



# HUNGARIAN STUDIES

2007

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*Volume 21*  
*Numbers 1–2*

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*Mihály Szegedy-Maszák*: The intellectual and Cultural Scene in the Dual Monarchy

*Vilmos Voigt*: Maurice Benyovszky and his "madagascar *Procotolle*" (1772–1776)

# HUNGARIAN STUDIES

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# MULTICULTURALITY AND INTERCULTURALITY: THE CASE OF TIMIȘOARA

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Geographically situated some 550 kilometers southeast of Vienna and 250 kilometers southeast of Budapest, Timișoara assimilated the influences of the two former imperial capitals relatively quickly. Its European openness was facilitated by the practice of plurilingualism and multiconfessionalism. At the beginning of the 20th century, Timișoara's population spoke five languages, namely Hungarian, German, Serbian, Romanian and Bulgarian. The main religious affiliations were Roman-Catholic, Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, Evangelic-Lutheran, Reformist-Calvinist Churches and Jewish. Interculturality and the intermingling of populations generated a very promising social culture. Analyzed from the behavioral point of view, Timișoara was an example of multi-cultural and intercultural society for two centuries, which made it possible for this center to be integrated into Europe ever since the 19th century and to represent the main link between the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy and the Balkan Peninsula. The multicultural and intercultural dimensions gave consistency to the anti-totalitarian resistance over the course of the 20th century. This was why the intellectuals in the post-Ceaușescu period defined the city's distinctiveness with the expression "the spirit of Timișoara".

**Keywords:** Timișoara, Banat, region, multiculturalism, multi-confessionalism, interculturality, melting-pot, ambivalence, citizen, civic society, 1989 revolt, identity

Geographically situated at 550 km southeast of Vienna and 250 km southeast of Budapest, Timișoara assimilated the influences of the two former imperial capitals relatively quickly. In 1910 the city was home to 72,555 inhabitants; it had two technical institutions of higher education, two episcopates, 62 small and medium sized factories, 132 scientific and professional associations, 7 dailies, 17 printing houses and musical life of a very high standard. Boasting 11,656 pupils and high school students in 1906, Timișoara used to be a real city of education. In 1911 the local authorities were allowed to set up the second technical university in the eastern territories of the Monarchy. After Budapest, Timișoara became one of the most important and modern cities in the eastern part of Austro-Hungary.<sup>1</sup>

The openness of the city towards Europe was facilitated by the practice of plurilingualism and multi-confessional life. At the beginning of the 20th century the inhabitants of Timișoara spoke five languages, namely: Hungarian, German, Serbian, Romanian and Bulgarian. The majority of the population was bilingual, speaking Hungarian and German. The use of four to five languages at the same time used to be a badge of cultural pride for those people. Their main religious affiliations were Roman-Catholic, Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, Evangelic-Lutheran, Reformist-Calvinist and Jewish. Interculturality and the intermingling of the different populations created a social culture of a high standard. Under those circumstances statistics are, I believe, less relevant. However, I will mention some figures. Analyzed from many viewpoints, such as urban, social, cultural, pedagogical and behavioral, in the year 1910 Timișoara was integrated into Europe and played the role of the “main chain of contact between the Monarchy and the Balkans.” The social culture formed during the dual monarchy proved to be useful throughout the 20th century.<sup>2</sup> This aspect all the more worthy of mention in light of the fact that the multicultural and intercultural character of the city gave consistency to anti-totalitarian resistance. The Romanian press and literature in the post-Ceaușescu period defined the specificity of the city with the expression “the spirit of Timișoara.”

Despite the pressures of the Magyar assimilation process in 1880–1914, the tentative of Serbian annexation during First World War and the politics of Romanian assimilation started in 1919, Timișoara continued to be a cosmopolitan city throughout the 20th century as well. It was remarkable that for a long time the citizens spoke German, Hungarian, Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian and that the differences based on idiom, ethnography and faith were not defining features like in the Balkans or within the territories under direct German influence. The name of the city was known in all important languages used by its inhabitants: Temeswar, Temeschburg, Temesvár, Temișvaru and Timișoara. The acknowledgement of the diverse historical heritages demanded that the religious practices of each cultural group be recognized. The Romanians were of Orthodox and Greek-Catholic denominations (Victor Neumann 2001);<sup>3</sup> Hungarians were Roman-Catholic and Reformist-Calvinist, and Germans were Roman-Catholics and to lesser extent Evangelist-Lutherans (Andrei Corbea-Hoișie, Jacques Le Rider 1996).<sup>4</sup> Jews were both of Ashkenazi and Sephardic denominations, but there were also Reformists or Neologues (Victor Neumann 2006).<sup>5</sup> The cultural heritages were also intermingled, which gave rise to numerous ambivalences and multiple codes assumed by the citizens of Timișoara. All this indicates the multicultural and intercultural character of the city, where mixed families played a vanguard role. As I mentioned previously, the first virtue is to the credit of the Habsburgs.<sup>6</sup> The phenomenon is not unique. In the second half of the 19th century Kakania (the

dual monarchy) had already become an eloquent example of the encounters and intermingling of cultural and religious diversity. Mórítz Csáky has remarked that the state unity of the dual monarchy was stimulated by cultural disparity and by the culture of hybridism. The cohabitation of different traditions led to an ambivalence concerning cultural inheritances, while collective neurosis such as nationalism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism (Mórítz Csáky 2000)<sup>7</sup> were born of the crises and ethnic conflicts.

As a consequence of the First World War and the breaking up of the empires and the re-shaping of the map of Europe in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, some of the former regions of Austro-Hungary were transformed into genuine engines of industrialization. The example of Bohemia was not repeated, however, in Banat. Timișoara came under the influence of Bucharest, the capital of Romania, which is to say that both a cultural model and a particular political mentality were imposed on the city, which were quite different in comparison to those inherited from the Habsburg Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. As a consequence, the proximity of and integration with Western civilization was considerably blurred. Called the “Manchester” of Transleithania in 1900–1910 (Szász Zoltán 1999),<sup>8</sup> Timișoara lived for a while through the industrial successes and commercial reputation of its past. In the Romania of 1919–1940 the city gradually lost its independent administrative power and remained without the financial resources necessary to continue its development in accordance with the needs of its population.

The Romanian authoritarian and totalitarian regimes of the 20th century practiced discrimination against various groups of the population based on ethnicity, denomination, or social status. Despite the shortcomings created by the racial laws, Timișoara succeeded in protecting the Jewish population during the war. A special role was played in this respect by the multicultural civic character of its population. The communist regime and national-communist ideology in Romania contributed to the massive emigration of the population to Israel, the USA and France from the 1950s through the 1970s. While in the aftermath of the Second World War the Jewish community of Timișoara numbered 13,000, today it is only 367.<sup>9</sup>

With regard to the German population, it represented a model of organization and work ethics both for Timișoara’s inhabitants and those of the whole region. The deportation of this community to the USSR and the Bărăgan Fields after the war, and, later, the encouragement of their emigration to Germany and their sale by the Ceaușescu regime to Germany all determined the decrease in their numbers (Reiner Munz, Ohliger Reiner 2001).<sup>10</sup> In 1992 13,206 German speakers lived in Timișoara and there were 26,722 in total in Timiș County. In 2002 their number decreased to 7,157 in Timișoara.<sup>11</sup> These demographical shifts provoked social

and behavioral changes. In 2002, the population of Timișoara reached 317,660 inhabitants,<sup>12</sup> while the proportion of all minorities was 14.48 %. The minority communities decreased enormously in comparison to the past. The examples of the Germans and Jews were followed by Hungarians, who in 1992 numbered 31,785 and in 2002 a only 24,287 in total.<sup>13</sup> The Serbian community, too, is in crises. The latest censuses indicate somewhere above 6,000 persons.<sup>14</sup>

Along with the majority Romanian population (85.52%),<sup>15</sup> Hungarians, Germans, Serbians, Romas, Jews, Slovaks, Czechs, Croatians, Poles, Armenians, Bulgarians, Turks, Lipovans, Greeks, Chinese, Csengős, Tatars and Italians still live in Timișoara today. From the cultural-administrative point of view, some of them live a community life. The most spectacular social-cultural phenomenon in Timișoara and within the whole region in the Eastern part of the continent is represented by the newly formed Italian community. Having settled in Timișoara roughly a decade and a half ago, this community has become one of a reference. The Italians deal with small and larger businesses, own shoe and textile factories, and provide high quality commercial services. They are concerned with buying and renovating historical buildings in the city, a fact that will contribute to saving a part of the neo-Baroque and Jugendstil architectural legacy of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Along with the German and Serbian consulates, an Italian consulate has been set-up, expressing Italy's intentions (particularly those of the region of Veneto) to develop longstanding economic and trade relations with Timișoara.<sup>16</sup>

The Orthodox, Catholic, Greek-Catholic, Reformist-Calvinist, Lutheran-Evangelic and Jewish faiths not only undertake diverse activities but also interfere with one another. Ecumenism is an accepted and developed idea by the representatives of the churches, though this has not led to setting up a faculty with a multi-confessional profile at the university. In addition to the above-mentioned denominations there are also neo-Protestant churches such as Adventist, Christian Evangelist, Baptist, Jehovah and Mormon. Some members of the population (more numerous though than those reflected in official censuses) were attracted by neo-Protestantism, a fact that proves that state policies and the officialization of the majority Orthodox Church did not disrupt the diverse configuration of Timișoara's identity.

### **Mixed Populations: About Timișoara's Melting-pot**

In comparison with other cities of Central and South-Eastern Europe, where the majority culture (either national or ethno-national) has linguistically assimilated that of any minority, Timișoara stands out through its cultural diversity, the



common history resulting from the multiculturalism of its population and its general melting-pot character (Borsi Kálmán Béla 2006).<sup>17</sup> Plurilingualism and multi-confessionalism have represented the dominant note of the city for three centuries, having an influence in the formation of the mentality and functioning of the society. Although the official languages have changed over time (German in the 18th century, Hungarian in the 19th, and Romanian since 1919), there has always been a propensity towards learning more languages in Timișoara. Without being imposed by state institutions, plurilingualism is visible even today among some of the inhabitants of the city. Along with numerous institutions of education in Romanian language, there are schools and high-schools in Timișoara in which teaching is conducted in German (Lenau High School), Hungarian (Béla Bartók High School), Serbian (Dositej Obradovici High School), French (Jean Louis Calderon High School) and English (Shakespeare High School). From this interest in learning languages, a phenomenon quite rare in the cities of modern and contemporary Europe, the aspirations of Timișoara's population to integrate with Europe (and in some cases to emigrate to the West) have emerged. Based on administrative, economical and socio-cultural indicators, Timișoara has the highest degree of European features of all the cities of Romania. Its population has proven its openness to the European Union, the absorption of EU funds, and European integration.<sup>18</sup>

Interference was possible due to the understanding of the inhabitants of the city and their assumption of the idea of diversity. Interference among religions has generated reciprocal borrowings or even new religions, such as Greek-Catholicism, which appeared in Banat in 1747. The Orthodox took over customs and holidays from the Catholic tradition. In the 19th century, under the influence of the same Catholic milieu, the Jews adopted religious reform by becoming Neologues of German or Hungarian mother tongue. The majority of them accepted the introduction of organ music and a choir into the synagogue. Church life was practiced in Hebrew and starting with the 19th century in German and Hungarian as well. The chief rabbi spoke many languages and services were conducted in Hebrew, Romanian and Hungarian. Catholics held services in German, Hungarian, Romanian, Slovakian, Bulgarian and Italian. If in the 19th century there was competition for priority between the German and Hungarian languages, today the Catholic churches serve in many languages, such as German, Romanian, Hungarian, Slovak, Bulgarian, and Italian.<sup>19</sup>

Mixed marriages and conversion from one faith to another are common practices (Victor Neumann 2006),<sup>20</sup> often motivated by social interests and less by the denial or assimilation of religious dogma. One comes across this phenomenon quite often in Timișoara and in Banat ever since the first half of the 19th century. The documents kept in the archive of the Roman-Catholic Episcopate indicate

such a process as being part of the co-habitation of multiple cultures and confessions. The same is true for the documents preserved in the archives of the Timișoara City Hall, from where the rate of mixed marriages can be traced starting from 1895 until today. The diversity of cultural elements generated a way of life and a culture to which each contributed, and the neighbor was seen, first of foremost, as part of civil society.

### **The Opposition of Minorities, the Solidarity of the Citizens of Timișoara and the Anti-Totalitarian Revolt of December 1989**

A *sensus communis* revealed in the tense moments of the history dominated in the city. The way in which the citizens cooperated during the revolt of December 1989 was exemplary, and it is worth mentioning this in order to understand why Timișoara's role was important in the 1990s. The great demonstration in Timișoara in December 1989 is closely linked to the multicultural and multi-confessional physiognomy of the city (Victor Neumann 2006).<sup>21</sup> Both the political idea directed against Ceaușescu and the anti-communist demonstrations were closely linked to Pastor László Tőkés's protest against the destruction of the Hungarian villages in Transylvania. The protest was positively received not only in Western Europe, but, first and foremost, by the inhabitants of the city (Miodrag Milin 1990).<sup>22</sup>

Despite intimidation and the launch of an ideological anti-Magyar campaign by the officials of the Ceaușescu regime, the protest of the Hungarian Reformist group was welcomed and joined by a large part of the population. The citizens unconditionally made common cause with László Tőkés when the question of his removal from his home was raised. Among the slogans one saw on December 16th in Timișoara, many marked the ideology of the revolt: "Down with Ceaușescu!", "Down with the tyrant!" Initially presented as a Hungarian group, the demonstrators for solidarity in front of the Pastor's house shortly attracted thousands of people. The plans of Ceaușescu's Securitate (secret police) to provoke a Romanian-Hungarian conflict were baffled by the demonstrators, who proved to be a real *societas civilis* animated by the ideal of liberation from the totalitarian regime rather than supporting an obsolete historical misunderstanding (Victor Neumann 2006).<sup>23</sup>

In December 17th, 1989 Radio Budapest (Miodrag Milin 1999)<sup>24</sup> announced that the Militia had dispersed the demonstration organized in order to defend László Tőkés, though it "was transformed into a protest against Ceaușescu." In its edition of December 18th, 1989 *Die Welt* wrote that about 4,000 demonstrators had gathered at the Calvinist-Reformist church in Timișoara in order to impede

Pastor László Tőkés's removal (Miodrag Milin 1999).<sup>25</sup> On the same day *Die Welt* announced that violent confrontations had taken place between the population and the militia and that the entire population of the city had joined the anti-Ceaușescu demonstrations (Miodrag Milin 1999).<sup>26</sup> The Romanian-Hungarian cooperation functioned, the population understanding very well that Ceaușescu's regime relied on a nationalist maneuver as an ultimate means of justifying its remaining in power. In fact, the Timișoara revolt in December did not have an ethnic character. Rather, it reflected the civic and multicultural spirit of the city, which was relatively well preserved at the time and had decisively contributed to the initiation of the political changes of 1989.

### **How Can the Multicultural and Intercultural Phenomena of Timișoara and Banat be Explained? A Few Comparisons with Transylvania**

- Multiple cohabitations from the Middle Ages to the present.
- Unlike Transylvania, the nobles of Banat had no numerical weight when the region was under Habsburg occupation, hence the absence of social discrepancies.
- With all the interest manifested on behalf of some families, the recovery of the nobler condition in Banat in the 18th and 19th centuries is irrelevant from social, cultural and economic points of view.<sup>27</sup>
- The policies of colonization of the Swabs, French, Spanish, Slovaks, Bulgarians and Boehms in the 18th and 19th centuries were planned and organized by the Office of the Habsburg Empire. They created a rare demographic dynamic in Europe at the time, creating notable differences in comparison with Transylvania, more conservative, yet more stable as far as the social hierarchies were concerned.
- In comparison with Transylvania, Timișoara and Banat accepted and immediately put into practice the mercantilism of the House of Habsburg, resulting in economic competition.
- By the end of the 18th century there already existed a local bourgeoisie, earlier than in the neighboring regions.
- The reorganization of the region and the city of Timișoara in the 18th century along the lines of European administrative criteria was possible against the background of the complete retreat of the Ottoman Empire from the Banat and in the context of the absence of medieval constitutions such as those that existed in Transylvania.
- The emergence of manufacturers and new trade companies.

- The reformist policies of Maria Theresa and Joseph II came into force earlier in Banat than in Transylvania because the inhabitants of Timișoara and Banat did not oppose them.
- Direct subordination, either military or civil, of the region of Banat to Vienna facilitated the colonization of various groups of populations, as well as imposing the cultural and educational model of the Empire.
- In the middle of the 18th century the local population was already responsive to the elimination of illiteracy among the masses.
- The formation of professional elites and the establishment of an outstanding infrastructure in the region started in 1850 with the measures of Austrian neo-liberalism.
- The separate administrative organization of Banat took place in the 19th century (1850–1860) through formation of an autonomous region under the name Timiș Banat and Serbian Vojvodina, with its capital in Timișoara.
- The interest in innovations and the refusal of the communities to isolate themselves.
- The propagation of confessional and cultural-linguistic diversity and the construction of mixed villages (Germans and Serbs, Germans and Romanians, Serbs, Germans and Romanians) helped better to exploit the richness of the soil and subsoil.
- The formation of a civil society similar to those prevailing in the developed regions of Central Europe.
- The exchange of cultural values and the early appearance of intercultural phenomena constituted another difference in comparison with Transylvania; the representatives of the religions and cultures of the city accepted and cultivated the values of the Other.
- The ecumenical ideal was assumed by higher representatives of the Church in the previous centuries.
- Exclusivist tendencies were blurred by raising awareness among the individuals about the spiritual pluralist life; an individualist culture more palpable and efficient than that of Transylvania was affirmed.
- Cultivation of an ambivalent cultural code proposed by Vienna during the Enlightenment period by its transmission in the family from one generation to another.
- Minimization of the diversity role through linguistic, ethnic and religious criteria imposed by the romantic identity ideologies of the 19th century.

### **Remarks About the Centralist System in Romania**

Today the population of Timișoara is very different from that of 1989, the year in which the political changes started. The new demographic structure of the city has not created visible cultural and confessional conflicts, yet quite often there have been problems of adaptation of newcomers from other regions or from rural areas. As for shared common values, they have not been integrated into the old model of Timișoara. In exchange, they claimed and wished to impose cultural-identity based values of the regions from which they came. In other words, there are incompatibilities from the viewpoint of the orientation of the social segments that populate Timișoara today. Theoretically, Romania has manifested an openness toward minorities throughout the country, yet the country lacks the knowledge necessary to manage cultural and confessional pluralism and does not possess the theory and the necessary instruments to decentralize. People of culture, writers, political scientists, historians, sociologists, university professors in various fields, all practice either a nationalist or a civic discourse, but only rarely in relation to the social-cultural and administrative phenomena typical of the region or the problems of minority communities. The local peculiarities have thus been avoided. Public and private television broadcasts, newspapers and cultural institutions in Romania contribute to the perpetuation of this situation.

Where do the origins of a policy so poor from a social and economic point of view lie, and how can this policy be explained? The role of Bucharest as the capital city of Romania means that the intermingling of Oriental and Occidental features has been proposed for the entire country. Inspired by Ottoman Turkey and Phanariot rule on the one hand and by French and Prussian intellectual sources on the other, the cultural model of Bucharest was imposed over the regions and cities after the Romanian state was founded in 1918. In the first phase the goal was the consolidation of the newly formed Romanian state. The fear of neighbors and possible territorial claims meant that the nationalist principle became the most popular Romanian political doctrine. Romanian communism itself was inspired by this doctrine, confiscating relevant parts of interwar ethno-nationalism in favor of its own policy. Professional promotion in institutional hierarchies was based on ethno-cultural criteria, a condition in which the majority has always had the last word.

The idea of decentralization has troubled those who have been used to decisions coming from the center. Beyond affable declarations and demagogy, the local socio-cultural configurations have been ignored. But we know that administrative decentralization allows for better conservation, not merely placing value on the multiple patrimonies of the city but also attracting development on the basis of its own capabilities. Access to financial resources and to the decisions of the Local Council and the Timișoara Mayoralty could contribute to the development

of the city's own administrative policies. Thus, for example, the impressive old architecture of Timișoara could be renovated.

Through an artificial division between the capital city and the provinces, centralism inculcated a form of exclusion from the public matters of the region. Situated at the European crossroads linking Hamburg to Athens and Istanbul and Vienna to Bucharest, Timișoara is in close proximity to Hungary and Serbia. From the point of view of social life and living conditions, it was regarded as a city bearing high-standards for a long time. Timișoara adapted itself only with considerable difficulty to the style proposed by Bucharest because its multicultural physiognomy and the critical attitude inherited from the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy contributed to the manifestation of a permanent opposition toward centralist and authoritarian policies. This fact is to be seen even today in the intellectual criticism practiced by the local media, in sports disputes, or in the interpretation of recent history, as well as in the ways in which the messages of the revolt of December 1989 are understood.<sup>28</sup> The model of the Central-European city seems to remain more attractive to the inhabitants of Timișoara than the Balkan ones, hence the resistance to the identity-based standardization of the region.<sup>29</sup>

Today Timișoara is in search of a new formula for social-identity. Many of the ancient families that gave an unmistakably distinctive note to the character of the city have emigrated. Engineers, workers, builders and handicraftsmen have emigrated in alarming numbers. From the point of view of plurilingualism, today's Romanian speakers do not know other regional languages. German is learned and spoken by a small number of students thanks to the survival of the German schools (such as the Nikolaus Lenau High School) and the Democratic German Forum, the German Cultural Centre and the German Chair of the Faculty of Letters, History and Theology within the West University of Timișoara. Members of the younger generation who choose to learn a second language prefer English and more recently Italian.

The emigration of the German community, the loss of the Jewish community and the move of an important part of the Hungarian cultural and artistic elite to Budapest has provoked a change in the cultural and behavioral model. The inhabitants who lived in the region before 1989 represented to a great extent the urban layer par excellence or a segment of the population that permitted assimilation to the urban area, maintaining the multicultural traditions of Timișoara and the Banat. The reasons for mass emigration were not merely economic, but also political and due to cultural discrimination. Despite some notable renewals, the laws designed to support private initiative and secure and restore private property came very late. The empty places left behind by those who emigrated have been gradually fulfilled by a population coming from the villages and small towns of the

Banat, and especially from Moldova, Oltenia and Maramureș. It is unquestionable that the identity balance of Timișoara has been dramatically changed.

Sociological studies reveal that after 1989 Timișoara does not have the necessary resources to assimilate newcomers, as happened during the interwar period or during the decades following the Second World War, i.e., within the context of other radical political changes. The set of values professed by the middle layer of the population, the one which gave the city its distinct personality, has dissolved itself under the pressure of a very rapid demographic mutation. The attraction exerted by Timișoara during the previous fifteen years could be explained on the one hand through the fact that it was here that the first important step to overturn dictatorship was taken and on the other that many Romanian citizens, even if they could not emigrate to Western Europe, at least were tempted to reach Timișoara in the western part of the country. It is equally true that political pressures to change the social structure of the city could be seized.

Cultural discontinuities with regard to the previous decades are visible in manifestations of chauvinism, including racist discourse and swastikas painted on some of the walls of the central buildings in the city and on statues, in parks, and even inside a few cultural institutions. In 2007 the Local City Council proposed and approved to grant the title of honorary citizen of the city to a person who denies the Holocaust. Such things reveal a new face of contemporary Timișoara. The quick Romanian assimilation within the recent few years has been of a political nature. Occasionally interest in preserving the patrimonial values of the minorities and a multicultural pedagogy at the level of the masses has been promoted. In general, and especially due to the governance of the former nomenclature of the Romanian Communist Party and the preservation of the old curricula and textbooks, Ceaușescu's nationalist ideology has survived. With different accents from one party or another, nationalism has remained manifest within all Romanian political groups. After the elections of 2004 Timișoara is represented in the Romanian Parliament by (among others) persons belonging to the extremist and chauvinist Greater Romanian Party. Even the politicians belonging to the Democratic Party in government from 2004 until April 2006 (whose leader, Traian Băsescu, used to be the President of Romania) have as their main representative of Timișoara the former leader of the xenophobic cultural-political group *Vatra Românească*. He opposes the Law of national minorities, a law that has been initiated by the Democratic Union of Hungarians and the other minority groups of Romania.

I have identified the phenomenon of Romanian assimilation, analyzing the history and literature curricula in high schools and universities.<sup>30</sup> They are uniform on a national scale and lacking in information about the region and the city that could particularize their historical and cultural existence. The names of schools,

publications and monuments reflect the propagation of a type of memory with an ideological background in which the nationalist dimension prevails. The monuments erected after 1918 commemorate primarily the history of the Romanians. A number of examples that fragmentarily evoke realities of the past have survived, however. This is the case of encyclopaedist Francesco Grisellini, of Governor Claudiu Florimond Merci, of mathematician János Bolyai, of writer Adam Müller Guttenbrunn, and of the bishop Augustin Pacha, who still figure on the frontispieces of some buildings or as names of centrally-situated streets. What could be emphasized as meritorious is that Timișoara's historical symbols did not provoke disputes like those concerning the Statue of Liberty in Arad.

### **In Place of Conclusions or About the Role of Multicultural and Intercultural Physiognomy**

Communitarian sectarianism did not concur with the political orientation of the city for long. Due to the relatively close social and material cohabitation of the majority of the inhabitants, as well as a mixing of families of diverse origins, Timișoara has defeated the assimilating tendencies, ethno-nationalism and the doctrinaire and religious excesses. Cultural ambivalences of Timișoara have generated a state of civilization that has contributed to the attraction for technical inventions and trade. The social and civic culture of Timișoara has generated an identity peculiar in comparison with those of the other cities of Transylvania, in which ethnic differences have been obvious. Unlike those cities, Timișoara has placed itself at an equal distance from Herder's and Fichte's *Volksgeist*, the German Romanticist *Kulturnation* and the mystic of the *Völkische Kultur* fantasies of discrete ethnographic identities (Victor Neumann 2004, 2005).<sup>31</sup> Under the influence of the Enlightenment cultural code imposed by the Habsburg Empire, Timișoara has remained for a long time now very restrained towards (not to mention opposed to) the above-mentioned key-concepts of the German Romantics and the ethnicity ideologies they developed. Most probably, the multicultural and multi-confessional character of Timișoara will play a role in social dynamics in the case of decentralization of the administrative system, renewal of the educational programs and political maturity of the new citizens. Irrespective of short-term local evolution, the future is open to any alternative. I state this because in an era of globalization the new colonists will find acceptable support for economic development or innovation in a city with serious multicultural traces and legacies.



## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Gusztáv Thirring (Ed.), *A magyar városok statisztikai évkönyve* [Statistical Yearly of the Hungarian Cities] (Budapest, 1912) 525–526. For further contextual information see Ilona Sármany-Parsons, “Die Rahmenbedingungen für ‘die Moderne’ in den ungarischen Provinzstädten um die Jahrhundertwende”, in Andrei Corbea-Hoişie – Jacques Le Rider (Hrsg.), *Metropole und Provinzen in Altösterreich* (Iaşi: Polirom-Böhlau, 1996), 201, note 50. The author offers a comparative description of the evolution of cities under Hungarian administration before the First World War, cities that aside from economic development, social emancipation, and cultural and civic recognition also had to confront the sensitive issue of nationalities. Even in the cities with mixed populations the tendencies of Magyar assimilation were obvious, while the promotion of language was the mission of associations created for this purpose in Bratislava or Timişoara. See also Zoltán Szász’s article “Manchester-ul ungar. Dezvoltarea Timişoarei moderne” [The Hungarian Manchester. Development of Modern Timişoara] in *Transilvania văzută în publicistica istorică maghiară. Momente din istoria Transilvaniei* [Transilvania in Hungarian Historic Writing. Moments from the History of Transylvania] in *História* (Miercurea Ciuc: Pro Print, 1999), 249.
- <sup>2</sup> According to Zoltán Szász, op. cit., 250. For further study of social and cultural details, refer to Victor Neumann, *Identités multiples dans l’Europe des Regions. L’Interculturalité du Banat*, Traduit du roumain par Maria Ţenchea (Timişoara: Hestia, 1997), 23–32 and 33–40. Some colleagues compared Timişoara of that epoch with Trieste, Krakow, Lvov, Kosice. See Adriana Babeţi, “Timişoara–Bucureşti. Culturi complementare. De ce versus?” [Timişoara–Bucureşti. Complementary cultures. Why Versus?], presented at the public debate organized by “Evenimentul Zilei. Ediţia de Vest” under the title: “Axa Timişoara–Bucureşti”, Expovest, Timişoara, 16 December 2005.
- <sup>3</sup> Victor Neumann, *Ideologie şi fantasmagorie. Perspective comparative asupra istoriei gândirii politice în Europa est-centrală* [Ideology and Phantasmagory. Comparative Perspectives on the History of Political Thought in East-Central Europe] (Iaşi: Polirom, 2001); see the chapter “Confessional Divergences. Greek-Catholics and Orthodox in Contemporary Romania (1948–1999)”, 134–148, in which I argue that even today Timişoara shows better cohabitation and more tolerance among denominations than other regions of Romania.
- <sup>4</sup> Apud Ilona Sármany-Parsons, “Die Rahmenbedingungen für ‘die Moderne’ in den ungarischen Provinzstädten um die Jahrhundertwende”, in Andrei Corbea-Hoişie – Jacques Le Rider (Hrsg.), *Metropole und Provinzen in Altösterreich* (Iaşi–Wien: Polirom-Böhlau, 1996), 201.
- <sup>5</sup> Victor Neumann, *The End of a History. The Jews of Banat from the Beginning to Nowadays* (Bucharest University Press, 2006). See also Béla Borsi-Kálmán, *Öt nemzedék és ami előtte következik... A Temesvári Levente Pör 1919–1920* [Five Generations and What Came Before... The Levente Trial of Timişoara 1919–1920] (Budapest, 2006), the chapter “Zsidók Temesvárott” [The Jews of Timişoara], 217–223.
- <sup>6</sup> The text was published in Idem, *Between Words and Reality. On the Politics of Recognition and Political Changes in Contemporary Romania*, Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 2001.
- <sup>7</sup> Mórítz Csáky, “Ambivalenz des kulturellen Erbes: Zentraleuropa”, in Mórítz Csáky – Klaus Zeyringer (Hrsg.), *Ambivalenz des kulturellen Erbes. Vielfachcodierung des historischen Gedächtnisses. Paradigma Österreich* (Innsbruck–Wien–München: Studien Verlag, 2000), 27–49.
- <sup>8</sup> According to Zoltán Szász, op. cit.

- <sup>9</sup> Apud *Recensămîntul populației României pe anul 2002* [Census of the Population of Romania in 2002].
- <sup>10</sup> Munz, Reiner, Reiner Ohliger, “Immigration of German People to Germany: Shedding Light on the German Concept of Identity”. *The International Scope*, Vol. 3, 2001.
- <sup>11</sup> According to *Recensămîntul populației României pe anul 2002* [Census of the Population of Romania in 2002].
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>13</sup> *Recensămîntul populației României pe anii 1992 și 2002* [Census of the Population of Romania in 1992 and 2002].
- <sup>14</sup> *Recensămîntul populației României pe anul 1992* [Census of the Population of Romania in 1992].
- <sup>15</sup> *Recensămîntul populației României pe anul 2002* [Census of the Population of Romania in 2002].
- <sup>16</sup> If the nationalist policies and state centralism of Romania are overcome and the above-mentioned relationship with the Italians in Timișoara nurtured, a possible model of European social and cultural integration will develop for the regions and countries of the Balkans.
- <sup>17</sup> Béla Borsi-Kálmán, “Temesvári társadalom történet és emlékiratok tükrében” in *Öt nemzedék és ami előtte következik... A Temesvári Levente Pör 1919–1920* [Five Generations and What Came Before... The Levente Trial of Timișoara 1919–1920] (Budapest, 2006) 223–240.
- <sup>18</sup> About today’s Timișoara according to: [www.administratie.ro](http://www.administratie.ro)
- <sup>19</sup> In 2002, there were 32,274 Roman-Catholic parishioners in Timișoara according to *Recensămîntul populației României pe anul 2002* [The Census of Romania’s Population in 2002]. According to *Schematismus Dioeceseos Timisoaraensis pro Anno Domini 2005–2006* (Timișoara: Mirton, 2005), the percentage of parishioners on the basis of the mother tongue was the following: 54.29% Hungarians; 15.39% Germans; 10.5% Romanians; 5.87% Bulgarians; 5.76 % Croats; 3.93% Roma, 1.6% Slovaks; 0.26% other.
- <sup>20</sup> Victor Neumann, “Schimbările politice din 1989. Timișoara revoluționară” [Political Changes in 1989. Revolutionary Timișoara]. *Orizont* 1 (2006).
- <sup>21</sup> Victor Neumann, “Schimbările politice din 1989. Timișoara revoluționară” [Political Changes of 1989. Revolutionary Timișoara]. *Orizont* 1 (2006).
- <sup>22</sup> Miodrag Milin, *Timișoara 15–21 decembrie 1989* [Timișoara, 15–21 December 1989] (Timișoara: Author’s Press, 1990) 11–35.
- <sup>23</sup> Victor Neumann, op. cit.
- <sup>24</sup> Miodrag Milin (Coord.), *Timișoara în arhivele Europei Libere, 17–20 decembrie 1989* [Timișoara in the Archives of Free Europe, 17–20 December 1989] (Bucharest: Fundația Academia Civică, 1999) 55–56.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, “Human Chain Protecting Clergyman Turns into Mass Protest” 60–61.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, “White House Condemns Romanian Use of Force”, 151–152 and 154–155.
- <sup>27</sup> The roots of the local and regional nobility were not in Banat, but in Transylvania. A part of the nobility came to Banat after the region fell under the rule of the Habsburg Empire. See also Béla Borsi-Kálmán, the chapter “A nemesi model és a magyar utópia” [The Noble Model and Hungarian Utopia] in *Öt nemzedék és ami előtte következik... A Temesvári Levente Pör 1919–1920* [Five Generations and What Came Before... The Levente Trial in Timișoara 1919–1920] (Budapest, 2006), 208–217.
- <sup>28</sup> See, for example, the interpretations given for ideological and political purposes by Ion Iliescu in *Revoluție și reformă* [Revolution and Reform] (București: Enciclopedică, 1994) and Idem, *Revoluția română* [Romanian Revolution] (București: Presa națională, 2001).

- <sup>29</sup> In recent years the supporters of the local football team increased and become more radical, very often displaying a very hostile attitude toward the Bucharest teams.
- <sup>30</sup> See Victor Neumann, *The Alternative Textbooks on the History of Romania as Places of Memory* in the volume: *Umbruch im östlichen Europa. Die nationale Wende und das kollektive Gedächtnis*, Edited by Andrei Corbea-Hoisie – Rudolf Jaworski – Monika Sommer, Studien Verlag, Innsbruck, Wien, München, Bozen, 2004, 137–149.
- <sup>31</sup> Victor Neumann, the chapter “*Volk și Sprache în gândirea lui Herder. Teoria speculativă a etnonațiunii*” [*Volk and Sprache in Herder’s Understanding. Speculative Theory of the Ethno-Nation*] in *Neam, Popor sau Națiune. Despre identitățile politice europene* [Neam, People or Nation. On European Political Identities] (Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 2005), 47–84. See also, *Conceptually Mystified. East-Central Europe Torn Between Ethno-nationalism and Multiple Identities* (Bucharest: Enciclopedică, 2004), 81–110.

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# PREVAILING IDENTITY STRUCTURES AND COMPETING ETHNOPOLITICAL STRATEGIES IN TRANSYLVANIA

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In spite of the remarkable political mobilization and disciplined ethnic voting of the Hungarian minority in Romania, major political objectives, seen by the political elite of the community as critical for the cultural reproduction of Hungarians in Romania, have proven to be unreachable since 1989 through the instruments of participation in the country's political life. The paper explores the historical and contemporary reasons that contributed to this failure, and identifies conditions that could trigger a change. Various political projects of the Hungarians in Transylvania seeking integration on their own terms into the Romanian state since 1920, together with the circumstances that lead to their failure, are critically assessed. Based on considerable research conducted between 1995 and 2006, conflicting identity structures and competing ethno-political strategies are identified that divide the Romanian political community along ethnic fault-lines. The consequences of the divide are evaluated from the perspective of normative political philosophy and an answer is offered to the question which refers to the grounds on which Hungarians in Transylvania could (or could not) be considered part of the Romanian political community. The paper concludes by identifying alternative ways out of the current situation.

**Keywords:** Transylvania, Hungarians in Romania, strategies of integration, Transylvanianism, identity structures, ethno-political strategies, political community, nation-state

George W. White, an American political geographer who has extensively researched the relationship between identities and contested territories, asks himself the question, within a comparative study dedicated to Northern Ireland, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Transylvania, what is the true nature of the latter: “Hungarian, Romanian, or neither?”<sup>1</sup> Though none of the mainstream Hungarian and Romanian public discourses seem to have doubts in this matter, the question is justified and timely today, more than eighty years after the incorporation of the territory into modern Romania. Irina Culic, a young Romanian sociologist and author of several articles on the dominant identity patterns in Transylvania, asks a similar question in the title of one of her studies: Hungarians of Transylvania belong: ours (Romanians), theirs (Hungarians), or no one's?<sup>2</sup>

The questions posed by George W. White and Irina Culic do not refer, evidently, to the political status of the province. The converging inquiries of the two researchers address rather the issue of the prevailing identity structures and the competing ethnopolitical strategies of Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania, trying to suggest foreseeable evolutions in the self-perception and the political projects of the two communities sharing the territory. While Irina Culic is more doubtful, as we shall see later, with respect to the chances, at least on the short run, of a positive, mutually acceptable outcome of the ongoing competition, George W. White is more optimistic. In his view,

Transylvania will not simply become a territory where [the two ethnic groups] coincidentally live. Transylvania will be a territory where these people interact and create ... something Transylvanian.<sup>3</sup>

It is true, however, that White adds two necessary conditions: (1) the two ethnic groups become more tolerant to one another; (2) there is no interference from either the Romanian or Hungarian states or nations to thwart the creation of such an overarching regional identity.

Considering this statement as a working hypothesis, I will try to address in the subsequent article the following questions: Is White's hypothesis plausible? Are there signs of the two ethnic groups, Romanians and Hungarians, becoming more tolerant towards one another? Do the two states, Romania and Hungary behave according to White's recommendation? What would be the necessary changes in order to preserve diversity in Transylvania by fostering institutional solutions acceptable for both communities?

The above questions will be addressed from the perspective of the Hungarian minority in Romania. The declared interest of the paper is to explore, from the perspective of normative political theory, the conditions under which the shrinking of the Hungarian minority in Romania could be stopped and counterbalanced. The underlying assumption of the paper is that the continuous postponement of the community's "self-revision" claimed by Sándor Makkai in 1931 – which equals, in my view, the refusal to adopt alternative identity structures and more feasible strategies of accommodation within the Romanian state – is one of the important explanatory variables for what we are witnessing today in terms of the relatively unsuccessful integration of the Hungarian minority into the Romanian political community.

Sándor Makkai was Bishop of the Calvinist Church, an emblematic personality of the Hungarian community in Transylvania which in 1920 unexpectedly found itself incorporated into the Romanian state in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Trianon. After a decade of heroic minority activism, Makkai concluded in 1931 that the long term survival of the Hungarian community in Transylvania required a thorough reconsideration of the way in which Hungarians in Transyl-

vania think of themselves and conceive of their future. In Makkai's views the "self-revision" of the community required that "ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania (...) take account of the facts that entered their life so decisively. Ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, in order to survive, need the truth of life and the obedient compliance with this truth..." According to the Bishop, the self-revision would imply the reconsideration of what Hungarians had regarded to be the causes of their new situation, abandoning prejudices that had loaded their relationships with the Romanian majority and designing a new collective identity that would be more compatible with the community's current status: "The primary task of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania is to revise their conception of the past in a way so as to exclude prejudices hostile to life and establish a sound form of self-defense and self-assertion." Any resistance posed to the required self-revision, warns Makkai, would lead to emigration:

We can hear the sad clattering of the railway carriages of expatriates and repatriates (...) those thousands who rejected the facts by avoided their orders (...) All these attempts at rejection of the facts entail the false paths of self-deception and delusion, mistake and confusion for us, Hungarians who stayed here, who are here, and who will have to remain here, observing the new legal order.<sup>4</sup>

It took not more than six years before Sándor Makkai himself was forced by the circumstances to leave Transylvania and to move to Hungary. In an attempt to justify his decision he published a pamphlet with a suggestive title – *It is impossible (Nem lehet)* –, denouncing his earlier views and declaring that "living as a minority is not only politically but also morally impossible". He emphatically explains:

the parts of the Hungarian nation thrown into minority status are incapable of remaining alive, even if, driven by instinct, they encourage and deceive themselves with the illusion of survival (...); in serfdom, in the circumstances of degraded life it might be possible to remain alive for quite some time, but it is impossible to live the life of a nation capable of development, which means that in the new Europe [1937 – L. S.] it is impossible to remain human.<sup>5</sup>

Apparently Makkai's theses have been refuted by history. The "self-revision" of the ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania has never happened according to what he considered necessary: the old conception of the past remains quite influential, both in public discourse and the collective memory of the Hungarian minority; the "hostile" prejudices are still there and are being uninterruptedly re-enforced, as the results of recent public opinion polls demonstrate; alternative forms of the minority's "self-assertion" more appropriate to the minority's current situation do not seem to emerge. In spite of that the community has survived. Though its institutional life has never been – and is far from being – full-fledged (a circumstance

which could be considered as substantiation of the “degraded life”), evidence of development in several concerns is undeniable, and the shrinking of the community is a relatively recent phenomenon.<sup>6</sup> How can this evolution, loaded with apparent contradictions, be explained? Is the reluctance of the Hungarian community of Transylvania to integrate more harmoniously into the Romanian political community an explanation for its endurance, as far as the past almost nine decades are concerned, or rather a threat to its continued existence in the future?

In order to explore the conundrum outlined above I will proceed as follows. First, I will briefly summarize the relevant conclusions of the available demographic data and forecast. I will continue by presenting competing views on the different strategies by which the Hungarian minority sought integration beginning in 1920 into the institutional system of the Romanian state. Based on the results of various surveys conducted in the past decade the prevailing identity structures, the competing ethnopolitical strategies and the evolution of some indicators of the mutual tolerance of Romanians and Hungarians (in Romania, in general, and in Transylvania, in particular) will be presented. Following a short digression on the issue of the political community, a brief assessment of the role of the Romanian and Hungarian states will follow, and I will conclude by formulating the answers that emerge from the arguments under discussion to the questions formulated at the outset.

### **The Evolution of the Ethno-demographic Situation in Transylvania**

Calculating in absolute numbers, the size of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania (in this context: the territory annexed from Hungary to Romania on the basis of the Treaty of Trianon) is fairly similar today to its population in 1920. The census conducted by the Romanian authorities in the year of the formal incorporation of the territory into Greater Romania registered 1,305,800 ethnic Hungarians, while the census of the year 2002 found 1,415,720 Romanian citizens residing in Transylvania who declared themselves to be Hungarian.<sup>7</sup> While this comparison could make us believe that the Hungarian minority in Romania provides a remarkable example of demographic stability in spite of its domination by the Romanian state, the situation is less spectacular if we compare the relative figures: while in 1920 the Hungarians represented 25.6% of the population in Transylvania, their proportion decreased to 19.6% in 2002. The following chart summarizes this evolution, including, for comparison, the evolution of the second and third largest minority groups in interwar Romania, the Germans and the Jews. The comparison includes the evolution of the Roma (Gypsy) population as well, except in the case of the 1920 and 1948 censuses, for which no data is available.






Chart 1

Source: Based on Kocsis, 2007.

The comparison proves that Romania has performed quite well as a nationalizing state. While the share of the Romanian population in Transylvania grew from 53.8%, in 1910 to 74.7%, in 2002, the percentage of the minorities decreased steadily, two ethnic groups, the Germans and the Jews, shrinking almost to extinction. The impact of the homogenizing policies of the Romanian Communist regimes between 1948 and 1990 is quite visible: while the Romanian component of the region's population increased steadily, the Hungarian, German and Jewish populations registered a trend in the other direction. The decrease of the German population from 5.8% (in 1948) to 1.4% (in 1992), which meant a loss of almost 250,000 persons in absolute numbers, is spectacular. Between 1956 and 1992 the Jewish community lost approximately 36,000 members.

As far as the Hungarians are concerned, their loss of position in terms of the relative shares was not always reflected in absolute numbers. Between 1948 and 1977 they registered a steady growth from 1,481,903 to 1,691,048, followed by a sudden decrease of approximately 90,000 persons between 1977 and 1992. This loss is attributed mainly to the migration of the ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania, primarily to Hungary, during the harshest period of the Communist dictatorship.<sup>8</sup>

The loss of almost 200,000 ethnic Hungarians registered between the 1992 and 2002 censuses (from 1,603,923 to 1,415,720, calculated for Transylvania only) has been of somewhat more serious concern both for statisticians and politicians of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Contrary to the widespread opinion that this loss is due, as well, mainly to migration, recent investigations have proved that at least half of the registered loss (approximately 100,000) was caused by the negative natural increase, various forms of assimilation being included.<sup>9</sup> Between

55,000 and 67,500 ethnic Hungarians have emigrated,<sup>10</sup> the remaining part of the loss (around 30,000 to 40,000) being attributed to the changes in the methodology of the 2002 census as compared to the one in 1992.<sup>11</sup>

The concern for the unexpected loss of the Hungarian population during the 1992–2002 decade, in spite of the considerable improvement in the community’s conditions, at least in comparison to the 1977–1990 interval, remains valid. Although it counts for not more than 30% of the total loss, the departure of 67,000 emigrants in ten years represents a considerable deficit for the Hungarians in Transylvania, particularly if we presume – no reliable data being available – that they represented the most mobile part of the community, the already negative potential of natural reproduction of the Hungarian minority being affected in addition by their departure.

Based on plausible hypotheses regarding the evolution of natural reproduction, life-expectancy, the rate of migration and the foreseeable loss through assimilation, Csata and Kiss realized a forecast according to which the Hungarian population in Romania will shrink to approximately 1 million in 2032.<sup>12</sup> The dynamic of the anticipated process is illustrated by the chart below.




Chart 2

Source: Based on Csata – Kiss, 2007.

53% of the forecasted loss (233,365 persons) is estimated to be caused by the negative natural increase, 42% (180,979) by emigration and 5% (20,822) by assimilation.<sup>13</sup>

The forecast estimates that in 2032 Hungarians will represent 5.6% of the country’s population and 5.7% of the Romanian electorate. The high-school and

university population of the Hungarian minority will decrease to 37% in the interval between 2009 and 2018 and will subsequently enter a period of slow but steady decrease until 2032. The decrease will be more moderate in areas where the Hungarians live in compact communities (Harghita/Hargita, Covasna/Kovászna, Mureş/Maros, Satu-Mare/Szatmár counties) and more significant in the rest of the territory, where Hungarians live dispersed.<sup>14</sup>

In spite of the foreseeable spectacular shrinking of the Hungarian population in Transylvania, a community with 1 million members, characterized by strong self-identification and massive support for political projects seemingly incompatible with the will of the Romanian majority and assisted by an active neighboring kin-state, will remain a challenge for Romania. On the other hand the Hungarians of Transylvania, who, in spite of the evidence of the censuses, stick to the myth that they belong to a community of 2 million, will have to take into account the ethno-demographic realities when they think of possible forms of their integration or design the institutions of their future in Romania. It is important to note that the evolution of the ethnopolitical strategies and the terms of ethnocultural integration in Romania – both in what concerns the Romanian majority's reactions and the positions of the Hungarian minority – will be significantly influenced by the increasing share of the Roma community in the country's total population.

### **Strategies of Integration: 1918–1989**

The context in which Sándor Makkai issued his two successive and contradictory warnings on the future of Transylvanian Hungarians was offered by the young Romanian state, which embarked after the “Great Unification” in 1918 on the ambitious project of forging a unitary nation-state out of the four regions that were unified within the borders of Greater Romania: Romania proper (the old Romanian Kingdom, “Vechiul Regat”), Transylvania (formerly part of Hungary), Bucovina (ruled by Austrians) and Bessarabia (taken over from the Russians).

The leading role in this bold project of national unification was taken by the political elite of the Old Romanian Kingdom, dominated by the National Liberal Party, which had earned undeniable merits in representing Old Romania in the peace negotiations following the First World War. A “nationalist consensus” emerged quickly, unifying most of the major political forces around the idea that a prompt national consolidation was necessary, pursued through policies of homogenization meant to render a “state of the Romanians” for the exclusive benefit of the ethnic Romanians.<sup>15</sup>

The task of the unifiers was complicated, however, by several circumstances. The three newly incorporated regions had quite different political cultures and were dominated by non-Romanian administrative elites which needed to be re-

placed as soon as possible. This objective was considerably hampered by the fact that Romanians, though they were in majority in most of the newly incorporated regions (except Bucovina), populated mainly rural areas, their presence in urbanized centers being less significant. While ethnic Romanians constituted 71.9% of the country's population in 1930, their share in the urban areas was only 58.6%.<sup>16</sup> In Transylvania, Romanians represented 17.6% of the urban population in 1910 and 35% in 1930.<sup>17</sup>

Another hindrance to the quick homogenization of the country was raised by its ethnic composition. While in the Old Romanian Kingdom ethnic minorities represented around 8% (mainly Jews), the non-Romanian component of Greater Romania was close to 30%, represented by Hungarians (7.9%), Germans (4.1%), Jews (4%), Ukrainians (3.3%), Russians (2.3%) and others.<sup>18</sup>

A third major element of the obstacles that the Romanian nation-building project had to face was the existence of "regionalized" Romanian populations in the new territories which erected, especially in Transylvania and Bucovina, unexpected resistance to the swift centralizing tendencies of Bucharest. It is important to note however, that their opposition was due to the way in which reform was conducted rather than their questioning of the need and scope of the process of Romanization.<sup>19</sup>

As a response to these hindrances the over-bureaucratized Romanian state, in close cooperation with a mobilized nationalist elite, engaged in a vast program of nation-building, a genuine *Kulturkampf*, as Livezeanu puts it, meant to compensate the Romanian populations for the disadvantages they had suffered in the past under foreign rule, in parallel with marginalizing non-Romanian elites and institutions and taking over foreign-dominated urban areas. Within a fervent general cultural mobilization, education was the main instrument by which national homogenization and consolidation of the state was pursued. The new elites that emerged swiftly as a result of the nationalizing endeavors were dominated by militant nationalism, pan-Romanianism and strong anti-regionalism. Their major political objective, supported by all the influential political parties of the time was a unitary, homogeneous national state that "includes all Romanians" and "belongs only to the Romanians".<sup>20</sup>

As far as Transylvania was concerned, the major challenge the Romanian nation-building project had to face in the region was the strong resistance – through political mobilization and an extended network of cultural, educational and religious institutions<sup>21</sup> – of the Hungarian and, partly, the German minorities, which sought integration on their own terms into the new Romanian state.

In a broader historical perspective, as Nándor Bárdi observes, with regard to the political status of Transylvania and the management of the province's ethnic relations three basic ethnopolitical strategies have been pursued subsequently by the different actors or have coexisted temporarily within the territory: (1) the de-

sire for national supremacy, (2) projects of national autonomy (of the whole province or regions within it) and (3) universalistic ideologies (Marxism-Leninism, internationalism) or local, regional identity constructions (Transylvanianism and other forms of regionalism) that aimed to transcend ethnic fault-lines.<sup>22</sup>

The strategy of national supremacy was employed by Hungary until 1918 and between 1940–1944 in Northern-Transylvania and by the authorities of the Romanian state beginning in 1918.<sup>23</sup> Between 1944 and 1989 the principle of national supremacy remained the basic tenet of the Romanian Communist Regime, the socialist homogenization of the country adding important achievements to the nation-building project started in the interwar period.

*Autonomy* has regularly been the option of the non-dominant group: it represented a political objective for Romanians under Hungarian rule until 1905 and it was reiterated by the Hungarians several times after 1920. Between 1920–1928 the desire for autonomy has been embodied by the ideology of *Transylvanianism*, initiated by Károly Kós, first as genuine political autonomy of the province (until 1923), later as a political vision uniting the Romanians, Hungarians and Germans into a separate federal unit within Greater Romania. In the 1930s, when it became evident that neither the Romanians nor the Germans were interested in *Transylvanianism*, the quest for autonomy of the Hungarian minority shifted to a decentralizing movement claiming cultural and administrative autonomy for the minorities within the province.<sup>24</sup> Territorial autonomy was implemented for a short while between 1952–1968, under the Communist rule, following the authoritative intervention of Moscow, which imposed a change in the new Romanian Constitution, dealing with the issue of national minorities and enforcing the establishment of the Hungarian Autonomous District according to the Stalinist model of territorial administration. The autonomous district, which had only a formal autonomy, the local leaders being appointed by Bucharest, was abolished in 1968 by a new administrative reform of the country carried out in a context in which the Romanian communist leadership was gaining more and more independence from Moscow.<sup>25</sup> Claims of different forms of autonomy have been on the political agenda of the Hungarian minority again since 1989.<sup>26</sup>

*Internationalism* was embraced by the representatives of the Hungarian minority between 1944–1948 (a period of sincere hope for the left-oriented Hungarian leaders to find a “genuine home” for the community within Romania’s borders), and was deployed manipulatively by the Romanian authorities after 1959 when they started an extensive campaign of closing down Hungarian language schools (including the Bolyai University in Cluj, of great symbolical importance for the community) by unifying them with similar Romanian institutions on the grounds of the requirements of “internationalism.”<sup>27</sup> Regionalism transcending ethnic fault-lines was manifest, as we have seen, in the ideology of early Transylvanianism, but it did not represent more than a generous offer of the Hungarians, of

little interest for the Germans and of practically no relevance at all for Romanians. As Zsolt K. Lengyel notes, during the 1920s there were several political projects targeting different versions of Transylvanian regionalism elaborated by Romanians, Hungarians and Germans separately, but those projects never managed to reach a common platform.<sup>28</sup> Some of the autonomy-claims made by the leaders of the Hungarian minority in the post-1989 period were gradually transformed into forms of non-ethnic regionalism after 1996, when it became evident that the desire for autonomy of the Transylvanian Hungarians met with tough resistance on the part of the Romanian majority.<sup>29</sup> An attempt to resuscitate *Transylvanianism* was recorded in 2000, when a group of Hungarian and Romanian intellectuals established the *Provincia* journal, edited in Romanian and Hungarian, hoping that a common space of discourse could be created gradually in which the differences so characteristic for Transylvania could be transformed from divisive to complementary within the frameworks of a consociational political system. The members of the group also hoped that through such a transformation Transylvania could be elevated from the status of a pre-modern province into a vibrant “center.”<sup>30</sup> In 2002, when it became evident that the time was not ripe for the kind of change in Romanian-Hungarian relations that they had hoped to trigger, the group dispersed and the journal was no longer published.

The chances of the Hungarian minority of finding means of integration on its own terms into the nationalizing Romanian state were thus quite slim. The success of any attempt at an institutional solution was undermined on the one hand by the strong legacy of Hungarian statehood in Transylvania (powerful identity structures connected to “Hungariannes” by language and culture, as well as an extended network of institutions) and on the other by the manner in which the young Romanian state defined its own objectives, targeting the nationalization of all the economic, social and cultural positions of the Transylvanian Hungarians. Indeed, since the early 1920s the core of the integration conundrum has been to find institutional solutions based on the double loyalty of the Hungarian minority: to the Hungarian nation defined in *cultural* terms and to the Romanian state and nation defined in *political* terms.<sup>31</sup> The question has been and recurrently is the following: how must the concept of the political community be conceived in order to allow and integrate such dual loyalties, preventing conflicts and accusations of disloyalty on one side or the other?

Generally speaking, throughout the almost nine decades of Romanian rule in Transylvania the Hungarian community tried to answer the question along two principally different strategies: through attempts of institutionalized – or at least institutional – “separateness” within the Romanian state, on the one hand, and through direct participation in the Romanian state-building project on the other, trying to adapt the structure and institutions of the Romanian state to the needs and expectations of the Hungarian community.

The ideologists of early Transylvanianism believed for instance that the Hungarians in Transylvania who accepted Romanian supremacy were entitled to enjoy autonomy in exchange for their loyalty to the Romanian state.<sup>32</sup> Romanians, however, had good reasons to resist all claims of different forms of autonomy, remembering well the importance of autonomous institutions in supporting their national movement in Transylvania under Hungarian rule.<sup>33</sup> This strange equilibrium of opposing forces and tendencies rendered in interwar Transylvania an arrangement short of institutionalized separateness of the Hungarian community, but one characterized by an extensive network of separate Hungarian institutions that survived the Romanian *Kulturkampf*. Between the two world wars the dual loyalty of Hungarians in Transylvania inclined strongly towards "Hungarianness," and those members of the community who tried to integrate on their own into the various institutions of the Romanian society were considered traitors and were excommunicated.<sup>34</sup>

After the Second World War, in the fundamentally changed situation in which Romania was transformed from a constitutional monarchy into a soviet-style popular republic, the perspectives of integration were interpreted and molded by the left-oriented leaders of the Hungarian community.<sup>35</sup> After the disappointments of the interwar period and the failures of the territorial rearrangements between 1940 and 1944, there seemed to be good reasons to believe that on the grounds of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism a solution could finally be found to the Transylvanian issue. Indeed, as Bárdi notes, the 1944–1948 interval was the only period in the history of post-1918 Transylvania when members of the Hungarian minority's political elite had the conviction that they were building a country that belonged to the Hungarian community as well.<sup>36</sup> In this atmosphere of generalized mutual trust a group of delegates of the political organization of the Hungarian community (The Hungarian Popular Alliance) adopted a document in 1945 which declared that the issue of the Hungarians in Transylvania is not a matter of borders, but one of the internal democratization of the country. This declaration offered unexpected help to the Romanian delegates who represented the country at the 1947 Peace Treaty in Paris, which brought Northern-Transylvania back under the sovereignty of the Romanian state after a period of almost three years of uncertainty regarding the political future of the region. Once this mission was completed, the situation of the Hungarian minority began to change quickly for the worse.

During Communist rule, in spite of the fact that Hungary and Romania belonged to the same Soviet Block, the manifestation of any form of dual loyalty was impossible. In the given circumstances the political elite of the Hungarian minority recognized that loyalty to the Romanian state was a precondition for preserving the community's linguistic and cultural identity.<sup>37</sup> Based on that principle, the issue of integration was simplified and reduced gradually to sustaining and

protecting, from positions occupied within the state apparatus, an ever diminishing circle of separate institutions that played a role in the cultural reproduction of the Hungarians in Transylvania. In this process, following the different crisis-points,<sup>38</sup> the leaders of the Hungarian minority gradually had to give up the illusion that communism would facilitate national emancipation and would provide integration on fair terms. Later, the issue of loyalty towards the Romanian state came under question as well, as it became more and more evident, starting with the mid-1970s, that the two objectives, participating in Romanian state-building and representing the interests of Transylvanian Hungarians, could not be reconciled.<sup>39</sup> Beginning in 1984 the Communist Party officially denied the existence of the Hungarian community in Romania, the references to its members in the public discourse being replaced with the term “Hungarian-speaking Romanians”. This was the period that, as we have seen, produced a massive wave of emigration of Hungarians from Transylvania.

The dynamic of the successive attempts of the Hungarian minority to integrate into the Romanian state, together with the repeatedly drawn conclusion that the way in which the leaders of the community think about the terms of integration is in conflict with the interests of the Romanian majority, generated an institutionalized mistrust of the authorities concerning the political objectives of the Hungarians. Between the two World Wars this mistrust became the central element of the state’s minority policies, which suspected educational and cultural institutions and churches and youth associations of subversive activity.<sup>40</sup> Following the Second World War, especially after the Hungarian revolution in 1956, the Communist authorities considered the separate institutions of the Hungarian minority as matters of state security.<sup>41</sup>

Both the failure of previous attempts towards integration of the Hungarian community and the tradition of institutionalized mistrust of the Romanian authorities represented a difficult legacy for the post-1989 political projects and ethno-political strategies.

### **Identity Structures and Ethnopolitical Strategies in the post-1989 Period**

From the perspective of the present approach, the most important changes that occurred after 1989, as compared to the period of the communist rule, was the disappearance of any barrier to the assumption of “Hungarianness” in public and the acceptance of the idea that the Hungarian community, together with other minorities, needs political representation on a corporative basis. Thus, in the context of the fragile, young Romanian democracy and the emerging multi-party system, the role of representing Hungarians in the country’s political life was assumed by a rapidly assembling organization, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Ro-



mania (DAHR), which found itself in the position to re-launch the attempts aiming to find ways of accommodating Hungarians within the structures of the Romanian state. Autonomy, as we have seen, came back to the agenda of the public debate, and a significant part of the mistrust of the Romanian authorities with regard to the political objectives of the Hungarians has been reactivated as well.

In spite of the fact that the situation of the Hungarians in Transylvania has improved significantly in many concerns – beyond political participation they gradually earned extensive language rights (in education, public administration, media and, to a more limited extent, in jurisprudence) and they are the beneficiaries of a considerable network of educational, cultural and media institutions operating in Hungarian, as well as dozens of private associations<sup>42</sup> – the conflicting interests of the Romanians and Hungarians could not be overcome. The new Romanian Constitution adopted in 1991 (over the opposition of the Hungarian community) and amended in 2003 continues to define the state as being based on the unity of the Romanian people (in an ethnic and cultural sense), and serving its interest only, the exclusive beneficiary of sovereignty being the ethnically defined Romanian people. According to special provisions, any future changes concerning the official language, forms of autonomy or federalism are excluded (art. 148). The national symbols, the day of the nation and the country's anthem reflect the Romanian nation's historical achievements, which have been accomplished against the Hungarian state and nation and thus embody an overtly anti-Hungarian message. Hungarians, for their part, consider themselves excluded by the Constitution and the national symbols from the integrative functions of the state, and continue to see no other guarantee for their cultural reproduction in the territories inhabited by them than cultural and territorial autonomy.

In November 1996 the unexpected outcome of the elections created a situation for which neither the Romanians nor the Hungarians were prepared: for pragmatic reasons the DAHR was invited to join the governing coalition. The Hungarian party has since been in power, and the Hungarians could consider again, for the first time since 1948, that by collaborating with the Romanian governing parties they are building their own country. In addition to the Educational Law adopted in 1995, which includes significant provisions concerning education in mother-tongue (retaining, however, important discriminatory features as well), the most important outcome of the cooperation was the Law on Local Public Administrations (2001), according to which a minority language can be used in those local communities in which the respective minority represents more than 20% of the population. In spite of these achievements, major objectives of the Hungarian community proved to be repeatedly unachievable, and as far as the issue of integration is concerned, the options of the Romanians and Hungarians remain irreconcilable.

As Irina Culic observes, in the post-1989 situation “neither the Romanian politicians, nor the representatives of the Hungarians in Romania succeeded in adopting a new approach in minority politics and, for that reason, they could not break out of the old, integration/assimilation versus separatism/autonomy polarity of the debate.” As a possible explanation she adds: “The Hungarians failed to convince the Romanian public that they consider the Romanian state as belonging to them as well, and wish to represent their interests within its frameworks; they did not succeed in elaborating a plausible form of the institutional arrangements they would like to see either.”<sup>43</sup>

Seventeen years after the re-launch of the political debate concerning the relationship between the Romanian state and the Hungarian minority, though it is a long time, it is still early, probably, to draw conclusions. I will try in what follows to assess the foreseeable future evolution of the debate with the help of public opinion polls and research conducted over the past years reflecting, among others things, the evolution of the dominant identity structures, the competing ethno-political strategies and the level of tolerance between Romanians and Hungarians in Romania.

As far as the dominant identity structures of Romanians and Hungarians are concerned, important similarities and differences were observed by Raluca Soreanu, who investigated the databases of a series of surveys conducted between 2000 and 2002<sup>44</sup> concerning representative samples of the population of Romania. The polls used questionnaires that were fairly similar so as to allow for comparison and conclusions concerning the evolution of the indicators under investigation.

Analyzing the distribution of answers recorded with regard to the question: “*According to your opinion, which are the three most important circumstances on the basis of which somebody can be considered Romanian/Hungarian?*” Soreanu compiled a table (the percentages represent the sum of the first, second, and third options – see Table 1).

It is interesting to note that while the way in which Romanians define both the *in-group* and the *out-group* is quite similar to the Hungarians’ views on the fundamentals of “Romanianness”, the auto-identification of the Hungarians in Romania is significantly different, laying emphasis on the mother-tongue and feelings instead of place of birth and citizenship. The most important conclusion of Soreanu’s analysis, however, is the fact that according to the way in which Romanians predominantly define “Hungarianness”, Hungarians in Transylvania do not qualify in this category, since they were not born in Hungary and are not Hungarian citizens.


**Table 1**

	Autodefinition	Similarities/ Differences	Heterodefinition
ROMANIAN DEFINING: the Romanian (active) the Hungarian (passive)	To be born in Romania 63.7%	Significant similarity	To be born in Hungary 54.5%
	To be a Romanian citizen 36.8%		To be a Hungarian citizen 40.9%
	Romanian mother-tongue 41.9%		Hungarian mother-tongue 44.1%
	To feel Romanian 31.5%		To feel Hungarian 30.5%
Similarities/ Differences	Significant similarity		Partial differences
HUNGARIAN DEFINING: the Romanian (passive) the Hungarian (active)	To be born in Romania 36.3%	Partial differences	Hungarian mother-tongue 75.4%
	To be a Romanian citizen 32.2%		To feel Hungarian 51.9%
	Romanian mother-tongue 60%		Hungarian parents 43.3%
	Romanian parents 34.2%		Baptized in a Hungarian Church 35.5%
	Heterodefinition	Similarities/ Differences	Autodefinition

Based on these findings, Soreanu considers that the relationship between the three identities – Romanian, Hungarian and Hungarian in Romania – can be represented graphically in the following way:

**Illustration 1**

Romanian citizens = citizens' *in-group*



Source: Soreanu, 2005.

Romanians accept Transylvanian Hungarians in the civic *in-group* provided that they do not consider themselves Hungarians (which means that they see them as Romanians). Since this is not the case – Transylvanian Hungarians consider themselves as belonging to the Hungarian nation, culturally defined –, the concept of the “Romanian civic nation” is void in the sense that it falls back to the ethnic concept of the nation according to the way in which the Romanian constitution defines it.

Interpreting the findings of the same research, Irina Culic observes that while the self-definition of Romanians is a “mixed territorial-cultural construct”, the self-definition of Hungarians in Transylvania is *par excellence cultural*.<sup>46</sup> This difference in self-perception leads in her view to the following patterns of exclusion:

The Romanians ‘enjoy’ their nation, while the Hungarians are excluded from it. Or, to conceive the situation from another point of view, the Hungarians exclude themselves from it, by entering the ‘club’ of the Hungarian nation, and enjoying its goods and services.<sup>47</sup>

Similar results were recorded by a survey conducted in 1997 as part of broader comparative research focusing on the Carpathian Basin and initiated by the Eötvös Lóránd University of Budapest under a UNESCO program on national minorities. The component of the research focusing on Romania identified significant differences in the dominant identity structures of Romanians and Hungarians in Romania. While 75% of the Romanian respondents’ opinions reflected total or partial agreement with the statement that for somebody to be considered Romanian it is necessary to be born in Romania, in the case of the Hungarians only 9% of the respondents agreed totally or partially with the corresponding statement: for somebody to be considered Hungarian it is necessary to be born in Hungary. If the question referred to the relationship between citizenship and identity, 78% of the Romanian respondents agreed totally or partially with the statement according to which for somebody to be considered Romanian it is necessary to have Romanian citizenship, while only 18% of the Hungarian respondents took a similar stand with regard to the corresponding question referring to the relationship between Hungarian identity and Hungarian citizenship.<sup>48</sup>

Based on the data of the research on the Carpathian Basin, Irina Culic observes the following:

The dilemma of the member of a minority is an important source of tension. First, for the member of the minority community who has to choose often between the two identities, civic and national (ethnic). In many cases, without regard to the alternative which defines, in a given circumstance, the person’s actions, attitudes and options, the result seems to be that of a zero, or even negative sum game. In most

of the cases in which ethnicity (identity) matters, the two alternatives cannot be reconciled. Second, the duality of the identity of the member of a minority is a source of tension for the members of the majority nation as well. The ambivalence of the member of the minority generates mistrust, uncertainty, suspicion. The majority expects a kind of loyalty which is unattainable for the minority.<sup>49</sup>

Culic believes that the situation could perhaps be changed by providing more substantive rights to the Hungarian minority. She is aware, however, that even if the loyalty of the Hungarian minority towards the Romanian state could probably be enhanced in this way, the reactions of the Romanian majority are more difficult to foresee:

A different type political and civic formalization of the minority’s situation (maximal educational rights in the language of the minority, cultural and territorial self-government, or other forms of civic and political organization) might probably change the substance of the minority’s identity construction, though it is debatable how such a change could come about or how the majority would relate to the minority in this situation.<sup>50</sup>

Other variables of the previously mentioned surveys conducted in 2000–2002 seem to offer several responses to the question posed by Culic. As far as the dominant views regarding the most important ethopolitical options of Transylvanian Hungarians – autonomy, education in mother-tongue, Hungarian language state university, state subsidies for the Hungarian culture, double citizenship, assistance offered by the Hungarian state – are concerned, the situation, as reflected in the surveys, is as follows.





Chart 3

Source: Paul – Tudoran – Chilariu, 2005.

It is evident from the data that while the enlisted objectives are supported by the large majority of the Hungarian respondents, the resistance of the Romanian population is considerable, especially as far as the issue of autonomy is concerned.

Regarding the way in which the topic of Hungary's involvement is concerned, the opinions are distributed according to the diagram below.



*Chart 4*

Source: Paul – Tudoran – Chilariu, 2005.

Using the databases of the polls conducted in 2001 and 2002, Ioana Paul, Mirela Tudoran and Luiza Chilariu<sup>51</sup> calculated the percentages of respondents characterized by ethnocentric tendencies (more positive attributes for the *in-group*), both in the case of Romanians and Hungarians. They obtained the following stratification of the identity structures:

The findings confirm the contact theory, since the more ethnocentric Romanians are non-Transylvanian, while the most ethnocentric Hungarians live in the Székely land.


Using the concepts of “Romanians with balanced ethnic views” and “ethnocentric Romanians” (ETNOr) as defined above, the opinions with regard to two major objectives of the Hungarians are distributed according to the following two charts.

If the question refers to the extent to which the spoken Hungarian language is being tolerated in public, the options of “balanced” and “ethnocentric” Romanians are distributed as follows:

**Table 2**


	Romanians total (%) (%)	Non- Transylvanian Romanians	Transylvanian Romanians (%)	Hungarians total (%)	Hungarians in Székely land (%) (%)	Hungarians outside Székely land
ĕ (equal number of positive attributes for in-group and out-group)	35.9	31.7	43.3	46.9	42.0	51.1
<b>ETNO<sub>r</sub></b> (at least with two more positive ĕ attributes for Romanians)	30.4	33.7	21.7	2.2	2.1	2.3
<b>ETNO<sub>m</sub></b> (at least with two more positive attributes for Hungarians)	4.2	4.9	2.6	21.0	24.0	18.5
Other	29.5	29.7	32.4	29.9	32.0	28.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Paul – Tudoran – Chilariu, 2005.




**Chart 5**

Source: Paul – Tudoran – Chilariu, 2005.



*Chart 6*

Source: Paul – Tudoran – Chilariu, 2005.



*Chart 7*

Source: Paul – Tudoran – Chilariu, 2005.

The tendencies reflected above are confirmed by subsequent polls as well. A survey conducted in 2003<sup>52</sup> recorded, for instance, the following opinions of Hungarians in Romania (the distribution does not include the opinions of those respondents who declared themselves Hungarians):






Chart 8

Source: IPP – Gallup, 2003.

In December 2006 a new nationally representative survey was completed and a research report compiled which compares the results recorded with the ones registered in the previously mentioned 2002 poll.<sup>53</sup> As far as the opinions regarding the role and involvement of the Hungarian state are concerned, the situation evolved as illustrated in the table below.

Table 3. “In your opinion is it acceptable that the Hungarian state...”

	Agreement (%)		Disagreement (%)	
	2002	2006	2002	2006
encourages Hungarian language education in Romania?	37.8	26	59	55
provides Hungarians in Romania with Hungarian language textbooks?	42.9	34	54	30
supports Hungarian companies that invest in Romania?	64.1	57.3	31	45
strengthens its relations with political organizations of the Hungarians in Romania?	42.4	39	51	52
offers Hungarian citizenship to Hungarians in Romania?	46	34	48	55

Source: Guvernul României, 2006.


Concerning the relationships between the Romanian state and the Hungarian minority, measured with the level of acceptance by Romanian public opinion of the Hungarians' ethnopolitical options, the evolution was the following.

**Table 4**

	Agreement (%)		Disagreement (%)	
	2002	2006	2002	2006
The Romanian state should provide education in Hungarian for Hungarian children.	47.2	46.2	50.2	47.4
The Romanian state should support cultural organizations of Hungarians in Romania.	55.6	51.1	41.5	39.4
The counties in which Hungarians are in the majority should have more autonomy.	18.6	13.8	77.8	75.5
It is good if Hungarians in Romania have double, Romanian and Hungarian citizenship.	44.1	40.1	50.6	49.2

Source: Guvernul României, 2006.

The report compares the evolution of opinions regarding the quality of Romanian-Hungarian relations as well. In this respect the situation evolved as follows.



*Chart 9*

Source: Guvernul României, 2006.

The slightly diminished level of acceptance of the involvement of the Hungarian state and the decrease of support for the ethno-political objectives of the Hungarian minority, together with the quite significant increase in the share of the respondents who see the Romanian–Hungarian relations more loaded with conflict, is explained in the report by the reinforcement of ethnocentrism due to the increased visibility of the Hungarian language in public spaces (in accordance with the provisions of the public administration law adopted in 2001) and the renewed public debate centered around the autonomy claims of the Hungarian political elite in Transylvania.<sup>54</sup> It is interesting to note that those respondents who appreciate the relations as being based on collaboration (30.8%) see as one of the major advantages of Romania's EU accession the legal framework of the EU which will curb the autonomy claims of the Hungarians' political organization (DAHR). The same respondents consider that the idea of autonomy is subversive and constitutes a political attack against the ethno-political status-quo.<sup>55</sup>

The Hungarian analysis of the data recorded in Transylvania during the research conducted in 1997 on the Carpathian Basin identified different types of cleavages in the Hungarian and the Romanian population in Transylvania.<sup>56</sup> According to Csepeli, Örkény, and Székelyi, Hungarians in Transylvania can be categorized in four clusters by the fear-hope and the nationalist-assimilationist axes. Close to 60% of the Hungarian population belong to the category of the "worried", which includes persons who do not situate themselves at large distance from Romanians but who have networks that do not include members of the majority, and perceive a high level of conflict generated by all actors involved. A second category, the "moderate optimists", comprising 20% of the Hungarian population in Transylvania, includes persons who situate themselves at a larger distance from the majority but believe that all actors are interested in reducing the tensions. Another 10% of the Hungarians are labeled as "nationalists" by the analysis: the persons included in this cluster situate themselves at a large distance from the Romanians. Their social networks do not include members of the majority and they consider that the tensions are intensified by the Romanians and mitigated by Hungarians and the international organizations. The remaining 10% constitute the cluster of the "integrated". The persons belonging to this category have an extended network of relations with Romanians, do not feel any social distance from the majority, and consider that the tensions are generated by Hungarians and the international organizations.

As far as the dominant patterns of thinking about the Romanian-Hungarian relationships in the case of Romanians in Transylvania are concerned, Csepeli, Örkény, and Székelyi identified three clusters. The first category is labeled as the "distance-keepers", comprising 47% of the Romanian population. The persons belonging to this cluster do not define a large social distance from Hungarians, but they have no Hungarian networks at all, and they blame mainly the Romanians

and the international organizations for keeping the tensions high. The second cluster includes the “nationalists”, who sense a large social distance from Hungarians. Their networks do not include members of the minority and they consider that the tensions are generated by Hungarians, while Romanians and the international organizations try to alleviate the conflict. This cluster comprises 46% of the Romanian population in Transylvania. The last category, consisting of 7% of the Romanians, is labeled as the “accommodators”, who do not feel large social distance, their networks include many Hungarians and they believe that Hungarians mitigate, Romanians intensify, and international organizations mediate the conflict.

The research report of the polling institute that conducted the 2006 survey contains further interesting data about the level of acceptance of the Hungarian language in public spaces and the ways in which the role and activity of the Hungarians’ ethnic party (DAHR) is appreciated.<sup>57</sup>

As far as the opinions regarding the implemented language rights are concerned, the situation registered by the 2006 poll is reflected in the chart below.




Chart 10

Source: Horváth, 2006.

The report includes an interesting comparison of the way in which the opinions concerning the role and impact of the DAHR were reflected in the 2000, 2002, and 2006 polls. The percentages in the following table reflect the opinion of the Romanian respondents only.

**Table 5**

From the statements below which is the one you agree with?	2000 (%)	2002 (%)	2006 (%)
Regardless of which party wins the elections, DAHR should be invited in the government.	11.7	10.8	3.5
DAHR can participate in the government like any other party.	34.9	30.7	39.8
DAHR can be represented in the Parliament but should not be invited in the government.	20.1	20	15.2
DAHR should leave politics and be transformed into a cultural organization.	21	20.6	13.4
DAHR should be banned.	9.5	11	15.4
DK/NA	2.8	6.9	12.7

*Source:* Horváth, 2006

The predominance, in 2006, of the Romanian respondent's negative opinion with regard to the impact of the DAHR's activity is reflected in the following set of data, too.

**Table 6**

To what extend do you agree...?	Rather agree (%)	Rather disagree (%)
DAHR serves the interests of the Hungarian minority only, not the whole population.	78.5	11.4
DAHR's participation in the government does not make any difference.	51.5	37.2
DAHR's participation in the government resulted in more rights of the Hungarian minority than the rest of the population.	55.5	30.2
DAHR's participation in the government resulted in the deterioration of the Romanian–Hungarian relationships.	46.7	36.1
Through its activity, DAHR promotes the rights of all minorities in Romania.	31.4	51.9

Further interesting aspects are offered by two undertakings that focus on younger generations. Research conducted in 2004 which included quantitative and qualitative components revealed that the intolerance identifiable at the level of younger generations (aged between 15–35) is due mainly to difficulties in communication with Hungarians, who prefer to speak in their language even in the presence of Romanians. Younger generations of Romanians consider that the Hungarian minority has too many rights (representation in Parliament, and they “aspire even to leading positions within the Romanian state”) and that the objective of the Hungarian community is “to impose a system in their own language, and they want to govern themselves”.<sup>58</sup>

Qualitative research conducted in 2006 on the dominant values of Romanians aged between 15–25 confirms these findings. The participants in the focus-groups generally consider that the Hungarians in Romania have too many rights (in some instances, more than the Romanians). They are disturbed by the fact that the Hungarian language is spoken in public and they firmly reject the idea of autonomy. Some feel that the Hungarians are “aggressive” and “they do not like the Romanians”. More than half of the participants would not accept a Hungarian in the family and one third refuse to have Hungarian friends. The report mentions minor regional differences and considers that the members of the 20–25 year age group are slightly more intolerant.<sup>59</sup> In both cases the research proves that the dominant way of judging Hungarians and their relationships with the Romanian state have been reproduced during the last 17 years.

Though its perspective is significantly different, the overall image emerging from the above is reinforced also by comprehensive research coordinated by Rogers Brubaker focusing on the interethnic relations of Cluj, conducted between 1995 and 2001.<sup>60</sup> Though the patterns of “everyday ethnicity” investigated by the fieldwork are predominantly peaceful and only occasionally loaded with tensions, the price paid for the peace seems to be avoiding systematically any substantive debate concerning the unsettled issues of Romanian–Hungarian coexistence in Transylvania: various “everyday coping strategies” are deployed both by Romanians and Hungarians to avoid confrontation over sensitive issues or to downplay the importance of controversial aspects.

The findings of the research mentioned here entitle us to raise the question: in what sense can we consider the Romanian political community to include Hungarians in Transylvania? In order to identify possible answers to this question we need to explore the concept of political community.

### **The Idea of Political Community**

The concept of political community is surprisingly under-theorized in political science. Seemingly, there aren’t any comprehensive research projects targeting the different historical, theoretical and empirical aspects of the issue. The Handbook of Political Science edited by Goodin and Klingeman<sup>61</sup> does not provide any definition of the term, and more systematic works dedicated to the concept are generally lacking, in spite of the fact that the issue of “bounded communities” has been a concern for authors like Kant, Hegel, Marx, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt and many others.<sup>62</sup> A more analytical account of the concept has been offered recently by Elizabeth Frazer, from the perspective of communitarian political theory.<sup>63</sup>

Though the concept is widely used, its significance is considered in most cases to be self-referential. However, if we have a closer look at the broad area of its significance we can easily see that the concept is loaded with several internal tensions and contradictions. Some use the term as if it were synonymous with polity, and most authors see a strong relationship between the state, the society and the political community. There are, however, opinions according to which well organized, self-governing sub-state actors also can be considered political communities.<sup>64</sup> Newly, the concept of the “European political community” has also been in use.

On a different level of analysis, Frazer observes that the term and its use embody at least four different types of ambiguities. The most common interpretation refers to a particular type of community, along other kinds of “partial” communities, such as ethnic, local or business communities, in which what is shared is political: institutions, values, etc. A second widespread account of the concept considers political community to be a community that is organized politically. According to this view, the political tie is added to other, prior commonalities like culture, economy and shared territory. A third sense of the term refers to the belief that a community can be considered to be a political community if it acts politically and behaves as a political actor, by defending the community’s continued existence, protecting the members’ needs and benefits, norms, institutions and traditions. The fourth interpretation holds that the distinctive feature of the political community is that it is constituted politically; this view reflects the recognition that the reasons for the disintegration of communities are usually political.<sup>65</sup> Frazer observes that political theory is highly ambiguous particularly as far as the first two connotations are concerned: while many authors consider that political ties are thinner and overlook other types of allegiances, the belief that a genuine political community needs deep forms of commitment, reciprocity, shared culture and meanings is at least as widespread.

Two further aspects of the issue are of interest for Frazer: the way in which a political community comes into being and the level of internal conflict and diversity that prevents a community from disintegrating.

As far as the first aspect is concerned, Frazer notes that political communities can be constituted both exogenously and endogenously. The endogenous version implies cases in which a “social contract” transforms an aggregate of individuals into a “duly constituted political association (or society, or polity – or community) with agreed procedures for legislation, adjudication, and administration and an agreed locus and distribution of sovereign power.”<sup>66</sup> However, a more “realistic” account of “bringing into being a political community” seems to be the following:

... a political settlement is forged – by violent conquest, by the gradual centralization of power and the accrual of legitimacy, by the dis-possession of kings in the favour of the commons – a political com-

munity, in the present sense, might be said to be the upshot at the point when individuals share allegiance to a particular set of institutions and procedures.<sup>67</sup>

Frazer observes that the accrual of legitimacy presupposes “stories, actions and orientations which tend to confirm its [the community’s] existence”,<sup>68</sup> as well as a group which undertakes to provide the rules and their justification. It is quite common that the group which assumes this role acts in its own interest:

The institution of politics, as has been observed, is quite consistent with a politically dominant class or group promulgating and promoting mythical justification of the social order, or arguments in favour of traditional patterns of government (...) – in their own interest.<sup>69</sup>

The existence of a group that defines the political community according to its own interests has further consequences in Frazer’s view: the exclusion of those who cannot accept the prevailing trend of justification for the community’s existence. For the sake of stability and efficiency, the discursive space of the political community has to be defined in such a way that the voices of the excluded cannot be heard.

The rules of the political game and the rules of conduct that govern participation in it, has been constructed so as to benefit those who constructed the political sphere and continue to participate in it, and so as to exclude persons whose disadvantage and subordination is necessary (...) At the same time, the claims of the disadvantaged cannot be pressed or heard in the normal political process which is organized so as to exclude certain kinds of voices, certain kinds of claims, and certain agenda items.<sup>70</sup>

Though Frazer seeks to maintain the balance between the empathy required by proper comprehension and the unengaged critique of the communitarian views, she seems to reach the conclusion that the essence of the political community can only be grasped from the perspective of the communitarian political philosophy. Acknowledging the merits of what we might call the “thin” interpretation of the term, according to which one can speak of a political community whenever a group of people is politically constituted through a common subjection to the same governing institutions, she firmly opts for a “thicker” version of the concept, according to which members of the political community are “related by sharing not only institutions, territory, state or national symbols, a legal system, etc., but also values, political culture, national and political identity, a sense of allegiance, and so on.” Echoing Rawls, author of *Political Liberalism* (1993), rather than that of *A Theory of Justice* (1971), she stresses at one point that “anything less than a reasoned agreement – grudging acceptance, for instance, indifference or the absence of conviction – will mean that the polity is nothing more than a *modus vi-*



*vendi*, and that cannot meet the needs for commitment and participation that generate genuine political stability".<sup>72</sup>

Frazer is aware, of course, that a community also involves arguments, even conflicts over the meaning of the shared values and goals, or the way those values need to keep pace with time. However she believes that in a full-fledged political community "what is shared will be privileged for practical purposes over disagreement and differences".<sup>73</sup>

Privileging agreement on values and purposes is relatively easy in communities that are not divided along ethnic, linguistic, religious lines and do not belong to incompatible legal traditions. In deeply divided societies however, the practical reasons are often less than sufficient. With respect to this challenge, Frazer admits, building on Benedict Anderson and David Miller, that in the circumstances of diversity "political relations and state unity can only be achieved by the use of symbols, and rituals as symbols, which relate each to each and to the whole on the imaginary level". More concretely, "state institutions must deploy myths and associated symbols of 'nationhood' in such a way that all citizens orient to these in such a way as to understand themselves as related to their fellow citizens and to the whole".<sup>74</sup>

However, as Frazer herself emphasized, the mythical justification of the prevailing political order is usually provided by self-interested political elites, who prefer to deploy the instruments of exclusion, rather than more integrative ways of defining the state and the political community, definitions in which the different segments of society relate to one another and to the whole on the imaginary level. In addition to this internal contradiction, Frazer's account bears a second one: when anchoring her interpretation of the ideal political community in the sphere of communitarian political theory, she is obliged to assume the consequences of what she sees to be one of the distinctive features of political communitarianism:

...communitarians argue that the conduct of political life must be congruent with the conduct of community life. That is, the culture inhering in political institutions of the state and the locality must fit with the cultural life people live in their communities – their local area of residence, their schools and workplaces and churches.<sup>75</sup>

Two consequences follow from this: (1) the political community is justified in seeking homogeneity in order to secure the congruence between politics and culture; (2) when the conduct of community life at the level of the state differs from that of certain local areas of residence then the latter are entitled to seek congruence between politics and culture by claiming the status of separate political community.

The salience of communitarianism in political thought on the nature and functions of political community and the exclusionary consequences of the dominant

interpretations of the term have been acknowledged by Andrew Linklater, too.<sup>76</sup> Building on Hegel, he emphasizes the importance of the communities' fundamental right to protect "their different ways of life", a right that stems from the "importance which human beings attach to their membership in specific bounded communities". By exercising this right through self-determination and the principle of sovereignty, communities create the appropriate frameworks of freedom in accordance "with the unique experience and distinctive tradition of different forms of life".<sup>77</sup>

Self-determination and the principle of sovereignty, however, often generate various forms of exclusion. Sovereignty, warns Linklater, "is exclusionary because it frustrates the political aspirations of subordinate cultures".<sup>78</sup> It also involves the right to closure: communal self-determination, the right of a community to determine its own affairs, cannot be considered complete if it does not include the right to decide who can and who cannot enter the community. In order to preserve its autonomy and distinctiveness, the political community is forced to harden boundaries that separate insiders from outsiders. The hegemonic political discourses, which "set the rules of the game" in Frazer's terms, are important instruments of the closure since they are meant to

...channel human loyalties away from potentially competing sites of power to centralizing and monopolizing sovereign states which endeavoured to make national boundaries as morally unproblematic as possible."<sup>79</sup>

What resulted from the practical need of political communities to protect their distinctiveness and particular way of organizing social life was a process through which "more inclusive and less expansive forms of political association failed in the struggle for survival".<sup>80</sup> The form of political community that prevailed as the result of this evolution is one that is "too puffed up and too compressed" at the same time:

...too puffed up, or universalistic, because the needs of those who do not exhibit the dominant cultural characteristics have frequently been disregarded; too compressed, or particularistic because the interests of the outsiders have typically been ignored.<sup>81</sup>

It is not difficult to discover in Linklater's account the same tension that has been identified by Frazer between the "thin" and "thick" versions of the idea of political community. As Linklater observes, a major dilemma for communitarian political thought originates from this tension: the challenge to think of the sovereign state as the only alternative to the cosmopolitan argument for enlarging the moral frontiers to include the whole of humankind, on the one hand, and to take issue with the sovereign state that deprives local communities of the right to self-determination, on the other.

Linklater believes that political communities accepted by the international legal order are far less “finished and complete” than neo-realism has depicted them to be. Many states are “incomplete”, political communities are often “precarious”, and what is needed in the current phase is an exploration of new forms of political community together with a “more comprehensive understanding of what it means to be a full member of a political community”.<sup>82</sup>

The shortcomings of the dominant conception of modern political community – in which sovereignty, territoriality, citizenship and one dominant ethnocultural community are wedded together, impoverishing, as Linklater puts it, Western political imagination – can be overcome in his view through a triple transformation of the idea of political community: (1) by greater respect secured for cultural differences; (2) stronger commitment to the reduction of internal inequalities; (3) significant advancements in universality. Progress in these three directions would have, according to Linklater, the impact of “deepening and widening” the sense of the concept, as well as gradually

...replacing unitary sovereign states with new forms of political community which are more hospitable to cultural difference, and there are equally strong arguments for granting the members of minority groups the right of appeal beyond sovereign states to global legal institutions which give expression to the normative idea of an international society of peoples.<sup>83</sup>

In addition to the solution thus offered to the problem of those groups which “do not feel at home in the political community”,<sup>84</sup> the suggested triple transformation has also the potential to bridge the gap between communitarian and cosmopolitan political thought on the nature of political community:

Far from being antithetical, communitarianism and cosmopolitanism provide complementary insights into the possibility of new forms of community and citizenship in the post-Westphalian era. They reveal that more complex associations of universality and difference can be developed by breaking the nexus between sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and citizenship and by promoting wider communities of discourse.<sup>85</sup>

If we return now to our questions concerning the Romanian political community, Frazer’s and Linklater’s account entitle us to draw the following conclusions. If we bare in mind the “thin” interpretation of the concept, the Romanian political community qualifies without doubts. However, if we consider the “thick” version of its significance, the entirety of the Romanian citizenry falls short of the criteria of the ideal political community. Though territory and political institutions are common, values, political culture, national and political identity, the sense of allegiance, are, as the evidence of a wide variety of polls and the

results of much research demonstrate, far from shared by the large majority of Romanians and Hungarians in Romania. Instead of a definition of the state in which the Romanian and Hungarian segments of the society relate to each other and to the whole, we see, both in the Romanian Constitutions and public discourse, those patterns and agents of exclusion – providing justification for the political order according to their own interest – which Frazer and Linklater talk about. As we have seen, any renegotiation of the way in which the different segments of the population relate to one another and to the whole is excluded by the Constitution. The myths and symbols associated with Romanian “nationhood” do not help Hungarians in Transylvania feel related to their fellow citizens or to the whole of the political community either: on the contrary, they are permanently warned by those symbols that they are historical enemies of the Romanian people. What is shared seems not to be privileged for practical purposes over disagreement and differences, and, as a result, the Hungarians in Romania evidently do not feel at home in the Romanian political community. They participate in the country’s political life with grudging acceptance, indifference and the absence of conviction, which means that the Romanian political community is not more, indeed, than a *modus vivendi* between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority. The accentuated interest in autonomy, which is equal to the desire to belong to a separate political community within which the disadvantages can be compensated, seems to be a logical reaction on the part of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania.

The case of the Romanian political community is evidently not singular. While the great majority of political communities today can be considered as such according to the “thin” interpretation of the word, they often fall short of the “thick” interpretation provides the criteria. Moreover, the dominant elites of the political communities are guided usually by the “thick” version of the concept when they think of themselves, while they regularly recommend to the minority nations to relate to the prevailing political order according to the “thin” interpretation of the term.

### **The Role of the Romanian and Hungarian States**

The process described by Linklater as the social evolution along which “more inclusive and less expansive forms of political association failed in the struggle for survival” and the dominant conception of political community prevailed is in fact the historical route leading to the triumph of the nation-state. The amalgamation of state building practices with principles of nation building seemed to confer to political communities an unprecedented efficiency, as compared to previously known state structures. In addition to internal efficiency, the practical advantages of pursuing the congruence between *states* and *nations* proved to be eas-

ily capitalized in international politics, too. The conviction that international politics is nothing but the process of state interactions and that states are concomitantly actors and ultimate goals of these exchanges, ensured a common starting point and solid grounds for all competing theories and paradigms aiming to explain the nature of international politics. The assumptions that the actors in international politics are theoretically equal and sovereign in relation to one another, they are not subordinated to one another or any other higher authority, and they have clearly marked territories and are easily identifiable as homogeneous units of organizing social and political life all represent further dimensions of the international consensus that offered a solid basis for the prevalence of the nation-state logic.

Romania, as we have seen, performed quite well as a nationalizing state. In addition to the *Kulturkampf* carried out during the two world wars and the homogenizing achievements of the communist regimes, the post-1989 political system of the country managed to strike the appropriate balance between minority protection and resistance to any claims submitted by minorities which could undermine, at least in the long run, the unitary character of the Romanian nation-state as enshrined in the Constitution. While the language-rights that were provided (in education, local public administration and to a limited extent in courts), the parliamentary representation of 19 “small” minorities,<sup>86</sup> and the presence of the DAHR in the government and other subordinated state institutions made the situation of Romania fairly comfortable in cases of international scrutiny targeting the country’s minority regime, the tough resistance posed by the Romanian authorities to all claims for autonomy, the acceptance of Hungarian as an official language of state, the (re)establishment of the Hungarian language state university, and the amendment of the Constitution to acknowledge Romania as a multinational state did not lead to any serious concern, at least so far, on behalf of any influential international organization – in spite of considerable efforts of representatives of the Hungarian minority. State institutions, together with various political actors, are efficient as well in keeping the necessary level of mobilization within Romanian public opinion against political targets of the Hungarian minority which could pose a threat to the Romanian nation-state.

The treatment that Hungarians in Transylvania get from the mother country is heavily loaded, as well, with the logic of the nation-state. The authorities of the Hungarian state maintain a high level of involvement in the life of the Hungarian minority, seeking ways of legalizing its relationship with members of the Hungarian community in Romania, considered, as we have seen, members of the Hungarian nation defined in cultural and linguistic terms. This involvement contributes with no doubt to the enhancement of the cultural and linguistic reproduction of the Hungarian minority in Romania, but significantly impairs the chances of finding

effective ways of integrating the Hungarian minority into the Romanian political community.

According to Article 63 of the Constitution, the Hungarian state “feels responsible” for its co-nationals who live outside the borders as citizens of neighboring countries, and this sense of responsibility has generated during the post-1989 era a number of initiatives, both on behalf of state agencies and various political or civic actors. The most spectacular elements of these initiatives were the extended system of financial aid provided by the Hungarian state from public funds to members of the Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries; the establishment, in 2000, of the Sapientia University in Transylvania, funded exclusively by the Hungarian state (meant to provide a substitute for the Hungarian language state university, the reestablishment of which is strongly resisted by the Romanian authorities); the adoption, in 2001, of the Status Law by the Hungarian Parliament (on the basis of which “identity cards” were issued by Hungarian state authorities to members of the Hungarian communities in neighboring countries, the carriers of the IDs being entitled to certain state subsidies);<sup>87</sup> and the initiative to grant Hungarian citizenship to members of the Hungarian communities abroad, which was finally abandoned after the unfavorable outcome of a referendum organized in 2004.

Though some of those initiatives seem bold post-Westphalian political projects meant to challenge the prevailing concept of political community and trying to surmount the unity of territory, sovereignty and citizenship, their impact was in fact seriously marked by the logic of the nation state: they delivered the message to members of the Hungarian communities abroad that the improvement in their situation rests in the hands of Hungary exclusively through unilateral initiatives, implemented in spite of the opposition of the neighboring state. The tacit assumption according to which the interest of all Hungarians lies in seeking peaceful reunification of the cultural nation across borders, without changing the status-quo, became openly assumed after Hungary’s and Slovakia’s accession to the European Union in 2004, when the frameworks of the European political community seemed to offer a perspective within reach for Hungarians in Transylvania, too. In addition to the above, Hungary openly supports the claims for autonomy and the project of a Hungarian language state university in Romania, without having any leverage in pushing those objectives closer to fulfillment.

As far as the role of the two states are concerned, we can conclude that they keep the Hungarian community in Transylvania in the cross-fire of two competing nation-states, rendering the integration-conundrum even more complicated: the higher the involvement of the Hungarian state, the more accentuated the resistance of its Romanian counterpart.

### Conclusion

Based on the above, we can return now to the questions formulated at the outset. We have seen in the previous chapters that the various political projects of the Hungarians in Transylvania seeking integration on their own terms into the Romanian state have all failed since 1920. We have seen considerable evidence of conflicting identity structures and competing ethno-political strategies that divide the Romanian political community along ethnic fault-lines, and we have taken note of survey results that show a negative trend of the indicators of mutual tolerance. Guided by normative considerations, we explored the relationship of Hungarians in Transylvania to the Romanian political community and reached the conclusion that this relationship is precarious. Finally, a brief assessment of the role of the two states was presented, revealing that the level of interference of the two states is quite high and that this thwarts the chances of more pervasive patterns of mutual acceptance.

Drawing the line, we can conclude that George W. White's hypothesis concerning the construction of something particularly Transylvanian, with the joint efforts of Romanians and Hungarians in the region, seems quite unlikely. Romanians do not seem ready to accept that the definition of the Romanian political community could include anything related to Hungarians, and the Hungarians in Transylvania are evidently unwilling to cooperate at the cost of giving up their Hungarianness. *Transylvanianism*, the ideology which could lay the ground for the type of cooperation and political innovation White considers plausible, remained, as we have seen, isolated in time and in the minds of a few visionary thinkers of the Hungarian elite in interwar Transylvania. The promising attempt to reinvent Transylvanianism in more appropriate terms and conditions, launched in 2000 by the *Provincia*-group, remained, as we have seen, a short-lived endeavor with no impact at all on the region's dominant identity structures.

What would be necessary to trigger change that could make White's vision concerning the potential of the region more plausible?

An initial theoretical option would be the "self-revision" advocated by Makkai in 1931, which would translate in contemporary terms into a thorough reconsideration of the identity structures and ethno-political options prevailing today in Hungarian public opinion in Transylvania. Such a reconsideration, should it prove possible, could allow perhaps a gradual demobilization of the Romanian majority with regard to the "dangers" posed by the Hungarian minority to the Romanian nation-state, and the salient differences between the Hungarian and Romanian components of public opinion in Transylvania could gradually disappear. Once the mental structures of mutual mistrust are deconstructed, the Romanian state could accept some of the main ethno-political targets of the Hungarian minority, which could enhance the loyalty of the members of the Hungarian community to-

wards the Romanian state. A more harmonious integration of the Hungarian minority into the Romanian political community could be the grounds on which “something Transylvanian”, as White puts it, could emerge in the territory.

The second theoretical option would be the triple transformation of the Romanian political community, according to Linklater’s recommendations. If the Romanian political community could become “more hospitable to cultural difference” and could accept “wider communities of discourse”, the Hungarians in Transylvania could have a say in defining the Romanian political community, could see themselves reflected in the symbols of the state and gradually would start to “feel at home” within the Romanian political community.

The first option would require the Hungarians to take the initiative, the second would depend on the stance taken by the Romanian political elite. Since neither of the two parties seems convinced of the advantages that might follow, these two options seem equally implausible.

A third possibility could be that if everything remains as it is, history could offer the solution on the medium and long run. The demographical forecasts, as we have seen, foretell a rapid shrinking of the Hungarian population in Transylvania. The population loss can be further amplified by the push-and-pull effect exercised by the behavior of the two states. Romania, being firmly reluctant to accept the main ethnopolitical objectives of the Hungarian community, generates a sense of community failure in the younger generations of Hungarians in Transylvania, who could decide to leave and seek new forms of belonging in Hungary or elsewhere. This trend could be amplified by the policies of the Hungarian state, facing itself a serious demographic deficit. It has been quite common in past years that increasing numbers of Hungarian institutions recruited members of a properly educated, Hungarian speaking work force from neighboring countries, especially in fields left behind by Hungarian citizens who moved to western countries seeking better paying jobs. It has also been observed that educational institutions, middle and high schools in Hungary, risking closure due to the decrease in the number of children, recruit Hungarian students from outside Hungary. The graduates of several university departments in Transylvania in which education is provided in Hungarian enter the Hungarian labor market, their return to Transylvania often being improbable. Judging from the mere statist perspective, it can be observed that the interests of Romania and Hungary seem to coincide for the first time since 1920: the massive, though gradual transfer of the Hungarian population in Transylvania to Hungary seems to be in the interests of both states anchored in the logic of the nation-state, in spite of contradictory public statements on one side or the other.

Finally, an alternative solution could be offered by the European Union. The dynamics unleashed by the various aspects of European integration, though the success cannot yet be taken for granted, may easily foster the reconsideration of



identity structures and ethnopolitical strategies which, for the time being, does not seem to be in the interest of either Romanians, or Hungarians, both in Hungary and in Transylvania. The evaluation of the chances for such a development would require a separate investigation.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> George W. White: "Transylvania: Hungarian, Romanian, or Neither?" In: G. Herb – D. Kaplan (eds.): *Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory and Scale*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998.
- <sup>2</sup> Irina Culic: "Magyarság Erdélyben: a miénk, az övék, senkié? Avagy hogyan értelmezzük a kettős állampolgárságról szóló népszavazást és a hozzá kapcsolódó reakciókat?" [Hungarians of Transylvania: ours, theirs, or no one's? Comments on the Referendum Concerning Double Citizenship and the Reactions to It]. *Erdélyi Társadalom*, 3 (2005), no. 1, 127–148.
- <sup>3</sup> G. W. White, 1998, 286.
- <sup>4</sup> "Magunk revíziója" [Our Self-Revision]. In: Sándor Makkai: *Egyedül* [Alone]. Kolozsvár: Erdélyi Szépművészeti Céh, 1931, 215–217.
- <sup>5</sup> "Nem lehet" [It is impossible]. In: Péter Cseke – Gusztáv Molnár (eds): *Nem lehet. A kisebbségi sors vitája* [It is impossible. A Debate on the Minority Condition]. Budapest: Héttorony Kiadó, 1989, 107–111.
- <sup>6</sup> Makkai's thesis referring to the "political and moral impossibility" of the minority condition is refuted as well by the abundance of data referring to the diverse ethnic composition of most contemporary states. According to Ch. Pan – B. S. Pfeil (*National Minorities in Europe. Handbook*. Wien: Braumüller, 2003) the 46 states of Europe include 87 different ethnicities which form 337 minority communities officially recognized by the states of the territory in which they live. It is interesting to note that while the population of 10 of the European states count less the 1 million people, among the 337 ethnic groups 5 minority communities number between 5 and 10 million, 4 communities have 2-5 million members, 12 minorities number between 1 and 2 million and 23 communities number between 500,000 and one million. According to J. D. Fearon the 160 most diverse states of the world include 819 sizeable minority groups. In addition, Fearon calculates the mean value for the major regions of the world of the ethnic fractionalization index (the probability that two individuals selected at random from a country will be from different ethnic groups): it is 0.48 for the 160 countries researched; 0.24 for the 21 states of the West; 0.45 for the 19 countries of North-America and the Middle East; 0.41 for the 23 states in Latin America and the Caribbean; 0.44 for the 22 states of Asia; 0.41 for the 31 states in Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union; 0.71 for 43 states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Cf.: J. D. Fearon: *Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity around the World: A Cross-National Data Set on Ethnic Groups*. Presentation at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29 – September 1. 2002.
- <sup>7</sup> It is important to note though that the 1920 census registered a loss of the Hungarian population close to 350,000 in comparison with the census conducted in 1910, which registered 1,653,943 Hungarians living in Transylvania. Cf.: Károly Kocsis (ed.): *South Eastern Europe in Maps*. Budapest: Geographical Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2007. The same source will be used for further references to the 1910, 1941 Hungarian and 1920-2002 Romanian census data.
- <sup>8</sup> The number of ethnic Hungarian citizens of Romania who emigrated in the period between 1985-1991 is estimated at between 93,000 and 97,500. Cf.: István Horváth: "Az erdélyi

- magyarság vándormozgalmi vesztesége 1987–2001 között” [The Emigrational Loss of the Hungarians in Transylvania Between 1987–2001]. In: Tamás Kiss (ed.): *Népesedési folyamatok az ezredforduló Erdélyében* [Demographic Developments in Transylvania at the Turn of the Millennium]. Kolozsvár: RMDSZ Ügyvezető Elnökség – Kriterion Könyvkiadó, 2004, 85.
- <sup>9</sup> Cf.: Valér Veres: “A romániai magyarság természetes népmozgalma európai kontextusban, 1992–2002 között” [The Natural Ethnodemographic Evolution of the Hungarians in Romania in the European Context Between 1992–2002]. In: Kiss, 2004, pp. 50–51. As far as the issue of assimilation is concerned, see Szilágyi N. Sándor: “Az asszimiláció és hatása a népesedési folyamatokra” [Assimilation and its Impact on the Ethnodemographic Developments]. In: Kiss, 2004, 157–234.
- <sup>10</sup> Cf.: Horváth, 2004, 90.
- <sup>11</sup> Cf.: Veres, 2004, 51 and Horváth, 2004, 87.
- <sup>12</sup> István Csata – Tamás Kiss: *Népesedési perspektívák* [Ethnodemographic Perspectives]. Kolozsvár: RMDSZ Ügyvezető Elnökség – Kriterion Könyvkiadó, 2007. The hypothesis concerning the evolution of the migration rate presumes that it will moderately decrease from 0.055% in 2002 to 0.04% in 2032. Cf.: *Ibid.*, 21–24.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 53–59.
- <sup>15</sup> Cf.: Irina Livezeanu: *Cultural politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, nation building and ethnic struggle, 1918–1930*. Cornell University Press, 1995. The following references to the book will be on the basis of the Romanian version: *Cultură și naționalism în România Mare, 1918–1930*. București: Editura Humanitas, 1998. As far as the “nationalist consensus” is concerned, Livezeanu notes that the Communist and Socialist parties did not adhere to it, but their disagreement with the nationalizing project had a strong counter-effect: due to their compliance with the Comintern’s anti-Romanian stand in the issue of Bessarabia and Bucovina, supporting the Russian expansionism, their position enforced the exclusionary nature of the Romanian nationalism in the interwar period. Livezeanu, 1998, p. 24. As far as the exclusionary, nationalist targets of unification are concerned see: *Ibid.*, 355.
- <sup>16</sup> Dumitru Șandru: *Populația rurală a României între cele două războaie mondiale* [The Rural Population of Romania between the two World Wars]. Iași: Editura Academiei RSR, 1980, 51. Quoted by Livezeanu, 1998, 19.
- <sup>17</sup> Sabin Manuilă: “Aspects démographiques de la Transylvanie”. In: *La Transylvanie*, 1938, 70–73. Quoted by Livezeanu, 1998, 164.
- <sup>18</sup> S. Manuilă, *Studiu etnografic asupra populației României* [Ethnographic Study on Romania’s Population]. București: Editura Institutului Central de Statistică, 1940, 97.
- <sup>19</sup> Cf.: Livezeanu, 1998, 57–63.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 349–353. See also: Sorin Alexandrescu: *Paradoxul Român* [The Romanian Paradox]. București: Editura Univers, 1998, 67–69.
- <sup>21</sup> “The Romanization of Transylvania – Livezeanu notes – had to face, after 1918, the challenge of nationalizing three major categories of important foreign enclaves: geographical regions, cultural institutions and cities.” Cf.: *Ibid.*, 168.
- <sup>22</sup> Nándor Bárdi: “Romanian-Hungarian Relations between Past and Present”. In: Levente Salat – Samaranda Enache (eds): *The Romanian-Hungarian Relations and the French-German Reconciliation*. Cluj: EDRC, 2004, 79–96.
- <sup>23</sup> Károly Kós, another important personality (in addition to the previously mentioned Sándor Makkai) of the political and cultural life of the Hungarian minority between the two world wars, was one of the initiators of the first program of political activism calling, in 1920, for the involvement of the Hungarian minority in Greater Romania’s political life after two years of

- apathy and passive resistance. In 1934 he drew attention to an interesting parallel. In 1848, when a national assembly in Cluj adopted the unconditional unification of Transylvania with Hungary, neither the Germans (Saxons) nor the Romanians assented. In 1918, when a Romanian national assembly in Alba Iulia declared the unconditioned unification of Transylvania with the Romanian Kingdom, the will of the Hungarian community was ignored, while the representatives of the German community assented to the decision much later, only after long negotiations with the representatives of the Romanian community. Cf.: Károly Kós: *Erdély* [Transylvania]. Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1988 (1934), 85–86.
- 24 Cf.: Zsolt K. Lengyel: *Auf der Suche nach dem Kompromiß. Ursprünge und Gestalten des frühen Transsilvanismus 1918–1928*. München, 1993, 193–238.
- 25 Stefano Bottoni: “A sztálini ‘kis Magyarország’ megalakítása (1952)” [The Establishment of the Stalinist ‘Small Hungary’]. *Regio*, 2003 (3), 89–125. The fact that the territorial autonomy of the Hungarians was imposed from the outside against the will of the country’s authorities represents a heavy legacy for any future plans of autonomy in Transylvania.
- 26 See in this respect Zoltán Bogdán: “Romániai magyar autonómiakoncepciók. Az 1989 és 2006 között kidolgozott törvénytervezetek” [Hungarian Autonomy Projects in Romania. The Draft-Laws Elaborated Between 1989 and 2006.], in: Ferenc Fejtő – Levente Salat – Mária Ludassy – Gábor Egly – Zoltán Bognár: *Autonómia, liberalizmus, szociáldemokrácia* [Autonomy, Liberalism, Social Democracy]. Budapest: EÖKIK, 2006, 85–117.
- 27 See in this respect L. Nastasă (coord.): *Minorităţi etnocolturale. Mărturii documentare: Maghiarii din România (1956–1968)* [Ethnocultural Minorities. Witness of the Documents: Hungarians in Romania (1956–1968)]. Cluj: CRDE, 2003, 482–503 and 867.
- 28 Zsolt K. Lengyel: “Politisches System und Minderheiten in Rumänien 1918–1989. Abriß über die innere Integrationsprobleme des zentralistischen Einheitstaates am Beispiel der Deutschen und der Magyaren”. *Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde*, 24 (2001), Heft 2, 12–14. It is important to note in this context that on the side of the Romanians the political projects suggesting the regionalization of Transylvania were modest forms of resistance against the centralizing tendencies of Bucharest. In the context of the general mobilization for cultural unification of the country, described by Livezeanu, the promoters of such projects again and again had to defend themselves against the charges of “separatism”. Cf.: Livezeanu, 1998, 195. It is not difficult to see that any compromise in this concern with the non-Romanians, especially with the Hungarians, would have implied serious political risks.
- 29 With regard to further details concerning the three strategies, see Nándor Bárdi: “A szupremácia és az önrendelkezés igénye. Javaslatok, tervek az erdélyi kérdés rendezésére (1918–1940)” [The Desire of Supremacy and Self-Determination. Proposals and Projects Aiming to Resolve the Transylvanian Issue (1918–1940)]. In: Nándor Bárdi (ed.): *Források és stratégiák* [Sources and Strategies]. Csíkszereda: Pro-Print, 1999, 29–133.
- 30 See in this respect the invocation of the journal’s editorial: “Mit akarunk [What we want]”, in: E. Szokoly (ed.): *Provincia – 2000*. Marosvásárhely: Pro Európa Kiadó, 2001, 5.
- 31 Concerning the issue of the loyalty of the minority communities in the interwar period see: Ferenc Eiler: “Nemzeti kisebbségek és az állammal szembeni lojalitás a két világháború között” [National Minorities and Loyalty with Respect to the State between the two World Wars]. In: Nóra Kovács – Anna Osváth – László Szarka (eds.): *Etnikai identitás, politikai lojalitás. Nemzeti és állampolgári kötődések*. [Ethnic Identity, Political Loyalty. Ties of Nationality and Citizenship]. Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2005, 204–219.
- 32 Károly Kós: “Kiáltó szó Erdély, Bánság, Körösvidék, Máramaros magyarságához!” [Call to the Hungarians in Transylvania, Banat, the Cris Region and Maramures!] In: Károly Kós – Árpád Paál – István Zágoni: *Kiáltó szó. A magyarság útja. A politikai aktivitás rendszere* [The

Calling Word. The Road of the Hungarians. The System of Political Activism]. Kolozsvár, 1921, 5.

33 Cf.: Livezeanu, 1998, 213.

34 Stefano Bottoni: “Integrálódó kisebbség?” [Minority on the Way to Integration?] In: Nándor Bárdi – Attila Simon (eds.): *Integrációs stratégiák a magyar kisebbségek történetében* [Strategies of Integration in the History of Hungarian Minorities]. Somorja: Fórum Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2006, 398.

35 The orientation towards the political left of the Hungarian minority was due mainly, in addition to the Soviet influence in the region, to the fact that the right-wing Romanian parties blamed the Transylvanian Hungarians for the 1940–1944 occupation of Northern-Transylvania by Hungary, which made any coalition on the right impossible. Cf.: Nándor Bárdi: “A romániai magyar elit generációs csoportjainak integrációs viszonyrendszere” [The System of Relations of the Different Generation-Groups of the Hungarian Elite in Romania]. In: Bárdi – Simon, 2006, 56.

36 *Ibid.*, 58.

37 Bottoni, 2006, 398.

38 1948: the start of expropriating communal properties; 1953: disbanding the Hungarian Popular Alliance; 1956–57: imprisonment and cruel penalties for sympathizers in Transylvania with the Hungarian revolution; 1959: the unification of Hungarian language educational institutions with institutions where education is provided in Romanian. For details see: *Raportul Comisiei Prezidențiale pentru Studierea Dictaturii Comuniste din România* [Report of the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania]: [www.presidency.ro](http://www.presidency.ro), 523–541 (updated in January 8, 2007).

39 Bárdi, 2006, 58.

40 Livezeanu, 1998, 217.

41 Bárdi, 2006, 56.

42 For details see István Horváth: *Facilitating Conflict Transformation. Implementing the Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Romania, 1993–2001*. Hamburg: INCORE Working Paper no. 8, 2002.

43 Culic, 2005, 144.

44 Research Center for Interethnic Relations: *Ethnobarometer – Interethnic Relations in Romania*, May – June 2000; Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center: *Barometer of Ethnic Relations*, November 2001; Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center: *Barometer of Ethnic Relations*, October 2002.

45 Raluca Soreanu: “Autodefinire și heterodefinire a românilor și maghiarilor din România. O analiză empirică a stereotipurilor etnice și a fundamentelor diferite de definire a identității etnice” [Autodefinition and Heterodefinition of Romanians and Hungarians in Romania. An Empirical Analysis of the Ethnic Stereotypes and the Criteria According to which Ethnic Identity is Defined]. In: G. Bădescu – M. Kivu – M. Robotin (eds.): *Barometrul Relațiilor Etnice 1994–2002. O perspectivă asupra climatului interetnice din România* [Ethnic Barometer 1994–2002. A Perspective on Romania’s Interethnic Climate]. Cluj: CRDE, 2005, 65–88.

46 I. Culic: “Nationhood and Identity: Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania”. In: Balázs Trancsényi – Dragoș Petrescu et al (eds): *Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies*. Budapest-Iași: Regio Books-Polirom, 2001, 237.

47 *Ibid.*, 241.

48 I. Culic: “Dilema minoritarului: între identitate civilă și identitate națională” [The Dilemma of the Minoritarian: Between Civic and National Identity]. In: Irina Culic – István Horváth – Cristian Stan (eds): *Reflecții asupra diferenței* [Reflections on Difference]. Cluj: Editura Limes, 1999, 43.

49 *Ibid.*, 46.

50 *Idem.*

51 Ioana Paul – Mirela Tudoran – Luiza Chilariu: “Români și maghiari. Reprezentări in-grup, out-grup în cazul grupurilor etnice din România” [Romanians and Hungarians. In-group and Out-group Representations in the Case of Ethnic Groups in Romania]. In: Bădescu – Kivu – Robotin (eds), 2005, 89–117.

52 Institutul pentru Politici Publice – Gallup: *Intoleranță, discriminare și autoritarism în opinia publică* [Intolerance, Discrimination and Authoritarianism in the Public Opinion]. Septembrie, 2003.

53 Guvernul României. Departamentul pentru Relații Interetnice [The Romanian Government. Department of Interethnic Relations]: *Climat interetnic în România în pragul integrării europene* [Interethnic Climate in Romania before EU Integration]. Material pentru presă [Information for the press], 4 decembrie 2006.

54 *Ibid.*, 11.

55 *Ibid.*

56 György Csepeli – Antal Örkény – Mária Székelyi: *Nemzetek egymás tükrében* [Nations in Reciprocal Mirrors]. Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2002, 40–42.

57 István Horváth: *Relații interetnice în pragul integrării europene. Câteva tendințe comentate* [Interethnic Relations before the EU Integration. Comments Concerning Certain Trends]. Cluj: Max Weber Institute, Research Report, 2006.

58 British Council – Gallup: *Tânăr în România. Raport de cercetare cantitativă și calitativă* [To Be Young in Romania. Report on a Quantitative and Qualitative Research]. București, 2004, 9.

59 British Council – ORICUM: *O perspectivă asupra valorilor tinerilor Români* [A Perspective on the Values of Romanian Young People]. București, 2006, 68–81.

60 Rogers Brubaker – Margit Feischmidt – Jon Fox – Liana Grancea: *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*. Princeton-Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006.

61 R. E. Goodin – H. Klingeman (eds): *A New Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

62 Some of the most recent referential works are: Ch. Mouffe: “Democratic Citizenship and Political Community”, in: Mouffe (ed.): *Dimensions of Radical Democracy* (London: Verso, 1992), P. Lichterman: *The Search for Political Community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), D. Archibugi – D. Held – M. Köhler (eds.): *Re-Imagining Political Community. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) and A. Linklater’s already mentioned book, *The Transformation of Political Community* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

63 E. Frazer: *The Problems of Communitarian Politics. Unity and Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

64 See for instance, A. G. Rubinoff: *The Construction of a Political Community. Integration and Identity in Goa*. London – Thousand Oaks – New Delhi: SAGE, 1998.

65 Frazer, 1999, 218–219.

66 *Ibid.*, 220.

67 *Idem.*

68 *Ibid.*, 221.

69 *Ibid.*, 236.

70 *Ibid.*, 234.

71 Frazer, 1999, 241.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 224–225.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 239.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 242.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 238.

<sup>76</sup> A. Linklater: *The Transformation of Political Community*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 49–53.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 193.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 187.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 187.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.

<sup>86</sup> For details, see C. Alionescu: “Parliamentary Representation of Minorities in Romania”. *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. V., No. 1 (June 2004), 60–75.

<sup>87</sup> For details, see Zoltán Kántor – Balázs Majtényi – Osamu Ieda – Balázs Vizi – Iván Halász (eds): *The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection*. Sapporo: Hokkaido University, Slavic Research Center, 2004.

# CULTURAL AND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND THE ISSUE OF HUNGARIAN IDENTITY

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The first part of the study looks at the historical context of the symbolic and territorial competition between Romanians and Hungarians, dwelling on the issue of Transylvania and the competition for historical legitimacy. It bridges, against this background, the question of Hungarian identity to a concept developed elsewhere as a part of a national minorities doctrine: that of community privacy. Territorial autonomy, currently invoked in several Hungarian projects, represents one possible answer to the need for the community privacy of Hungarians in Romania. Another manifestation of community privacy is cultural autonomy. The study then discusses the provisions of the current draft law on the statute of national minorities in Romania and shows that it has reduced cultural autonomy to its political dimension. This form of reductionism, together with the role granted to organizations of citizens belonging to the national minorities, harms the internal democracy of minority communities. Given the current political and social context, in order to be successful in their promotion of autonomy the relevant actors in the Hungarian community must overcome their differences and agree on a set of minimal goals as an expression of their identity as a community.

**Keywords:** community privacy, cultural autonomy, Hungarian community, normative multiculturalism, territorial autonomy

## 1. The Historical Context of the Romanian-Hungarian Symbolic and Territorial Competition

Romania is a relatively young state created between 1859 and 1862 through the union of two principalities (Moldavia and Walachia), both of which have a Romanian ethnic majority. Between 1918 and 1920 the state changed its frontiers by incorporating two new predominantly Romanian provinces: Transylvania and Bessarabia. Transylvania had been part of the Hungarian Kingdom until 1526, an autonomous principality until 1711, an autonomous province within the Habs-

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burg Empire until 1876, and part of the Hungarian state within the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918. In 1920, Transylvania was substantially different from the rest of Romanian society, which had its political center in Bucharest.

After the end of World War I the Romanian state had to manage an extraordinarily high level of ethnic and cultural diversity. The frontiers of Greater Romania contained approximately 17 percent Hungarians, 4.4 percent Germans, 3.2 percent Jews, 1.7 percent Roma and 2.9 percent Russians. The national minorities as a whole amounted to about 29 percent of the entire population.

At the end of the war, Romania, like Czechoslovakia, Poland, Greece, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, signed special treaties on the protection of national minorities, which were placed under the control of the League of Nations. In this context, Romania needed constitutional, legal and administrative measures to protect its minorities. Article 7 of the Constitution of March 28 1923 provided that "Differences in religious faith and confession, as well as in ethnic origin and language shall not constitute in Romania an obstacle to civil and political rights or the exercise thereof...". Articles 5, 8, 22, 28, 29, 64, 108 and 119 rehearsed in various forms the preeminence of the principle of equality over national, confessional, and ethnic distinctions. The authoritarian Constitution of 27 February 1938 stated that "all Romanian citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin and religious faith, are equal before the law..." (Article 5). Yet practice was a different matter. Many authors believe that the policies of the authorities in the "national, unitary, and indivisible" Kingdom of Romania deliberately aimed at the imposition of the ethnic and religious dominance of the majority over the minorities, and of the center over the provinces (Andreescu 2005).

The natural population growth of the Hungarian minority after the union with Transylvania was counterbalanced by Hungarian emigration. The fall in the percentage of the total population represented by Hungarians was visible in the (traditionally Hungarian) Transylvanian cities. Emigration also reflected the policy of the Bucharest authorities. In the interwar period, Hungarian border areas were colonized with Romanians according to a government-steered program. The policies also reflected the desire to turn upside down the consequences of the status of an inferior nationality endured by Romanians in pre-Greater Romania Transylvania.

The fall in the proportion represented by the Hungarian population also had purely demographic explanations. The cities, in which Hungarians had traditionally been a majority, had low birth rates and proved unable to offset the losses caused by the mortality rate in an era of urbanization (Manuilă 1929).

The evolution of ethnic relations after World War II reflected the nature of the new regime. The Statute of Nationalities adopted in 1945<sup>1</sup> codified the new internationalist vision of the communist powers. Its provisions secured high standards for national minorities. Tribunals and courts of justice with jurisdiction over com-



munities that included an ethnic minority amounting to at least 30 percent of the total could use the minority language in their proceedings upon request. The local and central authorities accepted official documents and statements written in the minority language and did not request an accompanying translation. The Romanian state guaranteed instruction in the minority tongue in primary, secondary, and tertiary education. The language in which instruction was delivered was also used for entrance or graduation examinations.

At the end of the 1940s and in the following decade Hungarians benefited from several specific measures, including the creation of the Autonomous Hungarian Region. The Moldavian Csángó population was able to study in Hungarian, while religious service was once again carried out in Hungarian in the community's (Catholic) churches. Minority policies were however dictated by several factors, including foreign policy. As a consequence, one cannot speak of a single standard for all minorities (consider the case of the Greek or Albanian communities).

The 1960s marked a crucial change from the principles of proletarian internationalism to the assimilationist project of national-communism. The colonization of Hungarian localities in the nationalist period and the discriminatory policies whereby graduates were assigned jobs by the state were the two main instruments by means of which the regime created Romanian majorities in predominantly Hungarian regions. Hungarian Csángós were denied the right to carry out activities that built on their ethnic and cultural identity, and the very name of the ethnic group was practically prohibited in the 1970s (Andreescu 2001a). The Jews and the Germans left the country in large numbers.<sup>2</sup> Despite the high standards set by laws concerning national minorities, the practice of national-communism severely affected the status of minority communities in the 1970s and 1980s.

After the revolution of December 1989 the new political elite capitalized on the nationalist and ultra-nationalist attitudes of the population. Nationalist discourse in this period particularly targeted the Hungarian population. Nationalism became especially widespread after 1989 for two chief reasons. First, its main ingredients had already been planted by Ceaușescu's national-communist regime in Romania. Secondly, the battle for political legitimacy launched after the changes of 1989 had a much higher stake than in other parts of Central Europe, confirming the thesis that the degree of political legitimacy is inversely proportional to the elite's reliance on aggressive nationalistic mythologies (Evera 1994). This historical context explains how bloody conflicts between Romanians and Hungarians, such as the one in Târgu Mureș (19–21 March 1990), the continuous harassment of Roma and the insulting of Jews, or more generally the anti-minority manipulation of public opinion, were possible after 1990.

After 1996, political relations between Hungarians and Romanians were brought back on the path towards reconciliation. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) became a member in the governing coalition

and, subsequent to the 2000 elections, it entered a political partnership with the ruling Social Democratic Party (PSD). But the right steps taken in political life could not compensate for the losses that had been incurred during the previous decades. The public sphere in Romania had become imbued with mentality deeply hostile to diversity.

The post-revolutionary emigration of Hungarians, Germans, and Jews continued in this highly charged context. The 2002 census points to a population make-up in which minorities occupy a peripheral position. The only minority that registered an increase in numbers is the Roma community.<sup>3</sup> The contemporary ethnic map is very different from that of Romania immediately following the war. Table 1 offers an image of the type of ethnic and cultural diversity that the Romanian state needs to manage at the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

**Table 1.** The ethnic composition of Romania's population in 2002

*Total population: 21,698,181*

Ethnic group	No. of individuals	Percentage of total
Romanians	19,409,400	89.5
Hungarians	1,434,377	6.6
Roma	535,250	2.5
Germans	60,088	0.3
Ukrainians	61,091	0.3
Serbs	22,518	0.1
Turks	32,596	0.2
Tatars	24,137	0.1
Slovaks	17,199	0.1
Russian-Lippovans	36,397	0.2
Bulgarians	8,092	< 0.1
Croats	6,786	
Jews	5,870	
Greeks	6,513	
Czechs	3,938	
Poles	3,671	
Armenians	1,780	
Slovenians	175	
Ruthens	262	
Carashovans	207	
Chinese	2,249	
Csangos	1,370	
Slavo-Macedonians	731	
Albanians	520	
Gagauz	45	

## 2. Transylvania in the Competition for Historical Legitimacy

Approximately 97 percent of the Hungarians in Romania are located in Transylvania. Estimates of the number of Hungarians in Bucharest vary significantly. Judging by the vote in the 1990 elections, the number of Hungarians in Bucharest is somewhere below 10,000. The regions of Oltenia in the south and Moldavia in the north-east each contain only about 0.1 percent Hungarians. An equally small percentage live in Dobrudja on the Black Sea coast, and about 0.05 in Walachia, south of Transylvania (Abraham et al. 1995).

The presence of Hungarians in this country has a powerful political dimension, as the national utopias and ideals of Romanians and Hungarians overlap, with Transylvania as the common ground.<sup>4</sup> The province is seen as having made a crucial contribution to the autonomous survival of both nations (Deletant 1995). Since both groups lay claim to the region on historical grounds, the disputes between the Romanian and the Hungarian versions of the past extend to virtually all major events in the national histories of these communities (Schöpflin 1990). Historiographic conflicts are especially concerned with chronological precedence in Transylvania, and the place of Transylvania within the Hungarian medieval kingdom.

Controversies concerning historical legitimacy are compounded by the strong sense of specificity among Hungarians in Romania, often defined by opposition to the identity of the majority. A wholly different language, a powerful literary tradition, and a strong sense of one's own history, as well as the tradition of Habsburg rule, have all contributed to the current sense of difference.<sup>5</sup> In religious terms, all Hungarians belong to Western Christendom (as Catholics or as members of the Reformed, Evangelical and Unitarian Churches), while Romanians belong to Eastern Christianity.

After the turning point of 1918, the year Transylvania became part of Greater Romania, Hungarians had to redefine their status. Since 1867 the Hungarian administration had pursued a policy of Magyarization in the region, where Romanians represented the numerical majority. Four laws were passed (in 1879, 1883, 1891, and 1907, respectively) aiming to Magyarize the teaching staff and to expand schooling in Hungarian, while simultaneously restricting education in other minority languages. In order to obtain education beyond the primary level, Romanian youths were forced to leave their villages and attend Hungarian or German schools in towns and cities. They were encouraged to abandon their traditional dress, which made it even more difficult to pursue strategies of symbolic resistance (Hitchins 1998).

By the time the region became a part of Romania in 1918, therefore, it was thoroughly Hungarian in political, administrative and cultural terms. Against this historical background, Bucharest regimes pursued an inverse policy of Roman-

izing Transylvania. Between the two World Wars the areas bordering Hungary were colonized with Romanians according to a systematic program. The local administration was replaced with Bucharest officials. As a consequence, the trend of Hungarian emigration which had started after the Treaty of Trianon continued. The proportion of the total population represented by Hungarians declined, a reality most visible in Transylvanian towns.

After becoming a national minority the Hungarian community founded ethnicity-based organizations in order to sustain its institutional framework. Between 1940 and 1944, during World War II, Hungary annexed the territory of northern Transylvania. The vast majority of Romanian agricultural colonists in the region were forced to leave. Simultaneously, in the southern part, 67,000 Hungarians were driven out by the Romanian authorities (Kocsis 1995).

During the 1950s, the Romanian government began a duplicitous policy towards the Hungarians. In 1952 it created the Hungarian Autonomous Province, which did not have a structure distinct from the other regions but ensured the territorial concentration of Hungarians. According to the 1956 census, this region, with the capital in Târgu Mureş, had a total population of 731,361, of whom 567,509 were Hungarians.

During the 1956 Hungarian revolution, Hungarians in Romania expressed sympathy for their co-ethnics fighting the Soviets in Budapest. This understandably alarmed the communists. It was at this time that the regime started its assimilationist policy. The authorities adopted a policy of population transfer, and handpicked Romanian officials in regions inhabited by Hungarians. The distinction drawn by the laws between the minimum number of children that could make up a class with instruction in the mother tongue, which considered the ethnic identity (Romanian or Hungarian) of the children as a relevant factor, clearly exposes these assimilationist designs.

Attacks on cultural institutions started in the late 1950s, the most notable being the merging of the Hungarian Bolyai University with the Romanian Babeş University in Cluj Napoca in 1959. The new Romanian administration was out to destroy the Hungarian character of higher education. The Hungarian Autonomous Province was reorganized in 1960 as the Mureş Hungarian Autonomous Province, a process whereby areas inhabited by ethnic Romanian majorities were added to the administrative unit. Eight years later, the province was completely disestablished. The goal of Ceauşescu's national-communist regime was to create a homogenous population so as to ensure that, first and foremost, citizens were good Romanians.<sup>6</sup>

Anti-Hungarian policies were reflected in the declining number of Hungarians educated in the mother tongue, as well as in the decreasing number of Hungarian-language teachers.<sup>7</sup> The practice of forced displacement was widespread: the regime tried to de-Magyarize Hungarian-inhabited areas by moving ethnic Hun-

garians out and ethnic Romanians in.<sup>8</sup> In December 1984, Romanian National Television ceased broadcasting programs in Hungarian.

It was in this context that the historiographic conflict became prominent in the 1980s as a result of a political command from above. Diplomatic relations between Bucharest and Budapest were strained.<sup>9</sup> The first Romanian samizdat, *Romania liberă* (April 1988), and the unofficial news agency “The Hungarian Press of Transylvania” were therefore both inaugurated in Budapest. Romania reacted by closing the Hungarian consulate in Cluj and the Hungarian Cultural Centre in Bucharest.

The downfall of the Ceaușescu regime happened to be connected with the Hungarian community in Timișoara. In December 1989, the threatened eviction of local Hungarian pastor László Tőkés met with the opposition of local Hungarians. Their protest was embraced shortly thereafter by Romanians and became the trigger of the Romanian revolution.

The euphoria of victory seemed for awhile to have completely altered the relationship between the two ethnic communities. The National Salvation Front, the new legislative and governmental body, included 14 Hungarians. The Hungarian press proclaimed a new era of Romanian-Hungarian relations, symbolized by the heroic figure of László Tőkés.<sup>10</sup> The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) was established on 29 December 1989 and has been representing the Hungarian minority ever since.

But the struggle for political legitimacy of the ex-communists in power turned Hungarians into a favorite target of the new nationalist movement. Since 1990, the political mobilization of anti-minority sentiment among the majority population has been a constant factor of disturbance. The most vehement organization was undoubtedly *Vatra Românească* (Romanian Hearth).<sup>11</sup>

The Hungarians' demand for the return of the Bolyai High School in Târgu-Mureș led to violent clashes in the city between Hungarians and Romanians on 19 and 20 March 1990. Five people died and a large number were injured, some gravely. It is fair to say that this was the moment when Romania adopted a state-sanctioned policy of minority-bashing. References to Hungarians as “barbarians” and “a primitive people” abounded (Andreescu – Weber 1996).

Between 1992 and 1996, extremist parties joined the nationalist PDSR in the ruling coalition. The PSM (Socialist Workers Party), PRM (Greater Romania Party) and PUNR (Party of National Unity of Romanians), all extremist parties with anti-minority agendas, secured some state secretarial positions and portfolios in 1994.

After the 1996 elections, the representatives of the Hungarian community became a partner in the government coalition alongside the new political class. Romanian-Hungarian relations experienced a genuine rebirth, but the virulent

anti-Hungarian and more generally anti-minority propaganda of the past had already poisoned the atmosphere for the minorities (Andreescu 2001a). Its effects on public mentality will take a long time to fade.

Against this background, the Hungarians' presence in and possible departure from Transylvania represents a constant subject of public intellectual and political debate in Romania. It is also a matter of concern for intellectuals and politicians in Budapest and their co-nationals in the Hungarian Diaspora. The unanimously (implicitly or explicitly) accepted goal of the representatives of Hungarians everywhere is to preserve in Transylvania a Hungarian community able to sustain demographically the current population and reproduce and develop its cultural tradition. The emigration of Hungarians from Transylvania is regarded with apprehension by most analysts, as it is strongly connected with the question of the community's stability. Table 2 offers a synthesis of the evolution of the Hungarian minority according to ethnicity and mother tongue between 1910 and until the census of 2002 (Andreescu 2005).

**Table 2.** Ethnic Hungarians in Romania according to 7 censuses (since 1910)

Years	Ethnicity		Mother tongue	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
1910	N/A	N/A	1,653,943	N/A
1930	1,425,507	10	1,554,525	10.8
1956	1,587,675	9	1,653,700	9.5
1966	1,619,592	8.5	1,651,873	8.6
1977	1,713,900 <sup>22</sup>	7.9	1,720,630	8
1992	1,624,959	7.1	1,639,135	7.2
2002	1,434,377	6.6	1,447,377	6.7

### 3. Hungarian Identity, Internal Self-determination, and the Concept of Community Privacy

The last decades of Romanian national-communism traumatized the Hungarian community in Transylvania. This is one of the reasons why freedom from the communist regime led to a fast-paced reorganization of the Hungarian community. The UDMR was "merely" the most representative and visible of the numerous cultural and political associations designing a new destiny for the community. The establishment of a single representative association in politics and the decision to place the segregation of schools at the top of the agenda proved beyond doubt that the Hungarian minority saw itself as a community able to take care of itself.

The UDMR Memorandum on Romania's acceptance to the Council of Europe (26 August 1993), and the UDMR-drafted Bill on National Minorities and Autonomous Communities (18 November 1993) concerning the status of the Hungarian minority in Romania, offered a formal expression of this program by promoting two chief concepts: (a) that of an autonomous community, that is, "that national minority which defines itself as such and exercises its rights according to the principle of internal self-determination"; (b) and internal self-determination, which is "an inalienable right of the autonomous communities and is manifested in the various forms of autonomy" – personal, local, and regional (Andreescu et al. 1994). The Draft Bill on National Minorities and Autonomous Communities never made it on the parliament's agenda. But the issues of autonomous communities and the three forms of autonomy have been constant among the community projects supported by the Hungarian elites.

Self-determination is a right of peoples, and the internal dimension is an attribute of self-determination. This is why the term "internal self-determination" was greeted by international legal experts with reluctance. It was all the more difficult to argue in favor of an international right as an inalienable right of autonomous communities. Internal autonomy and self-determination are seen as suspect especially in the cultural context of Romania and Central and Eastern Europe, where the terms are compromised. For this reason, I have chosen to introduce the broad issue of the internal self-determination of the Hungarian community by means of a different concept.

Recent history and developments suggest a "need to separate" from the rest of society which has been expressed more or less explicitly by the Hungarian minority in Romania. This need is a reflection of the traditional distinction in sociology between society and community. In a society, the functions of the group consist of adjusting divergent interests in order to reach common goals. A community involves, in addition to this, a desire for continuity and integration. It follows that the relationship between an individual and his or her community is different from that with his or her society. As Georg Schwarzenberger put it, the members of a community are united in spite of their individuality, while the members of a society are isolated despite their association (Schwarzenberger 2004). For Hungarians, Romanian society as a whole provides a contingent historical framework. While the necessity of accommodating Hungarians to the majority and the existence of general goals may be well recognized, the sense of isolation despite cohabitation within the same state is no less obvious. This attitude among Hungarians with respect to Romanian society mirrors their strong sense of identity. The differences between leaders and groups within the community do not diminish their investment in association with and the continuity of the community. Under such circumstances, to affirm the possibility and desirability of the simulta-

neous development of the community's integration and separation is to restate the observation that reality is a mixture of the ideal types of society and community.

The rejection of community separation, so vehemently expressed by supporters of majority rule, is based on the argument that separation (segregation) is at odds with integration and cohabitation. A minority that turns to itself is a minority opposed to integration. More separation means less integration and vice-versa. I believe this presupposition is false. The issue of minority separation and segregation may be regarded from the perspective of a need for "community privacy" (a form of group privacy). The condition of the community resembles closely that of a person who defines for him/herself a private space in which she has the right to be alone with herself and which she manages by herself, without outside interference. The well-acknowledged need for private life is the basis of the right to privacy and the correlative obligation of others to respect it. In much the same way, we may think of a community's need for "community privacy" and its correlative right to community privacy.<sup>12</sup> In view of the fact that the need for integration and privacy depends on the type of majority and the specificity of the national minority – different in the case of Hungarians, and, say, Roma in this country – what I have in mind is in fact a relative community privacy (relative, that is, to the majority – Andreescu 2001b).

The analogy above shows how artificial it is to oppose the need for separation to the need for integration. Respect for somebody's private life does not necessarily contradict that person's need to participate in the life of the nation of which he or she is a member. Similarly, the need of communities for privacy does not imply any lack of involvement in the broader society. The Hungarian community offers a telling example. Its strong need for privacy has not diminished its desire to influence the course of Romanian democracy.<sup>13</sup> The active role of the Hungarian parliamentary group and UDMR's participation in various governments is actually only the tip of the iceberg of Hungarian integration.

The simultaneous development of the integration and the community privacy of ethno-cultural groups is possible as well as desirable. This thesis is fundamental to a certain definition of multiculturalism, which describes the condition of a minority in a multicultural society along these two dimensions. To distinguish the term from other interpretations and underline its active meaning, I shall define "normative multiculturalism" as

the concept or attitude which states that balance in and fairness of inter-ethnic relations presuppose the recognition of a need for integration alongside a need for separation of the ethno-cultural communities, supports their simultaneous development (Andreescu 2001c).

In this definition, the idea of (non-assimilationist) integration underlies the realization of a common super-ethnic identity, equality of opportunity, and non-dis-



criminy treatment of the members of all ethno-cultural groups. The degree of integration determines the degree of democratization.

#### 4. Territorial Autonomy as an Answer to the Need for Community Privacy

Territorial autonomy may in principle be an instrument of ensuring community privacy. The former was defined in the 1993 Bill on National Minorities and Autonomous Communities by the representative association of Hungarians as an inalienable right of the Hungarian community. Projects for an autonomy statute had been drafted before that date and were drafted a long time after it as well. But, as a scholar of multiculturalism noted with bitter irony,

If the efficiency of the fight for minority rights could be measured by the number of autonomy statute initiatives, then Hungarians in Romania would certainly be one of the most successful minorities in Europe: starting in 1990, no less than ten such statutes were drafted on their behalf by various more or less self-selected experts and groups.<sup>14</sup>

Between 1990 and 2004 a number of such projects were submitted:

- April 1991: Géza Szűcs's Package of Nationality Draft Laws (*Pachet de proiecte de lege a naționalităților*)
- March 1993: József Csapó's Memorandum on the Self-Determination of the National Community of Hungarians in Romania (*Memorandum privind autodeterminarea comunității naționale a maghiarilor din România*)
- November 1993: the UDMR-CDU *Bill on National Minorities and Autonomous Communities*
- March 1994: Sándor N. Szilágyi's Bill on National Identity Rights and Respectful and Harmonious Cohabitation of National Communities (*Legea drepturilor identitare naționale și a conviețuirii respectuoase și armonioase a comunităților naționale*)
- September 1994: József Csapó's Autonomies Leading to Internal Self-Determination (*Autonomii care conduc la autodeterminare interăn. Statutul autoguvernării cu statut special; Statutul autonomiei individuale a comunității naționale a maghiarilor din România și Statutul autonomiei uniunii regionale a autoguvernărilor locale cu statut special*)
- April 1995: UDMR Executive Presidency Political Department (Barna Bodó, Zoltán Alpár Szász, Miklós Bakk), Statute of Personal Autonomy of the Hungarian Community in Romania (*Statul autonomiei personale a comunității maghiare din România*)

- April 1995: Miklós Bakk's Bill on Personal Self-Determination (*Proiect de lege privind autoguvernarea persoanelor*)
- May-June 1995: József Csapó's Statute for the Autonomy of the Székely Country (*Statutul autonomiei Țării Secuilor*)
- October 2003: Székely National Council's Statute for the Autonomy of the Székely Country (*Statutul autonomiei Țării Secuilor*, a project submitted by József Csapó)
- November 2003: An expert group's (coordinated by Miklós Bakk) Autonomy Project (*Lege cadru referitoare la regiuni, Proiect de lege privind înființarea regiunii cu statut special a secuilor, Statutul autonomiei regiunii cu statut special a secuilor*)

In the new millennium, the issue of territorial autonomy was no longer championed by the UDMR, but by the Hungarian National Council in Transylvania and the Székely National Council. A decision on the establishment of the Initiative Committee for the Self-Government of the Hungarian National Community was taken on March 14, 2003 during the March Forum in Cluj. In April 2003 an Appeal for the establishment of the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania and the Székely National Council was adopted at a forum in Odorheiu Secuiesc.<sup>15</sup> The two organizations came to life at the end of 2003. Their initiatives carried an older internal break within the ranks of the Hungarian elite, which now seemed to emphasize two different visions of community identity as its logical conclusion. The statement *On the Way from Szatmárnémeti towards Kolozsvár* offers a synthesis of the new situation:

The Hungarian national community in Romania has been continuously asserting its claim for autonomy since the change of regime of 1989. ... However, between 1996 and 2003, the period of participation in the government coalition and then the time-frame covered by the agreement with the governing party, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania neglected the concept of autonomy. Its rhetoric and practice delegated communal self-government to local administrative autonomies. Dismissing its own foreign affairs instruments, it supported the then current Romanian foreign policy, which would like the condition of Romania's Hungarians to serve as a model for other countries.

The Hungarian minority politicians who urged the abandonment of autonomy reforms were pushed out of the Alliance's leadership. The Transylvanian Hungarians' struggle for autonomy reached a dead-end. ... Keeping all this in mind, some prominent personalities of the Hungarian community in Transylvania, under the spiritual leadership of Bishop László Tőkés, the Honorary President of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, joined forces with

two internal groups within the UDMR – the Transylvanian Hungarian Initiative and the Reform Union – and decided to revive the process.<sup>16</sup>

Two resolutions on the self-determination of the Székely regions and the autonomy of the Székely Lands and, respectively, on the finalization of the statute of the autonomy of the Székely Land and its submission to the Romanian Parliament, were adopted by the Székely National Council on October 26, 2003 in Sfântu Gheorghe.

As a result, by the end of 2003 a significant group within the Hungarian community was already tying the Hungarian community's identity project more to community privacy by placing additional emphasis on the autonomy of the Székely Land and less to integration by expressing its skepticism towards collaboration with Romanian parties (a sentiment supported by some analysts).<sup>17</sup> It was in this context that the Hungarian Civic Alliance made public its intention in the summer and then the autumn of 2004 to have its own candidates run in local and parliamentary elections. It would have thus competed against the UDMR in order to support its own political and identity project.

At this point, something took place that is likely to leave an enduring mark on the internal relations of the Hungarian community: the UDMR responded by modifying the electoral law in an attempt to prevent the Hungarian Civic Alliance from participating in elections. The new law (no. 67/2004) on the election of local authorities was published in the Official Gazette on March 29, 2004. The new provisions were blatantly discriminatory. The organizations of persons belonging to national minorities already enjoying parliamentary representation were able to run in local elections by default, while all other organizations were subject prohibitive requirements: membership in the organization had to reach at least 15 percent of the national minority; if this percentage exceeded 25,000 individuals, the number of members of the organization had to be at least 25,000 *and* come from 15 administrative counties and the capital, Bucharest; further, at least 300 members had to reside in each of the 15 counties; personal data had to be included on the membership list, next to the members' names.

Several Romanian organizations (including the Open Society Foundation, the Institute for Public Policy, the Center for Legal Resources, the Pro Europe League, the Roma Community Resource Center, the Ethno-cultural Diversity Resource Center, and the Ombudspersons for National Minorities) tried to prevent the adoption of such a blatantly discriminatory norm. The Venice Commission also noted the discriminatory character of the Electoral Law, but its criticism had no effect. In April 2004, the Central Election Committee rejected the submission of the Hungarian Civic Alliance. The Alliance described the situation in the following terms:

The Hungarian Civic Alliance came into being in order to represent the aspirations of the Hungarian national community to achieve self-determination. The Hungarian Civic Alliance defines itself as an alternative to the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, which in our view has forfeited many of the original ideals of its program and has proved insufficiently democratic in its operations.

The UDMR has exclusive control over funds appropriated from both the Hungarian state and the Romanian state for the benefit of the Hungarian community in Romania. These funds are spent to support UDMR's institutional organisms and to preserve its political clout at the expense of local civic initiatives, of the Hungarian-language media, and of professional organizations and institutions.

The Hungarian Civic Alliance was created to end the UDMR monopoly. The Hungarian Civic Alliance does not intend to threaten the representation of the national community at the local or national level. By introducing political competition, a higher level of civic participation in political life could be achieved, thus strengthening the influence and increasing the number of Hungarian representatives in local and county decision-making bodies. Given that there is a 5 percent threshold for entry into the Romanian Parliament, the leaders of the Hungarian Civic Alliance have announced that they are ready to cooperate with other Hungarian political forces in order to preserve Hungarian representation therein (Alpár Szász 2003, 176).

The Hungarian Civic Alliance also missed the general elections, but it continued its efforts to promote the autonomy of the Székely Land. It submitted a project on the autonomy of the Székely Land to the parliament.

In his discussion of the obstacles to the realization of autonomy, Levente Salat mentioned the issue of mentality:

What can one say ... with respect to the autonomy projects of Hungarians in Romania? One thing one may say is that, on the one hand, the political elite of Hungarians in Romania sees this project either as a slogan devoid of content and impossible to fulfill under the existing circumstances, or as a fetish, the consequences of which are not fully grasped. Romanian public opinion, on the other hand, demonizes the plans of Hungarians concerning autonomy every time the issue returns to the forefront of political debate, referring to "conspiracies" behind separatist, self-isolationist, segregationist and bantustan-ist tendencies. So on the one hand we're dealing with a fetish, and on the other with a diabolical construct. Everything indicates a lack of political culture on both sides, and suggests we need a lot of additional effort to begin to talk properly about autonomy, to give it a real chance to succeed, and to be free of the unfortunate effects on the development of democracy in Romania (Salat 2006, pp. 37–38).

However, the projects of the Hungarian community now face an obstacle that is more specific than either the fetishizing or the demonizing attitudes: the uncon-

stitutional nature of any special statute or any kind of regionalization. Although the Romanian Constitution was amended in 2003 while Romania was negotiating the final chapters of its accession to the EU, an organization that presupposes regionalization, this step was delayed, undoubtedly with the Hungarians' projects in mind. The project of autonomy for the Székely Land is impossible to fulfill before the new constitutional order has been changed so as to enable a new administrative organization of the country. The change may be postponed only until 2013 at the latest.

However, constitutional acknowledgement for the regions does not imply the recognition of special statutes. The latter option would have to be mentioned explicitly, and this implies introducing in the constitution provisions the sole advocate of which remains the Hungarian community. What is the extent of its influence? I think it is extremely limited. Paradoxically, Romania's current status as an EU member lowers the ability to use the Union's power in order to support minority projects. The much larger role of political negotiation at governmental or parliamentary level in the process of promoting the interests of the Hungarian community has led to a much diminished part for civil society. The independent voices that could build inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic bridges in the past now seem to have lost their relevance.

Given the positions of the various actors with any say on such matters, one can at most hope for securing a degree of territorial autonomy for Transylvanian Hungarians through regionalization. This is the basic idea behind the project advanced by Miklós Bakk: drawing regional borders in such a way as to render the Hungarian minority a majority in an area covering its traditional territory.

There isn't much sympathy for this concept among Romanian parties. The current organization of the country in development regions avoided this solution and created an unfavorable precedent. Only the coalescing of the entire Hungarian community around the project of a region with a Hungarian majority can ensure the concept's success. The real solution does not consist of erasing the existing borders – something highly unlikely anyway –, but of including the project of a region with a Hungarian majority among a set of minimal, realistic principles, able to transcend internal divisions. To stand any chance, it is preferable for the initiative to come from outside the ranks of the big political players – UDMR and the Hungarian Civic Alliance.

### **5. Cultural Autonomy and the Statute Draft Law. Another Form of Community Privacy**

The 2004 elections made it possible for UDMR to return to power, this time together with the DA coalition and the Conservative Party. It was a moment that the

UDMR considered auspicious for its taking control of the autonomy project. Immediately after the conclusion of the governing protocol UDMR elaborated, with support from the national minorities' parliamentary group, the Draft Law on the Status of National Minorities in Romania. The law was designed as a constitution of national minorities and, as such, it provides a synthesis of numerous provisions already existing in sectorial laws, such as the Education Act, the Local Administration Act, or the Anti-Discrimination Act. There is, however, something new in the draft law: the principle of cultural autonomy. According to the draft law, "the state recognizes and guarantees the cultural autonomy of the national minorities" (Article 56), i.e., "the right of a national community to have decisional powers in matters regarding its cultural, linguistic and religious identity, through councils appointed by its members" (Article 57(1)). Under Article 58 of the bill, the cultural autonomy of national minorities refers to the following of powers:

- (a) elaboration of strategies and priorities regarding education in the mother tongue of national communities;
- (b) organization, administration and control of education in the mother tongue; or participation, in partnership with public authorities, in carrying out these duties in the case of public institutions;
- (c) organization, administration and control of private educational and research institutions, and development of cultural institutions in the mother tongue; or the participation, in partnership with public authorities, in carrying out these duties, in the case of public cultural institutions;
- (d) establishment and administration of minorities' media; or participation, in partnership with public authorities, in the organization of stations, sections, editorial boards, or shows in the public radio and TV system;
- (e) participation in the elaboration of strategies and priorities for the preservation and valorization of historical monuments and of the immovable and movable cultural patrimony of the respective national minority;
- (f) administration or participation, in partnership with public authorities, in monitoring the administration of funds for specific activities in the fields of the preservation, promotion and expression of the cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities;
- (g) power to appoint the management of private educational institutions with instruction in the language of national minorities, as well as private cultural institutions belonging to the respective national minority;
- (h) power to appoint the management of public educational institutions with instruction in the language of national minorities, as well as of public cultural institutions belonging to the respective national minority, under the relevant laws;

- (i) power to recommend members for management positions in public educational institutions where there are sub-units with instruction in the mother tongue of the national minorities;
- (j) power to recommend representatives of the respective national minority for positions in the Ministry of Culture and Religious Denominations and the Ministry of Education and Research, within departments having duties in the fields of the culture of national minorities and education in the mother tongue of national minorities;
- (k) establishment and award of cultural and scientific scholarships and prizes;
- (l) establishment of special taxes, under the law, in order to ensure the functioning of the institutions of cultural autonomy.

In order to exercise these powers, the organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities may establish National Councils of Cultural Autonomy – autonomous administrative authorities enjoying legal personhood. Such bodies may be established by means of internal elections carried out through the secret, direct, equal, and freely expressed vote of the persons belonging to the national minority whose Council is being established. Expenses for such elections are to be covered by the state budget. The National Councils of Cultural Autonomy consist of:

- (a) 7 members, for national minorities of less than 5,000 members, as counted according to the last census; or
- (b) 9 members, for national minorities consisting of between 5,000 and 15,000 members, as counted according to the last census; or
- (c) 11 members, for national minorities consisting of between 15,000 and 30,000 members, as counted according to the last census; or
- (d) 15 members, for national minorities consisting of between 30,000 and 100,000 members, as counted according to the last census; or
- (e) 25 members, for national minorities consisting of between 100,000 and 500,000 members, as counted according to the last census; or
- (f) 45 members, for national minorities consisting of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 members, as counted according to the last census; or
- (g) 91 members, for national minorities consisting of over 1,000,000 members, as counted according to the last census.

Council members are to serve for a term of 4 years (Article 64(1)). A Permanent Secretariat will function within the National Councils and carry out administrative and operative tasks. The expenses incurred for organization, operation and salaries are to be covered from the state budget (Article 69(1)).

The first thing to notice about the provisions on cultural autonomy is their essentially administrative nature. The main concepts of the draft law are “elabora-

tion”, “organization, administration and control”, “establishment and administration”, “establishment and award”, “appointment”, and “recommendation for the appointment” etc. These provisions add no new rights to those recognized in sectorial laws. No additional educational, linguistic, or religious measures are introduced that did not already exist. The main goal of the law is to transfer decision making power to structures consisting of persons belonging to the communities and ensure control over the exercise of specific rights. The administration of the principle of cultural autonomy is left to bodies with an essentially political nature. Although cultural autonomy is designed to impose the voice of the minority in specialized fields such as culture and education, the system not only fails to support professional associations, but in fact excludes their direct role. To rephrase this in terms of the concepts advanced above, cultural autonomy as defined in the draft law may be considered an expression of the need for community privacy, but reduces the latter to its political dimension.

Starting in February 2005 the draft law has been debated within several larger or more restricted meetings of specialists. During the discussions several matters of principle were criticized,<sup>18</sup> as were various technical details,<sup>19</sup> all of which were however relatively easy to solve. Eventually, the draft law was blocked in the government, since the Alliance’s partners refused to accept several details of the model of cultural autonomy it advanced. Neither the efforts of the UDMR nor those of other organizations to persuade the executive were successful in moving the project forward, nor were appeals to political partners in the EU. In order to understand the predicament of the UDMR, and in particular its difficult position in supporting the project, one must consider the draft law as a whole.

## **6. Identity, Community Privacy, and Internal Democracy**

I mentioned cultural autonomy as the new issue introduced by the draft law. Another novel matter, this time less visible, involved the formalization of the concept of an “organization of citizens belonging to a national minority”.

The term “organization of citizens belonging to a national minority” appears in the Romanian Constitution. Sectorial legislation interpreted it as referring to associations and foundations established by persons belonging to the national minorities. Any association or foundation of this type may compete against all others in order to represent the community in the Romanian Parliament. It also manages the funds through which the state ensures the protection and development of national minority identity. The basic law and sectorial legislation, including the electoral law, emphasize the internal democracy of minority communities.

The authors of the draft law, however, chose to define “the organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities” in such a way as to integrate the discrimi-



natory provisions of the 2004 electoral law: the document distinguishes between existing minority cultural associations and other minority associations. Under Chapter III of the draft law,

- (1) The organization of citizens belonging to a national minority represents the legal entity established by persons identifying themselves as members of the national minority in question and who, on the basis of an agreement, pool together, without any right to restitution, a material contribution, their expertise, or a contribution in kind in order to carry out activities in the interest of guaranteeing the right to preserve, express and promote their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious identity, or to constitute, promote and protect the institutional and legislative framework necessary for the achievement of the interests of the respective minority.
- (2) The number of members of an organization of citizens belonging to a national minority cannot be smaller than 10% of the total number of the citizens having declared their membership in the respective minority at the latest census.
- (3) Should 10% of the total number of citizens registered as belonging to a minority in the latest census be equal or exceed 25,000 persons, the list of founding members must contain at least 25,000 persons, residing in at least 15 counties in Romania, but no less than 300 persons in each of these counties.
- (4) Persons who do not belong to a national minority may be members of an organization of citizens belonging to a national minority, but their number cannot exceed 25% of the total number of the members of the organization at either a local or national level.
- (5) A person cannot be a member of two organizations belonging to the same minority, registered under the provisions of this law (Article 40).

These associations of citizens belonging to national minorities, the organizational logic of which is essentially political, were granted extensive powers on community life. They,

- (a) may take part in parliamentary, presidential and local elections, under the legislation in force, being regarded for all purposes as political parties and benefiting from legal facilitations in obtaining a mandate in the public local administration as well as in the Parliament, under the terms of Article 49;
- (b) may represent the respective minority in the Council of National Minorities;
- (c) may administer special funds received from the state budget or the local budgets for the purpose of achieving the goals stipulated in Article 40(1);
- (d) will receive yearly allowances from the state budget under the law;

- (e) may propose, under relevant laws, the appointment of representatives in institutions, state agencies or authorities active in the fields of the expression, preservation and promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the persons belonging to national minorities; should the special law fail to stipulate such representation, the organizations shall be consulted with respect to the appointment of managers in these structures;
- (f) will authorize representatives in inter-governmental commissions on issues concerning national minorities in order to conclude bilateral agreements between Romania and the country with which the respective national community forms a community of culture and language;
- (g) may represent before national or international courts persons or groups of persons whose interests have been harmed because of their affiliation with the respective minority;
- (h) may notify the National Council for Combating Discrimination in case of discrimination against persons belonging to the national minority they represent.

The terms and powers in the new draft law ensure the political monopoly of existing cultural organizations. Under the system now in place, the chief political role within minority communities is played by associations successful in the electoral competition. They obtain parliamentary representation and, through the Council of National Minorities, gain access to funds for the protection and development of minority identity. It has been noted that the competition remained relatively fair until 2004. For the last elections, several discriminatory amendments were passed. It could have been hoped that this violation of equality of rights within minority communities would represent merely an exceptional circumstance and would be easily overcome in the coming elections. But the draft law attempts to render the monopoly irreversible.

The provisions concerning organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities together with those of the cultural autonomy bodies practically entrust the entire life of the community to an organization formed according to political criteria. A large part of state funds are earmarked for support for the infrastructure of the organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities,<sup>20</sup> while competing associations are left out in the cold.

Many of the powers of the cultural autonomy bodies and the organizations of national minorities overlap.<sup>21</sup> This provides existing cultural organizations with additional means to cement their supremacy.<sup>22</sup> Such fears are not excessive. The way in which the UDMR and the Roma Party managed to prevent the Hungarian Civic Alliance and competing Roma associations from running in the 2004 elections is undeniable positive of the effects of this serious threat to the internal democracy of national minorities. The 2004 electoral law affected the ability of na-

tional minority communities as a whole to secure their representation. The number of Hungarian and Roma councilors dropped and the ability of those elected to express the interests of their constituencies was reduced.

The draft law on the status of national minorities of Romania offers a costly system of protection which adds little, if anything, to the rights enjoyed today via the system of sectorial laws by persons belonging to the national minorities. The draft law does, however, destroy the internal democracy of minority communities. It places their fortunes under the control of political groups, sometimes partners and possibly clients of Romanian parties. The draft bill puts no barrier in place against control of the entire natural and educational institutional system by the national minority organizations having secured the formal representation of the respective minorities.

Associations such as the Hungarian Civic Alliance, alongside coalitions such as the Roma Civic Alliance and human and minority rights groups, have expressed their opposition to the draft law. The norm would trade internal democracy for community privacy when, in fact, the latter's role is to empower the members of the community. Cultural and territorial autonomy are supposed to ensure the framework necessary for the manifestation of the diversity of views on identity and for the expression of the variety of elements of a community's identity. This principle is vital especially when the minority is large (as is the case with Hungarians and Roma in Romania) and when its sense of identity is strong and positive (as is again the case with the Hungarians). From the perspective of the concept of community privacy, the purpose of autonomy is to protect members of a community from external pressures. But significantly less protection from internal pressures would be too high a price to pay for additional protection from the outside.

To conclude, the current draft law on the status of national minorities in Romania cannot be understood as an expression of consensus within the Hungarian community in Transylvania, even though the notion of cultural autonomy that it promotes may have the support of every member. To stand any chance of success with its territorial and cultural autonomy projects, both of which are expressions of a need for community privacy deeply connected to the identity of Hungarians in Romania, such a consensus is however necessary. Research has shown that majorities do not like autonomies (Robotin 2005). If only for this reason, a minimal set of goals must be agreed on by the diverse representatives of the Hungarian community in Romania, and these goals must be asserted as an expression of a common identity.

But is it really so important for the future of the Hungarian community to affirm community privacy in relation to Romanian and Transylvanian society? Romania's accession to the EU ensures additional freedoms, mobility and security to members of the Hungarian community. Yet, in time it is conceivable that EU

membership might reduce Hungarian identity to a matter of folklore. On this point I am in agreement with Levente Salat: “Though such a development would not run ... contrary to tendencies prevalent throughout the world, it would be the proof of a common failure of all the actors with a direct influence on the condition of the Hungarian minority in Romania” (Salat 2005).

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Decree no. 309 of February 6, 1945.
- <sup>2</sup> Most of them were simply sold to Western Germany and Israel.
- <sup>3</sup> Note that this increase is much more marked than indicated by census data. Estimates are that the number of registered Roma amounts to approximately one third of the real number.
- <sup>4</sup> See Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center, “*Major characteristics of minorities in South-Eastern Europe. Hungarians in Romania*”, Cluj. Available at <http://www.edrc.ro>.
- <sup>5</sup> See Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center, <http://www.edrc.ro>.
- <sup>6</sup> After the mid-1960s, the era during which Nicolae Ceaușescu came to power, the condition of the Hungarian minority in Romania took a turn for the better. But the 1970s saw the beginning of a policy of forced assimilation, under which Hungarians, as well as other minorities, lost their remaining educational and cultural establishments (Schöpflin 1990).
- <sup>7</sup> In 1977 the László Takács memorandum indicated the steady reduction in Hungarian-language schooling. It included a disturbing statistic according to which of the 34,738 ethnic Hungarian students attending secondary schools nationwide 15,591 (or 45 percent) were attending technical secondary schools where instruction was offered exclusively in Romanian (Deletant, 1995).
- <sup>8</sup> See for example Helsinki Watch, *Struggling for Ethnic Identity: Ethnic Hungarians in Post-Ceaușescu Romania* (Washington: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Watch, 1993), 10.
- <sup>9</sup> On February 9, 1987, Mátyás Szűrös, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, admitted that there were fundamental differences of perspective between the two countries on the status of the Hungarian minority in Romania and that it had not been possible to reach any genuine understanding.
- <sup>10</sup> See Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center, <http://www.edrc.ro>.
- <sup>11</sup> This extremist group founded in Târgu-Mureș in early 1990 portrayed Hungarians as a “fifth column” inside Romania. Vatra Românească was responsible for placing the ethnic issue at the forefront of the political agenda, where it was ably used by Ion Iliescu to stir up support and to comfortably win the elections two months later (Adamson 1995).
- <sup>12</sup> Levente Salat provides a functional explanation: “the very varied and rich set of case studies [of minority autonomy] validate the thesis that the controversial issues arising between majority and minorities are easier to manage by reducing the surface of contact.” (Levente Salat 2006).
- <sup>13</sup> According to the 2002 Ethnic Relations Barometer most Hungarians (56.5%) believed UDMR should be part of the governing coalition, irrespective of who wins the elections, or that it ought to be co-opted in the government as any other party would be (Monica Robotin 2005).
- <sup>14</sup> See Levente Salat’s manuscript on “*Proiecte de autonomie ale maghiarilor din Transilvania*”.
- <sup>15</sup> See the documents in *Transylvanian Monitor* no. 1 (2004): 166–167 (published in Oradea by the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania).
- <sup>16</sup> See *Transylvanian Monitor* no. 1 (2004): 168.

- <sup>17</sup> Zoltán Alpár Szász refers to the “undemocratizing effects of the recent developments” in the UDMR’s participation in the majority political coalition (Alpár Szász 2003).
- <sup>18</sup> Such as the idea that in 2005 one needs a law covering the status of new minorities, following, for example, recent developments related to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
- <sup>19</sup> The protection of ethnic minorities may be defined as a matter of states’ international obligations, but in the case of Romania this would mean a reduction of standards of protection.
- <sup>20</sup> I use the shorter “organizations of national minorities” for “organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities”.
- <sup>21</sup> The chief norm governing the relationship between a National Council of Cultural Autonomy and an organization of citizens belonging to a national minority is enshrined in Article 59(2) of the draft law. This is a useful provision, aimed at avoiding a duplication of tasks. It suggests the National Councils would largely subordinate themselves to organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities. There is no such provision on the relationship between National Councils of Cultural Autonomy and the Council of National Minorities, although the duties assigned to the latter by Article 53 suggest a lot of overlapping with the powers of the Cultural autonomy of national minorities in fields such as education, culture and media.
- <sup>22</sup> In its Draft Opinion on the draft law, the Venice Commission underlined that: “In order for the draft law to better comply with the freedom of association, the conditions for the registration of the so-called ‘organisations of citizens belonging to national minorities’ should be eased”.

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# ERDÉLYI FIATALOK: THE HUNGARIAN VILLAGE AND HUNGARIAN IDENTITY IN TRANSYLVANIA IN THE 1930's

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The Erdélyi Fiatalok (Transylvanian Youth), a group of young Hungarian intellectuals in Transylvania, undertook in the 1930s “to know” the Hungarian village. They did so in order to know themselves better as Hungarians because they were convinced that the essential qualities of the “race” had been preserved in their purest form in the village, far removed from the cosmopolitan, modern city. Just as urgent, in their minds, was the need to establish close links between the intellectuals and the rural population, if the Hungarian community in Transylvania was to survive. Their way of achieving their goals was to carry out the systematic investigation of village life in all its diverse aspects and to base their work on up-to-date sociological theory and research methods. While drawing on the experience of their Hungarian colleagues elsewhere, they were perhaps most indebted to the ideas and practices developed by the sociological school of Bucharest, headed by Dimitrie Gusti, professor of sociology at the University. Gusti and his team of researchers welcomed the participation of the Transylvanian Hungarians in their work, and the resulting common labors offered an encouraging example of Romanian–Hungarian cooperation. In the end, the initiatives of the Erdélyi Fiatalok were thwarted by events beyond their control and perhaps by their own idealism.

**Keywords:** village research, ethnic identity, race, minority, peasantry, intellectuals, young generation, sociology

## I

My paper, broadly speaking, is about the self-styled “new generation” of Hungarian intellectuals in Transylvania who, in the aftermath of World War I, took it upon themselves as a moral and national responsibility to preserve the Hungarian community in Transylvania, now a minority, and foster its progress. This paper, then, is concerned with matters of identity and minority status.<sup>1</sup>

My perspective on such broad questions here must necessarily be limited. I shall, therefore, focus on a single, though central, aspect of the matter: the relationship that a significant portion of the new generation cultivated with the vil-

lage. It was here, in the countryside, that they were certain they would find the solutions to the urgent ethnic and social problems that preoccupied them. Known as the Transylvanian Youth (*Erdélyi Fiatalok*), from the name of the review they founded in Kolozsvár in 1930, they became engaged in pioneering investigations of the Transylvanian Hungarian village.<sup>2</sup> The inspiration for such an undertaking owed much to the extensive scholarly, literary, and polemical writings on the peasantry and to the tradition of village research in Hungary. Yet at the same time, the approach of the Transylvanian Youth to the village and its inhabitants drew creatively on the monographic method of village research developed by Dimitrie Gusti, professor of sociology at the University of Bucharest, and his teams of investigators. It was a debt they readily acknowledged.

## II

The Transylvanian Youth were composed of university and some gymnasium students, mainly from middle-class families, who formed a new organization in 1930 in order to deal effectively with what they regarded as the most critical issues facing the Hungarian community in Transylvania. Their immediate aims were to formulate a coherent plan of social action and to instill in all their supporters a sorely needed sense of purpose. They grasped the importance of the media for their enterprise, and they intended their review, *Erdélyi Fiatalok*, which was published between 1930 and 1940, most of the time as a quarterly, as an instrument to inform a wider public about their vision of the future and their work to achieve it, and, no less important, to rouse fellow intellectuals to action. In all their endeavors they were guided by a sense of mission notable for its idealism and integrity. Their high principles owed much to their religious upbringing, for the majority in 1930 were members of Calvinist (*Ifjúsági Keresztyén Egyesület*), Unitarian (*Dávid Ferenc Egylet Ifjúsági Köre*), and Roman Catholic (*Az Erdélyi Római Katolikus Népszövetség Egyetemi és Főiskolai Szakosztálya*) youth organizations.<sup>3</sup>

Among the most prominent figures of the Transylvanian Youth were: Béla Jancsó (1903–1967), writer and literary critic and an editor of *Erdélyi Fiatalok* who advocated an agrarian third way of development and urged the adoption of Dimitrie Gusti's monographic investigation of the village;<sup>4</sup> Dezső László (1904–1973), a founder and chief editor of *Erdélyi Fiatalok* who urged new foundations and a new minority ideology for the Hungarians of Transylvania;<sup>5</sup> Béla Demeter (1910–1952), the director of the Transylvanian Youth's village seminar who established direct contact with Dimitrie Gusti and helped to popularize his ideas in the Transylvanian Hungarian press; and Imre Mikó (1911–1977), a lawyer, public intellectual, and political figure.<sup>6</sup> Among their close associates were the Unitarian



pastor Ferenc Balázs (1901–1937) and the sociologist József Venczel (1913–1972), whose activities will be discussed later.

Two issues were of paramount importance to the Transylvanian Youth. The first was their own status as the new generation and the role they should play in both their own community and in Greater Romania. They were acutely conscious of the special burdens they bore as a minority in a state dominated by its Romanian majority, but they were determined to be forthright and impartial spokesmen for their generation.<sup>7</sup> The second issue that defined them was intimately connected to the first and had to do with the village and the urgent need they felt to bring peasants and intellectuals together. It was the only means they could see of assuring the continuity of the Hungarian race. It is worth noting here that the concept of "race" led to spirited polemics among the Transylvanian Youth. Although the biological view of race advocated by the Hungarian novelist Dezső Szabó, who was popular with them, had some support, important voices, notably those of Ferenc Balázs and Zsigmond Vita,<sup>8</sup> an editor of *Erdélyi Fiatalok*, insisted on speaking of race as a spiritual and cultural community. Their view reflected the thinking of a majority of the center Transylvanian Youth. In the minds of all, village, race, and minority status could not be separated, and the defense of them supplied the moral sustenance that lay behind all their endeavors.

Another objective pursued by the Transylvanian Youth was unity within their own ranks, but in this endeavor they were largely unsuccessful. From the beginning differences of opinion over the direction they should take and the goals they should achieve proved insurmountable. Antagonisms long held in check broke into the open at a conference of Hungarian youth in Kolozsvár in the fall of 1932. The factionalism was aggravated by disagreements over how to deal with the effects of the world economic depression and the growing political instability in Romania in the early 1930s. The left, led by János Demeter, a lawyer, objected to the group's emphasis on agriculture and urged adoption of a broader, more aggressive, more modern development strategy. Other leftists denounced the center's advocacy of class conciliation and called for class struggle, instead. They left the Transylvanian Youth and gathered around *Korunk* (Our Era), the ideological monthly, and *Falvak Népe* (Village Folk), the political organ of the left, both of which were under Communist influence. On the right the Catholic youth were at odds with what they thought was the Protestant character of the Transylvanian Youth. As an alternative they demanded adoption of a Christian socialist program based on the Church's social teachings. Some of them eventually joined *Hitel* (Credit), a social-political and cultural quarterly, and later monthly, founded in Kolozsvár in 1936, which pursued national objectives based on the spirit of Count István Széchenyi's program of the nineteenth-century Reform Era. On behalf of the center, which remained in place and kept control of *Erdélyi Fiatalok* and preserved the agrarian focus of the Transylvanian Youth, Béla Jancsó and Dezső

László reformulated the group's program in 1933. They declared allegiance to "Transylvanian realities" and to a third way of development that was neither capitalist nor socialist.<sup>9</sup> Discernible in their thought and that of their friend Ferenc Balázs was "Transzilvanizmus", the idea that Transylvania, because of its unique character, was the proper framework for the continued development of the Transylvanian Hungarian community.<sup>10</sup>

The Transylvanian Youth were by no means alone in their advocacy of the Hungarian peasant and their exploration of the Hungarian village. They were one of a number of agrarian currents that invigorated Hungarian intellectual life in the interwar period. Besides drawing inspiration from the populist writers like László Németh and Gyula Illyés, the Transylvanian Youth were deeply indebted to the writings of the novelist Zsigmond Móricz (1879–1942) and the poet Endre Ady (1877–1919), who taught them that the most important task for the new generation was the strengthening of the Hungarian village. Móricz wrote poignantly about the hardships of village life caused by the ravages of modern economic growth in his novel *Sárarany* (1910; Pure Gold), which was a favorite work of the new generation. So were many of Ady's poems, which portrayed the existence of the Hungarians as precarious because they had settled in a Europe that was utterly foreign to them. They took seriously his warning that they were in danger of losing their very essence. These were ideas that spoke movingly and somberly to the new generation, who were struggling with feelings of their own about being strangers in a land that had once been Hungarian.<sup>11</sup> Another, perhaps even more provocative source of inspiration was the novelist Dezső Szabó (1879–1945). The son of a city official, he captured the imagination of the Transylvanian Youth in his most influential novel, *Az elsodort falu* (1919; The Village Swept Away). It is the story of a well-educated son of a poor gentry family who returns from a failed sojourn in the city, portrayed as immoral and inauthentic, to his native village, where at last he feels at peace in this simple, uncorrupted "cradle of the Hungarian race".<sup>12</sup> Szabó's romantic enthusiasm, his expressionist rhetoric, and his admonition that the preservation of the race depended, in the final analysis, on the peasantry inspired the Transylvanian Youth and helped to sustain them in the difficult early years of their village work. Equally inspiring was the pamphlet-proclamation drawn up in 1930 by the poet Attila József and Dániel Fábrián, of the Bartha Miklós Társaság in Budapest, *Ki a faluba!* (Out to the Village), which declared that every social and economic question was ultimately a peasant question.<sup>13</sup>

The Transylvanian Youth also made common cause with the Sarló movement of young Hungarian intellectuals in Czechoslovakia (Slovakia). Both groups agreed that the peasantry formed the healthiest stratum of Hungarian society, and they expressed their joint determination to do all they could to preserve Hungarian culture in the successor states of Central Europe.<sup>14</sup> Edgár Balogh, one of the leaders of Sarló, wrote in *Erdélyi Fiatalok* that young intellectuals had a duty to ac-

quaint themselves with the laboring classes, both rural and urban,<sup>15</sup> and he and Béla Jancsó corresponded in 1930 about the desirability of cooperation among Hungarian minority organizations in Central Europe.<sup>16</sup> Initially, then, relations between the two organizations were close, but when Sarló's leaders became more radical in their social and economic objectives, the Transylvanian Youth drew back.

Despite shared enthusiasms and aims with other Hungarian groups, the Transylvanian Youth occupied a distinct place among Hungarian agrarian currents. They combined a commitment to the village and to the investigation of their own identity with new approaches in sociology, and perhaps more than any other Hungarian group they drew on the achievements of Dimitrie Gusti's school of sociology and strove to apply his methods in their own village work. Yet, however much they may have benefited from the thought and experience of others, both Hungarian and Romanian, they were determined to base their own projects and the means of accomplishing them on Transylvanian realities.

### III

Those who occupied the center of the Transylvanian Youth after the split of 1932 continued to make the peasant the main object of their attention. They viewed him in historical perspective and judged his role in the contemporary social and moral development of the Transylvanian Hungarian community as crucial. Idealistic and even romantic, they were certain that the fate of all the Hungarians of Transylvania ultimately lay in the village. In the circumstances prevailing in the Romania of the 1930s the village presented itself as a sturdy defense against the outside world,<sup>17</sup> not just the world of other ethnicities but, for some, at least, the world of the city. Some of the Transylvanian Youth thought of the village and its peasant inhabitants as offering a healthy alternative to the urban world, which they saw as burdened by modernity and materialism.

Not surprisingly, the Transylvanian Youth perceived a close connection between a vigorous peasantry, the minority status of the Hungarians, and the preservation of the Hungarian community. They valued the peasants as the one class in Hungarian society whose roots went back far into the past, a "pure-blooded", "elemental" force whose own welfare could not but determine the future of all the Hungarians of Transylvania. One commentator put the matter in stark terms: "Our existence or non-existence depends solely on the Transylvanian village."<sup>18</sup> Another observer described the village as a defense against the dissolving force of the cosmopolitan city, thereby transforming itself into a kind of rural autarchy that would save the Hungarian race from assimilation.<sup>19</sup>

As intellectuals who assumed that they were by right the natural and even the spiritual leaders of the peasant majority, the Transylvanian Youth became obsessed with the need to know the village and to understand its inhabitants. In their minds, knowledge of the village meant knowledge of themselves as Hungarians, for where better to plumb the nation's essence, they asked, than in the authentic Hungarian countryside. If they were successful in their mission and created close bonds with the rural majority, then, they were certain that the resulting spiritual unity would secure the future of the race.

One of the persistent anxieties of the Transylvanian Youth was their lack of knowledge of the village, or, as Béla Demeter put it in 1932, the "yawning gap" between the intellectuals and the people.<sup>20</sup> Young people, even those from the village, he complained, did not know the village or grasp the differences between the village and the city, and he wondered how such deficiencies could be remedied. Perhaps, he thought, the answer lay in the creation of a new intellectual leading class, one that would be fully attuned to the true essences of Transylvanian Hungarian society.

The faith of the Transylvanian Youth in the peasantry by no means diminished their sense of their own worth. They thought it their solemn duty to impart to the peasant the benefits of education and all those forward-looking ideas of which they themselves were the chosen guardians and purveyors. Thus, they came to the village not merely to gather information. They were determined also to perform good works, a mission that undoubtedly owed much to the religious foundations of the Transylvanian Youth.

#### IV

The Transylvanian Youth's encounter with Dimitrie Gusti and his monographic method of studying the village was decisive in guiding their approach to the peasantry. They were attracted to Gusti's project, in part, because it offered them a proven means of becoming acquainted with this essential source of the racial essence, of the spirit of community, and thus of enabling them to deepen their knowledge of themselves as Hungarians. To succeed in their village work they readily admitted their urgent need of proper organization and training. Before they had begun to absorb Gusti's teachings, their approach to the rural world had been beholden to a relaxed, romantic peasant ideology,<sup>21</sup> reminiscent of the novels and other writings of Dezső Szabó. From the beginning they had recognized the need for a thorough investigation of the village, and they were making progress, but it was their acquaintance with Gusti, first through publications and then by participation in the field work of his research teams, that imposed scholarly discipline on their work and gave it a firm sociological foundation.<sup>22</sup> Gusti taught

them, in particular, how vital it was to mobilize the expertise of many disciplines and how valuable sociological theory could be in coordinating their work and thus ensuring their success.<sup>23</sup>

Association with Gusti appealed to the Transylvanian Youth also because it fitted in with their efforts as a minority to ensure their place in Greater Romania. They appreciated the similarity between their view of the peasant and Gusti's as the decisive element that had determined the form that their respective societies had taken, and they warmly approved of his sending intellectuals into the countryside as validating their own central role as mentors of the peasantry.<sup>24</sup>

The Transylvanian Youth were certain that the monographic method would make crucial contributions to the solution of the minority question in Romania. They found Gusti's expressions of support for their own labors and his willingness to work with them to create a "harmonious existence" between Romanians and Hungarians especially encouraging.<sup>25</sup> His insistence that village research not be beholden to politics corresponded to their determination to keep their own village work free from ideological entanglements on either the right or the left. A non-political sociology seemed to them the best way to reveal to themselves and to others the "true essence of minority life", as Béla Jancsó put it, and thereby dispel the myths and prejudices that divided ethnic communities from one another. Thus, for them, Gusti's efforts to distance himself from the extremist politics of the 1930s were particularly reassuring.<sup>26</sup> Yet, they harbored no illusions about their actual status in Greater Romania. They were always conscious of the fact that the Hungarian peasant as a minority bore a double burden – economic and ethnic.

The Transylvanian Youth were the first among the Hungarians of Transylvania to initiate regular contacts with Gusti. Before them there were no important scholarly relations between Hungarian intellectuals in Transylvania and the monographic school in Bucharest. From the beginning of *Erdélyi Fiatalok* its editors followed closely the activities of Gusti's teams, publishing both reports of field work and theoretical and methodological commentaries on the nature and importance of village investigations.<sup>27</sup> Behind such interest was, of course, their desire to create their own monographic school by training a corps of Gustian village researchers. To do so they knew that they could not remain mere bystanders, but would have to participate directly in the work of Gusti's teams.

Personal contacts were crucial in persuading the Transylvanian Youth to embrace Gusti's goals and methods. In this way they became acquainted with the monographic school from within. Imre Mikó was the first of the group to meet personally with Gusti in December 1930. Afterwards the Ferenc Koós Circle in Bucharest, an organization of mutual assistance for Hungarian students in the capital, founded in 1925, played a key role in establishing and maintaining links with Gusti and his principal assistants, Henri H. Stahl, Traian Herseni, and Anton

Golopenția. The Circle served as an indispensable base for village researchers from Transylvania, providing them with ample opportunities to meet their Romanian colleagues.<sup>28</sup> The participation of Transylvanian Hungarians in monographic field work began in earnest in 1936. Noteworthy was the presence of three of the Transylvanian Youth at a two-week training course in methods of village research held in the summer of 1937 in the commune of Stănești, in Muscel County, northwest of Bucharest.<sup>29</sup>

Of all the members of the Transylvanian Youth, the most consistent Gustian was József Venczel, who before 1944 was probably the most important Hungarian sociologist in Transylvania.<sup>30</sup> He himself recognized the influence that Gusti's teachings had on the village researches of the Transylvanian Youth because, he insisted, Gusti had raised their work to a systematic, scientific level from its diffuse, romantic beginnings.<sup>31</sup> An active member of the Transylvanian Youth almost from its beginnings and a prominent representative of the new generation, despite his young age, Venczel wholeheartedly embraced Gusti's approach to knowing the village. His debt to the monographic method is evident in the article he published in 1935, *A falumunka és az erdélyi falumunka-mozgalom* (Village Work and the Transylvanian Village-Work Movement), a critical appraisal of village research by Transylvanian Hungarians since 1930.<sup>32</sup>

Inspired by Gusti's theoretical work, *Sociologie monografică, știință a realității sociale* (1934; Monographic Sociology, a Science of Social Reality),<sup>33</sup> Venczel insisted that the investigation of the Hungarian village be based on solid sociological principles and that a "journalistic superficiality" be avoided.<sup>34</sup> He urged his fellow researchers to see the Transylvanian village in all its complexity and to treat every aspect of village life as being intimately linked to all the other aspects. Only then, he admonished, when the interweaving of social, economic, and spiritual relations had been achieved could an authentic portrait of the village emerge and genuine self-knowledge of the race occur.<sup>35</sup> Like Gusti, he conceived of the village-work movement not only as a way of becoming acquainted with the peasants but also as a necessary preparation for intellectuals who were intent on carrying out social reforms.<sup>36</sup>

## V

In their exploration of the village the Transylvanian Youth engaged in a variety of activities designed to achieve self-understanding, to defend themselves as Hungarians, and to bring beneficial change to the village. As intellectuals and idealists, they had great faith in the efficacy of the spoken and written word to influence men's behavior and were confident of their own ability to find solutions to

the social and minority problems of the day. They thus put great store by seminars, lectures, conferences, and publications of all kinds.

Foremost among the tools of village research they created was the seminar, which was formally organized in the fall of 1930 and was chaired by Béla Demeter. Its role was crucial because it served as the coordinating center for the whole village-work enterprise. Demeter and his colleagues used the seminar to instill in their researchers a unity of approach to the peasantry free of religious or ideological constraints.<sup>37</sup> Inspired by Dezsó Szabó, they gave lectures not only to fellow intellectuals and urban audiences, but brought their message to the villages as well, Ferenc Balázs and Béla Demeter being the first to do so in October 1930.<sup>38</sup>

At the heart of the Transylvanian Youth's concerns was the need to establish direct contacts with the village, and in the summers of 1931 and 1932 they dispatched teams of young researchers to villages in the Székelyföld and Kolozsvár County, the most important work being done in the village of Kolozsborsa. The village seminar assumed responsibility for instructing the teams in how to organize their work and what techniques to use in interviewing peasants. Béla Demeter emphasized the importance of developing personal relations with their "subjects", but at the same time he and his colleagues urged researchers to maintain a certain "disinterested" distance from them. The Gustian spirit, manifest in this measured approach to the villagers, was strikingly evident in the questionnaires drawn up by Béla Demeter, József Venczel, and others. The first one was published in *Erdélyi Fiatalok* in 1930 and another in 1933.<sup>39</sup> The most detailed was the work of Béla Demeter, already cited.<sup>40</sup> Comprehensive, just like those elaborated by the monographic school of Bucharest, they invited the villagers to tell in detail about the place where they and their forebears lived and the routine of their daily lives. The researchers wanted to know about the history and the physical layout of the village and then asked about births and deaths. Next came questions about property relations and making a living from agriculture or from crafts, ideas about nationality, religion, and mixed marriages. Then they asked about cultural life and the role of the clergy and the teachers, and especially about the relations between the villagers and the intellectuals and how the intellectual class was formed, and about literacy and good and bad customs. They wanted to know about the cottage industry and about health and who cared for the well-being of the villagers – clergy, teachers, intellectuals? The current economic crisis was also on the minds of the researchers; they were curious about what categories of peasants were most likely to fall into debt and why small holdings could not survive?

These questions showed genuine enthusiasm for village research in the years just after the founding of the Transylvanian Youth. But it soon waned, and only in 1936 did serious work resume. In July of that year József Venczel, who had been studying at the sociological institute in Bucharest, and Attila T. Szabó, a young linguist from Kolozsvár, organized the first important work camp for some twenty

Hungarian university students at Bábonny, west of Kolozsvár in Kalotaszeg, on the property of Károly Kós, writer, architect, and graphic artist. Here in the course of several weeks they set about in true Gustian fashion to know the village.<sup>41</sup>

Not all those associated with the Transylvanian Youth joined in group village work. Ferenc Balázs, who was serving as a Unitarian pastor in Mészkö, near Torda, from 1930 until his death in 1937,<sup>42</sup> followed his own path to knowledge of the village. Although one of the founders of *Erdélyi Fiatalok*, he did not belong to the center of the Transylvanian Youth; he was too independent of mind to adhere to an ideology or even to follow all of Gusti's prescriptions for village research. Thus, while he published numerous articles in *Erdélyi Fiatalok*, he wrote at the same time for the leftist monthly, *Korunk*. His work in the village was certainly influenced by Gusti's ideals, but he shunned the monographic method of data collection; he preferred his own, informal approach, which consisted of observing his parishioners and talking to them as he went about his daily tasks as a village pastor. Although an intellectual in the true sense of the word, he employed the methods of an insider. He could thus be a member of the group and thereby avoid the formality and awkwardness often felt by the researcher who came to the village armed with a questionnaire and intellectual expertise and thus found himself treated as an outsider.

When it came to fostering change in the village, Balázs was a more ardent reformer than most of his friends in the Transylvanian Youth.<sup>43</sup> Convinced that the solution to economic and social problems in the village lay in the cooperative movement, he had before him as a goal transformations of the type he had seen in rural America during his stay there between 1923 and 1927, when he was a student at the University of California in Berkeley. He was one of those rare members of the Transylvanian Youth whose first concern was to reform the village rather than gather information about it. He thought deeply about the village, and his aspirations come through clearly in his remarkable memoir, *A rög alatt* (1936; *Under the Soil*). His way of grasping the essence of the village was to describe ten of its characteristic inhabitants from the pastor and teacher to the artisan and independent farmer, rather than follow the scientific rules laid down by Gusti. His book was the first true Transylvanian Hungarian sociological work and represented a milestone in the literature on village research.

The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 and the cession of north Transylvania to Hungary by Romania in the following summer seriously affected the village research sponsored by the Transylvanian Youth. The new order of things in Transylvania seems to have discouraged the comprehensive investigations and the contacts with the sociological school of Bucharest that had characterized the Transylvanian Youth's exploration of rural society. An indication of a change for the worse in the intellectual climate of the times was the absence of articles about village work in the pages of *Erdélyi Fiatalok* in 1939 and 1940. In-



deed, the review itself ceased publication in the summer of 1940, mainly, it seems, because of financial problems, and the last meeting of the editorial board was held on July 22, 1941.<sup>44</sup>

Village work continued for a while at a modest pace. The most important undertaking occurred in the summer of 1941, when thirty-three students from Kolozsvár made a four-week visit to the village of Bálványosvárálja, near Dés. They collected an enormous amount of information on vital statistics and family histories, filling some five thousand index cards, and made numerous photographs and phonograph cylinders.<sup>45</sup> But two follow-up visits by smaller teams did not take place until 1943, and afterwards work ceased altogether, and most of the material gathered was left unprocessed.<sup>46</sup> The researchers followed Gusti's principles for comprehensive village investigations, although no direct contact with him or his associates seems to have occurred.

## VI

The accomplishments of the Transylvanian Youth are difficult to measure. Rather than palpable things like institutions or specific social reforms, their contributions to interwar Hungarian social and intellectual life in Transylvania lay in the realm of ideas and in expectations for the future.

Their most important achievement was undoubtedly their promotion of ties between the intellectuals and the village. For the first time Transylvanian Hungarian intellectuals attempted a systematic study of the village through organized contact with its inhabitants. In doing so, they helped to arouse and sustain the interest of a broader public in peasant life and peasant problems, and they helped to secure a place for peasants in the consciousness of intellectuals.

The investigation of the village by the Transylvanian Youth and by individuals associated with them brought into being a pioneering scholarly and polemical literature. From the beginning the Transylvanian Youth had intended to make known the results of their work in a series they entitled *Erdélyi Fiatalok falu-füzetei* (Village Booklets of the Transylvanian Youth). Four were published, all in Kolozsvár in 1931 and 1932 and all based in some degree on village researches. One, by Béla Demeter, dealt with the techniques of village work, especially, as we have seen, the questionnaire.<sup>47</sup> Imre Mikó wrote on the intricate connection between the village, the minority question, and the future of the Hungarians of Transylvania against the background of the historical development of the nationality problem in Transylvania.<sup>48</sup> Zsigmond Gyallay-Papp described the misunderstandings between the village and the city and the role that intellectuals should assume as mediators between peasants and urban-dwellers.<sup>49</sup> He did not hesitate to declare that the village was the true source of Hungarian culture and the

main hope for the renewal of Hungarian society. Béla Demeter examined the mental climate of the Transylvanian village and urged harmony between its inhabitants and the intellectuals.<sup>50</sup>

Of no little importance was the contribution the Transylvanian Youth made to harmony and cooperation between Hungarian and Romanian intellectuals. The willingness of both sides to keep scholarship above political strife was a good omen for the future of ethnic relations. Leading members of the sociological school in Bucharest praised the initiatives of the Transylvanian Youth. Octavian Neamțu, writing in Gusti's *Sociologie Românească* (Romanian Sociology) in 1936, called attention to the exactness and systematic character of their investigations and thought that as a result of their research outsiders would be able more easily to penetrate the life of Hungarian young people and appreciate the changes taking place in their ideas. He expressed confidence that fundamental sociological investigations of Transylvanian Hungarian society would forge intimate links between Romanian and Hungarian scholars, and he hoped that their mutual understanding would be reflected more generally in their respective societies.<sup>51</sup> In a similar vein the Transylvanian Youth held up the work of Gusti's research teams as models to be followed. Yet, despite expressions of good fellowship and of hope for enhanced cooperation in the future, neither the Transylvanian Youth nor the monographic researchers in Bucharest showed any inclination to renounce the ethnic foundations of their respective undertakings. In the end, their promising partnership in village work was, as we have seen, overtaken by war.

In the final analysis, we may ask what difference the activities of the Transylvanian Youth made. The first of the tasks they had set for themselves – to know the village better and thus to know themselves better – I think they accomplished, even though their work was far from complete. As for the second task – the social and moral uplift of village life – it seems to me that they fell short of the promises they had made to themselves. Yet, it is fair to ask how far they actually wanted to change the village? Or perhaps the question should be: Were they social reformers at all? Admirable in their commitment to knowing the village and its inhabitants and in upholding high ideals of conduct and thought, they nonetheless failed to build institutions with sound foundations and they steadfastly shunned political parties, all of which could have served them as the engines of change. Instead, they relied on the power of good ideas and reasoned debate to achieve their ends. It was their misfortune to work in an era of advancing extremism, the 1930s, which proved fatal to their project.

## Notes

- 1 I am glad for this occasion to thank Zsuzsánna Magdó, doctoral candidate in history at the University of Illinois who was my research assistant in the summer of 2005, for her indispensable help.
- 2 Useful general works on the Erdélyi Fiatalok are: Mikó 1970; S. Balázs 1979, 148–189; Cseke 1986, 5–79.
- 3 Venczel 1980b, 63–64; Baczó 1933, 51–52.
- 4 Mikó 1973, 5–28.
- 5 László 1997, 3–21.
- 6 S. Balázs 2003, 7–225; Mikó 1978.
- 7 “Erdélyi Fiatalok”, 1–2; “Az Erdélyi Fiatalok főiskolás konferenciája”, 151–153; Mikó 1970, 544–547.
- 8 F. Balázs 1930a, 70–71, 1930c, 17–18; Vita 1930, 51–52.
- 9 Mikó 1970, 542–543; B. Jancsó 1933b, 6–17; László 1933, 21–27.
- 10 László 1938, 3–4.
- 11 E. Jancsó 1931, 65–67; “Móricz Zsigmond és az erdélyi magyar ifjúság”, 112–113; B. Jancsó 1939, 31–32.
- 12 László 1933, 37–40.
- 13 *Erdélyi Fiatalok* 1/7 (1930), 116.
- 14 Mikó 1930, 12–14.
- 15 Balogh 1930, 82–85.
- 16 Cseke 1986, 84–108.
- 17 F. Balázs 1930b, 85–88.
- 18 Fogarasi 1932, 77–78.
- 19 F. Balázs 1930b, 85–88.
- 20 Demeter 1932, 28–29.
- 21 Venczel 1980a, 138.
- 22 B. Jancsó 1933a, 46–49.
- 23 Venczel 1980a, 138.
- 24 Fogarasi 1932, 78.
- 25 B. Jancsó 1937, 23.
- 26 Demeter 1931, 100–102.
- 27 Demeter 1931; Fogarasi 1932; “Falu-Szeminariumunk munkája 1931–2 évben”, 81–82; Jancsó 1933.
- 28 Szappanyos 1931, 67–69; Debitzky 1935, 32–35.
- 29 “Magyar fiúk a stănești-i tanfolyamon”, 21–22.
- 30 Székely 1988, 7–20; Lengyel 1990, 9–42.
- 31 Venczel 1936, 22–27.
- 32 Venczel 1935, 219–248.
- 33 Gusti 1934, 29–120.
- 34 Venczel 1988, 204–214.
- 35 Venczel 1980b, 71–72.
- 36 Venczel 1980b, 72–73.
- 37 Baczó 1933, 52.
- 38 “Az Erdélyi Fiatalok első falusi előadásai”, 133; Vita 1977, 126.
- 39 “Hogyan tanulmányozzam a falu életét”, 91–94; “Kérdőív a falu-tanulmányozáshoz”, 55–57.
- 40 Demeter 1932, 7–32.
- 41 Szabó 1937, 51–65; Vita 1977, 127.

- <sup>42</sup> László 1937, 1–2; Mikó et al. 1983; Cseke 1998, 5–26.  
<sup>43</sup> On his plans for Mészkö and his efforts to realize them, see Mikó et al. 1983, 176–208.  
<sup>44</sup> Cseke 1986, 359–360.  
<sup>45</sup> Molter 1940–1941, 285–306.  
<sup>46</sup> Imreh 1967, 1192.  
<sup>47</sup> Demeter 1931.  
<sup>48</sup> Mikó 1932.  
<sup>49</sup> Gyallay-Papp 1931.  
<sup>50</sup> Demeter 1932.  
<sup>51</sup> Neamtu 1936, 24–30.

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## REMEMBERING WARTIME VIOLENCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRANSYLVANIA: A FEW THOUGHTS ON COMPARATIVE HISTORY

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This article is a comparative examination of processes through which collective memory is shaped. Taking as its focus the collective memory surrounding specific sites of remembrance, that of a massacre that took place in 1940 in the Transylvanian village of Treznea and that of the early period of communist takeover in the same village, it offers a discussion of the comparative value of contrasting narratives of the past and suggests insights into the processes through which these narratives take shape separately. It also examines these narratives across generations, situating them not as part of the past but as part of an ongoing dialogue of identity and, in some instance, conflict.

**Keywords:** Transylvania, Treznea, Shoa, collective memory, groupism, ethnicity, ethnic conflict, comparative history, transnational

This essay represents an exercise in comparative historiography, having as much to do with methods as with content. I want to explore the opportunities opened up by comparative history in looking at the memory of war in the twentieth century. In this case, the comparison is three-fold. To begin with, I want to examine the value of comparing ethnic groups (mostly Romanians and Hungarians, but with an eye to the Jewish population as well). At the same time I want to look at two sites of collective memory work – World War II and the early period of communist takeover. Finally, I also identify two generations, the wartime and postwar, as important units for comparative analysis. My discussion about these three types of comparisons is exploratory, but my considerations can be valuable even as such, since I am asking questions that are partly empirical, but more centrally methodological and theoretical. What I want to examine is: to what extent does comparative analysis enhance our ability to understand the processes of collective remembrance? And, conversely, how is collective memory comparatively shaped? This is not a pedantic question; it is a consideration that has bearing both on political contests but also on foundational assumptions of historians working on the twentieth century.

A few words about the usefulness of comparative history are in order at the outset. There is a growing interest in transnational history, which has had important bearings on how historians of modern politics and societies are currently framing, or reframing their work.<sup>1</sup> Instead of taking the national context as a given, this relatively new wave of historiography has been relativizing the assumptions embedded in this national context – regarding political legitimacy, stability of institutions, social relations, etc.<sup>2</sup> This wave has seen few inroads in Romanian historiography, however. One important exception has been the recent work by Rogers Brubaker on Transylvania as a site of multi-ethnic contestation.<sup>3</sup>

Comparativism has grown as a corrective measure, especially for those working on ethnic nationalist questions, whose single-group/community focus has suggested a reifying view of nationalism. One tends to reinforce uniqueness and privilege the perspective of the group studied, even as one might critique the notion that the group is unique or privileged. I have been guilty of this shortcoming myself. However, even comparing ethnic groups might become “ethnicism”, a term introduced by historian Jeremy King, who, like Brubaker, recommends moving away from such categories as fixed to regarding the processes by which ethnic identities are constantly in flux.<sup>4</sup> I accept both King’s and Brubaker’s own critiques of both constructivism and also “groupism”, but I also regard such categories as useful in so far as they in fact are being utilized by the subjects of my own research. What comparative analysis enables a historian to do is to relativize the claims of one’s own empirical subjects and place them in a culturally coherent context (enabling the reader to understand how members of a community in fact situated themselves inside that community and also against others, especially with regard to ethnic considerations), while offering the possibility of critical distance. In the case of Transylvania, for instance, looking at the multiple ethnic groups living in Cluj is not only a “politically correct” goal, but more importantly, it is the proper way to contextualize the complex local social, cultural, and political life of a town that for a long time has had a multi-cultural existence.<sup>5</sup>

But, as Jay Winter remarked at a roundtable on cultural history at Indiana University a few years back, the intellectual task of doing comparative history well, especially as a cultural historian, is often insurmountable. The notion that one person could become truly bi-cultural in her or his ability to situate herself within the communities and contests is a wonderful goal, but one that can be more easily spoken about than accomplished. There is also the issue of who, in a situation such as the still somewhat tense one in Transylvania, could be both bi-lingual and bi-cultural, and equally invested in understanding the different ethnic groups that co-exist in this territory. Brubaker is exceptional in this regard, not only because of his personal scholarly and intellectual skills and circumstances, but also because, in the case of the book on Cluj, he has actually done what Winter suggests for comparative studies: he has worked with a team.<sup>6</sup> Most historians, however, most of-



ten “fly solo”, both because of the way in which we are trained in our discipline (unlike sociologists, who most often work in teams, at least in terms of research), and also because of our proclivity to privilege the responsibilities and authority of the single voice when producing analyses. Yet even for a single author working closely on one case study, a certain type of comparative analysis is possible. A scholar can place herself or himself inside a single case study with an expressed awareness of other relevant contexts and cases.

Comparisons of a different kind – between two sites of remembrance – offer very different advantages and challenges. To begin with, such comparisons present a challenge to the notion that any event has such a central role in shaping the collective memory and identity of a community that it precludes useful comparisons with other events. The most obvious case in point is the Shoa for the Jewish community.<sup>7</sup> The historiography on the Shoa and its collective memory has developed largely outside the realm of the larger context of World War II. However, for non-Jews the Shoa has remained unjustifiably marginal in the historiography of World War II. For the non-Jewish communities in Eastern Europe who have more recently endured the extreme violence of Soviet occupation and then internal purges in the early years of communism, the Gulag has weighed more heavily on their collective memory than the violence of World War II.<sup>8</sup> From a scholarly perspective, the question is to what extent is it appropriate for the historian to bring in the comparative schema when, in fact, part of our task is to understand exactly the specific value/role that particular experience plays in the shaping of a community’s collective memory? Thus, the challenge in this case is less about the ability to undertake solid comparative work, as is the case with comparing the experiences of two ethnic groups, and more about the appropriateness of questioning the central role of one experience versus others. This is especially the case for the historian, by comparison with a philosopher or ethicist, for instance, since the historian’s task is fundamentally to understand and explicate/narrate rather than evaluate the moral value of a particular emotional attachment to one memory versus another.<sup>9</sup>

But compare we must. For in the same way that a historian focusing only on one ethnic group can reify the uniqueness of that group, so can a scholar of collective memory take for granted what is in fact the constructed discourse about an experience in the past, rather than some “natural” – if there is such a thing – collective remembrance.<sup>10</sup> In fact, physiologically speaking, even at the individual level remembrance is a continuous process of re-cataloguing of information, of specific impressions that might be directly personal (having witnessed the Holocaust, for instance), or only discursively appropriated (the meaning of the Shoa after returning from Auschwitz as a survivor, for instance).<sup>11</sup> Events that happened more recently might become more forcefully imprinted on the memory of one person/group (the Gulag versus World War II), and thus might displace the older

memory from a central place of pain and identification with victimization. Yet that is both an experience-based process (the actual lived experience of the violence done to a person or her/his family) and a learned process. The ways in which silences and discussions about World War II took shape in the late 1940s and early 1950s certainly shaped how different communities in Transylvania saw some forms of victimization as safe, appropriate, comforting, or less troubling than others in their construction of meaningful collective memories.

The point I am trying to make is that the subjectivity of different communities in this process of collective remembrance is important and must therefore be taken as an important force. But, by the same token, looking at these processes with some distance affords the scholar the ability to point out the relationship between politics and local cultural practices as a dialogue that is important for both the local level and also the central policy makers and knowledge brokers.

In the realm of collective memory, the comparative perspective also takes some particular features that are worth outlining on their own. The production of historical narratives is something that happens first and foremost in the scholarly realm, often with political endorsement, whether academically institutionalized or simply financially sponsored. There are individual attempts that fall outside such endorsements, and there are also important differences between academic and popular historical writing. The goals of such work are, however, to provide interpretations of the past that have the authority of some sort of either objective, or, most likely, balanced view of the contradictory traces of the past (especially in contested past events, such as wartime violence). The “balanced view”, however, is a claim that might be central to professional scholars but offers little satisfaction to communities still struggling to come to terms with their emotional, antagonistic view of the past.

Thus, when I look at the versions presented by different communities in terms of their collective remembrance of the past, rather than their different versions of the historical narrative of the past, my interest as a historian is not so much to balance such views, for I don't think there is inherent value in this. In studying collective memory I try to understand the process by which individuals and groups become attached emotionally to narratives about their or their communities' past experiences and the ways in which they are invested in these narratives. To what extent do people in the present identify with these narratives? To what extent do they question them? How does this process of association and disassociation come into being?

In the process of answering such questions, it becomes imperative to address contradictions, silences, and forgetting. Placing the spotlight on these aspects of the process of collective memory offers the chance to understand what shapes collective memory at the grassroots level. It also enables the scholar to move beyond empathy or moralistic judgments to consider the relationship between such local

processes and the politics of memory at the more institutional levels of discourse, privileging neither as more central than the other. My overall point is that comparisons are indeed valuable, though they might not necessarily move us in a more “objective” or unambiguously “better” direction.

Let me step into one small, but greatly contested, case study to illustrate the usefulness of comparative analysis when trying to understand the shaping of collective memory. In 1999 and 2000 I traveled through Transylvania to observe commemorative practices linked to the two world wars, to visit the sites of memory linked to the wars, and to talk with the local communities who are involved in these activities.<sup>12</sup> One of my stops was in Treznea, the village of some sad fame because of a massacre that took place at the beginning of World War II. For those unfamiliar with the case, the events took place on September 9th, 1940, while the Romanian troops were making their way out of Northern Transylvania and Hungarian troops were advancing into the area, according to the stipulations of the Second Vienna Award. Though the retrocession of Transylvania to Hungary was overall peaceful, in this instance as in others (on both sides of the World War II border), during that brief period of movement of troops the local population took advantage of the chaotic situation to settle accounts or express their ethnic nationalism in violent ways. In Treznea, what appears to have happened was that some local Hungarians, with the financial backing of a noble who had lost land to the Romanian local population during the land reform of the 1920s, came after those who had gained in that reform, and in the process killed 87 ethnic Romanians and 6 ethnic Jews. The details, total numbers, and especially the motivation for these killings have all been disputed, making it impossible to offer a clear historical narrative of the account. But the death of these local people is indisputable, and thus poses a question about the meaning of these events first and foremost for the witnesses of the various incidents of that day, next for the local community further down the road, during and since World War II, and ultimately about the meaning of World War II as a total war in these local contexts. The most central question for my study was whether the massacre of Treznea is in fact part of the collective memory of World War II beyond the local community of those directly affected by it. In other words, how does a small, albeit violent and tragic, local event become part of the web of emotional connections that shape collective memory (rather than historical narratives)?

When I arrived in Treznea I knew there was no objective way to narrate the events of September 9th, and my goal was not to come up with a reconciled, balanced version of the story. What I wanted to understand was how the local population had become attached to specific recollections of September 9th and to what extent wider political contexts, especially the ethno-nationalism of the Romanian and Hungarian political elites, had played an important role in these local recollections.<sup>13</sup> I no more believed that the survivors and the larger ethnic-Romanian

community of Treznea could be “objective” in their position vis-à-vis the massacre than that the Hungarians who had witnessed these events and had since left the village could have had an objective position on the matter.

In the process of trying to understand the crafting of these collective memories I came to several conclusions. To begin with, it became absolutely clear that in this case (and I think by extension in many other rural settings in Transylvania, especially with regard to World War II), different communities might have inhabited the same spaces, but they lived side by side, rather than together. Thus, the memory of one group can be completely separate from (and maybe antithetical to) the memory of another. This was the case not only for Hungarian and Romanian groups, but also for the Germans, Jews, and other ethnic groups who lived in Transylvania. In Treznea, for instance, while asking about the “accidental” 6 Jews who were victims of the massacre, I came upon the realization that the village had had a significant Jewish population (something not noted in the village’s monograph done by the local teacher), large enough to have its own Jewish cemetery and large enough to have personal stories about the Shoa and the return of survivors from Auschwitz. The collective memories of the wartime experiences of the local community are currently represented only by Romanians, as the Hungarian and Jewish communities have disappeared. Therefore, in this case, while one is aware of great gaps, it is impossible to reconstruct them in any meaningful way. Silences and questions, rather than specific stories, loom over this broader comparative contextualization.

What also became apparent in the process of speaking with local ethnic Romanians, especially members of the post-war generations, was that little of the broader comparative context had been passed down. Thus, while speaking to me about relations among Romanians, Hungarians, and Jews in the village during the war, the wartime generation didn’t mark the stories to their children in the same way. Whether out of convenience or some other ethno-centric reasons, these omissions and silences in fact misrepresented the 1940s generation’s collective memory to their children. And the result was rather obvious. These generations have both a sense of entitlement and also of victimization vis-à-vis the massacre. They have seen their parents unable to forget those events or stop suffering from the fear of the “return of the Hungarians,” but they also have little understanding of the history of ethnic relations in the village before 1940 or even during the war.

Another important issue has been the relationship between remembering the events of September 9th, the whole of World War II, the Shoa, and the communist takeover. Overall, the remembrances of the wartime generation are framed by two events: September 9th and the communist takeover. Few had much to say about World War II. Some went out of their way to emphasize how *normal* things were during the war, how their neighbors (meaning the ethnic Hungarians) did not behave in the same way as what they had witnessed on September 9th 1940. In fact,

in listening to their stories about World War II, the massacre appeared to me more as an extraordinary disturbance rather than the result of some long-festering nationalist antagonism. This is *not* how ethno-nationalist Romanian historians and politicians have interpreted the meaning of the massacre; they have tended to see it as illustrative of larger inter-ethnic tensions, an expression of a longer trend, rather than an isolated incident, no matter how painful.

And the Shoa only came into discussion marginally. Almost no survivors of September 9th who were in the village in the spring of 1944 (when deportations to the death camps started to take place) made any empathetic (or contrasting) connections between the massacre at the beginning of the war and the violence done to the Jewish community at the end of the war, even though some aspects of the process could have been seen as similar. I initially considered this silence as a sign of local anti-Semitic attitudes, but the comments I heard from those who did mention the Jewish community in any fashion were not so much hateful as simply unengaged with that community. Again, it may simply be that the ethnic Romanians and Jews in the village didn't live together so much as side by side, never heartily engaged in common pursuits. It is possible, in fact, that the interment in the Orthodox cemetery of the 6 Jews killed on September 9th might be the closest these two communities ever came together.

What was also remarkable in the stories I heard from the wartime generation was the great contrast between their memories of the war versus the early years of communism. For virtually all, the arrival of communism was a more traumatic event than their wartime experiences. In effect, this means that, despite spikes in violence of which political elites have made a lot of waves, at the local level communities experienced the war quite differently than one might have expected, if focusing solely on the larger military and political narratives. Treznea, like many other villages and towns of Romania and Hungary, was not part of the fighting front until the very end of the war, in the summer of 1944 and spring of 1945. For the people living in these locales, the wartime experience was more ethnically contingent if they were Jewish than any other ethnicity – Romanian or Hungarian. Otherwise, class, age, and gender all mattered in how they experienced the war, but the consistency with which my respondents spoke more negatively about the Soviet troops and the communist takeover than the Hungarian administration, despite their different personal contexts during the war, was quite remarkable. Thus, comparison between two different traumatic events is a useful corrective, as it confronts the historian with her or his own assumptions about what is broadly significant rather than locally contingent.

This comparison is also important when regarding the relationship between this community's collective memories of September 9th versus the politicization of that event. Though they have participated in the initial efforts to raise a monument to the victims and they continue to participate in the commemorations every

year, the local ethnic Romanians do so not necessarily out of some great loyalty toward the representatives of the state or some abstract notion of patriotism. The inhabitants of Treznea welcome the attention of the higher authorities only in so far as it is respectful of the memory of those who are honored at the commemorations. Many see through the annual politicians' pilgrimages, and qualify them as political struggles for votes and media attention. Such attention doesn't comfort the older generation in their sadness.

For the younger generation, the combination of political discourses and utilization of September 9th for political purposes has created a different, tense context. Being from a small village in the middle of nowhere is not something to brag about, especially when moving to a large city, as many of the younger inhabitants of Treznea have done. Having the massacre at the center of attention for the rest of the country (or at least the region) once a year creates an uncomfortable emotional link: Treznea has become recognizable, but only because of this massacre and the trauma associated with it. Thus, younger Romanians from Treznea have the option of downplaying this and accepting the notion that they're from a small unknown village, something that would in fact not be entirely in keeping with the collective memories of their families. Or they can embrace the media's annual focus on Treznea and draw attention to this event to identify themselves as representing some exceptional identity (of the "martyr" village) within the communities in which they currently live – Oradea, Bucharest, or elsewhere. If the former, they are betraying some of the collective memories valued by their families and community. If the latter, they mark themselves in antagonism with ethnic Hungarians, and thus re-inscribe the ethnic tensions that have existed in this area for too long.

Thus far, I have not seen many efforts to address the real tensions within individuals of these younger generations, to reconcile both expectations of their parents and also find their own comfortable place in a larger community where ethnicity might mean very different things than in small rural communities. History textbooks, museums, and other educational cultural settings have fallen short of providing a balanced view of the past while allowing room for preserving emotional links with collective memory. Would mutual awareness of atrocities committed by ethnic Romanians against Hungarians and Jews and by ethnic Hungarians against Romanians and Jews in World War II change the way in which these younger generations appropriate the burden of their grandparents' trauma and painful memories? Recent work on relations among Poles, Jews, and Germans of the postwar generations suggests that unlearning and the recasting of collective memory of victimization can in fact happen.<sup>14</sup> Eva Hoffman's recent autobiographical book, *After Such Knowledge*, is a powerful testimony to such hopefulness.<sup>15</sup> Political elites cannot force the hand, but they also need at least to step back in their heavy politicization of the commemoration of wartime violence and

victimhood, letting younger generations find their own vocabulary and path from revenge to empathy and from pain to reconciliation.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> One recent interesting dialogue on this issue was recorded in the pages of the *American Historical Review* by a group of six prominent historians whose work has focused on this trend. See "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History. Participants: C. A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia Seed," *American Historical Review* 111(5) (December 2006): 1440–1464. Accessed at <http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/111.5/introduction.html> (9 July 2007).
- <sup>2</sup> The scholarship on nationalism which has both attempted to deconstruct but also reified the national context is vast, but some of the towering figures in the field are Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, [1983], 1991), and more recently *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World* (London: Verso, 1998); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995); Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- <sup>3</sup> Rogers Brubaker, Margit Feischmidt, Jon Fox and Liana Grancea, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2006).
- <sup>4</sup> Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond", in Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield, eds., *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2001), 112–152, and *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); see also Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*.
- <sup>5</sup> Brubaker et al., *Nationalist Politics*.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>7</sup> Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *The Holocaust and the Historians* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Steven T. Katz, *The Holocaust in Historical Context* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Alex Grobman, "The Uniqueness of the Holocaust," accessed at <http://www.holocaust-trc.org/uniqueness.htm> (9 July 2007).
- <sup>8</sup> In May 2007 I attended a conference entitled "The Gulag and the Holocaust in the Romanian Conscience," organized by Ruxandra Cesereanu, a scholar in literary criticism, at Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj. The papers offered at the conference concentrated heavily on the Gulag, and only a minority of participants had either expertise or a primary interest in the Holocaust. In Poland, the historiography on the Holocaust has become more thoroughly developed, though it still coexists in tension with that on the Gulag. In other post-communist countries this dialogue has not even come this far. For a brief overview of the Cluj conference, see "Gulag și Holocaust in constiința românească," *Observator Cultural*, no. 377, 21–27 June 2007, accessed at <http://www.observatorcultural.ro/> (9 July 2007).
- <sup>9</sup> On collective memory as a subject of scholarly interest in the humanities, in particular with regard to historical analysis versus ethical concerns, see W. James Booth, *Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), Paul

- Ricoeur, *Memory, History, and Forgetting* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), Sue Campbell, "Our Faithfulness to the Past: Reconstructing Memory Value," *Philosophical Psychology* 19(3) (June 2006): 361–380, and Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).
- <sup>10</sup> Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*.
- <sup>11</sup> Edward S. Casey, *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); Campbell, "Our Faithfulness"; Joan W. Scott, "The Evidence of Experience," *Critical Inquiry* 17(4) (Summer 1991): 773–797.
- <sup>12</sup> Maria Bucur, "Treznea. Trauma, Nationalism and the Memory of World War II in Romania," *Rethinking History* 6(1) (2002): 35–55.
- <sup>13</sup> My research is based on fieldwork conducted in April 2000 and on oral history interviews (life stories) conducted with the few remaining survivors of the events and with younger members of their families.
- <sup>14</sup> See the papers presented at the conference "Polish–German Post/Memory: Aesthetics, Ethics, Politics," organized in April 2007 at Indiana University, Bloomington. The program and abstracts are accessible at <http://www.indiana.edu/~eucenter/pgconf/>.
- <sup>15</sup> Eva Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge: Where Memory of the Holocaust Ends and History Begins* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).



# **METAPHORS OF AMERICA: LABOR, GLOBAL INTEGRATION, AND TRANSYLVANIAN IDENTITIES**

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Deconstructing the diverse meaning behind the common metaphor “Little America”, this paper explores widely disparate ethnic identity conceptions and inter-ethnic relations in two regions of Transylvania, showing them as dependent on the ways in which each region was integrated into changing patterns of global labor. Regional ethnic identity and relations in the Jiu Valley coal producing region and in the mixed agro-industrial Făgăraș zone vary greatly. In the former, ethnic identity was downplayed and inter-ethnic relations always kept on an even keel owing to the particular process of regional settlement and the common integration of the region’s ethnic groups into the hard coal industry that dominated the Valley from the middle of the 18th century. In the latter region, ethnic relations were frequently tense due to a highly discrete ethnic-based division of labor and organization of political hierarchy. Despite these differences, citizens of each region expressed their ethnic dynamic through use of the “Little America” metaphor. However, in the Jiu Valley this referred to alleged ethnic peace of cooperating national groups, while in Făgăraș this notion referred to the dream of struggling for social mobility and differentiation. The paper thus shows how such basic ethnic conceptions, shaped by the treatment of regional labor in successive phases of the global economy, influence a wide range of differing attitudes toward diverse social and political processes, including socialist development policies and the modern global labor market.

**Keywords:** ethnic Identity; Transylvania; global integration of labor; micro-regional variation

## **Introduction: New Understandings of Ethnicity and Identity**

Social scientific definitions of ethnicity, ethnic identity, and ethnic politics respond to prevailing intellectual fashion. The anthropology of Central and East Europe increasingly accepts models of culture and identity that are processual, interactionist, contestory, and diverse. Culture is no longer defined as a “thing”, a bounded entity comprised of diverse characteristic traits and customs. Instead culture today is seen as a protean phenomenon defined by overlapping boundaries, fluid lives, and relationships used as resources in social interaction (see Appa-

durai 1996). So, too, ethnicity. The recent, important volume by Rogers Brubaker and colleagues (2006) is a classic and comprehensive restatement of the complex, fluid, and over-lapping quality of ethnic lives and identity choices. They ably show how citizens of Cluj enact ethnically different behavior depending on circumstance, the presence of others, and the contexts of interaction. Borrowing much from Katherine Verdery's seminal statement on Transylvanian ethnicity (1983), their approach is blessedly one more weapon to liberate us from the chains of ethnic primordialism.

Though the thesis of protean ethnicity is hopeful and insightful, its concern for process over substance tends to level diverse sources of identity, potentially rendering all contexts of interaction equal and relative in the formation and practice of identity, ethnic or otherwise. Chance meetings on the street and slurs and slights at the dry cleaner or hair dresser are as essential as national politics for motivating ethnic feelings, while conversations in a taxi rise to the level of labor and class relations as sources of sentiment. In contrast, as I argue below, there is still a need for social science to hang on to some of our determinist antecedents and hierarchically arrange the sources and resources mobilized in identity formation and practice, if only to make better comparative sense of them. This essay follows this strategy. In it I argue for the outsized significance of labor, and its integration into global systems of power and production, as key in the formation and the maintenance of ethnic and other forms of identity. This focus, I might add, follows a path blazed by György Ránki (1983) and his colleague Iván Berend (Berend and Ránki 1974), who wrote most convincingly of the significance of the domination of external powers on economic development and the conditions of labor, and hence on human identities and possibilities. Considering a hierarchy of influence in identity formation thus provides us with a tool to predict when and why personal interactions will provoke ethnic responses, and when and why they won't.

Local labor regimes and the global systems of power that shape them operate in "uniformitarian" fashion as far as ethnic identities are concerned. That is, they were as salient in the past for ethnogenesis and identity formation as they are today for ethnic practice and politics. Though labor and power uniformly act on ethnic identity formation and practice, since the origins of the world capitalist economy in the "long sixteenth century" the nature of ownership and related work regimes and the possibilities and obstacles afforded diverse groups within them are especially and increasingly defined in a global context. Stanley Tambiah (1989: 340), for example, shows how the Wallersteinian model of world capitalist integration especially influences the fragmentation of that same world into "nation-states" characterized by crescendos of ethnic violence. In the last decades of intense globalization diminishing states are further complemented by the intensification, if not aggravation, of ethnic identity and anger (Appadurai 2006, Holton 2000).

Thus, to effectively explain changing Transylvanian identities over the last centuries we especially need to include the global context and its structures of labor if we are to better define the interactive qualities of identity and related political practice. The remainder of this paper will thus consider such phenomena in two marginal regions of Transylvania, the Jiu Valley coal mining zone at the intersection of Transylvania with Banat and Oltenia, and the Făgăraș region of south-central Transylvania, between Brașov and Sibiu. I will specifically show how developing regional divisions of labor, set in motion and then cemented by global political economy, contributed to the production of two different senses of identity (one ethnic and one not), two different qualities of political practice (one aggressive and one passive), and different possibilities of local life and culture.

Throughout its modern history the Jiu Valley has mainly been a mono-industrial coal-producing region, first drawing labor from other Central European zones, and then sealing off that labor force to protect its coal-production for use by the Romanian state for purposes of development. The Făgăraș zone, of problematic but mixed agro-industrial economy, has long contributed labor to the international economy through the migration of its citizens. Though there is a certain similarity to the manner by which global forces intersect and influence labor in the two zones today, people in these regions respond to contemporary globalization in highly differentiated ways. Briefly, Jiu Valley miners, unified by their labor and disregarding ethnicity, came largely to fear and suspect influences emanating from the global economy. However, workers and peasants in the Făgăraș region, divided by their labor and intensely ethnic in identity, were forced at an early date to access economic opportunities in other areas of the world. Consequently, they long ago made their peace with the global economy and face outward and seek integration in global processes. As my thesis suggests, these stances emerge from the ways in which the regions were integrated into the global economy in the modern era, how this integration shaped the treatment of each region during the fifty-odd years of socialism, and how the regions have been transformed in the new globalized economy of post-socialism.

### **Metaphors of “Little America”: The Jiu Valley and Făgăraș Compared**

In his now classic article on the practice of multi-sited fieldwork, George Marcus (1995) suggests we can “follow metaphors” to discern global commonalities and ties in widely different areas. This is a particularly effective method for the regions under consideration here. Regional differences are multi-dimensional and include qualities of history, geography, settlement patterns, family structure, inter-ethnic composition and relations, and political orientations, to name a few.

However, though strikingly dissimilar, citizens of each zone commonly refer to their home region by the nickname “Little America”. Though one is struck by the common moniker, when this is probed further one sees that though the names are the same, their meanings are greatly disparate. It is in these differences that we can discern regional qualities and how these have been shaped by different patterns of global integration and reflect different qualities of identity.

When Jiu Valley citizens speak of their region as “Little America”, they refer implicitly to the American concept of the “melting pot” prevalent in the United States through the 1960s. The “melting pot” refers idealistically to an ethnically assimilated, happily cooperating population shaped by immigration and a merging of peoples from across the globe. Thus, according to the local master narrative, expressed by virtually all regional groups, no matter when they arrived nor from where,<sup>1</sup> modern Valley society was formed with the opening of the region’s first coal mines in the 1850s (Baron 1998:64–65) and immigration into the Valley by diverse people from throughout the then-Habsburg Empire to work in the mines and ancillary occupations. As people claim, Romanians, Hungarians, Székelys, Germans, Poles, Czechs, a smattering Serbs and Croats, Gypsies and Jews flooded into the region through the latter part of the nineteenth century to form a polyglot, multiethnic, immigrant melting pot (Velica and Schreter 1993). From its inception, then, the modern Valley was organized for primary raw material extraction making use of uprooted workers and caring little about their primordial origins. The motivation for those entering the so-called American “melting pot” was the “American dream” of economic success and political liberty. This was thought to encourage a manufactured consent (see Burawoy 1985 for analogous use of the concept) of people to strive for individualized wealth and success.

However, the Jiu Valley “little America” metaphor is virtually opposite this image and contradictorily refers to a common class experience within a surrounding and oppositional political structure. Rather than individualistic striving for success, the unifying force in the Valley was the subterranean mining of the region’s hard coal (*hUILă*) deposits, and the shared culture of underground mining was catalyst for an organized class-based politics that increased the insularity of the Valley’s mining population, instead of opening them up for further global influence.

Compared to the Jiu Valley, the “Little America” identity formed in the Făgăraș region resulted from an essentially opposite process. In the Jiu Valley global forces (i.e., the expanded need for coal in the Habsburg imperium and in developing European industry generally) forced immigration into the newly developed coal fields. In Făgăraș, however, those same changing mid-nineteenth century global conditions had a centrifugal effect and pushed people out. From its incep-

tion the Făgăraș socio-economic system was one based on feudal rights and obligations. The region was settled by petty Romanian nobility in the 13th and 14th centuries, who were soon eclipsed by and subordinated to dominant Magyar-speaking overlords and Saxon German bankers and traders. As regional population increased after feudalism (Bărbat 1938: 96–97) and land resources were pressured, many Romanian-speaking Făgărașeni had no recourse but to leave their homes to seek economic survival and gain in other areas of the developing global system.<sup>2</sup> Făgărașeni mainly went to work in the developing industries of the United States. Their presence there produced in their mentalities a classic “imagined community” (Anderson 1993) intensely linking the region with the USA, especially through the medium of immigrant newspapers like *Curierul Româno-American* or *Vremea Nouă* (Nemoianu 1997, 2001, Roceric 1982).

The Făgăraș Romanian migrant community in America had remarkable cache in their natal region. The typical goal of the Făgăraș emigrant was to go to America to make “big pile money”, in the words of one octogenarian reflecting on his New World sojourn. Nearly every regional village household depended on emigrant remitted capital. Regional economic development was also spurred by these monies (Kideckel 1993:40) as was general cultural change, including developing styles of dress, slang, home decoration, literacy, and the like. The telos of regional emigration and the symbolic capital of the emigrant community thus gave rise to the Făgăraș name “Little America”. This identity was further embellished by the importance and visibility of the returning migrants in Făgăraș local communities. Many returned purposefully to purchase land and take up positions as yeoman farmers, but others came back inadvertently having failed to adapt to life in the New World or having been deported for one infraction or another. But whatever the reason, the manifest presence of these “Americans” in Făgăraș communities lent credence to regional myths of upward mobility via hard labor and competition, facilitated by the assistance of one’s co-ethnics.<sup>3</sup>

### **History and Identity Practice in the Two Regions**

This brief discussion of the origins and meaning of the diverse “Little America” metaphors implies two separate but essential and related dimensions of the 16th–20th century global political economic system. The Jiu Valley reflected the expansionist nature of global capital seeking new mineral and raw material wealth, while Făgăraș was defined by the wholesale export of inexpensive, politically compromised labor to man industries in developing core states. The responses to these two different, but related, aspects of the 19th century global economy, Jiu Valley insularity and Făgăraș openness, were thus themselves necessar-

ily different. However, these different responses also produced and were intensified by different sentiments of identity in the regions. Again, however, the Jiu Valley and Făgăraș regions diverge in this regard. The formation of Jiu Valley mining, as discussed above, brought together a great number of diverse ethnic communities and interspersed them amongst one another in the coal mining towns of the valley. There were no ethnic neighborhoods, *per se*, nor were there distinctly ethnic trades except for agriculture and stock keeping, the near exclusive domain of regional upland peasants, termed “Momârlani”,<sup>4</sup> who produced cheeses, milk, meats, and vegetables for sale to mining families with whom they developed trading partner relations.

This system, then, along with the unity of labor in underground mining, lent itself to de-emphasis of ethnic identities which were conserved and practiced largely by Valley women in their crafts and cuisine. Miners themselves typically avoided religious practice and older informants spoke of how they only understood there were different types of people during holiday seasons. One German–Hungarian miner who mainly worked at the Vulcan Coal Preparation facility said:

I never knew I was a minority or even that there was such a thing as ethnic minorities until after World War II. Then, because of my German background, I was deported to Ukraine to work in the Dombas coal mines. Before, I walked on Vulcan streets and greeted people in their native languages. Holidays were best, because different people all had their own celebrations with different food, songs, and decorations. Kids played together and we never gave a thought to our differences. All the people on the street looked out for all the kids and sent them home when their parents wanted them.

The de-emphasis of ethnicity was paired with the embellishment of class in the Jiu Valley, a function of labor ferment in the raw capitalist early mining industry. The regional workforce regularly expanded and contracted in relation to industrial boom and bust cycles. Mine mechanization, begun in 1924, also caused unemployment of great numbers of miners. Wildcat strikes over pay and working conditions were common (Toth-Gaspar 1964, cited in Friedman 2003), especially as the price of coal plummeted and the world teetered toward depression in 1929. However, even though many non-Romanian ethnics permanently left the region after World War I, when the region became part of “Greater Romania” (Baron 1998: 273), ethnic peace still reigned, even if labor peace did not.

In contrast, in Făgăraș, the particular process of regional settlement and the early regional division of labor resulted in the separation of its few main ethnic communities (Romanian, Magyar, and Saxon German), whose divisions also showed in people’s responses to the late 19th century global economic transformation. The Făgăraș zone is an ecological micro-region separated from the rest of

Transylvania by the Olt River on the north and West and the low-lying Perșani Mountains on the east. As discussed, the region was originally settled and controlled by a class of Romanian-speaking nobility dominating a small-scale Romanian peasantry from the 12th through the 14th centuries. From the 14th century the area came under increased Magyar political domination and by the 17th century was fully encapsulated in that feudal system (Pușcariu 1907). A fairly strict division of labor took impetus through the feudal period, with Romanians restricted to peasant livelihoods and service as priests and teachers. This was eased at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the twentieth as the region developed (albeit small-scale) industry (Bărbat 1938), especially after its post-World War I integration into “greater Romania”. However, this was largely restricted in size as it was submerged and dominated by the larger centers of Brașov and Sibiu to the east and west respectively. Furthermore, Făgăraș industry was also typically ethnic-based, and frequently dispersed in regional villages, where workers had less class than local and/or ethnically defined identities:

At the start of... capitalist industrialization, almost all workers had rural origins, with deep roots in their native villages... Most had few advanced sociocultural aspirations, nor organizational capacity, nor clear conception of the historical necessity to develop their socioeconomic demands in a decisive way for political struggle (Herseni et al 1972: 307).

Thus, politics in Făgăraș, unlike among their working class Jiu Valley cousins, revolved around, the Romanian national struggle, where many Făgărașeni distinguished themselves. But as with ethnic-based politics everywhere, the creation of greater Romania after World War I (not to mention the previous four centuries of feudalism and Magyar political domination) left residues of resentment between the region’s Romanians and Hungarians.<sup>5</sup> Romanian intellectuals often spoke of the threat that a Hungarian fifth-column potentially represented to their rightful control of Transylvania even as many Hungarians from the region sought to emigrate to post-Trianon Hungary. In the Jiu Valley, however, post-Trianon emigration was largely a function of the capitalist business cycle and undertaken by individuals who defined themselves as workers rather than ethnics. These socio-economic identities, thus formed in the crucible of diverse nodes of the developing capitalist world system, were soon codified in local life and expressed in metaphor, social practice, language, religion, and above all politics. Such were the conditions of regional life and labor that were soon to be immersed in a new red “melting pot”, stirred by the flame of class struggle and socialist development.

### Socialism

The post-World War II ascent to and consolidation of power by the Romanian Communist Party was supposed to represent a break with the past insofar as ethnic and other forms of social relations were concerned. Furthermore, the socialist state was decidedly (publicly, at least) oriented to support workers and open their horizons to personal advancement and new forms of knowledge. This would contribute to their fulfilling their historic revolutionary mission. However, reviewing the course of the forty odd years of socialist power in Romania, and in the Jiu Valley and Făgăraș zones in particular, it is apparent that socialism merely deepened regional tendencies that had developed through the previous centuries. Furthermore, despite the formal break with the world capitalist economy that socialism was alleged to represent, it is also clear that vast, if not entirely similar, global forces continued to work on the definition and practice of social relations in the regions during that time, and especially on the diverse identity postures of local peoples.

Briefly, socialist practices further encouraged both the global insularity of Jiu Valley people and the global orientation of Făgărașeni. However, both these stances, in retrospect, appear to have developed due to the competition of Soviet and socialist societies with Western capitalism (Chase-Dunn 1980) waged in the Cold War. In the Jiu Valley, the first decade of the socialist period was characterized by the outsized domination of the Soviet Union whose agents controlled the region through the formation of joint mining enterprises, Sovroms, to intensify coal production and extract Romania's war reparations. Along with mining, the Soviets also controlled government and education, enabled the formation of an extensive secret police presence, and influenced building styles and other cultural practices. The ethnic melting pot image of the region articulated well with the ideology of ascendant socialism to elaborate an internationalist, working-class image of Valley folk. This was especially encouraged by the symbolic manipulation of the region's past labor strife to emphasize its multinational, proletarian characteristics. It was in the early 1950s, for example, that the profuse miner images and symbolism like the caricatured "miner and peasant" sculptor in the town of Uricani appeared in Valley communities, while miner grave decorations began to emphasize "prolecult" sculpture and bas relief like red stars, hammers and sickles, miner lamps, pickaxes, and jack hammers (see also Buchli 1999).

It was also in this period, however, that socialist policy began to turn the "melting pot" quality of Valley life away from the celebration of ethnic unity to emphasize differentiation, privilege certain ethnic groups over others, close off the Valley to foreign influence, and encourage a degree of xenophobia in miner culture. The initial factor promoting this change was the deportation due to their alleged Nazi collaboration of hundreds of German-speaking ethnics for forced labor in the



coal mines of the Ukraine Dombas region. Though this event is little noted or discussed by Valley citizens today, it made German-speakers a suspect group and marked ethnicity as a relationship of significance, at least outside the underground. This also continued after the Sovroms ended in the late 1950s, as Romania's socialist/nationalist governments continued expansion of Valley coal mining for national development purposes.

The region's semi-hard coal was ideal for coke manufacture for steel production and for power generation. To protect this industrial heartland, and taking their cues from the vast Soviet secret police apparatus put in place earlier, the Valley through socialist years became one of the most surveilled and tightly controlled of Romania's regions (Nicolau 1999). Authorities especially sought to control population movement in and out of the Valley even as the region's miners were increasingly favored by the state in terms of salaries, benefits, housing, and other amenities. These forces thus contributed to the deepening of regional isolation and the growth of a degree of Romanian nationalism previously unknown in the region. The miners' slogan, "We give coal for the country", was offered in deed as well as word as miners generally became imbued with nationalist sympathies.

Such tendencies were even furthered after the coal miners' strike of 1977. The strike was for economic purposes and the striking miners were careful to acknowledge their commitment to socialist principles and the Romanian state (Matinal 1997). However, to weaken the politically restive miners<sup>6</sup> and ensure uninterrupted coal production, the regime flooded the Valley with new workers, especially from poorer, rural areas of Romania, like Moldavia. Military units were also sent to the mines as were some criminals, sentenced there to hard labor. The influx of these new groups, especially the Moldavians, made the regional population even more insular and inward-looking and supportive of the nationalist impulses of the Ceaușescuite state. Still, despite this overt nationalism, and even through the 1980s and the extremes of Ceaușescu's attempts to foment inter-ethnic suspicions, Valley workers refused to give in to ethnic idioms of behavior. This was more a function of the unifying effects of labor in Valley coal mines than the region's multi-ethnic mythology of settlement. Here the danger of their work underground made them dependent on each other expressed in the miners' "code of honor" that averred that "in the underground no one is different, no one is an enemy. This code and the expected solidarity of individual miners with one's work-team mates (*ortaci*) thus enabled the persistence of the "Little America" metaphor even as it allowed for the continued expression of Romanian nationalism.

Socialism in Făgăraș, including the expansion of the region's chemical industry and the movement of thousands from villages to city as factory laborers, produced a near opposite result than that in the Jiu Valley. Such developments, in fact, only served to intensify regional longings for their integration into global re-

lations and intensified ethnic identity. Again, labor and ownership sat at the base of these deepening sentiments. In the first place, the region was a center for a Romanian nationalist, anti-Communist resistance in the decade after the party's capture of power (Ogoreanu 1995). The fervent desire to prevent the socialist capture of power turned people's heads to the West to wait expectantly for the Allies, especially the US, to make good on their (ultimately hollow) promise to keep Eastern Europe out of socialist clutches. Though Făgărașeni longings went unheeded, pro-Western sentiments rarely declined. In fact, emigration from the Făgăraș zone continued at a significant pace even during the years of socialism, facilitated by US "unification of families" immigration policies. Meanwhile Romanian-American immigrant groups in the United States continued to maintain contacts with people in the region. This was facilitated as the dominant Orthodox church was also thickly connected to American, Canadian, and Australian hierarchies, who themselves were replete with those tracing their family origins to the Făgăraș region.

Labor transformations figured largely into these perspectives. Collective farming, never imposed on the Jiu Valley, was resisted at every turn in Făgăraș and surrounding communes. But more than resistance, the rejection of collectivism intensified positive views of the region's past and called up embellished memories of the pre-World War II period and the glories of capitalism. "When we were private farmers..." was an oft-repeated phrase uttered by Făgăraș collectivists. Even the expanded degrees of industrial employment in the region's chemical factories did little to stem the "other directedness" of Făgărașeni. Făgăraș workers prided themselves on their technical competence and often expressed frustration at some of the outmoded practices and technologies with which they worked. They were insatiably curious about Western industrial practices and processes. During fieldwork in the mid-1970s many workers regularly questioned me about Western practices and requested catalogues and other information to attest to Western processes. In other words, unlike the miners who became even more insular with their experience in the mines, the industrial experience of Făgărașeni served to pique their international curiosity to an even greater extent.

At the same time as Făgărașeni still looked westward, the region fell greater prey to Ceaușescu nationalist exhortations. This was fueled by a number of factors. First, the steady "sale" and "repatriation" of Saxon Germans from the region back to Germany proper, left the region divided into two noticeably distinct ethnic groups, Magyar and Romanian. Second, the region's feudal history and the bifurcation of the regional population into dominant and dominated continued to resonate in the rural-urban distribution of population. Făgăraș villages were largely Romanian, though the Făgăraș city population was split between Magyars and Romanians, and over the years of socialism became increasingly Romanian. The

expansion of the regional chemical industry produced an intense rural-urban migration, such that the remnant Magyar population was increasingly differentiated and isolated from the regional mainstream. As Magyars felt overcome by increased Romanian nationalism and looked to Hungary for support Romanian distrust increased and ethnic tensions, though not violent and overt, continued to bubble beneath the surface of regional life throughout Ceaușescu's "golden epoch".

At one level the transformation of Făgăraș regional identities during socialism challenges my thesis of the importance of globally constituted labor in the production of identity. On the surface intensifying Făgărașeni Romanian nationalism seems a classic case of the "fear of small numbers" (Appadurai 2006), where the presence of a numerically limited minority produces a sense of incompleteness and threat to a far numerically superior majority. However, Appadurai's notion depends in great measure on such fears being goaded by overwhelming change in economic conditions, and this too was the case in Făgăraș. To be sure, Romanians did not see the resident Magyar population as occupying any different positions in the local economy and, in fact they typically filled the same jobs as Romanians in factories and offices. Nonetheless, Magyars were still thought to have some economic advantages that produced a certain envy amongst Romanians.

Though all in the region struggled with the difficult conditions of life in late socialism, those "difficult conditions" were often laid at the feet of the Hungarian population. Ceaușescu justified state demands for increased production and decreased, even rationed, consumption in his last years by constant reference to the threat the country faced from foreign agents, a concept that largely glossed the Hungarian minority and their ethnic state on Romania's borders. And Făgărașeni were increasingly susceptible to such propaganda. Additionally there were great and very obvious differences in the presence and roles of the Romanian and Hungarian Diaspora communities at this time. The Romanian community abroad was largely alienated from their homeland, spurred partially by a bitter dispute to the control the Romanian American Episcopate (Lascu 1984, Lascu, Ed. 1995). The "Little Americans" of Făgăraș felt wistful, isolated, and abandoned by their American cousins. As testimony to that, I was frequently sought out by individuals, many of whom I did not even know, to urgently request my help to find a relative, a missing address, or other information. Hungarians, on the other hand, and regardless of whether they personally benefited, were said to have the support of their co-ethnic community, whether in Hungary proper or in the Hungarian diaspora in the United States. Twisted versions of the impassioned speeches of Tom Lantos, Hungarian-American Democratic Congressman from California, in support of the rights of the Hungarian minority and highly critical of the Ceaușescu regime, were also publicized throughout the Romanian community to add to the

sense of differentiation. Thus, the two regions largely remained divergent throughout the years of socialism. The multi-ethnic miners, though supportive of the state, were only moderately nationalist in orientation. Făgăraș workers and collectivists, however, were both more suspect of socialism, but increasingly and intensely receptive to ethnic and nationalist rhetoric.

These patterns continued to play out in the 1989 Revolution. Space for a review of revolutionary events in both regions is too brief here to do justice to their complexity. Suffice it to say, however, that the miners reacted *en masse* and without regard to ethnic identity in their knee-jerk political reactions at the end of socialism. At that time they were called to Bucharest by Ion Iliescu, head of the revolutionary National Salvation Front and soon to be Romania's first post-socialist president, to beat up protestors in June 1990 and to bring down the government of centrist Petre Roman in September 1991. In Făgăraș, responses to the Revolution took on a religious character (Kideckel 1993: 214), even as the local Magyar population used their new-found freedom to arrange for trips (and sometimes emigration) to Hungary. Though both groups respected the catalyzing activities of László Tókéş, by Easter 1990 some Romanian intellectuals in Făgăraş were already highly critical of his outspoken program for Hungarian rights in Transylvania. Whatever the differences between the separate regional communities however, they did not endure. The end of socialism induced major change in the statist, mono-industrial economies on which both regions depended. These brought new labor regimes into the regions and forced a convergence of life and identity in them away from miner solidarity and Făgăraş ethno-nationalism to adapt to the commonalities of unemployment, decline, and depletion of the regions' populations.

### **Regional Responses to Post-Socialist Transformation**

Since the end of socialism, the Jiu Valley and Făgăraş zones have suffered remarkably in Romania's developing and increasingly dependent market economy. Given their past concentration on single spectrum, large-scale, state-supported industry (coal mining and chemical production), the two zones have been particularly affected by post-socialist privatization and industrial restructuring. Massive unemployment in both regions and the closing of mines and factories has had particularly disastrous effects on the solidarity of labor and have played a singular role in the changing identity and political practice of both the Jiu Valley miners and Făgăraş workers.<sup>7</sup> However, again we see that such identities were defined variously and to different effect especially insofar as inter-ethnic relations were concerned.

The Jiu Valley coal mining industry had a particularly steep downward slide considering the heights to which the miners had risen during socialism. Since the mid 1990s the coal mines have begun to close and/or be cut back in size, production, and labor force in a large way. This was prompted first by the general inefficiency of the mining industry,<sup>8</sup> but was also encouraged by demands from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and European Union for Romanian industrial restructuring, as well as Romania's increased integration into global exchange networks.<sup>9</sup> In the latter case, the declines in Romanian industrial production and access to cheaper coal on the international market meant considerably less of a need for home-grown production. Not incidentally, analogous to the state's importing so many different types of workers after the 1977 strike to neuter the politically restive miners, the large-scale cut-back in mining in the 1990s also came on the heels of the so-called *mineriade* of 1990 and 1991. Those miner invasions of Bucharest prompted widespread fear and indignation throughout the country (see, for example, Cesereanu 2003) and calls for dismantling the mining system that provoked such violence (Perjovschi 1999). To that end, starting in 1997 and continuing in a slow but steady pace, employment in the mines has been cut back by the state policy of labor contract buy-outs, or *disponibilizare*. This program enticed miner participation by offering them large severance packages along with regular unemployment benefits (Romania Government 1997). As a consequence over the last few years employment in mining declined from roughly 42,000 in 1997 to about 15,000 by late 2000 as three of thirteen mines closed and talk was of closure of another five to eight mines.

Global factors are clearly greatly responsible for these changes. However, the response by most of the Jiu Valley redundant miners was a curious and contradictory mixture of both fear of global integration of their production system and wholesale enthusiasm for the blessings of globalized culture (Friedman 2003). In the initial years of the post-socialist buy-outs the redundant mining population, taking its cue from the insular, semi-xenophobic qualities of regional life in socialism's last years and responding to the role of the international community in the decline of Romanian coal mining, evinced suspicion, reservation, if not outright disgust about the developing global production system. They were also extensively critical about the international institutions that allegedly catalyzed the taking apart of the mining industry, and even cast aspersions about other nations' roles in this process. In their response to the loss of their jobs, some unemployed miners sought to return to their regions of origin (chiefly Moldavia). Some tried to move, with little success, to still other areas of Romania where jobs were allegedly available. Some used their severance pay to try to establish small businesses in the Jiu Valley itself. However, in the first decade of post-socialism few redundant miners saw emigration to other European countries as an option.

At this same time Hungary and Hungarians began to be discussed with negative connotations, though this was again more an economic than an ethnic discourse. Thus in the late 1990s miners justified their fear of emigration by repeating rumors of how those who emigrated to work in Hungarian mines were given the worst and most dangerous jobs there at the lowest pay. Similarly antipathy toward Hungary was prompted by some EU and World Bank policies which seemed to favor that country at Romania's expense. One celebrated case was the EU demand that Romania's COMTIM pig-raising complex outside Timișoara be closed so that another could be built literally down the road in Kecskemét, Hungary. The urban-dwelling miners, who were largely without the possibilities of gardening or raising a pig, said their diets depended on that complex, which they also claimed to be one of the most productive and modern facilities in Europe. In other instances miners constantly cited Hungary as the referent for conditions and events in the Valley. They spoke of how women's wages in Hungary far exceed that of men's in Romania and how Hungary supports small business development for redundant workers while Romania does not. Hunger strikers in the Valley town of Lupeni, many of whom had lost jobs in the buyouts, also blamed their plight on the indifference of the European community to the plight of Romanians and the desire for Europeans to exploit Romanian resources. They spoke of shaming Romania by speaking to the international press, if they could only get across the border to Hungary to do so.

Hungary is not the only source of Jiu Valley concern. Other suspicions of global forces in the region derived from the out-sized presence of international NGOs and related organizations. The Valley has been a felicitous place for these organizations to set up shop, attracted as they are by the extremes of unemployment and social problems in the region, by Romanian state policies that formally or informally direct external organizations to the Valley, and probably by the notoriety of the Jiu Valley miners due to their recent past history of political violence. In the last years, then, a great number of internationally-based organizations, from the World Bank to a number of private, religious-based charities have established offices and programs in the Valley to "assist" local citizens in all manner of initiatives; establishing businesses, retraining workers, advising on and developing programs related to alcoholism and domestic abuse, etc. The extent of assistance "projects" and foreign-supported NGOs duplicates the profusion of such institutions found in war-torn Bosnia, and their problems and tensions between donors and locals are just as obvious (Sampson 2002). However, an overall review shows many of the programs to have been mostly ineffective. Many NGOs pass through the region quickly. Others establish programs for which there is little use. Still others are compromised by the didactic, non-responsive style they establish in their practices (see Kideckel 2005, Nesperova 2000). The World Bank loan scheme has had some positive results of late in seeding a developing group of

small entrepreneurs and attracting a few businesses to its “incubator” located in the east Valley town of Petrila. However, even these programs have been greeted by derision and accusations of favoritism by most miners (Carmen Tarnovschi, personal communication).

At the same time that global forces are derided for their affects on local employment, reemployment, and the mitigation of social problems, the atomization of Jiu Valley labor has been furthered by miners’ overbearing concern for consumption as a marker of status, itself intensified by Romania’s increased integration into the global production system. Miner culture had always been oriented towards consumption as a means of self-actualization. This was particularly supported by high salaries in the past, urban lifestyles, and their self-identification as modern and sophisticated. Thus many miners took their severance pay from the labor contract buy-outs and used it to purchase large numbers of household items, including furniture, rugs, and especially household electronic appliances and computers. The competition for these items was furious in the late 1990s and fed the development of a retail sector and ancillary services and also supported the extraordinary growth in local use of the Internet, web-searching, chatting, and the pirating and trading of videos (Rus 2004).

As in other Romanian locales, there are a great number of public Internet cafes and other outlets in Valley towns. However, Jiu Valley miners have also taken to purchasing computers, cable connections, and internet services for their apartments. Now, in place of spending time with colleagues at local bars after their shift, miners run home, log-on, and chat with their colleagues from the confines of their apartments, in a pattern reminiscent of the geekiest of Internet geeks in the West. To an extent, the miners’ penchant for the internet represents the intersection of earlier consumption patterns with changing labor conditions. In particular, it also reflects the increased insularity of workers that has developed in the wake of recent changes the Jiu Valley production regime. Thus, in the years since the buy-outs began typical group sociability of miners has declined precipitously as labor has become increasingly tendentious and insecure and the cost of living skyrocketed. This social breakdown has also been intensified by accusations and counter-accusations set in motion by the failed *mineriade* of the 1990s and the opprobrium this brought to the miners as a group. The decline in their social life even prompted one sub-engineer with whom I was speaking during a visit to the Valley in Summer 2006 to suggest that miners no longer even evince any concern or affinity for their “*ortaci*” (workmates) that was previously the essential social relationship in the Valley.

Increased consumption, unemployment, and social atomization together finally broke down miner resistance to international emigration and, in the last five years, the floodgates have opened. However, most of those leaving the Valley for work in Italy and Spain and even Hungary, tend to be younger workers, often un-

married, whose capital remittances has continued to fuel an intense culture of consumption in the region, despite the overwhelming extent of unemployment. Thus, people in the Jiu Valley today have highly ambiguous and emotionally-charged attitudes to global forces. Though Jiu Valley miners clearly recognize and decry the role of global economic forces in limiting local occupational possibilities, they also see those same global forces, often unrealistically, as a potential panacea to what ails the region. Aside from tourism, which many unrealistically see as the region's savior, people hope for a "white knight" foreign investor, to rescue the region's coal industry. Most of the mines, people say, still have large quality deposits of coal and all that remains is the wisdom and the wealth to exploit them effectively.

The ethnic identity of their potential saviors, of course, is not an issue for the Valley population. Tourism development and growth of the land market can only be fueled by large sums of capital coming from abroad. Thus, when people speak of the possibilities of attracting such investment, many again refer to the "Little American" quality of their population. They refer to how they parried Ceaușescu's attempts at provoking ethnic antagonism and point to the traditional harmony of the region's diverse peoples as reason for trusting the Valley as a site for wise investment. Such claims are rendered as a clear counterpoint to the disregard by which the Valley is seen throughout Romania owing to the violence of the past *mineriade*, the last occurring in January 1999. However, they have more than a kernel of truth to them. Ethnic politics has always been weak in the region, being replaced by an active and vibrant working-class culture. However, with mines closure, unemployment, the growth of consumption and a class of entrepreneurs who vertically integrate wholesale and retail, even this working-class solidarity has been eclipsed by social atomization. Even so, Valley folk have not fallen prey to ethnic recrimination. For example, though some Valley intellectuals are knowledgeable about the so-called Hungarian Status Law, and Romanians generally either found the multiple jurisdictions of the law objectionable (Deets 2004) or hoped the Law would be reformed to aid Romanians working in Hungary (Rompres 2001), few miners were cognizant of the law and none were particularly incensed nor motivated for work in Hungary.

Like their miner cousins, Făgăraș citizens, too, have experienced massive economic transformation and dislocation in the last years. However, differences in their history, in their current position in the global and national economy, and in the structure of the region's ethnic population produced widely different social conditions and identity postures and practices. From the very outset of post-socialism the region's factory mainstays, the UPRUC chemical fittings plant and the Nitramonia chemical production combine, now considered outmoded "mammoths", began to experience a slow, steady bleed of labor (Kideckel 2007). After a long and contentious process that pit workers against management, UPRUC's



last six sections (out of thirteen that operated during socialism) have been privatized, though two of these are also rumored to be close to bankruptcy. Nitramonia's circumstances during socialism were some of the best available in Romanian factories owing to the patronage of Elena Ceaușescu, who "earned" her PhD in Polymer Chemistry there. However, since the end of socialism the factory has been on a steadily downward path, losing markets, production sections, and workers. In the last years it was duped out of resources by foreign patrons feigning privatization assistance (Șelaru 2004) and has just recently been closed entirely, allegedly to be conserved for future sale (Anonymous 2007).

Unlike the miners, however, Făgărașeni did not wait for unemployment to swamp them before opening themselves up to global possibilities. Ceaușescu was not cold in his grave before Romanians in the region began to leave in large numbers, both legally and illegally, largely for positions of unskilled labor in Italy.<sup>10</sup> From the outset, this migration, like chain migrations elsewhere (see Yan 2003) not coincidentally reproduced values, structures, and relationships. Făgărașeni often moved in groups, established communities and common residences where they migrated, divided up their labor on community bases (i.e., migrants from different villages concentrated in different occupations),<sup>11</sup> and even traveled together *en masse* to and from Italy and other Western outposts.<sup>12</sup> In contrast to Romanian emigration patterns, the remnant regional Hungarian population either took temporary jobs in Hungary or sought to permanently move there. Cyclical migration to Western Europe and then a return to Romania was not so much an option for the remaining regional Magyar population.

The massive and steady emigration of members of all ethnic groups from the region was due to the vast redundancies of labor in the chemical plants, now even less relevant than the remaining coal mines for the national economy. Furthermore the economic downturn and resulting labor migration influenced different responses than those seen in the Jiu Valley. Instead of the class-based, ethnic-neutral mass orientation of Jiu Valley miners, Făgăraș workers after socialism began to fragment in a number of ways. Though local labor unions mounted some action, the dwindling numbers of union members and new regulations allowing formation of unions across factory and even sectoral borders, set in motion inter-union competition for members and resources (Kideckel 2001, Ockenga 1997). Workers soon tuned this out for their own individualist strategies. Most strikingly, as far as unemployment was concerned, the response of Făgăraș workers was diametrically opposite to that of the miners. First the factories were riven with all kinds of conflicts between different social categories of workers in the attempt to avoid unemployment. Men and women were jealous of each other. City workers and rural workers competed for their jobs. And ethnic identities also figured when some workers seemed to have gained favor with administrators. Then, by the time

of the labor contract buy-outs (1997), instead of attempting to keep their jobs, Făgăraș workers continued their competition for the ability to get out of their labor contracts, since many had new possibilities in Italy (Romanians) and Hungary (Magyars).

Still despite the wholesale elimination of most of their economic possibilities, and the recognition of the global forces that underlay this, people in Făgăraș are still much more oriented to and positive about these same forces than their Jiu Valley counterparts. The massive depletion of the region's economy and population, along with the refusal of the state to grant the region's application for special treatment as "Disfavored" leave locals no option but to see the necessity for their region of global factors like external investment, tourism, and greater Romanian integration into international structures. Of course many decry some corrupt practices of foreign patrons, and recognize how foreign ownership has been disastrous for salaries, benefits, union membership, and occasionally even responsible for the destruction of local firms (such as was the case with the UPRUC enameling section). Nonetheless, Făgărașeni of all ethnic persuasions continue to face outward in their approach to the world, though they often do so with an ethnic tinge to their behavior.

Variation in emigration strategies is not the only way that the relevance of ethnicity is observed in the region today. The region's ethnic communities also serve as strategic actors in development planning or in employment strategizing. For example, one leading local cultural institution, itself named after Negru Voda, one of the first nobles to settle the region and an identity that smacks of Romanian national sentiment, has begun to plan to develop a Museum of the Romanian Diaspora, dedicated to celebrating Romania's (and Romanians') global relationships, with hopes to draw significant amounts of foreign visitors and capital, Romanian-Americans in particular, to the region. At the same time, both Magyar and Romanian communities in the region were animated during the rise and then reform of the Hungarian Status Law. Some Romanian friends spoke of the great offense to national pride and integrity the Law represented while Magyars were enthused about the possibilities for greater and more effective contact with Hungary proper.

Thus as post-socialism produces a convergence of life circumstances in the two regions, the "Little America" metaphor also converges on a similar plaintive quality. Again, however, emphases differ. In the Jiu Valley, on one hand, miners still speak of "Little America" to define a glorified past, based on a waning solidarity amongst the now fragmented and diminished working class. On the other hand, Făgărașeni speak of "Little America" when discussing an unlikely future; citing the idea as justification for potential investors' interest in their region. Both these usages, however, have more in common than their phrasing and their plaintive-

ness. In fact they most importantly define the true commonality of the present period by their implicit recognition that “America” and the capitalist West have now come to both regions in the form of neo-liberal economic practice and its effects.

### **American (and European) Dreaming in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

The circumstances and relationships that defined the regions’ differential integration into past global systems continue today though regional change has transformed the meaning of the “Little America” metaphors in deed, if not in word. As suggested, many still mention their region’s nicknames when they talk of the past and dream of the future. This is still the case even though the collectivity of miner lives is barely evident and broken by a decade of mine closures and downsizing. Similarly those foreign investors with ties to the Făgăraș region have yet to materialize in any number. Despite these lacks, in both regions “America” still figures metaphorically in identity formation and change. However, this is not in the self-ascriptive identities of melting pots or “big pile money”, but in the significance of economic policies that fall under the rubric of the so-called “Washington Consensus” and its edgy neo-liberalism.

Taken to extremes the Washington Consensus consists of aggressive free trade regimes (and a deluge of foreign products on national markets), the protection of capital and downward pressure on worker salaries and benefits, and encouraging and facilitating the migration of surplus labor for minimal wages and benefits to other global areas of high labor costs (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). As Stephen Crowley (2004) suggests, post-socialist East Central Europe, and Romania in particular, more closely hews to this model compared to their West European cousins who preceded them into the European Union. Thus, in Romania, the neo-liberal policies and practices of the reformist Popescu-Tăriceanu government has further pressured the previously protected labor movement (cf. Rubin Meyer Doru and Trandafir 2003) and loosened the state’s grip over business by taxation reform. Markets of every sort are booming, especially housing and land, and larger Romanian cities have been over-taken by phalanxes of luxury vehicles, fashionable restaurants, and electronics stores of every kind. Cities are also again home to expanding groups of global expatriates of every sort, who move into the country for commerce (Arabs and Chinese), political asylum (Kurds), real estate speculation (Italians and Dutch), and as victim, purveyor, and/ or supervisor of the burgeoning international sex trade (Moldovans, Ukrainians, Albanians).

Thus where the two regions previously diverged in the selection of different aspects of the American myth and its ethnic identity implications, the rough manner by which Romania, and within Romania, its diverse regions, are integrated into new global and European configurations forces their convergence on a single

model. Thus in the Jiu Valley over the last few years economic necessity exploded the cultural dam holding back emigration and Valley folk, taking a lesson from Făgărașeni, have moved with a fury to join them in the legions of migrant workers in western Europe. One critical difference between the two regions is the visibility of migrant capital and how it is employed. In Valley towns, still shaped by miner consumer culture, capital remittances of labor emigrants have fueled a vibrant urban life and culture of consumption. In Petroșani, for example, the numerous restaurants and terraces fill up and remain busy throughout the day. However, the “café culture” is not tantamount to serious investment in productive enterprise and when you talk to people over a beer, they still bemoan the lack of jobs and futures in the region.

Meanwhile, given the extent of emigration from the Făgăraș region, that city these days seems like a ghost town. Streets are empty and driving through town at nine o'clock one night in summer 2006, a rough count showed about one in four apartments with visible light. Făgăraș migrant remittances are instead employed in the purchase of land and the refurbishing of houses in some regional villages (though some communities more farther afield have also been depopulated). A multi-dimensional pall hangs over the city and region, with empty factories, empty apartments, empty stores, empty churches. The Făgăraș Hungarian Unitarian Minister, for example, bemoaned the decline of the region's Magyar population. He is forced to divide his time between parishes in Făgăraș and Sibiu and says that neither location has sufficient parishioners to support his activities. And though the parish house in Făgăraș was recently refurbished, money for the project was donated by private funds from Hungary.

Thus, this turn of events is the exclamation point on the nature and possibilities of identity in these two Romanian regions under the impact of globally-inspired change. Now, however, in response to such overwhelming changes people in both regions have begun to deemphasize American images and look to their new European compatriots for assistance and support. In the Jiu Valley, in particular, potential tourist areas, like land around the Părâng Mountain chair lift or the Buții Canyon Restaurant and Resort Complex, have been purchased by West Europeans, Italians in the case of the former and Germans in the case of the latter. Major road repairs designed to further the accessibility of the Valley for the hordes of tourists yet to arrive have been contracted out to a Greek firm. In Făgăraș, too, the European presence is more noticeable. A new heating complex for many of the town's apartments has been built and the magnificent 13th century fortress (*Cetate*) that dominates the center of town is also being refurbished with EU funds. Despite these salutary developments, regional citizens are of two minds about their new European relations. Though they see hope in these material changes, their biggest concerns – developing each region's productive capacities to enable an expansion

of jobs for people and above all youth so they need not leave their homes and families – are as yet unmet. Thus in both regions today ethnic identity has largely paled as an important source of behavior. People are not terribly concerned about this evanescent phenomenon. Instead, as my thesis suggests and the work of György Ránki also attests, it is labor, its possibilities, and how those are shaped by locations in prevailing systems of global political economy that create primary structures of meaning and agency. In the end, people of both regions who remain at home now experience much the same type of influence emanating from globalization processes and in the end, regardless of ethnic or other qualities of background, both must draw upon their own resources and capacities to craft their own lives.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> As discussed here the multi-ethnic origins of the original Jiu Valley mainstay mining population was followed by a large influx of others mainly from Romanian Moldavia in the late 1970s. Despite this latter group's outsider status, they too echo this Little America myth about the Valley.
- <sup>2</sup> Magyars also left in the period, though more to Hungary proper than to the New World.
- <sup>3</sup> My own fieldwork in the 1970s in Făgăraș villages was also assisted by the region's first-hand knowledge of America and Americans. The nickname that many assigned me, "Americanul" was the same as others in the villages, simultaneously making me slightly more intelligible to locals as well as providing me with a network of co-villagers whose name and/or background I allegedly shared.
- <sup>4</sup> The term *Momârlani* is derived from Hungarian for "those left behind", (*maradvány*, residue or remnant), in reference to their autochthonous status. *Momârlani* are conceptually distinguished from *Barabe*, roughly meaning "outsider". According to Mircea Baron (1998:41) the terms came into use when workers in the late 19th century built the railroad linking Simeria and Petroșani, the main Jiu Valley town. The workers coined the term *Momârlani* for the peasants and the peasants bastardized the term "bahn arbeiter" (road worker) into *Barabe* when speaking of outsiders to the Valley. However, some *Barabe* families have lived there for over 100 years and worked in the mines for generations. *Momârlani* is not a precise regional term. Though it refers to rural provenience, according to Vasile Șoflău, the term is not exclusively restricted to the Jiu Valley but also used by and about other mainly rural populations in the larger southwest Transylvania region. *Momârlani* have also worked in the mines since the late 1970s. However, they are said to bribe mine officials with gifts of local produce to secure auxiliary posts and avoid work on the coal face teams.
- <sup>5</sup> This was not, however, the case with the Saxons, whom Romanians typically admired for their probity, business acumen, modern outlooks, and the fair treatment they received at their hands when serving them as domestics or agricultural day laborers.
- <sup>6</sup> After the strike fervor cooled down, strike leaders were removed from their work, with many taken away by the Securitate (Matinal 1997:8). A few months after the strike its main leader, Lupeni mine engineer Gheorghe Dobre, was forcibly exiled from the Valley. Rumors even persist to this day that he was run-over by a car whose driver was never identified, though this is not the case.

- <sup>7</sup> Political administrations in both regions applied to be included in the Law of Disfavored Zones passed by the Romanian Parliament in the late 1990s that allowed reduced duties on investment capital brought from abroad, reduced taxes on profits from investments, and special treatment of the regional unemployed (Romania. Government 1998). However, only the Jiu Valley was qualified for inclusion. Many people throughout the country, in fact, claim that the Law was passed solely for the Jiu Valley to help dampen the political restiveness of the increasingly disenfranchised miners.
- <sup>8</sup> It has been estimated that for every dollar worth of coal produced, the National Coal Company (CNH) invests \$16.00 (World Bank Group 2004: 6).
- <sup>9</sup> Thus the rumor in the late 1990s that the coal used in the Jiu Valley Paroșeni “Termocentral” electricity generating and heating complex, built right next to the mine of the same name, was actually being provided at a lower price (including the cost of transportation) by the southeast African nation of Mozambique!
- <sup>10</sup> A common joke in the region has it that there are so many Făgărașeni in Rome that Romans assume that Făgăraș is an independent country.
- <sup>11</sup> In Hârșeni, the Brașov County township (comună) where I worked in the 1970s, men from the four constituent villages concentrated on parking cars, driving taxis, and manual construction work. In contrast, women migrants from all Făgăraș communities mainly did domestic service work.
- <sup>12</sup> Typically, every August throughout the 1990s the region would overflow with cars sporting Italian license plates as young migrated for vacation, to find spouses, and maintain their social positions within their households.

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# ETHNICALLY BASED ENROLLMENT PATTERNS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CLUJ/KOLOZSVÁR, 1900–1944

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This paper is an assessment of Hungarian and Romanian degree-holder contingents of the Cluj/Kolozsvár university in times of spectacular political change and relative social stagnation. This university has invariably been localized within a higher educational market mostly limited to the needs of the ethnically mixed population of Transylvania, needs that were seldom, if ever, reflected in equitable ethnic enrollment ratios. Local ethnic competition in and through the academe was always conditioned by external centers of political gravitation. The integrative role of the university altered each time the centre changed, and each time it was exerted not so much along socio-economic but along ethno-political lines. The late imperial educational commonwealth before World War I was largely dominated by the Magyar element. The subsequent nation-state framework reversed the situation to the advantage of Romanians in the inter-war period. This was followed by yet another turn-over between 1940 and 1944. All the while the university was less an agent of modernization than a fortress of survival in a continuous struggle for national dominance. Ethnic dominance tended to prevail over reform and social advancement, and repeated failures in the latter were ascribed to the presence of the rival ethnic other in the competition.

**Keywords:** academic market, enrollment pattern, university, nationalism, ethno-confessional cluster, academically-based elite, ethnic cleavage, majority, minority, ethnic revolution, social reform, sociology of education, history of higher learning, Cluj, Sibiu, Transylvania, Romania, Hungary

## Introductory Remarks

Owing to its uniquely mixed ethnic surroundings, the national and confessional composition of the Kolozsvár/Cluj university was symptomatic for the underlying social inequalities as well as the advantages from which members of the ruling elite (and those culturally or socially associated with them) could benefit (Karády 1989). This local segment of the educational ‘commonwealth’ of the

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Monarchy proved to be limited in scope and highly selective as regards the various ethnic minorities.

Apart from the underlying strife for modernization manifesting itself during the decades at the turn of the century, the University was conceived of as a markedly Hungarian institution, presenting the local ethnic minorities with the chance of upward social mobility by and large via a change in cultural and national loyalty in favor of the Magyar element. Meager as it was, this perspective seems to have been nevertheless rejected by many Romanians since in their view integration in the above-mentioned sense would have meant 'disintegration' on the level of the ethnic society.

With the dissolution of the imperial bondage (that is, of the multinational Monarchy in 1918), the new political paradigms of successor states (each of which thought of itself as a nation-state) reshaped the self-identifying goals of Transylvanian<sup>1</sup> ethnic groups, both majorities and minorities, new and old alike. Among the problematic areas of heavily state-engineered political and socio-economic integration, cultural nationalization figures as both means and purpose.

A distinguishing feature of the post-imperial academic market was closure along nation-state borders, a stubborn market-protection from any eventual alien intrusion. Meanwhile, instability and repeated turnovers tended to hinder substantial qualitative expansion. This lack was compensated for by quantitative expansion on national grounds. The repeated instances of (ethnically framed) 'numerus clausus' and academic market closures/restriction along nation-state borders are illustrative in this sense, too. All the while, scholarly allegiances and career-expectations were hampered by exclusionary ethno-political drives. Irrespective of who dominated whom, the underlying assumptions were that ethnic domination can work as a substitute for reform and social advancement, and that repeated failures in these was due to the presence of the rival in the competition. Shifts occurring in the political realm induced a peculiar conservatism in the academic field in the sense that competition aimed at the conservation of the expectations concerning and the social functions of higher learning, not to speak of its inner structure. Implicitly or explicitly, the two dominant groups that periodically changed places aimed to monopolize positions in or attainable through the educational market.

The period surveyed is one of expansion and diversification of European higher learning in general, swelling student contingents in the less modern courses of study, and ethno-national friction in East-Central Europe, where expansion occurred without a significant diversification of study paths. In the latter case the competition tended to be inter-ethnic and the academic market was closely tied to the state-managed sector of labor-market.

The rapid growth in the nationalized academic sector was a sheer quantitative one, veiling an acute crisis in the modernization process of education (and not only this). Generally, for the first four decades of the 20th century, career-choices

were not strategic in the sense that they blindly followed the ephemeral tides of conjuncture. Unemployment became a constant challenge, pushing student masses towards (Rightist) political radicalization. Yet these phenomena were, in a most peculiar way, cause and effect at the same time. While the official standpoint was for ‘rationalization’, over-production served for ‘filling the blanks’ in the ranks of an educated middle class largely employed in state-bureaucracy either in the immediate future (in the case of Greater Romania) or in an envisaged future (in the case of Trianon Hungary).

While enrollment figures in general rose constantly in the period surveyed, inter-department enrollment ratios went roughly unchanged. In a specifically paradoxical way, ambitious plans for instant nationalization and integration compelled the ruling ethnic side to maintain the inherited structure. That is to say, law remained by far the largest department. It was followed by the medical school, albeit with considerable lacunae in its inter-war development. Letters and philosophy suddenly involved a large number of ethnic Romanians, an understandable switch if we keep in mind the former ethnic setup and the new acute need for teachers. Natural sciences was the least touched by the change of ownership in the sense that it continued to involve but a small number of students. On the whole, the period proved on average unfavorable for any modernizing of the scholarly structure. Rigidity of curricula is a matter of course in the rather stiff academic market that this curricula was intended to serve.

### 1. 1900–1920, the Hungarian Period

On the one hand, all through the period surveyed a clear distinction has to be made between law (and political science) students and others, the two halves having recruitment patterns that can be more or less traced down to some ethnic, denominational and social-group determinants.<sup>2</sup> For instance, Germans preferred engineering, Jews took up medical studies, Protestant Hungarians law, Jews and Germans showing a relative preference to vocational paths, the more ‘modern’ and academically demanding branches, Romanians demonstrating the lowest relative propensity for the same ‘modern’ courses of study, while the preference of Hungarian Christians, for obvious reasons lying in social profitability in a state-managed job-market, was for law and theology, to list but the most commonplace examples (Karády 1989: 301). Irrespective of the period in focus, all data in the tables presented in this paper are illustrative of the notorious predilection for legal studies, as well as of the fact that legal and medical studies made up the absolute majority as regards student enrollment shares according to study path.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, although to a varying extent, in most countries of East-Central Europe the state had characteristically overwhelming control of an unbal-

anced national job-market, becoming thus by far the largest employer. Owing to this, the political influence, social status and even direct income of any ethnic group depended largely on the extent to which it was able to secure itself positions in the state-sector. In other words, especially in the post-Monarchy setup, ethnic minorities were indirectly pushed towards the private sphere of employment.

Generational politics, combined with the natural liability of the university and its student body to politicize the issues of the day, made the universities 'workshops' of a national elite (Livezeanu 1995; Bíró 1992), so much the more since in countries like Romania or Hungary the educated depended far more heavily on the state via civil service employment than on the private sphere; hence the characteristically well-entrenched relationship between university training and state employment, a connection that refers both to Hungary and Romania, pre-and post war situations combined (Macartney 1937: 320). For the same reasons, legal studies were notoriously the most popular and swelled the ranks of university students to a far greater extent than any other study track in those periods. It is in this context that courses of study associated with the so-called free professions were less popular, while vocational training was the least so, and all that in a period marked by the under-development of the private sector in general, a noteworthy side-effect of belated modernization.

Irrespective of which ethnic group was dominant, there was a significant difference between majority and minority enrollment (implying career-choice) paradigms inter-ethnically, while intra-ethnic inter-departmental distribution of students is also meaningful, both in terms of the academically-based labor market supply and demand and in terms of ethnic strategies regarding such a labor market.

Invariably in the minority paradigm, Germans and Jews fared relatively well, since they tended to benefit from the opportunities opened in higher learning via the more 'modern' paths of study, or those that were basically out of the reach of the state-managed sector of the market. (The latter was crowded with members of the traditional Hungarian middle class anyway.) These two ethnic clusters were somewhat atypically 'modern' as regards ratio of urbanization, occupational strategies, level of 'embourgeoisement' and cultural orientation. In other words (and beyond situations when they felt compelled to do so), they could in general afford to compensate themselves via courses of study that moved them forward on the road of upward social mobility. The predilection of Germans for engineering, the massive over-representation of Jews in the medical profession (not to speak of their habitual over-investment in education), and the preference for legal studies on the part of the average Magyar element are just the few of the best-known examples of ethno-culturally based academic (and career) orientations (Karády 38).

As a minority, Romanians of Transylvania were in many respects placed on the other extremity of the above-mentioned modernization axis represented by Germans and Jews (Karády 36). The great majority of the Romanian population was of a markedly rural and traditional character (being only sporadically touched by the major changes that occurred elsewhere in Central, let alone Western Europe). Insularity and political apathy persisted until the end of the 19th century. Social grievances were all directed against the ruling Magyar element. There was scarcely any intra-ethnic clash among Romanians on the social plane. They tended to strive for self-preservation via passive resistance. Often their educational choices reflected and reinforced the same sense of group-solidarity and ethnically-minded strategy of social mobility via studies. They were on average not in any position to afford to break away from cultural traditions and ‘modernize’: instead of ‘compensating’ they ‘conserved’. The lowest relative ratio of academically-based lay career-paths displayed by this ethnic cluster is once again but one of the several examples that could be quoted to illustrate the point (see *Table 1*).

Again, while a relatively superfluous fulfillment of requirements in studies in the case of the Jewish contingent may be interpreted as being due to the urge of making the best of one’s studies as a channel towards assimilation, later ages of graduation and lower marks with the Romanians may, at least in part, be due to the linguistic hardships faced by these students in academic institutions in which the language of instruction was not their native tongue. Also, early graduation-age and excellence in school seem to be a largely cross-ethnic social class privilege, in which respect ethnic Romanians were on average disadvantaged if compared to the other major groups (Jews and Magyars). The age by which one had obtained a doctor’s degree was the lowest among the Jewish students, those belonging to the ‘dominant Christian confessions’ coming next, and the most advanced in age at the moment of their graduation were Romanian students of both confessions (Karády 36–37, 32, 47).

Beyond the ethnic composition of student contingents there were regional and geographical disparities as well, meaning, in general, that the probability of enrollment was greater, irrespective of nationality, for those who had been born in an urban community (the most characteristic segments of city-dwellers belonged to the mobile lower middle classes or the educated elite, that is, their willingness to seek higher education was much greater than that of the rural peasant masses, as were the opportunities available to them).<sup>4</sup> Regionally speaking, there seems to have been relatively little inter-regional transfer. In other words, Greater Hungary’s second best university did not have a significant number of students (whatever their ethnic belonging) who had been born outside of Transylvania. This was by and large valid for the interwar period as well – see *Tables 4 and 5* (Karády 1989: 295).

*Table 1.* Distribution of students by native tongue at the University of Kolozsvár/Cluj  
(sample years 1900–1901, 1905–1906, 1910–1911, 1912–1913)

Year	Department	Hungarian	German	Slavic	Romanian	Other	Total (100%)
1900/1901	Law and Pol. Sc.	661 80.90%	36 4.40%	11 1.33%	106 12.97%	3 0.36%	817
	Medicine	76 79.16%	3 3.12%	1 1.04%	16 16.66%	–	96
	Pharmacology	28 77.77%	6 16.66%	–	2 5.55%	–	36
	Philology	180 86.95%	23 11.11%	1 0.48%	3 1.44%	–	207
	Natural Science	69 82.14%	11 13.09%	1 1.19%	3 3.57%	–	84
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1,014</b> 81.77%	<b>79</b> 6.37%	<b>14</b> 1.12%	<b>130</b> 10.48%	<b>3</b> 0.24%	<b>1,240</b>
1905/1906	Law and Pol. Sc.	1,295 84.14%	67 4.35%	29 1.87%	144 9.35%	4 0.25%	1,539
	Medicine	134 76.13%	17 9.65%	5 2.83%	20 11.36%	–	176
	Pharmacology	69 84.14%	7 8.53%	4 4.86%	2 2.43%	–	82
	Philology	257 85.66%	19 6.33%	2 0.66%	22 7.33%	–	300
	Natural Science	99 86.84%	9 7.89%	2 1.75%	3 2.63	1 0.87%	114
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1,854</b> 84.23%	<b>119</b> 5.40%	<b>42</b> 1.90%	<b>181</b> 8.22%	<b>5</b> 0.22%	<b>2,201</b>
1910/1911	Law and Pol. Sc.	1,138 83.06%	57 4.16%	13 0.93%	160 11.67%	–	1,370
	Medicine	255 74.34%	30 8.74%	4 1.16%	53 15.45%	1 0.29%	343
	Pharmacology	94 87.03%	6 5.55%	–	8 7.40%	–	108
	Philology	174 89.23%	13 6.66%	1 0.51%	7 3.58%	–	195
	Natural Science	72 79.12%	14 15.38%	–	5 5.49%	–	91
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1,733</b> 82.24%	<b>120</b> 5.69%	<b>18</b> 0.84%	<b>233</b> 11.05%	<b>3</b> 0.14%	<b>2,017</b>

Table 1 (cont.)

Year	Department	Hungarian	German	Slavic	Romanian	Other	Total (100%)
1912/1913	Law and Pol. Sc.	1,059 83.71%	36 2.84%	8 0.62%	157 12.41%	5 0.39%	1,265
	Medicine	362 74.32%	37 7.59%	3 0.6%	83 17.04%	2 0.41%	487
	Pharmacology	85 79.43%	15 14.01%	2 1.86%	5 4.67%	–	107
	Philology	164 88.64%	12 6.48%	1 0.54%	7 3.78%	1 0.54%	191
	Natural Science	65 81.25%	10 12.50%	–	5 6.25%	– 80	–
	Total	1,735 81.68%	110 5.17%	14 0.63	257 12.09%	8 0.37%	2,124

Average Shares: by native tongue and by departments in the average of the four sample years

Year	Department	Hungarian	German	Slavic	Romanian	Other	Total (average)
1900–1914	Law and Pol. Sc.	1,041 83.31%	49 4.00%	15 1.20%	142 11.37%	3 0.24%	1,248 65.82%
	Medicine	206 74.35%	22 8.00%	3 1.00%	48 17.15%	1 0.25%	275 14.50%
	Pharmacology	69 83.13%	9 10.84%	1 1.20%	4 4.81%	– 4.37%	83
	Philology	194 86.35%	17 7.62%	1 0.44%	10 4.48%	– 11.76%	223
	Natural Science	76 82.60%	11 11.95%	1 1.02%	4 4.34%	– 4.85%	92
	Total	1,584 83.54%	107 5.64%	22 1.16%	198 10.44%	5 0.26%	1,896 (100%)

Source: Based on Sigmirean 2000: 119–125.

Of the total number of enrollments in all forms of higher education between 1900 and 1914, the Transylvanian university comprised but an average of around 13%. The Budapest university (without the Technical University) alone was more than three times the size of the Transylvanian one (2,112 on average) if measured in terms of enrollment figures. With its average in four sample years of 7,031 students, the former covered almost 45% of the whole Dual Monarchy higher education market (Ladányi 1999; Andorka 1979).

Within the larger Dualist framework the share of students with Hungarian as their native tongue grew from 84.9% to 88.9%. The low share of nationalities involved in higher education (that is, contrasted with their 48.6 among the total population in 1900 and 45.5% in 1910) is on the one hand due to a degree of suppres-

sion of ethno-national political movements. On the other hand, as in the case of Romanians gross under-representation is due to the social structure of this ethnic group: an overwhelming number of peasants, a very thin layer of urban middle class, and, consequently, a comparatively low cultural level and little propensity towards vertical social mobility through education. (The Magyars themselves were not much better off either in this respect.) The other extremity is manifest in the notorious over-representation of Jews in higher education, which they evidently found a major path towards emancipation and upward social mobility (Karády 1989: 285).

As the First World War neared, 'relative peace' at the multiethnic university of Transylvania was an impression eagerly nurtured by Hungarian onlookers alone. Irredentist, anti-Hungarian sentiments were there under the immediate surface. These were periodically pushed to the front by Romanian leaders active in politics (Bisztray et al. eds. 1941: 166; Márki 1922: 93). Indeed the issue of a separate Romanian university in Transylvania is at least as old as the history of the Kolozsvár Magyar university itself. Often the delegates of the Romanian minority asked for a Romanian line of study, especially in law. But the only concession was the creation of a department of Romanian language similar to the one that existed in the Budapest University (Sigmirean 1999: 36). As the first decades of the new century were marked by a strengthening of national sentiment on the part of ethnic minorities of the Monarchy in the face of the 'doom of assimilation', irredentism and nationalist resentments escalated. It is therefore no wonder that the issue of the university came up again in 1913–14, during the negotiations doomed to fail between Prime Minister István Tisza and the Romanian National Party, a failure symptomatic of the general irreconcilability between 'master nations' of the Empire and 'mastered' nations striving for one or another measure of national self-determination (Hitchins 1999: 399). Also, there is a similar antagonism, that of centralism versus federalism, as well as the idea that the minority-problem was no longer a matter of ordinary political give-and-take, but one of national survival itself.

There is evidently a gross discrepancy between Romanians as a slight majority in the population of Transylvania and the representation they had among the students. All through the pre-war history of the university the average number of Romanian students did not go above 10–12% of the total number. There was still a considerable number of ethnic Romanians among the students pursuing legal studies. The other faculty relatively favored by Romanians was medicine.<sup>5</sup> (*Table 1* contains telling data in this regard.)

Romanians' intra-ethnic enrollment patterns according to social category (determined on the basis of the occupation of the father) betrayed noteworthy peculiarities in contrast with the 'dominant Christian' Magyar paradigm. The most important of these was that the father of virtually every third Romanian student was



in the category of peasants owing small or medium-size ‘estates’. In the case of both ‘Romanian’ confessions, a considerable number of parents belonged to the priesthood (34% in the case of the Greek Catholics and 24% in the case of the Orthodox faith) and to the small intellectual class, that is, primary school teachers (slightly above 10%). This means that from one third to one half of the medical students had such family backgrounds. Paralleling this ethnically based pattern of recruitment, there is the striking lack of representation of the Romanian petty bourgeoisie (3–4%), especially if we take into consideration the share of around 13% among the students of members of this social category in other denominational groups (Karády 36–37).

While unlike its Budapest counterpart the Transylvanian university did not have a department of theology, almost 50% of Greek Catholic and Orthodox (that is, Romanian) holders of a baccalaureate chose priesthood as a career, meaning three times as frequently as their counterparts in the other Christian faiths. Still, once they chose lay occupations, Romanians had a predilection for the free professions. The law and medical faculty were their first choices. There was no hindrance for them as ethnic Romanians to pursue other careers, but as doctors and lawyers they could more closely cooperate with their co-nationals in aiding them not only culturally, financially and socially, but at times politically as well. Unlike the obviously Romanian-minded Orthodox and (to a lesser extent) Uniate priesthood, those seeking a career in the free professions were often viewed as likely to assimilate both by their co-nationals and Hungarian onlookers, while the overcrowded civil service sector hardly presented ethnic minority candidates (especially Jews and Romanians) with any profitable opportunities (Karády 12, 37; Bisztray et al. eds. 1941: 298, 302).

A very important segment of the Transylvanian ethnic Romanian student body was nevertheless not studying in Kolozsvár/Cluj but in Budapest, the major academic center of Dualist Hungary, having a much greater attraction for Romanians who could afford to study there. In approximate figures, while around 2,500 ethnic Hungarians attended the local Transylvanian university during its “Magyar” period, the number of those who chose Budapest (more cosmopolitan, less pitted against any particular ethno-confessional group) amounted to slightly more than 1,300. If we consider other higher learning centers that Transylvanian Romanians frequented in the Monarchy, we may well assume that roughly 50% of this ethnic contingent sought their academic credentials somewhere other than ‘at home’, but were most likely sponsored from there (and on evidently ethno-confessional basis) (Bisztray et al. eds. 1941: 299; Sigmirean 1999: 47).

In the same vein, we should not forget that a large number of Magyar, German and Jewish Transylvanians, to mention but the main ethnic contingents, also chose Budapest for their university studies for varying reasons. It is self-evident that a diploma earned in the capital had greater professional and symbolic pres-

tige. Beyond that, geographic proximity and students' favorable financial status could also be decisive in making the move (*Doctori nyilvántartások... 1900–1915*).

## 2. 1920–1940, the Romanian Period

Together with the territories ceded to the victorious successor states, Hungary lost two of its four universities. One was in Pozsony/Bratislava, taken over by Czechoslovakia, the other in Cluj/Kolozsvár, the second largest university of the country, which fell under Romanian sovereignty. In both cases, the take-over meant that most of their academic staff and virtually all their student body became refugees in post-Trianon Hungary even before the ratification of the Peace and Minority treaties. Ethnic proportions and exclusionary overtones were completely reversed: it was the members of the ruling majority that benefited from nationalizing state support in higher education. (See *Table 2* for ethnically based enrollment patterns in the early 1920s.) Thus, even after the first and biggest wave of refugee students (around 2,000, virtually the entire Magyar contingent) leaving Transylvania shortly after the war, Hungarian students from the 'lost territories' kept flocking, then trickling into universities of Trianon Hungary throughout the 1920s, especially to Budapest<sup>6</sup> (Mócsy 1983; Szögi 1991).

From the Romanian official point of view, Romanianizing the Cluj/Kolozsvár and Cernăuți/Czernowitz universities was but a natural and lawful consequence of the political union of Transylvania and Bukovina with Romania. The Romanian state had not only the right but the duty to take them into its custody and administer them according to its national goals. In the situation Romanian academics found themselves in after 1918 the factors necessary for an integrative (and, as it were, integral) nation-state seemed quite fortuitously to come together. Universities themselves served as factors of integration of the new provinces. Yet the reform-minded Romanian faculty of the newly nationalized university of Cluj/Kolozsvár soon had to learn the lesson of Old Kingdom-type political involvement ('politicianism' in Romanian, meaning unscrupulous political clientelism imbuing all spheres of public life), it must be admitted, not in every case to their professional or national pride. On the other hand, they stressed the importance of autonomy in academic and even administrative proceedings. In the context soon to be created, the two goals seemed to contradict each other (Pușcaș 1995: 40–48).

Along with the all-encompassing attempt to integrate the suddenly enlarged state, in Romania political instability induced social and economic uncertainty. This in turn hampered the contradictory pursuit of modernization itself. Instead, nationalism and nationalization became both means and ends in creating a centralized homogenous nation-state. Beyond its effects on ethnic minority education,

**Table 2.** Distribution of students at the Cluj/Kolozsvár University according to ethnic extraction and choice of course of study in the 1923–24 academic year

Department	Law and Pol. Sc.	Medicine and pharma- cology	Philosophy And Letters	Natural Science	Sub-totals per department	TOTAL per nationality
Romanians	729 (78.0%)	355 (67%)	216 (71.0%)	156 (80%)	936 48.9%	1,455 (73.9%)
Hungarians	81 (8.6%)	40 (7.5%)	47 (15%)	20 (10%)	533 27.0%	188 (9.6%)
Jews	91 (9.7%)	104 (19.5%)	10 (3.0%)	14 (7.0%)	303 15.4	219 (11.1%)
Germans	32 (3.4%)	27 (5.0%)	25 (8.3%)	3 (1.5%)	195 9.9%	87 (4.5%)
Other	4	7	5	2	1,967 100%	18 (0.9%)
Sub-totals	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

... and according to confession and place of birth

Department:	Law and Pol. Sc.	Medicine and pharmacology	Philosophy and Letters	Natural Science	Total
	by Confession				
Orthodox	403	249+12	138	114	516
Greek Catholic	327	94+0	77	42	540
Roman Catholic	55	9+41	38	19	157
Protestant	36	15+0	16	3	70
Evangelical	18	3+0	22	1	44
Unitarian	6	2+0	1	2	11
Israelite	91	100+8	11	14	224
	by Birthplace				
Old Kingdom	6	115+2	42	28	193
Transylvania and 'parts'	910	288+59	229	123	1,509
Bukowina and Bessarabia	6	55	15	31	106
Neighboring States, W, S-W	14	13	15	9	51
Other countries	–	2	1	4	7

Source: Based on *Anuarul... 1923/24 1925: 36.*

and to the detriment of the so-called provincial universities, the centralization of the academic market tended to over-emphasize and over-size institutions of higher learning situated in the capital city. For instance, if we do not count the theological faculties, the distribution of the 29,666 (100%) students enrolled in the four universities of Greater Romania in the 1926–27 academic year is as fol-

laws: law has a relative majority (45.18%), curiously (and symptomatically) enough, philology comes in second place (22.60%), while medicine is third with 19.63% and natural sciences fall to their 'usual' fourth place (12.60%) country-wide. Taken separately, the four universities presented the following order of size as regards enrollment ratios: Bucharest accounted for more than half (18,400) of the whole market, while Iași came in second and Cluj third with roughly 5,000 and 2,500 students, respectively. Put together, the other universities were left with only a minor fraction of the overall student contingent. With insignificant fluctuations, this distributional setup was maintained throughout the inter-war period (*Statistica învățământului* 1931).

One of the long-term results of unifying nationalization was the overall politicization of the academic sphere. Beyond ethnically-minded recruitment patterns, the immediate consequence was to be felt in university finances through staff eligibility criteria to students' guided career-choices and perspectives of positioning in the academically-based job-market. It was in the thirties that anti-Semitic and xenophobic drives came to the fore, resulting in attempts to remove the 'alien' element, especially Jews but Hungarians as well, to the intended advantage of the 'autochthonous element' (that is, native Romanians both in the academic sphere proper and in the overall setup of the job-market depending on academic qualifications)<sup>7</sup> (Pușcaș 1995: 30–33, 237–242).

The great number of students attending the Cluj/Kolozsvár university at the beginning of the twenties is in part due to the peculiar positive discrimination this institution received in that period. In 1921–22 the Romanian government allocated more than three times as much money for student financial aid here than for all the rest of the university students of the country put together (Bisztray et al. eds. 1941: 326). A sizable autochthonous student body figured as an important piece of symbolic capital in the minds of the leaders of the university, not to mention the immediate practical result of producing state officials and trained personnel out of the midst of the ethnic Romanian population of the new province. (See data on Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic students in *Tables 2, 4 and 5.*) Right before the war, in the four universities (Bucharest, Iași, Cluj/Kolozsvár and Cernăuți) that soon came together under Romanian rule, there were 8,632 registered students altogether. The figure grew at an astounding pace in the inter-war period: it was 22,379 in 1924–1925, 31,154 in 1928–1929, and reached an unprecedented peak of 37,314 by 1930. It was only by the late thirties that the efforts to curb the 'unscrupulous' overcrowding of the universities seemed to bring some palpable results. The effects of the measures taken were nevertheless more evident in the case of that segment of the student-body that was of non-Romanian extraction. The number of female students also dropped by one fifth (there were 672 female students in 1938). Except for this 'making way for the (male) autochthonous ele-

ment', the 'numerus Vallachicus' imposed in secondary and especially higher education bears no evidence of more rigorous selection within the Romanian group itself (Livezeanu 1995: 211, 235). (The contrasts between ethnic minority contingent sizes are self-evident in *Tables 4 and 5*.)

Overpopulation was a general concern of higher educational policies throughout Europe (Jarausch 1983). In addition to this perceived crisis, in countries like Greater Romania or Trianon Hungary the issue of education in general and that of over-production in higher education in particular acquired a strong ethno-national character. As soon as the 1920s rapid growth in student population nationwide resulted in overcrowding, a graduation record, and general frustration, distemper and uncertainty. Between 1914 and 1939 the population of Romania doubled, but the number of the students quadrupled (Pușcaș 1995: 46, 242). Yet overpopulation was neither unique, nor constituted the problem itself. It was the general backwardness that compelled most to consider the career of state official as the only feasible and profitable path that higher education entitled one to. Here, as in most of East-Central Europe, expansion of higher education meant no sizeable diversification, but rather was materialized in a heedless overcrowding of time-honored courses of study. Together with rigid centralization and dependence on state financial support, this blocked paths of curricular modernization and created extraordinary financial hardships affecting the majority of the students.<sup>8</sup>

While tendentious data-handling was by no means unheard of in the Dualist period, throughout the Romanian period of the university in Cluj there is a peculiar double-reading of enrollment data. While there was under-representation of minorities, especially of Magyars countrywide, Cluj Rectors repeatedly boasted about the considerable averages of non-Romanians – but also of women – among students, both coming as strong arguments as to how modern, tolerant and open to the Western way the university was. Meanwhile others stubbornly remind us of the 'outrageous' over-representation of minorities in the Cluj university. Willynilly, one must admit that in terms of enrollment ratios – even if we discount the general enrollment ratio growth so characteristic of the period – Transylvanian Hungarians as a minority did twice as well as their Romanian counterparts during the Hungarian period of the university. Their middle-class constituency and propensity to make the most of higher education credentials were still at work in the inter-war period, even though they perceived it as a period of severe deprivation. Even more so since as hardly tolerated aliens, they tended to see to their academic endeavors and not to the overly shrill political ambitions of the day. Curiously enough, minority students were less liable to abandon school or do poorly on exams.

Overall, in the 1920s the numeric development of students with non-Romanian and non-Jewish background at the Cluj/Kolozsvár university was as follows: 105 in 1919–20, 183 in 1920, 189 in 1921, and growing to 606 by 1928, respectively.

Together with the Hungarians involved in higher education in Romania universities other than Cluj/Kolozsvár University, the figure amounted to 720 in 1928–29 and to around 1,000 in the next two years. Interestingly enough, in 1922–23 and 1928–29 (there were no data for 1919–21), the same source reveals the following figures concerning undergraduates who studied in Hungary and whose parents lived in Romania: in 1922–23, there were 2,104 such students, 1,751 the next year, dropping gradually to 901 by 1928. Thus, apart from smaller fluctuations, the increase in the number of Transylvanian ethnic Hungarians studying at home paralleled the decrease of the number of those who went to Hungary. Nevertheless, the first row of figures is continuously lagging behind the second, with a difference of about 300 (roughly 20% of the total) even in 1929, when the two contingents came closest to each other in size. (Albrecht 1930: 99) (*Table 3* refers specifically to ethnic Hungarian students.)

By the late 1920s there came a retrenchment of the ethnic Hungarian student population in two directions, denoting time-honored Magyar middle-class patterns. One is ‘horizontal’, that is, the tendency of growth encountered in the predilection for law studies goes in parallel with that of the Romanian students, and

**Table 3.** Enrollment in the Cluj/Kolozsvár University, with special regard to the ethnic Hungarian contingent, 1921–1939

Year	Department					Total	Hungarians
	Law	Medicine	Philology	Nat. Sc.	Pharm.		
1921/22	1,119	828	238	132	52	2,447	32
1922/23	1,256						
1923/24	936	427	303	195	61	1,967	
1924/25	967	524	404	214	66	2,175	
1925/26	1,073	577	489	218	--	2,357	
1926/27	1,185	622	527	220	--	2,554	
1927/28	1,147	509	578	355	152	2,741	
1928/29	1,079	646	709	455	132	3,021	
1929/30	1,519	769	735	625	111	3,757	753
1930/31	1,714	870	764	598	127	4,064	842
1931/32	1,691	955	684	463	331	4,124	935
1932/33	1,813	984	710	575	387	4,469	922
1933/34	1,779	1,048	691	554	--	4,072	1,127
1934/35	2,184	1,005	808	403	--	4,400	954
1935/36	1,827	956	570	337	--	3,690	753
1936/37	1,341	862	587	401	--	3,191	570
1937/38	1,321	895	582	357	--	3,155	566
1938/39	2,364	898	508	324	--	4,094	553

*Note:* spaces left empty mean that the respective data is uncertain or marked as unknown by the source. The enrollment figures for the first mentioned academic year are presumably erroneous.

*Source:* *Emlékkönyv* 1996: 30.

**Table 4.** The Cluj/Kolozsvár student body in 1930–31

Criteria of distribution		Department				Total		
		Law	Letters	Medicine	Nat. Sc.	Num.	%	
By sex	M	1,611	363	817	294	3,085	75.9	
	F	103	404	180	295	979	24.0	
TOTAL		1,714	764	997	589	4,064	100%	
Confession	Gr. Orthodox	519	310	466	217	1,566	38.5	
	Gr. Catholic	589	197	161	169	1,116	27.4	
	R. Catholic	205	103	134	77	519	12.7	
	Calvinist	155	76	69	30	330	8.1	
	Unitarian	33	6	5	4	48	1.1	
	Evangelical	68	46	35	31	180	4.4	
	Mosaic	145	26	92	7	302	7.4	
	Other	–	–	3	–	3		
Regional Origin	Romania	Transylvania and its Parts	1,498	539	607	380	3,024	74.4
		Old Kingdom	57	67	177	87	390	9.6
		The Banat	56	62	65	36	219	5.4
		Moldova	29	32	49	42	152	3.7
	Bessarabia and Bucovina	28	25	9	19	81	2.0	
	Neighboring countries	65	24	46	19	154	4.6%	
	Other countries	8	13	4	6	31		
	Ethnic Origin	Romanian	1,108	513	617	447	2,659	65.4
Hungarian		393	150	211	88	842	20.7	
German		68	57	41	41	207	5.0	
Israelite		145	26	124	6	301	7.6	
Slavic		–	14	1	7	22	0.5	
Other		–	4	2	–	6		
% by Department		42.1	18.8	24.5	14.5	100%		
Degrees Awarded	Lic.	19	92	36	59	206	8.3%	
	Ph. D.	96	2	30	4	132		

*Note:* The 'Medicine' column includes students in Pharmacology as well; there were 127 in this year (70 male and 57 female students, 36 were awarded a licentiate and one a doctorate, 42 were listed as ethnic Hungarians, 38 as Romanians, 14 as Germans and 32 as Jews, all students of this department were Romanian citizens).

*Source:* Based on *Anuarul... 1930/31 1932*.

**Table 5.** Enrollment to the Cluj/Kolozsvár University in the 1934–35 academic year

Criteria of distribution	Department				Total	
	Law	Letters	Medicine	Nat. Sc.	Number	%
<b>By sex:</b>						
Male	2,050	325	830	244	3,449	80.2%
Female	134	383	175	159	851	19.8%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,184</b>	<b>708</b>	<b>1,005</b>	<b>403</b>	<b>4,300</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>By confession:</b>						
Gr. Orthodox	800	235	471	126	1,631	38.0%
Gr. Catholic	707	153	163	93	1,116	26.0%
R. Catholic	260	127	96	89	572	13.3%
Calvinist	167	97	58	56	378	8.8%
Unitarian	32	13	8	6	59	1.3%
Evangelical	60	41	29	11	141	3.2%
Mosaic	157	40	178	21	395	9.1%
Other	1	2	2	2	7	
<b>By regional origin (country of birth):</b>						
Transylvania and its Parts	1,630	490	506	268	2,893	67.3%
Old Kingdom Countries	161	72	231	46	510	11.8%
The Banat	192	43	76	31	342	8.0%
Moldova	48	32	74	17	171	4.0%
Bessarabia and Bucovina	52	14	51	15	132	3.0%
Neighboring countries	79	35	44	18	201	add
Other countries	22	22	23	8	47	6.0%
<b>By ethnic origin:</b>						
Romanian	1,507	399	632	219	2,757	64.1%
Hungarian	459	196	148	142	945	22.0%
German	60	65	34	18	177	4.1%
Israelite	157	40	178	21	396	9.2%
Slavic	–	5	8	5	18	add
Other	1	3	5	–	9	0.6%
<b>% by department:</b>	<b>50.8%</b>	<b>16.4%</b>	<b>23.4%</b>	<b>9.3%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
Degrees Lic.	35	102		96	233	add
Awarded Ph. D.	197	1	98	4	300	12.4%

*Note:* 50% of the foreign-born contingent are ethnic Hungarians (registered as born in Hungary, though only one of them bore Hungarian citizenship).

*Source:* Based on *Anuarul... 1934/35* 1936.



even exceeds it. The other is ‘vertical’, in the sense that it goes back to pre-war enrollment patterns of the then dominating Hungarian group. Over 40% of the Magyar student body at the Cluj/Kolozsvár university chose law, this most time-honored study-track, and intended to pursue careers that were traditionally made available through a diploma in law (*Anuarul...1929/30* 1930). Quite a few of these students were to be found in the political science track, since this was (for reasons discussed above) almost exclusively reserved for members of the dominant ethnic group. Less than half as many ethnic Hungarians chose medicine than those engaged in law studies. This is a striking trend in the enrollment patterns of ethnic Hungarians, since one would expect them to attempt to adapt to the altered job-market. At this time, private employment would have been more enticing for minority graduates, since career-paths made traditionally available via law studies were getting more closely under the purview of the state than ever.

Meanwhile Jews seemed to go through an academic retrenchment process that is curiously similar to the one witnessed in the case of Hungarians choosing to enroll in Cluj. In 1929–30, for instance, a little more than half of the Jewish contingent (238), 129 students, were enrolled in the law department (yet least of all in the political science track); and there were but 50 would-be medical doctors and even less pharmacology students (23) among them (*Anuarul...1929/30* 1930). This again betrays new-old expectations as regards the ‘traditionally Jewish’ medical and pharmacology departments.

Finally, of the three mentioned ethnic minority student contingents, the Germans seem, once again, to be most evenly and strategically disposed among the four faculties. There are but 48 would-be lawyers among them, with the greatest relative number within the contingent to be found at the letters and philosophy department (67, the best ratio of philology students within any ethnically-based minority student echelon). Twenty-three pursued medicine and 15 studied pharmacology; finally, there were 23 ethnic German students in the natural science department. Once again, German minority students seem to follow the most practical and practicable paths as regards higher education and envisaged career-choices, with a relatively high degree of adaptation to the chances offered by the new situation. As for ethnic Hungarian students, it was only in the mid-thirties that they felt compelled to make a switch towards philology and natural sciences. (*Tables 4 and 5* are illustrative for ethnically based enrolment strategies in the interwar period, too.)

### 3. 1940–1944, the Period of Division<sup>9</sup>

The geopolitical shifts that temporarily but radically altered the Central European status quo in the late thirties and early forties were viewed by revisionist

states as a long-awaited and well-deserved opportunity for ‘historic reckoning’. Twenty years before, the Hungarian university had become a refugee in Trianon Hungary. It now returned, forcing the Romanian university of Cluj into exile. Re-nationalization, that is, internal expansion via the reiteration of previous ideologies and practices, was the order of the day, and relocation was once again mistaken for modernizing expansion in qualitative terms. The practice of closed national markets with closed enrollment figures prevailed yet again. As in the inter-war period, turn-of-the-century student migration practices tended to degenerate into student repatriation for many and for almost all those who belonged to former ethnic elites in former nation-states.

In its ‘second Hungarian period’, Transylvania’s university and its ethnically-based clientele shifted in political space and moved in geographical space. According to the Romanian point of view the ‘transfer’ of the Franz Joseph University to Szeged had been a political illustration of the refusal to accept the territorial and geopolitical changes that had taken place in Central Europe after the First World War (Márki 1922: 127–154). In its turn, the King Ferdinand I Romanian University sought refuge in Sibiu (in what was now termed Southern Transylvania, still belonging to Romania) at the beginning of the Second World War, a war meant to reconfigure the ‘Europe of Versailles’ and create a ‘new Europe’. According to prevailing public opinion (but also in the eyes of the political and intellectual elite) both cases were associated with the tragedy of territorial losses, and this turned the university into a powerful national symbol. The transfer of the King Ferdinand I University to Sibiu and the return in autumn of 1940 of the Franz Joseph University to Kolozsvár/Cluj suggested the existence of a bitter conflict between the ‘Romanian University of Cluj’ and the ‘Hungarian University of Kolozsvár’ (Puşcaş 1999: 288).

Just as the Romanian-run Sibiu (Herrmannstadt, Nagyszeben) refugee university fostered national ideals, the territorial reintegration of the country included, so the renewed Hungarian university in Kolozsvár/Cluj was penetrated by war-time political and ideological trends. Both universities hosted lecturers and student group leaders who cherished extreme right ideas, racial discrimination and nationalist views pitted against each other in matters of historical rights and, ultimately, political formulas concerning territorial exigencies. Yet these trends are not characteristic of the majority. The moral conduct and academic standards that in the end prevailed over political extremism in both universities were clear signs of resistance against the abnormal conditions with which war-time higher education was generally faced (Joó 1990: 22–23).

Refugee-universities and the reasoning behind the decision to take the road of exile bore striking similarities, as did the manner of the takeovers.<sup>10</sup> Takeover arrangements were peculiarly swift, and, beyond their content, their speed bore the symbolic message of ‘national redemption’ (Bisztray et al. eds. 1941: 373–375).

Each time the takeover had ample and well-aimed political resonances, while the consequences of the shift in terms of the local educational market seemed to come in second place. In times of crisis, the student-body of either university in Transylvania is conceived of as a ‘fifth column’ in the political clash over national territories. In a similar vein, the presence, quality and size of the national middle class was in both cases a main legitimizing factor of the presence and size of this or that nation-state.

The ‘new’ Hungarian university of Kolozsvár/Cluj offered opportunities for study for a total of 2,572 students in its first year of activity, 2,405 in the following year, 2,745 in 1943–44 and only 742 in 1944–45. Law no. 39 of 1940, issued on December 31, formulated the rules of admittance to higher education. These included considerations concerning ratios of admittance into the various departments according to the country’s ‘actual needs’ and the compulsory criteria of national loyalty and moral reliability. To avoid overcrowding at certain universities, it also reformulated the idea that enrollment policies should take into consideration the regional setup, that is, the place of origin or current place of residence of would-be students. If we estimate that for the 1942–43 year the average number of students (2,500) was maintained, the total number of students at the Franz Joseph University of Kolozsvár/Cluj in its last five academic years amounts to 10,800, even if each student studied for only one academic year there. Owing to the general political climate, minority students were present in only very small proportions. For instance, in 1943–44 those of Jewish origin made up only 3% of the student body and Romanians only 4.8% (*A kolozsvári magyar királyi Ferenc-József-Tudományegyetem Almanachja*, 1943: 83; Cseke et al. eds. 1999: 48).

Once again, tendencies towards gross over-sizing in the law department are obvious: it started with 1,480 students (1,368 in the spring), while medicine was chosen by a mere 359 (340), letters by 202 (200), and mathematics and natural sciences by 107 (111). Against all expectations economics, the only new department in the academic setup, drew only 301 (317) students. Again, less than half of the students chose courses of study that were less tied to state-administered career-possibilities for which educational credentials constituted entitlement. In other words, the new setup clearly bore the mark of the change of sovereignty on the one hand – filling the gap created by foreign rule in ethnically-based state-bureaucracy –, and represented a complete continuation of former orientations on the other hand (*A kolozsvári magyar királyi Ferenc-József-Tudományegyetem Almanachja* 1943; Gaal 2001: 121–124)

Beyond an implicit fostering of the cause of the traditional Magyar middle class (once again conceived of as the backbone of the Hungarian nation), the manner of handling registration data for 1941–42 (*Table 6*) betrays an increased social awareness and a keen preoccupation on the part of leaders with student backgrounds in terms of social class (implicitly, probable career orientations). Com-

**Table 6.** The student body of the Kolozsvár/ Cluj University in the 1941–42 academic year: distribution according to social background (parents' occupation), confession, and citizenship

Country of birth of students	Sem. II.	Parent's (tutor's) main category of occupation					Total per country
		Agriculture	Industry, mining	Commerce, banking	Intellectual (state/education/army/private/pensioned)	Other or unknown	
Hungary		201	225	201	1,054	230	1,911
Romania		24	50	38	271	64	447
Other neighboring country		4	1	–	20	2	27
Other country		2	2	2	7	8	21
Total per occupation of parents in Sem. 2		233	278	242	1,352	304	2,405

Confession:	Department						Total by confession
	Law and Pol. Sc.	Medicine	Letters and Phil.	Natural Sciences	Pharmacology	Economics	
R. Catholic.	615	207	98	59	9	202	1,190
Gr. Catholic	40	41	9	11	2	11	114
Gr. Orthodox	4	6	4	1	–	1	16
Calvinist	363	107	100	27	3	143	743
Evangelical	38	12	21	5	–	23	100
Unitarian	55	17	23	2	2	22	120
Mosaic	44	16	13	20	2	26	121

Citizenship (all figures refer to Semester II. and include both ordinary and extraordinary students)							Total by citizenship
Hungarian	1,118	390	253	117	16	410	2,304
From territory annexed to Slovakia	2	–	–	–	–	–	2
From territory annexed to Romania	38	13	11	8	2	17	89
Of foreign citizenship	1	3	3	–	–	3	10
Total, Spring Semester 1941/42: 2,405							

Source: *Beszámoló* 1942/44: 158, 184, 186.

bined data refer to place of birth and parents' occupation, while confession and citizenship of students are also noted.

In the same academic year (1941–42) the Romanian refugee university in Sibiu had 2,208 students, less than 10% of whom had some non-Romanian ethnic origin (most of these were Germans). Most conspicuously, Jews are altogether absent from the student contingent, and only a little more than half of the students indi-

cated Transylvania as their region of origin. Again, this is one of the few occasions when there were fewer students (690) engaged in legal studies than in medical studies (1,029), evidently as a side-effect of the war (*Anuarul ...1941/42* 1943).

In 1940–41 Hungarian sources indicated a total number of 101 ethnic Romanian students (with mother-tongue as the criterion) enrolled in the Kolozsvár/Cluj university, which once again had been remolded along ethnic lines. This number rose to 146 in 1941–42. With all the official lip-service paid to the idea of tolerance towards ethnic minorities, few Romanian classes, courses and topics were preserved at the university, and the average percentage of ethnic Romanians among the students in the first two years was a meager 2–2.5%. Even though the demographic belonging to this ethnic background had been halved by the Vienna Award and many of the Romanian students of the formerly Romanian university of Kolozsvár/Cluj had naturally opted to take the road of exile to Sibiu, the figures mentioned nevertheless indicate a gross under-representation of the Romanian community of Northern Transylvania at the Franz Joseph University. No doubt the Sibiu university mistreated Southern Transylvanian Hungarians in the same manner and for the same reasons. These parallelisms speak eloquently about the often emphasized ‘parity-basis’ that comes into effect in war-time minority affairs (Pusztai – Popovits 31–32).

### Conclusion

Radical turnovers induced by geopolitical shifts left the academic framework proper and the scholarly content of Transylvanian higher education almost unchanged. Each time a rupture occurred, only a limited number of the elements seem to have been changed, while the main ‘organizing idea’ behind the whole was ethnic composition of student body and staff. Thus, the Romanian university of Cluj maintained the academic structure of the Hungarian university of Kolozsvár almost untouched, only professors and students came and went. The Sibiu university made a resounding commitment to keep up the scholarly integrity of the institution under dire circumstances. The temporarily returning Hungarian authorities themselves did their best to make the message clear: it was Transylvania’s ‘historic Hungarian’ university that they were now duly restoring to the returned ‘historic land’.

Throughout the period the academic field was part and parcel of the clash over which ethnic group was authorized to rule. Meanwhile, student enrollment patterns betrayed a tendency towards social conservatism in the sense that, beyond the short periods of ‘democratic opening’ that occurred after ‘academic turnovers’, the major tendencies of selection by social background were cyclically re-

trenched. Depending on who gained the upper hand, both the Hungarian and the Romanian academically trained elites carried out an inter-ethnic 'revolution' against each other, both failing in the long run to carry through the limited intra-ethnic social emancipation that higher education may in theory promise.

The series of measures aiming at Romanianization in cultural and educational affairs were part and parcel of the general social revolution intended to be carried out along national lines and interpreted as a matter of life and death by many Romanian leaders of the time. In social terms, the Hungarian 'cultural warfare' was not much better off, and much of what has been said about Romanian nationalizing efforts is valid for the Magyarizing strife in the academe as well. A true market-orientation in the academic market never prevailed in the first part of the 20th century. Market-restrictions did instead, but these were invariably imposed from above, that is, they were politically conditioned.

For most of the first part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Transylvania's university followed a basically unilateral national paradigm in recruitment, organization and promotion of elites through educational credentials or scholarly endeavors. This was a pluri-ethnic setup, reluctantly admitting non-dominant ethnic and social group clusters in addition to the politically sponsored, relatively over-represented dominant ethnic contingent, whatever that happened to be. Just as the overall circumstances never really allowed for a multi-cultural arrangement in society, the local educational market seldom, if ever, represented more than a pluri-ethnic arrangement of a restricted scope. At best, there were parallel universities, like in the latter part of the period under scrutiny. These and their older counterparts were far from being bilingual. It went as a matter of course that one or the other 'national culture' prevailed. Whether assimilative or dissimilative, cultural domination was repeatedly reiterated as the 'foremost mission' of the university.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> As a matter of convenience, the references are made not to the so-called historic Transylvania or Transylvania proper, but to all the Eastern Hungarian territories ceded to Greater Romania in the 1920 Trianon agreement.
- <sup>2</sup> In pointing out the general tendencies regarding recruitment patterns according to ethnic background, a combination of data referring to nationality (mother tongue) and religion seems the handiest. Usually statistics produced in the Dualist period and even after did not have a 'nationality' category as we understand the term today, but the two others mentioned above. Ethnic belonging nevertheless can be deduced from the combination of two markers, mother-tongue and confession.
- <sup>3</sup> Also, tables are illustrative for several eloquent phenomena: sharp changes in ethno-confessional composition of the student body; inter- and intra-ethnic shares according to study-track; the general growth of the student population; shares of ethnic groups within the student body

and the dynamics of rising figures and ethnic shares within and outside the temporal sections presented.

- 4 This is all the more important since the hierarchy of excellence attained in studies as expressed by age of graduation – as a rule, earlier ages of graduation both from high-school and from university were paralleled by a greater degree of excellence regarding the ethnic and denominational backgrounds combined (Karády 1989).
- 5 Beyond the statistics, though, there is a sizable group of Romanian intellectuals that has been trained at the Hungarian university of Kolozsvár/Cluj in the prewar period: altogether, 646 Romanians obtained a doctoral degree here, of which 519 were in law and political science (roughly equivalent with a licentiate, and relatively easy to obtain according to the conjuncture of the period, 99 in medicine, 10 at the faculty of philosophy, 8 in mathematics and natural sciences (Bisztray 1941).
- 6 Transylvania's university is not a unique case of post-war nationalization: similar take-over-situations occurred within the same short period: Czernowitz/Cernauti on the Romanian side, Pozsony/Bratislava on the Hungarian one, while Lemberg/Lvov and especially Strasbourg (going from German to French possession) are farther examples also worth recalling.
- 7 Once again, Romanian was not unique in that universities became hotbeds of Rightist movements. Hungary had its numerus clausus law, introduced as early as 1920 in a moment of shock and effective till 1928 (though to a lesser extent in the country's provincial universities). Here too, overcrowding went hand in hand with political radicalization towards the Right. The series of measures aiming at Romanianization in cultural and educational affairs were part and parcel of the general social revolution intended to be carried out along national lines, and interpreted as a matter of life or death by many Romanian leaders of the time (Kovács 1994; Livezeanu 1995).
- 8 Interestingly enough, most affected were Romanian students, since theirs was a more markedly rural background anyway, while Hungarians and Jews still kept most of their positions as town-dwellers, especially in Cluj/Kolozsvár. The other reason for the striking disadvantage ethnic Romanian students themselves were faced with comes from the direction of their economic background. It so happened that the Great Depression cut more deeply at the economic foundation of Transylvanian Romanians in general. This is not to say that Hungarians or Jews were so much better off. The discrepancy resulted mainly from the simple fact that the restricted economic networks ethnic minorities of Transylvania in general, and Hungarians in particular were compelled to resort to were less affected by the depression, since they depended less on the centralized resources of the state, which so massively promoted the Romanian socio-economic cause in Transylvania in the early twenties. Hence the relative decrease in the number of ethnic Romanian students, to the unexpected advantage of those with non-Romanian ethnic background. Needless to say, such side-effects of the 1929–1933 university crisis were soon heavily over-politicized, giving yet another push to the already existent xenophobia and Rightist-nationalist extremism (Pușcaș 1995).
- 9 This was when Transylvania was split into a Northern (Hungarian) and Southern (Romanian) part by the Second Vienna Award. Similarly, the region had two universities, clearly organized on ethnic bases and with clear political messages in mind.
- 10 Nevertheless, dislocation of student contingents, either as mass refugee-contingents or as a sum of individual choices has nevertheless radically different meanings in the first two periods under scrutiny: while pre-war ethnic Romanians enroll to the newly Romanianized Cluj university to return home, inter-war Transylvanian Magyar contingents chose to study in the 'mother-country' to move definitely to Hungary.

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## THE BOLYAI UNIVERSITY AND MINORITY ELITE RECRUITMENT: 1944–1959

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The Bolyai University was the Hungarian half of the current Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj/Kolozsvár, Transylvania. It was an independent Hungarian University until its merger with the Babeş University in 1959. This merged institution is one of the most important centers of higher education in present-day Romania. However, it has a past that can be traced back to the 16th century within the context of the independent Transylvania of John Sigismund and Stephen Báthory. It later evolved into a Habsburg institution, then a Hungarian and a Romanian University. Finally, during World War II it operated as two separate institutions with Hungarian and Romanian faculties respectively. The two were merged by the Gheorghiu-Dej communist government in 1959. Ever since, Hungarian minority intellectuals have called for the restoration of the independent Bolyai University. The current paper focuses on the independent Bolyai University between 1944 and 1959. It reflects on its role as the premier institution for the recruitment and training of the Hungarian minority's cultural and educational elite. The paper links the fate of this institution to the communist transformation of Romania and its consequences for the Hungarians of Transylvania.

**Keywords:** Bolyai University, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj, Kolozsvár, Transylvania, Gheorghiu-Dej, educational policy, assimilation, minority, nationalism, 1956

Since the overthrow of the Nicolae Ceauşescu dictatorship of Romania in December 1989, a constant refrain of the Hungarian minority in that country has been the re-establishment of an independent Hungarian language University in Cluj/Kolozsvár.<sup>1</sup> After decades of Romanian assimilationist pressure, the leaders of the Hungarian minority, including their most important organization, the RMDSZ (Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania), see the guarantee of their survival as a national community mainly in the establishment of some form of autonomy (political-territorial, cultural, or personal) within the Romanian state

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and in the re-establishment of their own institution of higher education along the pattern that existed between 1944 and 1959.

The present study will focus on the Bolyai University and its role in providing leadership and direction to the ca. 1.5 million Hungarian national community of Romania. The Bolyai University was an important institution which provided instruction for a generation of leaders. It was a research center that also documented the past and the present (to the end of the 1950s) of the Hungarians in Romania, particularly in the region of Transylvania. As such, to what extent did it contribute to “elite” education in Romania, and what was its influence on tolerance and peaceful co-existence between the majority Romanian and the minority Hungarian populations?

The answer to this question is important, because the University was destroyed, merged with the Romanian Babeş University, in 1959 with the argument that it had become a stronghold of nationalist parochialism and separatism and thereby an obstacle to the effective integration and assimilation of Hungarians into Romanian life and society. *Ipsa facto* the University also held back the minority from social progress and the task of building Socialism in Romania.

Was this really the case? Had the Bolyai University really become the obstacle to progress and inter-ethnic, inter-nationality peace? To answer this question we will reflect on the history of the Bolyai University in relation to the institution’s relations with its host city Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg) and to the service role it was to have for the peoples of historical Transylvania as well as Hungary and Romania respectively.

### **Background**

The fate of the Bolyai University reflects in a microcosm the fate of Transylvanian Hungarians as a whole. Thus, in terms of emotional and general psychological effects, its fate parallels Romanian–Hungarian relations from the end of the Second World War to the end of the 1950s. However, if we are to analyze these relations with minimum distortion, it is important first to summarize the history of formal higher education in Cluj (Kolozsvár), from its beginnings to the end of the Second World War. The first attempt to organize an institution of higher education in Kolozsvár is tied to the rule of János Zsigmond (John Sigismund). In 1565 the Transylvanian Diet accepted a plan for the establishment of a college. However, the unstable political conditions and the religious tensions between the major denominations kept the plan from being realized until 1581. (János Zsigmond was Unitarian.) In that year István Báthory (Catholic) opened a college under Jesuit direction. Its academic rank was officially recognized by Pope Gregory XIII

the following year. It evolved out of monastic roots and instruction was provided in Latin by Hungarian, German, and Polish Jesuits.<sup>2</sup>

When the Catholic Báthory family was replaced by Calvinist rulers, the role of the college was eclipsed by a Protestant College established at Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia) in 1622 by Gábor Bethlen. This lasted until the Tatar incursion of 1658, when the institution's library was destroyed in the fighting. Thus, it was only in 1693 that a third attempt succeeded in establishing a college at Kolozsvár, this time with a strengthened curriculum in the natural sciences. It underwent major reorganization under Maria Theresa in 1773 when Pope Clement XIV dissolved the Jesuit order. By 1776 the Piarist fathers were responsible for instruction and the institution acquired the title "Universitas". However, the rule of the "enlightened" monarch Joseph II reduced the role of this institution by making German the language of instruction in 1781 and re-classifying it as a Lyceum in 1784. Thus, we can say that from 1784 to 1872 college and university instruction was non-existent in Transylvania. In this time period intellectual life was guided primarily by scientific and cultural associations.<sup>3</sup>

The immediate forerunner of the present Babeş-Bolyai institution was established in 1872 after the Compromise of 1867 and the "union of the two Hungarian homelands". The Hungarian Parliament established it with the XIX and XX laws passed in 1872. It was named the University of Francis Joseph I in 1881.<sup>4</sup> Instruction at this institution was in Hungarian, with German and Romanian language and literature taught in one department for each. In 1872 it had 258 students, a number that grew to 2,570 by the 1918–1919 academic year. At this time 83% of the student body was Hungarian.<sup>5</sup>

On May 12, 1919 Romanian troops occupied the University and named a Romanian professor as the new provost. In the fall of 1919 a Romanian University replaced the Hungarian institution and it was renamed the University of King Ferdinand I. Hungarian language and literature was now taught solely in one department, as was German. The language of instruction became Romanian. By the end of the 1919–1920 academic year it had 2,552 students with a student body that was mainly Romanian. The Hungarians were not allowed to organize their own University. Thus, Hungarian intellectual life was restricted primarily to scientific and cultural associations and their activities.<sup>6</sup>

The Second World War and the Vienna Award of 1940 changed all this. With the return of Northern Transylvania to Hungary in August of that year, it was possible to re-establish a Hungarian University in Kolozsvár. From 1940 to 1944 Transylvania acquired two universities. In Kolozsvár the University of Francis Joseph I was re-established with Hungarian language instruction, reoccupying the buildings it had had to vacate in 1919. Now the Romanian University of King Ferdinand I had to relocate to Sibiu (Nagyszeben, Hermannstadt) in Southern Transylvania.<sup>7</sup> This dualism lasted until 1944, when Romania switched sides on

August 23<sup>rd</sup> and joined the Allies in fighting Germany and the remnants of the Axis Powers.

Soviet and Romanian military advances into Northern Transylvania did not bring this dualism to an end immediately. In fact only after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution did the Romanian leadership decide to move against Hungarian University-level instruction. During the last days of the Second World War the Hungarian University survived for a number of reasons. The most important reasons were: One, the Hungarian instructional staff did not flee and delayed the evacuation of University facilities until it was too late; two, the Romanian Maniu Guardists carried out atrocities against Hungarian civilians, which convinced the Soviet authorities not to let the Romanians reoccupy Northern Transylvania until hostilities ceased; and three, because Soviet occupation authorities wanted to avoid disruption of services in their sector of occupation. This enabled the Hungarian university to continue functioning during the 1944–1945 academic year.<sup>8</sup>

### Cluj/Kolozsvár/Klausenburg

The Bolyai University was a direct successor to the Hungarian University that was re-established in Kolozsvár after the Second Vienna Award in 1940. While Northern Transylvania was part of Hungary it operated in that city until the end of the war, and was officially transformed into the Bolyai University only in 1946.<sup>9</sup> At this time the city was still predominantly Hungarian. In fact, the city continued to have a Hungarian majority to the very moment when the Bolyai University was absorbed by the Babeş University.

Parallel to this “merger” of the two institutions the city of Cluj was itself undergoing a process of Romanianization. From the 1910 population census, when Hungarians still constituted 83.4% of the population and Romanians only 12.3%, the nationality profile was systematically changed to 50.3% and 48.2% by 1956 and 22.7% and 75.6 by 1992. (See *Table 1* on the “nationality profile” of the city.) In part this reduction of the Hungarian ratio was planned and implemented by both the Romanian leadership of the interwar years and the Communist leadership after the Second World War. Cluj was targeted for this Romanianization because it was a symbol of the Hungarian presence in Transylvania. The university was seen as a major instrument of Romanianization. Already in the interwar period Romanian professors, administrators, and students moved in large numbers into the city.<sup>10</sup> It provided the new Romanian administrators of the city, county and region with an important base of support and became the institutional core of the Romanian effort to transform the nationality profile of the city.

The effort to make Cluj the center of Romanianization was evident in the reduction of the educational opportunities for the Hungarian population.<sup>11</sup> They

**Table 1.** Population of Cluj/Kolozsvár by Nationality, 1880–1992

census year	total	no. of Hungarians	no. of Romanians	no. of Germans	others*	% of Hungarians	% of Romanians	% of Germans	% of others
1880	29,923	22,761	3,855	1,423	1,884	76.1	12.9	4.8	6.2
1890	32,736	27,514	6,039	1,336	660	84.0	9.9	4.1	2.0
1900	49,295	40,845	6,039	1,784	627	82.9	12.3	3.6	1.2
1910	60,808	50,704	7,562	1,676	866	83.4	12.4	2.8	1.4
1920	83,542	41,583	28,274	2,073	11,612	49.8	33.8	2.5	13.8
1930	100,844	54,776	34,836	2,702	8,530	54.2	34.5	2.7	8.4
1941	110,956	97,698	10,029	1,825	1,404	88.0	9.0	1.7	1.2
1956	154,723	77,839	74,628	1,115	1,141	50.3	48.2	0.7	0.7
1966	185,663	76,934	104,914	n.a.	3,815	41.4	56.5	n.a.	2.0
1977	262,853	86,215	173,003	n.a.	3,635	32.7	65.8	n.a.	1.3
1992	328,602	74,871	248,572	n.a.	5,159	22.7	75.6	n.a.	1.5

Based on "Statistical Studies on the Last Hundred Years in Central Europe", Mid-European Center, New York, 1968; Árpád E. Varga, *Fejezetek a jelenkori Erdély népesedéstörténetéből*. Budapest: Püski, 1998, 262–263.

were left only with the possibility of attending the Romanian-language Ferdinand I. University, but not in proportion to their numbers in the overall population, much less in the population of Cluj. (See *Table 2* for the nationality profile of the Ferdinand I. University of Cluj from 1919 to 1939.)

**Table 2.** The Hungarian Student Body of the Romanian Ferdinand I. University of Cluj

Academic Year	Total number of students	number of Hungarian students	% of Hungarian students of student body
1919–20	3793	n.a.	n.a.
1921–22	2447	32	1.3
1923–24	1967	n.a.	n.a.
1925–26	2357	n.a.	n.a.
1927–28	2741	n.a.	n.a.
1929–30	3757	753	20.2
1931–32	4124	935	22.6
1933–34	4072	1127	27.6
1935–36	3690	753	20.4
1937–38	3155	566	17.9
1938–39	4094	553	13.5

Based on *Erdély magyar egyeteme*. Kolozsvár: Az Erdélyi Tudományos Intézet kiadása, 1941, 332.

### Political Transformation

The Soviet occupation of Northern Transylvania lasted from October 1944 to March 1945. On March 6th of 1945 the Petru Groza administration came to power, assuring the Soviet Union of a friendly government in Bucharest.<sup>12</sup> On April 11th and 12th a delegation representing the Romanian University of Sibiu came to Cluj to discuss the future of the University facilities. By May 29th a formal decision had been rendered to move the Romanian University back to Cluj. At the same time a new charter was issued creating a separate Hungarian University. However, the Romanian University would get all the facilities in Cluj and the Hungarian University would have to make do with whatever other facilities could be found, including the buildings of a girl's high school and a reformatory. There were no buildings that would be adequate for the Medical College.<sup>13</sup>

Still, the Hungarian University was not abolished. It officially became the *Universitatea Bolyai din Cluj* (The Bolyai University of Cluj) in 1946. It survived because it was in the interest of the Petru Groza administration to placate the Hungarian minority. In this way he could assure their support for his administration. At the same time it was useful to demonstrate to the outside world that Romania was pursuing a tolerant policy toward its minorities. The negotiations in Paris leading to the Peace Treaty were concerned in part with the future fate of Northern Transylvania.<sup>14</sup> Would it remain part of Romania or would part of it be returned to Hungary? Apparently the retention of the Bolyai University was a convincing argument, used by Foreign Minister Tatarescu, to allow Romania to retain all of Transylvania.

Unfortunately the Bolyai University did not last long following the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty. Within a decade it was divided, reduced and finally by 1959 absorbed by the Romanian Babeş University. This process was carried out in a series of campaigns that culminated in the institution's Romanianization.

As we mentioned above, the actual Romanianization of the Bolyai University followed (or led) in some cases the overall pattern of Romanianization in Transylvania. The process went through a series of phases, including the immediate post-war period until the abdication of King Michael (1944–1947), the Stalinist consolidation of Pauker–Luka–Gheorghiu-Dej (1948–1951), the purging of the Party's "foreign" cadres (1952–1956) and the Gheorghiu-Dej era of Romanian "national" re-assertion (1957–1965).

One could argue that Romania under both Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceauşescu perfected the "salami tactics" system of Mátyás Rákosi, at least in the way in which it systematically undermined Hungarian instruction at the University level. As we have shown above, the nationality policy of the 1944–1947 years corresponded primarily to Romania's desire to retain all of Transylvania. With this in mind all kinds of temporary concessions were made to the minorities. The nationality pol-



icy also responded to Soviet hegemonial demands to assure that a communist government would come to power in Romania. Playing on the insecurities of the minorities helped the Communists to power. This required concessions such as the "Nationality Statute" and the protection of minority-language institutions, including the Bolyai University.<sup>15</sup>

The relative enlightenment in minority-majority relations was also due to two other factors. One was the role of Petru Groza, the other was the over-representation of the minorities in the Party organization at higher levels of the hierarchy. At least this was the case in 1946–1947, and also to a more limited extent from 1947 to 1952. While Groza was influential in policymaking, the minorities fared much better. His outlook was colored by tolerance for diversity and respect for the cultural contributions of all nationalities. In relation to the Bolyai University this was clearly demonstrated by his support in 1945 of the retention of thirty instructors who had Hungarian rather than Romanian citizenship prior to 1940.<sup>16</sup> However, as Groza lost his influence and the Party apparatchiks around Gheorghiu-Dej gained influence, he was less able to stem the tide of Romanian ethnocentrism.

The most dramatic development having long-range effects on the position of the country's ethnic minorities and on the resurgence of nationalism was the rapid growth of the Party following the seizure of power. This growth, particularly in the years up to 1948, drastically altered its ethnic make-up. It relegated the ethnic minority Party members, who in the past composed the bulk of the Rumanian Communist Party (RCP), to a secondary position as Party ranks were swelled by ethnic Romanians who had seen the "handwriting on the wall".<sup>17</sup>

This rapid post-war growth of the Party was the first major step toward its "nationalization". After 1948, however, the RCP stabilized its membership and carried out purges among elements it regarded as "unhealthy". Even these purges, however, caused greatest damage not in the ranks of the newly recruited ethnic Romanians, but in the ranks of the veteran ethnic minority Communists.<sup>18</sup> Thus, both the growth and the purges of the Party contributed to the strengthening of the ethnic Romanian sectors of the RCP. The most recent increases in Party membership under Ceaușescu further accentuated this trend.<sup>19</sup> The regime's search for popularity among the masses led to lowering its standards for membership. This enabled many to join who were ignorant of, if not hostile to the tenets of "proletarian internationalism" and the traditional policies of "minority tolerance" which had prevailed prior to this rapid growth in Party membership. This change took place on all levels of the Party hierarchy, from the Politburo down to the local cell organizations. This change brought about a real "nationalization" of the Party along ethnic Romanian lines.<sup>20</sup>

The changed complexion of the leadership in the Romanian power-structure set the stage for the "salami tactics" that characterized the Romanianization of all aspects of minority life. This process of planned corrosion began almost at the

moment that the regime issued the charter for the Bolyai University's right to exist. It could be argued, perhaps, that this first stage was not a consequence of Party planning, but the result of the passive resistance of the Romanian academicians who did not want to see a Hungarian University in Cluj. The most direct result of this resistance is that the University buildings were *not* shared. Because the Hungarians had to move out they could not find facilities large enough to house their institution. This forced them to divide the institution, leaving the legal, humanities, and social science sections in Cluj, while the Medical and Pharmaceutical sections moved to Tîrgu-Mureş.<sup>21</sup> This initial forced division of the University was made official in 1948 when the Medical and Pharmaceutical college was made independent of the Bolyai University by political decree.<sup>22</sup>

Parallel to this development, the university-level instruction of the institution was also undermined. Under the pretext of paying greater heed to ideological commitments, the instructors who did not have Romanian citizenship prior to 1940, were now terminated by non-renewal of their contracts. This meant that some of the most well-known scholars could no longer teach at the Bolyai University. A similar process of "weeding" or "purging" also took its toll among the Hungarian instructors with Romanian citizenship. Some of the finest instructors were charged with being "clerical reactionaries". While most were purged in this fashion during the early 1950s, some had already suffered termination as early as 1947.<sup>23</sup>

It is true that the instructors of the Romanian Babeş University also suffered during these Stalinist purges. However, a close comparison of the effects of these purges shows that the damage done to the Bolyai University was much more severe. It disrupted continuity of instruction and undermined the quality of education. It also instilled a constant sense of insecurity among the students, not just in terms of their personal existence, but in terms of the survival of the Bolyai University. This was accentuated by the recruitment of "politically reliable" replacements who were not competent in the areas or courses they were supposed to teach.<sup>24</sup>

### **The Impact of the 1956 Revolution**

Of all the Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe, the Transylvanian Hungarians were perhaps most adversely affected by the 1956 Revolution, both immediately and in the long run.<sup>25</sup> Until 1956–1958, they had had an extensive network of cultural and educational institutions. From this time onward these institutions and associated opportunities became the target of cutbacks, outright abolition, or gradual erosion. For the Transylvanian Hungarians, 1956 was the be-

ginning of extensive discrimination and even repression based on their national origin and sense of solidarity with the Hungarians of Hungary.

During the next two years the Romanian leadership undertook a systematic propaganda campaign to discredit the Revolution and its Transylvanian sympathizers. The Revolution was presented as a throwback to the “Horthyist”, “Fascist” past that would have become a threat to the territorial integrity of Romania.<sup>26</sup> Again, the mood that was activated related more to the knee-jerk reactions of the Little Entente than to the quest for “socialist solidarity”. This campaign came to a head a week before the first anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution, when the Party held a meeting of intellectuals at Cluj.<sup>27</sup> At this meeting the Hungarian intellectuals, headed by Lajos Jordáky, engaged in self-criticism of their behavior during the previous October. They admitted having succumbed to nationalism and having sympathized with the actions of Imre Nagy and other leaders of the “counterrevolution”.<sup>28</sup> In effect, this meeting documented the “nationalism” and “isolationism” of the Transylvanian Hungarians even at the highest levels.

The Romanian leaders began to move against this threat of “nationalism” at the first opportunity. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania in the Summer of 1958 meant that the last impediment to Romanian nationalist revival had been removed.<sup>29</sup> Gheorghiu-Dej and his faction of the leadership immediately set about dismantling the Hungarians’ remaining cultural institutions. The first major blow was aimed at the Bolyai University, which was merged with the Romanian Babeş University.<sup>30</sup>

Actually, the merger of the two institutions was already contemplated before the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.<sup>31</sup> However, the uprising provided it with a pretext which would enable the Party leaders to speed up the process of “unification”. During the 1955–1956 academic year visits by important party leaders to Cluj and the Bolyai University, hinted that the Romanian leadership was thinking of “alternative options”. Leonte Rautu of the Executive Committee and Miron Constantinescu visited with the University’s administrators raising questions about the placement of graduates and the “excessive” time devoted to Hungarian literature in the curriculum.<sup>32</sup> Also, during the summer of 1956 steps were taken to terminate the instruction of history in Hungarian. Although the University was able to stall implementation of this, it was not able to avoid the Party’s directives to hold round table discussions with administrators and instructors from the Romanian Babeş University, which became regular weekly occurrences at the Continental Hotel.<sup>33</sup>

After the Revolution in Hungary broke out in October 1956, everything speeded up.<sup>34</sup> Under trumped-up charges of sympathizing with the Revolution they fired a number of instructors in the Social Studies fields (Géza Saszet, Edit Keszi Harmat, etc.) and arrested a group of students in the history department. Then a brief lull followed until March, 1958, when more arrests and trials took

place. The Dobai-Komáromi trial was followed by the arrest of talented young University instructors, including Gyula David, Elemér Lakó and János Varró. They were accused of counter-revolutionary agitation for having visited the graves of the poets Sándor Reményik and Jenő Dsida during October, 1956, singing and reciting their poems. The well known professor Lajos Jordáky was also arrested at this time as well as many students in the Department of Hungarian Studies.<sup>35</sup>

Then a meeting of the Bolyai student body was called, at which representatives of the Young Communist League from Bucharest also participated. Provocative questions were asked of the students, and emotions ran high. Eight students were arrested and one of them was given a twelve-year prison sentence. A few days later the University was visited by Virgil Trofin, the Central Committee member with responsibility for youth affairs. For “weakness and indecisiveness” he had both the Dean (András Bodor) and Assistant Dean (Zoltán Náhlik) removed from their positions.<sup>36</sup>

The next step was to go public with the “Hungarian problem”. This took place on February 18–22, 1959 at the Bucharest Conference of the Romanian Student Association.<sup>37</sup> A high-powered government delegation was present at the meeting including General Secretary of the Party Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Athanasie Joja, the Minister of Education. Gheorghiu-Dej denounced “isolationism” and said that steps must be taken to eradicate the remnants of “national antagonisms”. This could only be achieved by bringing all students of all nationalities together in one institution where they can build Socialism together as a united and patriotic people. All the people who spoke up favored the unification of universities and schools. Minister of Education Joja added that even beyond the classroom, it is important to give students a sense of national unity via common dormitories and other common activities.<sup>38</sup>

### **Merger/Absorption**

On February 23<sup>rd</sup> the Administration of the Bolyai University called a meeting of the University Council. The Rector presided and stated that the Assistant Rector would make a statement that could not be discussed or questioned. The Assistant Rector then stated that the Party and the Ministry of Education had decided – on the basis of the demands of students from both universities – to unite the two universities of Cluj. Pandemonium broke out in the chamber, but the Rector refused to allow anyone to speak. He simply concluded the meeting by saying that this decision is in the best interest of all concerned, it will allow for teaching of all courses in Hungarian as well as Romanian and at half the cost because it will reduce administrative and other forms of duplication. He also called on everyone to

support the Party and Government decision with their active participation in the scheduled unification meetings.<sup>39</sup>

These meetings began on February 26 and continued until March 5th almost in marathon fashion. The objective of these meetings was to build public support for the Party's decision and to isolate those who were opposed to it. For this reason the Party sent many of its influential leaders to these "public sessions", including Nicolae Ceaușescu, a member of the Presidium, the Minister of Education Joja, Ion Iliescu, the president of the Romanian Student Federation (he has also been elected twice as President of post-communist Romania), and many others. Speakers followed one another in a steady stream applauding the Party's decision to "merge" the two universities. In this atmosphere only three members of the Bolyai staff dared to speak up against the unification: Edgár Balogh, István Nagy and László Szabédi.<sup>40</sup>

The public meetings were then used to bring pressure on those who were still hesitant or noncommittal about this decision. Nicolae Ceaușescu personally guided the intimidating of the individuals who opposed the decision. He harangued those present by saying that no one should live under the illusion that a Swiss model was applicable to Romania. No such "medieval" model was acceptable in sovereign Romania, where there was no room for Ghettos, and the "isolation of nationalities". In Romania there was room only for one culture, a culture devoted to the construction of Socialism.<sup>41</sup>

László Szabédi was picked out for particular pressure, because of his stature in the community and at the University. He did not break! When called by Ceaușescu to present his own views, he presented them in Hungarian as his colleague Lajos Nagy translated them into Romanian. Ceaușescu was livid and publicly castigated him. During subsequent evenings Szabédi was called in for questioning by the Securitate. This harassment convinced him that he could not alter the decision, but he refused to become a party to it. He committed suicide. On May 5th the Assistant Rector Zoltán Csendes and his wife also followed his example.<sup>42</sup>

"Unification" in this psychological sense, was then followed by joint committee discussions between the two universities for the actual implementation of this decision. While the "charter" of the Bolyai University was never annulled, no legal document was drawn up to define the rights and obligations of the two institutions in the newly created "Babeș-Bolyai University". In this way no one could be held accountable for the non-fulfillment of obligations. However, the joint committees did hammer out the future academic program in terms of language use in the classroom. Already in this "compromise" it became apparent that the Bolyai faculty and students would henceforth play second fiddle to the Babeș faculty and student body. Of all courses offered at the new unified institution, 137 would be offered in Romanian, while only 43 would be in Hungarian. In some areas Hun-

garian was totally excluded (law and economics) while in others it was reduced to a few insignificant sections, that were totally eliminated by the middle of the 1980s.<sup>43</sup> Only in the pedagogical section did Hungarian instruction survive for Hungarian literature and Hungarian language by the time of Ceaușescu's overthrow in December, 1989.

The fate of lower-level educational institutions followed the same pattern; they were not eliminated outright, but made subordinate parts of Romanian-language grade schools or high schools and subjected to administrative restrictions that undercut their status and standards. These considerations led many Hungarian students to take their classes in Romanian rather than in their mother tongue.<sup>44</sup> Thus, after 1958, the educational system became an unabashed instrument of Romanianization.

### Parallelization of Form and Content

The most pronounced feature of minority education in Transylvania has been the appearance of "parallelization". Though parallelization had always played a part earlier, it became particularly important after 1956.<sup>45</sup> "Parallelization" means the setting-up of Romanian language classes *parallel* with the existing minority language classes. This is done even in areas where there are no Romanian students to attend them. The primary purpose is to induce minority students to leave their own schools and classes to attend the schools and classes of the majority nationality. This policy reduced, in the long-run, the existence of the nationality schools. What happened is that one minority school after another closed because there were supposedly not enough pupils to attend them.<sup>46</sup> The real reason, however, was that the parallel schools and sections existed to absorb the students of the minority schools, after they had been pressured into deserting the latter.<sup>47</sup>

Parallelization has affected all levels of education, not excepting universities and higher institutions. In fact, it is on the level of higher education that this policy most clearly revealed the attempt to "Romanianize" and to assimilate. While proletarian internationalism lasted, the Hungarian minority had not only its own independent Bolyai University at Cluj, but its Medical and Pharmaceutical Institute in Tîrgu-Mureș (Marosvásárhely), and a Hungarian section in the Petru Groza Agricultural Institute and at the Gh. Dima Conservatory also at Cluj.<sup>48</sup> All four were "parallelized". As we have seen the Bolyai University was the first to meet this fate. This was followed by the reduction (i.e., absorption) of the Hungarian section of both the Petru Groza Agricultural Institute and the Hungarian Medical-Pharmaceutical Institute at Tîrgu Mureș in 1962. From that date all higher education for Hungarians was restricted to Romanian institutions, and to the few re-

maintaining Hungarian sections, which still maintained a precarious existence within such Romanian facilities.<sup>49</sup>

The Romanianizing effects of parallelization can be seen in the academic publishing activity of the Babeş-Bolyai University. While Nicolae Ceauşescu and lesser party leaders have denied that Romanianization existed,<sup>50</sup> a brief analysis of the official academic journals of the Babeş-Bolyai University indicates just the opposite.

Before the Babeş and the Bolyai Universities were merged, in 1958 their learned journals were published in Romanian and Hungarian respectively.<sup>51</sup> After the merger, the academic publications still appeared in both languages, but now the Romanian and Hungarian studies appeared together rather than in separate journals. In most cases each of these studies was followed by a brief summary of its contents in the other language.<sup>52</sup> However, with the passage of time (less than seven years) the Hungarian language studies were almost completely eliminated.<sup>53</sup>

As a perusal of these studies indicates, Hungarian scholars now published their studies mainly in Romanian.<sup>54</sup> This tendency was not a “natural process”. It was a consequence of both faculty and editorial pressure.<sup>55</sup> Perhaps an even more telling indicator is the “format” of these academic journals. In the years immediately after the merger, the journals were truly bilingual in appearance as well as content. The “table of contents” in each journal listed the articles according to the language in which they were written. The Hungarian article listings were even followed by Romanian translations.<sup>56</sup> Titles, such as “contents”, appeared in both languages. At first even the name of the place (Cluj-Kolozsvár) of publication, was provided in both languages. But, this was not to last. By 1959, the place of publication was listed only in Romanian.<sup>57</sup> In some journals even the bilingual designation for “contents” (Sumar-Tartalom) was replaced with the Romanian “Sumar”.<sup>58</sup> While this may seem trivial, it indicates that the “national form” was being eliminated for Transylvanian Hungarians in the University’s life.

A substantive analysis of these articles also indicates that the “socialist content” of higher learning, was falling more and more within a national Romanian, rather than an international Communist mold. This, of course, is discernable only in studies which fall within the Social Sciences. A comparison of the pre-merger academic journal, appearing in Hungarian, with its post-1958 successors, reveals that the earlier studies were often concerned with local Transylvanian problems and Hungarian cultural matters.<sup>59</sup> The later studies, on the other hand, have been concerned more with the problems, culture and history of Romania as a whole.<sup>60</sup>

The parallelization of the Bolyai University with the Babeş University has had other consequences as well. The two most dramatic results have been the Romanianization of the teaching staff and the student body of the combined institution. Louis Takács, who was the provost of the Bolyai University at the time of

its merger, wrote a memorandum fifteen years later, to document the consequences of the merger. In this memorandum he pointed out that in the hiring practices of the new combined (parallelized) University whenever an opening occurred, in almost every instance it was filled by a Romanian instructor.<sup>61</sup> George Schöpflin provides an excellent summary table on the consequences of this process (see *Table 3*).

**Table 3.** Nationality Breakdown of the Academic Staff of Certain Departments of the Babeş-Bolyai University at Cluj

		newly appointed staff		
		1958–1959	1976–1977	1958–1977
chemistry	Romanians	45	63	31
	Hungarians	36	14	1
law	Romanians	18	23	8
	Hungarians	15	4	1
economics	Romanians	23	76	n.a.
	Hungarians	15	19	n.a.
physics	Romanians	n.a.	92	n.a.
	Hungarians	n.a.	19	n.a.
mathematics	Romanians	31	51	30
	Hungarians	19	14	3
biology	Romanians	n.a.	112	n.a.
	Hungarians	n.a.	24	n.a.
history and philosophy	Romanians	29	20	Nil
	Hungarians	14	7	Nil

*Source:* Adapted from data in the memorandum by Lajos Takács, 1977, in samizdat.

In the process of Romanianizing the staff of the merged institution, the opportunities for Hungarian instruction were automatically reduced. Although initially, at the time of the merger – and subsequently reinforced by a party resolution of 1971 – certain subjects were to be presented also in the Hungarian language. These included philosophy, history, economics, psychology, mathematics, physics, chemistry, botany, zoology, geography, medicine and pharmacy. As George Schöpflin pointed out, this meant that Hungarian university graduates were largely restricted to medicine and teaching as career options.<sup>62</sup> These observations are also reinforced by the overall reduction of the Hungarian-language instructional staff. (See *Table 4* on the “Instructional Personnel of the Babeş-Bolyai University”.)

In terms of overall enrollment Schöpflin provides a number of other insights based on the Takács memorandum. During the last year (1957–1958) before the merger “the total number of Hungarian undergraduates following full-time courses in Romania was about 5,500. Of these 4,082 were studying... [in] the



**Table 4.** Instructional Personnel at Babeş-Bolyai University According to Nationality\*

instructors	1958–59		1970–71		1977–78		1980–81	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Total number	675	100	819	100	777	100	772	100
Romanians	385	55.5	564	68.9	586	75.4	601	77.8
All minorities	n.a.	n.a.	255	31.1	191	24.6	171	22.2
Hungarians	272	41.4	194	23.7	148	19.1	139	18.0
Other minorities	n.a.	n.a.	61	7.4	43	5.5	32	4.2

\* Based on *A romániai magyar főiskolai oktatás: Múlt, jelen, jövő*. Cluj/Kolozsvár: Jelenlét Alkotó Társaság, 1990, 29.

Hungarian language”.<sup>63</sup> Hungarian students constituted 10.75 percent of all undergraduates in that year. By 1974–1975 their share of students had declined to 5.7 percent of the undergraduate population which had, on the other hand, grown to more than double of what it had been two decades before.<sup>64</sup> For all practical purposes the elimination of the autonomous Bolyai University has eliminated Hungarian language instruction at the college/university levels.

The consequences of this were more drastic in light of employment opportunities *after* graduation. Hungarian graduates were discouraged from finding employment in Hungarian inhabited parts of Romania. They were pressured to look for employment outside of Transylvania in the Regat (“Old” Kingdom, i.e., Moldavia and Wallachia).<sup>65</sup> This was particularly the case if the individual was highly trained or educated and therefore would occupy a leading position. The purpose of this restriction was twofold: First to disperse the Hungarian minority as much as possible, and second, to deprive those Hungarians of their leaders who were still concentrated in specific areas. Both of these objectives were much easier to achieve once the Babeş-Bolyai University was completely Romanianized.

### Long-term Consequences

After the overthrow of the Ceauşescu dictatorship in Romania, the Hungarian minority finally had the opportunity to reorganize itself to defend its human and minority rights. In this struggle Hungarians brought into being their own political party called RMDSZ (UDMR), in English translation: the Democratic Federation of Hungarians in Romania. This organization became a very important component of the Romanian political system, first as a member of the opposition during the first Iliescu administration, then as part of the governing coalition during the Constantinescu administration, and most recently as a part-time critic, part-time reluctant partner, of the second Iliescu and the Traian Basescu administrations. This same Hungarian political party/interest group, also sponsored an important

self-assessment of the Hungarian minority, by compiling and editing a “Who’s Who” of the Hungarian inhabitants of Romania. This “Who’s Who” is an invaluable storehouse of information on the Hungarian “elite” in present-day Romania.<sup>66</sup>

The “Who’s Who” was dated 1997, but the research for it was completed on October 1, 1996. It’s a compilation that is based on six thousand biographical sketches culled from 35 thousand forms that were sent out to and distributed among community leaders and church institutions as well as public officials and educational establishments.<sup>67</sup> These six thousand individuals represent a good cross-section of the Hungarian elite in present-day Romania. It is a compilation that profiles the active cultural, religious, economic, educational and political leadership of close to 1.5 million minority inhabitants in Romania.

On the basis of a content analysis of this volume, with the assistance of my most faithful research associate – my wife – I have been able to pinpoint how many individuals in this sample are graduates, or former students, of the Bolyai and Babeş-Bolyai University respectively.<sup>68</sup>

The analysis leads to a number of important conclusions: first, that this elite was drawn in large part from among the students of the Bolyai University; second, that their publications and leadership represents an important segment of the Hungarian elite in Romania, and third that they have been in the forefront of democratic changes in the new post-Ceauşescu Romania. Of the six thousand individuals listed in the “Who’s Who” almost 25% were either students or employees of the Bolyai and the Babeş-Bolyai Universities respectively.

Although it is difficult to separate these graduates and faculty members from the rest of society, we can tell a lot about their impact on Romanian society through their contributions to the over-all culture and the public debate that has surrounded minority-majority relations in contemporary Romania.

### **Conclusion**

The history of the Bolyai University demonstrates that a minority nationality educational institution is an indispensable instrument for elite and leadership training. This history also reveals that the nationalism of the majority power-structure, at least in Romania after 1956, viewed this institution as a possible threat to its control of society. Hence, it moved to weaken and to eliminate the “independent” Hungarian University by merging it with the Romanian Babeş University. As the foregoing data indicates this resulted in absorption, and the Romanianization of university education.

In retrospect it is difficult to assess the linkage of the Bolyai University for inter-ethnic/inter-nationality relations without an analysis of its curriculum and

the values and beliefs of its graduates. In the preliminary discussions leading to the absorption of the Bolyai University, Leonte Rautu had indicated that too much emphasis was given to Hungarian literature in the curriculum. As the subsequent “unification meetings” also demonstrated, the Romanian leadership wanted to eliminate the Bolyai University as a “refuge of reactionary thinking, isolationism and ghetto parochialism”. It contended, that this was a threat to progress and Socialism. In actuality the Bolyai University was viewed by Ceaușescu and the party elite as an obstacle to their own hidden agenda: the “homogenization” of the unitary Romanian nation. Did the Bolyai University really constitute a threat to the Romanian nation? Was it actually as narrow-minded as its narrow-minded destroyers claimed?

Unfortunately this research has not been able to compare the content of history lessons and their instruction at the two institutions. The only concrete items that reflect the thinking of these two institutions is their published instructional materials and/or the research and publications of their respective teaching personnel. From the published evidence – and there is plenty of it – the content analysis of works written by the graduates and instructors of the Bolyai University reflect a desire for peaceful co-existence and mutual tolerance. Unfortunately the reverse is not the case if one reads the published works of the leading academicians, like Stefan Pascu, of the Babeș-Bolyai University. However, such a detailed analysis awaits the work of future scholars.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The city/place names in this paper will be presented in the language of the nationality that governed it at that time. The other names, in other languages, will be included in parentheses when first used.
- <sup>2</sup> Rudolf Joó and Béla Barabás, “A kolozsvári magyar egyetem 1945-ben”, unpublished MS Prepared for Magyarorsághoz Intézet, 1988, 1 of introduction; *Erdély magyar egyeteme* (Kolozsvár: Az Erdélyi Tudományos Intézet Kiadása, 1941), 45–46; for the Romanian version of the origins see Stefan Pascu, *Universitatea “Babeș-Bolyai” din Cluj* (Cluj: Editura Dacia, 1972), 8.
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 8–9; Joó and Barabás, “A kolozsvári magyar egyetem”, 2-4; *Erdély magyar egyeteme*, 54–136.
- <sup>4</sup> Joó and Barabás, 5–6.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 7–8; *Erdély magyar egyeteme*, 168.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 309–332; Pascu, *Universitatea “Babeș-Bolyai”*, 17–19; Joó and Barabás, 8–9.
- <sup>7</sup> Rudolf Joó, “Egy sorsdöntő esztendő: 1945 A kolozsvári magyar egyetem történetéből”, *Hitel*, X, No. 1 (January 3, 1989), 22; Pascu, *Universitatea “Babeș-Bolyai”*, 29–31.
- <sup>8</sup> Lajos Csögör, “Előszó” in Joó and Barabás, “A kolozsvári magyar egyetem”, 1–19, particularly 6–7; Joó, “Egy sorsdöntő esztendő”, 22–23.
- <sup>9</sup> Csögör, “Előszó” in Joó and Barabás, 10.
- <sup>10</sup> *Erdély magyar egyeteme*, 305–332.

- <sup>11</sup> Árpád E. Varga, *Fejezetek a jelenkori Erdély népesedés történetéből* (Budapest: Püski, 1998), 167–178.
- <sup>12</sup> Elemér Illyés, *National Minorities in Romania: Change in Transylvania* (Boulder and New York: East European Monographs, 1982), 106–111, 164–167.
- <sup>13</sup> Joó, “Egy sorsdöntő esztendő”, 23.
- <sup>14</sup> Csögör, “Előszó”, 11–12.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*: Illyés, *National Minorities*, 106–111.
- <sup>16</sup> Joó, “Egy sorsdöntő esztendő”, 24; Csögör, “Előszó”, 8.
- <sup>17</sup> Ghita Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania 1944–1962* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 204–208; Stephen Fischer-Galati (Ed.) *Romania* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), 69–71; Robert R. King, *History of the Romanian Communist Party* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 1980), 64. RCP stands for Communist Party of Romania. This name will be used throughout this study rather than the name adopted in 1948 at the time of the Communist “merger” with the Social Democrats. The name then adopted was Rumanian Workers’ Party (RWP). Since this study covers a longer period of time than just the post-1948 years, the older name of the Party will be used.
- <sup>18</sup> This is verified by the fact that in December, 1955, 79.2% of the RCP members were ethnic Romanians. By 1968, 88.43% were ethnic Romanians. Compare Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, 243, with “Report of Nicolae Ceaușescu on organizational measures for the steady strengthening of the moral-political unity of the working people”, *Documents, Articles and Information on Romania*, No. 27 (Oct. 28, 1968), 30.
- <sup>19</sup> Randolph L. Braham, “Rumania: Onto the Separate Path”, *Problems of Communism*, XIII (May-June, 1964), footnote 5, 16–17.
- <sup>20</sup> D. A. Tomasic, “The Rumanian Communist Leadership”, *Slavic Review*, XX (October, 1961), 482, 492–494; Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, 204–215, 241–245, 316–321. Also see A. Ludanyi, “The Impact of 1956 on the Hungarians of Transylvania”, *Hungarian Studies*, XX, No. 1 (2006), 95–98.
- <sup>21</sup> Joó, “Egy sorsdöntő esztendő”, 23–24.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, Csögör, “Előszó”, 10–11.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, Joó, “Egy sorsdöntő esztendő”, 24.
- <sup>25</sup> György Lázár, “Memorandum”, in *Witnesses to Cultural Genocide: First-Hand Reports on Rumania’s Minority Policies Today* (New York: Committee for Human Rights in Rumania, 1979), 104–105; Ludanyi, “The Impact of 1956...” 98–105.
- <sup>26</sup> Robert R. King, *Minorities Under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension Among Balkan Communist States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 84.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>29</sup> Ferenc A. Vali, “Transylvania and the Hungarian Minority”, *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 20 (1966), 280.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 282; István Révay, “Hungarian Minorities under Communist rule”, in *The Fight For Freedom: Facts About Hungary* (New York: Hungarian Committee, 1959), 298.
- <sup>31</sup> Kálmán Aniszi, “A Bolyai Tudományegyetem utolsó esztendeje: Beszélgetés dr. Sebestyén Kálmánnal”, *Hitel*, XII, No. 3 (March, 1999), 83; *A romániai magyar főiskolai oktatás: Múlt, jelen, jövő* (Cluj/Kolozsvár: Jelenlét Alkotó Társaság, 1990), 21.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 21–22.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.
- <sup>34</sup> Aniszi, “A Bolyai Tudományegyetem”, 83.
- <sup>35</sup> *A romániai magyar főiskolai oktatás*, 22–23.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 23–24; Aniszi, “A Bolyai Tudományegyetem utolsó esztendeje”, 86–87.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 84–85.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 85–86; *A romániai magyar főiskolai oktatás*, 25.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 25–26; Aniszi, “A Bolyai Tudományegyetem utolsó esztendeje”, 86–87; Péter Cseke and Lajos Kántor (eds.) *Szabédi napjai* (Cluj-Kolozsvár: Komp-press, Korunk Baráti Társasága, 1998), 127–136.

<sup>43</sup> *A romániai magyar főiskolai oktatás*, 26–27.

<sup>44</sup> For this “Romanianization” process see *Rumania’s Violations of Helsinki Final Act Provisions Protecting the Rights of National, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities* (New York: Committee for Human Rights in Rumania, 1980), 20–31.

<sup>45</sup> “The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania”, *Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists*, No. 17 (December, 1963), 76; Tamás Schreiber, “A magyar kisebbség helyzete Romániában”, *Irodalmi Újság*, July 15, 1964.

<sup>46</sup> In contradiction to the above contention it is possible to show that the total number of minority students in 4-year schools increased to 131,773 in 1956–1957 from 127,634 in 1955–1956. Yet in this same space of time the number of minority schools decreased from 1,416 to 1,343 in these same 4-year schools. This pattern is also apparent on the higher levels of education. See Randolph Braham, *Education in the Rumanian People’s Republic* (U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare; Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1963), 75, table 13. While the decreases of the years prior to the above seem more natural, the decrease in later years certainly does not. Now the decrease of minority schools is followed by the decrease of minority students rather than the other way around.

<sup>47</sup> These pressures are of various kinds, some direct and some indirect. See in this regard “The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania”, 76; Schreiber, “A magyar kisebbség helyzete Romániában.” F. K., “Románia szüntesse meg az erdélyi magyarok üldözését”, *Katolikus Magyarok Vasárnapja*, 71 (June 21, 1964), 1.

<sup>48</sup> “Cluj Regiune” according to *Faalia*, Feb. 6, 1958, in “Comprehensive Regiune Summaries”, *Weekly Summary of the Rumanian Provincial Press*, 4–9 Feb. 1958 (JPRS/Washington, D.C. – April 22, 1958), 3.

<sup>49</sup> Besides this formal pattern of “integration” there is also an informal trend along similar lines which is stressed and fostered by the Romanian regime. The most recent example of this policy has been the sharing of rooms in student hostels and dormitories by Romanians and Hungarians. The pretext for this is that the Hungarian students will more easily learn Romanian if they share rooms with Romanian students. See “The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania.” This policy received its inception soon after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. A. Rosca, “The Party Organizations and the Patriotic Education of the Youth”, *Lupta de Clasa* (Nov., 1957), 87–96 in *Selected Translations from East European Political Journals and Papers* (JPRS/Washington, D.C. Feb. 28, 1958), 126.

<sup>50</sup> Nicolae Ceaușescu, “A Romániai társadalom szerkezetében végbemenő mélyreható társadalmi-politikai változások” (Speech delivered on Oct. 24, 1968; Bukarest: Politikai Könyvkiadó, 1968), 28–41, and “Speech by János Fazekas at Odorhei Meeting”, *Documents, Articles and Information on Romania*, No. 21 (Aug. 27, 1968), 36–38, provide the best two examples of such denials.

<sup>51</sup> Compare *Buletinul: Universitatilor V. “Babeș” si “Bolyai”*, Vol. I, Nr. 1–2, (1957), and V. “Babeș si Bolyai”, Vol. I, Nr. 1–2, and V. *Babeș és Bolyai Egyetemek Közleményei*, I. évf., 1–2. sz. (1956).

- 52 *Ibid.*, *Buletinul: Universitatilor V. "Babeş" si "Bolyai"*, Vol. I, Nr. 1–2 (1957).
- 53 In 1956–1957 it was still possible to find scholarly works in Hungarian. In *V. Babeş és Bolyai Egyetem Közleményei*, I évf., 1–2. sz. (1956), there were fourteen Hungarian language studies and five Rumanian Language studies followed by the Hungarian summaries of seven Rumanian studies. By 1960 it was evident that Hungarian language studies declined in numbers. In *Studia: Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Series 1, Fasciculus 2, Anul 5* (1960), there are 26 items, articles and studies of which only one appears in Hungarian, while 21 of the contributors are Hungarian. By 1965 the situation became even worse. *Studia: Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai (Series Philosophia et Oeconomica, Anul X, 1965)*, contains seventeen items, articles and studies of which none appear in Hungarian in spite of the fact that five of the contributors are Hungarian.
- 54 *Ibid.*
- 55 That such faculty and editorial pressure existed is hard to substantiate. This contention is based on the observations of two scholars, a Pole and an American, who spent extended periods of time doing research at the Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj (Kolozsvár) during 1967 and 1968 respectively. Both maintained, in personal conversations, that the pressure was evident in the language used by the Hungarian faculty members. They never spoke to one another in Hungarian, if even one Romanian faculty member was present.
- 56 *V. Babeş és Bolyai Egyetem Közleményei*, I. évf., 1–2. sz. (1956).
- 57 Compare *Ibid.*, and *Studia: Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Series 1, Fasciculus 1, Anul 4* (1959).
- 58 *Studia: Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Series 1, Fasciculus 1, Anul 5* (1960); *Studia: Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Series 3, Fasciculus 1, Anul 4* (1959); *Studia: Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Series Psychologia Paedagogia, Anul 9* (1964).
- 59 *A kolozsvári Bolyai tudományegyetem (1945–1955)* (Cluj, Transylvania: Állami Tanügyi és Pedagógiai Könyvkiadó, 1956), contains some of these studies. Also representative are: Emil Petrovici, "A Roman oris, orsia, orasa, orasani, oraseni magyar varjas", 223–226, Attila T. Szabó, "A gyermeklő és rokonsága", 235–251, and Mózes Gálffy and Gyula Márton, "A Bolyai-Egyetem magyar nyelvészeti tanszékének nyelvjáráskutató tevékenysége a Magyar Autonom Tartományban", 253–279, in *V. Babeş és Bolyai Egyetem Közleményei*, I évf., 1–2. sz. (1956).
- 60 Some examples are: A. Bodor, "Adalékok a helyi elem fennmaradásának kérdéséhez a római kori Daciában: A Liber es a Libera kultusz", *Studia: Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Series 4, Fasciculus 1* (1960), 25–58; Zoltán Farkas, "Állam, nemzet és szuverenitás a szocializmusban", *Studia: Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Series Philosophia, Anul XI* (1966), 19–27. "Memorandum of Lajos Takács" in *Witnesses to Cultural Genocide*, 151–153.
- 61 *Ibid.*
- 62 *Ibid.*
- 63 *Ibid.*
- 64 *Ibid.*
- 65 *Ibid.*, 13.
- 66 István Stanik (Ed.) *Romániai magyar ki kicsoda 1997* (Cluj/Kolozsvár: RMD Sz and Scripta Kiadó, 1997).
- 67 *Ibid.*, 10.
- 68 *Ibid.*, perusal of entire listing.

# CHANGING ETHNIC PATTERNS IN TRANSYLVANIA SINCE 1989

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The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of changing ethnic patterns in Transylvania since the fall of Communism in Romania in 1989. The ethnic structure of this multicultural province was dominated by Hungarians, Romanians and Germans from the early 13th century until the middle of 20th century and by Romanians, Hungarians and Roma since 1989. The natural decrease and the increasing (e)migration of the population associated with the economic, social and political changes of the epoch has led to considerable changes in the ethnic structure of Transylvania. The most striking ethnic changes are the accelerated decrease of the population of the national minorities (mostly of Germans and Hungarians) and the dynamic demographic growth of the Roma population. Nearly half of the Hungarians live in municipalities where they represent an absolute majority of the local population (e.g., the Székely land and parts of Bihor-Satu Mare-Sălaj counties). As a result of their dynamic increase (25% between 1992 and 2002), the Roma community might outnumber the Hungarians in the decade to come, becoming the second largest ethnic group (to the Romanians) of Transylvania (according to estimates and not census data).

**Keywords:** Transylvania, Romania, ethnic structure, ethnic geography

## Introduction

The term “Transylvania”<sup>1</sup> is often used in contemporary Hungary to refer to the areas of the Carpatho-Pannonian region which today are part of Romania (but until 1920 had formed part of Hungary). Historic Transylvania (about 57,000 km<sup>2</sup>) is located between the Eastern-Southern Carpathians and the Apușeni mountains (Bihor Massif). This historic east Hungarian province possessed a certain autonomy in the medieval Hungarian Kingdom due to its remoteness from the capital (Buda) and its special geographic location, encircled by high mountains. Between 1541 and 1690 it existed as an autonomous principality of the Ottoman Empire (as the maintainer of lost Hungarian statehood). During the periods of 1690–1704 and 1711–1867 it constituted a province of the Habsburg Empire (constitutionally be-

longing to the Hungarian Crown). From 1867 until 1918 Transylvania was part of Hungary within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Since 1919 (de jure since 1920) it is part of Romania, apart from the period between 1940–1944, when the northern part of Transylvania (43,101 km<sup>2</sup>)<sup>2</sup> was temporarily incorporated into Hungary as a result of the Second Vienna Award (August 30, 1940).

Over the course of its history Transylvania has always been an ethnically and religiously mixed region of a strong multicultural character. Migrations, the events of wars, the distinct habitats of the particular ethnic groups and their different political status have resulted in considerable shifts in the ethnic structure over the past millennium. The sequence of the major ethnic groups of the province changed as follows: 10th–12th century: Hungarians, Slavs; 13th century–1650's: Hungarians, Romanians, Germans; 1650's–1980's: Romanians, Hungarians, Germans; since 1980's Romanians, Hungarians, Roma (Gypsies).

### **Direct Ethnic Antecedents: The Socialist Period**

Following the communist take-over in the 1950's, during the "heroic age" of Romanian socialist industrialization, population concentration and the increase in industrial jobs and urban population was a primary target. Between 1948 and 1956 the urban population of Transylvania increased by over one million, parallel with the increase of the ratio of Romanians in the urban population (1948: 49.9%, 1956: 58.1%). In addition to fulfilling the socio-political aims of early East European socialist urbanization, Romanian ethno-political targets (turning cities and towns with Hungarian majorities into cities and towns with Romanian majorities) played a very important role, too. Because of the massive migrations and losses during the war, the rural ethnic territory of Germans (whose number diminished by 200,000 since 1941) had vanished completely. The ethnic vacuum that emerged in 1944–1945 in the German villages was almost completely filled by Romanians by 1956.

In spite of an average 7.8% annual natural increase over the period between the 1956 and 1992 censuses, the population of Transylvania only grew by ca 1.5 million, i.e., 24.2%.<sup>3</sup> Because of the high discrepancies among different ethnic groups regarding their natural and mechanical demographic trends and the changes in ethnic identity (assimilation-dissimilation), the number of Roma (Gypsies) increased by 159%, of Ukrainians–Ruthenians by 59.7%, of Romanians by 40.7%, and of Hungarians by 2.9%, while there was a decrease in the number of Jews by 93.9% and of Germans by 70.4% over the course of the thirty-six years under examination (*Table 1*). Large shifts in proportions were due to emigration from and immigration to Transylvania affecting more than one million people, and a migration balance that was negative for ethnic minorities and



positive for Romanians. According to the statistics concerning place of birth and demographic trends, estimates on the number of Romanians resettled from the regions beyond the Carpathians put their number at about 630,000 between 1945 and 1977 (Varga 1998). An overwhelming proportion of immigrants from Moldavia and Wallachia were directed to southern Transylvania into the heavy industrial triangle of the counties of Braşov–Arad–Reşiţa, where an increased demand on the workforce could not be met owing to a traditionally low natural birth-rate (which subsequently became a negative rate of population growth) and, later, because of the growing rate of emigration of Germans. Furthermore, masses coming from Moldavia and Wallachia were used to accelerate Romanianization of certain municipalities in northern Transylvania (Cluj-Napoca, Oradea).

Beside the massive influx of Romanians, the rapid process of the decline in the number of ethnic minorities in Transylvania was the result of their increasing emigration. While there was an annual emigration of 2,000 to 3,000 Germans and maximum 1,000 Hungarians in the framework of family unification between 1956 and 1975, 389,000 people (215,000 Germans, 64,000 Hungarians, 6,000 Jews and 5,000 others) left Transylvania between 1975 and the 1992 census.<sup>4</sup> The annual number of German emigrants, in accordance with the agreement concluded in 1978 between German chancellor H. Schmidt and Romanian president N. Ceauşescu, had stabilized at 10,000 to 14,000 annually (Schreiber 1993). In the same period the number of Hungarians leaving the region rose from 1,058 in 1979 to 4,144 in 1986 and to 11,728 in 1989, in close relationship with the gradual deterioration of the economic and political situation.

Massive migrations in different directions taking place over the past four decades, especially within the framework of socialist urbanization, resulted in population growth in Transylvanian cities and towns from 2.1 to 4.4 million, while population of villages dropped from 4.1 to 3.3 million between 1956 and 1992. In rural areas, due to the exodus of Germans, all of the three present-day dominant ethnic groups (Romanians, Hungarians, Roma) grew, but in the cities, as loci of Romanianization, the number and proportion of Romanians rose considerably (1956: 1.2 million, i.e., 58.1%; 1992: 3.3 million, 75.6% in urban settlements). In this period eight towns formerly of Hungarian ethnic majority turned into settlements with a preponderance of Romanians (e.g., Cluj-Kolozsvár in 1957, Zalău-Zilah in 1959, Oradea-Nagyvárad in 1971, Satu Mare-Szatzmárnémeti in 1973). The relatively rapid and profound change of social patterns in urban settlements of Transylvania that took place when groups of different social structure and behavior, as well as ethnic and religious affiliation, were mixed increased the danger of emerging ethnic conflicts in the largest centers, as did the later total “ruralization” of towns.

**Table 1.** Ethnic Structure of the Population of the Territory of Transylvania (1941–2002)

Year	Total population	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Roma (Gypsies)	Ruthenians, Ukrainians	Serbs	Slovaks	Croats	Bulgarians	Czechs	Others
1941	5,882,600	3,288,400	1,735,700	533,600	81,400	25,100	43,000	35,600		11,000	12,000	116800
1948	5,761,127	3,752,269	1,481,903	332,066								
1956	6,218,427	4,041,156	1,558,254	367,857	78,278	31,532	43,689	23,093		9,749	9,645	55,174
1966	6,719,555	4,559,432	1,597,438	371,881	49,105	36,888	41,972	21,839		9,707	8,446	22,847
1966	6,719,555	4,569,546	1,625,702	373,933	32,022	36,208	39,816	19,558		9,268	5,086	8,416
1977	7,500,229	5,203,846	1,691,048	347,896	123,028	42,760	32,140	21,133	7,433	9,067	6,305	15,573
1992	7,723,313	5,684,142	1,603,923	109,014	202,665	50,372	27,163	19,446	6,751	7,885	4,569	7,383
1992	7,723,313	5,815,425	1,619,735	91,386	84,718	47,873	31,684	18,195		7,302	3,934	3,061
2002	7,221,733	5,393,552	1,415,718	49,229	244,475	49,299	20,816	17,070	6,691	6,607	3,041	15,235
2002	7,221,733	5,541,286	1,429,473	40,653	106,212	46,473	18,854	15,952	6,309	6,087	2,625	7,809

Table 1 (cont.)

In %

Year	Total population	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Roma (Gypsies)	Ruthenians, Ukrainians	Serbs	Slovaks	Croats	Bulgarians	Czechs	Others
1941	100.0	55.9	29.5	9.1	1.4	0.4	0.7	0.6		0.2	0.2	2.0
1948	100.0	65.1	25.7	5.8								
1956	100.0	65.0	25.0	5.9	1.3	0.5	0.7	0.4		0.2	0.1	0.9
1966	100.0	67.9	23.8	5.5	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.3		0.2	0.1	0.3
1966	100.0	68.0	24.2	5.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.3		0.1	0.1	0.1
1977	100.0	69.4	22.6	4.6	1.6	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
1992	100.0	73.6	20.8	1.4	2.6	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
1992	100.0	75.3	21.0	1.2	1.1	0.6	0.4	0.2		0.1	0.1	0.0
2002	100.0	74.7	19.6	0.7	3.4	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2
2002	100.0	76.7	19.8	0.6	1.5	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1

Change (1992=100%)

Year	Total population	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Roma (Gypsies)	Ruthenians, Ukrainians	Serbs	Slovaks	Croats	Bulgarians	Czechs	Others
1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
2002	93.5	94.9	88.3	45.2	120.6	97.9	76.6	87.8	99.1	83.8	66.6	150.8
2002	93.5	94.8	88.3	44.5	125.4	97.1	82.2	87.7		83.4	66.7	255.1

Remarks: In 1941, 1956, 1966, 1977 and 1992 Croatian mother tongue data are included in the category of Serbs.

*Italic figures:* mother tongue (native language) data of censuses.

Source: Census data (based partly on Varga 1998).

### Early Post-Communist Years and the Census of 1992

As a result of the exodus that began with the collapse of the Ceaușescu regime, 60,072 Germans, 23,888 Romanians and 11,040 Hungarians left Romania in 1990. Of the 96,929 people who left, 83,512 (86.2%) were from Transylvania. The factors prompting their departure were higher living standards abroad, the hope for a better future for their children, their shattered confidence in Romania, and an open burst of nationalism. This wave of emigration has subsided recently and stabilized at a national rate of 20,000 annually.<sup>5</sup>

At the time of the Romanian census of January 7, 1992 7,723,313 inhabitants were counted in the territory of Transylvania (310,000 less than in the middle of 1989). Of them nearly 5.7 million (73.6%) declared themselves to be of Romanian nationality, while 1.6 million (20.8%) declared themselves Hungarian, nearly 203,000 (2.6%) Roma, 109,000 (1.4%) German, and 50,000 Ukrainian. The Romanians formed the absolute majority in 14 counties. Romanians represented over 90% of the population in Hunedoara, Bistrița–Nasăud and Alba and between 80–90% in Sibiu, Brașov, Caraș-Severin, Timiș, Arad and Maramureș (*Appendix 1*). Romanians were the dominant ethnic group in 22 of the 26 Transylvanian city-municipalities, 77 of the 92 towns, and 4,222 of the 5,203 villages. The almost homogeneous Romanian rural areas could be found first of all in southern Maramureș, the historic Nasăud and Chioar regions, the Someș Hills, Bihor Masif and the Transylvanian Alps. As a result of enforced and ethnically controlled urban growth Romanians made up 75.6% of the urban population. In the previous centuries the Romanians of Transylvania were considered rural people, but by 1992 most of them (58.9%) had become urban dwellers. Some 50 to 70 years earlier the most populous cities of the region, including Timișoara, Cluj-Napoca, and Brașov, had had a Hungarian–German majority, but the populations of these cities became 75–90% Romanian. In 1992 95% of the Romanians of Transylvania lived in a city, town, or settlement in which they formed an absolute majority, and 67.1% were found in settlements with a Romanian population over 80% (*Appendix 2*).

The following cities were home to major Romanian communities: Brașov (287,000), Timișoara (275,000), Cluj-Napoca (249,000), Sibiu (159,000), Arad (151,000), Oradea (144,000) and Baia Mare (120,000).

The Transylvanian Hungarians (numbering 1,604,000 according to ethnicity and 1,620,000 according to mother tongue) constituted an ethnic majority at that time in two counties (Harghita and Covasna), four cities (Târgu Mureș, Miercurea Ciuc, Odorheiu Secuiesc, Sfântu Gheorghe), 14 towns (9 in the Székely land), and 795 villages. 56% of Hungarians were urban dwellers. Thanks to Hungarians dwelling in rural communities and especially in the Székely land, Bihor and Sălaj,

51.6% of Hungarians lived in a town or community with an absolute Hungarian majority. 30.5% were residents of communities in which they represented 80% or more of the population, but 22.2% of them lived in communities with less than a 20% Hungarian population. The most populous Hungarian communities (with the exception of Târgu Mureș) were to be found in cities, in which over the past decades Hungarians became a minority constituting between 23% and 41% of the population (Cluj-Napoca, Oradea, Satu Mare).

45.1% of Hungarians lived in the counties of the Székely land, 27.5% in Crișana/Partium, 10.4% in northern Transylvania, 8.8% in southern Transylvania, and 8.2% in Banat. They could only preserve the relative ethnic homogeneity of their settlements in Székely land and in northern Bihor. They lived in Satu Mare and in Sălaj counties alongside Romanians, Germans and Roma, while in the other regions they only formed ethnic pockets, islands and diasporas.

At the time of this census 202,665 persons declared themselves to be Roma (84,718 Roma mother tongue). The difference is that, due to the situation, the majority (54.3%) of the Roma living in the country declared Romanian their native tongue, 4.7% of them were native speakers of Hungarian, and a mere 40.9% declared Roma as their mother tongue. Provided that Roma population assumes its ethnicity to a similar extent in Hungary and in Transylvanian Romania, the Roma population of the region could be estimated at 700 thousand, or 9% of the total.<sup>6</sup> The settlement pattern of Roma that emerged in the 18th century did not change considerably over the past centuries within the ethnic territories of mixed (Romanian, Hungarian, German) character. Accordingly, 42.2% of the Roma lived in the inner areas of Transylvania (Mureș, Sibiu, Cluj, Brașov counties), and 34.1% of them inhabited the western areas of the region (Timiș, Arad, Bihor, Sălaj, Satu Mare counties). 34% of Roma were urban dwellers, with the largest communities to be found in gravity centers of their settlement areas: in the Transylvanian Basin Târgu Mureș (3,300), Cluj-Napoca (3,200), Târnaveni, Turda (2,400–2,400); in the western areas Timișoara (2,700), Arad and Oradea (2,100–2,100). At the time of the census of 1992 there were 24 settlements (predominantly those abandoned by Germans and one community named Ungra) in which the majority declared Roma ethnic affiliation.

The number of Germans, the third dominant ethnic group of historical Transylvania, dropped from 372,000 in 1966 to 109,000 in 1992 (91,000 by mother tongue). As a consequence of massive emigration of the younger generations they are primarily elderly people, most of them pensioners. 38% live in historical Transylvania (Saxons), 44.1% in the Banat ("Swabians"), 17.9% in the Crișana/Partium. In this area (Satu Mare) there lived a community of roughly 10,000 that, having gradually assumed Hungarian as its mother tongue over the past two centuries, declared German ethnicity out of political-economic consider-

ations. Only four villages in Banat and in southern Transylvania respectively have been able to retain their – mainly relative – German majority. Now the survival of German communities is maintained by residents of Timișoara (13,200), Sibiu (5,600), Reșița (5,300) and Arad (4,100).

### **Ethnic Developments between the Censuses 1992 and 2002**

In the period between the censuses of 1992 and 2002 the population of Romania decreased by more than 1.1 million and that of Transylvania by 502,000 (6.5%). The main triggers were the revolution of 1989 and the opening of the state borders after the change of political regime. The ensuing economic collapse hit the younger generations particularly hard and provoked large-scale emigration. Birth rates dropped and natural population decrease became a prevailing demographic trend. Natural decrease was responsible for 25.8% (129,555) of the population loss in Transylvania, the other 74.2% (372,025) being a consequence of emigration. Between the two censuses all the counties experienced population loss, but to a highly varied extent for different demographic reasons of natural and mechanical change. Whereas population decrease in Timiș (–3.2%), Cluj, Bistrița–Nasăud, Covasna (–4.6%), and Mureș (–4.8%) counties remained below the average of Transylvania, Caraș-Severin (–11.5%) and Hunedoara (–11.4%) counties lost more than a tenth of their population. The actual loss was somewhat curbed by a positive natural change of the dominantly Romanian Bistrița–Nasăud (+2.4%) and Maramureș (+1.2%) counties and Sibiu (+0.1%), with a sizeable Roma population, and a balanced proportion of birth and death rates in Harghita (–0.6%) and Covasna (–0.3%) counties (which have a Hungarian majority). There was a sweeping natural loss in Arad (–5.1%), Caraș-Severin (–3.5%), Bihor, Cluj (–3%), Timiș (–2.6%) and Sălaj (–2.5%) counties. The demographic picture is further distorted by a population loss in crisis counties formerly dominated by Romanian heavy industry and lately struck by emigration. At the same time the latter development has been successfully counterbalanced in Arad (–0.2%), Timiș (–0.6%) and Cluj (–1.6%) counties by migration from the regions beyond the Carpathians.

The spatial pattern of demographic components outlined above can further be analysed at the level of individual communities. In spite of the fact that it was the Romanians who suffered the least losses (–5.1%), the mountainous and hilly areas inhabited by them (–5.1%) were the most affected (e.g., Banat mountains, Poiana Ruscă mountains, the Transylvanian Alps, Bihor Massif, Someș Hills, Codru Hills, and the Țibleș mountains). This was a result of natural decreases in centers of heavy industry (which were sunk deep in crisis), villages in a disadvantageous

situation with regards to transportation, and alpine farmsteads with aging populations. It was also a result of an accelerated move of the younger generations into urban centers of Transylvania, which offer better living conditions. This migration from village to town, mountain to valley, and periphery to center runs counter to a recently prevailing national and international trend of moving from the cities and towns (mainly from housing developments) to villages of urban agglomerations with favourable situations for commuting and better habitability. As a result of this process of suburbanization the number of residents of communities in the surroundings of some cities of Transylvania (e.g., Timișoara, Arad, Oradea, Cluj-Napoca, Târgu Mureș, Sibiu, Brașov) grew considerably between 1992 and 2002.

The demographic move to the periphery of urban centers, the lower birth rate of urban dwellers, and the willingness to emigrate have all contributed to a more intense population loss (−7.9%) in cities and towns than in villages (−3.6%). This occurred in spite of the fact that the cities having undergone economic recovery due to foreign investment. Areas close to the western state border and demographic vacuum areas created by the outflow of Hungarians and Germans (e.g., Cluj-Napoca, Oradea, Târgu Mureș, Timișoara, Arad) have absorbed huge masses of Transcarpathian (mainly Moldovan) Romanians. Thanks to this trend the number of ethnic Romanians grew by 1.6% in Cluj-Napoca and by 0.7% in Oradea, whereas Târgu Mureș suffered a loss of a mere 0.4% and Timișoara of 1%. Proximity of the western border (as an incentive to undertake work abroad or to engage in cross-border commercial activities), migration of most of the Germans, and the presence of Romanian relatives and acquaintances who settled some decades before in the formerly Schwabian communities also stimulated a heavy influx, and this in turn resulted in considerable growth in the lowland areas of Banat, Arad and Bihor. Apart from the settlements of the Transylvanian Basin affected by suburban inflow, a similar massive increase could be observed in communities with a sizeable Roma population with a high birth rate.

Between 1992 and 2002 the number of Romanians dropped by 290,000 (and by roughly one million in the whole country) in Transylvania and that of Hungarians by 188,000. This meant a 5.1% loss of the former ethnic group and 11.7% loss of the latter. A dramatic decrease in birth rates (coupled with inaccuracy in the registration of the ethnic affiliation of newborn children, statements of the parents corresponding to ethnic assimilation) resulted in a sharp difference between birth and death rates. Between 1992 and 2001 the number of deaths exceeded the number of births by 49,370 among the Romanians and 97,108 among the Hungarians (Kiss 2004). In 86% emigration to the “West” accounted for the drop in the number among Romanians. The 188,000 drop in the number of Hungarians was associated with natural loss (56%), migration loss (34%) (Horváth 2004) and assimilation, overwhelmingly Romanianization (roughly 10%). Concerning Hungarians this decline affected the contiguous blocs of their ethnic area, which were hardly

hit by natural loss (e.g., Székely land), the least (6–7%), whereas in cities (e.g., Oradea, Cluj-Napoca, Târgu Mureş, Satu Mare, Braşov, Arad, Timișoara, and Baia Mare) the proportion of Hungarians has dropped by 16% to 26% since 1992. Over the same period Roma, the third most populous ethnic group, increased their number by 41,810 in Transylvania (and by 134,000 in the other provinces of Romania), 75.7% (31,651) (Kiss 2004) of which was due to natural increase, the rest resulting from a growing self-awareness and migration balance. A considerable mass of Roma emigrated from Transylvania, which curbed their growth by 20.7%, a figure much smaller than that in Romania Proper (46.5%). Germans of Transylvania, numbering nearly 540,000 during the Second World War, have been decimated as a result of their accelerating emigration to Germany from the 1970s, which turned into flight after 1990. Between 1992 and 2002 their numbers dropped by 54.8% because of emigration and natural loss among the aging population.

Change in the population of Romanians was basically controlled by objective demographic factors and not by those of a subjective character (shifts between Romanians, Hungarians and Roma resulting from assimilation and dissimilation). Natural loss was responsible for a drop of 0.9%, while negative migration caused a decrease of 4.4%. A northeast-southwest opposition in demographic behavior shaped in the 20<sup>th</sup> century has long survived and could be recognized even 20 years ago. In 1981 natural increase exceeded an annual value of 11% in Bistrița–Nasăud and Maramureş counties, whereas in Banat and in the southern parts of Crișana it did not reach 5% and there was even a 2.5% natural loss in Arad county. In the southwestern counties this trend could be attributed to economic considerations, *i.e.*, to an attempt to raise living standards through reduced birth rates, and limited reproduction led to similar demographic trends in the neighbouring areas of Hungary and Serbia (Voivodina) as early as the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>7</sup>

Following the change of political regime these spatial disparities vanished when on the one hand a large mass of Romanians with a high natural birth rate settled in the Banat, mainly in Timiș county, and on the other the unfavorable demographic processes became typical of the northern Romanian ethnic areas. Mortality has outweighed natality in Cluj and Bihor counties since 1991 and in Sălaj, Satu Mare and Mureş counties since 1992. Natural increase was recorded only in Bistrița–Nasăud (+1.2‰) and Maramureş (+0.2‰) counties neighbouring the regions of Bukovina and northern Moldva, which traditionally have high birth rates and are inhabited almost exclusively by Romanians. An extreme drop (over 10%) in the Romanian population was typical of the mountainous areas mentioned because of a natural loss among the prevailing elderly people and the migration of their younger cohorts. These circumstances led to a 7–10% loss among the Romanians in the period of 1992–2002 in Caraș-Severin, Hunedoara, Alba, Sălaj,



and Satu Mare counties, which offered very modest living conditions. Counties along the western borders in fairly good economic and geographical positions and large urban centers with the best living conditions were by far the most attractive areas for Romanians from the remote regions of the country. This is why the migration balance proved to be positive in Timiș (+2.1%) and Arad (+1.9%) counties and there was a minor migration loss in Cluj (−0.4%), Bihor (−2.1%), and Mureș (−2.8%) counties. This is reflected by the figures: of the 23 urban centers with the highest population loss (10–20%) in Transylvania, 18 are found in the southern areas of this region.<sup>8</sup> At the same time a positive migration balance is represented by the influx of the Romanians in Nădlac along the western border (8.5%), Sănnicolau Mare (3.2%), and Jimbolia (2.1%), as well as in Cluj-Napoca (1.6%) and Oradea (0.7%), both located along the European transport corridor traversing Central Transylvania. The “Székely capital”, Târgu Mureș, had a Hungarian ethnic majority (51.4%) in 1992 and turned into a city with a Romanian Majority (50.3%) by 2002 as a result of an intense Romanian influx and Hungarian emigration. A vigorous internal migration typical in Romania has affected not only the western regions and important municipalities. There was an en mass migration of Romanian urban dwellers into suburban settlements in search of better living conditions. This process of suburbanization was especially striking in the vicinities of Timișoara, Arad, Oradea, Satu Mare, Baia Mare, Cluj-Napoca, Târgu Mureș, Sibiu, Medişa and Braşov. The overspill phenomenon of Romanians into suburban villages not only reduced the ratio of Hungarians, but in some cases these communities became homes to Romanian majorities (e.g., Dumbrăvița near Timișoara or Botiz near Satu Mare).

The number of people declaring Romanian ethnicity grew not merely for demographic reasons, but through the assimilation of minorities as they changed nationality. There was an above average lingual and ethnic Romanianization of the Hungarians living sporadically and in large centers in southern Transylvania, while the assimilation of Roma could be traced primarily in southern Transylvania and sporadically in Banat. An inverse process, i.e., dissimilation among the Romanians, came about due to an increasing self-awareness among Roma, mainly in Satu Mare, Sălaj, and Bihor counties and to a lesser extent in the Transylvanian Basin. In Crișana/Partium (e.g., near Satu Mare and the river Barcău) there were examples of re-Magyarization at the expense of the Romanian population. On the whole as a result of demographic trends anticipating the formation of Romanian ethnic blocs and unfavorable to ethnic minorities, the number of Transylvanian urban settlements in which the ratio of Romanians was above 80% has risen from 658 to 687 between 1992 and 2002 and the share of Romanians within the aggregate living here increased from 67.1 to 73.2% over the same period.

In contrast to the population increase among Romanians, there was a 11.7% population decrease among Hungarians of Transylvania caused by migration (-4.5%) and a 6% natural decrease. According to the aggregate Transylvanian data (similar to the pattern in Hungary), among those declaring Hungarian ethnic affiliation death rates have exceeded birth rates since 1982, a shift that occurred among the Székelys a bit later, since 1992–1993 (Veres 2004). Moreover, in case of Hungarians of Covasna county there has been a trend towards equilibrium between these opposite demographic parameters measured in a fluctuation between -1.5 and +1.5%, which in the Carpathian Basin, regrettably, must be considered a “demographic success”. Spatial differences of natural demographic processes show a close interrelationship between the ethnic geographical pattern and historical features of the settlement area of the Hungarians living here. The most favorable demographic figures are seen among Hungarians living in blocs or those forming an overwhelming majority, in contrast with Hungarians of southern Transylvania and Banat (especially the urban dwellers). These assumptions are corroborated by birth rate data of Hungarian females of reproductive age, which represented 40–44% in the Székely land, 35–39% in Satu Mare–Sălaj, and 20–29% among the southern diaspora-Hungarians in 2002 (Veres 2004). Migration losses of Hungarians reflected a similar picture. Emigration potential and factual data on emigration of Hungarians living in blocs (predominantly the Szeklers) are lagging far behind the similar values of Hungarian minorities of Central Transylvania (Gödri 2004).<sup>9</sup> In shaping the spatial pattern of the Hungarians in Transylvania, however, emigration plays a much more important part than internal migration. In the framework of the latter – similar to the behaviour of Romanians – the resettlement of the urban dwellers (mainly from housing developments) to the suburban belt is highly typical. Due to this migration to the suburbs (in spite of an aggregate loss of 11.7% across Transylvania) the number of Hungarians in settlements in the vicinity of urban centers with a sizeable Hungarian population grew (e.g., Sfântu Gheorghe, Târgu Mureș, Cluj-Napoca, Satu Mare, Oradea). Along with the objective demographic components, change of nationality and processes of assimilation-dissimilation represent one tenth of the drop in the number of Hungarians over the period under study (Veres 2004).

Besides the aforementioned trends of natural population change and migration it was the change of native language and then of nationality that caused a 20.6% drop in the number of those declaring Hungarian ethnic affiliation in southern Transylvania and a 19.8% decrease in Banat, where Hungarians living primarily in urban centers but also in sporadic rural settlements were under extreme pressure from the Romanians to assimilate. At the same time the Székelys, who strive to preserve their ethnic self-awareness in better ethnic geographical circumstances, dropped by a “mere” 7.6%.<sup>10</sup> In the above mentioned areas of southern Transylvania and Banat, in which the vanishing diaspora Hungarians have been

trying to preserve ethnic and linguistic identity, their loss due to assimilation can be estimated at 51–61% of the actual decline (Szilágyi 2004). It should also be mentioned that Hungarians did not suffer serious losses everywhere. There are areas in which their number has risen and there are settlements of converts (people who declared Romanian, Roma and German ethnic affiliation in 1992 declaring Hungarian ethnic affiliation in 2002). As a result of internal (chiefly suburban) migration and processes of assimilation in favor of the Hungarians, the latter has expanded in the triangle of Satu Mare–Zalău–Oradea,<sup>11</sup> in marginal places of the Transylvanian Basin, in the innermost parts of the Székely Land, and in some of its towns (e.g., Sfântu Gheorghe, Bălan, Sovata). The number of communities and urban settlements with a sizeable Hungarian majority (above 80%) rose from 102 to 103 and the ratio of Hungarians increased from 30.5% to 32.6%. With the transformation of Târgu Mureș into an urban center with a Romanian ethnic majority the percentage of the Hungarian population has been reduced from 51.6% to 48.5%. The decrease of the ratio of Hungarians below 20% in Cluj-Napoca, Alesd, and Curtici contributed to the creation of a situation in which every fourth Transylvanian Hungarian lives in a towns or communities in which his/her language is not an official language (22.2% in 1992).

Of the populous ethnic groups of Transylvania only those of Roma ethnic affiliation managed to increase their number, if to a lesser extent (20.6%) than the Roma living in Hungary (which increased by 33.2%). An overwhelming part of this growth was prompted by their extremely high (15.6%) natural increase, while the other 5% was added by the shift from Romanian to Roma (dissimilation), when Roma having earlier declared Romanian affiliation acquired Roma self-consciousness. Between 1992 and 2002 the population size and local proportions of Roma tended to grow at a rate above the average within their traditional settlement areas in the lowland and hilly regions of Crișana/Partium and the Transylvanian Basin. “Magyarization”, a tendency opposite to that of “Romanianization” (but one that apparently did not last too long), hit the Roma communities mainly in southern Transylvania and to a smaller extent in Banat, Mureș and the Székely land. As a result of a steady demographic expansion of Roma, the number of urban settlements and communities in which they numbered more than 20% of the population rose from 30 to 49. In spite of trends of re-stratification which were favorable to Roma, in 2002 34.9% lived in settlements in which they accounted for less than 5% of the total population, in comparison with 43.5% in 1992.

The exodus of Germans continued after 1992 and caused a roughly 43% (nearly 60,000 people) population loss among the Saxon and Swabian minorities. Because of a considerable drop in the intensity of this exodus and the gradual establishment of networks promoting emigration among Romanians, the share of Germans among the emigrants declined perpetually (62% in 1990, 28.4% in 1992,

and 0.8% in 2002, [www.insse.ro](http://www.insse.ro)). Another factor in their disappearance is a high natural loss due to ageing. Their assimilation to Hungarians was only sizeable in Satu Mare county, mainly around Carei. The local Swabian population of Roman Catholic denomination, having been Magyarized by the early 20th century, also declared Hungarian ethnic affiliation since 1941. Their German ethnic self-awareness revived en masse in 1992 (perhaps for the last time). Nowadays they do not form the majority in any of the communities, and because of their emigration in the early 1990s, 86.3% of them live either in urban settlements or communities in which they do not constitute even 5% of the population.

For the time being there are more Ruthenians and Ukrainians in Transylvania than Germans. Their loss due to emigration was basically responsible for a 2.1% population decrease, despite significant natural increase. As a consequence of ongoing emigration from their overpopulated ethnic area neighbouring the border with Ukraine, which offers only modest living conditions, the number of Ruthenians in Transylvania everywhere suffered an above average loss (3–15%) in 1992–2002. As a rule regional and local centers (e.g., Baia Mare, Satu Mare, Timișoara, and Lugoj) constitute the destinations of their internal migration.

Serbs suffered a massive drop in their numbers (23.7%). It was moderate in the communities with Serb ethnic majorities located along the Danube (between 5.4 and 13.1%) in the border zone with Serbia owing to lower assimilation pressures from Romanians and less emigration due to the relatively acceptable living conditions. This is not valid, however, for the diaspora along Mureș River (which has a history going back some five hundred years), where their population loss was between 28% and 32%.

The number of Slovaks living mostly in the Șes mountains (in Bihor and Sălaj counties) dropped by a mere 5.4% thanks to their natural increase, in contrast with people of the same ethnicity of Banat and the vicinity of Arad living in language islets and diaspora, where their numbers shrank by 14–16%. In Nădlac their ratio dropped from 52.1% to 47.2% as a result of the influx of Romanians and the natural decrease in population among Lutheran Slovaks.

### **Recent Ethnic Map of Transylvania**

According to the data of the latest Romanian census (March 18, 2002), of the 7.2 million persons living in 16 counties of Transylvania nearly three fourth declared themselves to be of Romanian ethnicity, one fifth of Hungarian, 3.4% of Roma, and 0.7–0.7% of Ukrainian or German. The breakdown by native language indicated 76.7% Romanian speakers, 19.8% Hungarian speakers, and 1.5% Roma speakers. The number of people of Romanian and Hungarian ethnic affiliation remained below the number of those of the respective native language primarily be-

cause of Roma and Germans who declared Romanian or Hungarian as their mother tongue. It was also the Romanians and Hungarians who resisted alien language influence the most successfully; 98–99% of them declared a lingual affiliation coinciding with their ethnic affiliation. This ratio is 91–92% with the Slovak and Ukrainian minorities and 88% with the Serbs. Of the Germans and Roma only 70.3% and 44% assumed their native language, respectively.

In the ethnic spatial pattern of Transylvania the presence of the following ethnic blocs is still clearly discernible: two Romanian blocs in southern Transylvania–Bihor and in northern Transylvania–Maramureș; and two Hungarian blocs in the Székely land and northern Bihor. There are zones of mixed ethnic composition stretching between these blocs. As a consequence of conscious Romanian nation building and ethnic homogeneization efforts, between 1900 and 2002 the percentage of the Romanian population in Transylvania grew from 55.1 to 74.7. In two counties of the region Hungarians still form an absolute majority of the population. The percentage of people declaring themselves to be Hungarian was 84.6% in Harghita and 73.8% in Covasna in 2002, while in Mureș and Satu Mare counties (which had a Hungarian majority up to 1948) it was 39.3 and 35.2%, respectively. The Hungarian population reaches the 20% threshold necessary for the official use of the language in Bihor (26%) and Sălaj (23%) counties. In central Transylvania the percentage of Hungarians, which was 39.9% in 1941, dropped to 17.4% by 2002.

Romanians, the nation forming the state, represent more than 80% of the population in nine of sixteen counties in Transylvania (according to ethnicity 5.4 million and to mother tongue 5.5 million). In five other counties they made up between 50% and 80% of the population in 2002. The dominantly Romanian urban settlements and communities (i.e., in which Romanians form more than 90% of the population) are concentrated in the Transylvanian Alps, Bihor Massif and in the common border areas of Maramureș and Bistrița–Nasăud counties. 73.2% of Romanians live in urban centers and communities in which they make up more than 80% of the population and 23.3% of them live in settlements in which they comprise between 50% and 80% of the population. Seven municipalities (Timișoara, Brașov, Cluj-Napoca, Sibiu, Oradea, Arad, and Baia Mare) are home to more than 100,000 Romanians. As a result of socialist urbanization and a massive resettlement of Hungarians from municipalities and towns the ratio of urban Romanians (58.7%) was higher than that of urban Hungarians (52.6%).<sup>12</sup>

47.2% of Transylvanian Hungarians (1,416,000 according to ethnicity and 1,429,000 according to mother tongue) lived in the counties of the Székely Land (Harghita, Covasna, Mureș) and 27.5% lived in the Crișana/Partium (Bihor, Satu Mare, Sălaj, Maramureș). The rest of the Hungarians continue to attempt to preserve ethnic self-awareness in larger and smaller lingual islets in Banat, Arad and

its environs, and the central part of Transylvania. According to the census of 2002 32.6% of them lived in predominantly Hungarian urban settlements and communities (in which Hungarians constituted over 80% of the population) and 15.8% lived in communities in which there was a Hungarian majority of 50% to 80%. One fourth of them, however, lived in an administrative entity in which they represented less than 20% of the population. Consequently Hungarian was not in official use. 156,000 (10.9% of the Hungarians) are in a real diasporic situation (in municipalities, towns and communities with a Hungarian population of less than 10%) and are struggling for ethnic survival. More than 30,000 Hungarians live in the Székely municipalities (Târgu Mureș, Sfântu Gheorghe, Odorheiu Secuiesc, Miercurea Ciuc), Cluj-Napoca, Oradea, and Satu Mare. Owing to a massive outflow of Hungarians from the cities and towns, the share of urban Hungarians has dropped from 55.3% in 1992 to 52.9% in 2002.

According to self-declaration there were 244,000 people of Roma ethnicity and 106,000 people of Roma mother tongue in Transylvania at the time of the 2002 census. The respective figures for the whole country were 238,000 and 53,000, while the Roma organizations reported 1.4 to 2.5 million people of Roma ethnicity ([www.edrc.ro](http://www.edrc.ro)).<sup>13</sup> According to the latter source Roma is the second most populous ethnic group in Romania, outnumbering Hungarians. The ratio of those with Roma ethnicity (3.4%) based on self-declaration is higher in Transylvania than in the rest of the historical provinces of the country (2.5% in Wallachia, 1.4% in Moldva and 0.9% in Dobruja). The regions with the highest number and share of Roma population are traditionally the Transylvanian Basin (mainly South Transylvania, the Mureș area) and the lowland hilly regions of the western border counties (Satu Mare, Bihor, Arad, Timiș). Given traditional lifestyles, the Roma population as a rule avoids the mountainous areas. According to the 2002 census data a mere 0.4% live in a community (Ungra) in which they represent an absolute majority of the population. Another 34.9% are inhabitants of settlements in which their percentage of the population does not reach 5%. Though 68.2% of them are rural dwellers, communities of Roma numbering more than 3,000 live in large urban centers such as Târgu Mureș, Timișoara, Cluj-Napoca and Arad. As a rule Roma command the language prevailing in their environment (Romanian or Hungarian) as a first language, but in the Transylvanian Basin, mainly north of the rivers Târnava, they have Roma as mother tongue.

Those Germans (who were considered the third most populous ethnic group in Transylvania until the 1980s) who remained in the region by 2002 (49,000 by ethnicity and 41,000 by mother tongue) inhabit historical Transylvania (Saxon, 37%) and Banat and Crișana/Partium (Swabian). Owing to a far advanced exodus over the past two decades 86.3% of them live in urban settlements and communities in which they represent less than 5% of the population. Sizeable communities of Germans (between 2,000 and 7,000) have survived only in Timișoara, Reșița and Sibiu.

### Conclusion

As a consequence of migration and changes in ethnic patterns that took place over the course of the 20th century the ethnic make-up of Transylvania on the one hand became simpler and more homogeneous at the expense of the ethnic minorities and to the benefit of Romanians and on the other became more varied because of the vigorous expansion of the Roma communities. A conscious efforts towards nation building on the part of Romanians, coupled with ethnic homogeneization, the events of wars and migrations have resulted in an increase in the proportion of Romanians in Transylvania between 1900 and 2002 from 55.1% to 74.7% and a concomitant decrease in the proportion of Hungarians from 29.6% to 19.6%.

During the period between the censuses of 1992 and 2002 the population of Transylvania dropped by nearly 502,000. This was triggered by the revolution of 1989 and the opening of the borders after the change of power. Other reasons included a massive emigration as a consequence of the economic collapse (which has caused a particular drop in the population of reproductive age), the decline in natality, and an accelerated population loss. Three-fourths of the drop in population was caused by migration and one-fourth by natural decrease. Since 1992 the number of Romanians has fallen by 290,000, i.e., 5.1% (by 1,000,000 in Romania as a whole), and the number of Hungarians by 18,000, i.e., 11.7%. The drop in the population of Romanians was caused mainly by migration, whereas the decline in the Hungarian population was primarily the result of natural decrease and secondly of emigration. The ethnic pattern has also been modified by internal migration (e.g., a continuing influx of Transcarpathian Romanians into the developed, western lowland and border areas and suburbanization around the cities). As a result of their dynamic increase (an increase of 25% between 1992 and 2002), the Roma population may exceed the Hungarian population in the coming decade and could be, according to estimates, the second largest ethnic group of Transylvania after Romanians.

## Appendix

**Appendix 1. Ethnic Structure of the Population of Transylvanian Regions and Counties (1992–2002)**

REGION, county	Year	Total population	Romanians	Hungarians	Roma	Germans
CRIȘANA / PARTIUM	1992	1,846,548	1,290,187	440,148	47,544	19,506
	2002	1,725,652	1,215,629	388,554	65,024	9,694
Satu Mare / Szatmár	1992	400,789	234,541	140,392	9,823	14,351
	2002	367,281	216,085	129,258	13,478	6,417
Maramureș / Máramaros	1992	540,099	437,997	54,902	6,701	3,416
	2002	510,110	418,405	46,300	8,913	2,012
Sălaj / Szilágy	1992	266,797	192,552	63,151	9,224	146
	2002	248,015	176,671	57,167	12,544	102
Bihar / Bihar	1992	638,863	425,097	181,703	21,796	1,593
	2002	600,246	404,468	155,829	30,089	1,163
BANAT / BÁNSÁG	1992	1,563,997	1,279,558	131,753	35,937	48,050
	2002	1,472,936	1,239,141	105,671	41,662	25,175
Arad / Arad	1992	487,617	392,600	61,011	13,325	9,392
	2002	461,791	379,451	49,291	17,664	4,852
Timiș / Temes	1992	700,033	561,200	62,866	14,836	26,722
	2002	677,926	565,639	50,556	16,084	14,174
Caraș-Severin / Krassó-Szörény	1992	376,347	325,758	7,876	7,776	11,936
	2002	333,219	294,051	5,824	7,914	6,149
NORTH TRANSYLVANIA	1992	1,063,121	866,824	167,284	25,338	2,361
	2002	1,014,412	839,164	140,650	30,989	1,605
Cluj / Kolozs	1992	736,301	571,275	146,186	16,334	1,407
	2002	702,755	557,891	122,301	19,834	944
Bistrița-Nasăud / Beszterce-Naszód	1992	326,820	295,549	21,098	9,004	954
	2002	311,657	281,273	18,349	11,155	661
SOUTH TRANSYLVANIA	1992	2,058,003	1,826,498	141,481	52,580	34,058
	2002	1,879,211	1,692,583	112,372	56,567	14,220
Hunedoara / Hunyad	1992	547,950	503,241	33,849	5,577	3,634
	2002	485,712	450,302	25,388	6,823	1,937
Alba / Fehér	1992	413,919	372,951	24,765	12,661	3,243
	2002	382,747	346,059	20,684	14,306	1,311
Sibiu / Szeben	1992	452,873	397,205	19,309	18,730	17,122
	2002	421,724	382,061	15,344	17,125	6,554
Brașov / Brassó	1992	643,261	553,101	63,558	15,612	10,059
	2002	589,028	514,161	50,956	18,313	4,418
SZÉKELY LAND	1992	1,191,644	421,075	723,257	41,266	5,039
	2002	1,129,522	407,035	668,471	50,233	2,383
Mureș / Maros	1992	610,053	317,541	252,651	34,798	4,588
	2002	580,851	309,375	228,275	40,425	2,045
Harghita / Hargita	1992	348,335	48,948	295,104	3,827	199
	2002	326,222	45,870	276,038	3,835	140
Covasna / Kovászna	1992	233,256	54,586	175,502	2,641	252
	2002	222,449	51,790	164,158	5,973	198



In %

REGION, county	Year	Total population	Romanians	Hungarians	Roma	Germans
CRIȘANA / PARTIUM	1992	100.0	69.9	23.8	2.6	1.1
	2002	100.0	70.4	22.5	3.8	0.6
Satu Mare / Szatmár	1992	100.0	58.5	35.0	2.5	3.6
	2002	100.0	58.8	35.2	3.7	1.7
Maramureș / Máramaros	1992	100.0	81.1	10.2	1.2	0.6
	2002	100.0	82.0	9.1	1.7	0.4
Sălaj / Szilágy	1992	100.0	72.2	23.7	3.5	0.1
	2002	100.0	71.2	23.0	5.1	0.0
Bihor / Bihar	1992	100.0	66.5	28.4	3.4	0.2
	2002	100.0	67.4	26.0	5.0	0.2
BANAT / BÁNSÁG	1992	100.0	81.8	8.4	2.3	3.1
	2002	100.0	84.1	7.2	2.8	1.7
Arad / Arad	1992	100.0	80.5	12.5	2.7	1.9
	2002	100.0	82.2	10.7	3.8	1.1
Timiș / Temes	1992	100.0	80.2	9.0	2.1	3.8
	2002	100.0	83.4	7.5	2.4	2.1
Caraș-Severin / Krassó-Szörény	1992	100.0	86.6	2.1	2.1	3.2
	2002	100.0	88.2	1.7	2.4	1.8
NORTH TRANSYLVANIA	1992	100.0	81.5	15.7	2.4	0.2
	2002	100.0	82.7	13.9	3.1	0.2
Cluj / Kolozs	1992	100.0	77.6	19.9	2.2	0.2
	2002	100.0	79.4	17.4	2.8	0.1
Bistrița-Nasăud / Beszterce-Naszód	1992	100.0	90.4	6.5	2.8	0.3
	2002	100.0	90.3	5.9	3.6	0.2
SOUTH TRANSYLVANIA	1992	100.0	88.8	6.9	2.6	1.7
	2002	100.0	90.1	6.0	3.0	0.8
Hunedoara / Hunyad	1992	100.0	91.8	6.2	1.0	0.7
	2002	100.0	92.7	5.2	1.4	0.4
Alba / Fehér	1992	100.0	90.1	6.0	3.1	0.8
	2002	100.0	90.4	5.4	3.7	0.3
Sibiu / Szeben	1992	100.0	87.7	4.3	4.1	3.8
	2002	100.0	90.6	3.6	4.1	1.6
Brașov / Brassó	1992	100.0	86.0	9.9	2.4	1.6
	2002	100.0	87.3	8.7	3.1	0.8
SZÉKELY LAND	1992	100.0	35.3	60.7	3.5	0.4
	2002	100.0	36.0	59.2	4.4	0.2
Mureș / Maros	1992	100.0	52.1	41.4	5.7	0.8
	2002	100.0	53.3	39.3	7.0	0.4
Harghita / Hargita	1992	100.0	14.1	84.7	1.1	0.1
	2002	100.0	14.1	84.6	1.2	0.0
Covasna / Kovászna	1992	100.0	23.4	75.2	1.1	0.1
	2002	100.0	23.3	73.8	2.7	0.1

Change (1992=100%)

REGION, county	Year	Total population	Romanians	Hungarians	Roma	Germans
CRIȘANA / PARTIUM	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	93.5	94.2	88.3	136.8	49.7
Satu Mare / Szatmár	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	91.6	92.1	92.1	137.2	44.7
Maramureș / Máramaros	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	94.4	95.5	84.3	133.0	58.9
Sălaj / Szilágy	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	93.0	91.8	90.5	136.0	69.9
Bihar / Bihar	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	94.0	95.1	85.8	138.0	73.0
BANAT / BÁNSÁG	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	94.2	96.8	80.2	115.9	52.4
Arad / Arad	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	94.7	96.7	80.8	132.6	51.7
Timiș / Temes	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	96.8	100.8	80.4	108.4	53.0
Caraș-Severin / Krassó-Szörény	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	88.5	90.3	73.9	101.8	51.5
NORTH TRANSYLVANIA	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	95.4	96.8	84.1	122.3	68.0
Cluj / Kolozs	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	95.4	97.7	83.7	121.4	67.1
Bistrița-Nasăud / Beszterce-Naszód	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	95.4	95.2	87.0	123.9	69.3
SOUTH TRANSYLVANIA	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	91.3	92.7	79.4	107.6	41.8
Hunedoara / Hunyad	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	88.6	89.5	75.0	122.3	53.3
Alba / Fehér	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	92.5	92.8	83.5	113.0	40.4
Sibiu / Szeben	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	93.1	96.2	79.5	91.4	38.3
Brașov / Brassó	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	91.6	93.0	80.2	117.3	43.9
SZÉKELY LAND	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	94.8	96.7	92.4	121.7	47.3
Mureș / Maros	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	95.2	97.4	90.4	116.2	44.6
Harghita / Hargita	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	93.7	93.7	93.5	100.2	70.4
Covasna / Kovászna	1992	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	2002	95.4	94.9	93.5	226.2	78.6

**Appendix 2.** Major Ethnic Groups of Transylvania According to Their Proportion in the Communities of Their Residence (1992, 2002)

Share categories (%)	Number of communities		Number of Romanians		Distribution of Romanians (%)	
	1992	2002	1992	2002	1992	2002
80–100	658	687	3,837,501	3,959,760	67.1	73.0
50–79.9	234	207	1,595,179	1,271,338	27.9	23.5
20–49.9	93	96	246,169	157,654	4.3	2.9
5–19.9	46	41	31,725	28,594	0.6	0.5
0–4.9	85	85	5,326	6,281	0.1	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,116</b>	<b>1,116</b>	<b>5,715,900</b>	<b>5,423,627</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Share categories (%)	Number of communities		Number of Romanians		Distribution of Romanians (%)	
	1992	2002	1992	2002	1992	2002
80–100	102	103	489,750	461,791	30.5	32.5
50–79.9	74	65	338,774	223,786	21.1	15.8
20–49.9	141	136	420,604	376,840	26.2	26.6
5–19.9	179	179	317,011	317,898	19.7	22.4
0–4.9	620	633	40,918	38,240	2.5	2.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,116</b>	<b>1,116</b>	<b>1,607,057</b>	<b>1,418,555</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Share categories (%)	Number of communities		Number of Romanians		Distribution of Romanians (%)	
	1992	2002	1992	2002	1992	2002
80–100	0	0	.	.	.	.
50–79.9	1	1	1,148	1,080	0.6	0.4
20–49.9	29	48	19,503	36,164	9.6	14.8
5–19.9	251	308	94,505	122,321	46.3	49.9
0–4.9	835	759	88,776	85,476	43.5	34.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,116</b>	<b>1,116</b>	<b>203,932</b>	<b>245,041</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Share categories (%)	Number of communities		Number of Romanians		Distribution of Romanians (%)	
	1992	2002	1992	2002	1992	2002
80–100	1	0	119	.	0.1	.
50–79.9	2	0	2,126	.	2.0	.
20–49.9	6	4	4,287	1,686	3.9	3.2
5–19.9	77	15	34,683	5,602	31.7	10.5
0–4.9	1030	1097	68,077	45,943	62.3	86.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,116</b>	<b>1,116</b>	<b>109,292</b>	<b>53,231</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## Notes

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- <sup>1</sup> In this paper the territory of Transylvania is interpreted in a broader sense. In addition to historical Transylvania, it includes Banat within present-day Romania and Crişana and Maramureş (Partium), i.e., the whole area ceded by Hungary to Romania. In accordance with the Trianon Peace Treaty 102,724 km<sup>2</sup> was ceded by Hungary to Romania (Löökkös 2000). Later the area of historical Transylvania (895–1919) grew to 103,093 km<sup>2</sup> as a consequence of state boundary modifications and territorial changes in compliance with the agreements between Czechoslovakia and Romania (June 1921) and Yugoslavia and Romania (April 1924).
- <sup>2</sup> The population of the reannexed territories was 2,577,260 (52.1% Hungarian native speakers and 41.5% Romanian native speakers, Varga 1992).
- <sup>3</sup> Hungary's population grew by 5.2% and the population of Romania proper (i.e., not including Transylvania) grew by 11.2% between 1956–1992. In this period the mean annual natural increase was 2.3% in Hungary and 11.2% in Romania proper.
- <sup>4</sup> Between 1975–1992 503,553 people emigrated from Romania. Of them 235,744 were German, 171,770 were Romanian, 64,887 were Hungarian, 21,006 were Jewish and 10,146 were people of other nationality (*Anuarul Statistic al României* 1993, 143).
- <sup>5</sup> Number of emigrants from Romania: Germans: 1991: 15,567; 1992: 8,852; 1995: 2,906; Hungarians 1991: 7,494; 1992: 3,523; 1995: 3,608. (*Anuarul Statistic al României* 1996, 133). The proportion of Transylvanians among Romanian emigrants dropped between 1992–1994 from 76% to 64.4%.
- <sup>6</sup> In September and October 1993 the Central Statistical Office found 480,083 Roma and persons of “transitional” lifestyle in Hungary. Of them 143,000 declared themselves of Roma ethnicity in the census of 1990.
- <sup>7</sup> Between 1931 and 1933 an annual natural decrease of 0–3% was recorded in Timiş-Torontal and Caraş counties and a change of 0–3% in Arad and Severin counties, whereas there was a 9–15% natural increase in the northeastern areas (Ciuc, Mureş, Cluj, Someş, Sălaj, Satu Mare, Bistriţa–Nasăud, Maramureş counties), inhabited predominantly by Greek Catholic Romanians and Roman Catholic Hungarians. Already in the 1930s the combined territory of present-day Romanian Banat, Hunedoara and Arad counties, the Serbian Vojvodina, and southern Hungary represented the area of the Carpathian Basin with the lowest natural increase, below 6% annually (Rónai 1945).
- <sup>8</sup> Decrease in the number of Romanians in selected southern Transylvanian towns between 1992 and 2002: Uricani –19.4%, Cugir, Făgăraş –17.9%, Oraviţa –15%, Anina –14.8%, Hunedoara –11.7%, Petroşani –11%, Resiţa –10.5%.
- <sup>9</sup> Among the people obtaining immigrant status in Hungary in 2001 there were many more from Cluj, Bihor and Mureş counties than one would have expected from the spatial distribution of Transylvanian Hungarians (Gödri 2004). This can be attributed to the high mobility, emigration potential and background of the Hungarians of the large urban centers (Cluj-Napoca, Oradea, Târgu Mureş). According to the migration data between 1992 and 2002 the Hungarians of the Székely Land are underrepresented among the emigrants from Transylvania because of their strong adherence to the homeland.
- <sup>10</sup> During this period the number of ethnic Hungarians decreased by 8.3% in Hungary and 8.2% in Slovakia.

- <sup>11</sup> It was because of these developments that the communities of Micula, Urziceni, Culciu Mare, Viile Satu Mare and Coșeiu in the county Satu Mare and Sălaj regained Hungarian majorities by 2002.
- <sup>12</sup> It was not until the 1980s that the Romanian party and state leadership was able first to balance and then reverse the profound difference between the extent of “urbanization” of Romanians and Hungarians, i.e., the proportion of urban dwellers in the population (Nyárády 2003).
- <sup>13</sup> www.edrc.ro (Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center, Cluj-Napoca, Romania). Provided that the willingness of the Roma living in Romania and Hungary to declare their ethnicity is similar, their number in Romania might be estimated at 1.8 million. The same assumption concerning the Roma of Slovakia yields an estimated 2.2 million Roma based on the last Slovak and Romanian censuses.

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## MAURICE BENOVSZKY AND HIS “MADAGASCAR PROTOCOLLE” (1772–1776)

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The Hungarian Baron (then Count), Móric Benyovszky (1746–1786) was one of the best known European adventurers in the years before the French Revolution. As a young soldier he participated in a Polish uprising (1769) against the Russians, was captured by them and exiled to Kamchatka, from where he fled, and after a long journey at sea (via Formosa, Canton, Madagascar and Africa) he arrived in 1772 in Paris. There he proposed to the Court the colonization of Madagascar and organized his first expedition to the island (1774–1776), which turned out to be a complete failure. However, he insisted on making a second attempt, offering the island first to the French King, then to the English, and finally to rich American merchants in Baltimore. He was sailing to Madagascar again (1785–1786), but was soon killed by the French soldiers there. His *Memoirs* and other publications about him were quickly published in French and English, as were several books in German, Dutch, Swedish, Polish, Slovak, and Hungarian immortalizing him. In 2004 the Hungarian National Library published a manuscript *Protocolle* (originally an official report of exculpation to the French authorities about the first expedition). My paper describes this work, and adds some source critical remarks. Benyovszky was a typical figure of his time: hero and impostor, explorer and blind reporter of an extraordinary world. The interest in his person (not only in Hungary or Slovakia) has not flagged for over two centuries.

**Keywords:** Count Maurice Benyovszky (1746–1786), Africa, Madagascar, 18th century travelogues, 18th century popular literature

All his life B[enyovszky] made great things even greater.  
Both his weakness and his strength lay in the power of his imagination,  
because he would not have been the person he was had he not imagined  
that he was someone he was not.  
(Leon Orłowski: *Maurycy August Beniowski*. Warszawa, 1961, 242)

## Introduction

In the autumn of 2003 the National Széchényi Library asked the British Library for a photocopy of the manuscript known by the title *Protocolle du Regiment des volontaire de Benyovszky crée en 1772*, which was soon published in Budapest 2004 – with the assistance of the Hungarian–Madagascan Society – accompanying the French manuscript with a translation in Hungarian. (For the bibliographic description see Selected Bibliography, page 237.) Although researchers of history, literature, etc. in England, Hungary and France already knew about the existence of this manuscript, and its 2004 publication does not dispel most of the doubts concerning Benyovszky’s first colonizing journey to Madagascar, it is nevertheless an important event that this beautifully printed edition makes available a previously little known source on the activity of one of the travelers (from Hungary) best known in Europe in the decades before the French Revolution. Benyovszky was an adventurer, soldier and politician blessed with exceptional abilities.

Maurice Benyovszky (the literature about him see also at the end of this paper) was well known to his contemporaries, both in the Habsburg Empire and in Hungary, and there were reports – sometimes contradictory – about his military exploits in the Netherlands, his participation in the Polish independence movement and uprising, then his captivity and exile in Russia, his escape, his ocean journey from Kamchatka to Macao and his eventual arrival in Paris – after stopping on the way in Madagascar, which at the time was not yet a French colony. Since he played an important but not yet fully known role in the following years once again in the Austrian empire of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, as well as in the German lands and later in England and even in the still young United States, we can confidently claim that he was a man known throughout the world in the late 18th century. He came to cherish a plan to colonize Madagascar, first recommending it to the king of France, but later (when he organized his second journey with the help of rich merchants interested in colonization) Benyovszky offered the island to practically anyone, not only the French but also the British and the Americans. In the course of this planning and organization Benyovszky modified the primary documents of his earlier journeys and claimed that the heads of the Madagascan native peoples had already chosen him as their “king”. It is this falsehood, which remained (and still remains) most firmly in the mind of the public, appearing even in recent Hungarian encyclopedias and works of history. Benyovszky made false claims not only orally, for the attainment of his aims; there is much deliberate falsification, distortion of the facts, exaggeration and plagiarism also in printed “works” associated with his name. For this reason it is still difficult even to list the basic facts of his biography.



However, even if we ignore the invented elements, his life was worthy of the hero of a novel. Because the most natural source for the biography recounted briefly below was Benyovszky's own claims, we are frequently obliged to "correct" the well-known data originating from him but clearly exaggerated or false. It is interesting that right up to the present researchers into the life of Benyovszky can be divided into two groups: the "malicious" who expose the adventurer's lies and the "believers" who can still be found, who strive to regard even his smallest error as authentic.

### A Colorful Biography with Question Marks

Móric Ágoston Benyovszky – to use his name in current Hungarian orthography – was probably born on September 20, 1746 (and not in 1741, as he claimed in his memoirs) in Verbó, Nyitra County, Hungary (now Vrbové in Slovakia) in a noble family that had produced many military men. (Documents of the period written in various languages record both his and the family's name in numerous forms. In this article I use the Hungarian spelling, but when citing contemporary publications I give his name in the form used there.)

It is not easy to understand why he added five years to his age. It would be "understandable" if in doing so the then still young man (in about 1772) had wanted to show himself to be more mature and as having had more previous military experience, in short, as being more important. But why did he want to lengthen his youth with imagined events and years that could easily be disproved by his contemporaries? However, in his memoirs he regularly exaggerated other facts that can be easily checked. Neither he nor his father was a count, and his father was not a cavalry general but only a colonel of hussars. (It was only in 1778 that Móric Benyovszky was given the title of Count by Maria Theresa, whom he also petitioned for rehabilitation from his earlier punishment.) It is possible that as a very young man he acquired some kind of knowledge of sailing in Hamburg (or he acquired such knowledge later, though it's unclear where). Perhaps it is true that he also visited Amsterdam in his early youth, he could even have been to Plymouth, and he might have participated in the upheavals of the Seven Years' War.

Although it is not impossible that during one of his absences abroad family disputes within the extensive network of relations contributed to his exclusion from his father's inheritance (who died in 1760), compelling the young man to leave his native land, it is more likely that he was given a prison sentence by the authorities in Hungary (for two months) for his customary autocratic deeds in his own country. To escape this punishment he fled to Poland, where since 1767 Polish nobles had been fomenting an uprising against Russian rule within the frame of the liberal political movement "*Confederation of Bar*". Before that he had married a

common woman, Zsuzsanna Hönsch (she died in 1826) from the Zips region in Upper Hungary, who cared for him devotedly during his flight from the prison and gave birth to their first child in 1768. Benyovszky really did take part in the Polish struggles, although not at the rank of “leader” or even “chief cavalry commander”. He probably fought from 1768 until May 1769, and fell into Russian captivity after the Polish uprising was crushed. In November 1769 he was taken, together with his fellow officers in captivity, to Kazan, condemned to exile, and (perhaps after a real attempt to escape) the group, which included a bishop from Cracow and one from Kiev, was banished to very distant regions of the Russian Empire. In January 1770 Benyovszky reached Tobolsk and at the end of the same year the penal colony of Bolsheretsk in Kamchatka, which could be considered the end of the world. However, in May of the following year (1771) he succeeded in escaping with a group of about sixty companions in a Russian ship, the *Saint Peter and Saint Paul*, that they had commandeered, probably with the intention of reaching the Mexican port of Acapulco. But circumstances changed on the way and after a long and adventurous journey at sea, perhaps touching on the Aleutian Islands and Japanese islands, then almost certainly Formosa and Macao, in September 1771 he turned up in Canton, in China, seeking asylum. Even the European press learned of this seemingly incredible event. Separating from the ship and his companions in a rather questionable way, he contacted the French trade agent in Canton and in practice entered French service. In January 1772 he set sail again from Macao and after another long ocean journey around the coasts of Asia and Africa reached France on July 18. It was on this journey in 1772 that he first set eyes on the island of Madagascar.

In Paris in late 1772 he sought permission from the French ministry for the navy to visit Madagascar to build up local connections in preparation for French conquest. (However, the permission that was, in fact, given in March 1773, was for the preparation of settlements rather than for military conflict or conquest.) It can be concluded on the basis of Benyovszky’s memoirs that what he had in mind after what he had seen on the island of Formosa was the possibility of establishing an independent, almost state-like colony (which could then be handed over to the French king). But he did not arrive there as a French officer at the head of a professional army. His men were not regular soldiers but volunteers recruited from January 1773 who landed on the island in February 1774. No doubt they all had their own special reasons for joining this difficult and uncertain expedition. They did not number in the thousands, as Benyovszky claims in his reports; even including those recruited on the spot they could not have numbered more than a hundred and fifty. Many of them, including Benyovszky’s young son, died within a short while. (Many of the circumstances of his family life, his marriage and the fate of his children are still not clear.)

At that time the French had already had contacts with Madagascar for several decades, especially with the tribes living in the south-eastern part of the island, but it was only to the east of Madagascar that France had a permanent and officially regulated presence, on Bourbon Island and Isle-de-France (today's Réunion and Mauritius), where an intendant (not yet a governor) served and French "state" soldiers and settlers officially supported by France were living. Already in 1767 French travelers had been making plans to conquer the "big island" (Madagascar) in conjunction with regular trade, and Benyovszky must have known about these plans when he was in Paris. However, right from the start the French settlers and the intendant on Isle-de-France observed with distaste the autocratic activity of Benyovszky. The Count finally built the fortress of Louisbourg, named after the French king, in the north-east of Madagascar, in Antongil bay at the mouth of the Tingballe river, and spent long periods here himself with his group. By September 1776 the unhealthy site and the failure to generate real trade, together with his hostile relationship both with the majority of the natives and the French officials, led to the expedition having to return to Paris, a complete failure.

Of course, in the *memoranda* Benyovszky wrote subsequently to Paris (generally referred to as *Mémoires*) he painted a cheerful picture, exaggerating his successes as he was trying to organize a new, even bigger, second expedition to Madagascar. In Paris, however, the acquisition of the new colony was regarded as too costly and pointless. Moreover, inspections made on the spot gave rise to doubts over the success of Benyovszky's earlier colonizing efforts. The reports of the two official French inspectors (aptly known as *commissaires*) who had been sent, De Bellecombe and Chevreux, make for very instructive reading. Compared to the grandiose tableau painted by Benyovszky, they show a depressing picture: in place of fortresses, battles, grand political conferences, celebrations and construction, they found a few shabby huts and an occasional merchant who turned up for an hour or two a week to barter. At the same time it is also apparent that by then even this little known and distant place was not unknown to world trade or even politics: ships regularly appeared on the horizon, bringing salt, sugar, rum and weapons, and in addition to the native Malagasy groups there were already black people and mulattos on the island, and several distinct, African variants of Islam had appeared much earlier. (Benyovszky refers to this with the term *zafi-ramini* which he misunderstood.)

The *Protocolle* makes mention of kings, not tribal chiefs, obviously an exaggeration. But we know from other sources that there had been a lively migration of different population groups on the island for centuries with constantly fluctuating conquests and alliances. In short, all important descriptions of Madagascar at that time deserve the attention of today's reader. It was not Benyovszky's aim to describe the real situation on the island, but to present his own merits, greatly magnifying them. He does not really give a picture of his surroundings: he does not de-

scribe the different settlements or the way of life, dress, behavior or customs of the natives. He makes only brief reference to his interpreters, spies, representatives and soldiers without giving them a human face. We do not learn much about his enemies either: whether they are old, cunning, hunch-backed, what clothes they wear, etc. Nor do we read about the women, who no doubt represented a problem or challenge for the expedition. Although Benyovszky himself is always in the forefront of his writings, we do not learn much about how or where he lived, what clothes he wore, what he ate, or who he was in personal contact with. What he does write about is the kind of flag he designs, has made, and flies. The *Protocolle* does not afford us glimpses into the life of the triumphant adventurer, but offers rather the dry report of a forbidding conqueror. We read that the soil is excellently suited to the cultivation of European plants. He boasts about how quickly he dried the swamps and had roads built. But he makes no mention of the wonderful natural environment, and even the harsh climate and diseases are only mentioned when they are directly related to an event or failure. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Benyovszky lived there for years and survived all the ordeals.

### **Back in Europe and the Second Madagascar Expedition**

Earlier, in Paris, he owed his successes in the ministries and at the court to his obvious personal charm, his unmatched powers of persuasion, and his daring plans, which held out the promise of profit. However, at a time of social and ideological crisis in France, which was on the eve of revolution, overspending and caught in a mesh of increasingly opaque personal connections, Benyovszky, who had returned unsuccessful from the colonization trip, became an increasingly unwelcome client for France's policy on Africa. They satisfied some of his financial demands (it is still not known how or through whom the quarrelsome Hungarian newcomer achieved this financial support so quickly in Paris!), but he did not receive any further official French assistance for his grand new plans. From time to time he disappeared from Paris, which could not have fostered much confidence in his person in the court, even in the absence of his "Madagascan" ill-wishers, although his "hidden departure" to other countries may perhaps have been in the interest of the French intelligence.

After 1776 came a period of long, zigzagging European and American journeys in Benyovszky's life, but we still have no precise, reliable information on many of the details. Although some of his correspondence has been published, it is not complete and often raises further questions. We do not know exactly when he planned what between 1776 and 1784, or on whose behalf he acted. We do not know for what services he was granted the title of Hungarian count, whether he really took part in the War of Bavarian Succession, how he could have taken part

in the American War of Independence in the summer of 1779, exactly how much time he spent again in Hungary (between 1780 and 1781), and whether he did in fact come forward here with dynamic plans for the regulation of rivers and his idea of transforming the small town Fiume (today Rijeka in Croatia) into a world port on the "Hungarian" Adriatic coast. In that era it is quite possible to imagine all this, especially in the case of such an unbridled, many-sided character as Benyovszky. Nevertheless, it is a little suspicious that he returned to Western Europe without accomplishing anything in his native land, Hungary. Back in France he first wanted to recruit volunteers for the American War of Independence. In 1782, armed with letters of recommendation from Benjamin Franklin (who regarded Benyovszky as an honest man), he traveled to America in this cause. But in the following year he tried to persuade the British sovereign to conquer Madagascar, obviously unsuccessfully, because in April 1784 he set out for Baltimore, where he arrived on the 8 of July, to win the support of local merchants for his old-new scheme of colonizing Madagascar. In both cases he argued without success, but the count did set sail once again on board the *Intrepid* from Baltimore on October 25, 1784 with a group recruited with funds from somewhere for Madagascar, where he now obviously wanted to conquer the island for himself. We find information about the journey in a letter he sent from Brazil. Apparently unfavorable winds took him there, and the ship was not well enough equipped either. Even if it is true that the journey was delayed by repairs to the ship between January and April 1785, it is surprising that they did not reach the East African port of Sofala until May 22, 1785. After a lengthy stay they finally arrived in Madagascar on July 7, 1785. (Of course, this was a time when the slave trade, piracy and arms smuggling flourished on the oceans. No precise records were kept on any of them.) At first the landing at the new spot, at Antagava Bay on the north-west coast of Madagascar, seemed successful. But in early August, in violation of his contract, the captain sailed away with the ship, abandoning the increasingly ill-fated expedition. Without hope of escape they faced certain death. With the help of the Malagasy natives Benyovszky attempted to capture the French posts and stores, but his plans failed and the second expedition became more fatal than the first. This much-traveled man, who was still only in his forties, perished on May 23 (or 24, or 26), 1786 in a battle waged at Cap-Est with around 60 soldiers sent by the French governor of Isle-de-France. By then his "army" consisted of only two Europeans and 30 natives.

His grave has never been found; it was most probably in the north-east coastal region of the island, to the south of the Bay of Angontsy, more precisely a few kilometers south of Cap Est on the hill beside the former settlement of Serenana/Mauritanie. Especially over the last hundred years a number of French and more recently also Hungarian enthusiasts and researchers have visited Madagascar seeking traces of Benyovszky's presence. Although official publications of

the Republic of Madagascar make mention of him, as naturally do French experts in African studies and even travel books, public opinion as yet has a vague rather than a precise picture of Benyovszky's activity in Madagascar and its consequences.

### Contemporary French and English editions of Benyovszky's Memoirs

A number of widely read publications at the end of the 18th century gave information on his life. Although real travel reports were also drawn up and his letters to his French clients have survived (notes made on the spot and financial accounts are also included among the available sources), in later years it was not these primary, official documents (which constituted primary sources) that were published, but later summaries, first and foremost the *Mémoires*, generally considered to have been written by Benyovszky himself. These attempt to present the protagonist's whole life, including his youth, his exile to Kamchatka, his escape, his journey to Paris and the first expedition to Madagascar. The book ends with an account of the events of late November 1776. It contains claims so improbable that many researchers later doubted whether the *Mémoires* were written by the count at all, even though the first editions unanimously state that he did.

The two volumes of *Les Mémoires et Voyages de Maurice Auguste Comte de Benyowsky... Écrits par lui-même, et publiés d'après le manuscrit original* first appeared in London in 1790 in French. The English translation, *Memoirs and Travels of Mauritius Augustus Count de Benyowsky. Magnate of the Kingdoms of Hungary and Poland, and one of the chiefs of the Confederation of Poland, etc. ... Written in his own hand*, also in two volumes and also published in London in 1790, was obviously prepared for publication at the same time. It was edited by William Nicholson, who also wrote the foreword. As this work of 668 pages, decorated with engravings and maps, was the starting point for the illustrations of later editions, it is worth devoting a few words to it. (The English version was probably reprinted several times, there are even copies in which Dublin (1790) is indicated as the place of publication.)

Both English volumes begin with a detailed table of contents. The publisher, Nicholson, ends his foreword of more than one page with the date December 7, 1789. He says that at the end of 1784 the learned J. Hyacinth De Magellan recommended the manuscript to him for publication in three volumes, by subscription. However, nothing came of this plan. Benyovszky was absent (on the second journey to Madagascar, to which De Magellan himself also contributed a very substantial sum). Perhaps the idea of obtaining money from a subscription edition came from the count himself, who by then had no regular state income, and at the same time the publication could also have served as a kind of prospectus present-

ing the advantages of the venture. It was probably because of the failure of the second expedition to Madagascar that De Magellan sold the manuscript (or the publication rights). It was then that this bundle of manuscripts was given to the *British Museum* for preservation. After Christmas 1788 De Magellan fell seriously ill and lost his memory, so he was not able to take part in the publication of the book. Nicholson was given a manuscript in French which also included drawings. A number of the original illustrations (those numbered 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, and 27) were destroyed in a fire in the home of Heath, the artist who did the engravings, but the printing plates had already been made. However, those numbered 3, 4, 12, 23, 24, and 25 were also burnt and no copies remained. They were views and portraits and may not all have been related to Madagascar. (Since the "full" numbering of the illustrations remained in the book despite the fire, this caused confusion that is still palpable in later, foreign publications, which naturally took their illustrations from here.) In reply to my question, the British Library's expert confirmed that there is no known copy of the book *Memoirs and Travels* containing more illustrations. (Of course, other "images of Madagascar" may still be discovered, preserved by chance among Benyovszky documents somewhere.)

Nicholson raises the question of the credibility of Benyovszky's facts. In his opinion the work has the nature of a coherent narrative. As for external proof, Benyovszky did not use any instruments suitable for the precise determination of position on his travels in North-east Asia. However, the source works (mainly Russian) known at the time were not much more precise. Here he mentions the data of Erasim Gregorioff Ismyloff (or Ismaeloff, the correct name must have been Gerasim Izmailov), which was known in Europe through Captain Cook. It differs considerably from the account given by Benyovszky. Nicholson also refers to newspaper reports about Benyovszky that reached Europe from Canton in 1772. Nevertheless, taking all this into account he prefers to believe Benyovszky rather than his critics, even in the case of the illustrations.

Nicholson does not make any supplementary remarks on the section about Madagascar. However, he mentions that Benyovszky's text does not refer to the generally accepted sketch maps of the ports of Madagascar. The publisher took drawings Nos. XXI, XXVI, XXVIII, and XXIX from Dalrymple's collection, which are in turn copies made from drawings in the D'Après collection. According to Nicholson, Benyovszky made the same use of D'Après' maps, which probably originated from sailors circumnavigating the island or perhaps even from the French court.

But in De Magellan's correspondence related to Benyovszky's later journeys Nicholson saw letters so hostile to Benyovszky that he did not take them into consideration. The data referring to Benyovszky's last journey may have been part of this correspondence. It would be worth seeking these out again because even the most prejudiced contradictory opinions can be instructive.

The book's foreword is followed by a *Postscript* containing five documents. Nicholson received these from Sir Joseph Banks when he had finished preparation of the book. They concern the arrival in Macao and the events in Kamchatka. Nicholson also adds a few comments. It is here that he discusses the accuracy of the picture of the vessel *Saint Peter and Paul*. He mentions in this connection that there are two other pictures among the manuscripts sent to the British Museum: one of Benyovszky's shipwreck in Asia and the other of the coast of Formosa.

The English book also had a portrait of Benyovszky on the title-page. This too was engraved by Heath on the basis of a miniature portrait that Nicholson received from De Magellan. It is actually this portrait that appears in all Benyovszky editions right up to the present. (In a few cases the image is reversed!)

At the end of the second volume, after the sections on Madagascar (on pages 365–390), Nicholson publishes nine letters to Benyovszky from De Boynes and De Sartine drawn up by the Versailles ministry for shipping and colonial affairs between 1773 and 1777. Some of the letters have a serial number, suggesting that there were at least 21 such letters and Nicholson did not obtain all of them. The volume naturally includes (on pages 395–399) Benyovszky's later proposal for colonization, which was sent to the British ministry.

Special mention must be made of the connections between the English and French volumes published in London in 1790. The two-volume *Mémoires et Voyages de ... Benyovszky* was not only published in London by same publisher as the English volumes, it was also edited by William Nicholson. The foreword to the French volume and the *Postscript* that follows are exactly the same, including the passages on the illustrations and the portrait of Benyovszky. Since the title-page clearly states that this is a "*manuscrit original*", it seems highly likely that the two publications – the French book and the English translation – were produced almost simultaneously from a French manuscript. Nicholson's foreword and a few documents probably had to be translated from English into French. Since it would be too complicated to suppose that the whole of the French text had been copied once again for use by the person doing the English translation, it seems likely that the two volumes were prepared for printing simultaneously. Obviously it was because of interest shown by French readers that the travel report was published in French too. We do not know the names of the persons who did the translations, either from French into English or from English into French. There are no substantial discrepancies in the translations. There are a few minor mistakes, spelling and printing errors, but not many. Some are even found in the dates.

A third edition of Benyovszky's memoirs appeared in Paris in 1791 under the title *Voyages et mémoires de Maurice-Auguste, comte de Benyowsky, magnat des royaumes d'Hongrie et de Pologne etc. etc.*, published by F. Buisson. The anonymous author of the shortened foreword obviously made use of the London edition. Apart from a few technical changes (e.g., the table of contents giving a brief sum-



mary of the chapters is placed at the end of the volumes here) the difference is that this edition does not include the detailed publication of the documents. The illustrations have also been left out.

It must be assumed that the French and the English texts of 1790 with which we are familiar today are not primary texts, even though they contain (more than once) Benyovszky's "authenticating" signature, but were written subsequently in Paris and later even in London, probably after 1781, naturally before the "second" expedition, and together with the 1783 text drawn up for "His British Majesty", in other words not as a real report of the first expedition but as a justification based on confabulation. It could be that, despite the falsifications, this text was also compiled by Benyovszky himself and he probably then had it edited by someone else, a further reason why it needed to be authenticated with his signature. Tracing the precise origin of the illustrations in the early editions and the connections between them is a problem in itself.

However, before making this compilation Benyovszky must have been in possession of more original documentary material. He no doubt preserved the original credentials he had received in Paris. Probably at the time of the investigation he gave the "commissioners" not only accounts but also reports. It is unlikely though that at that time (in 1776 and in Madagascar) he had any "ethnographic" descriptions at his disposal. Perhaps he wrote them when he returned to France on the basis of works by others. (The situation must have been the same in the case of his earlier journey regarding his "ethnographic sketch" of the peoples of Kamchatka. There too, he was fortunate in that there were already "source works" in French that he could use.) In addition he must have had some kind of journal of his first long journey and later of his first expedition to Madagascar. On several occasions he reached France after a long journey at sea. It may have been on one of these, perhaps while sailing from Canton, via Madagascar, to Paris for the first time that he set down in writing what had happened to him up to that time. At the end of his first expedition to Madagascar he would have had to expect that he would be questioned in detail about his actions. Drawing on his earlier notes – perhaps already on the journey back – he may have written a report: but it seems simpler to assume that he later improvised a lengthy report for his new plans, attaching as an annex copies of a few other documents in his possession.

In the first volume of his memoirs (describing his journeys in Siberia, Kamchatka, then the Aleutian Islands and Japan) he quite freely used texts taken from others without naming his sources, even from works that had appeared in print. He no doubt had assistance in this in Paris. And since he was making plans to return to Madagascar, the same experts must have acquainted him with the descriptions of Madagascar available to the French. One of these was the plan drawn up by the Baron De Modave between 1768 and 1771 (only a few years earlier) expounding the great economic advantages that French colonization of Madagascar

would bring for the French court. The letter of commission given to Benyovszky by minister De Boynes also mentions this proposal.

Later however, the data compiled for him and “enhanced”, served as a further source for others. The maps of Madagascar too, appear for the first time in the English edition, and we can imagine how (illegally) these maps passed from French hands into the possession of the British who were at the very least rival colonizers. Actually very few illustrations, all of a stereotyped nature, appear in the early editions, and they were not necessarily based on precise sketches drawn on the spot. But these few illustrations appear very frequently in later works dealing with Benyovszky.

Taking all this into account, it seems probable that the two London books and the subsequent Paris edition of 1791 in French were based on a text in French that had remained in Benyovszky’s possession. It is strange though, that no one in Paris at the time checked the official Benyovszky documents to be found in the archives of the competent ministries. Of course, there was a revolution in France in 1790 and people had their minds on other things.

While it is obvious from the foreword to the London publications that the purpose of the book was to justify and support the second expedition to Madagascar, it is still striking that two-thirds of the publications were devoted to the earlier events in Siberia and Kamchatka and to Benyovszky’s escape. This, and not the Madagascar issue, was also the subject of the debate conducted by the editor. These two volumes do not question the report of the first expedition to Madagascar and they give only very brief information on the second expedition (although Benyovszky had died several years earlier). Of course by 1790 there was no longer any talk of organizing another conquest of Madagascar.

The *Protocolle* is not the direct manuscript source of the two books published in London, but it was one of the primary sources for them. It deals only with the first expedition to Madagascar (while all three of the previously mentioned two-volume books cover the count’s whole life). We point out on the appropriate pages of our 2004 edition the discrepancies in dating and the spelling of names that can be found between the London manuscript and the later printed texts. It can also be seen that the “documents” attached as annexes are not entirely identical either, and their order is different. All this cannot be attributed to a single careless copier. It is more likely that there were several different manuscripts concerning Benyovszky’s first journey to Madagascar.

A) Original proposals, plans, instructions and reports, documents of the investigation, accounts, maps, etc., originally in the possession of the French authorities or of Benyovszky himself. Of these, only a few official documents exist today. They can be found in French and British archives.

B) Obviously Benyovszky himself produced at least one overview using the documents in his possession as the primary source, but also drawing to a large ex-

tent on his memory and in some cases on his imagination. The *Protocolle* is one such writing. It is probable that, even if only one report was written, a number of copies were made later, always to serve some particular purpose. The narrative text of the *Protocolle* is Benyovszky's self-justification. He may have dictated it, and the scribe may even have polished the text subsequently, but even in that case it can be regarded as Benyovszky's work. The language of the text, just as in the case of the 1790 volumes, is reassuring, with occasional grammatical errors or uncertainties. Not surprisingly, the description of tropical vegetation, for example, reflects a "European" attitude and vocabulary. The spelling of names follows the French and English practice. Since the text of the *Protocolle* is not considered to be in Benyovszky's hand for proof-reading, there is little point in looking for traces of "Hungarian" or "Polish" influence in the spelling.

C) Autobiographical and travel writings drawing mainly on the B) texts and other documents. These appeared in London as soon as 1790. Since these cover the entire autobiography, it is possible that there was a general overview of the events in Benyovszky's biography before Madagascar, especially his journey from Kamchatka to Macao, similar to our Madagascar *Protocolle*. The idea for writing such a report may have arisen before 1776. Perhaps it was the investigation into the events in Madagascar and the explanation required that led to the idea of writing a detailed account of the count's life and travels. The "autobiographic story-telling" in Hungary around 1780–1781 (when Benyovszky recounted his adventures orally) could have been a good opportunity to practice narrating the more complicated events. It is worth noting that most of the famous travelers and discoverers of the period recorded the events of their journeys in book-length accounts. Benyovszky himself also used some of these sources. They include journal-like works with the emphasis on geographical data, and there are also more general descriptions of nature accompanied by maps and sometimes precise illustrations. There were "pre-ethnographic" descriptions of the lives of the peoples of particular regions which are of value to present-day ethnologists. In other cases the exciting narrative was the reason for publication. Very little of this can be found in Benyovszky's account of his life. The section on the Far East is somewhat more personal, but it is not a journal, and the account of events in Madagascar is a colonial affairs report. When "ethnographic descriptions" are inserted in these, they reflect the demand of the period in Paris rather than Benyovszky's own interest. We also know that he copied (or had someone copy) these sections from other sources into his own travel account. Nor was Benyovszky a real "discoverer" of the kind who would give names to rivers and mountains, record their length and height and make observations of the climate. In short, although the *Protocolle* is truly a personal work and takes reality only as a starting point, it is neither a work of *belles-lettres* nor an ethnological description. Besides, Benyovszky did not have the talent for either of these. Obviously he could not

draw well either, and he did not think of noting down even a short list of words from the remote and strange languages. He was really interested in only one person: himself.

### The German, Dutch, Swedish, Polish, Slovak Publications

Notwithstanding these limitations, the books published in London and Paris suited the tastes of readers of the period. It is an indication of the interest shown throughout Europe that an edition of the *Mémoires* translated from the English version appeared in Berlin in 1790 in German (published by Voss): *Des Grafen Moritz August v. Beniowski Reisen durch Sibirien und Kamptschatka über Japan und China nach Europa. Nebst einem Auszuge seiner übrigen Lebensgeschichte*. It included a foreword by the renowned German traveler Johann Reinhold Forster, in which he mainly drew attention to errors in the section on Siberia. The *sexto* volume of more than 400 sheets gives the section on Madagascar in very abbreviated form. The illustrations were also taken from the English edition. (The next editions by Voss were published in 1794 and 1806.)

In the following year (1791, Leipzig, Dykisch printing house) an *octavo* two-volume work appeared in German: *Des Grafen Moritz August von Benjowsky, Ungarischem und Pohnischem Magnaten, und Eines von den Häuptern der Pohnischen Conföderation, Schicksale und Reisen; Von ihm selbst beschrieben*. This too traces Benyovszky's life precisely, mainly up to his escape from Kamchatka. The volume lists Georg Forster, the renowned travel writer and writer, as the translator. The debate mentioned at the end of the second volume over the rights to the Benyovszky portrait on the title-page (where it is reversed) gives a glimpse into the rivalry among German publishers. Several of them wanted to bring out a translated edition of the successful book as soon as possible.

In 1791 the Cotta publishing house in Tübingen also brought out a small *octavo* book with the same title as the Leipzig edition (but different spelling): *Des Grafen Moriz August von Benjowsky Ungarischen und Pohnischen Magnaten Schicksale und Reisen von ihm selbst beschrieben*. This book, less than 200 pages long, gives an account, although very brief, of Benyovszky's first expedition to Madagascar and also of his death.

The two-volume work translated by G. D. Ebeling and J. P. Ebeling forms the second group of German editions. This was printed by Benjamin Gottlob Hoffmann in Hamburg in 1791 under the title of *Des Grafen Moritz August von Benjowsky Begebenheiten und Reisen, von ihm selbst beschrieben*. This is the lengthiest edition: it also includes the report by Hippolitus Stefanow on his own journey from Kamchatka to Macao. Since his data differs from that in Benyovszky's text, many people at the time debated which travel account was au-

thetic and which was either imprecise or simply an outright sham. In the foreword G. D. Ebeling gives a detailed report of the works written on the question and also mentions that the Germans not only published the various translations but also dealt in detail with the journeys of Benyovszky in reviews and articles.

We know from a number of contemporary sources that the Benyovszky volumes soon reached Vienna and were quickly sold there. Here the first volume of Benyovszky's travel account ending in Kamchatka appeared as an octavo volume printed by F. A. Schrämbl in 1792 as *Magazin von merkwürdigen neuen Reisebeschreibungen*. This was naturally based on the earlier German translations.

Altogether we know of seven early Benyovszky editions in German. In addition to the places mentioned, they were published in Braunschweig and Reutlingen. A feature they all share is that although they refer to the count's entire life and his death, they reflect interest principally in the parts related to Poland and Kamchatka. There is hardly any discussion of the events in Madagascar and their authenticity is not discussed. The German editions are all based on the English. The French texts were not used. Although it would have been possible to find witnesses who knew Benyovszky personally and could have commented on his statements (especially in the case of the Vienna edition) no effort was made to do this.

Benyovszky soon appeared as a hero in literature. The first person to use his figure was Goethe's brother-in-law Christian August Vulpius, author of a biography of the robber chief Rinaldo Rinaldini. He wrote a play entitled *Graf Benjowsky. Ein original Trauerspiel in fünf Aufzügen* (Leipzig, 1792), first performed in 1788. Much better known was the five-act drama *Graf Benjowsky oder die Verschwörung auf Kamtschatka* by August von Kotzebue, one of the most renowned and very prolific German dramatists of the period, performed first in 1792 and published in Leipzig in 1795. (It is interesting to note that Kotzebue entered the service of the Tsar and later was himself exiled to Siberia, so he must have had a personal interest in the story.) Kotzebue's work also appeared in popular, cheap editions. We know not only of new editions of the work and translations (Dutch, 1796, Amsterdam – French, 1798, Paris – English, 1800, London) but also of critical reviews, sequels and parodies in English and German. It was performed many times in Hungarian too. The Hungarian translation was first published in Hungary in 1835 and again in 1839. A 1796 Hamburg edition of Kotzebue's play even included the score of a "serenade" in the play. It is hardly necessary to mention that here too it was the Kamchatka episode (which is for the most part fictive) that the audience found the most interesting. It would have been possible to present a dramatized version of the Madagascan stage of Benyovszky's career, but the German writers made no effort to do so.

In 1866 Louise Mühlbach wrote a four-volume novel about Benyovszky, which was available in Hungarian in the same year.

The first Benyovszky opera, however, was not German but French. The music was written by one of the most popular composers of the time, François Adrien Boieldieu, to a libretto by Alexandre Duval (1800). It was performed in 1804 in German and in 1813 in Polish. As soon as 1800 not one but two parodies of this “serious” opera were produced in Paris, which is after all a certain sign of success. William Render’s play *Count Benyowsky* was printed in Cambridge (as early as in 1798) but we do not have records about its actual performance. An English opera following the plot of Kotzebue’s drama (with Thomas Simpson Cooke, Charles Edward Horn, Michael Kelly, John Andrew Stevenson and others, the librettist was James Kenney) *Benyowski, or the Exiles of Kamtschatka* was on the stage of Drury Lane in London, March 16th, 1826. An Italian opera (1831) is also known from the sources. In Hungary a similar opera titled *Benyovszky vagy a kamcsatkai száműzöttek* [Benyovszky, or the Kamchatka exiles] with a libretto by Rudolf Köffinger and music by Ferenc Doppler was performed from 1847 in Pest. (Later there was also a German version on stage.)

The Dutch translation of Benyovszky’s memoir, *Gedenkschriften en Reizen des Graaven van Benyowsky* ... appeared in four volumes in Haarlem, between 1791 and 1792. Only the fourth volume deals with Madagascar. This edition was also based on the English book and even the portrait of Benyovszky was taken from that source. Another edition also appeared in Amsterdam.

An *octavo* Swedish edition appeared in 1791 in Stockholm with the title *Grefwens Mauritz August von Beniowskis Lefnadslopp och Resor af honom sjelf beskrefne*. The editor, Samuel Ödmann, was aware of the various other European editions.

In 1797 an edition in four *octavo* volumes appeared in Warsaw, printed by Lebrun, with the title *Historya podrozy y osobliwszych zdarzen sławnego Maurycego-Augusta hrabi Beniowskiego szlachcica polskiego y węgierskiego zawieraiąca w sobie*. Naturally the most interesting thing here was Benyovszky’s Polish connections, as the order in which his two noble titles are listed shows. The four volumes cover the whole of Benyovszky’s life, and here too only the very end of the third volume and the whole of the fourth volume deal with Madagascar. The edition was based on the French book (not on the English or one of the German editions). We know of a number of its reprints (e.g., 1802, 1806). It is interesting that the parts dealing with events in Poland were not corrected here either, even though there must have been many witnesses still alive. However, lengthy passages boasting of Benyovszky’s exploits were left out of the stories (perhaps for this reason).

In Polish literature the great poet Juliusz Słowacki returned a number of times to the figure of Benyovszky, considering him to be practically Polish and devoting

a poem and later a drama to him. The adventurous life of Benyovszky appeared in Polish popular literature and belles-lettres in both the 19th and 20th centuries.

The earliest Slovak edition of the biography appeared a decade later than these early translations, in 1808 in Bratislava, printed by Simon Peter Weber in octavo, under the title of *Pamatné Pŕihody Hrabéte Beňowského ...*, translated by Samuel Čerčanský. As the translator and Jiří Palkovič, who wrote the publisher's foreword, mention, this brief overview followed the French edition. The manuscript was finished in 1805 and was given to the publisher in 1807. The small book includes the few pictures that then appeared in most European editions. The interest of the Slovaks is obvious, and on the last page of the book the publication mentions that Benyovszky later entered the service of Emperor Joseph II, then of the King of England, and that from there he went to America, this being followed by his second journey to Madagascar, which led to his death. His wife returned from America to Hungary, where at the time of publication (1807) she still lived (with her two daughters) in the village of Vieszka/Vieska (near Beckó/Beckov). The "new" information was obviously obtained locally and corresponds to the sentences that can be read in Hungarian in Gvadányi. It is an interesting circumstance that the translator and editor were Slovak intellectuals, the publisher and printer were Germans from Bratislava.

### **Benyovszky in Hungarian Public Opinion**

It could be asked why no Hungarian translation was made at the same time of Benyovszky's prose biography, which by then was world famous. One of the reasons obviously must have been that Benyovszky's adventures were already known by then, although in a different form, on the Hungarian market for popular books.

First of all those directly concerned, the family, relatives and acquaintances, naturally knew about the adventures of this extraordinary man: his flight to Poland and his participation in the struggles of the Confederation of Bar. News of his exile must have reached them too. Nor can we doubt that the newspaper reports from Canton in 1771 must have reached Hungary in some manner. Since Benyovszky soon called his wife to join him after his arrival in France in the summer of 1772 – and he was assisted in this by relatives living in France – the news (and rumors) reaching Hungary must have become more detailed.

In 1780–1781 the count entered the service of the Hungarian queen Maria Theresa (and later the king Joseph II), and no doubt he was not reluctant to recount his adventures. When he departed from America in 1784 on his second, fatal journey to Madagascar he did not take his pregnant wife with him. He must have sent her home, but we do not know when Zsuzsanna Hönsch reached Vieszka, nor do

we know when she learned of her husband's death. In short, when the first Benyovszky biographies appeared abroad in 1790, the hero's name and the whole of his adventurous life were already familiar in Hungary. There must have been plans for a Hungarian edition as well.

First in 1790 the journal *Magyar Kurir* published Benyovszky's biography. Later, other publications in Hungarian, German, and Latin reported on his deeds.

However, a work of literature played the most important role in popularizing him. Count József Gvadányi (1725-1801) studied humanities in Nagyszombat, then joined the army, took part in several wars, was captured by the French, retired as a high-ranking officer, and resumed his activity as a writer. He was a conservative and populist poet and a champion of ancient Hungarian values. *Rontó Pálnak egy Magyar lovas Köz-Katonának és Gróf Benyovszki Móritznak életek', Földön, Tengeren álmélkodásra méltó Történettyeiknek, 's véghez vitt Dolgaiknak Le-Írása, a' mellyeket Hazánk Dámáinak kedvéért Versekbe foglalt Gróf Gvadányi József Magyar Lovas Generális* [Account of the life of Pál Rontó, a Hungarian cavalryman, and Count Mórítz Benyovszki, their amazing deeds on land and sea, told in verse for the benefit of the ladies of our country by Count József Gvadányi, Hungarian Cavalry General] was published in 1793 by the printing house of Simon Péter Weber in Pozsony/Bratislava (and Komárom/Komarno), where the Slovak book about Benyovszky also appeared 15 years later. The two-part verse narrative first describes the life and incredible adventures of Pál Rontó, an early Hungarian *miles gloriosus*. In his foreword, Gvadányi claims that Rontó served together with him in the army and spent nine days recounting his adventures to the writer. However there is a great deal of exaggeration. Although it could be thought that the incredible adventures of this "common soldier" are intended as a parody of the subsequent stories of the count, Gvadányi's approach is not so simple. He wrote both parts of his poem as an entertaining work for "ladies".

What Gvadányi wrote about Benyovszky himself is of special interest:

As regards the life of Count Mórítz Benyovszki, he himself wrote it down in the French language, while he was making merry in London, and it was printed there; the English then translated it into their own language, and finally this work also came out in the German language: and so in part I have followed this German edition, but even more the things that I myself have heard and been told; because, as I have included in my work, when Count Benyovszki returned to our country from Paris he spent four days with me in Nagyszombat in the Golden Crown Inn, and as my dear and old friend and also a distant relative, he recounted to me all his adventures and vicissitudes. As for Pál Rontó, he was in the same Regiment with me and I was his sergeant, and discharging my duty I also rescued him from the gallows during the Prussian War that lasted seven years. When the Diet



assembled in Buda in the year 1790, learning of my presence there he sought me out and I did not let him go for nine days. On that occasion he told me the story of his life and all that had befallen the Count too; indeed, as I said to him some of his deeds that are set out in the book are falsified, and he recounted them to me as I have set them down. (Foreword to the 1793 edition: pages X–XI.)

Gvadányi knew indeed about the French publication in London, and also about its English and later its German translation. He was especially indignant about the falsifications in the latter regarding Benyovszky's origin. He therefore wrote an account of the count's life himself, right up to the Polish uprising and his arrival in Cracow. (According to the poem it was here that Benyovszky met Pál Rontó.) Gvadányi also made further corrections concerning the parts in Kamchatka at the end of the fifth section of part two (through the narrative of Pál Rontó). (There is perhaps no need to note that the Pál Rontó figuring in the poem was an invention of the author, he never lived in Hungary, and naturally was never in Siberia!) In the second part Gvadányi traces events up to Benyovszky's death in Madagascar. He too says (on page 548) that when the Countess learnt of this she returned to Hungary, where Mrs. Benyovszky continued to live an "exemplary life".

The remark made at the end of the eleventh section of part two is also of special interest. Here Benyovszky, driven back from the first expedition to Madagascar, bids farewell to the island. In his publication of 1807 Gvadányi makes the following remark on this (on pages 529–530):

The book translated into German reaches this point and goes no further in its description of the life of Count Mórítz Benyovszki, but I shall continue it in this humble work, as he himself recounted to me and also to Pál Rontó in Buda after his arrival in our country from Paris, with what befell him in Paris; and while he was in our country not only I but countless others also heard his stories, consequently I have included these too, with an account of where Pál Rontó parted from the Count and where he went. But I do not stop here either: I conclude my work with the account given by the English writer Nicholsson of how he traveled from our country to London, the capital city of England, why he went from there to Madagascar, and how his life came to an end there.

Then follows the "twelfth section" of the poem in which Gvadányi claims that Benyovszky had many enemies in Paris. Then however (in 1777) the crown prince, the later Joseph II appears in Paris to visit his younger sister, Marie Antoinette and naturally, he too knows about the famous Benyovszky, whom he summons, "pardons", and calls on to return to his homeland. Benyovszky sets out immediately and is given an audience by Maria Theresa, to whom he recounts his adventures. The queen makes him a colonel of the *Székely* hussars. On his way to take up this post, he stops in Pozsony, where he has to tell the story of his life to

many people. (The poem then continues with the farewell from Pál Rontó.) Then Benyovszky travels to Nagyszombat to inspect his estates. It is here that he meets Gvadányi and spends four days telling him about his adventures. According to Gvadányi's poem Benyovszky then fights against the Rumanian rebel, Hóra/Horea in Transylvania, travels to Silesia in 1778, from where he returns to Vienna, where he asks to be relieved of his commission and travels to Fiume to set up a wholesale business there. This is not successful, so he leaves for England. There he requests an audience with the king and promises to conquer Madagascar for him. But the English Parliament does not give the support requested, so he sails to America and, with the support of merchants there, again leads an expedition to Madagascar. The verse narrative ends with a description of Benyovszky's death. (Naturally Gvadányi could not have heard of these events on the occasion of their meeting in Nagyszombat; he took them from foreign publications.) The information presented briefly by Gvadányi is, of course, not precise even concerning the dates. (For example, the Horea-Cloșca uprising began in the autumn of 1784, i.e., at the time Benyovszky was on the journey from Baltimore to Madagascar!) And just as the writer's meeting with Pál Rontó is fictitious, perhaps the days spent with Benyovszky in Nagyszombat also belong in the world of poetry.

In 1807 in Pozsony/Pressburg Simon Péter Wéber issued the book again. By then Gvadányi was no longer alive either, as the publisher notes. Otherwise the new edition is the same as the old one, in fact, the two-part poem was printed with the same typographical composition (!). The book was published again in 1816 without any further changes.

The following generations showed the same interest. In 1857 József Gaal published a novel (today we would call it a novel for youth) entitled *Gróf Benyovszky Móric élete és viszontagságai* (Life and adventures of Count Móric Benyovszky). This was linked to *Rontó Pál élete és viszontagságai* (Life and adventures of Pál Rontó, 1857), which can obviously be traced back to Gvadányi and was also published again later. Other even later popular publications include the book by Vilmos Radó: *Benyovszky Móric élete és kalandjai* (Life and adventures of Móric Benyovszky, Budapest, 1889). It was reissued again and again for decades). The figure of Benyovszky also continued to attract the attention of belletrists. Besides the works of Pál Pados (1940) and Tibor Bevall (obviously a pen-name!), Dénes Barsi's *Madagaszkár királya* (King of Madagascar, Budapest, 1943) gave emphasis to adventures capturing the imagination of youthful readers. Works of better quality include Miklós Rónaszegi *A nagy játszma* (The big game), a novel for youth (Budapest, 1955), which focused on the events in Kamchatka. Árpád Thiery's novel *Benyovszky gróf* (Count Benyovszky, Budapest, 1993) covers the adventurer's entire life.

However, none of these publications included or drew directly on the text of Benyovszky's *Mémoires*.

As we can see from the above, there were already proposals in 1790 for a Hungarian edition of Benyovszky's memoirs, particularly since the foreign editions were familiar in Hungary. However, the Hungarian translation was not done until much later, thanks to Mór Jókai (who, as he himself claimed, was given his first name in honor of the count). *Gróf Benyovszky Móricz életrajza, saját emlékiratai és útleírásai* (The life of Count Móricz Benyovszky, his own memoirs and descriptions of his travels) originally appeared in four volumes (Budapest, 1888–1891, in book form – and not in the same order as the numbering of the volumes! – before that it was published in fascicles, between 1887 and 1891). A new, second edition appeared at the same time in 1891. This was used almost a century later for the critical edition of the complete works of Mór Jókai (as volumes 52 and 53 – Budapest, 1967), at which time it was edited and supplemented with detailed notes by György Radó, a polyglot literary scholar who was well acquainted with the Slavic aspects of Jókai's work. (The literary advisor for these volumes of the critical edition was Lajos Tardy, a man well acquainted with the curiosities of Hungarian cultural history.) In the introduction to the work Jókai himself recounted that Count Sándor Benyovszky, grandson of Benyovszky's younger brother, had himself proposed that the *Mémoires* finally be published in Hungarian. Jókai made his translation from the 1790 English edition. However, as the editor of the critical edition points out, Jókai also drew on the German translation of Benyovszky's "memoir".

Although this publication consisting of several volumes actually gives the well known life history of Benyovszky, as it has remained the source of knowledge on the count up to the present in Hungary, it is worth listing what we can read about in Jókai and where.

The first part of the critical edition (volume 52) presents the first part of the count's life, up to his escape from Kamchatka, in 32 chapters. At the same time Jókai regards this as his own "novel", even giving it a separate title: *Afanázia*. The second volume contains the last six chapters (33–38); these were written by Jókai himself, who – following what we have seen to be a century-old tradition – defends the statements made on geography, ethnology and the history of discovery in Benyovszky's memoir. (Even in the earlier parts of the "novel" Jókai consistently tries to confirm even Benyovszky's boldest claims.) The next volume (volume 53 in the critical edition) is even more interesting for our subject. Its title is: *Gróf Benyovszky Móricz életrajza, saját emlékiratai és útleírása* [Biography of Count Móricz Benyovszky, his own memoirs and descriptions of his travels], which Jókai himself calls a "translation". (It originally appeared in 1888, as volume III.) This includes the foreword by the English publisher, Nicholson, dated December 7, 1789, then Benyovszky's "memoir" (from his birth up to his banishment to Siberia), and Benyovszky's "memoirs" in 29 chapters (after a very brief introductory text this actually contains his escape from Kamchatka and the events

leading up to it). The “continuation” first describes his travels in the ocean around Kamchatka, then the journey via Japan and Formosa to Canton. A number of memoranda, agreements and military reports can be read in this part. According to the text, Benyovszky sailed on a French ship on January 22, 1772 and arrived on March 16 in Isle-de-France. (This had earlier been in Portuguese and then Dutch possession, it passed to the French in 1715 and was taken by the British in 1810. It is now known as Mauritius.) According to the text Benyovszky was a guest of the “governor” there. After about two weeks they set sail again and dropped anchor on April 12 at Madagascar, where Benyovszky went ashore at Fort Dauphin. They were able to spend two days on the island. They then sailed to France, landing on July 19, 1772. Benyovszky first drew up a proposal for the French for the colonization not of Madagascar but of Formosa. However, he soon recommended Madagascar to the French court which was eager for money but by then was no longer capable of colonization on a large scale and was in an increasingly disorderly state. Benyovszky called on his wife and children in Hungary to join him in France. The second volume of the *Mémoires* ends at the point in December 1772 when he was commissioned in the name of the French king to establish a French colony on the island of Madagascar.

The next part (volume IV, pages 79–100) is even more interesting. It bears the title “*Memoir of the expedition to Madagascar*”. According to this, Benyovszky was commissioned on September 15, 1772 to lead an expedition to Madagascar. The practical preparations began in early 1773. The text gives a brief plan drawn up by Benyovszky for the French minister. He made his farewell visits in France at the end of March and they arrived at Isle-de-France on September 22, 1773. They wished to set out very soon for Madagascar, but the leaders of Isle-de-France did everything to put obstacles in Benyovszky’s way, and it was only on February 14, 1774 that they dropped anchor off Madagascar.

“*Detailed description of matters concerning the royal colony ... established in Madagascar*” is the title of the next part (volume IV, pages 101–262). Here we learn from journal-like notes about the fate of the colony, contacts with the natives, revolt, sicknesses, even a rough record of accounts. In an entry dated March 1776 a brief account of the natives’ “Seclave” “kingdom” precedes a description of the “war” that was soon conducted against them. This is again followed by a description of the plots against Benyovszky, in which we can read about meetings and the speeches he made there. On August 16, 1776 the tribal chiefs elected him as their leader and promised to protect him from the French. But the commissaries De Bellecombe and Chevreau arrived from France on September 21 to investigate the circumstances of Benyovszky’s colony and, if necessary, to take him back to France. Benyovszky drew up a number of reports and handed over these texts. On September 29th the delegates ordered that Benyovszky’s functions not extend to anything beyond the colony. In early October Benyovszky informed the native

chiefs that he had left the service of the French king. At that point Benyovszky actually wanted to organize an independent state. He also records the text of the native leaders' oath of loyalty, the composition of the government to be formed, etc. Nevertheless, he wished to return to Europe and on December 14, 1776 he set sail. He hoped that this journey would be of great benefit for the future of the Madagascan colony. The *Memoirs* ends with this sentence.

As a kind of appendix the book also includes a number of documents (volume IV, pages 265–369): resolutions of the officers' meetings and rules for the general administration of the colony drawn up in the form of question and answer and including a description of the inhabitants of the island. A separate document discusses the diseases common on the island. There is also an economic proposal concerning the potential and profits of the colony. An appendix to the appendix describes the way of life of the peoples of the island. There are copies of nine letters and instructions sent from Paris. This is followed by a "Declaration by Count Móric Benyovszky" (dated December 25, 1785), in which he presents and offers the island of Madagascar to the king of England.

At the end of the work (volume IV, pages 379–381) Jókai points out that he is also publishing some letters of Benyovszky never before published, throwing new light on previously unclear details of his life. He also expresses the hope that we will obtain more reliable information on the period of Benyovszky's life after the first expedition to Madagascar.

This hope was realized, but not exactly in the way Jókai had thought.

For justifiable reasons György Radó did not include the sections from chapter 39 to chapter 60 of the second volume (Budapest, 1891) of *Gróf Benyovszky Móricz életrajza* in the Jókai critical edition (Budapest, 1967). As the publisher notes on page 66 of the 1891 edition, "The publisher commissioned Mr. János Jankó Jr. to write the parts of this work requiring geographical knowledge and research, a difficult task that he willingly undertook; the following chapters are from his pen." It is understandable that it is not the task of a complete Jókai edition to publish texts by Jankó. However, these passages may also be of interest to us. János Jankó (1868–1902), one of the leading representatives of Hungarian ethnology, was at the beginning of his career at the time. He had training in geography and also in African studies. Obviously, when he did research in French and English ethnological institutions, museums and archives in 1890 he must have made a special point of checking for material on Benyovszky in view of the request to write commentaries. He wrote his commentaries in 21 chapters (close to 250 printed pages) covering the chapters of the *Memoirs*. He begins (in chapters 39–50) with commentaries that on the whole confirm and even show enthusiasm concerning the events in Siberia, Kamchatka and the journey to Japan, and the stay in Canton. (For example, he even writes (on page 202) that the island of Mauritius was later named after Benyovszky, which would be an exaggeration even if

intended as a joke!) Beginning in chapter 51 Jankó deals with Benyovszky's activity in Madagascar (see pages 204–310). He presents the discovery of the island, the first French attempts to colonize it and their failure. Jankó drew on Louis Pauliat's *Madagascar* (Paris, 1884), in places simply translating passages from it. He characterizes Benyovszky's plans for colonization in the same way. Jankó even shows prejudice in attacking the governor of Isle de France (De Ternay), his intendant (Maillard) and the merchants there, who impeded Benyovszky's efforts whenever they could. Taking the reports in the *Mémoires* at face value, he comments briefly on Benyovszky's return to Europe, then on the plan for his new expedition and his subsequent early death. Jankó devotes three chapters to the history of the island from 1816 to the 1890s. Finally, he describes the changes in customs, morals and cultural relations. He also mentions the questions that need to be cleared up in future research on Benyovszky.

Jankó also provided appendices. He gave the text in Latin (and in Hungarian translation) of Maria Theresa's diploma of April 3, 1778 raising Benyovszky to the rank of count, which refers to Benyovszky as colonel and appointed governor of Madagascar (*"nec non provinciae Madagascar nominatae gubernatori"*). He traced the history and genealogy of the Benyovszky family. He also reproduced some of the notes made by Sándor Benyovszky, containing all the main elements of the count's legendry. Further family recollections contain even more fantastic details (for example, that Benyovszky married in America, fathered another three children there and was murdered in 1809 in Texas). Jókai and Lajos Kropf refuted such preposterous ideas with a touch of irony, and Kropf gave a detailed account of all that is known of Benyovszky's death on the basis of more authentic sources. Finally, he published seven letters from Benyovszky to his younger brother Emánuel (in French and German) written in April 1780 (from Vienna) and in the summer of 1781 (from Fiume), followed by a report on his military activity, his appointment as "k. k. General", and his journey to France. Unfortunately, the latter letters are not dated.

The apologetic tone of these communications follows the solutions of the "well-intentioned" Benyovszky commentators. At most he adds new source material, and there is a note of Hungarian pride.

But it seems that the discovery of new "authentic" sources on Benyovszky only leaves more biographical facts in obscurity and makes their explanation more difficult.

### Some Remarks and Some Source Criticism

S. Pasfield Oliver's book: *Memoirs and Travels of Mauritius August Count Benyowsky* (London – New York) was published in 1893; it was a new, updated version of the English edition of 1790. In this Oliver, who was a colleague and

friend of Lajos Kropf, tried to give a more credible picture of Benyovszky with the help of new data that had come to light. It is a pity that this book appeared after the Jókai version, too late to influence it, and at least in Hungary not everyone later took into account the new facts that it presented.

Lajos (Louis) Kropf (1852–1939), who first published an account of the precise circumstances of the count's death in the March 23, 1888 issue (No. 83) of *Egyetértés*, and later János Jankó, who published *Gróf Benyovszky Móric mint földrajzi kutató* (Count Móric Benyovszky as geographical researcher) in a separate booklet (Budapest, 1890) and his survey of the literature on Benyovszky in the columns of *Századok* (1891, 718–735, 797–808), both recognized the importance of manuscript sources. It is a pity that they did not make greater use of them at the time and did not publicly adopt a position on the matter of the falsehoods in the *Mémoires*. Perhaps they both knew that the British Museum preserved another manuscript in addition to the one published here: *Benyovszky Mauritius Augustus: Memoirs and Travels with maps and drawings* (MSS. Fr. 5359–5362, in French). It is worth noting that the British Library today knows of further, previously unpublished documents on Benyovszky under the manuscript reference numbers 18.128 to 18.139.

György Radó (1912–1994) himself lists no less than 124 manuscripts or archive sources (critical edition of Jókai's works vol. 52, pages 472–479), quite a few of them in the National Széchényi Library. Since then we have probably learned of further surviving documents in France or England. It would be worth publishing a full list and at least a register of these. The brief overviews made on special occasions or lists referring to new sources do not make up for this lack. (See, for example, the proceedings of the conference held on the 200th anniversary of Benyovszky's death – *Földrajzi Múzeumi Tanulmányok* 3. Érd, 1987.)

It is obvious that people still show interest in Benyovszky's adventurous life (not only in Hungary but also in Slovakia, Poland and naturally Madagascar and elsewhere). This is evident not only from the highly successful Slovak–Hungarian TV film series (1975, Hungarian title: *Vivát Benyovszky!* director: Igor Ciel). (However, this eight-part series once again concentrated mainly on the path leading to Kamchatka; Madagascar appeared only in the final part.) A slim volume entitled *Benyovszky Móric: Madagaszkár* appeared in Budapest in 2001. It essentially contains Jókai's Hungarian text (with minor publishing differences) without a single word of commentary. (See the Jókai critical edition, volume 53, pages 261–370.) This publication did not include any of the "Documents" found in the Jókai edition, but it did take two of its illustrations. The same publisher brought out Benyovszky's French text too, based on the 1791 Paris edition. Recently (in 2004) the Hungarian TV channel Duna-Televízió broadcast a documentary on Benyovszky's Madagascar.

Although I have not attempted to assemble a complete survey in this respect either, it should be noted that biographies of Benyovszky in numerous contemporary editions and the more recent editions based on them can be read in major libraries in Hungary. The Budapest University Library has both the 1790 English and the 1791 French editions. It has the German travel account of 1790 and 1791, its new edition of 1797 and the Vienna edition of 1815. The Academy Library in Budapest still preserves copies of the 1790 Berlin edition and the 1791 Hamburg edition. Naturally, the National Széchényi Library has the most complete Benyovszky collection. Unfortunately, the most recent works, mainly those on contemporary Madagascar, and at least copies of the manuscripts preserved abroad are missing even here.

It would therefore be good to see all these source works together at last, to enable us to form a more precise picture of what is fact and what is merely fiction in the old documents. However, it is not our task to make a moral judgment on Benyovszky's person or on the credibility of his memoirs. Rather, we should show the cause of this phenomenon, the process whereby texts containing false statements came into being.

### **The Budapest Edition of the *Protocolle***

In the autumn of 2003 the National Széchényi Library in Budapest obtained a photocopy of the carefully restored manuscript No. *Additional Ms. 18.844* from the library in London. (Ms. Lynne Brindley, chief executive of the British Library, is to be thanked for making it available.) In the following year we printed the manuscript in full, supplemented with illustrations taken from the old English edition of 1790. Naturally these are not found in the original manuscript. They come from other contemporary sources considered to be authentic. The Budapest 2004 publication contains a facsimile of the manuscript that is written in a clearly legible hand. However, since in places it is difficult to read and at times also contains unfamiliar linguistic forms, we also included a faithful French transcription of the manuscript. Naturally, no changes have been made to the original text. Wherever the wording of a passage (or its meaning) is doubtful, this is indicated. The very late 18th century French manuscript has been transcribed faithfully. Present orthography was taken into account only for the spelling of proper nouns as one or two words. The original articulation of the text was retained. The paragraphs, punctuation and emphases also follow the original manuscript.

Although the text of the 2004 Budapest edition is not the desired "original" source, it is nevertheless the closest thing to it. It has been known for more than a century that the manuscript of the *Protocolle*... exists and is to be found in the British Library. János Jankó already reported on this in an article published in



1891 (although he confused the later printed sources). In his notes for the Jókai critical edition György Radó also refers to this, but he had not seen the London manuscript. Győző Lugosi, a historian of Africa, wrote in his dissertation (1981) about the history of Madagascar before colonization. In his work he had access to a dissertation written in 1970 at the University of Tananarive (Paule Vacher: *Contribution à l'histoire de l'établissement français fondé à Madagascar, par le baron de Benyovszky (1772–1776), d'après de nouvelles sources manuscrites*), which gave a scathing critique of Benyovszky's falsifications and at the same time tried to point out genuine source works on the early history of the island. Vacher and subsequently Lugosi assume that in Paris there may be a further copy (or facsimile) in French of the manuscript preserved in London. They also mention the archives or publications in France and Madagascar (and elsewhere) where further authentic documents on the Benyovszky expedition could be sought. Unfortunately, as far as we know, this work has yet to be done.

Manuscript No. *Additional MS. 18.844* of the British Museum (British Library) is a very elegant, beautifully handwritten document comprising 102 folio sheets. (Corrections can be seen in only a few places). According to a hand-written inscription on the last page it was inventoried in 1870. The short title on the red morocco binding is: *Protocolle du regiment des volontaire [!] de Benyovszky créée en 1772*. The manuscript has no summary table of contents, but the different sections have titles.

On the first page a description of the subject, which is then expanded at the top of page 2, is inscribed: *Mémoire sur l'expédition et l'isle Madagascar*. There is a preliminary introduction (*Preliminaire*) and then from the next page (with the title *Exposé*) there are instructions concerning the expedition to Madagascar issued by the French naval minister (secretary of state) De Boynes and dated December 15, 1772. The manuscript contains precise dates and the years are shown separately in the left-hand margins. Then follows the text of Benyovszky's seven-point draft and a mention of the negotiations that took place in connection with this. After this comes a description of the journey to Isle de France and the preparations there. Although the manuscript is almost identical with the text of the *Mémoires*, it is striking that the spelling of names is not always consistent and there are discrepancies of not only days but even months in the dates. The figures in the "accounts" do not always coincide either, although the rules applying to the addition of the accounts published earlier were not always clear. In this case the cause seems to be inaccuracy on the part of the copyists rather than any intention to mislead readers. The division of the seven texts into paragraphs is not the same either.

From the top of page 12 we are given a "detailed description" of matters related to the colony (*Mémoire détaillé...*), beginning on February 14, 1774.

The first substantial discrepancies between the text of the *Protocolle* and the *Mémoires* can be found from February 1775, when in the "memoirs" Benyovszky

begins to give the story of how he was “elected as king”, doing so in the form of precisely dated journal entries. These passages are not found in the *Protocolle*. Here, however, we find the text of the “proposals of the Sambarives” (*Proposition et Discours des Sambarives*), dated April 30, 1775 and a description of the subsequent clashes in June and then the talks, again followed by armed conflict. By the end of the hostilities (in mid-August) Benyovszky was ill with a fever. His condition did not really improve until October. Of course, both the intrigues of the colonial officials and the conflicts continued. In early March 1776 a “description of the kingdom of the Seclaves” (*Notion du royaume des Seclaves dites Boyana*) follows in the manuscript, running to around two pages, but then without any further remarks the journal-style entries continue. These present in detail the aggressive behavior of certain chiefs, or the help others request from him, and above all the speeches made by Benyovszky. It is here (on pages 56–57) that he gives a description of the structure of his army. It is interesting to note that he does not mention the 1,129, 1,882, 1,088 and 12 individuals, altogether 4,113 people listed in the *Mémoires*, but only 49, 50, 46, and 4, a total of 147, which was, alas, probably closer to the truth (even despite the error in addition). The history of the campaign waged against the Seclaves, which began on April 30, 1776 (*Historique de la campagne contre les Seclaves*), follows from page 57. Towards the end of this campaign Benyovszky received the news that *La Syrène*, the corvette sent from Paris to “support” him, was shipwrecked and sank. He received a message from the ministry that he was to restrict his activity to the colony. On June 8, 1776 Benyovszky returned to Louisbourg from his military expedition, abandoning his native allies. Peace talks with the Seclaves began on August 14. This is a short section in the *Protocolle*, which then continues with Benyovszky’s inspection made near the colony on August 23, followed the arrival of the *S. Vincent* (dated early September). In contrast, the *Mémoires* report that between August 16 and 22 the island’s chiefs came to visit Benyovszky, fearing that the French king would recall him, and in essence made him the ruler of the whole island. This is followed by speeches and mutual vows. It is only then that he returns (taking up the thread from August 23) to an account of the ever more rapid events. It hardly needs to be said that the colorful description of how he was made king is all the work of his imagination. The reality was that General De Bellecombe and Chief Commissioner Chevreau, entrusted with conducting the investigation, arrived on September 21. They handed over a document containing 25 questions to which Benyovszky drafted a written reply, also in 25 points. By then Benyovszky was already preparing to leave the island. On October 3 at an assembly of the chiefs he said that he had left the service of the French and would soon write a report on the state of the Madagascan colony. The chiefs assured him of their support.

The *Protocolle* gives only a very brief account of the events of the last days on Madagascar and makes mention of October 1776, where we find the remark (at

the bottom of page 65) "*fin du mémoire*". In contrast, the *Mémoires* give a veritable novella recounting how the tribal chiefs asked him to take an oath as ruler, which he allegedly did on October 4. The long and detailed description ends with a list of those present and their ranks. The sections describing the organization of the new state are also missing from the *Protocolle*. According to the *Mémoires* Benyovszky did not leave the island until December 11, 1776. Although the last days are again recorded in journal form, we learn nothing about what Benyovszky did on the spot during the period of around ten weeks after he "left the service of the French king" (around September 28).

The last third of the *Protocolle* manuscript contains documents (similarly to the *Mémoires*). There are actually five documents. One, marked X, contains the resolutions of the assembly held by the officers of the volunteers on September 22, 1775 (on pages 66–71). A second marked XX contains the resolutions of a similar gathering of officers held on April 1, 1776 (on pages 71–74). In the *Protocolle* this is followed (on pages 74–77) by notes (*Observations...*) on diseases in Madagascar, a text that comes later in the *Mémoires*. Then follow, under the heading *X a*, the 25 questions of De Bellecombe and Chevreau, presented with the questions in the left column and Benyovszky's answers in the right column (on pages 78–98). Almost without exception each question was signed by the two Frenchmen, and each answer was signed separately and authenticated by Benyovszky; this is also shown in the London manuscript. The text of the questions and answers is not entirely identical in the two source texts. Naturally, Benyovszky gives an answer more favorable to himself to the two most important questions (the first and the last) in the version found in the *Mémoires*. It is characteristic that the answer given to the 20<sup>th</sup> question (how many inhabitants are there on the island) is 250,000 in the *Protocolle*, while the *Mémoires* give "two and a half million". In his answers Benyovszky mentions further documents and accounts, but these have not been passed on in either source (although some of them could perhaps still come to light in some archive somewhere). Finally (on pages 99–101) we find the draft titled *Projet pour fonder une Colonie à Madagascar*, which first sets out ten general conditions, then answers them in 22 points for the case of Madagascar. It concludes with a detailed list of considerations for the colonization of the island.

The manuscript does not contain figures, sketches, references or other documents. There is no indication of who had it made and for whom, who was the copyist, or in whose possession it was.

Since this text gives the best picture of Benyovszky's first expedition to Madagascar and contains more sober information than what appeared later in the *Mémoires* (although the exaggeration, self-praise and overestimation of the results are striking in these texts too), it deserved to be published. The observant reader will be able to spot the inaccuracies in dates and names in the original manuscript by comparing them with the transcription and the English or Hungar-

ian translation. We did not wish to correct, explain or supplement Benyovszky's geographical, ethnological or historical data or to compare them with the present data. This and similar research will be the task of a scholarly biography of Benyovszky when one is finally written.

Considering that the commentaries in the Jókai critical edition (1967, in volume 52, particularly between pages 470 and 490) gave what was at the time a quite complete international bibliography, we have not repeated that here, mentioning only the most important and the most recent publications. We have not mentioned the overviews or lexicon entries (although some of them also refer to the most recent literature).

### Conclusion

While it seems quite clear to me from the foregoing what we can believe from Benyovszky's writings and what not, I do not consider it superfluous or defamatory but merely a fact to mention the lies. Of course, these must be pointed out in scholarly criticism, but there are articles in the most recent literature whose authors continue to defend every claim made by Benyovszky.

Both the *Protocolle* and the later *Mémoires* are typical products of the last quarter of the 18th century. The places of Benyovszky's incredible adventures were real places. Of course, he drew on the works of others in describing peoples, battles and events, and he falsified names and events and exaggerated the facts. This has always been the case with great travelers. The account of the "Siberian" stage of his life and his journey around the world also begins in the manner of a boastful tale. Later, when he arrived in France, the need must have arisen for him to draw up a more detailed plan for the establishment of a big, independent colony, and to write "travel reports" providing the evidence required. It was not solely the fault of the already existing but tiny French "colonial administration", powerless and greedy, in the region, the countless more pressing problems of the mother country as it drifted towards revolution, or even Benyovszky's contradictory personality that nothing came of the grand plan. England and later the Americans also showed very limited interest in this plan of colonizing a far away island. In reality, the social conditions of the people of Madagascar at the time would not have made it possible to create a uniform colony there. After sporadic attempts at colonization by the Portuguese, Dutch, English and French from the second half of the 16th century, then the attempts at conquest around the turn of the 18th-19th century, which were doomed to failure from the outset, in the second third of the 19th century the natives united almost the whole of the island into their own kingdom. Initially they were under English influence, then between 1885 and 1895 the country became a French colony. It can be said that Benyovszky "arrived a century too early" to become the "ruler" of the whole island.

Clearly, there is still interest in Benyovszky and his deeds in Madagascar. Occasionally this has even reached scholarly circles. Editions published as early as the late 18th century attempted to explain, reinterpret or correct the incorrect and incredible parts of Benyovszky's descriptions of his travels. Nicholson's introduction to the 1790 English edition served as a source in this respect for a number of later editions. Pasfield Oliver's new London edition of 1893 goes even further in this direction. On the part of the French, in works published approximately 100 years ago Prosper Cultru, a researcher on Madagascar, deals in detail with the falsifications to be found in Benyovszky's descriptions of the island and its peoples. He also writes that the count simply "copied" his description of the "state organization" of the Malagasy people from a work by Flacourt, forgetting that more than a century had passed since it had been written. Moreover, Benyovszky placed the borrowed data in a different region. (Flacourt gave a detailed report of great scholarly value of the state of affairs existing between 1642 and 1660. We do not know when Benyovszky came across this book, but the Appendix to the *Protocolle* draws on it.) The dissertation written in 1970 by Paule Vacher, a historian specializing in Madagascar, criticizes the false descriptions given by Benyovszky more strongly than any previous author. Her negative opinion was fully accepted by the Hungarian expert on the question, Győző Lugosi, who in fact is constantly struggling to deflate Benyovszky.

On the other hand the mass media and tourism in Hungary nurtures the "cult" of Benyovszky. He has always been popular in Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland and recently studies on him have appeared in France, the United States, Russia, etc. Conferences and meetings have been devoted to him. Opera, film, and TV-programs feature him. For tourism and even for "national identity" his name has often been used. We will not enter into a discussion of this phenomenon. Several web-sites and home pages collect "actual information" about him, thousands of items in fact. His *Memoirs* and the other "first" publications regularly appear on rare bookseller's lists and at auctions. In recent years Japanese and Chinese Benyovszky books have been published. In certain circles Madagascar popularizes his fame. In the United States his eventful contacts with America have been increasingly studied. In June 2000 there was an exhibition in the Library of Congress, Washington D.C. (in the James Madison Memorial Building – European Reading Room) entitled *Count Maurice Benyowsky. An 18th century World-traveler from Slovakia*, with a seminar in which both the Slovak and Hungarian ambassadors praised him. It is typical that in 1996, in commemoration of the 250th anniversary of his birth, a silver coin in the amount of 200 Slovak crown was issued by the National Bank of Slovakia with the following text: "Count Moric Beňovský, a typical representative of the period of the Enlightenment, the development of transport and trade, exploration of unknown regions, French colonel, Ruler of Madagascar, the first Slovak author of a best-seller, involved in the his-

tory of various countries.” Miroslav Musil’s novel *Madagascar Diary* (1997) was a great success, and was followed by the Czech film: *Benyowsky and the World*. On August 13, 2006 Richard Randrianasolo, the honorary consul of the Republic of Malgash, presented his credentials in Budapest, stressing the importance of the “Madagascan–Hungarian friendship”. The latest Benyovszky program in the mass media was on February 17, 2007, when Duna Television repeated a film entitled *Benyovszky Móric és a malgasok földje* (Maurice Benyovszky and the land of the Malgash). The 2004 edition of *Protocolle* won prizes both in Hungary and abroad.

It would be easy to enumerate recent similar events, but this was not my aim.

Both international research and African historiography in Hungary have formed a sober and very critical opinion of the Hungarian “king” of Madagascar.

Of course, this is not what determined the respect he was shown by subsequent generations. Even if we remove the layer of falsehoods from Benyovszky’s memoirs we are still left with an incredibly colorful and varied life. It is a fact that Benyovszky lived and fought in Europe, was a prisoner in the Russian Empire, and escaped on a voyage around the world that took him back to Europe. He saw Madagascar three times, spending altogether years there. Even if he did not see the “kings” and other dignitaries he listed, even if there were not 40,000 natives in attendance on the evening of his farewell, Benyovszky was nevertheless on the island, he saw Madagascar and the Madagascans. The “texts of oaths” and the drafting of a constitution are both familiar products of the age of enlightenment, and if we do not regard Haiti’s “revolution” as merely a caricature of the French Revolution, then we cannot regard Benyovszky, the “civilizer and city founder”, as a parody of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau or the social contract. Even in the primary sources he himself wrote, his “volunteers” are sometimes true and selfless friends and valiant soldiers and sometimes petty, lazy, corrupt and cowardly nobodies. Of course, in that age volunteers fought in the same way for Polish liberty, in the American War of Independence, and later on both sides in the wars that lasted for decades after the French revolution. Benyovszky is a representative of his age, even in the fact that he was more an adventurer than a military leader and he lived more from the sale of (enslaved) servants than the production of goods. He was a great risk-taker and all we know of his family relations is drawn from sources he himself shaped. His learning could not have been very deep, if for no other reason than the great deal of time he spent on his journeys. But he undoubtedly had an exceptional ability to take stock of a situation and to win friends and influence people. At the same time he was a strict, cruel man who longed to rule, who always wanted to be first, always wanted to be in charge, and as a result often came into conflict with those around him. Especially in his youth he was not only restless but also often reckless. Later he became an obsessive planner and organizer. He was bold, tireless, and had great endurance. He was able to withstand

even the infamous climate of Madagascar for some time. He was boastful and did not feel at all constrained by reality. He was not so much a complex as a striking personality. All this brought him world fame at the time and today continues to draw the reader's attention. The manuscript of the "Ampansakabé" (as he named himself) finally published in 2004 in Budapest introduces us to a segment of European cultural history.

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## NATIONS, IDENTITIES, AND THEATRES: REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPTS OF NATIONAL THEATRE IN EUROPE

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In my paper I shall investigate the major changes in the concept of the national theatre from the early debates on the Hamburg Theatre in 1767 until the 2005 establishment of the National Theatre of Scotland. The starting assumption is that while in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the notion of the national theatre was regarded as a means for the integration of a nation or even an empire in most Western-European countries, in Eastern-Europe, the debates on and later the realization of the national theatres took place within the context of and against oppressive imperiums. In Eastern Europe, the realization of National Theatre was utilised for representing a unified nation in a virtual way, and its role was to maintain national identity and national culture. In present day Scotland, however, the notion of the national theatre has changed again as the National Theatre is used to represent a diverse and multicultural Scotland.

**Keywords:** nation, theatre, National Theatre, national identity, Scotland, Hungary

Investigating the formation of a national theatre and its relation to cultural legitimation in her book, *The National Stage*, Loren Kruger correctly pointed out that

the notion of staging the nation, of representing as well as reflecting the people in the theatre, of constituting or even standing in for an absent or imperfect national identity, emerges in the European Enlightenment and takes concrete shape with the Revolutionary fêtes.<sup>1</sup>

After that general statement, however, Kruger focused merely on a phenomenon she called ‘theatrical nationhood’ which ‘manifested itself fully in the course of the nineteenth century with the rise of mass party politics, “universal” (male) suffrage, and the demand of the people for legitimate representation as protagonist on the political stage’.<sup>2</sup> As a result, she focused her research in time from the 1870s until the 1980s, in space from France to England, and the USA, and in subject ‘comparing English, French, and American

advocates of national popular theatre at moments of crisis or critical success'.<sup>3</sup> In France and the USA, she dealt with the realisations of national theatre for those groups without proper representation in the legitimate theatres like the French National Popular Theatre for the 'urban working class',<sup>4</sup> and the Federal Theatre Project (1935–39) for 'the [working class] people across the United States'.<sup>5</sup> As an opposition, in England, she dealt with a case when the representation of the entire nation (or even imperium) was narrowed in the English movement for 'a [British] "National House" for the [mainly English educated] middle class'.<sup>6</sup> Hence, she investigated the late realisations of national theatre in functioning and independent Western states when their imperial context was lost (France and England), and when it was developed (USA).<sup>7</sup>

In other countries of Europe, however, national theatres were established much earlier and with different purposes.<sup>8</sup> Among the first ones, there was the Hamburg theatre in 1766, which was utilized as source of German cultural identity and values, and as an institution expressing the will for uniting the separate small German(-speaking) states finally achieved by Prussia during the course of the later nineteenth century.<sup>9</sup> Due to 'disorganisation, internal disagreement and poor public support',<sup>10</sup> however, it ended in a financial disaster within a year. As T. James Reed pointed out its basic problem, 'the ambition to create or found a German national theatre could not have been achieved at that time in the sense that such a company could not have been representative of a defined nation within a recognized country as Germany was not united until 1872'.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, the Hamburg National Theatre was one of the first attempts to regard (the German-speaking) people as nation that can be symbolically represented on stage.

In Austria – following the practice established partly by the French Sun King in the 1680s with the Comédie-Française,<sup>12</sup> and partly by the Monarch of Prussia, Frederick the Great in the 1740s in Berlin,<sup>13</sup> it was also the centralized power which established a national theatre when the Burgtheater was renamed as Hof- und National Theater in 1776. As part of the monarch's reforms, the symbolic functions of the theatre were also utilized by Joseph II, whose aim was not only to establish territorial integrity but also to unite the multicultural territories and multilingual ethnic groups in a centralized, modernized and fully bureaucratized civil state.<sup>14</sup> As a result, the monarch's centralized plan to establish a national theatre in the capital was regarded as a symbolic representation of a unified imperium under the rule of the Austrian Monarchy.

While the notion of national theatre was often regarded as a means for the integration of a (supposedly single and unified) nation as in France, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany; or even an empire as in Austria, Russia and Great Britain; the debates on and later the realisations of national theatre took also place within the context of and against oppressive imperiums like in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Norway, Serbia, Ireland, and in some respect Scotland.<sup>15</sup> In

these countries, the establishment of national theatre was regarded as an (often idealistic) expression for political, cultural, and economic independence. The national theatre was to represent the (often unified image of) nation, and to maintain (often a single and fixed) national identity and (often a homogenous and dominant) national culture.<sup>16</sup>

### Nation and Theatre as Contested Sites

In the countries of Europe, where the notion of national theatre has appeared, it has been situated alongside the formation and/or re-formation of nationhood and the nation-state.<sup>17</sup> The problem with the nation and its (re)formation, however, derives from the fact, as Benedict Anderson remarked, that ‘it is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’.<sup>18</sup> A nation forms a real community only in imagination, as only its members can imagine that it can be confined by nature as a sovereign entity. ‘The members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.’<sup>19</sup> Nations have to be imagined in particular and selective styles, which achieve tangible and symbolic forms in the traditions, museums, galleries, monuments, ceremonies and other practices by which the images of their communion are constructed. In *The Body of Spirit*, Allucquere Rosanne (Sandy) Stone called those communities *virtual* where the physically separated members are connected through mutual beliefs and practices.<sup>20</sup> As a result, nation can thus be best viewed as an imagined *virtual community*. For the creation, maintenance, self-definition of such a community, it needs to manifest link(s) between the physically separated individuals by representing their common elements and their difference from other peoples and communities. Kruger’s concept of ‘theatrical nationhood’ can thus be absolutely relevant here as the means of representation (i.e., of staging) are essentially theatrical. Hence, the representation of a nation as an *imagined virtual community* is theatrical both on-stage – in the (national) theatre (especially), and off-stage – in the various performative manoeuvres of everyday life (parliamentary debate, strike, reception, dinner, opening ceremony, etc.).<sup>21</sup>

Apart from the inherent representational character of nation as imagined virtual community, Anderson’s notion has other advantages. As Jen Harvie has recently argued in her book, *Staging the UK*, Anderson’s phrase imagined is resonant in at least two ways. First, it emphasizes that ‘people’s sense of community is produced through cultural practices that are creative and artistic’, and second, his phrase ‘conveys the impression that the practice of imagining is largely or entirely volitional’.<sup>22</sup> As a result, national communities are under

constant construction, and their identities are ‘culturally produced, dynamic, and (...) inherently troubled’.<sup>23</sup> As national identities are constructed, they can be changed and (re)formed. From here, however, Harvie easily jumps to the conclusion that due to the fact that national identities can be imagined by various people or groups, ‘authority is necessarily dispersed from the normal centres of power’.<sup>24</sup> The problem with her formulation is that even today the means and apparatus of representation are not equally accessible to everyone. Therefore, authority might be dispersed, but the normal centres of power still have vital roles and functions in the construction and legitimisation of national identities.

The (re)formation of nation as imagined virtual community is even more complicated as it is often thought to be based on a collective identity supposedly shared by most of its members. Collective identity needs to have (a mutually formed) past. The past, however, does not exist in itself, but as the German cultural historian, Jan Assmann rightly claimed that ‘the past comes into being at all, when one gets into contact with it’.<sup>25</sup> The past has to be (re)constructed consciously and (of course) unconsciously through the selective process of remembering and forgetting in a retrospective way. As the nearly forgotten memory researcher, Maurice Halbwachs noted, though it is always the individual who remembers, the past is also constructed collectively and socially by collective memory. Memory is active backwards and forwards, because memory does not only reconstruct the past, but organizes how to experience present and future.<sup>26</sup> As the past cannot be ‘eternally’ erased (i.e., as if it *never* happened) or ‘authentically’ reconstructed (i.e., as it *really* happened), it is *re*-constructed and re-ordered again and again *from* and *in* the present by various people and groups. Hence, the past is not a single and fixed entity, but rather the representations of the past are constantly realized constructions that are always utilized *for* the present. The different representations of the otherwise attainable and unrecoverable past serve as legitimation, reinforcement for, and sometimes symbols for the lack of the present, and basis for the future as well. As these representations (are) construct(ed by) different collective identities, different people or groups, and different communities exist even within a (seemingly unified and homogeneous) nation. Hence, nation is a contested site.

Though Assmann mentioned that memory needs locations and has a tendency for localisation,<sup>27</sup> it was the French historian, Pierre Nora who argued that, for remembering the past, a community needs certain means, which he called ‘mnemonic sites’ (*lieux de mémoire*).<sup>28</sup> The collective creation of these sites is the result of a process in which the spontaneous and privately lived through individual memories are transformed into and regarded as collective histories of a nation. The sites of historical remembrance can be manifested in various forms as institutions, topographical places, objects, cultural creations, social habits, and even buildings. These symbolic, real or even virtual sites are utilized not only for

remembering, but as sites on and in which cultural identities can be presented and confirmed in the present and projected onto the future by performative manoeuvres referring to various, but not stable symbolic meanings.

Architecture has always been utilized for these purposes. Investigating the various theatre spaces and their meanings, the theatre historian Marvin Carlson argued that ‘as “urban ideologies” change, the meaning of the urban environment as a whole changes as well, a change reflected in the “repertory of architectural objects”. New normative types (...) replace abandoned types (...), representing not only new urban activities but entire new social organisations.’<sup>29</sup> In the changing repertory of architectural objects, the theatre is one of the most persistent ones in the history of Western culture. Its stability, however, ‘does not mean that its urban role is stable, on the contrary, it shows that it has been able to accommodate itself to a variety of urban functions’.<sup>30</sup>

In her article on the Elizabethan Rose Theatre (London) Peggy Phelan clearly demonstrated not only the various urban functions of theatre in the seventeenth and in the twentieth centuries but, excavating the underlying connections between the various political agendas, power systems, and cultural performances at play in and around the 1989 excavation of the theatre, she tried to demonstrate how the past was re-constructed according to present political and cultural needs, claims and fears.<sup>31</sup> This way, she demonstrated that theatre as institution, phenomenon or even building can be well utilized for accommodating a real community as the representation of a virtual one; where collective identities can be tested, formed and manifested; and where the various images and memories of the past can be transformed into the present and even projected to anticipate the future.<sup>32</sup>

### **Pesti Magyar Színház (Hungarian Theatre of Pest) as a Multifunctional Institution in 1837**

In practice, the formation of a nation-state in nineteenth-century Europe, argues Eric J. Hobsbawm, was to be connected to a historically accepted and/or territorially independent country, administrative institutions, an aggressive political practice, a deeply rooted cultural elite, a national literature, and an administrative language.<sup>33</sup> Without an independent country and administrative institutions, people were supposed to supply their legitimisation through cultural practices and semiotized institutions. In the Hungarian context of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, these substitutive institutions and practices were extremely important as Hungary was part of the Habsburg Empire.<sup>34</sup>

By the 1810s the Hungarian language as a possible link among the members of the national community was recognized by the so-called ‘neologist’ movement,

which was spearheaded by leading Hungarian writers and thinkers who modernized Hungarian from 'above' to express the contemporary ideas of everyday life properly. Language and then the development of national literature functioned as one of the basic providers of the mythical national past and a desired future. As Latin was the main language in administration, German in business, and French in the salons of the aristocracy, the renewal of Hungarian and formation of national literature were also seen as signs of *passive resistance* against the Austrian political oppression and the Austrian, German and French cultural influences.

Apart from modernizing national language and establishing national literature as 'key factors' for national 'survival', cultural and civil institutions were transformed into mnemonic sites. Institutions such as the Academy of Sciences (1825), the National Museum and Library (1808), or even a bridge across the Danube (1842–48), beside their obvious practical, modernising functions, were seen as monuments to express the power and the values of the nation by means of their size, design, ornaments and location. These newly established institutions in Pest-Buda were seen as sites for cultural performances by which Hungarian national prestige and pride, as well as longed-for independence were articulated.

By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Pest-Buda enjoyed a growing economic significance and it was transformed into one of the administrative centres of the Austrian government. By 1835, its average population was about sixty-seven thousand out of which only almost a fifth were Hungarians. The rest were Germans and those of various Slavic backgrounds.<sup>35</sup> Though Pest-Buda was by that time recognized by contemporary Hungarians as their capital, its legitimate culture and widely-spoken language were Austrian/German. That situation was culturally manifested in the fact that, besides the various German newspapers, in 1812 a new German language theatre (Pesti Német Színház – German Theatre of Pest) was opened in Pest with the capacity of three thousand and five hundred (sic!), while another one had already been operating in Buda since 1789.

In that context, a Hungarian theatre could not function merely as a business venture because of the low number of its would-be spectators. Since its inception, the project of a Hungarian theatre was dependent on politics, especially national politics not only for its legitimisation, but for its financial security as well. In exchange, it was obviously utilized for political purposes. Although not all political implications could be articulated clearly in the debates because of political oppression and censorship, they appeared symbolically both in literature and on the stage, as was clearly expressed in the very name of the new theatre: Pesti Magyar Színház (Hungarian Theatre of Pest).

Apart from its possible (disguised or open) political purposes, the theatre was regarded also as a cultural institution. The renewal of Hungarian was seen as

crucial in terms of everyday life and of national survival, so the theatre was also employed to create, spread and maintain the public usage of national language through playing translated, adapted, and original Hungarian dramas, and later to establish a national repertoire. One of its main proposed functions was to find the national tragedy for articulating the representations of the once famous Hungarian past and project it towards the desired Hungarian independence and dominance over the Monarchy's smaller ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats, Romanians, Slovaks, Slovenes, etc.).

The political and cultural functions were obviously connected to moral and social ones. For the contemporaries, the purpose of the theatre was to establish and represent the characteristics of the 'good' Hungarian citizen, train the audience for the roles it needs to play in a reformed and modernized capitalist society while maintaining their national character and identity. Theatre was also to present the appropriate costumes, habits and behaviours of the day and to propagate the actual political and social views through contemporary Hungarian and foreign dramas.<sup>36</sup> Consequently, as the national theatre was imagined as a multi-functional national institution, and was regarded as a public monument, it was extremely important who builds it, where and when.

### **Anxieties of Building a Theatre**

In her above mentioned article, Peggy Phelan, investigating the connection between architecture and theatre, referred to Denis Hollier, who argued that the invention of architecture was motivated by a desire to forestall and forget death. Hollier pointed out that

the monument and the pyramid are where they are to cover up a place, to fill in a void: the one left by death. Death must not appear: it must not take place: let tombs cover it up and take its place. [...] One plays dead that death will not come.<sup>37</sup>

From this, Phelan rightly concludes that architecture plays a significant role in the strategy with which one can outlast the temporal decomposition of one's body by displacing its terror to a solid monument, to a tomb or a pyramid for instance. Therefore, besides its political, cultural, social, and moral functions, the construction of a theatre might have implicit ontological functions in face of death. In this sense, a theatre building itself can be seen as a solid monument for the past and of the present. At the same time, it can also be regarded as a site where, remembering the past, 'the survivors [i.e., members of the nation can] create identity for themselves',<sup>38</sup> and where its founders' temporary personalities

can be manifested in stone, transforming them into physical and visible manifestations, and where their temporality can hope to survive.

The concept of theatre as public monument was revitalized by the absolutist European rulers of the Enlightenment because of a correlative concept between the regularized city spaces and orderly society. While theatre was regarded private possession in the medieval and Renaissance concepts of theatre space, their signifying possibilities as a public monument were recognized and their possible cultural and political implications to publicize their founders' fame and name were utilized by the Enlightened absolutist rulers of the European kingdoms in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.<sup>39</sup> The first such theatrical monument was the Berlin Opera House of Frederick the Great in 1745. In order to elevate his minor kingdom to international prominence, Frederick rebuilt his capital as a rationalized modern city with great vistas, squares, and public buildings, including a new palace, an academy, and an opera house.<sup>40</sup> Frederick's effort to establish a palace, an academy, and an opera and rearrange a whole city centre can in fact demonstrate that architecture is not only connected to fight against decay and death, but also to express, publicize and visualize power. As Marvin Carlson observed that 'harmoniously constructed districts would call to mind the power of their author, standing out by the degree to which reason, and reason alone, determined their features [order, symmetry, and focus]'.<sup>41</sup> By the end of the eighteenth century, theatre as public monument with its cultural, political meanings was firmly established feature of the new urban design in the newly rebuilt European cities. That movement reached Pest-Buda around 1800, when Viceroy Joseph, the highest public dignitary and the representative of the Emperor in Hungary, established the Királyi Szépitő Bizottság (Royal Architectural Committee) which rearranged the city centre and built the German Theatre of Pest (1808–12).

The cultural, social, moral and political possibilities of theatre were recognized by the Hungarians as early as the 1780s. In 1830, the feudal assembly laid down the basic principles of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and declared the establishment of a national theatre for the promotion of the Hungarian language. In 1831, Pest county formed a Committee for Promoting Hungarian and asked one of the leading reformers, Count István Széchenyi for a detailed plan for a permanent theatre. According to him, as expressed in his book, *Magyar játékszínről* (On the Hungarian Playhouse, 1832), the theatre should be a national institution, run by a corporation, supported by the feudal assembly, located in the city centre by the Danube and its building should follow a Parisian model.<sup>42</sup> The leaders of Pest county were not entirely satisfied with Széchenyi's plan because they wanted to keep the theatre within the county's control. In August 1835, Pest county started the construction of a temporary building. In October 1835, Széchenyi who had not given up his plan for a feudal-assembly-supported permanent theatre,



received as a gift by the Viceroy the area proposed in his book, while the city of Pest announced a third plan with a third location. By the Viceroy's instruction the city's plan was abandoned and, in February 1836, Pest county also postponed the construction for four weeks in order to leave time for the feudal assembly to authorize a permanent theatre for the nation. That was refused by the Upper House. Thus, in March 1836, the Pest county could continue the construction. After that decision, the county's project received nation-wide moral and later nation-wide financial support, especially after the Emperor dissolved the feudal assembly and persecuted the leaders of the reformist opposition.<sup>43</sup>

The process of the realisation of a national theatre as the Pesti Magyar Színház between 1790 and 1837 expressed the struggle for power among the Hungarians and also a symbolic resistance against the Austrian Monarchy and its representatives in Hungary. Furthermore, it was also surrounded by prejudices against the theatre as an institution. Finally, the Theatre Committee of Pest county built, supported, and controlled it. As a result, the theatre represented the power of the landed gentry (*középnemesség*), which rose to power in Pest and other counties, and utilized the theatre and its programme to propagate civil reforms and liberal national political views. For these reforms and views, centred on the idea of extending the nation to incorporate the non-nobilities, a theatre could be well utilized, because it was designed to see and to be seen at the same time. At that time, it was the only medium with the capacity to bring together the various strata of society on and off-stage – members of the various classes in terms of occupation, wealth, social status, and gender – and display them in such a way as to be seen and recognized together as a nation. For the Hungarian poet and dramatist, Mihály Vörösmarty, the spectators of the opening night were transformed into a real community, representing a virtual one, a nation: 'The audience (...) was immersed in its clear patriotic feeling (...) and in its silence there were amazement, deep emotions and the dignity of a self-respected nation.'<sup>44</sup>

Therefore, for Vörösmarty, the theatre, especially the auditorium, represented the united body of the desired nation. At the same time, however, it also made visible the social and economic divisions articulated in the separate places, entrances and exits for the different groups within the theatre building.<sup>45</sup> In this respect, for the contemporaries, the establishment of the theatre was seen as a site for struggle over social, political and moral dominance and control, and thus it was formed along the line of power and legitimisation: What representations would be regarded as worthy of display on its stage and which would be hidden? Whose concepts would be officially presented and whose would be excluded? Whose stories and histories would be remembered and whose forgotten? What images of social, political and cultural life would be projected and which would be marginalized? What voices would be heard and which silenced? Who would represent whom and on what basis?

### Performing Theatre – Opening Night

In her above mentioned article, Phelan observed also that architecture is implicitly linked to 'theatre, to the art of disguise. Theatre itself is the space in which death is made to play, to be a play.'<sup>46</sup> Besides its political, cultural, social, and moral functions, the construction of a theatre is supposed to have implicit ontological function not only in face of death but of life as well.

On 22 August 1837, the opening performance of the Pesti Magyar Színház played with death and made it to be a (part of the) play. It was an evening of celebration, including Hungarian dances, music, songs and the melodrama *Belizár* (Belisarius, 1828) translated from German.<sup>47</sup> At the very beginning of the festive evening, in a poetic fantasy of the *Prologue – Árpád ébredése* (Árpád's Awakening), Árpád, the Conqueror, the mythological leader and territorial establisher of an independent, imperial Hungarian Kingdom, and of the first Hungarian dynasty – those necessary criteria for national legitimisation, described by Hobsbawn and Assmann –, was awakened on stage by a Ghost for the (real and symbolic) opening of the theatre. Árpád's awakening in the first scene of the *Prologue* set in a graveyard could obviously be interpreted as the awakening of the Hungarian nation by and for the theatre, but Árpád's historical dimensions were also emphasized by the *Prologue*'s intertextuality.

The *Prologue* was written by Mihály Vörösmarty, the author of the Hungarian national epoch, *Zalán futása* (Zalán's Flight 1825). This epoch is concerned also with Árpád and his territorial fights in which finally Árpád wins over Zalán, a Bulgarian prince, and regains the territory of the so-called historical Hungary. Through this intertextual reference, the performance could be seen as the re-creation of the famous Hungarian mythological past on stage; and as the symbolic legitimisation for the contemporary national(ist) claims: the Hungarians were supposed to have an independent national state in the Carpathian Basin, on the basis that it was occupied by Árpád as his legacy from King Attila. As in literature as on stage, Árpád's historical figure was thus connected to the great Hun Kingdom and was supposed to conjure up the images of a mythological past and to serve as the origin for a desired contemporary Hungarian independence.

Apart from recycling the images of the Hungarian mythological past for present national(ist) claims of independence, the performance of the *Prologue* was also utilized to legitimize theatre as a useful institution for spreading language, moral values, social customs and liberal civil reforms. The legitimization of theatre was manifested in the last scene in which an actress, symbolising the theatrical profession, was defended from various ghosts (Poverty, Hunger, Shame, Desire, etc.) by the national hero Árpád. In that scene, at least two interrelated topics are worth of consideration: the theatre as a suspicious

institution, and the identification of the theatrical profession with a female subject.

In his book, *The Antitheatrical Prejudice*, Jonas Barish pointed out that ‘at least as far as from Plato’s time, theatre has been suspect because it is mimetic (...) – and so it is deceitful, unscrupulous, and hypocritical. It is also ostentatious, exhibitionist, and lacks modesty’.<sup>48</sup> These anti-theatrical prejudices appeared also as the claims against the national theatre in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century. Noblemen and clergies regarded the theatre as an immoral institution, based on manipulation, which stirs audience’s emotions, and teaches its subjects how to deceive, while due to identification, they loose their own ability to judge and form an independent opinion.

In their claims, as well as in the *Prologue*, the suspicious character of theatre was often connected to the identification of the theatrical profession with a female subject. As Ruth Padel suggested that the ‘idea of femaleness’ is intrinsic to Western theatre:

Character, mask, persona: all those theatrical concepts were façades, invented by men using an idea of femaleness, its made-upness. (...) Like actors, women are ‘made up’. They play a part in order to please.<sup>49</sup>

Michael Managan strengthens her view, pointing out that ‘theatre and acting are repeatedly associated with those attributes that fall on the feminine side of the ideological binary divide: illusion, display, emotion, the body. By this process theatre becomes culturally encoded as feminine or female: not just, as Padel punningly suggests, because of its association with “make-up” but because it falls on one side of this larger binary divide – the culturally conditioned structure of oppositions, which is itself an instrument of masculine power and control’.<sup>50</sup> In this sense, the scene of the *Prologue* suggested that only the male national hero’s approval and power could save the female subject, and through saving her, he could legitimize the theatre as a useful institution and place the theatrical profession among the worthy occupations. The representation of the masculine as an active ruler and the feminine as the tormented and then saved passive subject could also strengthen the contemporary male and female images: the actor playing Árpád was the real husband of the woman who played the actress. As a result, not only theatre (profession), as a useful institution, was created, not only the contemporary representations of masculinity and femininity were saved, but the proper (i.e., patriarchal) relationship within the family was also maintained by the power of Árpád’s mythical figure.

In addition to regarding theatre as useful institution and strengthening the gender stereotypes, the ideas of liberal reform politics were also expressed. In the third scene, set on the street in front of the theatre, characters from various social

strata – Old Man, Young Man, Father and his Son, Women – appeared, and then they all entered into the theatre building. That image symbolized partly that the construction of the theatre was the result of national co-operation, excluding of course the oppositional views; and partly that the representation of the nation had shifted. Previously, nation had been thought of exclusively as noblemen (only males). At around the 1840s, however, the liberal reforms intended to extend the concept of nation to include the other strata of society: non-noble middle-classes, peasants, urban workers, and, as supporters and educators of the reform, women. As a result, like Schiller, Vörösmarty also proposed with the *Prologue* that ‘the national theatre might in fact call the nation into being’<sup>51</sup> by way of metonymic association of the characters presented on stage with the nation sitting in the auditorium decorated with the colours of the national flag (red, white, and green) as a whole in harmony. The disturbing elements of this representation of the nation was that though due to its conquests, the once great Hungarian Kingdom had always been a multicultural and multiethnic territory (including Slovaks, Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, Romanians, Germans, and Romanis), there was no reference to this ethnic and cultural diversity. From their point of view, the lack of minority characters was in fact seen as a sheer sign of homogenisation, Hungarian dominance and oppression.

Apart from Árpád’s mythical figure, the unification of the historical past with the contemporary present was also emphasized in the third and fourth scenes of the *Prologue* by its meta-theatrical visual imagery. For these scenes, the set was a painted back curtain and a door, depicting the perspectivic reconstruction of the actual front of the theatre building. The characters from various social strata entered the theatre building on stage, and after having been saved from the ghosts, the Actress was also escorted by Árpád to the theatre. As a result, they entered symbolically the same auditorium where the contemporary audience was sitting, and then they were watching symbolically the rest of the entire evening together. Therefore, ancient times far away, contemporary lived through a past not so far away, and the present moment in the theatre they were all united. Thus, the *Prologue* intended to re-create a seamless, harmonic, and unbroken history of Hungary.

The mythical past utilized for legitimising the present can be reassuring, but as Assmann argued, it can also draw the attention to the problems of the present situation.<sup>52</sup> In this case, the present is not only reassured, but ‘becomes relative in relation to a greater, more beautiful past’.<sup>53</sup> In the second scene of the *Prologue*, the Poet told Árpád what had happened to the Hungarians since his death: he depicted the slow but permanent disintegration of the Hungarian Kingdom, and then the Turkish and the Habsburg occupations. Thus, the difference between the heroic past and the contemporary situation could be seen as a relativisation of that situation and also as an urge to change that situation. That urge was realized on 15

March 1848 when the Hungarian revolution broke out in Pest. Its celebration in the evening performance with the by-then national drama, *Bánk bán* by József Katona, partly shows the important social, cultural and political functions of the National Theatre, and partly extends the notion of the national theatre in the sense Kruger used the term. As after that date, the notion of national theatre has been connected to the 1848 revolution in particular and the independence of Hungary in general.<sup>54</sup>

Consequently, the Hungarian National Theatre was initiated by educators and elites from 'above' as a multi-functional national institution and was realized as a semiotized site with political, cultural, and moral functions, connected to national identity and 'survival'. Later, these functions were consciously preserved, remembered and/or u(tili)sed for national(ist) purposes when the existence of Hungary as an independent state was (felt) threatened, after 1849, 1920 and 1949; and/or she was supposed to redefine her cultural, political, and moral status and her national identity after the Trianon Treaty in 1920, after 1945 and 1989.<sup>55</sup>

### **Challenges for the Contemporary European Nation-states**

Performing (the single) national language, establishing (the authentic) national dramatic literature, maintaining (the genuine characteristics of the) national character, and creating (the solely authorized) national past, national theatres like the Hungarian were often supposed to serve as a means for forming and maintaining a single, fixed, and unified national identity. Apart from national theatres, the national institutions were also supposed to construct ethnically (or culturally, religiously or racially) closed or 'pure' formations, in which one people, one ethnicity, can gather under one political (or cultural) roof. In this sense, the nation-state (or even the imperium) was imagined as a single, unified, and homogeneous entity, based on what Homi K. Bhabha called 'cultural homogeneity or the nation's horizontal space'.<sup>56</sup>

The inherent problem of this concept of the nation-state (or imperium) is that the history of the nation-states has never been of this ethnically (or culturally, religiously or racially) pure kind, neither in Western Europe, nor in Eastern Europe. As Stuart Hall remarked, nation-states 'are without exception ethnically hybrid – the product of conquests, absorptions of one people by another'.<sup>57</sup> Against this hybridity, continued Hall,

it has been the main function of national cultures (...) to represent what is in fact the ethnic hotch-potch of modern nationality as the primordial unity of 'one people'; and of their invented tradition to project the ruptures and conquests, which are their real history,

backwards in an apparently seamless and unbroken continuity towards pure, mythic time.<sup>58</sup>

Apart from the always present though suppressed hybridity of the modern nation-state, the recent phase of globalisation has also witnessed one of the largest forced and unforced contemporary mass migrations. As a result, the nation-state already hybridized, diaspora-ized, has become inextricably multicultural, and its stable collective of class, race, gender and nation have been deeply undermined by social and political developments. The nation-state is increasingly stretched by political, economic, ecological and cultural forces pulling power up from above (globalization, multiculturalism, information technology, supranational integration, and international media) and down from below (ethnic, social, racial, cultural, gender, and class/group difference and diversity). 'One result has been a slow, if uneven, erosion of the "centred" nationalism of the Western-European nation-state and the strengthening of both transnational relations and local identities – as it were, simultaneously "above" and "below" the nation state'.<sup>59</sup> As a result, the main challenge facing the European nation states, especially within the borders of the European Union, and their institutions today is how to present the various discourses, views, and perspectives of their diverse communities on national and international levels.

### **National Theatre of Scotland**

Since New Labour's elections in 1997 a paradigm shift has taken place in the UK on political and cultural levels. Politically, the New Labour model has focused on and emphasized the several nations. This remains true for both the overreaching new 'Cool Britannia' or the nations of Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland, who hold greater responsibility for their own home and arts policies and budgets since 1999 when Welsh and Northern Irish assemblies were established and a Scottish parliament was re-established after three hundred years. Culturally, the New Labour model has emphasized art and design as 'creative industries', but the concept contained some of the problems inherent in the commercialisation of the arts. Jen Harvie summarized these problems as

this model's economic emphasis prioritizes commercial value over social value and fashions culture as marketable commodities rather than as social acts performed by human agents. It potentially limits the right to artistic expression to those who can make it economically productive. (...) The term potentially disempowers people by transforming them from collective audiences and makers into individual and alienated consumers. It celebrates anti-social capitalist commodity fetishism at the expense of social practice.<sup>60</sup>

Nevertheless, the new model might be seen as 'a welcome change after decades of government neglect when the arts were perceived as worthy but irrelevant because [they were] rarely financially profitable'.<sup>61</sup>

The new emphasis on arts and culture gave the opportunity to Scotland and the other nations within the United Kingdom to adopt the language of the 'creative industries' and to rebrand themselves in the image of 'New Britannia'. For the benefit of the Scottish cultural sector in general and theatre in particular, it meant further investments and funding in order to improve and update Scotland's national and international images. 'The Scottish Executive has supported a heterogeneous, democratic Scottish theatre, investing not simply in its promotion, (...) but in its very making, while simultaneously resisting making an autocratic decree about what it should be'.<sup>62</sup> As early as 1999, the Executive recognized the need to support Scottish theatre suffering from under-funding, and pledged in its Strategy 'to take steps to establish a national theatre for Scotland'.<sup>63</sup> A few years later, in 2001, the final report of the Scottish National Theatre Working Group gave a detailed analysis on the roles and functions of the national theatre. It summarized that,

4. 3. The Scottish National Theatre should be a creative producer which engages with the whole theatre sector as its 'production company', working with and through the existing Scottish theatre community to achieve its objectives.

4. 4. The Scottish National Theatre should develop a quality repertoire originating in Scotland. This will include new work, existing work and the drama of other countries and cultures to which a range of Scottish insights, language and sensibility can be applied.

4. 5. The Scottish National Theatre should commission and initiate works of excellence on a variety of scales and tour them to all parts of Scotland and abroad.<sup>64</sup>

These clear and well-defined aims gave the possibility to the establishment of the National Theatre of Scotland as a 'production company' in 2005. As a production company, the NTS can invest extra funding in existing theatres and theatre work, instead of taking away all available public theatre funding, infrastructure and human resources (directors, actors, designers, writers, actors, etc.). As the NTS is not building-based, it does not limit itself to 'what it can produce within one particular set of built constraints, and draining scarce resources into material infrastructures instead of cultural practices'.<sup>65</sup> As the NTS is not based in one location, it cannot reinforce Scottish metropolitanism as the sole representation of the nation. In addition, as the work of NTS is not about atomized, individual 'creativity', but instead built on a collaborative model, 'it requires co-operation and co-production between groups of institutions and people in order to succeed'.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, the activities of the NTS can range from

small scale to large scale work, from international collaboration to community theatre, from building-based work to touring, and from urban-metropolitan experience to small village projects. In this sense, as Harvie also proposed before the opening of the NTS, it ‘will at once assume the authority of being national while maintaining the confidence to devolve and disperse its powers. It will also work collaboratively, and be adaptable to Scotland’s geographical and cultural diversity’.<sup>67</sup>

The opening performance of the NTS clearly put in motion the expectations of the Report, and also proved Harvie’s above assumptions right. The launch of the NTS was presented by a project, called *Home* at the end of February, 2006. For *Home*, the NTS asked ten directors to devise a piece of theatre around the word ‘home’ while working in partnership with a specific area and community to create an experience for each particular audience in Aberdeen, Caithness, Dumfries, Dundee, East Lothian, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Inverness, Shetland, and Stornoway. As the director of the NTS, Vicky Featherstone put it before the opening,

*Home* is our way of launching [NTS] all over Scotland: allowing somebody in Inverness or Stornoway or Caithness to see an entirely different performance by a completely different director but at the same time part of the opening night; for the work to reach across Scotland as far as possible.<sup>68</sup>

In Aberdeen, for instance, the director of Afterlife Theatre Company, Alison Peebles with writer Rona Munro and designer Martin McNee put together – in Joyce McMillan’s phrase – ‘a vivid, edgy, and moving meditation, in six flats and ten parts, on what “home” means today’.<sup>69</sup> In Edinburgh, writer-director, Anthony Neilson asked ten to twelve-year-old schoolchildren to write scripts about what they imagine *First Minister’s Question Time* to be, and these scripts were performed by well-known actors to an audience at the Queen’s Hall. While in Shetland, in a installation staged aboard the Northlink Ferry by director Wils Wilson, a poetic text by Jackie Kay – delivered through personal guided-tour handsets – ‘led us through a storey of deeply-buried female experience, and of the perennial island tension between leaving and staying, as ghostly actors dressed in 1940s or 1950s costume drifted through the lounges and saloons of the ship’.<sup>70</sup> In Glasgow, NTS director, John Tiffany presented ‘the ultra-dramatic story of hero Mudro’s return from London to his old hire-rise home’.<sup>71</sup> *Lord of the Ring*’s Billy Boyd and *Taggart*’s Blythe Duff led the performance in which actors were filmed inside the tower block by three men abseiling down the buildings with handheld cameras. Then these shoots were projected onto a huge screen, seen by a thousand of people from the natural amphitheatre of the ground below.

As a result of these different performances, *Home* worked on both ‘inter-cultural’ and – in Rustom Bharucha’s phrase – ‘intracultural’ levels. The former



could be seen in the presence of international stars, technology, and presentation techniques and materials. The latter could be seen in the presentation of the experiences drawn from different territories, age groups, and gender within the borders of Scotland. This way, *Home*'s focus on intraculturality could explore 'the differences that exist within the boundaries of [this] particular region in what [was previously] assumed to be a homogenized culture',<sup>72</sup> and at the same time, it could call 'attention to the internal cultural diversities within [this] specific region'.<sup>73</sup> Based on these diversities, *Home*'s focus on interculturality could project the different and diverse images of Scotland back onto the international theatre and media scenes. Therefore, the different images could represent Scotland as an imagined virtual community.

As we can see from *Home*, the NTS intends to present Scotland as a diverse cultural, social, and political community. The NTS does not want to define what Scotland is and does not impose a uniform Scottish identity in advance and then to cut and narrow its working methods and performances to fit those preconceived images. Instead, the NTS is used as a possible public forum, as a virtual stage, where the different voices and discourses, and the variety of cultural/political identities can be formed and presented. As Featherstone remarked that the NTS has 'the chance to undefine, to throw open the doors of possibility, to encourage boldness and, (...) to be surprised about where that boldness may take you'.<sup>74</sup>

As a result, the NTS can challenge authority, give alternatives, and facilitates the different groups' identities, voices and theatre practices, their different images of Scotland which all are and consist of what Scotland means and is today. Moreover, this fragmentary concept of national theatre fits perfectly well in the age, characterized by globalisation, fragmentation, hybridisation, diasporas, uncertainties, and displacement of identities.

In the practical, everyday life of the NTS, there are certain concerns, of course. With a theatre which is said to be 'a theatre without walls', the first problem comes from touring. If NTS produces large a scale work in one of the well-equipped city-theatres, can it really tour? Are there proper infrastructures in small towns and villages? If not, does the lack of infrastructure effect artistic decisions? If large scale works cannot tour, can people travel in to the big cities? Can everyone afford it? Are they willing to do it? The NTS intends to commission work from writers/directors and existing theatre companies. Are there properly functioning, permanent and well-funded companies that can produce performances on both national and international levels? The standard rehearsal period for an NTS production is usually six to seven weeks.<sup>75</sup> What can be achieved on an international level within this short time-span? As the NTS is 'within the reach of all', it is accessible to everyone by allowing space to express different views. But what is the limit? Whose views are not tolerated? Who decides? As a result of these concerns, the NTS can only work properly on

international and national levels, when the entire Scottish theatre system is working properly. As theatre is under-funded in Scotland, that can only be achieved by investing more resources in the infrastructure of existing theatre buildings and community centres across Scotland; by making travel easier and cheaper by cultural subsidy; and by increasing the subsidy for the *entire* theatre sector. As the 2001 Report suggested, the NTS ‘cannot by itself solve the problems of under-investment in Scotland’s theatre infrastructure’, but it ‘can play a major role in enhancing and energising the Scottish Theatre scene, and in winning a higher profile for the achievements of Scottish Theatre’.<sup>76</sup> (Report 2001, 5) Therefore, the NTS can immensely contribute to the Scottish theatre scene in general, and can also increase the awareness of arts as useful elements for the well-being of today’s Scottish society.

### Final Thoughts on National Theatre

So far I have tried to demonstrate some of the different concepts of national theatre. It was used for national unification without an existing country (Germany for instance) or within an existing country (France, Denmark for instance); and in opposition to foreign oppressors (Hungary, Serbia, Croatia, Norway for instance), as well as even for imperial unification over other nations and ethnic groups (Austria, Russia, Sweden, the UK for instance). It was also used as a possible forum for those who did not have representations on the stages of the legitimate theatres (the NTP in France and the FTP in the USA). In its last appearance so far (NTS in Scotland), however, it was used rather differently from the previous models. Until recently, national theatre had been thought of as a centralized monumental institution reflecting nationhood and identity often as an exclusive and inward-looking through a textual canon and a unitary, unifying language. The Scottish example has redirected it as a concept based on plural, diverse and de-centred network of groups, one which can represent the scattered and culturally divided population of a(ny) nation. What this temporary and fragmentary list of national theatres tends to provide is that even in today’s postindustrial, post-socialist and globalized world, when theatre in general is a marginal commodity in the capitalist cultural industry, *national theatre* projects still can draw people, parties, groups, and institutions as performers into debates, demonstrations, and panels of what it might be or should be within their real or virtual walls. As a result, the current advocates of national theatre projects might be able to transform an old idea and an old institution into new methodological territories and alternative sites where the status quo can be reconsidered, and where the constant (re)constructions of nationhood, nationality, and national identity can be analysed and understood. The rest we shall see...

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Loren Kruger, *The National Stage – Theatre and Cultural Legitimation in England, France, and America*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992, 3.
- <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 134.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.
- <sup>7</sup> As she summarized it in her introduction: ‘The English and French national theatre projects were marked by notions of a national culture in the imperial context at the turn of the twentieth century, notions that sought to mobilize but also to discipline the masses subjecting them to the dual authority of the centralized state and metropolitan high culture. The American debates attempted to resurrect not merely discourses of popular sovereignty invoked by the *theatres populaires*, but also their implicitly regional politics and local culture, to renegotiate critically the unquestioned metropolitanism of the English and French projects.’ *Ibid.*, 5. – Emphasis LK.
- <sup>8</sup> In France in 1680, Denmark in 1746, Sweden in 1765, Poland in 1765, Germany (Hamburg) in 1767, Austria in 1776, Germany (Mannheim) in 1778, Russia 1812, Hungary 1837, Romania in 1840, Belgium in 1853, Croatia in 1860, Norway in 1876, and Serbia in 1884. Apart from these countries, national theatres were founded in Ireland in 1904, Belgium again in 1945, Great Britain in 1969, and Scotland in 2005.
- <sup>9</sup> See, for example, Marvin Carlson, *Places of Performance – The Semiotics of Theater Architecture*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989, 94; John Russell Brown, *The Oxford Illustrated History of Theatre*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 292–294; and Erika Fischer-Lichte, ‘Some Critical Remarks on Theatre Historiography’, in S. E. Wilmer, ed., *Writing and Rewriting National Theatre Histories*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2004, 1–16.
- <sup>10</sup> T. James Reed, ‘Theatre, Enlightenment and Nation: A German Problem’, in Samuel S. B. Taylor, ed., *The Theatre of the French and German Enlightenment*. Edinburgh, 1979, 48.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.
- <sup>12</sup> See, for example, F. W. J. Hemmings, *Theatre and the State in France, 1760–1905*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 6–10.
- <sup>13</sup> See, for example, Carlson, *ibid.*, 73–74.
- <sup>14</sup> See, for example, Peter Simhandl, *Színháztörténet*, Budapest: Helikon, 1996, 182–191.
- <sup>15</sup> The Pesti Magyar Színház (later called the National Theatre) was realized against the Habsburgs in 1837, while the Serbian National Theatre was created against the Hungarian domination in 1884.
- <sup>16</sup> For a detailed analysis of the early attempts of establishing national theatres in Eastern, and Northern Europe see Laurence Senelick, ed., *The National Theatre in Northern and Eastern Europe, 1746–1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- <sup>17</sup> The co-existence of the nation-state and national theatre is not so evident, as Italy, for instance, has never had a national theatre.
- <sup>18</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities – Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso, 1991, 6.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.
- <sup>20</sup> Rosane Allucquere Stone, ‘A szellem teste’, *Replika*, V, No. 2 (1995): 298.
- <sup>21</sup> For a detailed analysis of the various practices a nation can be imagined and represented see Boswell and Evans 2004.

- 22 Jen Harvie, *Staging the UK*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2005, 16.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 3.
- 24 *Ibid.*, 3.
- 25 Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen*. München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1999, 31.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 35–43.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 40.
- 28 Pierre Nora, 'Entre mémoire et histoire. La problématique des lieux', in Nora, *Les lieux de mémoire. I. La République*. Paris, 1984, 2–25.
- 29 Carlson, *ibid.*, 6.
- 30 Carlson, *ibid.*, 7.
- 31 Peggy Phelan, 'Playing Dead in Stone, or, When Is a Rose not a Rose?' in Elin Diamond, ed., *Performance and Cultural Politics*. London and New York: Routledge, 1996, 65–88.
- 32 Apart from the usual financial, contractual and legal difficulties and problems, Phelan demonstrated that the homosexual references of the Rose Theatre in the seventeenth century were also among the hidden reasons why certain homophobic politicians of the 1990s British establishment did not want to continue with the excavation of the remainings, despite of the fact that the further excavation could have given us valuable insights on Elizabethan theatre architecture; and also did not want to elevate the status of the discovery on national and international levels.
- 33 Eric J. Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 50–53.
- 34 Though the Hungarian feudal assembly in 1723 accepted that the Austrian hereditary provinces and the Hungarian Kingdom were connected to each other as one indivisibly and inseparably ("indivisibiliter ac inseparabiliter, invicem et insimul"), and in case of an outside attack they are supposed to defend each other mutually (see I–III paragraphs/1723.), Hungary could keep its quasi independence with its own administrative institutions. These institutions, however, were subordinated to the Emperor and located in different cities: the Kancellária (Hungarian Chancellery) in Vienna, the feudal assembly (Dieta) in Pozsony (now Bratislava, Slovakia); the Helytartótanács (Council of the Governor-General; Consilium locumtenentiale) in Buda. The political rights belonged to and were practiced by only the nobility at the Dieta or locally at the county meetings. The Hungarian nobility's authoritative institutions locally, the counties were rendered under the Helytartótanács, led by the Nádor (app. Governor-General) who was appointed by the Emperor. Foreign affairs, defence and treasury were controlled by the emperor, who could also decide to convoke or dissolve assembly when his political purposes needed, depending on the Monarchy's foreign affairs. As the Monarchy was multi-ethnic, the Habsburg Monarchy usually utilized the aims of the various ethnic groups for his own purposes. The institutional systems and political relations were reinforced by the Hungarian nobility in the Dieta in 1791, and again in 1825, and they were not changed until the war of independence of 1848/49 (Berényi-Gyapai 1997), 305–307 and 323–347.
- 35 See, for example, Gyula Vízota, 'A Nemzeti Színház és Gróf Széchenyi István', in Vízota, *A százéves Nemzeti Színház*. Budapest: Pallas, 1938, 64–68.
- 36 See, for example, Ferenc Kerényi, *Magyar Színháztörténet 1790–1873*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990, 259–263; and Ferenc Kerényi, 'A Nemzeti Színház – és amiről nem beszélünk', *Magyar Napló*, XVI. No. 3 (1999): 40.
- 37 Hollier in Phelan, *ibid.*, 75.
- 38 Kosselleck in Assmann, *ibid.*, 63.
- 39 See Carlson, *ibid.*, 72–73.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 73–75.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.

<sup>42</sup> István Széchenyi, *A magyar Játékszínről*. Pest: Fűskúti Landerer, 1832.

<sup>43</sup> See, for example, László Szekér, *A nemzet színháza építésének 150 éves története*. Budapest: Műszaki Könyvkiadó, 1989, 23–37; Mihály Vörösmarty, *Összes Művei: Drámák V*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1971, 537; Mihály Vörösmarty, *Összes Művei: Dramaturgiai Lapok*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1969, 363–371; and Iván Berényi and Gábor Gyapai, eds, *Magyarország rövid története*. Budapest: Maecenas, 1997, 343–347.

<sup>44</sup> Vörösmarty, *ibid.*, 66.

<sup>45</sup> In those countries of the continent, where the institution of royalty was powerful (like Germany, Russia, Austro-Hungarian Monarchy) in the national institutions like the National Opera House, National Theatre, a Royal Box was placed opposite the stage on the first floor, surrounded by other private boxes. The distance from the main box in the theatre signified the economical and political distance from the strongest element of the society. As the performance, the arrangement of the stage and the structure of the auditorium were created from this central point of view, so the places of the Royal Box, were the best seats available in the theatre, where the monarch could appreciate the whole spectacle. From his position, the monarch could see both the entire audience and the performance. Thus the ‘glance’ of the sovereign was always on his/her subjects, physically in the theatre and symbolically in reality. The industrial and political power of the royalty predestined the monarch to possess the leading roles in these societies, and it was expressed by the best seats of a theatre. Moreover, these national institutions were usually sponsored by him/her financially. In Hungary, however, as the theatre was built by Pest county and the representative of the Emperor, József Nádor, did not really support its construction, the Royal Box was not finished on time and the theatre opened without the Nádor’s invitation.

<sup>46</sup> Phelan, *ibid.*, 75.

<sup>47</sup> *Belizár* was written by Eduard von Schenk, and translated into Hungarian by János Kiss – the lack of Hungarian drama is clearly evident here, as contemporary critics also noted.

<sup>48</sup> Barish in Harvie, *ibid.*, 117–118.

<sup>49</sup> Ruth Padel, *I’m a Man: Sex, Gods and Rock and Roll*. London: Faber and Faber, 2000, 229, and 239.

<sup>50</sup> Michael Managan, *Staging Masculinities – History, Gender, Performance*. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 18.

<sup>51</sup> Friedrich Schiller, ‘Was kann eine stehende Bühne eigentlich wirken?’, in Schiller, *Werke I*. Munich: Hauser, 1984, 728.

<sup>52</sup> Assmann, *ibid.*, 79.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

<sup>54</sup> That liveliness of the tradition can be recognised in the fact that the permanent building of the Hungarian National Theatre was opened on the same day, 15 March 2002.

<sup>55</sup> Since its inception, the cultural, political, and financial control over the National Theatre has been debated. The control over the existing theatre (company) had been connected to the proposed permanent building, which was not built until 2002. The first temporary building was demolished in 1913, the second in 1965. The company then stayed in its third temporary building until the opening of the new building on 15 March 2002, on the Danube shore, further down from the present city centre. Though the company of the National Theatre has worked since 1837 in Budapest and four other National Theatres exist in smaller towns in Hungary – Győr, Miskolc, Pécs, and Szeged –, the notion of a permanent building had been the most significant (*virtual*) theatre project in Hungary until 2002, around which (real and virtual) cultural, political, moral, and social performances occurred. Even after the end of socialism in

- 1989, when theatre in Hungary became a marginal commodity in the capitalist cultural and entertainment industry, that *theatre* project still drew people, parties, and institutions as performers into a debate or a demonstration. The architectural concept of the new building of the National Theatre, its construction process and budget, artistic leadership, ensemble, repertory, finance, and the use of Imre Madách's *Az ember tragédiája* (Tragedy of Man, 1861) at the opening night of 15 March 2002, all were areas of passionate public controversy.
- 56 Homi K. Bhabha, 'DissemiNation: Time, narrative and the margins of modern nation', in Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*. London and New York: Routledge, 2004, 220.
- 57 Stuart Hall, 'Culture, community, nation', in David Boswell and Jessica Evans, eds, *Representing the Nation: A Reader – Histories, Heritage and Museums*. London and New York: Routledge and The Open University, 2004, 38.
- 58 *Ibid.*, 38.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 37.
- 60 Harvie, *ibid.*, 23.
- 61 *Ibid.*, 23.
- 62 *Ibid.*, 32.
- 63 Scottish Executive, *Creating Our Future: Minding Our Past: Scotland's National Cultural Strategy*, [www.scotland.gov.uk/nationalculturalstrategy/docs/cult-05.asp](http://www.scotland.gov.uk/nationalculturalstrategy/docs/cult-05.asp)
- 64 *Scottish National Theatre: Final Report of the Independent Working Group*. Glasgow: Scottish Arts Council, 2001, 5.
- 65 Harvie, *ibid.*, 32.
- 66 *Ibid.*, 32.
- 67 *Ibid.*, 33.
- 68 Vicky Featherstone, 'Dream Theatre Becomes Reality', *Scotland on Sunday*, 19 February 2006.
- 69 Joyce McMillan's review continued: 'To the left, as we crowded into the cold staircase, a door was labelled "home is where the heart is"; behind it, in a room full of old photographs and nostalgic décor, an old lady was living out of a life of crushing loneliness, haunted by the ghosts of her long-gone family. In the top flat, an ageing fisherman thrown on the economic scrapheap wondered who was suffering the more painful slide towards extinction – himself, or the cod he once fished. What the Aberdeen show achieved was a bringing-together of all the strands of meaning in the word "home," from nostalgia to the quest for new places to call our own.' Joyce McMillan, 'For One Weekend, All the World's a Stage – Or All the Country, at least', *The Scotsman*, 27 February 2006.
- 70 *Ibid.*
- 71 *Ibid.*
- 72 Rustom Bharucha, *The Politics of Cultural Practice – Thinking Through Theatre in an Age of Globalization*. London: Athlone, 2000, 8.
- 73 *Ibid.*, 9.
- 74 Featherstone, *ibid.*
- 75 Though it is longer than the average rehearsal period (three-four weeks) in Scottish theatre, it is still very short, especially if you compare it to the European state-funded theatres where the rehearsal period is usually more than two/three months or even longer.
- 76 Final Report, *ibid.*, 5.

# THE INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL SCENE IN THE DUAL MONARCHY

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“Erschütternd ist der Untergang des Geschlechts.”  
 (“Shocking is the decline of mankind.” Georg Trakl: *Helian*)

The intellectual and artistic culture of the Dual Monarchy was marked by a diversity and richness that was inseparable from the multi-ethnic and multilingual nature of the Habsburg territories. As attempts to integrate the variety of cultural products of the Monarchy into a coherent identity run the risk of oversimplification, the following article offers a discussion of the works of several individual authors, artists, composers, philosophers, and scientists, locating these works within often divergent intellectual and artistic trends the broad range of which may be the single most conspicuous feature of the cultural identity of the Habsburg Empire. It presents the legacy of the Dual Monarchy as one rich in diverse contributions to the cultures of Europe and the world.

**Keywords:** Austria, Austria-Hungary, Austro-Hungary, Dual Monarchy, Habsburg, multilingual, literature, visual arts, music, philosophy, psychoanalyses, Zionism, cultural history

## 1. The Identity of Austrian Culture

“I think the good Austrian (Grillparzer, Lenau, Bruckner, Labor) is particularly hard to understand. In a sense subtler than anything else, and its truth never leans towards plausibility (ist nie auf Seiten der Wahrscheinlichkeit)” (Wittgenstein 1981, 3). On the face of it, this remark made by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) in 1929 is about Austria. In fact, the list of names suggests that the philosopher evoked memories of the cultural legacy of the entire Habsburg Monarchy. Niebsch von Strehlenau, known in German literature as Nikolaus Lenau (1802–1850), the grandson of a member of the German bourgeoisie of Pest, was born in the Southern region of the historical kingdom of Hungary and exerted a strong influence on Sándor Petőfi (1823–1849), especially with his poems presenting the plain land of the Carpathian basin. One of Schönberg’s teachers, Josef

Labor (1842–1914), the blind composer, organist, and pianist brought to the Wittgenstein home by the philosopher's mother Leopoldine (née Kalmus), was a Czech musician. If one remembers that *Ein treuer Diener seines Herrn* (*A Faithful Servant of his Master*, 1830), one of the outstanding works by the Viennese playwright Franz Grillparzer (1791–1872), is about well-known incidents of Hungarian history and the tension between Hungarians and their Western neighbours, the conclusion is inescapable that Wittgenstein's statement is about the cultural identity of the multi-ethnic and multilingual Habsburg Empire.

The philosopher's list of names refers to literature and music. Although there have been attempts to find the features specific to Austrian culture in the sphere of ideas, it is doubtful whether one can speak of a specific Austrian school of philosophy on the basis of a complex of criteria consisting of empiricism, "Sprachkritik" (critique of language), the rejection of Kantianism, and strong reservations about irrational approaches to existence (Neumer 2004, 103, 125). Since my field is not philosophy, it cannot be my task to dispute the arguments for or against the existence of a way of thinking specific to the Dual Monarchy. All I can say is that the multilingual nature of this region may be responsible for the rise of theoretical speculations about language, starting with Fritz Mauthner (1849–1923), an apostate Jew born in Bohemia who wrote novels, short stories, and plays and published several works on language, among them a three-volume *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache* (*Contributions to a Critique of Language*, 1901–1902) and *Die Sprache* (*Language*, 1907). Relying on "Völkerpsychologie" (the psychology of peoples), he took issue with the ideal of a common pattern underlying all languages and developed a cultural relativism.

There is no reason to believe that Dezső Kosztolányi (1885–1936), poet, novelist, short-story writer, essayist, and translator, was familiar with Mauthner's works. Born in Szabadka (today Subotica, in Voivodina), this Hungarian writer was brought up in a region in which Hungarian, German, Serbian, and possibly even other languages (Slovak and Romanian) were spoken. His language-based cultural relativism resembled not only Mauthner's ideas but also those of Karl Popper (1902–1994), born and educated in Vienna. Popper's argument that "a precise translation of a difficult text simply does not exist", his claim that "if the two languages have a different structure, some theories may be almost untranslatable (as Benjamin Lee Whorf has shown so beautifully)" (Popper 1982, 24) are strikingly similar to Kosztolányi's thesis that "translation is always distortion", either on the level of the signified or on that of the signifier (Kosztolányi 2002, 511–512).

In view of the multilingual nature of the Habsburg Empire, it is understandable that translation was a widely discussed issue. Since German served as the medium of communication, any approach to the culture of the region has to consider the difference between German and other languages. The translation of the culture of



the Dual Monarchy is partly a linguistic operation. Some of the key terms of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, the first major work by the Viennese philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, published in 1921 but written earlier – such as “Bild” and its associated form “abbildenden internen Beziehung”, “stellen dar”, or “stellen vor” – go back to earlier thinkers and are virtually untranslatable. In a French philosopher’s version the relevant expression is “cette relation interne de représentation” (Granger 1969, 106), whereas in C. K. Ogden’s English rendering the same words appear as “pictorial internal relation”. Both could be called misleading. Leo Black, the translator of the essays of the Austrian composer Arnold Schönberg (1874–1951), had serious difficulties in trying to find English equivalents for not only “Darstellung” but also “Anschauung”. I would even raise doubts about the same translator’s thesis that “‘Ideas’ for *Gedanken* is easy enough” (Schoenberg 1984, 18). The equivalents of “Setzkunst” and “Satzkunst”: “the craft of scoring” and “the craft of composing” (Schoenberg 1984, 323) are no less unsatisfactory. Such examples may explain why in his later years Schönberg preferred to write in English rather than ask for a translation. Other examples could also confirm that the multilingual situation in his homeland may have led Wittgenstein to the thesis he formulated in his later years: “Every sign *by itself* (*allein*) seems dead. *What gives it life?* – In use *it is alive* (*lebt es*)” (Wittgenstein 1974, 128).

Of course, the difficulties in interpreting the culture of the Monarchy cannot be reduced to linguistic matters. “One should never forget that what one learns in school about history is the truth only insofar as it does not interfere with the political, philosophical, moral or other beliefs of those in whose interest the facts are told, coloured or arranged” (Schoenberg 1984, 239). Schönberg made this warning in a lecture delivered in the United States, at a time he became exposed to different views on the Habsburg state abolished after World War I. Undoubtedly, even those educated in the Dual Monarchy differed in their retrospective evaluations. Chapter 19 in Book I of the Klagenfurt-born Robert Musil’s (1880–1942) *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* (*Man without Qualities*), first published in 1930, contains a letter in which Ulrich’s father outlines plans to devote “the whole year 1918 to the jubilee of our peace emperor” (Musil 1970, 79). This irony is supported by one of the standard works on the Austria of the early twentieth century. According to its authors, Wittgenstein “never overcame the crisis provoked by the collapse, in 1918, of the seemingly eternal framework of worldly falsehood into which he had grown up” (Janik and Toulmin 1973, 242). It is worth noting that the value judgment comes from the American authors of the book and not from the Austrian philosopher.

In sharp contrast to Musil’s interpretation of the Monarchy as a state so ethnically heterogeneous that it was doomed to fall apart, in Sándor Márai’s (1900–1989) *A gyertyák csonkig égnek* (1942, translated as *Embers*) it is presented as a

highly structured way of life, a mode of existence in which each participant had his or her proper place. The contrast is even sharper if one remembers that Márai belonged to the Hungarian community that was strongly influenced by the memory of the 1848–49 revolution crushed by the Romanovs and the Habsburgs. In 1852 a statue was erected in the fortress of Buda in memory of Heinrich Hentzi, the Austrian general who died in May 1849 when the Hungarian revolutionary army recaptured the fortress from the Austrians. Many Hungarians viewed this monument as a symbol of the humiliation of their people. In Kosztolányi's short novel *Pacsirta* (*Skylark*, 1924) the reader is reminded of this. Márai, of a later generation, refrained from any allusion to 1848–49. By 1942 many Hungarians became convinced that for their community conditions in the Dual Monarchy were favourable to those of the period between the two world wars. The fact that since the 1990s *Embers* has become popular in Italian, German, and English translation is inseparable from the current nostalgia for the Dual Monarchy. Márai's interpretation closely resembles that of Stefan Zweig (1881–1942). His idealized description of Vienna as a system of concentric circles also dates from the time of World War II:

Die kaiserliche Burg war das Zentrum nicht nur im räumlichen Sinn, sondern auch im kulturellen der Übernationalität der Monarchie. Um diese Burg bildeten die Palais des österreichischen, polnischen, tschechischen, ungarischen Hochadels gewissermaßen den zweiten Wall. Dann kam die 'gute Gesellschaft', bestehend aus dem kleineren Adel, der hohen Beamtschaft, der Industrie und den 'alten Familien', darunter dann das Kleinbürgertum und das Proletariat.

(The imperial castle was the centre of the supranationality of the Monarchy, not only in a spatial but also in a cultural sense. Around this castle the palaces of the Austrian, Polish, Czech, and Hungarian aristocrats formed a kind of second wall. Then came the 'good society', consisting of the lesser nobility, the high-ranking civil servants, the industrialists, the 'old families', and finally the lower bourgeoisie and the workers. Zweig 1981, 31–32).

These words came from a man of culture for whom the Dual Monarchy "war das goldene Zeitalter der Sicherheit" ("meant the golden days of certainty", Zweig 1981, 25). As a Jew of Moravian origin, he felt at home in Vienna. In his view the Habsburg Empire had been destroyed by the Great Powers. It represented a tolerant world that always welcomed the new settlers. Its disappearance meant a qualitative loss for human culture. Shortly after he had written about this loss, Zweig committed suicide with his wife in Brazil, a country in which he remained an outsider.

Some of the Western interpretations of the culture of the Dual Monarchy were based on more or less explicitly Marxist preconceptions, on the idea that culture

was the product of politics. Carl E. Schorske's assumption that "the growth of a new higher culture seemed to take place in Austria as in a hothouse, with political crisis providing the heat" (Schorske 1980, xxvii) is a telling example. The abundance of the cultural products of the Monarchy obstructs their systematic presentation in a short chapter; therefore, a somewhat arbitrary procedure must be used here. I am under no illusion that what follows is any more than a summary that gives no justice to all the important fields of cultural activity. With a certain self-irony, I could quote the great poet Rainer Maria Rilke (1875–1926), who maintained "daß man nicht das Recht hatte, ein Buch aufzuschlagen, wenn man sich nicht verpflichtete, alle zu lesen" ("that one has no right to open a book unless one obliges oneself to read all books", Rilke 1997, 167).

In 1958 the outstanding musician Pierre Boulez gave a list of the five greatest composers of the twentieth century. The fact that four of them (Schönberg, Bartók, Webern, and Berg) were born and developed their style in the Dual Monarchy (Boulez 1966, 34) is a testimony to the eminence of the musical culture of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1970 the Viennese Secession Exhibition at the Royal Academy in London drew attention to the international significance of Viennese Art Nouveau. The literature of the Dual Monarchy is widely read all over the world.

No less spectacular were the achievements in science. One example is the contribution of Ernst Mach (1838–1916). Born in Brünn (today Brno), this experimental physicist taught in Graz and Prague before being invited to the University of Vienna in 1895. His criticism of Newton's theory of absolute space and time and his philosophy of science, his *Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung* (1883, translated as *The Science of Mechanics*), *Die Analyse der Empfindungen (Analysis of Sensations*, 1883), and *Erkenntnis und Irrtum (Perception and Error*, 1905) had a far-reaching influence. Robert Musil wrote his doctoral dissertation on his works (*Beitrag zur Beurteilung der Lehren Machs*, 1908) and Hugo von Hofmannstahl (1874–1929) attended his lectures. "Few great men have had an intellectual impact upon the twentieth century comparable to that of Ernst Mach", wrote Karl Popper (1902–1994) in his autobiography.

He influenced physics, physiology, psychology, the philosophy of science, and pure (speculative) philosophy. He influenced Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, William James, Bertrand Russell – to mention but a few names (Popper 1982, 151–152).

Mach's research proved to be crucial for fields ranging from optics, acoustics, wave theory, and the theory of kinaesthetic impressions to historical investigations. His reduction of knowledge to sensation inspired Lenin to write his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1909), "a violent attack on the Russian adherents of this philosophy" (Kotakowski 1972, 151). Last but not least, Mach can also be re-

garded as a precursor to the logical positivists of the “Wiener Kreis” (“Vienna Circle”) of the 1920s. His opponent Ludwig Boltzmann (1844–1906) could also be named as one of the Austrian scientists of international fame who were many-sided in both research and teaching. Born in Duino (now in Italy), he was appointed to a chair of physics at Graz and then accepted a chair of mathematics at Vienna, in 1873. After three years he was back at Graz, this time as the chair of experimental physics. In 1900 he moved to Leipzig, but in 1902 he returned to his chair of theoretical physics and was given Mach’s philosophy course to teach. His statistical mechanics lies at the basis of twentieth-century thermodynamics, and his notion of a space of theoretical possibilities was an important source of inspiration for Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Other fields could also be mentioned in this context.

America owes its pre-eminence, in the medical sciences of our time, in no small part, to the thousands of medical students who traveled to Vienna at a time when the standards of American medicine were scandalously low, in order to study with such luminaries as Hebra, Škoda, Krafft-Ebing and Billroth (Janik and Toulmin 1973, 35).

To add one more item, let us remember that most of the physicists who helped the United States in World War II were born and trained in Budapest.

After 1920 many viewed the Dual Monarchy as a multi-national state that had failed. By the early twenty-first century interpretations have shifted: seeing the difficulties faced by the European Union, more and more people tend to appreciate the Habsburg Monarchy as an attempt at supranational integration. Such a re-valuation is also supported by the growing recognition of the intellectual achievements associated with the state established in 1867.

## **2. Nationalist Ideology and Culture**

As is well-known, the life of the Monarchy was inseparable from nationalistic movements. On 18 February 1853 János Libényi, a young Hungarian apprentice, tried to assassinate Franz Joseph in Vienna. Between 1856 and 1879 a neo-Gothic church, the so-called Votivkirche designed by H. Ferstel, was built on the site of the incident. The 1867 “Ausgleich” (“Compromise”) replaced the tension between Austrians and Hungarians with a delicate balance, but Czech nationalism not only continued but increased in the last third of the century. Its adherents tried to forget that Prague “was a German cathedral city long before Vienna” (Janik and Toulmin 1973, 49), and later ignored that great masters of the German language had been born in the Czech capital. Rilke must have heard some Czech spoken around him, not only in his native Prague but also in the Militär-Oberrealschule in

Mährisch-Weißkirchen (today Hranice), where he started his military education in 1890, four years before Musil became a cadet there. One of his early poems, written in the 1890s and entitled *Volkweise (Folk Tune)* refers to a Czech melody one cannot forget even when living far from the region. Characteristically, Czech is associated in the poem with the singing of a peasant child. The emphasis is on the distance between the speaker and the singer. From the 1890s on Rilke spent most of his time abroad and composed his greatest works there, including the *Duineser Elegien (Duino Elegies, 1912–1922)* and *Die Sonette an Orpheus (Sonnets to Orpheus, 1922)*.

No less divided was the population and cultural life of the Moravian capital. On December 6<sup>th</sup>, 1884, a performance of J. J. Kollár's play *Magelona* was given to celebrate the opening of the first Czech theatre in Brünn. On October 1–2, 1905, clashes occurred between Germans and Moravians in this city and a twenty-year-old carpenter's apprentice was killed. The statement that the "new anti-liberal mass movements – Czech nationalism, Pan-Germanism, Christian Socialism, Social Democracy, and Zionism – rose from below to challenge the trusteeship of the educated middle class" (Schorske 1980, 118) needs to be modified. Kálmán Mikszáth (1847–1910), a writer who earned national renown with the collections *Tót atyafiak (Slovak Kinsfolk, 1881)* and *A jó palócok (The Good Palóc People, 1882)*, stories about the two main ethnic communities of his native Upper Hungary, shrewdly observed in his parliamentary sketches *Club és folyosó (Club and Lobby, 1887)* that the Slavs of the Monarchy "were rapidly moving towards Russia" (Mikszáth 1887, 186) under the influence of the Pan-Slav movement sponsored from St. Petersburg. Even the most popular Hungarian prose writer of the nineteenth century, Mór Jókai (1825–1904), became aware of the Great Power interests vested in the fate of the Slavic minorities of the Monarchy. As a young man he participated in the 1848 anti-Habsburg revolution, but later he came to approve of the 1867 Compromise. One of the reasons for this change in attitude was his growing awareness of the Russian desire to dissolve the Habsburg Empire. Committed as he was to optimism, in his novel *A jövő század regénye (A Novel about the Next Century, 1872)* he wrote about a victory of a future Habsburg, backed by the Hungarians, over Russia.

The interrelations between politics and art are always of great complexity. Both the Pan-Slavism that undermined and the supranationalism that supported the integrity of the Dual Monarchy produced great art. Béla Bartók (1881–1945) collected not only Hungarian folk music but also that of other nations, including those living in Central Europe. *Két román tánc for piano (Two Romanian Dances, 1909, 1910)*, published in Budapest, and *Négy szlovák népdal for mixed chorus (Four Slovak Folksongs, 1916)*, published in Vienna, are just two among Bartók's numerous works inspired by the music of the neighbours of the Hungarians. In sharp contrast, Leoš Janáček (1854–1928) focused on Slavic culture. In this sense

he was more consistent than his immediate predecessors, Bedřich Smetana (1824–1884), the composer of the comic opera *Prodaná Nevěsta* (*The Bartered Bride*, 1866) and the cycle of six symphonic poems *Má Vlast* (*My Country*, 1874–1879), and Antonín Dvořák (1841–1904), whose overpopular *Symphony in E Minor* (1893), composed and first performed in the United States, has tunes alluding to African American music. “Smetana’s orientation was specifically Czech and thus appeared to Janáček to be endangering his Moravian regionalism and his pan-Slav ideals”, as a Czech musician remarked (Vogel 1962, 15). Although there is some continuity between the works of Dvořák and Janáček, e. g., the mixing of major and parallel minor is characteristic of both, the older composer’s opera *Rusalka* (first performed in Prague in 1901) shows a far more superficial interest in Slavic folk music than *Jenůfa*, Janáček’s first major work in the same genre, performed in Brünn in 1904. In fact, Janáček’s passion for old Slavic traditions dates from his early youth. In 1869 the millennium of St. Cyril’s death was commemorated at Velehrad in South-Eastern Moravia. As a chorister of the Queen’s Monastery of Old Brünn, the young boy participated in the festivities in memory of the struggle over the ecclesiastical language of Bohemia and Moravia, a struggle for political influence between Germans and Slavs. In 1873 Janáček was elected choir-master of the craftsmen’s choral society named after Svatopluk, the somewhat legendary head of 9th-century Magna Moravia. This association, founded in 1868, one year after the creation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, had obvious political purposes. In 1896, the year devoted to the millennium of the Hungarian state in Budapest, Janáček visited Russia, and in 1903 he organized, in Moravia, the folklore section for the Pan-Slav Exhibition in the city of the czar. “I wrote the *Violin Sonata* in 1914 at the beginning of the war when we were expecting the Russians in Moravia”, he remembered in 1922, and insisted that the high piano tremolo over the chorale-like part of the last (Adagio) movement represented “the Russian armies entering Hungary” (Vogel 1962, 218). Janáček’s love of Russian culture dominated his activity even in his later years: the three-part orchestral rhapsody *Taras Bulba* (completed in 1918) was inspired by a story by Gogol, one his most successful operas *Katya Kabanova* (1921) by a nineteenth-century play by Alexander Nikolaevich Ostrovsky, his *First String Quartet* (first performed in 1924) by L. N. Tolstoy’s *Kreutzer Sonata*, and his last opera *Z Mrtvého domu* (*From the House of the Dead*, completed in 1928) by Dostoevsky’s *Zapiski iz myortvogo doma*. Another major composition, the *Mša Glagolskja* (*Glagolitic Mass*, composed in 1926), a setting of an Old Church Slavonic version of the Latin ordinary, a ninth-century text by Cyril used in church services on 7 July (the day dedicated to Saints Cyril and Methods), affirmed the unity of all Slavs in an age moving away from that ideal. This work clearly shows

that Janáček's desire to return to the spiritual roots of Slavdom was part of a Romantic legacy.

Ironically, Liberalism was of some help to the cause of Pan-Slavism. In May 1913, it was discovered that the deputy director of the "K. u. K." (Imperial-and-Royal) intelligence, colonel Alfred Redl, was in the pay of the tsar. The fact that a General Staff officer had become a Russian agent in order to finance his homosexual life suggested that the sexual tolerance that was part of the Liberalism that made the Monarchy the centre of psycho-analysis penetrated all segments of society. Redl started his homosexual relations in a Cadet School similar to the one Musil attended. The explicit treatment of homosexual relations in a work like Musil's short novel *Die Verwirrungen des Zöglings Törleß* (1906, translated as *Young Törless*) would have been as impossible in Edwardian Britain or in the United States as the presentation of the extra-marital affairs of officers in a play such as *Reigen* (1900, translated as *Merry-go-round* and *La Ronde*), a popular work also known in film versions by the practising doctor, playwright, novelist, and short-story writer Arthur Schnitzler (1862–1931).

The restricted-suffrage system kept some radical Pan-Slavic nationalists away from the polls but fuelled the anti-Liberal movements. Without much exaggeration, it could be argued that most of the leading writers of Slavic nationalism spent their formative years in Vienna or Budapest. The Ukrainian Ivan Franko (1856–1916), the author of *Moisei* (*Moses*, 1905), a long poem about a leader's service to his people, received his doctorate from Vienna but failed to obtain a position at the University of Lemberg (L'vov) because of his socialist-nationalist declarations. The Slovenian Ivan Cankar (1876–1918), whose collection of poetry *Erotika* (1899) was confiscated by the Bishop of Laibach (Ljubljana), also spent years in Vienna, and the Croatian Miroslav Krleža (1893–1981) was sent to the military academy in Budapest before he fought in Galicia, an experience reflected in his *Hrvatski bog Mars* (*The Croatian God Mars*, 1922), a two-volume collection of stories that ridicules the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Compromise between Franz Joseph and the Hungarians, whose revolution of 1848–49 almost undermined Habsburg rule, was based on the two largest linguistic communities of the region. Germans constituted 24 per cent of the population, Hungarians 20 per cent, and Czechs (the third largest group) 13 per cent. The fact that the eminent historian František Palacky (1798–1876) attended the Slavic Congress held in Moscow in 1867 indicated that even some of the most civilized Czech intellectuals sympathized with pan-Slavism. Around the turn of the century Vienna made significant concessions to Prague. From 1897 every civil servant working in Bohemia or Moravia had to be bilingual and from 1907 every male adult citizen living in these two provinces was given the right to vote. Such measures constituted a disadvantage to the largely German speaking bourgeoisie, including the majority of Jews.

National identity was often a matter of personal decision rather than ethnic origin. Bedřich Janáček, one of the brothers of the great Moravian composer, married Hedwig Schmied at Aspang (near Vienna) a couple of months before the outbreak of World War I, “became a German himself and brought up his four children as Germans” (Vogel 1962, 275). Franz Herzog, born in the region that is called Voivodina today, became a very successful Hungarian author of narrative fiction and plays under the name Ferenc Herczeg (1863–1954). What is more, as a member of the Hungarian parliament he represented the interests of the Liberals of the Dual Monarchy.

From the beginning of the new century some Slavic nationalists turned not to Russia but to Britain and France for support. Arguing that the Monarchy was a satellite of Germany, they insisted that the break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy was needed to stop the German policy of “Drang nach Osten” (“drive towards the East”). Such was the substance of the propaganda launched by Eduard Beneš, who in 1916 published a work entitled *Détruisez l’Autriche-Hongrie* in Paris. While it is true that the empire of Franz Joseph was strongly affected by such trends as Liberalism, Christian clericalism, socialism, and nationalism, Stefan Zweig was probably right in pointing out that the primary cause of the fall of the Dual Monarchy was a decision of certain French and British politicians to abolish it. Louis Léger’s *Le Panславisme et l’intérêt français* (1917) proves that pan-Slavism was appreciated by some French publicists as an antidote to German nationalism. Freemasons, who played a major role in literary life, also asked for the elimination of the Habsburg Monarchy at their congress in Paris on June 28–30, 1917.

To avoid the generalization that all Slavs sought the downfall of the Dual Monarchy, it is worth remarking that Croats were divided. While some went to study at the University of Prague, where “they had been strongly influenced by T. G. Masaryk” (Krišto 2005, 76) and later organized such demonstrations as the burning of the Hungarian flag at the Ban Jelačić Square in Zagreb in 1895 or the rebellion that forced Ban Károly Khuen-Héderváry to resign in 1903, others regarded as their goal the opposition to the law favouring the use of the German language, and Ante Trumbić argued for the political alliance of Croats and Hungarians during the 1903 session of the Dalmatian Sabor (Parliament). From the perspective of more recent history, it is hardly surprising that contradictory trends characterized the ideology of Southern Slavs. A few months before the “new course” of the Dalmatian Parliament, Milan Obrenović, the pro-Vienna Serbian king, was assassinated and the Karadordevic dynasty opted for a pro-Russian orientation. Without much exaggeration it could be argued that Yugoslav nationalism was developed at least partly by artists. In 1910 the Dalmatian-born sculptor Ivan Mestrovic (1883–1962) and some of his colleagues arranged an exhibition in Zagreb under the title “Despite Unheroic Time” to promote the Kosovo myth. The next year Mestrovic, officially an Austrian citizen, exhibited in the Serbian pavilion in



Rome, thereby expressing his protest against the Dual Monarchy. Still, not all Croats joined Yugoslavism. After the assassination of Franz Ferdinand by a member of “Mlada Bosna”, a terrorist organization under Serbian influence, some Croats fought against Italy, Russia, and even Serbia. The Croatian parliament never ratified the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, declared by Aleksandar Karadordevic on 1 December 1918.

History is liable to reinterpretation. This is especially true of the intellectual climate of the period of Pavao Rauch, appointed as Ban of Croatia by the Emperor in 1908. Robert Seton-Watson (1876–1956) described this Ban’s régime as a perfect example of Hungarian repression (Seton-Watson 1912, 6–8), whereas a recent Croatian interpretation ascribes reforms to Rauch that led not only to “improvements to workers’ social insurance, the slowing down of emigration, and the care given to the improvement of agriculture” but also to the strengthening of cultural autonomy (Kolar 2003, 154). “The evidence shows that the rule of Pavao Rauch had not been pro-Hungarian but that he worked in the interests of Croatia” (Kolar 2003, 156). This conclusion contradicts not only Seton-Watson’s description but also a Hungarian historian’s description of the Scottish publicist as a “scholarly historian” and a “typical ‘seeker of truth’” (Jeszenszky 1986, 325, 305).

It is virtually impossible to decide to what extent German nationalism could be considered a reaction against Pan-Slavism. Georg von Schönerer (1841–1921), the author of a manifesto for a “Verein der deutschen Volkspartei”, written in 1881, was the son of a man who had built Austria’s first railway in 1828 and who in 1860 received his patent of nobility from the hands of the Emperor for his services. He combined German nationalism with demands for social justice. In the face of the growing Jewish immigration from Russia at the time of the pogroms, he turned to the United States for a legislative model for racial discrimination: the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1881. For some time Schönerer escaped censure by clothing his formulations in an anti-Russian dress that appealed to some people’s fear of Slavic encirclement. He tried to seek a following in Northern Bohemia, where German workers “met competition from Czechs who were willing to work in poorer conditions for less pay” (Janik and Toulmin 1973, 57).

There is no denying that aside from the strategic interests of the Western powers the main cause of the end of the Dual Monarchy was nationalism, whether Slavic or German. As a British historian remarked,

the crime committed by one young Bosnian in Sarajevo was hatched in a secret society, the Black Hand, which had been nourished on the idea of tyrannicide; it reflected the backward society from which it came (Mason 1985, 70).

The combination of the two factors was “neither inevitable necessity nor purely accidental” (Romsics 2001, 78).

Much comment on the Dual Monarchy “has been coloured by the knowledge of its political collapse” (Mason 1985, 30). There was a sense of decadence in the art and literature of the region, but the same feature was also characteristic of the culture of other European countries, including late Victorian Britain and fin-de-siècle France. Undeniably one of the works about the decline of the West was *Entartung* (1893), a book published in Berlin that became widely influential in English translation as *Degeneration*. Its author used the pen name Miksa (Max) Nordau (1849–1923). Born in Pest to an Orthodox family, he settled in Paris in 1880, published his articles in the daily *Pester Lloyd* (started in 1854), and later became the co-founder of the World Zionist Organization.

### 3. The Role of Jews in the Culture of the Monarchy

It is widely known that Jews made a significant contribution to the culture of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. “The proportion of Jews or men of Jewish origin among University professors, medical men, and lawyers was very high,” observed Karl Popper about his native Vienna (Popper 1982, 105), and one may add that if in the Austrian capital Jews “constituted five per cent of the city’s population” (Janik and Toulmin 1973, 59), Budapest had an even larger Jewish community by the early twentieth century. The majority of Hungarian Jews lived in the capital, “they constituted 20 percent of the population” (L. Nagy 1994, 39).

Austrian Jews assimilated to German culture. In 1919, when the architect Adolf Loos (1870–1933) asked Schönberg to contribute to the drafting of the program of the newly established “Kunstamt” (Ministry of Art), the composer started his short essay with sentences that implied an unqualified identification with the German nation:

The most important task of the music section is to ensure the German nation’s superiority in the field of music, a superiority which has its roots in the people’s talents. These may stem from the fact that in former times the German elementary school teacher was nearly always also a music teacher (Schoenberg 1984, 369–370).

In the Czech lands the Jewish bourgeoisie preferred to belong to the German-speaking minority. Franz Kafka (1883–1924) was sent to a German “Gymnasium” (state grammar school) and studied at the German university of Prague. All his works, including the nouvelle *Die Verwandlung* (*Metamorphosis*, 1912), the unfinished *Der Prozeß* (*The Trial*, written 1914–15), the short story *Ein Landarzt* (*A Country Doctor*, written and published 1917), and the novel *Das Schloß* (*The Castle*, written 1921–22), were composed in German. His writing is heavily indebted to German Romanticism: *Die Verwandlung* recalls several tales

of metamorphosis in the Grimm brothers' collection and *Ein Landarzt* to stories by E. T. A. Hoffmann. The interpretations of the Prague-born novelist, short-story writer, playwright, and critic Max Brod (1884–1968), which ignored the links between Kafka's works and German Romanticism, reduced the message of the two novels to their (allegedly) theological meaning by overemphasizing the presence of the Jewish legacy in *Der Prozeß* and *Das Schloß*. Both works have suffered from one-sided, allegorical readings. As an English critic observed with good reason, "the great reputation of Kafka began through accounts by foreigners who were more interested in ideas than in language" (Gray 1973, 3).

Before World War I the assimilation of the Jews seemed rather unproblematic in Hungary, where nationalism was fuelled by the memory of the suppression of the 1848–49 revolution, which had been supported by many Hungarian Jews. In 1881 an anti-Semitic member of the Hungarian parliament reported the disappearance of a Christian girl named Eszter Solymosi from the village of Tiszaeszlár. A ritual-murder allegation led to a public trial. The Liberal lawyer Károly Eötvös (1842–1916) won the case for the Jews. The anti-Semitic party was dissolved, the parliament passed a law in 1895 recognizing Judaism as equal to the other religious denominations, and in 1904 Eötvös published his detailed account of the trial under the title *A nagy per* (*The Great Trial*). The fact that the Hungarian banking system and later even the war industry were controlled by Jews proves that assimilation could be pursued not only along the road of culture, but from our perspective it is more important to remember that the German publishers were gradually replaced by Jewish ones. For all but the last five years of its existence (from 1890 to 1919) the magazine *A Hét* (*The Week*) was edited by József Kiss (1843–1921), a poet of Jewish descent. *Huszadik Század* (*Twentieth Century*), the chief organ of the quickly developing social sciences, was edited by Oszkár Jászi (1875–1957), a fully assimilated Jew, and *Nyugat* (*West*, 1908–1941), the literary periodical associated with the new generation, was largely sponsored by Jewish industrial magnates.

The examples of Ludwig Wittgenstein and György Lukács (1887–1971) indicate that intellectual life was not a substitute for the life of action: the fathers were successful businessmen and their sons became celebrated philosophers. Karl Popper's autobiography gives some idea of the growing division of the Jewish community:

My parents were both born in the Jewish faith, but were baptized into the Protestant (Lutheran) Church before any of their children arrived. (...) This, however, meant giving offence to organized Judaism. (...) assimilation worked. (...) But racial pride is not only stupid but wrong, even if provoked by racial hatred. All nationalism or racialism is evil, and Jewish nationalism is no exception (Popper 1982, 105).

The last words may refer to Zionism. The founder of that movement was born in Pest. Most of the publications on Tivadar Herzl (1860–1904) have the fundamental weakness of ignoring the historical background of his upbringing. He was raised in a family that profited from the advantages of Hungarian Liberalism. In 1848 his uncle joined the Hungarian revolution which in 1849 led to a parliamentary decision to emancipate Jews. The young Tivadar, however, was one of those who refused to assimilate to Hungarian culture. Even a more moderate form of enthusiasm for German culture in the cases of the poet, playwright, essayist, and film theoretician Béla Balázs (originally Herbert Bauer, 1884–1949) and the philosopher György Lukács led to alienation from some Hungarians. The tragedy of the holocaust has made many forget that in the early twentieth century anti-German and anti-Jewish feelings sometimes went together among Hungarians who wanted to escape from the political and cultural influence of Vienna. Having no desire to have any contact with Hungarian culture, Herzl went to study at the University of Vienna. For a while he was even attracted to German nationalism and to socialism. He moved to Zionism only in 1895, after he had covered the case of Alfred Dreyfus as the Paris correspondent of *Die Neue Freie Presse*. Interestingly, Richard Wagner's influence must have contributed to Herzl's plans for a Jewish state. As he wrote in his diary: "Moses' exodus would compare (to mine) like a Shrove Tuesday *Singspiel* of Hans Sachs to a Wagnerian opera" (quoted in Schorske 1980, 163).

As the feuilleton editor of the *Neue Freie Presse*, Herzl was largely responsible for the introduction of a genre that originated in French journalism. The limitations of this genre, its tendency to subjectify the objective, made intellectual rigour impossible. Together with the "Volksstück", the operetta, the well-made play, the occasional verse, and the pot-boiler novel, it represented popular culture.

The statement that Jews played a prominent role in the culture of the Monarchy is a somewhat overworked platitude today. It is not always remembered that the Jews of the Monarchy did not constitute a homogeneous community, and occasionally their contribution is emphasized to the detriment of the appreciation of non-Jewish scientists or artists. The following argument, for example, cannot be sustained:

the Jews were allied to those few outstanding intellectuals behind whom there stood nobody, especially not the Christian middle classes, a social stratum utterly hostile towards these intellectuals.

The characterization of "the Hungarian gentry that gambled away their (or, rather, their bourgeois wives') money" (Forgács 1994, 318) belongs to the legacy of a historiography that claimed to be Marxist. Péter Beniczky, who hired Gustav Mahler (1860–1911) in 1888, and Jenő Péterfy (1850–1899), the outstanding critic who praised Mahler's activity in the Budapest Opera House, belonged to the

gentry (Szegedy-Maszák 2007, 187), and at least three of the leading poets of the periodical *Nyugat*: Endre Ady (1877–1919), Mihály Babits (1883–1941), and Dezső Kosztolányi had a similar background. “Hungarian culture both in its origins and in its character is the culture of the nobility”, Babits claimed in 1939 (Babits 1978, 2: 621), strenuously defending a legacy that survived into the twentieth century. This declaration gave rise to a feverish debate during World War II, when some writers and artists relied heavily on the cultural heritage of the peasantry. Today all this is a closed chapter in history: both the gentry and the peasantry have disappeared. Whatever limitations the lesser nobility may have had, its lasting achievement cannot be denied. In Hungary this class constituted a considerably more numerous layer of society than in other European countries, with the possible exception of Poland. In 1848–49 most of the leaders of the revolution who wished to abolish the privileges of the ruling class and emancipate Jews belonged to that class. The culture of the Dual Monarchy cannot be separated from the life style of the gentry.

The thesis that Herzl’s Zionism was “the result of his own initial anti-Semitism” (Janik and Toulmin 1973, 59) may be far-fetched, but Jewish self-hatred has a claim to consideration. Otto Weininger’s (1880–1903) *Geschlecht und Charakter* (1903, translated as *Sex and Character*) was appreciated not only by Karl Kraus (1874–1936), one of the writers of Jewish parentage who were born in Bohemia and moved to Vienna. It is not absurd to believe that this work may “have had some influence on Wittgenstein” (Popper 1982, 1). This eminent philosopher’s comments that “tragedy is something un-Jewish”, Jews are “reproductive”, and Mahler’s music, in contrast to Arnold Bruckner’s (1924–1896), is “worthless”, “bad” (Wittgenstein 1980, 1, 38, 18–19, 67), and the opposition between invention and reproduction may derive from Weininger’s idea that the Aryan race is the embodiment of the masculine-creative, while the feminine-reproductive principle corresponds to Jewish culture. In 1931 Wittgenstein mentioned Weininger as one of his sources, together with Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Spengler, and Straffa. His argument that he himself borrowed everything from others may be linked to a nostalgia for tradition:

Tradition is not something one (Einer) can learn; not a thread he can pick up when he feels like it; any more than one can choose one’s ancestors (Wittgenstein 1980, 19, 76).

Such an approach to tradition is strikingly similar to that of Schönberg:

my music, produced on German soil, without foreign influences, is a living example of an art able most effectively to oppose Latin and Slav hopes for hegemony and derived through and through from the tradition of German music” (Schoenberg 1984, 173).

#### 4. The Impact of Socialism on Culture

One of the paradoxes of history is that Jews both contributed to and undermined the formation of what could be regarded as the specific culture of the Dual Monarchy. Socialism as an international ideology was as responsible for the end of Austro-Hungary as nationalism, and some Jews believed that socialism could make it possible for them to become politically active. In Vienna the Social Democrats founded a party in 1889. The Prague-born Victor Adler (1852–1918), the man whose party had become the largest political organization in the Reichsrat by the beginning of the twentieth century, was of Jewish origin.

Zionism emerged in the wake of the rapid and large-scale assimilation of Jews. In so far as Jews did not seem to aspire to the status of a nation, they helped the integration of the Empire. By the end of the century, however, some joined international socialism, which in the long run contributed to the end of the Monarchy.

During the First World War there was an influx into Vienna of Jewish refugees from the old Austrian Empire, which had been invaded by Russia. These 'Eastern Jews', as they were called, had come straight from virtual ghettos, and they were resented by those Jews who had settled down in Vienna; by assimilationists, by many orthodox Jews, and even by Zionists, who were ashamed of those they regarded as their poor relatives (Popper 198, 106).

Shortly after the resignation of Charles IV, the last Habsburg monarch, the Communist leaders of independent Hungary put the industrial magnates in jail. On both sides the majority was Jewish.

In the spring of 1919 even Karl Popper had converted to Communism, but after a few months he became an anti-Marxist. Several decades later he remembered this period in the following manner:

It took me some time before I recognized (...) that the attempt to realize equality endangers freedom; and that, if freedom is lost, there will not even be equality among the unfree (Popper 1982, 36).

This confession clearly shows that Popper was not familiar with one of the outstanding works of Central European Liberalism by one of those responsible for the foundation of the Dual Monarchy. The first volume of *Der Einfluß der herrschenden Ideen des 19. Jahrhunderts auf den Staat* by József Eötvös (1813–1871) was published in Vienna in 1851, followed by a second volume that appeared in Leipzig in 1854. One of the main theses of this outstanding work is that equality and liberty are incompatible.

József Eötvös, a titled aristocrat, fought as strongly for the emancipation of Jews as his namesake Károly Eötvös. Although anti-Semitism was much stronger in the Western than in the Eastern half of the Monarchy, the downfall of Schönereker

testified to the strength of Austrian Liberalism. When he broke into the offices of the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* and beat up its staff he lost his title and was sent to prison. "When his party dissolved in 1889 it had only twelve hundred members" (Levy 1991, 113). Up to World War I German nationalism seemed to be a lame duck in comparison with socialism, although it is quite possible that some Jews joined the international movement out of fear of German imperialism.

Needless to say, it would be a gross exaggeration to say that all the major socialists were Jewish. From 1903 on the Czech Jaroslav Hašek (1883–1923) was a member of Prague anarchist circles. In 1915 he was called up, promoted, and won a medal. Having become a Russian prisoner of war, he joined the Czecho-Slovak Legion and eventually the Red Army. He is best known for creating the character Švejk, a cunning fool who appears in *Dobry voják Švejk a jiné podivné historky* (*The Good Soldier Švejk and Other Strange Tales*, 1911), *Dobry voják Švejk v zajetí* (*The Good Soldier Švejk in Captivity*, 1917), and *Osudy dobrého vojáka Švejka za světové války* (*The Fortunes of the Good Soldier Švejk in the Great War*, 1921–1923). Švejk has become a quasi-mythic Central European type, a character resembling the heroes of picaresque narratives. His creation had been prepared in the popular anecdotes and feuilletons (some 1,500 short texts) published by Hašek before the Great War.

A far cry from Hašek's popular prose is the work of Lajos Kassák (1887–1967), poet, prose writer, and visual artist. The son of a technician in a pharmaceutical laboratory, he left school at the age of twelve. Five years later he moved from his native Érsekújvár (today Nové Zámky, in Southern Slovakia) to an industrial suburb of Budapest, where he became acquainted with the working-class movement. In 1909 he took a boat to Vienna, then walked to Paris via Germany and Belgium, and then was expelled from France as a vagrant. This trip is recounted in *A ló meghal a madarak kirepülnek* (*The Horse Dies the Birds Fly Out*, 1922), a long free-verse poem, and in the prose autobiography *Egy ember élete* (*The Life of a Man*, 1928–1939), a work that sheds light on the life of the working class in the last phase of the Monarchy. In 1913 he joined the Hungarian Social Democratic Party and two years later founded *A Tett* (*Action*), an international avant-garde journal in Hungary. After it was banned in 1916 because of the pacifist materials that had been published in its pages, he started a new periodical entitled *Ma* (*Today*). When Béla Kun, the leader of the Hungarian Commune of 1919, called *Ma* "a product of bourgeois decadence", Kassák protested in an open letter. As a result *Ma* was banned in July 1919 by the Communist authorities.

Kassák's free verse and Constructivist paintings represent an internationalism that is radically opposed to Christian Socialism, an Austrian movement led by Karl Lueger (1844–1910), a man of humble origin who became the mayor of Vienna in 1897. Unlike German, Slavic, or even Hungarian nationalism, Zionism, or Social Democracy, his movement strengthened integration within the Monarchy.

Today there is a square named after Dr. Karl Lueger at the point where the Stuben Ring and the Schubert Ring meet. Some may view this fact as a sign of Austrian opportunism. Undeniably, this mayor manipulated the anti-Semitic feelings of some lower-class citizens. He reputedly referred to the Hungarian capital as “Judapest”, but his “dislike of Hungarians was stronger than his dislike of Jews” (Lukacs 1988, 95). His aversion to Hungarians and Jews as communities that would weaken the Habsburg Empire made a great impact on Hungarian intellectuals, as is clear from *Timár Virgil fia* (*The Son of Virgil Timár*, 1921), a short novel by Mihály Babits. “Let him go to Judapest, where he belongs”, says a right-wing Roman Catholic priest teaching in a provincial town about a boy of partly Jewish origin, a student who is under the influence of superficial Liberal publications coming from Budapest (Babits 2001, 87).

Once more, the complexity of history can be illustrated by the fact that the statue adorning Dr. Karl Luegerplatz was put up by a Social Democratic administration after World War I in memory of the second most popular citizen of the Monarchy, a politician who with his ambitious program of public works had achieved much for his own class, the lower bourgeoisie. Thanks to him the British gas company that supplied Vienna was replaced by a native firm, public transportation and the water system were improved, and orphanages, hospitals, and schools were built.

### 5. Trends in the Visual Arts and Music

Lueger’s activity was badly needed at the time of the rapid growth of the population of the imperial capital, “from 476,220 in 1857 to 2,031,420 in 1910” (Janik and Toulmin 1973, 50). Most of the public buildings and apartment houses of the Ring that separates the inner city from its suburbs were built in the decades following the Compromise between the Emperor and the Hungarians. The Rathaus (City Council Building), designed by Friedrich Schmidt, was built in the years 1872–1883; the Hofburgtheater (Imperial Theatre), designed by Gottfried Semper and Carl Hasenauer, between 1874 and 1888; the University, designed by Heinrich Forstel, between 1873 and 1884; and the Reichstrat (Parliament), designed by the Danish Theophil Hansen, between 1874 and 1883. The political, educational, and cultural functions of these public buildings symbolized the rise of the bourgeoisie in contrast to the churches, the Hofburg, and the aristocratic palais of the inner city. The eclecticism of the Ring marked a departure from the Gothic style of the Cathedral of St. Stephen and the baroque architecture of the Burg. In 1914, “72 of the Weierstrass’s 478 privately owned buildings were in the hands of corporate owners” (Schorske 1980, 60). Sometimes it is suggested that the eclecticism of the Ring was in sharp contrast with the later Art Nouveau. This is a simpli-



fiction. One should recognize a partial continuity in the motives behind the partly pseudo-Greek, partly pseudo-Roman Reichstrat, the neo-Renaissance University, the neo-Baroque Burgtheater, and the neo-Byzantine style in some paintings by Gustav Klimt (1862–1918). Having made his fame as a representative of history painting, after his two visits to Ravenna, where he viewed the mosaics of San Vitale, he turned to Byzantine mosaics for inspiration when subscribing to a two-dimensional sense of space. In 1886–1888, together with his brother Ernst and Franz Matsch he made a series of ceiling paintings for the grand stairway of the Burgtheater. In 1888 the City Council commissioned Gustav Klimt and Franz Matsch to paint the auditorium of the old Burgtheater with such illustrious figures as the actress Katharina Schratt (the Emperor's mistress), Lueger, and the famous surgeon Theodor Billroth. Two years later he was awarded the Emperor's Prize. The following year Klimt was asked to decorate the Kunsthistorisches Museum and in 1894 the Ministerium für Kultur und Unterricht (Ministry of Culture and Education) invited him to design three ceiling paintings for the hall of the University. By the time he executed this commission (1898–1904) Klimt had become the leader of the Secession movement, a group of nineteen artists which had its first show in 1897. In 1900 the movement was represented at the Paris International Exhibition. The fact that Klimt was commissioned to make mosaics for the Palais Stoelet in Brussels (1910) was further proof that Austrian Art Nouveau met with international recognition.

Like the Pre-Raphaelites, the Viennese Art Nouveau artists met with some resistance, but represented a fully institutionalized trend that evolved gradually from the official culture of the state. The major catalyst in this process was the impact of Richard Wagner and Friedrich Nietzsche. One of the University ceiling paintings, *Philosophy* (1900), clearly refers to Erda in *Das Rheingold* and to "Das andere Tanzlied", a poem at the end of Part III in *Also sprach Zarathustra*, a text set to music by Gustav Mahler, in the second movement ("Sehr Langsam. Misterioso") of the "Zweite Abteilung" of his *Third Symphony*, composed in 1895–1896 and first performed in 1902.

In his later career Klimt was also supported by the haute bourgeoisie. He painted a series of portraits, among them one of Margaret Stonborough-Wittgenstein (1905, Neue Pinakothek, Munich), sister of the philosopher. In his portrait both the person of the subject and the environment referred to earlier art: in the *Portrait of Fritza Riedler* (1906, Österreichisches Galerie, Vienna) the window that frames the subject's face resembles the headdress in Velázquez's *Portrait of Queen Mariana of Austria* (1646), while the geometrical forms of the dress and the background in the first version of the *Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer* (1907, Österreichisches Galerie, Vienna) derive from the abstract cells on Byzantine mosaics. When Klimt was criticized from the perspective of Classical Greek art, he was defended by the outstanding historian Franz Wickhoff (1853–1909), who

rehabilitated late Roman art and argued for a cultural relativism. What he, together with Alois Riegl (1858–1905), suggested was that the history of art could not be interpreted in terms of progress and decadence. If Klimt's paintings seemed to depart from the norms of certain historical periods, they also established continuity with other eras.

Borrowing historical style also characterized the architecture of Budapest. It was only in the twentieth century that such eclecticism was questioned in the name of functionalism. In 1918 the art historian Lajos Fülep (1885–1970) published an essay condemning both Semper and his Hungarian contemporary Miklós Ybl (1814–1891) for an emphasis on “‘style’ to the detriment of structure”, for “a mistreatment of the materials and the absence of construction”. In his view the so-called “second Renaissance” of Semper and Ybl ignored the function of the buildings, and their eclecticism led to “an awful collection of apartment houses that imitated Renaissance palais” (Fülep 1974, 1: 277, 280–281). This attack was made at a time when the functionalism that culminated in the Bauhaus promised to introduce radically new ideas in urban planning. The twentieth century, with its totalitarian regimes, failed to realize such plans and the present age may look upon the buildings of the Budapest Customs House (1870–1874) and the Opera (1875–1885) with more favourable views. In comparison with Vienna,

Budapest's late start in development actually had certain advantages, allowing the use of new technical means and the adoption of modern, liberal-spirited ideas of city politics,

observed one historian (L. Nagy 1994, 49), and another went even further in emphasizing the regional role of the city by claiming that during the last three decades of the nineteenth century it

was the fastest growing city in Europe. From 1890 to 1900 its population increased by more than 40 percent. In 1900, with a total of 733,000 people, it had become the sixth largest city of Europe, and the largest one between Vienna and St. Petersburg (Lukacs 1988, 67).

This may explain why the Hungarian capital (after the unification of Pest, Buda, and Óbuda in 1873) had become a more important cultural centre than Prague, a city with a more illustrious past.

From the perspective of the twenty-first century continuity seems more striking than discrepancy between the eclecticism of the later nineteenth century and the Art Nouveau of the years around 1900. Camillo Sitte's (1843–1890) critique of the Ring, expressed in his book *Der Städtebau* (*City Building*, 1889), is as redolent with nostalgia for the vanished past of artisan and craft culture as the ideology

of Ruskin and the Pre-Raphaelites, whose cult of pre-industrialism became the starting point for Art Nouveau in Vienna, Prague, and Budapest.

Two European tendencies exerted a profound influence on the architecture of the Monarchy: the rise of art history and Richard Wagner's effort to create "Gesamtkunstwerke" ("total works of art"). Once again, continuity rather than rupture characterized the state of the arts: Gottfried Semper became Richard Wagner's theatre architect, the conductor and the scenery painter of the first Bayreuth performance of *Der Ring des Nibelungen*, the Hungarian János Richter (1843–1916) and the Viennese Josef Hoffmann (1831–1904) were members of Sitte's intellectual circle, in 1875 Sitte himself insisted on the importance of Richard Wagner's advocacy of artisan values in his address to the Vienna Wagner Society (*Richard Wagner und die deutsche Kunst*), and in 1883 he adorned the ceiling of the apartment he came to occupy as director of the new Trade School of Vienna with scenes from the tetralogy. The partly conservative, partly revolutionary ideal of the artist as the regenerator of culture embodied in *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg* became the driving force behind the intellectual and artistic achievements of the Monarchy that represented a strong opposition to the utilitarianism of the rapidly growing business-oriented society of the late nineteenth century. Schönberg characterized his sextet *Verklärte Nacht* (*Transfigured Night*, composed in 1899) in the following way:

the thematic construction is based on Wagnerian 'model and sequence' above a roving harmony on the one hand, and on Brahms' technique of developing variation – as I call it – on the other (Schoenberg 1984, 80).

Such a reconciliation of the legacies of Richard Wagner and Johannes Brahms did not characterize all Austrian composers of the late nineteenth century; one of Wagner's great admirers, the outstanding late Romantic master of "leider", Hugo Wolf (1860–1903), for example, decried the symphonies of Brahms in his writings on music.

The recordings of the composer-conductor Pierre Boulez have shown that one of the links between Richard Wagner and the second Vienna school was Gustav Mahler. Schönberg "at first considered Mahler's themes banal" (Schoenberg 1984, 455), but later discovered this composer's ability to elevate himself to resignation, his thinking for orchestra, and the melodic construction in his symphonies. In 1941 Bartók pointed out the decisive influence of Wagner in his *First String Quartet* (1908–1909), and scholarship has confirmed his opinion (Vikárius 1999, 49, 104). Numerous examples could be cited to prove that for the sonata form Richard Wagner substituted the Leitmotiv, a structuring principle that even an opponent to German culture such as Janáček borrowed, and paved the way for the emancipation of (unresolved) dissonances. Composition with twelve tones meant

a further step, a way of structuring that made Schönberg's school more radical than composition in other countries. He himself gave the following definition of the method of evolving the formal elements out of a twelve-tone "Reihe" ("row"), a medium of organization he used from 1921: "From the basic set, three additional sets are automatically derived: (1) the inversion; (2) the retrograde; and (3) the retrograde inversion" (Schoenberg 1984, 225).

Two of his pupils, the Viennese Anton von Webern (1883–1945) and Alban Berg (1885–1935) proved to be exceptionally original. In contrast to the monumental symphonies of Bruckner and Mahler, Webern's compositions are marked by extreme concentration. The third (Adagio) movement of Bruckner's *Eighth Symphony* (first performed in 1892) in a recording conducted by Pierre Boulez (Haas edition, DG 459 678-2) lasts twenty-four minutes and fifty-two seconds. The third piece in Webern's *Sechs Bagatellen für Streichquartett* (op. 9, composed between 1911 and 1913) lasts a mere twenty-two seconds in the interpretation of the La Salle Quartet (DG 419 994-2). Webern's *Fünf Stücke für Orchester* (op. 10, 1913) last four minutes and thirty-six seconds in a 1992 Boulez recording (DG 437 786-2). Four of the five pieces last less than one minute, and the duration of the second piece is thirty-nine seconds. In such works tone-colour is given a prominence unprecedented in Western music. In the words of Boulez, the stylistics of Webern "was revolutionary before and continued to be so after the row" (Boulez 1966, 372). The extreme brevity of his works, the use of large intervals and silence may be among the characteristics of his unique art that present difficulties for human perception. This is why his music has never met with a success comparable to that of *Wozzeck*, Berg's highly structured opera based on the dramatic fragments of Georg Büchner, composed between 1915 and 1921. This composer's "genius lay in resolving the tension existing between the idea of closed form and Wagner's continuous music-drama". The *Leitmotiv* plays a distinct role in this stage work, "really serving to elaborate forms and thus interpreting the dramatic and the musical thought" (Boulez 1986, 374–375).

In architecture the assault made on eclecticism comparable to the musical innovations of the second Viennese school and Bartók was launched in the last decade of the nineteenth century. In 1893 Otto Wagner (1841–1918) won a competition for a new development plan for the imperial capital. Two years earlier Ödön Lechner (1845–1914) and Gyula Pártos (1845–1916) won competitions with their plans for a City Council building in Kecskemét (in central Hungary) and for the building of a Museum of Applied Arts in Budapest. Both Otto Wagner and Ödön Lechner had successful historicism careers behind them. Otto Wagner's building of the *Österreichische Ländesbank* (1882–1884), for instance, has a Renaissance façade, and the apartment house Lechner designed for his father-in-law is in French Renaissance style (1871).

Even Otto Wagner's initiative cannot be called a form of counter-culture. In 1894, after the death of Carl Hasenauer, he was appointed Professor of Architecture at the Academy of Fine Arts. Roughly in the years between 1894 and 1901 he worked as the chief architect of the Vienna railways system and designed more than thirty stations, as well as cuts, viaducts, tunnels, and bridges, giving a prominent role to function, engineered structures, and such building materials as iron, glass, aluminium, and concrete. In *Moderne Architektur* (1895) he anticipated Fülep's critique of historicism by arguing that in art every style emerged gradually from the previous one, so that eclecticism was an illegitimate way of filling a gap in history. Later developments undermined his argument. From a Postmodern perspective, Otto Wagner's idea of a linear development seems somewhat naive and dogmatic. Despite his commitment to technology, he was tempted to view art as a surrogate religion. Symptomatically, his younger associate Joseph-Maria Olbrich (1867–1908) was to design the House of Secession (1898) as a modernized temple.

The difference between the Art Nouveau architecture of Vienna and Budapest lay in some Austrians' hostility to ornament. The most important among them was Adolf Loos, born in Brünn. Although relatively few of his plans were actually realized – the *Steiner House* in Vienna (1910) is one of them –, his writings, in which he argued against decoration, became influential after World War I, when the Bauhaus architects gave primary emphasis to functionalism. In this sense, Lechner was much closer to the mainstream represented by Belgian German Jugendstil, the Glasgow School, Belgian, French, Scandinavian, or North American Art Nouveau.

Klimt's *Salome* (1909, Galleria d'Arte Moderna, Venice) and other paintings can prove that hostility to ornamentation was restricted to architecture. One of the distinguishing features of Klimt's art was the blurring of the distinction between figure and ornamental background. In fact, it could be added that the influence of this painter made even Otto Wagner contradict himself; gilded trees of life can be seen on the façade of his two adjoining *Wienzeile Buildings* (1898–1899).

Following the example of the British Arts and Crafts movement, the Art Nouveau artists in the major cities of the Monarchy succeeded in undermining the opposition between art and everyday life by putting a special emphasis on interior design and the applied arts. Czech glasses, art deco, metallic and crystalline objects of the Wiener Werkstätten, a crafts workshop established around 1903 and dominated by Josef Hoffmann (1870–1956), or the products of the ceramic factory of Vilmos Zsolnay (1828–1900) in Pécs, a city in Southern Hungary, transformed not only upper-class but even middle-class homes. Such periodicals as *Magyar Iparművészet* (*Hungarian Applied Art*, from 1897), *Kunst und Kunsthandwerk*, *Ver Sacrum* (both from 1898), *Das Interieur* (from 1900), and *Wiener Werkstätten* (from 1903) campaigned for a reconciliation between the aesthetic

and the useful. The ideal of the Gesamtkunswerk inspired numerous artists to experiment with different media: Schönberg exhibited portraits and landscapes with the Expressionists, Oskar Kokoschka (1886–1980) published *Die träumenden Knaben* (*The Dreaming Boys*, 1908), a fairy tale in verse with colour lithographs, and Kassák designed his books.

If we want to assess the significance of the culture of the Dual Monarchy, we cannot help but conclude that it is more justifiable to emphasize the unity of conservatism and innovation in the intellectual and cultural scene than to speak of a conflict between them. Clear-cut distinctions and turning points are ruled out by two facts: the period since World War I has shown that the same intellectual phenomenon can be read as representing continuity or rupture, depending on the interpreter's historical perspective, and the innovator in one sphere often had retrograde views in another. To mention but one example, the satirist Karl Kraus, the founder and from 1913 sole contributor of the periodical *Die Fackel* (*The Torch*, 1899–1936) and the author of the visionary *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit* (*The Last Days of Mankind*, 1919), was consistently hostile to the painting of Klimt.

One of the shortcomings in the historians' interpretation of the legacy of the Monarchy is the underestimation of the stratification of culture.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, traditional opera became increasingly a minority interest; its élite audience of connoisseurs was able to follow it into the abstract and intellectual realm of Wagner and of post-Wagnerian music (Hanák 1994, 210).

Such generalizations can hardly stand. The notion of “traditional opera” does not apply in any relevant way to the complexity of the interrelations between the earlier tradition of Italian opera and the successful development of national schools there were as different from each other as French “grand opéra” and German “Singspiel. The concepts of “minority” and “élite” are vague in a sociological sense. More than terminology is at stake here. The relevance of the adjectives that are supposed to characterize Wagner's art is questionable in view of the musical and theatrical achievement that made the Bayreuth Festival a radically new institution. Wagner's influence transformed the attitude of the public in the Monarchy not only because of the composer's several stays in the Austrian and Hungarian capitals but also through the activity of such outstanding conductors as János Richter, Antal Seidl (1850–1898), and Gustav Mahler. Richter was the conductor of the opening performances in Bayreuth in 1876 and the first performance of Bartók's *Kossuth Symphony* in Manchester in 1904. Seidl led the campaign for Wagner's art in *Zenészeti Lapok* (*Musical Letters*, 1860–1876), published in Budapest, and conducted the first performance of the Ring in the Hungarian capital in 1883. Mahler's interpretations of Wagner during his stay in Budapest (1889–1891) and Vienna (1897–1907) set an exceptionally high standard. In Bu-

dapest he staged most performances in Hungarian. While from the perspective of the present age this practice might seem questionable, around 1890 it certainly made opera more accessible to the wider audience. In Vienna Mahler worked together with the stage designer Alfred Roller (1864–1935), who was also born in Moravia. In Budapest the composer-conductor succeeded in convincing the audience of the importance of stagecraft and *mise-en-scène*, setting an example for Count Miklós Bánffy (1873–1950), who during World War I staged Bartók's first ballet *A fából faragott királyfi* (*The Wooden Prince*) and in 1918 his only opera *A kékszakállú herceg vára* (*Duke Bluebeard's Castle*) (Szegedy-Maszák 2007a, 180–181).

Both Roller and Bánffy were painters, and their work was closely related to Austrian and Hungarian Art Nouveau. The difference between the two was inseparable from a difference in attitude towards peasant culture. While Otto Wagner spurned folk art, Lechner made use of the ornaments of peasant objects. At the beginning of the twentieth century some regions of Hungary still had an archaic peasant culture rooted in the distant past. In the summer of 1904 Bartók heard old Hungarian folk songs for the first time in a village in Upper Hungary (today Southern Slovakia). In 1906 Lechner published a manifesto insisting that “the Hungarian national style had to be discovered in the culture of the Hungarian people” (Lechner 1906, 6). At the same time, he referred to Finnish art and the activity of Otto Wagner and the *Wiener Werkstätten*. His goals were similar to those of Bartók, who published *Magyar népdalok* (*Hungarian Folksongs*, 1906) for voice with piano accompaniment with his colleague Zoltán Kodály (1882–1967). The similarities with Janáček's collecting of Moravian, Slovak, and Czech folk songs are undeniable. Among the works of both Janáček and Bartók one finds harmonized versions, more or less radically modified arrangements of folk songs, and original works containing elements of folklore. The Moravian composer's endeavour to instil into the future teachers a love of folk music which they could then pass on to the children in schools parallels Kodály's efforts to change education in music.

## 6. Literature and the Other Arts

Nevertheless, an overemphasis on folklorism would lead to distortion. Just as Bartók's second ballet, *A csodálatos mandarin* (*The Miraculous Mandarin*, completed in 1919) begins with an explicit imitation of the noises of the metropolis, in the same way, urbanization made a great impact on Hungarian literature. A literary historian cannot quite agree with the statement that the

city of the big tenements and brownstone schools, of the eclectic and ambitious public buildings, of millenary monuments and broad avenues does not surface in the pictures painted or stories told of Budapest (Forgács 1994, 317).

Counter-examples abound, especially in short fiction, but there are also novels that present life in the metropolis. *A püspök atyafisága* (*The Bishop's Relatives*, 1889), Ödön Iványi (1854–1893) has scenes in such public buildings as the Parliament and the Stock Exchange; *Midás király* (*King Midas*, serialized in 1891–1892) by Zoltán Ambrus (1861–1932) is about everyday life in an apartment house; *Budapest* (1901) by Tamás Kóbor (1867–1944) is a naturalistic “tranche de vie” about the less prosperous of the two Jewish districts of the city; *A kristálynézők* (*The Crystal Gazers*, 1914) by Kálmán Harsányi (1876–1929) is a roman à clef about the different intellectual circles of Budapest, including the members of the urban Art Nouveau group centred around Lechner. One of the most successful playwrights of the period, Ferenc Molnár (1878–1952), published several prose narratives about Budapest, including *A Pál utcai fiúk* (*The Boys of Pál Street*, 1907), a widely read and translated novel about one of the industrial districts of the city. The influence of urbanization was so strong that even Jókai felt an obligation to devote a work to the life of the petty bourgeoisie; *Gazdag szegények* (*The Wealthy Poor*, 1890) was even put on stage in 1893. Gyula Krúdy (1878–1933), a highly original and extremely prolific Hungarian writer, published numerous works of fiction about the Hungarian capital, including *A vörös postakocsi* (1913, translated as *The Crimson Coach*), a novel about actresses. With the advent of the avant-garde links between urbanization and art became even closer. Kassák's free-verse poem *Mesteremberek* (*Craftsmen*, 1915) is a collective monologue of workers. *A Keleti Pályaudvar éjjel* (*The Eastern Train Station at Night*, 1902), by Tivadar Csontváry Kosztka (1853–1919), a major painter whose work represents a transition from Art Nouveau to Expressionism, portrays one of the new public buildings of a rapidly changing city. Advertisement was also transformed, and the painters who made posters tried to bridge the gap between high and popular art. The Hungarians who cultivated this genre were inferior to the Czech Alphonse Mucha (1860–1933), who spent much of his early life in Paris, the birthplace of the poster, although he was also one of the founders of *Ver Sacrum*.

New forms of popular culture developed almost imperceptibly out of old genres, especially in literature. The “Volkstück”, a form of popular entertainment cultivated by the Viennese Nepomuk Nestroy (1801–1862) and the Hungarian Ede Szigligeti (1814–1878), was transformed into such musical comedies as *János vitéz* (*John the Hero*, 1904). It is based on Petőfi's celebrated verse tale (1844), and music was composed by Pongrác Kacsóh (1873–1923). The success of this work was largely due to the acting of Sári Fedák (1879–1953), who sung the male title role. She was one of the most talented actresses of the early 20th century.



(Sadly enough, at the end of her long and spectacular career she was deported by the Communists.)

Although several composers of the so-called Viennese operetta were Hungarian, the works of Ferenc Lehár (1870–1948) and Imre Kálmán (1882–1953) contained fewer “Hungarian” elements than *Der Zigeunerbaron* (*The Gypsy Baron*, 1885) by Johann Strauss Jr. (1825–1899), the libretto of which was based on a story by Jókai. Schönberg’s main charge against this kind of popular music was that it asked for no mental (intellectual and emotional) effort. It “accommodated (...) to the popular feeling” and thus concealed the fact that “unvaried repetition” was “cheap” (Schönberg 1984, 128, 131). As early as 1909 he insisted that market-value was “irrelevant to intrinsic value”. His rejection of popular culture became even more unqualified after he had been forced to settle in the U. S.: “if it is art, it is not for all, and if it is for all, it is not art”, he insisted, and he added: “Popular music speaks to the unsophisticated, to the people who love the beauty of music but are not inclined to strengthen their mind” (Schönberg 1984, 190, 124, 134). Such a conception implies that popular culture is characterized by addition, mere juxtaposition, and unmodified repetition, potpourri (a randomness that may remind some of what is meant by “bricolage” nowadays), whereas high culture is distinguished by “variation and development”. In short, “the laws of art work in a way that contradicts the way the popular mind works”. Serious art followed the principle of “never repeating without varying” (Schoenberg 1984, 265, 299, 480).

Much of the literature of the age could not meet such high standards. The literature that was published often relied on oral culture. Jókai was a passionate collector of anecdotes. Many of them appeared in the comic weekly *Üstökös* (*Comet*, 1858–1918). Two of its successors, *Borsszem Jankó* (1868–1936), read mainly by the lower middle-class, and *Kakas Márton* (1894–1914), were responsible for the development of jokes. In its best period *Borsszem Jankó* was edited by Adolf Ágai (originally Aigner, 1836–1916), an assimilated Jew. Between 1870 and the early 1890s it had a readership of 15,000–20,000. It often ridiculed the national minorities (including Jews). The most popular figure of *Kakas Márton* was the village mayor Gábor Göre, created by Géza Gárdonyi (1863–1922), the author of plays, short stories, and *Egri csillagok* (*The Stars of Eger*, 1901), a very popular historical novel about the Hungarians’ struggle against Ottoman occupation in the sixteenth century.

In certain respects Budapest could not help imitating Vienna. The Ring and the café represent two forms of public space that played a major role in the literary and artistic life of both cities. They are the location of the first two scenes in the above-mentioned *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit* by Karl Kraus, a satirical “tragedy” in five acts that incorporates speeches and editorials from the newspapers.

The café represented journalism and the Ring public institutions; the two were so closely interconnected that the one without the other seemed of no avail. The huge conglomeration of scenes that Kraus composed with the intention of presenting World War I in the form of an apocalyptic vision is closely related to journalism; several parts were published in *Die Fackel* before the whole work appeared as a book. If Weininger represented self-hatred, Kraus exercised another form of self-criticism: one of the targets of *Die Fackel* was journalism, the narcissism of feuilleton writing, the press and especially *Die neue freie Presse*, the most popular Viennese newspaper, which was infiltrated by political and business interests.

In Vienna and Budapest artists and writers spent most of their time in cafés and clubs. Peter Altenberg (originally Richard Engländer, 1859–1919), whose five “Ansichtskartentexten” (“picture postcard texts”) Alban Berg set to music in 1912, for instance, lived in the Café Central. Both the poet Ady and the prose writer Krúdy used the café as their workplace.

It was only in 1914 that an important difference became manifest in the attitudes of the Austrian and Hungarian artists and writers. Among the Hungarians most were reluctant to fight for the Monarchy, whereas among the Austrians there were many who were ready to participate in the war.

When the First World War began [Schönberg declared in 1950], I was proud to be called to arms and as a soldier I did my whole duty enthusiastically as a true believer in the house of Habsburg, in its wisdom of 800 years in the art of government and in the consistency of a monarch’s lifetime, as compared with the shorter lifetime of every republic. In other words, I became a monarchist. Also at this time and after the unfortunate ending of the war and for many years thereafter, I considered myself (...) a quiet believer in this form of government, though the chances of a restoration were at zero (Schoenberg 1984, 505–506).

Because of his strong attachment to the Monarchy, Kokoschka joined an élite corps of the Imperial Cavalry in 1915. He felt convinced that for someone whose life and work were deeply rooted in the traditions of the Monarchy it was a natural obligation to fight for the survival of that state. His vision of the Monarchy resembled that of Stefan Zweig, and his approach to tradition was similar to that of Schönberg and Wittgenstein. In 1949, in a letter to an English student, he himself explained that his art originated in the Baroque culture that “was still a tradition alive” in his boyhood. He named Maulbertsch, Daniel Gran, Kremser Schmidt, the sculptor Matthias Braun, the architects Fischer von Erlach and Hildebrandt as his masters.

This Baroque culture, of which still thousands of humble votives, shrines and crucifixes on the crossroads are witnesses, has saturated

me with the same mystic vein as you and your friends find in El Greco (Kokoschka 1992, 204).

Additional evidence of the ambiguity of the opposition of modern versus conservative could be the activity of Max Reinhardt (originally Maximilian Goldmann, 1883–1943). Although he was born in Vienna, his first great success was a production of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* in the Deutsches Theater Berlin in 1905. Karl Kraus saw superficiality in Reinhardt's works. If one watches the film version Reinhardt co-directed in 1935, this criticism cannot be dismissed as entirely illegitimate, although it is possible that after his emigration to the U. S. the director had to make concessions to popular taste. His early productions represented a reaction against naturalism. In 1906, in the Berlin Kammerspiele, which had no more than four hundred seats, he produced Ibsen's *Ghosts* with stage design by Edvard Munch, the Norwegian forerunner of Expressionism. The photographs that have survived suggest that his staging of the German writer Karl Vollmöller's *The Miracle* (London 1911, Vienna 1912) was characterized by remarkable visual effects. His plan to start a Festival in Salzburg with Hugo Hofmannsthal (1874–1929), was delayed by World War I. Kraus's attack on the first performance of *Jedermann* (*Everyman*) was at least partly directed against the text, Hofmannsthal's 1911 rewriting of the late medieval English morality. Other theatrical experts were impressed by the way the Baroque sculptures of the Cathedral Square were transformed into the allegorical characters of the play.

In retrospect, Alfred Roller, who sometimes worked together with Reinhardt, might seem a less spectacular but more sophisticated artist. The surviving visual and verbal documents suggest that during his association with Mahler in the Vienna Hofoper (from 1903 on) his productions were highly innovative in their handling of the interrelations of space, colour, light, music, word, and gesture. He excelled not only in the interpretation of Richard Wagner's works; his *Don Giovanni*, first created on 21 December 1905, was especially original: the transformations of the same columns served as the background to all the scenes.

No less remarkable was the activity of the Polish Stanisław Wyspiański (1869–1907). During his visits to Paris (1890–1894) he became acquainted with French painting and theatre. His portraits, paintings, and drawings, as well as his furniture and stained-glass designs represent a Cracovian variety of Art Nouveau. They served as a kind of background to his theatrical productions. He was no mere playwright. Both *Wesele* (*The Wedding*, 1901), his most popular work, and *Wyzwolenie* (*Deliverance*, 1903) ask for a wide range of extra-verbal effects, paving the way for avant-garde theatre.

It is often argued that the dramatic and narrative works composed in the Dual Monarchy owed their inventiveness to the impact of psychoanalysis. Those who turn to psychoanalysis to explain art usually produce rather one-sided interpreta-

tions. As I have pointed out elsewhere (Szegedy-Maszák 2007b), the fundamental difference between the short stories of Kosztolányi and his cousin Géza Csáth (originally József Brenner, 1887–1919) is that Kosztolányi kept a distance from the conclusions drawn by Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), whereas Csáth, himself a practising doctor, was increasingly tempted to reduce his tales to case studies. Kosztolányi had reservations about the value of psychoanalysis for art that were similar to those of Kraus. It was hardly accidental that this Hungarian author was one of the earliest translators of the verse of his Austrian contemporary.

Freud's literary contribution was twofold. He was a very prolific essayist who covered numerous fields, including the visual arts and literature. Several of his books exerted a decisive influence on literature. *Die Traumdeutung* (*The Interpretation of Dreams*, 1900) changed the treatment of dreams. One could cite numerous works, ranging from *A gólyakalifa* (literally *The Stork Calif*, 1913), a short novel about double identity by Mihály Babits, to *La coscienza di Zeno* (*The Confessions of Zeno*, 1923), by the Trieste-born Italo Svevo (pseudonym of Ettore Schmitz, 1861–1928), the Italian translator of Freud's above-mentioned book.

There is no denying that the rise of psychoanalysis went together with changes in the writers' approaches to their characters. Arthur Schnitzler, for instance, highlighted the life of instincts in a series of successful although somewhat superficial plays presenting sexuality as liberated from moral values. He also experimented with the interior monologue in such novellas as *Leutnant Gustl* (*Lieutenant Gustl*, 1901) and *Fräulein Else* (*Miss Else*, 1924). Csáth published a study on psychic complexes (*Az elmebetegségek pszichikus mechanizmusa*, *The Psychic Mechanism of Mental Illnesses*, 1911), and in *Anyagyilkosság* (*Matricide*, 1908) and other stories he tackled the manifestations of repressed sexuality. Caught between science and art, Schnitzler and Csáth produced provocative texts rather than finished works of art.

Csáth was a drug addict whose life ended in suicide. In his stories cruelty is often combined with deliberate artificiality and a sense of decadence, two characteristics that are manifest in the works of Hugo von Hofmannsthal, a fully assimilated Jewish poet, playwright, short-story writer, and essayist. His lyric *Ballade des äusseren Lebens* (*The Ballad of Exterior Life*, 1896) served as a model for *Esti kérdés* (*Question at Night*, 1908) by Mihály Babits. The Hungarian poem can be read as a palinode, a recantation of the earlier work. It is usually assumed that the Hungarian periodical *Nyugat* (*West*) expressed by its very name a desire to break loose from Vienna and turn to cultures beyond the German-speaking territory.

Budapest certainly made serious attempts to compete with Vienna. In the 1890s the painter József Rippl-Rónai (1861–1924) joined the group called "Les Nabis" in Paris. In the next decade the poet Ady visited the French capital and translated poems by Baudelaire, Verlaine, and Jehan Rictus for his verse collection *Új versek* (*New Poems*, 1906). The Transylvanian-born prose writer Dezső

Szabó (1879–1945) published essays on Laforgue, Rimbaud, Verlaine (1911), Corbière, Paul Fort, and Marinetti (1912) in *Nyugat*, and Babits was an avid reader of the British poets of the late nineteenth century. Still, in his *Esti kérdés* the parallels with the syntactic structure and existential questioning of Hofmannsthal's *Ballade* is clear evidence of the similarities between Austrian and Hungarian poetry. The long essay on Rilke, published in *Nyugat* in 1909, claiming that "today Vienna means more in world lyrics than Paris, London, or Germany as a whole" (Kosztolányi 1975, 347), and the same poet's numerous translations of poems from Rilke's *Das Stundenbuch* (*The Book of Hours*, 1905), *Das Buch der Bilder* (*The Book of Pictures*, 92, 1906), and *Neue Gedichte* (*New Poems*, 1907) are further proof of the close link between the Austrian and Hungarian poetry of the early twentieth century. Although the word "rilkissimus" was applied to Kosztolányi in a newspaper article by Dezső Szabó in 1920 (Kosztolányi 1977, 640), the indebtedness of Kosztolányi's cycle of poems *A szegény kisgyermek panasza* (*The Laments of a Poor Little Child*, 1910) to Rilke is far less direct in comparison with Babits's imitation of Hofmannsthal. Kosztolányi's war-time short story *Káin* (*Cain*, 1916) is a free and even distorted rewriting of the fifteen-line section of *Das Stundenbuch* that has the following inscription: "Der blasse Abelknabe spricht" ("The pale Abel speaks"). The poem is a monologue of the dead Abel, whereas the prose narrative is about a Cain who lives in contentment after the death of his brother.

In his essay *Der Dichter und diese Zeit* (*The Poet and Our Age*, 1906) Hofmannsthal formulated the thesis that what other generations had believed to be firm was in fact moving, slipping, sliding ("das Gleitende"). In *Ein Brief* (*A Letter*, 1902), a fictitious letter written by Lord Chandos in 1603 and addressed to Francis Bacon, he expressed a deep dissatisfaction with language. Later he abandoned lyric poetry for prose fiction and drama. Among his highly stylized short stories *Der goldene Apfel* (*The Golden Apple*, 1897) and *Dämmerung und nächtliches Gewitter* (*Twilight and Night Storm*, 1911–1913) are deliberately unfinished or open-ended. His early one-act verse play *Der Tor und der Tod* (*The Fool and Death*, 1893) relies on the tradition of moralities. Claudio is visited by death, who, playing his violin, brings three visitors from the other world to the hero's study: his mother, his lover, and his friend. This work paved the way for the poet's revival of *Everyman*. He reworked Thomas Otway's blank-verse tragedy *Venice Preserved, or a Plot Discovered* (1682) and Calderón's *La vida es sueño* (1635). His adaptation of the Greek drama *Elektra* (1904), suggesting that the tragedy happens within the heroine's mind, inspired Richard Strauss to compose his most chromatic opera, produced in 1909. Their collaboration continued with other libretti for the operas *Der Rosenkavalier* (1911), *Ariadne auf Naxos* (*Ariadne on the Island of Naxos*, 1912), *Die ägyptische Helene* (1928), and *Arabella* (193). In *Der Rosenkavalier* he expressed a nostalgia for the period of

Maria Theresa, whereas in the semiseria Ariadne he relied on the tradition of a play within the play. It is probably no great exaggeration to suggest that Hofmannsthal's later eclecticism could be linked to his inability to accept the disappearance of the Habsburg Monarchy. One could go one step further and argue that the relative failure of *Die Frau ohne Schatten* (*The Woman without a Shadow*, 1919), a highly ambitious opera by Strauss, may at least partly be due to the artificial fantasy play based on the longer prose narrative juxtaposing a fairy-tale emperor and empress with the earthly characters of a dyer and his wife.

The setting for *Der Tor und der Tod* is a villa in the 1820s. Hofmannsthal's nostalgia for the Biedermeier is contemporaneous with the art historian Riegl's rehabilitation of Biedermeier culture, Klimt's panel *Schubert at the Piano* (1899) or the music-salon of the Ringstraße Maecenas Nikolaus Dumba, as well as Mahler's evocations of early nineteenth-century music and his numerous settings to music of pieces from the collection *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* (1805–1808) made by Achim von Arnim and Clemens von Brentano.

Auf der Straß stand ein Lindenbaum,  
da hab' ich zum ersten Mal im Schlaf geruht!  
(Upon the road there stood a linden tree,  
there for the first time I slept in peace!)

These words from the final song of the cycle *Lieder eines fahrenden Gesellen* (*Songs of a Wayfarer*, 1884) refer back to the fifth song of Schubert's *Winterreise* (1827). Rewriting continued to be cultivated by the younger generation, reaffirming the unity of innovation and conservatism characterizing the culture of the Monarchy. Kokoschka's playlet *Mörder, Hoffnung der Frauen* (*Murder, Hope of Women*), staged in 1909 and published in the Expressionist periodical *Der Sturm* (*The Storm*) in 1910, for instance, is based on Heinrich von Kleist's *Penthesilea* (1808).

## 7. In Lieu of a Conclusion

The wide range of cultural products, from the annual performances of *Jedermann* at the Salzburger Festspiele to novels, play, and poems recalling the past, testifies to the significance of the cultural legacy of the Dual Monarchy. Instead of drawing a conclusion, let it suffice to mention two symptomatic facts. On November 3, 1914 a Medical Corps lieutenant of the Austro-Hungarian army died in a hospital in Cracow at the age of twenty-six. Deranged by what he had experienced as a dispensing chemist in the battle of Grodek, he had taken an overdose of drugs. Today this Salzburg-born poet Georg Trakl (1887–1914) is read as one of the greatest lyric poets of the twentieth century. His three hundred poems appeared in Ludwig von Ficker's periodical *Der Brenner* in 1914–1915 and in two

collections: *Gedichte (Poems, 1913)* and *Sebastian im Traum (Sebastian in Dream, 1914)*. In his Expressionist poetry the invisible is made visible, the physical world is subordinated to the spiritual, the soul is called a stranger on the earth: “Es ist die Seele ein Fremdes auf Erden”, as the poem “Frühling der Seele” (“The Spring of the Soul”) affirms, and pain is an existential gift of everything that exists – “Der Schmerz ist die Gunst des Wesenhaften alles Wesenden”, as his interpreter says (Heidegger, 1985, 60). His language of extreme concentration is as exceptional in literature as the texture of Webern’s music. The last of Webern’s cycle of orchestral songs, *Vier Lieder* (op. 13, completed after an interruption occasioned by military duties in 1918), and his *Sechs Lieder* (op. 14, composed between 1917 and 1921) for voice with clarinet, bass clarinet, violin, and cello, are based on poems by Trakl.

In 1945 this composer was staying in the small house of his brother-in-law near Salzburg. On September 15 he had supper with his family. Around 9 o’clock he stepped out of the house because he did not want to disturb his grandchild with his smoking. An American soldier shot him. Later at the trial this soldier tried to argue that he acted in self-defence. His statement was dismissed as untrue. “Do you know what kind of myth *that’s* going to make in a thousand years?” asks a character in one of the great American novels of the second half of the twentieth century, and then he gives the following answer: “The young barbarians coming in to murder the Last European, standing at the far end of what’d been going on since Bach” (Pynchon 1975, 440).

These two incidents might be regarded as an epilogue to the history of the culture of the country once known as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

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# HUNGARIAN WRITERS ON THE MILITARY MISSION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY IN THE BALKANS

VICEROY KÁLLAY AND GOOD SOLDIER TÖMÖRKÉNY

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The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy's military missions on the Balkans can provide the only experience in Hungarian history that can be connected with a notion of colonization. The paper scrutinises some Hungarian writers' responses to that experience. Kálmán Mikszáth as a journalist shows a shift in attitude; he strongly criticized the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but eventually he proudly advertised a colonizing discourse. The most important monument of the 40-year connection with Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Hungarian culture was János Asbóth's monography in two volumes entitled *Bosnia and Herzegovina*. In that work the celebration of modernisation, westernisation, the development of economy and infrastructure does not imply racism and religious intolerance. The short stories by István Tömörkény that describe the military life in the sanjak Novi Bazar offer a careful analysis of the cultural and linguistic aspects of the experience of otherness in the multicultural Balkan environment.

**Keywords:** imagology, Balkans, Muslims, Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, nineteenth-century Hungarian literature

## I

Hungary never had colonies. Moreover, it was conquered by various empires during its history, and this historical situation might suggest that the Hungarian attitude towards colonialism should be that of the colonised, but it is usually not the case. Hungarians tend to describe themselves as conquered, but not colonised. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy played a role that can be compared to that of the colonisers. In 1878 the Congress of Berlin settled the situation after the Russ-Turkish War. The Russian Empire won the war, but the European powers did not allow it to use its military success to redraw the political map of the Balkan Peninsula as it desired. Austria-Hungary was commissioned to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. The goal of the dual Monarchy was actually not to extend its territory, but to prevent Russia from extending its influence in the region. The situation for Hungarians was more delicate. During

the second half of the nineteenth century Hungarian politicians regarded Russia as the most threatening enemy, and therefore the Hungarian public supported the Turks in the war, although the Turks had been the traditional enemies, a fact constantly reiterated even in children's stories. Counterbalancing the Russian influence in the region was therefore an acceptable intention – especially because Pan-Slavism was regarded the most dangerous ideology threatening the integrity of the kingdom. Hungarians, however, did not like the idea of the occupation, even less the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which finally happened in 1908), because they did not want to increase the percentage of the Slavic population inside the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Hungarian political discourse seldom focused on that occupied territory. Bosnia and Herzegovina was a poor and underdeveloped region, and its occupation never seemed a fruitful enterprise. Actually there were no sources to be exploited. The Monarchy rather had to spend a lot of money on the occupation, government, policing, infrastructure, and general development. The occupation therefore was rather regarded a mission of civilising, which is, however, a constant part of colonising discourse. A survey of the places where Kálmán Mikszáth (1847–1910), a life-long journalist, mentions the occupied territories can demonstrate the attitude of public opinion in Hungary towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1878 he made a character of a sketch say in a pub: “The bill, please ... As long as I have some money to spend. Until [prime minister] Tisza bosnias away our last penny”<sup>1</sup> (“*János úr, a politikus vagy a szegedi kísértet*” [John the politician or the Szeged ghost] Mikszáth 1965, 70). The verb I translated as *to bosnia away* was coined by the author and it is a *hapax legomenon* in Hungarian literature. It more or less means ‘to spend on Bosnia’ or ‘gamble away in a game called Bosnia’, but it also implies a rather rude pun based on the similarity of the name of the region and the infinitive form of the Hungarian verb that means ‘to fuck’. Therefore the phrase suggests that Tisza “pisses the money away on Bosnia”.

Mikszáth did not show too much sympathy towards the government that time. As a journalist he usually supported the ideas of the opposition, who championed a program of independence. The slow change in his political attitude, which resulted in his close friendship with prime minister Tisza and the joining of his party as a member of parliament in 1887, went parallel with the change in the Hungarian public's attitude towards Bosnia. During the occupation and the suppression of the local uprising, when Hungarian soldiers were bleeding and dying for an obviously meaningless conquest, which was to weaken the Hungarian position inside the Monarchy, he used harsh words against the cause, emphasising the absurdity, the costs and the moral indefensibility of the campaign. “We have bitten into the sour apple of occupation. Our empire is going to be extended. Curse on this extension!”<sup>2</sup> (Mikszáth 1968, 58.) He employed conspicuous Biblical imagery to

emphasise the vicious nature of the war. In another article he protested against Hungarian involvement in Bosnian affairs:

The war of conquest is going on without victories, miserably. Without victories, when even a victory would make one blush. There is a curse upon Austria's unsheathed sword; its edge is blunt, its blade is fragile, its grasp is glowing. Oh shame that Hungarian guys have to hold that grasp! (Mikszáth 1966, 202)

This protest against the Hungarian involvement in the war, however, does not imply any antimilitary or pacifist attitude, since another article of the same period he brings to the fore the rather strange suggestion of a war against Serbia:

If our brave monarchy really wants a conquest, it should conquer Serbia as well. Bosnia is going to be a disgusting hunchback on its body; but if Serbia is joined to it too, the gaps will be filled up, and its body will receive nice muscles and good proportions.

Serbia, if she is controlled and joined to the Austro-Hungarian Empire with Bosnia, will create a strong dam against future Slavic currents. (Mikszáth 1966, 76)

The sustained metaphor of the empire's body concludes in the rather aggressive idea that the deformity of one's own body can be cured through the incorporation of the other's. This exceptional declaration suggests that the problem with the occupation was caused not so much by the costs, its immoral character, or the horrors of war generally, but by the poverty and backwardness of the occupied territory. It was not good business. However, it is exactly the poverty and backwardness that allowed Hungarian public opinion to create the narrative of a civilising mission in a medieval country. The conquest ceases to mean killing and oppressing people, but bringing for them development and enlightenment, i.e., European laws, institutions and know-how. It took twenty years of continuous investment, until in 1897 it was celebrated as a great success that the territory had become able to cover the costs of its own governing.

A novel published in 1887 by a woman writer repeatedly described the "colonization of the occupied territories" (Wohl 1907, vol. 2, 32) as a symptom of an ambitious but basically mistaken policy that serves the personal prestige of the leading politicians through eye-catching monumental projects instead of the equitable and forceful development of the homeland.

Bosnia and Herzegovina had a special status in the dual Monarchy, since they did not belong either to the Austrian Empire or to the Hungarian Kingdom. Their viceroy was the Common Finance Minister. (Both Austria and Hungary had their own Finance Ministers and a third one in common to manage the financial aspects of the common affairs, such as the common army and foreign affairs.) For a long

time, 1882–1903, the territory was governed by a Hungarian politician, Benjámín Kállay (1839–1903).

In 1888 Mikszáth published a sketch on Kállay (Mikszáth 1983, 27–29), most parts of which he made use of when he wrote Kállay's obituary fifteen years later. Kállay was a "political genius",<sup>3</sup> he writes, "who was working with inspiration as a novelist", and "that may explain such rapid development that Bosnia can be said to be flying toward civilisation" (Mikszáth 1910, 193). This statement implies that Bosnia had been completely uncivilised before the occupation and the mission of the Monarchy was forcing development. The viceroy's "notebook was always full of selected tricky plans of how Bosnians can be deceived so that they move in the proper direction" (Mikszáth 1910, 194). He was "stubborn in the execution of his plans, but Bosnians are also very stubborn in their backwardness. It is easier to make the Drina River flow backwards than to make a Bosnian go forward" (Mikszáth 1910, 195). We can see the implication of the view of history as a single line and unidirectional movement, familiar from ethnographic discourse. Hungarians know which direction is the proper one, and they are proud that they are able to push the uncivilised Bosnians in that direction. Mikszáth describes two examples of the viceroy's tricky plans, both concerning the development of agriculture. Every Bosnian received a taxation booklet every year, which contained an article in Turkish or in "Slavic language" on the most modern ways of growing plum trees or viticulture. (The plum was actually the only product the region was famous for also before the occupation.<sup>4</sup>) If a family had a literate member, the information necessarily infiltrated into their life, since the taxation booklet usually was the only material to read. Another example is Kállay's campaign to make Bosnians use iron ploughs instead of their traditional wooden ones.

## II

The most important monument in Hungarian culture of the forty-year connection with Bosnia and Herzegovina is János Asbóth's monograph in two volumes entitled *Bosnia and Herzegovina* (1887). It was also created in connection with Benjámín Kállay's person. Asbóth (1845–1911) was a political thinker,<sup>5</sup> who, however, also wrote a single novel, which is nowadays regarded as an important contribution to the history of Hungarian fiction. As a leading employee of the Monarchy's Ministry for Foreign Affairs he was a member of viceroy Kállay's team, and he traveled throughout Bosnia in his company for four years. The description of the region is structured in accordance with a narrative of those travels into the various districts. The narration of a district's history, the description of the geographical setting and the economic situation, and the ethnographic discourse are impregnated with references to personal experience, reflections on the Monar-

chy's mission and celebration of the changes already caused by the new connection, and especially through Kállay's activity.

A little narrative inserted into the description of the capital Sarajevo can exemplify Asbóth's technique of presentation. The narrative is attached to a short remark on the huge eastern Christian church, which does not fit in the Islamic town through its modern Byzantine design. "It has been standing there only for fifteen years" Asbóth says,<sup>6</sup> "and when it was built it became really evident how much of an Islamic town Sarajevo is" (Asbóth 1887, 1.124.) The narrative of the church construction, which is said to have made the town's religious character visible, begins with a surprising reference to an eyewitness:

The minister, who has come here now to organise the country, happened to be present that time too. Being the consul-general in Beograd he travelled all over Bosnia on horseback to get acquainted with the situation.

The minister referred to is of course Benjámín Kállay, who was Austria-Hungary's consul-general in Serbia between 1867–1875. The narrator suggests a sort of discernment through not telling his name, although he implies a narrative of the conscientious and well-prepared administrator, who carefully and devotedly studied the region already ten years before his appointment. The new Christian church was bigger than any mosque in Sarajevo, but what really annoyed the Moslems was the installation of the great bells.

The excited crowd marched along the main street, where the church stood; hadji Loya, who later became the chief organizer of the resistance during the occupation, was leading them. When he met the Austro-Hungarian consul-general from Beograd, who was just watching the upheaval as a simple tourist, he cast at him a glance of dark fanaticism, and he said under his breath with grin of hatred: 'giaour'.

Finally the pasha suppressed the upheaval and forbade the bells. The narrative of the church building uses Kállay to guarantee the reliability of Bosnia's historical and geographical description. Even one's words said "under his breath" or emotions expressed only by a glance can be narrated as exempla that make up an image of the locals. The consul-general is the only person who could pass these pieces of information to the narrator. Readers should imagine a middle phase of the narration, when the eye-witness narrated the story of hadji Loya's glance to the narrator, and the reader's activity is encouraged also by the (not too difficult) puzzle of the consul-general's identity. The later antagonists' moral qualities are also displayed in this miniature scene; the later viceroy is called an organizer, which suggests disorder before his appointment, and has the discerned and benev-

olent look of an observer, while the leader of the local upheaval is causing trouble due to religious intolerance and hatred.

Intolerance plays an important role in Asbóth's survey of Bosnia's medieval history, when it was more or less dependent from the Hungarian kings, who wore the title "king of Rama" (i.e., Bosnia) and the crown princes were always Princes of Bosnia; but the country was governed by local 'bans' (Asbóth 1887, 1.41). Asbóth describes the extension of the Hungarian influence as a sort of benevolent defense against other powers like Byzantium or Venice. He writes both on Croatia and Bosnia that "they were looking for defense and they found it under the Hungarian crown" (Asbóth 1887, 1.37 and 41). The coexistence resulted, Asbóth repeatedly states, in Bosnia's golden age during the periods when the Hungarian kings were not intervening in the territory's religious affairs. However, many Hungarian kings – in alliance with Rome – were sending crusades against the Bogomil heretics, and "eventually the Roman Church and Hungary lost Bosnia because they would not tolerate the Bogomils" (Asbóth 1887, 1.29).

Some copies of the first volume contain some unnumbered pages between the foreword and the first chapter with a sort of advertisement. This text offers a summary of Asbóth's statements about the history and the current state of the region. It emphasizes the importance of religion in the history of Bosnia. The Bogomil heresy is said to have separated the region from every other part of Europe and to have caused continuous wars of religion.<sup>7</sup> The Bogomil aristocracy invited the Turks to occupy the country, because in their desperate fight against Western Christianity they needed support. They changed their religion and this decision allowed them to stabilize their feudal power for centuries.

The presence can be understood with this historical background: a country that until the occupation has been governed by the sublime Porte only in name, practically by the national aristocracy, which was not accustomed to serve, but to rule, which was Slavic from the viewpoint of race and language, Muslim from the viewpoint of religion, and feudal from the viewpoint of institutions, privileges, morals – exactly as five hundred years ago (...) The author not only describes this state of affairs, but also explains the ways the Monarchy tries to solve the very hard political, social and economic problem of integrating this Muslim country into its modern European state organization. (Asbóth, unnumbered)

The book, however, does not so simply suggest a civilizing mission of leading Bosnia from the Middle Ages directly to modernity, but also the inorganic nature of this rapid development. Asbóth emphasizes the importance of some new institutions (e.g., the factories and the railway to Sarajevo that started being built just after the occupation, obviously for military reasons), but he also feels some nostalgia for the easy disorder and freedom of what he calls the East.<sup>8</sup>



The medieval arrangements could survive because the Ottoman Empire was not interested in the inner organisation of the occupied territories, but exclusively in conquest: “Turks – just like the Romans – accepted the organization they had found in a conquered country, as far as it fitted in with their plan to conquer the world” (Asbóth 1887, 1.129). Since Asbóth highlights the fact that Bosnia’s medieval organization ended with the Austro-Hungarian occupation, he seems to make a contrast between the occupation, which was changing and transforming the country, and the Turkish conquest, which had conserved the old institutions. Asbóth’s claim of tolerance in religious affairs does not imply any strategy of non-intervention; the occupation should develop the country and contribute to the happiness and advance of the population. He celebrated in detail the development of the economy and the infrastructure,<sup>9</sup> but he also highlighted the importance of the strong administrative control of a modern European state and that of the developed legal system deeply rooted in the western tradition: “The most obvious advantage the Monarchy could supply to the occupied territories was public order and legal security”<sup>10</sup> (Asbóth 1887, 1.146).

The new government tried to teach the population to settle their own minor affairs (Asbóth 1887, 1.181.), mopped up the bands of brigands in Zagorje (Asbóth 1887, 2.34–35), and installed reliable and consistent courts; Asbóth regarded all these preconditions of the economic development, since previously “the eastern institutions, the unstable governing and jurisdiction, the religious conflicts and the uncertainties about estate possession hindered it” (Asbóth 1887, 2.2). It sounds just logical that the modern, western institutions are preconditions of a western way of development. That is what is usually called colonization, and Asbóth clearly sees that the local population did not necessarily enjoy the advantages of this development.

One can often hear the complaint that the urban element, namely the craftsmen and the tradesmen, are sinking into poverty. Every rapid cultural change has its victims. Some industrial sectors and some craftsmen cannot stand the competition with the European industry and craftsmen flowing in from the Monarchy. (Asbóth 1887, 1.178)

The rapid westernization causes basic changes in the social stratification and gives splendid opportunities to the immigrant entrepreneurs who have been trained in the western economic system. This does not mean that the task of the immigrants was easy; they had to face the difficulties caused by the region’s backwardness and the insecurity of the transition period. Therefore the entrepreneurs were recruited mostly from the most mobile and venturesome social groups in the Monarchy. As an example I quote a passage from the description of Sarajevo:

We passed the Bosnia Tobacco Factory and the First Bosnia Leather Factory, which has been floated down by a Hungarian Jew from

Temesvár. We hear many Hungarian words; they are said (apart from the soldiers) mostly by Hungarian Jews, who always speak Hungarian to each other, and who are the main representatives of the European element in commerce and industry. (Asbóth 1887, 1.10–11)

Asbóth did not find problematic the fact that an ethnically alien new elite was coming up; he tended to describe this phenomenon as a cultural or civilizing mission undertaken by the immigrants, and their future riches as the fair profit of a risky and especially hard enterprise. As a historical parallel he used the eighteenth-century history of the Temes region, which was reoccupied from the Ottoman Empire in 1718. The land was cheap in the disorganized and depopulated area, since agriculture was unprofitable at the moment. Huge estates were bought by some venturesome people, which soon became the basis of extreme riches.

How little capital is needed for such a business can be seen from the example of some people who immigrated when the occupation took place as poor Jewish innkeepers or grocers, and they own 1–2000 hectares now. Just like the latifundia in Temes region were created by Serb and Armenian pig dealers,<sup>11</sup> it is probable that the Jewish element will play a similar role here, since they have no competition because nobody wants to face the current situation of agriculture and the primitive life conditions. (Asbóth 1887, 2.2)

Asbóth described such phenomena with discern and without evaluation; the celebration of modernisation, westernisation, the development of economy and infrastructure are not challenged by the discussion of the possibilities of access to the new goods or the chances of joining the new competition. This makes Asbóth's Bosnia book a kind of colonising discourse that lacks racism and religious intolerance. In this representation the very possibility of the rapid transformation of the occupied territories is based on the presupposition of a basic similarity between the occupier and the occupied. Cultural otherness seems, if not denied, limited to the realm of folk costumes and customs.

### III

It is a less known fact that the Congress of Berlin commissioned the Austro-Hungarian Empire also to maintain under military control the territory of the sanjak Novi Bazar (in the today's usual transliteration Novi Pazar), although it remained a part of the Ottoman Empire. The task of the Austro-Hungarian army was to ensure the safety of the commercial routes. This thirty-year mission was finished about the first Balkan war, when the territory of the sanjak was divided between Serbia and Montenegro. That military mission became a topic of the Hungarian literature in 1888, when István Tömörkény (1866–1917), the young

short story writer was forced to join the army, and as an act of childish revolt he took the hardest possible task, i.e., to go to Novi Bazar. He had one year to regret his decision. Tömörkény, originally called Steingassner, was a child of a rather rich bourgeois family in Szeged. When his father went bankrupt, the child started working as an assistant in a pharmacy. Even in this condition he had the “right of volunteering”. In 1886, however, he turned his back on his bourgeois career and started working as a journalist. He became an outcast and could be drafted into the army as a private. He reacted with extreme indignation to the situation that seemed unfit for a member of his original social class, and the indignation resulted in his decision of selecting the hardest possible version of the humiliating lot of a private.

He wrote short stories about his Balkan experience both during his stay in Novi Bazar and his whole career as a writer. Many of his soldier stories simply discuss the poor life conditions of the troops or the homesickness of the Hungarian soldiers, who came from the Great Hungarian Plain to the high mountains. But there are other stories discussing the encounters of the Hungarian soldiers, the natives, and the Turkish authorities. Tömörkény had to face Balkan reality on the lowest social level. While in the neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina Austria-Hungary played the role of colonisers (including their efforts to export European cultural goods and the discourse attached to them), the troops in Novi Bazar were not allowed to intervene in administrative or economic affairs. Tömörkény and his fellow soldiers were merely observers of a way of life, which was rather strange for them.

The position of the not personally involved observer can be compared to that of a traveller or a tourist. A soldier’s life, however, has some drawbacks: the lack of free movement and action, and others that may follow from these, such as boredom. Nevertheless, the ideas of tourism and observation sometimes arise in the stories. The landscape with its beautiful high mountains is characterised as follows: “This would be a place for British tourists.<sup>12</sup> It is inhabited by the population of a miserable Turkish town and some military companies” (“*Szabad nap*” [A day’s leave], Tömörkény 1958b, 62). The landscape is suited for tourism, but neither the local population, nor the soldiers have the opportunity to enjoy it. The introductory scene of the short story “Camp Entertainment”, however, visualises the observing position of the soldiers. They are terribly bored, and the majority lean on the camp fence watching the road and listening to the conversations of the locals when they meet. They prefer the Serbs to the Turks, because the former ones usually pursue long conversations, while the latter only salute each other and go on (Tömörkény 1958b, 100). There is no communication between the occupying troops and the locals; not only the fence separates them, but also the differences of tradition, habits, language, and religion. The soldiers remain in their own

camp and they look outwards; they observe the local life only because they have nothing else to do.

In 1902 Tömörkény made a minor journey to Orsova, a town of mixed population on the southern border of Hungary (now Orşova in Romania). In his feuilleton he displayed a tourist's views, and the most impressive part was the description of New Orsova or Ada-Kaleh, a small island in the Danube of uncertain national status, but with a Turkish population. Tömörkény felt the nostalgia of a traveller, who had arrived amid surroundings familiar from previous journeys. He recognised with pleasure the uniform of Turk policemen, since four such people had been sent by the Sultan to show his interest in the place. (A troop of soldiers from Szeged was actually keeping order.) Ada-Kaleh, however, was a place for tourists, who went there to enjoy the air of the East without actually taking a long journey. Tömörkény seemed proud of his real knowledge of the world of the Turks, on the basis of which he could realise that what was being sold there was not genuine Turkish wear, but orientalisising junk made in Germany (Tömörkény 1902, 2–3).<sup>13</sup> The narrator of the sketch was a tourist, but his nostalgia and his pride concerning his local knowledge gave the impression that he was regarding his previous experiences in the region also as something similar to tourism.

When he was in Novi Bazar, Tömörkény found the poverty of the local population – including Turk soldiers, whose pay was usually stolen on its way from Istanbul to the periphery through a corrupt administration<sup>14</sup> – the most depressing phenomena, as well as the poor condition of public safety. He explains the correlation of both problems in the story “*Téleste a délen*” (A winter's night in the South): if the winter is extremely cold (and it usually is), the famine forces the village population to make a living from robbery (Tömörkény 1958b, 114). That was actually the reason for the military mission of Austria-Hungary in the region. The methods of the local Turkish police against the bandits, however, he found shocking.

Someone that walks around sees a lot of various things, but I have never seen anything so characteristic, anything that demonstrates the difference between Europe and the real Balkans so clearly, as when the official power, the Sultan's selected soldiers carry a freshly cut human head in a pale; they carry it in the streets of the town as a triumph with the people's jubilation. (Tömörkény 1903, 1)

This story of bandit Bagulovics is narrated in detail in “*Novibazári emlékek*” [My memories from Novi Bazar] (Tömörkény 1958b, 300–302). The highly personal narrator finishes the story with a remark as follows:

Other so called “shocking sights” that I saw in my life have never haunted me. But that head of bandit sometimes appears in my dreams; it does not say a word; it only laughs from the pale.

We can see the colonising view in both passages. The narrator is clearly an outsider, an eyewitness, who is not involved in the action (no matter that his task is also to fight the bandits). When he experiences a behaviour on the behalf of the locals that he finds strange he makes a clear-cut division between “us” and “them”, and attaches positive values to the former, negative ones to the latter. The former is Europe, the latter is the Balkans, or anything else, and the strangeness of the other becomes a nightmare. In an extreme case the strangeness is visualised by impressing a scene, in which the disrespect of human dignity is symbolised by the disintegration of a human corpse.<sup>15</sup> Never mind that it is the corpse of a public enemy: at this final point the sympathetic attitude towards the local population disappears. The understanding of the logical chain poverty–criminality–repression cannot mean the understanding of the cruelty of repression, or of people’s jubilation in face of the extreme materialisation of cruelty.

The contacts with the civilian population were rather poor. The Hungarian soldiers were allowed to enter only one small district of the nearby town Prijepolje (“*Szabad nap*” [A day’s leave], Tömörkény 1958b, 65–67), and the contacts were also hindered by the language barriers. The separation resulted in a peaceful coexistence. At first sight it seems paradoxical that peace and love follow from ignorance of the other’s language, but it is one of the paradoxes Tömörkény experienced both in the Balkans and in the Austro-Hungarian army. The highly personal narrator of a short story speaks of an intimate friendship with a Turk soldier, Musztafa, and he narrates one of their friendly meetings in the canteen, during which the glances, the expressions of their faces, suggest some kind of real mutual trust in spite of the lack of verbal communication:

We are sitting face to face, looking at each other. What I know in Turkish is not more than “Mer habak”, and he only can say in Hungarian: “Jo nabot”. I say to him mer habak, and he cordially answers: jo nabot. (“*Diskurzus*” [Table talk] Tömörkény 1956, 105)

Even the most simple and formal phrases of greetings appear in a deformed spelling expressing funny pronunciation, but this does not prevent the characters from performing real cordiality. Another story offers the counterexample of some soldiers, who came from Zombor County, which had a mixed population, and are said to have been killed by the locals, since

they spoke the language of the country [i.e., Serbian], so they fraternised with the locals, and therefore they sometimes quarrelled with each other. But such happens also at home among people with young blood, be they soldiers or civilians. (“*Péter a hóban*” [Peter in the snow], Tömörkény 1958b, 49)

A story of this kind is narrated in detail in “*Egy pár fehér lábért*” (For a pair of white legs, Tömörkény 1956, 233–239). In this story the Hungarian soldier is killed by a jealous husband, but the situation is organised by the malignant servant Babanyák, who tells the soldier that the husband is far away and at the moment it is safe to visit the woman. Babanyák acts from the hatred of the foreign invaders. Womanising, however, is not a steady part of the descriptions of soldiers’ life in Novi Bazar. The separation of women in the Muslim country may explain this fact.<sup>16</sup> A remark, however, suggests that the Hungarians did not find the local women attractive (“the only beautiful Bosnian woman I have ever seen”: “*Káplár Papp*” [Corporal Papp] Tömörkény 1956, 126), but it could have been a case of sour grapes.

The relations with the Turk soldiers were even quieter, since both sides were obliged to be on friendly terms. Moreover, they felt mutual sympathy, since both Hungarians and Turks were foreigners in that sanjak, who came from far away places. As the Hungarians felt homesick for the flat plains, the Turks did for the palms (“*Albán csárda*” [An Albanian tavern] Tömörkény 1958a, 187; “*Szabad nap*” [A day’s leave] Tömörkény, 1958b, 65). The representation of the Turks usually emphasises the differences of religion, which also result in differences of habits. The entrepreneur that was running the canteen had to transport the live pigs in boxes since “the Muslims did not allow him to drive the impure animals through their town” (“*Péter a hóban*” [Peter in the snow], Tömörkény 1958b, 48). A Turk spits on a Hungarian soldier because he is eating bacon and this almost makes both garrisons fight fully armed, but finally they change their minds and do not do anything (“*Novibazári emlékek*” [My memories from Novi Bazar] (Tömörkény 1958b, 304). The most discussed topic is the prohibition of alcohol. Turks are many times represented as drinking champagne or rum, but this usually needs some explanation. A character called Musztafa drinks rum “in thimble sized portions, because that is such a negligible quantity that Allah will not see” (“*Diskurzus*” [Table talk] Tömörkény 1956, 105). Other soldiers put the rum bottle under the bench and only soda water on the table, and the rum and soda they drink does not really look like alcohol (“*Novibazári emlékek*” [My memories from Novi Bazar] Tömörkény 1958b, 303). The funniest explanation is offered by the short story “A day’s leave”, where the Turk soldiers or the narrator create an ideology to regard rum as an exception: “Mohammed, the Lord forbids wine, but not rum, since rum had not existed at the time the prophet invented his rules” (“*Szabad nap*” [A day’s leave] Tömörkény, 1958b, 65). Tömörkény many times described the scene of what happened when the Turkish officers gave a sort of farewell banquet with a lot of champagne to other officers, but in these cases they did not offer any explanation of the contradiction between Muslim law and drinking habits. The author only discussed the strange phenomenon that champagne was popular all around the world among people who wanted to show off

(“*A kis kadét*” [The little cadet] Tömörkény 1958b, 23–24; “*Novibazári emlékek*” [My memories from Novi Bazar] Tömörkény 1958b, 299). In a near contemporary Hungarian novella (written in 1886), however, pilgrims in Mecca drink champagne during Ramadan, and a commentary offers the explanation that Muslim law does not regard champagne a fermented drink, and therefore it is not forbidden (Jókai 1988, 70). In a novel by the same author a character explains the legal situation as follows: “What I give you to drink is wine, and it is not wine; it is the juice of grape, but it is not fermented; it has been bottled in its original condition as the French can make it. That is not forbidden by the Prophet.” And to prevent readers from thinking that it is a personal and sinful invention of the character (namely Ali Tepelenti) to go around the prohibition the narrator inserts a footnote: “The Muslims do not think that the religious prohibition concerns French champagne” (Jókai 1962, 360). Drinking habits seem a central feature in the Hungarian literary discourse on Turks or Muslims in general,<sup>17</sup> and the otherness is not simply displayed by their not drinking alcohol, but by the funny ideologies they develop to allow themselves to drink it in spite of the prohibition, which actually suggests a basic similarity of Muslims and Christians. This similarity is also implied in Tömörkény’s description of the effect of coffee. In a coffee shop Hungarian soldiers usually drink ten cups of coffee, and that “makes one jolly. Those who have drunk ten cups of such strong coffee will sing and whistle exactly as if they had drunk wine. But they will not stagger” (“*Szabad nap*” [A day’s leave] Tömörkény, 1958b, 66). Using legal or illegal drugs seems a universal human habit notwithstanding minor differences in ideologies or in the actual effects of drugs.

The question of nationality in this context is inseparable from the question of religion. Being a Turk means being a Muslim and using different gestures, while the name and the spoken language are Serbian (“*Kolónia élet*” [Life in the colony] Tömörkény 1957, 206). Turks are usually descendants of renegade Slavs (“*Novibazári emlékek*” [My memories from Novi Bazar] Tömörkény 1958b, 303), which practically means that the only difference between local Turks and Serbs is that of religion. Conversion to the Muslim religion was said to be forced by the government in order not to allow the percentage of the Turkish population to decrease (Tömörkény 1903, 2). This concept of national identity was rather different from the one used among the nations of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, where the language or ancestry were regarded the distinctive factors.

In some soldiers’ stories, however, the multilingual and multinational character of the Monarchy’s army is represented in a joyful tone and with a heavy emphasis on the absurdity of the whole situation that they seem to point forward to a masterpiece written somewhat later in another language of the dual Monarchy, namely *The Good Soldier Svejk* by Jaroslav Hašek (1883–1923).

Denomination of a soldier always implies a hint at the multilingual situation, since Tömörkény refers to the fellow soldiers with a reversed word order (family

name in the second position as in German) and many times with the German version of the first name. The denomination of the military rank tends also to be in German and to have the first position in a German-like word order.<sup>18</sup> The names of the soldiers therefore appear as alien bodies in the Hungarian text. They are quotations from another discourse or from another language. That language, however, is not simply a foreign one, i.e., German, it is rather the army's language spoken by the Hungarian soldiers. The general language of command was German, but a regiment was ethnically homogeneous and used its own native language. Therefore the army's language was a special mixture in every regiment. Without actual knowledge of German the soldiers used some words of opaque significance with distorted pronunciation. Tömörkény, a native speaker of German, enjoys the opportunity to make fun of that soldier's German by putting sentences on the paper in Hungarian transliteration. The disappearance of signification on the level of words might be suggested by the following example:

... the warrant officers make their reports that men have clean underwear on, and they have also washed their feet. It is really beautiful in German when they report instead of "Wäsche gewächelt, Füße gewaschen" that "vesse gevassen, füsze gevekszelt, meldige hozzám". ("Szabad nap" [A day's leave], Tömörkény 1958b, 63)

The Hungarian warrant officer's linguistic incompetence is displayed by the phonetic transcription of his sentence in a characteristically Hungarian spelling, which suggests that what he is speaking is actually not German, but the confusion of the two languages (actually he says "underwear washed, feet exchanged"), and this is also shown by the popular etymology of the last phrase. He changes the borderline between the words of the phrase "[Ich] melde gehorsam" [I humbly report] to harmonise it with the Hungarian rules of accent and to put a Hungarian word at the end. "Hozzám" means 'up to me', but it cannot mean anything in this alien context. No matter, how the words of the sentence are pronounced, how its words are regrouped or substituted by Hungarian words, the utterance is one single unit of significance that performs its function notwithstanding any deformation. Another story narrates how Hungarian soldiers decipher an order written in German.

... it came in a written order that *die Fahne ist zu hissen*. All right, everybody knows that Fahne is Fanny Regimenz, the flag of the regiment, which is addressed in this moving tone by the Hungarian regiments; she evokes unparalleled enthusiasm. But what can the 'hissen' be? We were rather soldiers than linguists of German, therefore we did not know, but we had an order, and Fanny was involved, so we hoisted the flag. ("Vélemények" [Opinions], Tömörkény 1958b, 30)

The soldiers' inability to communicate in German is the topic of a short story on a soldier who has a hole in the sole of his boot, but he dares not ask for a new



sole because he cannot explain his problem in German. A warrant officer teaches him the sentence (in a terribly deformed German), but in the moment of truth, face to face with an officer, he confuses the fragments of various German words, and he does not receive any sole (*"A bakancstalp"* [Sole of a boot] Tömörkény 1958b, 341–348). The words of commands, however, were taught so effectively that soldiers did not regard them foreign. Of course, for a Hungarian peasant the commands of very special movements did not substitute any Hungarian notion. Therefore a young soldier can say, when he is watching the drill of a Polish troop and listening to the familiar German words of command: "Look, even these damned Polish are commanded in Hungarian" (*"Vélemények"* [Opinions] Tömörkény 1958b, 33).

As a rule, Tömörkény did not translate into Hungarian the sentences or phrases he inserted in any foreign language. The reader should share the discouraging situation of the characters facing a multilingual setting, in which it is hard to orientate. The reader's position is sometimes rather unprivileged, since the narrator and the characters are suggested to understand the alien inserts, which requires that the readers should behave as if they were doing it too. Therefore they should do their best to find out the signification from the context. One of the rare occasions he supplies a translation is when a Polish officer gives his order in Hungarian. The narrator says that the utterance is comprehensible on the level of the narrated, since all the soldiers understand it; but for the readers he must offer a translation into a comprehensible Hungarian as follows:

Captain Wolhynyacky is not saying here that those who do not eat the soup at once will kick the bucket, but that those who do not shoot simultaneously will not have lunch today. That speech is rather short but rich in content, and the company familiar with Wolhynyacky's revised and enlarged Hungarian grammar understands it perfectly. (*"Parádé"* [Parade] Tömörkény 1956, 401)

What should be translated is Hungarian spoken by a Polish officer, but the Polish phrases that some Polish soldiers sing appear in Hungarian spelling, without any translation; its content must be known or concluded by the context supplied by the narrator:

The Polish soldiers of the Army Service Corps were drinking spirits in the canteen and singing that *estye Polska nye zginyela*, which was not really obvious, since the children of the oppressed Polish homeland, who had got to Novi Bazar, could hardly stand at the moment. (*"Katonakarácsony"* [Soldiers' Christmas] Tömörkény 1956, 212)

The tone of discussing ethnic differences and the multilingual, multicultural situation is rather cheerful. Although in the short story I last referred to some Hungarian soldiers, who are frustrated because the Christmas post is late, want to at-

tack the Polish and drive them out of the canteen by force, they eventually renounce to canalise their own despair this way. Finally the post arrives, which makes all happy (*ibid.* 215). In another short story the Hungarians give to the Polish a lot of food they have received from home in the Christmas Eve post (“*Egy önkéntes katonáról*” [On a volunteer] Tömörkény 1958a, 272).<sup>19</sup> The absurdity of the soldiers’ lot is probably best displayed by the Christmas Eve scene when some privates gather around the prison window of a deserter, who is shouting all night, bent on his bench, because he is simulating madness – or because he went mad, which is also possible. The soldiers listened to his shouting “since there was no other entertainment” (“*Katonakarácsony*” [Soldiers’ Christmas] Tömörkény 1956, 213).

### Notes

- 1 “Fizetni ... Amíg lehet fizetni. Amíg Tisza el nem boszniazza az utolsó garasunkat is...”
- 2 Written on 27. June, 1877.
- 3 Mikszáth’s 1888 sketch on Kállay was called “A Minister Full of Genius”.
- 4 According to Asbóth (1883, 1.164) Bosnia’s first position in plum export was overtaken by Serbia just before the occupation due to some more effective dehydration procedures; the occupation changed the trend.
- 5 See Szegedy-Maszák 2005.
- 6 Asbóth wrote this sentence in 1887, and the church was erected exactly in 1872.
- 7 Mór Jókai’s (1825–1904) novel *A három márványfej* [A triple head of marble] (1882) also represents the region as a fertile soil that grows various heresies.
- 8 For this image of the East cf. Said 1995.
- 9 Since the book’s coherence is established through the narration of Asbóth’s travels in the country, the laudation of new routes is a steady part of almost every chapter, which frequently contains the celebration of the achievement of the Monarchy’s engineers and soldiers (e.g., 1,241 and 244).
- 10 Similar conclusions can be found in the “Epilogue” of Amin Maalouf’s (1983) history of the Crusades.
- 11 This historical fact is also represented in Hungarian literature. In Jókai’s novel *A cigánybáró* [The gipsy baron], the setting of which is the reoccupied Temes region, the local nouveau rich is a previous pig dealer.
- 12 Asbóth advertised similar ideas: “When these regions are open to civilisation including the stream of tourists, it will be source of income for the population. There is no more beautiful place in Europe except Switzerland and the Pyrenees.” (Asbóth 1887, 1.233)
- 13 The locals of Ada-Kadeh are described as follows: “The Turks’ characteristic hatred against foreigners cannot be seen on them, although they may have it in their hearts. They know that they owe their living to the tourists, and that they are specialties, something to be visited, but they do not really bother about remaining original” (Tömörkény 1902, 2).
- 14 See some passages in the short stories “*Egy vidám katonáról*” [On a gay soldier] (Tömörkény 1956, 189–190) and “*Albán csárda*” [An Albanian tavern] (Tömörkény 1958a, 187).
- 15 This Turkish habit of putting the cut-off head of a criminal or a rebel on public display is a frequently repeated motive of Mór Jókai’s historical novel *A janicsárok végnapjai* [The last days

of the janissary], which narrates some events of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire (Jókai 1962, *passim*). The disrespect of the integrity of the human body appears also as a shocking feature of the Turks in a short story by Zsigmond Móricz, published in 1922. A poor Hungarian woman accuses a Turk soldier of having drunk her milk without payment. The Sultan asks the soldier three times if he did so, and he denies it three times. Then the Sultan orders his belly to be cut out, and the milk pouring with his blood proves he was guilty (Móricz 1988, 317–320).

- <sup>16</sup> The only exception is a tragic love story of a young officer and the daughter of a local authority. Bey Ismail eventually kills his daughter (“*A vízityúkok, Izmail bég s egvebek*” [Moors, bey Ismail etc.] Tömörkény 1957, 288–289). More characteristic is another story, in which a private falls in love with one of the wives of another local authority. He can only see her from a big distance, and everybody makes fun of him, because he can actually see nothing of the woman but her clothes of silk. He explains his emotions as follows: “She never says a word” (“*Egy vidám katonáról*” [On a gay soldier] Tömörkény 1956, 192). The condition of women’s life is hardly ever explicitly discussed; the Turk Mustafa when he is drinking together with a Hungarian soldier is supposed to “be dreaming of a world where a woman is also regarded human” (“*Diskurzus*” [Table talk] Tömörkény 1956, 106).

- <sup>17</sup> Géza Gárdonyi, who tended to represent Turks as completely immoral thieves, simply declares that they drank Hungarian wine when they ruled a part of Hungary. “Mohammed could have spoken whatever he wanted, the Turks preferred eternal punishment to letting the wine of the Hungarians turn to vinegar” (Gárdonyi, 1982, 83). A character of his most popular novel *The Eclipse of the Crescent Moon* answers the objection “Turks don’t drink!” as follows: “Ah, but not one of them’s a Turk when they see wine.” (Gárdonyi 1991, 21). In the same novel an aga drinks wine shouting now and then. A character explains this behaviour to another:

“Well, you must know that the aga shouted like that so that his soul should descend from his head to his feet while he’s drinking. For the soul dwells in the head and ascends to the other world when we die. And there, as you know, the true believer is punished for drinking wine”

“But if the soul isn’t guilty?”

“Well, the aga too thinks that his soul won’t be touched by his sin if he scares it away for a minute. But my view is that such tricks don’t do any good.” (*Op. cit.* 214)

- <sup>18</sup> I am going to offer some examples. In the name of „Alexander Ördög” (*Katonakarácsony* [Soldiers’ Christmas] Tömörkény 1956, 215) the family name is obviously Hungarian, but the first name is translated into German. Private Csupak is denominated as *Infanterist Csupak* (Tömörkény 1956, 147) with the German name of his rank, but “Fischer közlegény” (private Fischer) receives the Hungarian equivalent in the Hungarian word order, probably because that Hungarian guy has a German family name (Tömörkény 1956, 214). The only exception I know is “Klein Mór”, whose name is always put in the Hungarian word order and with the Hungarian version of the first name, which is actually the second one here. Of course the family name is German, meaning small, and Klein Mór is actually too small to be a soldier. Nevertheless he has been enlisted, because the army happened to need a tinman, and he had the bad luck to be one. The Hungarian form of his name suggests that he is a civilian essentially, and no soldier (“*Parádé*” [Parade] Tömörkény 1956, 394–402).

- <sup>19</sup> I tend to read Tömörkény’s soldier stories a short story cycle, which allows me to regard the events narrated in the two short stories identical, and to regard the common feeding the continuation of the almost-combat narrated in another narrative. Tömörkény never published his soldier stories in one volume, which is usually regarded a precondition of defining a set of short stories as a cycle. I think, however, that a reader also has the right to select his own cycle of an oeuvre if they find a set of short stories strongly linked by thematic patterns. See my discussion on the theory of cycles: Hajdu 2003.

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## HUNGARICA CANADIANA – ARCHIVAL SOURCES

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The material known as *Hungarica Canadiana* goes back to the 1880s, when a group of Hungarians in Pennsylvania, U.S.A., had expressed interest in immigrating to Canada and settling in the Canadian prairies. The first documents, mainly Cabinet discussions in Parliament, followed by extensive correspondence between the Canadian Government and Paul O. Eszterházy, a settlement agent in New York, are housed in the National Archives of Canada. During a century-and-a-half, the subject of Hungarian-Canadian studies and its archival collections has grown into an extensive and highly complex literature of print and non-print material, of official and semi-official documents issued by the Hungarian and Canadian governments and their related establishments, of societal and institutional records, of the cultural and religious organizations, as well as the private and family holdings of correspondence and photoalbums and handwritten manuscripts. Because of the enormity of the material, this essay is designed to focus on one aspect only: the archival records and their sources.

As an ever growing interest has occurred over the years in Hungarian studies in Canada, the purpose of this survey is to make the vast amount of information on archival sources readily available to the student and the information specialist. For further information the reader is advised to consult this author's bibliography *Canadian Studies on Hungarians 1886–1986*, published by the University of Regina Press, Canadian Plains Research Center, 1987, and its 3rd supplement, put out by the *Hungarian Studies Review*, 1998. Both publications have special sections on archival sources and their organization. The Publications listed at the end of this study should also be reviewed.

**Keywords:** Hungarian-Canadians, records of Hungarians in Canada, archives, manuscript collections, relating to Hungarian-Canadians both in Canada and Hungary

Official and semi-official records on Hungarians are held by several establishments in Hungary and Canada. The major repositories of documents are the national and regional archives, certain government ministries, related public agencies, and ecclesiastic as well as educational institutions in both countries.

### **Archival Sources in Hungary**

Official and semi-official records relating to Hungarian-Canadians are held mainly by the National Archives of Hungary, but other regional and ecclesiastical archives, such as those of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Esztergom and Kalocsa, and the archives of the Reformed Church of Hungary, also contain relevant material. Non-government holdings and literary archival material are collected by such establishments as the National Széchényi Library, the Library of the National Academy of Sciences, and the Petőfi Literary Museum.

#### **The National Archives of Hungary (NAH), Budapest**

This is the national repository for official and semi-official documents. Perhaps the richest source of information on Hungarian-Canadians and their community life are the records of the Hungarian consulate that existed in Winnipeg from 1927 to 1941. These records are part of the holdings of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that also include the records of the Hungarian Consulate General of Montreal (which operated from 1922 to 1941), the records of the Ministry's bureau in charge of the affairs of Hungarians outside of Hungary, and the records of the Ministry's Press Bureau.

Other relevant record collections at NAH include the collection of the Prime Minister's Office (relating mainly to the pre-1914 period), those of the Emigrants and Remigrants' Protection Bureau, and those of the Ministry of Agriculture – mainly documents pertaining to the emigration of agricultural labourers from Hungary, and the efforts to curb this out-migration. Some of the records of the World Federation of Hungarians (WFH) – in particular, those generated between 1928 and 1980 – are deposited in NAH, while those generated after 1990, and whatever records survive from Communist rule – are still housed in the WFH's headquarters in Budapest. Before 1989, the Institute of (Communist) Party History – later renamed the Institute of Political History – held extensive document collections that included some Ministry of the Interior records as well as memoirs of Hungarian communists living outside Hungary.

### **Archival Sources in Canada**

In Canada, records on Hungary and Hungarians are held by the National Archives of Canada (NAC), the various provincial archives, and the archives of Hungarian church and community organizations and private collectors.

**National Archives of Canada (NAC), Ottawa**

This is the national repository for official and semi-official documents generated by federal government departments and other government agencies. NAC also houses Canada's most extensive collection of private manuscripts. The most voluminous documentation on Hungarian migration and settlement in Canada can be found in the records of the government bureaus that handled immigration. These agencies used to exist within one or another of Canada's government departments: the Department of Agriculture; the Interior; and from 1936 to 1949, Mines and Resources. At times, the part of Canada's bureaucracy dealing with immigration existed as a separate department: the Department of Immigration and Colonization (1917–1936), the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (1949–1966), and simply, the Department of Immigration, after 1966.

Other parts of Canada's federal government have also, on occasion, produced documents relating to Hungarians in Canada and Canada's dealings with Hungary. These include the Governor General's Office (Canada's Governors General played important public and even political functions in the first half century of the country's existence), the Privy Council (whose holdings include the records of the Cabinet and its various committees), the Department of External Affairs (which deal with Hungary and matters concerning Hungarian aliens in Canada), the Department of Labour and the Department of Justice – which was in charge of Canada's chief of police and intelligence agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) – most of whose early records are also at NAC.

Still another government-owned corporation whose records are also at NAC is the Canadian National Railways (CNR) – which at times was also involved in attracting immigrants to Canada and settling them here. Occasionally information on Hungary and Hungarian-Canadians can be also found in the papers of various Canadian politicians and other public figures, including the Hon. W. J. Pickersgill, Minister of Citizenship and Foreign Affairs during the 1950s, many of whose manuscripts are also held by NAC. One private corporation some of whose records are found in this archival repository, and which had at times extensive dealings with Hungarian immigrants and settlers, is the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) Company.

From 1972 on, NAC has made an effort to collect archival material relating directly to the history of Canada's ethno-cultural groups, including the Hungarians. Although the quest to gather documentary evidence relating to the Hungarian-Canadian evolution is far from comprehensive, the Hungarian collection of NAC's Ethnic Archives Section has grown over the years and houses some very valuable record and private manuscript collections. These include the records of the social organizations, such as the Canadian Hungarian Association, the Rákóczi Foundation and the Széchenyi Society; of religious organizations, i.e., the Hungarian Re-

formed Church of Montreal, St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church of Montreal; the Hungarian-Canadian press, amongst them the *Kanadai Magyar Újság*, which contain detailed information, among other things, on the establishment and short life of the Canadian Hungarian Federation (established in 1928, but ceased to function in the early 1930s). The Ethnic Archives Section also has most of the records of two other prominent (post-World War II) Hungarian-Canadian newspapers: the *Magyar Élet* and the *Kanadai Magyarorság*. The collection also includes the private papers of several individual authors, namely George Faludy, Ferenc Fáy, Gyula Izsák, John Miska, Imre Székely Molnár, Ferenc Thassy-Plavensky, and Tamás Tűz.

In addition to NAC holdings, the reader should also consult the *National Photography Collection* located in Ottawa. Organized under the headings, Immigration and Colonization – Austrians-Hungarians, and Immigration and Colonization – Hungarians, some of the photographs go back to the 1890s and the 1920s, showing Hungarian agricultural labourers doing harvesting and threshing in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and photographs of 1956-ers interviewed by Canadian officials.

### **Provincial and regional archives**

A wealth of information is collected by the provincial archives. These are listed in alphabetical order as follows:

#### *Archives of Ontario, Toronto, ON*

Formerly known as the Public Archives of Ontario, which houses the records of the Government of Ontario and its agencies, as well as numerous manuscript collections. References to Hungarians can be found in such collections as the records of the Prime Minister's Office, those of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (in particular the files of the Hungarian Refugee Program, 1956–1961). (For a much larger collection on Hungarians, see the Multicultural Society of Ontario entry.)

#### *Glenbow Archives, Calgary, AB*

Has a large collection of documents, e.g., manuscripts, photos, sound recordings, slides, films, videos. The bibliographic information is held on fonds. Some of these are: (1) Canadian Pacific Railway Fonds, incorporates colonization



files, Advisory Committee minutes and records related to 29 ethnic groups. Hungarian-related records are Land Holding Colonization: Calgary Hungarian Colonization Co.; Milk River Hungarian Society; Raymond Hungarian Colonization. (2) The Coyote Flats Historical Society collection includes manuscripts, photos, sound recordings, slides, films and videos on Hungarians. (3) The Csávossy Fonds hold reminiscences, manuscripts, photos, sound recordings, financial and income tax return records. (4) The Hungarian Cultural Society Collection, 1972–1974, contains 110 slides, 1 audio cassette relating to Hungarian fashion show, embroidery and the like. (5) Peoples of Southern Alberta Oral History Project 1987–1991. Contents: 345 audiovisual cassettes. Hungarians interviewed were: Michael Földessy, Károly Forgács, Barbara Mátyás, Tom Pajkos, and Rose Pelyhe.

*Multicultural History Society of Ontario, Toronto, ON*

MHSO holds the largest collection of archival materials on Hungarians in Canada. Some of the benevolent, social, political organizations whose papers are in MHSO are: the Brantford Hungarian Mutual Benefit Society; The Royal Hungarian Gendarmes Veterans' Fraternal Benevolent Association; the Canadian Federation of Democratic Hungarians; the Canadian-Hungarian Federation; the Delhi Hungarian House, the Délvidék Club (Waterloo, Wellington), the Hungarian-Canadian Cultural Centre (Toronto), the Hungarian-Canadian Engineers' Association, and the Hungarian cultural associations of Oshawa, St. Catharines. Educational, cultural: Association of Hungarian Teachers in North America; Hungarian School Board; Scout Movement; Hungarian Chair; Hungarian Art, Theatre; Kodály Ensemble (Toronto). Religious: Canadian-Hungarian Christian Association (Niagara Falls); Church of the Ancient Magyar Faith; First Hungarian Baptist Church (Toronto); First Hungarian Reformed Church (Windsor); Hungarian Greek Catholic Church (Courtland, Hamilton, Welland); Hungarian Presbyterian Church (Calgary, Delhi, Hamilton, Kipling, Toronto, Welland, Winnipeg); Roman Catholic Church of Canada (Courtland, Toronto, Welland, Windsor). National organizations: Rákóczi Foundation (Toronto); Széchenyi Society (Calgary); World Transylvanian Federation. The MHSO also has an extensive oral history collection, tape-recorded interviews with many hundreds of immigrants to Ontario, including Hungarians.

*Provincial Archives of Alberta, Edmonton, AB*

Its holdings contain photocopies of letters, documents and pamphlets from the Immigration Branch Records, Ottawa, pertaining to Hungarian immigration to Canada, including published letters from the Esterházy Colony, 1902–1904. Also includes photographs of hunters and their catch, photographs of Hungarian women taken before emigration to Canada, c. 1890–1915.

*Provincial Archives of British Columbia, Victoria, B.C.*

Holds a few publications on Hungarians entered under the subject heading: Hungarians in British Columbia. It also houses a copy of the Strathcona Project Collection, which includes 121 sound cassettes, interviews with people, including Hungarians of B.C.

*Provincial Archives of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Man.*

This archives has the following manuscripts and photographs on Hungarian-Canadians: Emerich Duha: A Presentation of Hungarian-Canadians to the Canadian Unity Council. 1943. 5 p. In: H.A.J. Brodhal Papers, Mg14, C90, Box 2; Hungarian Protégés – Karl Nagy et al. 1957–1963, in: Ralph Maybank Collection, MG14, B35, File 46. Some photographs included are under the heading: Huns Valley.

*Provincial Archives of New Brunswick, Fredericton, N.B.*

This archive includes records relating to post-1956 Hungarian arrivals hospitalized with tuberculosis. For the time being these are closed, but might become available to the researcher with a promise of confidentiality. Within the records of the New Brunswick county courts, there are references to the naturalization of Hungarians, as these courts exchange information with the Federal Court of Canada. The Premier Flemming Records, the records of the Provincial Secretary and those of his (or her) deputy, also contain references to Hungarians.

*Saskatchewan Archives Board, Saskatoon, Sask.*

Has a sizeable collection on Hungarians, including the Records of Re-settlements of Hungarian immigrants, generated by the Department of Interior, Domin-

ion Land Branch. Also, papers on the first Hungarian settlers in Saskatchewan; the Rev. Frank Hoffman Papers, 1922–1945; the Gabriel Szakács Papers (Diary, 1953, 1961); Reminiscences, news bulletins of the Békevár Presbyterian Church, Kipling; Notes re: Békevár settlement. Individual files by Imrich Immer, Rev. Jules J. Pirot, Rev. Pál Sántha, Gabriel Szakács, etc.

### Private Archives

Although most of the Hungarian benevolent, cultural-educational, scientific and religious organizations are known to have maintained their establishment records, such as by-laws pertaining to operational and financial matters, commemorations, annual and other meetings, very few of their holdings are professionally organized and made available to the researcher. No attempt has been made to conduct an extensive survey of the overall resources, and there is no union list available to coordinate the large amount of material to make the bibliographic information and location of material available to the user. The Hungarian Canadian Heritage Collection is the only professionally maintained private collection in Canada.

### Hungarian Canadian Heritage Collection, Ottawa, ON

This collection started in 1981. Its founder, Mr. George Demmer, an educator of music, now retired, started to organize a large collection of his audio cassettes prepared with individual Hungarian folksingers across Canada. As the collection grew, he extended the scope and nature of the holdings. Today, the HCHC includes a sizeable collection of books by Hungarian-Canadian authors and complete sets of several Hungarian-Canadian newspapers. It also holds manuscripts of memoirs, newspaper clippings and correspondence by scholars, clergymen, authors and common folks. The music section, the largest of its kind in Hungarian-Canadian circles, contains more than 3500 audiotapes. Special holdings are the Rev. Kálmán Tóth archives, the Andrew Haraszti manuscripts, the total archival material of the Toronto-based and now defunct *Krónika*, and part of the *Kanadai Magyar Munkás* documents.

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Some years ago, I saw a display of archival collections in the National Library of Canada relating to a Jewish minority group in China. It was inspiring to notice that, although the community, as we came to realize, has hardly exceeded over the

centuries 500 souls at any given time, and yet its leaders were farsighted enough to preserve and organize an archival collection showing their existence. In fact, the collection was deemed to be significant enough to be put up on display in the major national libraries and public archives throughout Europe and North America. This accomplishment, I maintain to this day, should serve as an exemplary model for all of us. It should inspire the Hungarian communities outside and within Hungary in unearthing, gathering, organising, and preserving for future generations the very perishable archival documents relating to our history. The existence of history without tangible records is unimaginable, and no nation can hope to survive without the preservation of its history.

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## REVIEWS

### Hungarian Philosophy

Mester, Béla: *Magyar philosophia* (A magyar nyelvű filozófiai irodalom forrásai. Sorozatszerkesztő Laczkó, Sándor – Tonk, Márton), IX. Kolozsvár–Szeged: Pro Philosophia, 2006. 323 pp.

In recent times, there has been an increasing number of efforts to grasp the scope and the nature of an intellectual phenomenon called ‘Hungarian philosophy’. The author of the book under discussion, Béla Mester belongs to a generation of philosophers whose familiar vernacular is antimetaphysical reasoning and sociological foundations which helps to attach a specially national intellectual agenda to international mainstreams of philosophical discussions.

The book entitled *Hungarian philosophy* contains several case studies in Hungarian and Transylvanian philosophy and intellectual history of the 19–20th centuries, including such figures as Gusztáv Szontagh, János Asbóth, Béni Kállay or János Székely. In a unique and highly stimulating way, Mester conceives the scope of Hungarian philosophy as a network of or a dialogue between different – Transylvanian, Upper Hungarian, Budapest- or Debrecen-centred – traditions grappling with their own special – regional or confessional – determinations.

In harmony with the usage of the 19th century period examined, Mester uses the term ‘philosophy’ in a rather narrow sense. He conceives it as an integrative social science or even as a set of beliefs synthesizing the basic assumptions concerning the nation’s collective identity. As a part of another stimulating methodological issue, he confronts the presumptive aims of national philosophy to other intellectual traditions targeting the same goal: above all, to the tradition of Hungarian literature. Mester has, much more exhaustively than any other philosopher before, expounded the rivalry of literature and philosophy in Hungarian culture during the 19th century with all the efforts of philosophers for achieving the academic and social emancipation of their discipline.

Offering sometimes pathbreaking, though separate case studies, the book cannot be considered as an even approximatively comprehensive survey of the connections and conflicts between literature and philosophy in the 19th century. Mester does not examine, for example, Imre Madách and his *Tragedy of Man*. It would also have been useful, from this point, to read more about the attempts to canonize István Széchenyi or Dániel Berzsenyi as “national philosophers” (75–76). Even in the context of his protagonist, Gusztáv Szontagh, the author does not deal with his literary achievements (108).

It is a special feature of Hungarian culture that debates on the disciplinary and institutional independence of philosophy took place in the same critical period of the first decades of the 19th century, when philosophy and natural sciences began to separate from each other. There is little doubt, then, that a complete spectrum of literary genres could, although partially outdated, be established in Hungary, as well as in other national cultures of East-Central Europe, while blank areas of philosophy, testifying the missing links to researches on natural philosophy can hardly be filled out retrospectively. Literature needs only one root and one medium, e.g., language, to survive. Philosophy, on the contrary, can hardly exist without recurring to an ontology based on contemporary insights of natural sciences. Mester’s account of revisiting the extent and proportions of Hungarian national intellectual canon, literary or philosophical, shows us the necessary methodological prerequisite that further investigations has, in the first order, to be aware of the historical context of its very formation. A non-contextual comparative analysis of the philosophical corpus in 19th century Hungary on the one hand and the literary tradition on the other is rendered here rather problematical by the fact that one has to deal with philosophical texts of engaged, but often isolated individuals grappling with a newborn terminology. These almost forgotten texts emerge from the past in their original formulation which is often mysterious and cloudy, from linguistic point of view, even for philosophically cultivated native Hungarians. Literary texts, on the contrary, have undergone – ortographically, lexically and syntactically – a continual refinement achieved by successive philologists.

Another contrastive notion of philosophy in Mester’s book is the way of reasoning developed by theologians of various denominations, teaching in confessional colleges. It is in this connection that Mester states that Gusztáv Szontagh’s main concern was to found a philosophical discourse as a dialogue of intellectuals, independent from religious institutions, on core issues of politics and society. Szontagh’s efforts, apparently, led to dead-ends: the representants of the next generation of philosophers such as Bernát Alexander or Károly Böhm were united in choosing alternative ways of establishing Hungarian philosophy: the former cast for the mere reception and adoption of the outcomes of contemporary Euro-

pean intellectual currents, the latter for the task of a heroic system-building in new-Kantian style.

Mester's principal historical goal consisted in drawing new consequences concerning the overall liberal and Kantian characteristics of Hungarian philosophy in the 19th century. When examining the reception of John Stuart Mill's thought in Hungary, Mester contextualizes the utilitarian arguments in the liberal versus conservative controversy of domestic politics (170–171). He sees the motives of the popularity of Mill's social philosophy in the aspirations of his Hungarian contemporaries to establish a new political science on the basis of Mill's insights (176).

Despite Mester's mainly contextual arguments, the adequate meaning and signification of the received foreign ideas in Hungarian intellectual life should sometimes have been precised even by a more detailed consideration of their social and political surroundings. An example: Concerning the reception of Benthamian utilitarianism in Hungary, it would be, as Mester holds, the common denominator of the adherence to the principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" which united the reformist patriotes ideologically. But one can also argue for a rival interpretation of utilitarian rhetorics in Hungarian political life, according to which the divergent forces of a society based on prerogatives and privileges had rather to be held in equilibrium on the basis of a sort of Pareto optimality strategy. Hungarian intellectuals of the Reform Era – including Ferenc Kölcsey, whose famous painted figure drawing on Bentham's volumes is here referred to – admired Jeremy Bentham, above all, as the author of treaties on philosophy of law, quoting his arguments against the allegedly indisputable authority of ancient laws a number of times during their work of legislation. Similarly, the great Hungarian political theorist, József Eötvös rejected Bentham's moral position, while accepting, at the same time, his legislative principles.

Concerning the overall Kantian characteristic of Hungarian philosophical thought in the 19th century, Mester's account is not thoroughly convincing. While referring to the popularity of Kantian terminology, he does not examine, under of the surface of usage, eventually existing deeper intellectual connections. Working with a special terminology can be quelled from a looser metaphorical usage and does not involve necessarily the acceptance of a given theory as such.

Besides approaching substantial questions, Mester also deals with the auto-reflection of Hungarian philosophy on its own existence, for, as he puts it convincingly, "[t]his discourse is obsessed, in quite a monomaniac way, with the question of its existence or non-existence; backwardness or singularity; provincialism or universalism" (72). In addition, he argues that in the present state of the art of research into Hungarian philosophy, the work of antiquary is also indispensable. As he says in his case study on Péter Litkei Tóth: "We should maintain our skills in interpreting texts and ways of reasoning of a given era as well as these

texts themselves should be maintained, irrespective of the fact that for the moment we have little idea about what they will be, in the future, good for" (161).

There is, in fact, surprisingly few insights in these texts which would be worth to be revisited with a special philosophical curiosity. The details of the contemporary debates Mester analyses seem, indeed, to support this judgement. The controverse, for instance, concerning Hegel's notoriously ambiguous *Doppelsatz* from his *Outlines of the Philosophy of Law* between Litkei and Szontagh, resulted in a mere defence of this proverbial dictum about the interconnectedness of rationality and actuality against old Hegelian attacks on the one side and its presentation as an all-absorbing pantheism on the other. All this can hardly be taken seriously even in the context of continental discussions over Hegel's heritage.

In Béla Mester's latest book a considerable philological and interpretative work has been done in a jungly area of Hungarian intellectual history. Mester's task was not only to modify some emphasis of an existing narrative but much more to fulfill some preliminary requisits of an historical reconstruction in the hope that these endeavours once might be brought together in a grand synthesis on Hungarian philosophy.

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### The Posthumous Success of a Writer from Central Europe

Sándor Márai: *The Rebels*. Translated by George Szirtes.  
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007. 278 pp.

Reading in translation a novel that you know in the original is a strange experience, especially if your language (and culture) is that of the original text. The value of the translation depends largely on what the reader expects from a translation. Faithfulness to the original I find a very vague and therefore problematic ideal, so I ask for a well-written text in the target language. Although I am not a native speaker of English, my impression is that *The Rebels* reads extremely well, so I am perfectly satisfied.

Of course, all translations may raise questions. Some of the decisions may have been made by the translator, others by the publisher. The original title, *A zendülők*, seems to carry more specific implications than its English equivalent. The sixth volume of the standard nineteenth-century dictionary of the Hungarian language (compiled by Gergely Czuczor and János Fogarasi and published in 1874) makes it clear that the first meaning of the verb "zendül" refers to music, and Géza Bárcei's short etymological handbook, first published in 1940, confirms this ex-



planation. Both mention a second, figurative meaning, but both insist on the primary significance of the first. The adjective “zendülő” (ending in “k” in the plural) is still widely used as referring to musical sound, loud but pleasing. The English title makes more serious the activity of the boys, the members of the “gang” who are the heroes of the novel. The Hungarian title is more ironic, in harmony with the end of chapter 2, when the boys learn that “there were many gangs just like theirs”, in other words, what they had shaped as a private world was not private at all. The word in the title is never repeated in the Hungarian novel, in sharp contrast to the English version. In the source text it is synonyms that play a dominant role, while in the target text it is repetitions. As a result, the Hungarian text has more shades of meaning, it is more playful and even enigmatic, whereas the translation is more explicit and less nuanced.

As the relationships between an original and a translation are those characterizing a dialogue, it is understandable that in some cases the English version has connotations absent from the original; in others, certain characteristics of the world of the Hungarian novel are lost. At the end of chapter 2 it is stated about a character that “he rolled his Negro eyes absent-mindedly”. At least that would be the literal rendering. In 1930 “Negro” was a purely descriptive adjective in Hungarian, free of pejorative connotations. The translator himself must have been aware of this when giving a literal translation of a similar sentence in the opening chapter: “His great black eyes shone and turned with a confused light deep beneath his brow, the whites as large as a Negro’s”. In the next chapter, however, “swiveling his Kentucky minstrel eyes” has specific connotations somewhat foreign to the world of a novel about the city of Kassa in 1918.

Such solutions are perfectly satisfactory as the results of a creative reading. The difficulty consists in finding the limits of freedom. At some point the gang comes under the ambiguous influence of an actor who has arrived in the city. His stage name is Amadé Volpay. The young boys’ sexual inexperience is exploited by this actor. In an improvised theatrical performance he transforms Tibor Prockauer into a young woman and ends a ritualistic dance with him by kissing the boy. Volpay is portrayed as a somewhat demonic figure, foreshadowing the character of the totalitarian dictator in the author’s later novels. “There was something of Nero in Amadé. Nero himself had been an actor”, says the narrator, and some readers may take these words as an allusion to a novel by Dezső Kosztolányi, a writer Márai admired. In that work, published in Hungarian in 1922 and in English in 1927 with an introduction by Thomas Mann, the Roman emperor is portrayed as the archetype of the dictator as actor.

In the English text of *The Rebels* Volpay is said to be Jewish. This is an addition that might be somewhat problematic. Márai was extremely sensitive to the fate of Jews in his homeland. He had a Jewish wife and in 1944, during the German occupation, he condemned those Hungarians who failed to do their utmost to

save those who were being sent to concentration camps. After the end of World War II in his diary he criticized those Jews who joined the Communist movement. The word Jew does not occur in the Hungarian novel. If there is a character who could be Jewish by implication, he is the pawnbroker, who has a last name (Havas) that was often adopted by Hungarian Jews and who in the fourth and closing chapter tells the boys about his visit to a rabbi in Lemberg.

Undeniably the translator had to face difficulties specific to novels full of historical allusions. Some of these would have asked for an explanation, so their absence is fully justified, since most people are reluctant to read novels with footnotes. To mention but one example, "kuruc" denotes those Hungarians who opposed the Habsburgs in the 17th century. The substitute for this word, "rebel", may be a bit misleading in so far as some readers might think of a possible link with the members of the gang, but such details are of no great significance. There are, however, some textual components that could have been preserved because they contribute to the message of the novel. "There is a nice expression: *to sweep something under the carpet*", says one of the characters. Translating proverbs is notoriously difficult.

The English expression has a literal equivalent in Hungarian. Márai used a somewhat different saying. His sentence starts with the words: "As the Germans say: (...)". Our author was born in Kassa, a city which today belongs to Slovakia. Márai became a firm opponent to the Nazi régime from the moment Hitler came to power, which is especially important in view of the fact that he was born into a German bourgeois family (his original name being Grosschmied). He lived and published in the Weimar republic of the 1920s and never ceased to bewail the demise of the German-speaking bourgeoisie of the region once known as Upper Hungary. The German proverb is just one of the numerous elements referring to the culture of that minority. Among the characters of *The Rebels* Colonel Prockauer, his son Lajos, who "had returned a few months previously as an ensign, having lost one arm at the front", and Tibor, the boy who becomes "fed up with the game" played by the gang, represent this community.

When there are different versions of the source text, the publisher (or the translator) has to make a choice. The Hungarian text of *The Rebels* has different versions. In the second edition, published in 1945, the definite article in the title was dropped and there are minor changes in the text. The final version appeared in Toronto in 1988 for the first time as the opening section of the six-part sequence of novels about the German bourgeoisie of the author's native Kassa, under the title *The Work of the Garrens*. Márai considered this work to be his chef-d'oeuvre, as is clear from the Introduction he wrote for it one year before he committed suicide in San Diego, California.

The English translation of *The Rebels* is based on a book published in 1930. There may well be good reason for this: Knopf may have wished to present the

text as a separate novel. Still, it would have been a good idea to include one sentence in the "Note about the author", informing the reader that the version of *The Rebels* regarded by its author as definitive belongs to a roman fleuve.

To the question as to how much of the historical context of the action is lost on a foreign reader no general answer is possible. At the outset, a middle-class boy is visiting a cobbler, the father of the only lower-class member of the gang who remembers his experience at the front. His name, "Zakarka", is Slavic. He tells the boy that as a member of the Austro-Hungarian army he had to execute some soldiers. When the boy asks him about the identity of the soldiers, he gives the following answer: "Czech officers. Traitors from the motherland's point of view". A well-informed reader would know that during World War I some Czechs decided to sympathize with the Slavs fighting on the other side, which in the case of the Eastern front meant the Russian army.

*The Rebels* is not only a novel about the anarchistic life of adolescents who have to grow up in the absence of their fathers fighting far from their homeland, but also about the end of a multi-ethnic Central European state, although less explicitly than Márai's *Embers*, Robert Musil's *The Man Without Qualities*, or Joseph Roth's *Radetzky*. 1918 was the last year of the Great War. A few months after the boys' May picnic Czech troops fighting for an independent Czechoslovakia occupied Kassa. The second part of Márai's sequence of novels is about this occupation.

Who are the rebels? They are adolescent boys in the hinterland of World War I, neither children nor adults. Their main activities are playing games, acting, gambling, gratuitous lying, and stealing money to buy useless trinkets. "It was a second childhood, guiltier than the first but less restrained, more exciting, more sweet. (...) It wasn't like their fathers' lives, lives that did not appeal to them in the least." They defy the laws of the adults. Their game is over when the community of boys coming from different sections of society proves to be an illusion, and their semi-autonomous world is destroyed by Ernő Zakarka, the cobbler's son, who cheats at cards and betrays the other three boys to the actor and the pawnbroker, two adults who exploit the youngsters' innocence. His betrayal has an element of class struggle. The ideology he advocates was to serve as a pretext for the Hungarian Commune that started with a coup d'état on 21 March 1919 and lasted 131 days. Irrespective of the political implications that may be read into the novel by those familiar with Márai's later attacks on Communism, the boys' graduation party, and colonel's return from the front, and the traitor's suicide, three events that are almost simultaneous, bring the action to an abrupt end and constitute a closure that might earn the praise of a discriminating reader.

*The Rebels* is arguably a better novel than *Embers* (1942), which became a bestseller in Italy in 1998, attracted much attention in the second German translation at the 1999 Frankfurt Book Fair, and was successful in London in a stage ver-

sion by Christopher Hampton with Jeremy Irons in the principal role. There is a link between the two narratives. "The candle had burned right down." This sentence, which occurs after the traitor has finished his self-justifying speech, anticipates the title and basic metaphor of the later novel. Both *Embers* and *The Rebels* are about the end of the Habsburg Empire. It seems possible that their impact has something to do with the current nostalgia for a Central European state which may have been preferable to the political arrangements replacing it.

It is worth remembering that although Márai spent several decades in the United States, during his lifetime none of his books was published in English. *The Rebels* is his fourth work to appear in this language since 1996. More could follow, in view of the fact that in other languages many of his works are available. One of his autobiographical works, published in 1934, is widely regarded as a unique representation of the lifestyle and value system of the middle class in Central Europe, and a selection from his diaries or one of his late novels could be a moving testimony to an author forced to live in exile because of his unconditionally strong opposition to totalitarian régimes.

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