In this volume Myron Momryk tells the story of Hungarian-Canadian volunteers in the Spanish Civil war, Johanna Granville examines Yugoslav relations with Hungary and the Soviet Union during 1956, George Bisztray analyses literary works whose hero is Ignác Semmelweis, Stephen Béla Várdy comments on attitudes to the Treaty of Trianon in post-communist Hungary, and János Mazsu surveys the evolution of the Hungarian intelligentsia to 1914. The volume is completed by Eliza Gardiner's bibliography of Hungarian drama in English translation, review articles by S.B. Várda and George Bisztray, as well as several shorter reviews.
Hungarian Studies Review

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(Continued on p. 128.)
Hungarian Volunteers from Canada in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39

Myron Momryk

On May 25, 1998, the Canadian House of Commons voted on a motion to give "...to the members of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion and other Canadians who fought with Spanish Republican forces in the Spanish Civil War between 1936 and 1939, the status of veterans under the federal legislation and making them eligible for veterans' pensions and benefits." This motion was defeated but it evoked some strong reactions in the House of Commons and in the local press either supporting or condemning this motion. These reactions provide a hint of the emotions which ruled the political arena in the 1930's especially when the Spanish Civil War was discussed.

The Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, between the Popular Front Republican Government and the insurgent forces led by General Francisco Franco, was interpreted then, and subsequently, as an epic struggle between the forces of democracy and fascism, progress and reaction, good and evil. One of the enduring legends and myths of this war was the crucial role played by the International Brigades in defending the Popular Front Republican Government. There were over fourteen hundred volunteers from Canada, including a large number from the various Canadian ethnocultural groups who fought in the ranks of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion and in several other units of the International Brigades. Canadian participation in the Spanish Civil War has attracted only limited attention from Canadian historians and the specific Hungarian Canadian story remains virtually unknown.

There are several reasons for this lack of historical information. All records of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion and the International Brigades disappeared with the defeat of the Republican Government in early 1939. Historical information that was subsequently available could be found in published popular histories, memoirs and autobiographies, obituaries, archival collections of Spanish Civil War veterans' associations and lists of volunteers. It was only in 1994 that the National Archives of Canada acquired microfilm reels of most of the Canadian portion of the International Brigades archives in Moscow. Also,
files from the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service Records on the Canadian volunteers in the International Brigades were made available in recent years to researchers at the National Archives of Canada. As a result, there are now additional sources from which to create a profile of the Canadians in Spain; however, biographical information on all the Canadian volunteers continues to be sparse. In the Moscow files, there are questionnaires completed in 1937 and 1938 by many of the Canadian volunteers including their political evaluations. Through the examination of these questionnaires, it is possible to identify some of the Hungarian volunteers. The available biographical information differs for each volunteer and nothing in fact is known about many of them except their names and that they served in Spain. However, enough data exists among all these sources to draw a tentative profile of the Hungarian volunteers from Canada in the International Brigades.

The Spanish Civil War began on July 18, 1936 with the revolt of the military leadership in Spanish Morocco. The military, supported by an alliance of landowners, monarchists and the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy, opposed the growing socialist and anti-clerical tendencies of the Popular Front Republican Government. With most of the army in revolt, the Republican Government did not have any significant armed forces for its own defence.

Almost immediately, the insurgents were able to obtain military aid from Nazi Germany in the form of military aircraft. Later, the insurgents received many tens of thousands of ‘volunteers’ from Fascist Italy who were in fact trained soldiers. The Republican Government, more specifically the various political parties and movements including the Communist Party of Spain, began to organize militias from among their own followers to defend the government. These militias also included the first foreign volunteers and German and French units were soon established.

The Communist Party of Spain (CPS) believed that a large international expedition would generate widespread headlines and support for the Republican cause. The CPS began to organize the foreign volunteers and, through the Communist International in Moscow, a worldwide recruiting network was created. In Canada, reports on the Spanish Civil War appeared in the popular press and the involvement of international volunteers was reported in almost every issue of the pro-communist newspapers including the Daily Clarion. In the Hungarian left-wing community, news of events from Spain was published in the Kanadai Magyar Munkás [Canadian Hungarian Worker]. The first large group of international volunteers arrived in Spain in October and the first organized group of volunteers from North America arrived in December, 1936. Perhaps the earliest major battle where the International Brigades played a significant role was the defence of Madrid. During the winter of 1936-37, the volunteers were organized into military units according to language groups and national origin. In February, 1937, the Abraham Lincoln Battalion was organized and in May, the George Washington Battalion was formed to include the North American volunteers.
By April, 1937, there were sufficient Canadian volunteers in American and other units and they submitted a formal petition to the headquarters of the International Brigades requesting to form their own unit. The name selected was Mackenzie-Papineau, in recognition of the leaders of the 1837 Rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada. By the time the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion of the 15th International Brigade was formally organized on July 1, 1937, over five hundred Canadians had volunteered for Spain. Although the Battalion was nominally Canadian, it was really an international unit composed largely of Americans and other English-speaking volunteers including a large percentage of Spanish soldiers. Canadians also served in medical corps, armour and artillery units and in other American and European units.

On May 20, 1937, an association called the Friends of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion was established in Canada to support the volunteers in Spain. Most Canadian cities also had Spanish Aid Committees which corresponded with the volunteers overseas, sent telegrams to Ottawa in an attempt to influence Canadian government policy towards Spain, organized speaking tours and Spanish Aid Weeks, raised funds for medical supplies and ambulances, collected parcels and produced articles for publication in the popular press. Members of the Canadian left-wing movement also wrote letters to Canadian politicians in support of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion and the Spanish Republican cause.

In the final report submitted in March, 1939 by the Friends of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion Committee, the number of Canadian volunteers was given as 1,239. More recently, a "Mac-Pap" veteran, Lee Burke, compiled a list with 1,438 names. In the research for the book, Canadian Volunteers, the number was estimated at 1,448 Canadians. Among this number, names of 86 Hungarian volunteers from Canada were identified.

The Canadian federal government followed the British foreign policy of non-intervention in the Spanish conflict. In reaction to this volunteer movement, the Canadian government indicated in January, 1937, that the Imperial Foreign Enlistment Act would be revised to control enlistment in Canada for military service in foreign countries. Recruiting for Spain, which was largely a low-profile enterprise, went underground. In western Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) became suspicious when surprisingly large numbers of young men applied for passports for travel to Europe. Applications for passports were delayed until investigations into the motives of the applicants could be completed. However, individuals who were not British subjects could apply at the consulates of their countries of origin for visas allegedly to return to Europe without any investigation. According to available information, many of the Hungarian volunteers chose this route to leave for Europe. In April, a new Foreign Enlistment Act was adopted which made it a criminal offense for any Canadian to enlist in the armed forces of any foreign state at war with any friendly state. On July 31, 1937 the act was applied to the enlistment by Canadians on any side in Spain. Since it was illegal to volunteer for Spain, individ-
uales frequently disguised their identity under aliases, and recruitment in Canada was done in relative secrecy.

When examining the motivations of the Canadian volunteers to leave for Spain, it is essential to recognize the impact of the Depression on their personal and collective experiences. Beginning in 1929-30, the collapse of the Canadian economy into chaos obliged many to travel across Canada and search for what little work was available. They had to compete with Canadian-born labourers for heavy physical work on the industrial frontiers which in previous years was left to recent immigrants. Some had worked in the relief camps the federal government established for the unemployed or took part in the On-to-Ottawa Trek in 1935 that led to confrontations with police and a number of casualties.

The typical volunteer was politically radicalized by his experiences during the Depression and gravitated to left-wing organizations. In the Hungarian community, organizers from the Communist Party of the United States were sent to industrial centres in Canada to recruit members. In many cases, it was only a question of time before they joined the Communist Party of Canada (CPC). Throughout the 1930s, left-wing associations allied with the CPC made a concerted effort to organize unemployed workers, especially recent immigrants. Of the Hungarian volunteers whose political affiliations are known, 26 belonged to the Communist Party of Canada. According to the Moscow records, the figure for all Canadian volunteers may be as high as 75%.

The movement to recruit volunteers for Spain was administered by the Communist Party of Canada and there was a search for dedicated Communist Party members with previous military experience. Canada and the United States did not have compulsory military service in the 1920's and 1930's but many recent European immigrants arrived in Canada after completing their compulsory military service and therefore were preferred recruits. Among the Hungarian volunteers, information is available on only 7 with previous military experience and 4 of these served in the First World War. There was an attempt to recruit volunteers that were ideologically prepared and this required a record of some service in the Communist Party and the affiliated organizations. This accounts for the relatively high average age of the Canadian volunteers including those from the Hungarian community. The high average age of the Hungarian volunteers indicates that the decision to volunteer for Spain was made by men who were mature and, no doubt, aware of the consequences of their decision.

Of the 55 Hungarian volunteers from Canada for whom a birthplace is given, 54 were born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, that is, in Hungary. Approximately 75% of all Canadian volunteers were born outside of Canada. The year of immigration to Canada for 23 individuals is known: 21 had arrived during the years 1926-30 with the largest number (10) in 1929 when the Depression began in October. Two arrived in 1937 and shortly thereafter left for Spain. The known departure dates for 55 Hungarian volunteers indicate that almost all left for Spain in 1937, the large majority during the spring and summer months. The last two Hungarian volunteers arrived in Spain in February,
1938. The new Foreign Enlistment Act may have encouraged some volunteers to leave before the implementation dates. On the basis of 50 individuals, the average age of the Hungarian volunteers in January, 1939 was 36.3; the Canadian average was just over 33 years old. The last known address of 73 volunteers was in urban and industrial centres with the largest numbers coming from Lethbridge (14), Toronto (12), Montreal (7), Windsor (6) and Drumheller (4) and individual volunteers from various centres across Canada. This list of Canadian cities was generally similar to the last address of many of the other Canadian volunteers. The occupational backgrounds of 33 volunteers can be identified and portray a group of volunteers with solid working-class backgrounds. There were labourers (10), miners (6), farmers/labourers (5), mechanics (3), blacksmiths (3), and one each of the following: cook, waiter, cabinet-maker, shoemaker, moulder, engineer.

Regardless of their ethnocultural origin, potential recruits were interviewed by the Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy. In Toronto, the Committee had its headquarters on Adelaide Street off Bay Street in the same building as the headquarters of the Communist Party of Canada. The Committee interviewed the volunteers and attempted to exclude suspected RCMP agents and Trotskyites. When accepted, the volunteers received a physical examination from a doctor, had to obtain travel documents and were given tickets. The Canadian law against foreign enlistment did have an influence on the need for secrecy and the time of departure. Many of the volunteers from Canada were sent by bus to New York City for embarkation to Europe. Individual volunteers crossed the border at Detroit and made their way to New York City. In other cases, they sailed from Montreal and Quebec City to avoid over-crowding the New York City facilities. A few volunteers left on their own initiative. The volunteers who travelled in organized groups usually landed in Le Havre, France and made their way to Paris. Buses would take them to the south of France and they illegally crossed the Pyrenees on foot under cover of darkness, led by guides. Not all volunteers crossed the Pyrenees successfully. A group of nine Canadian volunteers were intercepted by the French police in February, 1937. They were eventually released and continued on their way to Spain. In one case, arrangements were made to have some of the volunteers leave France by ship, the Ciudad de Barcelona. This ship was torpedoed on May 29, 1937 and among the many casualties were two Hungarian volunteers from Canada.

On the other side of the Pyrenees, the volunteers were met by representatives of the International Brigades, taken to Barcelona and assigned to their units. If they spoke English, the volunteers were assigned to an English-language unit such as the Abraham Lincoln or the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalions. Otherwise they were assigned to their language-of-origin units. In the case of the Hungarian volunteers, many were directed to the Rakosi Battalion of the 13th International Brigade. They were trained in Casa Banes, a small village near Barcelona. Since most of the volunteers were expected to have some military experience, training
was short. The Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion was one of the few units that received any form of organized military training for a period of three months.

As the war progressed, the volunteers shared the fate of their respective units. Reports on their activities were included in the *Daily Clarion* and in the *Kanadai Magyar Munkás*. Some of those who were wounded were usually sent to other units such as rear support units or the artillery after recovery. An unspecified number of Canadian volunteers returned to Canada during 1937-1938 due to wounds or 'of their own accord'. Among those who returned were at least 6 Hungarian volunteers. In September, 1938, the International Brigades including the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion were withdrawn from the front lines by the Republican government. It was hoped that this action would oblige the Franco forces to withdraw the German and Italian units fighting on their side. This did not prove to be the case. On October 28, 1938, the International Brigades marched through Barcelona in a memorable farewell parade.

With the situation growing increasingly chaotic in the closing stages of the war, many Canadian volunteers were separated from their units; others deserted or simply disappeared. At least one Hungarian volunteer was listed as a deserter. At this time, those volunteers who were Party members were evaluated according to their political activities and reports were prepared which were sent to the Communist Party of Canada. They were categorized as cadres: good, mediocre, bad and very bad. The standards were very high and the judgements were severe. The political work of volunteers during their term as prisoners-of-war was also evaluated. In addition, non-Party members were evaluated according to their political activities and awareness. Some of the volunteers with distinguished records of service were recommended for Party work within the Hungarian community in Canada. For example, one report stated that “... Comrade Deza [sic Dező?] Beke No. 1 on your characteristics list is a very good Hungarian comrade and should be fully utilized in the work among the Hungarian People in Alberta... (from) Lethbridge, Hungarian, Very Good, Best among Hungarians, Speaks English fluently.” Throughout the Spanish Civil War, the political attitudes of the volunteers were also closely monitored especially in the case of those who were CPC members. There was great suspicion of Trotskyites, anarchists and other political groups which were perceived as rivals. Inevitably, problems relating to administration and military discipline were interpreted in political terms. Complete adherence to the Communist Party position on events in Spain was expected and demanded. After demobilization, volunteers were sought to defend Barcelona but two of the Hungarian volunteers turned in their CPC cards rather than volunteer.

In December-January, 1939, the volunteers crossed the Pyrenees into France along with the Republican Spanish refugees. They were confined in internment camps in Gurs in southern France and awaited repatriation. In this manner, many volunteers who served in other units joined the Canadian volunteers who had served in the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion and thereby became collectively known as ‘the Mac-Paps’.

8
The Canadian volunteers were interviewed by Canadian immigration officials and placed into one of three categories: Canadian citizens by birth, Canadian citizens (British born or naturalized in Canada) and aliens (those who claimed to have been legally landed and resided in Canada for five years or more). The volunteers with passports, Canadian birth certificates and naturalization papers were readily readmitted to Canada.25 Those who were aliens had to prove that they had resided in Canada for at least five years. Two Hungarian volunteers were refused re-admission to Canada because they did not have at least five years of residency in Canada.26

The volunteers who were allowed to return to Canada travelled through England to Halifax and then by train to Toronto where they were greeted with a large parade on February 5, 1939 at the Toronto railway station. They then dispersed across Canada to their own communities and attempted to reestablish their lives. Some remained active in the Communist Party of Canada and various other left-wing organizations while others apparently abandoned political activity and "disappeared" into the anonymity of everyday life. Two Hungarians from Canada remained in Spain as prisoners-of-war and were released only in 1941 and 1942. Of the 74 men whose fate is known, 53 eventually left Spain, including 3 who had been taken prisoners-of-war; 14 were killed in action, 4 declared missing in Spain including 2 as prisoners-of-war.

During the Second World War, some of the Canadian volunteers claimed that they attempted to enrol in the Canadian armed forces but they were rejected because of their service in Spain.27 When the Communist Party of Canada was banned by the federal government in the summer of 1940, the leadership was arrested and interned. However, after the Nazi German invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, attitudes in some federal government departments changed towards the members of the Communist Party. In 1943 there were attempts by the Special Operations Executive, a British military organization, to recruit Spanish Civil War veterans in Canada for special operations in central Europe and the Balkans. At least two Hungarian veterans were contacted for possible service in Hungary.28

An association of all Canadian veterans was formed in September, 1938,29 and over the years held regular meetings and reunions. The veterans maintained an active interest in Spanish events and organized protests when possible to assist Spanish refugees and political prisoners.30 One of the main objectives of their association was the attempt to gain official recognition from the Canadian government. The onset of the Second World War and especially the Cold War placed the events and the participants of the Spanish Civil War in a different and changing context. Among those Hungarian volunteers who returned to Canada, the establishment of a Communist regime in Hungary encouraged many to return to Hungary. After the Second World War, 14 veterans returned to Hungary and one went to live in the Soviet Union.31

After the death of Francisco Franco and the democratization of the Spanish government, a group of Canadian veterans organized a tour to Spain in
August-September, 1979 to revisit their old battlegrounds. There were other visits on various anniversaries and for special events. Recently, their campaign for official recognition resulted in some success. On June 4, 1995, Canada's National Historic Sites and Monuments Board erected a plaque in honour of the Mackenzie-Papineau volunteers at Queen's Park in Toronto. However, a motion in the House of Commons on May 25, 1998 to obtain veteran status for the surviving Mac-Pap veterans was defeated.

The motivations of the Hungarian Canadian volunteers to enrol in the International Brigades were largely based on their experiences in the labour movement in Canada and their subsequent political radicalization during the Depression of the early 1930s. For some volunteers, the events in Europe with the rise of Nazi Germany were the main reason for their political activities and their departure for Spain. In almost every case, their reasons for volunteering for Spain was due to their opposition to fascism.

Their political involvement in the Canadian left-wing movement of the 1930's was due to the existence of a number of associations and organizations that eagerly sought their membership and participation. The Hungarian community in Canada was characterized by a polarization along political lines into left- and right-wing organizations. The membership of the left-wing organizations grew to protest the economic conditions of Depression. Their formal and informal networks provided a motivated and organized body of ready recruits when volunteers were sought for Spain. Some went to Spain to test the courage of their own political convictions. Others who were CPC members, were sent by the CPC to Spain to be tested and hardened. The experience strengthened the political beliefs and convictions of some and shattered the political careers of others. During the Spanish Civil War and after, these organizations provided the volunteers and the returned veterans with encouragement and support. The volunteers who remained active in the Canadian left-wing organizations, were held in high esteem and respected throughout their lives as veterans of the International Brigades and as representatives of the epic ideological struggles of the 1930s.

These veterans also represented a cross-section of the hundreds of thousands of Canadians and recent immigrants who felt the full impact of the Depression during the 1930s in Canada and who were fully aware of the threat of fascism in Europe. The friendships which were forged and the commitments made during the Depression and especially during their service in the International Brigades, endured for many decades providing a core of dedicated members and leaders in the Canadian left-wing movement.

Many continued to fight the ideological battles from this period and their involvement in the Spanish Civil War remained the defining experience of their lives. As a result, many of the myths and legends surrounding the role of the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War continue to be mixed with serious academic research on this subject. The contributions of the Canadian volunteers remain largely unknown in Canadian historiography and the specific
Hungarian participation rarely receives any mention in Hungarian Canadian literature and studies. With the end of the Cold War, the opening of the Moscow archives and the RCMP surveillance records, it is now possible to re-examine from a historical perspective the participation of Canadians in the Spanish Civil War and dispel some of the myths and legends that have characterized this episode in Canadian history.

NOTES

3. Many volunteers from Canada served in various units on the Republican side and were not included in earlier estimates for a variety of reasons. The following is an estimate of the known general ethnocultural origins of 1043 Canadian volunteers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnocultural Origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Isles and Ireland</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European-Slavic</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European (including Hungarians)</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American and other</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1043</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5. Biographical information was compiled from various published sources and from the following collections at the National Archives of Canada (hereafter NAC): Tim Buck Papers (MG32 G3), Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion Collection (MG30 E173), Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion Fonds (MG10 K2) [Moscow Reels], Immigration Branch Records (RG76 Vol. 429, File 635107), CBC Program Archives, Spanish Civil War, Oral History Interviews by Mac Reynolds (1965).

6. There are several files in the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service Records (RG146) at the National Archives with information on the volunteers: Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion, Recruiting for Spanish Army-Canada, Friends of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion, Edward Cecil-Smith, Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion (Veterans of). These files were originally part of the records of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

7. It should be mentioned that the Soviet Union did provide military support to the Republican Government in the form of men and supplies.
8. Because the International Brigades participated in the defence of Madrid in 1936, the Franco forces believed that they were responsible for prolonging the civil war which was ruining Spain; see the memoirs of a British pro-Franco volunteer, Peter Kemp, Mine Were of Trouble (London, 1957), p. 169.


10. There is a list of 90 volunteers in the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion Collection (MG30 F 173, Volume 3, File 31- List of Hungarian Canadians who fought in Spain, 1936-39). Part of this list is based on 'Dan Beke's List'. According to statistics maintained by scholars in Hungary, 115 of the total of 965 Hungarians who fought in the Spanish Civil War had come from Canada. Private letter, Professor Iván Harsányi to Myron Momryk, 16 Aug. 1998. For Harsányi's book, see n. 31 below.

11. For information on RCMP attempts to monitor the volunteer movement, see James Dobno and Robin Rowland, Undercover. Cases of the RCMP's Most Secret Operative (Markham, Ont., 1991), pp. 228-236; see also Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion Records.

12. See newspaper articles on RCMP actions in investigating Canadian applicants for passports to travel to Europe in The Winnipeg Free Press, 15 January, 1937; Ottawa Citizen, 20 February, 1937; and Regina Leader, 14 January, 1937.


15. For historical information on the political evolution of the Hungarian community in Canada during the 1930's, see N.F. Dreisziger with M.L. Kovacs, Paul Bödy and Bennett Kovrig, Struggle and Hope: The Hungarian-Canadian Experience (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1982) especially the chapter, "A Decade of Setbacks: The 1930's." See also Carmela Patrias, Patriots and Proletarians. Politicizing Hungarian Immigrants in Interwar Canada (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994).

16. According to information in a few autobiographies of volunteers in the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion Collection (MG30 F173), members of the Communist Party of Canada required permission from the Party to volunteer for Spain.

17. For information on the recruiting process in Toronto see the chapter, "The Spanish Civil War; 1937" in Peter Hunter, Which side are you on, boys: Canadian life on the left (Toronto, 1988), pp. 109-112.


20. An unknown number remained prisoners of the Franco forces after the civil war was over. For example, in February, 1940, there were six prisoners who claimed Canadian citizenship or residency. See NAC, RG25 G1 A3A, Vol. 1833, File 291-h, Assistance for Canadians captured in Spain, 1939-1943. In the Miranda de Ebro Concentration Camp in Spain in November, 1942, there were 31 Poles, 2 Ukrainians and

21. NAC, Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion Collection, MG10 K2, Reel K-262, Fond 545, opis 6, delo 540.

22. NAC, Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion Collection, MG10 K2, Reel K-261, Fond 545, opis 6, delo 537.


29. *Daily Clarion*, 2 September, 1938, William Kardash was the first President. The veterans organization was re-established in 1947; see, "Mac-Pap Vets Organize New National Body," *Canadian Tribune*, December 6, 1947.


31. Service in the International Brigades in post-war Hungary was not a guarantee for political or even physical survival. László Rajk, political commissar of the Rákosi Battalion, was tried in 1949 and "confessed" among other things that he was an agent of the police of the Admiral Horthy regime in Spain. Rajk was executed for his "crimes." See Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 953-954. Jenő Györkői, in his *Magyar önkéntesek a spanyol polgárháborúban* [Hungarian Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War] (Budapest, 1977), states that 12% of the Hungarian volunteers in Spain were from Canada (p. 107). See also, Imre Gergely, *Magyarak a spanyol néppel, 1936-1939* [Hungarians with the Spanish People] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1977). For a more recent volume on the participation in the Spanish Civil War of volunteers from Hungary see Iván Harsányi, ed., *A spanyol polgárháború és magyar önkéntesei* [The Spanish Civil War and its Hungarian Volunteers] (Budapest: Antifasiszta Füzetek, 1996).


Appendix

Nominal List of Hungarian Volunteers from Canada in the International Brigades

Alarco (rH)
Balogh, Mihaly
Bartus, Ignac (rH)
Beke, Daniel (Dezso) (rH)
Berthus, Paul (rH)
Bodnar, Walter
Bogner, Julius
Bollo, Joseph
Bories, Joseph (KIA)
Brunner, Emeric
Bubanecz, John
Buckovic, Michael (POW)
Chodur, Michael (KIA)
Cisko, Andrew
Csereszuyes, Sandor
Cserny, Joseph (KIA)
Csirbaz, Mihaly
Csokc, Andrew (MIA)
Erdei, Gabor
Farkas, Alexander
Farkas, Ferenc
Ferencz, John (KIA)
Filkohazi, Emeric (KIA)
Gal, John (rH)
Gilian, Andrew (KIA)
Gombos, Anthony (SU)
Gyuricza, Matyas (rH)
Hadaszi, Karoly (KIA)
Herter, Adam (rH)
Horwath, Vendal (rH)
Illes, Paul (POW/MIA)
Jazku, Istvan
Jeney, Gabor (KIA)
Jokvach, Joseph
Juhas, Alexander (rH)
Kasza, John
Koleszat, Geza
Kondas, George
Koradi, Alex
Kosma, Denis
Kovacs, Istvan
Krizan, Joseph
Krizan, Antal (KIA)
Magyar, Joseph
Medgyse, Karoly (POW)
Merges, Elmer
Mezei, Elmer
Michna, Mihaly (KIA)
Milas, Nikola
Mocik, Istvan (KIA)
Molnar, James Imre
Mozer, Joseph

Nadanicek, Janos
Ordog, Frank
Osirma, Mihaly
Pacsuta, Gyorgy
Pocik, Stener
Pretz, Adam (KIA)
Princz, Joseph (MIA)
Racz, Imre (KIA)
Ragyacs, Janos (KIA)
Rajki, Mathias
Ribas
Satiz, Joseph
Schmeltzer, George
Schmidt, Joseph
Schneider, John
Sirko, Louis
Sisco, Alexander (MIA)
Soltész, Joseph (rH)
Steiner, Sandor
Straus, Gyorgy (rH)
Szabari, Gabriel
Szabo, John
Syurkovics, Istvan
Szucsko, Paul (POW)
Takacs, George (rH)
Tomasi, Michael (rH)
Toth, Dezso
Toth, George
Tuz, Imre
Varga, Andrew
Varga, George
Varro, Ferencz (rH)
Vasas, Zoltan (POW/MIA)
Vitez, Imre

Explanation of abbreviations in the parentheses:

KIA Killed in Action
MIA Missing in Action
POW Prisoner of War
rH Returned to Hungary
SU Relocated to the Soviet Union

Note: The names here are reproduced as they had appeared in the original document, i.e. without diacritical marks.

The Soviet-Yugoslav Detente, Belgrade-Budapest Relations, and the Hungarian Revolution (1955-56)

Johanna Granville

Just over four decades ago the first major anti-Soviet uprising in Eastern Europe — the revolution in Hungary — took place. Most scholars have focused on Soviet-Hungarian relations to discern causes of the conflict, while under-emphasizing the Hungarian-Yugoslav "normalization" process that took place in the months preceding the Hungarian revolt and Josip Broz Tito's ambiguous role in the conflict. Many have assumed that once Soviet-Yugoslav relations were "normalized" in the summer of 1955, Yugoslavia's rapprochement with the other "peoples' democracies" quickly ensued. Newly released documents from five of Moscow's most important archives, including notes of key CPSU Presidium meetings taken by Vladimir Malin, shed valuable light on the behavior and motives of Soviet, Hungarian, and Yugoslav decision-makers and information-providers, and on the events of 1956 generally. The article will explain that the Yugoslav-Hungarian rapprochement was, in fact, especially slow and tortuous, particularly between May 1955 and February 1956. Having initiated the rift with Yugoslavia in 1948 and enlisted the support of the peoples' democracies in Tito-bashing, the USSR now discovered, ironically, that it could not so easily induce them (especially Hungary) to make up with Tito after Khrushchev's own trip to Belgrade in May 1955. As explained below, this foot-dragging by the Hungarian dictator Máté Rákos (the most obsequious "Stalinist" to exit the stage) and the lingering bitterness of Tito and his subordinates confused the Soviet leaders somewhat about the true causes of the Hungarian revolt. The "Nagy affair," which developed in the two weeks following the Soviet invasion, chilled relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc nations once again.

Yugoslav-Hungarian Relations after July, 1955

The process of forging a detente between the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia was first set in motion when Khrushchev took the initiative to visit Tito in Belgrade
in July 1955. At first the rapprochement looked as if it would continue uninter-
rupted, and that all the bloc members — including Rákosi's Hungary — would 
play their part. In addition to Khrushchev's Belgrade trip and the disbandment 
of the Cominform,8 Khrushchev's speeches at the Twentieth Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress in February 1956 further paved the way toward 
warmer relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. Khrushchev acknowledged 
the existence of "many national roads to socialism" and foresaw "peaceful 
transitions to communism" for capitalist and colonial states alike. He also 
claimed that war between capitalist and communist systems was no longer 
"fatalistically inevitable," despite Lenin's prediction that war would continue 
indefinitely between the two camps. In the closed session (the "Secret Speech"), 
on February 24-25, 1956, Khrushchev clearly stated that the Soviet rift with 
Yugoslavia had been an "unnecessary" and "shameful" mistake.

The speech, with its denunciation of Joseph Stalin's brutality, "cult of 
personality," and acute paranoia, clearly delighted Tito, who received a copy of 
the secret text and published it in the Yugoslav party paper Barba [Struggle] on 
March 20, 1956. In Tito's mind, the decisions of the Twentieth Congress were 
merely the "continuation of a new trend within communist parties that began in 
Yugoslavia."10 Moreover, Khrushchev's call for peaceful coexistence with the 
West fit nicely with Tito's own ideas about "the principles of coexistence" and 
the evil of separate blocs and spheres of influence. These principles — Tito told 
the student body at Rangoon University (Burma) in January 1955 — are the only 
way to resolve international political conflicts. Furthermore, the division of the 
world into spheres of influence and blocs, Tito told the Indian Parliament in 
December 1954, is "one of the four basic elements which lie at the root of so 
much evil." Countries and states with different systems will not disappear 
overnight, Tito said, and thus coexistence is not only possible but necessary if a 
new world war is to be avoided.11

Khrushchev's rhetoric about "peaceful coexistence" between the two 
 socioecononmic systems also helped Tito rationalize his acceptance of economic 
aid from both the Soviet bloc and the United States. From Tito's break with 
Moscow in 1948 until 1956, the United States provided an estimated $1 billion 
in military and economic aid to Yugoslavia.12

After the Soviet-Yugoslav meeting in 1955, which launched the process 
of normalization, Tito and other Yugoslav officials were determined to exact 
reparations from Soviet bloc countries without jeopardizing the aid from the 
United States. The 1948 rift — when Yugoslavia was expelled from the Comin 
form and boycotted by all members of the communist bloc — had caused great 
economic disruption, and Tito wanted to make sure his country would be compen-
sated for damages. Most communist bloc countries complied, but Hungary 
was reluctant.13 The Soviet Union agreed to help Yugoslavia by extending $250 
million in economic credit14 and by developing Yugoslavia's atomic energy 
program.15 Czechoslovakia agreed to pay $50 million in reparations over a ten-
year period at a 2 percent interest rate.16 Romania permitted several thousand
Serbian prisoners to return to the Banat region. According to Stuart H. Van Dyke, European operations director of the International Cooperation Administration in 1956, the Soviet bloc as a whole made nearly $300 million of easy credit available to Yugoslavia.

Yugoslav relations with Hungary, however, remained at an impasse. Several problems persisted — the most obvious one being the fact that Tito detested Rákosi, the Hungarian leader — "the Last Mohican of the Stalinist Era" and "Stalin's Best Disciple" — who had clung to power long after the deaths of the other Stalinist leaders in the East European countries. Rákosi had conducted the 1948 anti-Titoist campaign more zealously than the other communist party leaders in the "peoples' democracies." Thousands of Hungarian communist officials and intellectuals were sentenced to death or years of imprisonment, while tens of thousands were dismissed from their posts and the party — and an even larger group of non-communists was sent to the gallows, to prisons or to concentration camps. Among the victims were Foreign Minister László Rajk and other prominent figures of the country's communist leadership. Most of them had been accused of being agents for Tito, the "chained dog of Western imperialists." As Tito exclaimed in a speech in 1949: "[O]ver there, in Hungary, the leaders are the most corrupted souls, the biggest perverts!" Later, in the summer of 1956, Tito described his enemy to the Hungarian envoy Kurimszki: "I know Rákosi: he's an insensitive, merciless, stubborn, and heartless person." Kurimszki noted that Tito "gripped the edge of the table" as he spoke.

Because Rákosi had played such a prominent role in denouncing Tito, the process of normalizing Hungarian-Yugoslav relations in 1955-56 entailed a direct threat to his own power and legitimacy. Rákosi clung to power as long as he could by resorting to half-measures. He expressed his regret for the rupture in Yugoslav-Hungarian relations in 1948, but blamed a conveniently dead Lavrenti Beria. However, Tito insisted in 1955 that several issues had to be resolved before Yugoslav relations with Hungary could be normalized: for example, the rehabilitation of László Rajk, amnesty to all Yugoslav political prisoners in Hungary, fair treatment of the Yugoslav minority living in Hungary, and the payment of reparations to Yugoslavia.

Rajk was eventually rehabilitated on March 28 and honorably reburied on October 6, 1956. However, in his announcement of the rehabilitation — published in Szabad Nép on March 29 — Rákosi never actually accepted full responsibility for Rajk's death. He blamed everyone from Beria, Victor Abakumov, Mihály Farkas, and Gábor Péter instead. On May 18 Rákosi admitted a degree of responsibility for the mass repression in the 1949-1952 period, although not for the Rajk case.

After some procrastination, Rákosi also freed all the Yugoslav prisoners in Hungary (197 people). On December 9, 1955, the Rákosi government allowed them either to return to Yugoslavia or remain in Hungary. (Rákosi had harrassed the Yugoslavs living in Hungary, arresting many of them, soon after the Rajk trial in 1949.)
As for the Hungarians’ treatment of the Yugoslav minority in Hungary, the situation also improved somewhat, once travel restrictions on Yugoslav diplomats and journalists — the information-providers — were removed. After 1948, all schools in Hungary offering instruction in Serbo-Croatian had apparently been shut down, particularly in the town of Mohács in southern Hungary. Yugoslav children in Hungary were thus forced to learn the Magyar tongue. By 1956 only several hundred Yugoslavs in Mohács even remembered their native tongue. This situation was little known because Yugoslav diplomats were apparently unable to visit the town, which had become part of a "forbidden border zone" after the Tito-Stalin schism. Rumours also abounded that in the late fall of 1955 the Hungarian authorities had arrested a large number of Serbs living in southern Hungary. Once the so-called forbidden zone was opened in early 1956, the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists made a point of attending cultural events there, and of denouncing Rákosi’s "policy of magyarization," a practice which irritated Hungarian and Soviet officials no end, judging from these officials' documented conversations. The war of words was often very bitter. At one point Yugoslav attaché Radenović apparently accused the Hungarians of treating the arrested Yugoslavs the way Italian fascist authorities had treated Yugoslav partisans during World War II for the latter's violence against suspected Nazi collaborators. We should note, of course, that Tito himself had been responsible for the presence of many Yugoslavs in Hungary as he had forced thousands of Yugoslav citizens loyal to the Cominform (branded "Stalinists," "Cominformists," or iheovci) to flee their country after the 1948 schism. (The less fortunate iheovci were sent to the infamous "Goli Otok" concentration camp in Yugoslavia.) According to Belgrade sources, the entire Cominformist emigration amounted to 4,928 individuals.

Finally, as mentioned earlier, one of the most persistent sources of tension between the two countries was the issue of financial reparations, the negotiations on which repeatedly stalled, unlike the negotiations with the other bloc members. Tito wanted not only to be compensated for the ruptured trade ties with Hungary, but also to be repaid for the economic credits Yugoslavia had extended to Hungary between 1946 and 1948. Delegates from the two countries first met on September 7, but the talks ended in a stalemate on September 24, 1955. Another round of secret negotiations began on January 17, 1956. The Yugoslavs insisted on a sum of $150 million, to be paid in the course of seven years, while the Hungarians would not budge from their offer of $71-72 million worth of commodities over a period of 10 years. Again, the negotiations broke down. In mid-March the Hungarian Politburo decided to increase the proposed sum by $10 million. Talks resumed on April 19, 1956, and on May 29, 1956, a draft agreement on reparations was reached. By June 26, Rákosi was able to report to Voroshilov in Moscow that "mutual financial claims [pretenziia] with Yugoslavia have been completely resolved." Rákosi confided in Voroshilov, however, that the Yugoslav delegation behaved so "arrogantly," that he had to keep his fellow Hungarians from reciprocating, in order to prevent the
talks from breaking down yet again. The Yugoslav negotiators' attitudes — if we can trust Rákosi's report — indicate their feelings toward the Hungarian leaders, while Rákosi's report seems illustrative of the resentment he continued to feel toward the regime in Belgrade.

Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the rehabilitation of László Rajk, the amnesty granted to Yugoslav political prisoners in Hungary, improved treatment of the Yugoslav minority in Hungary, and the agreement about reparations payment, were apparently not enough to ensure good relations between Budapest and Belgrade. This fact underlines the failure of Khrushchev's "pilgrimage" to Belgrade in May 1955 and Tito's visit to Moscow in May-June 1956 to bring lasting improvement to intra-bloc relations through eliminating — or, at least, greatly reducing — the mutual distrust that had existed between the Yugoslav and Hungarian leaderships ever since 1948.

Conflicting Views of Developments in Hungary

Khrushchev and his associates apparently assumed that "destalinization" in Hungary could take place as soon as new leaders were installed in the peoples' democracies. In Hungary Rákosi was at long last replaced in July as the Party's First Secretary with Ernő Gerő. However, the destalinization policy unleashed forces beyond Khrushchev's power to control. A number of authors have clearly showed that Moscow had been unprepared for the Hungarian crisis. Soviet leaders were unable to defuse the situation as they had in the case of Poland. The changes they made were always too late, outpaced by the wave of popular unrest. The masses themselves — not just the party elite or intelligentsia — were dissatisfied. The Soviet leaders mistakenly believed that by putting pressure on Tito, the popular movement in Hungary could be stopped. To understand better why and how the Soviet leaders miscalculated — and why the Hungarian-Yugoslav rapprochement was so slow — we must assess the nature of the information upon which Soviet leaders' perceptions were based.

The reports from the Soviet embassy in Budapest were often biased and alarmist. The embassy's staff construed the Yugoslav representatives' eagerness to strengthen ties with the Hungarians as interference in Hungary's internal affairs and a threat to the USSR. At the same time the Yugoslavs perceived the Hungarians' tardiness in responding to Tito's stated preconditions for normalization as evidence of their unwillingness to admit their mistakes committed in the 1949-1952 period.

Why were the reports by information providers not more objective? Perhaps it would be useful to consider the actual motivations of these people in order to answer this question. Although Khrushchev had, after much delay, replaced Rákosi with Gerő (and eventually with Imre Nagy and then János Kádár), mid-level state and diplomatic officials in Hungary (just as in Yugoslavia and the USSR) — that is, the people actually in charge of the day-to-day
running of diplomatic relations — remained at their posts.\textsuperscript{50} These were officials whose attitudes had been most shaped by the events of 1948-49, and who could not easily abandon their resentments.

Indeed, mid-level diplomats and journalists — whether in Hungary, Yugoslavia or the USSR — played an important role in the events of 1955-56, but their perspectives often differed from those of their superiors (i.e., the state and party leaders). The archives reveal a steady stream of negative diplomatic reports from the Soviet embassy in Budapest to the Central Committee of the Soviet Presidium or the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. Although he had lost credibility after July 1956, Rákosi also sent letters to the CPSU Central Committee — by this time from his residence in the Soviet Union — warning that "Hungarians [were] lavishing attention on Yugoslavia."\textsuperscript{51} Some of these reports, as well as those of the Soviet diplomats, contained unconfirmed rumours. Those filed by Yugoslav diplomats were no different. Tito himself complained about the "disinformation from our diplomatic personnel" during the secret meeting in the Crimea in late September 1956.\textsuperscript{52} The dissemination of this kind of disinformation had helped to prevent full reconciliation between Hungary and Yugoslavia, and between Yugoslavia and the USSR.

Perhaps it would be useful to consider the motivations of these three groups of information-providers: the hard-line pro-Soviet Hungarian officials, the Soviet diplomats in Budapest, and the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists.

The pro-Soviet Hungarian officials were inclined to give alarmist reports to the Soviet diplomats at the Budapest embassy, because it was they who felt most threatened by the rising popular discontent. Their jobs depended on Soviet power propping up the regime. They knew only too well that they — branded "Muscovites" and "Stalinists" — were hated even more than Soviet diplomatic and military personnel, because they were Magyars betraying fellow Magyars. Thus, they had a tendency to exaggerate the "danger" and to report every real or perceived rebuff (from the Yugoslavs) to the Soviet embassy personnel, in the hope that the Russians would take strong action. These alarmist reports, they hoped, served to "prove" their loyalty to Moscow.\textsuperscript{53}

The Soviet diplomats in Budapest also felt threatened by the rising discontent long suppressed during the Stalin era. The fact that they were in a foreign country for protracted periods of time made them suspect to the Kremlin leaders. Indeed, only a very few members of the Soviet elite were ever trusted to be sent abroad. Once given such an assignment, Soviet diplomats were constantly aware of the need to prove they had not "gone native." This way of thinking is revealed in their characterization of other diplomats. For example, in a collectively written biographical reference (spravka), Soviet diplomats described both Ferenc Münich,\textsuperscript{54} and Lajos Csebi\textsuperscript{55} to be partial to Yugoslavia, simply because both Hungarian officials had once served as ambassadors to Yugoslavia. This tendency of the Soviet diplomats to take a hard-line position in order to prove their loyalty to Moscow probably became even more intense when they were stationed in a country that was perceived to be in rebellion against the
Soviet Union. The fact that an "anti-Soviet movement" was growing in Hungary increased the danger that they, the diplomats, would be deemed, at the least, as not having been "strict" or "vigilant" enough, or at the most, as having encouraged anti-Soviet feelings. Being especially "vigilant," however, could improve one's chances for promotion in the Soviet hierarchy. It is noteworthy, for example, that Ambassador Yuri Andropov, who took a very strict approach to the 1956 revolution, was promoted in 1957 to the post of director of the CPSU Central Committee's department for ties with communist parties in the Soviet bloc. Janos Kadar's government also presented him with a special award. Clearly, Andropov's "vigilance" was richly rewarded.

Both Soviet diplomats and the Hungarian loyalists, described earlier, believed that "interference in Hungary's internal affairs" in the period before mid-October included the Yugoslavs visiting factories and preaching "the Yugoslav way" to the workers there, as well as publishing long articles about Imre Nagy's activities in major Yugoslav newspapers while abridging or virtually ignoring the speeches of Gerö. For these Soviet and Hungarian information-providers, the Yugoslavs' support of Nagy was especially vexing, since Nagy had not even been readmitted to the communist party until October 14, 1956.

To some extent the Soviet and Hungarian officials were correct: the Yugoslavs were interfering in Hungary's internal affairs. According to international law, a diplomatic envoy should remain politically neutral and not become involved in the local politics of the host country. But at times these officials appear to have confused "interference in the internal affairs" of Hungary with freedom of the Yugoslav press. They complained that the Yugoslav newspapers, especially the major ones, like Borba and Politika, were giving excessive coverage to the "counterrevolutionary events" in Hungary, while virtually ignoring major events in the USSR or in the People's Republic of China. These critics tended to forget that it was the Yugoslav journalists' professional duty to collect as much information as possible, especially about a country on their own border. By merely reporting, these journalists did not violate the sovereignty of Hungary. Accusations of interference by Yugoslavia became especially ludicrous after the November 4 invasion. Who were the Russians — who sent tanks crashing into Budapest — to talk about "interference in the internal affairs of Hungary?" Perhaps the reason why the proliferation of Titoist ideas so exasperated both Hungarian and Soviet officials is that they could not openly protest this influence: Khrushchev had publicly "made up" with Tito, so the latter had been certified respectable again.

For many Yugoslav diplomats and journalists the 1948-1949 events in Hungary had been formative experiences in their careers. Well-acquainted with the hardships Yugoslavia's population had endured as a result of the humiliating dismissal from the Cominform and economic boycott by the Soviet bloc countries, it was hard for some of them to change their thinking about Rákosi and his Stalinist colleagues. Like Tito, they were pleased with Khrushchev's speeches at
the Twentieth Party Congress, which they considered "a qualitative leap," but they expected much more direct criticism of Stalin at future party congresses.\(^5\)

Their hatred of Rakosi only intensified after he admitted in March 1956 that Rajk had been innocent, because it further discredited their own colleague Lazar Brankov. In 1948 Rakosi had ignored Brankov’s diplomatic immunity, arrested him and got him to testify against Rajk and Tito during the September 1949 trial.\(^6\) (Brankov had been consul at the Yugoslav legation in Budapest at the time and was chargé d'affaires in the absence of Ambassador Mrazović.)\(^6\)

The Soviet diplomats and Hungarian officials noted in their reports that many of the Yugoslav diplomats had "built their careers on" the 1948 rift and now had difficulty readjusting.\(^6\) For example, Marko Zsigmond, second secretary of the Yugoslav mission in Budapest, had once worked in the archive of the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee and thus "knew the history of the Soviet-Yugoslav rift well."\(^6\) Soviet and Hungarian officials noted his tendency to harp on the 1948 events in conversations.\(^6\)

For many Yugoslav diplomats the temptation to say "I told you so" was overwhelming. Many had traveled throughout Hungary, visiting factories and cultural events put on by the Yugoslavs, telling Hungarian workers that the 1948 rift had been the "Stalinists' fault." After the verbal abuse they had endured just a few years earlier, they must have been tempted to gloat over Rakosi’s setbacks and boast about Yugoslavia’s accomplishments. The ultimate repercussions of their encouragement of Imre Nagy’s supporters do not seem to have troubled them. For them the reason why the Hungarian-Yugoslav rapprochement was so slow was simple: it was all Rakosi’s fault. Many Yugoslav journalists attended the Petőfi Club’s discussions,\(^6\) and attributed the complaints by the students and writers to the fact that Rakosi had not fully recanted his mistakes.\(^6\) For these Yugoslav diplomats and journalists the measure of Khrushchev’s sincerity was his willingness to whip Rakosi into line or to dismiss him.

The Yugoslav diplomats also spread the rhetoric about the "third camp" and how there could be "alternative roads to socialism," which was in some ways reminiscent of the earlier ideological quarrel of the 1940s between Stalin’s "popular front from above" and Tito's "popular front from below." In contrast to Soviet and Hungarian officials’ claims of excessive coverage of the Hungarian "counterrevolution" in the Yugoslav media, the Yugoslav journalists complained about the scanty coverage of Yugoslav events and speeches by Yugoslav officials in Hungarian newspapers. Several speeches, they claimed, were "printed in such an abridged form that the information was distorted," while unimportant events in the other socialist countries were covered extensively.\(^6\)

It should be noted that the Yugoslavs were not the only proselytizers. Some of the attempts to improve ties (especially at the non-governmental level) between the two East European countries came at the initiative of the anti-Stalinist (or even anti-Soviet) Hungarian intellectuals themselves. As an anecdotal example, the Hungarians wanted to resurrect the Hungarian-Yugoslav cultural society, which had been banned in 1949.\(^8\) Ambassador Andropov
immediately notified Moscow with alarm. "Pay attention to the fact that, despite the liquidation of the society in 1949, it has continued to function, as the enclosed document shows," he wrote. Initiatives like these from the Hungarian intelligentsia seemed to justify Tito in defending himself against accusations of "interference." As Tito wrote in one of his post-invasion letters to the CPSU, in essence: it is not Yugoslavia’s fault if Hungarians look to Yugoslavia as a model to emulate.69

Tito's Attitudes

Tito's own perspectives serve as further explanation why initiatives like Khrushchev's trip to Belgrade in May 1955 and Tito's visit to Moscow in May-June 1956 did not quickly dispel the mistrust between the Yugoslavs and Hungarians. To Tito destalinization entailed much more than simply the replacement of Stalinist leaders with national communists in the East European communist countries, or simply the resolution of the concrete issues outlined above — although all these matters were important to him. Rather, Tito sought a fundamental recognition that Yugoslavia was just as important as the Soviet Union in the international communist movement. Thus, while in many respects, Tito's individual perspective resembled that of the Yugoslav information-providers, the slowness of the Yugoslav-Hungarian rapprochement stemmed also from Tito's own memories and values. His vivid recollection of Rákosi’s ruthless anti-Tito campaign, beginning with the Rajk trial in 1949, made it difficult for Tito to forgive and forget.

Furthermore, Tito greatly valued Yugoslavia's unique brand of national communism which had emerged from Yugoslav soil and the experiences of World War II. From Tito's perspective, Yugoslavia's historical achievements were hard-earned and thus needed to be cherished. It was the "twofold character of the National Liberation Struggle" — against both fascist aggressors and internal traitors — that made Yugoslavia unique. In an article written in October 1946, Tito had written:

[T]he people of Yugoslavia were not fighting only against the invaders but also against their allies, the local traitors — the gangs of Pavelić, Nedić, Rupnik, and Draža Mihailović. Despite the fact that the invaders and domestic traitors joined forces, the people prevailed in their great struggle. Therein lie the specific features of the liberation struggle of the nations of Yugoslavia, therein lies its greatness. No other occupied country in Europe can boast of such a struggle and our people have a right to be proud of it.70

It should also be kept in mind that Tito's Partisans had defeated the Nazi occupiers without the help of the Soviet Red army. True, Stalin sent security guards for Tito, but this was after the war and intended more as a means of
Soviet control than of protection for Yugoslavia. Then, in June 1948, Stalin banished Tito from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), just nine months after its founding congress in Szklarska Poreba (Poland). The Cominform resolution calling for Yugoslavia’s expulsion accused the country of "pursuing an incorrect line" in foreign policy, representing a "departure from Marxism-Leninism." It also stated that the Yugoslav Communist Party had spread "slandering propaganda about the "degeneration of the CPSU," thus borrowing "from the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism." At the heart of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute was Tito’s refusal to obey Stalin. Stalin first became angry at Tito already during the final phases of the war for supporting the Greek communists as well as for claiming the city of Trieste, thus complicating Stalin’s wartime alliance with the British and Americans. When all the communist bloc countries broke off trade with Yugoslavia, Tito’s Communist party managed to stay in power, despite the sudden economic boycott. To the Soviet leaders’ dismay, Tito succeeded in receiving economic and military assistance from the Americans while still remaining communist. Both Tito and his representatives in Budapest were fond of reminding Hungarian and Soviet officials of the fact that they had not "surrendered to the imperialists," despite their ostracism from the socialist camp. Tito certainly had not disappeared when Stalin had "shaken his little finger." Indeed the Stalin-Tito feud was so intense that Tito expected the Russians to intervene while the West was distracted by the war in Korea. Stalin may also have authorized an assassination of Tito in the fall of 1952, which was aborted only because of Stalin’s own unexpected death in March 1953. Having fought and won independence from both the Nazis (militarily) and from the Russians (economically and ideologically), Tito vowed never to relinquish Yugoslavia’s new status, never to capitulate to Moscow.

Tito’s peddling of the third-path model evidently worried Soviet and Hungarian officials for both ideological and political reasons. The concept frightened Moscow because it was providing communists with an ideological sanction for disobedience. Even after the disbanding of the Cominform in 1956, the Soviet leaders insisted that their Party should play a leading role in the world communist movement. (One of the "twenty-one conditions" for admission of a communist party to the Comintern, one might recall, had been rigid allegiance to the Bolshevik party line in Moscow.) As Khrushchev explained to Tito, apparently in earnest: "we didn’t seek a leading role; historical conditions have given us this special responsibility, and now we need to fulfill it."

In the context of politics, Tito’s advocacy of a "third path" bespoke possible intentions to form a separate alliance between Yugoslavia and some of the other communist countries, excluding the Soviet Union — a new regional federation of states, this time including Hungary. The notion of intrabloc ties independent of Moscow repelled Soviet leaders — and the Hungarian leaders dependent on Soviet hegemony — because it reminded them of the Titoist threat back in the mid-1940s, when Tito strove to form independent ties with other East European countries without Moscow’s participation. Tito’s Balkan Pact with
Greece and Turkey, established in 1954, was bad enough. Having ties with these two countries was tantamount to joining NATO, the Soviet leaders felt. But an alliance of communist countries, or small countries with sizable communist parties, that excluded the Soviet Union could not be tolerated. To the Soviets Tito seemed intent on forming one, or at the very least, driving a wedge between the USSR and the other bloc countries. They could not understand the concept of neutralism; any alliance excluding them would ipso facto be an anti-Soviet alliance.

Even if a separate bloc or federation were not formed, what the Soviet authorities and Hungarian Stalinists feared was the "spillover effect," or ideological contamination of the Hungarian people via the Yugoslav media. As mentioned earlier, the activities of the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists to some extent caused the Soviet leaders to misinterpret the origins of the discontent in Hungary. The Soviet leaders tended to think that only a small coterie of writers and intellectuals was causing the trouble, not the "toiling masses" of Hungary. This mentality was especially true of Soviet party stalwart Mikhail Suslov, who was sent to Budapest in mid-June 1956, and wrote back to Moscow, assuring the Kremlin that "...the mood of the workers and peasants is healthy.... Among them, as well as in the lower industrial party organizations, there are no conversations about a 'crisis' in the party leadership or about distrust toward the leaders."

Meanwhile Moscow also received numerous reports from Andropov, Gerő, and others, complaining about Yugoslav influence on the Hungarian intelligentsia. Thus the Soviet and Hungarian leaders tried several times in the months preceding the crisis to get Tito to exert pressure on his diplomats and journalists. For example, when the Hungarian envoy Kurimszki visited Tito at his retreat on Brioni Island on July 21, 1956 to deliver the official note about Rákosi's resignation, he also "reminded Tito about the commentaries on the Yugoslav radio and articles that appeared in the newspapers Borba and Politika.... He compared the roles of Tibor Déry and Tibor Tardos with the activities of Milovan Djilas." Tito evidently ignored him. The issue was raised again, both when CPSU Presidium member Anastas Mikoyan visited Tito on the same day, and also when Khrushchev, Tito, Gerő, Kádár and others convened in the Crimea (Yalta) in September-October, 1956. (Earlier, on September 3, the CPSU had warned all the East European communist parties in a secret letter not to "take the Yugoslav example" too seriously; the purpose of the Crimea meeting was, in part, for Khrushchev and Tito to iron out their differences). "The Yugoslav mission in Budapest openly maintains ties with people in opposition to the CC HWP... [and] the Yugoslav newspapers shield the opportunists banished from the communist party... for example, Imre Nagy in Hungary," Khrushchev claimed.

The Soviet leaders believed the Hungarian intellectuals were being "infected" by the Yugoslavs. If only Tito would clamp down on them, they thought, the situation in Hungary would calm down. It is significant that during
the October 28 CC CPSU Presidium meeting, according to the recently declassified Malin notes, Khrushchev thought he could use the Yugoslavs' influence on Hungary to Soviet advantage. He asked his colleagues: Would it not be appropriate if the Yugoslavs appealed to the Hungarians? Moreover, during this same meeting, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Viacheslav Molotov acknowledged that "the influence of the [Hungarian Communist] party on the masses [was] weak," despite the initial reassuring messages from Comrades Mikoyan and Suslov that the Hungarian government was strong. Despite Molotov's sober assessment, Khrushchev, as late as November 2-3, during his meeting with Tito on Brioni Island, apparently believed that at least some Hungarian workers could be mobilized against Nagy:

the workers in the Miskolc region, where Hungarian miners had remained loyal though reactionaries were in power. The Czechs had given the miners some arms and it might be possible to try some political action against Nagy with the help of those Hungarian miners or jointly with them.

Since Tito's death in 1980 numerous biographies of him have appeared, reappraising his character and policies. They challenge the orthodox view of his official biographer, Vladimir Dedijer, and describe Tito's skills of Realpolitik. Undoubtedly Tito — like the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists — sincerely believed in the superiority of the "Yugoslav way" and the equality of all communist countries. Yet, as an experienced politician, he must have realized the usefulness of the third-path rhetoric. Permitting his subordinates freedom of expression won the approval of American policymakers, especially of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

At the same time, much like Dulles's own "Liberation" rhetoric, it created the illusion of being on the offensive, of encouraging Nagy and his supporters. ("Liberation," it will be recalled, was coined by Dulles during the 1952 presidential campaign to present the American people with an alternative to the more passive-sounding "containment" strategy of Truman and the Democrats, whom Dulles accused of being "soft on communism.") To some degree, Tito's call for "alternative roads to communism" served to mask his own secret fears about the Hungarian rebellion.

**Tito's Secret Fears**

Like Khrushchev, Tito was caught off guard by the October-November, 1956 events in Hungary, specifically when the Hungarians' anti-Stalinist mood shifted to an anti-communist mood. Publicly Tito was propounding the third-path rhetoric, "different roads to socialism," and non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries. It was known that Nagy, like Tito, was also
attracted to the Five Principles (Pancha Shila) propounded at the 1955 Bandung Conference. In early 1956 Imre Nagy was writing his book, In Defense of the New Course, the third chapter of which is devoted to these principles.\textsuperscript{96} Nagy argued that the principles must extend not only to the Third World, or to the capitalist system, but also "to the relations between the countries within the democratic and socialist camp."\textsuperscript{97} (Interestingly, according to the Malin notes, the Pancha Shila was mentioned during the CC CPSU Presidium meeting on October 30, 1956 by Lazar Kaganovich, who said "I don't think they should propose that we build our relations on the principles of Pancha Shila.").\textsuperscript{98}

Despite his outward support of Nagy, inwardly Tito felt threatened by Nagy's movement. With the opening of the communist party archives, it can be seen that Tito's perspective changed as discontent turned into violence in Hungary.\textsuperscript{99} Tito realized the potential of nationalist (non-communist) "spillover" into multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. He had always been careful to conceal the fact that he was born into a peasant family from north Croatia and actually fought on the Austrian-Hungarian side against Serbia in 1914.\textsuperscript{100} It was much easier to encourage faraway Poland, than nearby Hungary. Between October 31 and November 1, the leading Yugoslav newspaper Borba stopped supporting the Nagy government and began denouncing its connection to "right-wing elements." Indeed, as his own fears of spillover intensified, Tito probably began to empathize somewhat with the Russians concerning their fear of the possible spillover of Yugoslav ideas into other communist bloc countries.

Recently opened archives provide some detail about Tito's fears.\textsuperscript{101} In his letter of November 8 to Khrushchev (and later on November 11 in his speech at Pula), Tito stated clearly that he had agreed with Khrushchev on the need to intervene.\textsuperscript{102} In fact, Khrushchev himself apparently was surprised at how readily Tito agreed with him on the need to intervene.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, Tito was quoted often by the Soviet Presidium as having asked rhetorically: "What kind of a revolutionary, what kind of communist, could Nagy be, if with his knowledge they hanged and shot leading workers, communists and public figures?"\textsuperscript{104} Two months after the Soviet crackdown, Tito confided in Firiubin, the Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, that "the reaction raised its head [podnial golovuj, especially in Croatia, where the reactionary elements openly incited the employees of the Yugoslav security organs to violence." After Firiubin told him that his speech in Pula, and the speech of Yugoslav Vice-President Eduard Kardelj later, made a bad impression in Moscow, Tito said, "I did not want to complicate in any way Soviet-Yugoslav relations."

The Soviet Presidium also claimed that Tito himself had plans to intervene militarily in Hungary.\textsuperscript{105} Tito, in his talk with the Soviet military delegation on Brioni Island on November 18, 1956, allegedly declared, "If the Soviet troops were not used to put down the insurrection, then Yugoslav troops, which were by that time braced [podtianutyi] on the Yugoslav-Hungarian border, would have been sent in for that purpose."\textsuperscript{106} (Khrushchev himself may have thought about a possible Yugoslav intervention when he said during the October 31 CC CPSU Presidium meeting "We should negotiate with
Tito... There will be no large-scale war."

In a conversation with Andropov, Kádár said, "The Yugoslavs apparently are trying to save Nagy not because they need him, but because they fear he can cause some undesirable things for them."

Tito's fears about spillover come into focus when one considers the larger historical context of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations. It is worth remembering that the state of Yugoslavia was created by incorporating large parts of southern Hungary after World War One. In November 1918 the autonomous Kingdom of Croatia severed its ties with the Kingdom of Hungary and the Serbs took control of the Bácska, the Baranya, and the western Bánát, presenting the Hungarians with a fait accompli. The Treaty of Trianon (4 June 1920), sanctioned these territorial changes. In fact, Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its pre-war territory. The territory ceded to Rumania alone — Transylvania and half of the Bánát — was larger than the area left to Hungary. Czechoslovakia gained Slovakia and Ruthenia, while other, much smaller areas were awarded to Austria, Italy, and Poland. Whereas in 1914 approximately 21 million people lived in Hungary, by 1920 Hungary had under 8 million inhabitants. Not surprisingly, many Hungarians — including those living in Vojvodina and elsewhere in Yugoslavia — clamored in the interwar years to have the Trianon Treaty revised.

Later, during World War II, Hungary became increasingly dependent on Hitler's Germany. The Hungarian prime minister László Bárdossy (who took over in 1941 when his predecessor, Pál Teleki, committed suicide) ordered the Hungarian army to follow in the steps of the German Wehrmacht on 11 April 1941 by invading Yugoslavia and occupying parts of the Vojvodina. Thanks to German support, Hungary recovered an area of 80,000 square kilometers with 5 million inhabitants, including over 2 million Magyars.

During the war a strong Serbian partisan movement under Communist leadership developed in occupied Yugoslavia, particularly in the Vojvodina. The Hungarian military command there responded by anti-partisan raids and summary executions. The largest anti-partisan campaign took place in Novi Sad (the main city in the Vojvodina) late in January 1942, when units of the Hungarian military and gendarmerie executed a great many suspected partisans — estimates range from several hundred to a few thousand — mainly Serbs and Jews. At the end of 1944, the Serbs reoccupied Vojvodina. Between 1941 and 1944 Serbian propagandists had exaggerated the size and extent of the massacre in Novi Sad. Not surprisingly, a far more bloody Serbian vendetta was carried out against the Hungarian population. Tito, the commander-in-chief of the partisan army at the time, condoned the campaign of violence and apparently issued verbal orders to his partisans to avenge all "injustices" suffered by partisans and Serbs during the four years of the war.

During the following years, bitter emotions abounded on both the Hungarian and Yugoslav sides. The Soviet-Yugoslav rift gave the Hungarian Stalinists like Rákosi and Gerő the opportunity to vilify all "Titoists" and the
Yugoslav minority in Hungary generally. Thus, given the history of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations, Tito no doubt feared that the ethnic Hungarian minority in northern Yugoslavia, consisting of over half-a-million people, would help spread the ideas of the Hungarian Revolution inside his own country.

On the question of exactly who Tito had in mind to succeed Rákosi as Hungary's leader the evidence is unclear. While some scholars have asserted that Tito wholeheartedly favored Nagy as a replacement for Rákosi, there is surprisingly little evidence in the Soviet archives to prove this. On the contrary, Soviet sources indicate that Tito seemed willing — although unenthusiastically — to tolerate the Stalinist Gerő, but would have preferred János Kádár or Zoltán Szántó to head the new post-Rákosi regime. When Tito was informed by Kurimszki that "Rákosi had resigned," he never mentioned Nagy's name. Of course, this may be because Nagy was not readmitted to the Hungarian communist party until October 14, 1956. However, it appears that Tito did not regard Nagy as highly as did the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists in the summer of 1956.

Indeed, as much as he detested Rákosi, perhaps he was willing to tolerate Rákosi in the interest of maintaining calm relations between the Yugoslav and Hungarian communist parties. As he said in July 1956 to the envoy Kurimszki:

Whomever the Hungarian people choose and recognize as their leader is their business... I also said in Moscow that I do not support Rákosi, but if the Hungarian people want him, then let him be. It is their business. We thought and still do think...that the settling of the issues between the two parties should not cause shocks to the Hungarian Workers' Party.

This is not to say that Tito did not denounce Rákosi during the 1955 Belgrade and 1956 Moscow meetings. However, even these negative comments would not have persuaded the Khrushchev leadership to dismiss Rákosi in 1955. The contemporary Western press speculated that reparations payments from Hungary — which were finally negotiated in May 1956 — may have persuaded Tito to end his overt opposition to Rákosi's incumbency.

Moscow finally insisted that Rákosi resign, because the situation in Hungary was getting worse. Even the Hungarian Politburo did not want him, but they were too afraid to tell Moscow; they were waiting for Moscow to take the initiative. Of course, Ernő Gerő, who took Rákosi's place, was no different. Hungarians quipped: "In place of a fat Rákosi, we got a thin one." Even Khrushchev during the November 3 Presidium meeting remarked candidly: "It is my fault and Mikoyan's that we proposed Gerő rather than Kádár.

Given his wariness of Imre Nagy, why did Tito offer the latter political asylum in his Budapest embassy? Scholars have been puzzled about Tito's motives. This event is worth examining in detail, both because Tito's act of granting Nagy asylum epitomizes his political philosophy, and because his
reticence in handing Nagy over to the USSR contributed to a new cold phase in Yugoslav relations with both the USSR and Hungary.

Until the November 4 invasion, most of the Soviet and Hungarian remarks were directed against the activities of the Yugoslav diplomats in Hungary, and against the pro-Nagy reporting of the Hungarian situation by the Yugoslav journalists. Even at the Crimea meeting when Khrushchev discussed this problem with Tito, he approached it in a delicate way that would enable Tito to save face. It is plausible that Khrushchev, until the November 4 invasion, had been willing to give Tito the benefit of the doubt and assume that the Yugoslav journalists and diplomats were simply acting on their own and not on Tito's orders. But after November 4, when Nagy and forty-one others received political refuge in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, the Soviet leader attacked Tito: How dare Tito shelter this leader of the counterrevolution? Khrushchev was enraged.

The course of events is well-known. At 5:20 a.m. Nagy made his last appeal on Radio Budapest and then went to the Yugoslav embassy with Zoltán Szántó and eleven other party leaders and intellectuals with their families. In the Yugoslav embassy, Nagy remained safe from the invading Soviet army until his final departure from the embassy compound on November 22, 1956. What is less known, however, is how exactly Nagy's group ended up in the Yugoslav embassy and what Tito's motives were in giving him asylum. From the newly available correspondence between Khrushchev and Tito, the following scenario emerges. On November 1, Szántó spoke with the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary, Dalibor Soldatic, about the possible need for political asylum. He was afraid of possible violence against Hungarian government members by the anti-communist insurgents. Soldatic gave a preliminary affirmative answer, and Szántó was supposed to tell him exactly when he and others would be coming to the embassy. Soldatic also informed Tito of this request.

The "Agreement" at Brioni

The next day Tito, Ranković, Kardelj, and Veljko Mićunović (the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR) met with Khrushchev and Malenkov at Tito's retreat on Brioni Island and discussed the Hungarian situation from seven o'clock in the evening to five o'clock the next morning. Khrushchev and Malenkov informed the Yugoslav leaders of Moscow's plans for invading Hungary, but not the actual date. As mentioned earlier, by November 3 Tito had agreed with Khrushchev both on the need to intervene militarily and on the wisdom of selecting Kádár as the new leader. Tito also agreed to try to persuade Nagy to issue a declaration announcing his own resignation, admit his inability to stop the violence in the country, and proclaim his support for the new Kádár government. During the course of the conversation, according to Mićunović, Tito informed Khrushchev about Szántó's request for asylum in the Yugoslav embassy:
They [Khrushchev and Malenkov] again asked what possibilities we had of trying to do something about Nagy. Apart from Losonczy we mentioned Zoltán Szántó, who has already asked for asylum in our embassy because of the danger of reprisals. It seems to us that such people are not to be distrusted, because they are decent folk with good intentions.¹²⁷

The question arises: if Khrushchev objected so much to Nagy's refuge in the Yugoslav embassy, why did he not protest this possible scenario when it was first broached during the meeting at Brioni? Several answers can be deduced. First, Tito apparently mentioned only Szántó, and not Nagy, so perhaps Khrushchev did not realize that Nagy himself might also seek asylum in the Yugoslav embassy. Second, the most pressing concern for Khrushchev and Malenkov at the time was getting Tito's support for the intervention and his promise to try to persuade Nagy to resign and announce publicly his support for the Kádár government. It was clear to the Yugoslavs that Khrushchev had already decided to intervene, and that he merely wanted Tito's ex post facto approval — not his advice or permission. Khrushchev needed Tito's help in making the Soviet invasion look more legitimate to the international community, which would then facilitate the "normalization" in Hungary.

In addition, since Tito had been surprisingly supportive of the Soviet invasion plan, Khrushchev evidently assumed that, even if Nagy sought asylum in the Yugoslav embassy, Tito would quickly turn Nagy over to the Soviet authorities. This is indicated in the telegram of November 4, in which Khrushchev instructed Soviet Ambassador Firiubin to tell Eduard Kardelj, Deputy Head of the Yugoslav Government, that

as far as the further sojourn of Nagy and his group in the embassy, excesses could occur with them, not only by the reaction but also by the revolutionary elements. Thus, bearing in mind that the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant government [headed by Kádár] does not have security organs at present, it would be expedient to deliver Nagy and his group to our troops for transport to the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant government in Szolnok.¹²⁸

Despite Tito's assent to "work on Nagy," what complicated matters was Khrushchev's silence about when the invasion would begin. Mićunović writes:

The Russians still said nothing about when their troops would intervene. We can't ask them, and they don't want to say. For that reason the time factor remains unclear: We don't know what opportunity we may have to influence Nagy and try to reduce the number of casualties and the amount of unnecessary bloodshed. But we agreed that we would try and influence Nagy.¹²⁹
Before Szántó could reply to Soldatic about when he would seek asylum, the actual invasion had begun, on November 4. Soldatic called Nagy at 1:00 a.m. on the same day in the Hungarian Parliament building and invited him to the Yugoslav embassy. Thus, on the basis of the first tentative conversation on November 1, the Nagy group fled to the embassy.\textsuperscript{130}

Since Tito had mentioned Szántó's request during the Brioni meeting, he apparently concluded that Khrushchev condoned the possible offer of asylum to the Hungarian leaders. This is indicated in the November 4 telegram in which Firiubin wrote:

Kardelj reported that on the night of November 4 they called Imre Nagy, as it had been agreed with comrade Khrushchev... It is still not clear, said Kardelj, whether or not Imre Nagy made his last declaration in the name of the government in Budapest. If he did make this declaration, then they, the Yugoslavs will try to get him to state that he made it under pressure from the reactionaries. They also intend to persuade Imre Nagy to make a declaration of support for the government headed by Kádár in Szolnok. In Kardelj's words such a declaration will facilitate discussion of the Hungarian question in the Security Council and [facilitate diplomatic] recognition of Kádár's government as the legitimate government.\textsuperscript{131}

This means that Nagy's group was already in the embassy before the Yugoslavs knew that Nagy had declared Hungary's neutrality.\textsuperscript{132}

Later, in explaining to Khrushchev why he had granted asylum to Nagy, Tito cited the sheer "speed of events" and "absence of detailed information."\textsuperscript{133}

"This problem... in the final analysis... is a result of our conversation on Brioni, although because of the events in Hungary, things developed differently than we expected," he wrote. The conversation between Szántó and Soldatic had already taken place before the Brioni meeting, and Tito did inform Khrushchev of it. Khrushchev appears to be the one to blame for the initial presence of Nagy's group in the Yugoslav embassy, since he did not tell Tito at Brioni that the offer of political asylum to Nagy was unacceptable. He also did not give Tito a reasonable amount of time in which to persuade Nagy to make the declaration supporting Kádár. Soviet troops went into action less than twenty-four hours after Khrushchev and Malenkov left Tito at Brioni.

The quarrel between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaders developed later when Khrushchev realized that Tito would not easily relinquish Nagy and his group. It was simply incomprehensible to Khrushchev that Tito could continue to harbour Nagy, the "leader of the counterrevolution," when Tito had been so understanding during the Brioni meeting.

The Soviets then, in all likelihood, decided to intimidate the Yugoslavs in another, non-verbal, way. By explicitly mentioning in the November 4 telegram that "excesses" could occur, the Soviets seem to have been preparing a cover for a little-known event that took place on November 5 at 3:30 p.m.\textsuperscript{133} On this day
a Soviet tank fired on the Yugoslav embassy. The cultural attaché Milenko Milovanov was killed in the gunfire, the building was damaged, and all the windows were shattered. The Yugoslav foreign minister, Koča Popović, accused the Soviet authorities of having deliberately opened fire on the embassy, knowing that it was indeed the Yugoslav embassy and that Imre Nagy and his supporters were inside.\textsuperscript{135} To reinforce Popović's complaint, the Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR, Veljko Mićunović, visited the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, Dmitri Shepilov, the next day.\textsuperscript{136} Dalibor Soldatic, the Yugoslav ambassador in Budapest, also complained about the incident to Andropov. Soldatic requested that Soviet tanks near the Yugoslav embassy be moved. Andropov relayed this message to Valerian Zorin, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, warning that "the demand for the withdrawal of the Soviet military unit from the building of the mission is of a suspicious nature."\textsuperscript{137}

As we know from Malin's notes, these messages were discussed at the Presidium meeting by Khrushchev, Zhukov and Shepilov. A cable was prepared for the Yugoslav government and transmitted via Firyubin to Popović.\textsuperscript{138} On November 9, 1956 a commission composed of Major-General K.E. Grebennik,\textsuperscript{139} Colonel K.V. Boskoboinik, and Major A. B. Lukin conducted an investigation of the circumstances.\textsuperscript{140} The Yugoslav government later presented a claim of $84,446 to Hungary for the death of Milovanov.\textsuperscript{141}

Although the Soviet officials claimed that it was an accident, the attack on the Yugoslav mission could very well have been deliberate (although this cannot be verified until other documents from the Soviet military archives are declassified). The Soviet leaders resented Tito for giving the Nagy group political refuge, and this would have been an easy way to take revenge. They had both the motive and the opportunity, and the incident could be readily explained. After all, Tito himself had earlier asked the Soviet government to "take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from possible attacks on it."\textsuperscript{142}

From the Yugoslav point of view, once Nagy's presence in the embassy became known throughout the world, the situation changed; Tito was caught in a dilemma. As Mićunović aptly articulated it: "[the Soviets] have decided to sling mud at Yugoslavia as the organizer of the counterrevolution if we don't hand Imre Nagy and the others over to them. But if we do hand them over, they will then point to us as a country which does not keep its word and which nobody should depend on."\textsuperscript{143}

Tito concluded that he might as well take advantage of this opportunity to persuade Nagy to resign — something he had promised Khrushchev he would do. As Tito wrote in his letter to Khrushchev, the act of granting asylum to Nagy "did not contradict the Brioni agreement."\textsuperscript{144} The Yugoslavs, Tito assured Khrushchev, wanted the same thing Khrushchev and Kádár wanted: a strong communist government in Hungary. They had sincerely tried to persuade Nagy to declare his support for Kádár.\textsuperscript{145} The fact that Nagy turned out to be stubborn, Tito noted, should not be blamed on the Yugoslav Communist Party.\textsuperscript{146} Furthermore, as he tried to explain to Khrushchev, not all of the members of
Nagy's group were "anti-Soviet"; some were "honest communists" who would be great assets to Kádár's new government. What was wrong with offering them asylum? Zoltán Szántó, for example, was one of the original leaders of the underground Hungarian communist party; he helped recruit Hungarians into the communist party while at a POW camp near Suzdal in the USSR in 1943. He had also once been the Hungarian ambassador to Yugoslavia, and was highly regarded by the Yugoslavs. Moreover, the Yugoslav leaders also evidently believed that, once Nagy and his group left the embassy and "confronted the actual situation," they would eventually "abandon their quixotic attitude" and "realize that they have to contribute to the building of socialism."

When Tito refused to turn in the Nagy group, Khrushchev began to accuse him of protecting Nagy, the very man Tito had described at the Brioni meeting as having "cleared the path for counterrevolution." From the Soviet viewpoint, offering Nagy political asylum was a supreme example of "interference in the internal affairs of Hungary." The longer Tito kept Nagy, the more convincing became the reports filed by the Soviet diplomats and Hungarian officials in Budapest in 1955 and in the early months of 1956. As time passed, the accusations became more shrill. Tito, the Soviet leaders said, had "warned Nagy of the upcoming invasion." This "Titoist perfidy" no doubt strengthened the clout of Molotov's Stalinist faction in the Soviet government. Molotov had opposed the 1955 reconciliation with Tito, and was later ousted in 1957 for his "erroneous stand on the Yugoslav question." (He apparently believed that even Kádár was too much of a "Titoist;" during the November 4 CC CPSU Presidium meeting Molotov urged his colleagues to exert more pressure on Kádár "so that Hungary does not go the route of Yugoslavia.")

It is true that the Yugoslavs did "warn" Nagy about the invasion; Soldatic called Nagy at 1:00 a.m. on November 4 and told him. But by then probably everyone could see that an invasion was imminent. Also, Soldatic could not have known exactly when the Soviet invasion would begin, so if he had warned the Hungarians, it was only in a very general way.

Given Tito's wariness of Nagy, his agreement with Khrushchev on the need to intervene, and his desire for harmonious relations with the USSR, one must ask: why did Tito not quickly hand Nagy and his associates over to the Soviets? Why did he object to sending them to Romania, Khrushchev's chosen destination for the group?

The answer lies, again, with Tito's values and fears. He valued Yugoslavia's reputation as a responsible, sovereign state, and was convinced that Yugoslavia should honor the principles of international law as befits such a state. It is noteworthy that Tito kept the Brioni meeting with Khrushchev secret from the Yugoslav public for several days, to avoid tarnishing Yugoslavia's reputation. Once Nagy's presence in his embassy became widely known, Tito took the concept of political asylum seriously. In his February 1957 letter to the CPSU's Central Committee, Tito maintained that he could not "violate his word
...and simply give up these people," citing the Yugoslav constitution on the issue of political asylum.\textsuperscript{156}

Apart from this reason, one must also remember Tito's considerable skills in realpolitik. Just as the "third-path" rhetoric served a dual purpose (winning the approval of both the Yugoslav people and U.S. policymakers), so sheltering Nagy in the Yugoslav embassy served both to incarcerate Nagy (thereby defusing the uprising), and also to win the approval of the international community for "protecting" Nagy from the Soviet aggressors. As Mićunović wrote: "[l]t could not be disputed that the fact that the Nagy government had in effect disappeared from the moment it entered the Yugoslav embassy had proved useful and had helped both Kádár and the Russians."\textsuperscript{157}

Tito could then take advantage of Nagy's presence in the embassy to coax him to cooperate with the Kádár government. If he could discredit Nagy, perhaps he could reduce the chances of anti-communist "spillover" into Yugoslavia. Tito was so sure he could get Nagy to support the Kádár regime that he believed the Yugoslav embassy might be attacked "when the reaction finds out that Nagy, who is in the embassy, supports the Kádár government."\textsuperscript{158}

Tito understood the political advantage of seeming (to the West) as if he were protecting Nagy. Although Tito himself may not have fully supported Nagy's movement when it turned anti-communist, some observers in the West thought that he did. To simply hand Nagy's group over to Kádár and the Russians would destroy Yugoslavia's reputation as an independent sovereign country with respect for human rights. Meanwhile, those domestic opponents who knew how Yugoslav prisoners at Goli Otok were treated did not dare to contradict Tito and his followers.

During the rift of 1948-55, Tito had discovered the advantages of being neutral, even before the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser did. U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been eager to extend economic aid to Yugoslavia, confident that the Yugoslav example would encourage Hungary and the other Soviet satellites to fight for independence. In a speech to the Four-H Club in Chicago in 1954, Dulles said:

In 1948 Yugoslavia broke free from the grip of international communism and reasserted its own nationalism. Now, the Soviet Union treats Yugoslavia with deference while it continues to treat with contempt the puppet governments of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. That may embolden the satellites to demand a measure of independence.\textsuperscript{159}

When Dulles visited Tito in May 1955, Tito ostensibly told him what he wanted to hear, speaking about "independence," rather than about "national communism." He told Dulles that the "transformation in the satellite countries" would take place faster than Dulles could even imagine, and that he, Tito, was trying to accelerate this process, so the satellites would become independent, which Tito wanted very much.\textsuperscript{160} In the tightly bipolar world of the 1950s, both
superpowers vied for client states among the neutral countries. Tito could pretend to do the bidding of each superpower, but neither would know his real intentions.

Moreover, if Tito had simply handed Nagy over to Kádár's government, Khrushchev might have been encouraged to see Yugoslavia as just another obedient Soviet satellite. Tito feared the prospect of Yugoslavia once again getting pulled back into the Soviet camp. He had swallowed his pride enough at the Crimea meeting, when he assured Khrushchev that he had "no fundamental disagreements," and that in Yugoslavia "only a different method of building socialism [was] being applied." Khrushchev had replied, "The methods and forms can differ, but there must be a single principled line." Tito had agreed: socialism can never be divided into various sorts; it is a "single revolutionary doctrine, which we, communists, should adhere to."

Thus, respecting Nagy's political asylum was a useful way of reminding Khrushchev that he, Tito — despite the official normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations — would still act independently, even if that displeased the Kremlin. His concern for Nagy's physical safety probably stemmed more from his determination to safeguard Yugoslavia's international reputation than from any desire to encourage Nagy and his plans for a multiparty system in Hungary.

As if to retaliate for Tito's stubbornness in holding on to Nagy, the Soviet leaders made a deliberate decision on November 17 to kidnap the Nagy group as soon as it left the Yugoslav embassy. On November 22 a bus was driven up to the embassy's doorsteps, supposedly to transport Nagy and the other asylum seekers to their apartments. While the Hungarians were climbing into the bus, a Soviet military official also entered the bus, despite the Yugoslavs' vehement protests. (The bus driver was also a Russian.) To make sure that the Hungarians were taken to their homes, the diplomat Milan Georgievic and military attaché Milan Drosa were ordered to accompany the group. The bus proceeded just around the corner from the embassy when the Soviet officer forced Georgievic and Drosa to get off. The bus took the Nagy group first to the closest Soviet military headquarters and then continued on to Romania where the group was imprisoned, contrary to the assurances that Kádár's government had given to the Yugoslavs.

What angered Tito so much about the kidnapping was the blatant deception. Nothing quite stings the ego as outright betrayal after lengthy negotiations in good faith. In an official letter to the CC CPSU on November 24, Tito wrote:

The Yugoslav government regards the abovementioned action a crude violation of the agreement negotiated with the Hungarian government. The [actions taken by the Kádár government]... are completely inconsistent with the agreement. The Yugoslav government cannot accept the version that Nagy and the others voluntarily went to Romania, since it
was known... — while they were still here in the Yugoslav embassy — that they wanted to stay in their own country. The Yugoslav government expresses an energetic protest to the Hungarian government, and demands that the agreement be followed immediately. [Failure to do so] will damage Soviet-Yugoslav relations. [T]he... violation of the agreement is in complete contradiction of widely recognized international legal norms.166

Tito's indignation probably equalled or surpassed the outrage Nagy felt when he had realized that the negotiations on November 3 for Soviet troop withdrawal had been a complete hoax. Until November 22, the discussions concerning the Nagy group's departure from the Yugoslav embassy had been conducted between Dobrivoje Vidić, Tito's delegate, and representatives of the Kádár government. The document that had emerged from these talks "guarante[ed] the security of the indicated persons," and pledged "not to hold the Yugoslavs responsible" for past events.167

Both of these pledges were broken: Nagy and several others were abducted, and Yugoslavia was blamed for fostering the "counterrevolution" in Hungary. This deception, Tito felt, had made Yugoslavia a laughingstock in the international community. Characteristically enough, the Romanian (and probably Soviet) officials were surprised that Tito was so angry about the abduction; they thought he might even raise the issue at the United Nations.168 During the November 27 meeting of the CPSU's Presidium, Khrushchev expressed his regret about Soviet involvement in the kidnapping. "It was a mistake for our officer to go into the bus," he said, according to notes taken by Malin's deputy Vladimir Chernukha. He thought the matter should have been left up to the Hungarians.169 For the Yugoslavs it felt like a "return to 1948."170

Tito's disappointment extended to Kádár. As early as the summer of 1956, Tito had favored Kádár as a possible replacement for Rákosi.171 At the November meeting on Brioni Island, the Yugoslavs persuaded Khrushchev and Malenkov to choose Kádár rather than Münich to head Hungary's new Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government, since Kádár had been in prison while Stalin and Rákosi had been in power, whereas Münich had been Hungarian ambassador to the USSR.172 (This was clearly a wise choice, since Münich was evidently involved in the plans to abduct the Nagy group.)173 Kádár had given his word concerning the Nagy group; now he had turned out to be almost as deceitful as Rákosi.

It should be pointed out here, however, that Kádár was not as hawkish during the October-November 1956 events as most books published in the West have portrayed him. In fact — as the Malin notes reveal — Kádár did not at first advocate a massive Soviet military intervention. At the CC CPSU Presidium meeting on November 2, Kádár warned the Soviet leaders that "the use of military force will be destructive and lead to bloodshed" and would "erode the authority of the socialist countries," causing "the morale of the Communists [in Hungary] to be reduced to zero."174
Ironically Kádár was deceitful in the one area where Western accounts have been more forgiving of him: the abduction of the Nagy group. Most writers have expressed the view that Kádár had not known about the kidnapping plan and had disapproved of the Soviet treatment of Imre Nagy. But recently declassified documents indicate that Kádár knew and approved of the secret KGB plan to arrest Nagy and the others the minute they stepped outside the Yugoslav embassy. If Nagy remained in Hungary, Kádár worried, he would inspire the Hungarian "reactionaries." Rumours about an American intervention vexed him as well. Sporadic gunfire in Budapest could be heard until December and widespread passive resistance continued into 1957. To gain the peoples' cooperation, Kádár had to resort to lies, namely, that he would share power with Nagy as soon as Nagy returned from the Yugoslav embassy. Clearly, Kádár wanted Nagy taken out of Hungary — not to Yugoslavia (technically a neutral country), but to Romania (at the time a loyal Soviet satellite). He knew that if Nagy went to Yugoslavia, "there would be two existing Hungarian governments: one there, and one here in Budapest."

Not surprisingly, given Tito's disappointment with Kádár, Hungarian-Yugoslav relations cooled after the "Nagy affair." Hungarian diplomats snubbed their Yugoslav colleagues by rejecting the latters' invitations to social events, and by declining to invite the Yugoslavs to their own social events. Thus, Yugoslav-Hungarian relations had come full circle. This clear case of betrayal began a brief new cold war between Hungary and Yugoslavia. In preparation for the Nagy trial, the judicial proceedings of which were initiated in February 1957, the Hungarian and Soviet foreign ministries went to great lengths to gather data on Yugoslavia's "role in the Hungarian counterrevolution." In November 1957 the Yugoslav delegation alone refused to attend the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow and sign a declaration affirming the Soviet Union's leading role in the communist movement. In late April 1958 the Soviet leaders then refused to send a delegation to the Yugoslav's Seventh Party Congress held in Ljubljana, where a document was signed that rejected the USSR's claim to any leading role in the communist movement. Evidently at this time Khrushchev also decided to act on an earlier decision to punish Imre Nagy. On June 16, 1958 Imre Nagy was hanged. The Hungarian authorities warned the Yugoslavs not to make a fuss about the execution, or they would publish more "evidence" of Yugoslav involvement in the Hungarian events. Jovo Kapićić, the new Yugoslav ambassador replied that the Nagy trial was just "another link in the chain of the new anti-Yugoslav campaign, being conducted by the USSR and other bloc countries." The Yugoslavs were keenly aware of the similarities between the Nagy trial and the Rajk trial nine years earlier.
Conclusions

This article has attempted to show that, despite Moscow's rapprochement with Tito's Yugoslavia in 1955, tensions between Hungary and Yugoslavia remained. Rákosi's Hungary had played a leading role in the anti-Tito campaign in the late 1940s, and Tito wanted a full apology. The Hungarian government's reluctance promptly to redress other Yugoslav grievances also helped to prevent the achievement of a full reconciliation between Belgrade and Budapest. These outstanding issues included: the rehabilitation of László Rajk, amnesty to all Yugoslav political prisoners in Hungary, fair treatment of Hungary's Yugoslav minority, and the payment of reparations to Yugoslavia. At the same time, Hungary's communist leaders also had complaints: they — as well as Soviet officials — resented the uncensored, pro-Nagy coverage manifest in the Yugoslav media. It should also be mentioned in this connection that reports by Yugoslav journalists and diplomats contributed to a Soviet misinterpretation of the Hungarian revolutionary movement's origins: the Soviet leaders came to believe that only a small core of intellectuals — not the masses of workers and peasants — was causing problems. Thus if only Tito would use his influence to help silence the "troublemakers," they thought, the conflict in Hungary could be resolved.

The newly-surfaced documentary evidence offers glimpses of the attitudes that prevailed at the time in Belgrade. There it was realized that while reconciliation with Hungary (and the USSR) would benefit Yugoslavia financially, it also brought a risk of renewed domination by the Soviet bloc. Tito in particular valued Yugoslavia's status as a neutral, nonaligned country that could stand up to Joseph Stalin. At the same time, the Yugoslav leader was also wary of the nationalist ferment of the Hungarian revolution, and in early November worked with Khrushchev behind the scenes to prevent it from spreading to Yugoslavia. The history of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations, from World War I and the 1920 Trianon Treaty to World War II and the Serbian partisans' revenge against the Hungarians in the Vojvodina, provided a basis for Tito's fears of a spillover. Indeed, the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has demonstrated that Tito certainly had good reasons to fear ethnic conflicts in his own country.

Tito's willingness to shelter Imre Nagy after the Soviet crackdown in Hungary, and Kádár's collusion in his abduction, served to open all the old wounds in Yugoslav relations with Hungary — as well as with the USSR. Ironically, Khrushchev was just as chagrined as Tito about the new rift between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Yet, had it not been for the Sino-Soviet dispute of the early 1960s, the events of November 1956 might have led to another complete break between Yugoslavia and the bloc countries closest to the USSR.
ABBREVIATIONS

Explanations of Hungarian, Yugoslav and Russian abbreviations and terms:

ÁVH  Államvédelmi Hatóság [State Security Authority] (name of the Hungarian secret police agency after 1949)
ÁVO  Államvédelmi Osztály [State Security Department] (name of the Hungarian secret police agency until 1949)
AVP RF  Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation], Moscow
CPSU  Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPY  Communist Party of Yugoslavia
CC  Central Committee
GARF  Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [State Archive of the Russian Federation]
HSWP  Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
HWP  Hungarian Workers' Party (under Rákosi's leadership)
KGB  Committee for State Security of the USSR
MOL  Magyar Országos Levéltár (Budapest)
RTsKhIDNI  Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History
SZKP KB  Szovjet Kommunista Párt Központi Bizottsága [the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]
TsAMO  Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva obrony Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation]
TsKhSD  Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii [Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation], Moscow
TsK KPSS  Tsentral'nyi komitet Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soyuza [Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]

F  Fond [Fund]
O  Opis' [Inventory]
Por.  Portfel' [Portfolio]
P.  Papka [Folder]
Per.  Perechen' [List]
D  Delo [File]
Dok.  [Document]
L  [Page]
Rolik  Reel

NOTES

1. In this paper we tried to provide diacritical marks for Hungarian and Serbo-Croatian names in the text and the endnotes, but not in the quotations where these had been omitted originally. I would like to thank Alexander Stykalin, Vyacheslav Sereda, Tofik Muslimovich Islamov, Janos Reiner, Csaba Bekes, Istvan Deak, Raymond
Garthoff, Mark Kramer, and the anonymous reviewers for earlier assistance and comments. Research for this article was supported in part by a Fulbright Scholarship, Kennan Institute grant, and ACTR scholarship. Responsibility for views presented here is mine alone. Portions of this work were presented at the AAASS Convention (Seattle, 1997), International Conference on "Hungary and the World, 1956" (Budapest, Sept. 1996), and V World Congress of Central and European Studies (Warsaw, 1995).


4. These are: the former top-secret archive of the Communist Party's Central Committee called the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents [TsKh-SD], the Archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry [AVP RF], the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History [RTsKhIDNI], and the State Archive of the Russian Federation [GARF]. Vladimir Malin, the head of the CPSU CC General Department during the entire Khrushchev period, took extensive notes of all Presidium meetings, although verbatim transcripts of CPSU Presidium meetings were not kept in the 1950s. Russian archival authorities released the Malin notes pertaining to the Hungarian uprising (October-November 1956) crisis in mid-1995 to a Russian historian, Vyacheslav Sereda, and to Hungarian scholars at the 1956 Institute in Budapest, who had exclusive access to the materials until the spring of 1996, when the full set were published in Hungarian translation. See Vyacheslav Sereda and János M. Rainer, eds., *Döntés a Kremlben, 1956*: A szovjet pártelnök ség vitái Magyarországról (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1996). The Russian version was published in the summer and fall of 1996. See "Kak reshalis voprosy Vengrii: Rabochie Zapisi zasedani Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, iyul'-noyabr' 1956 g.,” *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (Moscow), Nos. 2 and 3 (1996), pp.
73-104 and 87-121, respectively. Malin's handwritten notes are now available to all researchers in TsKhSD. See F 3, O 12, D 1005-6.

5. Yugoslav relations with Albania also remained tense. See AVP RF, Fond Referentura po Vengrii, O 37, Por 9, P 187, L. 4, From the Diary of S. S. Satuchin, "Notes of a Conversation with the Advisor of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest Osman Dikić," June 2, 1956, June 18, 1956.

6. AVP RF, Fcnd 077, Opis 37, Por. 8, Papka 187, List 29, From the Diary of V.V. Astaфiev, "Note of a Conversation with the Chairman of the State Assembly of Hungary Sandor Ronai," March 27, 1956. "Ronai reported that... at present, of all the peoples democracies, Yugoslavia's relations with Hungary are the very worse."


8. The Cominform was disbanded on April 17, 1956.


The July Plenum of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons for the development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role which Stalin played here. The "Yugoslav affair" contained no problems which could not have been solved through party discussions among comrades. There was no significant basis for the development of this "affair," it was completely possible to have prevented the rupture of relations with that country. This does not mean, however, that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes or did not have shortcomings. But these mistakes and shortcomings were magnified in a monstrous manner by Stalin, which resulted in a break of relations with a friendly country (emphasis added).


13. One exception to this might be Albania, with which Yugoslav relations were also at an impasse.

14. According to Stuart H. Van Dyke, European operations director of the International Cooperation Administration in 1956, the USSR promised Yugoslavia a ten-year loan of $30,000,000 in gold and convertible currencies at a two percent interest rate. The U.S.S.R also offered a ten-year line of credit of $110,000,000, also at a two percent interest rate, for specific investment projects, mostly in the field of mining. See John D. Morris, "Soviet Bloc Help to Tito is Huge," New York Times, April 29, 1956, p. 1, col. 7.

15. "The financial and technical help given to Yugoslavia by the USSR, especially in the sphere of atomic energy, is highly valued by the Yugoslavs." AVP RF, F. 077, O. 37, Por. 7, P. 187, L. 146-147, From the Diary of Y. P. Sanzhak, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest Milan Georgievic," February 17, 1956.

16. AVP RF, F. 077, O. 37, Por. 7, P. 187, L. 146-147, From the Diary of Sanzhak, "Notes of a Conversation with the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest Milan Georgievic," February 17, 1956. (The agreement was reached on the day of this conversation). According to Van Dyke, Czechoslovakia also offered $75 million in credit to Yugoslavia. See Morris, p. 1, col. 7.


18. The other Stalinist leaders include: Bierut (Poland), Gottwald (Czechoslovakia), and Dmitrov (Bulgaria). As Rakosi complained to Voroshilov in June, 1956: "They say that Hungary needs leaders not connected with the past. You can hear talk in Hungary about how Rakosi was... 'the faithful student of Stalin,' and that after the deaths of Dmitrov, Gottwald, and Beirut, Rakosi is 'the last Mohican of the Stalinist era' and thus... he doesn't fit the spirit of the times." TsKhSd, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 2, L. 2, "Note by K. Voroshilov About a Conversation with Rakosi," June 26, 1956.

19. Tibor Méray, a noted Hungarian Communist writer who after 1954 supported Imre Nagy, wrote: "Obviously the idea for the trials and trial staging was conceived by the Russians during their battle against Tito and Yugoslavia. [But] it is equally certain that Rákosi and his crew were the most brilliant of the stage directors, since they outstripped their Polish, Bulgarian, and Romanian colleagues. Intent on gaining the attention not only of Stalin but also of international opinion, they made a complete success of this spectacle.... [T]he methods of the Hungarian Gauleiters proved to be the best of all because they were the simplest." Tibor Méray, That Day in Budapest: October 23, 1956 (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), 114. See also
Ferenc Váli, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary*, 62. "It [the Rajk trial] was the most grandiosely staged trial of Stalin's reign, inside or outside Russia. Whereas the prewar rigged trials in the Soviet Union had served internal Soviet politics, the Rajk trial was intended to bear fruits in the foreign field and have an impact on international events to come." (emphases added)

20. László Rajk (1909-1949) was a leading functionary of the underground communist party before 1944. He was Rákosi's Hungarian Minister of the Interior from 1946 to 1948 and then Foreign Minister. He was sentenced to death in a show trial in September-October 1949, which marked the beginning of the anti-Titoist campaign. The three other high-level victims of the purge trials in 1949 were György Pálffy, Tibor Szőnyi, and András Szalai. The total number of those in some way purged in the 1948-1956 period was approximately 350,000. This figure includes those accused of being "class enemies" (kulaks, clerical reactionaries, etc.), those accused of being "Zionist agents" (Jews), and those accused of having "infiltrated the party" ("Titoists," "Trotskyists," "cosmopolitans," etc.). See György Litván, *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt, and Repression, 1953-1963* (London: Longman, 1996), 19.


23. Lavrentii Beria was KGB Chief under Stalin.


26. Victor S. Abakumov was Soviet Minister of State Security, 1947-51. He was executed in December 1954, in connection with the plot against Beria. The basis of the accusation was the repressive measures Abakumov took against Zhdanov's closest aides in the "Leningrad case." After Beria's arrest, Abakumov, along with Ryumin (deputy of Minister of State Security Ignatiev, winter 1952-53), was arrested and tried in public.

27. Mihály Farkas (1904-1965) was a member of the Politburo of the Hungarian Communist Party, and from 1948 to 1953 served as Minister of Defense. He carried a large share of the responsibility for the mass repressions from the late 1940s-1950s, in part as one of the main organizers of Rajk's trial. The decision to reexamine the role of Farkas in the repressions was made by the Hungarian Politburo in April 1956. In July
1956 he was expelled from the Hungarian Workers' Party [HWP]). In 1957 he was sentenced to sixteen years in prison, but three years later, he was given amnesty.

28. General Gábor Péter was for eight years the director of Hungarian State Security [ÁVH] during the trials of Rajk and János Kádár. He was a member of the Hungarian Communist Party and also of the party's Central Committee. In January 1953, he was arrested along with other ÁVH officers. Rákosi had heard that Péter had complained about him to Beria.

29. It should be noted that, while Stalin was alive, Rákosi did imply that he was responsible for Rajk's death. "Do not think that my decision in the Rajk case was so easily arrived at: I spent long sleepless nights before I decided to strike. But in the end we got that gang of criminals firmly into our grip." In 1955 and 1956, however, Rákosi sought scapegoats. See Méray, op. cit., 112.


31. Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 176-77.

32. The term "information-providers" will be used in this article to refer to diplomats and journalists collectively.

33. AVP RF, F. 077, O.37, Por. 7, P. 187, L 148, From the Diary of V.N. Kazimirov, "Notes of a Conversation with Second Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy Marko Zsigmond and Attaché Novak Radenović, March 5, 1956. Of course, from the Hungarians' point of view, the discrimination against the Yugoslavs was minimal compared to that inflicted on the large Hungarian community (420,000) in Vojvodina at the time. Furthermore, eight years (1948-1956) is probably not a long enough period of time for 6-7,000 Yugoslavs to become entirely "magyarized." However, this was the Yugoslavs' perception.

34. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 37, P.190, L. 1, From Andropov in the Soviet Embassy in Hungary to V. S. Semenov, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 1, 1956.


36. The term comes from the initials "I.B." for Informburo or Cominform (Communist Information Bureau).

37. AVP RF, F. 077, O.37, Por. 10, P. 188, L. 301. Soviet diplomat Timofeev recounts his conversation with Gojko Petrovic, a Hungarian citizen but "Yugoslav by nationality" who was sentenced to death in absentia for supporting the 1948 Cominform decision to expel Yugoslavia. According to Timofeev, Gojko was afraid to return to Yugoslavia in 1956, because those Yugoslav political emigres who did were "arrested and sentenced to 10 or 15 years in prison." See also New York Times (August 16, 1948), p. 3, col. 8, regarding purges of Cominform sympathizers within Yugoslavia. One Yugoslav (Colonel General Jovanovic) was apparently killed while trying to flee to Romania with two other high officers. See New York Times (August 19, 1948), p. 1, col. 6.


40. Ibid., L 9.

41. Ibid., Por. 7, P. 187, L. 54. From the Diary of V. V. Astafiev, Advisor of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the Former Director of the Balkan Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Karoly Erdei," January 19, 1956. This winter round of meetings was not reported in the local press.


46. See note #2 supra.

47. In Poland workers from heavy industrial plants in Poznan staged a large protest rally on June 28, which turned violent. The Polish army and security forces suppressed the protest, but the two days of clashes left 53 dead and many hundreds wounded. After a tense deadlock with the Polish government headed by Ochab, the CPSU Presidium decided not to intervene militarily but to seek a political compromise instead. Archival documents reveal that some Polish officers tried to resist the decision to shoot the demonstrators, but they were outnumbered by others in the security forces who were willing to carry out the orders. Also Soviet commanders (and their Polish allies) still dominated the Polish military establishment. See the collection of declassified documents in Edward Jan Nalepa, Pacification of a Rebellious City: the Polish Army in Poznan in the Light of New Documents] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Bellona, 1992).

48. During various meetings with Tito, Soviet and pro-Soviet Hungarian officials had repeatedly discussed the issue of the Yugoslavs' media coverage of the Hungarian events, requesting that Tito reign in his journalists. For example, Presidium member Anastas Mikoyan, as well as the Hungarian envoy Kurimszki, both visited Tito's country around July 21, 1956. See AVP RF, F 077, O 37, P 191, D 39, L. 81. Ërnö Gerô, in a talk with Andropov, said that Mikoyan called him from Sofia, Bulgaria, and reported that the Yugoslavs had "agreed to try not to support the hostile elements in the press and radio, although they did not give firm assurances."

49. "It should be noted that there are people in the Yugoslav mission in Budapest who not only harbor hatred toward the USSR, but try to undertake actions which have an obviously hostile character regarding the USSR." See AVP RF, F. 077, O. 37, P. 191, D. 39, L1. 75, August 23, 1956, "About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations, from the Soviet Embassy in Budapest," (signature is illegible). See also AVP RF, F 077, O 37, P. 191, D. 39, List 8-10. "O Sostoyanii Vengersko-Yugoslavskikh Otnosheni — Kratkaya Spravka, 8-ogo fevralya, ot N. Skacheva, sovyetnik V Evropei-
skogo Otdela MID SSSR." It is instructive to note that both of these reports were written about the "problems" the Yugoslavs were causing as early as August 1956 — long before the second Soviet-Yugoslav split over the "Nagy affair" developed. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, P 191, D 39, Li. 68-73. By V. Kazimirov, "About the State of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations," August 23, 1956. Other reports earlier in May alleged that Dalibor Soldatić, the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary, had "very good ties" with American envoy Ravendal and "even passes on military and political information." AVP RF, F. 077, O. 37, P. 191, Por. 39, L. 22. "Soobsheniye ob otnosheniakh yugoslavskogo poslannika Soldaticha s rukovoditelyami americanskoji missii, Budapesht, 9 maya 1956 g."

50. These include, on the Yugoslav side, Dalibor Soldatić (Yugoslav envoy in Budapest), Novak Radenović (attaché of the Yugoslav mission in Budapest from 1955 until June 1956), Osman Dikić (advisor in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest during the October-November, 1956 events), Milan Georgiević (first secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest), Marko Zsigmond (second secretary of the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest), etc. On the Hungarian side, these include János Boldoczki (Hungarian Ambassador to USSR), V.V. Altomar (Minister of Food Industry of Hungary and member of the Central Leadership of the HWP in 1956), and many others. On the Soviet side, these include B.V. Gorbachev (second secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, 1956-57), Kazimirov (attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary in 1956), Vladimir Kriuchkhov, (Third Secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, October 1956-1957), and others.

51. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 70, L. 3, Protocol #90 of the CC CPSU Presidium on April 18, 1957, "About the Request of the Hungarian Central Committee regarding Rákosi, Gerő, and Other Hungarian Comrades Located in the USSR, and about the Letter from Comrade Rákosi of March 25, 1957 to the CC CPSU." Also TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 54, L. 5, From the Diary of Zamchevskii, Director of the Fifth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, "Notes of a Conversation with János Boldoczki, Hungarian Ambassador to the USSR," November 28, 1956. Ernő Gerő, András Hegedűs (Hungary's Prime Minister before Nagy), Lajos Piros (Hungarian minister of internal affairs from 1954 to October 27, 1956), István Buta (Hungarian defense minister until October 24, 1956), together with their families, were flown secretly to Moscow in a Soviet military aircraft on the evening of October 28. Hegedűs and Piros remained in Moscow until September 1958, and Gerő stayed there until 1960. Originally there may have been some plan to send these officials to Bulgaria. See TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Li. 54-63, compiled by V. N. Malin. Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on October 28, 1956.

52. Ibid., Rolik 5173, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 403, L 7. By I. Vinogradov, to Comrade M. A. Suslov. "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the Other Leaders, Which Took Place in Yugoslavia and in the Crimea in September-October, 1956." "Comrade Tito stated that relations between us have become colder than they were before his trip to the USSR, and that the necessary trust toward him is absent on the part of the CPSU leaders [and] on the part of the communist and workers' parties of the peoples democracies. These doubts arose among them as a consequence of the disinformation, which they received mainly from their diplomatic workers, and also as a result of great confusion which they have in issues of ideology," (emphasis added)
53. Indeed, during the normalization period, even when the economy began to improve and the majority of workers returned to the factories, these pro-Soviet Hungarians were surreptitiously squeezed out of jobs, or at least harassed, as late as July, 1957. The novelist and playwright Béla Illés, for example, had a talk with Soviet diplomat L. F. Illichev, in which Illés warned: "there is still a very strong anti-Soviet mood in Hungary among all types of people: intelligentsia, peasants, workers, and even in the Kádár government." Illés recounted his experience of arriving at a Hungarian radio station, ready to expound on Soviet literature and asked instead to extemporize on French literature. TsKhSD, O 28, Rolik 5195, Delo 479, L. 1-2, From the Diary of K. A. Krutikov, "Notes of a Conversation with Sall, the Chargé D'Affaires of Hungary in the People's Republic of China," December 17, 1956.

54. AVP RF, F 077, O 38, Por 39, P 195, L 21-23, "Characteristics of the Political Statesmen: Information on the Members of the Party Delegation of Hungary," January 17, 1957--August 8, 1957. "In August 1956 Münich was appointed Hungarian ambassador to Yugoslavia... Several Hungarian comrades in chats with the embassy officials noted that upon his assignment as ambassador to Belgrade,... Münich has made statements approving the [Yugoslav] path of socialist construction and the forms and methods of administration in that country. [T]his is confirmed by Münich's speeches after his appointment, especially during the reburial of Rajk, Pálffy, and others in October 1956... In months after the crushing of the counterrevolution, several Hungarian comrades expressed a dissatisfaction toward Münich, and his... Yugoslav orientation..." Münich's term as ambassador to Yugoslavia ended on October 25, 1956.

55. Ibid., L 20, From the Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, N. Firiubin, "Short Reference on Lajos Csebi, the new Hungarian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, January 14, 1957." "...Csebi participated in the Hungarian Revolution [1919], after its failure, he emigrated to Yugoslavia, and then to the USSR.... In 1949 in connection with the Rajk affair he was arrested and imprisoned until 1954.... In January 1957 he was appointed Hungarian ambassador to Yugoslavia. According to data received from the employees of the Hungarian embassy in Belgrade, Csebi is an embittered [ozloblennyi], anti-Soviet person. He criticises the Soviet Union and other countries in the socialist camp [and]... praises the... "Yugoslav path"... The Yugoslavs think they will establish very close relations with him when he arrives in their country." On allegations about Csebi's ties with Yugoslavia, see also TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 67, L 5. Letter of Mátýás Rákosi in Moscow to Khrushchev, February 15, 1957.

56. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 75, L 3, "Notes of Yuri Andropov to the CC CPSU of August 29, 1957." This document is signed "Andropov, Head of the Department of the CC CPSU for ties with the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries."

57. AVP RF, F 077, O 38, Por 3, P 192, L 11, From the Diary of P. S. Dedushkin, "Notes of a Conversation with the Hungarian Ambassador in Moscow Boldoczki," December 4, 1957. "[T]he Presidium of Hungary issued a decree on Sept. 28 awarding Andropov the 'Order of the Banner of Hungary' as a token of gratitude for his fruitful activity in deepening Hungarian-Soviet friendship."

58. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, L 7, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the CC CPY, Tito, January 10, 1957. "Tito is always saying that one must not interfere in the internal affairs of another country, but that's what he did in his speech [at Pula]..."

60. Brankov was one of the most damaging witnesses at the rigged trial of Rajk in September 1949. He testified that he had attended meetings during which Tito and Ranković instructed Rajk about "overthrowing the socialist order in Hungary." It is unclear whether or not Brankov was coerced to testify. He left Hungary in 1956. See Banač, With Stalin against Tito, 225, and Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 62.

61. Tito expressed his puzzlement in a speech made on October 1, 1949 at the end of maneuvers by the Yugoslav People's Army in Serbia. "[I]t is interesting that Brankov, who is also one of the accused, immediately, from the very beginning, came out in support of the letters which were sent to our Central Committee. But it is well-known who Brankov is, a common thief and defrauder; this has been written about him earlier. And how is it possible that this rascal who considered himself to be the leader of all likeminded persons on whom they rely in the attack on our country, how is it possible that he was put on trial in such a role?" Josip Broz Tito, "Power Shall Not Be a Decisive Factor in Relations Between Socialist Countries," in Pejčinović, ed. Josip Broz Tito: Military Thought and Works, 302.

62. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 7, P 187, L 94, From the Diary of Y. V. Ponomarev, "Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the Protocol Section of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Jozsef Marjai," January 2, 1956. "Marjai said it is still difficult to restore normal relations with Yugoslavia. The diplomats of the Budapest mission are a big obstacle. The majority of them, in Marjai's words, "had built their careers on the rupture of relations with the democratic camp, on slander and lies, and now it is difficult for them to start on a new basis." (emphasis added). Ponomarev agreed: "I said [to Marjai] that in reality the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry is littered with people who are hostilely disposed [zasoren] toward the normalization of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, as well as between Yugoslavia and the other democratic countries. But we must work with these people."

63. Ibid., L 148, From the Diary of V. N. Kazimirov, "Notes of a Conversation with the Second Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission, Marko Zsigmond and the Attaché Novak Radenović," March 5, 1956. At a film presentation at the Czech embassy, Zsigmond "tried to again begin a conversation about the events of 1948-1949, saying that he knows well the history of the rift of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, since he worked in the archive of the CC CPY and is acquainted with the correspondence of that period. Then he tried to lay the blame for the rift completely on the USSR."

64. Ibid., L 95, From the Diary of Y. V. Ponomarev, "Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the Protocol Section of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Jozsef Marjai," January 2, 1956. "Marjai said 'with a person like Zsigmond, it is hardly likely that anything can be done.'" In a footnote to his report, Ponomarev wrote: "The second secretary of the Yugoslav mission [Zsigmond] is indeed different from the other Yugoslav diplomats in his reactionary views. In a number of conversations with our comrades he asks provocative questions about the normalization of relations and responds in a wholly unfriendly way about Hungary."

65. The Petőfi Circle, named after the Hungarian poet Sándor Petőfi, was a club organized by Hungarian communist intellectuals, which served as a forum for anti-Rákosi speeches in the spring and summer of 1956.
66. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 9, P 187, L 112, From the Diary of S. S. Satuchin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission, Milan Georgievic," July 2, 1956. "Georgievic said that, unlike in Yugoslavia, there are many people in Hungary who are not satisfied with the present situation [in Hungary]. He mentioned the resolution of the CC HWP of June 30, 1956, as well as information received from a Yugoslav journalist who attended the June 27 Petofi Circle discussion. In Yugoslavia,' Georgievic said, 'party members and famous social figures do not openly denounce the policies of the party and government as they are doing here. In my opinion a large part of the Hungarian population is displeased with the fact that the HWP leaders are unwilling to correct their serious mistakes.'"

67. Ibid., P 191, D 39, L 75, August 23, 1956, "About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations from the Soviet Embassy in Budapest." "On December 6, 1955, in a conversation with the Satuchin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, Georgievic (First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission) complained that the Hungarian press is giving very scanty information about Yugoslavia, and that several speeches of Yugoslav leaders are printed in such an abridged form that it amounts to unobjective information. The same goes for the Soviet press, Georgievic claimed, but he gave no details." (The signature on this document is illegible.)

68. Ibid., Por 39, P 191, L.43-47, From Yuri Andropov to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, N. S. Patolichev. "About the Rehabilitation of the Hungarian-Yugoslav Society," trans. from Hungarian by V. Kazimirov. (One of the society members was Geza Losonczy, a close Nagy supporter who died in prison even before Nagy was executed).

69. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L 15, From the CC CPY, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU, Khrushchev, November 8, 1956. "We reject the hint about our close ties with the Petofi Circle. Yugoslavia exists as it is, with its revolutionary past and experience...If separate people in Hungary speak about Yugoslavia, that does not give anyone the right to throw blame on Yugoslavia as being responsible for the internal events [of Hungary]."


71. GARF, F 9401, Special Folder [Osobaia Papka] of Stalin, D. 97, L. 351-352, July 13, 1945, To Stalin from L. Beria, "about the Guard on Tito and Security Measures in the City of Belgrade." Also F 9401, Opis 2, D 97, L. 69-70, June 29, 1945, To Stalin and Molotov From Beria, "About the Measures for Strengthening the Guard of Marshal Tito. A total of "509 cadres" were sent to serve in Tito's personal group of bodyguards or to keep order in the city.

72. For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! [the Cominform's newspaper], 1 July 1948, p. 1. Note: the Cominform communiqué announcing the expulsion of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was first made public on 28 June 1948 in Rude Pravo, organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

74. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 9, P 187, L 112, From the Diary of S. S. Satuchin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission, Milan Georgievich," July 2, 1956. "Georgievich said 'Despite the unfair accusations, as well as the difficulties, arising as a result of the rupture in relations, Yugoslavia continued to proceed along the path and did not surrender to the pressure of the imperialist states.'"


76. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 2, L. 3, "Note by K. Voroshilov About a Conversation with Rákosi," June 26, 1956. Rákosi informed Voroshilov that the Yugoslav official Vukomanović-Tempo told him that in the beginning of the war in Korea "guerrilla bases were created" in Yugoslavia "in case of attack by the Soviet Army." N.B. Yugoslavia's election to the U.N. Security Council in 1950-51 probably increased the chance of UN intervention if the USSR did attempt to intervene. A desire for such assistance may have been a motivating factor in Tito's decision to vote in favour of the UN "police action" against North Korea in 1950.

77. Sec Dmitri Volkogonov, "Nesostoyavsheesya Pokushenie: Kak Sovetskii Agent Maks Gotovilsya k Terroristicheskomu Aktu Protiv Tito [The Assassination that Didn't Take Place: How the Soviet Agent Max Prepared for a Terrorist Act Against Tito] Izvestia, June 11, 1993, p. 7, No. 109 (23964). Ironically the appointed "hit man" (Joseph Romual'dovich Grigulevich, alias "Max") was also involved in one of the assassination attempts on Leon Trotsky in Mexico. Also see Khrushchev, The Glasnost Tapes, 72. "[Stalin] was ready to go to war against Yugoslavia, and I suspect that he was thinking about this, although I never heard any conversation mentioning military action. Stalin, however, began to send out agents and put on displays of strength as soon as the break with Tito occurred."

78. TsKhSD, Rolik 5173, F 5, O 28, D 403, L 2, By I. Vinogradov, to Comrade M. A. Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the Other Leaders, which took place in Yugoslavia and in the Crimea in September-October, 1956." "Comrade Khrushchev stated that we do not lay claim to any special leadership, but we understand our responsibility before the peoples' democracies on the strength of historical conditions, which developed in the struggle for socialism."

79. A "little entente" had been formed during the interwar period consisted of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. This should not be confused with Stalin's plan — when relations with Tito were good — for the formation of a Balkan Federation consisting of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Khrushchev, Glasnost Tapes, 105.

80. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, L. 10, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with Enclosed Text," January 10, 1957. "What also does not help is the position of the Yugoslav comrades in the issue of the two world camps. You repeatedly speak out against military blocs, include the Warsaw Pact, and declare that Yugoslavia does not belong to any blocs and pacts. However, one cannot ignore the fact that Yugo belongs to the Balkan Pact, and the Yugoslav military organs cooperate with the military circles of Greece and Turkey. Via these partners in the Balkan alliance, you are simultaneously members of NATO...
We cannot ignore the inconsistencies in the official Yugoslav position regarding blocs and pacts."

81. See, for example, the anti-Yugoslav report prepared just after the invasion. AVP RF, F. 077, O. 37, Por. 39, P. 191, L. 90. From I. Zamchevsxkii, Director of the Fifth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the CC CPSU, "About the Issue of the Yugoslav Leaders' Support of Imre Nagy and His Politics: A Reference," December 4, 1956. "According to a report by Italian comrades, one of the leading workers of the Yugoslav Union of Communists, Mordić, who is now the director of the Institute of Party History in Zagreb, insinuated during a conversation with them that the USSR no longer reflects the interests of the workers of the small countries like Italy and Yugoslavia, and he even suggested that they 'unite the organizations of the small countries into their own International, without the USSR.'"

82. However, scholars have not been able to ascertain just how much influence Tito's "third-path" idea had on the Hungarian population as a whole. Soviet fears may have been unwarranted, given the historic animosity between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Hungarians massacred about 3,300 Yugoslavs in Novi Sad in January, 1942. In retaliation, Yugoslavs killed about 30,000-40,000 Hungarians in October 1944. These events marred relations between the two countries. Hungarians may have looked more to Poland -- which had never been a military adversary -- as a model. See Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, 179n.

83. TsKhSD, F 89, O 2, D 2, L. 1. "Information of Mikhail Suslov from Budapest, June 13, 1956." Many other documents state that the majority of Hungarian people were not involved in the uprising. See, for instance, TsKhSD F 5 O 28 Rolik 5195, Delo 479, List 14. "Report of the Delegation of the World Federation of Unions About its Trip to Hungary," November 23-27, 1956. "The overwhelming majority of the population tried to hide from the battle. A portion of the population demonstrated against the counterrevolutionaries and supported the new Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government in order to end the fascist terror. A third group supported the counterrevolution." The author of this document went on to explain that, of the members of this third group, a half of them simply didn't understand that the Soviet troops had come to help Hungary put an end to the "white terror." The other half actively fought against the Soviet army and socialist forces of Hungary. Also, Tito hinted at this misperception later in his Pula speech, November 11, 1956, when he stated: "Their [the Soviet leaders'] eyes have now been opened and they realize that not only are the Horthyites fighting, but also workers in factories and mines, that the whole nation is fighting. (emphasis added)" Cited in Zinner, National Communism, 529.

84. See AVP RF, F 77, O 37, Por 9, P 187, D 036, L. 55-56. From the Diary of V. N. Kelin, "Notes of a Conversation with the Employee of the Newspaper Népszava, Lorant, and the Editor of the Journal Csillag, Király," June 17, 1956. "Lately the Hungarian intelligentsia is very strongly attracted to the Yugoslav question. The fact that Tito went to Moscow through Romania, and not by the more natural route — through Budapest — is seen as an open demonstration against Hungary. In Hungary Dedijer's biography of Tito is passed from hand to hand. It was published in the Hungarian language for Hungarians living in Yugoslavia. The book is enjoying exceptional success..."

85. Ibid., P 191, D 39, L 41, To Shepilov from Andropov, "About the Visit of Kurimszki, the Hungarian Envoy, with Tito in Yugoslavia (Brioni)," July 21, 1956.
Milovan Djilas was a high official under Tito, at first a zealous communist, but later a harsh critic of communism. Tibor Dery and Tibor Tardos were veteran Hungarian communist writers who later turned against the Rákosi regime.

86. Ibid., L. 41. "Tito didn't answer this question; he was only interested in what kinds of elements participated in the Petőfi Circle discussions. I've been informed that the majority of those present were workers and only comrades who didn't oppose what was being said there."

87. Ibid., L. 81. Gerő, in a talk with Andropov, said that Mikoyan called him from Sofia, Bulgaria, and reported that the Yugoslavs had "agreed to try not to support the hostile elements in the press and radio, although they did not give firm assurances."

88. TsKhSD, Rolik 5173, F 5, O 28, D 403, L. 9, I. Vinogradov, to M. A. Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the Other Leaders, Which Took Place in Yugoslavia and in the Crimea in September-October, 1956."

89. Ibid.

90. AVP RF, Fond 077, O 37, Papka 191, D. 39, L. 75. August 23, 1956, "About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hinderin the Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations From the Soviet Embassy in Budapest." "It should be noted that there are people in the Yugoslav mission in Budapest who not only harbor hatred toward the USSR, but try to undertake actions which have an obviously hostile character regarding the USSR. Also see TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 5, Sept. 17, 1956. Gromyko wrote that "the reactionary part of the intelligentsia and the opportunist elements in the party are conducting a policy to try to rip Hungary away from the Warsaw Pact and replace USSR influence with Yugoslav influence." (emphasis added)

91. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 54-63, "Working Notes from the CPSU CC Presidium Session on October 28, 1956," compiled by V. N. Malin. (Hereafter cited as Malin, "Working Notes"). The other bloc countries — China, Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia — were also mentioned in the same sentence. As a result of this decision, the CPSU Presidium sent a cable to Tito expressing support for Nagy's new government and for the statement Nagy issued on October 28. The following day, October 29, the Yugoslav government published a message to the HWP, in Politika (the main Belgrade daily), which urged "an end to the fratricidal struggle" and warned that "further bloodshed would only harm the interests of the Hungarian working people and socialism, and would only promote the aims of reactionaries."


93. Veljko Mićunović, Moscow Diary (New York: Garden City, 1980), 134. Of course, Khrushchev apparently did understand that some workers were "supporting the uprising," judging from Malin's notes of the October 28 CC CPSU Presidium meeting. Malin, "Working Notes," October 28, 1956.

94. Cf. note 2 supra.

95. On August 21, 1952 in a television debate with Averell Harriman, Dulles said: "The first thing I would do would be to shift from a purely defensive policy to a psychological offensive, a liberation policy, which will try to give hope and a resistance mood inside the Soviet empire." Transcript of television program "Pick the Winner," August 21, 1952, Dulles Papers, cited in Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 131. The liberation policy was quietly dropped
early in the Eisenhower presidency; it was primarily for domestic consumption, and lacked operational content. Of course, Dulles' liberation rhetoric also helped to stimulate the Hungarian revolution and to encourage the "freedom fighters" to continue their resistance.

96. These are: 1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2) mutual nonaggression; 3) mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence. See Imre Nagy, On Communism: In Defense of the New Course (New York: Praeger, 1957), 22-23. Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru first endorsed these principles in a joint statement in New Delhi on June 28, 1954. The principles were intended to "guide relations between the two countries" as well as "relations with other countries in Asia and in other parts of the world." For the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962) (New York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 7-8.


99. AVP RF, F 77, O 37, P 191, D 39, L 99. From the First Secretary of the European Department of the Soviet Foreign Minister, V. Bakunov and Second Secretary of the European Division, A. Khanov, "Information about the Position of the Yugoslavs toward the Events in Hungary," December 12, 1956. "[T]he display of revanchist aspirations by counterrevolutionary elements, uttering the slogan 'Great Hungary,' noticeably influenced the Yugoslavs' position. If before this the Yugoslav press praised the actions of the Nagy government, so after the counterrevolutionary nationalist demonstrations, the press and various Yugoslav representatives spoke with alarm about the growth of the anarchic, counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary. This anxiety was noticeable in Tito's letter to the CC of the HWP on October 30." (This quote merely reflects Tito's subjective fears, based on effective Soviet disinformation. It does not reflect the conditions in Hungary, since no one among the Hungarian revolutionaries expressed "revanchist aspirations" or uttered the slogan "Great Hungary." The issue probably weighed on Tito's mind, given the fact that, after the Trianon Treaty (1920), Yugoslavia received significant Hungarian territory, amounting to 20,956 square kilometers.


101. See, for example, Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 350-51. It should be noted that many of these statements were reported by Soviet and Hungarian officials, and thus could be considered "hearsay." Given the numerous references, however, we have good reason to believe Tito actually did make these remarks.

102. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L.1-2, From the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev, November 8, 1956. "It is true that during our conversation on Brioni we agreed with your assessment, that the weakness of the Nagy government and its actions led to the danger of the destruction of the essential socialist achievements in Hungary. We agreed that the Hungarian communists should not remain in such a government, and that they should... decisively resist the reaction. There is no need to remind you that we expressed our doubts about the consequences of open assistance from the Soviet army from the very beginning, as well as during all conversations. But... such help became unavoid-
able." Also see Tito's speech delivered in Pula, November 11, 1956, as reported in Borba, November 16, 1956, or cited in Zinner, ed. National Communism, 516-541.

103. "I expected even more strenuous objections from Tito than the ones we had encountered during our discussions with the Polish comrades. But we were pleasantly surprised. Tito said we were absolutely right and that we should send our soldiers into action as quickly as possible." Strobe Talbott, ed. Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 421.

104. AVP RF, F 77, O 37, Papka 191, Por 39, List 100. From the First Secretary of the European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, V. Bakunov and Second Secretary of the European Division, A. Khanov, "Reference about the Position of the Yugoslavs toward the Events in Hungary," December 12, 1956. Also TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, List 3, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with Enclosed Text," January 10, 1957.

105. TsKhSD, F. 89, O 2, D 4, L 43, Information of Firiubin, Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, "Notes from a Conversation with the President of the Yugoslavia (Josip Broz Tito)," January 11, 1957.

106. TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, List 5, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the CC CPY (Tito) with Enclosed Text," January 10, 1957. Ivan Gosnjak, the Yugoslav State Secretary for Defense Matters, allegedly said something similar at the reception in the Soviet embassy in Belgrade on November 23 in honor of the Soviet military delegation. AVP RF, F 77, O 37 Papka 191 Por 39, List 82-93, "About the Issue of Imre Nagy and His Politics by the Yugoslav Leaders, Reference," December 4, 1956, by I. Zamchevskii, the Director of the Fifth European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR. Some speculate that Tito, and other prominent Yugoslav officials around him, may have contemplated this preemptive intervention, both to keep the Soviet army out, and to prop up the communist government in Hungary. See Richard Lowenthal, "Tito's Affair with Khrushchev," The New Leader, v. 41 (October 6, 1958), 14. Also Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 351.

107. TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, List 5, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with enclosed Text, January 10, 1957."


111. Ibid., 150.


113. Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986), 137. "Thus, with Tito as a key player now, and Nagy as Tito's obvious choice the Russians were increasingly interested in Nagy and the authority he could command." (emphasis added). See also Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 249-50.
114. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L 2, Protocol 54, Resolution of the CC CPSU Presidium, "About the Answer of the Yugoslavs on the Issue of Imre Nagy and His Group," November 10, 1956. "[Y]ou completely shared our positive view of Kádár, as a prominent and authoritative leading statesman of the communist movement of Hungary, who is capable in the present difficult conditions to lead a new revolutionary government... You were very satisfied that the CC CPSU still in the summer after the departure of Rákosi tried to have Kádár appointed First Secretary of the CC Hungary (HWP)." (This may suggest that Khrushchev's choice of Kádár was overruled by Molotov and other hard-liners in favour of the Stalinist Gerő.)

115. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, P 191, D 39, L 81, August 23, 1956, "About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations From the Soviet Embassy in Budapest," by V. Kazimirov. "[O]n July 23, 1956, Gerő in a talk with Andropov said that Mikoyan called him from Sofia, Bulgaria... Gerő stated that if he correctly understood comrade Mikoyan, the Yugoslav embassy considered the candidacy of Gerő as unacceptable for the post of First Secretary of the CC HWP, where they would have liked to see János Kádár or Zoltán Szántó." (emphasis added). Zoltán Szántó (1893-1977) was a revisionist communist, a member of the moderate wing of the opposition before October 1956. He sought refuge in the Yugoslav embassy on November 4 along with Nagy and his other supporters, but was taken to Romania on November 18 as a "guest" of the Romanian Communist Party (along with Zoltán Vas, chairman of the Government Commission on Consumer Supplies). Later, in the Spring of 1957, proceedings were initiated against him and the others, and the Hungarian security police arrested him. In 1958 he was permitted to return to Hungary.

116. Ibid., L 41, From Andropov to D. T. Shepilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 14, 1956. "Then Tito unexpectedly started to ask [Kurimszki] about the state of health of comrades Gerő, Kádár, and Révai... Comrade Tito did not mention Imre Nagy even once in the course of the whole conversation, and did not even drop a hint about him." The words in italics were underlined in the original document.

117. More evidence would be needed to substantiate this view, of course. Prominent scholars have always believed that Tito did insist that Rákosi be dismissed before Yugoslav relations with the communist bloc countries could improve. See, for example, Sándor Kopácsi, In the Name of the Working Class (New York: Grove Press, 1986), 89. "The Yugoslav leader wanted the head of the Hungarian dictator who had mounted the false trials of Rajk and Kádár in which everybody had been 'agent and spy for Tito's clique.'" Or Endre Marton, The Forbidden Sky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 207. When Khrushchev begged Tito to forget how Stalin had treated him in 1948, Tito demanded Rákosi's ouster." And Ferenc Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 223. "He [Tito] undertook to persuade the Kremlin to have Rákosi and his associates removed from the Hungarian leadership; but the Soviet Presidium steadfastly refused."


119. See TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 84, L. 7. To the CC CPSU from the CC CPY, Feb. 7, 1957. "In the course of our conversations with comrades Khrushchev, Bulganin, and others in May and June of 1955, we expressed our negative position regarding the policies of Rákosi. You passed by these remarks, defended Rákosi, and used the whole authority of the Soviet Union in defense of this person and his policies,
which he personified, right to the very last moment, that is, until the majority of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers’ Party eliminated him.” Also see Tito’s speech in Pula, November 11, 1956. "When we were in Moscow... we said that Rákosi’s regime and Rákosi himself had no qualifications whatever to lead the Hungarian state.... [T]heir actions could only bring about grave consequences... [W]e were not insistent enough with the Soviet leaders to have such a team as Rákosi and Gerő eliminated." (emphasis added) Cited in Zinner, ed. National Communism, 523-4.

120. John MacCormac, “Hungary Meeting Yugoslav Claims,” New York Times, May 4, 1956, p. 6 col 3. "In return for getting his way, it is believed that Marshal Tito will cease his active opposition to Mr. Rákosi, who is chief of the Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party."

121. See TsKhSD F 89, O 2 D 2, L. 9. "Information of Mikoyan from Budapest," July 14, 1956. When Mikoyan flew to Budapest on July 13 he had the impression that "the Hungarian comrades [in the Central Committee] had long ago come to the conclusion that Rákosi must go," but that they were "too afraid" to say so openly, and were simply waiting for the Soviet leaders to make the first move. Also see TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 84, L. 7. Letter of Tito of the CC CPY, Belgrade, to CC CPSU (Khrushchev), February 7, 1957, from Belgrade. "We are forced, in the interests of truth, although we do it unwillingly, to draw your attention to the fact that the CPSU leadership, Soviet government, and Soviet media rendered the greatest support to these people [i.e., Rákosi et al.] and their politics, even when when it became clear that even the Central Committee of the HWP and all the members of the HWP no longer wanted these people to lead their party and government, not to mention the wider working masses." (emphasis added)

122. Imre Horváth’s notes of Khrushchev’s speech at the November 3 Session; Magyar Országos Levéláltár (MOL), XIX J-1-K Horváth Imre külgüneyminiszter iratai, 55, doboz. This document is also contained in the Hungarian document collection Döntés a Kremlben, 1956 (pp. 92-93), cited in note #4 supra.

123. TsKhSD, F. 5, O. 28 D. 403 L. 9, From I. Vinogradov to M. A. Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the Other Leaders in the Crimea, September-October, 1956."

124. These included Júlia Rajk (widow of the executed Communist leader), Zoltán Vas, György Lukács (the philosopher), Géza Losonczy, Ferenc Donát, Gábor Táncos, (president of the Petőfi Circle), journalists Sándor Harasztí, Miklós Vásárhelyi, György Fazekas, and others. Altogether there were ten men, fifteen women, and seventeen children in the group. Elie Abel, "Nagy Is Abducted by Soviet Police; Sent to Romania," New York Times, November 24, 1956, p. 1, col. 7.

125. Aleksander Ranković (1909-1983) was the second most important public figure in Yugoslavia. He was minister of internal affairs and party secretary responsible for cadres.

126. Tito wrote: "...[W]hen they [the Nagy group] showed up here in our embassy,...[we] persistently tried to prove to them the usefulness of such a resignation for the regulation of the situation in Hungary." TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 84, L. 8. Letter of Tito to Khrushchev, February 7, 1957.

127. Mićunović, Moscow Diary, 137.

128. TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L.2 Telegram from the CC CPSU (Khrushchev) to Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Firiubin), November 4, 1956.


131. Ibid., Dok 25, L. 2. Emphasis is in the original document.

132. Ibid., Dok 38, L. 12. "From the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev," November 8, 1956. (Ties between Hungary and the USSR were not completely severed, since — among other things — Ambassador Andropov remained in Budapest, and Hungarian Ambassador to the USSR Boldoczki remained in Moscow.)

133. Ibid., 38, L 13. "From the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev," Brioni, November 8 1956. "If you take all this into consideration, then it becomes clear that only the speed of events was not anticipated and created problems that now are essential to solve. We think the question of whether or not our embassy acted correctly in Budapest no longer has any significance. What is important now is that we work together to solve this problem in the spirit of friendly relations, which we already established between our countries and parties."

134. Ibid., Dok 29, List 3, From the Diary of D. T. Shepilov, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, "About the Conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR Mićunović," November 7, 1956. There is a discrepancy in the time of the incident. Mićunović and Shepilov said it occurred on November 6 at 12:45 p.m. The Soviet investigatory commission, however, established the time of the occurrence as November 5, "around" 3:00 p.m. See AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 18, P 188, L 38, From General-Lieutenant Beliusov, Chief of the Eighth Administration of the General Staff, to N. S. Patolichev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, "Act."


136. TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 29, Ll. 1-3. From D. T. Shepilov to the CPSU Presidium, "About the Conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR Mićunović," November 7, 1956. Shepilov told Mićunović that the Soviet military command would comply with the Yugoslav request to "pull back the military unit next to the [Yugoslav] embassy compound."


138. Malin, "Working Notes." See the formal protocol for this session TsKhSD, F. 3, O. 64, D. 485, L. 141 "Vypiska iz Protokola No. 53 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 6 noyabrya 1956 g." The telegram, signed by foreign minister Dmitrii Shepilov, was sent to the Yugoslav foreign minister, Koča Popović, via the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko Mićunović. It stated that the Soviet military commander in Hungary had been ordered to make a careful study of how the incident happened. See the following note infra.

139. Major-General Grebennik was Serov's deputy in the KGB and Soviet commandant of Budapest after November 4, 1956.

140. AVP RF F 77, O 37, D 18, P 188, L 35, From Major General Grebennik, Lieutenant-Colonel Kuzimino, and Gaspar (Deputy of the Hungarian Government Assembly), November 6, 1956, "About the Accident to the Employee of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest on November 5, 1956." This report was later sent directly to
Colonel General N. Pavlovskii on November 9, 1956 and other superior officers in the Soviet General Staff. See AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 18, P 188, LI 38-39, To Comrade N S Patolichev and Beliusov, November 9, 1956, From the Commission composed of Grebennik, Boskoboinik and Lukin. "The Soviet soldiers said that the Soviet tanks were being shot at from the direction of apartment buildings situated near the Yugoslav mission. In reply to this shot, a Soviet tank opened fire on the indicated house. Apparently because the tanks were moving, a volley of shots fell on the embassy building, and as a result, one of the employees who was standing at the window was killed." The Soviet authorities pledged to transport the body to Yugoslavia.

141. Ibid., F 144, O 18, Por 4, P 41, L 25, "Telephone telegram no. 185 from V. Astafiev, Temporary Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Hungary (Budapest) to I. K. Zamchevskii, Director of the Fifth European Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry," April 14, 1957.

142. TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L 4, "Telegram from the CC CPSU to N. Firiubin, Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade," November 4, 1956.

143. Mićunović, Moscow Diary, 146.

144. Mićunović stated that... "During the conversations on Brioni it was agreed that Imre Nagy and others could facilitate the situation of the new revolutionary worker-peasant government [headed by Kádár] if they in some way or another declare their intention to cooperate with the government or at least, not demonstrate against it. The present location of Imre Nagy and others in the Yugoslav embassy does not contradict that agreement that was made with comrades Khrushchev and Malenkov with Tito and the other Yugoslav leaders during the Brioni meeting. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok. 29, L. 2, From the Diary of D. T. Shepilov, "About the Conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR, Mićunović," November 7, 1956.

145. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L 13. "From the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev," Brioni, November 8 1956. "Despite the absence of detailed information, we nevertheless thought that such a declaration from Nagy would have been essentially useful to Kádár's government... and could help to correct the situation in Hungary, which is what we suggested to you."

146. Ibid., Dok 84, L. 8, To the CC CPSU from the CC CPY, February 7, 1957. "As far as the remark about the resignation of Nagy is concerned, we'd like to remind you that we informed Nagy and his comrades of our opinion when they ended up in our embassy and persistently tried to prove to them how useful such a resignation would be in regulating the situation in Hungary. The fact that Nagy did not take our advice is not the business of the Yugoslav Union of Communists; it is his personally. We even went too far in this, wishing to ease the situation of the Kádár government and USSR by taking advantage of Nagy's presence in the Yugoslav embassy."

147. Ibid., Dok 25, L. 4. Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, N. Firiubin, Belgrade, to CC CPSU, November 4, 1956. "Tito asked also for the Soviet government to tell the Kádár government not to carry out repression against those communists who did not immediately take the correct line during the latest events in Hungary." Kádár also urged lenient treatment for many of the members in the Nagy group. Since Tito supported Kádár, he was receptive to this idea. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 34, L. 2, Telegram from the CC CPSU to Andropov, Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, November 9, 1956.


151. Ibid., Dok 83, L 4, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito," January 10, 1957. [Paraphrased] Thus, because of your contacts with Nagy, he was warned about the upcoming action of the Soviet troops in Hungary.

152. Malin, "Working Notes," November 4, 1956, (In the November 6 Presidium meeting Khrushchev accused Molotov of thinking about "bringing back Hegedus and Rákosi.")

153. Endre Márton, the Hungarian journalist employed by the Associated Press, wrote: "Béla Kovács was the first to tell me that Nagy and many Communists who remained loyal to him went to the Yugoslav embassy after Ambassador Soldatić called Nagy at dawn to say that Khrushchev had informed Tito about his decision to use force to quell the revolt.... Nagy was invited to seek refuge in the Yugoslav embassy at one o'clock in the morning, November 4th, by Dalibor Soldatić." (Béla Kovács was secretary-general of the Smallholders Party until his arrest in February 1947, and was appointed minister of agriculture by Imre Nagy on October 27, 1956). See Endre Márton, The Forbidden Sky, 197.

154. In his Pula speech (November 11, 1956), Tito said: "We are against interference and the use of foreign armed forces... [but] if it meant saving socialism in Hungary, then... Soviet intervention was necessary." Earlier in the speech he stated: "The first intervention, coming at the invitation of Gerő, was absolutely wrong."


156. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L. 14. Letter from CC CPY (Tito) to CC CPSU (Khrushchev), November 8, 1956.

157. Mićunović, Moscow Diary, 150.

158. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L.106. Telegram from N. Firiubin (Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia) to CC CPSU (Khrushchev), November 4, 1956. Tito asked the Soviet government to take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from these possible attacks.


160. AVP RF, F 77, O 37 Papka 191, List 89, December 4, 1956, "On the Issue of Imre Nagy and His Politics by the Yugoslav Leaders, A Reference," by I. Zamchevskii, Director of the Fifth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, USSR.

161. TsKhSD, F 5, O 28, D 403, L 9, From I. Vinogradov to Comrade M. A. Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the Other Leaders in the Crimea, September-October 1956."
162. Although Tito did not state this bluntly, he did imply repeatedly in the secret correspondence with Khrushchev that the reason he could not simply relinquish the Nagy group to Kádár's government was because he needed to safeguard Yugoslavia's international reputation. He wrote: "We understand your conclusions in your letter and consider them logical, but... absent in your letter is a deep understanding of our situation and especially of our readiness to solve this question in the spirit of mutual friendly relations and not to the detriment of the international reputation of Yugoslavia as a sovereign country." TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 38, L. 10. "From the CC CPY (Tito) to the CC CPSU (Khrushchev), Brioni, 8 November 1956."

163. TsKhSD, F 89, O. 2, D. 5, L. 3-4, "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov," November 17, 1956. "Our recommendations are: a) provide for the arrest of Nagy as soon as he is released from the Yugoslav embassy; b) demand that Nagy sign a declaration in which he admits his mistakes; c) send him and his group to Romania; and d) prepare a text for the Hungarian government about Nagy."

164. TsKhSD, F 89, Per. 45, Dok 56, LI. 9-10. "Protocol #62 from the CC CPSU Presidium session of December 6, 1956, to Malenkov, Shepilov, and Gromyko, "About the Answering Note to the Yugoslav Government's Note of Nov. 24, 1956 on the issue of Imre Nagy and his Group." See also the note of protest that Yugoslav foreign minister Koča Popović sent to the Soviet and Hungarian embassies on November 24, 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, 0. 2, D. 5, LI. 19-26, and TsKhSD, F. 3, 0. 64, D. 488, LI. 95-96. Information from Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov, November 23, 1956. This elaborate plot was devised by Ivan Serov and other senior KGB officials. Interestingly, Serov thought about using the same trick to arrest Cardinal Mindszenty — who had sought refuge in the American embassy. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 53, L. 2, "Notes of Serov on November 27, 1956." (There were several communications, incidentally, between Szántó and the Hungarian leaders, as well as several telegrams between the Yugoslav Embassy and Belgrade, in the final days before the Nagy group left the Yugoslav Embassy).

165. For details on the abduction, see the newly declassified correspondence between Tito and Khrushchev in early 1957, now stored in the former CPSU Central Committee archive "Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza ot 10 yanvarya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslavii/Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Soyuzu Kommunistov Yugoslavii ot 7 fevralya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," (Top Secret), February 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 83, Li. 1-12 and D. 84, Li. 1-18.

166. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 56, Li. 10-11. "Protocol #62 from the CC CPSU Presidium session of December 6, 1956, to Malenkov, Shepilov, and Gromyko, About the Reply to the Yugoslav Note of November 24, 1956 on the issue of Imre Nagy and his Group, including enclosed copy of the November 24 letter."

167. Ibid., Dok 49, L 2, "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov," November 22, 1956. In the end two promises were broken. The document "guarantee[d] the security of the indicated persons," and pledged "not to hold the Yugoslavs responsible" for the past events.

168. Ibid., O 2, D 5, L. 13-15, "Information by V. Nikolaev from Bucharest," November 26, 1956. Emil Bodnaras (head of the Romanian armed forces from 1947 to 1957 and senior aide to Gheorghiu-Dej) told Nikolaev: "We didn't think the Yugoslavs
would raise a fuss [podnimut shum] about the transfer of Imre Nagy and his group to Romania. However, as You know, they appealed with notes of protest to the Soviet and Hungarian governments. It is possible that this issue can be presented at the United Nations and so on. We think we ought to be ready for various speeches and conversations in connection with Imre Nagy." The CC CPSU Presidium later discussed this telegram, which went on to state that Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (the Romanian leader) planned to have high-level talks with Yugoslavia to soften tensions between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and Hungary about the fate of Imre Nagy. TsKhSD, F. 3, O. 64, D. 488, L. 177 "Excerpt from Protocol No. 60 of the CC CPSU Presidium Session," 27 November 1956. The protocol stated that "on the basis of the exchange of opinions at the session of the CPSU CC Presidium, Comrade Bulganin is instructed to hold negotiations with Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej." Later that same day, Bulganin called Gheorghiu-Dej, which he later recounted in writing for the other CPSU Presidium members: "I told Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej that, in our opinion, a meeting at the highest level with the Yugoslav leadership about Imre Nagy and his group will not produce a good solution, since the Yugoslavs have a set position on this matter, and such a meeting might complicate the situation. The Yugoslavs might demand a meeting with Imre Nagy and the others, which would hardly be worthwhile...."TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, L. 16-17, "Information of Bulganin to the CC CPSU Presidium about the telephone conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej," November 27, 1956.


170. "We asked the Yugoslavs to refrain from any additional declarations about the Nagy affair. The Yugoslav ambassador said any talks are useful, but the situation is deteriorating, as if we are returning to 1948." (emphasis added) TsKhSD, F 89, O 2, D 3, L. 13-15, "Information by V. Nikolaev," November 26, 1956.

171. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Papka 191, D 39, L 81, August 23, 1956. "About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations From the Soviet Embassy in Budapest." "On July 23, 1956, Gerő, in a talk with Andropov, said that Mikoyan called him from Sofia, Bulgaria and reported that the Yugoslavs agreed not to support the hostile elements in the press and radio... Gerő emphasized that if he correctly understood comrade Mikoyan, the Yugoslav embassy considered the candidacy of Gerő as unacceptable for the post of First Secretary of the CC HWP, where they would have liked to see János Kádár or Zoltán Szántó." (emphasis added)

172. Mićunović, Moscow Diary, 135.

173. TsKhSD, F 89, O 2, D 3, L. 11. "Yesterday, late last night, the negotiations of comrades Kádár and Vidić were concluded.... On the evening of November 22 Nagy and his group must leave the Yugoslav embassy. Essential measures [neobkhodimye mery] in connection with this have been prepared jointly by comrades Serov and Munnich." (emphasis added)

174. Ibid., F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L 24 (on the back), "Working Notes of the CC CPSU Presidium Session on November 2, 1956," compiled by V. N. Malin. It is true that Kádár did agree to travel to Moscow without informing Nagy and other government officials, and he did say during the November 3 Presidium meeting that "the correct course of action [in Hungary] is to form a revolutionary government." Also, he emphasized the fact that the Nagy government had failed to prevent the "killing of Commu-
nists" and said he "agreed with [Soviet officials]" that "you cannot surrender a socialist country to counterrevolution." However, even then Kádár stated that they should avoid creating a "puppet government." Apparently Kádár had not planned to head this new pro-Soviet regime either. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 32. "Working Notes from the CC CPSU Presidium Session on November 3, 1956, compiled by V. N. Malin. N.B. Until the declassification of the Malin notes, scholars had not known what Kádár was doing in Moscow on November 2 and 3. Both Kádár and Münich participated in sessions of the CPSU Presidium on these two days, although Kádár spoke the most. On November 2 they were joined by István Bata (Hungarian defense minister until October 24), who was flown to Moscow on the evening of October 28 (along with Gerő, Piros, Hegedűs). On November 3, they were joined by Imre Horváth (Hungarian foreign minister until November 2), who took detailed notes of that day's session.

175. Mátó, Forbidden Sky, 211.

176. TsKhSD, F 89, O. 2, D. 5, L. 3-4, "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov," November 17, 1956. "Kádár has agreed with these recommendations." (emphasis added)

177. Ibid., Per 45, Dok 38, L 4. November 10, 1956, Resolution of the CC CPSU Presidium, "About the Answer of the Yugoslavs on the Issue of Imre Nagy and his Group," with the enclosures: telegram from Andropov and Epishev in Budapest; letter of Khrushchev to Tito; letter of Tito to Khrushchev. "Kádár in a slightly worried tone also said that information reached him that the United States began military mobilization. He requested that someone tell him whether there is any truth to these rumors."

178. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 34, L 2, "Draft of the Telegram to the Soviet Ambassador Andropov in Hungary," November 9, 1956.


181. AVP RF, F 077, O 38, Por 14, Papka 193, From the Diary of V. K. Gulevskii, Attaché, and V. Astafiev, Temporary Chargé D'Affaires, "Notes of a Conversation with János Péter, Hungarian First Deputy Foreign Minister and István Sebes, Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister, June 17, 1958." Péter told Gulevskii about a recent talk he had with Jovo Kapičić, the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary. Kapičić had just learned about Nagy's sentence and execution. Péter told Kapičić that other material — about the role of Yugoslavia in the Hungarian events — would be included in the report of the Nagy execution. Péter warned that if the Yugoslav government begins to attack Hungary, then "Hungary will be forced to publish other materials in its possession."

182. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 77, L 8, Text of the "verbal note" from the Yugoslavs given to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on June 23, 1958 by the Yugoslav Ambassador Kapičić, transl. from from Hungarian, enclosed with "Telefonogram from Astafiev of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest to P.S. Dedushkin of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, June 24, 1958."
Semmelweis as Literary Hero

George Bisztray

Semmelweis, Saviour of Mothers! This epithet was coined by Jenő Rákosi half a century after the death of the famed physician.1 While Rákosi himself was later called an "arch-conservative" and a "reactionary" by the communists, they borrowed the epithet. The life of Doctor Semmelweis reminds one of a classical Greek tragedy, for which reason the Semmelweis story has over the years been the subject of a number of films and plays. In 1939 and in 1952 films were made about him in Hungary, directed by László Kalmár and Frigyes Bán, respectively. In 1950 an East German movie celebrated “Semmelweis, Retter der Mütter” (“Saviour of Mothers”).

In this article, I shall outline variations on a theme by three playwrights: the Norwegian Jens Bjørneboe; the American Howard Sackler; and the Hungarian György Száraz. I shall also mention an unusual lyrical prose work by the famous French author Louis-Ferdinand Céline — himself a medical doctor — in which the figure of Semmelweis is used to propagate Céline’s own, distinctively Nietzschean world-view.

Who was Semmelweis, and how can we conceive him as a classical tragic hero? Ignác Fülöp (in German: Ignaz Philipp) Semmelweis was born in Buda in 1818. He studied medicine in Vienna, and started his practice there in the obstetric ward of the Allgemeines Krankenhaus (General Hospital). Since well-to-do women gave birth at home, Semmelweis’s patients were mostly working-class women and prostitutes. It was a matter of common knowledge, but only the newcomer Semmelweis found it significant that in the section of the ward where midwives attended the death rate from a mysterious illness called childbed fever was much lower than in the section where delivery was assisted by medical doctors. After much observation and experimentation, Semmelweis found a connection between this circumstance and another factor. Unbelievable as it sounds now, obstetricians and interns in those days also conducted dissections of and even practiced delivery on cadavers. Semmelweis eventually came to the conclusion that childbed fever was neither God’s will nor an irrational event but a case of endemic poisoning caused by bacteria carried on decom-
posing particles of organic matter. He also found the remedy: thorough hand washing with a solution of lime.

As the Semmelweis myth goes, the envious medical establishment reacted disgracefully, belittling Semmelweis's finding, ridiculing his commitment to truth, eventually simply claiming his achievement. The historian, physician, and Hungarian patriot, István Benedek points out in an introduction to Semmelweis's essays, that Semmelweis was neither a martyr nor a national hero but a man of difficult nature: cantankerous, often rude, and unable to explain his theory in a voluminous, book-size work. Instead, he wasted his life writing polemic letters to colleagues all over the world. This may have been true for the last five years of his life when, after the belated publication of his *magnum opus*, Semmelweis initiated a vituperate correspondence with those who were slow to accept his findings. Semmelweis the medical student and young doctor, on the other hand, was remembered as a good-natured and popular member of the Viennese Hungarian community. Long years full of disappointments, and a general embittering of his disposition, made him the man that Benedek described. Although scientifically he was right, Semmelweis tried to prove his thesis in the wrong way. He died in 1865 in the same mental hospital (in Döbling, Austria) where the great statesman István Széchenyi had died five years earlier. Semmelweis's achievement was probably never acknowledged on its own merits; medical literature attributes his method to the German Virchow, the Scotsman Simpson, and even to others.

A Hungarian fate, one may say, bringing to mind similar examples, such as János Bolyai who was ignored in favour of Karl Friedrich Gauss, or Ányos Jedlik disregarded in favour of Werner von Siemens. In the field of inventions it is, indeed, difficult to prove primacy, and the children of smaller nations feel this especially painfully. Nevertheless, a misunderstood genius always makes a good tragic figure. Semmelweis exemplifies hubris: the tragic lack of knowledge or awareness. In his case, it is knowledge of the fact that the medical institution is part of the social structure, guided not only by scientific truth but also by hierarchical individual interests, political considerations, and personal informal connections. In other words, science is practiced by human beings who are fallible. In fact, they are all too frequently vain, jealous, and often engage in intrigues. Insolence, this other definition of hubris, also holds true for Semmelweis.

Enough of the biographical facts. We have on hand three dramas about the same person. Their authors agree in many respects, almost to the point of repeating each other. Yet, the different cultures and times that produced them lends each one its distinctive character. The same hero provides an instance for the three authors to air their ideas. Thus, of equal importance with their main character are the playwrights themselves. Who were they?

Jens Bjørneboe (1920-1976) was an *enfant terrible* of post-Second World War Norwegian literature. Labelled in turn a leftist, anarchist, and populist, actually his persistent aim was to provoke the middle class. Bjørneboe also
participated in an almost forgotten trend, once somewhat naively called the Scandinavian sexual revolution, which should be mentioned because this, too, left its trace on his drama about Semmelweis.

Bjørneboe's introduction to the play is, indeed, a sort of anarchist manifesto. Looking back at the upheavals of 1968, the playwright proclaims that all present societies are authoritarian, unrefrangible, and therefore they have to be torn down. The play, which is not meant to be historically accurate, illustrates the conflict between independent and authoritarian thinking. It begins with a narrative frame connecting present and past: a group of radical students occupy the theatre and announce a performance about how highly educated people become the tools of oppression. As Markusovszky, a "progressive" colleague of Semmelweis explains later on: "Whores and professors have no homeland. They serve anyone who pays them."

Bjørneboe insists that the conspiracy against Semmelweis was primarily politically motivated. Doctor Klein, Semmelweis's earlier supervisor and arch-enemy, calls the doctor a political rebel. Bjørneboe's hero reminds one of another, more famous Norwegian stage character: Henrik Ibsen's nonconformist Doctor Stockmann in An Enemy of the People — especially when he says: "the whole world is wrong and I am right." Plenty of the author's own ideas are present, however: besides anarchism and the neo-Marxist illusion of leadership by enlightened intellectuals, there is a populist twist when a prostitute makes Semmelweis realize how important regular baths are in preventing sickness; and, a sanitation worker (in other words, a latrine cleaner) tells him of the antiseptic quality of lime solution. Voilà! The belief in proven popular wisdom winning over affected intellectual superstitions. The sexual bandwagon rolls by: Semmelweis likes the company of prostitutes, and at one point he enters into a discussion with less enlightened colleagues about female orgasm. Indeed, having fun with less than reputable women was perfectly acceptable behaviour for young men in those days — maybe this is why absolutely no reminiscences of friends and contemporaries refer to such erotic escapades in Semmelweis's youth. Precisely because it is trivial, the episode does not enrich the portrait of the protagonist.

Though naive and biased, Bjørneboe's play is anything but boring. Unfortunately, references to the development of Semmelweis's ideas occasionally serve to confuse the reader. First Semmelweis calls childbed fever an epidemic, then discovers that it is endemic. He makes hand washing with water and soap obligatory for interns; later he insists on the use of lime. Imprecisions are frequent: Bjørneboe once identifies 1850, another time (correctly) 1848 as the year of European revolutions. Also, Semmelweis once appears in revolutionary uniform, when it is well known that he stayed aloof from the revolution. We also hear the "dual monarchy" mentioned. Bjørneboe shares several misconceptions with Sackler, such as the myth that Semmelweis died of an infected sore on his hand, and, less importantly, both believe that the capital of Hungary in 1850 was Budapest.
Yet another Semmelweis emerges from Howard Sackler’s (1929-1982) portrayal. (Pondering this author’s last name makes us wonder whether he had Hungarian ancestry.) Sackler wrote plays, television plays, and film scripts. His placement of Semmelweis in the development of medical science is interesting. In the mid-nineteenth century, this science was just shedding its inhibitions. Among these were a fixation with diagnostics, skepticism about the possibility of prevention, and an early Darwinist-positivist determinism. A typical manifestation of this attitude was the mania to dissect. Thus, Semmelweis was ahead of his time in his ambition to prevent sepsis. Sackler mentions that not only the bacteria on the exposed and unwashed hands of the medics but also on the medical instruments, blankets, and sheets could cause sepsis. Much less than in Bjørneboe, there is a reference to the impurity of science, to social contamination by ambition and envy. Sackler also refers to the forging of statistics (which we all know well), and the claiming of other people’s achievements as our own.

In Sackler’s drama there is just a short reference to Semmelweis’s premarital experience with women, in the form of a passing flirt with a nurse. Otherwise we learn that he lived with his widowed sister and married a well-heeled girl from Ischl. In this play Semmelweis never leaves Austria: fifteen years of his life in Pest are cut out. No reference is made to the revolution which, actually, had an important impact on academic freedom and, therefore, did influence Semmelweis’s career indirectly. The hero’s family name is misspelled, with a double “s” at the end, and everybody calls him by his infrequently used middle name, Philip — probably because “Ignatius” is unfamiliar to speakers of English. There are also other errors and improbabilities in the play, just some of which have been mentioned.

Sackler’s piece was first staged in Buffalo in 1977, and then in two other American cities, everywhere unnoticed. In 1987 the Equity Showcase Theatre staged Semmelweis at Toronto’s Harbourfront. This performance received laudatory reviews, which surprises one who did not see it, but has only read the play. The cast is large: thirty-seven persons, and there is much idling in the lengthy piece. Especially the directing and the performances of some of the lead actors were appreciated by critics.

György Száraz’s play Gyilkosok (Murderers) won the 1980 Agria prize and was staged that same summer in Eger, site of the Agria festivals. Száraz (1930-1987) was an enigmatic figure in the last decade of the Kádár regime. He was imprisoned during the rule of Mátyás Rákosi and subsequently held modest cultural positions. In 1977 he became column editor of the cultural weekly Élet és Irodalom and in 1983 editor of the literary monthly Kortárs. While he published nothing of importance until 1976, in the last decade of his life he ground out eight volumes. Obviously, Száraz became a protege of the cultural dictator György Aczél, taking responsibility for publications about sensitive subjects that the regime wanted to vent unofficially. In such capacity Száraz wrote a polemic pamphlet against Romanian chauvinism, and a long eulogy for the sadistic traitor Pálffy-Oesterreicher.
Agents entrusted with such sensitive propaganda tasks naturally enjoyed certain liberties, as will be pointed out. At first reading, Száraz's play strikes one as the best researched and historically most authentic of the three. He doesn't kill off Semmelweis at the end but finishes the play with the hero's decision to return to his native country. There is no reference to Semmelweis's private life, and the hero's non-participation in the 1848 revolution is made explicit. The play is so balanced and smoothly flowing, it is almost manneristic — something that reviewers pointed out. With its moral message it reminds one of László Németh's psychological morality plays.

A Hungarian reader or spectator may discover an underlying message, however. Hungarian literature during the Kádár era developed its own technique of double talk (now fashionably called meta-language). Unlike Bjørneboe's anarchist antics or Sackler's philosophized search for a healing truth, Száraz critically targets a well-defined bureaucratic autocracy of a certain age. Besides the untouchable figureheads of the old regime (shall we say, the venerable lifelong party comrades?), and, an overall ideological control, truth also gets a specific meaning. What if the world realized that obstetricians literally executed thousands of women worldwide in their ignorance? Nobody would ever believe again in medical science, or — who knows? — perhaps in any authority any more! We may continue this line of thought. What if the Soviet government had accepted responsibility for the massacre at Katyn? Not to mention the unknown number of its other victims: were they twenty million? Forty million? Who would have believed in communism any longer? When Száraz's Semmelweis says; “All of us are murderers,” he sounds very different from his Norwegian and American alter egos. Also, Hungarians may have recognized other analogies in the play, such as the mention of the reprisals against intellectuals who participated in the war of independence in 1848-49. Even more viciously persecuted were the participants of the revolution of 1956.

We have discussed three dramas — similar and yet different as they are. We met an erotic anarchist, a philosophical forerunner of democracy who arrived too early, and a speaker of the troubled conscience of a distant age — all called Semmelweis. Will the real Semmelweis please stand up? Actually, all three figures exist equally. We cannot learn much from comparing them, except that we know that any literary hero has more to do with the author than the real-life model, if there is one. In spite of the glaring errors of the Norwegian and American plays, and the artistic mediocrity of all three dramas, all three Semmelweises are worthy of consideration. Unfortunately language barriers and the absence of translations make it virtually impossible to do so for someone who does not read all three languages.

As a postscript, we may add yet another title to the list of literary works inspired by the life of Ignác Semmelweis. In 1924 a medical student by the name of Louis Destouches submitted a dissertation to the Sorbonne for which he received a doctoral degree. Since this slim volume is a rather rambling philosophical statement about the grim fate of the genius, presented in an
emotional, lyrical style and spiked with aphorismatic banalities, one wonders what amazing criteria the famous citadel of French scholarship had in those days to grant somebody a doctoral degree in medical history. Besides the definitely unscholarly presentation, the dissertation also contained numerous inaccuracies, for instance, the often-heard myth that Semmelweis was still dissecting in spite of his mentally unstable condition, when he acquired the fatal sepsis from a self-inflicted wound to his finger. There are also anachronisms in the book that serve as literary embellishments. We learn that the little Ignác visited his parents on Sundays by crossing the Danube on a beautiful bridge. The same little Ignác liked to play on the street, because streets in Hungary are full of music and song.

Obviously, the author knew nothing about Pest-Buda, nor would he ever in his life see Budapest. This did not keep him from becoming world famous under the assumed name Louis-Ferdinand Céline. Like Semmelweis, Céline too was a difficult and controversial figure, among other things as a supporter of Marshal Pétain. If his books prove anything, it is the curious interrelation between author and work. The Semmelweis Céline described was himself: a misunderstood, brooding, then raging misanthrope. The misunderstood genius was one of his recurring literary figures. For this reason, Céline’s 1932 novel about a suburban physician, titled Voyage au bout de la nuit does not seem directly related to the real Semmelweis.

NOTES

2. Ibid., pp. 5-10, esp. p. 9.
5. The cause of Semmelweis’s death baffles historians. The coroner’s report is inconsistent and suggests the possibility that Semmelweis was institutionalized with a nervous breakdown and died due to maltreatment.
8. This episode of Semmelweis’s life was also recorded inconsistently. During the decades of communist rule in Hungary, revolutionaries automatically counted as heroes. Maybe this was why Gortvay and Zoltán took pains to find recollections of two
incidents about Semmelweis participating in revolutionary activity (p. 62). All other biographies deny this.


12. A tábornok [The General] (Budapest: Magvető, 1984). "General" György Pálffy was a graduate of the Ludovika Military Academy. After the war he became a communist and was appointed to head of the Hungarian army's dreaded internal security unit (Katonapolitikai Osztály). His true character is revealed in just one page of Lieutenant General Pál Almásy's recollections of how, after his arrest, Pálffy orchestrated his torture (Ketrecbe engem zártak [It Is I Whom They Locked into a Cage], comp. Ferenc Kubinyi. Budapest: Holnap, 1989; p. 65.) In 1949 Pálffy himself was condemned to death by the communists and was executed.


15. Ibid., p. 28. The "beautiful bridge" must have been the Chain Bridge (Lánchíd) which, however, was finished only in 1849.

16. Ibid., pp. 23-26
The Trianon Syndrome in Today's Hungary

Stephen Béla Várda

No event in modern history affected Hungarians as much as the Treaty of Trianon (1920), which reduced the country to a fraction of its former self and cut the Magyar nation into five unequal parts. The impact of Trianon can only be compared to that of the Battle of Mohács (1526) and Hungary's subsequent trisection, which made the country into the battleground of two empires for two centuries, and also sowed the seeds of the nation's modern-day decline.

Hungary's dismemberment left a deep impact upon virtually every segment of the Hungarian nation, be these in the truncated country, in the detached territories, or in the immigrant communities abroad. During the interwar years, they all suffered from what came to be known as the Trianon syndrome, and they all devoted most of their political efforts propagandizing against this unjust treaty and seeking support for the cause of Hungarian revisionism.

The nature and magnitude of the psychological shock upon the Hungarian mind was perhaps best expressed by Gyula Székfű (1885-1955), the pre-eminent historian of the interwar years who, in his Három nemzedék [Three Generations], gave vent to his feelings as follows: "This book is my personal experience.... I felt... I would never be able to recover my strength and my will to work until having taken account of the decline that had lead us to this disaster. I simply had to face up to the forces that have dragged my nation out of a stream of healthy evolution. Thus did I come to write this book and... thus did I redeem my soul." Székfű's views were echoed by all segments of Hungarian society: Politicians and poets, scientists and historians, bureaucrats and artisans, landless peasants and landed aristocrats, right-leaning gentry and left-leaning intellectuals, avant-garde artists and conservative military men. The Trianon shock embraced the whole nation, and it became a lasting national malady that has ravaged the minds and hearts of all Hungarians ever since that time, notwithstanding the fact that during the four decades of communist rule Trianon became a national taboo.
That this was the case is best demonstrated by the rumblings in Hungarian intellectual circles since the early 1980s when, for the first time in many years, some dared to talk about Trianon and the psychological dislocations it has caused. This daring defiance, by the way, was the result of the growing concern for the welfare of the Hungarian minorities beyond the Trianon frontiers, who were being subjected to increasing pressures of denationalization. One of the best expressions of this concern was Péter Hanák's article in the Élet és Irodalom [Life and Literature], where he pointed out the fact that the Hungarians have never been able to digest Trianon: "The trauma of defeat was so terribly deep, and it shook the nation's life-foundations to such a degree that for years and even decades we could hardly expect anyone... to come up with its objective assessment.... Trianon prevented us from recognizing the relativity of our place and role in the world, and the necessity of establishing good relations with the Danubian peoples."

Given the above, the early reaction to Trianon included the foundation of a whole set of anti-Trianon organizations, the initiation of an all-embracing revisionist movement, the enlistment of the country's historians and scholarly institutions to justify revisionism from a historical, economic and geographical point of view, and the search for alliances among such equally revisionist European great powers as Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.

While this unified national effort in favour of a policy of revisionism did result in some ethnically-linguistically justifiable territorial revisions between 1938 and 1941, Hungary's unfortunate involvement in World War II on the Axis side undid all of those gains. Moreover, in light of the country's Soviet occupation and communist control between 1945 and 1990, the whole Trianon question was placed on ice. However keenly felt by all Hungarians, for at least three of the four decades of Soviet-communist rule, it was impossible to speak about the injustices of Trianon. Nor was it possible to raise the problem of the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring states, without being accused of chauvinism.

The Re-Emergence of the Trianon Question

The situation changed gradually during the 1980s, when the Treaty of Trianon and its impact were beginning to be treated by serious historians, and then very suddenly after the fall of communism, when the floodgates of the freedom of expression were suddenly thrown wide open. The result was the appearance of a whole series of Trianon-related works. Many of these are of little scholarly value, but they gave vent to the frustration that had accumulated during the decades of enforced silence.

Naturally, there are many exceptions among these emotion-filled post-communist publications. Some of them are respectable and well-researched monographs, like those by József Galántai and Jenő Gergely of the University of
Budapest, while others are sections of comprehensive syntheses produced by post-communist Hungarian historiography. The two best examples of the latter were prepared as university textbooks. They include Zsuzsa L. Nagy's synthesis of interwar Hungarian history written for use at the Kossuth University of Debrecen, and the multi-authored history of twentieth-century Hungary prepared under the direction of Ferenc Pölöskei for the Eötvös University of Budapest. L. Nagy devotes about six of her 266 pages (pp. 88-94) to the discussion of Trianon and its consequences; while the Pölöskei-edited volume covers the same topic in five of its 267 comparable pages, i.e., in its coverage of Hungarian history up to the year 1945. Both of these are detached summaries of historic Hungary's mutilation, but both of them also point to the peacemakers' violation of the principle of national self-determination that brought about the country's dismemberment and then resulted in the creation of several small, almost equally multinational states around Hungary. The authors of these works also emphasize the psychological pain produced by Trianon for several generations of Hungarians, most of whom were unable to reconcile themselves to the new realities, and were searching fervently for ways to undo the effects of Trianon.

It should be pointed out in this connection that these historical syntheses, as well as virtually all other books dealing with modern Hungary's historical development, have reverted to the use of traditional Hungarian names for places and regions located in the detached territories. This custom, a standard practice in interwar Hungary, had been abandoned by Marxist historiography in the late 1940s and early 1950s — although without affecting significantly their use in everyday conversation. A return to the use of traditional place names had already begun during the 1980s. The full impact of this trend, however, could not be felt until after the fall of communism. This trend also produced a number of geographical dictionaries that supply the original Hungarian and/or German version of many thousands of place names that have been altered following the transfer of these territories from under Hungarian to Austrian (1920), Czechoslovak (1920), Polish (1920), Romanian (1920 and 1945), Soviet (1945), Yugoslav (1920 and 1945), Ukrainian (1991), or Slovak (1993) sovereignty. This, in turn, revived their use even among those members of the younger generations, who by virtue of their age had no direct links with the lost territories.

The Question of Frontier Revisions

Notwithstanding the mass of emotional outpourings that followed the collapse of communism, and in spite of the ever more difficult situation faced by the Hungarian minorities in Ceausescu's and Iliescu's Romania, and in Mečiar's Slovakia, none of Hungary's post-communist governments came out in favour of frontier revisions. True, these governments did stress the need for improved human rights for the Hungarian minorities, but in emphasizing human rights the
Hungarian authorities marched hand in hand with the United States and all other major West European states. It seems therefore, that the various post-communist Hungarian governments were fully aware that Hungary's prospective membership in the NATO and in the European Economic Community [EEC] is predicated upon their acceptance of the status quo with respect to the frontiers.

This policy of keeping quite about frontier revisions and stressing the need for improved human rights has also been followed by most of Hungary's important civic organizations, including the Hungarian World Federation, which, at times, has been accused of being too nationalistic. Yet when, on the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon, the Federation organized a three-day conference, it turned out to be a detached assessment of the situation, with papers being presented by a number of respected Hungarian and Western scholars.11

Of the many recent publications concerning Trianon, the most talked-about is the one written by Ernő Raffay, a founding member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [Magyar Demokrata Forum], who had also served as a member of the parliament (1989-94) and as the Vice-President of the National Defense Council (1990-93) during Hungary's first post-communist government. Entitled *Magyar tragédia* [Hungarian Tragedy],12 this work combines elements of professional historical scholarship with a degree of emotionalism that appeals to the common reader. The author broaches the question of frontier revisions, but he recognizes that the possibilities for such revisions are very remote and unlikely in the foreseeable future.

In a later study prepared for a Hungarian-American audience, however, Raffay comes out clearly in favour of frontier revisions based on the principle of national self-determination. He does this in conjunction with his analysis of Hungarian party politics in the mid-1990s: "The border question is the fulcrum of today 's politics: The political parties that subscribe to the changeability of Hungary's Trianon frontiers stand for Hungarian national interests. Those that do not subscribe to this view, on the other hand, do not represent national interests, and as such are not within the ranks of patriotic parties."13

**The Growth of Pragmatism**

Raffay's book elicited sufficient reaction for a special conference to be organized by the Hungarian World Federation on January 15, 1996.14 The conference was attended by a great number of intellectuals, thirty-two of whom made an effort to comment on Raffay's book and on the whole question of revisionism. Their ranks included scholars, writers, politicians, and various other public personalities, a number of them from the Western World. They all agreed that the Treaty of Trianon was an intensely unfair and unjust arrangement, that the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring states are being subjected to various degrees of denationalization, and that the impact of Trianon was so thorough that it left a
permanent scar upon the Hungarian mind, but they could not agree on the question of revisionism. The majority of them, however, felt that it would be unwise to broach this question at this time, even though this frontier rectification would only be based on ethnic-linguistic considerations. They also agreed that they should concentrate on demanding improved human and collective rights for the Hungarians on the other side of the frontiers, and that frontier revisions would have to be left to a hoped-for better future. One of them, Gyula Borbádi, a noted scholar of the history of the Hungarians in the West, closed the argument with the well-known French proverb: “Jamais y parler, toujours y penser.”

One of the recent results of this reemerging Trianon syndrome is the establishment of a Trianon Association in 1997, whose goals included "the international reexamination of the peace-Diktats," aiding the preservation of the Magyar language and culture in the detached territories, and furthering the introduction of autonomy for the Hungarian minorities in the succession states.

The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon also resulted in the publication of a special edition of the highly respected popular periodical Historia, founded and edited by one of Hungary's most gifted historians, Ferenc Glatz, in which twelve scholars examined the whole Trianon question. All of the enclosed studies are the products of detached historical analysis and political pragmatism, and their authors all seem to agree with Glatz's conclusions to the effect that the answer to Trianon is not revisionism, but the

sober appreciation... of the grievances rising on both sides of the frontiers [and at the same time] the tolerant mutual appreciation [of the pain] of all Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, South Slavs, Germans, Gypsies, and Jews who identify themselves as a separate nationality. It must be acknowledged that the national minority question is not simply the questions of Hungarians across our frontiers. It is rather a universal question in our region.... The people of Central Europe have to stop the hysteria of national victimization, where everyone — Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, Serbians, and Croatians — view themselves as victims of history.

This kind of pragmatic view is also evident among the younger, Western education members of the immigrant elite, although many of their elders still cling to the idea of traditional revisionism. These Western educated intellectuals generally accept the geographical status quo, but they too view the current treatment of the Hungarian minorities — especially in Mečiar's Slovakia and pre-Constantinescu Romania — as an unacceptable violation of treaty obligations and of basic human rights. They generally favour the membership of these former Soviet satellites in the NATO and the EEC, because they believe that their joining or rejoining Western European civilization will oblige them to
accept the Western mode of behaviour toward their national minorities. These pragmatic professionals also hope that the expansion of the EEC into Central and Southeastern Europe will result in the rapid "spiritualization" of frontiers, and thus in elimination of the artificial boundaries between the various Hungarian communities in the Carpathian Basin.18

NOTES


4. One of the best examples of this rumbling and the authorities' reaction to it was the case of historian Károly Vigh who, on the occasion of the sixtyieth anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon, wrote a short inoffensive article for the journal Honismeret, 8, no. 3 (March 1980): 32-6. As soon as this issue of the periodical appeared in print, it was promptly withdrawn from circulation and replaced by another version without Vigh's article in it.


10. The most significant of these handbooks was compiled by György Lelkes, Magyar helységnév-azonosító szótár [Dictionary of Hungarian Place Names] (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 1992). Also useful is the one published two years earlier under the title: Magyar neve? Határokon túli magyar helységnévszótár [Hungarian Names? Dictionary of Hungarian Place Names Beyond the Frontiers], ed. László Sebők (Budapest: Arany Lapok Kiadó, 1990).

11. The conference was officially entitled "Peace Treaties and National Communities in Europe" and it took place on June 1-3, 1995, in Budapest. Papers were presented in English, German and Hungarian. The conference proceedings have not been published as yet, therefore, as of now, only a few of the there presented papers have appeared in print. These include those by the present author and his wife: "Treaty of Trianon and the Hungarian-Americans" (see note no. 1). The Hungarian version of this article appeared earlier under the title: "Trianon, revizionizmus és az amerikai magyar-ság" [Trianon, Revisionism, and Hungarian-Americans], in Korunk [Our Age] (Cluj-Napoca, Romania), Third Series, 7, no. X (August 1996): 47-61.


15. Never speak about it, but always think about it.


The word "intelligentsia" is one of those terms used in historical and sociological literature which is most difficult to define. It frequently gives rise to misunderstanding and misinterpretation. I will therefore begin with a few general words on the subject by way of clarifying my use of the concept. I will restrict this introduction to the questions: When did the term first appear, and where?

Despite its widespread usage, the term is of fairly recent origin. Before the nineteenth century there were references to "scribes" or "learned individuals" who earned a living in various countries from their knowledge of reading and writing: philosophers, lawyers or poets; but these people consistently referred to each other by these names, and never as "the intelligentsia."

When the Latin word "intelligentes" appeared in use before the last century, it was a philosophical term used to denote the level of cognition and degree of comprehension. Only in the early nineteenth century we do see the word used to refer to a special social group. Nevertheless in recent times the term of "intelligentsia" has been freely used by sociologists and social historians with reference to Greek teacher slaves in ancient Rome, Chinese mandarins, the thinkers of the Enlightenment, or even to members of contemporary bureaucracies. While the social historian should bear this conceptual similarity in mind, he or she should not disregard the differences between the social and cultural backgrounds of these thinkers; and the difference between the status of a teacher-slave in ancient Rome and that of a mandarin in ancient China must have been enormous.

A second point to be stressed in this introduction is that "the intelligentsia," where the term came into use, designated a special, distinct group in society, i.e. one clearly requiring its own label. Thus the intelligentsia must be clearly distinguished from the intellectuals, a term used in nearly all industrially developed or developing countries to designate people with education but without commensurate economic or even social status.
It may seem odd that the term *intelligentia* first appeared in Central and Eastern Europe, a comparatively peripheral and underdeveloped part of nineteenth century Europe. Historians have debated for more than a decade whether the term arose first in Russia, Germany, Poland, or some other region in this part of Europe. Russian historians argue that it was coined by a Russian writer at mid-century, but cannot agree whether he was Peter Boborykin or Vissarion Belinskii. A Polish historian, Waclaw Lednicki, has shown that the term became current nearly the same time in Poland. He concluded that these countries were the birthplace of this social group and the term first surfaced in East European languages. German historians, however, have found German texts using the word *Intelligenz* as early as 1849 to describe the same phenomenon, namely a group distinguished from the rest of society by its education, social character, and mentality. A synonymous term was *Bildungshurgertum*. Hungary’s leading political thinker of the 1840s and later revolutionary statesman Lajos Kossuth also used the term "intelligentsia" — and its synonyms értelemiség and honорátorok — as a designation for a social group, in his newspaper *Pesti Hirlap* at the beginning of the 1840s.

Philological investigators will no doubt unearth further information on this question. This paper is concerned more with the origins of the intelligentsia itself. It is generally agreed that a new social stratum emerged in the middle of the last century. It was a better educated part of society, distinguished from the rest of the upper and middle classes by a characteristic combination of psychological traits, manners, lifestyle, social status and, especially, a distinct value system. The chief source of Western scholar’s misunderstandings concerning the term is the fact that, in the course of the last century in Western Europe and the US, the social stratum known by this name did not emerge. There were, of course, professional and clerical workers in the middle and upper bourgeois classes of contemporary western societies as well, but these never became a social stratum with an independent role and group consciousness. Western scholars often misinterpret "the intelligentsia" to mean "the intellectuals." To cite Hugh Seton-Watson’s definition of intellectuals: "In western societies the word is used mainly to denote a small inner elite or self-styled elite of writers and cultural dignitaries" — and not a larger social stratum. Misunderstandings concerning the intelligentsia in the West seem to have arisen after the October Revolution in Russia, when a large number of emigres, former members of the Russian intelligentsia employed the term, although it lacked real meaning in the West.

The questions might be asked what characteristics of Central and East European social development explain its significant divergence from that of the West, and what factors account for the emergence of the intelligentsia in a region that was less developed? To answer these questions we have to emphasize the historical peculiarities of Central and Eastern Europe:

1. These were feudal agrarian societies that underwent a dramatically rapid industrialization.
2. Therefore, in a longer process the feudal structure of these "societies of orders or estates" was not demolished as it had been in the West. Rather, the estates, group relationships, values and ruling institutions were incorporated with little change into the newly emerging elements of these societies.

3. The chief organizing and integrating mechanism of these industrializing societies was not a developed market, but a neo-absolutist political system. These societies developed their own constituent institutions to further — and, at the same, time — control economic processes. The over-bloated bureaucracy of these neo-absolutist states not only supplanted the rudimentary market system, but required many well-educated people whom it organized and attached to these institutions, assisting in the birth of a distinctive corporate spirit.

4. The modernization of Central and Eastern Europe in the half century before World War I took place in largely illiterate societies. From Germany to Russia, fifty to ninety percent of the population could neither read nor write at the beginning of this period. Consequently the quickly emerging bureaucratic stratum of each society became separated from uneducated classes and strata by its own education. It is no accident that the intelligentsia, dependent on the state and culturally different from other groups, developed a distinct class consciousness. It considered itself to be socially unattached or free-floating, in Alfred Weber's original phrase, *die freischwebende Intelligenz*.

The classic *gymnasium*-type secondary education fostered and preserved the social and cultural homogeneity of the intelligentsia since all members of the stratum passed through it. Alexander Hertz wrote:

The high school diploma (*Reifezeugnis, Matura*) did not have the same meaning for a member of the intelligentsia as it did for an educated man in the West. It gave a man not only the right to practice a profession, but bestowed a title or dignity that would remain forever with its bearer, membership in a privileged stratum. But we can state that in neither the United States nor in other Western countries did education provide as much social distinction as did personal success, wealth even birth. In these countries a college graduate might be a member of an intellectual group, faculty, learned society, professional association, the bar, etc. — but his education by no means caused him to regard himself as the member of a distinct social class. He generally defined his status as bourgeois middle class.

Secondary and higher education became one of the most important sources of stratification in Central and East European societies. A high school diploma — and, especially, a college degree — practically replaced the former letters patent of nobility and the privilege of birth.

5. It is also important to note that the half-century of industrialization in this region was also the period in which linguistic national communities took
The intelligentsia of these comparatively backward, illiterate societies became the architect of national ideology, culture and, indeed, of future leadership. The undemocratic system of governing institutions reinforced the so-called national mission of the intelligentsia. Eventually, with the exception of Russia, the region adopted the idea and practice of western constitutionalism, but only in a formal sense: institutions enjoyed genuine prerogatives but they had strictly limited powers. (Russia did not even go this far before World War I). In place of the self-government of society characteristic of the West, we see in Central and Eastern Europe the hierarchical collaboration of a narrow, partly traditional governing elite of noble origin and a skilled, bureaucratized intelligentsia. The undemocratic state, then, was an important factor in the development of the distinctive social profile, mentality and class consciousness of the intelligentsia.

To be sure, my brief survey has disregarded the distinguishing characteristics of national variants. The expert modern German Beamtenintelligenz of the turn of the century, the descendant of the Bildungsbürgertum so well analyzed by Max Weber, was a barely recognizable relative of the Russian intelligentsia. The latter constituted an estate of the service nobility and a smaller number of so-called revolutionary intellectuals who hailed from similar social backgrounds.

To summarize: I use the term "intelligentsia" to denote the special social strata shaped by the processes of industrialization and bureaucratic modernization, as well as that of the birth of nations and nation states in Central and East Europe.

This introduction sought to clarify the term; the section that follows will point out the special features of one variant, the Hungarian intelligentsia.

The social origins and transformation of the Hungarian intelligentsia

1) General analysis: demographic growth and occupational change

This investigation utilized the census reports of the Royal Hungarian Statistical Bureau (Magyar Királyi Statisztikai Hivatal). The bureau was founded at the end of the 1860s and its first census of the entire population was taken in 1869. Thereafter the census was taken at ten-year intervals, producing the main source of research in social history. The two official censuses of the Imperial Austrian Statistical Bureau in 1850 and 1857 were only moderately successful because of the resistance of the Hungarian population. The basis for comparison of the period before 1848-49 are partial figures, nonofficial censuses, and calculations.13 (See tables 1 and 2).
Table 1. Growth of the Hungarian intelligentsia before World War I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>66,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>137,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>172,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>230,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>311,260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. The occupational make-up of the Hungarian intelligentsia (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1800</th>
<th>1840s</th>
<th>1870</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1910</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clerks in business</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>19.64</td>
<td>24.24</td>
<td>37.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors, lawyers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.21</td>
<td>8.83</td>
<td>11.24</td>
<td>11.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm managers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15.15</td>
<td>11.64</td>
<td>7.38</td>
<td>3.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15.15</td>
<td>19.73</td>
<td>21.51</td>
<td>19.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servants</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24.24</td>
<td>25.76</td>
<td>23.19</td>
<td>20.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>31.34</td>
<td>14.40</td>
<td>12.44</td>
<td>7.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there were approximately 20,000 persons employed in intellectual functions in Hungary. In consequence of the feudal, underdeveloped character of society three-fourths of them belonged to the clergy of the different churches. Only about 5,000 worked in secular fields as lawyers, civil servants of cities (exempt from seigniorial jurisdiction), teachers, artists, writers, poets, many of them employed by larger landowners or aristocratic families as members of their personal staff. I do not consider these groups to constitute a social stratum. Clergymen were members of privileged feudal institutions, and lawyers generally came from and belonged to the nobility. Employees of the aristocratic families had the same social and legal status as other personal servants. (The life of the outstanding Hungarian poet, Mihály Vitéz Csokonai, is very instructive in this regard.)

The numerical growth of the group of educated people performing functions of an intellectual nature accelerated in the first half of the nineteenth century. It constituted the first, weak response of the Hungarian economy to the external challenge: the transformation of the world economic system and the emergence of the industrial revolution reached the western parts of the Habsburg Monarchy in the late 1830s. Production rapidly increased in Hungary in these decades, despite several years of stagnation and a general crisis of agrarian commodity production. In the 1840s, the first truly modern factories appeared.

The response of a society of feudal estates to this transformation was multi-faceted. First of all, as a result of these changes, the secularization of society accelerated. Members of the clergy performed more and more non-religious functions, such as teaching, medical care and engineering. Outside the clergy, professional activities were increasingly in the hands of institutions other than the churches and traditional medieval cultural organizations. Furthermore, the country's labour force became increasingly professionalised. For the groups performing intellectual functions, this meant that the paid civil servant supplanted the so-called nobile officium in the administration, even in the traditional county administration directed by the nobility. At the same time the emergence of book publishing and of the daily press — and the growth of the urban reading public — brought about the proliferation of journalists, writers, actors and even poets. The urban publishing industry enabled professionals in the service of the nobility to rise above the level of personal servants. Still another result of professionalization was the appearance of highly-skilled farm managers (gazdaszték). They assisted in the modernization of many large estates and the adoption of western methods of rational agricultural management.

These developments altered the number and occupational composition of the social group. The assemblage of data from varying sources indicates that from the turn of the century to the 1840s the number of professionals grew to about 66,000. The proportion of the clergy dramatically decreased from 75% to less than one third, while the percentage of civil servants increased to one fourth of all professionals. Elementary and secondary school teachers and farm managers totalled about one sixth of the group, while lawyers, doctors, writers,
poets were less than one seventh. The engineer and white collar contingent of the modern economic sectors was only one and one half percent.

The rapidly growing professional groups found their place in feudal society in a special but characteristic way. In earlier times, the landowning nobility had administered the feudal constitutional system and members of the lower nobility as well as aristocracy had played an important role in the development of Hungarian culture and political theory. Beginning in the 1830s the growing professional groups, of varying social and ethnic origin but chiefly non-privileged, themselves constituted a sort of feudal corporation or estate. They were labelled honoratiors, which meant an estate of people who enjoyed great respect despite their non-noble origin. Their social status gradually improved until it approached that of the lesser nobility. For instance, at the beginning of the 1840s the honoratiors gained the right to vote. Until then this had been the privilege of the nobility which it jealously guarded.17

At first the coalescence of the professionals in Hungarian society came about as a result of their being different from the non-privileged classes. Soon they assumed the privileged estates' values, acquired social prestige, and developed their own group consciousness. This development was temporarily obscured by the collaboration between the honoratiors and the well-educated reformist segment of the Hungarian nobility. Their movement for radical social and economic change led to the Hungarian revolution of 1848. After the revolution's collapse, the intelligentsia continued to belong to a privileged part of society.

The mid-nineteenth century was a turning point in the development of Hungarian society and in that of the intelligentsia. Although the revolution was defeated, feudal barriers were largely abolished, opening the way to economic and social modernization.18 Not surprisingly, the ranks of the Hungarian intelligentsia grew rapidly in the two decades leading up to the Compromise of 1867. The number of people in intellectual functions doubled. An analysis of the professional structure indicates the increase occurred chiefly in the new state administration, the accelerated market economy and the increased demand for trained personnel. The number of civil servants increased by 222 % in twenty years, educational personnel grew by 270 %, and the percentage of clerks employed in the industry, finance and commerce rose from one and one half percent to one fifth of all professionals.

The withdrawal of the better-educated landowning nobility from political and public activity during this period of Habsburg neo-absolutism also helped the intelligentsia to solidify its status in society. It was in this period that professionals began, for the first time, to organize for their own protection, thereby taking an important step toward becoming a proper social stratum or macrogroup within Hungarian society.

The Compromise of 1867 restored the hegemony of the traditional Hungarian ruling classes. The stabilization of the political situation and the reorganization of the imperial market created a framework for the long-term development of both the economy and the society. In the decades following, the
Hungarian nobility's traditional values, way of life, and loyalty to the governing elite, became the decisive orientation for the intelligentsia. These considerations once again overshadowed the factor of professional competence which had been dominant during the preceding age of absolutism.

* * *

In analyzing the post-Compromise period, I was forced to take a longer perspective utilizing data from the 1890 census. (The Hungarian census of 1880 cannot be used due to its defective methodology.) Fortunately, for our purpose, the period from the Compromise to 1890, including the 1873 economic crisis itself, was one of continuous preparation for the industrial revolution, mainly in building up a national infrastructure.

The figures show that the rate of the growth in the numbers of professionals slowed during these two decades in comparison with the previous two. Total population growth and the transformation of the labour force also stagnated. All these factors had important implications for the development of the intelligentsia.

The most important cause of this slowdown was the economic crisis of 1873 itself: after four years of prosperity, the Hungarian economy was shaken and entered a period of stagnation. Another important cause was a famine and epidemic of medieval proportions, responsible for more than one quarter million deaths. But non-quantitative processes originating in the previous decades deepened in this period. They had the following consequences for the intelligentsia:

1) The tendency of professional groups to form into a stratum became strong. Intellectual employees involved in modernization were not absorbed by a modern bourgeoisie, but took the position of the declassed lower nobility. The intelligentsia emerged as a modern post-feudal estate.

   It is significant that the intelligentsia acquired the label "educated middle class of gentlemen" or "gentlemen's estate" (in Hungarian: "úri és művelt középosztály" or "az úri rend"). So it is not surprising that the label "bourgeois" became an indication of contempt.

2) In this period the so-called free professionals (szabad foglalkozású értelemiségi), self-employed and running independent enterprises, became a relatively large group. Their growth was a product of urbanization: a larger urban petty bourgeoisie appeared which had its own needs and means. But the group's limited potential for further growth is seen in the fact that real professionals, similar to their western counterparts, were never as many as one-tenth of the entire intelligentsia during the dualist period. Thus the clerical intellectual (tisztviselő értelemiségi) remained the dominant category of the intelligentsia.
3) An educational system that was comparable to the best in Europe developed at this time. Not only did it train white-collar workers needed for modernization but it also produced world-famous specialists (János Neumann, Béla Bartók, Zoltán Kodály, Lipót Fejér, György Czukor, etc.). Having an education, furthermore, superseded rank acquired through birth as a determinant of social status and legitimation. A law passed in 1883 specified the educational requirements for all professions, even for civil servants. It was also instrumental in the formation of the educated middle-class of gentlemen.

A term entered Hungarian usage in these decades which acquired a different meaning from that in the West: the gentry. In Hungary it denoted the declassed, impoverished segment of the previous landowning nobility which sought to maintain its social status and reputation by capturing positions in the state administration. This civil service gentry of noble origin became an intermediary between the nobility and the new middle class.

The numerical growth of the intelligentsia accelerated once again in the late 1880s. Economic modernization reached a new stage with the beginning of a proper industrial revolution in Hungary itself. From 1890 to 1910 (the last census taken in the Dual Monarchy) the number of professionals increased from 172,000 to more than 311,000. Clerical personnel in industry, commerce and transport were the most dynamic element. By 1910 they accounted for more than a third of the intelligentsia; the percentage of the clergy, on the other hand, had decreased to less than 8%. Academic employees also showed above-average growth: modern scholarly institutions were established and expanded at this time.

Hungary began experiencing a deepening societal crisis at the beginning of the new century, due largely to the country's very rapid industrialization but also to its unbalanced development. The urgency of the national minorities problem, the growing need for agrarian reform, and the demand for democratic government, all had serious implications for the intelligentsia:

1) Hungary's national minorities had developed their own intelligentsia by the beginning of the twentieth century. The composition of these intelligentsias however, was lopsided: they consisted chiefly of clergymen and elementary school teachers. Yet these intelligentsias took increasingly radical positions concerning the national question, at times even demanded separation from Hungary. Their political ideology and methods were sometimes more radical than those of their co-nationals beyond Hungary's borders. Many minority leaders began to believe that only a new national state could provide them with appropriate roles.

2) This crisis, tension and the consequent polarization of society led to a chasm within the Hungarian intelligentsia. Some members of this educated middle class of gentlemen began enjoying good relations with the formerly despised, urban, industrial bourgeoisie. They were increasingly benefiting economically from industrialization, and their employment became more closely connected to the market than to the state.  

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3) The Hungarian intelligentsia was polarized not only in terms of its social position and attitudes, but also with respect to its cultural and political outlook. In the years preceding World War I, it divided into two large factions. One group was conservative, radical-nationalist, and to some extent anti-Semitic. It sought a way out of the general crisis through calling for a radical, social transformation of society, and the creation of a powerful state based on so-called "national, Christian" principles. The other group consisted of the liberal or radical bourgeois part of the Hungarian intelligentsia. It developed an oppositional culture — European and democratic in nature — and sought to transform the Hungarian economy and society on the Western European model.

One more aspect of the development of the Hungarian intelligentsia must be mentioned: its geographic distribution. The concentration of the intelligentsia in the cities and larger towns had started in the late 1830s and dramatically accelerated as the result of the industrial revolution from the 1880s on. In the final decade of the dualist period more than two-thirds of professionals lived in cities, where only one-fourth of the general population resided. Budapest alone, was the home of one-fourth of intellectual workers; but half of all writers, scholars, engineers, and clerical personnel in industry and commerce found their livelihood and residence in the capital.

To summarize this section: the intellectual social stratum of Hungarian society experienced a dramatic and rapid development during the period under consideration. From the beginning of the nineteenth century to the outbreak of World War I, its size grew fifteen fold. At the beginning of the period its members were chiefly clergymen and other intellectuals living in villages, then this stratum took the form a feudal cast, then — with the abolition of feudal conditions — it became, in the sense of Max Weber, an estate based on a way of life. This "educated middle class of gentlemen" was the creator of modern Hungarian national culture and proponent of a national state which in part precluded genuine self-government. Its position was transformed by the industrial revolution and it became socially and mentally polarized.

2. Social mobility of the Hungarian intelligentsia

The research for this paper sought answers to two questions: first, what were the social origins of the intelligentsia, and how did these origins affect its basic characteristics? Second: to what degree did different social classes and strata, ethnic and religious communities enjoy a share in educational opportunities? In other words, how did the inequality of educational opportunity change under the influence of the industrial revolution?

It is difficult to answer these questions because Hungarian censuses of this period did not enumerate the social origins of occupational groups, so they do not provide the social status or occupation of people's fathers. The only way to determine this was to analyze educational enrollment and reports. These are
available sporadically from 1850 to 1880, then regularly and nation-wide from 1880 on. It was fortunate for my research that secondary education in Hungary, unlike in Western Europe, rigidly reflected social stratification. Almost all secondary school students were trained for professional positions, so school statistics provide answers to both our questions.21

Our sporadic sources for the early period suggest that in the 1840s only half of those in professional positions were of noble origin. The offspring of serfs provided large numbers the recruits for the clergy.

In the next two decades, after the abolition of feudal conditions, the children of the traditional urban strata (artisans and petty merchants) became the leading elements. By 1880 more than two thirds of secondary school students from non-intellectual families were of urban middle class origin; the percentage of those coming from the agricultural population, both former nobility and peasantry, declined to less than one fifth. Children of professionals of the first or second generation reached 40% at the same time.

Beginning with 1880 social origins can be studied in detail (see tables 3 and 4). In the course of the industrial revolution the share of traditional urban strata of artisans and shopkeepers slowly began to decline as these groups failed to play a role in the development of manufacturing industry. The decline of the former landowning nobility continued, their children constitute no more than 7-8% of the student population at the beginning of the twentieth century. The village peasantry almost disappeared as a recruiting pool for intellectuals. This was partly because industrialization generally bypassed the small agrarian

Table 3. The social and occupational status of the fathers of secondary school students in Hungary (expressed in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bourgeoisie</th>
<th>Landowners</th>
<th>Intelligentsia</th>
<th>Others*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>33.39</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>40.21</td>
<td>5.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>33.48</td>
<td>17.79</td>
<td>43.65</td>
<td>5.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>33.38</td>
<td>17.36</td>
<td>44.81</td>
<td>4.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>30.09</td>
<td>17.53</td>
<td>43.91</td>
<td>8.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>29.28</td>
<td>16.31</td>
<td>44.57</td>
<td>9.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>25.87</td>
<td>15.33</td>
<td>46.94</td>
<td>11.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In 1890 children of industrial workers made up 1.59% of Hungary's secondary school population. By 1895 this proportion had grown to 1.77%, and by 1908, to 2.04. The data for the same years for children of agricultural workers is 2.02%, 2.36% and 5.77% respectively.
sectors. In addition, the abolition of feudal society and the modernization process eroded the tradition of wealthy aristocratic and landowning families — as well as churches and charitable foundations — supporting the education of talented children of the lower strata of society.

A large part of the peasantry could not participate in the expansion of agricultural production; as a result, many peasants were unable to finance a good education for their children. The population of some agricultural centres (mezővárosok), such as Debrecen, constitute an exception.

In the 1890s, the industrial working class emerged as a source of recruits for the intelligentsia, just as recruitment from the agricultural class declined. The recruitment of students from the independent urban bourgeoisie also declined in significance, but a peculiar urban social group made its appearance which was important in later periods of Hungarian history: doormen, porters and office and military messengers (házmesterek and altisztek). There were as many secondary school students from among this group as from the working class and nearly as many as from the former nobility! This group was hidden in the statistical category of "others" at the beginning of the century.

Table 4. The social make-up of the general population and the student population of Hungary in 1900 (expressed in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>General Population</th>
<th>Student Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owners of landed estates (latifundia)</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners of less than 620 acres of land</td>
<td>38.00</td>
<td>13.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty bourgeoisie</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>26.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligentsia</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>44.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial workers</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural workers</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others, including the lumpenproletariat</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only long-term upward trend was the increasing proportion of intellectuals recruited from their own offspring. Even so, children of the intelligentsia did not exceed half of all students. This allows us to conclude that, with respect to recruitment, the intelligentsia did not become a socially closed stratum in the period before the war.

I explain these findings, in part based on research not presented here, as follows:
1. The growth of the intelligentsia under industrialization was too rapid for it to be a closed group.

2. Beginning in the late 1890s inflation began to erode the standard of living of intelligentsia families, as a result, they had fewer and fewer children. The decline in standard of living also meant that one-fourth of the group was unable to finance advanced education for their children.

3. Beginning at the turn of the century there was a large influx of women into professional occupations. This reinforced the decline in natural reproduction among professionals. Intellectuals, being well educated and independent, had a below average incidence of marriage. In 1910, for example, two-thirds of woman secondary school teachers in Hungary were single.

Because of the rapid growth in the demand for educated people, falling incomes for them, and their decreasing natural reproduction, the Hungarian intelligentsia was non-discriminating with regards to its recruitment. This contrasts, as we saw, with its exclusive status and mentality.\textsuperscript{22}

\* \* \*

Now let us look at our second question: what was the distribution of educational opportunities among social classes and strata?

This problem is important because the social and historical justice of educational inequality was debated in the political and journalistic arena without an accurate knowledge of the actual circumstances and processes.

Statistical data confirm that by the beginning of the century there were large gaps between traditional village society and the urban classes, and between the upper classes (intelligentsia, large landowners, urban bourgeoisie) and the lower classes (peasantry, agricultural and industrial workers). The group of doormen and office messengers, located at the lowest level of the urban petty bourgeoisie, had a much better chance of providing their children with a professional education than did the landowning peasantry.

The ethnic aspect of intellectual recruitment also becomes strikingly evident from the available statistical data (see table 5 on the following page). The representation of Hungarians in the ranks of the intelligentsia constantly increased during the dualist period, and in 1908 it was one-and-a-half times greater than the proportion of Hungarians in all of the population. But if we consider not only the declared nationality but also the spoken language of students, it appears that nearly half of all students were born to and grew up in families belonging to Hungary's national minorities. Most of these students, however, were on their way to being culturally and linguistically assimilated, i.e. Magyarized.
Table 5. The ethnic makeup of the student population of secondary schools in Hungary (expressed in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1870-71</th>
<th>1880-81</th>
<th>1890-91</th>
<th>1898-99</th>
<th>1908-09</th>
<th>1914-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>73.56</td>
<td>70.75</td>
<td>72.38</td>
<td>75.55</td>
<td>79.92</td>
<td>83.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>12.35</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>14.72</td>
<td>12.70</td>
<td>8.83</td>
<td>6.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanian</td>
<td>7.73</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>5.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbo-Croatian</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenian</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total numbers</td>
<td>36,464</td>
<td>38,567</td>
<td>42,116</td>
<td>54,676</td>
<td>67,699</td>
<td>76,856</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With respect to religion, the composition of the student body indicates that Jews, Lutherans (chiefly Germans), and Transylvania's Unitarians were over-represented in the recruitment into the intelligentsia (see table 6).

Table 6. The religious makeup of the student population of secondary schools in Hungary (expressed in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>1870-71</th>
<th>1880-81</th>
<th>1890-91</th>
<th>1898-99</th>
<th>1908-09</th>
<th>1914-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>45.99</td>
<td>44.08</td>
<td>44.50</td>
<td>43.43</td>
<td>43.46</td>
<td>45.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniate</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>4.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>4.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvinist</td>
<td>12.37</td>
<td>10.81</td>
<td>10.76</td>
<td>10.05</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>8.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitarian</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>11.26</td>
<td>20.26</td>
<td>20.16</td>
<td>22.13</td>
<td>22.23</td>
<td>22.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total numbers</td>
<td>36,464</td>
<td>38,567</td>
<td>42,116</td>
<td>54,676</td>
<td>67,699</td>
<td>76,856</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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A comparative examination indicates that the over- and under-representation of ethnic and religious groups of Hungary's intelligentsia was closely correlated to its members' social status and, to a lesser extent, to the degree of their assimilation within Hungarian society.

In conclusion it might be stated that the lopsided modernization in Hungary during the period of dualism (1867-1914) led to the birth of a neo-corporatist society in which the lack of social self-government was to some extent counterbalanced or compensated for by the cultural and administrative competence of the intelligentsia. This social stratum of dualist Hungary was characterized by a largely self-imposed segregation from other elements of society, a distinct mentality, a unique attitude to politics, a marked preference for urban living, and high expectations concerning the children in regards to education as well as economic and cultural achievements. The Hungarian intelligentsia of the time constituted an exclusive class of educated gentlemen or gentlewomen which — contrary to what might be expected at first glance — was non-discriminating in the processes of its recruitment.

Interestingly enough, many of the characteristics of this late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century intelligentsia have survived the passage of time, and some of them persist even today especially in families with gentry backgrounds.

NOTES


6. Pesti Hirlap, 26 March 1843.
7. Allen, op. cit.; Feuer, pp. 48-50; Pipes, p. 48; Hertz, p. 11.
18. György Szabad, Az önkényuralom kora (1849-1867) [The age of arbitrary rule], in Magyarország története 1848-1890 (Budapest, 1979), pp. 525-608.
19. Péter Hanák, Magyarország társadalma a századforduló idején [Hungarian society at the turn of the century], in Magyarország története 1890-1918 [History of Hungary 1890-1918] (Budapest, 1978); Fercenc Erdei, "A magyar társadalom a két világháború között" [Hungarian society between the two wars], Valóság, nos. 1-2 (1976).
22. Ibid., pp. 89-137.
Hungarian Drama in English Translation:  
A Guide to the Holdings of the 
University of Toronto's Robarts Library

Eliza Gardiner, comp.
with an introduction by George Bisztray

Hungarians often bemoan the fact that the world does not know them, or misunderstanding them. One may argue that "the world" does not notice many other countries either. Or, one may turn the table and remind the Hungarians that they should have done more to propagate their cultural heritage. The fact that no representative text of any length is available in English translation by Miklós Zrínyi and Ferenc Kölcsey or, by Loránd Eötvös and the great feminist Mrs. Pál Veres, speaks for itself.

Hungarian drama is a case in point. After the 1950s it has become widely known among Western intellectuals that countries like Poland or Czechoslovakia have an especially exciting theatre life and a number of first-rate, world-class playwrights, such as Mrożek and Różewicz, Havel, Klíma, and Kohout. In comparison, Hungary has been doing much poorer. The relative success of the cinema and a great volume of haphazard, mostly inadequate literary translations into English by no means make up for the fact that many facets of the Hungarian creative spirit were never made available to readers of other languages. Having taught Hungarian drama for more than a decade, my conviction is that the best plays of Csurka, Hubay, Sütő, or Szakonyi do have their place side by side the modern masters of Central European playwriting. And, then, we have not yet rendered justice to such classics as József Katona, Ede Szigligeti, or Gergely Csíky, who also belong among the world's best.

The bibliography published below is a more than sufficient proof of how little the Anglo-American reader can learn about Hungarian drama. It includes virtually all primary and secondary works available in the collections of the Robarts Research Library of the University of Toronto, which has the largest Hungarian collection in Canada. A comparison with the National Union Catalogue that lists titles in the libraries of the United States, would almost certainly not bring any true surprises.
Among the primary sources we find five translations of Imre Madách's *The Tragedy of Man* — none really successful. Furthermore, we also find many plays by Ferenc Molnár, and three eclectic anthologies of some more recent dramas. In the past, the *New Hungarian Quarterly* printed several plays, though some of them were excerpted. While there are a few in-depth monographs among the secondary sources, there is also a conspicuous absence of book-size surveys of the Hungarian drama, or, monographs other than the ones on Madách and Molnár.

While my colleagues in the University of Toronto's Department of Slavic Studies are able to teach Polish, Czech, and Ukrainian drama in English translation, it is clear that, because of the paucity of translations, the teaching of Hungarian drama in English has to be reduced to rudimentary basics, or, in the case of graduate students, it must be confined to special topics such as assessing the quality of the English translations of *The Tragedy of Man*. Our disturbing conclusion has to be that, by not making concerted, energetic efforts to propagate Hungarian drama through representative translations, Hungary missed yet another opportunity to make her rich culture better known in the English-speaking world. As a first step in remedying this situation, I am preparing a selection of post-1945 Hungarian drama in English translation in order to open up this little-known cultural asset of Hungary to the wider reading public of the world.

G.B.

Bibliography, compiled by Eliza Gardiner

**PLAYS:**


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REFERENCE MATERIALS

Books:


Articles:


A review article:

The American Adventures of Hungary's Holy Crown

Stephen Béla Várda


The Holy Crown of Hungary — also known as Saint Stephen's Crown — has been in the centre of political controversy for several decades. This was especially true in the late 1970s, when President Carter's decision to return the Crown to its homeland — after three decades in American "protection" or "captivity" — precipitated a veritable storm of protest by a significant segment of the Hungarian political emigration in the Western World.

This held particularly true for the Hungarian political emigration in the United States, whose members were most immediately affected by the Crown's repatriation. Their protracted and often desperate protest activities are chronicled at length in the documentary collection compiled by Attila L. Simontsits in his The Last Battle for Saint Stephen's Crown (1983).1

Ever since the Holy Crown's return to Hungary, scholars have been churning out articles and books about its origins and its artistic composition. They have also reassessed its role in Hungarian history, particularly in light of the "Doctrine of the Holy Crown," which had assigned to the Holy Crown an unusual role in the constitutional development of Hungary. In point of fact, ever since the fourteenth century — according to some, ever since St. Stephen's reign in the early eleventh century — the Holy Crown had been made into the symbol and representative of royal power, and even of Hungarian statehood itself. In line
with this doctrine, laws were passed and judicial decisions were made not in the name of the king, but rather in the name of the Holy Crown. Moreover, no king was viewed as the legitimate ruler of Hungary unless and until crowned by the Holy Crown that generally came to be referred to as "St. Stephen's Crown."

While many of the books published during the last two decades since the Crown's repatriation are useful, most of them are too specialized for the average reader. Moreover, with the exception of Sándor Háhn's *A Szent Korona utja és sorsa* [The Path and Fate of the Holy Crown], most of them also devote relatively little attention to the Crown's sojourn in America, which was only one of the Crowns several similar tribulations during the past one thousand years.

The situation is very different with the volume under review. Tibor Glant's *A Szent Korona amerikai kalandjai* [The American Adventures of the Holy Crown] is a delightful book devoted specifically to the latter topic. The author is a learned scholar, who has approached his topic in the spirit of detached objectivity. His book, therefore, is a scholarly work, which at the same time is oriented not only to the specialist, but also to the general reader. It is based partially upon archival sources, partially upon published primary and secondary sources, and partially upon personal interviews with individuals who have been involved in the Holy Crown's arrival to the United States and its return to Hungary.

Glant's *A Szent Korona amerikai kalandjai* is divided into eight chapters, which cover the Crown's tempestuous sojourn from Budapest to Fort Knox and back in the period between 1944 and 1978. The first chapter discusses the Crown's stormy departure from Hungary and how it got into American hands in the months following the World War II (pp. 19-33). The next three chapters narrate and analyze the changing relationship between Hungary and the United States during the three postwar decades, right up to President Jimmy Carter's decision to return the Crown to the country which in those days was generally viewed as the land of "goulash communism" (pp. 35-85). Chapter five is devoted to the somewhat quixotic efforts of the Hungarian political immigrants and their American allies to prevent the Crown's repatriation (pp. 87-102), while chapters six and seven treat the events surrounding the actual repatriation process itself, both in the United States and in Hungary (pp. 103-131). The final chapter describes the Crown's reception by the Hungarian public, the views and the fate of the main players in this repatriation process, and further developments in Hungarian-American relations in light of the Holy Crown's return to Hungary (pp. 133-141). Tibor Glant's book is supplemented by a series of relevant and useful photographs (pp. 145-167), endnotes (pp. 169-173), sources and bibliography (pp. 175-178), as well as an essay in which the author expresses his gratitude to those who have helped him in the realization of this undertaking (pp. 179-181). The main text is preceded by a Preface from the pen of Ferenc Esztergályos (b. 1927), the former Hungarian ambassador to the United States, who himself had played a considerable role in the Crown's repatriation (pp.
9-11); and also by the author's own Foreword, which itself is in the nature of a short historical essay (pp. 13-17).

All in all Tibor Giant's *A Szent Korona amerikai kalandjai* is a marvelous little volume, which is well-researched, displays the objectivity of a learned scholar, and is written in a style that makes it read almost like a novel. As is always true with scholarly books, however, there are a few questionable points in this volume as well, but they detract very little from the essential high quality of this work.

One of these questions has to do with author's interpretation of the Doctrine of the Holy Crown, which, according to him, developed in the above-described form only during the interwar years (pp. 13-14). This view does have some validity, for the Horthy Regime did in fact expand and amplify this doctrine so as to place it in the service of its revisionist goals — a phenomenon which I have also noted some two decades ago in my *Modern Hungarian Historiography*. Yet, one should not forget that this doctrine had evolved already in the fourteenth century under the Anjou dynasty, and that it had been codified essentially in identical form by Palatine István Werbőczi in his *Tripartitum* in 1514.

One may also question Tibor Giant's assertion to the effect that only American archivists call Hungary's Holy Crown the "Crown of St. Stephen" (p. 14). It is undoubtedly true that American scholars and publicists generally refer to Hungary's sacred relic by those terms, but they do so only because they have borrowed this expression from established Hungarian practice. Hungary's Holy Crown had been known as St. Stephen's Crown at least from the thirteenth century onward, and only in the late nineteenth century did scholars begin to question its direct link to the country's first Christian king. But even most of them believed that the upper half did reach back to King St. Stephen, and only the lower half was a later addition — a view that this still held today by a number of scholars. Therefore, calling the Holy Crown of Hungary "St. Stephen's Crown" is not necessarily wrong, and it certainly is not the invention of American archivists. This appellation is based on long-standing Hungarian traditions that reach back almost to the very beginnings of written historical sources in Hungary. As such, its use would still be justifiable even if art historians were to prove conclusively that the Holy Crown is a later creation and therefore not identical with the crown that King Stephen had received from Pope Sylvester II in the year 1000 A.D.

Although understandable, asking ambassador Ferenc Esztergályos to write the preface to this volume may not have been the wisest decision on the part of the author. This is so primarily because the former ambassador's involvement in the Crown's repatriation placed him into the first rank of the adversaries of those who opposed its return to communist Hungary. Thus, by giving Esztergályos such a prominent place in his book — despite the ambassador's positive role in the affair and the respect that he had shown toward this holy relic — Giant may well be accused by the representatives of the Hungarian political emigration of
being less than objective in his treatment of the events surrounding this repatriation. Signs of this disapproval have already surfaced, and they will undoubtedly increase in the future, even though the book itself is a model of historical objectivity.  

* * *  

All in all, Tibor Giant has written a worthy volume that deserves our praise and our appreciation. It reflects pedantic research, meticulous scholarship, and a captivating style that makes it difficult to put it down. It has much to offer even to the specialists, and as such it deserves the recognition and support of the Hungarian scholarly world, as well as of the Hungarian reading public. I recommend it very highly to everyone who is interested in modern Hungarian, Central European, and even American diplomatic history. I also hope that the book will soon appear in a slightly revised English language edition, so as to make it available at American and other English-language universities.

NOTES


6. Among the first scholars to question the Crown's connection to King St. Stephen was the noted positivist historian Gyula Pauler (1841-1903) in his A magyar nemzeti története az Árpádházi királyok alatt [History of the Hungarian Nation under the Árpádian Kings] (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1899). His views, however, were immediately attacked by the equally influential János Karácsonyi (1858-1929) in his Hogyan lett Szent István Koronája a magyar szent korona felső részévé [How did St. Stephen's Crown Become the Upper Part of the Hungarian Holy Crown?] (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1907). For the various modern views see Korai Magyar Történeti Lexikon, editor-in-chief Gyula Kristó (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1994), p. 634; and Steven Béla Várda, Historical Dictionary of Hungary (Lanham & London: The Scarecrow Press, 1997), pp. 338-339.

7. Tibor Glant has already been accused of political bias and a lack of objectivity in a personal letter written by the Hungarian-American political activist, István Gereben of Washington, D.C., who denounced the author for pursuing a path that reminded him "of the tone, ideological orientation, and... exploitive manipulations of the Leninist Seminars" he had experienced during his student days at a university in Hungary. Cf. István Gereben's letter to Tibor Glant, March 21, 1998, which was e-mailed to me by Glant on March 24, 1998.

This is a subjective review of a book whose author characterizes it as "a combination of essay, lament, celebration, and scholarship" (p. xiii). The unusual character of the volume justifies the unusual review, especially since it is documented with twelve pages of notes and fifteen pages of bibliography, which validate the exposed facts of mind and soul.

There will be several critical observations in my review. Before anyone misunderstands this fact, let me express my admiration for Teleky's book. With regard to Hungarian culture, it may be unique in its genre, and it is definitely an eye-opener for those among us for whom the richness of Hungarian culture is easily accessible because of our proficiency in the language. In this book a sensitive and highly educated mind is expressing a moving yearning to belong to a culture, to be accepted by his heritage which himself has already accepted.

The author was born and raised in Cleveland by Hungarian parents who gave him insight into the psyche of their ancestral culture, but did not teach him the language. The little information he got as a child about Hungary, mostly about the countryside, came from his grandparents. He did not visit Hungary until the age of forty-seven. He is one of those hundreds of thousands of North Americans whose family must have been regarded as "good immigrants" by the receiving country: hard-working and eager to assimilate. In the meantime, they became lost for Hungary, perhaps also for themselves. In seemingly unrelated essays Teleky traces his long way back to his roots, and to the understanding of
what he calls "Hungarianness." This was a conscious search, chosen and undertaken by an adult. In the meantime, the author became editor-in-chief of the Canadian branch of Oxford University Press, then retired from publishing and now teaches at York University in Toronto.

Of the twelve essays, seven are reprinted from earlier publications in various North American journals, and a further three were also published previously in a shorter version. It is a rare luxury for North American authors to have their dispersed essays published also in collective volumes, but the reader should welcome the opportunity to receive them in such convenient form. The arrangement of the papers does not appear to follow any logic but, the title of the volume being what it is, let's call the sequence rhapsodic. At least the reviewer can also take some liberties with logic.

Teleky's understanding of Hungarianness is limited, which he knows. Judging from his confessions, he has been studying the language diligently for some years but is not yet entirely at home in it. Most of his information is based on English sources. Why? Because "Hungarian is a notoriously difficult language" (p. 118). While countering stereotypes about Hungarians (once with critical intellect, another time with good-natured irony, depending on the stereotype), Teleky too perpetuates this die-hard one about the language which many Hungarians also proudly profess as proof of their being different. It is hoped that whoever finds Hungarian "notoriously difficult" has already tried learning Polish or Greek or Hindi, relatives of English, not to mention Japanese which, like Hungarian, is no Indo-European language. Only after such comparative venture would this sweeping generalization be valid. (Which is not to say that Hungarian is an easy language. Only that there are no objective criteria of which languages are "difficult" and which ones "easy." Dezső Kosztolányi knew this, as one can read in his polemic "open letter" to the French linguist Antoine Meillet, written about seventy years ago.)

It irks Teleky, as a man of letters, to witness the under-representation of Hungarian literature in English translation, and the segregation of North American Hungarian literature from mainstream Canadian or American fiction. Can we blame only the North American cultural mentality, however? The reading list Teleky compiled for his course on Central European literature at York University is reproduced in full, and the Hungarian titles show how little representative the available volumes are. The uncoordinated, haphazard way of singling out Hungarian works for translation also amazed me many times. With all that pride taken in national literature, it was, alas, never a successful vehicle to promote Hungary.

Hungarian political and cultural propaganda was never coordinated and, as one may fear, never will be. Our terra incognita is an ideal breeding ground for stereotypes, something that the book discusses as one of its central themes. Stereotypes in society, literature, and the cinema: we have to be grateful that not all of them are negative ones, although most of them are. Those who have read Teleky's report on Margaret Atwood's story "Wilderness Tips," with its gro-
tesquely repulsive Hungarian-Canadian protagonist, will have a lasting opinion about this celebrated author's ethical standards (pp. 58-60). As we know, success does not come from, or create, an honest personality. A whole critical essay (one of my favourites) discusses the outrageously insincere and slanderous movie, "The Music Box" (1989). Joe Eszterhas, the scriptwriter, may have attained a dubious fame with his contribution to such cinema "Classics" as "Flashdance" and "Basic Instinct," yet his defamatory handling of anybody and anything Hungarian in "The Music Box" deserves Teleky's well-applied term, "Ethnic self-hate" (64-65). Also, as Teleky points out, insincerity produces bad art. Which is, of course, pretty obvious if one considers the overall output of Hollywood.

Is this just another example of Hungarian paranoia that we don't cease to imagine ourselves as whipping boys? Teleky knows that, in spite of the attention and improved image that Hungary has received recently, nasty old stereotypes live on to serve fiendish new purposes. As he writes about Atwood's character: "Atwood is too clever a writer to make 'George' a black Jamaican, a Soviet Jew, or a Vietnamese businessman. He is Hungarian because Hungarianness provides a safe target" (p. 60). We all knew the above, yet we dared to bring it up only in low-voiced private conversations lest we be regarded once again as racists and anti-Semites, which are two frequent epithets used for us "Eastern Europeans." Teleky's courage was overdue, yet the more praiseworthy.

Indignation over Hungarian-bashing alternates with good-natured humour, which is another means to defeat ignorance. In the chapter "A Short Dictionary of Hungarian Stereotypes" he discusses such examples as the "Hungarian lover," "Csardas" [sic], "Goulash," "Gypsy music," "Paprika," even the fashionable turn-of-century American painter Virginia O'Keeffe whose maternal grandfather, as we learn, was a Hungarian count and Kossuth's aide-de-camp in the 1848-49 Hungarian war of liberation. (Strangely, history books never mention this Count Totto, and the reader wonders why.) The two recipes that Teleky reprints here: that of the goulash and the chicken paprikas [sic], are authentic and delicious.

Perhaps the most penetrating observations that the author makes are the most subjective ones: reflections on immigration and ethnicity. Childhood memories of Cleveland's St. Elizabeth church lead him to examine the role of religion in preserving ethnic coherence and heritage language. Upon revisiting the church as an adult, he is interested not only in the stained-glass windows, objects of his childhood fascination, but also in the archives, pondering all the while what will happen to this spiritual centre now that its "vital neighborhood link" has been cut. (At another place he expresses similar, justified concern about the erosion of Hungarian Studies at North American universities.) The fascinating juxtapositions of adolescent dreams and adult realities also appear in the description of image building. "Just as fairy tales have forests and castles, [Hungary has been] part of my imagination." (p. 172). With a slight twist, after his first visit to the ancestral land, he says: "my associations with the country are no longer from other people's lives — my family's, or favorite writers'. I have
people to correspond with and to see again." (p. 164). This concreteness of the "ethnic experience" is impossible in the new world exclusively — something that Canadian ethnic studies are still reluctant to accept.

Continuing the observations on immigrant mentality, the author points out that assimilation was never completely possible for the immigrants: between the world wars "deeper loyalties, fears, and anxieties kept the Hungarians keenly interested in the affairs of their homeland." (p. 40). Only when the passing time slowly ended community life and newer immigrants did not find structures to accommodate them did "the melting pot [become] a reality more by erosion than by choice." (p. 41). Xenophobia (illustrated by several instances from the film "The Music Box" [p. 71]), the "badge of foreignness" that Teleky confesses to have often felt (if not for other reasons, then for the frequent misspellings of his family name [p. 170]), and an "American distance from ethnicity" (p. 175) are some of the formidable obstacles facing immigrants in their uphill struggle for acceptance. As for today's Canada, according to Teleky, it "officially advances an idea of multiculturalism, but always in relation to a dominant culture that knows its identity as truly Canadian." (p. 175). The author does not seem to be happy about the term "ethnic" (p. 171) and states, perhaps unkindly but justly, that currently "'multiculturalism' tends to refer to non-European ethnicities," for which reason "it seems unlikely that Hungarian American subjects will come to the fore or be fashionable." (p. 62). A timely cold shower to cool down never-subsiding Hungarian illusions.

I found only three minor factual errors in the book — let me mention just one here. Teleky writes that Hungary was occupied "by Germans for only a few years during the Second World War." (p. 153). Actually, Hungary was under German occupation only for a little over a year --- and the eastern parts of the country for less than half that time. The author and I live in the same city but we have never met — should I have the pleasure to do so in the future, I'll point out to him the two other errors. I will also have questions for him: for instance, how could he so astonishingly misread a simple statement in my book on Hungarian-Canadian literature (p. 56). Or, whether he really tried to take an elementary Hungarian language course at the University of Toronto, about which he sweepingly writes: "Each time I've registered in [such] a course, with the assurance that it would be introductory, I was soon lost in a room of young people who already had more than a rudimentary knowledge of the language" (p. 5). I wonder where this personal experience comes from, if it is indeed a personal one.

Considering the fact that Teleky's information about Hungary is almost exclusively based on English language materials, he is eminently knowledgeable about many things. As a matter of fact, his zeal for information carries him away into directions where the goal is not worth the effort. He writes reproachfully about the University of Toronto's library in which he could not find any book by Árpád Göncz when the latter became president of the republic (pp. 101-102). The reason is, as Hungarians discreetly know, that Göncz was an undistinguished
writer. He had published three volumes before stepping into office. Now that he has gained notoriety, however, even the University of Toronto's library has several of his volumes.

The long bibliography looks impressive. Still, one wonders why Hannah Arendt's correspondence with Karl Jaspers, or Aronowitz's *The Politics of Identity* (among others) are such essential sources of information when basic works like Francis Wagner's *Hungarian Contributions to World Civilization* (1978), Zoltan Bodolai's *The Timeless Nation* (1978), or Stephen Sisa's *The Spirit of Hungary* (1983) are missing. Having arrived at the end of the volume, having sifted through the bibliography titles, having ascertained that the author missed a few useful works and had to rely on many peripheral ones, one ponders: is this all that we can offer to third generation North American Hungarians in their own language, which is, almost invariably, English?

Alas, we have to conclude that it is. And, even offering books may not be enough. Besides reading such books as Teleky's, third generation North American Hungarians need perseverance, intellect, and discrimination to sort and organize the facts to re-connect with their ancestral Hungarian culture. Very few young people of Hungarian extraction have Teleky's bitter and heroic determination to sacrifice decades of their life to redeem the omissions that had been made by their family, the Hungarian North American community, and their ancestral nation. This book is a warning to all of us.

The other day my son-in-law asked me to give him a book about Hungarians. He is a very typical mainstream American without any Hungarian ancestry. A short and uncomplicated survey of Hungary: history, people, geographical areas, customs, and the arts — was his desire; and... I had nothing to offer him.

NOTES


Book and Other Reviews


The book under review by one of Hungary's most noted medievalists is a history of the Magyar tribal federation in the ninth century, a period which ended with the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin (Historic Hungary). The manuscript was originally prepared for publication in the United States, but "for reasons other than professional" it never appeared in print until it was published in Hungary some five years later. The decision not to publish it in the United States is really unfortunate, because Professor Kristó's synthesis is a most worthy volume. It should be readily available in the English speaking world, and certainly more so than it is possible through the efforts of a small regional Hungarian publisher.

The book covers the century before the Árpádian Conquest of Hungary in fifteen chapters, whose topics stretch from the first appearance of the Hungarians in written sources to the above-mentioned conquest of the Carpathian Basin at the turn of the ninth to the tenth century. The chapters in between these two extremes treat such diverse topics as the ethnogenesis of the Hungarian people, the locations of the earlier Hungarian homelands, the relationship of the Hungarians to various Turkic peoples who have influenced the evolution of their language and culture, the origin and meaning of the various national names of the Magyars, their alleged relationship to the Huns of Attila's fame, their temporary homelands while on their way to the Carpathian Basin, the main historical sources of their nation building at the time of the Conquest, the role of Prince Levedi in this process of nation building, the nature and meaning of their heroic legends and archeological remains, their position and role within the Khazar Empire, their relationship to the Kangars and the Kabars, the role of Prince Álmos and his sacred kingship just before the Conquest, and finally the general condition of the Hungarian tribal federation at the time of the conquest of future Historic Hungary.

These chapters are complemented by two historical maps, a list of the most important primary sources, as well as by a detailed index of geographical
terms, ethnic designations, personal names, and the names of the authors of the main primary and secondary sources.

The book is an unusually well thought-out and well documented scholarly work that treats most of the questions, problems and debatable issues concerning the history of the early Magyars. At the same time, however, it is not an easy reading. The data contained in the individual chapters is so detailed and massive that unless one is already versed in the history of ninth-century Central and Eastern Europe, it is easy to get lost amidst the details. In consequence of this, Kristó's book is probably more useful to the historian than to the general reader. Even so, it is a book that should be available in all of the major academic and public libraries of North America, for it is the product of the scholarly effort of one of the most significant Hungarian medievalists in the twentieth-century Hungary. It would be a great service to the profession if an American publisher would find this book worthy of translation, publication and mass distribution in the English speaking world.

Steven Béla Várda
Duquesne University


This *book's title* could be translated into English more freely as "the chronology of Hungarian origins." In it, Makkay, an eminent archeologist, discusses Gyula László's hypothesis of the "double conquest" of the Carpathian Basin by the Hungarians, a theory which postulates that the ancestors of the Magyars appeared in the Middle Danube basin for the first time not in 896 — as it is traditionally held — but centuries earlier.

Makkay observes that the current received version of the Hungarians' origins maintains that between the 4th and 9th centuries a.d. the Bulgaro-Turkic (or Onogur) ruling class of the ancient Hungarian nomadic tribes began a process of acculturation to the masses of Finno-Ugric-speaking subjects they ruled. This supposedly happened on the southern Russian steppes. Through this process the Hungarian language is supposed to have been enriched by about 300 Bulgaro-Turkic (or early Chuvash) loan-words, most of them relating to animal husbandry. In 894 a.d., threatened by other invading Turkish peoples, the Magyars fled to the West and, under the leadership of Árpád, in 895-896 settled in the Carpathian Basin. Árpád and the other tribal chiefs of the Hungarians had Turkic names and contemporary Byzantine sources refer to them as *Turkoi* or Turks. This tends to confirm the theory that the rulers of the Magyars were of Turkic
origin. The Turkish language, however, rapidly disappeared, either at the time of
the "conquest" or very soon after it. In the onomastics of the Árpád dynasty,
Prince Vajk (after 1001 known as King Stephen and, later, as King St. Stephen)
and, as I suppose, his son Imre (the later St. Imre or St. Emeric), and his nephew
Vazul (as well as his son Levcntc), were the last Magyar leaders to receive
Turkic names, which suggests an earlier acculturation by this ruling class, for in
cases of language shift the change in namegiving usually follows the disappear-
ance of the language by one or two generations.

Against this widely accepted view, Gyula László had advanced a radically
different theory. In studies which appeared in 1944 and thereafter, László
argued that the peoples who spoke proto- or old-Magyar dialects might have
moved into the Carpathian Basin well before 895-6, possibly as subjugated tribes
of the Huns (4-5th century a.d.), or of the early Avars (6th century), or as allies
of the Middle or Late Avars (or Onogurs), around 670-680. In effect, László
claims that various groups of Magyar-speaking peoples were present in the
Carpathian Basin well before the 896 conquest, and the Bulgaro-Turkic loan-
words entered the Hungarian language here, and not during the Hungarians' 
journey through the southern Russian stepplands. Makkay argues that, if indeed
László's theory is valid, the middle Iranian (Alan) loan words in Hungarian came
not from the Ossetians of the north Caucasian region, but were borrowed from
the Sarmatian peoples living in the Carpathian Basin from Roman times through
the Hun and Avar eras. According to Makkay, the same is true of the numerous
Slavic loan-words in Magyar: these entered the Magyar language not after the
Hungarian conquest, i.e. in the 10th and 11th centuries, but at an earlier date
from the South-Slav peoples who also lived together with the Hungarians in the
Middle Danube basin under Avar rule. In this connection Makkay points out
that, notwithstanding the fact that after Hungary's conversion to Christianity it
received its priests from Germany and Italy, the Hungarian religious terminology
is not of German or Italian origin, but Slavonic, which suggests that a certain
degree linguistic-religious acculturation among Hungarians had started to take
place before 896, in the Carpathian Basin.

Arguing along these lines, Makkay postulates that, with the collapse of
the Avar Empire in the early part of the 9th century, the Avar ruling class
disappeared from the Carpathian Basin but the subject Hungarian population
remained there. This speculation gives rise to the theory that in 895 Árpád
entered this land not with a large Hungarian population in tow, but with a much
smaller military force of Turkic-speaking warriors (with whom there probably
were some Hungarian-speaking auxiliaries). This conquering force subdued
the Magyars who were living in the Carpathian Basin apparently without any
military or political organization, and Árpád and his successors established a
viable, strong state, in which the Magyars initially constituted the humbler strata
of society. Supporting this theory is the fact that in many 11th century docu-
ments the peasants mentioned have names of Finno-Ugric origin, while among
the leaders the ratio of Turkic names is high. Makkay even speculates on the

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proportion of the Hungarian population that lived in the Carpathian Basin before the conquest and suggest that this was probably four or five times greater than the size of Árpád's conquering host. This pre-896 population of Hungarians in the Middle Danube region amounted to about half-a-million, according to Makkay, and included the ancestors of the Székelys of Transylvania whose alleged Turkic origin Makkay rejects.¹

László's original impetus for postulating the theory of the pre-896 settlement of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin had been a sudden change (around 680 a.d.) that archeologist observed to have taken place in Avar metal ornamentation, when the so-called griffin and tendril motives appeared. The fact that after 896 the local population is known to have continued to use the same cemeteries that the people of the late-Avar period used, only strengthened László's conviction. In reinforcing László's theory, Makkay adduces indirect arguments from the fields and disciplines of toponymy, etymology, paleogeography, etc. He argues, inter alia, that the runic script (rovásírás) of the Székelys originated before 896, in the Carpathian Basin.

All-in-all, Makkay's book is the most comprehensive study of the theory of the "double conquest." A detailed summary in English (pp. 199-228) allows the non-Hungarian reader to get acquainted with this interesting historiographical controversy. Notwithstanding the publication of Makkay's work, most Hungarian historians will probably continue to doubt the validity of Gyula László's hypothesis.

József Vekerdi
Budapest

1. Regarding the origins of the settlement of Transylvania, a question of intense and bitter controversy between Hungarian and Rumanian historians, Makkay refers to the brilliant study of László Rásonyi who, following the remarkable hint of Dezső Pais, demonstrated that the mysterious Blacus people whom the Árpádian conquerors encountered in 9th century Transylvania were not Wallachians, as the Romanian theory of "daco-Roman continuity" claims, but a Turkic people, the Bulaqs. Thus it is quite reasonable that their leader had a Turkic (and not a Wallachian) name: Gelou. On this question see another monograph by Makkay: Hogyan lettek a blakokból románok [How the Blacs became Rumanians] (Budapest: published by the author, 1997).

During the past two centuries or so, Hungary had contributed its share to the list of international soldiers-of-fortune, including those who — while treading in murky waters — managed to achieve some international fame. Their lines stretch from Count Maurice Benyovszky (1741-1786) to Ignatius Trebitsch-Lincoln (1879-1943) and beyond. The former of these died as the uncrowned "King of Madagascar," while the latter — after spying for seven countries and going through four different religions — ended his career under the name of Chao-Kung as the abbot of a Buddhist Monastery in Shanghai.

The ranks of these soldiers-of-fortune included many others, among them Gusztáv Zerffi, the "hero" of the work under review. The son of an assimilated Hungarian of German-Jewish extraction, Zerffi was born in Buda, who during the 1840s became involved in the Hungarian Reform Movement. Initially Zerffi was an ardent critic of Hungarian populist nationalism and populist literature as represented by Sándor Petőfi (1823-1849), but then during the Revolution of 1848-1849 he joined the ranks of the anti-Habsburg forces. He worked in close cooperation with the radicals congregating around the "Minister for Police" László Madarász (1811-1909), while rising to the rank of a captain in the Hungarian revolutionary army. Then, after the defeat of the Hungarian War of Independence in August 1849, he fled to Turkey along with Kossuth and many other revolutionaries.

Zerffi's dedication to the Hungarian national cause abated soon after his flight from Hungary. He became a paid informer of the Habsburg Imperial Government as early as November 1849, and remained in the service of the Austrian spy system until January 1865. In the course of these fifteen years — while living in Turkey, Italy, France and England — Zerffi wrote close to a thousand spy reports on the activities of the Hungarian immigration. Even so, with the change of the political conditions and the imminence of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, he was unceremoniously dismissed.

Having been cast aside by his former masters, Zerffi went through a major metamorphosis and gradually transformed himself into a learned scholar-author of art history and historiography. He also became one of the founding members of The Royal Historical Society in London. By the 1870s Zerffi accumulated sufficient scholarly prestige that the Japanese commissioned him to write a historiographical handbook for their emerging historical profession in Japan. The book appeared under the title *The Science of History* in 1879, and it was followed within a year by Zerffi's election to the Chairmanship of the Council of The Royal Historical Society.

Tibor Frank's portrayal of Gusztáv Zerffi is both solid and convincing. It reflects phenomenal amount of scholarly research in over dozen archives and half a dozen countries stretching from Britain to Japan. It also shows commen-
dable critical thinking on the part of the author in handling the accumulated historical sources.

The book is supplemented by an extensive bibliography, a list of Zerffi's publications, a broad selection from his secret reports to Vienna, seventy-three illustrations, as well as a name index that facilitates the use of this volume.

Tibor Frank's *Egy emigráns alakváltásai* is a work of considerable importance that throws much light upon the inner life, activities and mind-set of the post-revolutionary "Kossuth-emigration." The Japanese have found it significant enough to have it published in a Japanese translation. It is an example that should also be followed by Anglo-American scholarship.

Steven Béla Várly
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Two Hungarian studies journals: *Hungarian Studies* (Budapest and Bloomington, Indiana), and *Rivista di studi ungheresi* (Rome).

**The International Hungarian Studies Association** (IHSA) was formed in 1979 at the initiative of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Its periodical, the semi-annual *Hungarian Studies* (*HS*), was first published in 1985. Vilmos Voigt, professor of ethnology, was managing editor for three years. In 1988 the literary scholar Mihály Szegedy-Maszák became Editor-in-Chief. When he got an appointment at Indiana University, the journal's editorial activities were split between two continents, although its publisher-distributor continued to be the Akadémiai Kiadó (Academic Publishing House) in Budapest. The association, the journal, and the academy thus form a cooperative triangle.

When the IHSA was established, it was spelled out that the association's mandate would not cover studies in history, which was a closely watched field in communist Hungary. Similarly to its sponsor *HS*, too, adhered to the policy of shunning contributions on modern Hungarian history until the nineteen-nineties (except for history as an auxiliary of literature and other kinds of disciplines).

One fascinating asset of the journal is the variety of contributors, disciplines, and — to a lesser degree — languages. Understandably, an almost eclectic search for a lasting profile characterized the first few volumes, which coincided with decisive changes in actual politics. Especially in earlier volumes surveys of relevant institutional activities (such as reports on congresses and symposia, the state of Hungarian Studies in various countries, and the like) were frequent, while in recent years they have virtually disappeared. Same goes for the book reviews. On the other hand, special issues or sections started appearing about such topics as North American Hungarians (vol. 7), early 20th century
Hungary (vol. 9), and religion in Hungary (vol. 10). Some of these materials derive from conferences organized by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the chair of Hungarian Studies at Indiana University. Experience proves that this kind of publication of topically related research is a good idea, as it lends focus to the issues. Naturally, mixed issues should also keep appearing to accommodate hard-to-classify submissions.

HS is now in its fourteenth year of publication -- or it should be, were it not set back by chronic delays, as so many scholarly periodicals are nowadays. It is to be hoped that the journal will print, sooner or later, a cumulative index of its rich past. There are a number of similarities between our Hungarian Studies Review and HS. Both are published by an association ("ours" by the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada, HS by the IHSA), both have gone through critical times of structural changes -- and, above all, both are fighting against formidable odds, financially as well as due to the curse of our discipline, Hungarian Studies. As we know, our culture cannot be attached to other fields of inquiry easily. Some renowned scholars dealing with Hungary publish their research in journals of their respective discipline rather than the two interdisciplinary Hungarian studies periodicals. Several familiar names could be also mentioned who published in HS, but never in the Hungarian Studies Review, and vice versa.

HS and the Review are the only two periodicals which represent Hungarian culture exclusively, and in an interdisciplinary way, to readers unfamiliar with the Hungarian language. The relationship between the two periodicals has been amicable. We wish HS many more years of successful publication.

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The Italian Inter-University Centre for Hungarian Studies was established in 1985 with the purpose to provide coordination for the activities of teachers and scholars of Hungarian at nine universities of the country. In 1986 the yearbook Rivista di studi ungheresi was launched. Both the Centre and the editorial office are located at the University of Rome "La Sapienza," where Professor Péter Sárközy, holder of the Chair of Hungarian Studies, has fulfilled directorial duties of the former and editorship of the latter with unflagging energy and efficiency. The yearbook is now in its twelfth year of publication, and is supported by the Italian government's National Research Centre.

Already from the start the Rivista was more oriented to a general readership than the two North American journals. Non-documented essays, reminiscences, and similar genres that fall close to belles lettres were printed frequently in the first issues, perhaps less so in the more recent ones. Reports on congresses, reviews of the state of research at different scholarly centres, and book reviews are regular features. The subject matter ranges widely, with literary scholarship and history taking about equal proportions in dominating over other
topics. There is a close cooperation between the Department of Comparative Literature and the Hungarian Chair at the University of Rome. Methods of comparative inquiries in Hungarian literature fall into the categories of influence studies, reception studies and imagology.

Italian and Hungarian cultural relations look back at a long history, and the fact that Hungarian language or some aspect of culture is taught at nine universities provides an enviable pool of resources. Italian studies are equally well developed in Hungary, adding even more names to the editorial list of contributors. A third group is that of the international contributors, so far from ten countries, among others from Canada. This latter contact is especially strong, due to the (non-codified) cooperation between the chairs of Hungarian Studies in Rome and Toronto. The two institutions have had several shared projects, such as mutual invitations to conferences, simultaneous publication of the papers delivered by Italian colleagues (about the Hungarian Renaissance) at the University of Toronto's Fourth Hungarian Studies Conference (1989), and regular exchange of information about each other's ongoing activities.

The language of the Rivista is overwhelmingly Italian, although publications have also appeared in other major languages. One of these, Shayne Mitchell's "An Italian Account of the Hungarian Peasant Revolt of 1514" (in vol. 8) is particularly interesting. Less regularly than the two North American journals, the Rivista has published special issues or thematic sections. In 1989, it commemorated the 500th anniversary of King Matthias's death, and in 1996, a whole issue was dedicated to Finno-Ugric Studies.

Unlike English, Italian is not a language of international communication. Even so, it is spoken by some 60 million people, not counting the diaspora. News from Hungary attracts surprisingly wide interest. The Rivista has an important mission, and it performs this mission conscientiously and successfully.

George Bisztray
University of Toronto


This book by the Director of the Institute of Ethnology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is a collection of twelve essays, all of which — with the exception of the first one — were presented at various international congresses or symposia, and the majority of which have already appeared in print. Collectively these essay deal with the "social classes, strata and occupation groups of
the Hungarian people" within the Carpathian Basin, and area that for the better part of a millennium used to constitute Historic Hungary.

Having been a multinational state through much of its existence, Hungary had been the homeland of close to a dozen different nationalities, each with its own folk traditions and way of life. Some of these ethnic groups were highly urbanized (like the Germans, the Jews, and many of the Hungarians), while most of the others were on various levels of rural and pastoral existence. They each had their own social elites. But by virtue of being part of the Hungarian state, the latter generally became members of the Hungarian nobility and the Hungarian honoratio class, and then gradually assimilated into the Hungarian nation. Paladi-Kovács does touches upon the society and culture of most of these ethnic groups, but his essays deal primarily with the Hungarians or the Magyars, who constituted the state-forming nation and the leading nationality of Historic Hungary.

Of the enclosed twelve studies, the longest and perhaps the most interesting to an outsider is the one on the society and culture of the Hungarian non-titled nobility in the period between the 16th through the 19th centuries (pp. 9-62). This study was originally written for a major Hungarian handbook entitled Magyar néprajz [Hungarian Ethnography], but for some unexplained reason it never appeared in print until now. This essay describes the various strata of the Hungarian nobility, their social organization and authority, their estates, mansions and clothing, their marriage customs, family relations and personal names, their social contacts and forms of greetings, their relationship to the church hierarchy, as well as their mentality and the level of their national consciousness. The author therefore presents a comprehensive picture of the Hungarian noble class, a portrait that can be of some use even to the specialists of Hungarian history.

The second essay surveys Hungary's ethnic composition both before and after the country's dismemberment in 1919-1920 (pp. 63-78). It is a balanced summary of Hungary's ethnic picture, with some references to the condition of the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring states formed after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The third essay discusses the nature of "Hungarianness" or "Hungarian identity" in the course of the past few centuries. In other words it tackles the question: what constitutes a "good Hungarian" (pp. 79-98). The author concludes that being a good Hungarian includes being a good European as well as being a good human being. But the definition of a "good Hungarian" never included the need to have only Hungarian ethnic roots.

This is followed by eight other essays on such diverse topics as: internal migrations within Hungary from the 18th through the 20th centuries (pp. 99-112); division of labour and work specialization by the various ethnic and nationality groups in traditional Hungary (pp. 113-126); exchange of children and child apprentices among the country's various regions and peoples, leading to the knowledge of languages and to the mutual understanding of each other's
peculiarities (pp. 127-140); continuity and increasing discontinuity of Hungarian
folk customs and traditions among the country's rural population (pp. 141-152);
role and work habits of the oldest generation of rural inhabitants in late-20th-
century Hungarian villages (pp. 153-163); system of commuting by rural workers
to new industrial centres, illustrated by the case of the industrial town of Özd in
northern Hungary (pp. 165-176); development and nature of industrial workers'
culture during the post-World War II period (pp. 177-188); changes in the use of
Historical sources in Hungarian ethnographical research (pp. 189-200); and the
development of Hungarian ethnographical cartography in the second half of the
20th century (pp. 201-209). The volume is complemented by forty-three illustra-
tions (pp. 211-214), and by a list of the most important geographical names in
several languages for places now outside of Hungary (pp. 215-217).

Paládi-Kovács's work is a book of pedantic scholarship, which at the
same time is also easy reading. It can be read effortlessly and with much profit
by anyone interested in the ethnic traditions of the people of Hungary. Fortu-
nately it is available in English, which makes it all the more valuable for people
in the related disciplines.

Steven Béla Várda
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Tibor Glant, "Roosevelt, Apponyi és a Habsburg Monarchia" [Roose-
velt, Apponyi and the Habsburg Monarchy], Századok 131 (1997),
pp. 1386-1401.

It is not a part of the North American academic tradition to review articles in
scholarly journals. An exception is made here because the subject of the article
at hand is of interest to Hungarian Americans — as well as North American
historians who study Hungary and, especially, Hungarian-American relations.
That subject is the friendship that existed between American President Theodore
Roosevelt and the Hungarian statesman Count Albert Apponyi. The story of this
relationship has been told by historian Tibor Glant of Kossuth Lajos University
of Debrecen.

In his study Glant claims that the friendship of Roosevelt and Apponyi
amounted to the most important unofficial tie between Hungary and the USA
from 1904 to the time of World War I, and wonders what would have happened
to Hungary at the end of the war if in 1918-1919 Roosevelt and not Woodrow
Wilson had been US President.

As those who have studied American history know, Theodore "Teddy"
Roosevelt (1858-1919), the "hero" of America's war against Spain, was elected
the governor of New York State in 1898, became vice-President of the US in 1901, and succeeded President McKinley after he was assassinated in the same year. Roosevelt served as President until 1909. In 1912 he tried to make a political comeback, but failed. Nevertheless, he remained an influential political figure until his death.

Count Albert Apponyi (1846-1933) was an eminent figure on the Hungarian political scene during the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first three decades of the twentieth. From 1906 to 1910, and again in 1916-1918, he served as Hungary's minister of cults and education. After the war he was the head of Hungary's peace delegation, and from 1923 to his death a decade later he served as Hungary's chief delegate to the League of Nations.

Giant compares and contrasts the two men's backgrounds, careers, and ideas. He points out that, despite the great differences between them (Roosevelt was very much a man of action, while Apponyi was a man of words), the two shared characteristics and ideals, including knowledge of foreign languages, interest in other cultures, and the desire to promote world peace. It was shared interests and beliefs that brought the two together and made them friends.

During their occasional personal meetings Roosevelt used to address Apponyi as "my dear Count."

In describing the meetings the two men had over the years, Giant discusses the incidents which reveal that Roosevelt had a good knowledge of Austria-Hungary's affairs. Much to Apponyi's surprise, Roosevelt on one occasion also talked about Hungary's history, recollecting little-known names and minor events. Apparently, he read about the subject decades earlier, and could still remember much of what he had read.

More important than the meetings the two men had, was the correspondence that they conducted from 1904 to 1915. This correspondence reveals Roosevelt's concern for the continued survival of Austria-Hungary, especially during the political crisis of 1905-06. To help to resolve this crisis Roosevelt took farsighted actions. Among other things he counselled Apponyi to advise his countrymen that the Habsburg Monarchy should be maintained intact. Though Roosevelt was evidently against the idea of Hungary separating from Austria at the time, his letters to Apponyi reveal that he did not reject the possibility of Hungary gaining her independence at some time in the future.

The two men's friendship continued after Roosevelt's departure from the White House. The ex-president visited Hungary in 1910 and, for part of this visit, Apponyi acted as his host. The following year it was Apponyi's turn to tour the United States and, during this visit, he stayed for nearly two days with the Roosevelts. In their conversations on this occasion, the two disagreed for the first time on the question of the resolution of international disputes, with Roosevelt endorsing the idea of the use of force as a last resort, and Apponyi opposing the idea of military intervention in such cases.

Though they never met again, their correspondence continued. On the eve of World War I, Roosevelt remarked in one of his letters to Apponyi that he
hoped a world conflict could be avoided, because if it broke out, it would be a great tragedy for mankind.

In 1915 the Roosevelt-Apponyi friendship became a casualty of the war. They continued to exchange letters, but it soon became obvious that the war had accentuated their differences. Apponyi's increasingly pro-German stance irritated Roosevelt who put an end to their correspondence not long after German submarines sank an American ocean liner, the Lusitania.

In the concluding section of his article Glant explores the question whether Hungary might not have been better off in the post-war restructuring of Europe with Roosevelt in the White House instead of Wilson. He points out that, despite the cooling of his relationship with Apponyi, Roosevelt remained sympathetic to Hungary, and for a long time avoided association with the people who demanded Hungary's dismemberment. By war's end, however, Roosevelt had abandoned his belief in the necessity of Austria-Hungary's preservation. After a lengthy analysis of Roosevelt's post-1915 attitudes, Glant comes to the conclusion that it probably would not have made much difference for Hungary's future whether Wilson or Roosevelt had occupied the White House during the war and at war's end.

Glant's study is based on a wide variety of primary sources and constitutes an important contribution to our knowledge of Hungarian-American relations. Hopefully it will become available in English translation in the not too distant future.

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A NOTE FROM THE EDITORS:

We apologize for our continued tardiness in the publication of our journal. The reasons for this are legion, and we do not want to offer any explanations here. There is hope that within the next few years, we might be able to catch up with our publishing schedule, as we have three special issues in the making, each of which should make up a substantial part of an annual volume. In particular, Oliver Botar of the University of Manitoba has been working on a small volume of essays on Hungarian-Canadian art and artists. Recently, Agatha Schwartz, German Section Head, Department of Modern Languages and Literatures at the University of Ottawa, has embarked on editing a collection of essays on the subject of Hungarian women in literature and the media. And, János Miska of Victoria, B.C., has been working on a still another update of his bibliography of things Hungarian-Canadian. With these special issues in the making, along with the manuscripts at hand (and those promised), we expect to increase the frequency of our journal's appearance during the next two years and hope that in 2000 we will publish the volume slated for 2000 (vol. 27)!

G.B. and N.F.D.