

DEMOGRÁFIA

Vol. 57. No. 5.
ENGLISH EDITION

BUDAPEST
2014

THE QUARTERLY
OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMMITTEE AT THE HAS
AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE AT THE HCSO

MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL EDITORIAL BOARD:

ARNSTEIN AASSVE (Milan, IT), MOHAMMAD JALAL ABBASI-SHAVAZI (Tehran, IR/ Canberra, AUS), PATRICK DEBOOSERE (Brussels, BE), İSMET KOÇ (Ankara, TR), IRENA KOTOWSKA (president, Warsaw, PL), MARC LUY (Vienna, AT), ATTILA MELEGH (editor, Budapest, HU), CORNELIA MUREȘAN (Cluj-Napoca, RO), KAREL NEELS (Antwerp, BE), NICO VAN NIMWEGEN (the Hague, NL), ARIANE PAILHÉ (Paris, FR), LADISLAV RABUŠIC (Brno, CZ), NORBERT SCHNEIDER (Wiesbaden, DE), ISMO SÖDERLING (Helsinki, FI), ZSOLT SPÉDER (editor-in-chief, Budapest, HU), NADA STROPNIK (Ljubljana, SI), MIKOŁAJ SZOŁTYSEK (Rostock, DE)

EDITORS:

ZSOLT SPÉDER editor-in-chief
ATTILA MELEGH managing editor
LÍVIA MURINKÓ editor
ILDIKÓ SIMONFALVI technical editor

COPY EDITOR

LINDEN FARRER

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:

ÁGNES ANEK VÁRNAI

PUBLISHER:

ZSOLT SPÉDER director

HU ISSN 1787-940X

DEMOGRÁFIA

The Quarterly of the Demographic Committee
at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
and the Demographic Research Institute
at the Hungarian Central Statistical Office

Editor-in-Chief: *Zsolt Spéder*

Editorial Office: H-1024 Budapest, Buday L. u. 1–3.

<http://www.demografia.hu/en/publicationsonline/index.php/demografiaenglishedition/index>

CONTENTS

STUDIES

József Böröcz: Regimes of remittance dependency: global structures and trajectories of the former Soviet “bloc”	5
Mauro Albani, Antonella Guarneri and Serena Piovesan: Dynamic historical analysis of migration in Italy	39
Katalin Kovács and Lajos Bálint: Education, income, material deprivation and mortality in Hungary between 2001 and 2008.....	73
Serap Kavas: Discourses of demographic change and population policies in Turkey in the twentieth century	91

DOCUMENTS

Attila Melegh: SEEMIG project overview	113
--	-----

REGIMES OF REMITTANCE DEPENDENCY: GLOBAL STRUCTURES AND TRAJECTORIES OF THE FORMER SOVIET “BLOC”¹

JÓZSEF BÖRÖCZ²

ABSTRACT: *The re-integration of the societies of the erstwhile state socialist bloc into global flows of capitalism is emerging as a major issue in the sociology of labour migration. Changes in the magnitudes of migrant remittances can be of crucial social and political importance. In this study, I link a conceptual contribution with a three-step empirical inquiry. First, I conceptualize migrant remittances as a form of external economic dependency. Next, I describe recent changes in the strength of the empirical relationship between migrant remittances as percentages of the GDP and per capita GDP for all societies of the world utilizing data from two online data sets. Employing what Charles Tilly (1984) called “variation-finding comparison,” I examine, next, the – as it turns out, quite sizeable – residual variation in the relative magnitude of remittances that remains after controlling for per capita GDP, and interpret it as a marker for patterns of remittance dependency. Finally, I trace the recent trajectories of the societies that had, until one generation ago, constituted the Soviet “bloc” against the backdrop of the global distribution in remittance dependency.*

The data have been adopted from two sources: Estimates for migrant remittances as percentages of the GDP of their home country come from the online World Develop-

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented as a keynote address at the Launching Conference of SEEMIG, a research project entitled “Managing Migration and its Effects in South-East Europe: Transnational Actions towards Evidence Based Strategies” (SEEMIG - SEE/C/0006/4.1/X), realized from a research grant provided by the South East Europe Transnational Cooperation Programme, held at the Institute of Informatics and Statistics of the Faculty of Natural Sciences of the Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia, on September 19, 2012. The author wishes to thank Attila Melegh for the invitation to the project, and Mahua Sarkar and Attila Melegh for a number of very relevant conversations about the topics covered here. The author is also grateful Endre Sik and Ágnes Hárs, as well as *Demográfia*’s anonymous reviewers, for their comments on various, earlier versions of the paper. Additional research funding was provided by Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, and the Hungarian TÁMOP research scheme dispensed through the Pázmány Péter Catholic University of Budapest.

² Professor of Sociology, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey; <http://borocz.net>; email: jborocz@rutgers.edu.

ment Indicators dataset of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,³ while per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP/cap)⁴ figures have been borrowed from economic historian Angus Maddison's widely used population, GDP and GDP/cap dataset.⁵

Keywords: migration, development, dependency, remittance, state socialism, transition

1 MIGRANT REMITTANCES, “DEVELOPMENT” AND DEPENDENCY

All forms of commerce involve importation and exportation of labour. In terms of social conditions and consequences, however, there is a considerable difference between those forms of trade where the labour that is exported / imported is embodied “only” in the product, and those that involve human beings crossing state borders to exert their labour power as non-citizens. My interest lies in deciphering the economic significance of the latter⁶ for migrant-emitting societies – an issue that is emerging, in the context of an ever more closely integrated world-economy, as an increasingly serious social, economic and political problem.

Of particular conceptual interest are the experiences of the societies of the erstwhile Soviet „bloc” that have experienced the reinstatement of (semi-) peripheral capitalism in the years following 1989–1991. They merit special attention with respect to migrant remittance dependency (MRD) for three main reasons.

First, because most state socialist states had operated some forms of restrictions on the foreign travel of their own citizens, one of the relevant social changes the collapse of states socialism brought in was the removal of such domestic constraints on flows of all kinds, including labour exports. Of course,

³ Variable code “BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS,” “Workers' remittances and compensation of employees, received (% of GDP), IBRD”.

⁴ Maddison estimates historical GDP/cap figures with the Geary-Khamis method – a version of the purchasing power parity (PPP) technique – at current USD. For the analysis, they have been translated into annual percentages of the world mean GDP/cap. PPP measures are known to have a close covariance with exchange rate (XE)-based measures, and have one clear advantage, namely, that they control for differences in real cost-of-living differences along the distribution. As a result, the overall variance in the PPP estimates tends to be more “conservative” than that of XE-measures; in other words, the rich appear somewhat less rich, and the poor somewhat less poor.


⁵ Maddison, 2012. Maddison's figures are Geary-Khamis PPP estimates, offered in fixed 1980 USD. For better over-time comparability and easier interpretability as “relative position in the global system of economic inequality,” I have converted Maddison's USD figures to percentages of the world mean GDP/cap for the given year.

⁶ Obviously, economic effects constitute only a subset of the many, far-reaching consequences of labour exports.

the end of the socialist state's administrative restrictions on cross-border population movements was paralleled by the creation of new barriers, this time by the two largest economic entities in the world, the European Union (through the seven-year delay in implementing the free movement of labour with respect to citizens of the newly admitted member states) and the United States (which introduced a similar delay in the implementation of the visa-free travel arrangement to citizens of the recent EU-member states, explicitly expecting that the latter would be more likely to overstay the 3-month period of stay than others). Those obstacles have since been removed in a subset of those states, and only with considerable hesitation, foot-dragging, and delays (Böröcz, 2014). Even today, i.e., more than ten years after formal accession of the first batch of erstwhile-state-socialist states in the European Union – the presence of the East European EU-member states' citizens in the labour markets, and, more broadly, in the formal and informal social spaces, of at least some other EU-member states is subject to considerable political resistance and consternation.

Second, all post-state-socialist economies sustained deep losses in economic output (Böröcz, 2012) over the first two decades after the transformation. Precipitating severe drops in incomes and a massive reduction of the labour force, the downward slide of post-state-socialist societies produced powerful incentives for labour to seek employment abroad, and for post-state-socialist economies to export labour power.

Third, the post-state-socialist transformation in the erstwhile Soviet-bloc resulted in the multiplication of three formerly federal states: Czechoslovakia broke up into two, the end of Yugoslavia created seven successor states, and the breakdown of the USSR produced no fewer than fifteen, at least nominally independent, post-Soviet polities. The state-socialist era administrative category of residency registration thus came to be re-inscribed as citizenship. One conclusion was the sudden creation of a sizeable cohort of "foreign" workers (Böröcz, 2014). The forced population displacements that resulted from the four post-Yugoslav wars and the various civil and international wars in Central Asia and around the Caucasus region further swelled the ranks of erstwhile-socialist labour abroad. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that the relationship between labour exports and the economic performance of the migrant-emitting societies would show some particularly strong patterns in the post-state-socialist context.



Source: Ratha and Silwal (2012).

Figure 1
Remittances and other resource flows to developing countries, 1990–2010

The idiomatic expression referring to the focal variable of my analysis, ‘remittance dependency’ is widely used⁷ in the literature on transnational / international migration. To be noted, however, is that the term often appears without a definition, making the idea suggestive but also rendering it inaccessible to empirical examination.

Another feature of the literature is that the use of the expression “remittance dependency” is somewhat undifferentiated in terms of scales: In some instances it refers, clearly, to the micro- and/or meso-scale, denoting families of migrants that experience dependence on remittances; at other places, it designates a macro-level phenomenon, referring to entire societies / states / economies as subject to such dependency. Dependency due to transnational integration involving smaller scales (e.g., households, other formal or informal institutions or individuals) might be of great conceptual interest, but we lack reliable global comparative data on those scales. Here, my conceptual interest and data refer to the macroscopic scale.

⁷ See, e.g., Keely and Tran (1989), Guarnizo (2003), Hujo and Piper (2007), Koppenberg (2012) or Thieme (2012).

The “migration-development nexus” is a ubiquitous concern for studies in international migration. To be sure, global structures of capital-labour relations ensure that the remuneration of foreign labour – likely the least protected, most precarious, often systematically discriminated-against and overall most exploited segment of the working classes of the world – remains very low. Hence, the remittance flows generated by non-citizen labour are relatively insignificant when compared to the total volume of the world economy, or even if measured against the economic output of the migrant-receiving, often high-income, societies. But that does not mean that those sums are equally insignificant for the migrants’ home societies.

The last decade has seen considerable growth in remittances: After two decades of near-stagnation around the 0.4% level, the sum total of migrant savings sent home by the approximately 3% of the world’s population that is foreign-born⁸ increased from 0.44% to 0.75% of the Gross World Product during the first eleven years of the 21st century.⁹

As data presented in a recent *Migration and Development Brief*, published by the World Bank (Ratha and Silwal, 2012; reproduced here as *Figure 1* above), suggest, the estimated total volume of migrant remittances surpassed the magnitude of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in 1996 and remained higher ever since. Worldwide remittances overtook private debt and portfolio equity in 2008 and the steepness of the curve indicating growth in migrant remittances since the mid-nineties is comparable to the rate of increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) during the same period. World Bank experts Dilip Ratha and Ani Silwal forecast that by 2014 the sum of worldwide migrant remittances will reach the levels that FDI had in 2006 and 2010. To the extent that it is necessary to understand aid dependency and foreign direct investment dependency a major structural problems for some of the poorest and least powerful societies of the world, the sheer magnitudes of, and the increasing trends in, migrant remittances – which show amounts comparable to OAD and FDI – suggest that dependence on transfers resulting from labour exports deserves scholarly attention as well.

Over the most recent years, global remittances have shown considerable fluctuation – likely a short-term effect of the global crisis of 2008. However, even if we take this volatility into account, the overall growth in remittances has been remarkably strong. As *Table 1* suggests, the upswing in remittances to the states that the World Bank categorizes as the “Third World” has been con-

⁸ According to the World Development Indicators dataset, the total foreign-born population (SM.POP.TOTL) of the world increased from 178.1 to 213.3 million people. The World Bank estimates that that comprises 2.92% to 3.11% of the total world population (SM.POP.TOTL.ZS) between 2000 and 2010 (IBRD, 2012).

⁹ The exact meaning of ‘remittances’ and a number of methodological remarks on the remittance data are presented below in the section of “Data Caveats.”

siderably more robust than the overall rate of growth in the world economy, irrespective of whether the latter was estimated via Gross National Income (GNI) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is particularly striking, given the likelihood that the data on which these computations are based likely underestimate the magnitude of the remittance flows (for more on that issue, see below).

Table 1
*Rates of growth in total remittances to the Third World
and global economic growth (%)*

	2008	2009	2010	2011
Growth in remittances to Third World	16.10	-6.30	5.70	10.5 ¹⁰
Total GNI growth (annual %) ¹¹	1.20	-2.57	4.47	..
Total GDP growth (annual %) ¹²	1.33	-2.25	4.34	2.73

Source: For remittances: Ratha and Silwal (2012); for GNI and GDP: IBRD 2012.


The number of states receiving relatively high levels of migrant remittances also shows a dramatic increase. While the number of the world's societies where migrant remittances exceeded 10% of the GDP of the migrant emitting

¹⁰ Estimate for the first half of 2011.

¹¹ Variable code: NY.GNP.PCAP.CD. "GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI, calculated in national currency, is usually converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies, although an alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is judged to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate actually applied in international transactions. To smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, a special Atlas method of conversion is used by the World Bank. This applies a conversion factor that averages the exchange rate for a given year and the two preceding years, adjusted for differences in rates of inflation between the country, and through 2000, the G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). From 2001, these countries include the Euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States."

¹² Variable code: NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. "Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources."

state¹³ had remained at or below five until 1990,¹⁴ that number doubled by 1999,¹⁵ only to double again by 2004. It has hovered above twenty ever since.¹⁶ As a result, the percentage of the world's states with high levels of MRD exceeded 15% by 2004, and has remained on that level ever since.



Source: Computed from IBRD.

Figure 2
Percent of the world's states with MRD above 10% of GDP, 1980–2010


¹³ 10% is of course an arbitrary threshold. I use it here to illustrate the changes in the magnitude of the situation. See also Helmke (2010).

¹⁴ Computed from IBRD 2012.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

Figure 2 depicts the dynamics of this transformation in percentage terms. Starting from around 5% of the world's societies in the 1980s, the share of states with high levels of MRD has increased to 16.8% by 2004, and has remained 15% since then. With rates of increase that have surpassed the growth rates of the world economy as a whole, it is undeniable that migrant remittances constitute an increasingly significant form of cross-border value transfers. In migrant remittances, we are looking at a key component of global economic integration.



Source: Computed from IBRD.

Figure 3

Remittances: medians, unweighted means and coefficients of variation (standard deviation / mean), 1980–2010

As the continuous blue line – representing the unweighted world mean remittance/GDP figures – in *Figure 3* indicates, the world mean in remittances as percentages of the GDP remained more or less constant around 3% until the second half of the nineteen nineties. Thereafter, it shows quite a sudden, dynamic upswing: It reached 4.5% in 2004, stayed above 4% ever since. The

median in worldwide remittances per GDP also shows a proportionate increase so that, at its peak in 2007, half of the world's states show a remittance dependence greater than 1.9% – a figure almost three and a half times greater than this period's minimum in 1986. Meanwhile, the distribution of the world's societies in terms of remittance levels became considerably tighter over the same period: The coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) among the world's societies in terms of the relative importance of migrant remittances has less than halved (dropping from above 3 to around 1.5) since the early eighties. As the share of migrant remittances in GDP grew and variation among the world's societies sharply decreased, some observers – mainly neoliberal economists – came to expect that increased remittances would by necessity lead to a perceptible surge in “economic development” in the migrant-emitting societies.

And yet – in spite of the indications of growth and the expectations based upon them – as Alejandro Portes has pointed it out, “[t]here is no known instance of remittances economically “developing” by themselves a labour-exporting country” (2007, p.20). In fact, remittance dependency is widely reported to entail a number of consequences that can only be described as conceptual opposites to what reasonable observers would define as “development”: Repatriated migrant savings are reported to have contributed to lowering political participation (Krilova, 2008); they seem to have increased only immediate consumption and inflation (Guarnizo, 2003), forcing “land use changes from agricultural production to cattle ranching” (ibid.), and, at least under some conditions, to “serious[ly] distort[ing] the local labour market,”¹⁷ “displac[ing] local jobs and incomes, inducing [. . .] foreign imports [. . .] creat[ing] disparity and envy between recipients and nonrecipients, and creat[ing] a culture of economic dependency” (Vertovec, 2004, p.985).

Facing such adverse effects, as Douglas S. Massey and his collaborators (1998) report, “nobody [among officials of inter-governmental organizations] believes [...] any more” in the possibility of an unambiguous causal connection leading from remittances to development. The “rapid growth in remittances to less-developed countries”¹⁸ ought to be seen, then, in another, more complex, conceptual framework.

To solve the impasse regarding the developmental effects of remittances, Castles and Delgado-Wise propose the idea of “the migration-development nexus” (2007, p.7), devised to transcend the traps of the “nonsensical [discussion about] what comes first” (Castles, 2009) in the relationship between cross-

¹⁷ Guarnizo (2003), summarizing findings, for the Dominican Republic, by Grasmuck and Pessar (1991) and, for El Salvador, by Lungo and Kandel (1999) and Zilberg and Lungo (1999).

¹⁸ Ghosh (2006) and World Bank 2006, quoted non-verbatim by Castles and Delgado-Wise (2007, p.7).

border flows of labour and economic development.¹⁹ Migrant remittances offer an excellent empirical focus for such an inquiry, as they constitute an institutionalized instance of the “migration-development nexus”. By focusing on the relative magnitudes of remittances at various levels of economic performance, we have empirical observations concerning patterns of migration and patterns of economic integration jointly, as elements of a single social fact.

The scholarly literature on global structures and inequalities conceived, on the most generic level, the idea of ‘dependency’ to grasp “an unequal relationship between societies” (Foran, 2012, p.383) that “shapes the nature of development” (ibid.). A classic definition of economic dependency, proposed most elegantly by Theotonio dos Santos in 1968, apprehends “dependence [as] a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected” (dos Santos 1970, 231; dos Santos 1968, 6). In more formal terms, dependency obtains in situations where entire societies are tied to other societies in such ways that the linkages between them are considerably more important to some than to others.

Dependency is, thus, an unequal network relationship depicted from the standpoint of the society that experiences significantly less network power. Viewed through a network ‘lens,’ the world economy is but a set of asymmetrical network ties, and the significance of those linkages is exceedingly rarely, if ever, balanced, or equal, for all societies involved.²⁰ Simply, experience suggests that, in the capitalist world economy, various dimensions of dependency tend to be clustered.²¹

From this perspective, I define migrant remittance dependency (MRD) as that aspect of the dependence of a society on the economic, political, and social conditions prevalent in a set of other societies which results from value trans-

¹⁹ Castles and Delgado-Wise (2009) find this discussion “nonsensical” because “socio-economic change and human mobility are constantly interactive processes” (p.1), making it impossible to separate the mutual effects of the two empirically.

²⁰ This is not necessarily and always a devastating socio-economic and -political problem: Small discrepancies in network power can be, and are, routinely absorbed, especially given the historic expectations that such external networks will, eventually, over time, provide possible avenues for a more equal relationship. However, magnitudes do matter, and it is also the case that true reciprocity in dependency – where society A and society B are by and large to the same extent, symmetrically dependent on each other in multiple dimensions – is almost un-heard-of.

²¹ Because of the tendency of asymmetrical ties to cluster, it is possible to regard the external dependency of society A as a structural condition, even without necessarily specifying which alters (societies B, C, D, etc.) A is dependent on. It is this insight that led, among other developments, to recognition of the importance of the existence and character of external linkages in explaining chronic problems of economic growth, industrialisation, and (internal as well as external) inequalities.

fers by its own citizens who sell their labour power abroad.²² Just like dependency on aid or on foreign direct investment, remittance dependency is a process whereby external structural conditions are internalized so that the migrant emitting society loses much of its control over its domestic economic, political, social, etc., processes.

Remittance dependency can be thought of as a ratio-scale variable: It is that percentage of the GDP of the migrant-emitting economy which is accounted for by migrant remittances. “High-MRD” obtains when the economic importance of remittances into a society by people from that state who work abroad is high. As with most empirical measures, of course there is no *a priori* way to determine what constitutes a “high” level but, given sharp differences in magnitudes, finding a society consistently in the top segments of distributions signals the likely presence of MRD.

2 DATA CAVEATS

While migrant remittances are, clearly, network phenomena, network data are not available anywhere in an even remotely comprehensive fashion.²³ All the World Bank World Development Indicators dataset – to my knowledge, the best globally comprehensive source of information on remittances available to scholars – allows us to do is model some consequences of network linkages without network data.²⁴ The analysis I am presenting below focuses essentially

²² There appears to be such a degree of agreement about the existence, and significance, of remittance dependency that, while a large number of studies – e.g., Keely and Tran, 1989; Guarnizo, 2003; Hujo and Piper, 2007; Koppenberg, 2012; Thieme 2012 – use a notion of remittance dependency, they do not offer a formal definition for it, nor do they specify its origins.

²³ The only example of a study that uses network data I have found, Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006), works with data for 11 remittance destination states, linked to 3 to 31 alters. This creates a small and very uneven sub-matrix of the 200 by 200 state-to-state matrix that is the world economy.

²⁴ The description of the relevant variable – “Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees, received (% of GDP)”, variable code: BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS . – reads as follows: “Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees comprise current transfers by migrant workers and wages and salaries earned by nonresident workers. Data are the sum of three items defined in the fifth edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual: workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers. Remittances are classified as current private transfers from migrant workers resident in the host country for more than a year, irrespective of their immigration status, to recipients in their country of origin. Migrants’ transfers are defined as the net worth of migrants who are expected to remain in the host country for more than one year that is transferred from one country to another at the time of migration. Compensation of employees is the income of migrants who have lived in the host country for less than a year (IBRD, 2012).”

on that endpoint of a network process where the savings of non-citizen workers abroad enter the migrant emitting society. This allows, clearly, only a first step toward an analysis of migrant dependency because, given the absence of information on specific remittances by source state, it is impossible to calculate pairwise, state-to-state rates of dependency on remittances. However, the data do allow calculating the degree of the dependency of a specific economy on the external linkages that emerge as a result of the exportation of its citizens' labour power.

More problematic, the World Bank data set includes only formal-sector transfers, i.e., it provides no information on remittances transferred through informal channels. This is quite a serious problem because – as the literature on international migration and migrant transnationalism²⁵ has insisted for quite some time – a considerable part²⁶ of migrant remittances never enter formal financial institutions. We ought to expect this to be the case with most migrants that find employment in the informal sector, and at least some of even those who are engaged in the formal sector. The powerful involvement of “labour supply companies,” recruiting agents and touts – i.e., almost always informal components of the value chains in the labour export industry that have every reason to conceal their activities (Sarkar, 2012) – is likely further to decrease the visibility of at least some of the related monetary flows into the migrant-emitting economies. As a result, the World Bank data definitely undercount the phenomenon they purport to represent.

Worse yet, there is reason to expect that the magnitude of the undercount is systematically related to the level of *per capita* income: Because of a host of social, political and cultural reasons, not to mention the widely noted²⁷ lower transaction costs of informal-sector banking services, the undercount is likely to become more pronounced as we proceed from the richer to the poorer receiving societies. This also raises the possibility that at least some of the recorded changes in reported levels of remittances may be the result of migrants switching between institutional arrangements, some of which might involve shifts

²⁵ See, e.g., Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999); Landolt, Autler and Baires (1999); Puri and Ritzema (1999); de Haas (2007); Zelizer (2007).

²⁶ According to one World Bank estimate, reported by Ratha and Shaw (2007), “the true size of these flows, taking into account unrecorded flows through formal and informal channels, is believed to be at least 50 percent larger” than estimates based only on formal sector transfers. (See also Awal, 2011.)

²⁷ Freund and Spatafora (2005, p.5), considers information concerning the lower transaction costs in the informal sector “anecdotal”; meanwhile, in the next paragraph, they assert without any qualification that “[f]ormal remittance channels are typically more expensive” (Freund and Spatafora 2005, p.5).

between the formal and informal sectors.²⁸ Some of the state-by-state differences may also stem from institutional variation in the transmission of funds along the formality-informality distinction, and there is no way to account for these effects empirically.

Finally, yet another caveat is at order: The World Bank has presented its remittances data without disclosing its sources or the specific techniques used in obtaining / estimating them. That is a serious cause for concern, given the great worldwide variation in the ways in which national banks and other central financial authorities are able, and willing, to monitor banking activity. This is especially so in the case of financial transfers – such as migrant remittances – that dwarf, for the most part, in comparison to other cross-border financial transactions.

We should keep all these caveats in mind. The validity of the analysis below rests on the assumption that the data we do have are robust enough to withstand the damage caused by the obvious imperfections at the source in order to yield meaningful results.

3 EMPIRICAL EXPECTATIONS AND ANALYSIS

The dependent variable is a single ratio-scale distribution of the world's societies in terms of percentages of their GDP that is accounted for by officially recorded migrant remittances. According to the precepts of a neoclassical-inspired “push-pull” model of migration (e.g., Adams, 2008; Glytsos, 1997), we should expect, *ceteris paribus*, strong negative covariance between migrant remittances and levels of income at the migrant-emitting societies.²⁹ That is a reasonable expectation because, first, as “push-pull” theories would argue, individuals in poor societies have greater incentives to go abroad to search for work than their colleagues in richer societies. In addition, the lower the position of the migrant emitting economy on the global income scale, the more opportunities there are for labour to find more highly remunerated positions. Amplifying this effect is the likelihood that, once incomes are earned, migrants' savings

²⁸ Freund and Spatafora (2005) raises the possibility that recorded higher levels may be artifacts of a movement toward the formal sector – but, from a sociological point of view, there is no *a priori* reason to exclude the obverse, i.e., that recorded drops may be results of a movement toward the informal sector.

²⁹ To be noted is that “most – but not all of the results” presented by Adams (2008, p.17) suggest an “inverted U-shape” relationship between remittances and *per capita* GDP – however, this is not directly relevant because Adams' dependent variable is remittances *per capita* (not remittances as % of the GDP).

go farther in terms of purchasing power in the poorer “home” economies than in their less poor counterparts.³⁰

Summarizing the tradition of sociological critiques in 1989, Alejandro Portes and József Böröcz (1989) offered a critique of the conceptual weaknesses of the “push-pull” paradigm by suggesting that it incorporated a selection bias fallacy: “The tendency of the push-pull model to be applied to those flows which are already taking place conceals its inability to explain why similar movements do not arise out of the other equally ‘poor’ nations or why sources of outmigration tend to concentrate in certain regions and not in others [. . .]” (Portes and Böröcz 1989, p.607). The present study allows an explicit empirical examination, not only of the explanatory power of this empirical expectation but, more important, also of the empirical dispersion of the world’s societies in terms of the degree of their dependence on migrant remittances, at similar levels of *per capita* GDP.


As a first step, let us examine the shape of the distribution of the magnitude of migrant remittances according to *per capita* GDP for 2008.³¹

Quantifying the economic impact of non-citizen labour on labour exporting states for 2008, *Figure 4* strongly confirms the critique of the “push-pull” paradigm put forth by Portes and Böröcz (1989). As the vertical spread of the dots representing the world’s societies indicates, the relative importance of migrant remittances covers a wide range, even after controlling for overall level of income (measured as *per capita* GDP along the horizontal axis). For instance, around the median *per capita* GDP (at 58.3% of the world mean *per capita* GDP in 2008),³² we find (see *Figure 4*) that societies dispersed on a range between 0.155% and 23.8%, i.e., the distribution shows a width of over 150 times. At other levels of *per capita* GDP, *Figure 2* shows even broader dispersion in remittances.

³⁰ E.g., Poonam Gupta spells out the precepts of a neoclassical perspective on migration, savings and remittances as follows: “one can think of an optimising framework whereby a migrant maximizes his utility by choosing the optimal level of his own consumption, remittances to family in his native country for their consumption needs, and investment in various available instruments in the native country as well as in the host country.” (2006, p.2772).

³¹ 2008 is the most recent data year for which both remittance and GDP estimates are available at the time of the writing of this study.

³² Medians in both dimensions are marked by straight black lines in this and all subsequent graphs.



Source: Computed from Maddison and IBRD.

Figure 4
Relative wealth and MRD, states of the world, 2008
 (% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap)

Table 2
*Percent of variance in remittance dependence explained by GDP/cap
 (R^2 yielded by univariate regression, select years)*

	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2008
GDP/cap as % of world mean	0.009 ³³	0.011 ³⁴	0.008	0.009	0.021	0.135	0.169

Source: IBRD, World Development Indicators and Maddison.

Table 2 reports the strength of the relationship between per capita GDP and MRD between 1980 and 2008 – the entire period for which relevant data are available. Throughout the period, R^2 -levels are remarkably low. There appears to be a certain tendency of over-time increase as we approach the more recent time points. I do not have a specific explanation for this apparent empirical regularity, but it is amply evident that even the highest R^2 -s leave more than four-fifths of the variation in the level of migrant remittances un-explained. In other words, clearly, the most exciting aspect of the relationship between migrant remittances on the one hand and levels of economic performance on the other is not their weak, negative covariance – the only regularity expected on the basis of the central insight of the “push-pull” paradigms – but the wide dispersion in migrant remittance levels after controlling for relative wealth. Of great conceptual importance is the empirical regularity that even relatively rich countries can also be dependent on remittances. This wide dispersion might actually mean that various social groups of rich countries also manoeuvre in the global economy and thus development migration nexus is to be rethought.

Table 3
Regimes of remittance dependency (MRD)

	Low <i>per capita</i> GDP	High <i>per capita</i> GDP
High remittance dependency	Poor – high MRD	Rich – high MRD
Low remittance dependency	Poor – low MRD	Rich-low MRD

Conceptually, the wide dispersion of remittance levels and their low sensitivity to control for *per capita* GDP allows consideration of various regions of this plot as distinct types of insertion in the global system of economic integration. In the rest of this study, I shall interpret these distinct locations as distinct regimes of remittance dependency. At the simplest, we can distinguish, as does Table 3, between high and low levels of dependency along poor and rich mi-

³³ The effect points in the direction opposite the expectation.

³⁴ The effect points in the direction opposite the expectation.

grant emitting states. In terms of this typology, the “push-pull” expectation would be that most cases fall in the top-left and bottom-right cells of this table.³⁵ Our alternative perspective opens up the question of where in this typology given societies fall – and examines the question empirically. Intuitively, it is reasonable to expect sharp contrasts in the available economic policy, geopolitical strategy, as well as labour, educational, pension and other social policy, etc. options for two states with approximately identical levels of *per capita* GDP where migrant remittances constitute, say, 12% of the GDP of one and 0.12% of another. As *Figure 2* and *Table 2*, above, suggest such contrasts do, clearly, exist at virtually all levels of national income.

4 TRAJECTORIES IN POST-STATE-SOCIALIST REMITTANCE DEPENDENCY

The post-state-socialist transformation of the erstwhile Soviet “bloc” produced 27 states. The erstwhile-state-socialist countries cover the world map in a fully contiguous manner from the former East German-West-German border and the eastern borders of Finland, Austria and Italy through the Pacific Ocean.³⁶ This political transformation made available approximately 8.14% of the world’s population,³⁷ and added altogether circa 10.4% of the gross world product³⁸ at the time, to that part of the global productive assets of humankind that is valorised by global capital without interference by a socialist state.

In the remainder of this study, I examine the trajectories of these 27 post-state-socialist societies in two batches: the states of (South-) Eastern Europe (referred to in the graphs as (S)EE) and the successor states of the USSR.³⁹ I examine the trajectories of these two groups of states at four time points: 1996,⁴⁰ 2000, 2005 and 2008.⁴¹ I keep the distributions for the rest of the world, marked by small black dots, in the background of the graphs.

³⁵ Further to aid orientation in this map of global positions, I also include a univariate power regression line in each graph – a visual aid that can be interpreted as the set of expected values under the “push-pull” perspective.

³⁶ The German Democratic Republic has been incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany and neither the IBRD (2012) nor the Maddison (2008) datasets provide estimates for it.


³⁷ Computed from Maddison, 2012.

³⁸ Computed from Maddison, 2012.

³⁹ Of the post-Soviet states, remittance data are missing for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, reducing the number of the post-Soviet data points to 13.

⁴⁰ This is the earliest year for which a reasonable number of data for the post-state-socialist states is available in the IBRD data set.

⁴¹ This is the most recent year for which the Maddison data set offers estimates of *per capita* GDP.




Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012.

Figure 5

*MRD by relative wealth, Eastern Europe and states of the world, 1996,
(% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap)*

As *Figure 5* indicates, Albania (AL) – the poorest of this lot of post-state-socialist states – was already among the world’s most highly remittance-dependent societies by the time it began reporting remittance information to the World Bank in 1996. We find the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (MK), as well as Croatia (HR), and Slovenia (SI) also in the top half (i.e., above the horizontal straight line representing the global median for the given year) of

the global distribution.⁴² Closest to the median are Poland (PL) and Bulgaria (BG), followed, from some distance, by Hungary (HU). Meanwhile, Slovakia (SK) and Romania (RO) are definitely in the low-RMD segment of the distribution. The regression line illustrating the strength of per capita GDP in predicting world-wide variance in MRD is almost entirely flat, with a negligible R^2 .




Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012.

Figure 6
MRD by relative wealth, Eastern Europe and states of the world, 2000
(% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap)

⁴² This could well be, to some extent, the effect of the dissolution of the federal state of Yugoslavia. (For more on the impact of the collapse of the erstwhile-state-socialist states on the global system of labour migration, see Böröcz, 2014).

By 2000, we see (in *Figure 6*) the definite signs of a rearrangement. For the first time, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BIH) reported data for this year and, with its remittances accounting for just a notch below 30% of its GDP, it is instantly one of the world's most migrant remittance dependent societies. Romania's MRD increased more than ten-fold, from 0.025% to 0.26% of its GDP, during the four years elapsed – but, even with this increase, Romania was still among the less remittance-dependent societies of the world in 2000. Poland has moved up to the median of the global distribution of MRD, somewhere halfway between the Czech Republic (CZ) and Slovenia. The remaining societies of the region registered no perceptible movement.



Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012.

Figure 7
MRD by relative wealth, Eastern Europe and states of the world, 2005
(% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap)

In 2004, the European Union underwent what is referred to as the “Big Bang” enlargements. As part of this expansion, five states of (South-) Eastern Europe – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) were formally admitted⁴³ in the EU. It is quite a surprising insight about the dynamics of remittance dependency that – contrary to some alarmist and xenophobic rhetoric warning that the EU would be “flooded” by “Polish plumbers”⁴⁴ and other temporary labour migrants from the newly acceded lands – only one state in the region, Slovakia experienced a noteworthy increase in RMD up till 2005 by going from well below to considerably above the global median (its remittances increased from 0.06% to 1.54% of the GDP), showing a more than twenty-five-fold jump. Although the other states in this region show only moderate increases, all states of Southern and Eastern Europe have moved to or above the regression line by 2005. To be noted also is that it is at this point – i.e., at the point where the former-state-socialist societies of eastern Europe joined the EU – that the R^2 estimating the significance of per capita GDP for migrant remittance dependency jumps to a non-trivial 13.5%, possibly signalling the importance of eastern Europe’s EU-membership for increasing the total amount of global inequality and, more specifically, dependency.

To be noted, however, is that, other than Slovakia, Eastern Europe’s highest increases in MRD were registered in Romania (jumping from 0.26% to 4.78% of the GDP, an uptake of more than 18 times) and Bulgaria (which shot from 0.45% to 5.58%, an over 12-fold increase) – i.e., states that were not among those admitted to the European Union’ in 2004 yet.⁴⁵ Viewed in the context of the world, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia and Poland occupied a position almost exactly on or, as with the Czech Republic, somewhat below, the global median of RMD, while not-yet-EU-member Romania and Bulgarian already joined Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BIH) and Macedonia – i.e., states of the region that had already been in the high-MRD category.


Meanwhile, by 2005, it became clear that Slovenia had a trajectory that was the exact opposite of the rest of Eastern Europe. The region’s wealthiest and smallest state began its migrant remittance experience at relatively high levels, registering an RMD of 1.03% in 1996. However, while most other societies of

⁴³ To be noted is that, with respect to labour migration, most already-EU-member states imposed a seven-year ban on the new entrants so, at least in theory, one ought to have expected a relatively minor effect on remittances until 2011, when the bans expired.

⁴⁴ The xenophobic public debates about east European migrants supposedly “inundating” western Europe unfolded with a particular viciousness in France, in the context of the debate on the European Constitutional Treaty (Favell, 2008) and in Britain over the latter government’s decision not to restrict labour migration to citizens of the newly-admitted EU-member states (Martyniak, 2006). About the emerging, *longue-durée* moral-geopolitical patterns of ‘European difference’, see Böröcz (2006) and Melegh (2006).

⁴⁵ Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession to the EU took place on January 1, 2007, and involved seven-year bans on the movement of labour, similar to all other “eastern” entrants.

the region experienced an upward-pointing trajectory or began high and stayed high (as most other successor states of the former Yugoslavia), Slovenia started moving down such that, by 2005, its MRD was 0.74%, a figure that put it well below the global median and almost exactly on the global regression line.




Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012.

Figure 8

MRD by relative wealth, Eastern Europe and states of the world, 2008
(% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap)

By 2008, we see (as in *Figure 8*) the culmination of the trends that began during the previous period. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Romania, Macedonia and Bulgaria each show high MRD levels, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland hover around the median, and the Czech Republic has joined

Slovenia as the other exception in Eastern Europe, of states with low MRD. With their figures at 0.63% and 0.64%, respectively, they show almost exactly the value expected on the basis of the “push-pull” perspective.




Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012.

Figure 9
MRD by relative wealth, successor states of the USSR and states of the world,
1996 (% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap)

It is a testimony to the complexities of the post-Soviet landscape that the data representing the MRD of the successor states of the former USSR⁴⁶ (presented in Figure 9) start with a remarkably wide dispersion. In 1996, Armenia's

⁴⁶ The post-Soviet states are marked by circles in the graphs.

(AM) MRD level already stands at 5.25% of the GDP, while Ukraine (UA) registers 0.013%, showing a difference between two former-Soviet successor states of over 400 times. Next to Armenia, we find Moldova (MD) and Latvia (LT) also considerably above the global median, with Belarus (BY), Lithuania (LV) and Russia (RU) around the intersection of the median and the regression line. Slightly below them, well beneath the global median, we see Kazakhstan (KZ), Kyrgyzstan (KS), Azerbaijan (AZ), Estonia (EE) and Ukraine (UA). Particularly noteworthy are the positions of Ukraine, Estonia and Azerbaijan, because they are particularly far below the regression line, clearly among the world's societies with the lowest levels of migrant remittances.




Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012.

Figure 10

MRD by relative wealth, successor states of the USSR and states of the world, 2000 (% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap)

By 2000 (in *Figure 10*), we see a truly different map. Ukraine has moved up (going from 0.013% to 0.105%, showing a 7.8-fold jump in four years). Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan both show similar upswings, putting Kyrgyzstan just below the global median, slightly trailing behind Kazakhstan and just above Russia and Belarus. Estonia, the wealthiest state in this group, continues with remarkably low levels of MRD. Among the high-MRD states, Moldova and Georgia (GE) are at the top, followed by Armenia and Latvia.




Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012.

Figure 11

MRD by relative wealth, successor states of the USSR and states of the world, 2005 (% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap)

The period of 2000 to 2005 (including, again, the momentous enlargement of the European Union, bringing, from this group, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

into the organization) shows a great flux. During this time, as *Figure 11* suggests, Estonia moved from far beneath to almost exactly on the global median (a jump of 26.7 times, from 0.071% to 1.899%), putting it considerably above the regression line as well. By the mid-2000s, Kyrgyzstan had also been catapulted into the high-MRD category, next to Tajikistan (TJ) and Moldova. Azerbaijan also became a high-MRD state during this period. Ukraine has continued its upward trajectory. By way of a movement in the opposite direction, Georgia's (GE) MRD decreased, but it still remained within the high-MRD category, while Russia and Kazakhstan (KZ) experienced a considerable drop in their MRD.



Source: Computed from Maddison n.d. and IBRD 2012.

Figure 12
MRD by relative wealth, successor states of the USSR and states of the world,
2008 (% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap)

By 2008 (see *Figure 12*), the polarization of the successor states of the USSR had become complete. With a full 49.3% of its GDP coming from migrant remittances, Tajikistan held the world record in remittance dependency for 2008. Moldova and Kyrgyzstan follow suit, with 31.3% and 24%, respectively. Ukraine has finally shot into the high-MRD category so that, all other successor states of the former USSR except Russia and Kazakhstan are above the regression line. Of the latter group, Estonia, Lithuania (LV) and Belarus are on the global median, the rest are considerably above it. Russia and Kazakhstan – two heavily energy- and raw-materials-export-dependent economies of the former USSR that saw considerable international revenue increases due to the consistently high energy prices during the last decade and a half – are the only two in the low-MRD category.

Finally, the last graph (*Figure 13*) plots all post-state-socialist states against the background of the world distribution for 2008.⁴⁷ This presentation allows us to gain a visual sense of the current position of the post-state-socialist former-“bloc” as a whole in the global system of migrant remittances.

Two things are particularly noteworthy about this image. First, and most suggestive, the larger dark circles representing the post-state-socialist societies of the former Soviet-“bloc” have by and large come to be in the top quintile of the global distribution of MRD, almost completely irrespective of their position in the global distribution of income. Tajikistan, Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Armenia are in fact exactly on the very top edge of the distribution of the world’s states, sharing this area only with only such states as Lesotho (LS), Lebanon (RL) and Jordan (HKJ),⁴⁸ known for their extremely high dependence on migrant remittances. Observing the global distribution, even in the second top “layer” we find such post-state-socialist societies as Kyrgyzstan, Albania, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Latvia.

Figure 13 also indicates⁴⁹ the positions of those “third-world” states that had undergone a socialist transformation at some point in their histories but – except for Mongolia – protracted anti-colonial liberation struggles and other wars dominated their socialist history. The list includes Angola (AO), Cambodia (KM), Mongolia (MNG), Mozambique (MZ) and Laos (LA). As *Figure 10* clearly suggests, only Mongolia and Cambodia are above the global median and on or above the regression line; the others are very clearly in the low-MRD category. Overall, none of them show the record-high levels of MRD that eastern Europe and northern Eurasia does.

⁴⁷ The post-state-socialist states are marked by full circles in the graphs.

⁴⁸ Lesotho, Lebanon and Jordan are marked by X signs in the graph.

⁴⁹ These states are marked by transparent squares.



*MRD by relative wealth, all post-state-socialist states and states of the world,
2008 (% of GDP by % of world mean GDP/cap)*

Finally, *Figure 13* also includes a transparent circle marking the Philippines (PHI). The Philippines offers an important point of orientation because its government has maintained, for a generation now, very strong pro-migration- and, more important, pro-migrant-remittance policies. This is so much so that it is accurate to characterize the Philippines, as Robyn Magalit Rodriguez (2010) does, as “a labour-brokering state.” The Philippine government trains selected groups of its citizens in specific skill areas, promotes the life strategy of working abroad as a service to the nation, acts as an agent and a representative of

sorts for them *in lieu* of trade unions and, most important, it makes concerted efforts to enable Philippine citizen migrants to return and repatriate their earnings. In other words, the Philippines ought to be seen as a society in the global South whose government is strongly focused on promoting a high level of migrant remittances.

As *Figure 13* reveals, with its concerted efforts, the Philippine government has managed to achieve a 10.7% level in migrant remittances. Of the group of post-state-socialist states, Tajikistan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania all receive greater proportions of their GDP from remittances, and Armenia is not lagging too far behind. This should help contextualize globally the condition of labour exports in the post-Soviet-“bloc.”

5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

We can isolate three distinct MRD patterns in the post-Soviet context. They are:

- “Global South”-like poor post-state-socialist economies with high MRD throughout the period under study (Tajikistan, Albania, Moldova);
- Medium-to-high MRD early on, followed by precipitous drops (Slovenia, Czech Republic, Russia, Kazakhstan);
- Systematic “march” upward, populating the top quintile in the global plot of remittance dependency (all others, both in Eastern Europe and the former USSR).

The by now quarter-of-a-century-old critique of “push-pull” theories, quoted above, argued that, by themselves, global inequalities in income levels fail to explain the manifold complexities of international migration. The wide dispersion of the world’s societies in terms of the share of migrant remittances in GDP, after controlling for *per capita* GDP above, strongly confirmed this critique.

Examination of the recent experiences of the post-Soviet states added another layer to that critique of the “push-pull” model. For, it is not just that relative income levels do not fully explain the variation in remittance levels; the world’s societies can, and as the post-state-socialist trajectories indicate, very much do, move in the global system along the dimension of remittance dependency. The empirical task for the researcher is, hence, not simply locating a position but following the trajectories of (groups of) societies.

The experience of post-state-socialist societies suggests, clearly, that there is movement in the system. In some exceptional cases that movement can be quite extreme, involving greater than twenty-fold increases in the percentages of the GDP accounted for by migrant remittances over relatively short periods of three to five years. Only a small subgroup of the world’s post-state-socialist societies

(Albania, Moldova and Tajikistan) show evidence of having begun their post-socialist involvement in global labour exports at levels comparable to the most remittance-dependent poor societies of the world. Practically all other erst-while-state-socialist societies examined here travelled quite a distance in the analytical graph. Most of them proceeded upward. This makes the cases of the three or four low-MRD exceptions (each of which began at higher levels and “descended” over time) that much more noteworthy for analytical purposes.

To recap, the post-state-socialist societies of the former-Soviet-“bloc” have recently become highly dependent on migrant remittances, almost completely irrespective of their level of income. There are two sets of exceptions from this regularity. Slovenia and the Czech Republic came down from their initial, mid-to-high-MRD to the regression line during this period, while Russia and Kazakhstan descended from medium-to low to really low levels of MRD (below both the “push-pull” regression line and the global median).

By the end of the period under study, almost all former-state-socialist-“bloc” have shown evidence of specialisation in high dependence on migrant remittances. This is a unique, specific, and, thus far, at least to this author, unknown finding. The implications of the sudden and unique move of the societies of (South-) Eastern Europe and Northern Eurasia to this particular kind of specialisation will require much more analytical space than what is available in the framework of this paper.

The inclusion of Mongolia and the non-contiguous, “former-third-world” former-state-socialist states (as it is done in *Figure 13*) offers an additional clue pointing toward a possible explanation for this striking empirical regularity. Because of the absence of high MRD among the latter group, the simple “post-state-socialism” explanation (one that would argue that specialization on high levels of MRD is somehow caused by the post-state-socialist transformation *per se* – i.e., a combination of a transition to a more formal multiparty political system with the constitutional guarantees for private capital ownership – does not hold by itself.

I do not have a firm alternative explanation to offer in this preliminary analysis. However, I will venture to say that this difference may have something to do with combinations of factors such as the historical legacies of Soviet-style state-socialist policies (industrialization, education, urbanization, collective and individual class mobility, including proletarianisation, etc., during the state socialist period) and the geopolitical presence of two large economies – the European Union and Russia – with intense needs, for their own distinct reasons, for industrially socialized, educated, urbanized and proletarianised and extremely inexpensive labour. In other words, my point is that neither the “transition to democracy,” nor property change, nor the mere cheapness of labour explain these extremely high levels of MRD by themselves.

We could get closer to an understanding of the full complexity of the story by way of a much more detailed examination of the histories of each of these societies in terms of their participation in the Eurasian labour migration systems. It is also important to note that the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Russia and perhaps even Kazakhstan had emerged, during the post-state-socialist period, as strongly migrant-attracting economies, and it stands to reason that the conditions that attract foreign citizens to work there might work as factors that help persuade their own citizens not to seek employment abroad.

REFERENCES

- Adams, R. H. (2008). The Demographic, Economic and Financial Determinants of International Remittances in Developing Countries. *Policy Research Paper 4583, Development Prospects Group, Development Economics Department*, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- Awal, A. (2011). Global Political Economy of Migrant Remittances. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 46(31), pp.108–112.
- Böröcz, J. (2006). Goodness Is Elsewhere: The Rule of European Difference. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 48(1), pp.110–38.
- Böröcz, J. (2009). *The European Union and Global Social Change. A Critical Geopolitical-Economic Analysis*. Cambridge, UK: Routledge.
- Böröcz, J. (2012). Notes on the Geopolitical Economy of Post-State-Socialism. In: D.J. Solinger and N. Bandelj, eds. *Socialism Vanquished / Socialism Challenged (1989–2011)*, New York: Oxford University Press. Ch.5.
- Böröcz, J. (2014). The Collapse of State Socialism in the Soviet Bloc and Global Labor Migration. In: M. Rowlinson, W. Vandekerckhove and R.M.S. Commers, eds. *Labor and Global Justice. Essays on the Ethics of Labor Practices under Globalization*. New York: Lexington Press. Ch.5.
- Cardoso, F. H. (1972). Dependency and Development in Latin America. *New Left Review*, 74, pp.83–95.
- Castles, S. and Delgado-Wise, R. (2007). Introduction. In: Castles S. and Delgado Wise, R., eds., *Migration and Development: Perspectives from the South*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration, pp.1–16.
- de Haas, H. (2007). *Remittances, Migration and Social Development. A Conceptual Review of the Literature*. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Social Development, Social Policy and Development Programme, Paper 34. Available at: <http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/unrisd-remittances-mig-dev> as of October 11, 2012.
- dos Santos, T. (1968). La crisis de la teoría del desarrollo y las relaciones de dependencia in América Latina. *Boletín del CESO*, Santiago, Chile.
- dos Santos, T. (1970). The Structure of Dependence. *The American Economic Review*, 60(2), pp.231–236.
- Favell, A. (2008). The New Face of East-West Migration in Western Europe. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34(5), pp.701–16.
- Foran, J. (2012). Dependency. Entry in: Anheier, H. K. and Juergensmeyer, M., eds., *Encyclopedia of Global Studies*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc., pp.383–386.
- Freund, C. and Spatafora, N. (2005). Remittances: Transaction Costs, Determinants, Informal Flows. *Policy Research Working Paper 3704*, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

- Glytsos, N. (1997). Remitting behavior of 'temporary' and 'permanent' migrants: The case of Greeks in Germany and Australia. *Labour*, 11, pp.409–435.
- Grasmuck, S. and Pessar, P.R. (1991). *Between Two Islands. Dominican International Migration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Guarnizo, L. E. (2003). The Economics of Transnational Living. *International Migration Review*, 37(3), pp. 666–699.
- Helmke, J. (2010). *Remittance-Led Development: Rebuilding Old Dependencies or a Powerful Source of Human Development? A View on Latin America*. Kassel, Germany: Kassel University Press. Available at: <http://www.uni-kassel.de/upress/online/frei/978-3-89958-968-9.volltext.frei.pdf> as of October 11, 2012.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1968). The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin-America. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 82(1), pp.1–32.
- Hujo, K. and Nicola, P. (2007). South-South Migration: Challenges for Development and Social Policy. *Development*, 50, pp.19–25.
- IBRD (2012). *World Development Indicators*. Online data set. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators> as of September 10, 2012.
- Keely, C. B. and Bao Nga Tran (1989). Remittances from Labour Migration: Evaluations, Performance and Implications. *International Migration Review*, 23(3), pp.500–525.
- Koppenberg, S. (2012). Where Do Forced Migrants Stand in the Migration and Development Debate? *Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration*, 2(1), pp.77–90.
- Krilova, N. (2008). *Political Effects of Remittances: Political Participation in Developing Countries*. MA Thesis, Creighton University.
- Landolt, P., Autler, L. and Baires, S. (1999). From Hermano Lejano to Hermano Mayor: The Dialectics of Salvadoran Transnationalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(2), pp.290–315.
- Lueth, E. and Ruiz-Arranz, M. (2006). A Gravity Model of Workers' Remittances. *Working Paper WP/06/290, Asia and Pacific Department*. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
- Lungo, M. and Kandel, S. (1999). Migración internacional y actitudes frente al trabajo en áreas rurales. In: M. Lungo and S. Kandel, eds. *Transformando El Salvador: Migración, Sociedad y Cultura*. San Salvador: Funde. pp.95–124.
- Maddison, A. (n.d). *Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1–2008 AD*. Available at: http://www.ggd.net/MADDISON/ Historical_Statistics /horizontal-file_02-2010.xls, as of March 31, 2011.
- Martyniak, I. (2006). The Polish Plumber and the Image Game. *Eurozine*. Available at: <http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2006-11-15-martyniak-en.pdf> as of October 20, 2012.
- Massey, D.S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouauchi, A., Pellegrino, A. and Taylor, J. E. (1998). *Worlds in Motion. Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Melegh, A. (2006). *On the East-West Slope. Globalization, Nationalism, Racism and Discourses on Central and Eastern Europe*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Portes, A. (2007). Migration and Development: A Conceptual Review of the Evidence. In: S. Castles and R. Delgado-Wise, eds. *Migration and Development: Perspectives from the South*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. pp.17–42.
- Portes, A. and Böröcz, J. (1989). Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation. *International Migration Review*, 23(3), Silver Anniversary Issue, pp.606–630.
- Portes, A., Guarnizo, L. and Landolt, P. (1999). The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promises of an Emergent Research Field. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(2), pp.217–237.

- Puri, S. and Ritzema, T. (1999). Migrant Worker Remittances, Micro-finance and the Informal Economy: Prospects and Issues. *Enterprise and Cooperative Development Department, Social Finance Unit, Working Paper 21*, Geneva: International Labour Office. Available at: http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/uploads/UNCT_Corner/theme5/remittances/Migrant_Worker_Remittances_Micro-finance_and_Informal_Economy.pdf
- Ratha, D. and Silwal, A. (2012). *Migration and Development Brief 18. Remittance Flows in 2011 – An Update*. Migration and Development Unit, Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Available at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief18.pdf> as of September 25, 2012.
- Ratha, D. and Shaw, W. (2007). *South-South Migration and Remittances*. World Bank Working Paper No. 102. Available at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6733/400060PAPER0Mi10082137072301PUBLIC1.txt?sequence=2>.
- Rodriguez, R. M. (2010). *Migrants for Export. How the Philippine State Brokers Workers to the World*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Sarkar, M. (2012). *Bidesh Kara: Bangladeshi Workers and Transnational Temporary Contract Work*. Paper presented in the Modern India History and Society Seminar at the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, May 10, 2012.
- Thieme, S. (2012). Coming Home? Patterns and Characteristics of Return Migration in Kyrgyzstan. *International Migration*, 52(5), 127–143.
- Tilly, C. (1984). *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Vertovec, S. (2004). Migrant Transnationalism and Modes of Transformation. *International Migration Review*, 38(3), pp.970–1001.
- Zelizer, V. (2007). Pasts and Futures of Economic Sociology. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 50, pp.1056–1069.
- Zilberg, E. and Lungo, M. U. (1999). '¿Se han vuelto haraganes?' Jóvenes, migración y identidades laborales'. In: S. Kandel and M. Lungo, eds. *Transformando El Salvador: Migración, Sociedad y Cultura*. San Salvador: Funde. pp.39–94.

DYNAMIC HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF MIGRATION IN ITALY¹

MAURO ALBANI,² ANTONELLA GUARNERI,³ SERENA PIOVESAN⁴

ABSTRACT: *In recent decades Italy has been affected significantly by multiple, complex and varied migratory flows as a consequence of demographic and socio-economic changes in Italian society. The processes, driven by the country's social conditions, have more or less over 20 years seen Italy change from a country of emigration into a destination country characterised by significant inflows. As a result of the economic crisis, recent years appear to show a resurgence of emigration, with numbers and conditions differing from the past. Immigration continues to be an integral part of the country's social and demographic structure; indeed, it is the predominant factor in population growth today. To understand these dynamics, this article analyses historical official statistics taking a medium- to long-term perspective that also considers changes in migratory systems, especially in South Eastern Europe. For a better understanding of the phenomenon, we describe the Italian situation within the framework of the main theories of migration change.*

¹ This article draws up the Italian Country Report (Albani et. al, 2013) prepared within the framework of “Dynamic historical analysis work package” in the SEEMIG project, a research project entitled “Managing Migration and its Effects in South-East Europe: Transnational Actions towards Evidence Based Strategies” (SEEMIG - SEE/C/0006/4.1/X), realized from a research grant provided by the South East Europe Transnational Cooperation Programme (www.seemig.eu). This paper benefits from the latest official data (published after publication of the SEEMIG Report) and from population series (both stock and migration flows) reconstructed by Istat on the basis of last census. Special thanks to Prof. Bruno Dalago and to Dr. Gert Guri, both at Trento University in Italy, who co-ordinated the activities linked to the Italian SEEMIG report and to Dr. Attila Melegh, project leader of SEEMIG, Hungarian Demographic Research Institute, Budapest, for his essential suggestions. The contents of this paper are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of the Italian National Institute of Statistics.

² Istat – Italian National Institute of Statistics – Rome (RM), Italy. E-mail: albani@istat.it

³ Istat – Italian National Institute of Statistics – Rome (RM), Italy. E-mail: Guarneri@istat.it

⁴ University of Trento – Trento (TN), Italy. E-mail: serethom@yahoo.it

Keywords: migration, Italy, inflows, outflows, migratory balance, foreign resident population, models of demographic change

1 INTRODUCTION

Since mid-1970s Italy has increasingly played the role of destination country. Without a doubt, this fact has been due to internal factors partly analogous to those of other, more traditional, migrant settlement countries in Europe: the period of economic growth which began in the 1950s and 1960s, which improved health, environmental and socio-economic conditions in the country (with the most significant progress recorded by the fall in infant mortality rate), demographic change characterised by a marked increase in life expectancy and a fall in fertility with consequential ageing of the population, increase in the female labour market activity rate.

Considering the aspects most linked to the international and geopolitical situation, the labour demand generated by economic development was for a certain period met by internal migration (especially from “Mezzogiorno”). Lately, in the 1970s, Italy like other Euro-Mediterranean countries began to recruit workers from abroad. Inflows in the early 1970s already exceeded outflows. However, a marked growth of inflows was recorded in the past decade: the migration balance in the period 2002–2011 was equal to 2,665,000 people, a huge figure that highlights the extent to which Italy’s demographic growth has primarily been due to migratory dynamics.⁵ The flows have reduced with the advent of the economic crisis, falling well below the peaks seen in the second half of the first decade of the new century (less than 568,000 between 2012 and 2014), even though immigration is still the factor that prevents the demographic decline.

In Italy, governance of migration, in particular migration and integration policies, must form a significant part in analysis of the phenomenon. The Italian state has pursued an array of these. The overview provided here highlights the changes that have taken place over recent decades, but it also emphasises some important continuities, mainly identifiable as the political rejection of an active immigration policy, high administrative discretion in the treatment of foreigners, and legal obstacles raised against integration of the regularised foreign population. It is also worth considering constraints imposed by the Italian constitutional order and by international conventions signed by Italy.

Governance of immigration has had an important role in defining not only the composition of the foreign population in Italy but also the characteristics of its socio-economic integration. The results of this are the high number of irregular (or illegal) entries into Italy, and the structural quota of irregular immigrants employed in the informal economy.

⁵ In this paper we consider the figures for years 2002–2011 as deriving from the population balances reconstructed on the basis of the 2011 Population and housing census.

This paper analyses the migratory phenomena that have affected Italy over the last sixty years. It considers various dimensions of migrations by focusing on the impact of both endogenous and exogenous factors. A historical perspective (in terms of political and socio-economic changes) is required to better understand and explain the migration dynamics that have occurred more recently. The main theories on migration provide a framework to analyse and contextualise the Italian situation.

2 THEORETICAL APPROACH

The relationship between demographic phenomena, cultural identity and a multi-ethnic society in a period of increasing migration flows characterised by dynamic and continuous growth, is an important theme to consider. There is no a unique theory for explaining migration; instead, a multi-disciplinary approach is required. In this context, the concept of the “migration system” is essential to describe the situation. It can be said that

“calls for a systems approach tend to follow from a recognition that to capture the changing trends and patterns of contemporary international migration requires a dynamic perspective. Consideration of the causes or consequences of international migration from either a sending - or a receiving - country perspective often fails to take into account the dynamics associated with the evolution of the flow, from its origins, through the shifts in its composition and volume as it matures, return migration and remittances. We also have to note that policies and structural conditions not only at the destination but also at countries of origin also shape migration.” (Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992)

Zelinsky (1971) conceptualised and analysed the systematic changes of different forms of migration along the lines of the demographic transition, splitting it into five stages: the pre-modern traditional society, the early transitional society, the late transitional society, the advanced society and the future super-advanced society. In ‘a future “super-advanced” society’, in which both fertility and mortality are very low, spatial mobility is very high and its tendency increases gradually due to circular forms of migration (Fassmann and Musil, 2013).

The model of migration transition, as an extension of the demographic transition model, describes the empirical observation that countries change (for example) from an emigration to an immigration country when it is difficult to guarantee demographic dynamism. Countries that face this crucial turning point are ‘learning’ to manage immigration, which is for them a new situation after a

long period of emigration (Fassmann and Reeger, 2012). This adaptation process can be described as a migration cycle.

The migration cycle theory, which follows a macro approach, focuses less on migrants and more on the migration process itself. According to this theory, the main question to answer is: “How do migration flows change over time?” (Fassmann and Musil, 2013).

Table 1
The concept of migration cycle

Domain	Starting stage	Transition stage	Adaptation stage
Demographic and labour market	Young population; surplus of labour supply and unemployment; Emigration exceeds immigration	Decrease in labour supply as time lag to decrease in birth; economic increase enhances demand; net migration turns positive	Decrease in labour supply and economic growth require continued immigration; net migration constantly positive
Public intervention	Regulation of emigration; immigration is not a topic of the public discourse	Conflicting public opinion; migration policy oriented on labour market	Increase consensus building; differentiated management of migration; focus also on integration

Source: Fassmann, Musil and Gruber (2014).

The starting position can be described by a situation in which emigration is more important than immigration because the population is young and there is a surplus of labour supply. Then, during an intermediate or transition stage, during which a decrease in labour market supply consequent to a decrease in birth is experienced, a former emigration country gradually becomes a new immigration country. The steps have different durations and characteristics but immigration already generally tends to outweigh emigration during the second stage. The third stage, called the adaptation stage or post-transformation stage, is characterised by a decrease in labour market supply, economic growth and a constantly positive net migration. Immigration plays the role of replacing the shortage observed in working population in the situation of a growing economy.

To investigate the causes of migration, one of the most popular theoretical models is the so-called “push-pull” model. It is the combination of a set of negative factors (or “push” factors) registered at the place of origin that drive people to migrate, and a set of positive factors (or “pull” factors) that attract migrants to the place of destination. The “push” factors are mainly represented by economic, social and political problems faced in the poorest countries, while the “pull” factors include comparative advantages found in the richest countries. This combination determines the size and direction of migration flows (Massey, 1999).

Economic and political factors are prevalent in initiating a migratory event, but only once the migration process takes place we can see the emergence of new factors such as personal choices and ties. The neoclassical theory considers macro-economic development of the labour market. Neoclassical micro-economic models instead turn their attention to the labour market, but focusing on cost-benefit calculations made by potential migrants, not only pertaining to the decision to establish a migratory event but also to the choice of destination. In this calculation individual and psychological reasons produce results that differ from individual to individual, depending on, for instance, the willingness to look for work and the level of education possessed (Schoorl, 1994).

Currently, and in contrast with traditional theoretical approaches to migration, the perspective of rational individual strategies in the labour market is losing its central position compared to other determinants of migration processes. In fact, non-individual factors are gradually gaining considerable attention in new studies as a part of the “new economics of migration”, which focus on families rather than on individuals (Bonifazi and Gesano, 2002). The micro-economic theories do focus, therefore, alternately on the individual (cost-benefit model) or on the family (new economics of migration).

Economic development, at least in its early stages, does not reduce but rather promotes the growth of migration flows. Migration continues to increase with income until an income threshold is reached. It is only over the longer-term, and when the development differentials are reduced significantly, when flows decrease. This is the model defined as the “migration hump”, which describes the relationship between outward migration and level of a country’s development (Martin and Taylor, 1996). When a country registers an increase in the level of economic wealth, the number of emigrants increases because they are able to finance and organise their emigration; as wealth increases emigration declines (Melegh, 2013).

According to Castles and Miller (1993; 2009) the ‘Age of Migration’ is a period during which international migration underwent acceleration. It is a globalised and diversified process becoming increasingly politicised and characterised by a progressive feminisation. The conceptual framework in which these changes took place is represented by the growth of ‘transnational societies’, in which a crucial role is played by newly arrived ethnic minorities. Castles and Miller’s study adopts a broader perspective, defining a four-stage model useful for different situations. The stages can synthetically be described as: 1) temporary labour migration; 2) prolongation of stay and development of social networks; 3) increasing orientation towards the receiving countries; 4) permanent settlement.

This model recalls the four different stages of migration identified by the Böhning model (1984). In phase 1 come a small number of immigrants, generally male, young, unmarried, and coming from the most developed areas of the country of origin, i.e. the big cities; they find employment in marginal positions and tend to stay abroad for short periods. In phase 2 come other waves of immigrants: they are mainly men and their average age is slightly higher; they are encouraged and motivated by the stories and the social ties of migrants who migrated first. In phase 3 the immigrants begin to stabilise, family reunions are held and female and minor presence increases. Meanwhile, a new immigrant wave from less developed countries begins, starting again with young unmarried men, but with lower levels of human and social capital. In step 4 the immigration process reaches maturity. This phase is associated with the development of ethnic institutions, such as associations, schools, shops, religious centres, etc.

Migration dynamics can be studied at different levels, generally following a macro or a micro analytical perspective. Additional attention, however, is deserved at the so-called meso level, which represents a crucial perspective linking these more conventional levels of analysis. The meso level of analysis has emerged more recently compared to the other two (Faist, 2000), and posits that it is not only families and households, but also other important social ‘clusters’ (besides economic, political and cultural institutions) that influence migrants’ decisions to move, stay or return (IOM, 2001).

Migration dynamics seem to be determined by the presence and functioning of a variety of networks at different levels of aggregation. Migration networks can be defined as

“groups of social ties formed on the basis of kinship, friendship and common origin. They link migrants and non-migrants together in a system of reciprocal obligations and mutual expectations. They develop rapidly because the act of migration itself generates network connections; every new migrant creates a group of friends and relatives with a social tie to someone with valuable migrant experience. Networks bring about the cumulative causation of migration because every new migrant reduces the costs of migration for a group of non-migrants, thereby inducing some of them to migrate, creating new network ties to the destination area for another group of people, some of whom are also induced to migrate, creating more network ties, and so on” (Massey, 1990).

As such, migration seems to be a process that simultaneously depends upon and creates social networks, assuming the characteristics of a self-feeding process. *“It is not people who migrate but networks.”* (Tilly, 1990, cited in Faist, 2000)

It is difficult to consider migration as a unified and separate ‘whole’ because it is a dynamic phenomenon. As integration proceeds, it is not necessarily the

case that there is a concomitant loosening of ties with the country of origin. Progressive inclusion in the host country seems to be a crucial step in the overall process of integration. But, and at the same time, in many cases ties with family and friends in the country of origin remain important. The migrant can play the role of an ‘agent of development’, by creating and maintaining ties with two different social realities.

“Terms such as transnational social spaces, transnational social fields or transnational social formations usually refer to sustained ties of geographically mobile persons, networks and organisations across the borders across multiple nation-states.” (Faist, 2006)

There are three main prerequisites for a migrant to become an “agent of change and development”: financial capital, human capital and social capital (Cassarino, 2004). Migrants can count on social capital in both the country of origin and the destination country. Both of these forms of social capital play an essential role because the resource is used to transfer and retransfer the other forms of capital (financial and human) (Faist, 1997).

If emigration is seen as a definitive project,⁶ return migration can signify a failure. By contrast, if the migration was temporary from the outset then the moment of return represents success and the accomplishment of a project. Between these two extremes lie intermediate positions, not least because intentions are susceptible to change.

3 A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

3.1 Political and socio-economic long-term changes in Italy

In order to better understand changes in the history of migration in Italy, it is necessary to provide a preliminary analysis of the evolution of the economic and social environment of the country over the last 60 years. According to well-known theories (e. g. ‘push and pull’), the economic and social situation of a country affects the direction and intensity of migration flows. As a result of profound economic change and development after the end of the Second World War, Italy became one of the largest economies in the world. It boomed be-

⁶ Even if migration can never be defined as ‘definitive’, it is the migration project that can be defined as temporary or otherwise.

tween 1950 and 1970, and continued growing during the 1980s and through to the late 1990s. Indeed, after the Second World War Italy underwent a period of major reconstruction, but for the south of the country it actually meant construction, because the area was quite poorly developed before the war. These were the years of great internal flows from the south to the big cities of the north. This migration accelerated the process of urbanisation.

Macro-economic developments are crucial to explaining the changes that occurred in the demographic and social structure of the Italian population in the period under review. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Italian ‘economic miracle’ took place with particularly high growth rates. This rapid and sustained growth was due to the emergence of new industries, to the modernisation of most Italian cities, such as Milan, Rome and Turin, and to the aid given to the country after the Second World War (notably the Marshall Plan). The 1970s and 1980s were characterised by investments in the south of the country (through the funds of the “Cassa per il Mezzogiorno”). At the beginning of the 1990s, Italy became the fourth largest global economic power, overtaking France. In more recent years Italy’s strength has moved from its big enterprises or corporations to small or medium-sized family-owned businesses, mainly located in the north-western ‘economic/industrial triangle’ (Milan-Turin-Genoa). Until 2007, GDP per capita continued to grow; thereafter, the ‘global’ economic recession affected the country severely. In recent decades, Italy’s economic growth has been stagnant. The application of measures to reduce internal and external debt, to liberalise the economy, and to stop tax evasion, allowed Italy to enter the Eurozone, but led the country to fall into an economic recession some years later.

Economic growth since 1970 has involved the services sector in particular and, at a lesser extent, the industry. In fact, the level of GDP recorded in the agriculture sector was low at the beginning of the 1970s, and subsequent growth was slower than in the other two sectors.⁷ It is useful to recall that in March 1957 Italy was one of the six founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC), alongside Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany.⁸ Upon entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the EEC was renamed the European Community (EC), in order to reflect its coverage of a wider range of policies. This was also when the three European

⁷ These trends are confirmed by looking at the time series of employed persons by economic sector. The share of employed persons in services was 46% in 1977, not much higher than the share in industry (38%); the gap has gradually increased to 68% for services and 28% for industry. Of less importance is the share of employment in agriculture, which was 16% in 1977 and which had decreased to 4% in 2011.

⁸ Italy was the driving force behind the right of free movement of labour in the EEC established in 1958 (Romero, 1993).

Communities (EURATOM, ECSC, EEC) were merged to constitute the first of the three pillars of the European Union (EU), which the treaty also founded. The European integration process has moved through important stages and enlarged to the extent that it now comprises (28 countries). Italy was also among the countries that adopted the euro as its official currency from the outset. This gradually created a large open space for migration, though it did not reduce inequalities between countries and macro-regions.

Despite the considerable outflows registered in the first part of the period considered, the population resident in Italy grew constantly, increasing from 47,539,000 in 1952 to 60,796,000 as of 1 January 2015. At the beginning the increase was mainly due to strong natural growth, whereas in recent decades it has been due to immigration and the subsequent growth of the foreign population due to its higher fertility rate than in the non-migrant population. In recent years, however, population growth has slowed (only +13,000 people in 2014): even a positive migration balance is no longer able to offset the fall in fertility and the high number of deaths due to the relatively old age structure of the Italian population.

The slow and inexorable decline in fertility in some developed countries, including Italy, has reached critical levels and has led some influential demographers, notably Ron Lestaege and Dirk van de Kaa, to speak of a “Second Demographic Transition”.⁹ This is a theory that associates the decline in fertility to family and value changes that have taken place since the Second World War, but it does not present a model with phases, as occurred in the First Transition. Such changes consider the more prolonged stay of young people in the family of origin, often for more than 30 years, the net delay in marriage and even the renunciation of marriage for consensual unions. Concerning childbearing, marital fertility decreases more than the fertility outside marriage.

The infant mortality rate is a key indicator of a country’s evolution in terms of health development, especially for women during pregnancy and for mothers and newborns at the moment of delivery. From a strictly demographic point of view, the rate also helps to identify the different phases of the demographic transition process. Progressive decrease of infant mortality – from 63.8 per

⁹ The pattern of the (first) demographic transition is a model that allows us to describe the transition from a population with high levels of fertility and mortality to a population with low birth and mortality rates. In the transitional phase, the gap between the birth rate and the mortality rate increases and a phase of expansion occurs. In the post-transitional phase, the gap between birth and mortality rates is the same as during the pre-transitional phase, but the levels are low with a tendency towards zero population growth.

1000 live births recorded at the beginning of the 1950s to the rather low 3.2 observed in 2012; the mid-1970s value (just over 20 per 1000) testifies to the conclusion of the demographic transition process and marks the start of the second demographic transition. This decrease generated a clear increase life expectancy: it was 67.2 for men and 63.7 for women at the beginning of the 1950s, whereas by 2014 it had risen to 80.2 for men and 84.9 for women.

3.2 *The history of Italian migration and its changing role*

Italy has had a long history of emigration since the unification of the country in 1861. After the Second World War, European countries became major new destinations (especially Switzerland, Germany and France) in addition to the traditional destination countries on the other side of the Atlantic (Argentina, the United States and Brazil).¹⁰ Emigration from southern Italy was mainly transatlantic (the United States, Canada, Latin America and Australia) whereas northern Italians generally emigrated to Europe due to the shorter distance – and consequent lower travel costs. This was particularly the case for migration flows to Germany because of application of the *Gastarbeiter* ('guest worker') model from the 1960s, according to which the so-called *Gastarbeiter* were recruited as low-skilled workers in the industrial sector. Children born to *Gastarbeiter* received the right to reside in Germany, but they were not granted citizenship. The Netherlands and Belgium had similar though smaller-scale schemes.

As a matter of fact, the number of Italian emigrants who chose Germany as the destination country grew progressively: in 1911 emigrants to Germany stood at 65,000 (more than 190,000 to the United States), whereas in 1961 they reached a peak of 114,000 (16,000 to the United States). As such, we witness a definite change in preference of destination country, presumably also as a result of the restrictive policies of the United States. During this period remittances were crucial for revitalising the Italian current account balance of payments. In the north and east return migration was encouraged, but in the south it encountered a more difficult environment, mostly in terms of re-entry into the local labour market and possibility of investments in new enterprises and trade activities.

As stated, the destination of mass internal migration from the south of Italy, especially in the 1950s and early 1960s, was the industrial north. Italian emigration reached its peak in the mid-1960s. Then, after the 1973 oil crisis, when the traditional countries of destination applied stricter immigration policies, Ita-

¹⁰ Large numbers of Italian emigrants also went to Venezuela and Canada, and Italian diasporas were also established in Chile, Peru, Mexico, Paraguay, Cuba and Costa Rica. Mass emigration to America ended in the most part in the 1960s, even if it continued to a lesser extent until the 1980s to Canada and United States.

ly changed its role in the international migratory context. Indeed, Italy, like the other countries on the northern shore of the Mediterranean, began to be an attractive destination country itself. Thereafter, the theoretical approach of the Mediterranean immigration model was created. Italy began evolving into an immigration country most clearly in the 1970s. However, then migration flows into Italy were more moderate in size yet well integrated in local realities which were fairly well organised (Sciortino and Colombo, 2004). In the early 1970s it was quite easy to enter Italy because border controls were not rigorous, as in all the other European countries of the Mediterranean area at that time. In fact, only identity documents were checked at the border, and it was assumed that the foreigner had sufficient economic resources to be able to stay in the country for the period stated. There were no specific rules for foreigners intending to work in Italy because this situation was not legally considered. For over a decade Italy was marked by a legislative vacuum in this regard, and it used regularisations to legalise the positions of foreign citizens who had been settled in Italy for years. In particular, when analysing Italian immigration policy and the recruitment of foreign workers, a paradox should be highlighted:

“the same political system that has always stressed the importance of an active management of (defined-as-needed) labour flows... has never paid a consistent effort to the design and implementation of programmes targeted to reach such a goal” (Sciortino, 2009, p.3).

In the 1970s and early 1980s the first wave of immigrants consisted mainly of Tunisian workers employed in Sicilian agriculture and the fishing industry, and of immigrant women from Latin America, Asia and the former Italian colonies in Africa who found employment in domestic work. The number of immigrants grew progressively, as did the number of nationalities concerned. Citizens from Maghreb countries became more common, but other nationalities also increased in number, including citizens from Philippines (mostly women) hired as domestic workers in the well-off families of the big cities (such as Rome and Milan) and citizens from China who worked in retail, restaurants, and textile manufacturing particularly in central Italy. At the same time, eastern European citizens became increasingly important. In particular, immigration from the Balkans was one of the new features of migration to Italy in the 1990s, and it involved three main countries of origin: Albania, Romania and the former Yugoslavia. Italy had to manage population flows with different characteristics because large numbers came to Italy, in many cases women and children fleeing war in the first half of the 1990s and in need of assistance, care and protection.

After the conflicts, two significant increases (in 1996 and 1999) were observed in the foreign population (both in terms of permits required to stay and in resident population registers); they occurred as a result of two regularisation laws that legalised the residence in Italy of illegal immigrants from the Balkans.

It was Albanians and Romanians who took the greatest advantage of the opportunity to regularise their immigration status (Bonifazi, Conti and Mamolo, 2006). The subsequent waves created a kaleidoscope of citizenships that evolved also considering the other characteristics of migrants. The progressive feminisation of flows was apparent, as well as a stabilisation process whereby it is often more appropriate to speak of families rather than individuals (marriages in Italy, children born in Italy, family reunifications). The increase in the number of acquisition of the Italian citizenship and the emergence of the “second generation” are just two examples of this process.

The number and composition of the foreign resident population in Italy has also been linked to the migration policies adopted in Italy and with various EU enlargements. In this general framework, it is important to note that employees are the main beneficiaries of programmes of regularisation (in particular blue collar workers and women employed in domestic service to families). A further crucial factor has been the entry into the EU of Romania in 2007, and the subsequent growth of immigrants from that country able to stay in Italy by directly enrolling on the municipal resident population registers.

It should be underlined that in recent years the foreign resident population in Italy seems to have slowed down. This is probably a result of a reduction in inflows and a parallel increase in outflows, in turn due to the economic crisis, and to the number of foreign people that became Italian (especially by naturalisation, automatic transmission and claim).¹¹

4 CHANGES SINCE 2000

The first 15 years of the new millennium was a crucial period for Italy. In the 2000s the Italian economy entered a phase of stagnation characterised by extremely low growth. Later, and as a result of the global economic crisis, the country has fallen into a period of outright recession from which it is still struggling to recover. It is worth separately analysing the latest major changes in the political and socio-economic situation of the country in this more recent period because they have conditioned the evolution of migration patterns and models described thereafter, together with the changes in the international framework.

¹¹ The claim system refers to foreigners born in Italy who obtain the Italian citizenship upon request with the condition of continuous residence in Italy until the legal age of 18.

4.1 Socio-demographic and political development


4.1.1 Demographic and social development

The population balance in Italy has been constantly positive over the past 15 years, mainly due to the positive migration balance. At the beginning of 2015 the total population residing in Italy amounted to 60,795,612. The trends in population dynamics have been constant and rapid since 2001, almost entirely due to considerable immigration from abroad during this period, especially because of the inclusion of new member states in the European Union. The average variation rate calculated between 2002 and 2015 was 0.5 per cent, a value that accounts for a growth of approximately 3,800,000 residents, starting from 57 million at the beginning of the period. The age dependency ratio on the same date was 55.1: for every 100 residents aged 15–64 there were 55 aged 0–14 or 65 years and over. The mean age as of 1 January 2015 was 44.4 and the age structure was typical of an ‘old’ population. The ageing index (the ratio between the elderly and the young) has been heavily influenced by all these factors and reaching 157.7 percent. Demographic processes have also determined the rise in the elderly population, the fall in the young population, the rise in survival rates, and the fertility rate well below the level of generational turnover (2.1 children per woman).

The mortality trend has been quite constant in recent years. As discussed above, the completed process of demographic transition started with the drop in mortality, in particular infant mortality. A crucial dimension of a population’s well-being – besides strictly economic indicators such as GDP – is life expectancy at birth. The trend of life expectancy at birth (*Figure 1*) is constantly upwards; it is higher for women, but the gap is narrowing because men and women’s lifestyles are increasingly similar. This indicator shows high values also compared with European and other countries around the world. The connection with the ageing of the population cannot be overlooked.


In this overall framework of ageing, the other component to consider is fertility. In 1995 Italian total fertility rate (TFR) fell to its lowest level (1.19 children per woman); thereafter the general fertility trend recovered to reach a peak in 2010 (*Figure 2*). This new peak can be described as part of the general pattern of the end of ‘lowest-low fertility’, but how can the subsequent renewed decrease be explained? The economic recession could be a valid answer, if we take the ‘period fertility’ point of view. However, fertility decline during a re-

cession is temporary, and it is usually followed by a compensatory rise (Sobotka, Skirbekk and Philipov, 2011).



Source: Istat – Italian National Institute of Statistics.

Figure 1
Life expectancy at birth, 2001–2014



Source: Istat – Italian National Institute of Statistics.

Figure 2
Total fertility rate (TFR) by citizenship of mothers, 2004–2014

Within this general framework of fertility in Italy, it is interesting to focus on the growing number of births with at least one foreign parent. Their increasing proportion is mainly due to the decreasing number of Italian births. Despite the increase in births with at least one foreign parent, the TFR has slowly declined in recent years. As is well known, after a certain amount of time immigrant women start to exhibit the fertility and family behaviour of the native population. However, this time-based perspective is not totally appropriate because the foreign-born population is particularly dynamic both in terms of its composition by nationality and of different reproductive behaviours. In fact, each nationality has different demographic characteristics (e.g. composition by gender and age), migratory and familiar models, and all these specificities influence the TFR.

4.2. Changes in international migration and the characteristics of migrants

4.2.1. The Italian legal system and the evolution of migration policies

The first legislative provision on immigration in 1986 introduced equal rights between foreign and local workers, together with family reunification procedures. However, this first provision did not provide any measure for the integration of the resident foreign population, which continued to rely on short-term residence permits. The entry policies were too complex to be implemented, and responsibility lay with employers. The various failures in this regard would also be apparent in subsequent immigration legislation. In addition, regularisation, a term which was officially used for the first time, soon became a political instrument and, according to the legislators, an inevitable one. In short, as Sciortino (2009, p. 4) writes, “*unsurprisingly, the real kernel of immigration policy for most of the ‘90s was the tolerance of entries through the back door, thus constantly producing a sizeable segment of irregular workers that, at nearly regular intervals, was absorbed into the official labour market through an amnesty*”.

The growing number of irregular migrants eventually led to approval of Law 39/90 in 1990. This law, usually referred to as the Martelli Law, had the aim of remedying the deficiencies of the previous legislation. It focused on three fundamental issues: 1) disciplining entries and stays, 2) abolishing the geographical limitation for refugees, and 3) launching a new regularisation procedure for self-employed workers. This law was notable for the large number it concerned (around 350,000). However, the legislation is known for the establishment of extremely rigid entry conditions. This is because immigration had attracted public attention – for the first time it was perceived as a threat, and fear became attached to the collective image of the ‘foreigner’. However, the pressure of pub-

lic opinion was not the only factor pushing for restrictive entry policies. Rules and procedures on border controls, with which Italy had to comply after subscribing to the Schengen Agreement in June 1990, also had a role in this development.

The most ambitious attempt to systematically restructure migration legislation was the Turco-Napolitano Law (40/1998). Its main aim was to adjust the fragmented framework by acknowledging the fundamental role of the local authorities in receiving foreigners and dealing with their social integration. Moreover, this law reformed control systems and regularised migration flows. It provided for the issuance of a governmental planning paper (every three years or longer) which would establish the general criteria for acceptance of non-Community workers in order to render the number of immigrants compatible with the so-called 'carrying capacity' (compatibility with the availability of working positions, housing and services). The entire procedure was based on the notion that demand had to match supply prior to the entry of foreign workers. Law 40/1998 also introduced a residence card (a long-term permit which can be requested after five years of uninterrupted residence in Italy in the absence of a criminal record and with an adequate income), the sponsor, and much criticised detention centres (CPT). The law envisaged the possibility of involving the states of origin and transit in regularisation, and establishing preferential quotas of citizens from those countries which had accepted the agreement. On 25 July 1998, Law 40/98 became a Consolidation Act on the provisions concerning the disciplining of immigration and the standards on the condition of foreigners, including old and new provisions.

Finally, Italian policies of the last decade were based on the idea of immigration as a cause of social conflicts, which led to measures intended to restrict entry but also the rights of legally resident immigrants. The issue was then partially changed by Law no. 189 of 2002 (the so-called Bossi-Fini Law), which came into full force in 2005, and by the so called 'security package' (Law 94/2009) amending the *Testo unico delle disposizioni concernenti la disciplina dell'immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero* (Legislative Decree No 286/1998 of 25 July 1998) consolidating the provisions regulating immigration and the rules relating to the status of foreign nationals. It contains measures which aim to control immigration more tightly and regulate it more rigorously. Three significant differences ensued with respect to the 1998 Consolidation Act: the residence period necessary to obtain a residence card became six years (instead of five); the conditions for issuing the residence card were tightened; and the deadline for the residence permit's renewal at the police headquarters was prolonged to 90 days before expiry. Furthermore, the so-called 'residence contract' was introduced. This explicitly bound entry into Italy for work purposes to the existence of a job offer prior to entry, so that renewal of the permit depended on uninterrupted status as an employed worker. To some extent it hardened the measures designed to contain the flow of immigrants from foreign

countries and at the same time paved the way for the above-mentioned possibility of regularisation. In fact, a regularisation took place following the entry into force of the “Bossi-Fini Law”.

In 2009 further restrictive legislation on public safety was approved, and mainly addressed the issue of irregular immigration (already mentioned in the ‘security package’). Law 94/2009 thus introduced the controversial offence of ‘illegal entry and/or stay’, which was punished with a fine of 5,000 to 10,000 euros imposed on foreigners who entered and stayed in Italy illegally. In 2011 the European Court of Justice did not approve the offence of illegal entry and/or stay introduced in Italy because it appeared to conflict with the European directive on the repatriation of citizens from third countries.

Within the so-called “*Pacchetto di stimolo all’economia*” – economic stimulus package – (Law 3 August 2009, n. 102, conversion into law with amendments of the Decree-Law of 1 July 2009, n. 78), the Government included an amendment (art. 1-c) to establish a procedure for the emergence of irregular employment relationships. Employers who on 30 June 2009 had employed Italian or foreign workers on an irregular basis for at least three months could make use of this new procedure to regularise the workers. Non-EU nationals without a permit for work purposes, those employed with families as domestic workers, or those assisting persons suffering from illness or disability, could thus regularise their positions.

In 2010 the Italian government introduced an ‘Integration agreement on foreigners applying for a residence permit’, which came into force in March 2012. With this agreement made between the Italian state and citizens from third countries entering Italy for the first time and requesting a residence permit of at least one year, the foreigner pledged to learn the Italian language, acquire a sufficient knowledge of civic culture and civil life in Italy, fulfil the obligation of education for minor children, and respect tax liabilities and social insurance obligations. This agreement was structured as a credits system, so that the foreign citizen could gain or lose credits depending on his or her activities.

Migration policies today are increasingly complex. The two main areas of interest are: “immigration policies” and “immigrant policies”. In the former, in addition to political asylum they include entry, residence and expulsion, the police and border control. The second area of interest, however, is related to integration of immigrants.¹² These two areas differ not only thematically, but also

¹² When it comes to integration there are multiple areas of interest: the labour market; housing; health; education; political participation and representation; protection of the com-

provide quite dissimilar guidelines. In the former case, a continuous consultation and ongoing co-ordination between different countries (at least among neighbouring countries) is not only desirable but necessary for working effectively against the illegal entry of illegal immigrants and the odious phenomenon of trafficking. On the other hand, integration is an issue that every country “should” be able to deal with in a more autonomous way, along the common lines outlined by the EU but adapted to needs and traditions.

Furthermore, the so-called “comprehensive approach” essentially consists of managing international migration by working on its different dimensions and its various stages of development (Pastore, 2000). The three levels to which a political legislation should address to are: 1) the causes of migration (by controlling the push factors), 2) migration in progress (planning regular migration and limiting irregular migration), and 3) the integration of immigrants into society arrival.

4.2.2 The evolution of net migration

The migration trend shown by official statistics has always been strongly influenced in Italy by changes in national immigration legislation. The inflows have historically been particularly influenced by the various regularisation programmes introduced by governments. The regularisations have led to the emergence in the official figures of immigration.

In addition to national legislation, international and European law also influenced immigration into Italy during the first decade of this century. In particular, during the period examined, the national transposition into law (April 2007) of EU legislation¹³ establishing the right of EU citizens to move and reside freely in other EU countries has affected the number of immigrants in Italy. In addition, the more or less simultaneous entry into the European Union of two new countries (Romania and Bulgaria) in 2007, following on from the previous entry of ten other countries (Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Slovenia)¹⁴ in May 2004, also affected immigration trends. The official data reflect all these changes in the legal and policy context. The number of Italian nationals residing abroad entered the country, between 2002 and 2014, was very low compared to the num-

munity and crime; discrimination and racism. The main areas on which the concept of integration unfolds are: legal, social, cultural and economic.

¹³ European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states.

¹⁴ On 1 July 2013 Croatia joined the EU.

ber of foreigners. This does not hold for emigration, especially for recent years. It must be said that de-registrations have probably been underestimated.¹⁵


The total population (Italian plus foreign) net migration balance was constantly positive between 2002 and 2015, ranging from about 157,000 in 2006 to about 436,000 in 2007. These figures are the result of strongly positive immigration flows (*Figure 3*) and low negative emigration flows when considering all foreign (EU and non-EU) countries. In fact, while immigration varied between 277,631 in 2014 and 629,075 in 2007, with an average of more or less 444,000 per year, emigration remained at an average of 195,000 per year. As stated, the total net migration balance has always been positive, but it varied widely during the period considered. Substantial annual values were recorded first in 2003-2004 (+407,799 and +362,912 respectively) as a result of the regularisation programme of 2002-2003 for domestic workers, caregivers and other relevant employees. The regularisation involved non-EU nationals without residence permits and who were employed in enterprises, or by families as caregivers or domestic helpers. This regularisation led to the increase in official statistics of immigrants with nationalities that were previously numerically not well represented in Italy, particularly Ukrainians. At the end of 2002, Ukrainian nationals had fewer than 13,000 residents in Italy.

A year later, at the end of 2003, with about 58,000 residents, it was one of the top ten most represented nationalities in Italy. After another 12 months, at the end of 2004, having moved three places higher in the ranking, it reached fifth place, the position it has maintained until today. Other peaks were recorded in 2007-2008 (+435,999 and +356,178). These are particularly large numbers, especially when one considers that they were recorded in the absence of regularisation measures. Nonetheless, they were the consequence of two major events in 2007: the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the European Union, and the subsequent entry into force in Italy in April of the same year of the aforementioned legislation on the free movement and residence of EU citizens in the countries of the Union, which had an immediate impact on immigration statistics in Italy.¹⁶ Romania became in the immediately following years the

¹⁵ In order to estimate the number of de-registrations of foreign residents who actually leave Italy the de-registrations “for other reasons” are added to the ones abroad. The first ones are mainly de-registrations of untraceable people made on the initiative of municipal offices or due to the expiration of the residence permit. Data reconstructed on the basis of the census take into account this estimation.

¹⁶ Essentially, with the entry into force on 11 April 2007 of Legislative Decree no.30 of 6 February 2007, for foreign citizens of a country of the Union and their family members in-

first country for number of foreign nationals legally resident in Italy. In fact, as said above, in the two years mentioned about one million immigrants, mostly those coming from Romania, registered themselves. These registrations rapidly moved Romanian citizens to the top of the list of foreign communities resident in Italy. On 1st January 2007, Romania, with about 342,000 residents, occupied third place in the ranking of the top ten most numerous foreign communities in Italy. At the beginning of 2008, the Romanian community had almost doubled its numbers in the country (about 625,000), overtaking nationals from Morocco and Albania with longer histories of immigration into Italy; Romanian citizens remained in first place for the rest of the decade with further significant increases, although decreasing from year to year.



Source: Istat – Italian National Institute of Statistics.

*Data for years 2002–2011 were rebuilt on the basis of XV Population and housing census (2011).

Figure 3
*Immigration to Italy, 2002–2014**

tending to stay more than three months in Italy, it was no longer necessary to have a regular residence permit issued by the competent authority (police headquarters). Instead, it was sufficient to register in one of the Italian municipalities upon proof of fulfilling certain requirements: in particular paid employment or, more generally, financial resources adequate to ensuring financial independence for the foreign citizen and his/her family so that they would not be a burden on the social and health system of the host country.

Finally, towards the end of the decade, large positive net migration balances were also recorded in 2009–2010 (212,363 and 200,091 respectively). The new regularisation for domestic workers and caregivers at the end of 2009 certainly contributed to the high number of registrations. At the beginning of the procedure (launched in September 2009) and in the next year, there was a total of over a million of new registrations of foreign nationals, and the new regularisation contributed to maintaining high inflows in 2011 as well. Registrations mostly referred to citizens of countries such as Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and some countries of south-east Asia (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and the Philippines).


The slowdown in immigration recorded in 2009 (498,000) was followed by a slight recovery the next year (512,000) and decreased again in 2011 (414,000). Since 2012 the decline of immigration has continued alongside an increase in emigration; while the net balance has remained positive, it has decreased every year (245,000 in 2012, 182,000 in 2013 and 141,000 in 2014).

Finally, the data on inflows of foreigners taken from the registers of Italian municipalities confirm that the attempts to manage immigration into Italy during the 2000s were often strongly characterised by the usual contradictory policy aims whereby the adoption of restrictive measures to re-assure public opinion on its “fear of foreigners” was regularly followed by amnesties once it became clear that immigration was ‘necessary’ not only for the migrant but also for Italian families or companies – both of which need a labour force willing to perform certain types of tasks no longer ‘attractive’ to the native population.

On the other hand, in recent years a new wave of outflows to foreign countries can be observed. The Italians going abroad, especially researchers and highly qualified young people, are looking for better work opportunities. This new recent trend seems to assume the characteristics of a ‘brain drain’: that is, a problem which traditionally affects only developing countries.

4.2.3. Characteristics of the foreign population

On 1 January 2015 the foreign resident population amounted to 5,014,437 individuals. There has been constant growth over the last decade, with peaks coinciding with the earlier-described amnesties. This growth has declined in recent years (*Figure 4*).



Source: Istat – Italian National Institute of Statistics.

*Data for years 2002–2010 were rebuilt on the basis of the 15th Population Census (2011). Data for years 2011–2015 were calculated adding to the 2011 census population the natural and migratory balances recorded year-by-year by municipalities.

Figure 4
Foreign resident population in Italy on 1st January, 2002–2015 (1000s)*

The foreign population's sex structure is quite balanced (females represent 52.7% of the total), but figures are influenced by nationality. Foreigners resident in Italy are nationals of a wide range of countries. The citizens of the top ten countries account for slightly less than 65% of the total. The first five countries (Romania, Albania, Morocco, Republic of China and Ukraine) in Table 2 represent more than 50% (2,563,000) (*Figure 5*). The largest foreign community is from Romania, which on 1 January 2015 reached almost 1,132,000 residents: 22.6% of the total number of foreigners residing in Italy. After the huge growth due to EU enlargement and the new regulations on the free movement and residence of citizens of EU countries in other countries of EU recorded in 2007 and, to a lesser extent, also in 2008 and 2009, the 2010 increase, though lower, was nonetheless significant: 9.1 per cent. In 2014 the increase was +4.7%. Another community historically well represented in Italy is the Albanian one. This is second in order of numerical importance, with nearly 490,000 residents on 1 January 2015 and a decrease of 1.1% in 2014. The following communities are those of citizens of Morocco, which in 2014 also decreased by 1.3%, totalling 449,000 resident citizens at the end of the year, Chinese nationals (nearly 266,000, +3.5%) and Ukrainian nationals (about 226,000, +4.5%).

The reduction observed in the number of Albanian and Moroccan residents can be explained not only by increasing outflows due to the economic crisis but also by the high number of acquisition of Italian citizenship by the members of these communities who resided long-term in Italy.

Table 2
*Foreign population by top ten countries of citizenship,
Italy – 2001 and 2015*

Country of citizenship	2015			Variation over 2014 (%)	Country of citizenship	2001		
	Foreign residents	% of total	Women %			Foreign residents	% of total	Women %
Romania	1,131,839	22.6	57.0	4.7	Morocco	180,103	13.5	39.8
Albania	490,483	9.8	48.1	-1.1	Albania	173,064	13.0	43.7
Morocco	449,058	9.0	45.9	-1.3	Romania	74,885	5.6	53.5
China	265,820	5.3	49.0	3.5	Philippine	53,994	4.0	61.1
Ukraine	226,060	4.5	79.0	3.2	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	49,324	3.7	46.8
Philippine	168,238	3.4	56.4	3.4	Tunisia	47,656	3.6	35.1
India	147,815	2.9	39.9	3.8	China	46,887	3.5	48.5
Moldova	147,388	2.9	66.1	-1.4	Germany	35,091	2.6	64.7
Bangladesh	115,301	2.3	29.6	3.7	Senegal	31,174	2.3	15.5
Peru	109,668	2.2	58.4	-0.2	Peru	29,452	2.2	62.7
<i>Total first ten countries</i>	<i>3,251,670</i>	<i>64.8</i>	<i>53.7</i>	<i>2.1</i>	<i>Total first ten countries</i>	<i>721,630</i>	<i>54.1</i>	<i>45.6</i>
Other countries	1,762,767	35.2	50.9	1.4	Other countries	613,259	45.9	56.3
Total	5,014,437	100.0	52.7	1.9	Total	1,334,889	100.0	50.5

Source: Istat – Italian National Institute of Statistics.

*Data for 2001 refers to 21 October 2001, for 2015 it refers to 1 January 2015.

Finally, we should note that if the countries of the former Yugoslavia were considered as a whole, they would constitute sixth country in ranking by numerical importance, with 220,356 residents.


With reference to geo-political areas, if the Central-Eastern European countries¹⁷ were considered as a whole (regardless of whether or not they form part of the EU), their residents in Italy as of 1 January 2015 would amount to

¹⁷ The most representative countries are: Romania, Albania, Ukraine, Moldova and Poland.

2,483,000: nearly half (49.5%) of all foreigners residing in Italy. About 1,338,000 (26.7% of all foreigners) were citizens of the EU countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, more than a fifth of residents (22.8%) were citizens of non-EU countries of Central and Eastern Europe (mainly Albania, Ukraine, Moldova and the Republic of Macedonia). As of 1 January 2015 these amounted to a total of about 1,145,000 residents. With regard to non-European countries, over 1,027,000 people, more than one-fifth (20.5%) of all foreign residents, were citizens of an African country, mainly in North Africa, and principally Morocco. Asian citizens, with nearly 970,000, represented 19.3% of the total; slightly less than half (47.4%: 460,000 individuals) were citizens of countries in the Indian subcontinent (India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan). The remaining 510,000 were mainly migrants from China and the Philippines. Finally, 7.4% of foreigners (369,000) were citizens of countries in central-southern America, especially Peru and Ecuador (*Figure 6*).

As stated above, the ratio between the number of men and women in the foreign population resident in Italy is overall quite balanced, but it is often very unbalanced within individual communities. Among the main female-dominated communities (from Ukraine, Poland, Moldova, Peru, Ecuador, the Philippines, Romania), the ratio varies from between 26 males per 100 females in the Ukrainian community to 77 males per 100 females in the Filipino one. A male prevalence is observed among the citizens of Senegal, Bangladesh, Egypt, Pakistan, Tunisia, India, Sri Lanka, Morocco, FYROM, Albania and China.


In these communities the ratio between men and women varies between the level of the community coming from Senegal, traditionally very unbalanced towards high ratio of men (about 265 men for every 100 women), and the level of the immigrants from China (about 103 men for every 100 women). Due to country of origin-specific differences, family reunification and creation, the ratio has changed over past years (see *Table 2*). For some communities (notably those who have been long resident in Italy) the ratio has become more balanced. By 2001, a much more balanced ratio was achieved, e.g. by immigrants from Morocco – there were only 40 women for every 100 residents in 2001, while there are 46 in 2015 – and by people from Albania (from 44 to 48 women per 100 residents). For others, such as Ukrainians, the balance remains markedly uneven, due to the migratory project and/or late arrival.



Source: Istat – Italian National Institute of Statistics.

Figure 5

Foreign population by top ten countries of citizenship, Italy – 1st January 2015



Source: Istat – Italian National Institute of Statistics.

Figure 6

Foreign population by geo-political area of citizenship, Italy – 1st January 2015


The foreign resident population in Italy is young. As of 1 January 2014 the average age of the foreign population was 32.6 years old (the average age of the Italian population one year later was 44.4). There is a clear middle age concentration, for both for men and women, especially those aged between 30 and 39 years old. In fact, the age structure of the foreign resident population is totally different from the Italian population. Because the main factor influencing immigration is undoubtedly employment, with corresponding hope for better living standards, and due to the fact that Italy is a relatively recent immigration country, the oldest age groups are still highly under-represented in the foreign resident population. The same cannot be said of younger age groups. Family reunifications and the high birth rate of the foreign population (in 2014 there were about 75,000 children born to foreign parents living in Italy, which accounted for 14.9 per cent of total births) result in a high proportion of minors (22.1 per cent at the beginning of the year).

As is the case for sex, the age distribution differs between nationalities. Considering only some of the main nationalities, the age structure is more imbalanced towards the first age group and a more balanced structure by gender for the Albanian community (historically long resident in Italy). An age structure much more oriented towards the mature age classes (45–55 years), and strongly biased towards the female component, characterizes the community coming from Ukraine (of more recent immigration). The latter – mostly middle aged women – are usually employed domestically.

Another important phenomenon that relates to the stock of foreign population is the acquisition of Italian citizenship (*Figure 7*).

This is especially relevant for third-country nationals because of the advantages that EU citizenship provides, most of all regarding freedom of movement and the vote in administrative elections. Italy's current legislation on naturalisation is particularly restrictive. It is mostly based on so called *ius sanguinis* and it does not contemplate *ius soli*. There are five main channels for foreign nationals to acquire Italian citizenship: marriage, residence (ten years for non-EU and four for EU citizens), birth (obtained upon request with the condition of continuous residence in Italy until the legal age of 18 (the so-called 'choice' or 'claim' system), children living with parents who acquire Italian citizenship (in short, 'automatic'), and specific application of *ius sanguinis*. During the past 15 years, the trend has constantly been upwards, except for 2011. In 2014 almost 130,000 acquisitions were recorded, a significant increase (+29 per cent) compared to 2013 (100,000) which already shown a big rise (+54 per cent).¹⁸

¹⁸ The process of naturalisation of foreign nationals that arrived in Italy a long time ago (as happens for Moroccans or Albanians) is currently resulting in the direct transmission of Italian citizenship to minor children living with them.



Source: Istat – Italian National Institute of Statistics.

Figure 7
Acquisitions of Italian citizenship, 2002–2014

While marriage predominated as the channel for acquisition of Italian nationality at the beginning of the decade, the proportion of acquisitions by residence, “claim”¹⁹ and automatic transmission increased during the decade. In particular, as immigration to Italy is becoming more established the method of direct transmission is gaining in prevalence: in 2014 almost 40% of total acquisitions concerned people under the age of 18. A peak is observed at the age of 18: the larger part of these acquisitions (over 75%) concerns people who were born in Italy (second generation). Women are prevalent in the age group 25-39 (58.8%), for whom acquisition via marriage is common. Acquisitions of citizenship are more frequent among nationalities that immigrated to Italy a long

¹⁹ People born on Italian soil, even those not of Italian descent, can claim Italian citizenship after continuous legal residence in Italy up to the legal age (18), and upon declaration of their desire to do so (http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/italiani_nel_mondo/serviziconsolari/cittadinanza.html).

time ago, because they mainly involve cases of naturalisation. In 2014, 22.3% of those who acquired Italian citizenship were former Moroccan citizens, 16.4% were Albanese (two of the oldest immigrant communities in Italy) and only 4.7% were from Romania. By contrast, Romanian citizens made up about 22% of total foreign residents in Italy at the beginning of 2015.²⁰

Data on the immigrant stock issued by the official sources refer only to the regular component of the immigrant population.²¹ It is not easy to estimate the irregular component. Natale and Strozza (1997) used the results of specific questions on irregular stays contained in field surveys to estimate the number of foreigners (including more developed countries) at 1,194,000, with the share of irregular immigrants at around 36 per cent of the total. In more recent years, the results of estimates of the immigrant stock (regular plus irregular) in Italy have yielded extraordinarily high numbers. Using quotients for irregular immigration calculated on the basis of field survey results, ISMU quantified the number of immigrants from countries with strong migration pressure as 3.4 million on 1 July 2005 and almost 4 million on 1 January 2007 (Blangiardo 2006 and 2008; Bonifazi, Heins, Strozza and Vitiello, 2009). These assessments reflect the radical change in the magnitude of migration, which has clearly increased considerably in this period. However, for the reasons explained above (most notably repeated amnesties), it is likely that this growth has concerned more the regular component than the irregular one, even if the number of irregular immigrants has remained high.

5 FROM DATA TO MIGRATION MODELS: THE ITALIAN CASE

As already commented, the model defined as the “migration hump” describes the relationship between outward migration and the level of a country’s development (Martin. and Taylor, 1996). Italy followed a similar path when its migration role changed after the economic boom of the 1950s.

The pattern observed in the transformation of Italy from emigration country to immigration country is similar to the one that characterised most European Mediterranean countries. Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain show similar trajectories in terms of migration history, forming the so-called “Mediterranean mod-

²⁰ Istat delivers aggregate data on citizenship acquisitions indirectly drawn from population registers yearly. Information about the different reasons for acquisition can be drawn out from the lists of individual records about resident citizens (LAC=*liste anagrafiche comunali*) elaborated by Istat, considering sex and age of people who become Italian. Another source is the Ministry of the Interior, which provides data only on naturalisations by marriage and residence.

²¹ The main sources for official data on regular migration are the Italian National Institute of Statistics (for data about residents) and the Ministry of the Interior (for data on permits to stay).

el of immigration". This is the result of a combination of factors that contributed to the transformation of the countries of the northern shore of the Mediterranean from an area of emigration to an area of growing immigration, shifting to the south the line between these two situations. In general, when referring to the Mediterranean model of immigration, we consider all the Mediterranean countries of the European Union (EU) with the exception of France, which as a traditional host country has migration characteristics more similar to northern European countries (Pugliese, 2002). Another feature of these new immigrant destinations is the coexistence of large presence of immigrants and high levels of unemployment (two characteristics that generally do not appear simultaneously). This situation is due, on the one hand, to the general trends of the labour market and, on the other, to the strong changes in the labour supply. Precisely because of this, the immigrant labour force has in many cases settled in temporary (sometimes also irregular) positions, mostly concentrated in the informal economy. In the service sector they are expected to fill the shortcomings of the welfare system (e.g. as providers of care). It has generated a kind of paradox: on the one hand, the lack of specific laws, especially during the 1980s, initially represented an incentive to entry; on the other it has left immigrants, especially in the beginning, living in conditions of illegality. In fact, it is precisely in the field of migration policies (or more accurately "no migration policies") that one can refer to the "Mediterranean model". Another characteristic feature is the extensive use (especially in Italy and Spain) of regularisation procedures that in countries with a long history of immigration are usually not considered a solution.

In this context, the role of the migratory system in Italy in seems to be particularly important due to its geopolitical position in the Mediterranean but also as a member of the EU. During recent years, after the great regularisations, Italian policies have constantly been marked by the management of new arrivals (in particular asylum applicants). On the other hand, the advanced integration reached by some migrants who arrived a long time ago draws attention to new aspects such as acquisitions of citizenship and successful inclusion in the labour market, especially for second generation migrants.

In the Italian case the pioneer migration inflows to Italy, like those from China, took advantage of their network ties and concentrated themselves in particular areas where they became entrepreneurs (e.g. Prato in Tuscany). With the arrival of families the demand for health services, housing, education, etc. increased, as did the impact of the immigrant community on the native society. The third and the fourth steps described by Böhning (1984) and by Castles and Miller (1993; 2009) seem to be the most suitable to describe the current stage

of immigration in Italy, with further distinctions linked to the distribution of the immigrant population in different parts of the country.

Again the model of “migration hump” could be used to describe some recent development in terms of the composition by citizenship of foreign resident population. Considering that notable migration trends usually follow in the wake of trade reforms or liberalisations (de Haas, 2010), the effects of the migration hump are witnessed also considering new countries joining EU. For them in a relatively short-term migration outflows continue or even increase rather than decrease the case of Romanian citizens in Italy is symptomatic. EU enlargements and the possibility to register directly in a population register for new EU members represent another important turning point.

6 CONCLUSION

Immigration to Italy can be described as a highly complex process which is deep-rooted in the country’s socio-economic conditions and demographic changes of recent decades. After the economic boom of the post-war period and the socio-demographic transformation of the Italian population, entry into Italy by foreign citizens significantly increased in number. From the 1970s onwards, Italy progressively changed from being a country characterised by emigration to one characterised by immigration (although outflows of Italians – often well-qualified young people moving to highly-developed countries – continue to be substantial today).

The data described in this paper illustrate these changes in the medium-long period. We interpreted the data in light of changes in the Italian legislative and political context, while at the same time salience has been given to the impact of international and European regulation. We also took into account the main theories of migration, to see if and which models could eventually be adapted to the Italian case, at each different stage of its migration history.

We should emphasise that immigration to Italy is a relatively recent phenomenon which is difficult to quantify and measure in all its dimensions. Scientific knowledge about the foreign population in Italy is still lacking and statistics are not always available promptly. These shortcomings are most evident in the case of the irregular component of immigration, but they also arise when the focus is extended from the foreign population to encompass the population with foreign origin. Nevertheless, a body of research and studies is now available in Italy that is sufficient for the features of the population of foreign origin to be determined with a degree of precision. Official statistics in recent years have contributed considerably to the description of migratory processes in Italy, in regard to both their contents and geography. More important developments

in the exploitation of administrative sources of migration data are planned for the future and further changes are on the study.

We should stress that the most recent data exhibit the effects of the economic downturn, which began in 2008. This applies to both inflows and outflows. After years of sustained growth of entries by foreigners, levels of immigration are diminishing, while those of emigration are increasing. At the same time, the occupational situation of immigrants settled in Italy has deteriorated – and it has done so to a much greater extent than among natives (which is also explained by the high concentration of foreign labour in the construction industry, which is particularly vulnerable to economic recession).

This analysis indicates the future prospects of immigration policies. In this regard, the study has highlighted that policy makers should take careful account of economic and demographic factors in the short, medium and long period. Demographic trends currently foresee a substantial decrease in labour supply by Italian citizens, which will only partly be off-set by the available foreign supply. Secondly, this analysis of the history of government immigration policies highlights the persistent inadequacy of immigrant entry procedures, which results in an unsatisfactory match between labour demand and supply. For instance, consider the demand for care and assistance expressed by Italian families. Italian immigration policies should become more efficient at modulating entry according to the needs of the labour market and its capacity to absorb additional supply (also considering the recent increase in unemployment among immigrants already present in Italy). This would facilitate access of foreign labour to the jobs market and it would discourage illegality – which remains a particularly difficult issue in Italy today.

REFERENCES

- Albani, M. et al. (2013). Dynamic Historical Analysis of Longer Term Migratory, Labour Market and Human Capital Processes in Italy. Country report developed within the project 'SEEMIG Managing Migration and Its Effects – Transnational Actions Towards Evidence Based Strategies'. Available at:
<http://www.seemig.eu/outputs/SEEMIGHistoricalAnalysisItaly.pdf>
- Barsotti, O. and Moretti, E. eds. (2004). *Rimesse e cooperazione allo sviluppo*. Milano: FrancoAngeli.
- Blangiardo, G.C. ed. (2006). *L'immigrazione straniera in Lombardia. La quinta indagine regionale. Rapporto 2005*. Milano: Fondazione Ismu, Regione Lombardia, Osservatorio Regionale per l'integrazione e la multiethnicità.

- Blangiardo, G.C. (2008). Quantitative Aspects and Comments on Foreign Migration Prospects and Advantages in Italy. In: Cesareo V. ed., *The Thirteenth Italian Report on Migrations 2007*. Monza-Milano: Polimetrica.
- Bohning, W. R. (1984). *Studies in International Labour Migration*. London: Macmillan Editor.
- Bonifazi, C., Conti, C. and Mamolo, M. (2008). Balkan International Migration in the 1990s. *Balkan Demographic Paper* 8.
- Bonifazi, C. (2007). *L'immigrazione straniera in Italia*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Bonifazi, C., Heins, F., Strozam, S. and Vitiello M. (2009). *The Italian transition from an emigration to immigration country*. IDEA Project Mediterranean and Eastern European countries as new immigration destinations in the European Union, IRPPS-CNR Working paper.
- Bonifazi, C. and Gesano G. (2002). *Contributions to International Migration studies*. IRP, Monografie 12.
- Caritas e Migrantes (2012). Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2012 – 22 Rapporto. Roma : IDOS.
- Carfagna, M., Sommersi, I. and Sanati, I. (2002). Le regolarizzazioni degli immigrati in Italia. In A. Colombo and G. Sciortino eds., *Stranieri in Italia. Assimilati ed esclusi*. Bologna : Il Mulino,.
- Cassarino, J.P. (2004). Theorising Return Migration: the Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, 6(2), pp.253–279.
- Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. (1993). *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. London: Macmillan.
- Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. (2009). *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. 4th ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cerase, F. P. (1974). Expectations and Reality: A Case Study of Return Migration from the United States to Southern Italy. *International Migration Review*, 8(2), pp.245–262.
- CIA (2012). *The World Factbook*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency.
- de Filippo, E. and Carchedi F. (1999). I mercati del lavoro e la collocazione degli immigrati. Il modello mediterraneo. In F. Carchedi, ed. *La risorsa inaspettata*, Roma: Ediesse.
- de Haas, H. (2010). Migration transitions – a theoretical and empirical inquiry into the developmental drivers of international migration. *IMI working paper*, 24.
- EMN Italy (2012a). *Fourth EMN Italy Report. Migration channels. Visa and irregular flow*. Rome: IDOS.
- EMN Italy (2012b). *Fifth EMN Italy Report. Immigrants and refugees. Legislation, institutions and competences*. Rome: IDOS.
- EMN/IDOS Italy (2012). *Rapporto Annuale sulle Politiche in materia di asilo e immigrazione 2012*. Rome: IDOS.
- Eurostat–European Commission (2000). *Push and pull factors of international migration. A comparative report*. Eurostat – European Commission.
- Faist, T. (1997). The crucial meso-level. In: T. Hammar et al. eds. *International Migration, Immobility and development. Multidisciplinary perspectives*, Oxford: Berg, pp.187–218.
- Faist, T. (2000). *Volume and Dynamics of International Migration*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Faist, T. (2006). *The Transnational Social Spaces of Migration*. Working Papers, 10. Bremen: Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development.
- Fassmann, H. and Musil, E. (2013). *Conceptual Framework for Modelling Longer Term Migratory, Labour Market, and Human Capital Processes*. SEEMIG Working Paper 1. Vienna: University of Vienna.

- Fassmann H., Musil, E. and Gruber, K. (2014). *Dynamic historical analysis of longer term migratory, labour market and human capital processes in the SEEMIG region*. SEEMIG Working Paper 3. Vienna, University of Vienna, 2014.
- Fassmann, H. and Reeger, U. (2012). 'Old' Immigration Countries in Europe. In: M. Okólski, ed. *European Immigrations. Trends, Structures and Policy Implications*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp.65–90.
- Garton, L. et al. (1997). Studying online social networks. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, 3(1).
- Guarneri, A., Paterno, A. and Strozza, S. (2008). L'immigrazione straniera nei paesi dell'Europa meridionale: caratteristiche, comportamenti demografici e politiche migratorie. In: L. Di Comite, O. Garavello and F. Galizia, eds. *Sviluppo demografico ed economico nel Mediterraneo*. Quaderno n. 35 del Dipartimento per lo Studio delle Società Mediterranee dell'Università di Bari, Cacucci, Bari, pp.185–229.
- Hammar, T. (1995). Development and immobility: why have not many more emigrants left the South? In: R. van der Erf and L. Heering, eds. *Causes of international migration*. Luxembourg: Eurostat, pp.173–186.
- Keely C. B., (1989). Remittances from labour migration: evaluations, performance and implications. *International migration Review*, 23(3), pp.500–525.
- King, R. ed. (1986). *Return Migration and Regional Economic Problems*. London: Croom Helm.
- Kritz, M.M. and Zlotnik, H. eds. (1992). Global interactions: migration systems, processes, and policies. In M.M. Kritz et al. eds. *International Migration Systems. A Global Approach*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- IMF (2012). *World Economic Outlook. Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain*. April 2012.
- IOM (2001). *Harnessing the Potential of Migration and Return to Promote Development. Applying concepts to West Africa*. IOM Migration Research Series, 5.
- Istat (2005). *Gli stranieri in Italia: gli effetti dell'ultima regolarizzazione*. Stima al 1° gennaio 2005, Statistica in breve, 15 dicembre 2005.
- Istat (2007). *Rapporto annuale*. La situazione del Paese nel 2006. Roma: Istat.
- Istat (2008). *Rapporto annuale*. La situazione del Paese nel 2007. Roma: Istat.
- Istat (2011). La popolazione straniera residente in Italia, 1° gennaio 2011, Statistica Report, 22 settembre 2011.
- Istat (2012). *Migrazioni internazionali e interne della popolazione residente. Anno 2011*. Statistica Report, 28 dicembre 2012.
- Istat (2012). *Cittadini comunitari regolarmente soggiornanti. Anni 2011–2012*, Statistica Report, 25 luglio 2012.
- Istat (2012). *Natalità e fecondità della popolazione residente. Anno 2011*, Statistica Report, 14 novembre 2012.
- Istat (2013). *Noi Italia. 100 statistiche per capire il Paese in cui viviamo*, 2013.
- Lesthaeghe, R. (1995). The second demographic transition in Western countries: an interpretation. In: M. K. Oppenheim, and A. M. Jensen eds. *Gender and Family Changes in Industrialized Countries*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Martin, Philip L.; Taylor, J. Edward (1995). The Anatomy of a Migration Hump. In: J. Edward Taylor (ed.): *Development Strategy, Employment and Migration: Insights from Models*. Paris: OECD, pp.43–62.

- Massey, D.S. (1999). Why does immigration occur? A theoretical synthesis, In: Hirschman, C., DeWind, J. and Kasinitz, P. eds. *The Handbook of International Migration. The American Experience*. New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, pp.34–52.
- Massey, D.S. (1990). Social structure, household strategies, and the cumulative causation of migration. *Population Index*, 56(1), pp.3–26.
- Melegh, A. (2013). *Diverging historical development of migration in Southeastern Europe since 1950*. Working papers on Population, Family and Welfare, 17. Budapest: Hungarian Demographic Research Institute.
- Natale, M. and Strozza, S. (1997). *Gli immigrati stranieri in Italia. Quanti sono, chi sono, come vivono?* Cacucci ed., Bari.
- Pastore, F. (2000). Le rivoluzioni incompilate della politica migratoria europea, *Euro-paEurope*, 6, pp.117–132.
- Paterno, A. and Toigo, M. (2004). Le tre collettività a confronto. In: O. Barsotti and E. Moretti, eds. *Rimesse e cooperazione allo sviluppo*, Milano: FrancoAngeli.
- Piore, M. (1979). *Birds of passage. Migrant labour and industrial societies*. New York: Cambridge University Press, Donzelli Editore, Roma.
- Pugliese, E. (2000). Il modello mediterraneo dell'immigrazione. *Migrazioni. Scenari per il XXI secolo*, Napoli, 9–10 novembre, 2000.
- Pugliese E. (2002). *L'Italia tra migrazioni internazionali e migrazioni interne*, Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Reyneri E. (2004). Immigrants in a segmented and often undeclared labour market. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 9(1), pp.71–93.
- Romero, F. (1993). Migration as an issue in European interdependence and integration: the case of Italy. In: A. Milward, F.M.B. Lynch, R. Ranieri, F. Romero and V. Sorensen eds. *The Frontier of National Sovereignty*. London: Routledge.
- Sciortino G. (2009). *Fortunes and miseries of Italian labour migration policy*, CESPI Country Paper 1(09).
- Sciortino G. (2004). Immigration in a Mediterranean Welfare State: The Italian Experience in Comparative Perspective. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 6(2), pp.111–129.
- Sobotka, T., Skirbekk V. and Philipov, D. (2011). Economic recession and fertility in the developed world. A literature review. *Population and Development Review*, 37(2), pp.267–306.
- Strozza, S., Ballacci F., Natale, M. and Todisco E. (2002). *La rilevazione delle migrazioni internazionali e la predisposizione di un sistema informativo sugli stranieri*. Rapporto di Ricerca 02.11, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Commissione per la Garanzia dell'Informazione Statistica, Novembre.
- Van de Kaa, D. J. (1987). Europe's Second Demographic Transition. *Population Bulletin*, 42(1), 1–59.
- Zucchetti E. (2004). I caratteri salienti della regolarizzazione in Italia. In E. Zucchetti, ed. *La regolarizzazione degli stranieri. Nuovi attori nel mercato del lavoro italiano*. Milano: ISMU-FrancoAngeli.

EDUCATION, INCOME, MATERIAL DEPRIVATION AND MORTALITY IN HUNGARY BETWEEN 2001 AND 2008

KATALIN KOVÁCS¹ – LAJOS BÁLINT²

ABSTRACT: *In Hungary, as in other Central Eastern European countries, large inequalities in mortality by level of education have been observed based mostly on cross-sectional data. This paper explores prospective mortality data from Hungary to evaluate the role of education, income and material deprivation using negative binomial regression.*

Education, income and material deprivation are all found to be important determinants of mortality. However, in the multivariate regression only low income and deep material deprivation remained important independent predictors of mortality for both men and women. Contrary to expectations, education had no independent effect on mortality once subjective income and material deprivation was taken into account. Medium-level deprivation increased mortality risk only among men, and medium to low income only among women.

Keywords: mortality, Hungary, education, material deprivation, income, follow-up study, poverty

1 INTRODUCTION

Differences in mortality by education have already been proven to be larger in Central Eastern European and Baltic countries than in Western, Northern and Southern European countries (Mackenbach et al. 2008). The very fact that national incomes are lower and poverty is more prevalent in Central Eastern European and Baltic countries suggests that inequalities in mortality, including those that have already been detected along the educational axis of social inequalities, cannot be understood without exploring the role of poverty.

¹ Senior researcher at Hungarian Demographic Research Institute, Budapest, email: kovacs@demografia.hu.

² Senior researcher at Hungarian Demographic Research Institute, Budapest, email: balint@demografia.hu.

Examining the role of poverty in shaping inequalities in health and mortality in different settings and from the perspective of different research traditions is challenging. In the social sciences in Europe the focus shifted in earlier decades from exploring absolute poverty to exploring relative poverty. While this shift can be partially justified from the perspective of the wealthiest countries of Europe, it also represented a hiatus in understanding major social processes in less wealthy European countries. In recent years, however, and parallel with the emergence of Europe-wide social surveys and the claims of EU social agencies, another significant shift has taken place in understanding poverty, at least within the context of the European Union.

It is now widely accepted that poverty cannot be measured (and consequently compared) in absolute terms across countries. Alternative approaches using country-specific relative income thresholds, such as 60 per cent of the country-specific median income, have also proven to be less fruitful for a number of reasons (Bradshaw and Mayhew, 2011). One of the proposed solutions is to introduce measurements based on the operationalization of the (wider) concept of deprivation. In practice, the European tradition of measuring deprivation is largely built on Peter Townsend's deprivation index (Townsend, 1954), but nowadays the index covers ownership of numerous household items, the possibility of carrying out several activities and aspects related to quality of housing, all judged to be necessary for conducting life without being socially excluded. From a theoretical point of view, the deprivation approach is useful for measuring persistent and deep poverty (Bradshaw and Mayhew, 2011), though we also know that deprivation is more complex than simply being the outcome of persistent poverty (Whelan et al. 2004). From a technical point of view, use an index of deprivation is particularly promising for measuring the actual extent of deep poverty in less wealthy European countries. In these countries several factors modify pure income effects and their influence is more intensive than in wealthier countries, such as persistent low income resulting from long-term unemployment or long-term receipt of low wages.

Systematic examination of the nature of deprivation in the social sciences resulted in notable discoveries during the last decade. For instance, the clustering of specific aspects of deprivation was recognised in European countries (Whelan et al. 2001); by and large this clustering proved not to be country specific. The authors found five distinct dimensions of material deprivation, which they labelled as "basic", "secondary", "housing facilities", "housing deterioration" and the "environment". The first dimension included very basic elements of everyday life, such as nutrition, adequate heating of the house, arrears as well as the possibility of having holidays and cooking for family and friends. The "secondary" dimension of deprivation was measured by ownership of different household items, while the third and fourth dimensions covered quality of apartments and the fifth measured quality of housing environment. Some

years later another study showed that while health has the strongest relationship with basic deprivation, it is also strongly related to the level of secondary deprivation; its relationship with the other dimensions of deprivation, though not negligible, is considerably weaker (Whelan and Maitre, 2012).

Deprivation measures, alongside income, also appeared in the studies searching for powerful determinants of health but typically only as a characteristic of the neighbourhood. Spatial comparison of the determinants of ill health became a well-established field of research first in the United Kingdom (Townsend et al. 1985; Phillimore et al. 1994; Romeri et al. 2006), and later on in other countries (for instance Beneach et al. 2003; Fukuda et al. 2007). Recognition that income alone is not able to capture all the aspects of disadvantageous living conditions affecting health and that other factors are also important at the individual (household) level is not new but has only recently become more popular in social epidemiology (Alley et al. 2009). Different aspects of material deprivation have been given particular attention in individual countries, such as access to health services and food in the United States (Rowntree 2000; Alley et al. 2009). Different aspects of housing (Elleway and Macintyre, 1998) and material living conditions (Pikhart et al. 2003; Laaksonen et al. 2004; Groffen et al. 2008) were included in studies on inequalities in health status in a heuristic way. The items included differed by study. Whatever the component of deprivation studied, deprived people were more often found to be in ill health. On the one hand, this relationship was found to reflect systematic disadvantages which were often found in parallel with living in deprivation, such as low education or low income, and on the other hand it affected health independently of these factors. The growing evidence base led to the practice of studying many facets of material deprivation simultaneously (Grundy and Holt, 2001; Sacker et al. 2001) and setting up a clear distinction between individual- and area-level deprivation (Torsheim et al. 2004). In addition to a call for a more systematic use of social stratification indicators (Galobardes et al. 2007), increasing efforts were put into finding methodologically sound ways to use the different indicators. Exploration of the role of material deprivation in health inequalities is therefore highly justified, but fitting the practices of social sciences and social epidemiology together is far from over. Improving this fit is one of the objectives of our study.

In the wider Baltic-CEE region the major role of income and material deprivation in mortality can be partly confirmed by the most recent findings regarding mortality in the Czech Republic, Russia, Poland and Lithuania (Vandenheede et al. 2013). However, this study was based on samples of urban dwelling populations. Regarding the wider geographical and political environment of Hungary, mortality appears to depend on several aspects of material conditions in Russia (Perlman and Bobak, 2008b). For Hungary, only one large-scale mortality research project (with a follow-up design) has been com-

pleted so far, but the results of this survey have been mainly evaluated from the point of view of mental health; mortality outcomes have only been analysed with regard to regional differences (Skrabski et al. 2003; Kopp et al. 2005; Kopp et al. 2006).

Variations of the sociological concept of deprivation (e.g. a characteristic of individuals in households) have already been used to explore health inequalities in countries of the CEE region, but usually not in their own right. In an analysis Pikhart et al. (2003) studied health inequalities in Poland and Hungary using different aspects of deprivation. In order to study the effect of “relative” and “absolute” deprivation, they used separate categories of “deprivation”, “ownership of basic items”, “fulfilling socially oriented needs” and “ownership of luxury items”. Irrespective of the original goal of this investigation, one of its important outcomes was that the dimensions of deprivation mentioned above were all strongly correlated with self-rated health, and this was largely independent of the effect of the actual monetary position of the household. An earlier study of small samples from seven countries in the Central Eastern, Eastern and Baltic regions focused on the role of the psychological concept of perceived control in forming health inequalities. It also measured material deprivation in a simple way (affordability of food, clothing and heating), and found that material deprivation is a strong factor determining chances of ill health, mediated at least partly by psychological characteristics, such as perceived control over life (Bobak et al. 2000).

Studies on relation between mortality and sociologically based concept of deprivation and other aspects of social stratifications for general populations in the region of Central and Eastern Europe are still missing. Taking into account the hiatus in this respect, our investigation aims to fill this gap by exploring the exact role of income and deprivation in shaping inequalities in mortality.

2 DATA AND METHODS

2.1 *Sample and variables*

In order to explore the effects of education, income and material deprivation on health our study uses data from the “Turning Points of the Life Course” panel survey, launched by the Demographic Research Institute at the Hungarian Central Statistical Office in 2001. The original sample was representative of the non-institutionalised Hungarian population aged 16–85 by age, gender, education and place of residence. The sampling design over-represented social groups that are known to produce low response rates (Kapitány, 2003). The original sample size was 16,035. Respondents were interviewed again in 2004 and in 2008. The time of death was also registered for those who died during the follow-up period. During the period 1138 participants died. The exact time

of death is known for 856 cases, while for 282 the exact time of death could not be determined; we only know that it occurred between the first and the second wave of data collection. For these 282 cases an approximated time is used: exactly in between the first and the second wave of the survey.

Education can be a powerful indicator of health, but only for those who have presumably already finished their educational career; consequently, the sample in our analysis was limited to those who were at least 30 years old when the survey started. Therefore our sample was reduced to 11,546 individuals.

Information on education, income and deprivation was collected in all of the waves, but only the information provided in the first wave is used here. Education was measured by completed level: elementary school (or lower), vocational training (lower secondary), maturation (higher secondary) and tertiary education (college or university). In the analysis the first two categories are merged into "lower secondary or less" category.

Exact data on income was available for 88.9 per cent of the respondents, while information on "subjective" income was available for 99.4 per cent. The latter was measured by the question "Are you able to make ends meet?". Evaluation was made on a five-point scale: "have to go without", "financial problems from month to month", "can just make ends meet by budgeting carefully", "live acceptably" or "live without problems". The correlation coefficient between the subjective evaluation and the actual income adjusted for household composition (in quartiles) was 0.44 ($p < 0.001$).

Only a subset was available for the items measuring social exclusion in the most comprehensive way, termed secondary deprivation by Whelan et al. (2001). This measurement is based on ownership of different household items (such as microwave oven, washing machine, video recorder, car, computer and telephone). The usage of this set of dichotomous items can be justified because it was used in a very similar way in European Household Panel Surveys in the second half of the 1990s, not long before the first wave of our data collection (2001). There is no established method of constructing an index from the variables that characterise material deprivation. Some use standardised scores of variables to construct the index, while others use un-standardised scores. For this study we standardised our variables, i.e. the ownership of less commonly owned items were given a higher index weight. The standardised scores were summarised and deprivation categories were constructed by dividing the study population into three roughly equal groups. The Cronbach alpha for the constructed index was 0.706.

In order to analyse individual data we stratify our dataset according to age (>44, 45–54, 55–64, 65+), education (lower secondary or lower, upper secondary, tertiary education) and by the two other variables – deprivation and subjective income. Deprivation categories were described in the previous paragraph.

Table 1
Descriptive statistics

	Number of observations						Number of person months					
	Men			Women			Men			Women		
	Survivors	Deceased		Survivors	Deceased	Total	Survivors	Deceased		Survivors	Deceased	Total
<i>Education</i>												
Tertiary	731	59		899	27	790	920	2,358		64,442	989	54,408
Upper secondary	1,105	94		1,865	67	1,199	1,992	75,151		137,593	2,595	81,970
Lower secondary or less	2,633	406		3,178	300	3,039	3,578	189,350		242,601	12,059	204,559
<i>Deprivation</i>												
No deprivation	1,331	62		1,581	29	1,393	1,610	100,045		122,617	2,447	222,662
Medium deprivation	1,559	166		1,938	87	1,725	2,045	163,040		137,939	9,946	400,979
Serious deprivation	1,579	331		2,497	278	1,910	2,775	56,466		84,080	3,244	140,546
<i>Subjective income</i>												
Without major difficulties	1,412	133		1,668	65	1,545	1,733	100,045		122,617	2,447	105,333
With careful budgeting	2,247	294		3,197	243	2,541	3,440	163,040		237,939	9,946	174,219
With major difficulties	811	132		1,171	86	943	1,257	56,466		84,080	3,244	61,385
<i>Age</i>												
30-39	1,714	62		2,004	16	1,776	2,020	118,434		145,632	622	264,066
40-49	1,262	131		1,657	57	1,372	1,714	91,560		112,425	2,145	213,985
50-59	909	136		1,328	98	1,045	1,426	66,590		110,316	4,027	166,906
60+	584	230		1,047	223	814	1,270	42,967		76,263	8,843	119,230
<i>Total</i>	4,506	565		6,078	396	5,071	6,474	319,551		441,636	15,637	340,937
												460,273

Source: HDRI GGS, Turning Points of Life Course, 1st Wave.

The five possible response categories for subjective income were merged into three categories (“serious difficulties in making ends meet”, “able to make ends meet with some difficulties”, and “live acceptably or without any problems”) (see *Table 1*).

We ran all regressions separately for men and women.

Table 2
Crude mortality rates with confidence intervals, 1/1000

	Men			Women			Total		
	Rate	Lower CI	Higher CI	Rate	Lower CI	Higher CI	Rate	Lower CI	Higher CI
<i>Age</i>									
30–39	34.91	26.77	44.75	7.92	4.53	12.86	20.55	16.24	25.64
40–49	95.48	79.83	113.30	33.26	25.19	43.09	60.92	52.52	70.28
50–59	130.14	109.19	153.95	68.72	55.79	83.75	94.70	82.95	107.64
60+	282.56	247.22	321.53	175.59	153.30	200.21	217.37	197.81	238.34
<i>Education</i>									
Tertiary	74.68	56.85	96.34	29.35	19.34	42.70	50.29	40.23	62.11
Upper secondary	78.40	63.35	95.94	33.63	26.07	42.71	50.45	42.96	58.88
Lower secondary or less	133.60	120.92	147.25	83.85	74.63	93.89	106.69	98.97	114.86
<i>Deprivation</i>									
No deprivation	44.51	34.12	57.06	18.01	12.06	25.87	30.30	24.40	37.21
Medium deprivation	96.23	82.15	112.04	42.54	34.08	52.48	67.11	59.09	75.91
Serious deprivation	173.30	155.13	193.01	100.18	88.75	112.68	129.99	119.87	140.74
<i>Subjective income</i>									
Without major difficulties	86.08	72.08	102.02	37.51	28.95	47.81	60.40	52.28	69.43
With careful budgeting	115.70	102.85	129.71	70.64	62.04	80.10	89.78	82.35	97.71
With major difficulties	139.98	117.12	166.00	68.42	54.72	84.49	99.09	86.37	113.15
<i>Total</i>	111.42	102.42	121.00	61.17	55.29	67.50	83.24	78.06	88.67

2.2 Count regression for the follow-up study

First, we applied Poisson regression in our analysis. Poisson regression analysis allows modelling of dependent variables that are count data (e.g. positive inte-

gers). Poisson regression is often applied to study the occurrence of a small number of events as a function of a set of explanatory variables, and is therefore commonly used in demographic and mortality studies.

Poisson regression, as for any other generalised linear model, is characterised by a random component, a linear predictor and a link function. In Poisson regression the random component is the number of events (in our case the number of deaths) d_i in the i -th group (strata) of n_i person-months of observation. The linear predictor is $\log[n_i] + \alpha + x_i\beta$, the expected number of deaths in the i -th group $E[d_i | x_i]$ is related to the linear predictor through a logarithmic link function (Dupont, 2002). Thus, the simple univariate Poisson regression can be written as follows:

$$\log[E[d_i | x_i]] = \log[n_i] + \alpha + x_i\beta.$$

Multiple Poisson regression is a simple extension of univariate Poisson regression. The notation is similar to the previous one. The dependent variable is the number of deaths observed in a given number of person months in the pre-specified strata. We regressed this dependent variable on different independent variables, taking into account the logarithm of the exposition time for every observation as an offset variable. This corresponds to the variable with a coefficient of zero. The formula of multiple Poisson regression is the following:

$$\log[E[d_j | x_j]] = \log[n_j] + \alpha_j + \beta_1 x_{j1} + \beta_2 x_{j2} + \dots + \beta_q x_{jq},$$

where α_j are unknown nuisance parameters, $\beta_1 \dots \beta_q$ are unknown regression coefficients, $\log[n_j]$ is the logarithm of person-months in the j -th strata. If we subtract $\log[n_j]$ from both sides of the equation we get:

$$\log[E[d_j | x_j] / n_j] = \alpha_j + \beta_1 x_{j1} + \beta_2 x_{j2} + \dots + \beta_q x_{jq}.$$

The logarithm of the response variable is linked to a linear function of the explanatory variables. More simply the formula is:

$$\log[Y] = \alpha_j + \beta_1 x_{j1} + \beta_2 x_{j2} + \dots + \beta_q x_{jq},$$

which is equivalent to:

$$Y = \exp^{\alpha_j} \cdot \exp^{\beta_1 x_{j1}} \cdot \exp^{\beta_2 x_{j2}} \cdot \dots \cdot \exp^{\beta_q x_{jq}},$$

The most important assumption of Poisson regression is that at each level of the covariates the number of cases has equal variance to the mean (μ), formally: $\text{Var}(Y) = \mu$. This assumption is rarely met with real data. In many cases the variance is greater than the mean, indicating that the Poisson model is over-dispersed and it is not the appropriate analytical approach. The estimates of the coefficients can still be consistent but the standard errors may be biased down-

wards, i.e. they will be too small. The first attempt to analyse our dataset with Poisson regression ended this way.

One remedy to analyse the over-dispersed count outcome variables is application of the negative binomial regression. This type of count regression addresses the failure of Poisson regression by adding a parameter that reflects the unobserved heterogeneity among observations. The negative binomial regression adds an error term, ε , that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the vectors of the independent variables x 's (Long and Freese, 2006):

$$\begin{aligned}\lambda_j &= \exp(\alpha_j + \beta_1 x_{j1} + \beta_2 x_{j2} + \dots + \beta_q x_{jq} + \varepsilon_j) \\ &= \exp(\alpha_j + \beta_1 x_{j1} + \beta_2 x_{j2} + \dots + \beta_q x_{jq}) \exp(\varepsilon_j) \\ &= \exp(\alpha_j + \beta_1 x_{j1} + \beta_2 x_{j2} + \dots + \beta_q x_{jq}) \delta_j\end{aligned}$$

where $\exp(\varepsilon_j) = \delta_j$. To identify the model we assume that:

$$E(\delta) = 1$$

With this assumption, it can be shown that:

$$E(\lambda) = \mu E(\delta) = \mu$$

Because δ is unknown we are not able to compute $Pr(Y|x)$. We assume that δ is drawn from a gamma distribution (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). That is why we compute $Pr(Y|x)$ as a weighted combination of $Pr(Y|x, \delta)$ for all values of δ , where the weights are determined by $Pr(\delta)$. The negative binomial regression appears well suited to our dataset.

We used the conventional interpretation of the regression coefficient, taking the natural logarithm of the incidence rate ratio, which explains the rate in incidence rate ratio (IRR) comparing all categories to the (lowest) baseline category. As mentioned, IRR has a multiplicative effect on the response variable. Data were analysed with Stata 12 software.

3 RESULTS

Men with maximum lower secondary education had 80 per cent higher mortality compared to those with tertiary education (*Table 3*). The mortality of men who completed upper secondary education, on the other hand, was only slightly and non-significantly higher than that of the best educated. Based on education, two-thirds of male respondents experienced highly elevated mortality risk (*Table 1, 2*).

Mortality rates were 160 per cent higher for the 38 per cent of men who reported the highest level of material deprivation. Medium-level deprivation also had a significant effect on mortality, elevating the IRR by 60 per cent, compared with those who experienced no or only minor material deprivation.

Table 3
*Social differences in mortality based on negative binomial regression,
men aged 30–85 in 2001*

	Incident Rate Ratios and 95% confidence intervals						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<i>Education</i>							
Tertiary	1.00			1.00	1.00		1.00
Upper sec- ondary	1.23 (0.84–1.80)			1.09 (0.77–1.53)	1.19 (0.84–1.69)		1.09 (0.78–1.51)
Lower sec- ondary or less	1.81 (1.29–2.55)			1.38 (1.02–1.88)	1.64 (1.20–2.23)		1.31 (0.97–1.77)
<i>Deprivation</i>							
No depriva- tion		1.00		1.00		1.00	1.00
Medium deprivation		1.59 (1.17–2.16)		1.47 (1.07–2.01)		1.53 (1.14–2.07)	1.44 (1.06–1.96)
Serious deprivation		2.64 (1.96–3.53)		2.29 (1.67–3.13)		2.31 (1.72–3.09)	2.06 (1.51–2.81)
<i>Subjective income</i>							
<i>Able to make the end meet...</i>							
without difficulties			1.00		1.00	1.00	1.00
only with careful budgeting			1.24 (0.94–1.63)		1.16 (0.91–1.48)	1.08 (0.87–1.33)	1.03 (0.83–1.28)
only with major diffi- culties			2.09 (1.52–2.87)		1.87 (1.40–2.50)	1.61 (1.24–2.09)	1.54 (1.18–2.00)
-Log likelihood	205.4786	194.3837	202.8506	191.1420	197.037	187.0347	184.6945

Notes: M1: age + education; M2: age + deprivation; M3: age + subjective income; M4: age + education + deprivation M5: age + education+ subjective income; M6: age + deprivation + subjective income; M7: age + education + deprivation + subjective income. Significant results are marked with bold letters.

When only subjective income was taken into account the narrow 20 per cent of men who reported that they had financial problems from month to month had more than 100 per cent excess mortality compared to those who reported having none or only minor difficulties in this respect. That half of male respondents can make ends meet with minor difficulties faced a mortality risk stating that they not significantly different from the mortality of respondents with satisfactory income.

In multivariate analysis (*Table 3*), however, the effect of education diminished and eventually disappeared when the effects of the other two variables were taken into account. Entering material deprivation or subjective income into the model reduced the educational IRR values somewhat, and entering both reduced it below the significance level. The effect of education was slightly reduced when income was also included (model 5). The decrease in effect was higher when deprivation was included in the model (model 4). Entering both subjective income and material deprivation into the model reduced the IRR values below the level of significance (model 7).

Regarding material deprivation, both a medium and high level of deprivation was associated with an elevated mortality risk among men. The deprivation effect was highly independent of the effects of the other variables examined: IRRs were only slightly reduced both in cases of medium and high level material deprivation, and when subjective income or/and education was/were entered into the model.

Perceived low income was associated with high mortality risk only in its extreme form. The high IRR of those men who experienced day-to-day difficulties diminished significantly when deprivation was also entered into the model (model 6) but still 60 per cent higher compared to those who did not experience difficulties in making the ends meet. When education was also entered into the model (model 7) mortality remained more than 50 per cent higher.

Men with major financial difficulties had a much higher risk of dying than those with a satisfactory level of income. Medium-level financial difficulties, however, did not result in elevated mortality.

As for women, educational differences in mortality seem comparable to what we saw among men (*Table 4*). Women having only lower secondary or less education (55 percent of our female respondents) had 61 per cent higher mortality than women with tertiary education. Those with upper secondary education did not have a higher chance of dying than women with tertiary education.

Table 4
*Social differences in mortality based on negative binomial regression,
 women aged 30–85 in 2001*

	Incident Rate Ratios and 95% confidence intervals						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<i>Education</i>							
Tertiary	1.00			1.00	1.00		1.00
Upper secondary	1.06 (0.66–1.69)			0.99 (0.62–1.57)	1.00 (0.63–1.57)		0.98 (0.61–1.50)
Lower secondary or less	1.61 (1.05–2.46)			1.32 (0.86–2.02)	1.39 (0.92–2.09)		1.20 (0.79–1.83)
<i>Deprivation</i>							
No deprivation		1.00		1.00		1.00	1.00
Medium deprivation		1.44 (0.93–2.22)		1.36 (0.87–2.10)		1.31 (0.85–2.01)	1.27 (0.82–1.96)
Serious deprivation		2.18 (1.44–3.30)		1.92 (1.24–2.97)		1.80 (1.19–2.73)	1.65 (1.07–2.54)
<i>Subjective income</i>							
<i>Able to make the end meet...</i>							
without difficulties			1.00		1.00	1.00	1.00
only with careful budgeting			1.58 (1.16–2.13)		1.48 (1.11–1.97)	1.44 (1.08–1.90)	1.39 (1.04–1.84)
only with day-to-day difficulties			2.21 (1.54–3.14)		1.97 (1.37–2.82)	1.80 (1.29–2.53)	1.75 (1.24–2.45)
-Log likelihood	156.05053	152.19808	151.70095	149.95613	148.42864	146.15434	144.70607

Notes: M1: age + education; M2: age + deprivation; M3: age + subjective income; M4: age + education + deprivation; M5: age + education + subjective income; M6: age + deprivation + subjective income; M7: age + education + deprivation + subjective income. Significant results are marked with bold letters.

Just as among men, only a very high level of deprivation influenced female mortality, raising the IRR by 65 per cent. On the other hand, when the effect of income was examined alone, we found a more pronounced effect on female than on male mortality. Among women not only a very low but also a medium level of income led to an elevated risk of mortality: those 53 per cent of women who managed everyday life with difficulties had a 48 per cent higher mortality, and those 20 per cent of women who faced day-to-day difficulties had a 121 per cent higher mortality compared to those who reported no such difficulties. When the role of education was additionally taken into account (model 5) then the decrease of mortality among those with minor and major financial difficulties was modest. The inclusion of deprivation into our model decreased the

over-mortality of both groups of women with moderate and major financial difficulties only slightly. When education and deprivation were simultaneously considered (model 7), women with moderate financial difficulties still had 39 per cent higher mortality than women without financial difficulties. Women with major financial difficulties on the other hand had 75 per cent higher mortality compared to those experiencing no financial difficulties.

Unlike for men, the effect of deep deprivation did not disappear among women when the effect of low income was also taken into account (model 6), but most mortality differences remained. Education had an even more restrained role in the relationship between deep material deprivation and mortality: after its inclusion into the model (model 4) the mortality rate was still 92 per cent higher among the most deprived women than their non-deprived counterparts. Medium-level education, on the other hand, did not involve significantly higher mortality among women.

4 DISCUSSION

In an earlier analysis (Kovács, 2006) we examined inequalities in health by different aspects of social stratification, similar to those used in the present paper for analysing the determinants of mortality. Using the same sample, we found that inequalities by education, deprivation and income all had effects of a similar magnitude on the chances of having poor health. These effects were partially independent and partially overlapping: by and large, two-thirds of the educational effect among the least educated did not disappear after adjusting for income and deprivation, and half of the effect did not disappear among those with medium-level education. Similarly, a large share of deprivation and income effects were found to be independent of the effect of the other variables. Both in uni- and multivariate analyses the effects of education, material deprivation and income were of similar magnitude, but overall income was the most important predictor of ill health for men, while education and income were equally important and leading determinants for women.

Collating past and recent results, the striking difference between determinants of poor health and mortality is that education no longer has an effect on mortality once the effects of subjective income and material deprivation are taken into account. These findings may indicate, at least in societies, like Hungary the commonly reported and analysed educational differences in mortality can actually be fully attributed to the short- or long-term poverty experienced by the less educated. Several aspects usually thought to determine educational inequalities in mortality, such as social disparities in general and health-related knowledge, or the problem solving/managing skills of the highly educated, do not seem to be relevant under certain conditions.

The relative importance of the determinants of ill health and mortality also seems to differ. While in the case of ill health material deprivation is an important factor on its own right – though relatively less important than income or education for both men and women –, in the case of mortality its weight seems supreme. This finding is not surprising considering the nature of mortality and material deprivation. Both mortality and income assimilate cumulative experiences: the first refers to experiencing ill health, in most cases for a longer period, and the second mostly refers to experiencing poverty for longer periods of the life course. This relationship, however, is not likely to be strong in many societies, except in cases where low education consistently involves not only relative but also absolute poverty for a longer period of time.

Material deprivation and income are strong predictors of mortality for both men and women, but their impacts are different. Experience of marked levels of deprivation or having very low income increases mortality equally. In turn, medium-low income has an effect only for female and medium-low material deprivation only for male mortality. Alternative arguments might offer explanations for this discrepancy.

Men's vulnerability to medium-level material deprivation can be understood by taking into account gender-specific experiences of social exclusion and its measurement. The material element of social exclusion used in this study – ownership of items – makes it easier to manage everyday life and maintain work relationships and friendships. Lacking the mentioned items might involve social exclusion as a result of loosened social connections more often in the case of men than women. Women often have additional opportunities to maintain social relations, unrelated to the ownership of items, for instance through caring for children or grandchildren. However, this reasoning cannot be proved, considering the relatively new and unexplored nature of the social exclusion measures examined in this study. Finally, the more commonly assumed reason for men's worse health – that they have less healthy lifestyles and a resultant lack of control of their financial situation – can also be considered.

Medium-level poverty was found to be a determinant of mortality for women but not men. The substantially higher mortality among men offers one possible interpretation. The higher average life expectancy of women compared to men implies that our female sample is older and less 'health selected' and consequently has more health problems than men of the same age. Management of ill health might depend on income, which could lead to elevated mortality risk for women with medium-low (subjective) income. Alternatively, or even in addition, one may consider the nature of gender roles and its implication on mortality. In traditional households the tasks of budgeting and managing everyday expenses are usually assigned to women. Indeed, in the same survey the majority of respondents indicated that everyday household expenses were predominantly dealt with by women. This prescribed role could be harmful to

women's health in two ways. First, the financial stress could translate into psychological stress on a daily basis; second, women might prioritise expenditures on other household members and play down their own needs, including those connected to their health.

The possibility that the actual determinants of ill health and mortality are different, however, cannot be ruled out. This concept was already proposed in a study analysing mortality and self-rated health in Russia (Perlman and Bobak, 2008a). In that study similar educational differences were found for having poor self-rated health and mortality but income predicted poor health more strongly than mortality. Other factors which affected mortality but not self-rated health in the study on Russia, such as alcohol consumption and smoking, were not measured in our survey. Nevertheless, it is possible they could explain some of our findings regarding the less important role of income relative to deprivation among men.

Other possible explanations emerge if we take the time frame of our data collection into account. Inequalities in health were assessed in 2001 and mortality was assessed for a seven-year period afterwards (2001–2008). Changes regarding the relative importance of the determinants of ill health and mortality have already been reported for Northern Europe (Ronegund and Zahl, 2005).

Earlier studies from Central Eastern Europe based on samples representing selected fractions of the populations (for instance urban-based or the employed) raised the possibility that subjectively evaluated income is an overwhelmingly important determinant of ill health in this region of Europe. Our investigation, based on an unbiased national sample of the whole of a non-institutionalised adult population except for the oldest people, reinforces the point that poverty is among the leading causes of mortality inequalities in Hungary and presumably in other countries of the region too. Inequalities by education, which were reported in only one large-scale prospective study from another country of the CE and Baltic region, namely Lithuania (Shkolnikov et al. 2007), were as large as in Hungary, but probably also mainly driven by material conditions.

Our study, however, has several limitations. Though self-reported income has to be connected with actual income, using self-reported income we could not precisely measure the possible effects of income on mortality. It is possible that our deprivation measure captures more from the effect of 'real income' than subjective income. Employing different income measures leads to conflicting results regarding its effect on mortality, as was shown in previous research on Finland (Martikainen et al. 2009).

The most comprehensive review of dimensions of social deprivation by Whelan and Maitre (2012) has already shown that the dimension of deprivation that they labelled as "basic" has the strongest relationship with health. In this study we employed an index characterising the deprivation dimension that they labelled as "secondary". Overall, from among the five existing dimensions of

deprivation only one could be employed in this study. Consequently, the relationship between material deprivation and mortality remains largely uncharted, even if the findings of this study are presumably applicable to other countries of the Central Eastern European region.

REFERENCES

- Alley D. E., Soldo B. J., Pagán J. A., McCabe J., de Blois M., Field S. H., Asch D. A. and Cannuscio C. (2009). Material Resources and Population Health: Disadvantages in Health Care, Housing, and Food among Adults Over 50 Years of Age. *American Journal of Public Health*, Supplement 3(99)S3, S693–701.
- Benach J., Yasui Y., Borrell C., Pasarín M. I., Martínez J. M. and Daponte A. (2003). The public health burden of material deprivation: excess mortality in leading causes of death in Spain. *Preventive Medicine*, 36, pp.300–308.
- Bobak M., Pikhart H., Rose, R., Hertzman C. and Marmot M. (2000). Socioeconomic factors, material inequalities, and perceived control in self-rated health: cross-sectional data from seven post-communist countries. *Social Science & Medicine*, 51, pp.1343–1350.
- Bradshaw J. and Mayhew E. (2011). *The measurement of extreme poverty in the European Union*. European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. Manuscript, completed in January 2011.
- Cameron, C. A. and Trivedi, P. K. (1998). Regression Analysis of Count Data. *Econometric Society Monograph*, 30, Cambridge University Press.
- Dupont, W. D. (2002). *Statistical Modeling for Biomedical Researchers. A Simple Introduction to the Analysis of Complex Data*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ellaway, A. and Macintyre, S. (1998). Does housing tenure predict health in the UK because it exposes people to different levels of housing related hazards in the home or its surroundings? *Health Place*, 4, pp.141–150.
- Fukuda, Y., Nakamura, K. and Takano, T. (2007). Higher mortality in areas of lower socioeconomic position measured by a single index of deprivation in Japan, *Public Health*, 121, pp.163–173.
- Galobardes, B., Lynch, J. and Davey Smith, G. (2007). Measuring socioeconomic position in health research, *British Medical Bulletin*, 81 and 82, pp.21–37.
- Groffen, D. A. I., Bosma, H., van den Akker, M., Kempen, G. I J. M. and van Eijk, J. T. M. (2008). Lack of basic and luxury goods and health-related dysfunction in older persons; Findings from the longitudinal SMILE study. *BMC Public Health*, 8(1), p.242.
- Grundy, E. and Holt, G. (2001). The socioeconomic status of older adults: How should we measure it in studies of health inequalities? *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health*, 55(12), pp.895–904.
- Kapitány, B. (ed.) (2003). Módszertan és dokumentáció. Az adatfelvétel ismertetése. *Műhelytanulmányok 1*, Budapest: KSH NKI.
- Kopp, M., Skrabski, Á., Kawachi, I. and Adler, N. E. (2005). Low socioeconomic status of the opposite sex is a risk factor for middle aged mortality. *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health*, 59, pp.675–678.
- Kopp, M., Skrabski, Á., Szántó, Zs. and Siegrist, J. (2006). Psychosocial determinants of premature cardiovascular mortality differences within Hungary. *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health*, 60, pp.782–788.
- Kovács, K. (2006). Egészség-esélyek. *Műhelytanulmányok 5*, Budapest: KSH NKI.

- Laaksonen, M., Rahkonen, O., Martikainen, P. and Lahelma, E. (2005): Socioeconomic position and self-rated health: the contribution of childhood socioeconomic circumstances, adult socioeconomic status and material resources. *American Journal of Public Health*, 95, pp.1403–1409.
- Long, S. J. and Freese, J. (2006). *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata*. 2nd ed., Texas: Stata Press.
- Mackenbach, J. P., Stirbu, I., Roskam, J. R., Schaap, M. M., Menvielle, G., Leinsalu, M., Kunst A. E- and the European Union Working Group on Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health(2008). Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health in 22 European Countries. *The New England Journal of Medicine*, 358, pp.2468–81.
- Martikainen, P., Valkonen, T. and Moustgaard, H. (2009). The effects of individual taxable income, household taxable income, and household disposable income on mortality in Finland, 1998–2004. *Population Studies*, 63(2), pp.147–162.
- Perlman, F., and Bobak, M. (2008a). Determinants of self rated health and mortality in Russia – are they the same? *International Journal for Equity in Health*, 7(1), p.19.
- Perlman, F., and Bobak, M. (2008b). Socioeconomic and Behavioral Determinants of Mortality in Posttransition Russia: A Prospective Population Study. *Annals of Epidemiology*, 18(2), pp.92–100.
- Pikhart, H., Bobak, M., Rose, R. and Marmot, M. (2003). Household item ownership and self-rated health: material and psychosocial explanations. *BMC Public Health*, 3, pp.38–45.
- Phillimore, P., Beattie, A. and Townsend, P. (1994). Widening inequality of health in northern England, 1981-91. *BMJ*, 308(6937), pp.1125–1128.
- Rognerud, M. A. and Zahl, P. H. (2005). Social inequalities in mortality: changes in the relative importance of income, education and household size over a 27-year period. *European Journal of Public Health*, 16(1), pp.62–68.
- Romeri, E., Baker, A. and Griffiths, C. (2006). Mortality by deprivation and cause of death in England and Wales, 1999–2003. *Health Statistics Quarterly*, 2006 WINTER (32), Office for National Statistics, pp.19–34.
- Rowntree, B. S. (2000). *Poverty: A Study of Town Life*, Centennial ed, The Polity Press: Bristol.
- Sacker, A., Bartley, M., Firth, D. and Fitzpatrick, R. (2001). Dimensions of social inequality in the health of women in England: occupational, material and behavioural pathways. *Social Science and Medicine*, 52, pp.763–781.
- Shkolnikov, V. M., Jasilionis, D., Andreev, E. M., Jdanov, D. A., Stankuniene, V. and Ambrozaitiene, D. (2007). Linked versus unlinked estimates of mortality and length of life by education and marital status: Evidence from the first record linkage study in Lithuania. *Social Science and Medicine*, 64, pp.1392–1406.
- Skrabski, Á., Kopp, M. and Kawachi, I. (2003). Social capital in a changing society: cross sectional associations with middle aged female and male mortality rates. *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health*, 57, pp.114–119.
- Torsheim, T., Currie, C., Boyce, W., Kalnins, I., Overpeck, M. and Haugland, S. (2004). Material deprivation and self-rated health: a multilevel study of adolescents from 22 European and North American countries. *Social Science and Medicine*, 59, pp.1–12.
- Townsend, P. (1954). Measuring Poverty. *British Journal of Sociology*, 5(2), pp.130–137.
- Townsend, P., Simpson, D. and Tibbs, N. (1985). Inequalities in Health in the City of Bristol: A Preliminary Review of Statistical Evidence. *International Journal of Health Service*, 15(4), pp.637–663.
- Vandenheede, H., Vikhireva, O., Pikhart, H., Kubinova, R., Malyutina, S., Pajak, A., Tamosiunas, A., Peasey, A., Simonova, G., Topor-Madry, R., Marmot, M. and Bobak, M.

- (2013). Socioeconomic inequalities in all-cause mortality in the Czech Republic, Russia, Poland and Lithuania in the 2000s: findings from the HAPIEE Study. *Journal Epidemiology and Community Health*, 68(4), pp.297–303.
- Wald, T., Lelkes, O., Sutherland, H. and Tóth, I. Gy. eds. (2009). *European Inequalities. Social Inclusion and Income Distribution in the European Union*. Budapest: TÁRKI.
- Whelan, C. T., Layte R., Maître, B. and Nolan, B. (2001). Income, Deprivation, and Economic Strain. An Analysis of the European Community Household Panel. *European Sociological Review*, 17(4), pp.357–372.
- Whelan, C. T., Layte R. and Maître, B. (2004). Understanding the Mismatch Between Income Poverty and Deprivation: A Dynamic Comparative Analysis. *European Social Review*, 20(4), pp.287–302.
- Whelan, C. T., Layte R. and Maître, B. (2012). *Understanding Material Deprivation in Europe: A Multilevel Analysis*. Amsterdam: AIAS, GINI Discussion Paper 37.

DISCOURSES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND POPULATION POLICIES IN TURKEY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY¹

SERAP KAVAS²

ABSTRACT: *In the early years of the Republic the Turkish government followed Western family values and norms, and attempted to implement population policies and programmes as part of its agenda, as they were believed to represent development and progress. The overall character of these policies was weighted towards “development”. Imposing demographic change, first through pronatalist and then through antinatalist population policies, the Republic aimed to bring the country to the forefront of developed countries. In this study I analyse the modernisation campaigns that challenged old demographic practices, the historical evolution of such policies and their impact since the beginning of the Republic.*

Keywords: *pronatalist population policies, antinatalist population policies, modernisation, developmental idealism.*

1 INTRODUCTION

Since the late Ottoman period Turkey has experienced extensive industrialisation and urbanisation, and governmental programmes have been implemented

¹ This study is carried out as part of a Survey on “the Relationship between the Perception of Modernity and Fertility”, which was supported by a grant from the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK, SOBAG 3501-grant #113K073). The contents of this paper are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official views of the sponsor. A previous version of this article was presented at The Fourth European Congress on World and Global History (ENIUGH), 4–7 September, 2014, Paris. I would like to thank the session participants for their insightful comments and suggestions. To prepare the paper the author used academic leave for the summer 2014. I would like to thank the faculty administration at Suleyman Sah University for making this leave available. Finally I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers at *Demográfia* for their comments and critique.

² Assistant Professor, Suleyman Sah University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Science, Department of Sociology, Ortanli-Tuzla / Istanbul. email: skavas@ssu.edu.tr.

to engineer social change. Being impelled by the ideas of modernisation and the need to transform the country, the newly founded Turkish republic engaged in several reform movements. As revealed in the following words of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the republic, Westernisation was adopted as the predominant ideology of the Republic: “All of our efforts are directed toward the establishment of a modern, therefore Western, government. Has there been a nation which has desired to be civilised, but which has not turned towards the West?” (Kemal, 1923, p.68).

In order to portray Turkey as a progressive nation, the Kemalist regime implemented modernization programmes including secular educational institutions, a new political and an administrative system as well as communication and transportation networks. The government elites’ emulation of the lifestyle patterns commonly found in the North-western societies led to the swift adoption of an urban lifestyle, to secularisation, and to widespread education. The main drive behind this wide-scale adoption of western lifestyle was the evolutionist worldview that considered the local patterns as deficient and bound to converge towards Western standards (Kağıtçıbaşı, 2005).

While there was strong support for Westernisation, many people were critical of it and advocated values and norms associated with Ottoman society. This tension led to a cultural clash and on-going debates that last up to the present day. Despite this, however, Westernisation still remains the *leitmotiv* and model of change characterising Turkish modernisation (Kavas and Thornton, 2013).

In order to Westernise, the country went through the most rapid and substantial economic and social change since the turn of the twentieth century (e.g., Ortaylı, 1994; Aytaç, 1998; Aykan and Wolf, 2000). At the same time, families in Turkey changed practices, for example those concerned with marriage, divorce and fertility, ultimately rendering Turkey a “rich demographic laboratory” (Toros, 1985, p.97). For example, although marriage remains almost universal, there has been a shift in the timing of marriage. Early marriage was quite pervasive in Turkey in the nineteenth century: the average age at first marriage was 20 to 22 for men and 14 to 18 for women (Duben, 1990). The average age at marriage for men and women was relatively stable at (respectively) 26 and 22 years during the 1970s, but in the last decade it increased to around 27 for men and 24 for women (Turkish Statistical Institute, Turkstat, 2013). Furthermore, the crude divorce rate increased from 0.15 in 1930 to 0.37 in 1961. And since then it has steadily increased, reaching 0.52 during the 1990s and 1.59 in 2009 (Turkstat, 2010); the current divorce rate stands at 1.65 (Turkstat, 2013). Fertility has also changed, declining from an average of 7 children per woman (TFR) in 1930-1935, to 4.6 in 1978, to 2.7 in 1995 and to 2.14 in 2008 (TDHS, Demographic Transition in Turkey, 2008; The world bank world development indicators, 1960–2013).

This study argues that Turkey's modernisation programmes, and their underlying developmental idealism as interpreted by Thornton (Thornton, 2001; 2005) have played a crucial role in demographic changes seen in the country (Kavas and Thornton, 2013). This study illustrates the role of developmental models in demographic practices, as well as discourses in Turkey. In particular, the study examines the influence of the developmental model on policies connected with fertility, which were carried out both in the early and the later phases of the Republic. Of particular concern, is examination of academic discourses regarding these demographic changes, since scholars' perspectives have important repercussions for the early and later population policies.

The article begins with a brief introduction to the theory of developmental idealism and the perspectives and attitudes of Turkish scholars *vis-à-vis* demographic changes and the family. I then discuss the ways in which the ideas of development relate to Turkey's experience of population policies since the foundation of the Turkish republic. Finally, I conclude the paper clarifying what role population policies and programmes have played in modernisation campaigns since the early Republican period.

2 THE THEORY OF DEVELOPMENTAL IDEALISM

Developmental idealism is a model of social change which draws on a developmental paradigm that has been prevalent in Western thinking from the Enlightenment period of the eighteenth century to the present. The paradigm suggests that social change is natural, imperative and directional and that all societies experience change and development (Burrow, 1981; Nisbet, 1969). With this paradigm in mind, Thornton argues that Western scholars have depicted societies as developing from traditional and backwards to modern and civilized, usually placing North-western European societies at the highest level and non-Western societies at various lower levels of the developmental hierarchy (Thornton 2001; 2005). This hierarchical thinking is no doubt associated with the colonialist paradigm, where Eurocentric perspectives reconfigured a new rhetoric of a 'civilisational slope' (Melegh, 2006, p.97; also see Melegh et al., 2013). In this civilisational slope the West was placed at zenith of the developmental ladder.

Moreover, these Western scholars studied societies comparatively and cross-sectionally rather than focusing on a single society, an approach that Thornton conceptualises as *reading history sideways*. These Western scholars believed that they could use this method of historiography to explain different forms of families across countries and the nature of developmental trajectories across time (Thornton, 2005). For example, they observed that the family systems of North-western Europe were quite different from societies outside of

Europe, in the sense that families in non-Western societies were usually extended with strong family solidarity, parental authority and arranged marriages. By contrast, families in North-western European societies were nuclear, more individualistic, with less parental authority, more affection and usually non-arranged marriages. Scholars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries believed that “there had been a family transition that had changed European families from being like the traditional world outside of Northwest Europe to being like the modern families of Northwest Europe” (Thornton, Binstock and Ghimire, 2004, p.5). So using a developmental paradigm and a historical model known as reading history sideways, they concluded that non-Western societies would develop into an ideal, Western form, characterised as modern and progressive.

Developmental idealism provides beliefs and values which suggest that modern society characterised by urbanisation, industrialisation, a high level of education, technology and wealth, etc., is desirable and attainable. It also exerts an influence on family systems and patterns, suggesting that modern families should adopt individualism, freely chosen marriages, gender equality and planned and low fertility. As it stands, developmental idealism provides policy makers and lay people with new methods and means of attaining these ideals.

Thornton argues that many notions connected with developmental idealism are increasingly accepted by policy makers, government elites, non-governmental organisations as well as lay people around the World, and that they have become powerful forces for social change (Thornton, 2010). Many factors, including education, mass media, social movements, foreign aid, the United Nations, and government and non-government programmes have been influential in spreading developmental idealism and making it an international phenomenon (Thornton, 2012). Particularly important for our purposes here are the international family planning programmes. Family planning advocates have energetically emphasised the importance of development and fertility control (Barrett and Frank, 1999). Importantly, to the extent that many of the elements of developmental idealism have become known and accepted, they have become a crucial drive for institutional and behavioural change (Binstock et al., 2013). A burgeoning literature, including survey research and individual studies conducted in various places around the world, exhibits the level of acceptance of the ideas of developmental idealism. For instance, recent survey research in Argentina, China, Egypt, Iran, Malawi, Nepal, Turkey, and the United States indicates that many individuals associate development with self-choice marriages, inter-generational independence, gender equality and low fertility, (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2012; Binstock and Thornton, 2007; Thornton et al., 2008; Thornton et al., 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; Kavas and Thornton, 2013; Allendorf, 2013; Allendorf and Thornton, 2015).

Here, I argue that developmental idealism is a useful perspective for understanding the shifting public policies Turkey has experienced. I describe how the message of developmental idealism – that small families facilitate the development of a nation – became a prevalent discourse in Turkey and an important force for family planning programmes in Turkey.

A caveat needs to be noted regarding the present study. The main weakness of this study is insufficient empirical data. I discuss two shifts in population policies and their impact on fertility change in Turkey on the basis of secondary analysis of research conducted at the relevant periods and also on the basis of discourses including speeches and legal reforms. Despite this inability to document empirically all the elements in the argument, I believe that the argument stated throughout this paper shows that developmental thinking is an important factor that needs to be taken into account to understand and explain the motives behind population policies in Turkey. Nevertheless, more research with a wider variety of empirical and archival data is needed to improve our understanding of the historical context, and the demographic processes during which population policies were implemented. I now turn to discussion of developmental thinking among Turkish scholars and how these discourses can be confronted with demographic processes themselves.

3 DEVELOPMENTAL IDEALISM IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSES

In Turkish demographic discourse one perspective was particularly dominant: a strong belief in modernisation theories, which took an evolutionist and developmental tone with regard to social change (see Kongar, 1972; 1976; Kıray, 1964; Yasa, 1969; Şahinkaya, 1966; Berkes, 1942). In doing so, these scholars followed Western scholars of the Enlightenment period who, having a distinct mode of developmental thinking, constructed trajectories of development or change from what they saw as the least to the most developed societies. They did so by assuming that contemporary societies they considered more developed, at some time in the past, had the same social and cultural features as the contemporary societies they considered as less developed. Following the same pattern, they believed that in the future a society currently characterised as less developed would become similar to the present society considered to be developed (see Thornton, 2001; 2005). Quite in line with this thinking, many sociologists in Turkey evaluated the changes Turkish families were experiencing as evolutionary processes of inevitable and natural change. As Kandiyoti (1985, p.33) states “the early comparative studies on family patterns in developing countries tended to attribute the increasing predominance of the nuclear family to the transition from a rural society to a modernizing urban-industrial one”. These scholars believed that the historical Turkish family was the tradi-

tional family characterised by extended family forms, with couples having many children and generations living together under the same roof. They believed this kind of family would change as the country modernised over time. For example, as the country became increasingly developed and urbanised, it was expected that extended family would be replaced by the nuclear family (see Kongar, 1972; Kıray, 1964; Yasa, 1969; Şahinkaya, 1966; Berkes, 1942). In the following quotation, a prominent social scientist, Kongar, associated modernity and the nuclear family form, reporting findings from surveys he carried out in Izmir:

That the predominant family form of Izmir is the nuclear family can be accepted as clear sign of the modernisation of the city. Other cities, which are relatively traditional when compared to Izmir, tend to follow an extended family form. This particular fact indicates that the family in Turkey goes through an evolutionary line of progress from the traditionally extended family to *famille souche* and then to nuclear family. This structural change is similar to what Levy pointed to when he analysed Turkish family forms. (Kongar, 1972, p.65) (English translation is Author's own).

Elsewhere, Kongar (1976) also uses the phrase progressive nuclear family (*çağdaş çekirdek aile*) to describe the nuclear family. We see similar labeling expressed by another scholar, Şahinkaya (1966) who uses the phrase 'modern democratic family form' to depict the nuclear family. Kongar's study is a quintessential example of the use of a teleological and evolutionist standpoint in examining family structures and arrangements in a certain context. His survey findings clearly reinforce the popular discourse of the time that extended families are traditional families and that they are inevitably and indispensably subject to evolving into nuclear family form as the country becomes more industrialised and urbanised. In fact he reiterates the word 'evolution' while he is describing the process of change:

At the last stage of its evolution, we come to see nuclear families that consist of father, mother and children... it is the end product of industrialisation. It is clear that Turkish families are also following this universal pattern, ...in societies with high technology, with resources and properties unequally distributed, income and other exogenous factors causes families to change. The tendency for nuclearisation in Izmir's families, for this particular reason, is a significant matter (Kongar, 1972, p.135). (English translation is Author's own).

However, nationwide surveys and individual studies introduce a different perspective and raise the question of whether or not the traditional Ottoman

family, characterised time and again by extended family and high fertility, really did exist. A notable part of the literature suggests that the family thus characterised was not a norm as such (Ortaylı, 1994; Özbay, 1985; Kandiyoti, 1985; Timur, 1972; Duben, 1985). As many scholars came to acknowledge, the patriarchal extended family (with generations living together permanently) was not prevalent, even in rural Anatolia, let alone being a norm in the urban hinterland of the empire (Özbay, 1985; Timur, 1972; Duben, 1985). Findings of a 1968 survey conducted by Timur attests to this: while the nuclear family was predominant among agricultural workers at 79 percent, it was around 70 percent in the urban setting. Moreover, for Vergin (1984) unlike what was frequently stated, it was the nuclear family that was the chief form in Turkish society as a whole (Vergin, 1985; Duben and Behar, 2002). A final statement comes from a leading sociologist, Özbay (1985, p.58), who stated that the likelihood that the patriarchal extended family, consisting of three generations living together with the eldest male acting as the family head, is quite low even during the precapitalist era, when the patriarchal system was dominant.

Moreover, Duben and Behar (2002) note that fertility was low even in the early nineteenth century, with the total fertility rate standing at 3.9. Duben and Behar (2002) also draw attention to the somewhat surprising fact that families in Istanbul were practicing birth control as early as 1860s.

Although extended family forms with high fertility and inter-generational living might have been fairly common in the past, the over-generalisation and attribution of a static character to the family (rather than families) reveals the influence of modernisation theories on scholars' views of past family forms in Turkey (Vergin, 1984). In this way the perspectives of Turkish scholars were similar to Western scholars of the eighteenth century, who, as Thornton argues, constructed a developmental hierarchy and portrayed societies as moving through this hierarchy from traditional to modern. This conceptual schema influenced the ways scholars studied families in history. As noted, they studied societies comparatively and cross-sectionally at one point in time and assumed that "at some time in the past the most developed nations had been like their less developed contemporaries and that, assuming continued progress, at some point in the future the least developed nations would become like their more advanced neighbors" (Thornton, Binstock and Ghimire, 2004, p.5) As noted, in many ways Turkish scholars, in their aspiration to modernise the country, were depicting the Turkish family as being in transition. This was a transition from a traditional, past and 'imperfect' state to an advanced and modern family. This mode of thinking can be further illustrated by the following quotation from a Turkish demographer, who views the Turkish fertility transition as being at an incomplete stage and maintains that with the current state of fertility Turkey represents the state of European countries in the 1970s:

Turkey has the highest fertility rate among the EU countries. As it stands, Turkey reminds us of the 29 states' (25 members and 4 candidate states) situations in the 1970s in terms of fertility... if we remember the fact that the average total fertility rate among the EU member states is 1.5, it becomes necessary to come to terms with the fact that the issue of fertility will inevitably stall Turkey's progress toward integration with EU states (Özgür, 2004, p.10). (English translation is Author's own.)

As the quotation indicates, Turkish scholars, by applying a developmental model to the family structure, were, in a way, following in the steps of Western scholars and reading history sideways. In the following sections I will illustrate this particular developmental and modernist view as appearing both in scientific discourses and also in the history of population policies since the foundation of Turkish republic.

It is common for population experts to use the demographic transition model as a benchmark for evaluating demographic changes in Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey is about to complete its fertility transition and "is moving toward an advanced stage of its fertility transition" (Yavuz, 2005; also see Özgür, 2004). Importantly, demographers consider it necessary for Turkey to follow the demographic transition model in order to join the ranks of developed countries, regardless of the fact that the demographic transition model, in reality, is a mere projection of an idealised state of population change in a country. To take an example from one demographic expert:

Turkey has gone a long way from being a closed village society in the early twentieth century with high fertility, and an agricultural mode of production, with the majority of the population illiterate; an introverted society. At the turn of the twentieth century, Turkey has managed to become a society which has completed its demographic transition. The majority of the population lives in urban areas, its family structure has been transformed, and it has diversified its cultural mosaic. Agricultural transformation has been accomplished and modernisation has been achieved (Atauz, 2003).

As seen quite clearly in the example above, there is a remarkable consensus among demographers and population experts that demographic transition is also a transition to a better world. This way of thinking clearly reveals the underlying ideological assumption that limiting population growth would help achieve socioeconomic development (see Thornton et al., 2012; Thornton, 2005).

4 DEVELOPMENTAL ELEMENTS IN POLICY MAKING

Before we move to the discussion of history of population policies since the foundation of Turkish republic, it is important to talk about the overall developmental framework shaping the actual policy making both in the pronatalist and antinatalist phases analysed below. An important characteristic of family planning programmes since the foundation of the republic was that they were all implementations of formal state policy focusing on development. Family planning reform was one axis of the process of creating the Turkish Republic (See Akşit, 2010). The state had a strong interest in determining the number of children born to a family. During the early phase of the republic, the pronatalist state encouraged population growth to counterbalance population losses resulting from successive wars that lasted for several decades. The policy here was circumstantial, sporadic and pragmatic. By 1960 the republic had achieved a significant increase in population growth, yet it continued to shape the population policies for several decades to come, this time reversing the population policy that had been stable for several decades. As we will see below, as of the 1960s, antinatalism was the formal policy and the issue of family planning was a central theme of general state policies. No doubt, imposing demographic change through first pronatalist and then antinatalist population policies, the republic aimed to bring the country to the rank of the countries they considered advanced at the time. What we can call demographic disciplining geared towards social modernisation was in place that would continue even to date. This social modernisation no doubt aimed to improve Turkey's 'ranking' in a globally competitive world. Turkey, in this respect, was embodying 'the globally framed link between demography and national positioning' (see Melegh, 2012, p.482).

It is important to note that the implementation of demographic disciplining was not a straightforward process. Many resisted family planning programmes for nationalist reasons, arguing that contraception was a Western innovation and that fertility control was inconsistent with Islamic principles. Widespread opposition continued for several decades and even to the current day, with the current president labelling family planning advocates as betrayers of the country. (Radikal, 2014. *Agenda. Radical*, 22 Dec. p9.)

Another important dimension of family planning programmes, and ensuing fertility decline in Turkey, corresponds to a perceived association between fertility control and development. A strong belief in a causal relationship between smaller family size and a higher standard of living was particularly prevalent among policy makers. It was on this basis that economists in the state planning organisation recommended the government to change its pronatalist population policies in the early 1960s (Fişek, 1965).

It was against this background that when the State Planning department was founded in 1960, one of the first attempts made was to form a new population

policy geared towards reducing what was often termed uncontrolled population growth. In fact, reducing the population growth rate became part and parcel of the five-year development plans drafted every five years by state planning departments (Metiner, 1965).

The five-year development plans conveyed explicit messages that control of population growth was crucial for social and economic well-being. In this sense, the state's population policy was drawing on a developmental paradigm that one can find examples of in UN reports or, if we want to go back in history, Thomas Malthus's policy recommendations. Reducing total fertility rates as well as the general population growth rate was presented as necessary for both economic and social transformation. For example, the eighth five-year plan stated that population dynamics are strongly associated with economic activities, distribution of natural sources and technological development. In the seventh five-year plan population decline was found to be insufficient, as a result retarding sustainable economic development by increasing the demand for infrastructure, housing and education (Hoşgör and Tansel, 2010). In a similar fashion, a Turkish demographer's use of a developmental tone in the following statement evinces the tendency among professionals to form an association between development and demographic change. The way population control and agricultural and industrial development is juxtaposed is particularly telling:

"Surely a great problem of mankind in our time is to raise the standard of living in the developing countries, partly in order to achieve and maintain peace. Population control is one of most effective means of attaining this goal, along with the increase of agricultural and industrial production." (Fişek 1965, p.298).

Turkey's bid to join the European Union coupled with a commitment to United Nations policy recommendations and action programmes also influenced Turkey's population policies. The recommendations and agreements reached at United Nations' conferences and, in particular, the population and development objectives and actions, reinforces the perceived association between population and development. The 1994 International conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo, is a quintessential example in that it explicitly states that issues of development and population cannot be considered in isolation:

"The 1994 Conference was explicitly given a broader mandate on development issues than previous population conferences, reflecting the growing awareness that population, poverty, patterns of production and consumption and the environment are so closely interconnected." (ICPD, 1994).

5 POPULATION POLICIES IN TURKEY: PRONATALIST POPULATION POLICIES TILL THE 1960S

The newly founded Turkish republic aimed to “revitalise” the nation. In addition to abject poverty, natural catastrophes and hopelessness in the aftermath of successive wars, one major problem, no doubt, was population decline. Successive wars, including the Balkan wars (1912–1913), the First World War (1914–1918) and War of Independence (1919–1922), led to high mortality and morbidity not only as a result of the conflicts themselves, but because of widespread epidemics in the population. Bleak circumstances reduced the male population and exacerbated poverty especially in the rural hinterland (Taeuber, 1958; Akın and Aykut, 2011). It was reported that in 1927, three years after the foundation of the republic, the population of Turkey was 13.6 million. The sharp reduction in the male population and the ensuing labour shortage impeded both agricultural and industrial endeavours, hindering the newly founded republic’s ability to make the great economic leap that it was energetically seeking (Metiner, 1965; Silier, 1981; Özbay, 1985; Akın and Aykut, 2011). It was against this background that a heated debate about increasing the population of the new republic came to the fore. Mustafa Kemal voiced his concern several times in his public speeches. The following words from his speech evince his concern:

It is our aim to protect our nation’s state of health and to make our nation even healthier, to decrease the mortality rate, to make population increase possible and to combat epidemics. By doing all these things, we aim to render our citizens strong and healthy and capable of work. (Speech in the Assembly, March 1922). (English translation is Author’s own).

While Atatürk’s speeches were, no doubt, setting the stage for pronatalist population policies that would continue for more than 40 years, it is important to state that this “climate of pronatalism” was not solely peculiar to Turkey. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, population growth was promoted as an asset for the nation states – large nation states were considered to be strong nation states (Barret and Frank, 1999). Moreover, as previously noted, just like Turkey many other war-torn nations were in favour of boosting fertility to counterbalance the human loss resulting from wars. Hence, in an era when most nations including France, Germany and East European states were taking pride in having a large population, the Turkish Republic, following in the footsteps of especially east European countries was also joining in the movement to boost the birth rate.

It is important to note that this political attitude, in many ways, was somewhat different from the North-western developmental model which was not necessarily marked by pronatalism at the time. In fact it is possible to read this sentiment as a twisted reaction to the ideology of North-western developmental model. To be more specific, the pronatalist model Turkish republic energetically implemented was more in line with East European nationalism which promoted the idea of building larger nations through stimulating birth rate (see Barret and Frank, 1999). In any event, promoting population growth was part of the reform plans to develop the country. As Melegh (2012, p.482.) states, throughout history population management was largely carried out so as to advance the nation through demographic revival:

“In other words, demographic policy was framed and organised by various considerations of how the nation could be ‘revitalised’, made ‘healthy’ and ‘normal’ or could be advanced with regard to greater powers and/or ‘civilised’ nations.”

Toward this end, in an effort to catch up with Western nations, the Republic prepared to implement additional measures including bringing people back from the Turkish diaspora, as indicated in the following piece by Mustafa Kemal:

“The population of the nation is at present at a very regrettable level. I believe the population of the whole of Anatolia does not exceed eight million people. Now our aim is to compensate for this population loss. As you all know, to compensate for population loss many medical and social measures are required, but we will implement whatever measures are required. If necessary, we will invite foreign experts to help guide us to achieve this. Yet in addition to that, we need to bring people with whom we have common race, language and culture from other countries and provide them with a healthy and prosperous life. It is only when we take these measures that we will manage to have a large nation. This nation is twice that of Europe; in Germany there are just 70 million people... this nation is so big that with the increasing population, it will thrive soon” (1923, quoted in: İnan, 1982). (English translation is Author’s own).

Towards this end, preparations, particularly on the legal front, launched the movement. The law titled *Umumi Hıfzısıhha* (public hygiene) was among the leading laws that promoted population growth, which had already become a formal policy of the Turkish government as early as 1930s (Fişek and Shorter, 1968). Within the framework of this law, the sale and use of contraceptives was

prohibited except for medical reasons or emergency. For example, an oral tablet was allowed for gynecological disorders (Özbay and Shorter, 1970). Needless to say, educating or raising consciousness about family planning was also strictly forbidden. The law provided financial incentives for families to have at least six children. Lower income taxes for parents with many children and a childcare allowance for state officers were examples of the financial stimulus provided.

It is important to note that promotion of population increase was successful. Relatively better economic conditions, a gradual extension of health protection, as well as a reduction in mortality, played a significant role in helping achieve the much desired population growth of the new nation (Metiner, 1965). As seen in the table below, when the republic reached the 1950s, the national population had already more than doubled with rapid population growth rate being 21.7% in 1950 alone. The total fertility rate increased from 5.5 to 7 children per woman and stood at around 7 during 1930s. Moreover, life expectancy at birth increased from 35 years to 45 years (Eryurt and Koç, 2012).

Table 1
Population growth rate every five years between the years 1935–1965 (‰)

Years	Population	Population growth rate, ‰
1935	16,158,018	21.1
1940	17,820,950	17.0
1945	18,790,174	10.6
1950	20,947,188	21.7
1955	24,064,763	27.8
1960	27,754,820	28.5
1965	31,391,421	24.6

Source: Turkstat-Statistical indicators 1923–2013.

In the absence of historical data, it is not possible to disentangle the impact of pronatalist campaigns and incentives on the ascent in fertility during the early phase of the Republic. However, it is safe to say that with the vigorous population campaigns it is quite likely that it had at least some effects on people's motivation to have more children. Moreover, according to demographers some of the factors involved in the process of population increase were a notable decline in mortality rate, ever-increasing fertility, and a positive migration balance though at a very low rate (Cerit, 1983; Peker, 1983; Metiner, 1965; Gürkhan, 1966). Although the population increased continuously from the time that it was first enumerated (1927), a slowdown was observed in 1935–1940, which can be attributed to physical and social conditions during the Second

World War. In any event, what one can say is that a steady population growth is evident, emanating in particular from high fertility and decreasing mortality.

An important determinant of high fertility since the early phase of the Republic was, no doubt, early marriage. In 1935 alone, the average age at first marriage for the urban women was 20.8 (Turkstat, 2006). With early marriage and contraceptive use forbidden, perhaps even unheard of for the rural women, and with government campaigns and incentives to have children energetically implemented, it is no wonder that an upward trend in fertility occurred.

6 ANTINATALIST POPULATION POLICIES SINCE THE 1960's

The pronatalist policies were implemented for four decades. After decades of extensive campaigning to drive people to have more children, the pronatalist government changed its population policy entirely in the 1950s for a number of reasons.

Many factors were involved in this change, the chief one among them was a shift in the government's population policy in favour of family planning, beginning as early as the 1960s. Turkey's experience was no different from that of many developing countries around the world, including Egypt, India, South Korea, Albania and Mongolia, where political elites expressed concern that the rapid rate of population growth had been holding back their prospects for socio-economic development (See United Nations Population Division Report, 2002). These governments supported policies and programmes that had an effect on fertility. Especially since the early 1950s with the advancement of the family planning industry, they increasingly supported services providing modern, contraceptive methods (*ibid.*). This neo-Malthusian approach was not uncontested, and several countries and blocks of countries opposed these policies, leading to well-known debates of which the best known was at the Population Conference of the UN at Bucharest in 1974.

Turkey was among the countries that considered its population growth rate too high. There were already reactions and heated debates among policy makers, civil initiatives and universities working against 'population overflow' and the unintended consequences of this growth from as early as 1958 (Peker, 1983). The adverse effects of population growth, such as unplanned urbanisation, an increasing unemployment rate in urban areas and health care problems, (particularly as concerns maternal health and infant mortality, which was as high as 165 per thousand,) were among the hotly debated issues. Moreover, one particular highlighted issue was the rapid increase in illegal abortions, which had become pervasive and was even employed as a form of birth control. In rural areas, in particular, half of all maternal mortality was a result of induced abortions, which was taken as the sole means of terminating an unwanted preg-

nancy (Akın and Aykut, 2011). As one would expect, it soon became common for many obstetricians to perform induced abortions as a side-job, even though the act was criminalised by the penal code (*ibid.*).

“All these factors have an extremely significant soaring effect on the ability of Turkey to modernize, as outlined in the three five-year-plans – from 1962 to 1977.” (Metiner, 1965, p.135.)

It was against this background that the family planning programme of Turkey gained ground. In many ways the process to initiate fertility control programmes was realised with the help of international agencies. In 1963 the Turkish government solicited assistance from the Population Council, to conduct a nationwide survey to investigate people’s attitudes to a nationwide family planning programme. This demand gave way to Turkey’s first ever survey on knowledge, attitudes and the practices of family planning (KAP Survey) conducted by staff from the Turkish Ministry of Health and an international research team from the Population Council. The findings of the survey revealed a high level of interest and positive reactions towards birth control practices and to the family planning programme in general. Moreover, the survey showed that people who participated in the study had very limited knowledge of contraceptive methods, with 43 percent of couples stating that they have no idea about how to avoid having a child. Importantly, perhaps, preparations to initiate a solid programme gained momentum in the aftermath of the publication of the findings. Over the course of the next year, a number of Turkish staff were sent to the United States to be trained in family planning, and experts from the Population Council assisted the Turkish team in implementing the programme.

A legal framework soon accompanied the preparations. In 1965 a new law was drafted by the government and was passed in the parliament repealing previous laws, which forbade the sale, use and distribution of contraception. The law stated that “individuals can have as many children as they want and the individuals will be free to use birth control practices to control their family size.” (*Population Planning Act 1965*. (no.557) Istanbul: Official Gazette of The Republic Turkey, 10 April.)

Following this legal support, a Family Planning Division was established within the Ministry of Health. Information about birth control and services for the provision of birth control devices were established. For example, maternal health centres were primarily responsible for educating people in every region of the country about birth control measures. Intra-uterine devices were provided free of charge. In 1967 abortion was decriminalised and the use of abortion was justified for a range of medical reasons. Further legislation on abortion came in 1983, when the criteria for a lawful abortion were expanded and tied to some preconditions such as obligation to have it undertaken at a public hospital, with the husband’s consent (for married women) and determining the legal limit for termination as the first ten weeks of pregnancy.

It is important to note that religion was also instrumental in supporting birth control. The fact that Islam does not prohibit limiting the size of couples' families, and that it even provides an "ideological underpinning for child limitation for Muslim Turkey throughout history" (Duben and Behar, 2002, p.4.), was a relief for policy makers because convincing people to act against religion would have been difficult in the path towards disciplining the demographic behaviour of the populace.

7 FERTILITY CHANGE IN TURKEY SINCE THE 60's

The spread of developmental thinking and an intense state campaign to spread use and knowledge of family planning practices since 1965 soon came to fruition. In 1978 women who were using a modern contraceptive represented 34 per cent of the population, which would soon rise to 51 per cent of women in 1983 (Ortaylı, 1989). Contraceptive use is now widespread, with 92 percent of ever-married women having used a contraceptive method some point during their reproductive years and 74 percent of currently married women using contraception (TDHS, 2013).


A notable decrease in fertility was observed which clearly corresponded to the increase in contraceptive use. In fact, Özbay and Shorter (1970) note that the transition from high to low fertility might have started in Turkey as early as the 1960s, just before the official policy change. In 1965 alone, the total fertility rate was 5.8, and this had decreased from 6.7 in 1950. A general change in population composition emanating both from internal migration and the massive emigration of young Turkish men to Western Europe are often cited as important ideational drivers behind the descent in fertility. Turkey experienced two migration patterns from the 1950s which had a significant impact on the demographic characteristics of the country. Turkish labour emigration to Europe, particularly to West Germany, could lead to late marriages and spousal separation which resulted in fertility decline (Özbay and Yücel, 2001). The fact that the workers stayed without their families and family reunion policies came only after they had spent years abroad might have had an effect on the fertility size of these families. However, it is important to note that the majority of these Turkish workers brought their families with them, settled down and did not return to their own countries (Kirisçi, 2003). As such, it would not be wrong to say that emigration to Europe had a limited effect in changing fertility patterns in Turkey.

On the other hand, Turkish internal migration around the same period changed the fertility trajectory of the country to a great extent (Eryurt and Koç, 2012). First of all, the internal rural-to-urban migration led to a decrease in child mortality as a result of improved antenatal care and city hospital deliver-

ies. In addition, better health services and conditions made it easier for women to have access to contraceptive knowledge and services (Özbay and Yücel, 2001). Needless to say, urbanisation, in many ways, improved women's status in terms of both access to education and employment – and this might have been translated into more female autonomy in fertility decision making as shown by figures.

These important structural factors, no doubt, resulted in changes to fertility. Additionally, demographers commonly stress attitudinal change as the major drive behind the fertility decline. As the findings of the KAP Survey conducted in 1963 show, a majority of couples endorsed family planning and showed interest in learning about a method to practice family planning (Fişek and Shorter, 1968). This indicated that people were already receptive to the idea of limiting family size or setting up a smaller family earlier than the government's antenatalist policy (Özbay and Shorter 1970; Fişek and Shorter 1968).

Due to lack of survey data, it is difficult to disentangle the impact of all of these developments on the steady fertility decline which saw the total fertility rate drop from 7.1 children per woman in 1930, to 4.3 in 1978, to 3.1 during the late 1980s, and finally to 2.07 in 2013 (Kavas and Thornton 2013; The world bank world developmental indicators data, 1960-2013). However, it is clear that the education of women and relatedly the increasing access to contraceptives, implemented within the framework of the antinatalist policies, facilitated family planning and was the major driver of fertility decline (See *Figure 1* below). This is in line with experiences elsewhere in the world (Ergöçmen and Bozbe-yoğlu, 2005). Moreover, attitudinal factors still persist: according to the recent Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (2013), the desire for a large family has declined considerably. Among women who have two living children, 59 per cent want no more children. An important characteristic of Turkish fertility change is geographical variability. In eastern Turkey, where Kurdish populations predominate, the TFR is on average 3.3 births per woman, while in western Turkey the average fertility rate is as low as 1.7 births per woman.



Source: Author's calculation using the World Bank, World Development Indicators data.

Figure 1
*Total Fertility Rate between 1960–2013 and Women's years
of education between 1970 and 2013*

8 CONCLUSION

Concern with population growth has occupied the political agenda of Turkish governments for several decades now. Many countries have adopted policies to modify population growth and to improve family well-being. Since the 1960s, the Turkish government has joined other states in supporting family planning as part of its development plans.

Believing that Western family values and norms represent development and progress, the Turkish government attempted to implement population policies and programmes. The main characteristic of these policies was that they were all conducted with a developmental mindset. Importantly, population policies implemented since the early Republican period have acted as a channel whereby developmental ideas have penetrated far into society. With extensive population campaigns and discourses people have been exposed to notions prevalent in Western countries. In many ways, Turkish people have learnt that large population means national welfare and later the state-led fertility control

programme thought them that overpopulation impedes development of the country. With these and other related approaches developmental idealism prevailed the common discourse and have had a potential impact on people's fertility behaviours for several decades.

During the period when antinatalist policies were implemented, the Turkish political elite and intellectuals believed in a causal relationship between lowering fertility and achieving a higher standard of living. With a modernist stance, they believed that fertility decline was an end product of socio-economic transformation (See Thornton 2005, p.76.). Following the fertility decline experienced by European states, they thought that Turkey was antiquated and that family practices would change in Turkey along European lines as the country advanced. Following this line of thinking, Turkish elites and scholars illustrated a mode of historical analysis that Thornton (2005) identifies as Reading History Sideways.

All in all, since it was ratified by parliament in 1965, the government has made concerted and repeated efforts to lower fertility around the country. Even though the present ruling government supports a high population growth rate for Turkey and the current president advocates that couples should have at least three children, family planning remains at the core of public policy.

REFERENCES

- Abadan-Unat, N. (1977). Implications of Migration on Emancipation and Pseudo-Emancipation of Turkish Women. *International Migration Review*, 11(1), pp.31–57.
- Abbasi-Shavazi, M. J., Nodoushan, A. A. and Thornton, A. (2012). Family Life and Developmental Idealism in Yazd, Iran. *Demographic Research*, 26(10), pp.207–238.
- Akin, A. and Aykut, N. B. (2011). Arastirmadan Uygulamaya: Nufus Politikalarinin Olusturulmasinda Turkiye Deneyimi. *Saglik ve Toplum Dergisi*, 3.
- Akşit, E. E. (2010). Geç Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemlerinde Nüfus Kontrolü Yaklaşımları. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 117, pp.179–197.
- Allendorf, K. (2013). Schemas of Marital Change: From Arranged Marriages to Eloping for Love. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 75(2), pp.453–469.
- Allendorf, K. and Thornton, A. (Forthcoming). Caste and Choice: The Influence of Developmental Idealism on Marriage Behavior. *American Journal of Sociology*.
- Atauz, A. (2003). *Türkiye'nin Nüfus ve Kalkınma Yazını: Eleştirel bir Değerlendirme*. Ankara: Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi.
- Aykan, H., and Wolf D. A. (2000). Traditionality, modernity, and household composition: Parent-Child co-residence in contemporary Turkey. *Research on Aging*, 22, pp.395–421.
- Aytaç, I. A. (1998). Intergenerational Living Arrangements in Turkey. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology*, 13, pp.241–64.
- Barrett, D. and Frank, D. J. (1999). Population Control for National Development: From World Discourse to National Policies. In: J. Boli and G. Thomas, eds. *Constructing World Culture*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp.198–222.

- Berkes, N. (1942). *Bazı Ankara Köyleri Üzerine Bir Araştırma*. Dil Tarih ve Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları Sosyoloji Serisi, 2, Ankara.
- Binstock, G., Thornton, A. (2007). Knowledge and Use of Developmental Thinking about Societies and Families among Teenagers in Argentina. *Demográfia English Edition*, 50(5), pp.75–104.
- Binstock, G., Thornton, A., Abbasi-Shavazi, M. J., Ghimire, D., Yu Xie and Yount, K. M. (2013). Influences on the knowledge and beliefs of ordinary people about developmental hierarchies. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 54, pp.325–344.
- Burrow, J. W. (1981). *Evolution and Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cerit, S. (1983). *Türkiye’de Nüfusun Yapısı, Türkiye’de Planlı Dönemde Nüfus ve Aile Planlaması Çalışmaları*. Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Yayınları, Ankara.
- Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat (2002). *Views and Policies Concerning Population Growth and Fertility among Governments In Intermediate-Fertility Countries*. Available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/completingfertility/RevisedPOPDIVPPSaper.PDF>.
- Duben, A. (1985). Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Ottoman-Turkish Family and Household Structures. In: T. Erder, ed. *Family in Turkish Society*, Ankara: Turkish Social Science Association.
- Duben, A. (1990). Household formation in late Ottoman Istanbul. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 22, pp.419–435.
- Duben, A. and Behar, C. (2002). *Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1881–1940*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ergöçmen, B. A. and Bozbeyoğlu, A. Ç. (2005). An Alternative Approach to Measure Unmet Need for Family Planning in Turkey. *Nüfusbilim Dergisi/Turkish Journal of Population Studies*, 27, pp.3–16.
- Erman, T. and Icduygu, A. (1994). Turkey and European Union: A comparison of population distribution and urbanization. *The Turkish Journal of Population Studies*, 16, pp.15–27.
- Eryurt, M. A. and Koç, İ. (2012). Internal Migration and Fertility in Turkey: Kaplan-Meier Survival Analysis. *International Journal of Population Research*, 2012, pp.1–11.
- Fişek, T. (1965). Problems in Starting a Program. In: B. Berelson, ed. 1965. *Family Planning and Population Programs: A Review of World Developments*. London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Fişek, N. and Shorter, F. (1968). Fertility control in Turkey. *Demography*, 5(2), pp.578–589.
- Gürtan, K. (1966). *Türkiye’de Nüfus Problemi ve İktisadi Kalkınma ile İlgisi*, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi yayınları, No. 260.
- Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies (2014). *2013 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey*. Ankara: Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, T.R. Ministry of Development and TÜBİTAK.
- Hoşgör, Ş. and Tansel, A. (2010). *2050’ye Doğru Nüfusbilim ve Yönetim, Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD) yayınları*. No: TÜSIAD-T/2010/11/55.
- İnan, A. (1982). *Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün 1923 Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara.
- Kandiyoti, D. (1985). Continuity and Change in the Family: A Comparative Approach. In T. Erder ed. 1985. *Family in Turkish Society*, Ankara: Turkish Social Science Association.
- Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç. (2005). Modernization does not Mean Westernization: Emergence of a Different Pattern. In: W. Friedlmeier, C. Pradeep, B. Schwarz eds. 2005. *Culture and Human Development: The Importance of Cross-Cultural Research for the Social Sciences*. London and New York: Psychology Press.

- Kavas, S. and Thornton, A. (2013). Adjustment and Hybridity in Turkish Family Change: Perspectives from Developmental Idealism. *Journal of Family History*, 38(2), pp.223–241.
- Kemal, M. (1923). *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, II, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997).
- Kiray, M. (1976). The Family of the Immigration worker. In: N. Abadan-Unat ed. *Turkish Workers in Europe 1960–1965*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, pp.214–216.
- Kirişçi, K. (2003). Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration. *Migration Policy Source: Online Journal of Migration Policy Institute*. Available at: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/turkey-transformation-emigration-immigration>.
- Kongar, E. (1972). *İzmir'de kentsel Aile*. Ankara : Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği.
- Kongar, E. (1976). *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı* (Turkey's Social Structure since the Period of Empire). Istanbul: Cem Press.
- Melegh, A. (2006). *On the East-West Slope: Globalization, Nationalism, Racism, and Discourses on Eastern Europe*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Melegh, A. (2012). Review of Baloutzova, Demography and nation: social legislation and population policy in Bulgaria, 1918–1944. *Continuity and Change*, 27(3), pp.481–486.
- Melegh, A., Thornton, A., Philipov, D. and Young-DeMarco, L. (2013). Perceptions of Societal Developmental Hierarchies in Europe and Beyond: A Bulgarian Perspective. *European Sociological Review*, 29(3), pp.603–615.
- Metiner, T. (1965). Turkey. In: B. Berelson, ed. *Family Planning and Population Programs: A Review of World Developments*. London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Nisbet, R. A. (1969). *Social Change and History*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ortaylı, I. (1994). *Studies on Ottoman Transformation*. Istanbul: Isis Press.
- Ortaylı, N. (1989). Doğum Kontrolünün Hikayesi. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 45, pp.49–64.
- Özbay, F. and Shorter, F. (1970). Turkey: Changes in Birth Control Practices, 1963 to 1968. *Studies in Family Planning*, 51, pp.1–15.
- Özbay, F. and Yücel, B. (2001). Türkiye'de Nüfus Hareketleri, Devlet Politikaları ve Demografik Yapı. In: F. Özbay, ed. *Nüfus ve Kalkınma*, Ankara: Nüfus ve Kalkınma Hacettepe Üniversitesi Nüfus Etütleri Enstitüsü Press, pp.1–69.
- Özbay, F. (1985). Transformation of the Socio-Economic Structure and Changing Family Functions in Rural Turkey. In: T. Erder, ed. *Family in Turkish Society*. Ankara: Turkish Social Science Association.
- Özgür, M. (2004). Türkiye'de Toplam Dogurganlık Hızının Mekansal Dağılışı. *Coğrafi Bilimler Dergisi*, 2, pp.1–11.
- Peker, M. (1983). Nüfus Politikaları. *Türkiye de Planlı Donemde Nüfus ve Aile Planlaması Çalışmaları*, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Yayınları, Ankara.
- Sahinkaya, Rezan (1966). *Orta Anadolu Köylerinde Aile Strukturu*. Ankara Üniversitesi Ziraat Fakültesi Yayınları, 225, Ankara University, Ankara.
- Shorter, Frederic C. (2003). *Estimating Fertility, Mortality, and Net Reproduction in Turkey from the 2000 Census*, Working Paper. Available at: <http://www.hpntech.com/popart/fs4.aspx>.
- Silier, Oya (1981). *Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapının Gelişimi (1923–1933)*. Istanbul: Bogazici Üniversitesi yayınları.
- Thornton, A. (2001). The Developmental Paradigm, Reading History Sideways and Family Change. *Demography*, 38, 449–465.
- Thornton, A. (2005). *Reading History Sideways: The Fallacy and Enduring Impact of the Developmental Paradigm on the Family Life*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

- Thornton, A., Binstock, G. and Ghimire, D. (2004). *International Networks, Ideas, and Family Change*. PSC Research Report, Report No. 04–566, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.
- Thornton, A., Binstock, G. and Ghimire, D. (2008). International Dissemination of Ideas About Development and Family Change. In: R. Jayakody, A. Thornton and W. Axinn, eds. *International Family Change Ideational Perspectives*. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum. pp.19–44.
- Thornton, A., Ghimire, D. J., and Mitchell, C. (2012). The measurement and prevalence of an ideational model of family and economic development in Nepal. *Population Studies: A Journal of Demography*, 66(3), pp.329–345.
- Thornton, A., Binstock, G., Yount, K. M., Abbasi-Shavazi, M., Ghimire, D. J. and Xie, Yu (2012). International Fertility Change: New Data and Insights from the Developmental Idealism Framework. *Demography*, 49(2), pp.677–698.
- Thornton, A., Binstock, G., Abbasi-Shavazi, M., Ghimire, D. J., Gjonca, A., Melegh, A., Mitchell, C., Moaddel, M., Yu Xie, Li-shou Yang, Young-DeMarco, L., Yount, K. M. (2012). Knowledge and beliefs about national development and developmental hierarchies: The viewpoints of ordinary people in thirteen countries. *Social Science Research*, 41, pp.1053–1068.
- Timur, S. (1972). *Türkiye’de Aile Yapısı*. Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Toros, A. (1985). Hypotheses on the major demographic developments in the recent past in Turkey. *Genus*, 41, pp.97–117.
- Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) (2008).
- Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) (2008). Demographic Transition in Turkey. Ankara: Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies. Available at: http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/TurkiyeninDemografikDonusumu_220410.pdf.
- Tauber, I. (1958). Population and Modernization in Turkey. *Population Index*, 24(2), pp.101–122.
- Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat) (2006). *Family Structure Survey*. Available at: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr>.
- Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat) (2010). *Statistical Indicators 1923–2013*. Available at: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr>.
- Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat) (2006). *Statistical Indicators 1923–2005*. Available at: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr>.
- United Nations (1994). *Report of International Conference on Population and Development*. Cairo, Egypt, 5–13 September, 1994. New York: United Nations. Available at: <http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/offeng/poa.html>.
- World Bank, World Development Indicators. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>.
- Xie, Y., Thornton, A., Guangzhou, W., Lai, Q. (2012). Societal projection: Beliefs concerning the relationship between development and inequality in China. *Social Science Research*, 41, pp.1069–1084.
- Vergin, N. (1985). Social change and family in Turkey. *Current Anthropology*, 26, pp.571–574.
- Yasa, İ. (1969) *Yirmibeş yıl sonra Hasanoğlu Köyü*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi yayınları.
- Yavuz, S. (2005). Completing the Fertility Transition: Third Birth Developments by Language Groups in Turkey. *Demographic Research*, 15, pp.435–460.

SEEMIG PROJECT OVERVIEW

ATTILA MELEGH¹

After 30 months of intensive work, the SEEMIG project (Managing Migration and its Effects in South-East Europe. Transnational Actions towards Evidence Based Strategies) was closed at the end of 2014. The project relied on a wide network of partners, including 18 research institutes, universities, statistical offices and local government bodies from eight countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia) and observers from an additional three countries (Albania, Georgia, Ukraine). The Lead Partner of the project was the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. The Hungarian Demographic Research Institute was responsible for two important work packages.

The main objective of the project was to better understand and address the longer term migratory, human capital and demographic processes of the South-Eastern European (SEE) area, as well as the effects of these processes on labour markets and economies, in order to enable public administrative institutions to develop and implement policies and strategies by using enhanced datasets and empirical evidence. Despite growing (policy) attention given to international migration, and attempts to standardize and harmonize related data collection in recent decades, there is still a paucity of accurate and reliable migration data. Inconsistencies in data collection and measurement prevail, especially in the SEE region. Against this background, longer term historical analyses, databases, data reform strategies, policy recommendations on the local, national and transnational levels, novel surveys and population projections have been developed within the SEEMIG project.

The key achievements of the project were the following. Utilizing the *knowledge on longer term historical trends* and developmental patterns, the project has developed *new ways of population forecasts*. The project has also invited experts, decision makers and civic groups to conduct *foresight exercises* to identify key factors of future developments. Altogether, the relevant participating institutions could develop a broad picture on future challenges based on a comparative understanding of 60-year-long historical trajectories.

¹ Senior researcher at Hungarian Demographic Research Institute, Budapest, email: melegh@demografia.hu.

The project has also carried out an *innovative, national emigrant survey* in two countries, and thus provided brand new, statistically reliable data on the basic composition of migrant groups. Project partners have created a *transnational database* based on longer term national data time series, with the aim of providing regional “good practise”, in order to help decision makers and researchers use better evidence in their understanding and managing of major developmental dilemmas related to migration, human capital and labour market processes within the entire region. The SEEMIG project has also created several types of *local databases*, which will be indispensable for underpinning efficient local developmental strategies.

The partners of the project have *monitored and reviewed the international, national and local data systems*, which generate the necessary data for the statistics on migration, labour market and human capital. On this basis, the project partners prepared a set of *strategies and recommendations for reforming relevant data systems*.

Altogether 28 partner institutions, including statistical offices, research institutes and local governments, have participated and thus established a powerful mix of partners who have been able to increase their capacities via cooperation and via the integration of differing views. The partnership has been able to improve the evidence-base for policy making on national, local and transnational levels in a field where data problems are a major obstacle.

The project also did its best to ensure the sustainability of the results; data system analyses and strategies will be updated regularly and are in harmony with the already existing data structures. Results have also been delivered to primary international actors such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The leverage effects of the rich network of partners, as well as the exceptionally intensive stakeholder involvement that have, already, resulted in some stable local/regional structures and national level key connections, are strong predictors of the project’s continuity.

Below you can read the final output of the SEEMIG partnership, the “Transnational policy recommendations”, which can be considered the extract of the 30 months of common work and cooperation. Further information on the project can be found at: www.seemig.eu.

TRANSNATIONAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy Area 1: Harmonization of data collection and exchange

Harmonization of definitions and methods in the European Union and relevant international bodies: Despite the growing attempts to standardise and harmonise migration-related data collection in recent decades, fully comparable mi-

gration data are still scarce. Therefore, there is a need to harmonize definitions of migration in the relevant registries of the European Union Member States; most importantly, in the address registration and also in surveys conducted in these countries. There is also a need to agree on the definition of repeated shorter-term migratory moves in order to cover current changes in the nature of migration. These harmonized definitions should be elaborated in close cooperation with regional and global institutions and major migratory partner countries.

Continued mainstreaming of migration data: Migration issues are increasingly taken into account in a wider range of public policy areas, including health, education, and social policy. To promote these activities, richer information on the socio-economic situation and composition of migrants is still needed, including the level of education, labour force participation and language skills. This could be achieved through the means of broader inclusion of the indicator ‘country of birth’. The introduction of this information in registries and large scale surveys would also allow better international comparison and the clarification of the social composition of migrant groups. This would promote quick analyses aimed at identifying problems related to migration and development.

Harmonization of address registration within the European Union: In the European Union, there is a need to take steps towards a more unified system of address registration to be applied in the case of all foreign citizens – including EU citizens. This would prevent their parallel registration in more than one country. While national governments maintain the right to introduce, operate and change such registries, EU level recommendations should help them in establishing a unified system that integrates the transnational needs of migration statistics.

Policy Area 2: Enhancement of data collection methodologies

Improvement and integration of administrative data systems: The introduction of a unique statistical identifier (PIN) in most of the EU member countries is especially urgent, as it would sufficiently link data from different registers. To achieve this, steps need to be taken at the European level as well, in order to systematically follow emigration through deregistration from data systems. This would enable less costly and more frequent analyses and it would provide better data on the demographic and social composition of the registered migrant population. Data protection has to be guaranteed on a sufficient level, so that individual data are not traceable beyond statistical purposes.

Improvement of data collection on the regional level: Demographic and economic polarisations as well as persisting regional specificities are the main factors that will continue to shape the development of SEEMIG regions, also in the future. For this purpose, differentiated data for the regional level – amongst others and particularly as regards (net) migration trends – are important. The availability of such data on the regional level as of yet is still scarce. For this reason, there is a great need to enhance the collection of regional-level data.

Improvement of methods to estimate migration flow and stock data and use of “big data” on the transnational level: To produce reliable estimates of migration flow data, systematic consideration and possibly a combination of several approaches is needed. These include using stock data to derive country-level flow data and also making some simple census tabulations universal (particularly the tabulation of residents by place of birth and, for the foreign-born, by year of entry). Other new approaches such as using “big data” – for instance the data from social media – are still at an early stage of development. The aim of comparing, improving and checking estimates should be incorporated into various research and policy calls of international and national funding agencies.

Emigrant-surveys based on SEEMIG pilot methodology: To improve emigration statistics, potentials of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) should be further utilised. The SEEMIG pilot studies in Hungary and Serbia have demonstrated how an emigrant-sample, large enough of for meaningful statistical analysis, can be achieved through LFS even in countries with medium level emigration. A harmonised and streamlined version of the method piloted in the SEEMIG project could serve as a basis for producing reliable estimates of the size of emigration as well as of the composition of the emigrant population across Europe in a comparable manner.

Policy Area 3: Increase in transnational partnerships and cooperation

Establishment of transnational dialogue among migrant sending and receiving areas: There is an urgent need to enhance dialogue among the relevant policy makers in both types of communities in order to make migratory linkages an opportunity instead of a challenge. Such transnational dialogues would be helpful in the specification of migration management policies at the local, national and regional level. This dialogue can also lead to better articulation of interests and data problems concerning linkages among migrant-sending and migrant-receiving communities.

Creation of a transnational monitoring committee: A transnational monitoring committee composed of a multi-disciplinary group of experts from all countries in the region representing research institutes and statistical offices, which continuously observes migration processes and provides a transnational framework for better cooperation in the region, should be set up. Such a monitoring committee could become the first step towards a better and more coordinated management of international migration within the region by fostering the improvement of evidence about migration and related processes.

Collection and exchange of data, increased cooperation between National Statistical Offices in the European Union: To capture new realities of migration, a systematic collection of data with regards to (daily, cross-border) labour mobility is needed in the EU Member States as well as in their non-EU neighbouring countries. Reporting on cross-border migration should be made uniform in terms of the applied methodology in order to have comparable data. Increased partnerships for the exchange of data among statistical offices via Memoranda of Understanding are needed.

Improvement of transnational databases and maintenance of the SEEMIG transnational database: Assembled national data, collected and published by international organisations, still often lack comparability or do not allow for the incorporation of regional specificities. Continued efforts for the harmonisation of the collection of national data and for building partnerships among statistical offices and international organisations seem essential. The SEEMIG Transnational Database, as a pilot activity, offers an important information source on migration, labour market and demography in the region regarding the period after 2001. Its maintenance beyond the project's life span is considered to be of significant national and transnational interest for the South-East European region.

Policy area 4: Improvement of data collection and data use on the local level

Enhancement of institutional capacity of local public administration for data management as well as new forms of multi-institutional cooperation: Implications of migration – particularly those concerning migrant integration but also those related to out-migration – are currently dealt with on the local level, primarily. Consequently, local governments need to be able to respond to these specific local situations based on clear and local specific evidence. However, local public administration tends to lack fundamental professional capacities in collecting relevant data about development and migration. It is of public inter-

est that local databases – similar to the ones produced by SEEMIG – are created, preferably under statistical and expert supervision and coordination.

Launch of local surveys on migrant groups, local communities and on vulnerable groups (especially young people) on a transnational level: To understand current migration patterns and to pave the way for policy action, both the quantity and quality of statistical data at the local level need to be improved, along with cross-sectional analysis methods in order to integrate migration, labour force and family aspects. This has to be done both from the migrant sending and receiving country perspectives, in order to support their social policies, labour market policies and local development strategies. For this purpose, surveys on emigration and emigrants are needed as well.

PARTNERSHIP

Lead Partner:

- Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Hungary

Work Package Leaders:

- Hungarian Demographic Research Institute, Hungary
- University of Vienna – Department of Geography and Regional Research, Austria
- Institute of Informatics and Statistics, Slovakia
- University of Trento - Department of Sociology and Social Research - Research Unit on Local Development and Global Governance (LoG), Italy

Partners:

- District Administration of Montana, Bulgaria
- National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria, Bulgaria
- Municipality of Pécs, Hungary
- Harghita County Council, Romania
- Municipality of Sfântu Gheorghe, Romania
- The Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, Romania
- Institute of Social Sciences, Serbia
- Municipality of Kanjiža, Serbia
- Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Serbia
- Town Council of Turčianske Teplice, Slovakia
- Institute for Economic Research, Slovenia
- Maribor Development Agency, Slovenia
- Scientific Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Slovenia

Associated partners:

- INSTAT Albania, Albania
- Hungarian Ministry of Interior, Hungary
- Autonomous Province of Trento, Italy
- Republic of Slovenia, Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs, Slovenia

Observers:

- Federal Ministry of Interior, Austria
- Tbilisi State University, Georgia
- European Migration Network – Hungarian National Contact Point, Hungary
- Visegrad Statistical Societies, Hungary
- Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction Unit, Hungary
- Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, Serbia
- Centr Strategitsnogo Partnerstva, Ukraine

