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Abstract

Unlike other areas of grammar, the category of affixes is a yet unexplored area of the cognitive linguistic description of Hungarian grammar. The present study intends to start to fill this gap and provides a cognitively plausible account of the Hungarian deverbal suffix -Ó. By adopting a combined approach of corpus and cognitive linguistics, the paper attempts to answer the following questions. 1. In exactly which ways do -Ó constructions reflect cognitive construals? 2. How is the semantic structure of the suffix -Ó structured by meaning extensions? 3. What is and what is not metonymical in this semantic structure? And finally, 4. On which levels of constructional organization can metonymic patterns of meaning construal be identified? After a thorough corpus and cognitive linguistic analysis of data extracted from the Hungarian Gigaword Corpus (Oravecz–Váradi–Sass 2014), the paper comes to the general conclusion that the semantic map of -Ó is structured by metonymic meaning extensions of different sorts. While the functions of -Ó resulting from these meaning extensions proved to be straightforward cases of word-formation metonymies (ACTION FOR AGENT, ACTION FOR LOCATION, ACTION FOR OBJECT INVOLVED IN THE ACTION, AND ACTION FOR CHARACTERISTICS), the core meaning of the present participial -Ó constructions was interpreted as 1. as a secondary action in a multiple action scenario as well as 2. a reference-point helping in the identification of the agent. Furthermore, the metonymic extensions are represented in all three levels of meaning construal: 1. on the level of individual constructions 2. on the level of constructional schemas, and 3. also in the semantic structure of the affix itself. Bearing all this in mind, the author argues for the flexibility of coding and construal contrary to the perceived arbitrariness of grammar.

Keywords: affixational word-formation, conceptual metonymy, cognitive grammar, token frequency, type frequency, constructional schemas

1. Introduction

Research on word-formation metonymies attracts a rapidly growing attention within the cognitive linguistics enterprise. Iconic manifestations of this interest include articles such as Dirven (1999), Panther and Thronburg (2001, 2003), Schönefeld (2005), Ungerer (2007), Janda (2011) and Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014a). Its central position within the cognitive linguistics paradigm is reflected by the fact that current debates on the topic were hosted by Cognitive Linguistics (22/2, 25/2). A possible reason for this heavy interest towards word-formation metonymies is that this phenomenon can be postulated as an organic synthesis of two main research areas of cognitive linguistics, namely: 1. the description of grammar in terms of cognitive construals and 2. metonymy studies.
On the one hand, the recognition of language as a main representation of how humans interpret the world and make sense of experiences (Kövecses 2006) opened up a radically new perspective on the description of grammar (as opposed to the generativist tradition). Instead of postulating an autonomous language module, a foundational goal of cognitive linguistics, or more specifically cognitive grammar, is “to explain linguistic phenomena in terms of general cognitive strategies” (Langacker 1987: 12–13) such as categorization, prototype effects, mental spaces, image schemas, figure-ground alignment, generalization, schematization, analogy and by means of figurative meaning extensions via metaphor, metonymy and conceptual integration. An especially relevant increment of this cognitively plausible view of grammar in the context of the present paper is the recognition that just like morphologically simple and complex words, their lower constituents (e.g. suffixes) as well as higher levels of linguistic organization (e.g. syntactic and discourse patterns) are also representations of cognitive construals, and as such, they are considered as meaningful symbolic units, however schematic this meaning might be. Moreover, just like lexical units, they also have the capability to exhibit polysemy. Along this path, the initially lexeme-centered cognitive linguistic descriptions started to push their boundaries above and below the lexeme level by explaining discourse strategies and syntactic patterns as well as inflectional morphology as representations of general cognitive meaning-making mechanisms.

On the other hand, from the late 1990’s, accelerating interest in metonymy resulted in a “metonymy turn of a kind” (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014a) within the field of cognitive linguistics. Not only has metonymy been recognized as a fundamental conceptual operation (Kövecses–Radden 1998, Radden–Kövecses 1999), but it has also proved to be just as ubiquitous as metaphor (Radden 2005). This growing attention towards metonymy (represented in monographs like Panther–Radden (1999), Barcelona (2000), Dirven and Pörings (2002), Benczes et al. (2011), Brdar (2007) Thornburg–Barcelona (2009) shed light on many inherent problems and hidden complexities in metonymic meaning-making, most of which are centered around the difficulties in setting limits on the notion of conceptual metonymy.

Interestingly, in research on word-formation metonymsies, these hidden complexities in metonymic meaning-making seem to be present in high density and as such, it can be considered as a “veterinarian’s horse” of metonymy studies. Here the need for a proper definition of metonymy – i.e. *where does it begin and stop?*, or what is the focal point in the emergence of metonymy from weaker forms of reference-point phenomena (cf. Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014a, 2014b) and Langacker (1993) for a contrasting view) – seems to be especially decisive in uncovering both similarities and differences between word-formation metonymies and lexical metonymies. Considering this, in the following I will briefly touch upon two such definition-oriented problems that have serious implications in the study of metonymy in affixational word-formation.

1.1. The broad vs. the strict definitions of metonymy and their implications in affix polysemy

Those who rely on the broader definition of metonymy, which is the quasi adoption of the Langackerian idea (Langacker 1993: 29–35; Langacker 1999: 199) of the equality of metonymy

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1 This phrasing is intended to evoke the titles of two influential definition-related studies on metonymy (namely Paradis 2004, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014a).
and reference-point phenomena, argue for the pervasiveness of metonymic patterns in affixational word-formation. In these accounts (Colman–Anderson 2004, Basilio 2006, Janda 2010, 2011, Nesset 2010) practically the base of the suffixation is interpreted as the metonymic source domain and the morphologically complex derivation (i.e. the suffixation itself) is interpreted as the metonymic target. As an example, Janda (2011) identifies the Russian suffixation *saxarnica* (lit. 'sugar'-nica) ‘sugar-bowl’ and the Czech suffixation *květináč* (lit. ‘flower’-áč) ‘flower-pot’ respectively as instances (and products) of the contained-for-container conceptual metonymy, where the bases *saxar* and *květin* serve as source domains, the suffixations *saxarnica* and *květináč* as the targets and the suffixes -nica and -áč serve the contexts for the metonymic relationship (Janda 2011: 360).

By contrast, those who intend to limit the notion of metonymy to an overtly unmarked meaning shift from one reading of the symbolic unit (i.e. the suffixation in our case) to another (see Panther–Thrornburg 2001, 2003, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014a, 2014b) evaluate the idea of word-formation metonymy in the previous sense (i.e. in the sense of Nesset (2010), Janda (2011), etc.) as a broad overgeneralization of the notion of conceptual metonymy which seriously threatens the explanatory power of metonymy itself. This, however, does not mean that the narrow view of metonymy would deny the existence of metonymic patterns in affixational word-formation. Instead, the consensus over the existence of affix polysemy directs our attention to another source of ambiguity, namely on which levels of constructional organization metonymical meaning construal takes place.

### 1.2. Different views on the operation of metonymy along the levels of constructional organization

As a case of affix polysemy in a strict sense, Janda (2011) and Nesset (2010) argue that in the case of affixational word-formation, metonymy operates on the suffix. As such, they identify suffixes with the strong capability to exhibit metonymic patterns, some of which are claimed to accommodate fifteen or sixteen metonymies. In Janda’s (2011: 375) taxonomy, such strongly polysemous word-formation devices are called versatile suffixes. Similarly, Panther and Thornburg (2001, 2003) also argue for the suffix-level representation of metonymy, in spite of the fact that they argue against the overt markedness of metonymy. In addition to and clearly separated from metonymies operating within the suffix, they also identify metonymic and metaphoric processes operating on the base. By contrast and following from the strict definition of metonymy (that is, the morpholexical invariance involved in metonymic meaning construal), Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014a,b) (in line with Bybee (2006, 2010)) argue that metonymy in word-formation takes place primarily on the level of individual constructions as a result of 1. idiomatization due to entrenchment and consequently 2. the

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2 This latter view of metonymy in word-formation shows a higher degree of congruency with other, theoretically groundbreaking studies on metonymy such as Barcelona (2000) and Benczes at al. (2006).

3 “However, most suffixes are much less specific and some can signal a wide variety of metonymy patterns. (…) Multiple metonymy patterns are common among suffixes: Norwegian has up to eleven metonymies for a given suffix, and the figures for Russian and Czech are fifteen and sixteen respectively (for more detail, see Section 3.4). The point is that a word-formational affix can be highly non-specific in terms of identifying the relevant metonymy. Affixes are sublexical and abstract, and in terms of metonymy they often underspecify the relationship involved.” (ibid. 361)
post-hoc emergence of metonymy in suffixations, which in turn can trigger analogical changes and schema-level abstractions. Consequently, they reject the idea of the suffix-level representation of metonymy patterns; instead, it is argued that similarly to lexical metonymies, an extension is carried out from one meaning of the suffixation to another. Finally, and as a third approach, Basilio (2006) does not even take the challenge of the precise identification of source and target or the position of metonymy patterns along the levels of constructional organization.

In sum, the great deal of ambiguity regarding these issues, the sharply contrasting views and conceptions as well as the intensity of such debates show that the above questions and problems are far from being settled. Additionally, previous research on the topic (i.e. affix polysemy in particular and word-formation metonymy in general) has suffered from a number of shortcomings. 1. First of all, no study has yet strived to look at the correlations between idiomatization (i.e. metonymical meaning construal in our case) and the dynamics of language use in contemporary corpus data, despite massive evidence for the high degree of intertwining of the emergence of meaning shifts with the dynamicity of language use in the usage-based literature (e.g. Barlow–Kemmer 2000, Langacker 2000, Bybee 2006, Taylor 2012). In terms of data collection, studies on word-formation metonymy mainly rely on either the grammar book approach or the mere inventory of suffixation patterns instead of using naturally-occurring corpus data. 2. Second, although cross-linguistic diversity is a relevant issue within this field (e.g. preference for conversion vs. preference for affixation), all the above cited studies investigate Indo-European languages. As such, in terms of the canonic (basic-level) categories of language typology, all of the studied languages belong to the same type of fusional languages. Considering this, it is suggested that research on languages other than fusional ones would be especially beneficial as it would give a more accurate picture of diversity in word-formation metonymies. Moreover, agglutinating languages seem to be especially suitable for the study of affix polysemy since the high frequency of affixational word-formation patterns (as opposed to other means of word-formation such as conversion) is one of their typological features (Comrie 1987).

2. Aims

Bearing all this in mind, I wish to contribute to the research on affix polysemy in particular and word-formation metonymies in general. In order to uncover some metonymic patterns in Hungarian word-formation, the deverbal suffix -Ó will be the case in point. Such investigation is especially needed if we consider that unlike other areas of grammar, the grammatical category of affixes is a yet unexplored area of the cognitive linguistic description of

4 “However, we believe that appearances are deceiving and that what is referred to as polysemy or polyfunctionality of affixes is the result of a generalization over a number of individual cases of polysemy of specific morphologically complex words. In other words, it is a post-factum type of phenomenon. On more theoretical grounds, there are reasons not to assume that metonymies (or metaphors) invariably extend the meaning of an affix detached from its bases and the affix is then added to certain bases to produce new lexemes with the given meaning.” (ibid. 317–318.)

5 For an exception, see Hartmann (2015) who provides a proper corpus analysis on the Geman deverbal suffix -ung from a diachronical perspective.

6 For the only exception, see Fekete (2013) who investigates the -stül/stül suffix which can be posited onto the borderline between inflectional and derivational morphology.
Hungarian grammar. This lack of attention is even more striking in the light of the above claims on the richness of agglutinative languages in affixes. Having a rich system of derivational affixes (see e.g. Kiefer and Laasko 2014: 486–489) makes Hungarian especially suitable for the study of affix-polysemy.

Based on all this, the aim of the present study is to study some important features of affix polysemy in general and to provide a cognitive linguistic description of the Hungarian deverbal suffix -ő in particular by answering the following questions:

1. In exactly which ways do -ő constructions reflect cognitive construals?
2. How is the semantic structure of the suffix -ő structured by meaning extensions?
3. What is and what is not metonymical in this semantic structure? And finally:
4. On which levels of constructional organization can metonymic patterns of meaning construal be identified? That is, can we talk about affix polysemy in a strict sense in the case of -ő?

3. Methodology

The present paper adopts a combined approach of corpus and cognitive linguistics. Data were collected from three sources: 1. As a starting point, the most widely-used Hungarian comprehensive grammar books were consulted, with Velcsov (1968) and Lengyel (2000) representing a descriptive framework and Laczkó (2000) and Kiefer (1998) representing a generativist approach. 2. Natural usage-based data was culled from the personal (személy-es) subcorpus of the Hungarian Gigaword Corpus (henceforth HGC, Oravecz–Váradi–Sass 2014). The choice of this subcorpus was justified by two considerations. Firstly, its size (it contains 338,600,000 tokens in contrast to the total amount of 1,532,933,778 tokens in HGC) makes it possible to conduct quantitative and qualitative analyses at the same time. Secondly and most importantly, the lack (or very low percentage) of patterns of everyday language use in HGC, i.e. the dominance of literary texts and newspapers, was kept in mind. It is assumed that the subcorpus compiled from forum texts exhibits patterns of language use that are closer to the everyday registers and as such, shows a more balanced picture of language use (in contrast to the other, literary works and newspaper articles-dominated modules of HGC). Thirdly, in order to account for patterns of -ő neologisms in language use, the “fabulous linguists’ playground” (Taylor 2012: 17), Google was also consulted.

As to the issue of metonymy-identification in the course of the analysis: complexities in the task of identifying metonyms in discourse are reflected by the fact that (up to my knowledge, at least) for this purpose there are no such conventionally used methods or criteria established as they exist for the identification of metaphor (MIP or MIPVU). Thus in the course of the analysis I will simply rely on the following, widely accepted definition of conceptual metonymy: “Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity,
the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same
domain, or ICM” (Kövecses–Radden 1998: 39).

4. Cognitive construals behind the semantic matrix of -Ó

Hungarian comprehensive grammars agree that the deverbal suffix -Ó is a highly polyfunc-
tional one and they are also quasi-consistent⁹ in the identification of its functions. In terms
of thematic roles, it is used in:

a) present participles e.g. álló (áll (‘to stand’)+ -ó → ‘standing’), létező⁰ (‘existing’)
b) adjectives denoting characteristics e.g. forró (‘hot’), különböző (‘different’)
c) agent nouns, either occasional or professional, e.g. olvasó (‘reader (of a book)’,
hozzászóló (‘commenter’) and író (‘writer’), szerző¹¹ (‘author’) respectively
d) instrument nouns, e.g. rugó (‘spring’), riasztó (‘alarm’)
e) purpose location nouns e.g. háló(szoba) (‘bedroom’), parkoló (‘parking area’)  
f) complex event nouns e.g. esküvő (‘wedding’), lakásavató (‘flat warming party’)

The hierarchy of these functions in terms of their evolvement¹² can be seen in Figure 1. Here
the spatial distance among the given functions represents their grammatical (and – as will
be seen later – also their conceptual) distance from the base.

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⁹ There are only two considerable differences in the assignment of the functions in the different accounts.
1. Laczkó (2000) distinguishes an occasional instrument category or function as well. 2. The older, descrip-
tive grammar books, such as Velcsov (1968) make reference to an archaic, nowadays already unproductive
patient noun (nomen patientis) function as well. They mention examples like szántóföld (‘plough land’) and
kölöpénz (‘spending-money’). Based on corpus data, however, a much more straightforward example of
this schema suggests itself: in the personal corpus of HGC adó ‘tax’ (derived from the verb ad ‘give’) is by
far the most frequent type of all the -Ó nouns with a token frequency of 1287. Furthermore, a higher degree
of diversity is manifested in how these different accounts relate the many functions of -Ó to each other (i.e.
whether the focus is on the overlaps and contiguity between them (like in Velcsov 1968) or rather on the
criteria for their clear delineation (as in Kiefer 2000, Laczkó 2000).
¹⁰ Examples are taken from the 10 most frequent types of -Ó nouns in each category (e.g. agent noun, instru-
ment noun etc.) in the personal subcorpus of the HGC.
¹¹ The suffix -Ó comes in two variants: the back-voweled -ó and the front-voweled -ő.
¹² This model of evolvement is also supported by the etymology of the examples respectively in Benkő
(1967-1984) and also supported by diachronic descriptions of -Ó (such as A. Jászó 1991, Károly 1956). As
to this latter: the fact that the suffix arose during the Uralic period and as such, even its polyfunctionality
had been emerged far before the first written documents of Hungarian, raise serious difficulties in providing
a proper, unambiguous description of the historical development of the functions of -Ó. For a more detailed
summary of such complexities (see Tóth-Czifra 2016).
As the term *deverb*al suggests, -Ö constructions have verbs as bases. At the same time, in many cases the present participle -Ö constructions give rise to both adjectives and nouns via conversion, exhibiting the word-formation patterns [V+ -Ö] → [V+-Ö] e.g. forró ('boiling') → forró adj, ('hot') or [V+-Ö] → [V+-Ö] e.g. iró part ('a writing person') → iró noun ('writer'). Furthermore, another portion of -Ö nouns are the result of ellipsis from a compound/phrase in which the -Ö component first acquires an adjectival meaning, as in folyó víz (transcr. folyó víz, ‘flowing water’, Jók.K 140,) → folyó ('river') or hálószoba ('bedroom') → háló ('bedroom').

As to the development of these functions of -Ö, Laczkó (2000: 402) argues against the deductibility of functions e) and f) (that is, the instrumental and complex event -Ö nouns) from the other functions of -Ö. With this incompatibility in mind, he postulates another -Ö suffix which shows a ‘fake homonymy’ (álhononim) relationship to the original present participial -Ö. Contrary to this approach, in the following a more coherent, network model of the suffix -Ö will be outlined. Instead of fake homonymy, it is argued that these seemingly diverse functions are conceptually related as they result from systematic metonymic meaning extensions.

Based on its above summarized polyfunctionality, it can be put forward that the deverbal suffix -Ö is a polysemous symbolic unit. In order to account for the semantic map of -Ö, the first step is the identification of the central sense of the suffix which serves as a basis of its meaning extensions. Notice that the map of functions in Figure 1 already suggests how these seemingly diverse functions are conceptually related.

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**Figure 1:** Function of suffixations in -Ö. (source: own construction.)

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V</th>
<th>+ -Ö</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ír</td>
<td>forró ('boiling')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aggódik ('to worry')</td>
<td>aggodó ('worrying/worrier')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forr ('to boil')</td>
<td>forró ('hot')</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N occasional</th>
<th>ADJ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>író ('author of a text')</td>
<td>hálószoba ('bedroom')</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N professional, typical</th>
<th>PART/ADJ</th>
<th>PART</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>író ('writer')</td>
<td>szűrő ('filter'), esküvő ('wedding'), háló ('bedroom')</td>
<td>forró ('boiling')</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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13 For a third possibility, that is, the direct derivation of -Ö nouns from verbs, see section 5.
4.1. The core meaning of suffixations in -Ő as a reference-point phenomenon

In line with the diachronic development of the suffix, the present participle meaning or function seems to be the primary one. Here the suffixation is considered as a composite structure (Langacker 1987) resulting from mutual elaboration (with emergent properties) between the base verb and the suffix. This composite structure as a symbolic unit serves 1. to designate a secondary action in a multiple action scenario (again, in the sense of Langacker 1987) and also 2. as a reference point helping in the identification of an agent.

(1) A cikket író diákok jól le lettek dorongolva.
('The students who wrote the article were harshly scolded.')

Sentence (1) shows a random present participle example from the HGC. What can be seen here is a complex scenario, consisting of two actions: the scolding of the students as the primary one and the writing of the article by the students as the secondary one. As such, (1) is an instantiation of figure ground alignment where the action expressed by the finite verb form serves as a figure, since it is more salient than the secondary action expressed by the -Ő construction, which serves as a ground. On the other hand, the -Ő construction becomes the salient element if we restrict the scope of analysis to the NP, i.e. to the cikket író diákok ('the students who wrote the article') part. Within the scope of the NP, the -Ő construction has a referential function (in the sense of Ruiz de Mendoza and Velasco 2002). That is, the secondary action is salient enough to clearly identify or designate the agent(s) in a particular context. In another words, it serves as a reference-point (Langacker 1999: 199) to the agents, i.e. to the particular students in question. This feature of present participle -Ő constructions shows similarity to referential metonymies, such as ham sandwich in the sentence The ham sandwich wants the bill (just to refer to a classic, extensively studied example). There is however a decisive difference between present participle -Ő constructions and ham sandwich in terms of metonymic meaning-making. In the case of ham sandwich, apart from providing reference to the agent (i.e. to clearly identify it in a particular context), it also stands for the agent. Such a stand for relationship is not present in the case of present participle -Ő constructions, such as író in (1). In conclusion: such -Ő constructions are not exhibiting metonymic patterns. Instead, they 1. designate a secondary action/event in a complex scenario. 2. serve as a reference point for-the identification of the agent(s). Although I am aware that -Ő constructions do not necessarily profile actions in a strict sense, I will henceforth refer to this core meaning (or source meaning) as action in cognitive terms.15

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14 All the further examples are also taken from the personal subcorpus of HGC.
15 This decision stays in contrast with Langacker (2008), who claims that only finite verbs can exhibit temporal relations, and as such can serve as source domains, while other verb forms, e.g. the gerund -ing, are processed by summary scanning, consequently they lose their temporality. Contrary to this explanation in this paper the non-finite present participle -Ő constructions are considered as temporal (although not prototypically temporal) relations for three reasons. First, these constructions show a relative temporality as they are isochronic with the primary temporal relation expressed by the finite verb form. Second, they also show an inner temporality or inner temporal structure i.e. aspect as they express ongoing, continuous actions and finally, because of the controversial nature of the sequential vs. summary scanning dichotomy. For a detailed discussion on this latter, see Broccia and Hollmann (2007). Also, for a detailed argument for the temporality of present participial -Ő constructions in terms of profiling see Tóth-Czifra (2016).
This present participle sense then, i.e. the actual, physical ongoing action can serve as a source domain and can provide mental access to other thematic roles. These thematic roles are accommodated within an action icm, and as such, meaning extensions from the action core sense carried out within the action icm — are clearly metonymic in nature. Figure 2 illustrates these metonymic mappings that motivate the figurative meanings of -Ő constructions.16

![Diagram](SLH_30.indd)

**Figure 2**: The semantic map of the Hungarian deverbal suffix -Ő.

### 4.2. From ongoing actions to professional agents

One line of meaning extension leads towards things and human agents. In cases where there is an action that is typical or habitual (or permanent) for an agent, this particular agent can be accessed or conceptually construed via this actual, ongoing, typically physical action, exhibiting therefore the action for the agent generic level metonymy. Exactly this happens in (2).

(2) a. *A level írója még 2 hónap múlva se kapott választ.* (‘The writer of the letter hasn’t received any answer for 2 months’)

b. *A legjobb reklámot egy író találta ki.* (‘The best commercial was invented by a writer.’)

(2a) and (2b) are however on different degrees/levels of idiomaticity. In (2a) a non-professional (i.e. occasional) agent is present and as such, here the action for the non-professional agent sub-metonymy is instantiated. This level of meaning extension exhibits a lower degree of conceptual and grammatical autonomy than (2b) where the metonymic target is a professional agent. In terms of conceptual construal, in (2a) the target író (‘writer’) is more closely tied to a given instantiation of the action icm (in this case the írás/writing icm.), as it is elaborated in relation to another entity of this specific action scenario, namely the object/patient element of it in terms of a possessive relationship. As such, here the (untypical)

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16 Function f), that is, the complex event meaning of -Ő constructions is missing from here. The lack of this extended meaning from Figure 2 is explained at the end of the section.
possessor, the letter serves as a reference-point for the identification of its possessed entity, its writer within the ACTION ICM. In other words, just as in the case of (1), here the reference-point phenomenon is present as well.\(^{17}\) This conceptual construal is illustrated in Figure 3, where the bold line represents the metonymic mapping between the ACTION as a source and the NON-PROFESSIONAL AGENT as the target, while the simple arrow represents the reference-point relation. The third arrow indicates the perspective itself, i.e. the relationship between the conceptualizer/viewer and the reference-point.

\[\text{Figure 3: PATIENT serving as a reference-point for NON-PROFESSIONAL AGENT within the ACTION ICM.}\]

By contrast, the target for író (‘writer’) in (2b) is a PROFESSIONAL AGENT who is a conceptually autonomous being (as entities denoted by nouns generally are).\(^{18}\) First, its autonomy is reflected by the fact that based on our culturally conditioned knowledge (or cultural model) on the target, i.e. people who make their living from writing, író in this sense is capable of evoking a rich cognitive content. Consequently, many elements of this cultural model (in the sense of Kövecses (2006) and the encyclopedic view of meaning (see Langacker 1987)) are independent already from the action of WRITING. For instance, apart from writing they also participate in literary events, such as dedication events), give interviews, or eventually are requested to create commercials, as in our case in (2b). All this conceptual richness and independence from the particular action of writing is missing from (2a), where the profiled entity in the target is much less elaborated, as it is restricted to a random person who writes a letter. Accordingly, the target of (2a) is closely tied to the given situation.


\(^{18}\) For a discussion on conceptual autonomy with regard to word-class categories see Radden – Dirven (2007), Langacker (2000).
In sum, what can be seen between (2a) and (2b) is a gradual meaning shift (involving the specific for generic and actuality for potentiality generic level metonymies) from an actual, situation-tied relationship to a conceptually and grammatically independent entity which does not necessarily involve a specific instantiation of the action icm (in this case, that of writing) anymore. Corpus data shows that this metonymic meaning shift is well-entrenched in language use: as Table 1 shows, in the personal subcorpus of HGC, the proportion of író as a noun vs. író as a present participle is 807 to 65. As such, író is the fifth most frequent -ő agent noun, following újságíró (újság ‘newspaper’ + író → ‘journalist’) which is a compound with író in its head.

![Token distribution of író in the personal subcorpus of HGC](image)

Table 1: Token distribution of the suffixation író in the personal subcorpus of HGC.

Naturally, the fact that író in (2a) and (2b) are on different levels of conceptual autonomy and idiomatization is also reflected in their grammatical behavior: while the idiomatized, institutionalized professional agent -ő construction loses the argument structure of its base verb completely, in 2a. the Patient argument of the verb ír (ír – levelet ‘to write – a letter’) is present in the form of a possessive relation (a levél írója ‘the writer of the letter’).19

In addition to the action for agent metonymy, the core meaning of -ő constructions is also capable to account for instruments (e.g. riasztó ‘alarm’), purpose locations (e.g. háló(zoba) ‘bedroom’) and complex events (e.g. esküvő ‘wedding’), exhibiting therefore the action for instrument, action for purpose location and action for complex event metonymies, respectively. This latter however is missing from figure 2. The reason for that is very

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19 For a detailed discussion on the grammatical representation (or linguistic coding) of the stages of this word-class/conceptual category change see Kiefer (1998) and Laczkó (2000). The changes in the syntactic behavior of these suffixations as a result of word-class category change (e.g. losing argument structure) however calls into question the per definitionem unmarkedness of metonymic meaning making. Although morpholexical invariance is beyond question, the syntactic changes still can be interpreted as a sign of markedness. This is especially considerable with the lexicogrammar continuum in mind.

20 As the dashed line indicates in Figure 2, instruments can be also interpreted as metaphoric meaning extensions from professional agents.
simple: unlike action for agent, action for instrument and action for purpose location, the action for complex event metonymy is a part for whole type of metonymy, in which a salient subevent/action of the complex event provides mental access to the whole complex event (consisting of a series of subevents). This conceptual operation is represented in Figure 4.

![Figure 4: Part for Whole mapping giving rise systematically to Complex Event -ō constructions.](image)

Interestingly, the salience of these -ō constructions comes from the fact that their bases are performatives (in the sense of Austin 1962) almost exclusively, such as esküvő (esküzik ‘to take an oath’ + -ō → ‘wedding’), keresztelő (keresztel ‘to baptize’ + -ō → ‘baptizer/christening’), kőszöntő (kőszönt ‘to toast sb’ + -ō → ‘gratulatory event’. The salience of these subevents therefore lies in the fact that without performing them, the complex events cannot come into existence or they are not considered valid. (A wedding without taking an oath to be a husband/wife is not a wedding, a baptizer without the act of baptizing is not a baptizer, etc.) In the case of complex event -ō constructions with non-performative verbs in their bases e.g. találkozó (találkozik ‘to meet’ + -ō → ‘meeting’), it can be argued that these are more recent developments which were triggered by analogy from the ones with performatives in their base.

3.3. From ongoing actions to characteristics

The other line of meaning extension leads towards adjectival meanings, that is, from temporal relations towards a-temporal relations. In cognitive terms: first, a typical, habitual action is accessed through the actually occurring/happening action (as it is illustrated in Figure 2) exhibiting the specific for generic as well as the actuality for potentiality generic level metonymies. This metonymic shift can be further extended towards the more abstract category of general characteristics, which does not involve the actually occurring action anymore. Example (3) shows an instantiation of this metonymic chain (cf. Figure 5).

![Figure 5: Metonymic chain giving rise to adjectival -ō constructions.](image)
In contrast to (3a) where *aggódó* exhibits the core meaning of -Ó constructions, i.e. it involves an ongoing action closely tied to a given situation, in (3c) a meaning shift is represented ranging from the temporal relation of an actually occurring, ongoing action toward an atemporal relation type of characteristics. Here the same stabilization process is at work as it was seen in the case of (2b). That is, just like the professional agent *író* in (2b), here *aggódó* ‘worrying’ as an atemporal relation becomes an inherent feature of an agent, and as such, it acquires independence from a particular situation (such as standing next to another person and worrying, as in (3a)). Unlike (3a) and (3c), where the elaboration of the -Ó constructions is quite straightforward, (3b) exhibits a high degree of ambiguity between the senses of the core meaning, the ongoing action and the lower form of its meaning extension, the habitual action of *aggódó*. As such, here not even the context proves to be sufficient enough to disambiguate between this here and now versus the typical, habitual action reading of the construction. This example points on the gradual nature of this meaning shift, with meaning shifts in *aggódó* presenting a slow transition from the core meaning to higher degrees of extension.

In sum, what can be seen is that the line of meaning extension in the construction *aggódó* ranges from the actually occurring action (which can be equated with the present participial function of -Ó constructions) towards the clearly adjectival target of characteristics. Nevertheless, corpus data shows that the parts of this cline are not equally frequently elaborated i.e. not equally typically present in language use. Table 2 sheds light on the asymmetry in the use of *aggódó* as a present participle and as an adjective respectively.

Table 2: Token distribution of *aggódó* in the personal subcorpus of HGC.
In naturally occurring language use, *aggódó* dominantly instantiates/tends to instantiate the core meanings (*ongoing action*) or low-level meaning extension (*typical/permanent action*). This dominance is represented in the fact that *aggódó* as a present participle exhibited 113 tokens in the corpus, while the higher level of meaning extension (*characteristics*, represented in the word-class category of adjectives) was instantiated only 10 times. Consequently, what can be concluded from frequency data is that although *aggódó* has the full potential to be elaborated on any point in the meaning extension cline ranging from ongoing *actions* to *characteristics*, in language use a clear preference is present for the lower parts of the cline. As such, *aggódó* proves to be a better candidate for being a present participle than an adjective.

Now let us see by contrast an instance of -Ó constructions that is dominantly used as an adjective and let us see in which ways it deviates from the patterns of meaning construal represented in *aggódó*. Our example is *forró* ('hot') in example (4). As Table 3 shows, *forró* was used 980 times as an adjective but only 48 times as a participle. This clearly points on the established, lexicalized status (Pusztai 2011: 412) of the metonymic meaning shift in the construction.

![Token distribution of forró in the personal subcorpus of HGC](image)

**Table 3:** Token distribution of *forró* in the personal subcorpus of HGC.

(4) Ó, azok a régi, hosszú, *forró* nyarak!
('Oh, those old, long, hot summers!')

In Hungarian, the word for the concept of *hot* (*forró* _adj_) derives from that for boiling (*forró* _part_). This concept, however, lost its direct connection to boiling liquids, since we use it in all cases when referring to high temperature. In (4), for example, for the hot temperature in the summer. Notice that due to the established, lexicalized status of this meaning shift, there was no need to show the further elaborations of *forró* in other contexts, since in contrast to *aggódó*, context has a negligible impact on the existence of this lexically fixed meaning shift. Interestingly, due to this lexical fixedness and the dominance of the adjectival sense of
forró, in the course of lexicalization it became detached from its original and etymologically prior source meaning. As a result, for its original source meaning, i.e. in reference to boiling liquids, forró is not used anymore. Instead, for actually boiling liquids another expression, forrásban van/forrásban lévő (‘it is in boiling’), is preferred.21 Here therefore – unlike in straightforward cases of metonymy, the source domain – in our case the action itself, i.e. boiling – is not activated or present anymore. This is what Panther and Thornburg (2002) and Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014b) calls post-metonymies where “the concept that was the metonymic source is no longer present synchronically as part of the lexeme’s meaning” (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014b: 317). Their independence from an actual situation, such as boiling water, puts this type of meaning extension outside of the action circle (as it is represented in Figure 2).22

In sum, the degrees of meaning extension in the different elaborations of the construction aggódó in (3) and the lexicalized meaning shift represented in forró in (4) show parallels with író constructions in (2).

Figure 6: The stabilization process in the semantics of -Ó constructions along the line of meaning extensions.

First, as it is summarized in Figure 6, all these cases of metonymic meaning shifts reflect a stabilization process leading from tied-to-situation type of relations expressing actual,

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21 Evidence for this preference is supported by a random sample (n=50) from one of the biggest Hungarian online recipe collection mindmegette.hu. Out of the 50 recipes in 37 cases the actually boiling water was referred to by the term forrásban lévő víz ‘water in [the state of] boiling’, while forró was used only 13 times. Although this pattern clearly shows the detachment of the lexical entry forró from its source meaning, it is far from being representative.

22 Again, the scope of the present paper does not allows for a detailed discussion on the effects of this stabilization process in terms of their grammatical coding (e.g. as a sign of conceptual autonomy, adjectival -Ó constructions can occupy a nominal complement position etc.). For the criteria on differentiating between adjectival and present participle constructions see, again, Laczkó (2000) and Kiefer (1998). For a cognitive grammar approach towards these criteria see Tóth-Czifra (2016).
ongoing reality to atemporal relations being independent from one given situation and making use of the general-level conceptual metonymies specific for generic and actuality for potentiality. Second, in line with this stabilization process, an increasing degree of conceptual autonomy from the resulting action ICM can be detected. As a result, well-entrenched instances of higher-level meaning shifts, as in the professional agent író and in forró, have the capability for reaching out, i.e. become independent from this action ICM. Third and finally, frequency data points on the influential role of the dynamics of language use in the process of idiomatization. As can be seen, level of entrenchment has a serious impact on the manifestations of metonymic meaning construal. In the case of constructions with a lower-level entrenchment, such as aggódó, we saw that metonymic meaning shifts were unfolding as a slow transition from the core meaning towards higher levels of meaning extension. By contrast, in heavily entrenched instances of figurative meaning construal (e.g. in forró), metonymy took a more radical form, namely it came in the form of post metonymies. These results suggest that this complex relationship between idiomatization (lexicalization, grammaticalization) and language use is well worth studying in the context of -Ö constructions.

5. Does such a thing as affix polysemy in a strict sense exist in -Ö?

After modelling the semantic matrix of -Ö constructions and identifying the metonymic patterns in the discourse functions of -Ö, there is one more important question remaining to be answered, namely, on exactly which levels of meaning construal metonymy operates. Can we talk about affix polysemy in the sense of metonymic meaning shifts directly represented in the semantic structure of the affix as well, or is it restricted for specific -Ö constructions (such as író, forró, aggódó)?

Notice that previous scholarship on word-formation metonymies is far from being unambiguous in this respect. A brief survey on the different views on the scope of metonymy in affixational word-formation was outlined in the Introduction. In our case, examples in (2)-(4) suggest that metonymic meaning shifts are limited to particular constructions in isolation, instantiating therefore cases of idiomatization due to entrenchment. Consequently, these instances of metonymic thought could be considered as a bunch of individual cases of conversion which show no difference from conversion patterns in morphologically simple lexemes (such as drink noun → to drink verb).

In the following, however, I will argue for a more systematic account of the scope of metonymy in affixation. Namely, I attempt to outline a schema-based account for polysemy in -Ö constructions which yields a multi-layered representation of metonymic patterns operating on all 3 levels of meaning construal: 1. on the level of particular instantiations of -Ö construction schemas (such as forró or író), 2. on the schema level, be it a high-level schema (e.g. \[V+{-Ö}_\text{part} \rightarrow [V+{-Ö}]_\text{adj}\]) or a more elaborated, lower-level schema (e.g. \[N+{álló} \text{ ‘Nproof’}\]) and finally, 3. in the internal semantic structure of the affix -Ö.

5.1. From individual instances to schema-level representation of polysemy: The role of analogy in schema establishment

As it was already touched upon (see footnote 12), the fact that -Ö constructions – moreover, all its meaning extensions – were established around the Uralic period of the development of Hungarian, i.e. far before the appearance of the first written documents in Old Hungarian, causes serious difficulties in describing their historical development in terms of the consecutive
steps of the emergence of the above outlined metonymic patterns. Nevertheless, there are reasons to assume that the establishment of metonymic patterns follows a general evolutionary path of grammaticalization (as it is outlined e.g. in Bybee 2006) in that analogy had an important role in the emergence of systematic meaning extensions, that is, in the emergence of generic- and specific-level constructional schemas (Langacker 2000) from individual constructions.

First, again, because of the early emergence of the affix it is not easy to define exactly which constructions served as starting points for meaning extensions and to identify the initial instantiations/cases of analogy. Instead, at this point only potential patterns of analogy can be outlined, serving as a hypothesis for a more thorough diachronic corpus study. As an example, it can be put forward that the character trait tőrvénytisztelő (‘low-abiding’), jogkövető (‘law-abiding’ again) and istenhívő (‘believer’) are results of analogical coining on the basis of istenfélő, which is one of the earliest -Ő construction that clearly exhibits an adjectival sense, i.e. the HABITUAL/PERMANENT ACTION FOR CHARACTERISTICS metonymy. All these constructions denote behavior patterns as characteristics that show a high degree of conformity to a given social-moral maxim (God’s laws or the law/legal canon).

Second, the strength of analogy in -Ő constructions is clearly illustrated by the fact that apart from straightforward cases of analogous meaning shift carried out via conversion (as previously pointed out with regard to tőrvénytisztelő and jogkövető), analogy gave rise even to backformations. As an example, the adjective apró ‘very small’ has an Old-Turkish origin, and it base verb aprút has never existed as a regular base for apró. Instead, it is a result of the recategorization or remotivation of the borrowed adjective apró according to the very productive to a [V+Ő̂]part → [V+-Ő̂] adj word-formation pattern. As a result, apró became considered as a regular -Ő adjective, and as such, it received an analogously coined, fake base verb aprút (see Benkő 1967: 233) on the basis of the already existing [Vít]+[-Ő̂] → [V+Ő̂]part → [V+-Ő̂] adj patterns, such as taszít (‘to repulse’) → taszító (‘unattractive’), segít (‘to help’) → segítő (‘helping/helper’). The same remotivation process is reflected by the emergence of the archaic verb gyarlók (‘to commit something bad’), as it is also a backformation from a false -Ő construction, in this case from gyarló, (‘fallible’) which also has an Old-Turkish origin (Benkő 1967). The fact that analogy was at work even in backformations clearly points out the strength of analogical formations in the development of -Ő constructions.

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23 For a historical corpus-based study see, again, Tóth-Czifra (2016).
24 The oldest accessible instance of istenfélő is dated as early as 1590, in the first full Hungarian translation of the Holy Bible (Károli 1590). The frequent use of the construction in Bible translations and codices could have significantly helped the construction to gain entrenchment.
25 Here, of course, the need for more thorough corpus studies is beyond question.
26 In the case of these analogously recategorized, fake -Ő adjectives it would be especially interesting to conduct an experiment with the same procedure as in Wheeler and Schumsky (1980) or Nordquist (2004). As such subjects would have given a list of words and their task would be to slice them off in line with their morphological constituents. The results would shed light on whether these fake -Ő adjectives are still represented mentally as [V+-Ő] adj constructions.
5.2. The establishment of constructional schemas along the lines of extension and elaboration

What follows from the above subsection is that analogy has the capability of triggering more systematic meaning shifts on the basis of individual suffixations/constructions. These systematic meaning shifts are then becoming abstracted and represented in the forms of constructional schemas (Langacker 2000). It can be argued, for instance, that from the analogous coinings of *istenfélő, istenhívő, törénytisztelő* and *jogkövető*, a schema (although with limited productivity) of *behavioral patterns complying with conventional social-moral maxims* can be abstracted which in turn has the capability to give rise to other instances with the same generic meaning. Opposite to this subschema of -Ó adjectives, the more elaborated [Nsértő] (‘N hurting’) schema with the meaning of *behavioral patterns not complying with conventional social-moral maxims* is also observable in language use. Instantiations of this schema from the personal subcorpus of HGC can be found in in Table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Number of tokens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>törvénysértő</td>
<td>‘malféasant’</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jogértő</td>
<td>‘injurious’</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alkotmánysértő</td>
<td>‘unconstitutional’</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kegyeletsértő</td>
<td>‘impious’</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>becsületsértő</td>
<td>‘libelous’</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jogszabálysértő</td>
<td>‘malféasant’</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>szabálysértő</td>
<td>‘malféasant’</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>határsértő</td>
<td>‘invader’</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fülsértő</td>
<td>‘grating, earsplitting’</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>szeméremysértő</td>
<td>‘pornographic’</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bankitioksértő</td>
<td>‘hurting banking secrecy’</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>államtitoksértő</td>
<td>‘hurting state secret’</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>titoksértő</td>
<td>‘hurting a secret’</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>szabályzat-sértő</td>
<td>‘malféasant’</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>légitersértő</td>
<td>lit. ‘airspace hurting’</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dobhártyasértő</td>
<td>‘grating, earsplitting’</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>törvény/alkotmánysértő</td>
<td>‘unconstitutional/malféasant’</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>szimmetriasértő</td>
<td>symmetry hurting</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>személyiség-sértő</td>
<td>‘personality threatening’</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rágalmazó-becsületsértő</td>
<td>‘calumniatory’</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>normasértő</td>
<td>‘norm hurting’</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014b) outlines very briefly the same procedure regarding the polysemy of the Croatian place suffixation –iste.
Table 4: Types instantiating the constructional subschema [Nsértő].

Table 4 shows that 1. many of the coinings are highly synonymous and 2. the [Nsértő] subschema shows a higher degree of productivity than the Behavioral Patterns Complying with Conventional Social-Moral Maxims subschema.

Such constructional schemas “are able to capture the commonalities of specific expressions at any linguistic level” (Benczes 2010: 234). Figure 7 gives us an insight on the arrangement of -Ó constructions in terms of their resulting schemas. Nevertheless, it is limited to the adjectival -Ó constructions and it is far from exhaustive.

Here, in addition to the generic-level meaning extensions of the [V+Ó]part → [V+Ó]adj scheme and the [Nsértő] subschema, another subschema is presented in order to illustrate correlations of the two axes, extension and elaboration. The subschema [Nálló] ‘Nproof’ is at the same level of elaboration as [Nsértő], however, it gives rise to instances with a closer-to-adjectival meaning (e.g. golyóálló ‘bulletproof’ (45), vízálló ‘waterproof’ 38). That is, unlike the behavioral patterns of törvénsértő, jogsértő etc., they are prototypical instances of Characteristics.

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28 There productivity is used in the sense of Bybee (2006, 2008, 2010), and as such, it is a phenomenon having to do with type frequency, i.e. the capability of a particular schema to motivate novel instances.

29 This finding is in line with Bybee’s markedness theory.

30 A comprehensive account of all the subschemas of -Ó constructions is far beyond the scope of the present paper.

31 This figure was inspired by Benczes (2010).
In sum, the schema-level analysis revealed that apart from the individual -Ó constructions, metonymic meaning shifts are also abstracted into schemas as well, at different levels of extension and elaboration.

5.3. The emergence of a direct -Ó

So far, it has been demonstrated that 1. metonymic meaning construal starts out from individual constructions (such as istenfélő). 2. These individual constructions trigger similar changes by analogy and as such motivate similar meaning shifts. 3. From these analogous constructions, constructional schemas can be abstracted on different levels of extension and elaboration. In sum, it was demonstrated that metonymy operates both on the level of individual constructions and on the level of constructional schemas. The only question therefore remaining to be answered is whether we can identify these metonymic shifts within the semantic structure of the affix -Ó, and if so, how such absorption has been carried out in the course of language use.

In the following, evidence will be shown to demonstrate how polysemy is represented in the semantic structure of the affix as well. On the exact way in which such semantic absorption is carried out in the course of language use, Taylor (2012) gives us an insight. “To know the word [or any other symbolic unit] involves knowing the contexts in which the word is used, where ‘contexts’ refers, not to the situations in the world which speakers wish to talk about, but the linguistic context in which the word is used” (ibid. 160). To put it in a more abstract way: “knowing the construction consists in knowing its established instances and their conventional semantic and pragmatic values” (ibid. 30). Accordingly, in the case of composite structures such as -Ó constructions, the established patterns of figurative use also become part of the semantic representation of their components (that is, in the semantic representation of their base and their suffixes respectively).

The same process can be identified in the grammaticalization of -Ó. As it was touched upon previously, the meaning extensions in -Ó constructions analyzed so far are carried out either via conversion (e.g. aggódó → aggódó) or via ellipsis from an [[V+-Ó]+N] construction (e.g. hálószoba ‘bedroom’ → háló ‘bedroom’). However, the comprehensive grammars Velcsov (1968) and Laczkó (2000) also mention a third possibility for the -Ó nouns. They point out that not all of the -Ó nouns are the result of conversion or ellipsis from the present participial or adjectival senses, but rather some of them are directly derived from verbs via the addition of the affix -Ó, exhibiting therefore an alternative word-formation pattern: [V+-Ó]noun. As can be seen, this involves the skipping of the intermediate stages of word-formation, and consequently the establishment of a direct, deverbal -Ó producing nominal -Ó constructions. Figure 8 illustrates this pattern for this direct derivation of -Ó nouns together with the already familiar patterns of conversion and ellipsis.

An important difference in these two accounts is that Laczkó (2000) argues for a fake homonymy relationship between the present participle -Ó and the deverbal noun -Ó. By contrast, Velcsov (1971) puts the emphasis on the way in which the direct deverbal noun -Ó affix had emerged from the frequent exploitation of part→noun conversion. Furthermore, in her account these two word-formation patterns giving rise to -Ó nouns are co-present in synchronic language use. The present paper adopts this latter view, since neologisms (e.g. lépésszámláló készülék ‘pedometer device’ → lépésszámláló ‘pedometer’) show evidence for the present-day productivity of ellipsis and conversion as well.
Figure 8: Word-formation patterns giving rise to -Ó noun constructions.

Velesov’s (1968: 38) examples for -Ó nouns resulting from this direct affixation include szereplő (‘character’), könyvelő (‘accountant’), (csecsemő)gondozó (‘nurse, caretaker’), although she presents no etymological evidence for the direct emergence of these -Ó nouns. Instead of such dubious cases, in the following I wish to show evidence for the existence of a direct deverbal noun -Ó suffix in the form of -Ó neologisms. Due to the (relative) availability of their etymological history, it can be clearly detected whether they underwent intermediate stages of derivation (such as conversion or ellipsis) or are the result of direct addition of an -Ó suffix.

The recently emerged agent noun szoftverfejlesztő (‘software developer’) seems to be a good candidate representing this direct development. A Google search shows no collocations for this construction (i.e. no such coinings as szoftverfejlesztő szakember (‘a software developer professional’) are available). Furthermore, no present participle use of the construction is available. As an example for instrument nouns produced by direct affixation, kijelző (‘display’) is the case in point. It shows similar properties as szoftverfejlesztő, in that it is available neither in collocations, nor as a present participle. This clearly indicates that it could not have emerged either via conversion or via ellipsis.

All in all, the emergence of a direct -Ó noun affix clearly shows how patterns of metonymic meaning shifts became represented in the semantic structure of the affix itself. This affix-level representation in the intrechment of metonymic construal has led to the emergence

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33 On the other hand, however, this could be a direct translation from software developer as well.
of a new, figurative -Ő noun affix, homonymic with the present particle -Ő and existing as autonomous affix in the Hungarian affix system.

5. Conclusion

The aim of the present paper was to study some important features of affix polysemy in general and to provide a cognitively plausible account of the Hungarian deverbal suffixations in -Ő in particular by answering the following questions:

1. In exactly which ways -Ő constructions reflect cognitive construals?
2. How is the semantic structure of the suffix -Ő structured by meaning extensions?
3. What is and what is not metonymical in this semantic structure? And finally:
4. On which levels of constructional organization can metonymic patterns of meaning construal be identified? That is, can we talk about affix polysemy in a strict sense in the case of -Ő?

With respect to questions 1–3, the corpus and cognitive analysis shed light on the metonymic nature of meaning construals represented in the semantic structure of -Ő. From the ongoing action core sense (which is coded grammatically as present participle) two lines of meaning extensions could be identified, both exhibiting metonymic chains. On the one hand, this core meaning provides mental access to things and human agents via the conceptual metonymies action for agent (either occasional or professional, e.g. író), action for instrument (e.g. ri-asztó), action for purpose location (e.g. háló(szoba)) and action for complex event (e.g. esküvő). On the other hand, another line of meaning extension leads towards adjectival meanings, that is, from temporal relations towards a temporal relations. In cognitive terms: first, a typical, habitual action is accessed through the core meaning ongoing action, exhibiting the specific for generic as well as the actuality for potentiality generic level metonymies (e.g. aggódó). This metonymic meaning shift can be further extended towards the more abstract domain of characteristics (e.g. forró ‘hot’). All these metonymic shifts are accommodated in an action icm. While the functions of -Ő produced by these meaning extensions proved to be straightforward cases of word-formation metonymies, in its core meaning, the present participial -Ő construction was interpreted 1. as profiling a secondary action in a multiple action scenario and 2. as a reference-point helping in the identification of the agent.

With regard to the fourth question, evidence was shown for a multi-layered representation of metonymic patterns. It was demonstrated how such patterns are at work in all three levels of meaning construal, namely 1. on the level of the particular instantiations of -Ő construction schemas (such as forró ‘hot’ or író ‘writer’), 2. on the schema level, be it a high-level schema (e.g. \[V^+-Ő_{part} \rightarrow [V+-Ő]_{adj}\]) or a more elaborated, lower-level schema (e.g. \[N+áltó] ‘Nproof’), and finally, 3. in the internal semantic structure of the affix -Ő.

Apart from providing answers for the above questions, the cognitive and corpus analysis revealed a significant amount of hidden complexities in the emergence of metonymic patterns giving rise to -Ő constructions. These hidden complexities are waiting to be explored.
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A SEMANTIC DESCRIPTION OF TWO MEANINGS OF ELVAN IN THE DIALECT OF NYITRAGERENCSÉR

Katalin Tóth

Abstract

The present paper offers a semantic description of two meanings of the verb elvan (consisting of the preverb el- ‘away’ and the verb van ‘be’) in the dialect of Nyitragerencsér. Compared to the standard language variety, the lexeme has an additional meaning in the dialect in question, namely the marking of constant spatial distance. The analysis makes it clear how the preverb contributes to meaning generation. Whereas in the dialectal meaning ‘be far’, the preverb does not affect the temporal reference of van ‘be’, it does so in the second meaning (‘passes time by having fun’), where the ongoing, enduring nature of the activity is in profile.

Cognitive semantics aims primarily at the description of meanings by exploring the building up and schematization of conceptual structures. Linguistic units, which can be schematized or specific to varying degrees, are studied in context, i.e. against the background of texts derived from natural speech situations. In this way, cognitive semantics breaks with the tradition of describing language as an end in itself, and complies with the requirements of functionalist linguistics (cf. Ladányi–Tolcsvai Nagy 2008: 33). As Gábor Tolcsvai Nagy puts it, “the self-reflexive experiential sphere and Erwartungshorizont of the new millenium is aware of, and demands, usage data (...)” (Tolcsvai Nagy 2011). Accordingly, my study relies on corpus data collected and recorded by the dialectologist Ferenc Sima. Sima collected the dialectal vocabulary of the Nyitra region, including that of the village of Nyitragerencsér, with the aim of preparing a dialectal dictionary. However, his illness prevented him from completing this task (Sándor 2007).

The paper adopts the theoretical and descriptive framework of Ronald Langacker (1987, 2008), in which the preverb and the verb are to be interpreted as forming a composite structure. I have previously offered a description based on the notion of blending (Tóth 2013); however, an account in terms of composite structures promises to be more detailed and precise. The analysis aims to contribute to our understanding of semantic extensions affecting the preverb el ‘away’, and to shed light on the basis of functional variability.

Keywords: cognitive semantics, composite structure, Nyitragerencsér dialect, preverb, semantic structure, verb

1. The preverb el ‘away’ and the existential verb van ‘be’

The process of Hungarian preverbs taking on new functions has been going hand in hand with their grammaticalization (Ladányi 2007: 95). With regard to preverbs, two phases of grammaticalization can be discerned. The first of these produced the word class of preverbs (from adverbs, and ultimately from nominals with a lative suffix), as well as the systemic
organization of its members by the end of the Old Hungarian period. The second phase is still unfolding in the present, and is characterized by further semantic extensions and abstractions affecting the class, as well as an increase in token frequency.

The opacization of the original directional meaning of preverbs and their increase in token frequency are two processes which mutually reinforce each other (D. Mátai 1991: 433–434). Grammaticalization includes a range of functional, phonological, grammatical and (crucially) semantic changes, among them the generalization of meaning with the loss of semantic specifications. However, grammaticalization also involves semantic enrichment. In the process of metaphorical extension, the semantics of the target domain contributes to the development of grammatical meaning, hence the semantic aspect of grammaticalization cannot be equated with the loss of meaning specifications (Sweetser 1988, Ladányi 2005). Semantic generalization and enrichment are best demonstrated on historical texts; however, they can also be illustrated by the description of particular meanings.

As a result of grammaticalization, the meaning of preverbs is schematic, simple, highly abstract and polysemous, which allows them to fulfill a variety of functions. The meanings of a polysemous linguistic unit form a network in which secondary meanings are related to the core meaning via semantic extension (Cuyckens–Zawada 2001, Tolesvai Nagy 2010: 113–115). In their primary meaning, most preverbs express movement or directionality along a path, with respect to physical space, implying a spatial endpoint for the activity denoted by the verb when the end of the path has been reached. By marking directions of action, preverbs construe displacements in the spatial structure created by language (Szilágyi N. 1996: 17). They profile a part of spatial structure in their primary meanings, and allow for the perception and interpretation of subtle distinctions in directionality, similarly to the function of suffixes with a spatial meaning. On the other hand, the directional meaning of preverbs has gradually moved to the background, with temporal reference taking centre stage in the focus of attention. As Mária Ladányi remarks, temporal boundedness (perfectivity) was the first secondary meaning to be added to the primary spatial one, owing to the fact that the reaching of a spatial endpoint coincides with a temporal one (Ladányi 1999: 127–129). In some cases, when the action itself does not imply movement, the preverb may be central to the expression of the passing of time (e.g. tart ‘hold’ vs. eltart ‘endure, last’, cf. Kövecses 2005: 36–39). What stands in the focus of attention is not so much the directionality attached to a process but rather the temporal boundedness thereof, i.e. perfectivity.

Prototypically, the preverb el expresses directionality. This meaning can be characterized as follows: el represents the spatial position of an entity (the trajector) in relation to bounded space (serving as landmark), where the trajector in the preverb’s conceptual structure moves along a path from a source to a goal. More specifically, the entity serving as trajector (primary figure) is moving away from a place (functioning as landmark, or secondary figure), within three-dimensional space (Tolesvai Nagy 2010: 70–71).

The existential verb van ‘be’ is one of the most basic and most frequent verbs of Hungarian, its semantic description is nevertheless far from simple. In the Historical-Etymological Dictionary of Hungarian (Történeti-etimológiai szótár, TESZ), the verb’s lexical entry includes the following passage: “the original meaning may have been ‘that which exists’. The verbal function of the word is secondary, and its development is closely related to the consolidation of vagy as a second person singular verb form. Van as a third person singular form emerged relatively late, through back formation from the third person singular vannak [vagy-nak ~ vadnak].” Given the source of development mentioned above, the word may have
originally been a nomenverbum-like element, “interpretable as a first, second, or third person verb form, but also as a noun meaning ‘that which exists; an existing person’ (Benkő ed. 1976: 1084–1085). The New Hungarian Dialectal Dictionary (Új magyar tájszótár) also remarks that the word used to have a nominal function in some dialect (B. Lőrinczy ed. 2010: 631).

Despite its rich meaning, the existential verb has received less attention than it deserves in Hungarian semantic studies. A detailed description of distinctions between particular meanings is yet to be elaborated. In her paper, Márta Varga H. (2010) distinguishes between six functions of the verb, namely the expression of i. existence, ii. existence with a partitive meaning, iii. existence modified by an adverbial, as well as iv. use as an auxiliary, v. use as a verb of possession, and vi. use as part of a passive construction expressing a state (lenni 'be' + -va, -ve '<participial suffix>' pattern). However, she does not provide an elaborate semantic description, and does not back up her categorization with arguments. The Dictionary of the Hungarian Language (Értelmező kéziszótár) only lists two meanings: “1. Exists. 2. Is in some state of under certain circumstances” (Pusztai ed. 2003: 1428–1429).

The primary function of the existential verb is the expression of existence; it can also construe a state in continuous aspect, with a full paradigm (Langacker 2008: 125, Tolcsvai Nagy 2009: 379). Similarly to other verbs, it profiles a process; compared to verbs of movement, this process is more abstract. Its semantic structure includes mental representations of a trajector (something) and a landmark (somewhere), but at a high level of abstraction.

2. The meanings of elvan

The Dictionary of the Hungarian Language lists two meanings of the verb elvan (consisting of the preverb el- 'away' and the verb van 'be'): “1. To be able to stay somewhere or in some state (for some time), 2. To get along with somebody (for some time)” (Pusztai ed. 2003: 300). By contrast, the New Hungarian Dialectal Dictionary supplies four meanings: 1. ‘to be away, to be absent’, 2. ‘to stay somewhere’, 3. <e.g. about news> ‘to spread’, 4. <with pejorative evaluation> ‘to be just about acceptable’ (B. Lőrinczy ed. 1988: 172–173). The above specifications are far from exhausting the semantics of elvan. Not only do they fail to cover all the corpus examples to be examined in the next section, but they also insufficiently account for examples found in the Hungarian National Corpus (henceforth HNC).

Based on the 1.267 tokens found in the HNC (the new, updated version of the corpus), at least five meanings can be discerned (without detailed semantic analysis). The distinctions between them are somewhat arbitrary, as it is impossible to draw a neat boundary between them; the most adequate presentation would take the form of a semantic network.2 Below is a list of the five meanings in question, illustrated by sample sentences.

(1) ‘make a (good) living; do all right; get along (with each other); bear’

a. (…) a honvédelmi tárcánál és környékén mindenki jól elvan.
‘At the defence ministry and around it everybody is doing all right.’

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1 The preverb+verb structure of elvan is highly lexicalized, as also suggested by the fact that there are no occurrences in the HNC2 in which the preverb and the verb would be separate.

2 A detailed corpus study may allow a more refined analysis of meanings; here I only provide the semantic groups which minimally need to be distinguished.
'They are just existing, living. They are getting along well there, in their own Parises and Persias.'
c. Más szavakkal: az evolúció, a tudományos elmélet jól elvan Isten nélkül is – és ezt Te írtad le.
'In other words: evolution, the scientific theory is doing all right even without God – and You wrote this.'

(2) 'stay/survive in a good shape for some time; function (somewhere)'

a. Állítólag ebben hosszú évtizedekig is elvan egy üveg bor, akárcsak egy pincében.
'They say that in this a bottle of wine can survive for decades, just like in a cellar.'
b. Akkumulátora 800 mAh-s kapacitású, ezzel átlagosan 3 napig eléggé jól elvan, mire töltő után kellene nézniünk.
'Its battery has a capacity of 800 mAh, with this it survives 3 days on average before we need to look for a charger.'

(3) 'occupy oneself, pass time while having fun (or staying idle)'

a. Anyuka betérhet ide gyerekkel is pár percre, mert a gyerek elvan, amíg ő barnul.
'Mummy can pop in here for a few minutes even with a child, because the child is occupying himself while she is tanning.'
b. Nincs hát benne semmi csodálni való, hogy órák hosszáig elvagyok egymagam-ban és boldogan merengek el az emlékezetemben felvonuló képeken.
'So there is nothing strange about it that I am able to occupy myself for hours on end, and linger on happily with the images in my memory.'

(4) 'bear something; stay busy with somebody/something or the thought of something'

a. Háromkor erős fájdalomra ébredtem, de valahogy elvoltam vele reggelig, amikor megnézett Cs. doktor.
'At 3 o’clock I woke up with a strong pain, but somehow I managed to bear it until the morning, when doctor Cs. arrived.'
b. Egyszerűen dolgoznak és elvannak a maguk építette világában.
'They are simply working and staying busy in the world they have built for themselves.'

(5) 'be far; be away'

a. Már egész gyerekfővel is sokszor elvoltam hazulról.
'Already as a child I was often away from home.'
b. Hát vártalak - gondolhatod - amíg elvoltál külhonokban.
'Well, I was waiting for you - you may think - while you were away in foreign countries.'

Most occurrences of elvan exemplify the first meaning, accounting for 40% of tokens from the HNC2 corpus. Collocational analysis shows that elvan most frequently co-occurs with
the adverb jól ‘well’, in 407 cases. In the next large group of data, the verb carries the third meaning, followed by the second and the fourth functions with approximately equal shares in the corpus. The fifth meaning is the rarest to occur.

In the two corpus sentences from Nyitragerencsér, the meanings of elvan are as follows: 1. ‘be far away’, 2. ‘pass time while having fun’. Although it would seem that both of these have also been documented in the HNC2, the ‘be far away’ dialectal meaning of elvan is not identical with the function attested in the national corpus. In the HNC2, the relevant interpretation is that a person is far away at the time of speaking (cf. (5a) and (5b)), whereas the dialectal example refers to the (stable) distance of some place. It is also interesting to observe that most of the examples from the HNC2 feature verbs with preverbs which do not profile spatial distance. By contrast, in the New Hungarian Dialectal Dictionary, spatial relations are important even in the first two meaning specifications.

3. Composite structure and frame of reference

Before we turn to the semantic analysis of the two corpus examples, it is necessary to give an overview of the notions of composite structures and frames of reference.

The preverb and the verb make up a composite structure, forming a linguistic unit (Langacker 1987: 57). With regard to conceptualization, this structure is processed by the human mind holistically, since it represents an event with well-defined, closed boundaries (Wallace 1982). Features of composite structures can be described by reference to valency relations, including the following: 1. correspondences (as a function of overlaps between profiled substructures of the component structures), 2. profile determinance (the profile of a given component structure will also be the profile of the composite structure), 3. conceptual and phonological autonomy and dependence (with the autonomous component structure elaborating a profiled substructure of the dependent component structure), and 4. constituency (component structures are hierarchically combined in a given order, forming elaborate composite structures) (Langacker 1987: 277–326).

The main properties of Hungarian preverb + verb composite structures are summarized by Tolcsvai Nagy (2013: 188) as follows:

a) the semantic pole of the composite structure is provided by the relation between the meanings of the two components, i.e. of the preverb and of the verb
b) the composite structure profiles a process (temporal relation), unfolding with the participation of schematic figures
c) the composite structure is based on partial correspondences and elaborative relations between the preverb and the verb; the composite structure functions as a linguistic unit whose internal structure is nevertheless transparent, and recognizable parts of the semantic structure make specific contributions to the meaning of the entire unit, or extensions thereof.

It has been remarked above that the meaning of el includes directionality. As a matter of principle, directionality can only be interpreted in the context of some space, with respect to something; therefore, it is important to consider the role of reference points in the analysis. Reference points are mentally construed spatial vantage points from which figures (or processes) are conceptualized. A reference point can be absolute, i.e. independent of the conceptualizer (e.g. geocentric, such as North) or relative, i.e. contingent on the conceptualizer's
perspective (perspective-centred, such as the human body). Heine (1997: 11–12) provides the following classification based on types of spatial orientation:

a) deictic (the deictic reference point as the centre: the speaker’s body),

b) object (some physical object, primarily a human body serving as reference point)

c) geographical object (the reference point is supplied by a point or structure in the physical environment, such as a mountain or a river)

d) cardinal (the reference point as a centre is independent of the speaker and the speech situation; e.g. North, South).3

4. Az elvan igekötös ige szemantikai szerkezete

The corpus example in (6) below illustrates the verb elvan as used in the dialect of Nyitra-gerencsér, with a meaning that is undocumented in HNC2.4

(6) Csȧk tőlünk elvȧ késztő nȧgyonn -:- Úlȧk /!/ -:- plȧne, hȧ gyȧlog mën ȧ embër.
Csȧk tőlünk messze van nagyon – Újlak5 – plȧne, ha gyalog megy az ember.
'It’s just that it’s very far from us – Újlak is – especially if one goes there by foot.’

In this example, the preverb has a static meaning, its function is to express spatial distance. Thus, elvan has the following meaning here: 'with respect to a place specified by the speaker, another place is (on a stable basis) at a distance.'

In this sentence, the semantic structure of el includes an abstract type of directionality, construed with summary scanning. In a physical space, the preverb maps the directionality of a schematic entity (SOMETHING), departing from the primary landmark (FROM SOMEWHERE) toward the secondary landmark (TO SOMEWHERE). In the atemporal SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema, the distance between the SOURCE (primary landmark) and the GOAL (secondary landmark) is in profile.

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3 The presentation of these types follows Gábor Tolcsvai Nagy (2013:198).
4 This dialectal meaning of elvan can be identified in its collocations with kéztől 'from the hand'. The study of this pattern’s idiomatic properties is beyond the scope of the present paper. It is important to note that this verb is still in use in the region, often without the adverbial kéztől.
5 A municipality in Slovakia in the vicinity of the town of Nyitra (Nitra).
In addition to the path (representing the distance), the two spatial boundaries are also in the foreground of attention. The goal (secondary landmark) is provided by unbounded physical space. In the semantic structure, the source (the speaker’s physical position, her 3D space) marks the referential and deictic centre (signalled by R). However, the directionality from the starting point to the endpoint (from the source to the goal) is abstracted, with the distant endpoint being foregrounded and receiving holistic conceptualization: the trajector of the preverb (the entity) can be identified in the endpoint. This means that the preverb’s function is to profile spatial distance: it has a static role in the mapping. In Figure 1, the schematic entity is marked by a circle, the spatial starting point and endpoint are represented by vertical lines, and the path is signalled by the horizontal line which represents the distance between the two boundaries.

In (6), the existential verb van profiles a process which does not involve change: the verb serves to designate the stable relation of the entity functioning as trajector with respect to the schematized space in which the landmark is situated (or which is specified by the speaker in the course of her speech act).

The existential verb designates an enduring state in some place, construed as temporally unbounded (in the immediate scope, time is conceptualized without starting and endpoints, as a succession of moments). In Langacker’s theoretical framework, the verb can be described as follows:

- it designates a process (in which the trajector’s position is stable), processed via sequential scanning; it is in continuous aspect; the construed process is temporally unbounded (lacking an endpoint)
- the relevant cognitive domain is physical space
- the trajector is some entity
- the event structure of the process: the trajector’s continuous presence in a conceived physical space.

In the figure, squares represent three of the momentary states being processed via sequential scanning, while the arrow marks temporality. The circle corresponds to the schematic primary figure, or trajector, and the thin dotted line surrounding it signals the landmark’s high

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**Figure 2:** A schematic representation of the meaning of van

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degree of schematicity.\(^6\) In terms of conceptual content, existence may be bounded; however, it is construed in the immediate scope as lacking boundaries.\(^7\)

In the composite structure of *elvan* as used in (6), the verb and the preverb mutually elaborate each other.

![Figure 3: The semantic structure of elvan in its first meaning](image)

The trajector of the existential verb corresponds to that of the preverb. The existential verb’s trajector (a bounded region of some entity) is more specific than the preverb’s one, therefore elaboration is directed at the preverb. The preverb’s landmarks are schematic, but still more specific than that of the verb, thus the preverb functions in an elaborating capacity, and contributes two reference points to the semantic structure.

As a result of the elaborative relations, what gets profiled is the (stable) distance of the municipality of Újlak with respect to the reference point. The structure has a continuous meaning, firstly because the preverb does not imply directionality toward the endpoint, and secondly because the process profiled by the existential verb does not contain any change in the relationship between the schematic figures. The composite structure foregrounds distance (as a static configuration): the trajector (marked by the circle in Figure 3) is conceptualized in the secondary landmark specified by the preverb, in relation to the reference point residing with the primary landmark. The dotted line between the two landmarks serves to represent their distance schematically. The event structure can be described as follows: the time-stable distance of an entity (bounded physical space) with respect to a reference point. The stable, unchanging state profiled by the existential verb is put into the immediate scope via the preverb’s semantic contribution (cf. Langacker 2008: 153–154).

In (7), the verb *elvan* has the meaning ‘passes time by having fun’.

(7) Mëggyig ēvānnȧk āzonn ā hitvāny muzinn.
     Meddig elvannak azon a hitvány mozin.
     ‘How long they are passing time with that poor movie.’

\(^6\) Whether the existential verb indeed contains a landmark in its semantic structure requires further investigation.

\(^7\) “To say that something *exists* does not imply that it has always existed or that it always will but does portray the situation as constant during whatever is taken to be the relevant span of time (the temporal immediate scope)” (Langacker 2008: 147).
In its occurrence in (7), *elvan* does not profile spatial distance, but rather an enduring activity going on for a long time. In this example also, the deictic and referential centre lies with the speaker, the profiled process is occurring at a distance from her. However, in this case, distance is signalled by the grounded, case-marked nominal (*azon a mozin* ‘on that movie’) rather than the preverb.8

Within the source-path-goal schema activated by *el*, this time the path (summarily scanned) and the directionality are foregrounded: the preverb expresses the direction inherent in the process (this is consequently a dynamic schema as opposed to the static function seen in (6)). However, what is important with regard to directionality is not the reaching of the endpoint but rather the direction itself and the mapped section of the route. This use exemplifies the case when the source-path-goal schema has a metaphorical spatial structure, owing to directionality.9 Whereas in the previous example, the preverb had an exclusively spatial meaning, this time the spatial structure is transferred metaphorically into the domain of time, and consequently has both temporal starting and endpoints (which, however, stay in the background).

The two temporal boundaries are abstracted, and are in the background of the overall semantic structure. Although in the the primary meaning of *el*, directionality and temporality (perfective function) are closely intertwined, this time the profiling of duration becomes prominent, yielding continuous aspect. This follows from schematization (with the speaker profiling particular elements of the schema in specific usage events) and also from the conceptual content of the verb.10 Figure 4 below provides a schematic representation of the preverb’s meaning in (7). Thin dotted lines correspond to the highly schematic landmarks, whereas the dotted arrow marks the path (indicating duration) and directionality of the process.

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8 According to data in HNC2, examples of *elvan* with the meaning of ‘have fun’ do not necessarily include ‘distance’ in their semantics (see examples (3a,b,c,d)), and the latter semantic feature is restricted to other contexts (cf. (5a,b)). Example (7) may partially involve directionality; however, I would suggest that its main function is the expression of continuous aspect here. Directionality is (or may be) explicit owing to the dependent *azon a mozin* ‘on that movie’, and may be interpreted in both temporal and spatial dimensions.

9 The temporal meaning associated with *el* is shown by the pattern’s collocation with temporal interrogative pronouns. The construct *meddig elvannak* (where *meddig* literally means ‘until what time’, and *elvannak* is the 3rd person plural form of *elvan*) has the meaning ‘how long they are having fun’.

10 This continuous aspect is obviously different from the unboundedness associated with the verb lacking a preverb, and also from the aspect of constructs involving inversion (with the preverb following rather than preceding the verb). Since a sufficiently refined analysis of continuous aspect is not yet available, I will use the term “continuous aspect” in this paper. I do not consider the notion of boundedness as used by Kiefer–Ladányi (2000: 465–483) to be adequate, as boundaries have a perfectivizing function, and here it is precisely the enduring nature of the process that is being foregrounded.
Example (7) features an even more abstract meaning of the existential verb (whose basic meaning is already highly abstract): it provides a generic expression of an activity spanning a length of time. The process is construed as continuous (with the unboundedness of the activity/state being in the focus of attention). In this sentence, the use a verb with such abstract meaning (in other words the lack of specific construal of the activity) may be motivated by the fact that the speaker is directing attention at a process unfolding without changes, with the time-stable activity of the primary figure (trajector) receiving prominence. (Schematicity follows precisely from the fact that in the event structure of *elvan*, characteristic phases of the process cannot be defined). The time of the speech act (or the time experienced/imagined by the conceptualizer) may serve as a metaphorical landmark (reference point).

The duration of the process denoted by the existential verb is foregrounded via the use of the preverb. The abstract, backgrounded temporal boundaries place the abstract process into the immediate scope in such a way that its duration transgresses the time of speaking. The trajector of the composite structure is elaborated by the verb, and the metaphorical landmarks, having performed their function of placing the process into the immediate scope, are out of profile, thus attention is directed at the enduring nature of the abstract process. The overall structure has a continuous meaning. The backgrounded reference point (R) is the time of speaking, it is bounded (as represented by the line segment). The profiled activity is construed as continuous with respect to this reference point. The semantic structure of *elvan* in (7) is schematically represented by Figure 5 below.

![Figure 5: The semantic structure of *elvan* in its second meaning](image)

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11 The meaning 'have fun' is another highly lexicalized meaning, which is presumably secondary with respect to more general meanings (such as 'existence' and 'making a living').

12 In the speech act of (7), possible specific construals could have involved the meanings 'watching a film' or 'having fun'.

13 In the corpus example, the film's precise duration may serve as a reference point. The time of speaking (time of conceptualization) coincides with the time expressed by the existential verb, therefore the reference point cannot be visually represented in the figure.
5. Summary

This paper made an attempt at the detailed semantic characterization of a lexeme which had not received such description before. The framework of cognitive semantics is well-suited to the exploration of highly abstract semantic structures, allowing one to describe the two meanings of elvan found in the dialect of Nyitragerencsér, with the associated differences in construal. Whereas in sentence (1) the 'presence, stable state' meaning of the existential verb is activated as a function of the preverb el, the second example profiles a meaning of 'abstract activity' in the immediate scope. Both constructions involve continuous aspect, which, however, is conceptualized in two different ways. In (7), the fact that the abstract activity has temporal starting and endpoints remains implicit, and the preverb's meaning includes the function of continuous aspect. By contrast, in (6), the preverb el has no influence on the temporality expressed by the verb van 'be'. The two examples also illustrate the schemas coded in the preverb's meaning: (6) involves a static, while (7) a dynamic schema. These schemas are activated as a function of context. Although in conceptualization, the preverb and the verb are processed as a single unit, the proposed semantic description is motivated on methodological grounds.

Particular meanings may undergo lexicalization in a given language community, as a result of frequent use. It would be beneficial for dialectology, but also for Hungarian linguistics more generally, if further dialectal words received similar detailed semantic descriptions. An extensive, corpus-based case study of the existential verb (including elvan) seems to be especially necessary, given the uncertainties surrounding this verb and the constructions it occurs in. Such a description allows one to trace and understand the process of lexicalization.

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand I aim to demonstrate the benefits that cognitive linguistics can have from a phenomenological contemplation; on the other I would like to demonstrate that in spite of the anti-philosophical attitude of the naturalizing cognitive sciences, a phenomenological reflection on the subject and the methods of cognitive linguistic research can provide numerous considerations which can help us to avoid both the problematic theoretical presuppositions (e.g. reductionism or the problem of isolated minds) and the conflation of the research field of cognitive linguistics with other fields in cognitive science. To make the case for choosing phenomenology as one of the metatheories of cognitive linguistics I investigate the problem of representation and metaphor in standard cognitive science and in cognitive linguistics. The phenomenological discussion of the process of cognition has several theoretical insights about the status of the experience and the subject, the meaningfulness of perception, the situatedness of experiencing the phenomenal world, the central significance of meaning as a constitutional pattern, and the implicit horizon of intersubjectivity. The paper dwells on the methodological consequences of these insights too.

Keywords: phenomenology, cognitive linguistics, representation, constitution, intersubjectivity, metaphor

1. Introduction

More than a decade ago a debate was held on the adequacy of embodied realism for cognitive linguistic investigations (See Rakova 2002, Johnson–Lakoff 2002, Krzeszowski 2002, Sinha 2002). Perhaps the most interesting result of it was not the various interpretations of conceptual metaphor theory, but the foregrounded relation between cognitive linguistics and philosophy, since the main arguments and objections shed light on a latent anti-philosophical attitude of the mainstream theory of embodied cognition in linguistics. Though Rakova had made several critical claims about the role of preconceptual patterns in concept formation deserving attention from the representatives of the notion of embodiment, the main answer of Mark Johnson and George Lakoff for the critique was that

“[b]ecause she [Marina Rakova] has successfully mastered and incorporated the Western philosophical tradition and made it part of her mode of thought, she natural-

* The research was supported by the MTA Postdoctoral Fellowship Programme and the Eötvös Loránd University.
ly and systematically misreads our work – and will similarly misread a large body of the research in cognitive linguistics” (Johnson−Lakoff 2002: 258).

From this conviction it follows that if one aims at interpreting the philosophical framework of embodied realism from the Western philosophical point of view, he or she will not meet with complete success, because Lakoff and Johnson “hold a third position” from which they can move beyond the rigid, dichotomous formulation of the questions in cognitive science. The essence of this position is motivated by empirical evidence:

“the question of the necessity and cognitive reality of embodied realism is an empirical issue, not a matter of armchair speculation but rather a question of what view of human cognition is supported by the evidence and is necessary to explain human meaning and all forms of symbolic expression” (Johnson−Lakoff 2002: 246, second emphasis is added).

The skeletal structure of the theoretical argumentation is that (i) embodied realism is based on strong empirical grounds, the evidences of various fields of research (from neuroscience to historical linguistics) support only the embodied notion of meaning; (ii) because of the long standing but senseless speculative philosophical tradition, many of the researchers are not able to accept the new way of thinking; (iii) since embodied realism contradicts the assumptions of the philosophical tradition, (iv) the solutions are ignoring philosophy as it is and directing our attention to the empirical evidences.

Although Tomasz Krzeszowski (2002: 266) raised in his comment that Johnson and Lakoff are forced “to see their data through their own glasses of embodied realism, in a way that best fits their own ideas”, i. e. they have their own lenses of theoretical assumptions, and reality is not given in the data, it is the data-driven, radical empiricist scientific position which is worth our attention. From an experientialist (or embodied realistic) point of view, philosophy is mere speculation, a first-person conception of the things in a world, which has nothing to do with reality itself, thus we had better abandon it.

It is the naturalistic attitude towards investigated phenomena and theoretical questions that can be characterized with the above mentioned anti-philosophical standpoint:

“a philosophical perspective on utterance processing [or broadly on cognition – S. G.] is not reducible to a scientific, psychological one: rather, in the latter there often remain hidden philosophical presuppositions, which may require overt philosophical discussion. What philosophy can say about utterance processing [and about cognition – S. G.], moreover, hardly count as a description of actual processes and is more likely to hold as the rational reconstruction of how a certain understanding may be arrived at and justified” (Sbisà 2011: 7).

Unfortunately, by reason of the mistrust towards philosophy, and despite the fact that they consider their theory as a new philosophical perspective, Lakoff and Johnson are not able to recognize that philosophy is not an unrealistic (“armchair”) speculation, but it is a way of scientific thinking which always offers a more comprehensive approach to phenomena than the objectscientific explanation offered by particular disciplines (for objectsciences, see Kertész 2004: 24), which treat things in their own original relations. A philosophical argumentation
takes the phenomena out of their natural context of appearance, and confronts them with the general possibilities of cognition (Mezei 1997: 98). As Dan Zahavi states it,

“[p]hilosophy is a discipline which doesn’t simply contribute to or extend the scope of our scientific knowledge, but which instead investigates the basis of this knowledge and asks how it is possible” (Zahavi 2010: 6).

The other profit of philosophical contemplation is clarifying the core notions of linguistic research (Sbisà 2011: 9), and it is exactly such a clarification of the notion of embodiment which is initiated by Rakova (2002: 218), nevertheless in their answer Johnson and Lakoff refused both the reinterpretation of the core notion in the light of epistemological assumptions and the initiative of rethinking old concepts in view of the empirical evidence: “[w]e reject such classical notions of representation, along with the view of meaning and reference that are built on them” (Johnson−Lakoff 2002: 250).

It is clear from the foregoing that the debate on embodied realism seems to be sadly unproductive: as Krzeszowski (2002: 266) notes it, even in the case of highly controversial perspectives of the participants, there would be a lot of emerging questions deserving discussion, but the clash of contemplative versus anti-philosophical standpoints makes the debate much less discursive. However, there are two ways out of this gap between first and third personal attitudes, both of which narrow the validity of the third personal attitude reminding us that in humanities the observer is one part of the observed world.

One of the viewpoints making the tightening of the gap possible is offered by the notion of evolution. Though the field of cognitive linguistics is heterogeneous regarding the theoretical presuppositions of the different investigations, there is a very important shared theoretical commitment:

“the human mind is structured by the evolutionary and developmental processes which underlie, and have been selected by, the interaction between the human organism (brain-in-body) and its (developing) environment” (Sinha 2002: 274).

If we admit the constraints of the evolutionary process on our cognition, we will be able to recognize the predispositions affecting our observations.

The other perspective is the phenomenological one: following Husserl’s method “back to the things themselves”, we can realize the importance of subjective consciousness in experiencing the world, as well as the multiple possible attitudes toward the phenomenal world, which determine how the world is given to us. The main aim of phenomenology – in contrast with the sciences based on mathematics – is not to explain the world as such but to describe in the most accurate way how the world makes itself evident for consciousness, how the things arise in our direct sensory experience (Abram 1996: 35, see also Reynaert−Verschueren 2011: 218−219). Thus phenomenology can be indeed a productive approach for cognitive linguistics in the field of metascientific reasoning, for

“[e]ven the most detached scientist must begin and end her study in [the] indeterminate field of experience, where shifts of climate or mood may alter his experiment or her interpretation of »the data«. [...] Our spontaneous experience of the world, charged with subjective, emotional, and intuitive content, remains the vital and dark ground of all our objectivity” (Abram 1996: 33−34, see also Varela 2002: 140).
In other words, phenomenology directs our attention to encountering the world as human beings in an environment which determines and adjusts itself to the structure of our experience. It is the active subject-environment interaction that is studied by phenomenology in a rigorous way as expected from a scientific discipline but with a theoretical attitude inherited from philosophical tradition. Therefore a phenomenological account of cognition can integrate the first and the third personal methods of scientific inquiry: it can highlight not only the experiential grounds of meaning, but also its social aspects, the significant role of the intuitions and intentions of language users, which make the individual meanings conventional and intersubjective.

For these reasons I aim to elaborate an accurate theoretical system of notions and background assumptions on the basis of phenomenology and the cognitive application of its ideas. My hope is that such a philosophical framework can serve cognitive linguistics at a metatheoretical level, making on the one hand the cognitive linguistic enterprise more reflected, and making on the other the move beyond the classical dichotomies possible not without philosophy, but as a result of theoretical contemplation on notions and evidences.

The canonizing efforts of phenomenology in cognitive linguistics is very much on the agenda: though two handbook were published in 2008 and in 2010 about the fruitful interrelations between phenomenology and cognitive sciences (Mattens ed. 2008, Gallagher–Schmicking eds. 2010), in Hungarian cognitive linguistics they remained without reactions: one of the representative handbooks of cognitive linguistics does not mention phenomenology at all (see Kövecses–Benczes 2010), the other more detailed handbook acknowledges a partial effect of phenomenology, but it refers to the ideas of Husserl and Heidegger only in relation to time perception and the semantic structure of verbs (see Tolesvai Nagy 2013: 35, 72, 74).

The study is structured as follows. First it is demonstrated through the dilemma of representation that the naturalistic attitude in metascience cannot yield a real solution of theoretical problems in cognitive linguistics (2). Then I collect the most difficult notions and epistemological problems of the field in our days, and I attempt to demonstrate how a phenomenological approach can help us give proper answers to the questions which have emerged (3). The study ends with a summary of the most important results of articulating a phenomenological cognitive linguistics (4).

2. A dilemma and what is in the background of it

It seems that the whole story can be grasped with the notion of representations. For one of the most fundamental questions arising in cognitive linguistic research is whether there is any need of representations to explain cognition and the role of language in cognition.¹ The representationalist view (represented by e. g. Leonard Talmy, Ronald Langacker) claims that

¹ This question has a somewhat simplified formulation. A more sophisticated version of it is whether representations are necessary for explaining all sorts of cognition or only some forms of cognition must involve representation (see Rowlands 2015). The latter can be answered with scalar terms, thus it is not a “yes or no” question, and fits in probably better with the evidences of cognitive science. Nevertheless making a sharp distinction between the representationalist and the anti-representationalist position makes the philosophical differences more visible, and since this study does not aim at scrutinizing the possible alternative adaptations of the notion of representation in cognitive research, my hope is that this simplification is acceptable.
meanings are mental entities residing in the mind and being grounded in conceptualization (see Zlatev 2010: 421, 432–434). Since it attributes meaning to the individual mind, it can be accused with mentalism and subjectivism. The opposite anti-representationalist view (represented by George Lakoff, Mark Johnson [in their important work Philosophy in the Flesh], or Tim Rohrer) identifies representations with the flexible pattern of organism-environment interaction, or with the neural structures of such co-ordinations, and hence rejects the classical notion of representation as a useful device in the explanation of meaning (see Zlatev 2010: 430). This radical view of embodiment can avoid the solipsistic attitude of conceptual semantics (Shapiro 2011: 14), however it cannot explain the large scale of conventional cognitive patterns extending from cognitive maps to highly elaborated meanings.

The problem of representations is a so-called sceptical dilemma (Kertész 2004: 161): if we do not use the notion of representation, we will have to abandon the elaborated cognitive linguistic models of semantic structures, but if we accept the representational view of language, we will not be able to bridge the gap between the elementary events and acts of cognition itself (perception for example) and the higher ordered, systematized linguistic meaning. Thus both standpoints are destructive (hence the question is dilemmatic) and both threaten the possibilities of cognitive linguistics as a scientific project (hence it is sceptical).

Thus the first question of this study can be formulated as follows:

Q1: How can we resolve the dilemma of representationalism?

There are answers to this question which assert exclusively one of the alternatives (as we have seen in the previous paragraph), but these answers cannot solve the problem, since the status of representations is not a dilemma for those radical views. Another solution is the strategy of ignorance: though both alternatives have some validity, the researcher considers the dilemma itself as irrelevant for his or her work, because it can be carried out without answering the difficult question of representations (Kertész 2004: 162–163). In one of the most canonical works in CL, in the first volume of the Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Ronald Langacker seems to follow the latter attitude: when discussing the notion of sensory images, he rejects the classical representational view of the homunculus metaphor (which models mental representations as images analyzed by a homunculus in the head), thus he accepts the non-representational theory of sensory perception, while the cognitive functioning preserves its autonomy in cognitive grammar. Langacker makes

"a general distinction between autonomous and peripherally connected cognitive events. The sensation directly induced by stimulating a sense organ is an instance of a peripherally connected event; the corresponding sensory image, evoked in the absence of such stimulation, is an autonomous but equivalent event." (Langacker 1987: 112)

At first sight this proposal is an efficient solution of the problem of representations, since it can handle the issue of elementary cognitive events and the “representation-hungry tasks”, the displacement of reference (see Clark 1999: 349, Sinha 2014, Simon 2014: 254) as well. In this respect it resolves the dilemma through detecting (and rejecting) a twofold overgeneralization: the representationalist and the anti-representationalist views overgeneralize the significance of their own assumptions (the notion of representation or the direct interactions between the organism and the environment) and hence both of them disregard the specificity and importance of the other. Investigating the process of cognition yields the consideration
that there is no uniform organization of human mental properties and abilities, since there are various subprocesses with different degrees of complexity in different contexts, consequently it is unproductive to narrow the organisation of the mind for one or for another structure. From a metascientific perspective, the solution proposed by Langacker is the elimination of the original scientific problem through a careful self-reflection of the cognitive sciences themselves. Consequently, the reflecting argument in the field of the (empirical) objectscience helps us to resolve the metascientific problem. This is the typical strategy of naturalism in metascience: Quine’s essential argument is that only the empirical self-reflexivity can eliminate the sceptical dilemmas, the philosophical arguments and methods are not useful in solving epistemological problems (Kertész 2004: 162).

The argumentation above can be summarized as follows: there is a hard theoretical problem in cognitive linguistics, but the classical philosophical method of metascience is not able to solve the dilemma, since both of the alternative answers have their own validity. However, reflecting on the real, empirical subject of cognitive sciences makes it possible to recognize that the radical views are overgeneralizations, thus accepting the validity of both views as a result of empirical self-reflections eliminates the theoretical problem. In other words, the naturalistic attitude of metascience can help us to solve philosophical problems of cognition: the only thing to do is to replace the first-person argumentative method of philosophy with third-person observation of empirical phenomena.

There are, however, additional problems: if we consider − according to Langacker − the mental representations of sensory inputs as autonomous cognitive events, the gap between the “peripherally connected” subprocesses and the detached representations remains unbridged. Cognitive grammar provides a detailed approach to explaining semantic structures as representations, but it does not treat sensory images, the periphery of representation building, although Langecker admits that “sensory stimulation lays the foundation and provides the raw material for the construction of our conceptual word” (Langacker 1987: 112). The wording of the later handbook of CG (Langacker 2008: 31) is more careful in this regard, but it emphasizes again that the task of a cognitive approach to language is to model the mental events of cognition via investigating linguistic structures. This is the reason why I have considered above the attitude of CG as the strategy of ignorance: admitting the importance of the sensory inputs or the embodied neural structures of organism-environment interaction by a theory does not mean that it really treats these aspects of cognition, therefore focusing on the mental representation and disregarding the sensory/experimental base of it makes the theoretical proposal an implementation independent, functionalist model, a useful toolkit of examining meaning, but not its valid explanation. We can point out the instrumentalist attitude of CG and of all the approaches manifesting the strategy of ignorance: these theories of linguistic meaning can be considered well established if they offer useful explanations of it (more accurately, if they provide falsifiable predictions about it), without fulfilling the demand on describing meaning as it is in the real world (on instrumentalist attitude, see DeWitt 2010: 71–79).

2 “Ultimately, conceptualization resides in cognitive processing. Having a certain mental experience resides in the occurrence of a certain kind of neurological activity. Conceptualization can thus be approached from either a phenomenological or a processing standpoint: we can attempt to characterize either our mental experience per se or the processing activity that constitutes it.”
The problem of representations and the answers of cognitive linguistics (meaning as mental entity or anti-representationalist standpoint in the terms of radical embodiment) highlight the main tension of cognitive linguistics increasing nowadays (see Zlatev 2010): if cognitive linguistics is an enterprise that explains language use as a part of human cognition, then it has to localize its subject, namely meaning in the mind (internalism and subjectivism) or in the empirical data, in corpora or in neural structures (objectivism and reductionism). As we have seen, the solution of the dilemma proposed by CG apparently moves beyond the theoretical dichotomy, in accordance with the self-reflexive method of naturalistic metascience, but it does not afford a real solving of the dilemma: although CG is able to eliminate the strictness of the dichotomy, it ignores the sensory inputs of cognition in the description. In contrast with the argumentation of András Kertész, who claims that reflective empirical observations can resolve theoretical problems, and this can be seen as the main advantage of naturalistic metascience for linguistic research, I do not think that any variant of naturalism can propose true answers for epistemological questions ever. Elimination is not a solution.

Nevertheless, the application of the naturalist metascientific method draws our attention to the latent tendency of ignoring hard theoretical problems in cognitive descriptions of language. Although cognitive linguists claim that meaning is grounded in conceptual structures, and conceptual structures are grounded in experiences, the arbitrary narrowing of the field of research to the semantic representations (which is a strong tendency in cognitive linguistics) has the fallacy of ignorance as its result: the belief that linguists can explain and describe the details of meaning without regard to the structure and process of experience.

Experientialism that is claimed to synthesize the opposite views of objectivism and subjectivism preserves partly the internalistic and solipsistic attitude toward cognition, because from the experiential point of view, meaning resides continually in the individual mind, though not in the form of logical computation but rather as symbolic conceptual structure. Experiential realism as a version of internal realism chooses another strategy for narrowing the epistemological gap between sense/perception and meaningful representation: it explores the continuum along preconceptual and conceptual structures. The central thesis of the experiential strategy with reference to conceptual representations is that

“[a]bstract conceptual structures are indirectly meaningful; they are understood because of their systematic relationship to directly meaningful structures” (Lakoff 1987: 268).

The “directly meaningful structures” are preconceptual (basic-level and image-schematic) structures that characterize experience through repeatedly emerging (as gestalts) from the functioning of the body in its environment. Consequently for treating experience as meaningful we do not need representations, nevertheless conceptual ones are grounded in experience itself. Taking it seriously and completing it with its theoretical basis, however, we can recognize that experientialism does not offer any solution to the problem of representations in the same way as CG, but it raises additional problems. First, it overextends the notion of representation to the experience: the Putnamian version of internal realism – which is chosen by Lakoff and Johnson as solid epistemological basis – considers experience as being shaped by our concepts, hence our experiential knowledge is “conceptually contaminated” (Putnam 1981: 54). We as humans rely on emergent preconceptual structures of experience in forming conceptual representations, while these representations shape our preconceptual structures – it is this circular argumentation which results in a radical representationalist view in
experientialism though prima facie it grounds conceptual meaning in pure body-environment interactions. (About the problematic role of preconceptual schemas from a developmental point of view see Rakova 2002.)

On the other hand, the notion of experience itself becomes so extended, that it does not serve the empirical validity of experiential realism. As Lakoff (1987: 266) formulates it,

"»[e]xperience« is (...) not taken in the narrow sense of the things that have »happened to happen« to a single individual. Experience is instead construed in a broad sense: the totality of human experience and everything that plays a role in it – the nature of our bodies, our genetically inherited capacities, our modes of physical functioning in the world, our social organization, etc. In short, it takes as essential much of what is seen as irrelevant in the objectivist account."

The broadening of the notion of experience from the actual events to the latent structures in the background of cognition makes the cognizing human being a part of the world cognized. In contrast with the objectivist paradigm (and with its metaphysical realism), and in accordance with internal realism, experientialism does not get the subject and the object of cognition apart, it does not separate them from one another, hence it could stabilize the position of the cognizing human mind in the world. But the price embodied realism pays for this epistemology is giving up the empirical verification. For we cannot experience directly our “collective biological capacities” (inherited genetically), our collective social experiences in an individual experimental design. Cognitive semantics based on experientialism remains thus nothing more than a useful approach for modelling conceptual meaning, which makes falsifiable hypotheses and generalizations possible, but which does not describe meaning as such.

The theoretical problem elaborated in the foregoing can be outlined with the following theses:

a) It is a hard theoretical question in cognitive linguistics whether there is any need of representations for explaining the processes and structures of cognition, as well as the cognitive functioning of language.

b) There are two radical answers to this question. One of them (the principle of mental representations) regards mental representational structures as the main subject of cognitive explorations, the other (the principle of radical embodiment) denies the role of representations in the process of cognition.

c) We can argue that the problem cannot be resolved with classical metatheoretical methods, but if we recognize that the radical answers have the process of overgeneralization in common, since they extend the use or non-use of representations to the whole process of cognition, we will be able to eliminate the dilemma. The representational view can be applied to the higher level of cognition (e.g. language use), while the anti-representationalist approach is very productive in modelling perception. Thus the opposite views have different scopes of research, and the problem arises not in the theoretical field of cognition, but in the empirical field of investigations.

d) If theoretical considerations do not help answer epistemological questions, we have to turn to the empirical results of the objectscience, and through self-reflection the hard dilemmas can be eliminated. This is the methodology of naturalistic metascience, which banishes philosophical contemplation from the field of epistemology.
e) However, this naturalistic metascientific argumentation seems to fail, because it results in instrumentalistic explanations in objectscientific research. One of its precedents is CG, which admits the importance of sensory/peripheral structures, but narrows the scope of investigation to the mental representation of meaning, therefore it instantiates the strategy of ignorance from the perspective of the holistic process of cognition. The other canonical theory on cognitive linguistics, namely cognitive semantics based on experientialism deals with the problem in another manner (it extends the notion of representation to the experiential structure, moreover it extends the notion of experience itself), but it is no less problematic, since it implements circular argumentation, and the results, models of experientialism cannot be verified with empirical experiments because of the collective nature of experience.

f) The main conclusion of investigating – though in the broadest outlines – the problem of representations is that the method of naturalistic metascience does not offer any solution to the theoretical dilemmas in cognitive research: it can only disregard the dilemma, and instead of answering the question, it proposes serious reflections on the scope of theorizing. This has great significance in scientific research, but it yields only instrumentalistic explanations.

The central question is: what is investigated when cognition is investigated? Since language use is part of cognition, the question above is valid in cognitive linguistics too. The endeavour of naturalism regards the cognizing human as one part of the world cognized, but as a psycho-physiological being, therefore the answers to epistemological questions can be given through considering the psycho-physiological characterisation of the human mind and body. There is no autonomous field of philosophy; the realm of sciences includes also the epistemological investigations. This is a viable alternative to Cartesian dualism, since it tries to explain the phenomena of cognition with the methods of scientific research, thus it avoids any reference to an immaterial substance. However, the metaphysical monism implied by naturalism can have two dangerous consequences (see Zahavi 2010: 5–6): on the one hand it looks on the mind as an object explainable like any other phenomena of nature, thus it objectivises the functioning mind, which brings us back to the objectivist view of realism; on the other hand, naturalism can be radicalized as psycho-physical reductionism, which considers the structures and processes of mind caused by neural activity, hence this activity determines and directs our cognitive processes, giving no place and role to interpersonal, socio-cultural factors. As we can see, the radical reductionalism of naturalizing epistemology arrives at the internalistic standpoint of representationalism.

In my view the most difficult problem which cognitive linguistics has to face is the following (paraphrasing the question of Searle 2000: 55):

Q2: How can we avoid both the Scylla of internalism, the solipsistic view of mental representationalism and the Charybdis of determining reductionalism and objective monism in the objectscientific research?

For getting out of this dilemma we do not need to abandon the naturalistic attitude in epistemology, but we have to be careful in applying the third-person perspective in cognitive linguistics: it must not be the absolute point of view in treating theoretical problems. As we have seen, the third-person naturalistic methodology is tightly connected with objectivism,
whereas one of the most important considerations of the philosophy in the 20th century is that the subject and the object of cognition cannot be separated.

While methodological decision or a specific interpretation of the central notions is the matter at issue, one cannot evade theoretical reflections. Still the proposal of naturalistic metascience to turn to the empirical evidence for eliminating the dilemmas demands reflections. In this study I propose the other way of treating these dilemmas: instead of avoiding philosophical contemplation, I consider it as necessary for solving the hard problems of cognitive linguistics. In other words I try to reverse the attitude of the objectscience toward philosophy, since my conviction is that the rigorous theoretical explication of our background assumptions can help us answer Q2, more accurately to formulate a new alternative direction instead of the radical ones (for an opposite evaluation of metascientific reflection see Kertész 2004: 168). Phenomenology – as a philosophical method of investigating the process of experience and cognition – has particular significance in this endeavour. In the next section these processes are discussed from a phenomenological vantage point in order to renew the theoretical basis of cognitive linguistic investigation.

3. The phenomenological model of cognition

For demonstrating the genuine benefits of phenomenology for cognitive linguistics the main theses of Husserl’s philosophy must be surveyed. However, the aim of this section is not merely to enumerate the possible connections between phenomenological and cognitive linguistic principles and concepts, since through it phenomenology would remain only one of the theoretical supports of cognitive linguistics, and it could not initiate reflections on the background assumptions of cognitive linguistic investigations. Nor would I like to recapitulate the phenomenological contribution to the hard problems of the philosophy of mind (e.g. consciousness or the body-mind relation), for it would be a philosophical explanation, which would change the field of contemplation. The real significance of phenomenology for cognitive linguistics would be pushed into the background in both cases, and it would remain invisible how philosophical reflections can contribute to objectscientific research. Instead of these alternatives I demonstrate the phenomenological model of experience and cognition from the perspective of cognitive linguistics to show the potentialities of a theoretical contemplation for moving beyond the strategy of ignorance.

My other preliminary remark is that the titles of the subsections imply the SOURCE-PATH-TARGET metaphorical mapping as if the phenomenological explanation of the process of cognition could be grasped with the CONCEPTION IS MOTION ALONG A PATH metaphor. Though this metaphorical conceptualization is highly common in cognitive sciences (especially in

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3 Following Jordan Zlatev (2010: 415) I use the term of Husserlian phenomenology as metonymic for phenomenological philosophy, since although several thoughts of Husserl were developed in the second half of the last century (by e.g. Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty), the core assumptions of phenomenology remained unchanged. The main notion reinterpreted by the followers of Husserl is transcendental subjectivity: Merleau-Ponty rejected the disembodied conception of the ego (Abram 1996: 45), Heidegger considered the notion of the subject without its historical environment unsatisfactory (Schwendtner 2008: 147–148). However, with the notion of “Lebenswelt” Husserl could avoid the ontological idealism (and priority) of the subject, thus Husserl himself integrated the critiques against transcendentalism into his late works (see Gadamer 2002: 56–57). In this study, I outline the theses of phenomenology on the basis of Husserl’s works, and I refer to other philosophers only if it is necessary.
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functional explanations), one of the main intentions of Husserl and his followers was to replace such linearity and sequentiality with the concept of direct participation in the situated action of cognition (Gallagher–Zahavi 2008: 8). From this it follows that the process of experience in fact comprises the factors of sensation, subjective intention and impression, schemas and meaning, and assuming the perspective of the other. I preserved in the subtitles nevertheless the convention of sequentiality for it serves as a basis compared to which the phenomenological considerations can be evaluated.

3.1. From perception to understanding: constitution

It is scarcely disputable that “sooner or later any science of cognition has to tackle the fundamental condition that we have no idea of what is mental or cognitive, apart from their experience by us” (Varela 2002: 126). This condition – inherited indeed from behaviourism – makes the scientific explanation especially difficult in the field of cognitive linguistics which considers meaning to be based on experience. According to Varela, one can experience the outer world and one’s own mental states and processes as well, but it does not follow from this that there is a causal relationship between these experiences. We can mention conceptual metaphor theory as an example: the source domain of a conceptual metaphor is more concrete or physical: “[o]ur experiences with the physical world serve as a natural and logical foundation for the comprehension of more abstract domains” (Kövecses 2010: 7). The explanatory power of CMT depends on how we interpret the notion of experience. As Kövecses states, metaphor comprehension is founded on the direct experience of the world, in accordance with embodied realism, and it can be a productive explanation in the cases of simple (everyday) source domains, e. g. LOVE IS A JOURNEY, since everybody has experiences of journeys. But the role and the nature of experience is a matter of dispute in the case of ARGUMENT IS WAR, because it is by no means certain that one has direct/physical experiences of events of war. At this point the extended notion of experience (cited above from Lakoff 1987) can help us arguing for experience based metaphorization, but it causes a tension between the narrower and the wider interpretation of experience: the former refers to the situated encounter with directly perceptible phenomena, related to the embodied nature of cognition; the latter includes everything mediated by the body and the community, and the central role of culture is emphasized. Thus it remains an open question whether metaphor has physical (individual) or cultural (supra-individual) validity.

This tension cannot be dissolved unless we differentiate between the actual experiential situation (with its physical factors) and the situated process of cognition in the broader sense: both are important for understanding utterances but they ground meaning in experience in different ways. My opinion is that the omission of this differentiation generated some misinterpretations of the philosophy of embodied realism in the debate on the pages of Cognitive Linguistics: while Rakova argued for the direct interpretation of experience (and hence she considered experientialism as a radical empirical theory), Johnson and Lakoff rejected this interpretation without outlining their own conception of what experience is and how it grounds conceptualization.

Husserl’s phenomenology proposes an essential approach to the role of experience: he distinguishes between the psychological concept of the subjective consciousness and the phenomenal aspect of it: the former is the experiencing self with her/his actual psychological processes (perception, concept activation and so on), the latter is the conscious mind which constitutes the world for herself/himself (Husserl 1972: 213). Identifying these aspects would
mean naturalizing the consciousness, reducing it to observable psychological processes and structures and identifying the sensory inputs with an observed entity. When I look at a table, however, I see its profile from my own perspective, I can see one or two sides of it, I can see its surface or its legs, but I cannot see the table as a whole. Nevertheless, I see a table, more accurately I interpret my visual sensations as a table. On the one hand there are partial sensations of an entity in the world, on the other there is a perceived – i.e. consciously processed – object. The formers belong to the psychological self, the latter belongs to consciousness; from a psychological point of view, perception can be seen as partial, non-holistic in nature, but from a phenomenological perspective it is holistic and meaningful (Merleau-Ponty 1992: 215–218, Gallagher–Zahavi 2008: 92–98).

It is worth realizing that our perception is always the perception of something, as our consciousness is always the conscious experience of something – it is this aboutness which differentiates the psychological from the phenomenal, and the root of it is intentionality. As Husserl formulates it,

> “[i]f we pay attention to the stream of the modes of appearance, as well as to the mode of their »synthesis«, then it become evident that every phase and section is in itself »the consciousness of something«, nonetheless during the sequence of the new phases it is the synthetically unified consciousness of one and the same entity which arises” (Husserl 1972: 197).

Since the act of the conscious mind is intentional, i.e. our minds are directed at the world, the objects of consciousness are delimited as entities of the world. To put it differently, our mind always transcends the perceptual sensations to a unified and delimited object of perception and acts of consciousness, hence the phenomena of cognition are transcended constructions. “Transcendental” does not mean in this context something unreal or something not tangible, rather it means a perspective from which we can constitute the entities of the world despite the partiality of our perception: we do not have to fit the psychical sensations together in order to experience something in its totality, because our mind has the capacity to transcend the sensory inputs (see Seregi 2010: 600, Mezei 1997: 127–128).

Because of the mind’s intentionality our experience is directly meaningful: there is no need for mediating representations or for any other mental structures to perceive and understand the world from our subjective point of view. Our experiencing look “directs itself exclusively to things, thoughts, purposes, devices at all times, and not to their psychically living experience within which they become the objects of consciousness” (Husserl 1972: 195) – as Ricoeur put it into words, “meaning is always prior to self-consciousness” (Ricoeur 1997: 35). From this it follows that phenomenology is not a mere philosophical speculation on the possibilities of cognition: it seems to be the exact theoretical model of everyday cognition. In other words a phenomenological argumentation makes the essential processes of cognition visible and explainable – it is both the valid alternative of a naturalistic-objectivist attitude and the prerequisite of a hermeneutic investigation (Ricoeur 1997: 33).

The other important consequence of the phenomenological view of perception and cognition is the recognition of the phenomenal world as the base of our experiences. What we perceive is not the physical factors of the environment but the entities in their surroundings. Thus if a theoretical framework considers our conceptual system or the linguistic meaning to be based on experience, then it must be added that experience from a phenomenological point of view must not be equated with physical sensations. We experience the phenomenal
world with our consciousness, and the reflections on the physical appearance of it are secondary in our naive attitude toward the world. At the moment when perceiving the phenomena proves to be unsuccessful, we direct our attention to the sensory inputs for gaining relevant information: we try to get more inputs, or we adjust our (sense) organs or our technical devices to the actual environment. As Merleau-Ponty (1992: 227) points it out,

“there is a natural attitude of vision in which I make common cause with my gaze and, through it, surrender myself to the spectacle: in this case the parts of the field are in an organization which makes them recognizable and identifiable. The quality, the separate sensory impact occurs when I break this total structuralization of my vision, when I cease to adhere to my own gaze, and when, instead of living the vision, I question myself about it, I want to try out my possibilities, I break the link between my vision and the world, between myself and my vision, in order to catch and describe it.”

For phenomenology, perception is a double-edged process: the visible/audible/tangible sensations and the transcended object of consciousness are two sides of the same coin. However, the latter has priority in the explanation, since it is concerned with our naive experience.

Therefore cognitive linguistics, which explains meaning as experience-based representation, has to take it into consideration that neither meanings nor concepts are reducible to physical sensations. In my opinion experientialism – and consequently conceptual metaphor theory – did not take care of this irreducibility, and the theories of embodiment also identify the sphere of experience with the physical, and not with the phenomenal world, while the idealized cognitive models or conceptualizations correlate with the phenomena of consciousness and not with physical entities. The problem of representation remains unsolved in cognitive linguistics unless we recognize the irreducible nature of concepts and meanings to the physical. This irreducibility does not mean of course that sensory inputs are detached from concepts or mental structures, as the classical view of cognition as symbol manipulation stated; there is an obvious relation between the physical process of experience and the phenomenal experiencing, which can be called correlation. However, the phenomenological interpretation of experience (as an intentional act toward the world results in and is based on transcended objects of consciousness) makes the observed action, the socially mediated action, moreover the cultural evaluation of actions real sources of understanding the world. In the phenomenal world observing something or discussing something are experiences in the same way as doing (seeing, hearing and so on) something since these activities are directed equally towards intentional objects; and this is what makes such metaphors like *argument is war* comprehensible, according to the phenomenal interpretation of experience.

This has an unavoidable methodological consequence in cognitive linguistics: we have to realize that we do not know what part of empirical evidence is phenomenologically real. There are artificial stimuli in an artificial experimental situation, which trigger some sort of responses from the subjects, but they reflect in some measure on their mental activity, the secondary process of self-consciousness precedes the primary action of directly meaningful experience; therefore we cannot interpret the results as the data of everyday cognition. We can observe at most the psychical processes that make the experience of the phenomenal world possible, but since the subject of these experiments is the psychological self, the task of mapping how the mind forms concepts from sensations belongs to the field of psychology. As phenomenology can draw our attention to it, explaining linguistic meaning starts with the conceptual level which correlates with the intentional functioning of the conscious mind.
wherein representations have a central role. Thus the problem of representation can be resolved with the cautious delimitation of the field of linguistic research and with the model of the intentional mind.

Again the notion of correlations is highly essential at this point: starting from the conceptual does not mean that concepts or meanings belong to the realm of immaterial mind or soul, therefore the claim that the objects of consciousness are not irreducible to physical sensations does not mean acknowledging Cartesian dualism in investigating the process of cognition. Bridging the gap between the sensory inputs and higher ordered cognitive structures is one of the most difficult tasks for cognitive sciences; though connectionism seems to provide an adequate model for explaining the emergence of representations, the experiential paradigm in cognitive linguistics ignores the gap and implies the direct identification of conceptual structures with physical states of the body (and the mind) and with their separated sensorial effects undergone by the subject. Nor is phenomenology united in this respect whether intentionality is peculiar to the consciousness (Husserl) or the body itself has a latent knowledge of transcending the sensations into a holistic view in the process of perception (Melreau-Ponty), therefore a phenomenological argument in itself is not able to fill the gap mentioned above. Nevertheless, it can draw our attention to the fact that the physical factors being observable from a third-person perspective have only secondary significance in explanation, because we do not collect sensory data to orient ourselves and to act successfully in the natural and naive attitude toward the world, rather we interact with the entities as phenomena of consciousness.

The intentional relation of the mind toward the world is one of the important claims of phenomenology. The mind does not contain the representations in this sense (the container-metaphor implies the internalist conception of cognition), rather it participates in an active relationship with the world and forms (transcends or synthesizes, from the perspective of perception) representation-like structures in concrete situations for concrete purposes. Consequently the entities of the phenomenal world afford themselves as possibilities of manipulation: a chair for sitting on it, or for standing on it to reach other things being laid on a higher level, or for closing an entrance and so on. It is the active “interchange” (Abram 1996: 52) between the mind and the environment which determines how the phenomenal world is constituted in the mind. Thus perception is directly meaningful not only because of the intentionality of the conscious mind (which transcends the received profiles to a whole), but also because of the context of situated action in which the intentional act proceeds – the situated action is the other pillar of experiencing in the phenomenal world.

The role of the mind-environment interaction, as well as the role of the body in it, i.e. the active and constructive functioning of the mind gained a central significance already in the Gibsonian theory of active perception (see Shapiro 2011: 29–37). Yet the standard idea of embodied cognition partly preserved the black-box schema of behaviourism referring to the mind. To illustrate this I quote how Vyvyan Evans summarizes the notion of embodied cognition: its essence is that “the nature of concepts and the way they are structured and organised is constrained by the nature of our embodied experience” (Evans 2007: 66). As we can see, in the framework of embodied cognition the environment is the source of the stimuli, the body is the apparatus which filters the information or lets it through (the example of Evans is the human visual system with three colour channels, compared to the system of rabbits or goldfishes), the response is the conceptual structure being mapped from the linguistic data, thus we can infer the internal representation of the mind from the stimuli and the bodily devices. This version of embodiment has clear phenomenological roots since it
grounds our cognitive structures in direct interactions with the world. Yet it disregards the different nature of the experience of being embodied and reflecting on being embodied. As Merleau-Ponty says,

“[t]o say that it is still myself who conceive myself as situated in a body and furnished with five senses is clearly a purely verbal solution, since I who reflect cannot recognize myself in this embodied I, since therefore embodiment remains in the nature of the case an illusion, and since the possibility of this illusion remains incomprehensible” (Merleau-Ponty 1992: 213).

In embodied experience the species-specific biological and physiological systems of the human body determine the “nature and range” of perception (Evans 2007: 67−68), and from this it follows that we can grasp the embodied conditions of our cognitive processes through analysing the bodily perceptual systems. In other words the standard idea of embodiment takes the access to the embodied constraints of cognition for granted, as if the observer of embodied cognition were not herself an embodied subject, and hence she could examine the process of cognition from an outside position. However, there is no external viewpoint for investigating cognition; therefore the standard embodiment thesis commits the fallacy of objectification. It separates the subject of cognition from the object, and considers the body as a mere mediator between them. It is unaware of the fact that phenomenal consciousness interacts with the world in a given situation actively and reciprocally, which has two consequences: on the one hand the real embodied experience is not accessible in its totality for the external observer, and hence on the other hand one cannot make general universal patterns of embodied experience from even the most accurate third-person observation (and thus the empirical evidences of embodiment seem to be overgeneralizations).

There are other extended conceptions of embodiment in cognitive sciences which integrate the phenomenological theses on perception and experience (see Shapiro 2011 for a detailed treatment), but the standard view of embodied cognition canonized in cognitive linguistics ignores the role of the mind in concept formation in so far as it explains linguistic meaning from physical bodily experience. How can we arrive in this framework at the colour concepts of the mind for example? From one perspective, they are determined by the physiological structure of the organism and its visual system, and from the other they are accessible directly via collecting and analysing the linguistic expressions of colours. Hence the structure of the concepts is explainable from the structure of the organism, and language is transparent in this respect since it mirrors the conceptual structures. Consequently we can trace linguistic meaning back to the body: concepts become mere labels, and the mind becomes gloomy. It loses the active role in cognition, and as Varela points it out, we have no idea about the concept-construing function of it. That is why I termed the idea of embodied cognition as a “black-box”-like conception of cognition. The embodied view in cognitive linguistics turns a blind eye to the intentional nature of the mental, to the situatedness of experience, as well as to the tight interrelation between consciousness, body and environment,

4 The methodological framework of Gallagher’s “front-loaded phenomenology” tries to avoid the reification fallacy and to approach the embodied experience with forming the experimental design on the basis of first-person reports (Gallagher 2010).
consequently it has a latent tendency to regard the mind as a black box, or simply to ignore the aspect of phenomenal consciousness.

I demonstrate this with another example: the vertical sensorimotor stimulus (moving up) is evaluated positively because of the wider sight of the horizon, which makes successful preparation for dangers possible. Since “language reflects conceptual structure then it follows that language reflects embodied experience” (Evans 2007: 66), the experiential correlation between up and good grounds the conceptual metaphors more is up, control is up, rational is up, happy is up (Kövecses 2010: 40), from which the latter is considered as universal mapping (Kövecses 2010: 195–197). But it is easy to imagine such situations in which moving up does not mean solely and clearly positive changes in mental state: e.g. flying up, moving up in a roller coaster, or being on the top of a cliff. Of course we can argue that these events are artificial in part, therefore our cognitive capacity is not adjusted to these experiences. However the point of this example is not the nature of the event, but the situatedness of the experience. Our biological, physiological, neurological apparatus contributes to the process of cognition in the concrete situation with an action in its centre. The idea of active interaction with the environment – foregrounded by the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty – draws our attention to the body not as a mere filtering and constraining apparatus but a dynamic system which resonates to its surroundings – it is only the extended view of embodied cognition (which regards the body as the active part of the cognitive process, see Shapiro 2011: 158–200) which has phenomenological reality.

The main notion of the phenomenological idea of (embodied) cognition is constitution: the mind constitutes the world for itself in a given situation through bodily interactions with the environment. In this regard the body, its surroundings and the situation are the constituents of the process of cognition which yields intentional objects of the conscious mind. In the phenomenological tradition constitution means being confronted with preliminary conditions, without assuming absolute preconditions in cognition (Seregi 2010: 601). When the conscious mind constitutes the world, it becomes part of the world and at the same time it creates the world in the intentional relation to the world. Therefore as experience is not identical with the physical sensations (it is rather the (re)cognition of a phenomenon), the embodied character of cognition cannot be seen as a mere constraining factor on conceptualization, it is rather the dynamic capacity of interacting successfully in the world and creating meaning as a result.

Some readers may find a contradiction in my argumentation: if the main mistake of embodied cognitive linguistics is to disregard the role of the mind in concept formation, how can we as cognitive linguists start our enterprise from the conceptual terrain of cognition, ignoring the embodied processes? To put it in another way, does the explanation of semantic structures require the description of the brain processes from perception as far as to conceptual representation, or not? The answer is twofold, it depends on the perspective of the investigation, and hence the contradiction is only apparent. If we recall the phenomenological proposal of differentiating the psychological self from the phenomenal mind, we can see that describing the processes of perception and sensation processing makes only the psychological self explainable. From the fact that we know how the brain processes the sensory data and which psychological processes can be localized in the neural structure it does not follow that we have a causal explanation of the mind and its concepts. What phenomenology directs our attention to is the fallacy of determinative reductionism: having experimental evidences about perception or sensory processes is no reason for claiming that these are the evidences of how the mind functions, because mind is intentional in its nature, and intentionality is not
reducible to physiological structures. To claim that intentionality cannot be naturalized (see Searle 2000: 92–94) does not mean that the mind is an immaterial capacity in a dualistic ontology; it only means that the sciences do not have satisfactory devices for understanding the intentionality of the mind.

From this it follows that to understand the functioning of the mind we need phenomenology. Since the body forms part of the world that is experienced by it, and the world offers itself as meaningful through this active participation, cognition is not the process of data-collection and processing, but it is the process in which the environment becomes saturated with meanings for human minds. The physical factors affect the environment and the body in it, but the true task is to understand how the mind experiences this effect, and how it constitutes the world through the experience of it. Since the standard cognitive view reifies the mind and its functioning after the fashion of sciences, it is unable to explain how the mind grasps the world for itself. Instead of this reification we can follow the phenomenological model of experience and cognition: the mind (in the body) takes part in a situation within which the entities gain their significance through the action of the subject of cognition (or through her purposes, intentions and beliefs). This is the process of constitution, and the human mind is adapted to perform it, it is equipped with a neuro-cognitive apparatus that makes constitution possible (see Sinha 2002: 274 cited above).

This redefines the subject of investigation in cognitive sciences fundamentally: cognition is possible not only because the human body and the brain are natural entities (hence the authority of nature prevails in them), but because the conscious mind being in correlation with the actual situation has the capacity of constituting the world as a meaningful environment. We must recognize this twofold determination of cognition, and the aim of phenomenology is to explore the basic structure of it (Mezei 1997: 145). The main function of the mind is to constitute the world for itself, which proceeds intentionally; however it takes place only in situation, and only through the active participation of the body in the situation. From a phenomenological point of view we can interpret the empirical evidences as concerning constitution, and thus it becomes evident that it is the subject experiencing and constituting the phenomenal world that has the central significance in cognition.

As a consequence, phenomenological argumentation reminds us to be careful in planning, carrying out experiments, as well in interpreting their results: cognition is situated, and the subjective consciousness is the focus of it. We can therefore observe a lot of behavioural or linguistic patterns, but these data are connected to the actual situation and to an experiencing subject for her/his consciousness the world affords itself. With the help of this phenomenological reflection we can avoid the overgeneralization of conclusions that can be drawn from the data. As Daniel Casasanto (2009: 127–128) calls our attention to it, the conceptualizations used in language are importantly different from the conceptualizations used in other situations of cognition (remembering, perceiving, acting without words). What can be analyzed thus through linguistic patterns is not the conceptual organization itself, but a way of constituting the world by a conscious subject in a situation, hence conceptual organization must not be identified with the patterns of constitution. To return to vertical orientation as an example, the conceptual metaphors related to the spatial domain up are the following: conscious is up, control is up, God is up, happy is up, healthy is up, more is up, rational is up, virtue is up (from the metaphor index in Kövecses 2010). However, there are Hungarian expressions like felbosszant (‘annoy’), felbőszít (‘enrage’), in which the conceptual domain up (symbolized in the preverbal element fel ‘up’) is related to the experience of being angry, and this cannot be explained with more is up, since the expression lenyugszik
('calm down', with the preverbal element le ‘down’) demonstrates that there is a constitutional pattern in which we experience the state of angry and calmness along a vertical axis. Our (not systematic, but intuitively correct) observation is that Hungarian offers a pattern for understanding negative mental states as being up. A standard cognitive linguistic explanation would be that there is a language specific conceptual pattern (angry is up) which has universal experience-based conceptualization in its background (anger is hot fluid in a container). These conceptual structures are in the human mind originated from experiencing the physical world in a human body; hence their activation is automatic in the context of language use. The radical view of embodiment would complete this explanation with the notion of primary metaphor: for intensity is up (or more is up) is learnt from the active experience of the world by the same bodies in the same relevant environment, it can be considered a neural co-activating pattern, which motivates the meaning of the expressions.

What is the alternative phenomenological answer? In a given situation the subjective consciousness constitutes intentionally the world for herself/himself, and the basis of this process is the access to the phenomenal world offered by the body, in other words the experience of being in the world. The state of being angry is experienced differently in different situations, depending on e.g. the cause of the anger, the physical circumstances and so on. In one of the potential experiences the subject feels herself/himself as being in a more and more intensive physical, mental, emotional state (correlated with the needs of action in the actual situation, e.g. the need of physical motion), and this experience of increasing intensity (or increasing preparedness for action) can be related to the process of moving along a vertical axis. It is important not to consider experiences as mere states and directions, since they are processes experienced by a subjective mind. It follows that constituting the experience of being angry does not have universal validity, though linguistic patterns offer intersubjectively acceptable (and analogically reusable) ways of constitution. A vast number of constituting possibilities are available theoretically, from which language offers for the subject some patterns. There are several other intentional relations toward the phenomena of the world and of the subjective consciousness in it, as we can observe other gestures which manifest the constitution of anger on a horizontal axis, e.g. the move of the hands rapidly away from each other referring to the tension of anger. What we can explore through linguistic investigations is not conceptual structures but the alternative ways of constitution. Another example is constituting the domain of time: while the conceptualization paradigm claims that it is the sagittal axis (front/back) which structures the experience of time, analysing co-speech gestures of English informants demonstrates that the horizontal (left/right) axis is also essential in time-constitution (Casasanto 2009: 130).

Consequently the important conclusion of the phenomenological argumentation is that linguistic meaning represents constituting patterns and not conceptualization. While the latter refers to the content of human mind, and thus it implies both the internalistic conception of cognitive (mental) representations and the radical reductionist approach to them from the perspective of embodiment, the former means that the human mind is always a conglomeration of dynamic acts within which the subject create her or his attitude to the experienced world. As a result of phenomenological contemplation we can avoid both internalism (consciousness is not a container but it is an active constituent of embodied experience) and reductionism (the phenomenal experience is not reducible to sensory inputs), and the homunculus-problem does not arise either.

At first this seems to be a mere terminological specification, but there is an essential difference between the standard (or embodied) view of conceptualization and the phenomenological
approach to meaning and cognition: the conceptualization paradigm is theoretically deductive, whereas the phenomenological approach uses induction in explaining the process of cognition. The conceptualization theory uses double deduction: (i) it assumes the priority of conceptual structures over meanings (hence meaning can be deduced from conceptualization), and (ii) it assumes the priority of the physiologic body over conceptualization (hence concepts can be deduced from bodily organisation). In comparison with the deductive theorizing of conceptualization, phenomenology begins the investigation by mapping the situation and the active consciousness correlates with it; on the one hand it makes possible not to reify the constituents of cognition, and to avoid ignoring one or another constituent though simplifying its role; on the other hand it determines the boundaries of generalization: not every observed behavioural pattern is general, but only those which follow from the correlation of the consciousness with the world, since these have intersubjective validity.\(^5\)

The central notion in conceptualization is causal motivation: the direct cause of meaning is the conceptual (for it determines what mappings evolve in understanding), the indirect cause of it is the body (for it determines what conceptualizations emerge during learning processes). By contrast, the central notion of a phenomenological epistemology is correlation: the constituted world and the constituting consciousness cannot be reduced to each other, however their relation is not accidental, since the cognitive apparatus with which the human mind adapted to survive provides a common ground for experiencing and understanding a shared world.

Looking at the problem of representation (Q1) from the phenomenological perspective, the main question is not whether there is any need for mental representations in explaining linguistic meaning, since experiencing the phenomenal world involves some kind of mental structures which transcend our sensations to phenomenal objects for the purposes of representation-hungry tasks (planning, memorizing, discussing etc.), and these structures cannot be reduced to physical-physiologic data. The real question is what the representations stand for: the standard cognitive answer is that these are the representations of the mind’s concepts, whereas the phenomenological answer is that the mental structures represent alternative constitutions of the phenomenal world. They are flexible and dynamic patterns of cognitive acts being suitable for adapting them in a given situation. The constitutional patterns i.e. the mental representations are in other words possible attitudes of the mind toward the environment and toward itself, and because of the ability to act without words we can assume that there is a representational mind prior linguistic meaning.

In the process of constitution, the experiencing self becomes a subject. It is therefore not an unreliable point of view with restricted validity, but the main result of every cognitive act, as well as the vantage point of understanding and explaining everyday cognition. From a phenomenological perspective, experience is always subjective, which means that it is the constitutional act of a subject within which a possible correlation between the conscious mind and the world becomes visible. But a difficult question follows from the subjective nature of

\(^5\) I do not follow the husserlian argumentation in this regard, since it proposes an idealistic method for the problem of generalization: for Husserl it is the transcendental subjectivity, and idealized being which grounds the individual behaviours in the generality of humankind, and which can be revealed through phenomenological reduction (Husserl 1972: 214–215, see Gadamer 2002: 62). Since cognitive linguistics dose not assume a priori entities for elaborating general explanations, this kind of reduction (and the idealistic metaphysical background of it) is alien to its nature. It is a difficult but promising task for cognitive linguistics to find and integrate such theses of phenomenology with which the explanation of cognitive functioning of language becomes more natural and not more obscure.
experience: how can we be sure of experiencing the same world as others? How can we find ourselves in a shared world, and how does the world not collapse into an infinite number of subjective phenomenal worlds? This is the hard problem of solipsism; in the next section I demonstrate how phenomenology moves beyond it.

3.2. From the subject to the other: intersubjectivity

The foregoing demonstrates that phenomenology proves to be productive for cognitive linguistic research at a metatheoretical level: the reflections initiated by it explicate important presuppositions, e.g. the differentiation between psychological self and phenomenal mind (through which we can re-evaluate the methodological and theoretical significance of experimental investigations), or the prevailing first-person perspective of experience (which directs our attention to the importance of constitution instead of generalized patterns of conceptualization). The latter claim, however, leads us to the problem of solipsism, and unless it is not reflected, phenomenology cannot be applied as epistemological background for cognitive sciences, since a solipsistic attitude toward the world is inconsistent with any scientific enterprise which has the aim of exploring the world in itself. The claim that world appears always for a subject, hence there is no world in itself (or we are not able to reach it, as Kant stated) would make the modern scientific endeavours senseless.

But if one interprets carefully the notion of correlation in phenomenology, the objection of solipsism does not arise either. For correlation means that two entities (the constituted world and the constituting consciousness) are not reducible to each other (Mezei 1997: 100). As Husserl notes it,

“The following should be noted in this connexion: Just as the reduced Ego is not a piece of the world, so, conversely, neither the world nor any worldly object is a piece of my Ego, to be found in my conscious life as a really inherent part of it, as a complex of data of sensation or a complex of acts” (Husserl 1982: 26).

And though Husserl makes his claim about the phenomenologically reduced ego, the essence of his words is that the affordance of the world in the consciousness does not mean that the world exists only in the field of consciousness, or that it forms a part of it. Idealism states that one of the two entities (the constituted world or the constituting consciousness) is a priori: either the world (objective idealism, as we find it in Kant’s epistemology and in the notion of the world in itself [Ding an sich]) or the subject (solipsism, as we find it in the philosophy of Berkeley). The subjective consciousness has the priority in the process of experience, because the world appears from its perspective, thus subjectivism is peculiar to phenomenology, yet the perspective of the subject is not only prior but also partial: the acts of consciousness cannot grasp the world as a whole; that is why consciousness needs to transcend the sensations to a phenomenal object. Because the subjective consciousness never can cognize the world in its totality, the priority of the subject is tenable without any idealism (Mezei 1997: 100). It is this subjectivism which received a serious critique from hermeneutics (see Ricoeur 1997: 29–31), but if one conceives the subjective consciousness as a vantage point and as an inherent factor of every experience, whereas the subject is the (self-)reflecting consciousness which find herself/himself in a relation to the world (see Maclaren 2009, Ullmann 2013), the epistemological subjectivism does not mean ontological apriorism of the subject.
Husserl himself regards transcendence as the central notion of correlation between the world and the consciousness:

“[t]his »transcendence« is part of the intrinsic sense of anything worldly, despite the fact that anything worldly necessary acquires all the senses determining it, along with its existential status, exclusively from my experiencing, my objectivating, thinking, valuing, or doing, at particular times” (Husserl 1982: 26).

In my interpretation, the act of transcendence (or the act of intentionality in other words) links the world in itself and the consciousness, making correlation, becoming the psychological self (being one part of the nature) a phenomenal consciousness (participating in the world as a subject) possible. Intentionality is therefore the essential capacity of our cognitive apparatus. It is one of the adaptations of the human mind, thus it can be naturalized only with evolutionary and not with neurobiological terms. The question, however, that why the subjectively constituted world is valid for others remains unanswered. On the one hand intentionality is a common inheritance of humankind, on the other one can experience only through her/his own intentional acts.

The dilemma can be solved with the Husserlian notion of horizon, which presupposes that we do not experience the world as isolated intentional fields (Husserl 1972: 201), our intentional acts direct toward the other too in the world. We experience the other as intentional subject of the same kind, so the consciousness of the other forms a part of my consciousness. As we can interpret the notion of horizon as a latent field of possibilities (Spielraum der Möglichkeiten), the unbroken system of possible acts and actions setting the directions of the experience (see Ullmann 2013: 35), we can also assume an intersubjective horizon around our conscious acts. The perspective of the other as intentional consciousness (intentional mental agent, intentional being having purposes, attention and the ability decision making as Tomasello terms it, see Tomasello 2002: 83) appears implicitly in every act of the conscious mind. The intersubjective horizon, and the perspective of the other figured in this horizon can become explicit, which is a special kind of intentionality called empathy (Gallagher–Zahavi 2008: 183), but as a latent field of experience it is implied in every acts of consciousness from perception to decision making.

Why is the phenomenological idea of intersubjective horizon important for cognitive linguistics? What are the main differences between the standard cognitive scientific and the phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity? The first is that cognitive sciences have thematized the notion of intersubjectivity as the problem of cognizing the other in the context of discoursive and cultural practices. This thematization regards the subject as an individual embodied conscious mind, thus it maintains the isolation of it in spite of directing our attention towards the social life (see Zlatev–Racine–Sinha–Itkonen 2008: 1). Contrary to the standard approach, phenomenology considers intersubjectivity an essential terrain of experiencing the world, hence it is significant not only in social acts, but in cognition in the broadest sense. And while the standard approach preserves partly the solipsist attitude in explaining cognition, since individual minds turn to the others only if they have something communicable for them, Merleau-Ponty (1992: 361) notes:

“[s]olipsism would be strictly true only if someone who managed to be tacitly aware of his existence without being or doing anything, which is impossible, since existing is being in and of the world.”
Since humans live evidently in a social world, and since sociality is one of the most important evolutionary developments in and for human cognition, the perspective of the other must be an inherent (explicit or latent) factor of cognition.

The second difference is the model of intersubjectivity: while cognitive science elaborated the analogy + inference model of recognizing other minds, phenomenology rejects the analogical modelling (for a detailed discussion of analogical modelling and implicit simulation in phenomenology see Gallagher–Zahavi 2008: 177–183). The reason of rejecting analogy in understanding the other is complex. On the one hand it implies the assumption of one’s own mind’s transparency for itself: one can identify the conscious state with one’s own, but this procedure is successful only if one’s own states are totally known to oneself. To put it differently, analogical modelling presupposes the knowledge of the subjective mental states by the subject through introspection. However, introspection presupposes the separation of the external from the internal, and renders the mind an internal entity not participating in the world, phenomenology therefore rejects introspection as a valid method of cognizing the consciousness (Gallagher–Zahavi 2008: 21). The consciousness itself cannot become the object of the acts of consciousness, consequently the mind is never immanent for itself, and the subjective consciousness has to transcend itself through constituting the other if it wants to know something about itself. Hence analogy never leads us to understand other minds.

On the other hand, as Merleau-Ponty argues (relying on Scheler’s declaration, see Merleau-Ponty 1992: 352–353), analogy always presupposes what it is called on to explain. It takes the sameness of one’s own and the other’s mind as a starting point; hence through analogy we lose the otherness of the other, and instead of mapping the other mind, we analyse our own projected mind as other. Analogy makes a double failure in explaining cognition: it preserves the individual mind as a central and transparent vantage point, which results in the illusion of understanding otherness. Analogy is the true but hiding solipsism.

The inferential processes of analogical modelling are simulations: I try to understand the perspective of the other from my own one, and then I can infer through simulating the situation from the other’s point of view. Explicit simulation (in which comprehending one’s own intentional state is prior to understand the other’s) raises however the homunculus-problem, and it has no objective verification from a developmental viewpoint (Tomasello 2002: 85); whereas implicit simulation (in which simulation proceeds directly in cognition, thus there is no mediating phase of introspection-like comprehension) is not distinguishable from direct perception and action: the neural activations which are identified with simulation can be interpreted as the subprocesses of perception, and the mirror neurons (which are said the most powerful evidences of simulation) can function in the sensori-motor process of perception. The main difficulty with implicit simulation is that its empirical evidence is a matter of interpretation: if we extend perception from a passive to an active process and we interpret it as a kind of action (as phenomenology does), it includes the firing of the mirror-neurons as well. The important conclusion is that the question of simulation – like the question of representation – cannot be answered from an empirical standpoint with naturalistic argumentation, because the evidences are interpretable either as supporting or as opposing the existence of a simulating process. Scientific research needs theoretical contemplation and philosophical reflection in order to interpret carefully the empirical evidences.

According to phenomenology, intersubjectivity is an essential dimension of conscious life. The appearance of the other in the horizon of subjective consciousness is not equal with the perspective of the other, or with the implicit or explicit knowledge of what is in the other’s mind, since successful interaction (with or without words) presupposes that (i) the other
experiences the same phenomenological world (though not the same physical one because of the different perspectives), and (ii) the vantage points, the backgrounds and the situations are in principle shareable, thus the other would or could be in the situation of the subject (though not exactly in the same situation). Consequently, intersubjectivity is to be conceived primarily not as perspective taking (for it preserves the separate view of individual minds) but as the origin of understanding the world:

“This intersubjectivity of cognition and language relies on the notion of ‘truth’ which implies that what is true or false, correct or incorrect, is also true or false, correct or incorrect for other persons” (Praetorius 2010: 308).

Intersubjectivity ensures that the phenomenal subject is able to understand the environment as a meaningful world and she/he can manipulate the entities around herself/himself to execute successful actions, despite her/his limited cognitive abilities. The human mind needs the other for constituting the world as such through perception, cognition and action, since it experiences the world with others, and it experiences the others as intentional mental agents of the same kind – this is our cognitive inheritance and the main factor of our cultural evolution.

The importance of intersubjectivity is far from new in cognitive linguistics: in the last two decades, fundamental theoretical and empirical investigations have been conducted on developmental psychology and language acquisition with the recognition of the central role of intersubjectivity (i.e. the understanding of the other as an intentional mental agent similar to me) as a result (see Tomasello 2002, Sinha 2014 for details). However, the notion of intersubjectivity has not gained its real significance in the theory of linguistic meaning. In the pragmatic tradition, the term is conceived as “mutual attribution of intention and understanding”, hence it is the context of language use which is intersubjective in nature (Harder 2009: 67–70, Tátrai 2011: 30). The pragmatic interpretation adheres itself to the attribution of intentions, but it implies the priority of the individual mind (and the subjective vantage point as well), a monolithic theory of mind (which developmentally questionable), and an analogical-inferential model of interpersonal epistemology with its view of separated minds. Another important model on intersubjectivity in cognitive linguistics is due to Arie Verhagen: he considers some areas of grammar (negation and negation-related costructions, complementation, discourse connectives) as the scaffolding devices of engaging in “deep cognitive coordinations with others” (Verhagen 2005: 4). In his framework it is not the context of the discourse, but linguistic structures themselves are regarded as intersubjective constructions, hence the notion of intersubjectivity gets central significance in describing linguistic meaning. Nevertheless this significance does not extend to meaning as such: only one part of grammatical constructions proves to be intersubjective, and though it is the core of their meaning, intersubjectivity remains the dimension of coordinating meanings being otherwise individual and isolated.

A phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity can not only explicate the erroneous presuppositions of investigating human meaning creation from a cognitive point of view (e.g. the solipsistic attitude towards the other mind, the fallacy of analogy in explanation), but it also extends the application of intersubjectivity in semantics. Merleau-Ponty (1992: 354) describes the event of a discourse as phenomenal experience:

“[i]n the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric, my
words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and
they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We have
here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behaviour in my
transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate
reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a com-
mon world.”

It is worth recognizing that the process of experience is itself intersubjective, namely it pre-
supposes the consciousness of the other, consequently not one or another linguistic construc-
tion has intersubjective character. We can distinguish the phenomenological notion of inter-
subjectivity from the canonized one: whereas the latter can be seen as an explicit interpretation
(which presupposes the individual meaning, and according to which intersubjective construal
consists of specific subprocesses like perspective taking, inference, coordination through
constructions, negotiation on meaning), the phenomenological interpretation conceives inter-
subjectivity as an implicit factor of every meaning (from the nominal/verbal/adjectival ones
through indexicals and pronominal meanings as far as to clausal meaning), it is the substrate
of conceptualizing or construing entities and events of the world (hence it is not confined to
verbal discourses, see Harder 2009). To interpret the clause

*Just put it on the table!*

it is not

enough to know that the reference of

*it*

is elaborated in relation to the common ground; it is

not enough to know what the verb

*put*

means in the context of use and what kind of interper-
sonal relations are symbolized in the imperative construction; we need to know what

*table*

means and why can we use the

*on*

preposition with the

*table*

nominal in the context of the verb

*put*. The latter knowledge is intersubjective, though we do not make any negotiations on it, as
well as no perspective taking is needed for meaning creation: knowledge of the table (as a
phenomenal object having an extended vertical surface that can be used to laying something
on it) is shared, i.e. it is intersubjective knowledge. It must be realized that meaning has an
implicit intersubjective character in its every aspect; to put it differently, intersubjectivity of
meaning is prior to its subjectivity. As Praetorius (2010: 308) notes,

“intersubjectivity must be the rock bottom, the very point of departure from which
any discussion about our knowledge and description must be based and proceed –
whether such discussions concern our knowledge and description of thing in publicly
observable reality, or our internal states, such as our emotions, thoughts or feelings
of pain.”

Cognitive linguistics can profit from the phenomenological interpretation of intersubjectiv-
ity on multiple fields of explaining linguistic structures. At first it is worth noting that the
schematic semantic descriptions provided by the most elaborated theories in cognitive lin-
guistics model the intersubjective ground of the meaning of linguistic structures being spec-
ifiable in the discourse. The so called idealized cognitive models are based on experiencing
the phenomenal world; their validity is therefore not universal but intersubjective. Also the
semantic matrices of cognitive domains elaborated in cognitive grammar demonstrate that
core of linguistic meanings originating from the intersubjective experience of a shared phe-
nomenal world, just as the semantic descriptions of frame semantics can be regarded as in-
tersubjective categorizations of experiencing the world, hence they can motivate actual
meaning in a discourse. Phenomenology as a metatheoretical perspective does not serve for
refining the proposed schematic structures (although it directs our attention to the synthetic
configuration of sense experiences in spite of their separated description in domains for example), the real benefit of its application is to redefine the character and significance of the elaborated models.

Nevertheless we can build new explanations on phenomenological claims about intersubjectivity in the cases of (creative or poetic) innovations. Creativity has a strong intersubjective character: it is neither creating something from nothing (Pope 2005: xv), nor a purely subjective act of cognition. Instead of a binary (yes/no answer for the question whether something counts as innovation) and subjectivist approach in which innovation is a solely act of the individual, the phenomenological reflection can propose a scalar idea of innovation ranging from the conventionality of intersubjective constitution of the phenomenal world to the more and more subjective constitution patterns. If semantic descriptions provided by cognitive theories of linguistic structure are the models of the intersubjective ground of meanings, then the process of subjectivization can be grasped on the level of semantic structures, and not only on the level of the discourse: in so far as conventionality carries out the intersubjective constitution, in which the conscious mind does not want to step out from the shared phenomenal world, every departure from conventionality highlights a new way of constituting the world from a consciously changed perspective, be it an archaism, a neologism or other poetic formation; yet every innovation is only partial departure, since the intersubjective ground of meaning does not disappear, it only goes to the background (see the principle of optimal innovation in Giora 2003: 176–184). The exact, absolute degree of departing from the conventions (and hence from the intersubjective constitution) cannot be measured, but from a phenomenological point of view (as from a cognitive linguistic one, see Zawada 2005) innovation and creativity are relative phenomena. The benefit coming from phenomenology is again not the elaboration of a strict methodology but of a theoretical frame in which innovation is interpreted as the symbolic marker of relatively subjective constitution.

The phenomenological idea of intersubjectivity can put the canonized notions of cognitive linguistics into a new light. One of the examples is the generic space in the model of conceptual integration: according to Turner (2007: 378) it “contains what the inputs have in common”. However, this definition does not elaborate the status of the generic space in the blend: it is open whether the generic space is the result of an a posteriori generalization or it is the prerequisite of creating a blended space. Considering the famous example This surgeon is a butcher, is the generic space needed for interpreting the metaphor, or is it a useful device for analyzing the semantic structure? Well, if we recognize that the generic space summarizes such aspects of the blended entities or events which are indisputably valid in the shared world (the use of sharp devices, the process of cutting flesh or meat for executing the purposed act successfully and so on), we can conclude that the generic space functions as the intersubjective ground on which the new (metaphorical) meaning emerges. In other words, the reference of the butcher to the surgeon, as well as the emerging conceptualization of incompetence is meaningful only for those who have the intersubjective knowledge of what a surgeon and a butcher do in the shared phenomenal world. As we can see, even in creative conceptual integration, there is an intersubjective substructure, since without it the blend

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7 The redefinition of subjectification from a phenomenological perspective as a new way of constituting the phenomenal reality is of specific importance in cognitive stylistics and in cognitive poetics: insofar as nonconventional linguistic solutions symbolize the subjectivized perspective in experiencing the world, stylistic and poetic formation can propose new constituting relation or attitude towards the shared world.
would be totally incomprehensible. The generic space ensures that the emerging meaning remains intersubjectively understandable. Therefore blending seems to be a useful device for constituting the phenomenal world from a new perspective without abolishing its shared character. Mark Turner formulates this phenomenal function of conceptual integration as achieving a human scale (Turner 2007: 382–383).

The other example comes from the theory of grammaticalization and from the theory of construction grammar: the term constructionalization designates the process when a construction becomes more schematic and less compositional in its meaning, hence the increase of its use results in the increase of the emergent character of its meaning; the new construction is a new node at a higher level in the network of linguistic knowledge, thus constructionalization leads to convergent use of linguistic structure, in other words to a shared grammar (see Hilpert 2015: 134–140). The emergence of a construction is the stabilization of an intersubjective constituting pattern in the discourse community. As it was demonstrated above, innovations count as departures from the conventional, intersubjectively valid constitution of the phenomenal world. Constructionalization can be seen as the reversed process through which a subjective way of experiencing the shared world becomes intersubjective. From this it follows that the corpus-based investigations are of overriding importance, because the quantitative analyses can demonstrate what kinds of constituting patterns are accessible in a language community, and through measuring their frequency we can infer their degree of intersubjectivity. Phenomenology leads us to the claim that language is not only the medium of cognition but it is the socio-cultural context of emerging new patterns of cognition, thus language use can yield new insights into the world around us.

4. Back to the problem of representation: conclusion

The aim of this paper was twofold: on the one hand I aimed to demonstrate the benefits that cognitive linguistics can have from a phenomenological contemplation; on the other I wanted to demonstrate that in spite of the anti-philosophical attitude of the naturalizing cognitive sciences, a phenomenological reflection on the subject and the methods of cognitive linguistic research can provide numerous considerations which can help us to avoid both the problematic theoretical presuppositions (e.g. reductionism or the problem of isolated minds) and the conflation of the research field of cognitive linguistics with the other fields in cognitive science. Though I agree with András Kertész that metascientific reflection “is not capable of solving objectscientific problems per se” (Kertész 2004: 168), the contribution of metascientific reflection to objectscientific investigation is not limited to motivate ignoring certain phenomena or aspects in explanation – an accurate theoretical reflection can set the task of taking new realms of cognition (e.g. phenomenal consciousness, the implicit intersubjectivity of meaning) into consideration, and it helps to define the subject of objectscientific researches.

The main theses of a phenomenological contemplation on cognition are:

a) the differentiation between the psychological self and the phenomenal consciousness; between the actual situation of experiencing and the situated process of cognition;
b) the direct meaningfulness of perception;
c) the recognition of the phenomenal world as the basis of our experiences;
d) the irreducibility of concepts and meaning to physical sensations;
e) the secondary importance of direct empirical (external) observations in investigating cognition;

f) the inherent situatedness of experiencing the phenomenal world, in which not only the body, but also the situation becomes the constituent of the intentional object;

g) the definition of cognition – instead of mere data-collecting and data-processing – as the process in which the environment becomes saturated with meanings for human minds;

h) the recognition of constitution as the active functioning of the human mind;

i) the recognition of the subject’s central role in the process of cognition;

j) modelling linguistic meaning not as conceptual but as constitutional patterning;

k) the recognition of intersubjectivity as an implicit horizon of the conscious mind;

l) attributing an implicit intersubjective character to linguistic meaning.

As we can see, a phenomenological argumentation can alter the subject of the inquiry and the interpretation of the central notions as well. The naturalistic metatheoretical reflection eliminates some of the research dilemmas construing new conditions on the grounds of empirical evidences within which both of the destructive alternative of the dilemma become avoidable, limiting their application to only one part of the investigated phenomena. Thus if we consider the behavioural aspects of cognition, we do not need representations, but if we consider the higher ordered tasks of cognition, representations are needed. In comparison with it – and this is the central metatheoretical claim of this study – a philosophical reflection carried out as phenomenological argumentation can solve the dilemma without ignoring important aspects of the phenomena investigated.

To recall the problem of representation I reformulate it with the terms of standard cognitive science. The representationalist alternative claims that we need representation-like structures in order to understand and explain cognition, and hence the main purpose of cognitive linguistics is to model the (conceptual or semantic) representations in the background of actual meanings. In the course of this endeavour we can maintain the embodied (experience-based) nature of these representations, but we can ignore the specific explanation of it – a rigorous description of semantic or conceptual representations. The anti-representationalist alternative goes as follows: because of the non-observability of representations these are mere labels of the analyst, there is no evidence for using intermind structures; thus the only vivid and true alternative is to consider representations as neuronal activation patterns, and though in a special sense they can be seen as (bodily) representations, the actual representations of these physiological structures (in language, in discourse and so on) are of secondary significance, i.e. ignorable.

Phenomenology ignores neither the embodied, nor the representation-like aspects of cognition: by placing the human mind into a situation of action which is meaningful through the acts of the participating mind it can balance the significance of body, mind, and environment. The intentionality of the subjective consciousness pervades the process of cognition making both the correlation between the mind and the world and the correlation between the subject and the other possible; however, neither aspects of cognition can be reduced to intentionality, since it is the factor of correlation, not of causal relation. Intentionality is the characteristic feature of the human mind, an adaptation to acting successfully in the world, yet it cannot develop without (epigenetically) interacting with the world. In so far as the cognizing human mind directs itself toward the world through intentional acts, explaining cognition
needs representation in any aspect of the process, but these representations are subjective representations of the shared world having intersubjective (not universal) validity.\(^8\)

To the question whether phenomenology also ignores something, namely the psychological self and the empirically tested process of cognition, the answer can be given that phenomenology does not ignore it, but it limits the validity of the results of empirical observations and testing. We can explore many important details of cognition through third-person observation, but neither linguistic structures nor cognition itself can be explained causally with it. The data need to be interpreted from a theoretical point of view, and phenomenology serves as an accurate and reflected device for this interpretation. The only thing being ignored in a phenomenological contemplation is the naturalistic attitude toward the mind: I admit that a phenomenological perspective is not promising regarding the wished synthesis of humanities and sciences. However, a synthesis must involve an active discourse between humanities and sciences which will initiate the redefinition of the central theoretical constructions such as cognition, experience and representation. Instead of being dominated by the ideal of sciences, humanities – and especially philosophy – can offer theoretical considerations which are essential for scientific explanation, and phenomenology carries the promise of a two-directional, real interdisciplinarity of humanities and sciences – it can lead to a new cognitive linguistics.

References


\(^8\) This answer for Q1 coincides partly with the conclusions of Mark Rowlands (2015: 28–29): he argues that the yes or no answer has no theoretical or practical utility, because “some items that seem to be involved in cognitive processes may satisfy some commonly accepted conditions of representations but not others. Other items may satisfy different constraints. And that is all we can, fruitfully, say on the question of whether cognition requires representation” (Rowlands 2015: 29). The main point of Rowlands’ argumentation is that “craving for generality” leads us to close both the notion and the question of scientific terms, and because of this closing we cannot answer satisfactorily the hard theoretical problems. The clear categorization and definition of our notions and the investigated phenomena is expected by the rigid empirical methods of the sciences; philosophy always opens the notions to reinterpretation, and hence makes us enable to reflect on them continually. The answer phenomenology offers is not the absolute necessity of representations in investigating cognition, but the necessity of them in so far as cognition is concerned as the active participation of the intentional conscious mind in a shared world. This claim does not exclude other possible answers from other scientific perspectives, but it leaves the terms representation and cognition open to further reflections, which is the most important advantage of a phenomenological argumentation.


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TWO FIELDWORKERS’ EFFECTS ON A RESPONDENT’S
LANGUAGE USE IN SZEGED, HUNGARY

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Abstract

Interviewing techniques in variationist sociolinguistics may work in one location but fail in another. In this paper we test the effect of a dialect (ö-speaking) fieldworker and a Standard Hungarian (e-speaking) fieldworker on the speech of the same respondent who uses ö [Ø] in place of Standard e [e]. Quantitative analyses showed no effect of any of the traditional explanations such as Labov’s audiomonitoring, Bell’s audience design, progress of time in the interview, topic or emotional loading. However, Watzlawick’s interactional view of communication provides an adequate means to interpret the data. What did have an effect on the speech behavior of the respondent was how he placed himself vis-à-vis the two interviewers on a social hierarchy axis. The importance of constructing profiles of the persona of the respondent and that of the interviewer is emphasized.

Keywords: fieldworkers’ effects in a sociolinguistic interview, bidialectals in hiding, Labov’s audiomonitoring, Bell’s audience design, trust between interlocutors, Watzlawick’s interactional view of communication, the respondent’s and the interviewer’s profiles, the respondent’s position in the interview, indirect effect of the fieldworker’s persona

1. The Variation and Change in Szeged Speech project

The dialect traditionally used in and around the city of Szeged (population c. 160,000) in South Eastern Hungary is a nationally conspicuous one, using the front mid round ö [Ø] in place of Standard Hungarian e [e] in certain syllables as in köröṣt [kőrőst] vs. Standard kereszt [kereszt] ‘cross’.

When we began our project to study variation and change in the dialect of Szeged2 in 2012, we assumed that

• the dialect was probably disappearing fast,
• most of its users are bidialectal in Standard and local speech,
• they are very skillful code-switchers (“bidialectals in hiding”).

One more consideration we had to take seriously is that about one-third of the city’s population are in-migrants, many of them from non-ö dialect regions.

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1 This paper is based on our presentation at the International Conference on Language Variation in Europe (ICLaVE 8) in Leipzig, Germany, 28 May 2015.
2 This project is supported by OTKA, Grant no. K-105720.
Our major methodological tool is a modification of the interview designed by Labov (1984) and adapted to Hungarian in the Budapest Sociolinguistic Interview project (see Kontra–Váradi 1997, Kontra–Borbély 2010). We have a fair number of conversational modules, subjective reaction tests, reading passages, modules on local speech, questions designed to gauge respondents’ attachment to solidary with Szeged, forced-choice tests such as “Which of these two words do YOU use?” and “Which of these two is correct?” Also included are two map-drawing tasks (see Preston 1999) and some other components typical of sociolinguistic interviews.

Our basic linguistic hypotheses state that the use of ö (vs. e) is (1) influenced by the position of the ö-able syllable in the word: initial, medial or suffixal, and (2) the position of a preverb like fel-/föl- ‘up’, which may be either preposed (e.g. fölad ‘it gives up’) or postposed (e.g. nem ad föl ‘it does not give up’). We also hypothesize that some additional linguistic variables may covary with our major variable (ö).

As regards social variables, it is hypothesized that

- the young use the dialect less than the old,
- the less educated use it more than the more educated,
- it will be used more in interviews than in reading passages or tests,
- people more attached to Szeged use it more than those less attached.

We have no hypothesis regarding the sex of speakers.

We also hypothesized six types of respondents on the basis of in-migration status and linguistic behavior (see Berente–Kontra–Sinkovics, forthcoming). Some people born and raised in Szeged may be able to use the local dialect, in which case they may be either speakers of it (ö-ing people) or they may avoid using it (using e almost always). Others born and raised in Szeged may never have learned the dialect and use e categorically. In-migrants are defined as speakers who were born and raised outside the ö dialect region and who moved to Szeged after age 14. Some in-migrants cannot use the ö dialect and use e categorically. Other in-migrants may be able to speak the dialect and they speak it (ö-ing people), yet others may be able to speak it but avoid doing so (using e almost always). The avoiders (those who can use ö speech but avoid using it almost always) will be identified as using ö in less than 20% of the ö-able syllables, which is the researchers’ admittedly subjective threshold. Thus the avoiders can use the local dialect (a qualitative decision), but avoid doing so (a quantitative decision).

All members of our random representative sample of 160 respondents will be categorized as belonging to one of these six types ex post facto, on the basis of their in-migration status and use of ö in the guided conversations. One of our aims is to find out whether these six posited categories of speakers will actually show important sociolinguistic differences.

2. On bidialectals in hiding

Based on our everyday experience of language use or speech behavior in Szeged, we are aware that almost all speakers of the local dialect are extremely good at code-switching between ö-ing speech and near-Standard (e-ing) speech. They also seem to be very good at choosing the right code or variety with practically all their interlocutors: they use ö with people they know are good speakers of the dialect, and e with everybody else. They are bidialectals in hiding, which makes it very hard to observe their use of ö. They are a nightmare
for the fieldworker if s/he is not a native speaker of local Szeged speech. Here is what a 22-year-old male respondent told our fieldworker in an interview:

Respondent: De énbennem valahogy mindig az van, hogyha jön szembe egy ismeretlen, akiről nem tudom biztosan, hogy ű ű-ző tájszólást beszél, akkor én nem fogok vele úgy beszélni. Még itt Szegeden sem. És hogyha most én itt vagyok az egyetemi épületben, akkor itt is bennem van egy ilyen, hogy nagyon nehezen kezdek el úgy beszélni.

Fieldworker: Aha.

Respondent: És az iskolában is így volt. Hogy főleg inkább, ha elmöntünk egymáshoz, akkor ott jobban előjött ez, [köszörüli a torkát] de egyébként szóval a többiekkel, akik nem szögediesen beszélték, azokkal tehát mi mindig tudtunk ezen így változtatni, hogy ha akartuk így, ha akartuk úgy. És nekem ez gyerekkorom óta így van. Én nem emlékszem olyan időre, amikor nem tudtam volna eldönteni, hogy most kivel beszélek hogy.

(K01, 00:12:50 – 00:13:34)

The above is a simplified transcript of about 45 seconds of the interview. An English translation follows:

Respondent: When I see a stranger coming towards me, someone who I don’t know for sure that they speak the local ű-ing dialect, I won’t use it to them. Not even here in Szeged. And when I am in this university building, I would start ű-ing only with great difficulty.

Fieldworker: Right.

Respondent: And it was like that at school too. When we visited each other, ű-ing speech would more likely be used, but when we spoke to the others, those who did not use the Szeged dialect, we didn’t use it either. So we could always easily switch between speaking this way and that way. And I have been like that, since I was a child. I don’t remember a single situation when I couldn’t decide which kind of speech I should use to someone.

In order to hopefully minimize the respondents’ use of Standard (e-ing) speech, which they would likely use to strangers like our fieldworkers, we instructed the fieldworkers, native speakers of the dialect, to consistently use ű-ing from the first minute of the interview to the last. However, as will be shown below, the respondent in this case study used his ű-ing speech over 75% of the time, regardless of the different (local vs. Standard) dialects of the two fieldworkers. This lack of accommodation in the speech of the respondent and the interviewers

3The extract is from the interview with Respondent K01, between 12 minutes and 50 seconds and 13 minutes and 34 seconds in our project archive.
prompted us to look for an explanation which is different from such traditional views as Labov’s audiomonitoring, Bell’s audience design, the progress of time in the interview, the trust between the interlocutors, topics, and emotional loading.

3. Research Questions

As a methodological exercise outside the main thrust of our project, in order to test the fieldworkers’ effects on respondents’ speech, we set up two interviews with the same respondent: one conducted by a native speaker of the local ö dialect, and the other conducted by a standard e-speaking fieldworker. Apart from the dialect differences, the two fieldworkers were very similar: female university students of humanities in their twenties. The setting was the same (the porch of the respondent’s house) and the topics (conversational modules) were also as similar as possible. A few months elapsed between the two interviews, and their real purpose was disguised as “research on the life of people in Szeged”.

Our respondent is a retired male who had earlier worked as a printer. He was born and raised in Szeged and is a skillful bidialectal speaker of Szeged (ö-ing) speech and near-Standard (e-ing) speech.

The following research questions were addressed:

1) Is there any intra-speaker variability in the frequency of use of [ö] in the respondent’s speech with the two different fieldworkers? Our working hypothesis: the respondent will use different frequencies of [ö].
2) If the answer to (1) is “yes”, is the use of [ö] by a fieldworker correlated to its use by the respondent? Our working hypothesis: the respondent will use [ö] more frequently with the ö-ing fieldworker than with the e-ing one.
3) Is the frequency of use of [ö] by the respondent correlated to (a) the progress of time in the interview (cf. Shepard–Giles–Le Poire 2001), (b) the amount of attention paid to his own speech, and (c) the building up of trust between him and his interlocutor? Our working hypotheses: (i) with the progress of time, the respondent’s use of [ö] will increase in both interviews as his audiomonitoring decreases, (ii) in the interview with the ö-ing fieldworker, the respondent’s use of [ö] will increase as a result of the trust building up between them.

4. Findings

The two interviews have been transcribed and coded with ELAN (https://tla.mpi.nl/tools/tla-tools/elan/). Table 1 shows the essential properties of the two interviews.

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4 We are indebted to Naomi Nagy for coming to Szeged in June 2014 to teach us how to use ELAN and for discussing with us the linguistic minutiae of the ö dialect.
Table 1: The two interviews analyzed

Table 2 demonstrates the frequency of use of [ö] vs. [e] in the two interviews. The data demonstrate a 5.1% difference between the interview conducted by the e-speaking fieldworker and the ö-speaking one.

Table 2: The frequency of use of [ö] vs. [e] in the interviews with two different-speaking fieldworkers

As can be seen, our hypothesis (1) is corroborated: the respondent used the [ö] variant in 81.6% of all the ö-able syllables with the standard speaking fieldworker and used it 76.5% of the time with the local dialect speaking fieldworker, a highly significant difference (chi-square [df=1] = 10.550, p < 0.001). However, we must reject our hypothesis (2) because the respondent’s use of [ö] is not more but less frequent with the ö-speaking fieldworker than with the e-speaking one. Thus these two interviews provide evidence against our expectation that the fieldworkers’ dialect differences influence the respondent’s speech in harmony with accommodation theory.

Let us review why the data in Table 2 are perplexing. First, our respondent is not a bidalectal speaker in hiding: in the interview with the Standard-speaking fieldworker he uses his vernacular style realizing over 80% of the tokens with [ö]. Second, these data go against the view, widely held by both linguists and non-linguists, that the use of a dialect (feature) presupposes a good amount of trust between the interlocutors. (Such views have also been voiced by several respondents in our Szeged project.) Third, the results of our case study cannot be explained by Bell’s (1984) audience design theory either. Fourth, the frequency of use of [ö] by the respondent does not vary between different topics discussed, nor between modules characterized by different degrees of his emotional involvement.

In order to answer our research question (3a) on the role of the progress of time, we looked at the interview with the ö-speaking fieldworker in some detail. This interview lasts for 8 hours and was recorded in two sessions. We divided each session into two parts and compared the respondent’s percent of ö-ing vs. e-ing session by session and part by part. Table 3 shows the results.
The data shows very little difference in ò-ing between the first two hours and the second two hours of a session: ò-ing increased by 4.3% in the later part of the first session, and decreased by 1.3% in the later part of the second session.

In summary, the linguistic behavior of our respondent cannot be explained by the principles of audiomonitoring, or trust between interlocutors, or Bell’s audience design.

5. A possible explanation

We believe that the unexpected lack of the effects of our fieldworkers’ language use on the respondent’s linguistic behavior can be explained by an interactional framework, in which the key factor is the relationship between the fieldworker and the respondent in the interchange. More specifically, we think the most important factor is how the respondent strives to strengthen his own position – at the expense of the fieldworkers’ position. In this attempt to explain the dynamics of language use by the respondent and his interlocutors, we draw on Watzlawick’s interactional view of communication. In this view, “all communicational interchanges are either symmetrical or complementary, depending on whether they are based on equality or difference” (Watzlawick–Beavin–Jackson 1967: 70). Symmetrical interaction is characterized by the minimization of difference, “while complementary interaction is based on the maximization of difference” (ibid. 69). The crucial issue is who controls the interchange. “One-up communication is movement to gain control of the exchange. A bid for dominance includes messages that instruct, order, interrupt, contradict, change topics, or fail to support what the other person said. One-down communication is movement to yield control of the exchange” (Griffin 2012: 186). We also draw on the role of sex difference and power asymmetry in the interview discussed illuminatingly by Schilling (2013). In the Hungarian literature Bartha–Hámori’s (2010) analyses of speakers’ discursive-interactional strategies are precursors of the explanation we are about to present.

However, one should not run away with the idea that a fieldworker will necessarily end up in a hierarchy where s/he is dominated by the respondent. For instance, Szabó (2013) demonstrates that a young Hungarian schoolboy radically changes his opinion on a language issue during an interview as a result of recognizing the authority of his adult fieldworker, a teacher. Referring to Eckert’s and her own work, Schilling (2013: 205) also notes that “even teenagers and children can take over [control of the interview] when talking with adult interviewers.”
In what follows, we will show the linguistic means the respondent uses in order to gain the dominant position in the interactions, to weaken the fieldworkers’ positions, and to control the overall communication. First, we need to sketch a profile of the respondent on the basis of his statements during the interviews.

6. The respondent’s profile

- Our respondent has a negative attitude to all foreign languages, which is demonstrated by statements like büdös angol, tanuljon meg magyarul ‘Damned English people, they should learn Hungarian!’
- He is also negative about any Hungarian dialects different from the Szeged ö-ing dialect, including the mekögő dialect ‘e dialect spoken by people who can but will not speak ö’. This is shown by how he always cites a person he dislikes: mekögő people are always cited as speaking Standard Hungarian e-ing speech.
- His statements are unmistakably anti-intellectual and anti-humanities. His views of young female university students of the humanities are extremely negative. (Once we consider the social hierarchies in the two interviews analyzed, it is clear that both of our fieldworkers were in an extremely difficult situation, quite different from “the power asymmetry that inheres in the relationship between the researcher, usually someone with an advanced education who is affiliated with an authoritative research institution, and the community, whose members are often far removed from mainstream power structures” [Schilling 2013: 197].)
- On the other hand, our respondent holds positive attitudes to
  1. his Hungarian mother tongue,
  2. his own dialect,
  3. people in Szeged,
  4. peasants in general,
  5. all kinds of manual labor,
  6. the Kádár regime (Hungarian socialist regime, 1957–1990), and
  7. the past in general.

7. The respondent’s position in the interviews

Here we will show how our respondent uses, consciously or unconsciously, verbal strategies to gain superiority in the interviews. Some of the elements in the respondent’s profile make it inevitable that the two young female fieldworkers start out with a great disadvantage in the discourse if they mean to gain recognition for their chosen profession. The quotations below offer ample evidence that the respondent wants to gain superiority and he does not recognize his interlocutors as equals. He is projecting his own view of his own position in society, and tries to make sure that these views also dominate the entire discourse. He uses several linguistic means to achieve this goal, and the common denominator of all of them is his attack on the fieldworkers. Examples follow:
1. **T/V form of address**
   Violating the rules of Hungarian politeness, the respondent has sometimes used T forms of address to the fieldworkers who categorically used V forms to him, e.g. *De tudod?* ‘But do you [T form] know?’ (A163e 405)

2. **He used dozens of face-threatening moves to the fieldworkers, for instance**
   a) *Mikó<r> látott tyúkot, igazi tyúkot életibe<n>?* ‘When did you ever in your life see a real hen?’ (A163e 320)
   b) *Kuncsaft szót ismeri?* ‘Do you know the word *kuncsaft* «customer»?’ (163e 639)
   c) *Tudja mi a cserje?* ‘Do you know what a shrub is?’ (A163e 768)

3. **There are countless examples of the respondent interrupting the fieldworker, examples will not be cited.**

4. **He uses pejorative language regarding the fieldworkers’ chosen profession, for instance**
   *Hát bö- böl- hát két diplomája van. Bölcs is, meg ész is.* ‘Untranslatable linguistic mocking of the Hungarian expression *bölcsész diploma* ‘degree in the humanities’, as if such a degree were two degrees, one in *wisdom* and the other in *mind*. (A163.2. 197)

5. **Attacks on women, for instance**
   a) … és ez a maga korosztálya a legundorítóbb. ‘… and your [V form] age cohort is the most despicable.’ (A163e 489)
   b) *nem pici lány, mán tudja, hogy milyenek a nők.* ‘You’re not a little girl, you know what women are like.’ (A163.1. 91)
   c) *Hány gyerököt vitt má<r> a bölcsödébe?* ‘How many children have you ever taken to the kindergarten?’ (A163e 227)

6. **Teaching a lesson**
   *Úgyhogy nagyon szépen megkéröm, hogy le- legyen szíves bemutatni majd a diplomá- ját.* ‘So I ask you to please show me your university degree.’ (A163e 1005)

7. **Patronizing vocatives**
   *Tündérkém* ‘sweety’ (A 163.1. 919, A163.2. 405), *pici baba* ‘little babe’ (A163.3. 420), *édös lelköm* ‘my li’l sweetheart’ (A163.2. 417)

8. **Role-shift: respondent takes upon himself the role of interviewer**
   *De én a gyerökkorát, most én is visszakérődőzik a gyerökkorára, hogy …* ‘But your childhood, now I’m gonna ask you back about your childhood…’ (A163e 324)

**8. Speaking time**

The hierarchical relationship between the respondent and his two interlocutors is also shown by their speaking times in Table 4. This table also demonstrates that the respondent used more time vis-à-vis his standard (*e*-speaking) interviewer than with his local (*ö*-speaking) one.

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5 *A163* is the code for the respondent. When this is followed by an *e*, this shows that the fieldworker is an *e*-speaker. *A163* without an *e* indicates an *ö*-speaking fieldworker in the interview. The final digits in parentheses indicate the location of the segment in the ELAN transcript.
Table 4: Speaking times in the two interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fieldworker’s dialect</th>
<th>Minutes</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fieldworker</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e (standard)</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ò (local)</td>
<td>109.6</td>
<td>252.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. What has and what has not had an effect on the respondent’s use of [ò]?

Now that we’ve seen the quantitative data on the use of [ò], the profile of our respondent, and the hierarchical relationship between the respondent vis-à-vis the fieldworkers, we will look at which factors did, and which did not, have an effect on the use of [ò] in the two interviews. Table 5 demonstrates the factors which did or did not have an effect on the use of [ò].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Their effect on the use of [ò]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fieldworker’s use of [ò]</td>
<td>+ (negative effect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of the interview</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress of time in the interview</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topics</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional loading</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent’s identity</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent’s linguistic identity</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent’s view of his own social position</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent’s self-assigned social position</td>
<td>+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vis-à-vis his interlocutor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male vs. female hierarchy as seen by the respondent</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Which factors have an effect on the use of [ò] in the two interviews?

This case study has thus demonstrated that the use of the salient dialect feature [ò] by our respondent was not influenced by the fact that the two fieldworkers spoke different varieties, nor was it influenced by his audiomonitoring, the topics in the interviews or the variation in emotional loading. On the other hand, the respondent’s local peasant identity and his extremely positive attitudes to the local speechways have been shown to be important influences. Most important of all the factors, however, is the social hierarchical relationship assigned by him to himself vis-à-vis the two fieldworkers. This effect is enhanced by his self-assigned male vs. female hierarchy. In the interviews the respondent does his best to take the position he believes he deserves: he positions himself so much higher than the fieldworkers that he shows no sign of behaving according to the fieldworkers’ implicit or explicit expectations. There is no trace of linguistic accommodation in his speech.
10. Conclusion

As Tagliamonte (2016: 93‒99) states in a recent review of fifty years of variationist sociolinguistics, interviewing techniques which had been successful in one location did not work well in other places. “Even though Peter Trudgill interviewed a broad range of people in Norwich, the Danger of Death question got him nowhere” (p. 96). She notes that “The interviewer him or herself can have a major impact on the nature of the data in any interview situation” (p. 97) and goes as far as saying that the fieldworker is the prime variable. In this paper we hope to have contributed to this discussion.

Our case study has demonstrated that there exists a kind of sociolinguistic interview in which the respondent’s linguistic behavior cannot be explained by a number of traditional explanations: Labov’s audiomonitoring, Bell’s audience design, the progress of time in the interview or the building up of trust between the interlocutors. However, an interactional view of communication provides adequate means to interpret the data. Our two interviews show that the fieldworkers’ language use has no direct effect on that of the respondent. The fieldworkers’ personae, however, do have indirect effects in as much as the respondent places himself vis-à-vis the fieldworkers on a social hierarchy axis in the interview and in society in general. Thus the fieldworker’s effect is not triggered by their speech behavior/style, but by the respondent’s positioning himself vis-à-vis the fieldworker on a social hierarchy axis. This same explanation can also hold for a mirror image of the social hierarchy: a Hungarian schoolboy positioned himself below the fieldworker (a teacher), and radically changed his opinion on a linguistic issue, adopting the views of the fieldworker in the second half of the interview (Szabó 2013).

Our general conclusion is that some sociolinguistic interviews may yield data which can only be meaningfully interpreted by (1) constructing a profile of the persona of the respondent, (2) of the persona of the fieldworker, and (3) by defining their position vis-à-vis each other on a social hierarchy axis by means of analyzing explicit linguistic features. This case study poses the perplexing question: What kind of linguistic data would be provided by the same respondent if he were interviewed by a fieldworker he places above himself, or by one he regards as an equal?

As regards our Szeged project, we have learned that the indirect effect of our fieldworker’s persona (who uses ö speech categorically with all respondents) on the speech behavior of a respondent can neither be predicted, nor excluded. The methodological lesson we have learned is that we must attach interlocutor profiles to each of our interviews.

References


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Abstract

The present paper gives an overview of the linguistic situation in Central Europe. The investigation focuses on the features of language, in particular on the social, cultural and political power factors of the languages used in the region, and the relations between them. The linguistic situation is described in two historical periods: one is the Soviet colonial era between 1945 and 1990, the other one is the postcolonial period after 1990. The historical developments have had an elemental effect on the communication and linguistic systems of the region. The Soviet colonial rule introduced a hierarchical and centralized communication system with strict communist party control of ideology, ways of thinking and ways of talk, apparent everywhere from public opinion to the private sphere. Censorship was a powerful tool in the region. In 1990 the situation turned into its polar opposite in most cases. A heterarchical, decentralized communication system was built, with freedom of speech and human rights in general in focus. This radical change resulted in linguistic plurality, the acknowledgment of and reflections on variability in language, its functions for adequate conceptual construal, linguistic expression, individual and group identity.¹

Keywords: colonialism, Central Europe, communication system, heterarchy, hierarchy, language community, postcolonialism

1. Central Europe has had a special history during the 20th century. The future of the region was basically determined by the Paris peace treaties that followed World War I, with partly artificial borders that forced masses to flee to other countries, during and after World War II, too. In 1945 the whole region was occupied by the Soviet army and was placed under Soviet colonial rule, which ended in 1990. The countries and societies of the region were forced to introduce the Soviet communist system in every domain of life, controlled by the Soviet and the local communist parties. In 1990 Central Europe was freed from the Soviet occupation, and a postcolonial period began in its history. Ever since this historical turn, the region has had a double face. On the one hand, modernization has been performed in a very fast, determined and effective fashion, bringing radical changes again in all aspects of life. On the other hand, the cultural and socialization schemas of the previous era still live on and influence the ways of life in the region.

The historical developments have had an elemental effect on the communication and linguistic systems of the region. The Soviet colonial rule introduced a hierarchical and centralized communication system with strict communist party control of ideology, ways of thinking and ways of talk, apparent everywhere from public opinion to the private sphere.

¹ The paper includes sections taken over, partly in an abridged form, from Tolcsvai Nagy (in press).
Censorship was a powerful tool in the region. In 1990 the situation turned into its polar opposite in most cases. A heterarchical, decentralized communication system (see Luhmann 1998) was built, with freedom of speech and human rights in general in focus. This radical change resulted in linguistic plurality, the acknowledgment of and reflections on variability in language, its functions for adequate conceptual construal, linguistic expression, individual and group identity and the like. In this process the view of language as a simple tool to be used for control turned into one of language as the human capacity for joint actions and comprehension, with creativity and innovation related to conventions.

Central Europe is defined in the present paper as the region coextensive with the prevailing geographical, linguistic and state territories of Poland, the former East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the present Czech Republic and Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, and Slovenia (cf. Szűcs 1983, Szűcs–Hanák 1986, Kosáry 2003). In this sense, Central Europe is a region, formed by cultural cumulation, that is, through the rational, intelligible economic, political, cultural and communicative activities of communities, with communicative and cultural activities showing identical or similar features for prolonged periods (they are added and become conventionalized), and differing significantly from the communicative and cultural activities of the communities of neighbouring regions (from a general perspective, see Bassand and Hainard 1985, Lipp Hrsg. 1984, Győri-Szabó 2006).

2. The present study interprets the linguistic situation of Central Europe from 1945 to the millennium, with the help of the basic categories of colonialism and postcolonialism. The occupation of the region by the Soviet Union that lasted forty-five years was colonization, with specific features. These features are partly the same as those of the relations between the Western European states and their Asian and African colonies, and partly different. As a consequence, the linguistic aspects of colonialism and postcolonialism in Central Europe can be described with the canonical categories only in part; here the categories of the generalizations of the specific circumstances are used too. The present description has an essentially historical and linguistic perspective, not a political one. It is not a critical approach, it is a description written with objectivity in view with a perspective of a functional, usage-based approach to language.

The basic features of Soviet colonialism in Central Europe are as follows (see Courtois et al. 1999, Romsics 2013).

A main feature is the control and leadership of the political, military, secret service, economic and cultural life either directly or indirectly by country leaders nominated and confirmed by the Soviet communist party, both on the highest and other important levels. On the other hand, Central European countries did not form a part of the Soviet Union in the sense of constitutional law, the head of the Soviet state or the communist party was not the head of the state or the communist party, say, in Czechoslovakia or Poland.

The society was (or was expected to be) transformed totally in line with the communist ideology. However, the occupiers did not become a large and formative part of the societies of the countries in question. They lived instead in closed communities and barracks (mostly because Soviet paranoia expected imagined enemies everywhere), they did not join forcibly the elites of the countries. Nevertheless, a new elite was created in the countries of Central Europe, along with the elimination of the earlier one (by forced emigration and exile, deportation within the country, forced declassing, having to hide one’s social background, or execution following a show trial), directly from communists and working class people, or by the approval of ‘converted’ individuals and sympathizers.
The total control of society, transformation of thinking and world knowledge, and the brainwashing of individuals, according to the ‘correct’ ideas was another fundamental goal of this colonization. The process of the transformation and total control of social structure and thinking was completed with an awareness of the supremacy of the Soviet colonizers and their local servants. This supremacy was presented as an ideological and moral status (see the self-evaluation of the communists: a communist is a “vanguard”, “made of special material”). The drive for the colonization was not a mission for civilization, it was only a mere ideological commitment, the idea of the world revolution of the proletariat.

At the same time, the Us vs. Them relation was clearly present, with specific characteristics. No general inferiority complex became widespread as a reaction towards the colonizers. The societies of the occupied countries felt suppressed by the Soviet invaders and their local communist allies, after some years of early support mainly by working class groups and leftist intellectuals. Nevertheless, Western ideological and cultural patterns were alive, though hidden.

Also, it was a striking difference between Western colonization in Asia and Africa and Soviet colonization in Central Europe that there were no basic ethnic and traditional cultural differences between the Soviet occupiers and the suppressed nations.

Postcolonialism – in its widely shared interpretation – developed as a critical academic study of specific political and cultural circumstances in countries and regions colonized earlier by Western powers, freed from this state some time after World War II, and suffering from the aftermath of the previous era (cf. Said 1975, Bhabha 1990, Spivak 1990, 1999). In the present study, postcolonialism is a basically non-critical term used for the objective naming of the historical situation with a process-like character: Central Europe has existed in the postcolonial state for twenty-five years after being freed from the Soviet occupation and the communist rule in 1990.

After 1990 the military occupation of the region came to an end. The countries became independent of the Soviet party, the direct and indirect Soviet control stopped.

The communist elite ceased to exist, it partly transformed and adjusted itself to the new conditions. New elites arose. One is the economic elite, based on primary capital accumulation, in a relatively short period of ‘wild capitalism’, usually without much intellectual background, coming from various social groups. Another one is the cultural elite, combining the remnants of the historical middle classes and intelligentsia, the non-Stalinist moderate leftists, and the liberal, conservative and nationalist groups that emerged recently.

The social structure changed slowly into a network, with different parts of it guided by diverse ideologies and values. The socialization patterns of the periods before 1945 or 1990 seem to be active as well as the Western European ones at the millennium.

Because no elite or population of the colonizers stayed in the earlier colonies after 1990 (in Central Europe, unlike in the Baltic states), the societies as complete units consider themselves freed from the Soviet rule. On the other hand, certain groups still feel the need to adjust themselves to external power centres at the state and social levels, while other groups take national independence as the default case, the starting point that was achieved with struggles and must be preserved, in cultural and linguistic respects, too.

The Us vs. Them relation of the colonial age almost disappeared. Instead, a fresh one became important in the region, the comprehension and application of Western patterns and schemas, including successes and frustrations.

The knowledge about language as well as language use shows postcolonial markers, at the level of community, group and the individual as well: language became part of the
ideological and power struggles, while the proliferation of language variants in public communication may cause uncertainty.

It can be stated that the situation in Central Europe at the millennium is postcolonial. Postcolonial – due to the backwardness originating in the forty-five years of colonial suppression and imposing a heavy socio-psychological burden on the region. Democracy, freedom and the responsibility for actions and creativity were introduced very fast, in a top-down manner, not allowing enough time for the processes of internalization.

3. Central Europe as a region as defined above was put under Soviet political, military and economic rule in 1945. The Soviet Union introduced the total communist (Bolshevik) dictatorship in the occupied Central European countries. This situation had its consequences and developments in everyday life and culture, in linguistic communication and language policy as well.

One of the main factors in a community’s self-maintenance, autopoiesis and self-reflection is the native language or a variety of it. Language communities as well as speech communities take this as a natural, default setting, since a person is born into one such community, s/he acquires the language/variety of this community as her/his vernacular (or dialect, see Halliday 1968), s/he construes her/his utterances in this variety, closely related to her/his conceptualizing, cognitive operations. Language maps knowledge about the world that is based on experiences in a perspectivized way. Phenomena may be processed in various ways, thus, our knowledge about the world and its linguistic mappings have culture specific features in addition to universal cognitive and linguistic schemas.

Communication is essential for the communities’ maintenance and normal functioning, in all ages and settings. A community operates its long term linguistic norm system with minor modifications and innovations, in order to secure good results in its everyday activities. Violent changes in this communication system or changes preventing its functioning endanger the existence of a community in its foundations.

The destruction of the language and communication system yields the destruction of the community. One of the main factors of the colonial situation following 1945 was the coarse intervention, the significant change in the languages and communication systems in Central Europe. The basic outcomes of this process are as follows. Certainly, there were some differences between the states of the region, but the main ideological trends and political actions were controlled by the Soviet Union.

The military enclosure of the individual states by the Iron Curtain both physically and in a symbolic sense, particularly in the 1950s, blocked the societies in question almost hermetically from chances of natural everyday linguistic contacts and the reception of innovations.

One of the main goals was the homogenization of society, on the basis of the Marxist idea of the class society and the Stalinist notion of class war. With respect to language, this development, directed from above, from the communist party centre

- regarded the language of the majority as the one state or official language,
- neglected other languages of minority ethnic groups spoken in the given state,
- supported the standard version of the given state language, with a levelling ideal of education, also centrally controlled.

The general education programs run centrally by the party propagated the centrally defined cultural values, including linguistic knowledge and made them a conscious part of the popularized knowledge. Thus, censored knowledge was spread in a highly homogeneous way.
among people of different social statuses, while the cultural goods banned by the censors remained simply unknown to the majority.

The political and ideological intention to homogenize society was connected with overt or covert nationalism that was meant to be realized in linguistic homogenization, among other things. That was the case in those states like Romania and Czechoslovakia where large ethnic (national) minorities lived. The communist ideology, being international on the publicly presented surface, but nationalistic in practice and not asserted as such in public, manifested itself in the extreme discrimination of minority language use in all domains of communication and at all levels. Such domains were state politics, public administration, jurisdiction, media and public information, workplace communication (note that all firms were nationalized and headed by a local party secretary besides the director), education, healthcare, the army, and also spontaneous public communication (e.g. in the street, on public transport, in movies, theatres, and restaurants).

As a result of the homogenization efforts, people were forced to speak one variety of the state language, unified in its semantics and pragmatics: this meant that people had no choice but use the words related to social life with the meanings defined centrally, repeat the same clausal and idiomatic constructions used by the political leaders, not to deviate from the central ideological line, thus not risking punishment (whether formal or informal) for a joke or a critical note.

The centralizing language policy used censorship as a fundamental instrument (cf. Schöpflin 1983, Thom 1989, Bourdieu 1991). Censorship controlling the public is an evident effort to break the free spirit and to prevent the self-creation (self-maintenance) of the individual and the community. Moreover, it has further significant linguistic consequences. Censorship suppresses or calls off some of the main functions of language. One such function is mediation of the flow of information. Another one is conceptual innovation that depends partly on linguistic innovation. By the process of innovation people always reflect on the already known in one human domain, for the sake and in the hope of improvement. The suppression of linguistic innovation by censorship results in the suppression of creativity; prevention of the spreading of linguistic innovations obstructs the spreading of knowledge and leads to the material and intellectual damage of the community (state or society).

Censorship was directed primarily inwards, but also outwards, in relation to other states and countries. The central control and censorship defined those entities (e.g. books, newspapers, ideas and innovations, words, works of art) that were allowed to go across the border and those that were banned from coming in, and, on the other hand, what may go out even to the neighbouring ‘sister’ countries within the region. The censors and other party officials were fully aware of the fact that, for instance, a new loanword entails the learning of a new concept, the pretensions to possess new things, and considered such “western effects” harmful and dangerous to the political system.

Censorship in the countries of the region turned slowly and as a result of different measures into ‘self-censorship’. From a later period, mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, it was not necessary to supervise all public messages by the central party officials, because the reliable state officials and adherents of the political system did the controlling at every level.

Another result of the homogenization efforts was that the social, ethnic and linguistic distinctions became stiff and sharp bordered, based on emotional attributions and the asymmetric counterconcepts (cf. Koselleck 2004). The system of asymmetric counterconcepts is created between the representatives of communities, powers, and ideas that are at odds with each other or are distinguished from each other although they are in close contact. In this
dichotomous interpretation, the “we”, the home value community represent the positive pole, while the “they”, “those”, i.e. the aliens, represent the negative pole. One group may form an opinion about another one; this group may name and evaluate it. These opinions, evaluations, namings and addresses may imply the appreciation of the other, but, in contrast, they may be condemnatory, disdainful, too. “The simple use of “we” and “you” establishes a boundary and is in this respect a condition of possibility determining a capacity to act. But a “we” group can become a politically effective and active unity only through concepts which are more than just simple names of typifications. […] In the sense used here, a concept does not merely denote such an agency, it marks and creates the unity. The concept is not merely a sign for, but also a factor in, political or social groupings. […] An acting agency might, therefore, define itself as a polis, people, party, Stand, society, church, or state without preventing those excluded from the agency from conceiving of themselves in turn as a polis, people, and so on. Such general and concrete concepts can be used on an equal basis and can be founded upon mutuality. It is certainly true, however, that historical agencies tend to establish their singularity by means of general concepts, claiming them as their own. […] In such cases, a given group makes an exclusive claim to generality, applying a linguistically universal concept to itself alone and rejecting all comparison. This kind of self-definition provokes counterconcepts which discriminate against those who have been defined as the “other”” (Koselleck 2004: 155–156).

The system of asymmetric counterconcepts developed totally during the 1950s throughout the whole Central European region, based on earlier collective conceptualizations, mainly by folk attributions. The process was helped by the formal and informal actions and communication of the local ruling communist party. That was both the result of earlier and the origin of later hostilities between the ruling social strata and the rest of society, or between the majority population speaking the state language and the ethnic and linguistic minorities.

The linguistic homogenization efforts between 1945 and 1990 deprived the ethnic and linguistic minorities of using their native languages in public administration, jurisdiction, education and healthcare in many countries in the region (mainly in Czechoslovakia, Romania, partly in Yugoslavia, and certainly in the Soviet Union). The formal or informal hindrances to prevent minority native language use in public were everyday practice. Linguistic and social homogenization was part of the larger process aimed at the elimination of smaller local communities, regardless of ethnic origin. This process was supported by the argument of the extension of the presumed equality, although the main reason for this was the more effective ideological control of social groups. Private associations of any kind were banned or reorganized under strict political control. The elimination of local communities resulted in the weakening of language varieties, again helping the destruction of local communication networks and the disturbance of the traditional ways of conceptualization and construal.

The homogenization process hinders the useful bilingualism of the minorities, i.e. the fluent, functional working of everyday communication in a bilingual environment. Since the representatives of the communist homogenization do not want to accept the minorities’ right to have their mother tongue, they interpret proficiency in the state language and its use by minorities as a legal question and a demonstration of accepting the general rules of the society as a whole. Within the complex frame of the international communist ideology and state nationalism, minorities are expected to learn and use the state language, meanwhile its acquisition and modest use was (and is in many cases even today) not ensured. This discriminating situation of the minorities elicits, through its socio-psychological consequences,
resistance to the compulsory learning of the majority state language. Also, the absolutization 
of the majority state language narrows the prestige domains: the prestige of the minority 
languages becomes low. Practical existential opportunities become less accessible, too: 
school education and authentic knowledge acquisition, profession and job opportunities are 
all tied to knowledge of the state language, while these existential goals are increasingly 
difficult to reach.

One basic feature of the colonial situation is the manipulation of long term concepts 
maintained by communities and cultures. The ruling party in each Central European country 
centrally controlled the ideologically fundamental concepts as part of the practice run by the 
communist dictatorship. One manifestation of this control was the abandonment of 
long-standing concepts and the introduction of new ones with newly coined or reinterpreted 
words and expressions. Language had a basic role in this development.

To take one transparent example, when the concept and word *mayor* was simply banned 
in the countries in question, and the expression *president of the council* introduced instead, 
seemingly a plain change happened (see the entries e.g. in Juhász et al. 1972, or Schubert– 
Hellmann 1968). Actually, the political power completed a highly complex change. As a part 
of it, the concept of *mayor* was eliminated, that is, the notion, the conceptual domain accord- 
ging to which a settlement as a community elects its leader in a democratic process from 
among contesting candidates based on a knowledge of these candidates; the winner carries 
out her/his program autonomously with the endorsement of the municipal representatives 
forming the municipal board. Instead of this conceptual and semantic frame, the new expres- 
sion, *president of the council* is the component of a frame or the label for the creation of a 
frame whereby the leader of a settlement is singled out by the only political organization, the 
communist party, no other candidates are to be nominated freely, and the leader voted under 
pressure this way executes the instructions that come from above, from the party centre, the 
ministries and the upper levels of the public administration. The council, i.e. the local unit 
of public administration is the managing board of the settlement, with members nominated 
by the single party, a political and administrative unit in the dependency hierarchy totally 
controlled from above. Thus, the change in linguistic naming mapped and prescribed the 
corresponding political and social change and its newly created and settled content. Children 
learned already this new concept and the expression denoting it, while they did not know 
about the former one, the change and the opposition.

The main domain of communication and medium for the manipulation of concepts and 
words expressing them were public administration, the party units, the workplace, education, 
commerce, propaganda and adult education, always organized from above, by the central 
authorities. Among the important thematic domains one finds politics, social structure, pub- 
lic administration, official human contacts, community and social life and customs (e.g. the 
system of addressing), and religion. Partly as the result of these developments, generations 
grew up between 1945 and 1990 in Central Europe without any knowledge of religious con- 
cepts, for instance.

The manipulation outlined here is based on the cognitive principle that the meanings of 
linguistic expressions form a system of encyclopaedic concepts based on experience closely 
related to world knowledge (see Chapter 3.1.). The linguistic system and its use in this sense 
are extremely large for the individual and the community, although limited qualitatively for 
memory and mental reasons. The individuals’ and the communities’ knowledge about the 
world may be formed by education and propaganda, i.e. by manipulation: certain concepts 
and words may be banned or stigmatized, mostly in dictatorships, forcing populations to
change their worldviews. Without linguistic expressions even the entities do not exist, or entities denoted by stigmatized words become taboo, being unutterable. Thus, concepts qualified as non-existent or taboo cannot be discussed; this results in the severe restriction of freedom and human creativity.

It is particularly interesting from a sociolinguistic perspective that the linguistic bases of the conceptual and linguistic manipulation in the region were almost exclusively the standard variety. The reasons for this are manifold. The standard variety provided the necessary level of linguistic unity throughout the whole state territory for the mediation of the ideological contents in every social and linguistic group and the desired efficiency of the propaganda, albeit not all native speakers were familiar with the standard varieties of the language in the region. At the same time, this role of the standard eroded its own social status and prestige, since it became increasingly evident that the manipulative publications came from the centres, and the overt lies were all formed on the standard regarded as the perfect variety.

The linguistic manipulation, the intentional and artificial changes in the coherent world knowledge were completed with the contribution of other factors. This development was sustained by the centrally forced industrialization and urbanization. Masses were compelled to move to towns, e.g. fleeing from the forced founding of co-operative farms, the arbitrary compelling of independent farmers into them, or because they were hounded for their social, primarily middle class origin. The persecuted social groups were forced into anonymity: they hid themselves by linguistic, behavioral and clothing ways, mingled with the grey and ever growing poorer urban crowd. Cultural levelling up caused the overshadowing of many language varieties, mainly a colloquial standard of the middle classes and the rural dialectal vernaculars, often manifested in the open stigmatization of these varieties. Individual and community identification by linguistic and behavioral expression was not possible, and, according to the central party ideology, it was not even necessary, since the linguistic mapping of the communist ideology controlling all domains of everyday life was completed in one uniform way, and deviations from this line counted as ideological deviation and were, thus, condemned. On the other hand, the homogenization intention and the notion of social equality demanded linguistic homogeneity, for the party ideology.

4. The region of Central Europe became free from the Soviet colonial rule in 1990. The establishment of liberal societies (of the Western European and American type) has been completed gradually, through different methods, under the circumstances of postcolonialism (see Ekiert and Hanson 2003, Romsics 2013, Valuch 2015).

The change of regime in 1990 left language in general and the languages spoken in the region, and even the communities using these languages and their relation to these languages, largely untouched. Still, the fundamental political and social transformation radically modified the relation to language, even if the subject and the predicate have been agreed in the same conventional grammatical structures in the Czech, Romanian, and Hungarian languages, for instance. It is just that point where the inherent togetherness of the language system and the linguistic functions, the diverse schemas of usage present themselves – not only in practice, but as a consequence, in the description, too.

One main reason for the change in the relation to language was the introduction of freedom for speech and human rights in general. These rights were enacted in the countries of the region immediately in 1990 with prompt and substantial effects, i.e. every citizen could make the best of this opportunity, and many of them did, of course.
The overall introduction of human rights has had liberating consequences in every respect. Free talk and free language use became a basic condition of communication in public and private scenes as well.

A lively, open and discussing discursive order was being formed, or more precisely: the basic political and legal conditions were provided for this discursive culture. The historical and cultural dispositions of the populations living in the period as participants in the historical moment made the absolute success possible only to a restricted extent, since the circumstances of the given situation and the dispositions of the participants affected the realization. Nevertheless, the possibility of open and effective participation in the affairs of the community became part of the conscious and intuitive knowledge of people gradually. Still, there are people who fear the consequences of their public statements, and others would use censorship in certain situations. These are, at least partly, the social psychological remnants of the communist era.

The radical change in 1990 was a historical moment for the creation of democracy in the region. One of the main events and fundamental experiences of this development was the cathartic moment of declaring truth: truth can be stated, language has regained its human and moral content, i.e. the warranty of its functioning. And this could be experienced by all those present and participating actively or passively in the historical process.

In what follows, the restructured communication systems of Central European countries, with the general features in focus of the postcolonial situation will be discussed in more detail. Other domains, like (i) the level of linguistic performance, the affinity toward or the lack of linguistic and conceptual creativity, (ii) the uses and effects of e-communication, (iii) the role of rhetoric in public communication, (iv) language ideologies in the cultural and political domains, and (v) external linguistic and cultural contacts, orientation towards prestige centres, are detailed in Tolcsvai Nagy (in press). All these domains show heavy postcolonial effects in all Central European countries.

5. The communication systems of societies and states show typical historical instantiations (cf. Luhmann 1998: 312ff). One basic type is the hierarchic communication order. This system is centralized, with control and influence being directed from top to bottom, and the information sent from the centre usually spreading successfully through to the destination, the audience which it is aimed at.

Another one is the heterarchic communication order. This system is shared, decentralized, has a network structure, and the contacts hinge upon the spatial–temporal conditions of the situation.

The geographical diversity of printing, and the complexity of the contents pushed centralized communication systems towards heterarchy, mainly in modern times. Still, at the same time, the continuous development of message forwarding resulted in the opposite trend of integration. The communities, or in a wider realization, the societies created and spread the public nature of discourse, i.e. the widespread and simultaneous learning and discussion of new information. Thus, communication is detached from its direct spatial conditions and becomes a dynamic acting system maintaining much of the developments in social life. The simultaneity of current knowledge of events and affairs in a community, in a society formed what we know as public opinion.

The modernized European society and language community in the twenty-first century is a community built as a network of speech communities and individuals in a dynamic,
self-creating, i.e. autopoietic and self-reflexive style (cf. Luhmann 1998, from another perspective see Jackson ed. 2014).

The network structure can be pointed out in an earlier traditional community type, too. The essence of societies and language communities at the millennium is the relatively balanced but continuously evolving inner structuring and external contacts, less present in historically earlier societies or just taking other shapes.

The inner structure of a network style communication system is based on

(i) the existence of numerous elements, speech communities and individuals in particular,
(ii) the interplay or interaction of these elements, and
(iii) the dynamic, discursive social semantics (more widely, construal through language use in varieties) and pluralistic public opinion.

The speech community is a community that is structured by frequent linguistic intercourse between members. That frequency of use causes the joint forming and use of similar or identical linguistic structures, including semantic interpretations and linguistic and conceptual perspectivization and categorization of the mental contents in focus (Gumperz 1968). The family, friends, the inhabitants of the village, the local part of town, the kindergarten and school (school class), the members of a profession, a workplace, a hobby group, the congregation, etc. all form speech communities, because their everyday communication results in joint registers within the complete language system including usage.

Individuals are members of various speech communities, firstly that of the family, obviously. During the process of socialization, the individual joins other speech communities and learns their varieties, while s/he adds her/his own specific linguistic features if accepted. It is the general competence of humans that they can adjust themselves to another community with enculturation processes when joining it, and also, they can add to the norm system of that community. In the current situations, the relations are much more complex and the variability of the registers used by an individual is greater.

The network system of a language community functions as a dynamic and open structure. This system is self-creative (autopoietic) in the sense that it changes continuously: new contacts evolve, new speech communities arise from one day to the other. These dynamics and this openness are also initiated and supported by electronic communication. People form communities just by occasional meetings or through the internet, agree on how to define and create the language variant and meaning they use, using ways of communication and joint actions impossible ten or fifteen years ago.

It is well known that a wider system of discourses functions upon the network system characterized above. This system of discourses has a cultural basis. Discourse in this sense is a cultural activity in a community, whereby the participants focus on and talk about a certain topic (or related topics), even through historical periods (see Foucault 1971). Discourses are, for instance, on abortion, capital punishment, metaphor, environmental protection, in Central Europe on the legal responsibility and legal prosecution of communist leaders, etc. Convergent and divergent views are confronted within a discourse, although the discourse order determines – as Foucault points out –, by the leading personalities of the discourse, the topic(s), the ideologies and views, the language (style) used for those who intend to participate in a discourse. The discourses in this sense form larger intellectual networks.
5.1. These general characteristics have some particular postcolonial specification in Central Europe.

One of the first political decisions completed by the communists in Central Europe after 1945 was to put social and state communication under strict central ideological supervision. The measure of this totality altered in the countries and also in certain periods, still, the party control remained in service until 1990 in the whole region. This control was, for instance, extremely severe during the 1950s in the whole region, looser in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, in the 1980s in Hungary, and much stricter in the DDR and Romania than in Poland or Hungary during the last two decades.

This hierarchic communication system was changed formally to a modernized heterarchic one within a strikingly short period of one month, in 1990.

One basic change was the transformation of public discourse. The instinctive distrust felt when talking to strangers or principals faded in general, at least with respect to the commitment to the central ideology required earlier throughout society. Certainly, many social and institutional dependencies kept on functioning. In any case, the legal and structural conditions of the overall system took a shape that was unlike the previous one:

- any kind of communication from diverse sources, including that of the state and public administration became subject to independent control and discussion,
- any communication of local scope (e.g. information and statements by and in settlements and districts, bureaus, firms and other workplaces, schools, institutions) was rendered independent from the direct control and practice of the central government organizations and other (e.g. political party) headquarters,
- informal talk among family members, friends, colleagues and acquaintances was freed from the fear of informing (i.e. report on the subjects’ views and acts by spies), organized and maintained by the secret police until the last minute of the collapsing regime, and also from its constraining power on linguistic expression.

The Central European countries needed much more time for the transition of the social structure than for the changes in politics and economy. Within this historical process, the new rights and forms of communication affected generations and social groups in different ways. Although it seems a matter of fact that younger generations adopt innovations more easily and faster than the older ones, it should be stressed that people socialized during the years of the communist rule, i.e. the older generations in 1990, could cope with the new ways of thinking and acting more slowly and with only more mental efforts than their counterparts in Western Europe. Mental and social flexibility played a great role here. The general change into effective and expedient ways of talk was also quick and hard to cope with for many social groups.

This drawback comes from the retarded and then sudden and quick process of modernization that occurred during a four decade period before 1990 in Western Europe. Since the transition period was too short and the nature of the outcome itself at the end of the transition was totally in opposition to the social and communications patterns people got used to, the adjustment proved to be hard for the middle generations and the elderly.

Also, it generated tensions between the young and the older generations. The gap that emerged quite quickly in the linguistic forms and content of politeness show clearly the radical change, comprehended only with difficulties, even with total disapproval, completed
with higher intensity than in Western Europe. Knowledge of linguistic behaviour and of
varieties of politeness usual in Western European culture was very low, proficiency in Ger-
man, French or English too, so when the cultural barriers ceased to be, influential forms and
behaviours were introduced in intercultural contacts, though in translations, i.e. in interpret-
ed and adjusted ways.

This general – but not tragic – opposition was amplified by electronic communication,
learnt by the young quickly and with pleasure, while many people followed developments of
the computer and internet suspiciously – almost everyone was banned from computers (and
copy machines) in Central Europe until 1990 for censorship reasons.

The general features of communication changed in every important domain: private
conversation, public talk, institutional and office interaction. It was the main trend that lin-
guistic communication became fast, concentrated, economic, expedient, adequate for the
situation and the goal of the speaker, intended to be effective. Great variability and creativ-
ity in this complex world of actions also started to have functions. This course was complet-
ed in sharp contrast to the ways of talking, public and official in particular, characteristic of
the communication system before 1990. This latter was pursued under the pressure of the
compulsory ideology and censorship of the communist era, in order to avoid falling under
the suspicion of acting against the “working class power”. But this kind of talk, having fea-
tures like euphemism, circumlocution, impersonality, and the desemantization of political
clichês, tried to diminish and hide responsibility, at least at the level of linguistic expression.

5.2. Another fundamental factor of the historical change was the development of speech
communities, individual and group networks.

The communication system was interpreted by social and ideological terms during the
forty-five years before 1990. This means that, on the one hand, the tripartite idealized social
stratification was imposed upon the communication system, with a generalized hierarchy of
the settlement structure of the countries: the capital, towns, and villages. On the other hand,
in a strictly close relation to the condition mentioned above, the centralized state communi-
cation always profiled and emphasized the ideological background of the messages, connect-
ed to the social status of the addressees.

This imagined but ideologically supported world changed into a network system of com-
munication in Central Europe that is shaped by dynamic changes, and the basic factor in the
nature of the network is that it became open and self-creative. In this respect communication
systems in Central European countries have developed similarly to those in the Western
world – with, however, some postcolonial with features, too.

The prototypical communication system (as one per country or language community) of
the region is open, compared to the earlier periods. It is open because it is not bounded, and it is open

(i) to new interlocutors,
(ii) to new speech communities or new forms of communication communities to re-
ceive them as organic units created by members of the system,
(iii) for new ways of linguistic communication, for the construal of new linguistic struc-
tures and the re-interpretation of existing ones,
(iii) for self-reflection, self-interpretation.
The prototypical communication system is self-creative, because

(i) in its ways of functioning it is not controlled from external political or ideological power sources,
(ii) the dynamics of its inner development is directed by its own regularities, formed by the participants themselves,
(iii) it evolves by continuous innovations in communication methods, ways of talk, types of interpersonal and intersubjective contacts.

The communication system run before 1990 was grounded in a static, one-way hierarchical communication model, whereby the active speaker sends her/his message to the passive hearer. The latter has to comprehend the content of the message as it was meant by the speaker, since this message can be interpreted only in the same way.

After 1990, a radically different view of communication was gradually introduced. This communication system is based on the tripartite schema of joint attention focusing and meaning construction (see Tomasello 1999, Tátrai 2011). This kind of communication dominates linguistic interactions to an increasing extent in the region. This means that speaker and hearer (both interpreted as roles at a given moment) participate actively in the course of talking. The speaker directs her/his own attention at something which s/he expresses by the construal of meaningful linguistic structures that directs the hearer’s attention to the same entity, and s/he makes an effort to comprehend what the speaker construed and said. They join in understanding the discourse uttered by the speaker in a given situation. The speaker initializes the interaction, but they go through it together, in joint actions.

This way of communication is a relatively balanced one with respect to the interlocutors: as a principle that was moulded first in practice and makes communication an adequate factor in communities preferring participation.

Certainly, the communication system characterized above is still being developed, with varieties in the region. It is not introduced as a ready-made way of talk by licence, but something that is gradually elaborated in practice and reflection.

Also, the network of cultural discourses (in Foucault’s sense) was transformed. During the colonial rule, discourses were constrained in number, themes and spreading, and directed from the party centre as efficiently as possible. After 1990, discourses started to develop freely in all respects. However, as a postcolonial feature, the order of these discourses, i.e. the inner control of the topics, the participants and the variety used prove to be stricter, more centralized with signs of intolerance in many cases, compared to the Western practice. This feature, partly an element of the heritage from the dictatorial socialization, has clear linguistic mappings, for instance, in the strong stigmatization of words, expressions, and as a consequence concepts from all sides of the participants, in the high frequency of superficial and simplified argumentation and manipulation, or in the sheer rhetoric aim of direct effect and stylistic vulgarity.

Some of the observable and identifiable factors are analysed briefly below. These are as follows: new types of speech communities as a result of the self-creative nature of the communication system, the re-interpretation of traditional varieties (local dialects and standard, their acceptance and stigmatization), the new system of community semantics.

5.3. The transformation of the communication system in the Central European region took place not as a development by a given schema, whereby the participants have a clear knowledge of where and how to go. Instead, speakers find their ways in joint experiences and de-
cisions, during real time linguistic interactions. This did not mean that the interlocutors adjusted themselves to preconditions or newly given principles, but they re-formed some features of the discourse space and the interlocutors, i.e. themselves, too.

For a long time in European modernity, there were some prototypical social and cultural groups that belonged to basic types of language varieties, i.e. those who spoke regional or local dialects and those who spoke the standard. In the Central European region these two types dominated the linguistic communication system (and its scientific description) during the 19th and the first half of the 20th century. As a result of the lower level of urbanization and the high proportion of the population living in villages (in traditional village communities) and working in agriculture, the role of local dialects was more important in the region than urban dialects, as compared to Western Europe. Certainly, there were and are divergences from this average, e.g. the Czech territories had a higher level of urbanization than others (Poland, Hungary or Romania). The German settlements in Transylvania, and northern parts of the historical Hungary lived in closed towns for centuries, and used traditional dialects that slowly diverged from the German originals and the German standard.

In general, the two basic speech community types dominated most of the Central European region until the millennium, although in a gradually weakening and changing fashion. At least one-third evolved and joined the two, transforming the social and cultural background of language.

One basic type is the peasant speech community. Rural people belong here, farm labourers, farmers, craftsmen. They live in villages, where all the members of the population are aborigines, they are acquainted with each other, usually speak the same dialect as their vernacular, supported by their everyday talk, and have similar cultural customs. Important factors are as follows:

- the cumulative culture of these communities is based on traditions, i.e. the replicative, repetitive nature of the schemas, including linguistic ones, when participating in interactions; this means, among other things, that the linguistic markers of local dialects are maintained despite growing influences from other language varieties,
- the individual belongs basically to one social group, also as a speech community, this group is the village; this is the social, linguistic and intellectual, emotional domain where the individual forms and experiences directly her/his identity, e.g. when s/he gets into contact with others whose identity rests also on the same cultural and linguistic knowledge,
- the individual of these communities usually has an awareness of the wider relations, with reflexive and self-reflexive knowledge on locality,
- the communities of this type have strong regional contacts (in the sense of local region), for instance by marriages, local fairs or markets, church, regional centres of commerce, public administration, health care (the latter ones rather since the 1950s or 1960s), while cultural and linguistic contacts with remote centres, the global national or even European communities are rare and loose.

Another basic speech community type is the one that speaks the standard or a variety close to the standard. Intellectuals, educated people, many of the urban citizens, also those who speak dialects close to the standard belong here. The populations of these groups come from all parts of a society and language community. Some of them have the standard as their vernacular, others have learned it at a certain stage of socialization, as an addition to the
knowledge of other varieties, primarily the vernacular (see e.g. Chambers 1995). Important factors include the following:

- the cumulative culture of these communities is based on the maintenance and improvement of the codified language variety, the standard, closely related to other domains of education; moderate innovations are accepted and supported; the standard is maintained independently of the geographical and cultural position of and other varieties known by the speakers,
- the maintenance and improvement of the standard takes place in a relatively dynamic network system, but partly also by an institutional (academic) network for codification,
- the standard variety is part of the elite culture, spoken by those who have the standard as their vernacular, also by many highly educated people and by most of the middle classes,
- the standard is usually not a specific variety of any geographical region, though its use is a significant feature of the communication in larger cities and cultural centres, the capitals,
- the communities and individuals speaking the standard have a high degree of awareness of this variety, as well as being self-aware, i.e. they define themselves and their linguistic and cultural environment deliberately.

A third basic speech community type evolved gradually in Central Europe. This development started in the 1960s, when teenagers and people in their twenties formed a generation that grew up after the WWII. These generations did not automatically believe in the communist ideal and ideology, saw the false directions in social life, and realized that language in public communication is badly manipulated. Since all direct reactions of this perception were impossible, indirect methods were employed, with vivid fantasy and innovative force. Among these methods were the extended use of irony, grotesque, slang and urban popular lexicon, vulgarity, not only in spontaneous conversation among teenagers, but in literature, films and the theatre, too. The official reaction was completely and rigorously refusing, albeit the process could not be stopped.

At the historical moment of the regime change, and in the decades that followed it, new generations developed a communication culture that accepted these relatively fresh ways of talk step by step. Around 1990 this process seemed to explode as this urban popular way of talk invaded the media, followed by commercial communication, interactions between strangers, and discourses on grave, even tragic topics, too.

The third prototypical group of communities and individuals is the one where people speak popular, i.e. urban folk varieties. This type has the following features:

- the cumulative culture of these communities is based on the radical transformation of traditions, i.e. it is innovative, non-replicative as much as possible; this means, among other things, that the linguistic markers of speakers are the new expressions, meaning structures, and ways of construal,
- the sources of linguistic creativity come from all kinds of varieties, including foreign languages, to construe adequate linguistic expressions for a given state of affairs at the moment of the interaction, and individual creativity and fantasy have a great role,
- the individual belongs basically to several social groups, also to speech communities, this is the individual’s personal social and communication network, the self-identity is given by the system of the vernacular and the other learned and created varieties,
- the innovative varieties are created and used in situations with momentary, local validity,
• language contacts, i.e. contacts with others who use language in the same innovative way, is based on personal mobility, migration, travel and electronic communication, irrespective of the interlocutor’s cultural and linguistic knowledge,
• these communities have become relatively independent of real spatial and temporal conditions through the use of the internet,
• the individual belonging to these communities usually has an awareness of the wider relations, with a reflexive and self-reflexive look at the universal factors of current language use.

5.4. Although the societies were transformed from above artificially after 1945 in the Central European region, and another non-organic but basically expected and approved change took place in and after 1990, the system of language varieties was modified in a slower way. The status of the standard variety and its relation to the other varieties has been a central issue for the societies and language communities in the region.

Generally speaking, the standard variety was adopted and adapted by the communist leaders. Most of them were of lower middle class or upper working class origin, speaking an urban dialect. In the countryside, in villages the local communist party secretary had the local dialect as his/her vernacular.

The standard, regarded as the perfect and comprehensible variant of the language for everyone, was used to mediate all information and propaganda. It was left out of the direct class war, the social and ideological, also cultural transformation of the society, concerning language’s formal (phonological, morphological and syntactic) norms. Nevertheless, the use of stigmatized non-standard forms by the new political elite showed a lack of education for most standard users, while these middle class groups were forced to hide their standard usage in many cases.

On the other hand, the codified variety could be used as a tool for social homogenization, at least indirectly. Interestingly and ironically enough, this trend met the intention of traditional academic linguistics, which declared the historical unification of language. In reality the unification of the language community was thought to end in one variety, the standard, as a teleological development on the long run. Although Marrism in the Soviet Union declared at the end of the 1940s that all social classes have their variety, this idea was soon dismissed by the party.

However, the standard variety was deprived of its social and cultural origins. In the cultural policy of the central political powers of the region, it was not any more the linguistic and cultural medium and result of the development of the middle classes and the nation, but the medium and mark of the rise of the working class. At the same time, middle class people and those aware of the cultural and historical role of the standard in the development of the language community and the nation, and also as the ideal, perfect completion of the national language, considered language, national language in particular, to be one of the domains where traditional universal and national values can be rescued from the destructive forces of the communist rule.

Nevertheless, the picture is yet more complex. The historical process is one of suppression, stigmatization and counteractions.

Traditional linguistics predicted the death of local dialects for inner, linguistic reasons, from the 1940s for three or four decades. As mentioned, those committed to the linguistic theoretical framework based on neo-grammatical and structural ideas were convinced that the general direction of historical language development will result in the unification of varieties within one language, for structural and cultural reasons. This idea caused, among
other things, the stigmatization of traditional local, i.e. rural dialects, along with the later developments of urban popular varieties. These varieties were declared unsuitable for the complex communication forms and conceptualization ways (i.e. ways of grammatically and stylistically adequate expression). This view of language showed parallels with the dominant political ideology and underpinned, though unintentionally, the political stigmatization of the peasantry and the middle classes. Also, forced social transformation from above as a method was supported indirectly through it.

Certainly, there were differences between the national traditions of linguistics in relation to the standard variety in the Central European region. While Hungarian linguistics was committed to the view of a secondary role of dialects, Czech linguists, the Prague School in particular, demonstrated the multifunctional nature of language mapped in varieties. And this prevalent view had nothing to do with contemporary ideas of formal theories, sociolinguistic and pragmatic investigations in international linguistics from the 1950s.

After 1990, the social status of the varieties changed strongly. The absolute value and role of the standard became undermined, even stigmatized in some cases, while others were re-habilitated, in the course of democratization and pluralization. For many speakers and linguists, the standard variety is treated as a source of linguistic suppression and stigmatization (linguicism), as a variant that is imposed artificially on the language community and society to maintain the power of the elite.

The functions of the traditional rural dialects and the recent urban dialects increased and their prestige rose. Also, a number of these varieties became a definite and overt factor in the formation and demonstration of the identity and identification of individuals and groups. Thus, the hierarchic system of language varieties with the standard in the centre and the dialects on the periphery turned into a heterarchic network system whereby the varieties are interpreted by their complex functions for the adequacy of their construal performance, their originality and identity power (see e.g. Kontra ed. 2003).

5.5. Every society, language community and state develops and maintains a kind of social semantics. This social semantics comprises the ways of seeing and construing things in language, the conventionalized meanings of linguistic expressions. Meaning construction is a crucial factor for community members to join in comprehending the world and the part of it they belong to.

Before 1990, social semantics was controlled and directed by the centre of the communist parties, and in the general questions, by the Soviet communist party. Meaning was taken as a rule about how to use a word or an expression, and this rule was given to the population as an a priori law, i.e. something that is beyond the user’s will and control, beyond discussion and critique. This kind of social semantics collapsed by the late 1980s.

After 1990, the social nature of meaning has changed. The realization that meaning as the semantic content of a linguistic expression is partially conventional but is always object to joint meaning construction, prevailed. In other words, interlocutors join in the comprehension of what the speaker said, they agree on the meaning of the discourse in dialogic processes in discussions.

As a consequence, dictionaries began to give meaning definitions in accordance with the everyday use, i.e. joint meaning construction. In contrast with the censored dictionary (see page 57–58), the 2003 new edition of the Hungarian academic dictionary gives realistic semantic accounts of certain concepts and their linguistic expressions of public administration (see Pusztai ed. 2003).
The present paper has given an overview of the linguistic situation in Central Europe, how the historical developments have influenced language, language use, community formation and individual action, and also, in the opposite direction, how language, communication and language communities have affected politics and ideology, after World War II, and more specifically after 1990 in Central Europe. The investigation focused on the features of language, in particular on the social, cultural and political power factors of the languages used in the region, and the relations between them.

The colonial and postcolonial situation in Central Europe resembles the situation in African and Asian (post)colonies, but also differs from it. During the years of the Soviet colonial rule, the states of Central Europe did not form a part of the Soviet Union in the legal sense, there was no Soviet (i.e. mainly Russian) elite settled in the region. Still, the cultural effect on communication and language was strong enough. A centralized hierarchic communication system was introduced with strict censorship, with control on social semantics, and meaning was defined in the ideological centre. Linguistic homogenization was a relevant goal; it resulted in the levelling of linguistic performance and creativity, with innovation fading, and free identification and reflection, self-reflection on language use and joint action being severely constrained.

In 1990 the situation turned into its opposite in most cases. A heterarchical, decentralized communication system was built, with freedom of speech and human rights in general in focus. The region has been subject to diverse cultural effects on communication and language, mainly from the Western world. These effects are manifested in various ways according to cultural and ideological differences. A decentralized heterarchical network communication system has been developed with general democratic control, whose basic features include dialogue, discussion about social semantics, and meaning (i.e. the content of utterances, primarily in public communication) not defined in one ideological centre. Linguistic heterogenization is the current practice with reflections: the radical change has resulted in the acknowledgment of and reflections on variability in language, its functions for adequate conceptual construal, linguistic expression, individual and group identity and the like. In this process the view of language as a simple tool to be used for control has been replaced by the interpretation of language as the human capacity for joint acts and comprehension, with creativity and innovation challenging conventions, whereby creativity and innovation are appreciated, free identification and reflection, self-reflection on language use and joint action are supported, certainly in varieties and with critical opposing views, too.

References


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Abstract

This paper offers a functional, more specifically social cognitive interpretation of apostrophe. Under the proposal, this figure of speech involves the special functioning of joint attention as a feature of linguistic activities (cf. Tomasello 2002, Sinha 2005, see also Tátrai 2011). At the same time, it is also a characteristic, even defining property of lyrical poetry (see Tátrai 2012). The proposal will be backed up by the study of lyrics produced by the Hungarian alternative rock band Quimby.

The interpretation to be offered here departs from the received view that is dominant in the rhetorical tradition; for example, it rejects the need for situating apostrophe in the system of figures of speech. Instead, it makes an attempt at the cognitive linguistic adaptation of certain insights of literary theory (cf. Frye 1998, Culler 1981) about the relationship between apostrophe and lyrical poetry. My departure from the rhetorical tradition is motivated primarily by its basic incompatibility with the view of meaning characteristic of functional cognitive linguistics. From the adopted perspective, meaning is not seen as a mental object existing prior to linguistic activity, but rather as an intersubjective act (within a scene of joint attention) which allows its participants to construe and share their experiences of the world (cf. Sinha 1999, Croft 2009, Verschueren 1999). Once the social character of linguistic cognition is taken as a point of departure, it is worth devoting special attention to apostrophe, given the inherently discursive basis of this figure of speech.

Keywords: apostrophe, lyrics, joint attention, intersubjectivity, fictional discourse, spatio-temporal relations, social relations, mental states

1. Theoretical background

Recent decades have seen the publication of several theoretical works which place more emphasis on the social (interactional, discursive) grounding of linguistic cognition, along with its implications (see, e.g. Tomasello 1999, 2003, 2011, Sinha 1999, 2001, Croft 2009).

It is a general feature of functional cognitive linguistic models that (whether explicitly or implicitly) they conceptualize the evolution and functioning of language as an epigenetic interaction between the human brain/mind and the physical/social environment. On the one hand, the concept of epigenesis highlights the fact that linguistic cognition crucially depends on genetically based, innate cognitive abilities (processes and structures). On the other, it also ascribes special significance to the constructive role of the physical/social environment in the elaboration of those abilities (cf. Karmiloff-Smith 1996). Under this explanation, environmental stimuli do not simply trigger a fully developed genetic program. Rather, relevant experiences of the environment assume a decisive role in the elaboration and emergent refinement of the initial, genetically determined perceptual and behavioural repertoire (cf. Sinha 2005).
In this context, elaboration refers to the fact that simpler or more general constructs develop into more complex or more specific ones. Emergence, for its part, highlights the tendency that the above development gives rise to new properties and levels of the human cognitive system that cannot be simply deduced from the processes and structures serving as their basis.

It follows from the above that the potential scope of human cognitive development is crucially determined by the simple interactions occurring between the human body (with its characteristic, species-specific biological features) and the physical environment. This embodied grounding (Sinha 1999) of human cognition makes an essential contribution to our ability to conceptualize and linguistically construe our experiences of the world. Embodied experiences are mapped onto concepts which are in turn mapped onto linguistic symbols, thus the symbols also (indirectly) map embodied experiences (cf. Lakoff–Johnson 1999, Rohrer 2007). However, recognizing the essential dependence of linguistic cognition on embodied experience does not amount to a claim that the former can be reduced to the latter. Our personal “coming into possession” of the world only partially explains the unique emergent nature of linguistic cognition. For a comprehensive explanation, one also needs to be mindful that humans do not simply take the world into their possession but rather also share it in the context of social interactions. Put differently, our embodied experience of the world only “becomes” language by being embedded into the socio-cultural praxis which is formed by our joint social activities (cf. Zlatev 1997). It is in this framework that people can make their experiences of the world accessible to others. In view of all this, the discursive grounding of linguistic cognition (Sinha 1999) must also be regarded as crucial.

The process of dynamic meaning generation is framed by discourses interpretable as joint attentional scenes (Tomasello 1999, Sinha 2005). Joint attentional scenes are characterized by the fact that their participants, the speaker(s) and the recipient(s) initiate interactions with each other through the medium of some natural language or languages, and by directing and following each other’s attention, constructively contribute to the production and comprehension of a referential scene (or scenes) with the aim of satisfying their communicative needs (cf. Verschueren 1999: 61–65).

Thus, one precondition of the employment of linguistic symbols is for humans to regard each other as mental agents similar to themselves, possessing the ability to direct and follow their discourse partners’ attention (cf. Tomasello 1999, Sinha 2005). This allows them to bring their own mental states (intentions, desires, beliefs and emotions) to symbolic expression, and at the same time also influence the mental states of others (see also Croft 1994, Searle 1998). The ability to identify with others is presumably an exceptional biological endowment which is put to use and elaborated in social interactions (cf. Sinha 2005, 2009; Tomasello 1999). Hence, a crucial feature of linguistic cognition is its intersubjectivity: we learn to comprehend the world through language by comprehending others with respect to ourselves, and ourselves with respect to others (cf. Tomasello 2003, 2011).

An additional feature of the use of linguistic symbols (by no means independently of our ability to interpret others as well as ourselves as mental agents) is referentiality. Intersubjective linguistic cognition is characterized by a triadic system of relationships, also known as a referential triangle: somebody [1] directs the attention of somebody else [2] onto something [3] (cf. Sinha 2005). As a result, linguistic reference can be interpreted as an intersubjective act whereby we as speakers use linguistic symbols to direct the recipients’ attention to some distinct entity of the world around us (and including us), or better, a referential scene which involves that entity (see also Brisard 2002: xii).
Joint attentional scenes establish the intersubjective context in which the referential interpretation of linguistic symbols (their grounding in the discourse world) becomes possible (cf. Tomasello 1999). Looked at in this way, context does not have a reality prior to, and independently of, utterances. Rather, it is a dynamic system of relationships which includes the discourse participants along with their physical, social and mental worlds (cf. Verschueren 1999: 75–114, Tátrai 2011: 51–67, see also Croft 2009). The physical world comprises the system of spatio-temporal relations as perceived by the discourse participants. The social world consists of socio-cultural relationships as processed by interlocutors. Finally, the mental world includes the mental states (intentions, desires, beliefs and emotions) that the participants are attributing to themselves and each other. Thus, the intersubjective context emerges in a dynamic process: the participants make lesser or greater efforts in order to reach referential interpretations which satisfy their communicative demands, by relying on their knowledge pertaining to the physical, social and mental worlds of the discourse.

2. Method and data

The corpus of my study is supplied by the lyrics of 40 Hungarian songs written by the alternative rock band Quimby. In 38 cases, Tibor Kiss is credited as the songwriter, and in two cases Líviusz Varga. Of the 40 texts, 13 come from the album Diligram (1997), 15 from Kilégzés (2005), and 12 from Lármagyűjtögető (2009).

The selection of these lyrics was motivated by the fact that texts belonging to this genre can be regarded as examples of “occasional poetry” which are aimed at the satisfaction of a widespread everyday demand for lyricism. Lyrics by Quimby are also peculiar, however: as lyrics of “alternative music”, they constitute a transition between popular hits and poems belonging to the literary canon. This makes it easier to employ the interpretive model under elaboration, and to potentially extend its application in both directions. The aim of this study is to lay the qualitative foundations for an extended quantitative study, supplying specific hypotheses that can be tested in the future.

3. Apostrophic fiction in the lyrics

3.1. Under an initial interpretation, apostrophe is a figure of speech which allows the speaker to exploit the opportunities resulting from the discursive nature of linguistic activities by turning away from the real addressee of her utterance, addressing some other entity instead (which may be present or absent, real or imaginary, human or non-human, with the latter category including living creatures, objects and abstract concepts) (Tátrai 2008: 52, 2011: 58). In contrast with embedded discourses such as quotations (cf. Tátrai–Csontos 2009), discourses created by apostrophe run in parallel and simultaneously with the matrix discourse.

It is important to add, moreover, that apostrophic discourse may involve either a factual or a fictional turning away from the addressee. In the case of factual apostrophe, the speaker turns to another person (subject) who is physically present in the speech situation. To put it in a simpler way: in the course of a conversation, we are dropping a word to somebody and then resume our temporarily interrupted discourse.

(1) Átmegyünk a felejtőbe
     Ráülünk az énlejtőire
Csúszunk egész lazáig 
Ipszunk egy csésze akármit 
Taxi!

'Oblivion is where we go, 
sliding on the slope of our egos 
we’re getting loose with gravity 
and drink a cup of anythin’
Taxi!

(Taxi [1997])

In the fictional discourse of (1), whose participants are marked by first person plural forms with inclusive reference (including both the speaker and the addressee), the exclamation Taxi! can be considered as an instance of factual apostrophe. It can easily receive a metonymical interpretation, according to which the speaker is addressing a physically present other person (a taxi driver).

However, as the initial interpretation offered above also makes it clear, apostrophe often (and in lyrical texts characteristically) fails to be directed at an addressee who is indeed available for being addressed. In cases of fictional apostrophe, the speaker is creating an apostrophic discourse by ignoring the physiological and discursive grounding of linguistic cognition (cf. Tátrai 2011: 26–35). She initiates linguistic interactions with entities with which this is not strictly speaking possible (unless the limitations of linguistic cognition are ignored), either because they are not physically present, or because they are not human beings.

(2) Szeretni, Istenem, milyen nehéz! 
'To love, my God, how hard it is!’

(Don Quijote ébredése ‘Don Quijote’s awakening’ [2005])

In (2), the form of address Istenem ‘my God’, highly conventional as it is, exemplifies fictional apostrophe: here, the speaker is initiating human communication with a non-human being.

3.2. In view of the above, apostrophic fiction can be said to produce a joint attentional scene prototypically characterized by direct interaction. In its context, the speaker is directing the attention of the apostrophic discourse’s addressee (with the employment of linguistic symbols) to a referential scene (a linguistically represented event or state) which can be directly observed by both of them. In (3a), this is made explicit by the proximal space deictic pronoun ez ‘this’, while in (3b), by the first person singular form of the verb of perception lát ‘see’.

(3a) Tükröm, tükröm, tükröm, mondd meg nékem: 
Jól áll-e ez nekem?

'My mirror, my mirror, my mirror, do tell me: 
Does this suit me well?'

(Don Quijote ébredése ‘Don Quijote’s awakening’ [2005])
(3b) Ismerlek, Mari, 
éksacsíntánék, 
mondanám, hogy menjünk, de látom, 
hogy nálad még be van ragadva a kézifék.

'I know you Mary 
and I'd just wink 
and say »Let’s go«, but I [can] see 
that by your side the hand brake is still stuck’
(Mari ’Mary’ [2005])

During all this, the addressee of the actual discourse (the lyrics’ recipient) fulfils the role of 
eavesdropper with respect to the apostrophic discourse, listening in to what the interlocutors 
are saying whilst the latter are unaware of her presence (cf. Frye 1957). In addition, apo-
strophic fiction offers further opportunities as well (for the concept of fictionality, see Iser 
1993, Anderegg 1998). The apostrophic fiction’s addressee can pose as if she were present as 
an onlooker, with a chance to observe the referential scene, this time with the interlocutors’ 
consent. What is more, she can also act as if she were a marginal participant that could be 
talked to, and even play with the idea as if she were also talking as a kind of “vocalist” (on 
participant roles, see Verschueren 1999: 77–87).

In terms of the organization of spatial and temporal relations, it has important implica-
tions that in cases of apostrophic fiction, the space and time of the joint attentional scene 
coincide with those of the referential scene. In other words, the events being construed lin-
guistically unfold at the same time and place as the joint attentional scene, and typically 
feature the same participants as well. This can be contrasted with narrative fiction (character-
istic of epic texts and dramas), in which there is spatial as well as temporal distance be-
tween the referential scene (the story) and the joint attentional scene (the storytelling) (for 

(4) Most olyan könnyű minden, 
szinte csak a semmi tart.
[...] 
Alattunk a tenger, 
szemben a nap zuhan.
[...] 
G dűrban zúgják a fákon a kabócák, 
hogy láss csodát, láss ezer csodát, 
láss ezer csodát.

'Now everything is so light, 
it’s as though only nothing is holding us. 
[...] 
The sea is beneath us 
and the sun is falling opposite. 
[...]
Cicadas are buzzing in G major on the trees:
see miracles, see a thousand miracles,
see a thousand miracles.’
(Autó egy szerpentinen ‘Car on a serpentine road’ [2005])

In (4), the first person plural word form alattunk ‘beneath us’ makes is evident that the participants of the joint attentional scene are at the same time also participants of the referential scene. More specifically, they are participants of a referential scene which unfolds simultaneously with the joint attentional scene (cf. the use of most ‘now’, tart ‘is holding [us]’, zügják ‘they are buzzing’, lass ‘see’), and the deictic centre for spatial orientation also lies with the position of the discourse participants (vö. alattunk ‘beneath us’, szemben ‘opposite [us]’). All this has two major implications. Firstly, as illustrated by (5), any linguistic construal of the addressee may result in apostrophic discourse. Here, for example, second person singular is construed in a fictional discourse enacting a face-to-face interaction.

(5) Hárman egy ladikban,
evezünk felfelé,
Hátul egy rablóhal,
S elől te meg én.

‘There’s three of us in the boat,
we’re rowing upstream,
behind us, a predatory fish,
and in front, you and me.’
(Rablóhal ‘Predatory fish’ [1997])

Secondly, in close correlation with the strategy to ignore limitations of human communication, the spatial and temporal relations of apostrophic fiction become accessible and interpretable as constituting not so much a physical but much rather a metaphysical world.

It also follows from the above that apostrophic fiction results in the special organization not only of spatial and temporal but also of interpersonal relations. It can be said about linguistic cognition in general that any experiencing of the world is framed by an intersubjective system of relationships. However, apostrophic fiction goes further than this: here, experiencing the world is itself represented as an intersubjective relation (cf. Culler 1981: 135–154).

(6a) Sikítani akarok egyet Baby
Lesz-e szex ma a szabadban?

‘I wanna make a scream Baby
Shall we have sex today in the open?’
(Country Joe McDonald [2005])

(6b) Átkozott harangok, tücskök, madarak!
Hagyjatok!
'You damned bells, grasshoppers, birds!
Leave me alone!'
(Álmatlan dal 'Song of insomnia' [2009])

(6c) Mint telihold az éjszakával
Együtt nőttünk fel a fákkal
Te idő sosem vicceltél

'Like the full moon with the night,
we grew up together with the trees
Time, you were never joking.’
(Aranykor [1997])

(6d) sehol se találalk téged életem
'I can find you nowhere, my life.’
(Sehol se találalk 'I can find you nowhere' [2005])

Fictional apostrophe makes it possible to take entities which are normally available as objects to linguistic cognition, and construe them as subjects participating in a system of social relationships. In (6a), a desire for the loved one (Baby) who is absent; in (6b), certain objects and animals (harangok, tücskök, madarak ‘bells, grasshoppers, birds’); and in (6c–d), issues associated with abstract concepts (idő ‘time’, élet ‘life’) get construed in a discursive way. Example (6d), in which élet ‘life’ appears not as a metaphorical form of address directed to the loved one but rather in its own right, also aptly illustrates the paradox of apostrophic fiction: while I do not even know where you are, getting in touch (entering a discourse with you) poses no problem. The main lesson to be drawn from this is that in interpreting the “as if” of apostrophic fiction, it is difficult and even unreasonable to ignore the social character of linguistic cognition.

In addition to processing spatial, temporal and interpersonal relations, comprehending the mental states of the participants (their beliefs, desires, intentions and emotions) is also an integral part of the processing of apostrophic fiction. Such “embarrassing” manifestations of the human mind as apostrophe ought not to be exclusively explained by reference to emotions (Culler 1981). Rather, it is worth highlighting that even in this case, intersubjective linguistic cognition involves the three dimensions of knowledge, action and emotions (cf. Croft 1994). In the context of the intersubjective directing of attention, the speaker of an apostrophic discourse not only brings her emotions to expression but rather also her beliefs, and she does so in order to influence the beliefs held by the apostrophe’s addressee and (with a fictional transfer) by the addressee of the actual discourse. The aim is either to get her to recognize something she has been familiar of, or to share with her some new knowledge about the world surrounding (and including) the interlocutors. Additionally, the power of apostrophe is manifested not only in the sharing of particular experiences but also in attempts at getting someone to act (cf. Culler 1981: 137–143, Tátrai 2008: 54). This is what we find in cases when the addressee (and by a fictional transfer also the recipient of the lyrics) is encouraged to bring about some change in the world surrounding her: do something she has not previously done or stop doing what she has been doing up to this point.

(7a) Pofozzatok fel, bajszos angyalok
Mutassátok, hol van a szerelem
'Give me a punch, you angels with a moustache, show me where love is.’
(Homo Defectus [2005])

(7b) **Menj** már a pokolba,
Vagy **menj** felőlem a mennybe akár,
**sodorj** egy cigit, kannibál!

'Go to hell, come on,
or go to heaven, I don’t care,
roll me a cigarette, cannibal!’
(Kannibálkarnevál [1997])

(7c) **Küldj át** a szőrös szívbe markolót
**S nyúzzuk le** az égboltról a rákfogót

'Send me over as I’m grabbing a hairy heart, and let’s strip the lobster trap off the sky’
(Dal Lászlónak 'Song for László' [1997])

(7d) Gyűlnek a gerlék, várni kár
**Leteperhetnél** végre már

'You should overpower me at last.’
(Haverom a J. J. Cale ‘J. J. Cale is my pal’ [2009])

In (7a–c), the highlighted imperative verb forms (pofozzatok fel 'give me a punch', mutassatók 'show me', menj 'go', sodorj 'roll', küldj át 'send [me] over', nyúzzuk le 'lets strip off') make it explicit that an apostrophic address is often also an apostrophic command (with 26 out of 40 songs including imperative forms). Moreover, it is not to be overlooked that getting others to act also has indirect forms of expression, as exemplified by leteperhetnél ‘you should/could overpower me’ in (7d). Thus, apostrophe cannot be interpreted exclusively as an outburst of passion, of emotions. It provides a special opportunity for the expression of beliefs, desires and intentions, and for influencing the corresponding mental states of others.

3.3. When the above considerations are brought to bear on the relationship between apostrophe and lyric, then it is worth regarding apostrophic fiction as a characteristic property of lyric as a general literary form and of (song) lyrics as a specific lyrical genre. It should be noted at the outset that from a functional cognitive perspective, the concepts of *literary form* and *genre* are open, prototype-based categories organized as complex systems of properties and expectations (cf. Tolcsvai Nagy 2001: 331–338, 2008, see also Genette 1988). **Lyric** as a general literary form is not a basic level category, rather it is at a higher level of abstraction (cf. Tátrai 2008: 49–50). By contrast, **songs** can be treated as representing a basic level category and at the same time a prototypical lyrical genre (besides the genre of odes, cf. Culler 1981: 135–145). Songs rarely include epic or dramatic elements, the employment of fictional apostrophe is, however, one of their essential properties.
The theoretical insight implied by the previous section, namely that the lyrical speech situation is basically created and evoked by apostrophic fiction (cf. Culler 1981: 135–154), is also confirmed by the corpus of lyrics under study. Of the 40 songs, 38 include fictional apostrophe in some form, i.e. explicit marking of the speaker’s turning away from the actual addressee of the song. This exceptionally high proportion overwhelmingly supports the hypothesis that apostrophe belongs to the central properties underlying lyric as prototype-based category.

Having said this, it is worth taking a closer look at the two songs which do not employ the figure of speech of apostrophe.

(8a) kettesben élünk, én és a bank, az első közös kis lakásban.
meztelen testünk összefeszül a hitelből vett nászágyban.
ő kölcsönadott nekem egy lehelletet és én cserébe gazdagon jutalmazom beengedtem és most már marad, hosszú évekig baszhatom.

‘we are living here just the two of us, me and the bank, in the first small flat we own.
our naked bodies stretch out in the matrimonial bed bought by credit.
she lent me a breath of air and in return I’m rewarding her generously
I have let her in and now she’s staying, I can screw her [or: ‘I’m screwed’
[figurative meaning] for years and years.’
(Én és a bank ’Me and the bank’ [2009])

(8b) Üdvözlöm érintem nem mutatom
Nem emlékeztetem nem kutatom
Nem zavarom zavarom csak figyelem
Belefedezem vele utazom

‘I’m greeting, I’m touching, I’m not showing,
I’m not reminding, nor searching,
I’m not disturbing, I’m only watching,
I’m getting immersed [in it/her], I’m travelling along.’
(Magam adom ’I’m giving myself’ [2005])

With regard to (8a), presenting the full text of the song in question, it may be suspected that we are faced with a non-prototypical song, given the shortness of the text and the punch line relying on the polysemy of the final word (with baszhatom meaning either ‘I can screw her’ or ‘I’m screwed’ in a figurative sense). The same point about non-prototypicality may also apply to (8b), which is based on the figure of speech of isocolon. However, we need not be satisfied with this overly trivial argument. Rather, it should be noted, for example, that the “real-time unfolding” character of lyrical texts is found in both songs, as suggested by the use of tenses, and creates a sense that the joint attentional scene and the referential scene are

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1 Due to the special property of Hungarian that definite objects can be morphologically marked by the verb, but with an inherent ambiguity regarding gender, the transitive verbs in this song can be interpreted as having either azt ‘it’ or Őt ‘her/him’ as their syntactically unelaborated complement.
simultaneous. In addition, the notion of apostrophic fiction need not be completely discarded either, despite the fact that the speaker's turning away is not made linguistically explicit. It may be presumed that the speaker is turning here not to a person outside of the speech situation but rather to himself; he is acting as if he were talking to himself (cf. Frye 2007). The actual addressee of the discourse is eavesdropping on him, as it were; alternatively, she can also pretend that she is the one who is talking (as suggested before).

The study also investigated the question as to what typical patterns of apostrophic fiction could be detected in the 38 songs which included explicit markers of the speaker's turning away. Of the 38 lyrics, 15 consist entirely of apostrophic utterances, thus these examples can be interpreted as texts in which the speaker is talking to the same apostrophic addressee from the beginning to the end. However, seven songs have also been found in which the apostrophic addressee is only addressed for part of the text's length.

(9) Most mondanám, de nem bírom.
    Megtehetném, mégsem szidom.
    Liliom volt az éjben, kősza sugár.
    Látod Nyina, múlik már.

    ’Now I would say it but I can’t.
    I could do that but I’m not scolding her.
    She was a lily in the night, a ray gone astray.
    Can you see Nina, it’s going away.’
    (Nyina ’Nina’ [2005])

In the first three lines of (9), Nina is marked by third person forms; in the fourth line, however, she appears as an addressee marked by second person singular. The corpus includes nine additional texts in which multiple apostrophic discourses are initiated by the speaker.

(10) Sikoly a sorsa,
    ha magába száll.
    Szponzora: téboly,
    bílines és halál.
    Ez az útvesztőhely, Mari,
    nem túl előkelő.
    Órlángon égő, üregi szenvedély,
    most jöjj elő!

    ’Her fate is a scream
    when she’s lost in herself.
    Her sponsors are madness,
    handcuffs and death.
    This maze is the scaffold, Mary,
    it’s not the most elegant.
    Passion burning in a cave on pilot-flame,
    it’s time to come forward!
    (Mari ’Mary’ [2005])
Example (10) begins in a way very similar to (9), with Mary first described in third person singular before the speaker is addressing her. However, the speaker then moves on to open up a new apostrophic discourse, using the address őrlángon égő, üregi szenvedély 'passion burning in a cave on pilot-flame'. The remaining seven lyrics feature apostrophic discourses in which both participants get to talk.

(11a) Mondd,
Hol van a furcsa fény
Ami az éjt szűrja át?
Hol lenne... ugyan már
Jó éjszakát!

'Tell me
where is that strange light
that pierces through the night?
Where would it be... forget it,
good night!'

(Hol volt hol nem volt 'Once upon a time' [1997])

(11b) Valami nem hagy békén, valami jár a parton...
Lefogadom, hogy a szerelem, na, ezt a fogadást tartom.

 [...] 
Felel a szellő értőn, felelek én is.
Kérdőn eljött értem az ágyad,
Úzen a vágyad és most bennem árad szét.

'Something doesn’t leave me alone, something is walking on the shore.
I bet it is love, hey, that’s a bet I’ll take.

 [...] 
The breeze is answering in a savvy way, I will answer too.
Your bed has come to ask for me,
your desire is sending out a message and now it’s spreading in me.'

(Cuba Lunatica [2009])

In examples like (11a–b), fictional apostrophic is so successful that the speaker even receives a verbal response. This discursive relationship even becomes the subject matter of reflection in (11b) (cf. Felel a szellő értőn, felelek én is 'The breeze is answering in a savvy way, I will answer too.').

4. Conclusions

The goal of this paper has been the elaboration of an interpretive model which accounts for the role of apostrophe in lyrical texts from a functional cognitive perspective. Although the theoretical and empirical grounding of the model requires further investigations, some general remarks are already warranted.

Apostrophe, understood as the speaker’s turning away from the actual addressee, often (and in lyrical texts characteristically) initiates discourses with entities that cannot be (strict-
ly speaking) addressed, unless the physiological and discursive limitations of linguistic cognition are temporarily ignored. Crucial features of apostrophe include the following:

- Fictional apostrophe construes a joint attentional scene prototypically characterized by direct interaction, in which the fictional speaker is directing the fictional addressee’s attention to a referential scene which both of them are able to observe directly.
- Apostrophic fiction makes it possible to take entities which are normally available as objects to linguistic cognition, and construe them (in the referential scene) as subjects participating in a system of social relationships.
- Apostrophe cannot be interpreted exclusively as an expression of the speaker’s emotions in the context of her intersubjective directing of attention. Rather, it provides a special opportunity for the expression of beliefs, desires and intentions as well, and for influencing the corresponding mental states of others.

Thus, apostrophic fiction is a characteristic property of lyrical discourses in that it creates the lyrical speech situation (cf. Culler 1981: 135–154). However, it cannot be equated with lyricism. In particular, it must not be overlooked that the construal of referential scenes in apostrophic fiction also affords an important role to rhythm (cf. Simon 2014) as well as metaphorization (cf. Tołcsvai Nagy 2003). In addition, it needs to be emphasized that apostrophic fiction only creates an opportunity for aesthetic experience, in other words for transcending meaning generation (cf. Anderegg 1998), but does not guarantee its attainment. It does not suffice to ignore the embodied and discursive grounding of linguistic cognition; for an aesthetic experience that dual grounding needs to be transcended as well.

Source of the lyrics


References


