of the Balkan family illustrated a unique variant of this approach, with their almost uniform value orientation and ideology meant to provide empirical material with which to prove the existence of ancient and distinguished communal family forms among one or another ethnic or national group, for one or another political goal (Rihtman-Auguštin 2004, 23 ff.; Todorova 1989 , 47; Kaser 2004; Vitorelli 2002).[41]

Some of the more modern models on European family systems have also suffered from similar entanglements. Hajnal and Laslett's debate on the geography of family forms of historical Europe – no matter how quantative and supposedly objective terminology they applied – did not pertain to some marginal aspect of 'European identity,' but rather to issues of major significance for determining who and under what conditions belonged or, conversely, did not belong to Europe. Historical demographers – by linking individualization and rationalization of an individual to specific demographic conditions of the western part of the continent and seeing them as basic causal factors of modernization – tended to perpetuate the stereotype of familistic, changeless societies of the European East. This theme would often be supported with the notion of a 'comparative backwardness' of the region seen to 'lag behind' in its lack of urbanization, industrialization and modernization processes (Hajnal 1965, 131; Laslett 1983, 558–559; Schofield 1989, 284).[42] It comes as no surprise then that such approaches have recently been facing gradually more severe criticism (Sovič 2008; Szołtysek 2005, 2008a; Todorova 1996; also Dennison and Carus 2003).

[40] Both Le Play and his peer W. Riehl were strongly affected by the intellectual, social and political context of their times. The influence often surfaced in the way the two of them conceptualized the object of their studies. Both regarded family in general and its multigenerational form in particular as a condition necessary for social stabilization and integration thanks to which societal habits and behavioural norms could be passed from one generation to the next. In their authors' designs, the studies were supposed to provide a viable programme of social restoration/rejuvenation in light of the conservatives' heated debates on the evolving condition of 19th century family.

[41] On similar discussion within Japanese context, see Ochiai 2000.

[42] Critically on this topic: Melegh 2006, 69–71; Szołtysek 2007.

Owing to its intellectual and ideological roots, Conze's work comes across as a particularly blatant example of political instrumentalisation first of the past and then also of historical research (similarly in: Ehmer 2000, 17). Conze's scientific insights continue to serve in today's historical-demographic literature as an essential building block of the argument that asserts the validity and persistence of the East-West differentials in family systems in East-Central Europe. Our attempt at merging intellectual history with historical-demographic investigation suggests that such a practice should be viewed as highly problematic from a scientific perspective. The re-examination of *Agrarverfassung und Bevölkerung* in light of other existing theories of spatial patterns of family in Eastern Europe and available qualitative and quantitative evidence has revealed serious shortcomings in Conze's analysis. These problems result from making unwarranted inferences based on non-representative and circumstantial evidence, which derive from Conze's underlying motivation to identify German-Slavic differences. The use of Conze's work in contemporary historical-demographic research must be meticulously revised, if not entirely abandoned. Referring to Conze's supposed "empirical" findings are not conclusive, but perpetuate certain stereotypes of Slavic populations and consolidates an opaque understanding of the East-West differentials in historical family forms.

Modern social science history and historical demography related to the Eastern European space (but not only, of course) should remain particularly cautious when trying to accommodate highly ideological and political works of the 1920s and 1930s into their corpus of knowledge. Many of those works, and Conze's pre-1945 contributions, serve as excellent examples of studies that hardly meet the methodological requirements of modern social science, especially when they generalise from single case studies. Failure to exclude these works may result in extravagant extrapolations from single cases or other non-representative datasets that would continue to foster tacit assumptions about European families in the past.

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FAMILY COMPOSITION AND REMARRIAGE IN RURAL TRANSYLVANIA, 1838–1910[1]

LEVENTE PAKOT[2]

ABSTRACT: *Analysis of remarriage in 19th century Transylvania is an unexploited research topic. The ethnical and religious diversity of the population, as well as the physical geographical variety and economic situation of the region allow a multi-perspective, comparative analysis of family and population history. Present paper explores the impact of demographic factors and family composition on widowhood and remarriage in two typical mountain villages in Szeklerland (in present-day Romania), between 1838 and 1910. By using micro-level data based on family reconstitutions we found evidence of a significant role of family composition concerning the decision to remarry for both widows and widowers. The results of multivariate analysis show that the age entering widowhood was a key-element for both widows and widowers as the probability of remarrying declined in parallel with the growing age at dissolution of marriage. The variables concerning family composition (the number, age, and sex of the children living in the families) influenced the chance of remarrying. Both in the case of widows and widowers, the presence of children under age 12 increased the chance of remarrying. At the same time, the presence of an adult son in the family decreased the chance of the remarriages of widows because of the problems related to inheritance.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The death of a spouse used to change the everyday life of the surviving household members fundamentally.[3] The widowed person lost some of the material (property and income), emotional (mutual communication and empathy) and social support (social network and status), as well as potential help

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[3] For the latest historical demographic and family history approach on widowhood and loss of parents, see Derosas and Oris 2002.

with household chores and child raising that marriage had provided for them (Dribe 2007). The surviving spouse had to decide how to live after loosing the partner. Re-marriage was one of the possible options.[4]

However, the intention to remarry was not sufficient to conclude another marriage. It was also important whether the widow(er) was considered as an appropriate partner by their environment. Their situation was characterised by numerous disadvantages (their age and children from the first marriage) and also some advantages if they were property owners and already had a house, a farm and some income.

Historically legal regulations, cultural attitudes, specific social circumstances and local marriage markets could also influence the decision to remarry. The options of widow(er)s were highly dependent upon gender, age, socio-economic status and household composition.

Remarriage has been a somewhat neglected field of family and population history. The marriage model of John Hajnal (1965) considered only the first marriage and remarriage can be regarded as a missing variable of this model (Saito 2005: 174). Co-operation between historical demographers and family historians was facilitated by a conference about this topic in 1981 (Dupâquier et al. 1981; Oris 2003). Authors[5] defined gender and age as the most important factors of remarriage. Later, new aspects entered analyses such as financial status, inheritance, autonomy of women and the role of family systems.[6] More recently scholars apply multivariate statistical methods in the investigation of factors influencing remarriage (complexity of the household, presence of children etc.).[7]

Analysis of remarriage in 19th century Transylvania is an unexploited research topic. The ethnical and religious diversity of the population, as well as the physical geographical variety and economic situation of the region allow a multi-perspective, comparative analysis of family and population history. Present paper focuses on remarriage in two typical mountain villages in Szekler-

[4] By analysing village communities in Sweden, Martin Dribe and his fellow researchers enumerated many alternatives after widowhood: a) individual management of the household with the support of family members or individuals outside the family; b) re-marriage to maintain the continuity of the household; c) moving to a household headed by own child or his/her spouse; d) moving to a household headed by someone else; e) leaving the village. The authors consider these choices as strategies of widows and widowers to survive the difficult life conditions caused by spousal death (Dribe, Lundh and Nystedt 2007).

[5] Dupâquier 1981; reviewed by Watkins 1983.

[6] For a detailed review of the literature on remarriage, see Oris and Ochiai 2002: 63–79.

[7] Some of the latest micro historical and quantitative approaches on remarriage: Breschi and Manfredini 2007; Breschi et al. 2009; Dribe, Lundh and Nystedt 2007; Kurosu 2007a; Kurosu 2007b; Kurosu et al. 2008; Lundh 2007; McQuillan 2003; Moring 2002a; Moring 2002b; Van Poppel 1995; Van Poppel 1998.

land (in present-day Romania), Szentegyházasfalva[8] and Kápolnásfalva[9], between 1838 and 1910. The aim of the study is to identify the demographic and family factors of remarriage.

In Transylvania, there are very few data available on remarriage from the period before official statistics. After the Austrian-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, statistical recording became continuous, thus enabling the identification of local remarriage patterns (Faragó 2000). However, the available descriptive and aggregated data do not allow the investigation of factors that influence remarriage. Recent international studies recognised the necessity of individual longitudinal data for analysing the impact of family factors on remarriage.

The present paper is based on the analysis of parish registers and applies the method of family reconstitution. Family reconstitution has been criticised by numerous scholars in the last decades (Ruggles 1992; Kasakoff and Adams 1995). However, international examples demonstrate that family reconstitution data allow the use of multivariable statistical methods (Gutmann and Alter 1993). Recent studies have convincingly demonstrated that family reconstitution data can be successfully applied in the investigation of remarriage (Knodel 1988; Knodel and Lynch 1985; McQuillan 2003).

The first part of the paper provides descriptive statistics. We describe the marriage market, the frequency of widowhood by age, the change of remarriage propensity in time and by age, and gender differences. The second part of the paper presents event history or hazard models in order to explain remarriage. The third and last part includes descriptive statistics again to describe the main characteristics of the new spouses.

2. THE COMMUNITIES: SZENTEGYHÁZASFALVA AND KÁPOLNÁSFALVA, 1838–1910

Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva are neighbouring settlements. They are located along the southern skirts of Harghita Mountains, in the eastern part of Inner Transylvania, present-day Romania, at about 860 metres above sea level. The territory belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy during the investigated period. The villages lay on the frontier, far from the economic centres of Transylvania. Their total population reached 4,000 in the 1900s. The majority of their inhabitants belonged to the Roman Catholic Church. Due to their geographical proximity (2 km) and the joint privileges received from the Princes of Transylva-

[8] In Romanian: Vlăhița.
[9] In Romanian: Căpâlnița.

nia, the history of the two villages was closely interlocked: they formed one parish until 1838 and one administrative unit until 1876.[10]

The discovery of iron ore sites close to the villages and the opening of mines were important events in the 19th century history of the two settlements. An industrial plant, Szentkeresztbánya was founded a few kilometres away from the villages in the 1850s, which provided the opportunity for the locals to secure some extra income. Due to contemporary financial and infrastructural conditions, mining remained a small-scale enterprise.

The majority of villagers were smallholders, and their living was provided by lumbering and woodwork in the communally owned woods and extensive animal husbandry. Timbering and woodwork was carried out within a cottage industrial framework that required the close cooperation of related families. The number of water-driven sawmills operated by siblings or close relatives reached 100 according to the cadastre of 1909 (Sándor 1998; Molnár 1974). The economic development of Inner Transylvania raised the demand for woodenware. Timber used in construction and agriculture was transported in carriages by male family members towards the agriculturally more developed and more urbanised Southern Transylvanian regions.

Besides their geographic and economic conditions, the population of the settlements was characterised by particular patterns of demographic behaviour (Table 1). Apart from the dynamic increase of the population and its young age structure, the common demographic characteristics of the two villages included relatively high fertility, low emigration and relatively high infant and child mortality (Pakot 2003; Pakot 2008; Őri and Pakot 2009). Between 1786 and 1869, the population doubled. After 1869, epidemics (cholera in 1873) and increased infant and child mortality in the 1870s and 1880s slowed down this increase, however, a significant increase took place around the turn of the century. An important characteristic of demographic behaviour was universal and early marriage. Average age at first marriage was 20–21 years for females and 25–27 years for males. The ratio of unmarried people among the old was very low. Strict religious and community regulations forbade divorce.[11] The influence of the Roman Catholic Church was present in other aspects of everyday life too.[12]

[10] For a history of the privileges of the communities, see Herman 1999; for a detailed account of public administration changes and the process of losing the privileges in the 1870s, see Pál 2003.

[11] In the 19th century, we found only four married couples who supposedly divorced.

[12] In a subregional or regional perspective, the denominational diversity of the county's villages may influence the variety of marriage regulations. Regulation on divorce is a good example: the Roman Catholic Church forbade it, whereas Protestant Churches were more permissive. Therefore, divorce was a tolerated – although not widely spread – practice in Protestant villages of the county. For more information on the institution of divorce and the regulation on divorce under 19th century Reformed Church of Transylvania, see Kolumbán 2009.



Map 1
Map of the area under study

Household structure was mainly characterised by a stem family system, in which one child – generally one of the adult sons – remained with the old parents and lived there with his wife after getting married. However, nuclear families were the most common household type due to high adult and old age mortality. Due to the dominant economic role of men, marriage was virilocal or neolocal.

Table 1

Selected demographic indicators of the two communities

	Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva (1900)	
	Male	Female
SMAM	27.2	20.9
Celibacy	2.0	2.0
e_0	30.7	30.6
I_g		0.735

	Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva (1868)		
	Household type	Population	Mean household size
Nuclear	71.5	71.0	4.4
Complex	19.5	26.0	6.0
Solitaries	6.3	1.4	1.0
No structure	2.6	0.5	2.6
Total	100.0	100.0	
N	757	1761	

Source: Census 1900; Parish registers of Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva; Communion books of Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva 1868–1880

Note: SMAM is the singulate mean age at marriage; celibacy is defined as the proportion never married at age 50; e_0 denotes life expectancy at birth; I_g is the Princeton index of marital fertility

3. SOURCES

We reconstructed the demographic behaviour of the examined settlements from parish register data. An electronic database was compiled from parish registers between 1776 and 1943. Based on the principles of the family reconstitution method set by Louis Henry and Michel Fleury (Fleury and Henry 1985; Henry and Blum 1988) and making use of available computerised database management facilities, we were able to reconstitute the most important demographic events of families and individuals by applying time-consuming record linking.

When investigating widowhood and remarriage, data on marriage are of high importance. Marriages that took place in Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva were recorded jointly until 1838. After Kápolnásfalva became an independent parish, marriages were registered separately in the parish registers of the two villages. In the first decades of the 19th century, entries included information on the date of marriage, names of bride and bridegroom, and the name of the celebrating priest. From 1822, information on the age and family status of bride and bridegroom were added to the records. Place of residence, religion and parents' name of the new couple were also recorded from 1857 (and sporadically from 1840). Registering the date of birth of both the bride and the bridegroom instead of their age at marriage started in 1926. Occupation and social status were recorded inconsistently. The label "farmer" is frequently used in a general sense. In accordance with contemporary marriage customs, marriages took place where the bride lived. Therefore, we can draw a relatively reliable picture about marriages of local women; however, marriages of local men that took place somewhere else remain unknown.

Using family reconstitution data for the analyses of remarriage face a specific problem. Reconstitution studies usually have to define the population at risk. According to the rule of Louis Henry, one shall separate the continued presence of a family during a particular period and the examined behaviour itself. This rule put major limits on the analysis of remarriage. By following the sampling strategy of John Knodel and Kevin McQillan (Knodel 1988; Knodel and Lynch 1985; McQuillan 2003), this study may regard only a fraction of the couples. Our data set includes couples who married in one of the villages and for whom the death certificates for both partners are available. This conservative approach ensures that widow(er)s are followed until remarriage or death. A drawback of this method is that it uses a non-representative sample of the total population; therefore, individuals leaving the settlement after the death of their spouse are excluded from the analysis. Consequently, we underestimate the relationship between emigration and marriage: if the individuals left the village in order to get married, the study underestimates the likelihood of remarriage.

Due to the nature of family reconstitution data, we have no information on migration. No data are available on the number of individuals who left the villages and on the date of their emigration. People from other settlements may have moved back to their villages after the death of their spouse. Others may have left in order to find a job or to remarry. Therefore it should be kept in mind that emigration, death and remarriage were competing risks after the termination of the marriage.[13]

Table 2 describes the construction of the sample. Couples married between 1820 and 1910 constitute the total sample. Almost 29% of them were excluded due to missing data on the date of death. If we suppose that the death of all adults was registered, these individuals must have been alive at the end of 1941, the end of the data collection period, or they left the village after getting married or widowed.

Table 2

The diminishing number of cases in the complete sample of couples in the reconstitution study on widowhood and remarriage

Characteristics of couples	N	% of all couples
All couples with marriage date between 1820 and 1910	2824	100.0
Couples with end of union date	2391	84.7
Death dates known for both partners	2026	71.7
End of union between 1838 and 1910	1402	49.6
Age at widowhood is less than 65	1247	44.1

Source: Parish registers of Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva.

The final sample is the result of further data selection. It contains couples whose marriage terminated between 1838 and 1910 and the age at widowhood was 65 or less. Hereby we tried to avoid that individuals becoming widow(er)s at an old age dominate the sample. For instance, a marriage that was terminated in 1930 could have been included in the sample if the surviving partner died until 1941. During this period, however, those widow(er)s were more likely to die who had been old at widowhood, therefore, they had less opportunities in the marriage market.

[13] For measurement difficulties of remarriage, see Van Poppel 1998: 348–349; Blom 1991; Watkins 1983.

4. THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF WIDOWHOOD

Examining the distribution of marriages by marital status is a common method for analysing remarriage (Table 3). During the examined period, 25% of total marriages were concluded by widows or widowers. The most frequent type among these marriages was concluded between a widower and a single woman or a widow and a widower. These two marriage types constituted 40%-40% of all marriages. The remaining 20% were concluded between bachelors and widows. Thus remarriage was characterised by gender differences: widows remarried in smaller proportion than widowers. However, it is not gender differences but the high proportion of marriages concluded by widows and widowers that characterised the examined population.[14]

Table 3

Distribution of marriages and mean age at marriage for men and women by prior marital status and year of marriage

Year of marriage	Prior marital status of spouses									
	Bachelor and spinster		Widower and spinster		Bachelor and widow		Widower and widow		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Distribution										
1838–1874	908	72.5	138	11.0	68	5.4	138	11.0	1252	100.0
1875–1909	952	72.3	148	11.2	83	6.3	133	10.1	1316	100.0
1838–1909	1860	72.4	286	11.1	151	5.8	271	10.5	2568	100.0
Age at marriage for men										
1838–1874		25.2		37.2		26.6		47.9		29.3
1875–1909		26.1		38.2		27.3		49.5		29.8
1838–1909		25.7		37.6		27.6		48.7		29.6
Age at marriage for women										
1838–1874		21.2		24.3		30.1		41.6		24.8
1875–1909		21.2		23.2		32.9		44.5		24.0
1838–1909		21.2		23.8		31.7		43.0		24.4

Source: Parish registers of Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva.

[14] In the pre-industrial communities of Western Europe, widower-widow marriages were only 20% of total remarriages concluded by widows or widowers (Oris and Ochiai 2002: 67).

The distribution of marriages concluded by widows or widowers is not sufficient to make any conclusions, since differences in emigration, mortality and first marriage may significantly influence the proportion of remarriages after spousal death within all marriages. Analysing the phenomenon of widowhood may provide a clearer picture.

Table 4 describes the first widowhood experience of both males and females. According to life table calculations, the risk of widowhood increased in parallel with age. There are great gender differences. Due to early marriage, the age difference between wife and husband and high adult mortality, almost 10% of the hypothetic female cohort became widow by the age of 30. During the reproductive age (age 20–40), the risk of widowhood is higher for men than for women owing to the higher mortality of females because of childbearing. Above the age of 40, the risk of widowhood rose for both sexes and it gradually became twice as high among women as among men. This difference may be explained by higher male mortality and the age difference between the spouses. All in all, married woman aged 30 lost their partner on average 28.5 years later. The corresponding figure is 31.3 for men.[15]

[15] For the sake comparison, 30 year-old men and women lost their spouses on average 33.4 years later between 1812 and 1900 in Sart, a village in Eastern Belgium (Alter, Capron, Neven and Oris 2002: 392).

Table 4

Widowhood tables by sex, Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva (Romania), 1838–1910

Age	Men					Women				
	Married person years	Number of widow-hoods	Rates	Risks	Fictitious survivors	Married person years	Number of widow-hoods	Rates	Risks	Fictitious survivors
15–19	35.0	0	0.000	0.000	10000	544.9	4	0.007	0.036	10000
20–24	1219.1	5	0.004	0.020	10000	3307.4	36	0.011	0.053	9643
25–29	3693.8	35	0.009	0.046	9798	4700.6	36	0.008	0.038	9136
30–34	4270.5	71	0.017	0.080	9346	4512.8	57	0.013	0.061	8793
35–39	4023.7	76	0.019	0.090	8599	3992.1	50	0.013	0.061	8256
40–44	3537.0	66	0.019	0.089	7825	3359.5	88	0.026	0.122	7754
45–49	2924.7	62	0.021	0.101	7131	2566.6	80	0.031	0.144	6805
50–54	2234.6	65	0.029	0.136	6410	1900.7	70	0.037	0.168	5822
55–59	1618.8	47	0.029	0.136	5536	1299.1	66	0.051	0.225	4844
60–64	1098.4	53	0.048	0.215	4784	749.5	56	0.075	0.312	3754
65–69	581.6	34	0.058	0.254	3753	362.2	34	0.094	0.391	2582
70-74	229.8	14	0.061	0.263	2800	116.7	22	0.189	0.693	1573
75+	115.7	7	0.061	0.259	2063	19.4	7	0.361	0.938	482
				e20	36.0				e20	33.2
				e30	28.1				e30	26.0

Source: Parish registers of Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva

The annual number of widowhoods demonstrates moderate fluctuation in the short- and medium term (Figure 1). It is difficult to define clear temporal tendencies for this specific non-representative sample. However, the effects of a typhus epidemic in 1850 and a cholera epidemic in 1873 are clearly visible.



Source: Parish registers of Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva.
Note: Couples with union date between 1838 and 1910.

Figure 1
The number of marital dissolutions by death, Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva, 1838–1910

5. THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF REMARRIAGE

For the study of remarriage, the longitudinal method has to be extended to the period after widowhood. Therefore we defined an observation period spanning 10 years after widowhood. The observation of an individual lasted until the first event (remarriage or death) or until the end of the 10-year observation period.

Table 5 shows the cumulative probability of remarriage after widowhood. Strong gender differences can be observed: widowers remarried in a higher proportion and within a shorter period after the death of their spouse than wid-

ows did. The likelihood of women for remarriage significantly increased after the year of mourning was over (usually 10 months after the death of the husband). Overall, almost two thirds of men and 42% of women managed to remarry within five years after widowhood. This result seems to validate the conclusion from macro studies that the proportion of remarrying females was higher in the Transylvanian Basin than the national average in the last third of the 19th century (Faragó 2000: 434).

Table 5

Life-table estimates of the proportion of those remarrying, by the elapsed time since dissolution, by period of dissolution and age at widowhood. Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva, 1838–1910

	Proportion remarrying within					
	3 months	6 months	12 months	24 months	60 months	120 months
Males						
Period of dissolution						
1838–1874	0.166	0.351	0.487	0.596	0.676	0.685
1875–1909	0.184	0.336	0.449	0.565	0.633	0.652
Age at widowhood						
<35	0.309	0.530	0.716	0.849	0.902	0.911
35–44	0.223	0.448	0.603	0.735	0.815	0.829
45–54	0.140	0.307	0.395	0.527	0.626	0.641
55–64	0.063	0.129	0.209	0.257	0.297	0.310
Total	0.175	0.343	0.467	0.579	0.653	0.668
Females						
Period of dissolution						
1838–1874	0.020	0.055	0.162	0.301	0.451	0.509
1875–1909	0.011	0.053	0.141	0.263	0.395	0.460
Age at widowhood						
<35	0.043	0.181	0.390	0.677	0.854	0.910
35–44	0.018	0.025	0.127	0.271	0.519	0.625
45–54	0.005	0.021	0.070	0.154	0.242	0.294
55–64	0.000	0.012	0.062	0.094	0.141	0.152
Total	0.015	0.054	0.150	0.280	0.420	0.482

Source: Parish registers of Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva.

There is a close relationship between age at widowhood and the probability of remarriage. The majority of men who became widowed under age 45 remarried within a short period of time: about half of them remarried within 6 months. The proportion of remarrying males decreased in parallel with increas-

ing age at widowhood: only one third of men who got widowed at age 55–64 remarried within 10 years.

The negative effect of age was stronger among women than among men. Females widowed under age 35 had better chances in the marriage market than older ones. Those becoming widows at a later age remarried after a longer period. About 30% of females widowed at age 45–54 managed to set up a new marriage, whereas only 15% of women widowed at age 55–64 succeeded in doing so.

The distribution of remarriages by period demonstrates a slowly decreasing tendency for both sexes. However, no apparent decrease took place. Our data do not coincide with previous results about the decreasing frequency of remarriage by subsequent historical time periods.

Figures 2–3 provide a clearer and more detailed picture. Kaplan-Meier survival functions demonstrate the decreasing proportion of not remarrying males and females in parallel with time elapsed since widowhood. Since the values are cumulative, the curves are monotonously decreasing. Survival functions provide information on the changing risk of remarriage and the proportion of individuals at risk as well. Survival functions steeply decrease during the periods when the risk of remarriage is high and they are slowly decreasing or flat during periods of low remarriage risk.



Source: Parish registers of Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva.

Figure 2

Proportions of remarrying women and men by elapsed time since dissolution, by period of dissolution (Kaplan–Meier survival functions). Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva (Romania), 1838–1910



Source: Parish registers of Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva.

Figure 3

Proportions of remarrying women and men by elapsed time since dissolution, by age at widowhood (Kaplan–Meier survival function). Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva (Romania), 1838–1910

The subsequent table indicates that gender differences are even more pronounced in remarriage. The majority of remarrying males found a new spouse within the first 2 years, whereas it took 5 years for the majority of widowed women. Men responded more quickly to the negative stress caused by spousal death.

Regarding men, the negative effect of age is the strongest among individuals aged between 55–64. In the case of younger cohorts, the risk of remarriage is almost identical during the first months after widowhood. It suggests that the negative impact of age affected life in the period subsequent to widowing slowly and gradually. The negative impact of age was stronger among women and started to take effect immediately after becoming widow.

The period of widowing had a negative effect after a few years had passed since the event. Again, this impact was stronger for women than for men. It seems that remarriages between 1875 and 1910 usually took place during the first few years after widowhood. In the last quarter of 19th century and the first decades of 20th century, the process of adaptation after widowhood was shorter and the negative period effect can be demonstrated from the third year after the loss of the spouse.

Concerning the explanation of gender differences in remarriage, we may rely on the arguments of a Swedish researcher, Christer Lundh (Lundh 2007: 378–379). According to Lundh, gender differences may be explained by the following factors. Firstly, assuming the role of the head of the household was an accepted and "normal" situation for married men and it was not threatened by widowhood and/or remarriage. As the head of the household, the man represented the household for the outside world (for the local community, village leaders or the landlord). Women, especially in non-peasant strata, were scarcely able to cover the expenses of the household and take over the tasks of their late spouse. Women having rented land had to remarry soon in order to keep the land.

Secondly, it must have been easier to find a woman who was able to take household chores than to meet a man who can provide as much financial support as the late spouse. Widows or spinsters who were able to do household work were considered as potential wives. Widows needed a new partner who was able to carry out the same tasks as the late husband, who possessed land, a work contract or an own house. The restricted number of available men impeded or postponed the remarriage of landowning widows.

Thirdly, a widower could bring more property to a new marriage than a widow, which inequality ensured a better position for males in the marriage market. Fourthly, a widow may have lost her legal rights regarding property and her position as the head of the household if she remarried. Finally, the psychological burden associated with remarriage could have been more severe for widows than for widowers. Adult children, especially among landowning peasants, had the right to declare their disagreement regarding the remarriage of their mother. Since one of the adult children usually took over the farm from the widowed mother, the remarriage intentions of widows and the expectations of her children could have been in conflict with each other. In the following section we investigate the validity of above statements by applying event history analysis.

6. EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS

In the previous chapter we have demonstrated that remarriage patterns and risks differed by gender and age. We used stepwise event history models with demographic and family context variables.

Demographic characteristics are measured by two variables: the number of months elapsed since widowhood and age at widowhood. Since remarriage usually took place within the first few years after widowhood, 6 categorical variables were generated that measured the number of months elapsed since start of widowhood: : 0–3 months, 3–6 months, 6–12 months, 12–24 months, 24–60 months and 60–120 months. As the first variable was used as the refer-

ence category, we had 5 dummy variables. Age at widowhood was broken down into 4 categories: below 35, between 35–44, between 45–54 and between 55–64. The first one is the reference category, which indicates the reproductive age in which the majority of children were born.

Family composition was measured with three categorical variables including information on the presence of children. The first one referred to the presence and gender of children under age 12 at the date of widowhood: no child; only son(s); only daughter(s); at least one son and one daughter. The latter one was used as reference category and three dummy variables were created. This variable indicates not only the presence of children in the household but also their gender. The second variable refers to the presence of daughter(s) aged between 12–22 at widowhood (yes or no). The third variable indicates the presence of son(s) aged between 12–25 at widowhood (yes or no).

By including the period of widowhood, historical time also assumed a role in the model. Two periods were differentiated – between 1838–1874 and between 1875–1910 – regarding demographic aspects epidemics (primarily cholera) gradually disappeared after 1874 among the adult population. The place of residence of individuals in the sample was also included in the analysis as a dummy variable.

Table 6 contains the distribution of the sample by the dependent and independent variables. All the variables in the model are categorical ones. The sum of the categories is 100% for all variables.

We ran three event history models. In order to highlight gender differences, first we examined the entire population at risk. Subsequently the remarriage of men and women was analysed in separate models. We expected that the more difficulties the widow(er) faced in household work, the more motivated he/she was to remarry. According to our hypothesis, marriage meant a secure and relatively cost-effective way of achieving adequate household size required for farm work and household tasks. Since rural families were based on the balancing of traditional gender roles, if one adult was missing from the work structure, it needed to be replaced immediately[16]. The presence of dependent children under 12 was considered as a sign of household difficulties in our model. The imbalanced gender distribution of children may signal unsuccessful family reproduction. In this way, the lack of children or having children exclusively of the same sex could have stimulated remarriage.

[16] See Segalen 1980: 15–16 about the complementarity of traditional gender roles in the rural family.

Table 6
Distribution of widows and widowers by dependent and independent variables in the sample

Variable	Widowers		Widows	
	Number	%	Number	%
Remarriage				
Yes	389	63.8	286	43.5
No	220	36.1	371	56.4
Duration of widowhood				
0–3 months	609	27.6	657	20.7
3–6 months	493	22.3	637	20.0
6–12 months	390	17.6	604	19.0
12–24 months	311	14.1	533	16.8
24–60 months	239	10.8	436	13.7
60–120 months	162	7.3	303	9.5
Age at widowhood				
<35	114	18.7	140	21.3
35–44	170	27.9	163	24.8
45–54	167	24.7	185	28.1
55–64	158	25.9	169	25.7
Number of children < 12 years old				
At least 1 son and 1 daughter	138	22.6	114	17.3
No child	287	47.1	366	55.7
Only son(s)	92	15.1	92	14.0
Only daughter(s)	92	15.1	85	12.9
Daughter 12–22 years old				
Yes	158	25.9	204	31.0
No	451	74.0	453	68.9
Son 12–25 years old				
Yes	180	29.5	218	33.1
No	429	70.4	439	66.8
Period of dissolution				
1838–1874	288	47.2	295	44.9
1875–1909	321	52.7	362	55.0
Parish/Village				
Szentegyházasfalva	336	55.1	343	52.2
Kápolnásfalva	273	44.8	314	47.7

Source: Parish registers of Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva

The presence of working-age sons and daughters eased the difficulties of the household. Therefore, these children could have been an alternative to remarriage. Working-age daughters could help their widowed father by carrying out the household chores. Sons of similar age could help the widows with the farm.

As we have mentioned earlier, children from the first marriage could have opposed remarriage as it could have been a threat to their legal inheritance. They could have tried to avoid living with step parents and step siblings as they would have had to share assets with the newcomers. Therefore, we expect that the presence of a working-age child of the opposite sex decreases the risk of remarriage.

7. RESULTS OF EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS

Results of regression analyses are presented in Tables 7–8. Table 7 include the results of two models. The main difference between Model A and B is that the former one excludes the "age group" variable while Model B is complete. Since the number and age of children strongly correlates with the age of widow(er)s, the effect of variables relating to the presence of children was considerably modified when we controlled for age. Entering age also improved model fit.

Table 7 shows relative remarriage risks for the entire population at risk. Sharp gender differences may be observed. The remarriage risk of men was twice as high as that of women. The relative risk of remarriage significantly decreased in parallel with ageing and as time elapsed since widowhood.

According to Table 8, the negative effect of age was stronger among women than men. Gender differences may be observed in the effect of time elapsed since widowhood as well. The remarriage risk of men was the highest 3–6 months after becoming widower. For women, the risk was higher during later periods.

Contrary to expectations, period effect is positive for both sexes; however, these results are not significant. There are no differences between the two villages in either the effects or in the reliability of results. This result coincides with our expectations as the basic demographic and family characteristics of the two neighbouring settlements were quite similar.

Regarding the effect of dependent children, the size of this burden encouraged remarriage. In the case of the total population at risk (Table 7), the remarriage risk of those having no child under age 12 are significantly lower than of those having at least one daughter and one son when their spouse died. This effect was more evident for males. Among widowers with underage daughters or sons, remarriage risk was 25% higher than among men with no such children.

The presence of working-age daughters had no effect on the remarriage risks of either men or women, as opposed to the presence of working-age sons. The remarriage risk is 30% lower if there is at least one 12–25 year old son in the household. The presence of young adult sons decreased the remarriage risk of widowers as well, however, this result was not significant.

Table 7
Relative risk of remarriage, total population at risk

Covariates	Model A		Model B	
	Relative risk	P-value	Relative risk	P-value
Duration of widowhood				
0–3 months	1.000	ref.	1.000	Ref.
3–6 months	1.343	0.022	1.400	0.009
6–12 months	0.874	0.290	0.950	0.691
12–24 months	0.613	0.000	0.712	0.007
24–60 months	0.242	0.000	0.299	0.000
60–120 months	0.062	0.000	0.078	0.000
Gender				
Female	1.000	ref.	1.000	ref.
Male	2.006	0.000	2.386	0.000
Age at widowhood				
<35			1.000	ref.
35–44			0.557	0.000
45–54			0.305	0.000
55–64			0.129	0.000
Number of children < 12 years old				
At least 1 son and 1 daughter	1.000	ref.	1.000	ref.
No child	0.390	0.000	0.769	0.013
Only son(s)	0.824	0.103	0.876	0.266
Only daughter(s)	0.942	0.612	0.953	0.682
Daughter 12–22 years old				
No	1.000	ref.	1.000	ref.
Yes	0.725	0.001	0.961	0.707
Son 12–25 years old				
No	1.000	ref.	1.000	ref.
Yes	0.600	0.000	0.816	0.050
Period of dissolution				
1838–1874	1.000	ref.	1.000	ref.
1875–1909	0.959	0.600	1.066	0.414
Parish/Village				
Szentegyházasfalva	1.000	ref.	1.000	ref.
Kápolnásfalva	1.064	0.420	1.053	0.507
Events		675		675
Total time at risk		64768		64778
Max. log likelihood		–1744.7		–1642.9
LR test statistic		936		1140
Overall P-value		0.000		0.000

Source: Parish registers of Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva.

Table 8
Relative risk of marriage, male and female population at risk

Covariates	Widowers		Widows	
	Relative risk	P-value	Relative risk	P-value
Duration of widowhood				
0–3 months	1.000	ref.	1.000	ref.
3–6 months	1.349	0.032	2.684	0.008
6–12 months	0.661	0.007	3.806	0.000
12–24 months	0.408	0.000	3.589	0.000
24–60 months	0.127	0.000	1.865	0.065
60–120 months	0.015	0.000	0.676	0.289
Age at widowhood				
<35	1.000	ref.	1.000	ref.
35–44	0.710	0.013	0.386	0.000
45–54	0.452	0.000	0.159	0.000
55–64	0.181	0.000	0.075	0.000
Number of children < 12 years old				
At least 1 son and 1 daughter	1.000	ref.	1.000	ref.
No child	0.762	0.051	0.937	0.704
Only son(s)	0.866	0.353	0.992	0.967
Only daughter(s)	0.936	0.675	1.164	0.401
Daughter 12–22 years old				
No	1.000	ref.	1.000	ref.
Yes	0.975	0.859	0.988	0.944
Son 12–25 years old				
No	1.000	ref.	1.000	ref.
Yes	0.871	0.311	0.704	0.027
Period of dissolution				
1838–1874	1.000	ref.	1.000	ref.
1875–1909	1.043	0.688	1.158	0.225
Parish/Village				
Szentegyházasfalva	1.000	ref.	1.000	ref.
Kápolnásfalva	1.136	0.217	0.915	0.463
Events		389		286
Total time at risk		23502		41265
Max. log likelihood		–890.6		–681.7
LR test statistic		751		403
Overall P-value		0.000		0.000

Source: Parish registers of Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva.

8. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW SPOUSE

Another possible research question is the family status of the new spouses. Our data set allows us to analyse the marital status of the new wives and husbands (Table 9). There are considerable gender differences: widowed men chose single women as new partners more often than widowed women chose single men. A high proportion of those under age 35 concluded their second marriage with spinsters/bachelors (84% of men and 62% of women). Some other researchers came to the same conclusion concerning Dutch and French rural communities (Bideau 1980; Van Poppel 1995). According to them, widows and widowers prefer single and childless partners so they could avoid the difficulties of integrating children of different sex into the new household and the complex question of inheritance. While widowers held an advantageous position in the local marriage market for a relatively long period of time (the result that the marital status of their new partners was spinster in most cases is suggestive), ageing had stronger negative effect among widows. Parallel with ageing, the number of widowed women concluding marriage with bachelors was decreasing.

As we stated earlier, the better position of men resulted from the characteristics of the family system. A widower was more likely to have his own home and household that provided him advantages in the local marriage market. The proportion of women in the same situation could have been lower, because the first marriage usually meant leaving the parental home for females. Widowhood could have raised several complex questions in regard to inheritance. We have seen in previous parts of the paper the characteristics of the own family or that of the family of the late husband (e.g. the presence of adult sons) played an important role in the decision.

Table 9

Relative distribution of widows and widowers remarrying, by marital status of the new spouse and age at widowhood. Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva, 1838–1910

Age at bereavement	Widowers				Widows			
	Never married		Widow		Never married		Widower	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<35	87	84.46	16	15.53	75	61.98	46	38.01
35–44	82	58.99	57	41.00	18	19.56	74	80.43
45–54	32	31.37	70	68.62	2	3.92	49	96.07
55–64	6	13.33	39	86.66	0	0.00	22	100.00

Source: Parish registers of Szentegyházasfalva and Kápolnásfalva

Table 9 makes it clear that both sexes were more likely to choose widowed partners after they reached age 45. These choices are supposed to have resulted from the relatively independent decisions of the remarrying partners[17] and the need for mutual support in old age could have motivated them. Literature refers to marriages between old widowed individuals as "assistance remarriages". Our data indicate that this form of remarriage was dominant in Szeklerland, too.[18]

9. CONCLUSION

The death of a spouse could have significantly impacted the welfare of the surviving partner. In the villages of Transylvania, remarriage was a frequent reaction to the stress caused by spousal death. The frequency of remarriage was relatively high in international – especially in Western European – comparison.

Present chapter found evidence for previous findings in the literature. The role of gender is important: men concluded another marriage more often than women in all age groups; however, this difference was lower among older individuals. Remarriage propensity dropped in parallel with ageing, nevertheless, the negative impact of age affected women more strongly. Remarriage took place relatively shortly after the termination of the first marriage.

Our results differ from previous ones in one respect. While researches on Western European and Asian communities consider the decreasing frequency of remarriage with time as evident – explained by improving mortality, attitude change, transformation of local marriage markets, changing attitudes about gender roles and the function of family –, our data do not support this kind of overall decrease. In the examined period (1838–1910), a slight decrease of remarriage took place. It may be explained by the fact that we analysed only a short period from a historical perspective. Moreover, the sample was drawn from a basically agrarian, immobile population. It is possible that this stratum preserved "traditional" demographic patterns for a longer period.

During the analysis of factors that influenced remarriage, we emphasised that age, time elapsed since widowhood and the family context of widow(er)s were important determinants. After the inclusion of demographic characteristics as control variables, the presence of young adult and underage children remained significant predictors of remarriage. The size of the burden on the widowed person – measured with the number of dependent children – encouraged remarriage, especially among men. In the case of widows, the presence of work-age son(s) helped to overcome the difficulties and it discouraged remarriage. All in all, remarriage proved to be a useful tool for ensuring the survival

[17] The lack of parental control must have contributed to the ability to make a free choice.

[18] The unambiguous and clear need of the remarrying partners for mutual assistance in old age is present in contemporary written sources as well (Oláh 2007).

of the individual and the family. However, the institution of the stem family could also provide the necessary protection for older widowed people who did not find a new spouse, especially women.

When examining the remarriage behaviour of males and females in their reproductive age, a question arises: did they have any alternative? We are inclined to accept Fancine Roley's research results as valid for the examined two Transylvanian villages. In the French communities that Rolley examined there were hardly any women who were free to choose their partners. In many cases, the family selected the second spouse and remarriage was enforced by the difficulties that widows had to face (Rolley 1998: 266).

Translated by Zoltán Takács

SOURCES

Parish registers of Szentegyházasfalva:

Matricula Baptisatorum 1825–1845; Matricula Copulatorum 1825–1845; Matricula Defunctorum 1825–1845 Eccl. Oláhfalvensis, Eccl. Szentegyházas Oláhfalvensis. Roman Catholic Parish Archive, Szentegyházasfalva (hereafter RCPASZ).

Matricula Baptisatorum 1846–1856; Matricula Copulatorum 1846–1856; Matricula Defunctorum 1846–1856 Eccl. Szentegyházas Oláhfalvensis. RCPASZ.

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Parish registers of Kápolnásfalva:

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Matricula Baptisatorum 1876–1895; Matricula Defunctorum 1880–1895 Eccl. Kápolnás Oláhfalvensis. HCNA, Fond 47, inv. 85.
Matricula Baptisatorum 1872–1908 Kápolnás Oláhfalu. HCNA, Fond 47, inv. 84.
Matricula Defunctorum 1879–1902 Eccl. Kápolnás Oláhfalvensis. RCPAK. Vol. II.
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Matricula Baptisatorum 1908–1937 Kápolnás Oláhfalu. RCPAK. Vol. IV.
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THE HIGHEST FERTILITY IN EUROPE – FOR HOW LONG? DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY CHANGE IN ALBANIA

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ABSTRACT: *Albania's demographic changes have sparked considerable interest in recent years. Much of this attention has arisen due to a general lack of knowledge and to the seemingly paradoxical demographic behaviour of the Albanian population (Gjonça, A. 2001; Gjonça, A. et al. 1997). The country has experienced a high level of life expectancy and relatively high levels of fertility in recent years. While previous research gives some answers to developing trends and patterns of mortality and fertility change, not much is known about fertility behaviour either during the communist period or during the nineties. The post-transition situation is bound to have profound impact on society and the behaviour of individuals within it. Using the 2002 Albanian Living Standard and Measurement Survey (ALSMS) we analyse fertility behaviour in terms of the quantum and tempo. The results from survival analysis techniques suggest that the reduction of fertility is mainly due to social development, with particular emphasis on female education, as well as the improvement of child mortality. The results for the 1990s also reveal some strong period effects mainly influencing higher parities. The persistence of traditional norms and values continue to affect family formation in Albania, while the changes in social and economic circumstances shape childbearing.*

INTRODUCTION

After the collapse of communism in 1990, Albania emerged as one of the most isolated countries of the former Eastern block, and the rest of the World either knew little or nothing about its development. In 1990 the country was rated as the poorest in Europe and continue to be so to date. At the same time there have been surprising achievements regarding its social development and demographic change. Having very limited knowledge, the spectacular improvement of mortality as well as the reduction of fertility has been questioned by a large number of scholars (Watson, P. 1995). The fifty year period under communism saw radical social and economic change in Albania, which affected the whole society and its individuals. This transformation also appeared in the country's demographic change. Mortality decreased significantly with life expectancy at birth increasing from 51.6 years in 1950 to 70.7 years in

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1990. Dramatic fertility reductions also occurred during this period with TFR coming down from 6.1 children per woman in 1950 to 3.0 in 1990. We believe that this work and other recent research on Albania have completed the final jigsaw of the demographic transition of the Balkan countries (Gjonça et al. 1997; Gjonça and Bobak 1997; Gjonça 2001; Falkingham and Gjonça 2001).

Most of the previous work has been based on aggregate data and has focused on describing patterns of demographic change. However, very little is known about the demographic behaviour of Albanians. Though on the basis of census and vital registration data first Falkingham and Gjonça (2001) and later on Gjonça, Aassve and Mencarini (2008) provided very useful insights into the fertility transition in Albania from 1950 to 1990, very little is known about fertility behaviour and the offered explanatory pattern is more suggestive than conclusive. In addition, Albania went through a remarkable transition during the 1990s, which involved dramatic political and economic changes. The emerging new situation in Albania is bound to have profound impact on society and the behaviour of individuals within it. We can observe demographic changes, in particular with regards to migration and fertility. The aim of this paper is to analyse fertility change in Albania until 2002 based on individual data. The introduction of the Albanian Living Standard and Measurement Survey (ALSMS) surveyed in 2002 provides unique information about demographic change. Using this information we analyse fertility behaviour in terms of the quantum and tempo during the period following the collapse of the communist era. Fertility histories are constructed and a number of variables are introduced to explain the change. In this paper we use standard survival analysis and event history models. The analyses of this paper demonstrate strong cohort and period effects, which vary a great deal by birth parity. The results shed light on why fertility continues to come down in Albania, supporting the previous research that emphasises social changes in Albania as the most important and significant determinant of fertility transition, with education being the most important variable.

The paper starts with an account of what is known about fertility change in Albania and continues with the description of the data used in this paper (ALSMS). Here we also assess the accuracy of the aggregate data by comparing our results using the Albanian LSMS with those of previous research based on census and vital registration data (Falkingham and Gjonça 2001). It then presents the results of the non-parametric and semi-parametric methods applied to these data. A detailed discussion of these results follows to conclude with considering possible future developments within the European context of delayed or postponed fertility.

FERTILITY CHANGE DURING COMMUNIST ALBANIA, 1950–1990

The period of communist rule in Albania from 1945 to 1990 was characterised by relative political and economic stability. During this 45 year period striking changes in the social sphere were accompanied by a dramatic reduction of fertility (Falkingham & Gjonça, 2001). At the end of the Second World War, Albania had the highest fertility in Europe with an average of about six births per woman. High fertility was reinforced by traditional patriarchal norms. Total fertility rate, which was already high by 1950, reached a peak of almost seven children per woman around 1960. After that a steady decline started in the 1970s, with TFR being reduced to less than four in 1980, and just over three children per woman in 1990 (Figure 1). This rise in period fertility during the 1950s and 1960s mirrors the experience of many European countries at the end of the Second World War. As one of the countries with the highest population losses, it is not surprising that fertility increased in Albania immediately after the War. However, in other European countries post-war baby boom did not start from such a high base. An alternative interpretation of this trend is that it represents a pre-decline rise in fertility of the kind studied by Dyson and Murphy (1985) in which they argue that this has been a widespread characteristic of fertility transitions. It is also important to mention here that infant mortality started declining rapidly in the 1950s. By the-mid 1970s it was almost half of the very high value of 143 deaths per thousand of the 1950s. The effect of infant mortality reduction related to fertility change will also be addressed later in this paper. The 1990s saw a continuous reduction in fertility with both vital statistics data and survey data confirming a TFR of 2.2 children per woman close to the replacement level of 2.1.

The decline in fertility until 1990 came from all ages and all cohorts (Falkingham and Gjonça 2001). Interestingly, during the decades of communist rule strong forces were present that ideally should have kept fertility high. Explicit pro-natalist policies were implemented, abortion was illegal, availability of contraception was restricted, and strong financial incentives were provided to mothers or childbearing. Albanian society was also dominated by strong cultural and traditional values typical of a patriarchal society: extended family, universal marriage, childbearing only within marriage and male dominated society (INSTAT 2004, Gruber, S. and Pichler, R. 2002). Given these pro-natalist forces, it is somewhat surprising that the levels of fertility decreased from 7 to 3 children per woman. Falkingham and Gjonça (2001), and Gjonça, Aassve, and Mencarini (2008) argue that powerful social and economic policies, which include universal education, in particular for women, full female employment and successful policies aimed at reducing infant mortality explain this pattern. While there were no direct population policies, there were other policies in transforming the social sphere that had an implicit effect on fertility in Albania. The investment in education, with a particular focus on the im-

provement of female education was unprecedented historically in Albania. Female literacy improved from 8 percent in 1945 to 92 percent in 1989, and by 2002 illiteracy was under 5 percent among women, similar to the most developed European societies. For the sake of full female employment, government invested in the pre-school education system, creating a system of day-care nursing and kindergartens across the country. This had a double effect. On the one hand it increased female employment (which comprised 47 percent of the total labour force by 1990) as it liberated them from childcare, and on the other hand in conjunction with other measures, it created a significant externality favouring large families.



Source: Authors' calculatios based on data from vital statistics and LSMS 2002.

Figure 1
Period and cohort fertility rates, Albania 1950–2000

THE ANALYSES OF FERTILITY CHANGE IN ALBANIA DURING THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSITION OF THE 1990S

Socio-economic changes in the 1990s

After a long and sustained period of economic and political stability, profound changes took place during the nineties following the collapse of communism. By 1992 democracy was established, and after a dramatic economic recession, the country embarked on a period of relatively high economic growth.

Between 1993 and 1996, GDP grew by about 9 percent annually in real terms (World Bank 2004). The country experienced a dramatic setback in 1997 with the collapse of the financial pyramid schemes – and consequent huge losses in terms of households' savings. This also had an effect in the rise of crime, insecurity, lack of governance, and increased unemployment, all of which are expected to have an effect on the level of childbearing. During 1997 Albania experienced a negative growth of 7 percent, but over the following three years the economy bounced back to experience an average growth rate of 7 percent. In 1999 Albania faced another crisis from the Balkan wars. However, the country was able to weather the storm of Kosovo refugees and by the end of the year Albania had regained its economic momentum. Economic growth continued in the following years, reaching 7.3 percent in 2000 and started to decline only in the second half of 2001, reaching 4.7 percent in 2002 (World Bank 2004).

Several structural reforms were introduced after the collapse of communism, including banking, land reforms, the privatization of strategic sectors like telecommunication and the selling of state-owned small and medium enterprises. The reforms also implied important changes in the labour market, first and foremost leading to higher unemployment rates, especially among women.

Despite the improved performance of the economy in recent years Albania remains one of the poorest countries in Europe and is ranked only 73rd of 177 countries by the human development indicator of 2006 (Human Development Report 2006). It has features in common with both developing and developed countries. For instance, its total fertility rate of 2.2 and infant mortality rate of 17 per 1,000 live births are comparable with many medium developed countries (Human Development Report 2006 on data of 2004), whereas the high life expectancy at birth (currently 73.7 years) is comparable with much more developed European countries.

Table 1
Vital statistics for Albania, 1980–2004

	1980	1990	2000	2004
Total fertility rate	3.6	3.0	2.4	2.2
Life expectancy at birth (years)	69.3	72.3	74.0	74.01
Population growth (% annual)	2.0	1.2	0.4	0.58
Total population (mill.)	2.7	3.3	3.1	3.13
Rural population (% of total)	66.3	63.9	58.1	56.2
GDP per capita ($US 1995 prices)	910.0	841.9	1008.0	1190.4

Note: Data refer to 2004, last year available.
Source: World Development Indicators database.

The dramatic economic and social changes between 1990 and 1998 were expected to bring fertility further down, due to the insecure economic and social environment created. During the 1990s there was a sharp increase in unemployment, affecting more than 28% of women and about 20% of men, and an increase in both income inequality and poverty, with one out of four Albanians living below the poverty line (World Bank 2003). With regards to the social conditions, the only positive change was that the education level was kept high, with an increasing proportion of women obtaining university level education. In the period of economic transition there was also a move from a "traditional" to a more "modern" set of values together with a slight increase in cohabitation, a move from extended to nuclear families and a new openness within society weakening old taboos such as use of contraception, divorce, cohabitation and childbearing outside marriage (INSTAT 2005). The rapid economic changes led to massive emigration, and since 1990 about one fourth of the total population has left the country and is living abroad, mainly in Italy or Greece. However, the majority of this migration is seasonal and temporal. Remittances are estimated to account for about 13 percent of total income among Albanian households with a higher share for urban households: 16 percent against 11 of urban areas (INSTAT 2002). Despite the economic benefits of remittances, migration also implies high social costs. According to INSTAT 2002 emigration was particularly evident among males, whose population dropped by 20 percent between 1989 and 2001 and in this way migration has deprived the country of its most active labour force.

Data description and the quality of data

The Albanian Living Standard Measurement Survey (ALSMS) was conducted in 2002 and it collected data on 3,544 households and 16,634 individuals. It follows the standard format of the LSMS surveys and not only contains rich information on income and consumption expenditure but also on education, employment, and importantly full information on retrospective fertility histories for all women in the household. The 2002 ALSMS forms the basis for a longitudinal survey, with a sub-sample of households and individuals re-interviewed in 2003 and 2004 (see Table 2 for details).

The Republic of Albania is geographically divided into 12 Prefectures, which in turn are divided into Districts. These districts are divided into Cities and Communes. The Communes contain all the rural villages and the very small towns, divided into Enumeration Areas (EAs), which formed the basis for the LSMS sampling frame. The sample is drawn from 450 EAs, and in each of them eight households were selected. Household membership is defined as not having been away from the household for more than six months prior to the date of the interview. Table 2 gives an overview of the Albanian Survey. It is

important to mention that during the 1990s there were drastic administrative changes, which were accompanied by large internal migration (INSTAT, 2004). However, since the latest census in 2001, these changes were taken into account, and the survey sample was based on census results.

Table 2

Overview of the Albanian living standard measurement survey

	ALSMS (Albanian Living Standards Measurement Survey)
Target population and sample frame	Private households
Dates of fieldwork	Three waves: Apr-Sep 2002, May-July 2003, May 2004
Panel entry, exit and tracking policy	Unique cross-wave identifier of persons. New entrants included in sample. All exiting individuals tracked into new households.
Welfare measures available	Income and subjective indicators (all waves); expenditure (wave 1 only);
Sample Size (Panel)	1682 panel households
Sample Size 2002 survey	3544 households

One of the most important issues about the demography of Albania has always been the quality of statistics compiled by the communist administration. While the mortality statistics were found to be accurate (Gjonça 2001), not much work has been done on data related to childbearing. In order to check the accuracy of information on fertility within LSMS and vital statistics, we compare cohort total fertility rates and age specific cohort rates from Vital Registration Data and LSMS respectively. Table 3 shows that the survey data produce somewhat higher estimates of total fertility for recent cohorts. This might be due to the effect of the large-scale emigration of the 1990s. Emigration affected the young ages and in particular the single population, initially men, and in the late 1990s females too. For the younger cohorts of the 1950–54, 1955–59 and 1960–64, the LSMS results might be influenced by emigration, since the enumerator has been affected due to the emigration of the single population. However, Figure 3, which plots the age specific rates for the old cohorts, not affected from emigration, shows very similar shapes for age specific cohorts rates (cohorts born during the 1930s and 1940s) from the two data sets.

Table 3
Cohort total fertility rates from both vital registration and LSMS

Cohorts	1930–34	1935–39	1940–44	1945–49	1950–54	1955–59	1960–64
CTFR-VS	5.03	5.03	4.46	4.43	3.60	3.17	2.92
CTFR-LSMS	5.28	5.01	4.61	4.71	4.09	3.64	3.27



Source: LSMS data 2002.

Figure 2
Age specific cohort rates from vital registration data and LSMS

A strong reduction of cohort fertility is evident from both data sources. It decreased from about 5 children per woman born during the 1930s to about 3 for those born in the early 1960s. Period fertility measures, estimated for 1980, 1990 and 2000 from LSMS data (Table 4) show that the reduction of fertility continued and it continues to be sharp in the most recent period, during the 1990s.

Table 4
Period fertility rates 1980, 1990, and 2000

Age groups	1980	1990	2000
15–19	21.9	15.4	16.5
20–24	188.7	167.1	130.7
25–29	223.2	213.6	158.6
30–34	158.5	133.3	91.1
35–39	93.6	55.7	32.9
40–44	32.8	17.4	6.9
45–49	4.7	2.7	0.6
TFR	3.62	3.03	2.19

Source: LSMS data 2002.

Methodology

The nature of recent fertility reduction is better understood using appropriate survival analysis techniques such as non-parametric Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimation and semi-parametric Cox regression.[4] In our estimation we include control for cohorts, period effects, child mortality ratio, urban – rural dummy variable, four regions, religion, and education. In addition we control for the age of first birth in the regression for second birth, and the age at second birth in the regression for the third birth. The period effect is specific to the nineties, and intends to capture any further fertility decline as a result of the economic and social upheavals during this period.

Results of the Kaplan-Meier estimates

The Kaplan Meier estimates provided for first, second, and third births are estimated for six cohorts. (Women born between 1930 and 1939, 1940 and 1949, 1950 and 1959, 1960 and 1969, 1970 and 1979, 1980 and 1986.) The last

[4] The Cox regression assumes that the impact of covariates on the hazard is proportional. We test for the proportionality assumption throughout.

three cohorts have not completed their reproductive life at the time of the survey. For the first birth the risk of first childbearing is supposed to start at age 15. Thus, the time scale on the X-axis for first birth starts at age 15, whereas for subsequent births the starting point is defined at the time when the previous birth took place. Figure 3a and 3b present the Kaplan Meier survival estimates for the first birth, whereas Figures 4 and 5 contain the Kaplan Meier survival curves for the second and the third birth respectively. Of particular interest here is the extent to which the two youngest cohorts differ from the older ones. Overall the estimates show that there is little difference between cohorts for the first birth, very little difference for the second one and there is a distinct difference between the youngest and the two older cohorts for the third birth. This indicates that having a first birth is universal in a still traditional society. As for the higher parities we see strong differences, showing that the decline in fertility (as seen in Figure 1 and 2) is mainly driven by a decline in higher order births.



Source: LSMS data 2002.

Figure 3a
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of first birth by cohorts



Source: LSMS data 2002.

Figure 3b

Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates of first birth by cohorts



Source: LSMS data 2002.

Figure 4

Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of second birth by cohorts



Source: LSMS data 2002.

Figure 5

Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of third birth by cohorts

Estimates for the first birth in particular and the other two to a lesser extent, go almost close to zero in the early cohorts. This suggests a very high proportion of women having a first birth. This can be expected to a certain extent if one remembers that the overall level of fertility for these cohorts was very high (Table 3). However, it could also be a result of other factors. First of all surveys where fertility histories are asked tend to under-represent unmarried, divorced, or even childless women. This in particular might be true in the case of Albania, which has been, and to a certain extent still remains, a traditional and patriarchal society. However, these results might also be affected by the fact that marriage was universal in Albania for the period under consideration and in particular the early cohorts, where childbearing outside marriage was almost zero (Falkingham and Gjonça 2001; INSTAT 2005).

Results from the semi-parametric analysis

In this section we present the semi-parametric analysis (Cox regression) based on the fertility histories derived from the Albanian LSMS survey. We have conducted two sets of analyses. The first includes control for cohort effects and uses the full sample of women. The cohorts are defined over the periods of 1930–39, 1940–49, 1950–59, 1960–1969, and 1970–86, the latter one being the reference group. Whereas this analysis provides a good picture of fertility decline across cohorts, it does not inform us about the possible period effect during the nineties. As a result the second analysis is based on a sub-sample of women born after 1959 where a period effect for the nineties is included. In a separate set of analyses we included the period effect and cohort variables in the same model using the whole sample. Though the estimates are qualitatively consistent, this approach is problematic since very few of the oldest cohorts had births during the nineties, for which we included the period effect (these estimates are not presented here). The estimates for the subsample are presented in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 5

Results of Cox regression analysis controlling for cohorts (hazard ratios)

	First birth	Second birth	Third birth
Reference: Cohort 1970–1986			
Cohort 1930–39	1.244**	1.278*	2.159***
Cohort 1940–49	1.278***	1.407**	2.200***
Cohort 1950–59	1.254**	1.442**	1.936***
Cohort 1960–69	1.179*	1.382**	1.391***
Child mortality ratio	2.534***	2.473***	5.374***
Reference: Urban			
Rural	1.060	1.078	1.389***
Reference: Tirana			
Coastal	1.139*	1.328***	1.426***
Central	1.220***	1.163*	1.209*
Mountain	1.172**	1.515***	1.981***
Reference: Muslim			
Orthodox	0.941	0.891	0.683***
Catholic	0.914	1.049	1.349***
Other religions	1.042	1.074	1.014
Reference: Less than 5 yrs			
Education (yrs) 5–8	1.141	1.018	0.846
Education (yrs) 9–11	0.996	0.952	0.742***
Education (yrs) 12–15	0.651***	0.781***	0.457***
Education (yrs) 16 plus	0.418***	0.654***	0.289***
Age at first and second births	N/A	0.972***	0.910***

Note: *:10%, ** 5%, ***: 1%.
Source: LSMS data 2002.

Not unexpectedly we find the oldest cohorts to have higher hazard ratios for first, second and third births. The highest hazard ratios are for the 1940–1949 cohort, which had its peak of childbearing during 1960–1969, the period for which the level of period fertility was the highest in Albania. This is consistent with the overall fertility decline of Albania (Figure 1 and 2). It is quite understandable for the oldest cohorts to have much higher hazard ratios for the second and third births. This is also shown from the Kaplan-Maier estimates which indicate that these cohorts have higher risk of having a 2nd and 3rd birth compared to other cohorts.

One of the main assumptions of the Cox hazard model is the restriction of proportionality. It is clear that the 1960–69 cohort does violate it, and so does education as a variable. In order to overcome the violation of the proportionality assumption, the analyses were also run including interactions. As expected the results did not change qualitatively. The detailed results of these interactions are given in Table 6 and 7.

The Cox proportional hazard model assumes that covariates shift the baseline hazard proportionally. This implies that the effect of the covariates does not change from short durations to long durations, for instance. Testing for the proportionality assumption is straightforward and its remedy (if violated) is also simple. The proportionality assumption is tested for all our estimates, and some violations are found. For the first birth reported in Table 5, we find the cohorts, especially the one of 1960 – 1969, to violate the assumption, as does education and to a lesser extent the child mortality ratio. To correct for the proportionality assumption we split the duration (i.e. time until birth) into segments which are interacted with the variables causing the violation. The violation of the cohort variables in the first birth regression can be traced back to Figure 3b. Here we can see that the hazard rates for the youngest cohorts are lower than those of the older cohorts, which is reflected in the estimates in Table 5. But we can also see that the hazard function of the two youngest cohorts (the reference group in Table 5), peaks and declines much more rapidly than the other older cohorts and this causes the violation of the proportionality assumption.

Table 6
Cox regression controlling for cohorts

	First birth	Second birth	Third birth
Reference: Cohort 1970–1986			
Cohort 1930–39	1.225	1.291**	2.168***
Cohort 1940–49	1.590**	1.405***	2.212***
Cohort 1950–59	1.379*	1.435***	1.951***
Cohort 1960–69	0.78	1.379***	1.395***
Cohort 1930–39 – interaction	1.024	–	–
Cohort 1940–49 – interaction	0.916	–	–
Cohort 1950–59 – interaction	0.898	–	–
Cohort 1960–69 – interaction	1.566**	–	–
Child mortality ratio	2.486***	5.121***	5.401***
Child mortality ratio – interaction	–	0.193***	–
Reference: Urban			
Rural	1.061	1.074	1.390***
Reference: Tirana			
Coastal	1.136*	1.339***	1.426***
Central	1.217***	1.168**	1.210*
Mountain	1.172**	1.535***	1.980***
Reference: Muslim			
Orthodox	0.941	0.887*	0.682***
Catholic	0.917	1.049	1.347***
Other religion	1.038	1.07	1.015
Reference: Less than 5 years			
Education (yrs) 5–8	1.166	0.934	0.841
Education (yrs) 9–11	0.776	0.889	0.739***
Education (yrs) 12–15	0.292***	0.629***	0.457***
Education (yrs) 16 plus	0.050***	0.429***	0.291***
Education 5–8 – interaction	0.963	1.179	–
Education 9–11 – interaction	1.360*	1.161	–
Education 12–15 – interaction	2.468***	1.488***	–
Education 16 plus – interaction	9.391**	2.055***	–
Age at risk of second and third births	–	0.998	0.925***
Age at risk of births – interaction	–	0.956***	0.972*

*Note: * 10%, ** 5%, ***1%. Interactions are created by splitting the duration variable at 4 for the first birth, and 2.5 years for second and third births. More detailed interactions can be constructed by splitting the duration interval into several segments, but did not seem necessary for the variables concerned here.*

Source: LSMS data 2002.

Table 7
Cox regression controlling for period effect

	First birth	Second birth
Reference: Before 1990		
Period effect 1990–2002	1.234*	0.837**
Period effect – interaction	0.779*	–
Child mortality ratio	2.464***	7.343***
Child mortality ratio – interaction		0.081***
Reference: Urban		
Rural	1.083	1.134*
Reference: Tirana		
Coastal	1.061	1.384***
Central	1.187*	1.231*
Mountain	1.06	1.625***
Reference: Muslim		
Orthodox	1.022	0.796*
Catholic	0.948	1.032
Other religion	1.116	0.913
Reference: Less than 8 years		
Education (yrs) 9–11	0.66	1.291
Education (yrs) 12–15	0.243***	1.026
Education (yrs)16 plus	0.079***	0.765
Education 9–11 interaction	3.823***	–
Education 12–15 interaction	7.061***	–
Education 16 plus interaction	13.034***	–
Age at risk of second birth	–	1.021
Age at risk – interaction	–	0.995

*Note: * 10%, ** 5%, ***1%. Interactions are created by splitting the duration variable at 4 for the first birth, and 2.5 years for second and third births. More detailed interactions can be constructed by splitting the duration interval into several segments, but did not seem necessary for the variables concerned here.*

Source: LSMS data 2002.

The pattern for the education variables is somewhat different. Here the hazard function is highest for those with lowest education, as is reported in Table 5. Those with higher education have a lower hazard rate, a natural result of delaying childbearing due to time spent in education. However, as women leave full time education, their rate of childbearing is accelerated compared to those with lower education, and again this tends to violate the proportionality assumption. This pattern is clear from Table 6, where the interactions with duration show a hazard ratio much higher than unity, reflecting the acceleration in childbearing. The effect of education is as expected: those undertaking higher education delay childbearing, but start a recuperation process as they complete their studies. A similar pattern is found for the second birth, whereas the educa-

tion variables do not violate the proportionality assumption in the estimates for the third birth. It is also worth noting that the cohorts do not violate the proportionality assumption for the second and third births.

Table 7 shows some interesting results with respect to the period effect for the first birth. Whereas Table 8 shows no period effect for the first birth, we see that this changes in Table 7 when controlling for duration effects. Compared to women having their first birth before 1990, the hazard rate is slightly higher in the first duration segment, but declines significantly after four years.

The other explanatory effects are as expected. The most important of these for the reduction of fertility is the survival of the previous child. We introduced here a variable that measures the ratio of deceased children to the total number of children for each woman, a variable that was included for all parities. The results show a strong effect of child survival on the level of fertility for each parity. They indicate that the rapid improvement of child mortality in Albania between 1950–2000 (Gjonça, A. 2001) played an important role in reducing the level of fertility. As expected this effect is much stronger for the higher parities.

Rural areas, together with the geographical areas outside Tirana, the capital, all have higher childbearing. Understandably the mountainous area of the country, which is also the least developed region of Albania, has the highest hazard ratios for the higher parities. It confirms the previous analyses that high levels of fertility are to be found in the less developed region of the north east. Education has a strong negative impact on all birth parities, especially on the third birth. This might be due to the fact that no matter how long education is, most Albanian women are having at least one child, as this still remains a universal practice and the norm even after dramatic social changes.

In contrast the effect of other factors, in particular education, becomes stronger at higher parities. Given that there is a continued expansion of education, with more women gaining higher education, it suggests that education is an important factor in determining future fertility levels in Albania. The effects of religion on first and second births are statistically insignificant. This can be related to the fact that the country banned religion for almost 30 years from 1963 to 1991. Thus, the main conclusion here is that, religion is not important. The only significant results are the ones for the third birth. Data shows that the Catholic population, mainly in the northern part of the country, has much higher hazard ratios than the Orthodox Christian and Muslim believers, based in the more developed south and centre of the country.

Table 8 shows the results of the second analysis where we only included women born in 1959 and after. Instead of controlling for cohorts we introduced a binary variable that captures the time period between 1990 and 2002. The great majority of the estimates remain highly similar to previous ones. The estimated period effects are however interesting. Whereas we would expect further fertility decline during the nineties, the period effect shows that there is

no delay in the *onset* of childbearing. Taking into account the fact that first birth remains universal in Albania, fertility decline only materialises through second and especially third births. Albanian society clearly remains a traditional one, despite social and economic changes during the 1990s, there is no postponement of the onset of childbearing (the first birth in our case). As a result strong norms surrounding the timing of marriage and the onset of childbearing remain, whereas the economic hardship associated with the economic and social upheavals reduces fertility through higher parities. This seems to be the easier adaptation to the changes.

Table 8

Results of Cox regression analysis controlling for periods (hazard ratios)

	First birth	Second birth	Third birth
Reference: Before 1990			
Period effect 1990–2002	1.018	0.840**	0.639***
Child mortality ratio	2.371***	2.579***	20.388***
Reference: Urban			
Rural	1.09	1.127*	1.651***
Reference: Tirana			
Coastal	1.057	1.388***	0.953
Central	1.181*	1.238*	0.914
Mountains	1.049	1.610***	1.744***
Reference: Muslim			
Orthodox	1.021	0.791*	0.467***
Catholic	0.941	1	2.009***
Other religion	1.121	0.92	1.44
Reference: Less than 8 yrs			
Education (yrs) 9–11	1.613**	1.427	0.71
Education (yrs) 12–15	1.002	1.135	0.469***
Education (yrs) 16 plus	0.593**	0.827	0.379**
Age at risk of first and second births	N/A	1.018*	0.940***

Note: *:10%, ** 5%, ***: 1%.
Source: LSMS data 2002.

CONCLUSION

Our analysis of the determinants of fertility has revealed highly interesting findings. Firstly they confirm previous research that the dramatic reduction of fertility in Albania came as a result of the reduction of fertility in all cohorts. The youngest cohorts while not delaying the entrance into childbearing (having a first birth is still universal), have reduced the fertility of the second and third

birth. Most importantly the reduction of fertility in the 1990s came mainly from the reduction of the second and mainly the third births.

When the two periods are compared interesting results can be established. First, during the 1990s the period effects concerning the first birth are not significant, while concerning the second and third births the period effects are stronger. The latter has been expected as the reduction in fertility came mainly from the reduction in these two parities. However, the fact that not much is changing with regards to the first birth might be explained by several factors. First, in 1990 maternity leave was expanded from six months to one year. During the early 1990s the collapse of state owned industries generated large redundancy programmes severely affecting the working population, in particular women. These two factors might have supported women's decision for having a first birth, respectively by continuing to have the first birth early and making it universal even in the 1990s. Most importantly there is evidence that with the introduction of the market economy, women in Albania are giving up full employment and in increased proportions they become housewives. The percentage of housewives has increased to 47% for women aged 15 years and over, from a period of full employment before 1990 (INSTAT 2004). The unemployment rate among women is also higher compared to men. Female unemployment rate is 28% as compared to 18.8% for men (INSTAT, 2004). All these factors, combined with the fact that Albanian society still remains traditional, (where having a first birth is the 'norm') can explain why there are no significant period effects for the first birth compared to other parities.

The findings also prove that female education has been one of the most important determinants in bringing fertility down in Albania. In this respect Albania is similar to other East European countries where social changes particularly the ones related to the expansion of female education during the communist period had strong effects in bringing fertility down. Again similar to Eastern European and in contrast to Southern European countries, the economic and social crises of the 1990s affected the timing of birth, but in Albanian only in the cases of second and third births. However, since Albania remains traditional concerning family values, the timing of the first birth was not affected. In this respect we cannot yet talk about a postponement of childbearing in the Albanian case (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002). Given the rapid improvements of mortality mainly affecting infant and child mortality, one expects that this improvement would also have a strong effect in reducing fertility. The results of these analyses confirm yet again the fact that the survival of the previous child has a significant effect in bringing Albanian fertility down, similar to other analysed countries (Palloni and Rafalimanana 1999; van de Walle 1986).

It is clear that Albania still remains a traditional society with regards to family formation and childbearing. Thus, marriage is still universal and cohabitation is almost non-existent. Childbearing outside marriage is insignificant and

stays at a ratio of 0.5% as compared to Greece being at 4.8% (one of the lowest in Europe) and to neighbouring Macedonia having a ratio of 11.2% in 2003 (INSTAT 2005). About 88.1% of 25–29 year old singles and about 37.5% of the married people of this age group still live with their parents. Knowledge of contraception has been increasing but at a slow pace. 90% of Albanian women are aware of at least one modern method of contraception, however, only 8% of married women use modern them (Morris et al. 2005). The traditional methods that brought fertility down during the communist period remain the main ones even today, with 67% of females and 74% of males reporting withdrawal as the main means of contraception. This is in contrast to the fast changes with regards to education, which continues to be high in the agenda of Albanian family. The number of registered students in higher education has increased by a third since 1990. The number of females at the university level has increased from 51% in 1990 to 60% in 1999 (Social Research Centre, INSTAT, 2003).

Albania is facing a contrasting experience; it has a family formation similar to the Southern European countries on the one hand, while on the other hand we can observe such short term effects of social and economic changes which occur in most other Eastern European countries. Interesting patterns of fertility behaviour are happening at a time where Albania faces huge political and economic changes. It seems that "traditionalism" or "norms" persist for the onset of family formation, whereas perhaps "modernity" and economic constraints reduce the number of children.

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SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE MOBILISATION OF HUMAN CAPITAL[1]

PERTTU SALMENHAARA[2]

ABSTRACT: *It is commonly argued that in ageing OECD economies, labour supply should be increased so that it would meet the demand when the working-age age cohorts decrease. The OECD has argued that foreign immigration would play a key role in increasing the supply. While these approaches seem to be well grounded, foreign immigrants in the OECD countries face persistent labour market deprivation: their labour market status are rarely in line with their education and other forms of human capital, while in the case of natives, the situation is much better. This equals both squandering of human capital and misery, bringing challenges to both economic sustainability/productivity and social cohesion. This article focuses on how different theories seek to explain the problem. Statistical evidence suggests that immigrants' labour market deprivation is not caused by the lack of human capital (e.g. education) but instead the lack of opportunities in using their skills. Certain kinds of social networks (social capital) are suggested to bring more out of these opportunities. These networks seem to be needed to improve immigrants' labour market status in the OECD countries.*

> *"Over the next few years OECD countries will be beginning to feel, if they have not done so already, the first consequences on the size of the working-age population of the fall in birth rates following the baby-boom period. The impact this is likely to have on international migration initially is as yet unclear (...) because there exist in every country sources of unutilised labour supply that can be mobilised in response to demand pressures" (OECD 2007, 30).*

> *"[W]e are at a loss to understand when predicted results fail to occur, as when blacks are unemployed during high aggregate demand" (Granovetter (1995 [1974], 5)*

[1] The title of this paper follows the title of Coleman's classic article "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital" (Coleman 1998) where he argued that social networks would help children gain *education.*

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INTRODUCTION

This article concerns the need to increase foreign immigration to the OECD countries because ageing of the population is projected to increase the demand for labour. Nonetheless immigrants face severe labour market integration problems, which in return causes similar problems supposed to be cured. Therefore we have to ask how underutilised labour supply could be mobilised in response to changes in the demand for labour. In short: we have to acknowledge the need to make immigrant integration policies more efficient. The ideas related to the mobilisation of migrant labour and presented in this article are close to the integration ideas presented in Kraal, Roosblad and Wrench (2009). The authors apply the point that Granovetter made: people do not integrate into the labour market in the way mainstream economic theory (neo-classical theory) suggests:

> "[i]t has long been assumed that the problem of labour market exclusion was one that affected primarily 'first-generation' immigrants but young ethnic minorities, even when they are born and educated in EU member states, still do not experience equal employment opportunities." (Kraal, Wrench, Roosblad et al. 2009, 10).

These fore-mentioned issues can be generalised via formulating two contradictions; ageing versus inefficient use of labour resources and the established belief on how people integrate to the labour market, versus how they do it in fact. In other words; firstly, shrinking working-age populations call for increased labour immigration while at the same time immigrants face persistent problems concerning labour market integration; and secondly, according to statistical data from the OECD countries (OECD 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009) this deprivation is not caused by their educational level, unlike it is often thought.

Thus a research question arises: the demographic situation makes it an imperative to strengthen immigrants' labour market integration, i.e. to mobilise their labour resources but since their labour market integration does not seem to depend on their educational background, how could the necessary mobilisation be carried out?

Ageing of the population is expected to decrease the percentage of working age people and creates demand for increased labour immigration. Ageing OECD countries are projected to face shortage of workers starting from 2010–2020 (OECD 2007, 30–32). The shortages are projected to have severe negative impact on the ageing OECD countries because the percentage of the working-age population would shrink, while at the same time the demand for elderly care services would increase (OECD 2007, 30–32; Valtiontilintarkastajat 2006, 76–79). The problem would not be limited to economic issues and the worsen-

ing dependency ratios, but finding enough workers with suitable education will also be challenging (OECD 2007, 20–32). Insufficient labour supply could also make companies invest in other countries, and this loss of foreign direct investment (FDI) would lead to loss of jobs and increasing unemployment rates.

Ageing of the population is projected to peak between 2010 and 2020, when the large baby boom age groups reach retirement age. In most OECD countries, age cohorts that enter working age during that period are remarkably smaller than those that exit. As a consequence, the supply of labour decreases and the exiting age groups become pensioners who consume elderly care services, health care services etc. This results in a demand pressure leading to widespread problems in the ageing societies; unbalanced public economy and labour shortage (Valtiontilintarkastajat 2006, 17). As a result the everyday man would have less opportunity to find a job, and also poorer welfare and unemployment benefits will be provided. In the end the micro level problems may threaten social cohesion in the OECD countries.

National political strategies in these countries seek to minimise the negative consequences of ageing by increasing labour supply in different ways. The ways of increasing labour supply include reintegrating unutilised labour resources that already exist in the domestic labour market, increasing immigration and improving the productivity of work (e.g. Finland: Valtiontilintarkastajat 2006, 31). It is often suggested that these measures would have to be used in parallel (Valtiontilintarkastajat 2006, 31).

Thus the immigration of foreigners alone is unlikely to be a sufficient solution for the problems brought by ageing. All three measures are needed and even when all of them are utilised, they may only minimise the negative effects. This problem is especially apparent in countries where ageing is most advanced.

This leads us to the second part of the contradiction that this article seeks to reinterpret. Mobilising domestic unused labour resources is unlikely to satisfy the needs and thus immigrants have a crucial role in most OECD countries' strategies that seek to increase labour supply during the worst ageing period; *however* their labour resources are particularly poorly mobilised.

Immigrants experience persistent integration problems in the OECD labour markets. The European situation is comparable to the situation in the entire OECD; immigrants' labour market integration problems (mobilisation problems) have four main forms: firstly, getting employed and the unemployment rates (OECD 2008a, 68–92; 2008b, 113–161; 2009, 12–26; Nilsson and Wrench 2009; Zorlu 2002); secondly, getting employed in other than atypical jobs (Kraal, Wrench, Roosblad 2009, 11; Forsander 2002); thirdly, getting employed in jobs that match the person's education (immigrants and women face a

high risk of deskilling)[3][4] and fourthly, a high risk of getting paid less than people with the same education level do (high risk of getting under-paid work; OECD 2007, 136).[5]

Immigrants' labour market integration problems are not limited only to these dimensions. A considerable proportion of immigrants have retreated from the official labour market altogether. According to OECD statistics, between 2000 and 2006 foreign-born people's labour market participation rate (the employed plus the unemployed) was remarkably lower when compared to the native-born (OECD 2008a, 113–127).

The issue is complex because there are thus many variables concerned, i.e. thus many indicators: looking at one variable such as unemployment rate does not give a complex image of a person's labour market status. For example, some immigrant nationality groups' employment rate may be high, even higher than that of natives, but this tells nothing about how stable these jobs are and whether they match the concerned people's education. Even more, cross-sectional data aggregate showing a given group's labour market status at one point of time is far from ideal.[6] But here it is sufficient to show that immigrants are in a deprived situation in the OECD countries' labour markets. Immigrants' labour market deprivation is suggested to cause not only the fore-mentioned macro economic problems, but due to already existing conflicts in the integration of immigrants, they may also lead to problems in social cohesion.

The mobilisation strategy promoted in this paper is based on the results of previous research on social mobility (Granovetter 1995 [1974], 1983, 1985; Burt 1992, 2000, 2005; Lin 2000; Portes 1998, 2000; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Massey et al. 2005, 31; Portes and Bach 1985; Rusinovic 2006, 81–108; Ahmad 2005; Behtoui 2006; Kraal, Roosblad and Wrench 2009).[7] The starting point or "hypothesis" is that for the most part immigrants' deprivation in the OECD countries' labour markets is not caused by "human capital mismatch", but instead other factor(s) disturb their labour market integration. Grounds for this hypothesis are delivered in previous research literature and statistics that are provided in this article.

[3] According to OECD statistics, in the years following 2000 employed foreign-born people more often held a job that would have required lesser qualifications than would theoretically have been available to him at his education level (OECD 2008a, 136).

[4] The labour market status by country of birth, country of residence and gender in the OECD is presented as a cross-tabulation in OECD 2008b. Labour force participation rate: OECD 2008a, 118, unemployment rate OECD 2008a, 120

[5] "An individual will be considered over-qualified in terms of wage levels if more than a certain percentage of the persons holding a diploma of the next lowest category earn more than that individual" (OECD 2007, 138).

[6] The shortcomings of cross-sectional and aggregate data are discussed elsewhere.

[7] A good comparative study about the impact of social networks on immigrants' labour market success is also van Nieuwenhuyze 2009.

The article is structured as follows: firstly, population and economic trends in the OECD countries are discussed with a special attention to immigrants,[8] their education and labour market status. Secondly the Finnish situation is presented as an example. Thirdly three rival theories about the causes of immigrants' labour market status are discussed. Weaknesses of these explanations are discussed after which I present a fourth theory. According to it current policy approaches would fail in making full use of immigrants' workforce because they would disregard the impact that social structure, namely social networks, have on social mobility. The fourth explanation suggests that social networks would create inequality of opportunity so that immigrants would have poorer opportunities to find work and career advancement than natives do.

The labour markets I analyse are those of the OECD. The data is based mostly on the OECD's Sopemi and Dioc statistics (OECD 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009).[9] I use Finland as an example country, using documents for example by Statistics Finland and the Finnish Government.

1. AGEING IN THE OECD COUNTRIES

Ageing of the population made it an imperative to use labour resources more efficiently, to develop immigrant integration policies, and to mobilise both those labour resources that already exist in the country, as well as those that immigrate. For example in its 2007 Sopemi report, the OECD suggests that immigrants' labour market deprivation would be caused mainly by inequality of opportunity (OECD 2007, 68), i.e. not by individuals' competencies like the human capital theory (Becker 1993 [1964]; Borjas 1985; Dustmann and Fabbri

[8] The concept "immigrant" is empirically or statistically invalid. It does not refer to any clear measurable group of people. In this sub-chapter I refer to the country of birth because I apply OECD data (OECD 2007, 2008a, 2008b) which is based on this definition. This group of people is often called first-generation immigrants.

[9] The Sopemi is the OECD's continuous reporting system on migration. Sopemi reports have been published annually since the early 1970s. They are mostly based on data from OECD member states' population registers. DIOC data is taken from a new OECD database founded in 2008. Dioc reports focus more narrowly on the immigrant population.

2003) suggests.[10] The OECD (2007, 68) suggests that "[e]quality of employment rates is an objective which is partly attainable, subject to equality of opportunity".

Also recent research suggests that inequality of opportunity would be the main cause of inequality in the labour market (Kraal, Roosblad and Wrench 2009; Ahmad 2005; Behtoui 2006; Makkonen 2010). On basis of existing research literature and statistics it seems rather obvious that certain kinds of social networks could help immigrants to find work. This is why social capital, meaning social networks that mediate employment information, could possibly be used in the mobilisation of human capital.[11]

However first we should look at the ageing problem and its consequences in OECD countries. The ageing problem is already acute in the OECD: as the large baby boom cohorts exit working age while at the same time labour resources are used inefficiently, the percentage of employed people decreases heavily: only the pace and timing varies between the OECD countries (OECD 2007, 30–31).The rate of ageing in the OECD can be seen from the United Nations' statistics that describe the relative size of the working-age population in countries the UN classifies as "advanced economies"; most of these economies are OECD countries.

The ageing situation in the advanced economies is illustrated in Figure 1. The decreasing number of the working-age people in relation to the elderly increases the dependency ratios. According to United Nations' projections the overall dependency ratios would not increase much, but the size of the elderly age cohorts would. The number of the elderly in relation to other age groups would be more than three times higher in 2050 than it was in 1950.

[10] The definition of "human capital" has broadened since the concept was coined in the 1960s (by Becker 1993 [1964]). The original definition included three main components (education, work experience and health) but later several slightly subjective components have been added that try to fit labour market discrimination in the theory. Becker tried this himself in the 1950s (Becker 1996 [1957]) and later the including of language skill in the definition and concepts such as "country-specific human capital" have taken the concept rather close to the established theories of employment discrimination and some branches of the social capital theory.

[11] The same goes with natives but this paper focuses on immigrants.



Source: United Nations 2008. The exact numbers are available on-line at http://esa.un.org/unpp/[12]

Figure 1
Old-age dependency ratio, advanced economies

The problem is acute: OECD statistics and projections (OECD 2007, 31) suggest that the working-age population has already started to decrease in several OECD countries such as Japan, Czech Republic and Italy and will reach almost all other OECD countries in the period 2010–2015, starting with countries such as Germany, Hungary and Finland.

According to the OECD (2007, 30–31) this increase is rapid, but would not be a problem in itself to the OECD countries; they have previously experienced such increases. The increase of the old-age dependency ratio is problematic when combined with the high consumption levels of the elderly (OECD 2007, 30–31) in terms of pensions and care services. The shrinking working-age population is not expected to be able to satisfy the demand in the OECD area (OECD 2007, 30–31).

As a result of ageing, public finance in the OECD countries may show deficit and consequently, the core of the welfare state – public services and income transfers – could be in danger. There are some exceptions, for example, Turkey, where the fertility rate is still high (United Nations 2008).

[12] For more analysis see Salmenhaara 2008.

The problems that the decreasing percentage of working-age people is likely to cause could be made even worse because of globalisation. Globalisation has liberated the international movement of both economic capital and labour. It is widely claimed that the third core pillar of the welfare state – employment – could also suffer. A shrinking and costly working-age population is likely to lead to labour shortages and would probably lead private companies to move their production to other countries, where the demanded labour is available (Florida 2005, 16; Sassen 1998). Ageing of the population may thus lead to increasing off-shoring of production and loss of foreign direct investment, leading to decreasing number of jobs and increasing unemployment rate (Florida 2005).[13] In sum: while ageing could increase the general unemployment rate, the public sector's capacity to give out unemployment benefits could be insufficient.

Migration and labour in OECD countries

Apart from the problems that the status quo causes to the individuals concerned, the deprivation is likely to cause macro level problems, namely problems to the OECD countries' political strategies against ageing. The root of the macro level problems is that ageing is projected to create a demand pressure of labour (i.e. labour shortage), immigration is designed to be one of the key means against the demand pressure but immigration does not increase the supply of labour in the designed way if immigrants do not end up in jobs that match their education.

[13] The economic scientist Borjas (1985) has studied the impact of globalisation on the international movement of economic capital and labour. In his influential article he notes that whereas in the 20th century labour markets and capital markets where usually national with strict national limits, in the globalised world national boundaries have become lower, which has liberated the international movement of capital and labour. The main consequence of the free movement of capital is that companies are rather free to move their production facilities to whichever country they have the best preconditions for production; such as the demanded kinds of labour (quantity and quality, price), infrastructure that supports the production, etc. Ageing of the population threatens the availability of labour and may thus makes companies off-shore their production – and jobs. Like Florida (2005, 16) puts it: "[Companies] have always sought to attract the best talent; the difference today is that instead of bringing that talent to their existing locations companies are setting up facilities where that talent already exists" (Florida 2005, 16). A report by the International Labour Organisation (Stalker 2000) stresses that the freedom of companies to operate offshore has grown from the early 1990s (Stalker 2000, esp. 8–9) because the countries themselves have deliberately chosen to retreat from political control over many sectors of the economy. In practice this means privatisation of state-owned companies and promoting free trade (Stalker 2000, 9).

A significant percentage of immigrants face difficulty in integrating into the labour market[14] and unlike it is often thought these integration problems are usually not caused by human capital deficit of these individual immigrants (Kraal, Wrench, Roosblad et al. 2009, 11–12). To be sure: immigrants' education and other human capital ("ability" like Burt 2000 puts it) does not cause all of their labour market integration problems. Thus the problems are in integration policies.

This ineffective use of labour concerns also people who already are in the labour market. This underlines the need to focus not only on increasing demand-matching labour supply through skill-selective immigration (labour immigration) but to mobilise these unused resources.

In the OECD the problem of ineffective use of labour may be expected to become acute also around 2010–2020 (United Nations 2008; OECD 2007, 30–32). Public finance, public services and employment will be threatened if the OECD countries fail to attract immigrants and integrate them to the labour market. Currently, advanced economies need demand-meeting labour immigration to sustain them. The world's countries compete over workers (Florida 2005), on the whole, both those with the highest and lowest level of education (Stalker 2000, 135). The situation is somewhat similar to the period between the 1950s and the 1970s in Europe, where wealthier European countries used Turkey and Northern African countries as their "labour reservoir" (Castles and Miller 2003, 123–128), with two key differences. Today, the demand exceeds supply across the OECD in highly skilled work and the "reservoir" is the entire world instead of only a few countries in Africa and adjacent to Europe (Stalker 2000).

The percentage of foreign-born residents in the OECD and Europe has increased rapidly since the 1970s. In Europe, since 1988 immigration has been responsible for a greater share of population growth than natural increase (births minus deaths). In the year 2000, foreign-born people represented nine percent of the population over 15 (OECD 2008a, 16). This approximate average figure includes much variation between countries and areas; for example in Finland the percentage was below three, while in several countries such as Switzerland, the percentage was ten times higher (OECD 2008b, 69). Immigrants tend to concentrate in urban areas, which residential pattern affects their labour market trajectories and conditions of labour market integration. In some European cities some fifty percent of residents were either foreign-born or children of a foreign-born parent (or parents) (Penninx 2006, 8).

These figures show that foreign-born people represent a large stock of moderately well educated workers. They also show that currently immigrants' labour force is least efficiently used in the OECD countries. Ageing OECD coun-

[14] (EU-27: Kraal, Wrench, Roosblad et al. 2009, 10: aggregate data from the OECD: see below).

tries should both increase the productivity of work and the supply of labour and the realisation of these aims depends largely on foreign immigration. However, if qualified immigrants face labour market integration problems like this also in the future, then OECD countries' political strategies against ageing are in trouble. In some countries and areas, the percentage of foreign-born people is substantial, leading to heavy local effects of the squandered resources.

In societies where political strategies against ageing are largely based on immigration and the efficient use of labour, squandering labour resources in this way is a problem. Foreign-born people's labour market deprivation is a problem to the OECD countries not only because immigrants play a critical role in their anti-ageing strategies but also because immigrants represent a large and a growing share of the OECD's population and labour force. In 2006, the share of the 15+ OECD population that was foreign-born stood at nine percent and 21 percent of them had tertiary education. (OECD 2008b, 16).

The native population's age structures are not the only problem; Florida (2005, 7–16) argues that even without ageing, countries can hardly afford inefficient use of labour in their labour market. The good educational profile of immigrant populations in the OECD countries shows that already currently the OECD countries manage to attract the required type of workers who are well educated. However, for some reason this large pool of labour often does not end up in labour market positions that would match their education. There is insufficient much time to argue over the reasons for this, nevertheless, immigrant workers have to be used efficiently before ageing hits the OECD countries with its full force. Now let us look at the case of Finland.

2. FINLAND'S POLITICAL STRATEGIES CONCERNING AGEING AND MIGRATION

According to population projections, by 2030 the Finnish population will age more rapidly than in any other EU member state and the percentage of working-age people will start to decrease in the year 2010 (Valtiontilintarkastajat 2006, 14). This aging will also happen slightly ahead of other EU countries: in 2030, the old-age dependency ratio is projected to be the worst in the EU, whereas in 2050 the ratio is projected to be under the EU average (Valtiontilintarkastajat 2006, 17). Aside from this, ageing in Finland causes roughly the same political challenges as in the other OECD countries. The timing of ageing is described in the OECD projection below; the working-age population shrinks slightly at different pace in different OECD countries.



Source: OECD 2007, 31; 2008a, 56.

Figure 2
Expected net change in the percentage of working-age population in selected OECD countries, 2005–2020

The official Finnish Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT)[15] has calculated possible macro economic impacts of aging in Finland; these consequences are roughly speaking the same in all OECD countries (OECD 2007, 30–31). The VATT has created three alternative scenarios, a positive, a neutral and a negative one. It is suggested that ageing will result in a public finance deficit, except in the "positive scenario" where global economic development is ideal until 2030 (Valtiontilintarkastajat 2006, 20–31). Without such positive development, the tax rate was predicted to increase to about 50 percent, i.e. the level of Sweden (Valtiontilintarkastajat 2006, 20–31). In addition, the state is expected to have to utilise foreign loans (Valtiontilintarkastajat 2006, 20–31). It is also to be noted that even by now labour shortages exist in some areas and are expected to hit caring, nursing and the construction business especially hard when the large age cohorts retire (Valtiontilintarkastajat 2006, 90–91).

Concerning the employment situation and ageing there are two main differences between Finland and the other OECD countries: Firstly, unlike in the

[15] http://www.vatt.fi/en/ (July 10, 2010).

OECD in general, Japan and many Southern European countries, most of the unused labour resources are not women but the elderly. In Finland as in other Scandinavian countries, the employment rate of women is practically the same as that of men, whereas the general retirement age of about 60 years is often considered to be rather low.

The second Finnish peculiarity is that even though the aging trend and related macro economic and socio-political problems were common knowledge at least from the 1980s onwards the political reaction was postponed even up to 2006; only then the government stated that ageing poses societal challenges that should be addressed at governmental level (Hallituksen… 2006; Salmenhaara 2008). Early ageing and late political reaction mean there is little time to increase labour supply sufficiently. This is the reason for the rather heavy handed methods used. How these methods are to be realised politically remains to be seen: in early 2009 the government suggested that the general retirement age should be increased to 63 years of age, which caused a domestic political furore that was headline news for almost a week and made the labour union movement threaten a general strike.[16]

Unused labour in Finland and ageing

Among these peculiarities let us elaborate the first: much unused labour exists in the elderly age groups but rather little among women, and that the early and heavy ageing is likely to find a rather poorly prepared Finland. In Finland, women's employment rate is almost equal to that of men (Tilastokeskus 2009).[17] Concerning several other aspects of labour market status gender inequality in the labour market has prevailed for decades but concerning employment it has almost disappeared. One reason for this has been the building-up of the universal welfare state since the 1950s: the established public services have employed mostly women in caring and nursing jobs (Karisto, Takala and Haapola 1998, 171–178). While women entered the labour force their traditional role in the family changed. Thus, the welfare state was an important factor in increasing women's employment rate (Karisto, Takala and Haapola 1998, 171–178).

However, women's increased employment rate did not amount to "emancipation" because the economic sectors where women typically were employed

[16] News of the Finnish Broadcasting Company (in Finnish): http://yle.fi/uutiset/talous_ja_politiikka/2009/03/vanhanen_ja_ay-johtajat_jatkavat_elakekiistan_puintia_ensi_viikolla_589749.html (July 10, 2010).

[17] These statistics refer to the period before the worst impact of the global economic downturn ("crisis"). The relation has however not changed much until when this was written (May 2010).

became generally poorly paid (Karisto, Takala and Haapola 1998, 171–178). From a critical perspective it can thus be said that the Finnish welfare state was – and is – partly based on cheap labour provided by women. This issue is not of primary importance in this article but interestingly parallels the feminist critique of the welfare state (Pierson 1998, 66–76). In relation to ageing it is worth noting that the ageing of the population is expected to increase the demand for labour in the same branches (Valtiontilintarkastajat 2006, 90–91.

When it comes to mobilisation needs, women's poor salaries are not the main issue, rather it is that in Finland there exist few unused labour resources among women but many among the elderly. One of its reasons is that the average retirement age is low when compared to some other countries.

Population projections suggest ageing will hit Finland a few years earlier than other European countries because its baby boom generations were born slightly earlier. Whereas in Italy and Austria baby boomers were born in the early 1950s, in Finland they were born immediately following the war: the peak years were 1949 and 1950 (Karisto, Takala and Haapola 1998, 58). Also the size of the baby boom cohorts was larger in relation to the cohorts after them. This means that ageing will not only hit Finland a few years before most other European countries but that the impact will also be greater. Age cohorts that leave the working age are exceptionally large by international standards (Karisto, Takala and Haapola 1998, 58).

The impact will be even more extreme as during previous decades Finland has not installed any political measures that would have balanced out the population's distorted age structure. These could have included: increasing the birth rate instead of letting it decrease for fifty years from the 1950s to 2009; increasing immigration. Immigration decreases the average age of the population because foreign-born people's age structure is usually younger than that of the native-born (OECD 2008a, 64). In addition Finland experienced large-scale emigration to Sweden around 1960–1970. In the peak years of 1989 and 1970 over 80 000 people migrated (Koskinen et al. 2007, 257). In addition during the war some 170 000 people, mostly war invalids and children, were sent to Sweden (Koskinen et al. 2007, 257). Most of these people belong to the baby-boom generation themselves and therefore do not decrease the average age.[18]

[18] Many have re-migrated from Sweden to Finland but in 2005 it was estimated that the number of Finnish-born people and their descendants in Sweden was over 500 000 people (Koskinen et al. 2007, 257).

The late political reaction

Now let us consider the second peculiarity of Finland: the very late political reaction. The demographic trend of ageing could already be seen from population projections soon after the baby boomers as birth rates started to decrease. In the 1990s, general discussion of labour shortages was concerned merely with shortages caused by economic fluctuations (Paananen 1999). At approximately the same time the demographer Parkkinen (1998) wrote about the coming "century of the elderly". Like Paananen, statistics authorities of Statistics Finland were aware that ageing would cause labour shortages and that the general discussion had lost its focus on the long-term population trend.

Successive Finnish governments of the right-wing, the Centre Party and the Social Democrats did nothing about the issue from the 1950s to 2006 even though the demographic trend was well known especially after 1980. From a political scientist's viewpoint, it is difficult to understand why the political reaction was delayed even though the demographic trend and the likely macro economic and socio-political impacts were well known. In its 2003 immigration political programme the government continued to ignore the fact that labour immigration would be needed in order to maintain Finnish public finance, employment and the economy.

A few years later the subsequent government's political programme stressed that immigration was important for precisely the reasons that were curiously ignored in the 2003 programme. The 2006 programme marked a drastic change in the history of Finnish immigration policy. This change in policies was even more mystifying given that the governments that produced both the 2003 and 2006 programmes contained almost the same parties, most of the same ministers and the same Prime Minister. The demographic trend was certainly known in 2003 but policy was not grounded in the requirements of the labour market. But now let us see what problems might arise if immigrants are seen as a major source of labour supply but their employment problems are ignored?

3. APPROACHES TO IMMIGRANTS' LABOUR MARKET DEPRIVATION

In this section I present four alternative theories about the causes of immigrants' labour market deprivation. These are ideal types, i.e. "pure types" that exist nowhere in reality (Giddens 1997, 591). In reality different explanations of immigrants' labour market deprivation include elements from two or more of these four theories.

The approaches are 1) the human capital theory; 2) a claim according to which recognising immigrants' educational credentials would be thus difficult and this leads to their deprivation; 3) the dual labour market theory, which

stresses the impact of social structure on immigrants' labour market success; and 4) the social capital theory that suggests that the inequality of opportunity would cause much of the deprivation. This paper leans on this fourth theory because the other theories have weaknesses discussed below.

3.1. The human capital theory

Immigrants' labour market integration problems have persisted for decades; in Western Europe for example, immigrants' labour market status has been deprived since the 1960s when the so-called "guest worker strategies" brought masses of low-skilled immigrant labour to fill in gaps in domestic labour supply in the wealthier European countries (Castles and Miller 2003, 123–128; Sassen 1999, 102–104; Stalker 2000, 38–39; Penninx and Roosblad 2000, 5–7). At the time, levels of education could explain some of the deprivation: for example Zorlu (2002, 1) argues that in the late 1970s, the general up-grading of skill requirements in European labour markets would have caused employment problems to immigrants, many of whom were relatively low skilled back then (Castles and Miller 2003, 123–128).

However, it is doubtful whether lower education could account for all aspects of deprivation. This can be seen when immigrants' and natives' labour market status are compared with reference to education. As mentioned above an immigrant groups' labour market status can – and should – be measured with several different variables. However only one is taken into account when human capital theory is utilised: unemployment rate. The human capital theory suggests that people's unemployment rate should become lower when their education level becomes higher (i.e. a negative correlation). OECD data from the year 2006 shows that this correlation depended on the country of birth: according to this aggregate data, the native-born people benefited more from education than the foreign-born. As the below table shows in 2006 the formal education of the foreign-born was slightly higher than that of the native-born (OECD 2008b, 82).

Table 1

Official education levels of the native-born versus foreign-born populations, percent; Unweighted OECD average

Education	Native-born	Foreign-born
Primary	35,8	33,1
Secondary	47,3	44,8
Tertiary	17,0	22,1

Source Database of Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC), (OECD 2008b, 82).

These education levels had little to do with the labour market statuses of these groups. Immigrants' unemployment rates were significantly higher than those of natives in most of the OECD countries with the exception of Hungary and the United States.



Sources: European countries: European Union Labour Force Survey (data provided by Eurostat); Australia: Labour Force Survey; Canada: Census of population, 2006; United States: Current Population Survey, March supplement.

Figure 3
Unemployment rate of immigrants relative to the native-born, percentage, 2006

Immigrants were thus not deprived in the labour market because of their educational level. On the basis of their educational level their unemployment rate would have been lower than those of the resident locals. Taking a more detailed view on the issue we can look at each educational level separately. At each educational level, the unemployment rate of foreign-born people was higher than that of the native-born (OECD 2007, 89–90). In addition once immigrants got employed they more often ended up in jobs that did not match

their education; i.e. their over-qualification rate[19] was significantly higher than that of the native-born (OECD 2007, 89–90).

Obviously then, the cause should be other than their educational background. However, one of the alternatives, favoured by many human capital theorists is exactly this: that immigrants' individual characteristics or "ability" (Becker 1993 [1964]) such as education would more or less cause their labour market status (Becker 1993 [1964], 15–26). As shown above this suggestion did not hold in the OECD between 2000 and 2010. There is empirical proof of a positive correlation between education and labour market position among both immigrants and among natives (i.e. Borjas 1985) but from the perspectivee of human capital approach there was no evidence that the one would cause the other, i.e. that properties of individuals would determine their labour market status.

3.2. "Recognition of foreign education"

Another suggestion is that it is difficult for immigrants to gain the recognition of their foreign education. Difficulty in recognising foreign education would explain why foreign-born people often work in jobs that do not match their education. This suggested reason is interesting since comparing education obtained in different countries has been possible since the early 1970s through the ISCED classification that was developed by UNESCO.[20] The ISCED classification compares degrees between countries and thus acts as a guide. The classification is not simple because in one country it may take more time to gain a given degree than in others (OECD 2007, 145–136). It is possible that the recruiters of workers are not aware of the ISCED system nor how to compare the degrees in other ways but this "unawareness" may also be an excuse for recruitment discrimination.

So behind this explanation we have to take into account that migrants are discriminated via not recognising their educational levels, or in other words the local labour markets are protected via deskilling. Public authorities and employers are interested in maintaining a gap between educational level and the actual job of the migrant.

[19] Technically speaking this means that employed foreign-born people more often held a job that would have required lesser qualifications than would theoretically have been available to him at his education level (OECD 2008a, 136).

[20] More information about the standard: http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced_1997.htm (April 30, 2010)

3.3. The dual labour market

The dual labour market theory suggests that in advanced industrial economies, the labour market have two segments. The primary segment is characterised by stable, skilled jobs, and capital-intensive production (Massey et al. 2005, 30). In the primary segment, it would be productive for employers to invest into workers, "leading to the accumulation of firm-specific human capital" (Massey et al. 2005, 30). Because of these investments, labour would be a highly valuable factor of production for employers and firing employees would be costly (Massey et al. 2005, 30).

The secondary segment would be labour-intensive and would show the opposite characteristics. Production would depend less on workers' skills and thus employers would have to invest less into workers' human capital (Massey et al. 2005, 30). As a result, it would be less costly to fire employees, leading to less stable jobs (Massey et al. 2005, 30). The same dualism would also show in salaries: more skilled workers in the primary segment would have higher salary and both their salary and jobs would depend less on economic fluctuations (Massey et al. 2005, 30).

Without going further into details the dual labour market theory is rather similar to the segmented labour market theory (Massey et al. 2005, 28–30). Immigrants however do not fully fit into the theories, as they tend to form a third segment that has characteristics of both the first and the second segment (Massey et al. 2005, 31; Portes and Bach 1985). Portes and Bach (Portes and Bach 1985; also Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993) noticed this when conducting an empirical study of the Cuban community in Miami. The third segment is comprised of "ethnic enclaves" that affect immigrants' labour market trajectories. In ethnic enclaves, individuals' human capital would not determine their labour market status as strongly as in the first and second segment. Especially large (urban) concentrations of co-ethnics would create a demand for cultural products and make individuals' labour market status depend more on their social contacts within the enclave (Portes and Bach 1985; Wilson and Portes 1980; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). Newly arrived immigrants' labour market trajectories would thus depend to a large extent on these individuals' social connections (i.e. social, cultural and network capital); this would detach the correlation between human capital and labour market status. Thus, the human capital explanation would be weakened.

Both the human capital theory and the dual labour market theory have problems in explaining immigrants' labour market status. In ethnic enclaves, the correlation between human capital and labour market status becomes less obvious than either of human capital theory or the dual/segmented labour market theory suggest.

4. DEPRIVATION AND INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

When the entire OECD is considered between 2003 and 2006 formal education does not account for foreign-born people's labour market status very well. During this period foreign-born people's labour market status in the receiving country was not only deprived when compared to the native-born, but even more so when the level of education was taken into account. In the words of the OECD (2007, 68), "[e]quality of employment rates is an objective which is partly attainable, subject to equality of opportunity"

This approach explains immigrants' labour market deprivation with inequality of opportunities. As argued above historically human capital could explain deprivation, but nowadays the situation is different and reasons for immigrants' labour market deprivation in ageing OECD countries may not be the same as they were in the 1970s. Also the difficulty in recognising foreign degrees and deficit in language skill (Dustmann and Fabbri 2003) may be to blame to some extent but not fully. Statistics show that human capital factors do not fully explain why immigrants are deprived in the labour market. For example in Finland, Paananen's analysis showed that recruiters based their recruitment decisions partly on the basis of classifications of ethnic groups and different nationalities (Paanen 1999, 58–67, sections 5 and 6). Instead of only education and other individual abilities some other factor(s) obviously pull down immigrants' labour market status (Kraal, Roosblad, Wrench et al. 2009). Inequality of opportunity, including discrimination, is the somewhat only remaining causing factor. The importance of language skill is generally exaggerated by employers (Paananen 1999) and thus some researchers have coined the term "norm deficit" to explain immigrants' employment difficulties (Knocke 2008). "Norm deficit" is already closer to discrimination and inequality of opportunity than the human capital explanations.

Abandoning the human capital explanation of immigrants' deprivation has a crucial effect on designing integration policy and mobilisation strategy. Designing and implementing immigration and economic policy on basis of the human capital theory simply does not seem to work. In the words of Granovetter (1995 [1974], 5) "we are at a loss to understand when predicted results fail to occur, as when blacks are unemployed during high aggregate demand". Just place "immigrants" in the place of "blacks" and we can pose the same question.

For the most part immigrants' labour market deprivation in the OECD countries is caused by other factors than human capital deficit. On the contrary actually their human capital is wasted and this waste should be minimised before ageing begins to meet the OECD countries with its full force between 2010 and 2020. There are thus evident reasons to develop the OECD countries' immigration policies. On basis of previous research it seems immigrant integration poli-

cies would be based on faulty assumption of what makes immigrants integrate into the labour market, e.g. how their labour force could be mobilised in response to the demand pressures of the ageing OECD countries.

OECD (2007, 96–115) divides its member states' immigration policies into three phases that exemplify this issue well. The first phase is called "attracting", and the last is "integrating". Florida (2005, 3) even goes as far as concluding that "[e]very key dimension of international economic leadership, from manufacturing excellence to scientific and technological advancement will depend on this ability": to attract and mobilise successfully in order to get the right workers to the right jobs in the labour market (Florida speaks of the USA, therefore "leadership" equals competitive edge in relation to other countries).

The projected development of the dependency ratios shows that during ageing this competitiveness is not a question of how to better other countries. Instead it is merely a question of how national economies could survive – i.e. to minimise the potentially disastrous effects of population ageing. Integration and mobilisation seem to be the actual challenge that ageing societies face. As was shown above, the OECD countries manage to attract well educated immigrants but for some reason fail in labour market integration, i.e. in using their abilities efficiently.

For reframing integration issues and policies we should look for social capital and network theory. The observation related to the importance of networks was made in the early 1970s by Granovetter (1995 [1974]). This original finding is important both theoretically and empirically because it propped the way for a whole research genre of sociological study of the economy (the development is described well i.e. in Portes 1998). Granovetter conducted an empirical study about individuals' career patterns. The research showed that the studied job seekers' social contacts had a crucial impact on how their labour market careers developed. Granovetter sought to find out how individuals had ended up in the job they currently held. His data included about three hundred non-self-employed persons who lived in Newton, Massachusettes in 1961 (Granovetter 1995 [1974], 185). Granovetter simply asked them a bunch of background variables and how they had ended up in their current job. The results showed that in sixty percent of cases, the studied job seekers had got information about their current job from their social contacts (Granovetter 1995 [1974], 41–50). This finding has later been repeated in several studies that have used the same kind of interview data. Several studies were done instantly after 1974 and are listed in Granovetter 1983; a great number of studies have more or less repeated the same interview in different settings, ending up with the same kinds of results (i.e. Ahmad 2005; Behtoui 2006). Granovetter concluded that job seekers' career patterns would follow information about employment opportunities (Granovetter 1995 [1974], 41–50). He stressed that the impact of social connections in getting a job should not be ignored: "behaviour and insti-

tutions ... are so constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent [like the neoclassical theory does] is a grievous misunderstanding" Granovetter (1985, 482). Results of his 1974 study showed this, and the result has been confirmed repeatedly. Classic studies about social embeddednesss in the sense of Granovetter are the fore-mentioned Portes' studies about ethnic enclaves (i.e. Massey et al. 2005, 31; Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).

From the late 1980s, most of the empirical evidence about the impact of social networks on individuals' labour market trajectories has come from immigration studies. This is because immigrants are one of the most obvious examples of the impact that social structure has on individual action (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). Stripped from their previous social ties in the country of origin they depend heavily on social networks in the country of immigration (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Massey et al. 2005, 30; Portes and Bach 1985). The impact is shown by time series data.

Borjas used statistical econometric data to describe how immigration cohorts' wages in the US increased between the 1960s and 1980s. The data shows that immigrants' salaries became closer to natives' wages when the duration of stay in the country of immigration increased: for example, people who immigrated in the 1960s got much lower wages than natives in the same jobs but gradually (Figure 4) immigrants' wage levels improved. The same kind of development has shown to happen also in the labour market status in general (i.e. other working conditions and stability of employment). This effect is shown in empirical longitudinal studies for example in the cases of Hungary (Gödri 2008)[21] and Finland (Forsander 2002;[22] Linnanmäki 2007).[23] The figure below shows the principle.

[21] Empirical details: intereview data, 2001–2006. "The study examines the factors influencing the labour market integration of immigrants from the neighbouring countries in Hungary as revealed by a longitudinal survey. The first wave of data collection was carried out in summer 2002, on a representative sample of 1015 persons who had gained immigrant status in 2001. The second wave took place between December 2005 and February 2006 when 690 members of the previous sample were questioned." (Gödri 2008, 563).

[22] Empirical details: see footnote 23 (Linnanmäki 2007). Linnanmäki's study basically continues the same time series, although Forsander's data also included interviews and statistical data from the labour administration. Forsander studied the years 1989–1993 and used triangulation to integrate the different types of data with each other.

[23] Empirical details: "The data was collected from Statistics Finland's different individual-level longitudinal statistics. The data includes a 33 percent sample of people who immigrated to Finland between the years 1989–1993 and who were in working age (15–64) when they immigrated. The data concerns the year of immigration and the years 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2004. The sample consists of every third case of the target population. The target population includes immigration cohorts from the years between 1989 and 1993." (Linnanmäki 2007, 36, free translation from Finnish by myself).



Figure 4
Immigrants' salaries improve as the duration of stay in the country of immigration increases. A = natives' wages, B = immigrants' wages

Even though Borjas does not use the social capital theory to explain this increase, a great number of research results suggest that the development of social ties would explain it. For instance Gödri (2008) focused especially on how the development of immigrants' social networks has improved their labour market status in Hungary between 2001–2006.[24] More data and evidence about the impact of social networks is provided by and listed for example in Rusinovic 2006, 81–108 and in van Nieuwenhuyze 2009. In their comparative study about West African immigrants' labour market trajectories in Spain and Belgium, van Nieuwenhuyze (2009) shows that individuals' job opportunities are largely affected by their social contacts and contact networks, especially in the case of newly arrived immigrants.

The research genre that Granovetter started, termed as "new economic sociology" (Granovetter 1995 [1974]) also has an additional vital theoretical insight. The theory is based on Granovetter's finding that contacts between individuals could be divided in two kinds that would differ in how efficiently they deliver job information. This is actually the key to understanding how ethnic enclaves are built and how they work. Granovetter expands this theoretical issue in his 1985 article but in short, there would be strong ties, based on social acquaintances (family, friends, free-time activities etc.) and weak ties, based on work. Strong ties would form tightly-knit "clumps" of people, who all would be connected to each other (Granovetter 1985; Burt 1992, 25–27).[25] Thus employment information that enters this clump would spread efficiently inside the group and since individuals' career patterns follow this employment informa-

[24] See footnote no. 23.

[25] In these few brilliant pages, Burt abstracts Granovetter's theory and the strong/weak tie argument In Burt 2000, he abstracts the human/social capital arguments just as well.

tion, their labour market trajectories easily end up circulating inside the group (Granovetter 1985; Burt 1992). This is basically the core of an ethnic enclave (Portes and Bach 1985). They help individuals to find work within the enclave.

However, finding work in the labour market outside the enclave would call for weak ties that bridge these tightly-knit clumps of friends, relatives etc. Weak ties are crucial in bringing information about employment opportunities elsewhere into the group (Granovetter 1985; Burt 1992; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). As individuals' career patterns follow employment information, it is precisely weak ties that guide them out from an enclave, towards better employment opportunities and the mainstream labour market.

The separation between the human capital theory and the social capital theory has a crucial policy impact. When ageing societies seek to give individuals jobs that match their education it is crucial to notice the following: individuals do not end up in the right jobs automatically as predicted by neoclassical economics and the human capital theory. Increasing immigration of the demanded kinds of workers to the labour market does not necessarily add to the number of workers, but it can increase the number of people who face employment problems.

5. CONCLUSION: THE LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION CHALLENGE – HOW TO MOBILISE UNUSED LABOUR RESOURCES?

Ageing of the population in almost all OECD countries causes a need for immigrant labour but when they come they are likely to face serious problems in the labour market – they did in the past, they currently do and if obstacles to immigrants' labour market integration are not decreased, immigrants are likely to face similar problems in the future as well. Deprivation results in the squandering of immigrants' human capital, which has negative effects both on the individual immigrants as well as on the macro level of the economy, the labour market and the society.

The human capital theory itself cannot fully explain these integration problems and therefore we should look for alternative explanations. In other words, supply-side explanations of immigrants' labour market disintegration seem invalid: immigrants' educational profiles are far from their labour market statuses.

The situation of immigrants in the OECD countries has changed substantially from the 1970s to 2009. Immigrants' labour market status was deprived when compared to natives but the reasons for this were different. In the 1970s their deprivation to a large extent may have been caused by individuals' properties (Becker 1993 [1964]) such as education (Zorlu 2002). However, in the beginning of the 21st century they still experience deprivation even though their education is closer to the level of natives and even the second generation experi-

ences similar problems. OECD data (OECD 2007, 2008a, 2008b) shows that at the start of the 21st century, immigrants' labour market status depended only partly on their education and was heavily affected by both gender and country of birth. Both the human capital theory and the segmented labour market theory face some problems in explaining the issue. Instead Granovetter's network theory (Granovetter 1973, 1983, 1985, (1995 [1974]; 2005) can offer an explanation.

Labour market integration, however crucial in this article, is only one of the many different factors effecting the way in which natives and immigrants alike integrate into society. Immigrant integration has many different aspects; cultural, social, economic, etc. All these different aspects should be taken into account even if the analysis focuses only on labour market integration (Sassen 1991; Wacquant 2008; van Nieuwenhuyze 2009, 14–15, 25). Transforming research findings into policy calls for strengthening the connection between research and policy-making (Kraal, Roosblad, Wrench et al. 2009). This may turn the ideal of equal opportunities into reality. Immigrants' social networks should be better connected to the networks of the mainstream population. In practice this would mean that during the integration process education and training should be more focused on seeking jobs and less courses that intend to increase immigrants' human capital. Statistics suggest that for the most part, immigrants would be deprived merely because the lack of proper connections to the labour market and discrimination than because of lack of human capital (Kraal, Wrench, Roosblad et al. 2009; OECD 2008a, 2008b, 2009). Research provides these tools but it is eventually up to the politicians to use them.

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THE ROLE OF TRUST IN THE SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS

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ABSTRACT: *The paper relies on a unique international comparative study focusing on the political integration of immigrants in large European cities. The study analysed the degree of interest in politics, levels of political knowledge and political participation among immigrants and examined the perceived trust in institutions of the relevant home and host countries and people in general. In this analysis we begin by exploring a few general questions on trust and some that apply specifically to the situation of migrants. We then consider the degree of trust potential across various migrant groups, how the host country and the microclimate of the residential area affect the level of trust, and how specific ethnic backgrounds influence trust. We attempt to establish different types of trust concerning the general trust in people, institutions and the faith in one's own ethnic group. Finally, we consider how and whether trust as capital serves successful integration and settling down.*

INTRODUCTION

Trust is a social psychological mechanism that positively influences social behaviour and that acts as a connection between personal motivations and creeds on the one hand and desired organizational and societal goals on the other. The opposite of trust is *suspicion*, which distances and questions the reciprocal relationship between the individual and society (or, simply put, "others"), and which psychologically brings doubt into the meaning and success of the actor's actions (Festinger 1957). Trust and suspicion manifest themselves as a social phenomenon connected to the individual. Trust is a kind of social capital[3] that positively influences the individual's chances for social success, while

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[3] Beyond the Marxist use of the term 'capital', there are a growing number of similar terms used to explain economic and social relations, including the relation system of individuals (social capital), inherited and acquired knowledge (cultural capital and habits), influence potential and power position (political capital). These kinds of capital work separately and in conjunction to define the social position of the individual. The types of capital and the conversion mechanisms between them largely define the methods and limits of attaning

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suspicion can obstruct such success. Further, on the social level, trust is one of the most important elements of social integration, while the lack of trust leads to social disintegration and delegitimization of the social system (Misztral 1996).

The question of trust has become a popular topic in various social sciences over the past few decades: the birth of theories of social trust has led to numerous research projects in economics, political science, sociology and social psychology, covering topics like the economic behaviour of individuals, consumer behaviour, political participation and legitimacy and the organization of community relations. Researchers have separately examined the characteristics of manifestations of trust and its potential strength in complete societies as well as in certain social groups. Surprisingly, there are hardly any analyses on the ethnic-cultural aspects of trust and its role in the everyday life of religious, ethnic or migrant groups.[4] This holds despite the fact that trust plays a special role in the social relations of immigrants, the norms and mechanisms that guide their coexistence with the majority, their social and cultural integration, personal success, and the ability of the majority to accept migrants and their otherness.[5]

The goal of this analysis is to use the tools of empirical sociology to examine the role of trust in a unique social situation: the settling down of immigrants and the process of integration. The paper relies on a unique international comparative study focusing on the political integration of immigrants in large European cities.[6] The study covered the degree of interest in politics, political knowledge and political participation among immigrants and examined the perceived trust in the institutions of the relevant home and host countries and people in general.

In this analysis we begin by exploring a few general questions on trust and some that apply specifically to the situation of migrants. We then consider the degree of trust potential across various migrant groups, how the host country and the microclimate of the residential area affect the level of trust, and how specific ethnic backgrounds influence trust. We attempt to establish different types of trust concerning the general trust in people, institutions and the faith in one's own ethnic group. Finally, we consider how trust as capital serves successful immigration and settlement.

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status in given societies. Individual freedom and opportunity lies in choosing the optimal capital acquirement and conversion mechanisms (Coleman 1989; Bourdieu 1977).

[4] As an exception: Victor Nee and Jimmy Sanders (Nee 2001).

[5] Naturally if we widen the concept of trust then we cannot neglect the robust social science tradition that has long dealt with characteristic mechanisms between minorities and majorities (ethnic minority categorisation, stereotyping, social distance, prejudices, discrimination, racism). Theories using a narrower reading of trust have not produced literature that links trust and the above-listed phenomena.

[6] The investigated cities included: Madrid, Barcelona, London, Lyon, Milan, Zurich, Geneva and Budapest. For further information please refer to the project's website: http://www.um.es/localmultidem/

ON TRUST

The examination of the question of trust is relatively new in sociology. As sociologists have begun to move from examining grand social relations, the behaviour of institutions and social groups toward more hidden aspects of human relations, the question of trust has gained in importance. Though researchers have still not agreed on an exact definition, there is a wide consensus on the significance of trust in large-scale societies and in smaller groups. There are some who interpret trust as a personal characteristic and a psychological phenomenon. Others stress the value component in trust and emphasize the moral aspect (Uslaner 2002). The most common approach understands trust as a social „good" which functions as a capital asset that can be mobilized by the individual, and which is an important precondition or tool for effective social cooperation (Gambetta 1988). Macro-level approaches treat trust as a glue serving the moral integration of society (Elster 1989).

Behind the various definitions three quite divergent interpretative options can be formulated. The first is motivated by theories focusing on relations between people and economic, social, and cultural exchange activities that drive effective interest assertion mechanisms. This approach sees trust as central element in rational behaviour and decision-making, reciprocity and cooperation among individuals or groups, the establishment and acceptance of rules, and the belief that the other party will comply with the rules. On the level of individuals and interpersonal relations trust increases the predictability of actions, minimizes risk, strengthens solidarity with others, and provides participants with milieus of security, satisfaction and friendship (Hardin 2002). On the macro level, this kind of trust (or trust in this interpretative framework) makes the functioning of social systems predictable, relies on the principle of reciprocity in establishing opportunities for participating in public decisions, deepens the legitimacy of the system, and creates faith in all areas of life. On the macro level trust is a type of commodity, something that can and ought to be acquired by individuals and collectives (private and public good), and a social capital, which significantly assists individuals in attaining success.

Another interpretation stresses trust as a cognitive form. In this reading behavioural elements learned through socialization are responsible for the presence (or absence) of trust. Trust in others is not necessarily a concrete goal, and it is not always dependent on external conditions. This type of trust is a kind of belief in other people, which is to a degree a characteristic of the individual personality, part of a person's disposition, and is manifest in a generally positive and optimistic approach to others, or may become an everyday behaviour pattern. A different but related theory posits that consciousness of belonging to

one's own group and the differentiation from other groups lead to trust forming the foundation of personal identity. In this reading trust is an important part of our social identity and helps establishing harmony with group membership.

The third possible interpretation of trust emphasises moral aspects. The basis of this is *generalised trust*[7], displayed toward not individuals but toward entire communities (and all their members) or institutions, whereby these groups and institutions are expected to behave in predictable and socially acceptable ways. If these expectations have a normative content then generalized trust will take the form of moral trust. According to the normative interpretation trust links the individual to his/her group morally, ensures the acceptance of social prestige, and generally generates widely accepted value fields which serve as a foundation for social coexistence. Erik Uslaner defines two rather different types of trust. One is called general or moral trust while the other is described as partial or strategic trust. "Trust in other people is based upon a fundamentally ethical assumption: that other people share your fundamental values" (Uslaner 2004: 2) The moral trust approach posits that individuals not only have to cooperate with each another but they also have to perceive each other as credible and should have feelings of mutual moral obligation. According to Uslaner the culture of trust assumes fundamental egalitarianism and is paired with the belief that we should pursue not only our own interests but should attempt to help others as well. Moral trust is characterised by a strengthening function in which it is derived from the individual's moral obligation. Trust can be directed toward institutions, individuals or groups, without expecting reciprocity. Moral trust is stable and is characterized by permanence, unlike partial trust.[8] Moral trust ensures acceptance of societal rules and institutions and as such is a necessary condition for social integration (Uslander 2004).[9]

The above approaches to trust see the social role of trust differently, though they are the same in the fact that they consider the phenomenon from the point of view of the individual embedded into society or from the perspective of the social system as a whole. But what happens when we seek the presence of trust in the periphery of society, when we examine the presence of trust in terms of social relations between minorities and majorities? How do we interpret situations where an individual moves between cultures and homes? Does trust ap-

[7] This term originates from the English-language literature.

[8] Moral trust (or lack thereof) permeating society and general honesty (or suspicion) are definitive organizing principles of social integration that operate meaningful mechanisms of choice concerning cultural patterns and values. For this reason moral trust or lack thereof can only change slowly over time and drastic events have to occur for such positions to change. In contrast trust capital that assists coexistence and cooperation is quite unstable: any negative event affecting us can destroy the trust we held earlier.

[9] According to Uslaner, strategic trust works entirely differently. This form of trust always assumes two different parties and increases effective cooperation between the parties. Strategic trust is always directed toward concrete individuals and assumes reciprocity.

pear in this situation, and which of our earlier instrumentalist, moral and cognitive approaches deepen (and which obstruct or weaken) trust? In a typical situation an immigrant is short of most of the resources that are necessary for success and personal security. Thus trust can become his/her only accessible and "inexhaustible" type of capital. As Victor Nee and Jimmy Sanders established regarding trust in ethnic relations, this kind of social capital is often more important in the social adaptation of immigrants than other kinds of capitals, whether these be networks of relationships, material resources, language, cultural capital or even positions of political power (Nee and Sanders 2001). It is generally true that in the case of immigrants the role of human resources (language, skills, networks, social norms and qualifications) increases, given that the transfer of material goods during migration is limited. For newly arrived immigrants, several immediate problems arise (legalisation of residence, contacts with authorities, insurance, housing, employment, education of children etc.) and trust as capital can help solving difficulties arising from lack of experience, information and various resources.[10]

Trust as capital can be a special "asset" for a migrant. However, it is possible that migrants marginalised in the host society, with a status of a cultural stranger, will be suspicious or will not be able to secure the trust of others toward themselves. Trust in others can play various roles in relationships: on the one hand it can play a *bonding* role within very different, more or less closed communities (such trust networks keep together families, religious groups or groups based on common ethnic origin). On the other hand it can play a *bridging* role among individuals, groups and cultures that are distant from one another. Third, trust can bring about *linking* among groups and individuals that occupy different positions in social hierarchies (Hardin 2002; Tóth 2005).

In the life of an immigrant the linking and bridging roles of trust are of the greatest significance. Physical distance from the country of origin weakens (or completely destroys) traditional social networks (family, extended family, friends, colleagues etc.) that may act as a safety net. It is not surprising that newly arrived immigrants set up links to their ethnic-national diasporas, where they will feel a common destiny and look for a source of assistance.[11] This is due not only to the common recent experience of migration but also to language, ethnic identity, or perhaps religious connections and the sense of a common culture and past. Trust based on ethnic origin builds tight bonds along the lines of ancestry and common culture: ethnically based trust among group

[10] The research data introduced later in this paper shows that newly arrived immigrants have much more trust in the institutions of the host country than those who have lived for a long time in the host country.

[11] Our data shows that the networks of newly arrived immigrants are more closed. The longer an immigrant lives in a country, the higher the chance that friendship circles will expand beyond fellow ethnics.

members demands a high degree of commitment, while granting such trust to other ethnic groups may be grounds for suspicion. Ethnic trust in the life of an immigrant is of a dual nature: on one hand relationships based on ethnic trust help protect the immigrant's cultural self-image and identity in a socio-cultural environment that is foreign to him/her, all the while for the migrant community ethnic trust is an important tool for cohesion. On the other hand, according to the literature, this kind of trust often results in ethnic isolation, segregation, the formation of cliques and obstructs the successful social integration of the immigrant. This in turn can strengthen intolerance and exclusion on the part of the majority toward the minority (Uslaner 2004).

Bonding type trust must be accompanied by bridging trust in the life of an immigrant. This is a condition for successful social integration and it will influence the degree to which the immigrant can make him/herself accepted by the majority and to which the original personal goals of migration can be attained. Should bridging trust – which bridges the host and the hosted – be damaged or not be built up at all then the immigrant's only option for survival is ethnic segregation and self-ghettoisation.

Trust among migrants can of course also be related to Uslaner's concept of dual trust. On one hand we can speak about generalised or moral trust, which comes to light in the relationship with the host country and which shows the degree to which the migrant trusts the host country's institutions, authorities and citizens. On the other hand a potential lack of trust can encourage the building of partial or strategic trust, especially toward co-ethnics sharing the plight of migration, toward members of his/her own network and toward the representatives of civic associations assisting migrants (with whom a personal relationship has been established and where assistance can be sought).

THE LEVEL OF TRUST AMONG IMMIGRANTS

Having considered the theoretical aspects of trust, we now turn to the results of an international empirical study, in order to understand the role of trust among immigrants

The research project originally covered six countries, eight cities and sixteen migrant groups. The subsamples provided approximately 300 subjects.[12]

[12] The migrant groups across various cities naturally varied along demographic parameters. It is generally true that migration is more common in younger generations. Migrants were on average ten years younger (on average 39 years old) than the host population in all the countries. An exception to this was Italians living in Switzerland, among whom almost three-quarters were older than 45. Another extreme group was cross-border Hungarians having moved to Budapest, among whom three-quarters were younger than 30. The adventurous nature required for migration is stronger among men, who made up 56 percent of the

For the sake of clarity we classified the immigrant groups into eight types (see Table 1). We differentiated groups coming from North Africa, Europe, the Americas and Asia. The study took place in a very heterogeneous field, given that it covered not only „classic" migrant groups but also others (like Italians in Switzerland) who lived a much shorter distance from their country of origin. There was also a group (ethnic Hungarians migrating to Hungary from neighbouring countries) for whom language barriers or serious identity problems were not present concerning the host population.

Table 1
Ethnic groups[13] *examined, according to host city*

	Barcelona	Madrid	Geneva	Zurich	Lyon	London	Milan	Budapest
North African	x	x			x		x	
Latino	x	x				x	x	
Turkish				x				x
Indian, Bangladeshi						x		
Chinese								x
Kosovar			x	x				
Ethnic Hungarian								x
Italian			x	x				

When examining the degree of trust our research design made it possible to distinguish between two types of trust: general trust in people and confidence in the institutions and public figures of the host country.[14]

The starting point of our first hypothesis was that immigrants have fewer resources compared to members of the majority society, and as such trust is seen as a resource that is a necessary condition for integration. We assumed that

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sample. Male dominance was particularly strong among North African and Turkish groups. An exception to this was Arabs living in Lyon, where the high proportion of second-generation immigrants meant that the sexes had evened out. The proportion of women was higher than average only among Latin American groups. Despite the male majority in immigrant groups and the young mean age there was a high proportion of married persons (60 percent), but a quarter of spouses did not (yet) live in the host country. Close to 60 percent of the immigrants did not have children.

[13] In he sample selection process the criteria was the ethnic self-identification of the interviewed person to be selected.

[14] We included a direct question in our questionnaire in order to measure the respondent's level of trust on an 11-point scale. The scale of trust in the host country's institutions and public figures was calculated using an aggregate index composed of several questions. High scores on the index indicate a high level of trust in institutions and public figures, while low scores indicate a lack of trust.

immigrants have stronger generalized and strategic trust than the citizens of the host country. Figure 1, however, shows that with the exception of migrants in Budapest and Milan, general trust in people was higher among members of the majority in every city, though the differences were not significant. The cities do not vary much from one another in this aspect. Majority members and immigrants in Lyon both showed a visible lack of trust.[15]



Figure 1
The level of general trust in people among immigrant and the autochthonous[16] *groups according to city (averages on an 11-point scale)*

Results regarding the level of trust in institutions is different. Beyond the fact that the autochthonous groups and migrants in cities have more trust toward institutions than toward people, it is also clear that immigrants have more trust in institutions than autochthonous groups do.

[15] Our data is similar to the summed results of the European Social Survey. The European average on a scale of 0 to 10 was 4.7, in our sample it was 4.8. Cf. European Social Survey, 2004.

[16] As control group, a similar survey was carried out in each cities on a sample of the autochthonous population



Figure 2
Level of trust in institutions among immigrant and autochthonous groups according to city (averages on an 11-point scale)

It thus appears that insecurity experienced by migrants results in a lack of trust in personal relations. At the same time the intention to conform, the expectations with regard to the host country, or the negative image of the country of origin strengthen the trust that immigrants have toward the institutions of the host country. For this reasons we have to refine our first hypothesis. We have shown that for the migrants trust is strengthened by the faith in institutions of the new country. This type of trust is known in the literature as bridging trust.

Our second hypothesis states that in migrant groups, members of the co-ethnic group are the most significant and strongest sources of trust. This is supported by the observation in the literature on migration that states that for migrants the own diaspora living in the host country is the most important support (this is known in the literature as bonding trust). The relative weight of trust in one's own ethnic group varies widely across cities.



Figure 3

Level of general trust in people and in own ethnic group among immigrants across cities (averages on an 11-point scale)

As can be seen in Figure 3, in Spanish and Swiss cities trust in people and trust in members of one's own ethnic group do not diverge significantly. In other cities immigrants trust fellow immigrants to a significantly higher degree.

The explanation for difference among cities can be related to two different aspects. The first is the nature of the host country and the city's defining cultural and social milieu, while the second has to do with immigrants' cultural roots and ethnic embeddedness. In other words, we have to answer whether the exceptions in Figure 3 arise from the effects of divergent urban contexts or from differences in the ethnic background of immigrants. In order to answer this question, we should take into account the effect of both the city and that of the local ethnic groups.



Figure 4

General trust in people and in own ethnic group among immigrants across cities and immigrant groups (averages on an 11-point scale)

Given the structure of the sample it is not always possible to separate the effect of urban context from that of the ethnic component. There are migrant groups in the sample that appear in only one city (e.g. Chinese in Budapest), and for such groups the effect of urban context cannot be examined. However, for those migrant groups where comparison is possible we see that trust in one's own ethnic group is basically dependent on the city, and less so on the characteristics of the ethnic group.[17] The effect of cities, however, is not consistent. North African immigrants in Barcelona and Madrid are less trusting of their own ethnic groups than of their Spanish hosts. The opposite is true in Lyon, where the general level of trust is lower. In Milan there is no difference between the level of trust in local Italians and in the members of the own group. For Latin American migrant groups the effect of the urban context is negligible, and there is no significant difference between the level of trust in members of one's own group and those of the majority society. Turks in Budapest are much

[17] In a variance-analysis model in which we explain trust in the own ethnic group as a function of the host city (contextual effect) or the ethnic identity of the immigrants, the eta of the city is 0.25, and 0.21 for ethnic membership.

more trusting than their compatriots in Zurich. While in Switzerland the level of trust in members of the host society and the own group is about even, in Budapest there is a somewhat higher level of trust in members of their own group (compared to trust in Hungarians). The only Indian-Bangladeshi migrant group in the sample is located in London. In their case we can only state that they display a higher level of trust in the members of their own group compared to people in general. The same can be said for Chinese immigrants in Budapest. Kosovars living in Switzerland trust members of their own group somewhat more than the citizens of Geneva or Zurich. However, the Kosovars in Zurich are less trusting than those in Geneva. Italians in Switzerland do not differentiate between the citizens of the host country and members of their own ethnic group when it comes to trust; however, they see Zurich as a friendlier city. Ethnic Hungarians display a high level of trust, one which is stronger toward their own group than it is for citizens of Hungary.

Figure 4 also indicates how general trust in people develops in various migrant groups across cities. We can state that the urban context effect is much stronger than that of ethnic membership.[18] General trust in people also reflects the image that the host city presents to migrant groups. In this aspect Lyon can be seen as the least friendly city, while Budapest is the friendliest one. Cities do not "treat" all migrant groups in the same way. Zurich is seen as much less friendly among Turks as it is among Italians. Madrid "deals" with Latin Americans more poorly than it does with those arriving from North Africa.

General trust in people and in one's own ethnic group is asymmetric in Switzerland and Spain, and especially so in Lyon. It appears that in the eyes of immigrants Spain and Switzerland are countries where people can be trusted, and immigrants living in these countries are not forced to compensate for possible trust deficits by exaggerating trust in their own ethnic group. The situation is the opposite in Lyon. North Africans living there are characterised by general distrust toward the host population (autochthonous group), which the try to balance by increasing trust in their own group.

These results indicate that trust capital can have a role in the integration strategies of immigrants. High general trust can result in an adaptive, integrative strategy. Exclusive trust in one's own group can result in a (self-) segregationist approach. The situation is quite mixed, given that the level of trust in the own group and in people in general can change due to the migration history of the group, cultural background and the microclimate of the host city.

Whether discussing trust in institutions or general trust in people, we can establish that migrants – in divergent ways, depending on ethnic membership and the nature of the host society – can rely on trust as a capital. Taking into consideration the level of trust in one's own group, we may ask whether we can

[18] The urban context effect is 0.26, while that of ethnic membership is 0.17 in the variance analysis model.

identify clear groups by the level of trust immigrants have in the institutions of the host country, whether they have to rely instead on trust in members of their own group or whether they have a high level of trust in people in general. We searched for such groups using cluster analysis. The levels of trust capital range from complete distrust to absolute trust.

Table 2
Configuration of trust capital, cluster centres and frequency distribution

	General trust in people	Trust in members of own ethnic group	Trust in institutions	Frequency of type
Complete distrust	1.7	2.1	3.7	12.8
Trust in institutions only	1.2	1.3	6.9	10.8
Medium trust and preference of own group	4.7	6.1	4.4	24.1
Medium trust but high trust in institutions	5.5	4.8	7.0	27.1
Absolute trust	7.6	8.0	6.9	25.2

Table 2 shows that 13 percent of immigrants are characterized by absolute distrust. That is to say, they trust neither the members of their own group nor institutions and they do not trust people in general. One-tenth of immigrants do not trust people (neither generally nor members of their own group) but do display relatively high trust in the institutions of the host country. Two groups have medium-level trust (and they have a proportion of about one-quarter each). While one such group prefers members of its own ethnic group in terms of trust, the other rather trusts institutions. The last group is characterized by high general trust. The proportion of this group is approximately 25 percent.

In terms of trust capital, there are significant differences among the investigated cities. Figure 5 presents these differences in detail. The most significant differences are the following: migrants living in Lyon are very suspicious, while those living in Budapest are just the opposite, as they have a high degree of trust. Among migrants living in Budapest we find no one belonging to the type that trusts only institutions. This type is very rare in Lyon as well. It is common for migrants in Budapest and London to have a medium level of trust and to prefer trusting members of their own group. Migrants in Spanish and Swiss cities have medium levels of trust but instead prefer trusting institutions.



Figure 5
Configuration of trust capital across cities, percent

Figure 6 helps us see the degree of variation among migrant groups in terms of levels of trust capital within cities. In some cases we can examine what type of trust is characteristic of given migrant groups and how this is dependent on the city in which they settled. North Africans in Madrid have more trust than immigrants from Latin America, but the latter group has a higher frequency of trusting institutions while having low general trust. Before we assume that we have observed the influence of the cultural background of immigrants, we should observe that the opposite is the case in Milan. Latin Americans have a higher level of trust there than North Africans, and there are many North Africans there who trust only institutions. The microclimates of the host cities certainly effect whether migrants will trust institutions or people and the degree to which they will prefer members of their own group. This is illustrated by the case of North Africans in Barcelona and Madrid.



Figure 6
Configuration of trust capital across cities and according to immigrant groups, percent

The microclimates of the cities are to a large degree influenced by the policy and the historical links if any of the host country toward immigrants and the prejudices that the host population (autochthonous group) has toward immigrant groups (and these prejudices may vary across groups). This is well illustrated by the example of North Africans and Turks. North Africans in Lyon are very distrusting and this is certainly related to the situation of Arabs in France. The picture is a bit hostile in Italian cities, while the levels of trust among North Africans are the highest in Spanish towns. Regarding the situation of Turkish migrants, those living in Zurich do have a lower level of trust than those in Budapest, indicating Turkish that immigrants in Hungary feel more at home. At the same time we must observe that there is hardly any difference in the levels of trust between Turkish and Kosovar migrants in Zurich. This may lead us to conclude that the significance of the historic-cultural difference between the two groups is lowered given the homogeneous reception toward all types of immigrants in Switzerland. This homogeneous reception seems even more likely when we observe that migrants from Kosovo in both Zurich and Geneva have almost exactly the same types of trust. The situation is, however, complicated by the situation of Italians in Switzerland. The cultural background

and historical presence of Italians in Switzerland result in a special treatment. This in turn results in a higher level of trust among Italians as compared to other immigrant groups. There are, however, differences among the Italians across cities, given that those in Geneva have a lower level of trust. Regarding capital types among migrants from Turkey in Switzerland and Budapest, we can see that Hungary should not be treated as an oasis for immigrants. The positive situation of Turks in Hungary is unique, as it is tempered by distrust among Chinese and immigrant ethnic Hungarians in Hungary.

We can observe that different types of trust (whether an immigrant is trusting, whether he/she trusts the host country's institutions or the members of his/her own group, and whether he/she generally trusts people) depends not only on ethnic background but on the migration policy and milieus of the host cities as well.

THE COMPLEX EXPLANATORY MODEL OF THE LEVEL OF TRUST AMONG IMMIGRANTS

Having become familiar with the types of trust capital and the divergent levels of trust across cities and ethnic groups, we now return to our original question, namely, how trust influences the success of migration. This is naturally a very complex question with numerous theoretical and methodological problems. Among these the most obvious is the definition of success. Given that the international comparative research we rely on did not focus on this question, we have to clarify that success – whatever it may mean in theory – was operationalised using only one question[19]: the occupation of the immigrant and its ensuing prestige. Of course occupational prestige provides a narrow perspective on the situation of migrants.[20] However, we should acknowledge

[19] The questionnaires used in the international study contained both mandatory and optional questions. Among the mandatory questions only that dealing with occupational prestige can be interpreted as a measure of success. Among the optional questions, there were several variables (e.g. subjective status in the country of origin and the host country, preference between settling in Hungary or seeing Hungary as a transit country, etc.), but these questions were not identical and did not allow us to work out unified indicators.

[20] It would seem obvious to go beyond occupational prestige and to use educational attainment to better operationalise success. However, among immigrants, this is not useful for two reasons. First, there is only a tentative relationship between educational attainment and occupational prestige for immigrants (compared to autochthonous groups). This is because immigrants have difficulties in terms of language, employment, accreditation of degrees, etc., meaning immigrants will often accept work that is below what they were trained for. Further, education attainment is often "brought" and not attained in the host country. In this sense it cannot be related to success in integration. (The survey could not ascertain whether high educational attainment was achieved in the country of origin or in the host country.)

that the comparison of occupational prestige among autochthonous and immigrant groups allow us to measure whether immigrants are placed at the periphery of the host country's society or whether they have integrated into the social hierarchy.



Figure 7
Occupational prestige for migrants and autochthonous groups, Treiman prestige scale averages[21].

Across all the studied cities immigrants on average had lower occupational prestige than autochthonous groups[22], except for immigrants living in London, where the difference is striking: immigrants can reach similar level of occupational status as autochthonous groups do. In Switzerland, with the exception of

[21] Treiman's standard international occupational prestige scale consists of prestige scores for 509 occupations, 288 unite groups, 84 minor groups and 11 major categories. The scale has a range from 1 to 100. The international mean scale score computed over all the occupations is 43.3.

[22] Given the unique situation of migrant groups in Hungary, very few immigrants have a full-time job (Chinese are employed mostly in companies dealing with trade and catering and are often not registered as workers. Many of the Turkish migrants are active in the grey economy. The majority of ethnic Hungarian immigrants are young and are still at school.) Occupational prestige measures would have covered only five percent of the sample. For this reason we have not included Hungary in our analysis.

Italian immigrants, immigrants are markedly on the low end of the occupational hierarchy. We were somewhat surprised that Arabs in Lyon expressing deep distrust, were not far behind the autochthonous population in terms of occupational prestige. This may be due to the fact that the most displeased and thus least trusting young Arabs are unemployed and thus – given that they do not have measurable occupational prestige – they do not appear in this sample.

In our approach occupational prestige and related material success is just one aspect of social integration. Utilising the additional data of the survey, we understood the generational question also as an aspect of success. We looked at whether a respondent was a first- or second-generation immigrant, what proportion of the life of first-generation immigrants was spent in migrant status, and to what degree the respondent was able to learn the language of the host country. Using main component analysis we established an integration index.[23]



Figure 8
Level of integration across cities and ethnic groups, main component score averages

[23] The main component preserved 60 percent of the information contained in the variables. A high score on the index indicates a high degree of integration.

Figure 8 shows that the ethnic background of the immigrant, the microclimate of the city, and in some cases the host country have an effect on the level of integration. Italy seemed to be a place where immigrants could not integrate into society regardless of their ethnic background. London is the opposite extreme, where immigrants from both the former colonies and from Latin America successfully integrated. The effect of urban microclimate is exemplified by Madrid and Barcelona, where North Africans integrated less in the former city. Italians are more integrated in Geneva than in Zurich. The effect of ethnic group is illustrated by the fact that in Madrid the integration of Arabs is lower than that of Latin Americans.

To this point we have discussed the structural aspect of integration, i.e. we examined what objective parameters indicate the integration of an immigrant into the host society. Integration, however, contains a subjective aspect as well: the degree to which immigrants feel themselves to be members of the host society, the degree to which they feel connected to their new country[24], whether they have experienced anti-immigrant discrimination[25], and how difficult they feel immigrant life is. [26] The aggregate main component of these three indicators[27] shows the degree to which immigrants feel at home in the host country.

The difference between host countries is the strongest element regarding the subjective aspect of integration. Differences between cities and between ethnic groups within cities are much less significant. Immigrants feel the least accepted in Italy and the most accepted in Switzerland. Comparing Figures 8 and 9 we see that the levels of integration in structural and cognitive terms are quite divergent. In terms of structural integration London appears to be the most accepting city, but in subjective terms immigrants in Switzerland have the highest scores. Italy is a disadvantageous place for integration in both structural and cognitive senses. The bad mood characterizing Lyon is evident in this dimension as well; despite the fact that working immigrants in Lyon are objectively integrated, in cognitive terms we can see that they do not feel at home.

[24] Ties to the host country were measured using two questions focusing on connections to residents of the country and to the host city. The indicator of ties to the host country is a simple aggregation of these numbers.

[25] Experience of discrimination was measured with a simple yes/no question.

[26] This indicator is an aggregate of four questions: how difficult it is to get a residence permit; how difficult it is to get citizenship; how difficult it is to bring your family to the host country; how difficult it is to find work. Low scores indicate a very difficult life for the immigrant, while a high score indicates the simplicity of integration.

[27] High scores on the main component indicate that the migrant group feels at home in the given city.



Figure 9
The cognitive aspects of integration by city and ethnic group, main component score averages

We can now turn to the construction of the model referred to in the introduction, i.e. we can examine the degree to which trust contributes to successful integration. Before introducing the model, it is worth noting that from the point of view of integration, we only took into account general trust in people and trust in the institutions of the host country. We assume that trust in one's own migrant group encourages segregation, and not integration.[28] Our model makes use of a path model to show the degree to which trust contributes to integration, and to what degree a cognitive aspect of integration is necessary for the operation of trust capital.

[28] Our data shows that trust in one's own group clearly weakens the cognitive aspect of integration and in turn weakens structural integration.



Figure 10
The path model of trust and integration

Before we interpret Figure 10, we would like to turn back to the theoretical discussion in the introduction where we reviewed the literature on trust to define trust as a type of capital that has an important role in the success of migration. Our path model clearly does not support this definition. Trust is an obstacle to the structural integration of immigrants, given that we can see a negative number above the arrow leading from trust to structural integration. It is true that if such trust is paired with positive cognitive aspects of integration, it assists successful integration. This indirect positive effect does not supersede the empirical experience that for migrants distrust in people and the institutions of the country strengthen the level of integration

We must consider whether distrust contributes to success for the autochthonous populations of the host cities.[29] We noticed that in their case there was a positive correlation between trust and status[30], thus trust truly functions as capital. If this is the case, then we may suspect that the reason for a negative relationship between trust and successful integration for migrants lies in the status of migrants.

We assume that for migrants trust is not a cause but rather a consequence. To illustrate this assumption we use a path model in which we try to explain the level of trust with the degree of cognitive and structural integration. This is shown in Figure 11.

[29] For autochthonous populations the indicator for structural integration is meaningless. For them we measured status by using occupational prestige and educational attainment, and we used this as an indicator of integration.

[30] For autochthonous populations trust influences status with a beta of +0.14.



Figure 11
The path model of integration and trust

The first thing we see is that integration better explains the level of trust than vice-versa. True, distrust is characteristic of better integrated immigrants, but those immigrants who are pleased with their lives feel a great deal of trust. This leads us to conclude that for immigrants trust cannot be seen as a form of capital. Instead, trust is a feeling much like the positive view on integration and as such it is an expression of acceptance of or satisfaction with the status of the migrant. (A counterargument may state that the method used in the study to measure trust was somewhat misleading. As a method it was inappropriate because trust measured in the same way among autochthonous groups had a positive effect on status, so it functioned as capital for them.) The negative correlation between structural integration and trust is an indication of the vulnerability of immigrants, even if just indirectly. We may argue that those subordinated immigrants who are pushed to the periphery of society and have low-prestige occupations are forced to place greater trust in people and in the institutions of the host country. Those who are more successful – experiencing the problems and difficulties in getting integrated – are more critical of the country's institutions and the majority population. The harmonic but very infrequent situation (see Figures 8 and 9) when structural integration is successful in a cognitive sense as well is a scenario that can strengthen trust.

CONCLUSION

The trust that a migrant feels toward people and the institutions of the host country can only be understood in the entirety of the multidimensional migratory space: defined by his/her individual life history, distinct personality, cul-

tural differences between origin and host country, the average attained position, the acceptance of the members of his/her own migrant group within the host country, and the historical, legal, economic, political and social-psychological characteristics of the host environment. The elaborated analysis of this space would have exceeded the framework of the utilised international empirical study. Our analytical constraints allowed us to measure only the level of trust in the given countries, cities and among the relevant immigrant groups. In the same way we could only illustrate the relationship between trust and integration using a rather simple model. Our comparison was hindered by the fact that the research on the strength of trust and its role in integration was conducted in diverse countries, cities and among ethnic groups with varied backgrounds.

The results show that trust plays an important role in the settlement and adaptation of immigrants into host countries. This is indicated by the fact that trust in institutions is higher among migrant groups than it is for the local majority. However, trust in one's own group must be seen as a „tool" that can balance out the emotional and identity deficit brought on by the migrant experience. In this case trust serves the purpose of attaining the original goals of migration and making integration successful.

In our theoretical discussion we treated trust as a type of capital that can help immigrants (who lack tools and are poor in terms of other capitals like money, cultural skills, family network etc.) achieve successful integration. Our data, however, shows that the relationship between trust and integration is not so simple. Migration itself, excluding those cases where one is forced to leave his/her country of origin, assumes that the migrant has faith in the future, has confidence in the success of the migration, and hopes that the institutions of the host country will help him/her adapt, and has a general trust that people are good-willed. But in the moment of arrival exaggerated trust is paired with a perfect lack of integration. This is reflected in our model, in which we see that high trust is coupled with low integration. As time goes by, in most cases immigrants more or less integrate. At the same time they loose many of the illusions with which they arrived. This can reduce the level of trust. We also saw, however, that if the method and level of integration satisfied the immigrant then trust could become an emotion that strengthens success through a cognitive filter. As we saw, among autochthonous groups trust acts as a form of capital that increases the chances of social success. For immigrants it is integration that provides them with trust, but only when the migrant feels that such integration has been successful.

The structure of this study makes it difficult to follow those slight differences caused by immigrants' cultural-ethnic background, the attitudes of the citizens of host countries, or the immigration policies and activities of institutions designed to assist integration. We can simplify the consideration of this complex set of correlations by using a contextual model in which we study the

relation between trust and integration while paying attention to the degree of welfare (the level of GDP per capita) and multiculturalism (the proportion of migrants in the population) of the host cities. Wealthier cities like London, Milan or Lyon offer higher chances for immigrants to successfully integrate, but this is paired with a kind of dissatisfaction and distrust – likely as a result of relative deprivation. This is evident through the fact that such immigrants do not feel their integration has been successful, have little trust in the host country's institutions, and are not at all well-meaning toward the citizens of the host country. Immigrants do feel more at home in ethnically plural cities. This is evident not only through higher trust in people and institutions but also in the fact that their integration – even in their own estimation - is much more successful in such cities. It thus appears that successful integration of immigrants is most likely in rich and ethnically pluralistic cities. Richer cities offer a rise in standard of living for immigrants, but if they compare their situations only to that of autochthonous groups, then they will become distrusting and dissatisfied. However, should many kinds of immigrants live in such cities, the basis for comparison will be their own group and thus their position in life – although it may be more modest – will be satisfactory and will generate trust.

Translated by Ferenc Zsigó

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