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Special Issue:

Oscar Jaszi: Visionary, Reformer, and Political Activist

In this issue scholars from Hungary and North America assess some of the activities and ideas of the early twentieth century Hungarian thinker and politician, Oscar Jaszi (1875–1957).

Hungarian Studies Review

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The Editors
Hungarian Studies Review
University of Toronto
21 Sussex Avenue
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Special Issue:

Oscar Jaszi: Visionary, Reformer, and Political Activist

edited by:

N.F. Dreisziger with A. Ludanyi

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Preface

Oscar Jaszi, to Hungarians known as Oszkár Jászi, was the leading figure in turn-of-the century Hungary's bourgeois radical movement. He was born on March 2, 1875, in the city of Nagykároly (today's Satu Mare, in northeastern Rumania). His father was a Jewish doctor who had converted to the Reformed faith and who instilled in his son a love for learning and a sympathy for the common people. Jaszi completed his higher education in Hungary, France and England, and by 1911 he was teaching as a lecturer in constitutional studies at the University of Kolozsvár (today's Cluj, in Rumania). By this time he had also become prominent in Hungary's non-Marxist radical reform movement. He was one of the founders and sustainers of the Társadalomtudományi Társaság (Sociological Society) and became the editor of the reformist periodical, *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century). He also published numerous pamphlets and some longer studies on subjects relating to sociology, politics and what nowadays is known as "ethnic studies." Still later he was elected president of the National Radical Party. In the short-lived postwar revolutionary government of Mihály Károlyi, Jaszi was the minister in charge of nationality affairs, and shouldered the difficult task of negotiating with Hungary's national minorities at a time when the country, indeed the whole of the Austro-Hungarian Dual-Monarchy, was disintegrating.

Jaszi was unable to stop this process of disintegration. He resigned from his post and, several weeks after the collapse of the Károlyi regime, left Hungary to begin his long exile, the first leg of which took him to Vienna. Here, he worked feverishly to organize the democratic elements of the Hungarian emigration. For some time he edited the *Bécsi Magyar Újság* (Hungarian Newspaper of Vienna). He tried to establish contacts with the leaders of the Successor States (Hungary's new neighbours), in preparation for a possible takeover by democratic forces in Hungary and a subsequent rapprochement between that country and its neighbours. When it became evident that the leaders of the Successor States were not interested

in supporting Jaszi's (and Károlyi's) aspirations, he made plans to abandon his avocation of full-time political émigré and sought employment as an academic in the United States. In 1925 he succeeded, and from that time until his retirement after the war, he taught at Ohio's Oberlin College. Both during the time of his Viennese exile, and during his life as an émigré academic in America, Jaszi conducted a war of words against what he called "unreformed" and "feudal" Hungary and its postwar leadership, in particular, Admiral Miklós Horthy. Jaszi's aspirations—the creation of a democratic Hungary, an equitable revision of the territorial provisions of the postwar Treaty of Trianon and rapprochement between Hungary and its neighbours—were never realized. His hope that the Second World War might bring about the achievement of his dreams was dashed by the war's after-effects: the further growth of chauvinism in Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, and the coming of Soviet domination over East Central Europe. Jaszi died a disappointed but unrepentant democrat in Oberlin on 13 February 1957. He had outlived, by a few days, his post-1919 political nemesis, Miklós Horthy.

* * * * *

Jaszi has been a controversial figure not only in the realm of Hungarian politics, but also in historiography. Early assessments of him as a thinker and a political activist had been negative, no doubt because as a cosmopolitan intellectual who had served a revolutionary regime, he was an anathema in post-1920 "counter-revolutionary" Hungary. His advocacy of radical land reform, his opposition to the privileges of the feudal ruling class, his criticism of the Roman Catholic Church's role in education, his befriending of the leaders of the non-Magyar minorities, were deeds that doomed him an opponent of a " Christian-National" Hungary.[1] After the passing of the Horthy era in Hungary at the end of the Second World War, a different assessment emerged of Jaszi in a liberal, post-war Hungary. He now came to be seen as a democrat and a reformer in the tradition of the Enlightenment and nineteenth century liberalism. This view of Jaszi was soon to change however. After the imposition in Hungary of a communist dictatorship under Mátyás Rákosi, communist historians declared Jaszi a man with petit-bourgeois ideas who, as time went on, became increasingly opposed to true proletarian socialism.[2]

The dark days of Stalinism were fortunately not long lasting in the Hungarian People's Republic. In the 1960s winds of change began to be felt in the country and, especially, the world of Hungarian scholarship. Increasingly, non-communist progressives became acceptable to the regime and all sorts of reformers of the Magyar past were co-opted into the pantheon

of the nation's heroes. As one contemporary historian argued, Hungary was not so richly endowed with social and political reformers that she could afford to disown Jaszi.[3] Indeed, from the 1960s on, Jaszi's reception by Hungarian scholarship became more and more positive. Of course, he was still criticized for not accepting a Marxist viewpoint, but the fact that he had been an opponent of the Communists throughout his life was not voiced. On the contrary, his anti-communism was sometimes glossed over by historians dealing with him.[4] And, as intellectual dissent in socialist Hungary increased, it became more and more fashionable to praise people who sought a road to reform that did not involve the bloody revolutionary path advocated by the Soviets. By the mid-1980s, when Hungarian scholars could endorse anyone except outright counter-revolutionaries, Jaszi had become an attractive focus for research and reflection. As a result, his reputation reached new heights. It is probably safe to assume that Jaszi's historical stature had peaked at the end of the 1980s, as it seems unlikely that in post-communist Hungary a critic of capitalism and an associate of Mihály Károlyi would continue to have a camp of enthusiastic admirers. Because most of the papers in this volume were produced in the period that Jaszi's historical figure stood at its highest, this collection of essays might well constitute a tribute to him the like of which has not appeared in the past and might not appear in the future.

East Central Europe has only recently lived through experiments with radical socialism and with official anti-clericalism, and has been left with the bitter after-taste of these explorations in alternate politics. As a result, Jaszi the left-leaning reformer and critic of the Church might not be the figure that will solicit praise from the present generation of historians. On the other hand, Jaszi the advocate of East Central European reconciliation and integration will no doubt continue to receive attention in the future. His dream of a federated Danubian Europe remains unfulfilled. At the same time, the division of that part of the world into competing and potentially quarrelsome independent states will no doubt be seen as the major weakness of the region. As the problems of disunity will probably plague East Central Europe for some time to come, Jaszi will be remembered as one of those few who had proposed to prevent that disunity as soon as it became evident that the old Habsburg Empire was not acceptable to its component nations. Jaszi then, will most likely continue to have his admirers, if for no other major reason than for his advocacy of Danubian federalism. And, we can also predict with reasonable assurance, that he will remain a controversial figure of modern Hungarian history.

* * * * *

Most of the papers in this volume were prepared for a conference dedicated

to the memory of Oscar Jaszi that had been held at Jaszi's American university, Oberlin College, several years ago. For quite some time, the proceedings of the conference had languished on the desks of various would-be editors—and they had spent quite some time in the filing cabinets of the present ones also. In the meantime some of the papers were revised and updated by their authors, a fact which prodded the editors of this volume to resuscitate the project and resume—or begin as the case might be—the work of editing. Some of the papers given at the original Jaszi memorial conference were not included in this collection, either because their authors had not been able (or willing) to update them, or because turning them into publishable prose would have taken more time than the editors felt they could afford. These decisions were arbitrary and had been taken without the type of consultation that our journal and its camp of contributors and advisors had been accustomed to in earlier years.

The first paper in the collection is an overview by Péter Hanák, Jaszi's biographer and the doyen of Hungarian historians of the turn-of-the-century. It deals mainly with the subject Jaszi will probably be most remembered for in the third millennium: the question of Danubian patriotism. The next essay, written by Hungarian historian Attila Pók, explores the quite neglected subject (at least as far as historical literature in English is concerned) of Jaszi the political tactician and organizational leader of Hungary's reform movement. The following paper, by Canadian historian Thomas Spira, offers a case study of Jaszi's dealings with Hungary's minorities during his brief 1918 tenure in office as Minister of Nationality Affairs. Next, György Litván, another long-time Hungarian student of Oscar Jaszi's life and writings, outlines the exiled Jaszi's efforts during the early 1920s to build contacts with the progressive statesmen of the Successor States. Then, in the penultimate paper in the collection, American historian Thomas Szendrey deals with another non-chronological theme: Jaszi's philosophy of history. The concluding essay examines a less prominent phase of Jaszi's life. It treats some of his activities during the Second World War and sketches his reflections on the "Hungarian Problem" some quarter century after he had disappeared from the main stage of Hungarian history. This study paints a less flattering image of Jaszi—in this case Jaszi the isolated and disappointed émigré academic—than that presented by those who deal with his career in his younger days. However, rather than intending to rain on the Jaszi enthusiasts' parade, this essay wishes to remind readers that Jaszi too, had his weaknesses—especially as he was approaching old age—and that he is a controversial figure in Hungary's evolution.

By publishing this collection of papers, we not only wish to honour Jaszi's memory but hope to rekindle interest in a man who was an outspoken critic of the Hungary of his day, and who dedicated his life to changing the social and political system of his native land, and indeed, the fate

of all of East Central Europe. Now that the centenary of Jaszi's debut on the Danubian political stage is slowly approaching, we hope that a new assessment of his life's work might be possible, one which is not coloured by the ideologies – and the ideologically induced emotions – that had prevailed in Hungary in the more than three-quarters century since he had fled his homeland.

N.F. Dreisziger

NOTES

1 Lee Congdon, "History and Politics in Hungary: The Rehabilitation of Oszkár Jászi," *East European Quarterly* IX (Fall, 1975), pp. 319f.
2 *Ibid.*, pp. 320–23.
3 Historian József Varga cited *ibid.*, p. 324.
4 Passages that revealed Jaszi as an anti-communist, were simply left out of a published collection of his writings. Tibor Hajdu to the writer of these lines, in a private discussion in October, 1983, Bellagio, Italy.

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Oscar Jaszi's Danubian Patriotism

Péter Hanák

Oscar Jaszi's career spans three countries and three epochs—with two interludes in between. Though his relentless search for truth embraces a large segment of time, his actual impact on history was limited. Even posterity has failed to do justice to his life and ideas.

Jaszi was—it can be seen clearer and clearer—a scholar, strongly committed to public life; as well as a politician, deeply committed to scholarship and ethical norms. Our century gave him few chances to fulfill this double role. He was an expert on minority problems in East Central Europe, and became an ardent advocate of a new type of regional—Danubian—patriotism. During the last 80 years, however, East Central European reality has been reluctant to confirm the validity of his rational vision.

To start with, we have to ask: how did Jaszi recognize the importance of the nationality problem? How could he realize the inter-relatedness of the issues of Hungarian national existence and the minority question in Hungary? How and why did he arrive at the idea of a common Danubian patriotism? The answer seems to be obvious. Jaszi's homeland, Szatmár County, had been the land of the Rákóczis and the Károlyis for centuries. It was the land of the Hungarian struggle for freedom from Habsburg rule. Furthermore, it was a frontier region, a place where various ethnic and religious groups co-existed and, sometimes, clashed with each other. It seems evident that, from infancy, he had imbibed an understanding of minority problems. This answer is, however, suspiciously easy. As a matter of fact, in his youth, Jaszi was more interested in social problems than in nationality issues. He was almost thirty when he realized the close connection between social and nationality problems.

"I was the first in Hungary to [elucidate] the relationship between the national state and socialism, and to prove that socialism will not result in the annihilation of patriotism" he claimed in 1906. Contemporary socialists—even Jaszi's best friend Ervin Szabó, the scholar—rejected the "nationalization" of socialism. Jaszi himself soon realized that in backward and agrarian

Eastern Europe, socialism was a remote utopia, and that the first requirement was to free the bourgeoisie from the influence of aristocratic nationalism, and to free the peasantry from the economic remnants of feudalism.[1]

Jaszi was rightly proud of being the first—together with his friend and companion-in-arms, Endre Ady—to link the programme for social development with the need for a new patriotism based on democracy. He realized that democracy would be unable to work unless it accommodated patriotism, and it was only through democracy that the nationalism of the Hungarian aristocracy and gentry could be cleansed of its feudal stains. Jaszi did not exclude from his reform programme Hungary's traditional left-wing national opposition either. He believed that he could find in this group the "missing link" which would connect the old Hungary of the *kuruc* freedom fighters with the reformed, democratic Hungary of the future.

Those progressive elements of the opposition who remained faithful to the ideas of 1848 might have accepted Jaszi's programme of democratic reform had Jaszi not wanted to extend democracy to Hungary's minorities. "One cannot make democracy on a fifty percent basis"—he used to say. As long as the minorities do not possess equal rights, as long as they do not have autonomous administrative and cultural rights, it will always be easy to turn them against any Hungarian effort for democracy, as had been the case, with tragic consequences, in 1848.

Jaszi's argumentation was primarily political: it was seemingly based on tactical exigencies of Hungarian national politics. His everyday experiences as well as his investigations of the nature of nationalism convinced him that there were no substantial differences between the Hungarian national idea and that of the minorities: they were all manifestations of one and the same cultural process of human evolution. The minorities had the same right to national existence as Magyars had, all these movements had the same purpose: national autonomy and self-determination.[2]

Before World War I, Jaszi dedicated himself for years to the study of history and sociology. The result of successful reconciliation of the scholar and the politician was his famous 1912 book: *The Formation of Nation States and the Minority Question*.[3] In this work he pointed out that the national movements were powerful enough to create nation-states and, in the process, disrupt artificially created, dynastic empires. This was a law of nature which manifested itself in the process of national development. Therefore, all the endeavors which tended towards the unfolding national cultures are "not immature chauvinism . . . but a vital force without which people cannot survive." This was Jaszi's conclusion in terms of his positivist philosophy.

Jaszi saw the advancement of mankind as a gradually unfolding process. One cannot begin the unification of mankind with internationalism, he used to say. "Mankind has been created in a manner that the road to

internationalism leads through the national path, and to this through the vernacular of masses." From this basic thesis follows that national minorities can be involved in a higher level of culture only through their mother tongue. Any kind of forced assimilation can only impede the desirable process of regional and continental integration. Hungary can get rid of domination by the Austrian bureaucracy and military only through just and fair minority legislation. "Therefore I state that the minority question is the Archimedean point of Hungarian democracy."[4]

Initially, a radical federalist plan for the reorganization of Hungary did not arise from this premise. All Jaszi demanded for the country's minorities was fair administration and jurisdiction, as well as good education, all offered in the language of the nationalities. He did not mention any kind of federation involving the peoples of Hungary before the war, on the contrary, he wanted to maintain the territorial and political integrity of Greater Hungary *tout a prix*. In this sense he was unable to break out from the magic spell of Hungarian nationalism. But in pre-war Hungary there was no person among the Magyars who went—or could go—further than Jaszi, nor did the demands of the national minorities exceed these requisites. The relevant point in Jaszi's activities was not so much the actual formula of any programme of transition, but the new orientation. Jaszi discovered and propagated a new alternative to the nationalist tradition prevailing in Hungary at that time.[5]

During the First World War, Jaszi's political outlook radically changed. As a devoted believer of progress, he discovered some kind of "historical purpose, divine will" even behind the shocking absurdity of the war. Mankind, he believed, was marching toward a higher level of integration and civilization. He was worried that this progress would be hindered as a result of invasion of East Central Europe by tsarist Russia, or through the penetration of the region by Pan-Slavism. As a result, he became attracted to the German *Mitteleuropa* project—for a while. Immediately after the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia, however, he changed his opinion. "After the overthrow of Russian tsarism it is no longer a utopia to coordinate the entire territory of European culture in a united international organization," he wrote in 1918.[6]

Such an organization or a narrower Danubian Union was, however, politically unfeasible. We may ask what consideration induced him to accept the idea of such confederation? Did it not stand in sharp contradiction with the basic thesis of his book of 1912, which had regarded the formation of the nation and nation-states almost a law of nature?

Although Jaszi discovered and acknowledged the historical inevitability of the formation of nations, he never glorified the idea of small states, which he called *Kleinstaaterei*. Particularly not in East Central Europe, under shadow of two colossal big powers. He knew very well—as did

all serious thinkers and politicians in the Danube region: Palacky, Balcescu, Eötvös, or Masaryk—that in this multicultural part of Europe the existence of homogeneous nation-states was simply impossible. Even the smallest state would be mixed ethnically and all these internally divided states would be rather weak in themselves. As a matter of fact, the concept of the *Kleinstaaterei* had always been—and would always be—responsible for their dependence on one or the other of the neighbouring great powers. This situation was one reason why Jaszi offered, in 1918, a third alternative. If under the given circumstances it would be impossible to maintain the supranational monarchy on the one hand, and if its splintering into small states would be undesirable or fatal for the nations of the region on the other, the only acceptable solution would be confederation. Only this could comply with the divergent historical tendencies making for national independence as well as supranational integration. Only this could fulfill the historical task of establishing the cooperation "of peoples who, left alone, would be unable to stand up to the double squeeze of the Germans and the East Slavs."[7]

There were other motives behind Jaszi's great plan, too. One can take it for granted that his arguments were influenced by his national sentiments even in 1918, in the midst of national and Central European catastrophy. At the same time, his negotiations with the leaders of Hungary's ethnic minorities show that he regarded his plan as a basis for discussion, and he was ready to make compromises. He wanted, he wrote later, "to work for anticipating the future" [elébe dolgozni a jövőnek].

History has buried Jaszi's still-born project for a Danubian Confederation. In the post-World War I years of desperation, Jaszi could do nothing but concentrate on two struggles: a war of words against the counterrevolution in Hungary, and a campaign for a democratic minority policy toward Hungarian minorities in the Successor States. Concerning the latter, he had hopes in the new regimes, particularly that of Czechoslovakia. At the time, his hopes did not seem totally unrealistic, only afterwards did they prove illusory. In spite of these hope-driven illusions, Jaszi soberly warned of the dangers inherent in the post-war reorganization in East Central Europe.

As early as 1920, he returned to the idea of the confederation. In the *Bécsi Magyar Újság* (the Hungarian Newspaper of Vienna), he argued that the problems of Central Europe could be solved only by the establishment of a Danubian Confederation, and that only such a confederated Central Europe could rescue Europe from economic decay and endless power conflicts. The crisis is general, he wrote in the 1921 Christmas issue of the newspaper, but its nest—the *sedes mali*—reside in the Danubian Basin. The problem was Janus-like. While in the old Monarchy there was economic unity and free inter-regional trade, the dynastic supranational state impeded the free national development of the region's ethnic groups. In the succes-

sor states, however, national sovereignty was realized but economic unity had been shattered. Neither the old regime nor the new post-war system was conducive to Danubian co-existence. "The great problem of the Danubian people is that they ought to reconcile the uncurtailed national independence with the economic and cultural interests of the common Danubian fate." They had to give up economic autarchy in order to preserve their political and territorial sovereignty: "this is the way which leads the Danubian people from disorder and disintegration to organization and liberty."[8]

Historical and political considerations lead Jaszi to the conclusion that little states were obsolete. He wondered whether the renewal of a set of little states could be lasting or would be a transitional and anachronistic phenomenon in a world of "mammoth-states." The only solution was integration and federation. But neither the pre-national dynastic "supranationalism," nor the post-national socialist internationalism could provide the form and the ideological basis for a new multinational federation. The feasible way was nothing else but a rational and fair compromise between the Danubian nation-states and their nationalisms. And here Jaszi arrived at an essential discovery: no awareness of common interests or a common fate—a Danubian consciousness—existed in the region. Or, at least, only a very weak one could be found among a handful of educated intellectuals. In the Habsburg Monarchy—Jaszi wrote in his pioneering book on the Habsburg Empire's dissolution—"all the nations lived as moral and intellectual strangers to one another. Both the dynastic epic in Austria and the feudal [one] in Hungary were incapable of creating a sufficiently strong and cohesive state idea. What really did fail was a general civic education based on a common civic ethos." Consequently, the first step toward the Danubian Confederation should be the fostering of a regional community consciousness: a Danubian Patriotism.

From the 1920s on, Jaszi was a Danubian patriot first. He never ceased to explain and interpret the new form of regional patriotism. He always argued the compatibility of democracy and nationalism in a multinational region, and to proclaim the advantages of a confederation held together by the force of humanism and rationalism.

Jaszi's conception was based on the rational assumption that freedom and democracy can create and satisfy the need of the community, (i.e. the national community) for self-realization. Democracy and national existence are, however, two different forms of organized human existence. Although compatible, they can not replace each other. Thus the question arises as to whether the voluntary union of the Danubian peoples can ever be attained through democratic means. Prior to the breaking up of the Monarchy, the Hungarians had closed their minds to any internal national autonomy for the nationalities. After the Treaty of Trianon, the Hungarian Left would have been satisfied even with territorial revisions based on ethnic consider-

ations, but by then the leaders of the successor states would not accept this compromise. What power could have created and held together a confederation of this "Babel" of nations? Reason and understanding and equity? Or the will of the great powers? A centralized dictatorship? History seems to suggest that the dictatorial method could establish a Danubian confederation, but this would not be beneficial, while the democratic approach, although beneficial, seems hardly feasible.

In the course of time, Jaszi also recognized that, in addition to the existing international order and irreconcilable nationalism, there were other inherent obstacles and contradictions in the path of a democratic Danubian confederation. Still, he faithfully adhered to this idea up to the end of his life. The gap between political realities and his rational prophecy, was so enormous that in his last writings even he admitted that Danubian peace, democracy and patriotism did not live but in dreams.[9]

Presumably all men of *Realpolitik* and all serious political scientists are of the same opinion. But the historian cannot safely say that the only reality to be coped with is what has been realized or can possibly be realized. Instead, he feels sympathy for Jaszi's last sentence on this point: "there are dreams which are stranger and more realistic than any petty games and scrambles of everyday politics."

EDITORS' NOTES

1 For more details on this subject, see Péter Hanák, *Jászi Oszkár dunai patriotizmusa* [The Danubian Patriotism of Oscar Jaszi] (Budapest: Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1985), especially pp. 34f. For a succinct overview of the topic see Péter Hanák, "A dunatáji közösségtudat ébresztése" [The Awakening of a Common Danubian Awareness] *Mühely* [Workshop], VII, 3 (1981) 4–20. For Hanák's sources see the endnotes to his book, pp. 161–79, and those of his article, pp. 19–20.

2 Hanák, *Jászi Oszkár dunai patriotizmusa*, pp. 39–46.

3 Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* (Budapest, 1912); a more recent (partial) edition, edited and introduced by György Litván, appeared in 1986 (Budapest, Gondolat).

4 For a more detailed discussion of Jaszi's book, see Hanák, *Jászi Oszkár dunai patriotizmusa* pp. 47–55, as well as Litván's introduction to Jaszi's book (see above).

5 Cf. József Galántai's postscript to Jaszi's book: *A Monarchia jövője, a dualizmus bukása és a dunai egyesült államok* [The Future of the Monarchy, the Collapse of Dualism and the United States of Danubia] (Budapest, 1918), pp. 123f.

6 Hanák, *Jászi Oszkár dunai patriotizmusa* pp. 59–67.

7 Jaszi's ideas were outlined in his book *A Monarchia* . . . (see note 5 above). See also Hanák, *Jászi Oszkár dunai patriotizmusa* pp. 67–74.

8 See Hanák's *Jászi Oszkár dunai patriotizmusa*, especially the chapter "A dunai patriotizmus" (pp. 95–108).

9 See the concluding chapter to Hanák's *Jászi Oszkár dunai patriotizmusa*, "Miért nem. . . " (pp. 148–58).

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Jaszi as the Organizational Leader of a Reform Movement

Attila Pók

Judging merely by the method of counting the number of times Oscar Jaszi's name occurs in certain Hungarian books, one can draw conclusions about his historical significance: he is among the key figures in the Hungary of the early twentieth century. Volume 7 of the 10-volume *History of Hungary*[1] contains more references only to Gyula Andrássy Jr., Albert Apponyi, Dezső Bánffy, Gyula Justh, Ferenc Kossuth, and of course Francis Joseph and Prime Minister István Tisza; about the same number to Endre Ady or Mihály Károlyi; and fewer to the Habsburg dynasty in general, to leading Social Democrats, Francis Ferdinand, and countless others. In the 4-volume *Chronology of Hungarian History*[2] Jaszi rates a creditable, middle-ranking ten mentions in a work that spans the whole of Hungarian history.

How did this son of a country doctor come to play so central a role on the crowded stage of Hungarian history between 1900 and 1918?

The Periodical *Huszadik Század* and the Society of Social Sciences

The story begins in the 1880s, in the law faculty of Budapest's Péter Pázmány University of Sciences, and in one or two of the city's salons. Here a circle of friends formed. Jews, Catholics and Protestants from noble, gentry, and bourgeois families alike were among them, but the commonest type had a middle-class or petty-bourgeois background, hailed from areas of Transylvania and Upper Hungary with their sizable minority populations, and had exchanged their native land for the capital. In Budapest, members of this group became disillusioned by the emptiness of the patriotic sloganeering that permeated political and social life. They loathed the tub-thumping nationalism of the day mainly for its intellectual poverty.[3] For the time being, however, they by no means offered a social, national or minority reform programme of their own. At first their main demand

was that social problems should be approached scientifically. Accordingly, the group sought to provide a forum for the scientific analysis of society, and succeeded in doing so in the shape of the periodical *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century), the first, and perhaps the most lasting tribute to Jaszi's talent as an organizer. From the publication's very inception, Jaszi appears to be the ablest editor on the staff who was capable, through the force of his arguments and personality, of asserting his views in the debates that arose.

Of debates, there were plenty. The reason for this was that the people that gathered around the *Huszadik Század* were extremely heterogeneous in political outlook. The group, under Jaszi's intellectual and practical guidance, considered it vital to examine the general laws governing social development in order to arrive at effective solutions to day-to-day issues. Jaszi's own theoretical investigations by 1904–05 had led him to conclude that however day-to-day politics might develop, the future would belong to socialism. The path to this would be through general social reform, through the cleansing of Hungary of the nobles' nationalism. The feudal elements in the country's economy, politics and social affairs would be eliminated through a new kind of socialism, one that eschewed the idea of class struggle but respected patriotism and favoured the unity of mankind.[4] Apart from the columns of the *Huszadik Század*, which served as a forum for such ideas, and for the debates surrounding them, there was the *Társadalomtudományi Társaság* (the Society of Social Sciences) formed in 1901. Jaszi cannot be credited with founding it, but he soon became involved in choosing the themes for the Society's debates, as well as the people to be invited for lectures.

Suffrage and Socialism

Like many members of his generation, Jaszi saw a need, and a realistic chance for, urgent political action, especially during the crisis of 1905–06, which turned political life in Hungary on its head. Having considered the political front-lines—on the one hand the nationalist nobility demanding constitutional change, and, on the other, reformers calling for an expanded franchise and effective social policy—Jaszi's decision was clear: if the Imperial Court in Vienna stood for the latter, it had to be supported. On returning from an extended research and study trip to Paris, he began working towards organizing the League for Universal Suffrage by Secret Ballot. On August 26, 1905, a joint declaration was issued by four organizations of reformers, including the *Huszadik Század* and the Society of Social Sciences. The emphasis was placed on the potential of the suffrage issue to unite the nation. Universal suffrage by secret ballot was declared a *sine qua non* "for our national liberty and material and intellectual prosperity."[5] However, it soon became evident that under the prevailing political cir-

cumstances the struggle for suffrage could not, after all, be elevated above the level of day-to-day politics. As soon as September 20, Jaszi had to admit to a friend of his that the League would collapse and that, in the future, the reformers would have to change their tactics.[6] The new tactics required new organizations and forums. Accordingly, in the same year Jaszi helped to establish the Társadalomtudományi Szabadiskola (Sociological Free School).

Jaszi outlined the reformers' objectives in 1907 in his work *Az új Magyarország felé* (Towards a New Hungary). The traditional political slogans of 1848 and 1867, he argued, no longer provided realistic political platforms. The only way to true independence for Hungary was through land reforms, progressive taxation, universal suffrage by secret ballot, freedom of assembly and the press, the guarantees of minority rights, the abolition of *latifundia*, and the secularization of church property. From such changes, Jaszi believed, constitutional and military independence would follow automatically.[7]

The Independence Party

In rethinking the concept of independence and relating his theoretical notions to daily politics, Jaszi arrived inevitably at the problem of clarifying the relations between the radical movement and the Independence Party. He pointed out in an article in 1910 that the "Independentist," or *kuruc* [*kuruc* refers to the anti-Habsburg freedom fighters of early modern Hungary—ed.] policy had, historically, "taken two directions. One was a wholly constitutional policy of protest against the infringement of constitutional rights, representing the interests of the armed nobility. The other supported the interests of those whom the nobility had harmed . . . and thus was democratic and social . . . The Independence Party had inherited both policy currents from the by-gone era of the *kuruc*."[8] In another article Jaszi called this party "the missing link between *kuruc* Hungary and modern Hungary."[9]

Jaszi was working towards long-term cooperation with the Independence Party people who were inclined towards democratic reforms within the framework of organizing all political forces willing to stand up for universal suffrage. The publication of an "open letter" by Hungarian intellectuals to István Tisza, demanding democratic suffrage,[10] the foundation of the Suffrage League and the Reform Club in 1910, were important milestones of this work. A new, still more important forum for Jaszi's ideas would be the establishment, at the end March 1910, of the daily newspaper, the *Világ* (World).[11]

Freemasonry

The paper was launched by Hungarian freemasons as a forum for "ex-

treme liberalism." Jaszi was not its founder, but was largely responsible for the internal stirrings among the 67 lodges (with 6,000–7,000 active members) that operated in Hungary at the time. Jaszi believed that the freemasons, who in principle eschewed day-to-day politics, could establish a liberal or, more precisely, a freethinking daily paper that proclaimed radical principles.[12] As early as September, 1905, Jaszi had remarked in a letter to a friend that Hungarian freemasonry, influential in so many ways, might come to serve the ideas he was forming: "freemasonry can only regain its old shine if it considers the cause of the working-class struggle for liberty as its own, as it once did the cause of the bourgeoisie . . . Those familiar with the situation believe that by displaying appropriate determination we could soon gain a dominant role and deploy a vast organization behind us."[13]

The plan was put into practice; in 1906 Jaszi and a few of his followers joined the Democracy Lodge, with the momentary aim of gaining financial support for the establishment of the Sociological Free School. But the group, which urged political, scientific and cultural action, had difficulty adjusting to the lodge. Shortly afterwards they were to be found in another lodge, this one named after Martinovics,[14] in which the foremost progressive figures of the day soon gathered. In most cases it was Jaszi and his friends who organized activities aimed at bringing freemasonry and the circle around the Society of Social Sciences and the *Huszadik Század* closer together. These activities took the form of debates on fundamental issues such as the agrarian question, clericalism, or the minority problem. Jaszi and his friends, and their new-found freemason allies also helped to bring into being the Galilei Kör (Galileo Circle), an association of freethinking, socially and progressively-minded students.

Other partners and allies

One of Jaszi's greatest enterprises of the time was the preparation (from about 1906 until its publication in early 1912) of his book on nationalism, the rise of nation states, and the nationality problem.[15] In the course of collecting material for this book, he made much use of his contacts with some leading personalities of Hungary's nationalities. Some of these contacts had been established while Jaszi had been looking for allies in the struggle for universal suffrage. Not only did Jaszi correspond and maintain good personal relationship with these people, but he also helped to publish the articles of minority writers in progressive journals, reviewed their works, contributed to their press, and visited the regions inhabited by nationalities. We know best his relations with Slovak[16] and Rumanian[17] politicians, writers, journalists (e.g. M. Hodza, A. Stefanik, and E. Isac) but some of his correspondence with Serb and Croatian intellectuals has also survived.[18] During this period Jaszi was doing his best to make representatives of the

nationalities allies in the struggle for a truly democratic Hungary. In spite of numerous conflicts, and the final outcome, I don't think the daily *Világ* was exaggerating in the middle of October, 1918, when it proclaimed that Jaszi was the "Hungarian to be trusted by Rumanians, Slovaks, as well as by South Slavs and Czechs. . . "[19]

Jaszi's book, his most important scholarly output of this pre-1918 period, was most enthusiastically received by Endre Ady, the great Hungarian poet of the age. There had been a long-standing mutual respect and friendship between the two for some time. Jaszi was a devoted admirer of Ady's poetry. He considered Ady to be the poet of the Hungarian renewal. Ady, the regular reader of *Huszadik Század*, had always carefully followed Jaszi's activity and defended the radicals in the press against conservative attacks.[20] For Ady, Jaszi's book was the greatest, most daring and most Hungarian deed of the decade. According to Ady, Jaszi gave new content to the corrupted concept of Hungarian liberty by working out a well-grounded, long-term project for the transformation of the country. ". . . his stream assumed riverlike width," wrote Ady about his friend, "the other tiny little blind paths of honest Hungarian intellectuals. . . , now flowed towards him, towards a happy communion. . . "[21] Jaszi's great significance is that he offered a way worth following in a country which seemed to lack any possible way out of its desperate situation. Though, of course, Jaszi cannot be credited with being the organizer of the Hungarian literary renewal, when surveying his organizational activity, we have to keep in mind that modern literature (and of course the new painting and music as well) were Jaszi's natural allies in the struggle for a thoroughgoing renewal of Hungarian society, politics and culture. As Jaszi put in an article on Ady in 1914: "Both Petőfi and Ady are unique among poets of their times: they make the gravest social issues relevant in a most passionate way. They offer programs . . . becoming orators or politicians."[22] Ady reciprocated the compliment in a speech—made in June, 1914, at one of the founding rallies of the Bourgeois Radical Party—by calling Jaszi "his leader."

The Bourgeois Radical Party

The debates that paved the way for this party's establishment took place in the Martinovics Freemasons' Lodge. In these debates, during the final months of 1913, Jaszi argued for the creation of a party. He pointed out that—because the slogans of 1848 and 1867 had been thoroughly compromised, and were shorn of their credibility—there was good chance for the creation of a party structure that would reflect the actual interests of society. Jaszi's arguments came in for plenty of criticism.[23] His critics doubted that the small Hungarian middle class could be organized to champion bourgeois interests in a consistent fashion. They also questioned the likelihood of a bourgeois party ever enlisting the support of the peasant masses. At

most, they said, one could count on a small group with anticlerical, radical opinions.

These doubts were not unfounded. Although the new party soon attracted the most prominent personalities of the bourgeoisie and of the intelligentsia, it never developed into broad political movement. The decisive obstacle, undoubtedly, was the war, yet one cannot duck the question: Did the establishment of the Radical Party strengthen or weaken cohesion among progressives? Was Jaszi right in 1914, or was he right in 1938 when he described the founding of the party as the biggest blunder of his life? For the party was rebuffed in almost every quarter, including Jaszi's comrades-in-arms in the struggle for universal suffrage. With hindsight one can say it would certainly have been more helpful to the immediate cause of electoral reform to have retained the old framework, in view of the fragile unity within the progressive camp. Viewed from a historical perspective, however, the foundation of the party was a milestone in the democratic transformation of public and political life in Hungary. By its very existence the party in time would have provided an impetus for the creation of a modern party structure able to reflect and express the actual interests of Hungarian society.

The Great War, Mihály Károlyi

The use of the conditional tense is appropriate, of course, because before the party could begin functioning the war broke out. Even before hostilities had started, Jaszi wrote that resolving the South Slav question through war could only infect fatally the wounds that the Monarchy had already received: "The call that should be trumpeted with renewed force from the tragic bier of the heir apparent [the assassinated Francis Ferdinand] is that of universal suffrage and a democratic people's state, not armed vengeance."[24] But it only became possible for the progressives to organize against the war once others had recognized the deadly peril as well. On July 17, 1916, Mihály Károlyi founded a new Independence Party with an anti-German, democratic platform that included support for universal suffrage. By this time Jaszi had started to distance himself from the Naumann plan for Central European integration under German influence. Although Károlyi's paper chose precisely this juncture to accuse him of unbridled chauvinism, Jaszi's article in reply called, in fact, for alliance: "Honourable pacifism has two other pillars apart from general democracy: the first is national freedom, and the second commercial freedom. Mihály Károlyi must finally become clear on these matters if he desires a fruitful working atmosphere for his noble endeavors . . . But this requires, above all, a strict stock-taking of his principles and friends."[25] Shortly afterwards, Jaszi sent Károlyi a copy of his 1912 book: *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* (The formation of the Nation States and the Minority Question).

This great theoretical work played a part in transforming Károlyi's political views. Jaszi himself was astonished to learn—at the pacifist congress in Berne at the end of 1917—that Károlyi, when asked by a British politician how he thought the peoples of the Danube and the Balkans might live together in the future, expressed his support for a federal solution.

From 1917 onwards, significant cooperation developed among Jaszi's radicals, the Social Democrats, members of Károlyi's party, and other left-wing forces. There is more than symbolic significance in the fact that Jaszi, who had done such manifold theoretical and practical work to bring the various strands of progressive Hungarian thinking together, drafted the programme for the National Council—the common organization of the Social Democratic, Independence and Bourgeois Radical Parties—on October 25, 1918, opening a new, albeit short chapter in Hungarian history.[26]

I have considered Jaszi's organizational activity in the Hungarian progressive movement up until October, 1918. This was not a movement that slowly spread or steadily gained greater influence, but it undertook a series of greater or lesser, more-or-less successful actions. Jaszi's greatness as an organizer lay precisely in his ability to adapt the concept of a national democratic state—which he had carefully matured in theory—to prevailing circumstances. He was also able to recognize opportunities for potential alliances, and to put them to use when it was possible. He was not a political manager eager to score day-to-day successes, but was one who matched the rational, ethical content of his political concepts with an equally rational and ethical search for a way to realize them. His rational expectations were often belied by history, but through his great abilities and energy as an organizer, his reputation as a scholar and, last but not by any means least, his moral integrity, he became the central figure of the Hungarian progressive camp. Most of the achievements of the Hungarian progressive movement in the early part of this century were in some way connected to his name.

NOTES

1 Péter Hanák (editor in chief) and Ferenc Mucsi (editor), *Magyarország története, 1890–1918* [A History of Hungary, 1890–1918] (Budapest, 1978).

2 Kálmán Benda (ed.), *Magyarország történeti kronológiája* [A Historical Chronology of Hungary] I–IV (Budapest, 1981–82).

3 György Litván and László Szücs (eds.), *A szociológia első magyar műhelye. A Huszadik Század köre* [The First Hungarian Workshop of Sociology. The Circle of the Review Twentieth Century] I-II, (Budapest, 1973), vol. I, pp. 6–12; and Péter Hanák. *Jászi Oszkár dunai patriotizmusa* [Oszkár Jászi's Danubian Patriotism] (Budapest, 1985), pp. 14–16.

4 Cf. Jaszi's study "Szocializmus és hazafiság," [Socialism and Patriotism] *Huszadik Század* [Twentieth Century] VI, I (1905) 11, republished in György Litván and

János F. Varga (eds). *Jászi Oszkár publicisztikája* [Oszkár Jászi's Publicism] (Budapest, 1982), pp. 49–61, and his letter to Ervin Szabó of 16 October 1904 in György Litván and László Szücs (eds.), *Szabó Ervin levelezése, 1893–1904* [Ervin Szabó's Correspondence, 1893–1904] (Budapest, 1977), pp. 577–583.

5 The appeal was published in *Népszava* [People's Word], 27 August 1905, and *Huszadik Század* VI 2 (1905), 249–251.

6 In György Litván and János Varga (eds.), *Jászi Oszkár válogatott művei. Levelek.* [Oszkár Jászi's Selected Works. Letters] Manuscript, available at the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

7 *Huszadik Század*, VIII (1907) 1–10, republished in *Jászi Oszkár publicisztikája* pp. 89–106.

8 "Justh Gyula," *Világ* [World], 5 June 1910, republished in *Jászi Oszkár publicisztikája*, pp. 470–474.

9 Quoted by György Litván in *Magyar gondolat—szabad gondolat* [Hungarian Thought—Free Thought] (Budapest, 1978), p. 96.

10 *Világ*, 10 April 1910.

11 On the history of the *Világ* see György Litván, "A Világ 1910–1926," [(The Világ /World/], in *Világ, 1910. III. 30—1926 IV. 30. Repertorium* [The Világ . . . a Repertory] (Budapest, 1984).

12 On freemasonry in Hungary see Zsuzsa L. Nagy, *Szabad-kőművesség a XX. században* [Freemasonry in the 20th Century] (Budapest, 1977). For further literature see the notes of this book.

13 Jaszi's letter to Bódog Somló of 27 September 1905 in *Jászi Oszkár válogatott művei, cit.*

14 Philosopher Ignác Martinovics (1755–95) was the leader of the struggle for an independent and republican Hungary during the French revolutionary era (ed.). On the Martinovics Lodge see György Fukász, "Szabadkőművesség, radikalizmus és szocializmus az 1918 előtti Magyarországon: A Martinovics-páholy története" [Freemasonry, Radicalism and Socialism in Pre-1918 Hungary: The History of the Martinovics Lodge] *Párttörténeti Közlemények* [Communications on the History of the Party] VII, No. 2 (1961), 55–84.

15 *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* [The Formation of Nation States and the Minority Question] (Budapest, 1912).

16 László Szarka, "Jászi Oszkár szlovák kapcsolatai" [Oscar Jaszi's Slovak Connections]. Manuscript, available at the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

17 Erzsébet Vezér, "Emil Isac és a magyar progresszió. Levelezése Jászi Oszkárral" [Emil Isac and the Hungarian Progressives: His Correspondence with Oszkár Jászi], *Korunk* [Our Age] XXXVII No. 8 (August, 1978), 642–643.

18 In the Manuscript Collection of the National Széchényi Library in Budapest, Fond 114/9, 22, 23.

19 Lajos Bíró, "A Dunai Egyesült Államok, Jászi Oszkár új könyve" [The Danubian United States. Oscar Jaszi's New Book] *Világ*, 13 October 1918.

20 For Ady's political views see Tibor Erényi, "Ady, a szociáldemokrácia és a szocializmus" [Ady, Social Democracy and Socialism] in Tibor Erényi, *Szocializmus a századelőn* [Early Twentieth Century Socialism] (Budapest, 1979), pp. 260–342 and the literature in the notes of this study.

21 Endre Ady, "Jászi Oszkár könyve" [Oscar Jaszi's Book] *Nyugat* [West] 16 May 1916. Republished in József Láng and Erzsébet Vezér (eds.), *Ady Endre összes prózai művei* [Endre Ady's Collected Prose] (Budapest, 1973), pp. 191–194.

22 Oszkár Jászi, "Egy verseskönyvről" [On a Book of Poems] *Világ*, 15 February 1914. The article is analysed by András Veres, "Jászi Oszkár 1919 előtti munkásságának megitéléséhez" [On the Evaluation of Oscar Jaszi's pre-1919 Activity] *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények* [Journal of Literary History] LXXIX, Nos. 5–6 (1975), 633–634.

23 The minutes of the debates in the Martinovics Lodge on 15 and 31 October 1913 are in the Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archives], P 1123.

24 "Háború vagy béke" [War or Peace] *Világ*, 19 July 1914. Republished in *Jászi Oszkár publicisztikája*, pp. 224–225.

25 "Csinálják már az új háborút" [The New War is in the Making] *Világ*, 29 October 1916. Republished in *Jászi Oszkár publicisztikája*, pp. 250–251.

26 Another area of wartime organization by the progressives in which Jaszi played an important part was the work of the Society of Social Sciences. Particularly important was the debate within this society in the spring of 1918 on conservative and progressive idealism. At a critical juncture in history, this debate made a very small, but extremely valuable group among the young Hungarian intelligentsia, the Vasárnapi Kör (Sunday circle) conscious of its progressive commitment. For György Lukács and his companions sensed the troubles that weighed on Hungarian society at the time just as much as the politically active progressive groups. But in this debate Lukács and his friends – instead of seeking the answer in the transformation of political, economic, social and cultural institutions – sought it in a moral transformation of the individual, and considered this the point of departure. The debate in the Society of Social Sciences helped to clarify the fact that at this historical moment, in spite of their disputes, the "progressive idealists" and the "progressive materialists" belonged in one camp.

On the Sunday Circle see Zoltán Novák. *A Vasárnapi Társaság* [The Sunday Society] (Budapest, 1979); Éva Karádi and Erzsébet Vezér (eds.) *A Vasárnapi Kör* [The Sunday Circle] (Budapest, 1980).

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The Reaction of Hungary's German Minorities to Oscar Jaszi's Plan for an "Eastern Switzerland"*

Thomas Spira

On October 26, 1918, the newly-formed Hungarian National Council replaced the defunct royal government and soon proclaimed its programme for a reconstituted Hungary. This seven-point directive was the work of Oscar (Oszkár) Jaszi, leader of the Radical Bourgeois Party, and soon to be minister of nationalities in the Hungarian "People's Republic" under the presidency of Count Mihály Károlyi, wartime leader of the radical section of the pacifist Independence Party.[1] The Károlyi government was aware of Hungary's precarious situation after the defeat of the Central Powers. The Austro-Hungarian dualist partnership was dead. Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (the future Yugoslavia), the new and enlarged states that materialized from the ruins of the Habsburg Monarchy, had detached the bulk of Hungary's non-Magyar inhabitants even before the fighting had stopped. Károlyi and Jaszi hoped that it might still be possible to recover some of these territorial and human losses before the impending peace treaties ratified this situation. The two statesmen proposed to transform the hitherto Magyar-dominated Hungarian state into a voluntary federation consisting of autonomous nationalities governed by liberal principles – an East Central European replica of the Swiss Confederation – or a virtual "Eastern Switzerland."[2] This plan was in harmony with Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, a peace proposal that the American president presented to the joint session of the two Houses of Congress on January 8, 1918. Point 10 stipulated that "The peoples of Austria-Hungary . . . be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."[3] Jaszi agreed that the destiny of Hungary's non-Magyar nationalities "had to be settled on the basis of the Wilson Principles."[4] This paper investigates why Hungary's German-speaking people, often referred to as Swabians, refused to accept the Károlyi regime's far-reaching cultural and administrative autonomy offers, or, as Jaszi expressed it, to accept an

"endeavor to democratize Hungary and to remold the old feudal state into a confederation of free nations."[5] The Germans' reluctance to cooperate with Károlyi's government may be ascribed to the socialist tinge of the new regime, the social, religious and political arch-conservatism of the predominantly rural Swabians, and Hungary's Magyar-oriented minority policies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In 1910, Hungary's German-speaking citizens totaled about 2,037,000 out of the country's population of nearly 21 million.[6] The mainly Protestant Transylvanian Germans (Saxons) numbered about 234,000; the largely Roman Catholic Swabians numbered about 1,667,000.[7] By the early 20th century the Saxons had become urbanized, politicized, and many were well-educated. Most Swabians, however, clung to their ancestral German peasant culture. Swabian majorities lived in 330 small villages and a few towns scattered throughout Hungary. Many communities were clustered in strategically insecure areas: in West Hungary adjoining Austria, surrounding Budapest, and next to the Serbian (later Yugoslav) frontier.[8] While Hungary was part of the powerful Dual Monarchy, the Germans' distribution pattern did not matter. But when Hungary became a small and vulnerable independent state after World War I, the presence of these enclaves in sensitive regions became a source of concern and set the tone for a cautious Hungarian minority policy.

At first, Hungary treated the non-Magyars evenhandedly. The 1867 Compromise had granted the country equal partnership in the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, and for the first time since the Middle Ages, the Magyars could formulate domestic policy without interference from Vienna. The Nationality Law of 1868 was a liberal document that granted Hungary's non-Magyar citizens the right to establish elementary and middle schools in their mother tongue, permitted a limited number of ethnic higher institutions, national churches, use of the vernacular in rural administration and opportunities for non-Magyar cultural development.[9] However, these benevolent measures failed to stand the test of time. In the fifty years preceding World War I, the Magyar public and the governments grew increasingly more nationalistic, partially in response to the rising consciousness of Hungary's non-Magyars. During these decades, Hungary's minorities, especially the Swabians, lost most of their indigenous cultural facilities.[10] By war's end in 1918, the formerly well-organized German-language village school system had virtually ceased to exist.

The rural Swabians' ultra-conservative culture centered around churches and clerically-dominated elementary village schools. The Swabian literacy rate of 82 percent was the highest in Hungary,[11] yet few of these Swabian villagers desired to expose their children to higher education or embark them on professional careers in Hungary's Magyar urban centers. They distrusted and disliked such "progressives" as liberals, socialists and com-

munists, and particularly Jews. Before World War I, the Swabians were the only non-politicized ethnic group in Hungary, with the possible exception of the Ruthenes. They voted for Magyar or Magyarized conservatively-minded Christians to represent them in the Hungarian Parliament. They did, however, acquire a self-appointed informal leader in the person of Dr. Jakob Bleyer, professor of philology at the University of Budapest. Bleyer's humble peasant origins in the Bácska region of southern Hungary and ultraconservative Roman Catholic credentials gained the confidence and support of the Swabian peasantry.

Bleyer preached a simple homily of German cultural nationalism, dynastic Habsburg loyalism and traditional Hungarian patriotism. Bleyer and his Swabian supporters saw no contradiction between simultaneous devotion to the German cultural *Nation* (the Habsburg Emperor-King was a German) and loyalty to the Hungarian fatherland representing the political state. Bleyer explained these complex issues in terms the average Swabian villager could easily comprehend. The Hungarian state, he wrote during World War I, had every right to assimilate the ethnic intelligentsias into the Magyar lingual and cultural stream, provided the government preserved the sanctity and high quality of the German-language rural school system. In the urban centers, however, the fusion of the ethnic intelligentsia into the Magyar ethos was inevitable. Particularly for this reason German culture had to remain pure in the Swabian rural environment. To Bleyer, secession from the Hungarian fatherland or autonomy on the basis of ethnic peculiarities was tantamount to treason. He maintained these views firmly throughout the brief postwar period leading to the 28 June 1919 Treaty of Trianon.[12] By then, nearly all of Hungary's ethnic minorities, including the Saxons of Transylvania, had seceded and joined one or the other of the fledgling successor states.

Since 1908, Jaszi had been considering how to remedy the real or alleged injustices the Magyars inflicted on Hungary's non-Magyar minorities. At that time, he was still uncertain how exactly to counteract the centrifugal forces imperiling polyethnic states. He criticized the Magyar nationalists for refusing to grant the non-Magyars a more favourable franchise. It was untrue, Jaszi asserted, that if given the opportunity these peoples would betray the Hungarian state. Peasants of all nationalities had much more in common with each other than Magyar peasants with Magyar officials. Jaszi accused the Magyar ruling classes of keeping national animosities alive for selfish reasons.[13] In a real democracy, he maintained, "the loyalty of the ethnic minorities is ensured by letting them have their legal rights and permitting them to succeed in their aspirations."[14]

Within four years, Jaszi had systematized his thinking on the grievances suffered by Hungary's nationalities. He classed minority violations into three principal categories: (1) administrative and judicial grievances; (2)

economic grievances; and (3) educational and other cultural grievances.[15] Because the heterogeneity of Hungary's population confounded him, a concrete, universal solution still eluded Jaszi. Hungary's nationalities differed culturally, historically and numerically. He considered certain improvements mandatory—in Hungary's schools, for example, in the public administration and in jurisprudence. Moreover, sooner or later the government would have to allow the nationalities to use their languages and culture.[16]

By 1918, Jaszi's ideas on how to solve the nationality question had matured. In March of that year, he wanted to " liberate the nationalities from the assimilationist drill that is unable to Magyarize effectively but which keeps our ethnic fellow citizens in an eternal state of dependency, and makes bitter enemies of them."[17] To remedy these evils involved invoking Point 8 of Jaszi's National Bourgeois Radical Party programme: "The creation of peace with the nationalities, in order to ensure the unity and flowering of the Hungarian state. Non-Magyar citizens must have all their legal lingual and cultural demands satisfied in the spirit of the Deák and Eötvös Nationality laws [of 1868]."[18] Jaszi would most likely have agreed with Bleyer that adequate minority-language schools formed the bulwark of non-Magyar privileges.[19] Unlike Bleyer, however, Jaszi wanted to establish limited minority language instruction in Hungary's middle schools, academies and universities.[20]

Near war's end, Jaszi published his definitive plan for a Danubian confederation.[21] The new political-economic unit would include the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in addition to the various Danubian Balkan states. Jaszi's scheme may be summarized as follows. The dual monarchy would be replaced by a pentarchy, a polity consisting of one sovereign Magyar state (Hungary); one German state (Austria with its German possessions only); and three Slavic states (composed of Czechs, Poles and Illyrians or South Slavs). The new commonwealth would have a common defence and foreign policy, and a customs union would make it economically viable. Each national unit would include minority populations of varying size and composition. Most of these ethnic groups would be related to the nationality dominating one or more of the states. For practical reasons alone, member states would not persecute each others' ethnic minorities, whose rights would also be protected by laws and constitutional arrangements. Disputes would be adjudicated by an inter-state arbitration board and by a hereditary dynastic ruler, presumably a Habsburg.[22]

Jaszi's book did not explain how ethnic autonomy would be practiced within each unit. He did, however, criticize Austrian Chancellor Karl Renner for opposing the division of the Austrian Empire into four autonomous units based on their populations' language differences. Jaszi believed that autonomy would alleviate minority grievances in the Austrian part of the monarchy, whose four major peoples—the Czechs, Poles, Germans and

South Slavs, had the expertise to establish and maintain viable autonomous governments.[23] Jaszi cited the excellence of Louis Kossuth's 1860 nationality plan formulated in exile for the reconstruction of the Austrian monarchy. Although Kossuth's eight-point plan never used the word "autonomy,"[24] many of these ideas eventually cropped up in Jaszi's autonomy schemes while Jaszi was serving as Károlyi's minister of nationalities.

Jaszi soon had the opportunity to translate his nationality theories into action. On November 16, 1918, the Károlyi regime proclaimed a republic in Hungary. Jaszi immediately initiated action to prevent or reverse the defection of Hungary's non-Magyar nationalities by offering each of them the opportunity to become administratively autonomous units in a federated Hungary. He was too late. On October 12, the Rumanian National Party, composed of Hungarian-Rumanian politicians, had opted for self-determination and forbade Hungary to represent Rumanians at the impending peace conference. By December 1, Hungary's Rumanians formally attached Transylvania and the Bánát of Temesvár to the Rumanian Kingdom. On October 29, Croatia joined the newly constituted Yugoslav National Council and participated in proclaiming Yugoslav independence. On October 30, the Slovak National Council unified Slovakia (Felvidék) with the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia. The Ruthenes of Kárpátalja (Ruthenia) followed suit shortly thereafter.[25] On January 2, 1919, the Saxons of Transylvania formally joined their Rumanian fellow citizens in the Kingdom of Rumania. The Swabians of southern Hungary (Bácska) put up no resistance when Yugoslavia overran their territories.[26]

By the end of 1918, the Swabians living in Hungary remained the only sizable non-Magyar group to remain loyal to Hungary. Only the approximately 300,000-strong Swabian enclave adjacent to the Austrian frontier in West Hungary still had the opportunity to secede.[27] Numerous complex factors persuaded these Germans to remain with Hungary, although their minds were by no means made up. Strong secessionist sentiments flared periodically in response to specific incidents and shifting economic and political conditions.[28]

In the closing days of the war, Bleyer tried to guide Hungary's Swabians through the difficult days ahead. At heart a Hungarian patriot, he wanted to prevent West Hungary's secession to Austria, remedy the loss of southern Hungary to Yugoslavia, and insulate his people against the persuasive and sophisticated secessionist rhetoric of his rival for the leadership of Hungary's Germans, Transylvanian Saxon Rudolf Brandsch.[29] The Bleyer-Brandsch leadership struggle profoundly influenced not only the unity of Hungary's Germans but the relationship of Bleyer's Swabians with the Károlyi regime and later governments. The newspaper *Neue Post*, edited by Canon Johannes Huber, a close Bleyer collaborator, served as Bleyer's principal propaganda forum. In an October 24 editorial, Bleyer questioned

Brandsch's credentials to represent the Swabians. In his view, Brandsch's demands exceeded the bounds of propriety, and ignored Magyar sensibilities. In contrast, he pointed out, the Swabians desired a package containing cultural, political, administrative, and economic reform short of autonomy. But the most important task was the restoration of German elementary schools. Bleyer insisted, however, that all decisions would have to be reached in perfect amity with the Magyars.[30]

Bleyer was determined to outmaneuver his Saxon adversary. On November 1 Bleyer, with the support of sixteen other Swabian intellectuals, founded and became the leader of the political organization *Deutschungarischer Volksrat*. The Party gained the immediate support and blessings of the newly installed Károlyi regime.[31] Bleyer apparently enjoyed the government's confidence from the start because of his well-known pro-Magyar stance before and during the war, and because only a few days earlier, Huber had pleaded with Swabians languishing under Yugoslav occupation in southern Hungary to foil enemy attempts to annex the region. In his view, the Slavs constituted a mortal danger to Germans.[32] Such attitudes linked Bleyer's Swabians with the new government in a patriotic cause against common foes. As a gesture of good will, the government permitted Bleyer to be the first to announce the formation of his party and reveal its programme. The Swabians, Bleyer pledged, would defend Hungary's territorial integrity and not demand any rights that Hungary's other non-Magyars did not possess. Moreover, the Swabians had no desire for autonomy, he declared.[33] A few days later, Huber loosed a broadside that virtually accused Brandsch of plotting secession. Huber claimed that the Saxon leader considered the Magyar people as aliens, and wanted to promote a frigid, even hostile, relationship with them.[34]

The fear that Hungary's Swabians might desert to Brandsch prompted Bleyer to chart a more defiant course with the government, lest he be accused of being a collaborator. As a result, hearty relations barely survived the first week of Károlyi's tenure in office. On November 8, Huber rejoiced that the Swabians' national consciousness had been finally aroused. After being on the edge of national oblivion, Huber asserted, the Swabians demanded the revival of their German language.[35] The day before, Bleyer jolted Jaszi with a revised version of his *Volksrat* inaugural speech. In a November 7 Budapest declaration to the *Volksrat*, Bleyer informed the audience that he had just transmitted a copy of an appended Point 4 of his November 3 three point programme to Jaszi: "Our pledge of allegiance to the political Hungarian state stands only so long as it is not limited to the Magyar people alone, and only if the integrity of the Hungarian state can be maintained in its entirety. In all other instances we reserve the right of unconditional self-determination." Bleyer also firmed up an earlier demand: "We expect for German-Hungarians all those rights in politics, adminis-

tration, justice, economics, education and cultural life which the newly constituted Hungary has already vouchsafed for all its other non-Magyar peoples."[36]

The speech might have prevented many lukewarm Bleyer supporters from deserting to Brandsch, and it might have rescued Bleyer's credibility as a vigorous Swabian leader; but the altered scenario for would-be Magyar-Swabian cooperation dismayed the Károlyi government and injured the Swabian cause. In effect, Bleyer was threatening the Károlyi regime in its most difficult hour. Hungary's minorities were deserting in droves, and the Entente was ready to invade Hungary. On one hand, Bleyer was professing fidelity to Hungary and swearing solidarity with the Magyars, while on the other hand he seemed to be undermining the country's security by demanding the right of Swabians to exercise self-determination. The Swabian cause might have been better served had Bleyer forthrightly called for autonomy, an arrangement Jaszi was prepared to grant at that time. Although, in his view, every people had the legal and moral right to demand self-determination, shortly after war's end, "self-determination" served as a euphemism for "secession." Claiming such a privilege at that particular moment was a grave error. In vain did Franz Bonitz, a Bleyer colleague in the *Volksrat*, urge Swabians to "march shoulder to shoulder with Magyardom," because simultaneously he also advocated "a united [German] front [to be demonstrated] to the public both at home and abroad, with respect to our cultural, linguistic, political and economic aspirations."[37]

Bleyer's political instincts regarding Brandsch's quest for the leadership of Hungary's Germans had been sound. On November 10, the Saxon leader founded a rival organization, the *Deutscher Volksrat für Ungarn* (*DVU*). Unlike Bleyer, Brandsch was a liberal with a large following among Transylvanian Saxons and Hungarian-Swabian urban working classes and miners. The *DVU* boasted several influential Social Democrats among its leaders, such as the Jewish Heinrich Kalmár and the Swabian Viktor Knaller. Here was a paradox. The ultra-conservative Bleyer was willing to cooperate with the leftist Károlyi, whereas the ideologically congenial Brandsch wanted to wrest as many concessions from the hard-pressed Károlyi as possible. All the while he was secretly negotiating with the Rumanians. The *DVU* demanded cultural autonomy and the right to exercise self-determination, and refused to swear unconditional allegiance to Hungary. Its leaders merely pledged to maintain Hungary's territorial integrity as long as possible.[38]

Stiffened Swabian resolve, fears of Saxon defection, and mounting signs of Austrian annexationist designs in West Hungary (Moson, Sopron and Vas counties) with its sizable German population[39] prompted Jaszi to promulgate a flood of regulations to prove the Hungarian government's honourable intentions to the non-Magyar minorities. On November 16, Magyar-language instruction terminated in the first two elementary school grades in

predominantly German-speaking regions. The *Neue Post* rejoiced. Apparently, the new government meant to deal honourably with Swabians after all, and this was a good omen for the future. In an emotional outburst, Bleyer characterized his sentiments for Hungary as love for mother, those for Germandom as love for father. This easily-won victory prompted new demands. On November 20, the *Volksrat* clamored for exclusively German schools in Swabian districts, and demanded German as an official language in the courts and in the administration of predominantly Swabian areas. The *Volksrat* also wanted non-Germans barred from interfering in Swabian affairs. As the *Neue Post* expressed it, "we desire to be represented in public life only by men who stand close to us."[40]

Hungary's diplomatic and military position deteriorated steadily, yet Bleyer and his associates maintained their patriotic air. They steadfastly urged West Hungarians to remain loyal to Hungary in the face of increasing Austrian efforts to annex West Hungary's Germans. They cautioned fellow Swabians that the loss of a quarter-million Germans to Austria would weaken the German cause in Hungary, because the few remaining Swabians would be cut off from the German-speaking world.[41] The government and the Magyar public, however, believed that the Bleyer group was less interested in maintaining Hungary's territorial integrity than in preserving German influence in Hungary.

In order to purchase Swabian loyalty, Minister of Education and Religion, Márton Lovászy, offered more concessions. As of November 21, German would become the mandatory language of instruction in the first two grades of Swabian elementary schools. Magyar would be taught as a subject, but only in subsequent years. The regulation would apply not only in state-sponsored schools, but be valid in church-run institutions as well.[42] This was a major concession. Nearly six out of seven Swabian schools were confessional institutions. Normally, legislation involving state schools had minimal impact on Swabian education, because church institutions were not obliged to obey. Three days later, Lovászy promised Bleyer additional reforms. German instruction would be provided in Swabian kindergartens, and in all Magyar middle schools located in Swabian-inhabited areas.[43] Lovászy's generosity was an empty gesture, however. All Swabian schools suffered from a critical shortage of teachers, and German instructors and textbooks in particular were in short supply.[44]

Swabian disillusionment with Károlyi's regime and Jaszi's minority policies became acute by year's end. The new school laws were not being enforced. The Swabians could not be certain whether the Károlyi government lacked the means or the desire to implement them in any meaningful way. Soon complaints began filtering into *Volksrat* headquarters that local officials were violating the education ordinances.[45] Even under normal peacetime conditions, village and county officials enjoyed considerable freedom

in the exercise of their authority, and frequently ignored directives from the central government. In the chaotic postwar environment, conservative functionaries, many of them patriotic Magyar refugees from the successor states, or fervent ethnic proselytes, assumed greater importance and influence than ever before.[46] Pointing to the alleged perfidy of the seceded ethnic minorities, these officials frequently obstructed the Károlyi regime's attempts to introduce German instruction in the schools. Károlyi and Jaszi could claim with some justification that they had sincerely endeavoured to serve the cultural needs of the Swabian minority. It was not their fault if local and church authorities failed to comply with the central government's directives.

The Swabians became even more disillusioned when they discovered that the new regulations regarding the adoption of German in their schools were invalid, because Count Albert Apponyi's restrictive 1907 minority school law was never repealed.[47] Despite Károlyi's and Jaszi's good intentions, the Swabians were worse off now than before. Magyar instruction was curtailed for them, while an effective German education seemed barred.[48] Friedrich Lang, a Bleyer follower, explained how this situation affected Swabian youngsters. Swabian children attending Magyar schools were merely taught to parrot Magyar phrases without gaining the benefit of true comprehension, Lang asserted. This malpractice caused many children to become functionally illiterate, and, in addition, they frequently forgot their German mother tongue.[49]

In view of these disappointing developments, the era of Magyar-Swabian good feelings rapidly terminated. On December 27, Géza Zsombor, a Magyarized Swabian of Jaszi's radical party, announced in Sopron that unless West Hungary was granted immediate autonomy, the Swabians would proclaim an independent German republic. The crisis deepened when, a few days later, Brandsch's Saxons defected to Rumania.[50] Bleyer could not resist gloating. In an open letter addressed to Jaszi he noted that Jaszi's excessively permissive nationality policy had led to disaster, whereas his own views had been vindicated. "Whose judgment on the Brandsch crowd had been more accurate, yours or mine?" Bleyer taunted.[51] Bleyer had few reasons for rejoicing. Despite valiant efforts to discredit Brandsch and the *DVU* with Hungary's German public, Bleyer only partially succeeded. Hungary's rural Swabians stuck to him. Many leftist Swabians abandoned the *DVU*, remained in Hungary and supported the Károlyi regime, but disliked Bleyer and were in turn ostracized by him.[52]

The Saxon desertion embarrassed Károlyi and cast serious doubt on the viability of Jaszi's approach to solving Hungary's nationality problems. If Hungary's non-Magyars were indeed patriotic Hungarians as Jaszi claimed, then why did the ideologically compatible Saxons desert so lightly? Could Jaszi hope to persuade the arch-conservative, ideologically hostile Bleyer

and his Swabians, Hungary's sole remaining Germans, to accept terms that the far more congenial Saxons had rejected? This turn of events propelled both the government and Bleyer to pursue defensive, opportunistic tactics. Károlyi no longer trusted the Swabians, and Jaszi soon became disillusioned with them as well. For now, he stuck to his earlier nationality programme. Both men still wished to introduce fundamental social and economic reform to benefit Hungary's remaining German-speaking citizens. But these measures would have to be entrusted only to ideologically dependable individuals.[53] The thoroughly isolated Bleyer, now the sole leader of a vastly shrunken Swabian following that lacked an effective intelligentsia, wished to salvage from the ruins some ethnic privileges that might preserve the unique Christian and ultra-conservative nature of Swabian rural society. Bleyer's and Jaszi's clashing objectives bred the distrust and eventual enmity that poisoned relations between Bleyer's *Volksrat* and the Károlyi government. In turn, this impasse rendered the Jaszi formula for obtaining ethnic peace in Hungary impossible to achieve.

To many Magyars, Brandsch's betrayal was proof positive that all Germans were opportunists and potential traitors, and that Jaszi had bungled by negotiating with them.[54] The politically inexperienced *Volksrat* mistakenly assumed, however, that with Brandsch gone, the remaining Swabians' relatively moderate demands would not be honored. Bleyer's followers hinted that unless the government met their claims in full, they too might threaten secession. On January 11, 1919, the *Volksrat* added German middle schools and teacher academies to its list of demands, and insisted that Hungary provide Swabians with German primary education even in predominantly Magyar-speaking areas.[55] On January 20, Swabians in Sopron again demonstrated for immediate autonomy, otherwise, they threatened, West Hungarians would secede and either proclaim an independent German republic or join Austria.

The hard-pressed Károlyi government thereupon commissioned several conservative and moderate Germans, notably Peter Jekel, Guido Gündisch, and Otto Herzog, to draft a new statute that would grant Swabians extraordinary privileges. However, Károlyi and Jaszi took no chances. A Magyar, Ödön Berinkey, and the Jewish Heinrich Kalmár participated in the preparation of the document, and the final draft underwent modification by Jaszi before being approved by the Ministerial Council. By then, the Cabinet had serious misgivings about the wisdom of dispensing constitutional largesse to non-Magyars, and Jaszi protested that the Swabians did not merit special consideration.

Despite growing reservations in government circles regarding special treatment for minorities, Law VI of January 29 granted cultural and political autonomy to Swabians in Hungary's predominantly German-speaking areas. This included control over administration, justice, education and

religion. Political authority was vested in *Deutschwestungarn* (German West Hungary), although Hungary's entire Swabian community became a legally distinct corporate body. In addition, the Swabians obtained a national assembly, a German ministry in the cabinet, district councils, and commissioners. János Junker became Minister of German Affairs, and Géza Zsombor emerged as governor of the autonomous district.

After this, Jaszi's active involvement in the Károlyi regime terminated. Jaszi realized that granting the minorities special privileges sounded good on paper, but that translating theory into practice had not produced a solution of the nationality question, and might even have caused the alienation of some of the minorities.[56] Even this generous new autonomy law failed to satisfy Swabian aspirations. Bleyer and his supporters considered the regulation a government tactic designed to discourage further German defections, as in West Hungary, and to lure back Swabians and others who had already seceded, as in southern Hungary and Transylvania. Although the concessions were generous, the manner of their enactment and application displeased the *Volksrat* and hence sharpened rather than soothed Magyar-Swabian conflicts. Bleyer was offended, for example, because Kalmár, Károlyi's State Secretary for German Affairs, had a major share in drafting the autonomy statute. Bleyer objected no less to Kalmár's Judaism and ideological incompatibility than to the government's alleged impudence in foisting an "outsider" on the Swabians. A similar stigma clung to Berinkey, another non-Swabian architect of the law. Bleyer's followers insisted that only Christian Swabians could be involved in their new jurisdiction, and complained strenuously when Zsombor, an alleged Magyar, became governor of *Deutschwestungarn*. Bleyer scorned the new autonomy law because it conflicted with his own views on the meaning of loyalty to the Hungarian nation. In his opinion, Hungary's destiny had to be resolved by the peace conference, hence Swabian autonomy was premature. Finally, Bleyer declared, cultural autonomy was the most far-reaching concession the Swabians ought to accept.[57]

Following these major disagreements, Magyar-Swabian relations reached a breaking point. The *Neue Post* accused Károlyi of trying to sabotage his own autonomy statute, and of attempting to subvert Swabians by introducing Social Democratic officials and ideas into their midst.[58] An editorial condemned Minister of Education Zsigmond Kúnfi for having forbidden religious instruction in the schools, and pilloried him for planning to nationalize education. This would enable the government to assume ideological control over the education of Swabian youth, the newspaper charged.[59] The Swabian anti-government press campaign raged with great intensity, when Bleyer unexpectedly resigned from the *Volksrat* and terminated all contact with the Károlyi regime. On March 12, the *Neue Post* hinted that secession might be the only plausible alternative Swabians had in West

Hungary, now that the government had mismanaged the autonomy decree. The newspaper complained that home rule had not brought economic security to West Hungary. Swabians there needed Austrian markets for selling their produce, whereas Swabian industrial workers were used to being employed in well-paying jobs in Lower Austria. The *Neue Post* pleaded with the government to reverse its decision to isolate Austria from Hungary by erecting trade barriers, or by imposing excessively onerous criteria in the granting of border passes to Swabians. Moreover, the newspaper declared, autonomy was unworkable because Zsombor staffed his office exclusively with fellow Magyars and Magyarized Swabian radicals.[60]

In the final weeks of Károlyi's incumbency, secessionist activities increased in frequency and intensity on both sides of the Austro-Hungarian border. Austrian agitators infiltrated West Hungary in the guise of private citizens. Oscar Charmant, Hungary's envoy in Vienna, identified the Vienna-based *Fremdenblatt* as the chief fomenter of anti-Magyar propaganda in West Hungary. The Austrian government refused to curb the extremists, particularly since the Germans of West Hungary appeared to favour Austrian intervention. For example, the mayor of Fürstenfeld, an East Austrian town, pursued his pro-Austrian annexationist campaign with undisguised enthusiasm. Now that Bleyer's moderating influence was gone, all thoughts of compromise had ceased. On March 21, the Károlyi regime fell, destroyed by the combined weight of a multitude of issues, one of which was its inability to resolve the Swabian ethnic minority crisis.

When Jaszi conceded several years later that creating a Danubian "Eastern Switzerland" had been premature and would have to await a time when both nationalism and communism had disappeared as primary social forces from the world scene, he was still hoping for the eventual fulfillment of his dreams.[61] The behaviour of Saxons and Swabians certainly confirmed the accuracy of Jaszi's judgment that nationalism played a major role in spoiling the blueprints for a supranational federation of autonomous states. As the war ended, the Swabians and Saxons were both swept by mighty nationalistic currents. With the Saxons, nationalism had reached a fully mature state, overruling both ideological and patriotic considerations. The Saxons ignored their liberalism and their long-standing affiliation with the Hungarian nation and state because they were convinced that even under conservative Rumanian rule they would still be able to preserve their German national essence. Jaszi had no success with the Swabians because, although they had been exposed to the same nationalistic tide as the Saxons, they had not yet matured sufficiently as a people to be a nation. Had the Swabians reached the nationalistic stage of the Saxons, they probably would not have hesitated to accept the far reaching autonomy package even from a donor they despised, and whom they considered politically, socially and ideologically reprehensible. But the Swabians did mind that the views

of their alien masters clashed with the standards they revered, which they considered more important than even the needs of the German nation. The Saxons and Swabians thus both rejected Jaszi's autonomy plans, but for entirely different reasons. If the Swabian and Saxon behaviour is a typical reaction of two branches of the same nation at different stages of development, then the application of Jaszi's autonomy scheme for the pacification of polyethnic states may have a long wait, possibly even beyond the putative demise of nationalism and communism.[62] Perhaps only a basic change in human nature itself, or possibly an imposed conformist Age of Religion would ensure the success of a scheme as complex as Jaszi's.

NOTES

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1 Stephen D. Kertesz, *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool. Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia* (Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1953), pp. 12–13.

2 Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* (Budapest: A Nap nyomdája, 1912), pp. 529–534. For a detailed exposition of this plan, see *idem*, *Magyarország jövője és a Dunai Egyesült Államok* (Budapest: Az Új Magyarország R.T., 1918). Also see *idem*, "Középeurópa és a demokratikus fejlődés," (Feb. 13, 1916) in *idem*, *Múlt és jövő határán* (Budapest: Pallas Irodalmi és Nyomdai R.T., 1918).

3 United States Serial 7443. Doc. #765, Jan. 8, 1918.

4 O. Jászi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), p. 35. Original English edition by P.S. King & Son, 1924 .

5 O. Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy* (Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1929), p. vi.

6 C.J.C. Street, *Hungary and Democracy* (London: T. Fischer Unwin, Ltd., 1923), p. 8.

7 The rest, about 136,000, lived in Croatia and Slavonia. All statistics gathered from M.K. Belügyminisztérium, *Az 1910. évi népszámlálás* (Budapest: 1912). Also see Wilhelm Winkler, *Statistisches Handbuch des gesamten Deutschtums* (Berlin: Verlag Deutsche Rundschau, 1927).

8 "Előszó," M.K. Belügyminisztérium, *Az 1920. évi népszámlálás* (Budapest: 1923). Also see Heinrich Schmidt, *et al.*, *Das Deutschtum in Rumpfungarn*, edited by Jakob Bleyer (Budapest: Verlag des "Sonntagsblattes," 1928), II, especially 91–99.

9 Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy*, p. 315.

10 See, for example, Paul Somassa, *Der Völkerstreit im Habsburgerstaat* (Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Theodor Weicher, 1910), pp. 105–122, especially pp. 116 and 118–120; Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Buchhandlung Ignaz Brand, 1907), p. 372; and propaganda literature sponsored by the *Alldeutscher Verband*, such as Guntram Schultheiss, *Der Kampf um das Deutschtum. Deutschtum und Ma-*

gyarisierung (Munich: J.F. Lehmann, 1898).

11 Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1942), pp. 539–549.

12 Jakob Bleyer, "A hazai németség," *Budapesti Szemle* (March 1917), 10–11, and *idem*, "A hazai németség kérdéséhez," *ibid.*, 4.

13 Oszkár Jászi, Gyula Rácz and Zoltán Zigány, *A választójog reformja és a magyarság jövője* (Budapest: Deutsch Zsigmond és Társa, 1908), p. 17.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 70.

15 Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása*, p. 458. Also see idem, *A nemzetiségi kérdés és Magyarország jövője* (Budapest: A Galilei Kör Kiadása, 1911).

16 *Idem*, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása*, p. 497.

17 *Idem*, *Mi a radikalizmus?* (Budapest: Az Országos Polgári Radikális Párt Kiadása, [March] 1918), p. 19.

18 *Ibid.*, back page, inside cover.

19 *Idem*, *Die Krise der ungarischen Verfassung. Eine Denkschrift* (Budapest: Sigmund Politzer Buchhandlung, 1912), pp. 18–19.

20 *Idem*, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása*, p. 500.

21 *A monarchia jövője*, the second edition of which appeared in October 1918 as *Magyarország jövője és a Dunai Egyesült Államok*. Also see *idem*, "Középeurópa és a demokratikus fejlődés" (Feb. 13, 1916), in *idem*, *Múlt és jövő határán*, pp. 143–147.

22 *Idem*, *Magyarország jövője*, pp. 49–51.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 99–117.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 48.

25 Arthur J. May, *The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy 1914–1918* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), ii, 790–793.

26 For Jaszi's views of these events, see Jaszi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary*, pp. 57–61, or the German version, *Magyariens Schuld, Ungarns Sühne. Revolution und Gegenrevolution in Ungarn* (Munich: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1923), pp. 59–63.

27 Carl Petersen and Otto Scheel, eds., *Handwörterbuch des Grenz und Auslanddeutschtums* (Breslau: 1933), I, 668; and Winkler, *Statistisches Handbuch*, p. 103.

28 For background and consequences see T. Spira, "The Sopron (Ödenburg) Plebiscite of December 1921 and the German Nationality Problem," Béla K. Király, ed., *War and Society in East Central Europe* (New York: Brooklyn College Press and Columbia University Press, 1982), VI, 321–344.

29 Hedwig Schwind, *Jakob Bleyer. Ein Vorkämpfer und Erwecker des ungarländischen Deutschtums* (Munich: Verlag des Südostdeutschen Kulturwerks, 1960), p. 57, on Brandsch's popularity.

30 Jakob Bleyer, "An die Deutschungarn," *Neue Post* (*N.P.*), Oct. 25, 1918.

31 Bleyer stressed the full name of the party: *Volksrat der Deutschen von diesseits des Königssteiges*, to stress the exclusion of Transylvanian Saxons from membership. Schwind, Bleyer, pp. 58–59.

32 *N.P.*, Oct. 27, 1918.

33 *N.P.*, Nov. 3, 1918.

34 *N.P.*, Nov. 9, 1918.

35 *N.P.*, Nov. 8, 1918.
36 *N.P.*, Nov. 3, 1918.
37 "Deutsch-Ungarn, rasche Organisation!" *N.P.*, Nov. 12, 1918.
38 Schwind, *Bleyer*, pp. 63–67. Also see T. Spira, *German-Hungarian Relations and the Swabian Problem from Károlyi to Gömbös 1919–1936* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, dist. Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 22; and Ludmila Schlereth, *Die politische Entwicklung des Ungarländischen Deutschtums während der Revolution 1918–19* (Munich: Verlag Max Schick, 1939), pp. 38–40.
39 The first public mention of Austrian plans to annex the region appeared in the Nov. 18, 1918 issue of *Wiener Mittag*.
40 *N.P.*, Nov. 16, 19 and 20, 1918.
41 J. Huber, "Ein Mahnruf an die Deutschen Westungarn," *N.P.*, Nov. 20, 1918.
42 *N.P.*, Nov. 21 and 24, and Dec. 22, 1918.
43 Telegram of Nov. 24, 1918.
44 *N.P.*, Mar. 5, 1919.
45 *N.P.*, Dec. 22, 1918.
46 Observers had complained for years that most local officials did not know the local non-Magyar languages, and that thousands of central government directives were ignored. See, for example, Mercator, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die ungarische Reichsidee* (Budapest: Móritz Ráth, 1908), p. 64.
47 *N.P.*, Dec. 22, 1918.
48 László Koncsek, "A bécsi és Sopron megyei ellenforradalom kapcsolatai 1919-ben," *Soproni Szemle*, X (1956), 107. Also see C.A. Macartney, *Hungary and her Successors* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1937), p. 50. Even conservatively-minded observers believed in Jaszi's fundamental honesty. See, for example, Schwind, *Bleyer*, p. 56; and E. Treumund [Edmund Steinacker], "Die deutsche Bewegung in Ungarn," *Österreichische Rundschau*, V, No. 1 (1919), 107.
49 "Die deutsche Schule," *N.P.*, Dec. 8, 1918.
50 *N.P.*, Jan. 5, 1919; J. Huber, "Was trennt uns von Herrn Brandsch?" *N.P.*, Nov. 9, 1918, is a good comparison between Brandsch and Bleyer.
51 *Budapesti Hírlap*, Jan. 15, 1919.
52 Schwind, *Bleyer*, pp. 67–69.
53 "Eine Erklärung des Ministers Oskar Jászi," *Pester Lloyd*, Jan. 4, 1919. Jaszi believed fervently that Socialism would cure extremist nationalism, which he considered the cause of all ethnic hatreds and problems. O. Jászi, *Új Magyarország felé. Beszélgetések a szocializmusról* (Budapest: Deutsch Zsigmond, 1907), pp. 186–187.
54 "Oskár Jászi verhandelt," *Pester Lloyd*, Jan. 3, 1919.
55 *N.P.*, Jan. 11, 1919.
56 Országos Levéltár, Miniszter Tanács, Jan. 27, 1919, Point 67; *Pester Lloyd*, Jan. 4, 1919; and *N.P.*, Jan. 30, 1919, for full text of the Law. Also see G. Katalin Soós, *A nyugatmagyarországi kérdés (1918–1919)* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1962), p. 20.
57 *Budapesti Hírlap*, Jan. 25, 1919; *N.P.*, Feb. 1, 1919 (editorial); and "Was sagt Professor Bl.[eyer]?" *Deutsches Tageblatt*, Feb. 13, 1919.
58 *N.P.*, Jan. 30 and Feb. 1, 1919.

59 "Christen, zur Rettung der Kinderseelen," *N.P.*, Mar. 7, 1919.
60 *N.P.*, Mar. 12, 1919.
61 Jászi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, pp. 57–60.
62 See N.F. Dreisziger, "Central European Federalism in the Thought of Oscar Jászi and his Successors," in Steven Bela Vardy and Agnes Huszar Vardy (eds.), *Society in Change. Studies in Honor of Béla K. Király* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, distr. Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 539–556.

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Jaszi's Viennese Years: Building Contacts with the Democratic Left in the Successor States

György Litván

The Viennese years of Oscar Jaszi were inserted between the two halves of his life, the Hungarian and the American ones. This period represents a kind of transition between these two lives, that of the Hungarian scholar and politician with international outlook, and that of the American professor with Hungarian preoccupations. Jaszi's Vienna years gradually disrupted or transformed his former existence, family circumstances, professional and political ties, and prepared him for his "second life" in a new world, for a new marriage, a new profession, and for a new approach to old problems.

"Since our last meeting in Budapest, a whole world had collapsed," Jaszi wrote to R.W. Seton-Watson in his first letter after the war.[1] When he left Hungary for Vienna on 1 May 1919, the "May Day" of the Soviet Republic, he could not yet realize that his old world had vanished forever. When, in 1925, he left Vienna for Oberlin, Ohio, he was already aware of it.

The Vienna years were the most tormented ones in Jaszi's long life. He spent them in a feverish state of constant inner crises and mental anguish, both public and private, and he could not calm down until after he had arrived in America.

Despite this, his performance was extraordinary. He wrote an account of the Hungarian revolution and counter-revolution of 1918–19 in Hungarian, German and English;[2] he attempted to draw up a balance-sheet of his social and economic theories in several book-sized manuscripts.[3] He edited the daily *Bécsi Magyar Újság* (Hungarian Newspaper of Vienna) for three years and wrote hundreds of articles for Hungarian, German and other journals. He lived in Vienna but made frequent and long trips to meet friends and relatives in the Successor States and in Italy. In 1923–24 he spent half a year on a lecture tour in the United States. All the time, he conducted an enormous correspondence and kept a diary which remains an indispensable source for the history of all the emigres, from the Liberals to the Com-

munists, and of their political and diplomatic efforts never mentioned in printed sources.

As leaders of the democratic group of Hungarian exiles Jaszi and Mihály Károlyi aimed, in the first months of 1920, at uniting in a common front most of the anti-Horthy exiles. There was, a single but important difference: Károlyi wanted to include the Communists, while Jaszi wished to keep them out in a neutral position. All these efforts for unification were frustrated by various disagreements, above all in regard to international orientation. The Communists (and Károlyi) looked towards Soviet Russia; the Social Democrats hoped for the aid of the Socialist International and the Socialist and Liberal public opinion of the West; while the Liberals were divided between pro-Habsburg and anti-Habsburg elements.

Jaszi felt deeply disappointed by the Allies' attitudes and their peace-making in East Central Europe. He declared Entente policy regarding Hungary "wrong and short-sighted."[4] Though he never gave up faith in the values of Western democracy – and the usefulness of its liberal and socialist aspects – he sought support from sources he considered more immediately concerned. He thought to have found this in the Successor States, in the countries of the future Little Entente, whom he called the "allies of Hungarian Democracy." The paramount interest of the governments appeared to be the elimination of the revanchist Hungarian regime which seemed to be preparing for war against them and fomenting unrest among their Hungarian minorities. It was, therefore, only logical for Jaszi to build contacts in these directions. He conceived this alliance not as a mere tactical one, necessary to defeat the Horthy regime, but as a long-term necessity in the strategy of seeking rapprochement with the Successor States, in the integration of Hungary in a new democratic environment and, as a final step, in a Danubian Confederation.

He considered this work of contact-building as one of the most important tasks of the exiles and as his personal mission, because he felt to be the right man to accomplish it. Indeed, his past, his whole political record qualified him to negotiate with the political and intellectual leaders of the Danubian states and to try to persuade them to assume a tough attitude towards the Hungarian regime and a friendly one towards the Hungarian people – at home and in their own countries. Actually, this was the very same plan which he had been unable to realize in 1918 as Hungarian minister of nationalities. Now he tried to initiate it from abroad and hoped to co-operate with his former adversaries, the Czech and Rumanian leaders.

Meanwhile, he distanced himself from all kinds of Magyar nationalism and was ready to accept the basic condition of any co-operation with the Successor States: the acknowledgment of the *status quo* and the renouncing of the idea of forcible revision of the Trianon treaty. The Károlyi-Jaszi group was the first and, for a long time, the only Hungarian political con-

stellation which recognized the lasting nature of the post-1920 international order in East Central Europe. This stand separated them from the overwhelming majority of their compatriots. They were denounced as "traitors" and "Masaryk's agents" by official Hungary and the entire right-wing press. Jaszi shouldered defiantly this role for 25 years, without abandoning his patriotic feelings, and his loyalty to Hungary's true national interests.

In a memorial talk on Thomas G. Masaryk, given before the Assembly of Oberlin College in 1937, Jaszi related that he once asked the President: "If you were a Hungarian statesman, what would you do?" Masaryk answered: "Well, in this hypothetical case I would try to do two things: First, I would fight for an honest carrying out of national autonomy for the Hungarians. In the second place, I would advocate the return to Hungary of those territories in the frontier regions where the Magyars constitute a solid, homogeneous majority."[5] Undoubtedly, Jaszi quoted these words as the supreme justification of his own stand. He had exactly the same two reservations in his friendship to and moral support of the Successor States. The first one he outlined in an editorial about the possible alliance of the Democratic exiles. Hungarian Democracy, he wrote, may renounce revanche but can never give up claiming the same rights for its separated Hungarian kinsmen which it had demanded before the war for the oppressed nationalities of old Hungary.[6] The second reservation, a peaceful correction of the new frontiers in favour of a democratic Hungary, Jaszi found impolitic to declare publicly, but raised it in his private talks with Czech statesmen.

These confidential talks started in October 1919, when Jaszi visited Masaryk, Beneš and Tušar in Prague, for the first time. His visits there became regular during the next years. Czechoslovakia was, as the first democracy in Central Europe, the most important country in Jaszi's international connections.

On March 30, 1920, together with Mihály Károlyi and Pál Szende, Jaszi had a long and decisive conversation in Prague with Eduard Beneš. According to Jaszi's diary, the Hungarians put the following questions to the Czech statesman: 1. Whether Beneš saw any sense in an organized Hungarian political emigration without the participation of the Communists? 2. Whether Czechoslovakia was willing to redress the injustices of the Peace Treaty? 3. Whether Beneš was ready to acknowledge the Hungarian democratic emigration in a semi-official way?[7]

Beneš answered all the three questions in the positive. He asserted that the regime in power in Budapest was unacceptable and intolerable, because "this feudal island cannot maintain itself amidst the democratic Successor States." He assured his visitors that he regarded them as the only group suitable for leading Hungary and for creating a new equilibrium in East Central Europe. The most important thing was, Beneš emphasized, to

create honest and sincere communication between the democratic forces of their nations.

This was exactly what Jaszi wanted to hear and to put into practice. During the following months he greatly extended the range of his activity. In November 1920, he made his first Balkan tour, visiting Belgrade, Bucharest, and Zagreb, to meet both the government and opposition leaders of Yugoslavia and Rumania . . .

> I felt the necessity for some time, [he said in a statement] to inform the Southern Slav and Rumanian political circles about the true situation of Hungary and on the views of the Hungarian democrats and, at the same time, to build direct contacts with the democratic and progressive wing of these circles. Also, I received invitations from my old Yugoslav and Rumanian friends to renew our connections which were interrupted by the war and the revolutions. Of course, I spoke everywhere in my own name, but I am sufficiently familiar with the conception of all shades of Hungarian exile [opinion] to feel entitled to speak also in the name of the others, except for the Communists who continue their policy of the world-revolution catastrophy.
>
> My conception, [Jaszi continued] presented to the South Slav and Rumanian democratic public opinion, was roughly as follows: The Hungarian problem concerns closely the Little Entente. Without its proper solution it is impossible to create those conditions which would allow the development of Central Europe. Hungary is the Archimedean point of this fatally sick Central European world. This must be the starting point of either a regeneration or a final dissolution . . . the collapse of the Horthy regime is therefore the vital interest of the Little Entente.[8]

However, he warned against a military intervention. Instead, he proposed political pressure, insistence on demobilization, and a delay of the evacuation of the Southern town of Pécs and Baranya county by Yugoslavia. At the same time he advocated free trade and a solution of the problem of the Hungarian minorities whose situation he defined as depressing.

The poor refugee—coming from a Viennese bed and breakfast place, and traveling day and night by slow trains—was received as a statesman and a true friend by Pasić, Pribićević, Drashkovic and others in Belgrade, by Averescu, Take Ionescu, Gareflid, Duca, Octavian Goga and other ministers, Iuliu Maniu, Bratianu, Iorga Mihalache, Gusti and other leaders in Bucharest. Some wanted to introduce him to the King. However, his person was better received than his proposals.

"I got many encouragements but no definite promises," Jaszi wrote to Károlyi. "The leftist parties and the young people greeted my ideas enthusiastically, while the right-wing parties and old people did not understand

me. Averescu or Take Ionescu would more easily communicate with an agent of Horthy. In spite of their great politeness, their old diplomatic and militaristic brains cannot accept the thought that there are Hungarians who oppose revanche sincerely and in principle."[9] Very soon, however, Jaszi had to experience a similar attitude displayed by the "modern" and "progressive" representatives of the Successor States.

In March 1921, just a few days after the Károlyi family was expelled from Italy and Jaszi was prevented from boarding a ship in Naples bound for the United States, Eduard Beneš met the Hungarian foreign minister Gusztáv Gratz. The Successor States began to accommodate themselves to the Horthy regime, which they actually preferred to a strong and democratic government in Hungary, which might have been attractive to the Magyar minorities of their own countries. Accordingly, their relations with the emigres became looser and more businesslike. They regarded them rather as political tools than allies and partners for the future.

Jaszi, too, began to differentiate more sharply between the governmental and the genuinely democratic forces in the Successor States. He trusted less and less the former and tried to base the cause of a Danubian rapprochement on the latter. Before the end of 1921 he presented a detailed plan of a Danubian Cultural League to be formed of the democratic elements and the intellectual elite of these countries. The tasks of this multinational organization would have been to make mutually known the history and culture of every Danubian nation, to analyze their social and economic problems, to popularize their cultural achievements, to publish a review, to organize conference and — last but not least — to combat chauvinism and defend the national and human rights of the minorities in each country. A remarkable plan indeed, even for today!

The problem was, however, the weakness of such independent elements and forces in East Central Europe. The keenest interest for Jaszi's plan was shown in Rumania, both among the Rumanian intellectuals in Bucharest and the Hungarians in Transylvania. The left-wing Bucharest review *Revista Vremii* published a series of articles by Jaszi on Danubian problems and on the proposed cultural league.[10]

In May, 1923, Jaszi spent three weeks in Bucharest and in six cities in Transylvania. Again, he was received sympathetically by political authorities and scholars in the capital. In Transylvania, however, he was confronted with the daily practice of Rumanian nationality policy and the realities of minority life. He had to realize that his benevolent urging for an active and loyal civic attitude became, in the eyes of the Hungarians, tantamount to national submission. During this dramatic trip he came to see clearer than ever before that the policy of the Little Entente, which was tolerant towards the Hungarian regime and intolerant towards the Hungarian minorities, was ruining and compromising his own position and activity.

At the end of his journey, like a *deux ex machina*, R.W. Seton-Watson appeared in Kolozsvár [Cluj] and Jaszi, according to his diary, shared with him his doubt whether it was permissible to continue his political activity and to keep up his one-sided alliance with Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade. Seton-Watson, as Jaszi noted, "understood the dilemma and promised to tell Beneš that he [Beneš] must decide whether he will or will not cooperate with the [Hungarian] exiles."[11]

Beneš, however, as Jaszi himself suspected, had very much changed his mind since 1920. Jaszi believed that the Czech leader was thinking the following way: "the exiles, once they get home, would pursue the same nationalist policy of territorial integrity [as Horthy does]. Otherwise, the exile is not an appropriate partner because he passed the limit which no emigre should, vis-a-vis his country's public opinion."[12] In this cynical view, Jaszi was sadly right. Still, he was unable and unwilling to change his mind on the future of Danubia and the necessity of an understanding with the Successor States. Since he was prevented from representing this idea in all honesty on the political level and on the spot, he had no other choice but to abandon politics in favour of scholarship, and leave Danubia and head for America.

As an independent American scholar, in the 1930s, he criticized the domestic policies and minority policies of the Successor States, even those of Czechoslovakia.[13] But he maintained his sympathy towards this endangered democracy, especially in the dark years of 1938–39. For this attitude, Oscar Jaszi had to pay a high price in terms of his relations with Hungary, and most of his compatriots.

Nevertheless, he was ready to pay this price in the hope that the Czech leaders learned their lesson from the easy collapse of their multinational states, and that they will promote – as Beneš had personally promised him during the war in Chicago – Danubian understanding and federation after the conflict.

When, in 1945, he witnessed the opposite trend, Jaszi tried to do everything to stop the forcible expulsion of the Hungarian minorities from Slovakia. He wrote letters to Beneš,[14] Harold J. Laski,[15] British journalist W. Steed, and, in the end, to the *New York Times*.[16] And in a private letter, he confessed to his beloved first wife that the great mistake of his life had been overestimating "our Czechs!"[17]

Jaszi's efforts to establish closer contacts with democratic elements in neighbouring countries did not have many supporters in the seventy years after his arrival in Vienna. Even his call for the establishment of a Danubian Cultural League has fallen on deaf ears.

NOTES

1 Jaszi to R.W. Seton-Watson, Nov. 29, 1919. Columbia University, New York,

Butler Library, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Jaszi Collection.

2 *Revolution and Counter-revolution in Hungary* (London, 1924). Second edition: New York: Howard Fertig, 1969.

3 Jaszi Collection.

4 Jaszi to Seton-Watson, Nov. 29, 1919, *cit.*

5 "The Significance of Thomas G. Masaryk for the Future," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, April 1950, pp. 1–8.

6 "A magyar democrácia szövetségesei" [The Allies of the Hungarian Democracy], *Bécsi Magyar Újság*. Dec. 15, 1920.

7 Jaszi Collection.

8 *Bécsi Magyar Újság*. Dec. 12, 1920.

9 Jaszi to Károlyi, Dec. 14, 1920. *Károlyi Mihály levelezése* [The Correspondence of Mihály Károlyi] (Budapest, 1978), p. 729.

10 See Sándor Balázs' article in *Századok* (Budapest), 5, 1985.

11 Jaszi's Diary. June 1, 1923. Jaszi Collection.

12 Jaszi to Károlyi, March 21, 1922. Jaszi Collection.

13 "Czechoslovakia's First Years," *The Yale Review*, 1934, pp. 701–734. "War Germs in the Danube Basin," *The Nation*, Nov.-Dec. 1934.

14 O. Jaszi and R. Vámbéry to Eduard Beneš, Sep. 11, 1945. Jaszi Collection.

15 Jaszi to H.J. Laski, Sept. 19, 1945. Jaszi Collection.

16 "Hungarians in Slovakia. No Solution in Minority Problem seen in Czechoslovakia's Plan" *The New York Times*, Dec. 2. 1946.

17 Jaszi to Anna Lesznai, May 19, 1945. Jaszi Collection.

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Some Reflections on Oscar Jaszi and his Philosophy of History

Thomas Szendrey

Bringing together the scholarly aspirations and political career of Oscar Jaszi with the field and subject matter of the philosophy of history requires not only an understanding of Jaszi's intellectual, specifically philosophical, development and major contours of his thought as expressed in his numerous writings and extensive correspondence, but also an understanding of what one means by the term philosophy of history and the intellectual and cultural context in which it was undertaken. This is complicated even further by the meanings and values attached to the philosophy of history by the one who is reflecting on these issues.[1]

Basically, we are engaged in a dialogue about what is the philosophy of history, what it meant for Jaszi, who never wrote specifically and at length about it, only episodically in works dealing mostly with social and political philosophy. The social and intellectual context in which Jaszi worked opened concerns generally and properly characterized as a philosophy of history, and led to subsequent understandings (or for that matter misunderstandings) of this complex of ideas. There can be no doubt that Jaszi was not first and foremost a philosopher of history as that term will be defined and used in these reflections; however, he did reflect, and often very meaningfully and perceptively, on issues and matters central to the philosophy of history, such as the idea of progress, the nature and role of social science, especially its essentially positivist variant, in the understanding of the nature of human society, including also the issues of the relationship of the individual and society, the problem of historical materialism, philosophy of the state, the issues concerning human destiny, and ultimately a compelling critique of the Marxist philosophy of history, coupled with a statement of his own ideals for humanity generally and a statement of the development of society and the proper role and status of the individual.[2]

Before turning to some reflections on these themes by citing passages

from some of Jaszi's writings, two points previously alluded to should be developed at least briefly. The first of these is what is meant by the philosophy of history and the relationship of sociology to the philosophy of history, an issue which also much concerned Jaszi and was inevitably among his concerns and that of his contemporaries.[3] The second is the intellectual and socio-cultural context in which Jaszi's ideas developed, only to the extent necessary in so brief a discussion and one not centered specifically upon that point.[4]

It is necessary to state at the very inception of an attempt to explain what one means by the philosophy of history to point out that it is by no means only a *Weltanschauung* or complex of attitudes about the issues of human destiny, although the philosophy of history generally commences, at least in one respect, precisely with such issues and concerns. Certainly, any attempt to explain the nature of human existence, individual and social, can and does lead to the formulation of a philosophy of history. Hence, concern with the nature of human existence – of necessity in time – and the direction and goal of human effort (what Karl Jaspers in a book entitled *The Origin and Goal of History* has attempted to explain) constitutes a fundamental dimension of the philosophy of history. This was so aptly described by Karl Löwith in a book dealing with thinkers as diverse as St. Augustine, Vico, Voltaire, Condorcet, Comte, Proudhon and Marx; among these Voltaire first used the term philosophy of history in a modern context and many of the others tried to explain what it was, namely an attempt to explain in some way the meaning of human history. It must be noted, in order to establish some relationship between our concern with Jaszi and the philosophy of history generally, that Jaszi was deeply influenced in his thought, inevitably in an eclectic manner, by most of the thinkers above mentioned. For example, his belief in the idea of progress was derived from the thinkers of the Enlightenment tradition, whereas his sociological interests, the concern with historical materialism, the evolution of social consciousness, from Saint-Simon and Comte as well as Darwin, Marx, and Spencer. Jaszi wrote about these thinkers in numerous essays, but especially, in one entitled, "The Marxian Paradox," 1941, to wit:

> There is nothing surprising in the simultaneous elaboration of the democratic and the socialistic doctrines . . . liberalism and socialism are Siamese twins . . . children of the two most fundamental dynamic forms, Equality and Freedom. Socialism simply asserted that constitutional democracy alone cannot realize true Equality and Freedom without giving them an economic foundation. This was the point of view of the great pre-Marxian socialists of the first half of the nineteenth century, who practically laid down all the foundations for the later Marxian synthesis.[5]

Jaszi was to develop further these ideas not only in his critique of the Marxist philosophy of history, but also used the thought of these pre-Marxian socialists in the development and formulation of his own ideas concerning the nature and development of human society, which he himself often characterized as liberal and democratic socialism. It should be added that in his opinion the theories of these pre-Marxian (and later the revisionists such as Eduard Bernstein) socialists did not endanger democracy, which in his estimation—especially in his later writings—was not the case with the message of Marxist socialism, which he considered catastrophic and essentially anti-democratic, indeed approaching a new and inflexible religious orthodoxy.[6]

Continuing the point that one branch of the philosophy of history entails the recognition of pattern and meaning in the ever-evolving human condition, then the recognition of great, indeed even cosmic and new forces in human history, indicates a concern with such philosophical issues. Jaszi's explanation of the social and cultural conditions engendered by a gigantic and blind technological upheaval which uprooted social and individual relations (the industrial revolution and the political upheavals of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries) certainly helps one to understand the success of the Marxist philosophy of history, especially what was characterized (by Engels) as Marx's discovery of the evolutionary laws of human society. Thus, Jaszi's subsequent critique of the Marxist philosophy of history was accompanied by an understanding of the appeal of Marx's theories to a society which had lost its traditional moorings.

Actually, Jaszi examined Marxism in at least four ways: 1. As a philosophical, sociological, and moral doctrine; 2. An economic interpretation of history; 3. A guide to political action and certainly most significantly from the point of view of the speculative philosophy of history, 4. A normative ideal for future development which of necessity must follow from the pattern expounded by Marx. Jaszi further believed that the historical materialism of Marx was helped along by a behaviorist attitude informed by the belief that human nature can be conditioned, a position Marx shared with many other social scientists. Thus, Jaszi's understanding of Marxist thought and his constantly increasing disagreements with it,[7] represented perhaps his most significant incursion into a speculative philosophy of history. In the essay cited previously, Jaszi concluded his discussion of Marx in the following words: "Here is a man who regards human nature in all history with contempt and pessimism, yet who prophesies for the future a human nature purified from baser motives."[8] This theme became the basis of his subsequent discussion and critique of Marxism as practiced by Marxists in power, but even more outspokenly than his critique of the thought of Marx himself. Before dealing with that briefly, here one might only note that Jaszi's ethical idealism (probably the best term for Jaszi's position

in terms of social and political thought) expounded in some of his more philosophical works may indeed represent an unwarranted belief in the efficacy of progress and enlightenment-based optimism about human nature generally. These are also ideas of interest to the speculative philosophy of history, indeed to any philosophically based concern with issues of human destiny and the meaning of human existence in time. One could thus argue that Jaszi concerned himself with the philosophy of history mostly through a critique of the philosophy of history expounded by Marx and the Marxists.

A concern with the meaning of human history by no means exhausts the concerns of the philosophy of history, since the field also has a dimension which adheres more to logic and epistemology rather than metaphysics (broadly conceived, perhaps ontology, and also ethics or moral philosophy), namely the question of how one can know past events or more specifically the nature of historical knowledge. Obviously, our ability to obtain knowledge of ourselves and the social world, or more precisely the explanation of that, has also concerned philosophers of history, social theorists, and philosophers generally. The search for pattern, meaning, and direction is decidedly related to how one obtains knowledge of human history broadly conceived. For example, the attempt to discover the patterns or so-called laws of social development in the study of economic factors only, or even primarily, is not only an issue in the realm of a speculative philosophy of history, but also mandates a method for the study of such phenomena. This particular economic interpretation of history – derived from Marx and dealt with by Jaszi among many others – makes use of the methods of social science and the critical examination of these social sciences and indeed also the related evolutionary theories (derived from Darwin and formulated among others by Spencer) and Jaszi's discussion of these issues in his major theoretical works[9] form the core of his contributions to what can be considered the philosophy of history in both the speculative and analytical domains. Jaszi was certainly deeply concerned with questions of the methodology of the social sciences, a topic very germane to the methodological concerns of history as a discipline.

Jaszi, for example, pointed out that an economic determinism is not really tenable and one must have recourse to spiritual and moral factors, independently of the materialistic conception inherent in economic determinism. Indeed, this was his major objection to the Marxist philosophy of history in its original Marxian form and even more in its subsequent development into what Jaszi called a system of state religion.[10] These criticisms were noted especially in his recently published posthumous work, where he stated that much harm had been done by the political practice of Marxist-inspired revolutions based upon what Jaszi considered to be the faulty philosophy of history espoused by Marx. His major critical observa-

tions were directed against the idea of catastrophic revolutionary rhetoric, the exclusive revolutionary role of the proletariat, a one-sided materialistic conception of historical development, and a series of what Jaszi considered flippant generalizations about the history of the 100 years before 1848.[11] He further implies that this half-mystical, half-revolutionary dialectic must be replaced by another dialectic more carefully constructed to reveal social changes independently of revolutionary rhetoric. Marx, according to Jaszi, helped to provide a method for the analysis of social change, but it must be used without recourse to this revolutionary praxis which for Jaszi distorted the method. Jaszi also objected to the excessively materialistic determination of intellectual, cultural, and moral life and ideals. He emphasized that this spiritual-moral ideology was also a creative activity in itself and without it all social progress would come to an end.

Specifically in terms of the issues of the philosophy of history, Jaszi's one leading idea was his deeply held belief in the idea of progress, from the essentials of which he never deviated and which he held until the end of his life. For him, however, the idea and the fact of progress was by no means limited to the socio-economic sphere, but found its most significant dimension in the spiritual and especially moral realm. In his words:

> Really good scholarship, outstanding art, properly understood morality, even religion conceived in a proper manner, can never loose its contact with suffering individuals and the realistic needs of the masses. Every truly progressive spiritual (*szellemi*) activity satisfies a spiritual need, resolves a pressing concern, or carries forward a progressive tendency.[12]

Even though this particular statement deals specifically with the nature of progress and does so more on the spiritual-cultural rather than socio-economic level, Jaszi still remained committed to progress, but certainly not in a Marxian or even materialist context. He argued that ultimately all progress was nurtured in the human soul and that this was as evident as any of the theorems of Euclid. What he called the creative impulses of the human spirit he saw as the basis of all of world history.[13] Ultimately, therefore, Jaszi too was a visionary of the creative possibilities inherent in the human spirit and he gradually moved away from the Marxist conception which he had considered necessary in his earlier works. Summing up his critique of Marxism, one may point out that Jaszi eventually expressed it in five statements as follows. First of all, he stated that the Marxist philosophy of history was based upon a simplified set of generalizations about the era of bourgeois revolutions based upon incomplete and inexact information. Secondly, Marx attached undue significance to the class struggle and underestimated the role of social solidarity. Third, Marx's entire conception was mechanically fatalistic and attempted to eliminate the creative

force of the human spirit as a factor in progress. Fourth, in conjunction with this Jaszi asserted that Marx eliminated all true morality from history, making it only a reflection of the class struggle or the so-called "morality" of struggle. Finally, Jaszi stated that the Marxist vision of the future was in turn catastrophic and vague.[14] In place of this, Jaszi developed a vision of liberal and democratic socialism, cleansed of dogmatic elements. However utopian his vision—and Jaszi believed in the creative force of such utopian visions—his belief in progress, especially the progressive realization of the human spirit, remained with him and was the major motif of his historical vision and philosophy.

There are other issues in the writings of Jaszi, as well as statements of the significance of progress in his political tracts and newspaper articles written under the pressure of revolutionary events,[15] which dealt with one or another issue of the philosophy of history, be it a belief in moral progress which illuminated his political and sociological writings, his concern with the extension of modern ideas in a Hungarian context—he once wrote that a new philosophy of history is needed to renew faith in Hungary's future[16] —or his understanding of the role of great individuals in history,[17] but ultimately I think it is essential to place Jaszi's concerns in the context of Hungarian intellectual life at the turn of the century. Perhaps a few observations about the pervasiveness of social problems in Hungarian life in the early years of the twentieth century will explain Jaszi's intellectual development in some manner.

The concern with social thought and the establishment of social reform movements permeated every realm of human activity. Oscar Jaszi posed a whole series of questions about land reform, the nationality issue, the role of sociology in public life, and a critique of the Marxist vision of history from the point of view of bourgeois radicalism; György Lukács opened the way to the social analysis of literature with his writings on modern drama; Bódog Somló and Gyula Pikler combined psychological and sociological observations with the study of public law and jurisprudence; issues of social ills agitated writers such as Endre Ady and Dezső Szabó, churchmen such as László Ravasz and Ottokár Prohászka, Catholic scholars such as Sándor Giesswein, socialists such as Zsigmond Kunfi and Ervin Szabó. One should also recall that Arnold Hauser's social analysis of art and Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge were also influenced by these same movements of thought and social reform. The list could be extended, even specified and detailed, but the intellectual and cultural milieu of Jaszi was strongly influenced by it.

Out of this maelstrom of ideas emerged some of those concerns which forced thinkers to face up to the ultimate questions, especially those posed most evidently and compellingly by the philosophy of history. On the issues of most concern to human beings the ultimate question is not to what

century one belongs, or one particular thinker such as Jaszi belongs, but rather how one transcends the ever-changing human condition to understand the essence of our very being. Jaszi's vision, however limited by his age and his values, was nonetheless open to this dimension. That is why one can discuss his thought in terms of the philosophy of history.

NOTES

1 The philosophy of history has an extensive bibliography. A good introductory account is Bruce Mazlish, *The Riddle of History*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), and a representative selection of readings can be found in Patrick Gardiner, ed., *Theories of History* (New York: The Free Press, 1959). The journal *History and Theory* provides a good sampling of contemporary writings, reviews, and bibliographies.

2 Jaszi's writings most pertinent to the philosophy of history include the following: *A történelmi materializmus államböIcselete* [The Philosophy of State of Historical Materialism] (2nd ed., Budapest: Grill, 1908); *Marxizmus, vagy liberális szocializmus* [Marxism or Liberal Socialism] (Paris, Magyar Füzetek, 1983, but the work was originally written in 1919); *Kulturális elmaradottságunk okairól* [Concerning the Reasons for Our Cultural Lag] (Budapest: Politzer, 1905); *Művészet és erkölcs* [Art and Morality] (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1908); *Mi a szociológia* [What is Sociology] (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1908); "The Marxian Paradox," in *Democracy is Different; Series of Lectures at Oberlin College* (New York: Harper, 1941), pp. 34–54.

3 The relationship of sociology and the philosophy of history was dealt with by Jaszi, *Mi a szociológia*, cited in note 2 and by others, especially István Dékány, *Társadalomalkotó erők* [The Forces of Social Formation] (Budapest: published by the author, 1920), pp. 252–300 and also *A társadalomfilozófia alapfogalmai* [The Basic Concepts of Social Philosophy] (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1933). See also Thomas Szendrey, "Sándor Giesswein, Hungarian Writer, Social Reformer, and Political Philosopher," (unpublished manuscript, 1989).

4 Concerning Jaszi's intellectual development the following books proved to be of some interest, even though this writer does not share some of their judgments and conclusions. Attila Pók, ed., *A Huszadik Század körének történetfelfogása* [The Conception of History in the Circle around the Journal *Huszadik Század* — Twentieth Century] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1982); Zoltán Horváth, *Magyar századforduló* [The Turn of the Century in Hungary] (2nd ed., Budapest: Gondolat, 1974); György Fukász, *A magyarországi polgári radikalizmus történetéhez, 1900–1918* [On the History of Hungarian Bourgeois Radicalism] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1960). Of great interest are the recent writings of György Litván, especially his introductory essay to a two volume collection of the writings of Hungarian sociologists, György Litván and László Szűcs, eds. *A szociológia első magyar műhelye* [The First Workshop of Hungarian Sociology] (2 vols., Budapest: Gondolat, 1973).

5 Jaszi, "The Marxian Paradox," p. 36.

6 Jaszi, *Marxizmus, vagy liberális szocializmus*, pp.20–29 and 103–123.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 40–46; Jaszi, "The Marxian Paradox," p. 47.
8 Jaszi, "The Marxian Paradox," p. 47.
9 Jaszi, *A történelmi materializmus államböl̈cselete*, pp. 12, 16–18, 166; also Jaszi, *Művészet és erkölcs*, pp. 354ff; Jaszi, "Darwin és a szociológia" [Darwin and Sociology] in Litván and Szűcs, eds., *A szociológia. . .* , vol. 1, pp. 261–266; also in the same volume the article "Herbert Spencer és jövő feladataink" [Herbert Spencer and Our Future Tasks] vol. 1, pp. 359–375.
10 Jaszi, *Marxizmus, vagy liberális szocializmus*, pp. 50–62.
11 *Ibid.*, p. 32.
12 *Ibid.*, p.129. (My translation).
13 *Ibid.*, p. 43, pp. 130–131. Jaszi writes: "In fact, it is possible to go even further and state that world history is nothing more than a constantly recurring struggle for the realization of this ancient spiritual reality." p. 43. (My translation).
14 *Ibid.*, pp. 47–49.
15 This is the case mostly with his journalistic writings. For examples, see György Litván and János Varga, eds. *Jászi Oszkár publicisztikája* [Jaszi's Journalistic Writings] (Budapest: Magvető, 1982). His perceptive critique of a book about Spengler is reprinted in *Századvég* [End of the Century] (1985, no. 1), pp. 196–201. His faith in progress was reaffirmed in his article written for the first number of the journal *Huszadik Század* entitled "Az új Magyarország felé" [Toward a New Hungary], in Litván and Szűcs, *A szociológia. . .* , vol. 2, p. 416. He wrote as follows: "There are points of time in history, when the less perceptive observer and the man of little faith notes that the cause of progress has failed for some time; but behind the dark chaos of daily events, the rays of light of a new age are already becoming visible." p. 416. (My translation).
16 Jaszi, *Kulturális elmaradottságunk okairól*, pp. 5, 11, 29–30.
17 Jaszi, *Marxizmus, vagy liberális szocializmus*, p. 133.

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Oscar Jaszi and the "Hungarian Problem:" Activities and Writings during World War II

N.F. Dreisziger

If it is fair to say that Oscar Jaszi's life can be divided into two halves, the Hungarian and the American, it can also be said that World War I and II were the respective plateaus of these two half-lives. Much has been published on Jaszi's activities, as well as the evolution of his ideas, during the Great War,[1] but very little on what he was doing—or thinking—during World War II. Undoubtedly, this imbalance in the historical literature on Jaszi's career is a reflection of the fact that 1914 to 1918 constituted the zenith of his political career; moreover, he was in the prime of his life, full of energy and intellectual vigour. And though he must have been displeased by negative reception of many of his ideas in his country, by the failure of some of his political ventures, and by the outbreak of the war itself in 1914, the greatest disappointments of his life were still ahead of him.

By the Second World War Jaszi's circumstances had changed. In particular, his political prospects had greatly diminished. He, along with his 1918 platform to reform Hungary, had been rejected. Even his career as an émigré statesman had come to an end by the early 1920s, and he had become a political exile, an émigré academic. There were other profound disappointments behind him as well by this time, including the mistreatment of his nation by the peacemakers in 1919–1920, and his own rejection by the statesmen of the Successor States soon after the conclusion of the postwar peace treaties.[2] Jaszi's spirit had not been crushed, however. Despite the setbacks he had suffered, he retained a fair reservoir of hope for the future. With whatever strength and energy he could muster—he was approaching retirement age—he continued to work for his beliefs and ideals throughout the Second World War and after.

Jaszi's political aim during the Second World War was very much the same as it had been during the First: a thoroughgoing reform of Hungarian

politics and society, and the establishment of a confederation of the peoples of the Danube Valley. How Jaszi wanted to achieve these, kept changing with the evolving political and strategic situation, just as he had grasped at different political constellations during the First World War while working toward a democratic Hungary, at peace with its neighbours. But a few elements of his strategy remained constant and remind one of his endeavors during World War I. He never missed a chance to denounce his native country's conservative ruling élite and their alleged or real reactionary policies, and he lived an active public life.

As we know, Jaszi's efforts in the early 1940s were just as, or even more, unsuccessful than his earlier ones had been. Not only did history deny him—even more profoundly than in 1918—a chance to implement his ideas, but the end of the new war brought renewed disillusionment, equal perhaps to what he had felt after the First World War. Jaszi's reactions to the events of World War II, his activity during the conflict, have never been fully documented. Neither have his writings of the period been analyzed or reprinted. This paper will begin to redress this gap in the historical literature.

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As war clouds gathered on the European horizon during the mid-1930s, Jaszi experienced still another of his frustrations with the post-World War I situation in East Central Europe. In 1935 he crossed the Atlantic again to tour this part of the world once more. Prior to his visit, he was under the impression that the only feudalistic and militaristic country in the region was Hungary, and cherished the hope that a thoroughgoing reform in that country would lead to a general reconciliation among the peoples of the Danube Valley. His visit to Czechoslovakia and, especially, to Rumania and Yugoslavia, left him far less optimistic about the prospects of East Central Europe. What he found there was inter-ethnic tensions, hate-mongering, xenophobia and the undue influence of "unbalanced intellectuals" in politics. He concluded that the Successor States were plagued by the same nationality problems and intra-national antagonisms as the old Habsburg Empire before 1918.[3] The outcome of the visit was his even stronger conviction that the postwar division of East Central Europe into independent small states had been a failure and that their only hope for the future would be the creation of a federal structure, "combined with a complete cultural and administrative autonomy of the variegated national minorities. . . ."[4]

Jaszi and his fellow exiles were slow to make political moves in response to the outbreak of the Second World War, primarily because Hungary did not get involved in the conflict until 1941. In fact, it was the conservative camp of the Hungarian immigrant and émigré community in the United

States that took the initiative in wartime organizational work.[5] Much of this activity was inspired by the regime in Budapest. Throughout the interwar years, the Horthy regime had cultivated contacts with the patriotic elements in North America's Hungarian community. The leading political institution for Hungarians in the United States was the American Hungarian Federation, an organization which to some extent owed its existence to the ruling élite in Budapest.[6] After the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, Hungary's government redoubled its efforts at strengthening its influence in the Hungarian-American community. Part of the reason for this policy was Prime Minister Pál Teleki planned to create of a wartime government-in-exile in case Hungary fell under Nazi domination.[7] Obviously, such a government, whether established in the United States or in another of the North Atlantic democracies, would need the support of influential ethnic community organizations such as the American Hungarian Federation.

In November 1940, János Pelényi, the Hungarian Minister to Washington, and several members of his staff, resigned their posts and sought asylum in the United States. As political refugees they could expect to have a freer hand in directing the activities of the patriotic wing of the Magyar-American community. Indeed, two months later, in January 1941, Hungarian-America's leading personalities gathered at a conference in Washington to lay the foundations for a free Hungarian government in the West, should fate require its establishment.[8]

To head a Hungarian government in the free world, Hungary's political élite of decided to send one of its members into voluntary exile. Their choice fell on Tibor Eckhardt who secretly left Hungary through still neutral Yugoslavia in early March. Though by the late-1930s Eckhardt had moved to the centre-left of the Hungarian political spectrum, his selection as a spokesman for the Hungarian diaspora in the West proved to be a mistake. The fact was that during the post-Word War I turmoil, Eckhardt had been a vocal right-winger, a fact which had made him *persona non grata* with the leftist faction of the Hungarian emigration in the United Kingdom and the Americas.[9] Jaszi, in particular, loathed Eckhardt with singular vehemence.

Eckhardt encountered many obstacles and delays in making preparations for his assumption of the leadership of a free Hungary movement in the West. Soon after his departure from East Central Europe, dramatic events began to unfold. A pro-allied military coup in Yugoslavia precipitated Hitler's decision to postpone his planned invasion of the USSR until after the danger to his flank in the Balkans could be eliminated. Pressure was brought upon Hungary to abandon her neutrality and allow German troops to cross the country on their way to Yugoslavia. The situation raised the spectre of a British declaration of war against Hungary. Prime Minister Teleki tried to deflect this threat by taking his own life, to demonstrate that his country had been coerced into involvement in Germany's Balkan

venture. War with Britain was averted for the time being, but enough damage had been done to Hungary's stature to preclude the possibility of Eckhardt going to the United Kingdom to launch his planned Free Hungary Movement. Nevertheless, he managed to embark for the still neutral United States, after dodging Gestapo agents all the way from the Balkans to Egypt, and from there to South Africa.[10] Eckhardt's appearance in the United States in August 1941 finally prompted the left-wing elements of the Hungarian-American community into action.

The Hungarian-American left, unlike the right which tended to concentrate around the American Hungarian Federation, was by no means a cohesive community. There were divisions in its ranks along ideological and class lines, and there were differences in outlook between the "old" immigrants and the more recent arrivals. There were also regional rivalries, exemplified by the lack of cooperation among groups centred around various metropolises such as Cleveland, Chicago, and New York. Actually, in discussing the Hungarian-American left, especially the non-communist left, it might be more accurate to talk of prominent individuals rather than of organizations. Some of these people had achieved their fame or notoriety in Hungary, others in America, and a few—like Jaszi—in both. Many of them had stayed away from immigrant organizational life until the wartime crises prompted them to political action. Perhaps the best-known among these luminaries was the film actor Béla Lugosi, Hollywood's own "Count Dracula."[11] One of Lugosi's close allies was László Moholy-Nagy, the Chicago-based avant-garde artist and lifetime devotee of Károlyi.[12] Then there was Lajos Tóth, described by one of his contemporaries as "an internationally recognized authority on accounting," who would lead the New York Council of Hungarian Americans for Victory.[13] Somewhat less known but similarly active leftist Hungarian-American personalities were two recent arrivals to America, László Fényes (a member of the Hungarian parliament during the First World War) and Pál Kéri. Both of these men had lived in European exile before their arrival in the USA, and both had been implicated in the murder of wartime Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza during the early days of the Károlyi revolution. Fényes was acquitted at a trial held in 1920, while Kéri was convicted—he was released from prison several years later and went into exile. Still another prominent Hungarian who would play an important role in the wartime politics of the Hungarian-American left was Rusztem Vámbéry. Also a recent arrival in the US, he, like his friend Jaszi, was a publicist, scholar and university teacher; unlike Jaszi however, Vámbéry had never held high political office in Hungary. He was a professor of criminology at the University of Budapest where, during the Károlyi regime, he had been a dean. After the revolutionary interlude of 1918–19, Vámbéry continued his teaching career in Hungary until 1938 when he emigrated to the United States. There, despite his age

(66), he resumed teaching by accepting a post at the New School of Social Research in New York City.[14]

A bitter conflict between the Hungarian-American left and the right should not have been inevitable at this time or, at least, not between Eckhardt and Vámbéry. These two men had been prominent members of Hungary's legal profession and were acquaintances. They had had a meeting when Eckhardt visited the United States in 1940 and discussed the question of starting a movement for a free Hungary in America should it become necessary. There seems to have been no evidence at the time that the two could not collaborate in such a venture.[15] After Eckhardt returned to the United States in August 1941, he met with Vámbéry again and outlined his plans for the movement. While the two agreed that there was a need for such action, they now came to the conclusion that they better pursue their aim of rallying Hungarian Americans to the anti-Nazi cause through separate organizations. Eckhardt believed that the majority of "patriotic Hungarians" would not support a movement in which Vámbéry and his associates took part, while Vámbéry felt that he was no longer in a position to cooperate with Eckhardt. Nevertheless, the two apparently agreed not to obstruct each other's work.[16]

Soon after his meeting with Vámbéry, Eckhardt completed his preparations for the launching of his "Independent Hungary" movement and issued a manifesto outlining its aims. The declaration began by arguing that Hungary's independence had been "destroyed" when that country had been "tricked" into the war as Germany's ally. Hungarians living in free countries had "the sacred duty to give voice to the genuine convictions of the Hungarian people and to take up the fight against Nazi domination." The proclamation's authors also declared that the existing Hungarian government did not represent the aspirations of the Hungarian nation. Next, the statement announced the establishment of an executive committee to lead the fight for an "Independent Hungary," and called on all Magyars living in freedom to endorse this movement.[17]

No sooner than Eckhardt's plans became public knowledge, personal attacks on him started, some of them by Vámbéry's own associates. The change in the Vámbéry group's attitude toward Eckhardt and his movement probably had a lot to do with the activities of Mihály Károlyi in England—the other aspirant to the leadership of Hungarians in the free world. Ever since Hungary's involvement in the war against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941, Károlyi had contemplated launching a movement of free Hungarians living in Britain and the Americas. The 66-year-old former statesman, politically isolated and not in the best of health, needed allies. To help him with organizational work, he chose Count Károly Lónyai, a man with close links to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile.[18] The two of them turned to Jaszi and Vámbéry to organize the American branch of the movement. In

a message addressed to Jaszi, Károlyi outlined its requirements and aims. The immediate goal was to separate the true anti-fascists from the "Trojan horse crowd" congregating around Eckhardt, by denouncing Horthy for selling out Hungary to Hitler. The long term aim would be the building of a democratic Hungary: the ending of feudalism and capitalism, radical land reform, the establishment of producers' cooperatives and so on. Such a program, Károlyi believed, would be welcomed by progressive Hungarians everywhere, but would be unacceptable to Eckhardt's potential followers.[19]

In response to Károlyi's plea, the American Federation of Democratic Hungarians (AFDH) was brought into being in September at a meeting in Cleveland, Ohio. On its executive were Vámbéry and Jaszi, as well as Ignácz Schultz, a recent arrival from occupied Czechoslovakia.[20] The organization's headquarters were established in New York City. Its news organ became the bulletin, *Harc* [Combat], but it was also supported by another newsletter, *Igazmondó* [The Truth Teller].[21]

The AFDH leadership's attitude to Eckhardt was illustrated by an article that Schultz published at the time in the periodical, *The Nation*. This front-page declaration, entitled "Budapest's Fake Mission," denounced Eckhardt as an anti-Semite and anti-democrat and an agent of the "feudal coterie which rules Hungary by the grace of Hitler." Schultz then went on to paint a black picture of the regime in power in Budapest.[22] The AFDH's platform was couched in less vituperative language, but was equally strident. "We make no difference," began the document's second paragraph, "between Hitler and Horthy." It called on members of Hungary's armed forces "to go over to the enemies of Hitler and Hungary," and on the Hungarian population to sabotage the Axis war effort. It also rejected the alterations to Hungary's boundaries that had taken place since 1937. Concerning the country's future, the AFDH's platform called for a democratic postwar Hungary at peace with its neighbours, and demanded the abolition of the monarchy and the dissolution of the nobility's and the churches' estates.[23]

The AFDH, together with the Hungarian-American communist press, managed to frustrate Eckhardt's efforts to mobilize the Hungarian immigrant community behind his Independent Hungary Movement. More importantly, the AFDH and their allies helped to cast enough doubt over Eckhardt's figure in the eyes of Allied authorities to make his movement a stillborn venture.[24] On the other hand, the Jaszi-Vámbéry coalition was unable to rally the Hungarian-American community behind its efforts. So, the search for the creation of a credible lobby to represent Hungarian Americans had to continue. This effort followed a two-pronged approach. One was aimed at the creation of a new organizational structure for the Hungarian-American left that was more acceptable both to the Hungarian immigrant community and the authorities in Washington, especially the State Department. The other aspect of the search was the attempt to reach

an accommodation with the less "compromised" members of Eckhardt's entourage.

To realign the organizational structure of the Hungarian-American left, the AFDH, at its annual meeting in New York City in September 1942, launched the movement New Democratic Hungary (NDH). NDH was to step into the shoes of Eckhardt's Independent Hungary movement which had suspended its activities during the summer. The leadership of the AFDH evidently believed that with their conservative rivals in disarray, they could bring into being a lobby under whose umbrella a wide range of Hungarians opposed to the Axis could gather. They also cherished the hope that NDH would be able to achieve effective cooperation with émigré groups from other Central European countries, and that through creating a high-profile movement, they would be in a better position to further the cause of Mihály Károlyi. The executive of the new organization was made up entirely of recent arrivals: Vámbéry became its president and László Fényes its vice-president.[25]

The time seemed propitious for attracting converts to the NDH. With the demise of Eckhardt's movement, it should have been easy to draw some of its prominent followers. The prime target of the AFDH's effort was Antal Balásy, one-time deputy head of the Hungarian legation in Washington. Balásy, who had sought diplomatic asylum in the United States in November 1940, was known in Allied diplomatic circles as an honest man with a liberal outlook. Though for some time he had been a follower of Eckhardt, he still managed to retain his reputation as a professional diplomat of impeccable credentials. He could have been a solid asset to the organization, even though his following among Hungarian immigrant masses was very limited. Negotiations with Balásy had been initiated before Eckhardt's resignation from the Independent Hungary Movement. At the time, the purpose of the discussions was a possible reconciliation between the patriotic and the progressive Hungarian camps in America. On 15 April 1942, Vámbéry and Balásy met, but failed to achieve concrete results. Vámbéry was unhappy with Balásy's disinclination to condemn the Horthy regime, while the latter was doubtful of Vámbéry's ability to command respect among Hungarian Americans, and, especially, among Hungarians in general, or even to control others in his group.[26] Contacts with Balásy were resumed after Eckhardt's resignation as leader of the Independent Hungary Movement, but, unfortunately for the people behind the NDH, the attempt to recruit Balásy failed.[27]

Another man the NDH planned to approach was the recently arrived renowned composer, Béla Bartók. While Balásy's joining the new movement would have increased its credibility in the eyes of the State Department, the winning of Bartók to the movement's cause would have elevated the NDH's profile in Hungarian-American circles and with the broader

American public. Regrettably for the NDH, Bartók remained an elusive target. He, in fact, was soon recruited by those members of the Hungarian American Federation who sought to breathe new life into Eckhardt's discredited Independent Hungary Movement.[28]

Still another project for the newly launched NDH was the continuation of efforts to bring Mihály Károlyi to the United States. This undertaking had its origins with Károlyi himself. In the late summer of 1941 he had come to the conclusion that if he were to lead "democratic" Hungarians outside of Hungary effectively, he would have to transfer his operations from the United Kingdom to the United States. Accordingly, in September of that year he asked his American supporters to plead with the State Department to grant him a visa.[29] Unfortunately for Károlyi, the State Department showed no interest in letting him come to America. Nor did authorities in Washington change their mind when the AFDH officially endorsed the cause of Károlyi's planned move and began campaigning for his admission.

The failure of these efforts was to have a damaging effect on the prospects of a Vámbéry-Jaszi coalition. Already during September 1942, a number of influential members of the movement expressed dissatisfaction with the leadership of the AFDH especially in regard to its inability to secure a visa for Károlyi.[30] This group, lead by László Moholy-Nagy and a few of his Chicago associates, decided to go it alone and undertake their own vigorous campaign to bring Károlyi to the United States. In time, they would establish a separate organization, the Hungarian-American Council for Democracy.[31]

The launching of the NDH then did not solve the problems of the Vámbéry-Jaszi group. Authorities in Washington were correct in their initial assessment that "the formation of the New Democratic Hungary movement [left] the situation largely unchanged."[32] The movement did not gain the desired wide-scale support for its leaders; on the contrary, it lead to a further proliferation of anti-Axis Hungarian organizations, and to the fragmentation of community leadership. Furthermore, the conservative wing of the Hungarian-American community had not been neutralized. Even though Eckhardt had been driven from prominence, nothing could prevent him from continuing his diplomatic maneuverings behind the scenes, and from wielding considerable influence in Hungarian émigré affairs.

For the balance of the war, America's "democratic" Hungarians would expend much time and effort to influence both Hungarian-American and Allied opinion, and would continue to launch new organizational undertakings to this end. They would win some skirmishes in their war against the "patriotic camp," but would never see their work crowned by substantial success.

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Jaszi's precise role in this work, both before and after 1942, has not been documented. Both contemporary and latter-day commentators refer to him as the leader, or one of the leaders of the Hungarian-American democratic left. This assessment seems appropriate in view of the facts that he had been one of the founders of the AFDH—and later became its president—and he had helped to launch the movement for a New Democratic Hungary. He held no office on the NDH's executive only because the State Department frowned upon the participation of American citizens in organizations of recent political refugees. Even some members of the patriotic camp of the Hungarian émigré community in North America acknowledged Jaszi's abilities as a leader and organizer. In a conversation with then American secret serviceman Allen Dulles, Balásy described Jaszi as the "ablest of the Vambery [*sic*] group . . . idealist and honest [though] pretty well discredited because of his connections with Károlyi. . . ."[33] Indeed, throughout this period, Jaszi was one of Károlyi's chief contacts in the US. One of his acquaintances described him as an " uncompromising though not uncritical friend" of the Count. "He knows the erratic mind, and all the other faults of the former Hungarian President, but, rightly or wrongly" believes Károlyi to be "the man" to lead a "Free Hungarian movement."[34]

Aside from supporting Károlyi's cause and involvement in the work of the AFDH and the NDH, Jaszi continued to write on Hungarian subjects. Much of what he produced appeared in the North American English-language press, but Jaszi also joined the ranks of those experts who reported on Hungarian affairs to America's wartime intelligence agency—the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Large fragments of one of his studies have survived in the OSS records. It is an essay on the "Hungarian Problem" that Jaszi wrote in the spring of 1944, evidently in response to a journalistic report that appeared in the British press at the end of March, assessing the Hungarian situation after the occupation of Hungary by the *Wehrmacht*. The report came from the pen of Noel Panter, a former special correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph* stationed in Budapest. Panter disagreed with those journalists who, after the German occupation, tended to portray Hungarian Premier Miklós Kállay "as a liberal minded man fallen victim to Nazi malevolence," and reminded his readers that in 1942 Kállay went around "making speeches emphasizing Hungary's duty to the Axis." Panter concluded his report by saying that "Hungary's occupation [was] but the natural development of a policy pursued during the past twelve years. . . ." [*The Daily Telegraph*, 31 March 1944]

Jaszi was evidently impressed by Panter's analysis. So much so that he wrote a lengthy memorandum, entitled the "Hungarian Problem," in support of it.[35] On the question of Hungary's German orientation, which

Panter had emphasized, Jaszi offered a different explanation. "This German orientation," Jaszi argued, was not of recent origin as Panter indicated, but it had been a "well thought out policy of a series of Hungarian governments. . . . since the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which guaranteed the leading role of the German bourgeoisie in Austria and the feudal classes in Hungary. . . ." By "at least the beginning of the 20th century," he continued, "it was evident to all," that this system "was collapsing." Progressive thinkers throughout the monarchy "recognized that the growing crisis could only be cured by the introduction of universal equal suffrage with secret ballot . . . [and the replacement of] the dualistic structure of the monarchy . . . by a kind of federalism giving equal rights to the Slavs and the other nationality groups."

The Austrian bourgeoisie was not the prime barrier to such reforms, according to Jaszi. Indeed, universal suffrage by secret ballot was granted in Austria in 1907. The "greatest obstacle" to reorganizing the Monarchy and to introducing universal suffrage in Hungary, was the "Hungarian feudal parliament." This legislature, in Jaszi's words, was "absolutely dominated by the landed aristocracy" and capitalists "utterly at the disposal of the lords." This "feudal system" sought to maintain the latifundia and "the great economic privileges which [it] enjoyed. . . " and to safeguard "the exclusively Magyar character" of Hungary. "The very idea of a federal structure," Jaszi continued, "was regarded as treason, and even the acknowledgment of the existence of the nationality problem was punished by social and political ostracism." Moreover, "feudal" Hungary continued to impede the solution of the Monarchy's nationality problem even during the war. "When it became evident in 1917 that the war was lost, the young emperor Charles made . . . efforts to appease the disgruntled national minorities of Austria by the promise of federalism, but . . . he did not dare to promote the same thing in Hungary, afraid of the ire" of the Hungarian ruling élite. The emperor's efforts were in vain, and the Monarchy "broke into pieces."

Next, Jaszi outlined the efforts of the government that he had served over two decades earlier:

> In Hungary, the government or Count Michael Károlyi. . . , tried to undo the vices of the past. The most needed democratic reforms were immediately voted: universal suffrage, dismemberment of the large estates, and national autonomy for the minorities. Unfortunately, economic collapse, social unrest, and the military occupation of the country made the execution of these laws impossible, and the national minorities of the country repudiated the idea of federalism and preferred to build up their own states with their brethren beyond the frontiers. Economic misery and national despair provided fertile soil

> for the Bolshevik emissaries. At the same time, the feudal forces of the country. . . , regained their vitality and began to plot with the reactionaries of England and France against the People's Republic [*sic*] of Károlyi. . . .

After the postwar peace settlement, Jaszi went on, there were "two roads open" to Hungary's governments. One was "to follow the policy initiated by the Republic," and the other was "to disregard and to undermine the peace treaty . . . to foment the spirit of irredentism, to concentrate all the energies of the country for the restoration of the old frontiers and to maintain the privileges of the feudal oligarchy. . . ." All post-1919 governments in Budapest, Jaszi asserted, had pursued the "second road without the slightest endeavor for democratic reforms or for bringing about a tolerable compromise" with the Successor States.

In subsequent text Jaszi turned to an analysis of the policies of the Horthy regime. Concerning foreign affairs, he pointed out that "the feudal aristocrats of Hungary never liked the parvenu Hitler. . . " but believed that the "danger of Nazism could easily be counterbalanced by the power of Mussolini." In domestic affairs the "feudal aristocracy" lost some of its influence to "Fascist elements." "Already during the shortlived Republic . . . the first signs of a Fascist terrorist system were manifest. . . ."

The "type of Fascism" that developed in Hungary, Jaszi felt compelled to add;

> was far nearer to the Nazi than to the Italian type. Several years before the advent of Hitler, a Hungarian type of Nazism grew up quite independently which anticipated many aspects of the Nazi ideology. It was an uncritical, exasperated and romantic philosophy of hatred and revenge. It emphasized the inalienable historic rights of Hungary to her old frontiers. It was a "stab-in-the-back" legend to the effect that Hungary was never defeated, that her collapse was exclusively due to the propaganda of the Allies, the Jews, and the Communists. The fight against the Jewish danger was one of the chief demagogic forces of the movement. . . . A vehement anti-Marxian campaign was carried on . . . Instead of socialism or communism, a "Christian National Social State" [was called for]. A doctrine of racial purity was proclaimed. . . , This mystic racism and wild nationalism paved the way for . . . a rapprochement with Nazism always with the hope that no exclusive pressure could be exercised by Germany . . .

The Hungarian leadership's hope of counterbalancing the influence of Hitler with that of Mussolini met with disappointment, and the country drifted closer and closer to the Third *Reich*. With the coming of World War II, Jaszi continued, "the old secret dream of the irredentist policy seemed

to become a reality: the countries of the Little Entente were destroyed or paralyzed and the dictators began the fulfillment of their promises to restore Hungary's territorial integrity. . . ."

> The German orientation, proved to be a mixed blessing. . . . The half million German minority, in the past a politically powerless element, assumed more and more the position of a privileged nationality and the pressure of the German general staff and the Gestapo hurt considerably the interests of the ruling Magyar classes. Hungary became more and more a German colony . . . German competition was painfully felt when Nazis were put into the key positions, whereas the feudal aristocracy was increasingly menaced with subversive activities of the Fascist organizations which began a demagogic campaign for the dismemberment of the large estates.

Jaszi's next paragraphs were devoted to depicting "the misery of the small peasantry and of the landless proletariat" and exploitation of workers and intellectuals by the "Magyar oligarchy and its Nazi allies." To support his arguments, Jaszi cited the works of a "group of young Hungarians, mostly descendants of peasant families. . . , [who] produced an amazingly . . . well documented literature in which the sufferings of the Magyar peasantry were unveiled." Next, Jaszi cited statistics compiled by these populist writers demonstrating that Hungary of the times was indeed the land of "three million beggars." The war and the territorial gains that it brought, he went on, did not alleviate the situation of Hungary's poor, but confounded it as a result of massive deliveries of foodstuffs to Germany, the demands of the war effort on the eastern front and the growth of "hatred between the Magyar and the non-Magyar races . . . in the reconquered territories." Referring to "atrocities . . . committed by the armies of occupation against both the Carpatho-Ukrainians and the Serbs" and the spread of "the spirit of wrath and revenge," Jaszi predicted that "[it] will be a hundred times more difficult to solve the nationality problem after the war than it would have been any time after [1867]. . . ."

In the following section of his essay, the author lashed out at Hungary's wartime leadership. These people were not quislings, "persons who became traitors to the[ir] country through motives of sordid economic interest or base ambition." Jaszi had no doubt that there were "thousands of people in Hungary who belong to this category and who became Nazi servants out of such motives." But Hungary's actual leaders were "conscious promoters and partly even originators of the system under which Europe is suffocating." And he continued:

> The Hungarian oligarchy and its capitalistic satellites have followed for a hundred years both a national and international policy that drove

the country ultimately into Fascist servitude. [They abandoned the] tradition of . . . Kossuth . . . and, instead of introducing the necessary social and national reforms . . . they embarked upon a policy of social-economic oppression and forcible denationalization of the alien groups. In spite of repeated admonitions and the lessons of the revolution[s] of 1848 and 1918, they continued to maintain the antiquated privileges of the ruling aristocracy. Because this could not be done without foreign protection, the Magyar oligarchy accepted Hapsburg domination first, the leadership of the German Kaiser during the first World War next, and finally Fascist hegemony, which ultimately led to Nazi supremacy. . . .

The main motive for this was not class or "personal interest as some simplifiers of history state." Though the "economic interest" of the landowners have played an "important role," Jaszi believed that Hungary's leaders "were influenced . . . by a complex of ideologic motives[:] the exaggerated and misguided feeling of patriotism, the haughtiness of an old warrior class, and the belief in their own historical mission."

In the penultimate section of his essay Jaszi turned to the subject of Hungary's future prospects. In his opinion these depended very much on the "international policy of Soviet Russia." The Soviets had already repudiated the "idea of the federalization" of East Central Europe. They had also made it clear that they will not deal with "any government which they cannot trust." Evidently the national "ruling oligarchies" had to be "replaced by new social and political forces which in their very nature would feel a strong affinity with the aims of Soviet Russia." Jaszi never doubted that "old feudal Hungary would be unacceptable to the rulers of Russia" and so it would be eliminated. "The only possibility for Hungary to come to terms with the Soviets and to safeguard her cultural and national independence. . . ," Jaszi concluded, "would be to create a democratic republic of the peasants, workers, and creative intelligentsia which could not be used in fomenting a hostile coalition . . . against Russia." He then added with a touch of pessimism, that the Russian leaders might opt for the "complete sovietization of the whole region" as they had done in the case of the Baltic states. In the end, however, he remained optimistic.

A situation could easily arise in which the Soviet leaders would hesitate to embark upon a policy which would arouse the distrust and the indignation of the Western democracies and of the United States whose economic and technical cooperation will be badly needed in the enormous work of reconstruction of Russia. Furthermore, in the post-war period the air and naval supremacy of Great Britain and the United States will be so thoroughly established that the realistic leaders of the Soviets would not risk a conflict . . . The complete and sincere

democratization of this region would make an aggressive policy [by] Russia unnecessary and would rob it of all ideologic pretexts.

And Jaszi went even further. "It is possible. . . ," he argued, that through the reform of Hungarian (and Yugoslav and Rumanian) society, and the "increasing socialization" in the "economic life" of Western democracies, the Soviets could be persuaded to abandon their "objection against a federalization" of East Central Europe. Perhaps Soviet Russia itself might embark on the "democratization" of her own political order. "In order to inaugurate such an evolution," Jaszi concluded, "it would be absolutely necessary to [do away with] the Danubian and the Balkan danger zone . . . Such a transformation could only be the work of the peasants, the workers and the creative intelligentsia of this region."

* * * * *

Thus ended Jaszi's 1944 analysis of the "Hungarian problem." At the time, many of his Hungarian compatriots would have declared this essay treasonous, while others might have called it an astute and realistic assessment. The treatise remains controversial even from a historical distance of nearly half-a-century. It is not easy to decide whether it is brilliant synopsis or journalistic polemic. Perhaps it is a combination of both. It has its insights, but contains many biased statements. There is also a strain of righteousness and even vindictiveness in its tone. His speculations concerning the future reveal Jaszi as an eternal optimist whose views are tinged with a degree of naivete.

Most disturbing is the very opening of Jaszi's essay, the treatment of Hungary's alleged or real long-term pro-German orientation—subject matter which prompted Jaszi to undertake his analysis of the "Hungarian problem" in the first place. Here Jaszi seems to be especially unreasonable in depicting the Hungarian governments of 1867–1914 as being "pro-German"—especially in the 1944 context of that phrase which implied a pervasive sense of evil. One would have thought that the Hungarian fathers of the 1867 Compromise, in preserving a constitutional link with Austria, rather than being evil or shortsighted, were the epitomes of political wisdom. Rather than serving narrow class or ethnic concerns—which they did in a way, but only coincidentally—they acted in the best interest of all peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy. Nor can we equate Hungarian loyalty—lukewarm at best with many Hungarians—to Emperor-King Francis Joseph with enthusiasm for Hitler.

There is even more to this charge of the Hungarian elite's "pro-Germanness." Jaszi himself can be said to have been tainted with it, a fact which he conveniently forgot or ignored in 1944. In 1915, however, he had

been a supporter of Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* plan, envisaging the postwar union of the lands of the principal Central Powers. True, at this time Jaszi saw in a liberal postwar Germany the force to counteract the influence of an autocratic Russia, and he soon abandoned his dallying with a German orientation. Nevertheless, three decades later, he would condemn interwar Hungary's leaders some of whom saw in a revitalized Germany a potential ally in their struggle to amend the blatantly unjust provisions of the post-1918 peace settlement.

A similar problem exists with Jaszi's accusation that the "feudal elite" of Hungary opposed the federal restructuring of Hungary before 1914, and even during the last year of the war. While this had indeed been the case, Jaszi's record is not such that he can make this charge lightheartedly. Though ever since the 1920s Jaszi has been known as one of the foremost promoters of Danubian federalism, his pre-1919 record is not such that allows him to castigate his aristocratic compatriots. In his famous 1912 book on nationality problem he rejected the idea of the federal reorganization of the Kingdom of Hungary.[36] Even in his 1918 proposal for the federal union of East Central Europe, Hungary (excepting Croatia which had had its autonomy already) remained a single administrative unit.[37] It was only in the late autumn of that year, when Hungary's territorial disintegration had reached an advanced stage, that Jaszi and his associates in the Károlyi government's Ministry of Nationality Affairs came up with plans to turn Hungary into a federation of autonomous cantons, on the pattern of Switzerland.[38]

In dealing with the Károlyi era of postwar history, Jaszi reveals himself as a skillful apologist. In suggesting that the reform efforts of this period were undermined by Hungary's "feudal forces" plotting "with the reactionaries of England and France," he engages in the kind of myth-making which he finds repulsive when used by the conservatives who blame the socialists and their allies for the ills that befell Hungary after the war. In attacking the Horthy regime in general, Jaszi often uses half-truths or outright falsehoods. In suggesting that Hungary's post-1919 regime should have followed the path charted in 1918–19, he ignores the fact that in those years the left of the Hungarian political spectrum had thoroughly discredited itself in the eyes of Hungary's populace. Implicating the Hungarian leadership in the 1934 assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia can today be deemed historical falsification: the real culprit was Mussolini, but the international community at the time refused to blame him lest he be driven into an alliance with Hitler.[39] Jaszi might not have known this fact, which suggests that he was as much a victim of anti-Hungarian propaganda as he was a perpetrator of it.

Jaszi's treatment of the war period also leaves much to be desired for historical accuracy and fairness. In stressing the "atrocities" committed by

Hungarian troops in the reoccupied Hungarian territories, Jaszi ignores the fact that these incidents were the exception rather than the rule in those days of conflict, and can hardly be compared to what was taking place elsewhere in occupied Europe. In especially condemning Hungary's aristocrats, Jaszi makes another omission: he ignores the fact that it was precisely certain members of this class (Prime Minister Count Pál Teleki and former Prime Minister Count István Bethlen, in particular) who opposed the German alliance. To call such people not even "quislings" but "the conscious promoters . . . of the system under which Europe is suffocating," is at best complete insensitivity and at worst, slander.

In assessing future possibilities, Jaszi differentiates himself from many left-wing intellectuals of the time. He does realize that the Soviets might ride roughshod over the countries of East Central Europe and impose Soviet-style authoritarianism on them, but is naive enough—easily said with the benefit of hindsight—to believe that Moscow might end its opposition to a federation of East Central Europe. It was even more naive for Jaszi to hope that the Soviets, rather than imposing Stalinism on this part of the world after the war, would begin the democratization of Russia—especially if the countries of Eastern Europe, and even those of the West, would embark on building socialist societies. As this socialist transformation of the West never happened (or, at least, not in the manner Jaszi had in mind), we cannot know whether if it had, Soviet Russia would have started along the path to democratization after the war, as Jaszi had predicted. Knowing the nature of Stalin's regime, however, we can now call this prediction profoundly simplistic.

The democratization of Russia was to begin four decades later, mainly for reasons that Jaszi could not have foreseen. Interestingly enough, the elimination of the "Danubian and Balkan danger zone" in Europe did not precede that democratization. In fact, that sore spot only intensified in the wake of political changes in Russia. It may well be that Jaszi is still correct in his prediction that the elimination of this "danger zone" remains a precondition of the successful completion of Russia's democratization. Whether Jaszi's other, final prophesy—that the solution of the Danubian and Balkan problem can be only the work of the "peasants, the workers and the creative intelligentsia"—is valid, only time will tell.

* * * * *

Much research remains to be done if we are to arrive at a comprehensive and fair assessment of Jaszi's activities and thinking during the Second World War. Without this research, historical evaluations of this subject must remain tentative. Nevertheless, such sources of information as archival

collections—such as records of the Office of Strategic Services and those of the State and Justice departments in Washington—as well as Jaszi's own publications and the limited historical literature that deals with this period of his life, allow us to begin a stock-taking of his wartime work and draw some preliminary conclusions about his reactions to the Second World War and, in particular, to Hungary's involvement in it.

The years 1941 to 1945, not unlike the years from 1914 to 1919, seem to have been a period of intense organizational and intellectual activity for Jaszi. He corresponded, mediated, organized and, above all, wrote about subjects close to his heart. His situation was, of course, vastly different during these two critical phases of his life. During the First World War he had been a well-known figure in Hungary, a prolific publicist, a respected scholar and an aspiring opposition politician. He could look forward to a future in a postwar world which he believed would be brighter than that which had preceded the war and laid the seeds for its inevitable outbreak. In contrast, during the Second World War he was an émigré academic with little influence with the general public of both his adopted and native lands. In fact, he was isolated even from the masses of Hungarian Americans; and, as a resident of Oberlin, Ohio, he had limited influence in such centres of Magyar émigré life as Chicago and New York.

By the early 1940s, moreover, Jaszi was past his prime, a fact which influenced not so much his capacity to work, but his intellectual vigour. In the years prior to 1919, he was much more likely to come up with original analysis of complex issues. In those days his work and outlook seem to have been oriented towards the future. During the Second World War he did exhibit a degree of interest in looking ahead, but in thinking and writing about what the postwar era might bring, Jaszi kept looking to the past, to the year 1918 when—as he no doubt believed—opportunities had been missed and history had taken a wrong turn adversely affecting both his country's evolution and his own fortunes.

Even a cursory examination of Jaszi's World War II work and writings reveals that his immediate post-World War I experience had a profound and lasting effect on him. The collapse of the regime he had served, the rejection of his own program for the reorganization of East Central Europe and the emergence in Hungary of a political system almost diametrically opposed to his ideals had dealt Jaszi an emotional blow from which he seems not to have recovered. It is this mind-set that helps to account for his relentless opposition to the regime in Budapest, and which explains why the struggle against this regime preoccupied his spirit and consumed his energy during the war years of 1941–45. The more he saw his enemies in Hungary on the verge of political collapse and moral bankruptcy, the more strident his attacks on them became. In certain respects, it seems then that when he wrote his essay on the "Hungarian Problem" in 1944, Jaszi

was continuing a fight that he had lost—but in his view only temporarily—in 1918–19. As a result, this work is not so much the kind of incisive analysis that we associate with Jaszi the scholar of the pre-1914 period, but the polemic of a disappointed, elderly man. In observing Jaszi's wartime assault on the reputation of the Horthy regime, one is also tempted to wonder if for him fighting German Nazism had not taken second place to combating Hungarian "feudalism."

Jaszi's work and writings during World War II, not unlike what happened during World War I, had no immediate impact on the final outcome of the war and the evolution of postwar Danubian Europe. There are those who would argue that his writings in particular had a lasting negative effect on Hungary's reputation. Although targeted at the "feudal coterie" that he perceived as ruling his country throughout his lifetime, his polemical observations probably reflected on the whole Hungarian nation, and gave ammunition—and continue to do so even today—to those who wish to discredit Hungary and Hungarians in general. The aim of a patriotic statesman is to serve his nation. The person who forgets his aim and redoubles his effort is a fanatic, to paraphrase George Santayana. One is tempted to wonder to what extent Jaszi's relentless tirades against "feudal" Hungary make him a true leader of the Magyars, or a political zealot.

Whether Jaszi's—and Vámbéry's, Károlyi's, Fényes's, etc.—diatribes against Horthyite Hungary had significant impact on Allied policies during the war is doubtful. Most Allied statesmen and officials knew enough to take the arguments of the Hungarian "progressives" with a grain of salt. London's and Washington's anti-Hungarian stand, as manifested in their rejection of Eckhardt as a spokesman for Hungarians of the Atlantic democracies, was based on other considerations: that the Horthy regime—and anyone even vaguely associated with it such as Eckhardt—was not acceptable to the Czech government-in-exile, which, after all, was an ally in the war against the Axis. In rejecting the Horthy regime then, Jaszi and his associates were, on the "side of the angels" in World War II. Unfortunately for them, even this stand failed to ensure them a measure of lasting success.

The post-1945 era was to bring new disappointments for the septuagenarian Jaszi. Under occupation by the Red Army, Hungary's future remained as uncertain as ever. What saddened him even more was the political outlook adopted by the countries of East Central Europe regarding minorities. This manifested itself through intolerance, discrimination against and the wholesale deportation of ethnic groups. These were the very policies that, in the 1941–44 context, Jaszi deemed to have harmed relations among the peoples of the region in a way never experienced during the life of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. What hurt Jaszi the most was the fact that these attitudes surfaced even—one might say especially—in Czechoslo-

vakia, a country that for him had been a beacon of hope in the post-1919 period. For Jaszi then, World War II ended very much the way the First World War had a quarter century earlier. It brought him anguish mixed with excitement and hope, but in the end and above all, disappointment.

NOTES

The author is indebted to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Department of National Defence of Canada, for providing him with research grants over the years that made research on this and other World War II subjects possible.

1 See especially Béla K. Király, "The Danubian Problem in Oscar Jaszi's Political Thought," *Hungarian Quarterly* V (April-June 1965), pp. 120–34. Also, Péter Hanák, *Jászi Oszkár dunai patriotizmusa* [The Danubian patriotism of Oscar Jaszi] (Budapest: Magvető, 1985), pp. 59–80.

2 See the conclusions to the paper by György Litván in this volume.

3 N.F. Dreisziger, "Central European Federalism in the Thought of Oscar Jászi and his Successors," in *Society in Change: Studies in Honor of Béla K. Király* eds. S.B. Vardy and A.H. Vardy (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1983), p. 545.

4 One of Jaszi's wartime publications cited *ibid.*

5 On the origins of the Hungarian community of the United States see Julianna Puskás, *Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Államokban, 1880–1940* [Immigrant Hungarians in the United States, 1880–1940] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1982).

6 N.F. Dreisziger, "Bridges to the West: The Horthy Regime's 'Reinsurance Policies' in 1941," *War & Society* 7 (May 1989), pp. 4f.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 2–4.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 5f.

10 Eckhardt says relatively little on his journey in his book, *Regicide at Marseille: Recollections of Tibor Eckhardt* (New York: American Hungarian library, 1964), pp. 245f. His trip is described in fair amount of detail in an intelligence report: "The Hungarian problem in Europe and the United States," by Hans Habe, 10 Feb. 1942, OSS Records, RG 226, No. 15181, Regular Series, National Archives of the United States (NAUS).

11 Lugosi had had a promising acting career in pre-Horthyite Hungary, and managed to continue it in America of the 1920s and 1930s. By the 1940s, however, his fortunes had declined – he was being hopelessly typecast and had problems with substance abuse – but that did not prevent him from assuming a leading role in the efforts to support Mihály Károlyi's quest for the supreme leadership of anti-fascist Hungarians in the West. On Lugosi see Robert Dremer, *Lugosi: The Man Behind the Cape* (Chicago: Henry Regenry, 1976), and Arthur Lennig, *The Count: The Life and Films of Bela 'Dracula' Lugosi* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1974).

12 On Moholy-Nagy see Oliver A.I. Botar (editor and contributor), *The Early Twentieth Century Avant-Grade*, a special issue of the *Hungarian Studies Review* 15

(Spring 1988).

13 Lengyel, *Americans from Hungary*, p. 177.

14 For Jaszi's comments on Vámbéry see his introduction to Vámbéry's 1942 publication, *The Hungarian Problem* (New York: The Nation, 1942), pp. 7f. See also, Paul Nadanyi, *The "Free Hungary" Movement* (New York: Amerikai Magyar Népszava, 1942), pp. 13–14, 33–34.

15 Nadanyi, pp. 83f.

16 Copy of memorandum by Tibor Eckhardt to the State Department, 11 Feb. 1942, The Papers of Tibor Eckhardt, Vol. 1, file 4, Hoover Institution Archives. In this memo Eckhardt accuses Vámbéry of breaking his promise of not obstructing the work of the "Free Hungary" movement very soon thereafter. According to information received by Allen W. Dulles at the time, Vámbéry acknowledged his associates' attacks on Eckhardt, did not consider them wise, but felt that he had no way of preventing them. "[T]his was a free country [Vámbéry said] and he had no control over what his associates said or did." Memorandum, A.W. Dulles to Hugh R. Wilson, 16 April 1942, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Entry 106, Box 14. National Archives of the United States.

17 For a copy of the proclamation see the Tibor Eckhardt Papers, Box. 5. Hoover Archives.

18 According to historian Tibor Hajdu, Károlyi's biographer, Lónyai was an unfortunate choice. See Hajdu's *Károlyi Mihály. Politikai életrajz* [Mihály Károlyi: A Political Biography] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1978), p. 475.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 478–79.

20 Schultz was a former member of the Prague Parliament, but was not associated with the group of deputies in that legislative assembly that accepted the leadership of János Eszterházy and were known to represent the Hungarian minority of the country. For more on Schultz, see Nadanyi, pp. 46f.

21 "Hungarian Groups in the United States," memorandum by Hodza, (Jan. 1942), Foreign Nationalities Branch of the Organization of Strategic Services (hereafter FNB), HU–17, Records of the OSS, National Archives of the United States.

22 *The Nation: America's Leading Liberal Weekly since 1865*, 27 September 1941.

23 "Hungarian Groups in the United States," *loc. cit.* (FNB HU–17).

24 Dreisziger, "Bridges," 10–12.

25 "Hungarian Politics in the United States," FNB memorandum, 30 Sept. 1942, OSS Records, RG 226, Regular series, file 21786, NAUS.

26 Both Balásy and Vámbéry reported on this meeting to OSS officials in Washington. See the memos exchanged by H.R. Wilson and Allen Dulles, 16 and 17th April, 1942, the "new" OSS Records, Entry 106, Box 14, NAUS. For fragments of the Vámbéry-Balásy correspondence of the spring of 1942 see Allen W. Dulles to H.R. Wilson, 27 May 1942, FNB Records, HU-73.

27 One source points out that at one point Balásy and Jaszi had agreed to meet in person in Washington, but Jaszi did not show up for the meeting. "Hungarian politics. . . " 30 Sept. 1942, *loc. cit.* In England, Károlyi was more successful, as he managed to recruit to his cause another former Eckhardt supporter, Antal Zsilinszky. See Hajdu, *Károlyi*, p. 480.

28 The idea of replacing Eckhardt with Bartók as the leader of the Independent Hungary movement had originated with Eckhardt himself. See the FNB memo-

randum "Independent Hungary Movement in the United States," 11 Aug. 1942, FNB Records, HU–212.

29 Hajdu, *Károlyi Mihály*, p. 478.

30 FNB memo 30 Sept. 1942, *loc. cit.*

31 Besides Moholy-Nagy and the above mentioned Lugosi, this organization would count among its leaders Hugo Rony, who had been Minister of Health in Károlyi's government, and Sándor Vince, another high-ranking functionary of that regime.

32 FNB memo, 30 Sept. 1942, *loc. cit.*

33 Dulles to Wilson, 16 April 1942, *loc. cit.* Balásy apparently had a less favourable opinion of Jaszi's associates: Vámbéry liked to "agree with everyone" and had "no particular fighting qualities" and possessed "very little control over . . . [the] others in his group," and Kéri was decidedly "not well viewed in Hungary." *Ibid.*

34 M.W. Fodor, reporting to the FNB of the OSS, 16 March 1942, FNB Records, HU–48. According to Fodor, the opponents to Károlyi's coming to America within the AFDH were Vámbéry and his New York associates. Hajdu, Károlyi's biographer, explains that Vámbéry was reluctant to advocate an idea that was not favoured in the State Department. Hajdu, *Károlyi*, p. 482.

35 The text is given in the Appendix. Its source is the files of the OSS, NAUS. Jaszi's name is not to be found on the document, no doubt because the 1st page of his essay is missing. The index card to the document that had been prepared by OSS officials during the war, identifies Jaszi as its author.

36 Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* (Budapest, 1912). Jaszi's book has been recently re-published in abbreviated form in Hungary: Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok. . . .* , György Litván ed. (Budapest: Gondolat, 1986). See also the postscript to Jaszi's 1918 work: Oszkár Jászi, *A monarchia jövője, a dualizmus bukása, és a dunai egyesült államok* [The Future of the Monarchy, the Failure of Dualism, and the Danubian United States], (Budapest, 1918), by József Galántai, in a recent re-issue (Budapest: AKV-Maecenas, 1988), p. 125.

37 Galántai's postscript to Jaszi's 1918 book, p. 128.

38 László Szarka, "A méltányos nemzeti elhatárolódás lehetősége 1918 végén" [The Possibility of Equitable Settlement of the Ethnic Question at the End of 1918], *Regio: Kisebbségtudományi Szemle* (Regio: Review of Ethnic Studies) I (January 1990), pp. 49–56. See also Thomas Spira's paper in this volume.

39 Bennett Kovrig, "Mediation by Obfuscation: The Resolution of the Marseille Crisis, October 1934 to May 1935," *The Historical Journal* xix (1976), pp. 207ff. See also Eckhardt's *Recollections*, cited in note 10.

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Appendix

Document 1

The Hungarian Problem

Editor's notes:

The following document is reproduced from the records of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (RG 266, regular series, 1941–45, doc. no. 79021), deposited in the National Archives of the United States (NAUS). The document's first page contains an excerpt from a March 1944 press report by Noel Panter. Its second page is the second page of an essay, apparently entitled "The Hungarian Problem." The first page of this essay has not been located. The OSS index to RG 266, regular series, identifies Oscar Jaszi as the author of this essay, and gives July 1, 1944 as the time of its receipt by the agency. The document was declassified, at the request of N.F. Dreisziger, on 25 Feb. 1991. (Authority NND 750140). N.F.D. is indebted to the staff of NAUS for declassifying this (and other) OSS document(s) for him, and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for providing him with a research grant that made his research in Washington and elsewhere possible during 1990–91.

In the reprinting of this document, the original spelling of certain words was retained, even though this is unconventional (e.g. Jugoslavia instead of Yugoslavia) or is not used by our journal (e.g. Hapsburg instead of Habsburg).

Declassified

The Hungarian Problem

The essence of the Hungarian situation was admirably stated by an Englishman, Noel Panter, for several years a special correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post* stationed at Budapest who wrote in the March 31, 1944 issue of his paper the following introductory remarks to a careful and well informed article:

"Hungary's occupation is but the natural development of a policy pursued during the past twelve years. To do the rulers of Hungary justice they never concealed or camouflaged their intentions or predilections. They were and are revisionist and pro-Axis. Leaders of a nation which cannot forget, which has 'No, no, never' as its watchword, and much of whose misery and discontent was born of defeat could not well have acted otherwise.

Kállay, whom there is just now a tendency to represent as a liberal minded man fallen victim to Nazi malevolence, was in May, 1942, engaged making speeches emphasizing Hungary's duty to the Axis and threatening 'with whip and gallows' all those who failed to appreciate the sign of the times. . . ."

[the rest by Jaszi, starting on p. 2 of his essay]

The Hungarian Problem

II

This German orientation, however, which Mr. Panter describes, did not originate after the first World War and the dismemberment of Hungary but it has been a well thought out policy of a series of Hungarian governments. *This policy was a logical and inevitable continuation of the dominant currents of Hungarian Public life* since the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which guaranteed the leading role of the German bourgeoisie in Austria and the feudal classes in Hungary.

By at least the beginning of the 20th century it was evident to all unbiased observers, both Hungarians and foreigners, that the Dual System, established by the Compromise or 1867, was collapsing. Both the Austrian and the Hungarian parliaments were paralyzed by obstructionism. The national minorities in both countries which constituted the majority of the population in the Hapsburg monarchy, accused the system of giving unjust advantages to the Germans and Hungarians to the detriment of the other national groups.

All the progressive elements in both parts of the monarchy recognized that the growing crisis could only be cured by the introduction of universal

equal suffrage with secret ballot which would make an end to the domination of the German and the Magyar oligarchies. The resistance of the leading German bourgeoisie was not very strong, for the parliamentarian reform was advocated by labor, the national minorities, and even very influential elements around the court and in the general staff who understood that the Hapsburg monarchy, without popular support, must necessarily succumb. Under the pressure of all these groups who found great support in the energetic personality of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, universal, equal, and direct suffrage was introduced in Austria in 1907. *It became more and more a common opinion of advanced thinkers that the dualistic structure of the monarchy must be replaced by a kind of federalism* giving equal rights to the Slavs and the other nationality groups.

The greatest obstacle to this reform and to universal suffrage was the Hungarian feudal parliament. Its Upper House had a strictly medieval character and the Lower House was absolutely dominated by the landed aristocracy and the financial capitalism utterly at the disposal of the lords. This feudal system had two main objectives. One was to maintain the *latifundia* and the great economic privileges which feudal agrarianism enjoyed by its predominance in the dualistic set-up. Its second main objective was to safeguard the exclusively Magyar character of the state against the will of at least one half of the population. The very idea of a federal structure with the other nationality groups, especially the Slavs, was regarded as treason, and even the acknowledgment of the existence of the nationality problem was punished by social and political ostracism.

III

The reactionary forces in Hungary, under the leadership of Count Stephen Tisza, made a parliamentarian reform in Hungary impossible and the nationality tension in the monarchy assumed more and more dangerous features in the form of the various *irredentas*. Especially the gravity of the Southern Slav problem grew continuously and led to the assassination of the heir apparent, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. *The clash between Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism became inevitable.* Following the German suggestion Vienna used the assassination of Francis Ferdinand as a pretext for starting a war to crush Serbia, the leader of the Southern Slav movement.

When it became evident in 1917 that the war was lost the young emperor Charles made some desperate but belated efforts to appease the disgruntled national minorities of Austria by the promise of federalism, but even in the last hour he did not dare to promote the same thing in Hungary, afraid of the ire of the Hungarian feudalism. In vain did the last Hapsburg invoke the principle of self determination in the Wilsonian sense and ask the people

of Austria to form their own governments and to confederate. None of the peoples, not even the loyal Germans, heeded the imperial manifesto.

The Austro-Hungarian monarchy broke into pieces in a few days, each national unit establishing its own government. In Hungary, which soon became a republic, *the government of Count Michael Károlyi, returning to the traditions of 1848, tried to undo the vices of the past.* The most needed democratic reforms were immediately voted: universal suffrage, dismemberment of the large estates, and national autonomy for the minorities. Unfortunately, economic collapse, social unrest, and the military occupation of the country made the execution of these laws impossible, and *the national minorities of the country repudiated the idea of federalism* and preferred to build up their own states with their brethren beyond the frontiers. Economic misery and national despair provided fertile soil for the Bolshevik emissaries. At the same time, the feudal forces of the country, alarmed by the immediate danger of the expropriation of their estates, regained their vitality and began to plot with the reactionaries of England and France against the People's Republic of Károlyi. The illfamed note of the allied powers presented by Col. Vyx to the Budapest government, shifting the line of demarcation laid down in the armistice and compelling the Republic to evacuate purely Hungarian territories, aroused such nation-wide indignation that the Károlyi government abdicated and gave place to a socialist government that immediately compromised with the Communists. A Soviet Republic was proclaimed (March, 1919) which soon collapsed under the bayonets of the Rumanian army.

IV

After the dismemberment of Hungary, carried out long before the Treaty of Trianon went into effect, *there were only two roads open to the subsequent governments.* One was to follow the policy initiated by the Republic: to democratize the country, to carry out the agrarian reform, to lay the foundation for a free peasantry, and to establish an honest compromise with the neighboring states tending toward a future federal structure. The other was to disregard and to undermine the peace treaty negotiated by the Horthy government itself, to foment the spirit of irredentism, to concentrate all the energies of the country for the restoration of the old frontiers and to maintain the privileges of the feudal oligarchy and its satellites.

All the governments after the fall of the Republic pursued constantly the second road without the slightest endeavor for democratic reforms or for bringing about a tolerable compromise with the Succession States. . . .

[T]he most significant fact of the new regime was the treaty of friendship with Italy, April, 1927, which meant the closest relationship with Fas-

cism. . . . *For years Italy was glorified as the chief protector of Hungarian irredentism* and when the Nazi power began to grow, the Hungarian leaders were convinced that the danger of Nazism could easily be counterbalanced by the power of Mussolini. As a matter of fact the feudal aristocrats of Hungary never liked the parvenu Hitler and his crude demagogic method. They cherished the old type alliance with the Prussian Junkers but regarded the Nazi regime with a certain amount of distrust, even disgust.

V

The chief aims of [Prime Minister] Count [István] Bethlen, however, were only incompletely realized. The feudal aristocracy lost its former political leadership to the advantage of Fascist elements. Already during the short-lived Republic under Károlyi the first signs of a Fascist terrorist system were manifest. The violent "Awakening Magyars" (under the leadership of the then little known Tibor Eckhardt) and similar secret organizations caused a considerable amount of bloodshed among workers and Jews. In this connection an important fact must be emphasized. The type of Fascism that developed in Hungary was far nearer to the Nazi than to the Italian type. Several years before the advent of Hitler, a Hungarian type of Nazism grew up quite independently which anticipated many aspects of the Nazi ideology. It was an uncritical, exasperated and romantic philosophy of hatred and revenge. It emphasized the inalienable historic rights of Hungary to her old frontiers. It was a "stab-in-the-back" legend to the effect that Hungary was never defeated, that her collapse was exclusively due to the propaganda of the Allies, the Jews, and the Communists. The fight against the Jewish danger was one of the chief demagogic forces of the movement. The slogan "Third Hungary" was coined, which would bring unity and the restoration of the old frontiers to the country. A vehement anti-Marxian campaign was carried on; hated books were burned on the streets. Instead of socialism or communism, a "Christian National Social State" should be established. A doctrine of racial purity was proclaimed, which found a glorification in the Turan myth. Regent Horthy himself organized a Knight Order of feudal character (the so-called *Vitézek*), the members of which received hereditary landed property for the defense of the country against "subversive elements."

This mystic racism and wild nationalism paved the way for many leaders of the oligarchy toward a rapprochement with Nazism always with the hope that no exclusive pressure could be exercised by Germany, because of the prominent influence of the glorious Duce. The successor of Bethlen, Julius Gömbös, of an extreme Fascist and anti-Semitic type, introduced promises of vast social reforms, opposed the restoration of the Hapsburgs, but made cooperation with Fascist Italy even closer. When Hitler came to power and

much Nazi propaganda and money came into the country, Gömbös visited Berlin in June, 1933, and in July he journeyed to Rome. His main objective was to gain both Fascist and Nazi support for the territorial claims of Hungary. This policy assumed an openly inimical character against the Little Entente in the signing of the Rome Protocol, and culminated in the assassination of King Alexander and Foreign Minister Barthou at Marseilles in October of the same year, leading to serious international complications as the connivance of the Italian and of the Hungarian governments in the organization of the plot was well known. Very soon, however, the influence of *the German dictator prevailed and the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in October, 1936, signified the surrender of Austria.* This was effectively carried out in March, 1938, and in the February of the next year *the government of Paul Teleki joined the anti-Communist pact of Germany, Japan, and Italy.* In the increasingly aggressive policy of the Nazis, Hungary shared in the loot of Czechoslovakia, occupying Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian territories.

With the beginning of World War II the Hungarian policy for the Axis became even more accentuated. With the war the old secret dream of the irredentist policy seemed to become a reality: the countries of the Little Entente were destroyed or paralyzed and the dictators began the fulfillment of their promises to restore Hungary's territorial integrity. Half of Transylvania and a part of the Jugoslav kingdom were returned to the Crown of St. Stephen. The German orientation, however, proved to be a mixed blessing for the country. The half million German minority, in the past a politically powerless element, assumed more and more the position of a privileged nationality and the pressure of the German general staff and the Gestapo hurt considerably the interests of the ruling Magyar classes. *Hungary became more and more a German colony both from the political and economic point or view.* German competition was painfully felt when Nazis were put into the key positions, whereas the feudal aristocracy was increasingly menaced with subversive activities of the Fascist organizations which began a demagogic campaign for the dismemberment of the large estates.

VI

Behind these various developments the old wound of the country was still open. The *latifundia* system exercised the old-time pressure upon all the energies of the country: *the misery of the small peasantry and of the landless proletariat remained unaltered* and the industrial working class and the intelligentsia of the towns and cities suffered under the exploitation of the Magyar oligarchy and its Nazi allies. A group of young Hungarians, mostly descendants of peasant families, introduced a movement which has

much resemblance to the Narodniki movement of Czarist Russia in the 19th century. They produced an amazingly prolific and well documented literature in which the sufferings of the Magyar peasantry were unveiled. This literature is a flaming protest against existing conditions. Though not daring to acknowledge it, and camouflaging their propaganda by national and racial slogans, they returned to the main objectives of the October revolution of 1918. The essential causes of the Hungarian sickness remained practically the same and the Narodniki literature never tired of reiterating them. On the basis of the statistics of Hungary under the Trianon frontiers they asserted that: *1,232 large estates (over 1,400 acres) representing 0.1% of the total number of separate agricultural holdings, cover 30% of all the land. The average size of a large estate is 5,61S acres. The 1,142,294 small properties (under seven acres), representing 71% of all agricultural holdings, cover an area of 2,486,838 acres;* i.e.,*11% of all the land.* A small proprietor has an average holding of 2.13 acres. Forty per cent of the agricultural population has no landed property at all; and if one adds to this number the category of small proprietors, mentioned above, who cannot live on their minute lots, but eke out a starvation wage as occasional workers on the large estates, one reaches a figure of around 3,500,000 out of an agrarian population of about 4,500,000. That is to say, almost 80% of the total agrarian population lives on the outer fringe of proletarian existence. This situation has given rise to the oft-repeated slogan: "the three million beggars of Hungary."

VII

The adventurous foreign policy of the Magyar oligarchy and its territorial gains did not bring any relief to the oppressed classes of Hungary. On the contrary, the administrative and economic pressure has grown in direct proportion to the regained provinces. Enormous amounts of foodstuffs were taken to Germany, workers were transferred for convict labor, and thousands of soldiers perished in the offensive against the Russians. And, what is even worse, *the hatred between the Magyar and the non-Magyar races grew enormously in the reconquered territories.* Unheard of atrocities were committed by the armies of occupation against both the Carpatho-Ukrainians and the Serbs. The whole area is full of the spirit of wrath and revenge. It will be a hundred times more difficult to solve the nationality problem after the war than it would have been any time after the *Ausgleich* of 1867 and to protect the truly Hungarian interest, both economic and cultural, will be an even harder task than it was after Trianon.

If we look over this whole story it will be evident how erroneous it is to speak of *Hungarian Quislings.* By quislings we mean persons who became traitors to the country through motives of sordid economic interest or base

ambition. It cannot be doubted that there exist many thousands of people in Hungary who belong to this category and who became Nazi servants out of such motives. These people, however, are only the personal subordinates of the chief actors of the drama. *The real actors are not quislings of the Germans, but the conscious promoters and partly even originators of the system under which Europe is suffocating.* The Hungarian oligarchy and its capitalistic satellites have followed for a hundred years both a national and international policy that drove the country ultimately into Fascist servitude. The tradition of the great Hungarian liberal of the period of 1848, of Kossuth and his collaborators, was abandoned and, instead of introducing the necessary social and national reforms in favor of the peasants, the proletariat and the national minorities, they embarked upon a policy of social-economic oppression and forcible denationalization of the alien groups. In spite of repeated admonitions and the lessons of the revolution of 1848 and 1918, *they continued to maintain the antiquated privileges of the ruling aristocracy.* Because this could not be done without foreign protection, *the Magyar oligarchy accepted Hapsburg domination first, the leadership of the German Kaiser during the first World War next, and finally Fascist hegemony, which ultimately led to Nazi supremacy and to World War II.*

It would be unfair to assert that the responsible leaders of this policy were primarily or exclusively motivated by selfish, personal interest as some simplifiers of history state. Though in their policy the economic interest[s] of the great landowners have played an important role, it cannot be doubted that they were influenced above all by a complex of ideologic motives. Among these were the exaggerated and misguided feeling of patriotism, the haughtiness of an old warrior class, and the belief in their own historical mission.

VIII

In the light of the previous analyses it is clear that no better future for Hungary can be expected without introducing the following fundamental reforms: 1) thoroughgoing democratization of its antiquated political and administrative structure; 2) a democratic land reform on the basis of the distribution of the large estates and in building up a free peasant class on a cooperative basis; 3) a reasonable compromise with the neighboring states with the elimination of irredentistic agitation, paving the way toward a federal structure.

It is equally clear that the plan of a *Danubian confederation is utterly utopian as long as the present Hungarian economic and social structure continues; the feudal lords of Hungary and their Fascist followers will*

never cooperate with countries which have a really democratic structure. Similarly, a military dictatorship in Jugoslavia and the corrupt dynastic structure in Rumania or the military absolutism which followed it, would never accept the idea of a Danubian cooperation. It is significant, however, *that whenever the peasantry of the Danubian region found genuine leaders the idea of federation was immediately proclaimed.* So Kossuth after the collapse of the Hungarian war for independence, the Croat Radic, the Bulgarian Stambolisky, and the Rumanian Maniu after the first World War, unfolded the flag of a Danubian confederation, further expanded by Benes in the hour of the Czech disaster towards the program of a European federation.

IX

With the smashing military victories of the Soviet Union which will make it in all probability the strongest continental power in Europe *the future of Hungary and of the Danubian states will depend to a large extent on the international policy of Soviet Russia.* Two things are already sufficiently clear in the foreign policy of the Soviets: One is that they repudiate the idea of the federalization of the small states with the argument that the social and political structure of these countries are so different that there is no possibility whatsoever for the establishment of a solid and stable federal structure among them. *The idea of federalization could only follow the necessary readjustments in the social-economic structure of those countries.* The other fundamental point in the Russian foreign policy is their claim that they will not recognize any government which they cannot trust. *The states of the Danube and the Balkans should not follow a foreign or military policy hostile to the Soviets.* Therefore, the former ruling oligarchies which through their continuous intrigues were always instrumental in creating hostile coalitions against Russia, must be eliminated and replaced by new social and political forces which in their very nature would feel a strong affinity with the aims of Soviet Russia.

It cannot be doubted that old feudal Hungary would be unacceptable to the rulers of Russia and they would try to crush them either by military means or by fomenting social revolution. It would be easy for the Soviets to use the unsolved agrarian problem of Hungary for the complete sovietization of the country—the same thing which they did in Russia after the revolution. The only possibility for Hungary to come to terms with the Soviets and to safeguard her cultural and national independence following her Western traditions would be *to create a democratic republic of the peasants, workers, and creative intelligentsia* which could not be used in fomenting a hostile coalition, *cordon sanitaire*, against Russia.

The leaders of the Soviets have expressed repeatedly these ideas concerning Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania. They have promised that under these conditions they would respect the free and independent political, cultural, and economic life of those countries. It is very probable that they will accept this point of view. A renitent [*sic* ?] Hungary would be either crushed by a hostile alliance under Russian leadership or it would be only tolerated as long as its final collapse would not emerge automatically through bloody social convulsions leading to some form of proletarian dictatorship.

X

Whether this point of view of the Soviets is a sincere one or simply a transitory tactical position before the complete sovietization of the whole region, is a controversial issue which will depend primarily on the final outcome of the World War. It is sure that Russia made the same promises to the Baltic states and she disregarded them incorporating those countries completely into the Soviet structure. Yet the problems of the Danubian and Balkan regions are quite different both from a geographic and a political point of view. *A situation could easily arise in which the Soviet leaders would hesitate to embark upon a policy which would arouse the distrust and the indignation of the Western democracies* and of the United States whose economic and technical cooperation will be badly needed in the enormous work of reconstruction of Russia. Furthermore, in the post-war period the air and naval supremacy of Great Britain and the United States will be so thoroughly established that the realistic leaders of the Soviets would not risk a conflict for the rather ideologic advantage of the sovietization of Central Europe. *The complete and sincere democratization of this region would make an aggressive policy of Russia unnecessary* and would rob it of all ideologic pretexts.

In this way the remolding of the antiquated social and economic structure of Hungary, Jugoslavia, and Rumania would be the essential prerequisite for the establishment of an at least transitorily stable and peaceful Danubian and Balkan region. In this new atmosphere many things could happen toward a final stabilization. It is possible that the basic ideologic and economic differences between the democracies and the Soviets could be substantially mitigated, that Russia could abandon her objection against a federalization of the smaller nations whose friendliness could be tested and that a common cooperation with the other states in an international organization could give to the Soviets a new impetus for common efforts in the solution of the German and the Japanese problems. Besides, there can be no doubt that *mighty currents are developing in Soviet Russia toward the democratization of her own structure*, the limitation of the autocratic

tendencies of the dictatorship, and the realization of an effective bill of rights. At the same time *the inevitable trend in the Western democracies toward increasing socialization of their economic life* would all contribute to make the antagonism between the two worlds less acute.

In order to inaugurate such an evolution it would be absolutely necessary to make an end to the Danubian and the Balkan danger zone, to that keg of dynamite which has already twice exploded, driving the whole world into turmoil and disaster. Such a transformation could be only the work of the peasants, the workers and the creative intelligentsia of this region.

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Appendix

Document 2

Editor's note: The following document is Oscar Jaszi's introdution to Rusztem Vámbéry's 1942 pamphlet *The Hungarian Problem*. A copy of this publication can be found in the library of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

The Hungarian Problem

by Rustem Vambery

Introduction
by OSCAR JASZI
Professor of Political Science
in Oberlin College

Published by THE NATION

TEN CENTS A COPY

[1942]

Introduction

BY DR. OSCAR JASZI

In such cataclysmic times as these past history becomes living history. Everyone feels that, without understanding the past, reasonable and responsible men cannot plan for the future. This is the reason why every group or individual who tries to shape the future endeavors to prove that the policy which he favors is in the line of historical development.

This is the reason why the forgotten history of Hungary becomes again interesting reading. Books and pamphlets are written exclusively to show that the shameful role of the present Hungarian government, in being a vassal of the Axis, has nothing to do with its sins, or the sins of those who shaped the politics of the last four generations: but that it was simply imposed upon the present rulers by a fate for which they are not responsible.

This thesis masks for the benefit of the Allied democracies a double-crossing game. Should the Axis win, feudal Hungary will enjoy all the territorial gains made with the help of the dictators. Should the Axis be crushed, the so-called Free Hungarians will establish an alibi by reiterating: "Poor democratic and liberal Hungary was compelled by armed force to join the Nazis, and Admiral Horthy and his government have carried out this policy with bleeding hearts."

In the essay which follows, Professor Vámbéry raises his voice against the falsifications of history which are involved in the previous argument. Nobody is more qualified to do this than he. One of his chief merits is the fact that he has never been a politician. Somebody has rightly called him the Voltaire of Hungary. He has been interested mainly not in the changing trends of the political game but in the supreme values of human dignity and liberty of thought. As a noted criminologist he has studied the Calvary of the human race, and he has felt that it is not enough to write textbooks and learned treaties, that one must always attack the eternal citadels of servitude: the ignorance of the many and the entrenched privileges of the few.

He was suffocating in the atmosphere of his country, the last bulwark of European feudalism, where the extravagant luxury of the rulers was in painful contrast to the starving misery of the masses. Not revolutionary critics but supporters of the Horthy system coined the slogan of the "three million beggars of Hungary"—out of a population of eight millions at that time. Vámbéry felt that *man must act*, and so he did.

And when the critical date of recent Hungarian history came in 1918, after the defeat of the Central Powers, he wholeheartedly embraced the cause of the so-called October Revolution. This name is somewhat mis-

leading if we mean by "revolution" an act of conspiracy carried out by violence. There was no fight and no resistance in this short-lived upheaval. It was a by-product of the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy. There was no government either in Vienna or in Budapest which could claim a single atom of authority. The popular forces were simply liberated by the collapse of the Dual system, and the soul of the country returned almost automatically to the traditions of the Revolution of 1848, to the spirit of Louis Kossuth.

But the dawn of liberty was a very brief one. The accumulated misery and hatred of the war could not be appeased in a short time. The national minorities, mindful of the past, repudiated the extended hand of the Hungarian Republic; all the beneficiaries of the old system were engaged in fifth column activities; the emissaries of Moscow spread successfully the ideas of a Communist revolution; the reactionary delegates of the Western democracies humiliated intentionally the new regime; the illegal dismemberment of the country against the stipulations of the armistice heated the age-old nationalism of the country to the boiling point; and hundreds of thousands of refugees from the occupied territories flooded the capital, blaming the republic for their sufferings.

The immature Communist Revolution which ousted the democratic republic gave to all the counter-revolutionary forces a welcome pretext for organizing a common front for the restoration of the old feudal order. Admiral Horthy gained power with the help of the Western democracies and under the protection of Rumanian bayonets.

And silence and order reigned again in Budapest . . . All the instruments of terror, of concentration camps, of racial mythology and persecution had been used systematically long before Hitler and the Nazi ideology; and all the achievements of the October Revolution were crushed, its leaders calumniated, and the feudal rule restored in an orgy of extreme nationalism and an officially fomented irredentism. Most of the leaders of the October Revolution were compelled to flee. Many of those who remained were imprisoned.

The only man who could maintain his personal liberty in the country conquered by the counter-revolution was Vámbéry, because he had never accepted office during the Revolution, and because his connections with influential British circles were generally known. He had inherited many British friends from his distinguished father, Armenius Vámbéry, who had played an important role in the English diplomatic policy in the East and been honored by the personal friendship of the King of England. Rustem Vámbéry has maintained and enlarged this precious legacy.

During the reign of the White Terror, Vámbéry fulfilled a very important

role. He criticised courageously the regime as far as the tight censorship would permit. He became a kind of ambassador for the oppressed people. After having received the blue-prints of the Horthy press bureau and its multiple little favors (ably administered by Mr. Eckhardt during the heyday of the system), every distinguished and intelligent foreigner who tried to understand the situation of Hungary went into the Vámbéry home to hear the real story of the past, of the intricate machinations of the counter-revolution, and of its diplomatic repercussions.

In spite of insults and threats of every kind from his enemies, Vámbéry remained at his post until the final Nazi invasion. When he saw that the intimate cooperation of the Horthy regime with Fascism and Nazism had become a real alliance, and that Hungary had finally assumed all the features of a vassal state of Hitler, he left the country.

Now, here in America, in noble poverty and unaided by the mighties of the land, who favor the Habsburgs and hidden exponents of the Horthy system, he continues the fight with youthful fervor.

As a true liberal and democrat, he cannot be other than a Free Hungarian in the real sense. As a matter of fact he has been a Free Hungarian for fifty years, even in times when such a movement did not exist. Attacked by the pseudo-Free Hungarians, the adherents and emissaries of the Horthy system who are trembling for that tottering regime, Vámbéry has recapitulated in his pamphlet the past history of Hungary and exposed its repercussions in the present struggle. He conclusively shows that no future peace is imaginable in the Danubian Basin without a solution for the two fundamental problems of this region: the agrarian and the nationality problem.

His logic, his conviction, and his sincerity will surely impress all unbiased readers of the essay. His passion and irony are natural results of his life as a fighter. He may overstress here and there the economic-social interpretation of the present Hungarian mentality, and perhaps underestimate its sentimental and historical background, but no impartial observer will deny that his diagnosis of the Hungarian tragedy is correct, and that the remedies he offers for the ills of the Hungarian people are based on real facts and a true analysis of the conflicting forces.

I ardently hope that all friends of democracy and fighters for a stable world order, based on cooperation and justice, will give careful attention to his ideas.

Oberlin, May, 1942.

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Appendix

Document 3

Editor's note: The following document is from the records of the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the OSS.

The Platform of The American Federation of Democratic Hungarians

–May 23, 1943–

I. We shall aid the war of the United States and the United Nations against the Axis Powers sincerely and honestly. We make no exception with respect to any member state and by all means at our disposal, deeds, words, writing we will endeavor to help the common struggle of the United Nations against the Axis to an early victory. We shall not permit that in the press under our influence, there should appear any writing that has a double meaning, is defeatist or besmirches any member of the United Nations. We shall do everthing to make sure that the Hungarians of the United States will individually and with their united force in every way do their duty in the interest of a successful conclusion of the war, in the first place as soldiers in the United States army, as workers in war industries and factories where they should be examples of diligence and punctuality, and by buying War Bonds and serving in the Red Cross and Civilian Defence.

II. We make no difference between Hitler and Horthy nor between the regimes of the two countries. We equally condemn both and fight against their politics, aims and goals. We call upon the soldiers of the Hungarian army everywhere, whether fighting on Russian soil or performing the duties of maintaining order, to lay down their arms, to go over to the enemies

of Hitler and Horthy, or to join those who as free troops or guerillas fight aginst Hitlerism. We call upon the people of Hungary to do all they can against the war made by Hitler and Horthy: to hide their grain, the meat, the feed-stuffs from the Nazis and to sabotage the work in shops, plants and factories.

III. We desire that Hungary after the war shall be a democratic country patterned after the western democracies, that its people shall have general, secret and equal rights to vote, that its peasantry shall partake in a complete redistribution of land, that its workers should have a part in social security and justice and its intellectuals in complete freedom of its spirit and culture. We desire that Hungary's future politics shall be built upon cooperation. In its economic, financial and military relations it shall be based first of all upon cooperation with neighboring peoples, the Czechoslovaks, Jugoslavs, Rumanians, Austrians, Polish, Bulgarian and Greek populations, upon close alliance with them as an equal among equals. Hungary shall endeavor sincerely to make up with its neighbors without any mental reservation, and to live together with them. As a precondition to this we assert that the system of large estates of the so-called "historical class," its privileges and advantages must be liquidated in favour of the Hungarian people. Similarily we take stand against that propaganda aimed at the Habsburg restoration which from the beginning was designed to influence in a one-sided way the decision of the Hungarian people regarding the form of government.

IV. We recognize nothing of what was established by the gangsterwars of Hitler and Mussolini with the shortening of certain state boundaries or lengthening of others. But with complete faith in the principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter as well as in the prospective peace negotiations after a victory by the Uited Nations, we believe that Hungarian people will be neither punished nor deprived and that they will share as equal among equals in justice and brotherhood.

V. In carrying on the war there can be no difference between us who make the victory of the United States and its Allies over the Axis Powers and their gang our goals. And because of this we desire that the population of the United States of Hungarian descent without regard to their religion and their political convictions should cooperate along the same line in the interest of the earliest possible victory of the United States and its Allies. In regard to questions which will emerge after the war, especially concerning Hungary's future, we do not believe cooperation is possible because the size and gravity of the issues demand that we should be able to present our principles to the masses in their entire austerity.

"The American Federation of Democratic Hungarians."

Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 1–2 (1991)

Appendix

Document 4

Editor's note: The following document is a confidential printed report of the Foreign Nationalities Branch (FNB) of the OSS. These reports can be found both in the records of the FNB, and in the various other record collections of the OSS, all at the NAUS. Hungarian diacritical marks were not used in these reports and are not reproduced below.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH
September 30, 1942

MEMORANDUM:

Hungarian Politics in the United States

The American Federation of Democratic Hungarians, which has steadfastly set itself against Tibor Eckhardt's Independent Hungary Movement, achieved at least one of its objectives at its annual meeting in New York, September 19 and 20, by bringing forth a movement to be called New Democratic Hungary. This will probably be closely allied with the Federation and will be headed by Rustem Vambery, noted Hungarian criminologist resident in the United States. The other objectives, apparently unreached, were said to be: (1)) to bring together a wider representation of Hungarians against Hitler than has hitherto been possible under the leadership either of Eckhardt or the Vambery-Jaszi group of the American Federation of Democratic Hungarians; (2) to lay the basis for effective collaboration of anti-Hitler Hungarians with other Central European representatives; (3) to develop closer relations with the movement headed in London by Count Michael Karolyi, onetime Hungarian prime minister. Meanwhile the Hungarian press in the United States indicates that despite the "temporary sus-

pension" of his Independent Hungary Movement last July, Tibor Eckhardt is still a political force on the Hungarian scene. Indeed the fact appears to be that Eckhardt remains pre-eminently the strongest individual among the Hungarian political refugees, and his ostensible retirement as a result of the doubts cast on his political motives has left a considerable void.

The New Democratic Hungary organization excludes American citizens from its line-up. With Dr. Vambery as president and Laszlo Fenyes, former member of the Hungarian Parliament, as vice-president, the organization will maintain relations with the American Federation of Democratic Hungarians through Dr. Vambery's participation in the Federation's meetings. Dr. Oscar Jaszi, an American citizen of Hungarian origin, professor at Oberlin College, retains his presidency of the Federation.

Leaders of the Federation are reported to have hoped that a wider representation of Hungarian elements might be secured through contacts with Anthony Balasy, formerly counselor to the Hungarian Legation in London, and Bela Bartok, the noted musician who has sometimes been mentioned as a figure about whom all factions could unite. For some reason, however, Jaszi is said to have failed to keep an appointment which he had made with Balasy in Washington; and the leaders of the Federation cooled in their feeling toward Bartok when it was charged that he was in close contact with Victor Bator, formerly chief economic adviser to the Commercial Bank of Budapest and lately an associate of Eckhardt's.

Balasy's current position is one of aloofness from political activities while he professes to be ready to join any movement uniting all individuals who are both Hungarian and anti-Hitler.

The leaders of the Federation are reported to have hoped also that representatives of other Central European countries would be on hand at their annual meeting in New York and that a basis might be laid for cooperation between the various groups. However, Charles A. Davila, chairman of the Free Rumania Council, refused to participate on the grounds that one of the Federation's officers was in the service of the Czechs. Further attempts were abandoned.

A certain faction of the Vambery-Jaszi Federation has been insistently advocating the admission to this country of Count Michael Karolyi, now in London. Recently Dr. Alex Vince, Dr. Hugo Rony, and Mr. L. Moholy-Nagy all of Chicago, resigned from the Federation on the grounds that it had not supported Karolyi with sufficient energy. These Chicagoans are now engaged in gathering ten thousand signatures which they plan to present to the Department of State to bolster their plea that Karolyi be granted a visa.

It is reported that Professor Vambery had been in communication with Karolyi recently and at the latter's request agreed to adopt New Democratic

Hungary as a name for the organization which Vambery now heads. This name is also used by the pro-Karolyi organizations in London and South America, but it is understood, nevertheless, that the three organizations will maintain complete independence.

Observers of the Hungarian-American political scene feel that the formation of the New Democratic Hungary movement leaves the situation largely unchanged. An organization which can draw all Hungarian individuals together for political purposes and the cooperation with other European groups still waits to be formed. . . .

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Appendix

Document 5

Editor's note: The following document contains a description of Oscar Jaszi by one of his Hungarian-American contemporaries, Emil Lengyel, in the latter's *Americans from Hungary* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1948). pp. 260–61.

Hungarian literati did come to the United States in the early post-First World War years but not in large numbers. One was Oscar Jászi. In pre-war Hungary he had tried to raise alarm over the problem of national minorities which did not exist at all to the average Hungarian. Hungary was Hungarian and that was all; the Magyar closed his eyes to the fact that the highlands all around Hungary were inhabited by several nationalities, spilling into the plains. The then Hungarian governments, too, sought to "settle" the nationality problem by pretending that it did not exist. Jászi knew that such "solutions" could only be temporary and that Hungary's future could not be assured unless she reached agreements with her minorities which almost formed a majority. He contended most emphatically that as a uninational State Hungary was an absurdity and that she must be transformed into a multi-national country. Not far distant from Hungary's western marches he saw a successful solution of this problem. Switzerland was inhabited by four different nationalities speaking as many languages, drawing from four different traditions, German, French, Italian and Romansch, often antagonistic to one another. In spite of this, Switzerland was prosperous and the very image of peace. Instead of fighting each other, the four nationalities were engaged in amicable competition. Here was a ready-made example for Hungary and, possibly, some of her neighbors. The idea of "Eastern Switzerland" was born. Each "canton" of Eastern Switzerland would be delimited along ethnic frontiers and would possess a large measure of self-government. An ideal blend would result by combin-

ing the constructive qualities of these peoples who in the past had defeated their own aims by working at cross purposes. Before the war, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was a political monstrosity, since it took no account of the most dynamic force of the age, nationalism, while at the same time it was an economic necessity because it united a variety of interdependent regions producing most of the essentials of economic life. Oscar Jászi followed in the traditions of Lajos Kossuth, who, in later life, saw the solution of the Southeastern European problem in the formation of a Danubian federation of friendly States, dependent upon their own strength rather than serving as cat's-paws for foreign interests.

Under the First Hungarian Republic, headed by Count Károlyi, Oscar Jászi served as Minister of Nationalities. Hungary had been defeated and the remedies that might have helped when the minorities were begging for concessions were of no use whatever now that they held the whip hand, and not even Jászi's earnest endeavors could turn the scales. He personally had numerous friends among the nationalities, but Hungary's friends were few. The former servants in mistress Hungary's mansion now had become mistresses themselves. Jászi went into exile after the downfall of the Hungarian democratic Republic and, preceded by high reputation in scholarly circles, eventually reached the United States. Here he accepted a position on the faculty of Oberlin College in 1925, became professor of political science, and taught there for fully seventeen years, his fame reaching into many corners of the United States. He wrote a standard book, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* and made many notable contributions to books and scholarly periodicals. After the Second World War he saw his ideas about Hungary's future vindicated, as it became crystal clear that the region of the mighty Danube was a unit.

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Appendix

Document 6

Editor's note: The following document is the text of the introductory remarks made at the Oscar Jaszi Memorial Conference at Oberlin College by Curtis L. Kendrick:

When Oscar Jaszi joined the faculty of Oberlin College in 1925, he had a distinguished reputation as an Hungarian scholar and statesman. He had been one of the founders of the Hungarian Sociological Society, and for about twenty years, editor of the monthly review, *Twentieth Century* (Huszadik Század). He had taught at the Universities of Kolozsvár and Budapest, and published many books and articles. He had been a bold advocate of political and economic changes in the pre-war Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; as Minister of Nationalities in the liberal Károlyi government of 1918, he had worked for a democratic federal solution to the problem of national minorities and for basic agrarian reforms.

Exiled from his native land by the Communists and by the reactionary Horthy regime, he continued his fight against dictatorship and war. Liberal emigres from many European countries have paid tribute to the value of his counsel and support. Oberlin takes pride in the fact that his most famous book, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, was completed in the early years of his Oberlin professorship. This book, which earned the admiration of American scholars, was followed by a stream of articles and lectures on the explosive problems of Danubia and on the urgency and difficulties of effective international organization. During the Second World War, he made several broadcasts to Hungary for The Voice of America.

Oscar Jaszi quickly became, and remained, an important member of the faculty community of Oberlin College. He had an accurate grasp of Oberlin's problems and potentialities, and a deep loyalty to its welfare. He

carried conscientiously and effectively the large and small responsibilities of a professor and a department chairman. He had an influential voice in the making of college policy, to which he brought both practical judgment and clearly thought-out principles. Few men have been less concerned with the trivialities of the academic vocation; perhaps none have been more concerned with the essentials.

For seventeen years Oscar Jaszi was one of Oberlin's greatest teachers. His forceful character, his pungent humor, and his urbane courtesy won the affection of his students; the substance of his teaching assured their immediate interest and their lasting respect. At a time when American study of government was still largely legalistic and descriptive, he introduced his students to a different type of study. He took them beyond the regions of familiar liberal constitutions into the new and troubled regions of Fascist and Bolshevik rule. He insisted that no student could hope to understand the government of a country without learning something of the sociological background of its constitution and of the international equilibrium in which the country was involved. He taught his students to try to assess the nationalist and socialist tendencies that were in varying degrees affecting the development of all continental countries. At a time when many Americans innocently debated over disarmament, the League of Nations, neutrality legislation, and the Oxford Pledge, his students had clear warning of the harsh social, political, and economic forces that were driving the world to a crisis that no international machinery could prevent and no isolationism could avoid. His teaching, like his scholarship, was an indissoluble blend of responsive realism and stern idealism. His skepticism about quick and easy cures was combined with a deep faith in traditional liberal values and in the moral capacity of free men. His students learned not only to look realistically at the world they must live in, but also to understand something of the conflict of values beneath the surface of events. His teaching was a continual challenge to their sense of moral responsibility. . . .

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2. All manuscripts should be sent to the Editors, *Hungarian Studies Review*.
3. Persons wishing to review books for the journal should get in touch with the Editors.
4. Persons wishing to prepare review articles–either detailed discussions of a single book or a review of some area of Hungarian studies–should get in touch first with the Editors.
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