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**Forgotten Minorities:
The Hungarians of East Central Europe.**

Edited by

N.F. Dreisziger and A. Ludanyi

Hungarian Studies Review

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Forgotten Minorities: The Hungarians of East Central Europe.

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N.F. Dreisziger and A. Ludanyi

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Hungarian Minorities in East Central Europe: An Introduction.

Nandor Dreisziger with Andrew Ludanyi

In a series of guest lectures at the University of Toronto in 1985, William H. McNeill, one of North America's most distinguished historians, surveyed the evolution of the relationship of polyethnicity and national unity in the history of mankind.¹ His conclusion was that, throughout history, the norm of societal existence was the co-habitation of different ethnic groups within the individual states that made up the community of nations. In ancient times, McNeill observed, "civilized societies" were multi-ethnic as foreign conquests, trade and epidemics worked to make them such.² In the period between 1750 and 1920 an ideal emerged that went counter to this norm. This was the idea of nations made up of members of the same ethnic group. Ironically, this concept gained greatest acceptance in Western Europe just at the time when Europeans started expanding overseas, initiating a mingling of races and cultures on an unprecedented scale.³ This experiment in building homogeneous nation states began to ebb after World War I, even though some outbreaks of militant nationalism took place later. Since 1920, there has been a gradual return to the ideal of polyethnic society. Surveying the world today, McNeill sees the increasing mingling of peoples, the greater ease of international travel and migration, and the growing acceptance again of the concept of multi-ethnic societies.⁴

While McNeill's analysis was not designed to deal with the specific question of ethnic minorities within states, it implicitly has a great deal to say about them and their situation. Hence it is not inappropriate to test McNeill's observations about the global situation in light of the realities of ethnic groups in a small part of the world—East Central Europe—and in particular in the position of one ethnic group there: the Hungarian. Such a test will confirm a few of McNeill's observations, but it will also reveal that in East Central Europe, especially as far as the situation of Hungarian minorities is concerned, for some time the general trends have been

going against those that Professor McNeill has observed elsewhere in the world.

* * * * *

East Central Europe is one of the highly "polyethnic" regions of the world. Despite the attempt by the peacemakers after the First World War to create national states there, most of the states of East Central Europe remain multi-ethnic entities. That this is so is largely due to the fact that many of these states have sizable Hungarian minorities. In fact, Hungarians compose the largest minority populations in a number of states within all of contemporary Europe. There are over two million Hungarians in Rumania, approximately 660,000 in Czechoslovakia, almost half a million in Yugoslavia, about 200,000 in the Carpatho-Ruthenian part of the Soviet Ukraine, and about 50,000 in Austria. It might be added that there are also some two million Hungarians dispersed throughout the world with many of them settled in the United States and Canada, in several Western European countries, as well as South America and Australia. This volume will not deal with the communities of Magyars in the Hungarian diaspora, not even with the Hungarian community of Austria as it is made up in part of people who had migrated there from Hungary over the past four decades. It will deal with Hungarians who have been born in ancestral Hungarian lands which are now part of one or the other of Hungary's socialist neighbours.

There are three traits of these Hungarian minorities that are worth stressing. One is the fact that minority status was imposed upon them from the outside, through border changes affected without plebiscites. This differentiates the members of these Magyar minorities from those of Hungarian settlements in the New World for example whose members had assumed minority status through more-or-less voluntary migration (and here we do not mean to deny that some of these migrants fled East Central Europe to save their lives). The second characteristic of Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe is the fact that their birth is a fairly recent development, having occurred in the aftermath of World War I, in living memory of the older generation. A third, and perhaps even more important trait of these minorities, is the fact that a large percentage of them are "border" minorities: their members live in territories abutting the borders of Hungary. This last factor makes Hungarian minorities potential irredentas, a fact which can engender a great deal of political insecurity in the countries where they exist.

The states that received these large Hungarian minorities from the hands of the peacemakers in 1920 were the so-called successor states: newly created Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and enlarged Rumania. In the interwar period these countries failed (to a greater or lesser extent) to abide

by the treaties they had signed after the war promising to respect the rights of their minorities.⁵ This resulted in conditions which weakened the political stability of the whole region. The stability of East Central Europe was also lessened by the dissatisfaction of the ethnic groups that had felt wronged in the peace settlement (the Hungarian, Ukrainian, and the Bulgarian). Majority-minority relations in the region became more and more tense which made the nations of East Central Europe easy prey for Nazi-German expansion.

The Second World War brought important changes in the situation of the Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe, even though it brought few significant changes in the territorial arrangements that had been imposed in the Carpathian Basin in the wake of the First World War. First of all, the establishment of Soviet control over East Central Europe in the wake of World War II put the "nationality question" there into a new political and ideological context. Marxism-Leninism, as practiced in the Soviet Union, became the "guiding light" for the solution of all ethnic and national friction within the expanded empire of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the war, and the post-war peace treaties and population transfers, profoundly affected the ethnic make-up and, in particular, the minority profile of East Central Europe, or Eastern Europe as some prefer to call the socialist countries between Central Europe and the U.S.S.R. (Poland Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria). Leszek Kosinski has pointed out that in 1930 Eastern Europe had 94 million inhabitants of whom 24 million lived in minority status (24 percent of the total population, i.e. every fourth person). In 1960, these same states had a population of 99 million, out of which only 7.1 million were members of minorities (7.2 percent of the total population, that is every 14th person).⁶

This changed demographic balance between minority and majority populations in East Central Europe had significant adverse implications for the survival prospects of Hungarian minorities there. Hungarians remain (besides Albanians) the only numerically significant minority people in the region (if we assume that Slovaks, Croats, etc., are power-sharing ethnic groups within their respective countries rather than simple minorities). Moreover, they have become minorities without allies or friends. In the interwar years Germany demanded minority protection for the Germans of East Central Europe, the Soviet Union for the White Russians and Ukrainians, and the Zionists of the West, for the Jews. This situation had enabled Hungarians to form alignments with one or the other of these ethnic groups and even with their protectors. But, after World War II, this kind of a united front against minority persecution was no longer a viable option. Forming alliances for the protection of minorities has become difficult if not impossible in Soviet-controlled East Central Europe for another reason. There, the fate of minorities became governed by the principles of pro-

letarian internationalism, bringing central control, one party rule, and the subjugation of the individual to the state. In this new political context, alignments within bourgeois parliaments, and other means through which pluralistic societies provide protection for ethnic, religious or occupational groups or minorities, were no longer possible. But Soviet rule after 1945 brought dangers that were specific for the Hungarian minorities. The Russian leaders looked upon Magyars as non-Slavs, and as an enemy people who had fought against Russia in both world wars, and especially, in the Great Patriotic War. Soviet rule, moreover, brought the isolation of Hungarian minorities from Hungary, as well as from the West, and even from each other, making them much more vulnerable to pressure from the central (majority) authorities. Soviet domination also meant the weakening or even the destruction of social and religious institutions that in the past had acted as spokesmen for minorities, or had given them hope and solace. The destruction of a free press, the reduction of the influence of the churches, the elimination of voluntary organizations of the villagers, have all contributed to the increased vulnerability of Hungarian minorities in most East Central European states. The economic malaise that Soviet rule and Marxist economic practices have brought to this part of the world have also had their negative effect: it led to the pauperization of all segments of society, and especially the middle class to which many Hungarians belonged in some regions, such as urban Transylvania. And poverty makes all citizens—members of minorities and majorities alike—more dependent on the state.

After these comments on the situation of Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe in general, it is necessary to pay a little attention at least to the particular conditions that govern their situation in the individual East Central European or East European countries. This is necessary as basic conditions facing these minorities vary a great deal from one East European state to another.⁷

In Czechoslovakia there exists a Hungarian minority that should be culturally dynamic, given its size and its geographic concentration along the southern border of Slovakia (as well as within many tightly knit village communities), yet there are factors that sap this minority's cultural dynamism, restrict the group's development, and cast dark clouds over its prospects. The most important of these factors is a basic one: the Hungarians of Czechoslovakia live in the territory of one of the principal ethnic groups making up the country: the Slovaks. The Magyars of this Czech-Slovak state are an ethnic group within the living body of another ethnic group, jealous of its present status and concerned about its prospects. It should be explained that Slovaks, after having lived for centuries under Hungarian rule, and decades under that of the Czechs, developed a resilient, even a militant form of nationalism. They had feared for their cultural sur-

vival for generations, and they continue to feel threatened by what they see as potential Hungarian irredentism or, possibly, an alliance of their country's non-Slovak ethnic groups (i.e., mainly the Czechs and Hungarians) against themselves aimed at keeping Slovaks "in their place." In Slovakia Hungarians (both the autochthonous types and visitors from Hungary) are openly resented. They are looked upon as the former "cruel" masters of the Slovaks, and as members of the nation whose armed forces had assisted the U.S.S.R. in crushing the "Prague spring" experiment in 1968 (tending to forget that Hungarians had little choice in this matter). Furthermore, Slovakia, like all of Czechoslovakia since that fateful year, has been a "hard-line" communist police state. In such a state the authorities—and, in the matter of cultural policy this means the Slovak party hierarchy—can utilize the unlimited powers of the state security forces to impose their will on any minority living under their jurisdiction.

The Hungarian minority of the U.S.S.R. exists in a somewhat different situation, even though its prospects for cultural survival are similarly dim. In the context of the politics of the Soviet Union, a huge multinational empire, the Magyar minority is insignificant. Within the political affairs of the Western Ukraine, and in the context of Ukrainian *versus* Soviet or Russian nationalism, and Ukrainian *versus* Ruthenian particularism, the Hungarians of Ruthenia assume much greater significance. Unlike the Magyars of Slovakia, those of Ruthenia can hardly be regarded as irredentists capable of jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the U.S.S.R., or even the Ukrainian S.S.R. But the question of which other ethnic group in the region (the all-Ukrainian nationalists or some Ruthenian particularists) would have the Magyar's sympathy and support can hardly be ignored by the political and cultural elite of the Western Ukraine. For this particular Hungarian minority, the advent of the age of Mikhail Gorbachev seems to have brought immediate changes. The increased opportunities for cultural self-expression that *glasnost* has given to many minorities has had a positive impact on the Hungarians of Ruthenia—as Professor S.B. Vardy points out in the conclusion of his paper. The new political atmosphere in the U.S.S.R. has also served to enhance Ukrainian as well as other particularisms, and has fueled minority aspirations everywhere. With prospects for Ukrainian self-determination growing, and the possibility of the principle of the "separate roads to communism" being applied to some extent even within the U.S.S.R., the Magyars of Ruthenia might conceivably be facing the same situation as they do in Slovakia. That is, they might be abandoned by the central authorities to an even greater extent than they have been in the past and be placed at the mercy of an ethnic group more jealous of its influence and more concerned with its own cultural survival than the Russians.

There can be no doubt that the saddest situation of all of East Central

Europe's Hungarian minorities is that of the one in Rumania. In view of its size and its geographical disposition in mainly Hungarian-populated regions, this Hungarian minority should be the most viable, the most dynamic and should have the best prospects for cultural survival. However, given the political situation in Rumania, the traditions of the Rumanian nation, and the attitudes of Rumania's present regime, even this very large Hungarian minority is threatened with cultural extinction. One of the most important factors is the following: the Magyars of Rumania, unlike those of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and, especially, the U.S.S.R, live in a state in which they constitute the only truly large ethnic minority (tens of thousands of ethnic Germans, and thousands of Jews having emigrated from Rumania in recent decades to West Germany and Israel respectively). As a result of this, they have no possible political allies in their struggle for minority rights. At the same time, they are considered by many Rumanians—and obviously by the country's regime—as constituting the main internal threat to the country's security.

Indeed, Rumania seems to be the classic example of a state with a most insecure elite, as such insecurity is defined by ethnic and military affairs specialist Dr. Cynthia H. Enloe. She describes this situation in her book *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies*:

When state élites feel most insecure and when that sense of insecurity (i.e. the feeling that state institutions are ineffective, . . .) stems in significant measure from perception of ethnically based dissidence or withdrawal, then the penetration of the state into all ethnic communities is the greatest.⁸

The distrust of Hungarians by Rumanians is coupled with a legacy of hatred that Rumanians have felt toward Hungarians—their former masters and social betters in Transylvania—for several centuries. It was this hatred that evidently made it easier for Rumania's leaders to invade Hungary four times in living memory (in 1916, 1918, 1919, and 1944), and it is this deep-rooted resentment by Rumanians of anything Hungarian that no doubt enables Rumania's present regime to maintain a singularly repressive minority policy in the country. As at least two of the studies in this volume point out, this resentment against Hungarians by Rumanians is deliberately and systematically fostered by the country's current regime.

In recent years, of all the Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe, the one in Yugoslavia enjoyed the best situation and had the best (relatively speaking) prospects for cultural survival. This fact is due mainly to Yugoslavia's particular ethnic and constitutional make-up. The country is a federal state made up of several ethnic groups. In recent decades, its politics have been based more on a political stalemate among the various republics representing the principal ethnic groups than the domination of

one group (historically the Serbian) over the others. The vast majority of the Magyars in Yugoslavia are within the Serbian republic. But even within this constituent part of Yugoslavia there are other minorities, the most notable of these being the Albanians.

This complex situation has tended to benefit the Hungarians, at least in the recent past. It provides for the formation of alignments among ethnic groups. It threatens any ethnic group aspiring to hegemony with the prospect of a hostile alliance of other ethnic groups. This is certainly true in the all-Yugoslav context, but might also apply, to some extent at least, in the context of the politics of Serbia. Furthermore, in Yugoslavia—unlike in Czechoslovakia and, especially, Rumania—no ethnic group or political elite needs to fear Hungarian irredentism, or consider Hungarians a threat to the extent of their political influence. Yugoslavia has enough irredentist problems in places other than the Hungarian border to have to worry about a possible threat that the Magyars could pose. Thus, no major ethnic group or political faction in the country needs to feel the necessity for the accelerated assimilation of the Hungarians. Further, some ethnic groups might decidedly oppose the idea of assimilating the Magyars into the already large and influential Serb nation. These factors tend to outweigh those that might threaten the position of the Magyar minority (such as a tradition of hostility between Magyar and Serb).

* * * * *

As part of the conclusion to this introductory essay, it might be worth returning to Professor William McNeill's observations about polyethnicity in world history and test it against the realities of the East Central European situation. From time immemorial, East Central Europe has been a meeting place of peoples. In recent centuries, Slavs, Germans, Rumanians, and Hungarians had co-existed there—along with some smaller groups—though not always in harmony. They had formed a bewildering array of settlements or "ethnic islands." This situation continued in East Central Europe, in particular in the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Empire, even during the nineteenth century, at a time when the concept of the homogeneous nation state had gained greater and greater acceptance in Western Europe. This "barbarous ideal"—to use the words of McNeill—did gain adherents in nineteenth century East Central Europe (including Hungary), but it was not really inflicted upon East Central Europe with particular vehemence until the end of World War I, precisely at the time when, according to McNeill, the tide began to turn and the world began its return to the "polyethnic norm." In particular, the idea of unitary nation states was applied to East Central Europe by the peacemakers. They saw polyethnic Hungary as an

anachronism and divided much of her among her neighbours. They meant (or pretended) to create mainly homogeneous nation states, and ended up establishing multi-ethnic ones. In this process they managed to create present-day Europe's largest minorities.

As a result of the work of the peacemakers, but contrary to their professed intentions, polyethnicity increased in East Central Europe. As already emphasized, this was the result of external intervention and not the consequence of natural processes that McNeill sees at work in the world since 1920. Furthermore, the events of 1918–20 failed to set a trend in East Central Europe as far as the growth of polyethnicity is concerned. In the seventy years since then, however, the region has become less rather than more polyethnic. Much of this reduction in polyethnicity has resulted from the expulsion or near-extirpation of some minorities during and after World War II, but in recent decades it has been enhanced by the forced assimilation policies of some East European regimes.

The natural processes that McNeill sees increasing polyethnicity in the world, such as the unrestricted intermingling of peoples brought on in part by the policies of free emigration practiced by democratic countries, are largely absent in East Central Europe. There, ruling elites jealous of their position and power, tend to resist the free intermingling of peoples and forbid trans-boundary migration. Moreover, some of these same elites adhere to that “barbarous ideal” of the homogeneous nation state with greater zeal than their misguided nineteenth century predecessors. In fact, in countries such as Rumania, this idea is elevated to the highest of state priorities and is pursued with ruthlessness possible only in a totalitarian society.

Trends in East Central Europe then, go counter to what exist elsewhere in the world. While advanced industrialized nations seek economic advantage, the backward regimes of Eastern Europe pursue discredited, “barbarous” ideals. Moreover, while the citizens of the former nations bask in prosperity, the subjects of the latter—and especially their minority peoples—suffer poverty and persecution.

In analyzing the world situation, McNeill has paid little attention to East Central Europe. After all, as the decades pass and as other regions of the world come into influence and prominence, that part of Europe has become less and less significant. Its economic troubles, cultural stagnation, and its backward political system—based on an outdated and inflexible ideology—relegate East Central Europe to the backwaters of world civilization, a region fit to be ignored. Alas, the by-product of this trend to ignore this part of the world is the tendency to forget the sufferings of its peoples, especially, the plight of its minorities. It is hoped that the publication of this collection of studies will help to counteract this tendency, that it will remind scholars and lay readers alike of the need to provide more detailed

and more accurate information on the situation of East Central Europe's minorities to the public and leaders of the industrialized world.

* * * * *

Most of the studies featured in this volume are based on, or are the expanded and revised versions of papers that were given at a memorial conference held at Oberlin College in Oberlin, Ohio, on November 7–9, 1985. The gathering was held in honour of the 110th anniversary of the birth of Oscar Jaszi (1875–1957), the noted turn-of-the-century Hungarian thinker and politician who ended his career as a professor at Oberlin College.

Jaszi (in Hungarian Jászi) was a highly appropriate choice for being honoured by a conference dealing mainly with Hungarian minorities. He was a Hungarian who had devoted many of his works to the examination of the question of ethnic relations—"polyethnicity" one might say, though the term does not crop up in his writings—both in his native Kingdom of Hungary and, after that country's dismemberment after World War I, in the successor states. Indeed, a few of Jaszi's works deal, much like Professor McNeill's *Polyethnicity* but in far greater detail, with the relationship of ethnic minorities and states in world history.⁹ Jaszi was not only an expert on ethnic and minority questions, but he was also a philosophical internationalist, a true believer in East Central European federalism—as a possible beginning for a world federation of nations.¹⁰

The papers that were given at the Oscar Jaszi Memorial Conference in Oberlin were divided into two groups. Those that dealt with Jaszi as a thinker and politician will be published elsewhere, while those dealing—directly or indirectly—with Hungarian minorities in socialist East Central Europe are published in our volume. Of these papers Walker Connor's is the broadest in scope. It treats the approach of communist thinkers and statesmen to the nationality problem. This paper outlines the tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology regarding ethnic relations, and examines to what extent these ideological considerations have determined communist practice in dealing with minorities, and also, to what extent communist states have been successful in dealing with issues of minority-majority relations. This paper places the rest of the studies in this volume, those dealing with Hungarian minorities directly, into a broader, theoretical context.

Connor's study is followed by papers with specific themes covering or at least touching on the past and recent situation of the individual Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe. The situation of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia is introduced by Magda Ádám, a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Her chapter in this volume is excerpted from a larger study that dealt with the ethnic-awareness of the Hungarian minorities in the socialist countries of East Central Europe as revealed in their

media. According to our information, this study had been commissioned for Hungary's communist party, and for some time was restricted in its circulation. The excerpts that are printed here serve to give an overview of the fate of Hungarians in Slovakia and offer a taste of the problems faced by them and their cultural institutions.¹¹ To round out the subject of the Hungarian minority of Czechoslovakia, the third paper in this volume deals with the problems of Magyar ethnic schools in that country in recent years. This paper is by Professor Karoly Nagy, and it tells the story of attempts by Slovakia's leaders during the 1980s to restrict access to minority schooling for Hungarians in Slovakia. The paper also outlines the case of Miklós Duray, a dissident who took upon himself to lead a movement of protest against these measures.

The volume's next chapter is devoted to the fate of the Hungarian minority in the Carpatho-Ruthenian region of the U.S.S.R. This is done in a detailed historical study written by Professor S.B. Vardy. His work is a case study of the Soviet Union's efforts to be the Soviet bloc's "guiding light" in the realm of Marxist nationality policies. The following chapter, by Andrew Ludanyi, is an examination of the Yugoslav variation in the communist treatment of minorities. It traces the history of the Hungarian community of Yugoslavia and Yugoslav policies toward this group from the interwar period through World War II and the Tito era. This work is an amplification of communist nationality policy as implemented by the regime that pioneered the practice of taking the "separate road" to socialism. Ludanyi's paper is followed by studies dealing with the Hungarians of Rumania or with books that touch on this minority group. Louis J. Elteto, in particular, examines the consequences of a total breakdown in tolerance toward minorities. Through the examination of popular Rumanian literature and the way it pictures Hungarians, Elteto outlines the Ceausescu regime's practice of using minorities as scapegoats for Rumania's troubles. The volume ends with Thomas Szendrey's in-depth review of the recently published multi-volume history of Transylvania. This review outlines the international controversy that followed the publication of this work.

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Dramatic changes have taken place in East Central and Eastern Europe while this volume was being prepared. Some of the chapters were revised to take these events into consideration, only to be rendered outdated by still newer developments. With the situation in that part of the world changing day-by-day during the second half of 1989, it became evident that this volume could not be an overview of the "current" state of affairs, but only a guide to understanding its background.

The changes that East Central Europe has experienced while this volume was in its gestation period have their roots in the decision of the Soviet leadership, particularly Mikhail Gorbachev, to embark on a new course of reforms. This new era of Soviet policy had momentous implications for the situation of Hungarian minorities of East Central Europe. Some of these were direct and some were indirect in nature. Gorbachev's new approach to Soviet politics has resulted in a veritable revolution in the ethnic politics of the U.S.S.R. The changes introduced have resulted in a dramatic transformation of the situation of the Hungarian minority of Carpatho-Ruthenia. From being one of the most stunted and neglected Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian Basin for decades, this ethnic group's affairs were transformed within the course of not much more than a year. Currently, this Hungarian minority is experiencing a cultural renaissance. How long this revival will last, how long-lasting its effects will be, will be determined in the end by the general trend of Soviet nationality policies during the 1990s.

While the changes in the Soviet Union's approach to ethnic affairs have been dramatic, they fall short of a fundamental revolution. While the country's minorities have received the right to voice their concerns and aspirations freely, and the government has repeatedly urged restraint in the use of military force for the solution of ethnic problems, some aspects of the old minority policies remain. One of these is the idea that the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF) will continue to be recruited on the cadre and not a nationality principle. This means that there will not be nationality-based formations in the SAF, and the forces will continue to be an instrument of ethnic integration and assimilation within the U.S.S.R.¹² Furthermore, Gorbachev has repeatedly stressed that there is a limit to the political restructuring of the U.S.S.R. He has emphatically stated that the idea of the "federalization" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has to be rejected,¹³ which means that the dissolution of the country is not part of his leadership's agenda.

Another observation that should be made about the new Soviet nationality policy is that while the new approach is more positive and more humane than the old one, it has not, and will not in the foreseeable future, solve the U.S.S.R.'s ethnic problems. In fact, the new approach, with its more relaxed attitude to the question of ethnic agitation, in the short run will probably be more conducive to heightened ethnic strife than the old approach of regimentation and repression.

While *glasnost* and *perestroika* have their limitations in the U.S.S.R., no restrictions have been prescribed by the Soviet leadership on reform in East Central Europe. Presumably, changes there can be restricted by the local communist elites, and it is an open question to what extent and how long these can resist popular demand for reform. The first half of 1989 has already brought change to Poland and Hungary. If and when change

will come to the rest of East Central Europe, the position of Hungarian minorities will be inevitably affected. The advent of Soviet-style *glasnost* should alleviate their situation and might even allow a cultural revival in their midst similar to that which is taking place in Sub-Carpathia. More dramatic change in the political structure of the countries of East Central Europe might have similar effects; however, if that change should come about through bloodshed, and should lead to civil war and anarchy, the impact on Hungarian minorities—in fact, all minorities—could be negative. Under these circumstances, the immediate prospects of Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian Basin can only be deemed uncertain.

Prospects for the 1990s and beyond are no different. It is impossible to predict what political atmosphere will prevail in this part of the world if and when the last of the hard-line communist regimes cease resisting the pressure for change. Presumably, the prospects for Hungarian ethnic survival in countries such as Czechoslovakia and Rumania will be a function of the extent to which democratic pluralism can be introduced there. Unfortunately, such pluralism is not easy to achieve, even if the present hard-line elites should be replaced by a new group of leaders. In the case of Rumania, one also wonders to what extent anti-Hungarian suspicions, generated by years of hate-mongering, will persist even in a post-Ceausescu era.

An assessment of the Hungarian minorities' prospects for the future, however, need not end on a negative note. The extent of change already implemented in the Soviet Union bodes ill for the forces of Stalinist totalitarianism in East Central Europe. The proximity of a prosperous and democratic Central and Western Europe, and the obvious interest this Europe has in the lands adjoining it to the East, also give hope and encouragement to the oppressed peoples of the Carpathian Basin. While Eastern Europe will undoubtedly see changes in the not too distant future, it is highly unlikely that these changes will bring a revamping of political boundaries there. Thus, the re-uniting of Hungarian-populated districts of the successor states with Hungary does not seem to be a probability. Nevertheless, the future might still hold encouraging prospects for the Hungarian minorities of these countries. In a reformed, democratic, and pluralistic East Central Europe, the cultural survival, and even flowering, of nationality groups should be possible. In such a political environment ethnic institutions—the churches, schools, and the media—should be able to function freely, and meaningful contacts should evolve between the Hungarian minority groups of Hungary's neighbours. Furthermore, each of these minorities should be able to cultivate extensive cultural and social contacts with Hungarians in Hungary, and their institutions, whether they be schools, churches, publishing houses, or the media.

An even more hopeful prospect would be the integration of the states

of East Central Europe into the European Community. In a democratic and pluralistic “common European home,” should one ultimately emerge from the fateful events of 1989, freedoms such as described above would be commonplace. Moreover, in a united Europe, all the nations of East Central Europe will be minorities, which in fact should make minority status—as we think of that status in the 1980s—meaningless and irrelevant. While the creation of such a Europe is the optimum that the members of East Central Europe’s Hungarian minorities can hope for, their true prospects probably lie somewhere between ethnic renaissance in a free and united Europe and continued cultural stagnation under hard-line, xenophobic communist rule.

* * * * *

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Notes

- 1 William H. McNeill, *Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 33. This idea constituted the thesis of Professor McNeill’s first lecture in the 1985 Donald G. Creighton Lecture series: “Empire and Nation to 1750.” *Ibid.*, pp. 3–29.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 36.
- 4 The only major industrial power that he could find as being an exception to this state of affairs was Japan, and in that country too, McNeill saw the existence of forces that might make for developments similar to those that have been taking place elsewhere in the world. *Ibid.*, p. 70. For a further discussion of McNeill’s ideas see the introduction to the volume of essays *Ethnic Armies: Polyethnic Armed Forces from the Time of the Habsburgs to the Age of the Superpowers*, ed. N.F. Dreisziger (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, forthcoming in 1990).
- 5 See Ferenc A. Váli, “International Minority Protection from the League of Nations to the United Nations,” in *The Hungarians: A Divided Nation*, ed. Steven

- Borsody (New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988), especially pp. 101–06.
- 6 Leszek Antoni Kosinski, "Changes in the Ethnic Structure in Countries of East Central Europe," a paper presented at Louisiana State University on February 19, 1968. For further elaboration see the same author's "Population censuses in East-Central Europe in the Twentieth Century," *East European Quarterly* V (1971) 274–301.
 - 7 A word might be said about the autochthonous Hungarian population of Austria. The members of this ethnic group enjoy being citizens of a pluralistic country where the powers of the police cannot be mobilized against them. They could not possibly be considered a threat to the Austrian majority's hegemony, or to state security; therefore their persecution could not possibly be justified even in the eyes of extreme majority nationalists. Despite this situation, the chances of a very small ethnic group surviving culturally, and its members resisting the attraction of integrating into German-speaking society, are undoubtedly limited.
 - 8 Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1980), p. 20.
 - 9 The most important being his *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* [The development of nation states and the nationality question] (Budapest, 1912); most recent (partial) edition, ed. György Litván (Budapest: Gondolat, 1986).
 - 10 The most authoritative work on Jaszi is probably Péter Hanák's *Jászi Oszkár dunai patriotizmusa* [The Danubian Patriotism of Oszkár Jaszi] (Budapest: Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1985). There is fair amount published on him in English as well: Bela K. Kiraly, "The Danubian Problem in Oscar Jaszi's Political Thought," *The Hungarian Quarterly* V, nos. 1–2 (April–June 1965), pp. 120–34; N.F. Dreisziger, "Central European Federalism in the Thought of Oscar Jaszi and his Successors," in *Society in Change: Studies in Honor of Bela K. Kiraly*, ed. S.B. Vardy and A.H. Vardy (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1983), especially pp. 539–44; also, Lee Congdon, "History and Politics in Hungary: The Rehabilitation of Oszkar Jaszi," *East European Quarterly* IX (Fall, 1975), 315–29.
 - 11 The original title of Ádám's study is "Nation and Nationality, Patriotism in the Hungarian Minority Press of the Neighbouring Socialist Countries." The parts excerpted here were translated with the help of Ms. Zsuzsa Béres of Budapest. Funds for the translation of this work have been received from the Soros Foundation. We are hoping that more of this study could be translated and published in our journal at a future date.
 - 12 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "'Brotherhood in Arms:' The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces," paper given at the 13th R.M.C. Military History Symposium, March, 1986. Forthcoming in Dreisziger (ed.), *Ethnic Armies* (see note 4 above).
 - 13 Address of Gorbachev to the meeting of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., 19 Sept. 1989. Printed in Mikhail Gorbachev, *The Nationalities Policy of the Party in Present-Day Conditions* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1989), p. 47.

- 14 Including Mrs. N. Layton of New Fairfield, Conn.; Mr. and Mrs. L. Bojtos of Brecksville, Ohio; Dr. and Mrs. B. Somogyi of Cheshire, Conn.; and Mrs. S. Lanyi of Oberlin, Ohio.

Leninist Nationality Policy: Solution to the “National Question”?

Walker Connor

Nationalism in the Writings of Marx

The most fundamental tenets of classical Marxist ideology would seemingly mandate a clear, transitory, and relatively unimportant role for ethnic nationalism. There is an evident conflict between a fundamental division of mankind horizontally into economic classes and the division of men vertically into nations. In turning Hegel's dialectic “right way up,” Marx explicitly repudiated nationalism (that is, the “idea” of the nation striving to manifest itself through its cultural and institutional contributions) as the principal vehicle of history in favour of socio-economic classes. The nation and nationalism became relegated to the superstructure. The nation was explained as an historically evolved phenomenon which comes into existence only with the demise of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. Prior to the capitalist stage there were human groupings, such as tribes, clans, and peoples,¹ but it was the new economic relations required by changes in the mode of production which created nations.² Nationalism was merely a device of the bourgeoisie for identifying their own class interests as the interests of the entire people. It attempted to dampen the class consciousness of the proletariat (1) by obscuring the conflicting class interests within each nation and (2) by evoking rivalry among the proletariat of various nations. Because of its association with a specific economic stage, nationalism could be progressive or reactionary, depending upon the level of society. At a feudal or semi-feudal stage, it is progressive, but at a stage of developed capitalism it is counter-revolutionary.

To this point the Marxist position is unambiguous, consistent, and given unequivocal support by contemporary Marxists of rather diverse stamps.³ More obscure, however, is the question of what happens to nations in the post-capitalist period. Marx and Engels made clear in the *Manifesto* that

the nation would survive the revolution at least for a time:

The struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie. . . . Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

But since the nation is part of the superstructure and the product of specific productive forces and relations, will it not, as the state, wither away in the post-capitalist period? If so, does its termination merely mean the end of national antagonisms or does it mean the end of all national distinctions, including such cultural singularities as language? Phrased differently, does the socialist revolution presage total assimilation?

On this issue Marx proved a poor guide. His statements are obtuse, and subject to diverse interpretation. The key passage appeared in the *Manifesto*:

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in condition of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster.

The most common interpretation of this passage is that Marx and Engels meant that *all* national differences faced extermination. But the absence of the word *all* has also permitted another interpretation which holds that the authors of the *Manifesto* foresaw only “the abolition of sharp economic and social differences, economic isolation, invidious distinctions, political rivalries, wars and exploitation of one nation by another but . . . not the complete disappearance of all distinctions whatever.”⁴ The fact that most states, communist and noncommunist alike, are multinational units causes the matter to be of great importance, but Marx and Engels’ ambiguity on this point is reflected even today in the general vagueness which surrounds the national policies of contemporary communist governments.

Marx’s failure to spell out the future of nations in greater detail is symptomatic of the fact that his interest in nations was at best peripheral. This is also illustrated by his careless use of terms. Nowhere does he undertake a systematic definition of a nation. The term is employed at various times as synonymous with (1) country or state, (2) the ruling class of a country, and (3) society. His lack of avid curiosity concerning the nation is accountable in part to his reaction to Hegelian thought, to his own cosmopolitan background and proclivities, and to the fact that he lived during an early phase of the era of nationalism, when the breadth and depth of its

appeal were not yet fully manifest. But his lack of interest was also due to a basic misreading of the nature of nationalism. His emphasis on economic forces caused him to slight the importance of cultural and historical elements, thereby badly underestimating the magnetic pull exerted by the ethnic group. Since the nation was to Marx essentially an economic unit, the question of national consciousness was reduced by him to economic ties. This led him to believe that small minorities should be considered, and did in fact consider themselves to be, members of the large nation to whom they were economically wedded. Regardless of dissimilarities in language, mores, and traditions, membership in the nation was determined simply by ties to the economic unit.⁵

Marx's emphasis upon economic considerations also heavily influenced his attitude toward questions involving national liberation movements. He was not a proponent of national independence in the abstract. His bias toward economic considerations caused him to support or renounce national aspirations, depending upon whether or not they were consonant with economic progress. He defended overseas colonialism on the ground that it offered areas such as India the most efficacious means for advancing to a higher economic stage. Moreover, not a believer in the innate worth of the nation, Marx would not attempt to breathe the national idea into industrially backward people (whom he termed "people without history"), but would prefer to see them attached to more progressive societies. He was most apt to support independence for large nations such as the Poles, while denying it to nations such as the Czechs which were adjudged too small to permit the growth of a modern economy. But beyond the question of size and regardless of the potentiality for developing a modern economy, Marx ultimately judged each national movement in terms of its impact upon the global, revolutionary movement. He was prepared to deny support to large movements and to grant it to small, if such seeming inconsistencies served grand strategy. Thus, Pan-Slavism was repudiated by Marx because he feared it would prove advantageous to czarism, which Marx considered the archetype of reaction. Conversely, despite its small size and despite his own earlier objections, Marx became an ardent proponent of independence for the Irish nation because he believed that the issue was diverting class antagonisms from their proper target. The English proletariat and the Irish workers within England were at loggerheads over the independence question. Proletarian solidarity therefore required support for Irish independence, although it is interesting that Marx believed that once independence had been achieved and emotions cooled, economic self-interest would lead the Irish to seek a form of reunion (probably along federal lines) with Britain. At least in this instance, Marx had been forced to recognize national consciousness as a more powerful motivation than class consciousness. In this situation, strategy took precedence over ideology.

In summary, Marx's approach to nationalism was characterized by a tendency to underestimate its force and, indeed, to misunderstand its nature. His legacy on the national issue included the theory of the nation's relation to economic stages and the assertion that national distinctions were necessarily vanishing, a process which would be accelerated following the socialist victory. That legacy also included a number of precedents for supporting national movements deemed progressive, but only if the movements were also consonant with the larger interests of the global movement. National movements were not to be treated in isolation, but viewed against this larger backdrop. Alliances with otherwise unprogressive nationalist movements were condoned if strategically wise.⁶ But while condoning such alliances with nationalism and while acknowledging, as earlier mentioned, that the proletariat for a time must "constitute itself the nation" thereby becoming "national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word," Marx maintained that the leadership of the communist movement is differentiated precisely by its non-nationalistic outlook:

The Communists are distinguished from the other working class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.⁷

A final important element of Marx's legacy to his successors was the slogan which later played a vital role in the rise to power of the communist parties of Russia, China, Yugoslavia, and Vietnam, and which continues to be an important element in the strategy of all four states. In 1865, a half-century before Wilson became associated with it, "the right of self-determination" was proclaimed in a public document drafted by Marx.⁸

A *right* of self-determination of nations must by definition constitute a prerogative shared equally by all nations, and subsequent endorsements of the principle by both the First and Second Internationals made this interpretation explicit.⁹ Yet, as noted, both Marx and Engels in practice were highly selective in extending their support for independence movements, and it is evident, therefore, that self-determination was conceived by them not as a principle, but as a slogan which could be used to weaken enemies and attract allies. Toward the end of his career, Marx, while continuing to underestimate nationalism, had come to sense that identifying with it might prove useful. The underlying lack of interest in the concept of self-determination, however, is manifest in the failure of the communist leadership to detail precisely what it meant by self-determination of nations despite the slogan's periodic endorsement over several decades.

Nationalism in Lenin's Pre-Revolutionary Strategy

This oversight led to a number of acrimonious disputes within the movement in the period immediately prior to World War I. The issue was of particular import to those most concerned with the multinational states of Central and Eastern Europe, and included such notables as Rosa Luxemburg, Otto Bauer, and Karl Renner. However, it was Lenin and, to a lesser degree and under his direction, Stalin, who gave definition to the meaning and the role of Marxist self-determination. The program of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, which had been drafted by Lenin and endorsed at the 2nd Congress in 1903, contained, in addition to guarantees of equal rights to all nationalities (including certain linguistic rights), "the right of self-determination for all nations comprising the State."¹⁰ But another decade elapsed before Lenin's important writings on the subject began to appear.

One point that Lenin consistently made clear in his writings and statements was that self-determination included the right of political secession. Indeed, most of his references to self-determination virtually equate the two.¹¹ However, he appears to have agreed with the more comprehensive definition, set forth by Stalin in 1913, which includes but is not limited to secession.

The right of self-determination means that a nation can arrange its life according to its own will. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign and all nations are equal.¹²

But is not the doctrine of political independence for all nations in consonant with Marx's insistence upon the need for large states? Not to Lenin, because he was certain that few small nations would act against their economic self-interest. And, in the event that they did, they would soon perceive the wisdom of requesting reunion. In Lenin's words: "To defend this right [to secession] does in no way mean encouraging the formation of small states, but, to the contrary, it leads to a freer, . . . wider formation of larger states—a phenomenon more advantageous for the masses and more in accord with economic development."¹³ It may appear paradoxical to espouse a principle in order to frustrate it, but the basis for Lenin's conviction on this point is essential to an understanding of Marxist national policy.

Throughout his life, Lenin was convinced that the only way to defeat nationalism was by use of the carrot, never the stick. He conceived of nationalism in purely negative terms, that is, it was the response of a people to oppression and prejudice (whether real or imagined). Thus the dialectic: by conceding all, or rather, by seeming to concede all to nationalism,

one in fact was promoting cosmopolitanism. With specific regard to self-determination, this meant that the best way to avoid or to dissipate a grass-roots demand for independence was to proffer that independence. Phrased differently, support for the slogan of self-determination, rather than acting as a stimulant to nationalism, would prove to be an antidote.¹⁴

But what if Lenin proved wrong, and a number of nations should elect to withdraw from Russia at the time of the Revolution? Was Lenin prepared to permit secession? Lenin's position remained unclear. On the one hand, he often employed Finland as an example of a nation which might secede, and he did not appear to consider such a limited loss objectionable. As noted, however, just as Marx in the case of Ireland, Lenin thought that the proletariat of a small unit such as Finland would soon perceive that it was to their economic advantage to achieve reunion. Moreover, there are a few hints that Lenin would view any post-revolutionary attempt at secession as counterrevolutionary. When asked directly how he would respond to a situation in which a non-proletarian leadership was in charge of a border nation, Lenin's evasiveness hinted at something less than resignation: "What shall happen when the reactionaries are in the majority? . . . This is one of those questions of which it is said that seven fools ask more than ten wise men can answer."¹⁵ On another occasion, his comments on Marx's position on the Irish question appeared to preclude any post-revolutionary nationalist movements: "If capitalism had been overthrown in England as quickly as Marx at first expected, there would *have been no room* for a bourgeois-democratic national movement."¹⁶

In any event, Lenin left his options open by making explicit that the communists need not support each liberation movement.¹⁷ Lenin thus made a distinction between the abstract right of self-determination, which is enjoyed by all nations, and the right to exercise that right, which evidently is not.¹⁸ Though supporting the right of self-determination, "we are not obliged to support 'every' struggle for independence or 'every' republic or anti-clerical movement."¹⁹ The question of support in a specific instance was left to the communist party and,²⁰ just as strongly as Marx, Lenin insisted that members of the communist party not be tainted by nationalism. He demanded, for example, that members whose nationality coincided with that of the dominant group in a multinational state must support the right of secession, while those of the minority nations must insist on the right to union.²¹ By thus insisting on proletarian cosmopolitanism within the party, Lenin insured that the communist position on self-determination (in practice rather than in principle) would be guided by Marxist strategy rather than by ethnicity.

What of those nations who remained within the multinational state? The victorious communists would introduce the policy of "national equality," guaranteeing to the members of each nation the right to use their own

language and to an education in that language. These guarantees were contained in the 1903 Programme, and they were reasserted in 1913 by Stalin in "Marxism and the National Question." Stalin also set forth as essential a system of regional autonomy "for such crystallized units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and so forth," while explicitly denying it to smaller nations such as the Latvians.²² In some instances autonomous borders would reflect ethnic distribution; in others (for example, the Caucasus and smaller or less nationally conscious groups) they would not. The following year (1914), in a private letter Lenin made clear that he had already devised the basic content of what subsequently became official Soviet national policy, although he also demonstrated something substantially less than ardour for the policy's merit.

In order to struggle against the stupidity of the cultural-national autonomists, the fraction must introduce into the Duma a draft law on the equality of nations and the definition of the rights of national minorities. I propose that we draw up such a project:

The general situation of equal rights—the division of the country into autonomous and self-governing territorial units according—among other things—to nationality (the local population determines the boundaries, the general parliament confirms them)—the limits of the administration of the autonomous districts and regions, as well as the self-governing units;—the illegalization of any departure from equality of nations in the decisions of autonomous districts, zemstvos, etc.; general school councils democratically elected etc., freedom and equality of languages—the choice of languages by the municipal institutions, etc. The protection of minorities: the right to a proportional share of the expenditures for school buildings (gratis) for students of "alien" (non-Russian) nationalities, for "alien" teachers, for "alien" departments in museums and libraries, theaters and the like; the right of each citizen to seek redress (before a court) for any departure from the corresponding equality of rights, for any "trampling upon" the rights of national minorities; a census of population every five years in the multi-national districts, a ten-year census in the country as a whole, etc...²³

Lenin's lack of ardour for his own program of promoting national equality and cultural autonomy was a reflection of his conviction that such a policy was merely the prerequisite for a higher stage. Interspersed throughout his writings are references to "the inevitable merging of nations," their ultimate "fusion," "amalgamation," or "assimilation."²⁴ Consonant with Marx's position on the vanishing of national differences, Lenin viewed the movement toward assimilation as both progressive and inevitable.

But if one desires ultimate assimilation, is he not working at cross-

purposes when he encourages the use of local languages and creates national schools? Doesn't such an approach strengthen the nationalism of the various ethnic groups? Again, as in the case of self-determination, Lenin thought not, and essentially for the same reason. Since the bitterness and mistrust which the minorities felt toward the Russians was due to a superior-to-inferior relationship long practiced by the latter, these negative attitudes, which constitute the major barrier to assimilation, must be exorcised by a period of national equality, characterized by a pandering to some of the more apparent manifestations of national diversity such as language. Since he considered nationalism to be the mental product of past oppression, Lenin believed that attempts to eradicate it by force could only have the unintended effect of strengthening it. His emphasis is ever on the voluntary nature of assimilation.²⁵ Although once in power he was to condone the use of force to nullify political secession, he remained convinced to the end that a frontal attack upon nationalism was improper strategy.²⁶

Even if his assumptions proved incorrect, Lenin's temporary concessions to national diversity were probably not viewed by him as dangerous because of the presence of the Communist Party. It is significant that the tract in which he defined the central role and organizational principle of the Party preceded by a year his inclusion of cultural concessions in the Programme of 1903. His insistence upon party members strictly observing international proletarian discipline has been mentioned. Even more important was his explicit rejection of any form of federalism or autonomy within the Party, and his insistence upon democratic centralism. One reason specified for his rejection of any form of decentralization (and this was also a major reason for the support he received on the issue of party organization) was to prevent the formation of ethnic poles of power within the party apparatus.²⁷ In Lenin's words: "We Social-Democrats are opposed to *all* nationalism and advocate democratic centralism."²⁸ Since the power to make all major decisions rested with the Party, such a highly centralized organization was the best insurance that regional autonomy could never pose a serious threat.²⁹

It would be in the higher echelons of the Party that the general content of educational curricula and of the communications media would be designed. To Lenin the key element was not the language but the message. To grant the use of local languages while maintaining control of content was to surrender little. Moreover, broadcasting, writing, or lecturing in the native language tended to overcome ethnic resentment and suspicion, thereby rendering the audience more susceptible to Party direction, including direction toward national amalgamation. Stalin's famous shorthand for this policy was "national in form, socialist in content."

As a guide to actual policy, then, there are three prescriptions in Lenin's national policy. (1) Prior to the assumption of power, promise the right

of self-determination (secession), while offering a policy of national equality and regional cultural autonomy to those nations who wish to remain. (2) Following the assumption of power, terminate the right of self-determination within the state and begin the dialectical process of assimilation via regional cultural autonomy. (3) Keep the Party free of any taint of nationalism.

Post-Revolutionary Practice

Lenin's injunction to uphold the right of all national groups to self-determination, expressly including the right of separation, need not long detain us. However, it might be noted in passing that such promises played a major role in the rise to power of the Soviet, Yugoslav, Chinese, and Vietnamese communist parties.³⁰ The Leninist strategy of pledging respect for self-determination, including secession, has therefore paid handsome dividends to Marxist-Leninist parties in their quest for power. Far less effective, however, has been Lenin's scheme for ridding the state of national antagonisms following a successful revolution. It will be recalled that he envisaged a dialectical approach. Homogenization was to be achieved by passing through a period of cultural pluralism, during which the more overt manifestations of each nation's uniqueness were to be nurtured by the state. This seemingly incongruous synthesis was possible because during the period of cultural pluralism (which, with time, would come to be known as the period of "the flourishing of the nations") all of the state's vast, multifaceted apparati for shaping the consciousness of its citizens were to din the messages of scientific Marxism.

The keystone of Leninist national policy for a post-revolutionary situation was therefore a plenary distinction between form and substance. While the former assumes a national coloration during the period of the flourishing of the nations, the latter must remain unerringly socialist at all times. Faithful compliance with both aspects of this policy ("national in form, socialist in content") is expected to cause a "coming together" of the nations until a final "fusion" or "merging" of the nations into a uniform whole occurs.

The guiding slogan for the period of national flourishing is that "all nations are equal" and the inclusion of it, or a near equivalent, in the constitutions of Marxist-Leninist states has become *de rigueur*.³¹ In turn, the policy of national equality contains three subcategories: (1) cultural equality (particularly the right to employ one's own language), (2) economic equality, and (3) political equality (predicated upon a system of territorial autonomy for all compact national groups). But although Marxist-Leninist governments pay public obeisance to Leninist national policy in all of its aspects, the record of carry-over from avowal to practice has been an extremely spotty one. For example, within only four Marxist-Leninist states (the Soviet Union, China, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) do internal borders and institutions reflect any concession to Lenin's prescription con-

cerning the granting of territorial autonomy. In 1968 Rumania dropped the single autonomous region that it had accorded a segment of its Hungarian minority. And Vietnam also demonstrated something less than unquestioning faith in the wisdom of Lenin's legacy on the national question when it summarily dissolved its autonomous regions in 1975, the same year as the surrender of South Vietnam. The propagandistic value of the autonomous regions having evaporated with victory, autonomy (though always devoid of real content) was immediately perceived as having outlived its usefulness.

Even in the case of those few states that confer special territorial status upon their national groups, the diverse manner in which they have done so invalidates the assertion that all nations are equal under Marxist-Leninism. There are great variations among states. For example, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and, since 1968, Czechoslovakia are self-proclaimed federations composed of "republics"; within China, which remains adamantly unitary in form as well as substance, groups cannot aspire to republic status. Moreover, while the Constitution of the Soviet Union concedes to its union republics the theoretical right of secession, such a right is denied by the constitutions of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. And thus, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, etc. are not accorded the same right of separation ostensibly granted to Latvians, Ukrainians, Georgians, *et al.*

Variations also exist in the treatment accorded individual nations within a single state. Within the Soviet Union, for example, while certain groups are accorded a union republic (the only level of organization with the theoretical right to secede), others are assigned the progressively lower status of autonomous republic, autonomous region, or autonomous area. And some important groups are permitted no autonomous status whatsoever. Similarly, within Czechoslovakia, only the Czechs and Slovaks are accorded a republic or, for that matter, any other form of autonomous status; the large, territorially compact Hungarian minority is denied an autonomous organ, and the large gypsy element is not even extended recognition as a distinct people in the census. Within Yugoslavia, the Albanians are granted only an autonomous province (a subsidiary part of the Serbian Republic), while the substantially less numerous Montenegrins are awarded their own republic. Within China, there is no autonomous region (China's most prestigious level of autonomous unit) named after the Yi, Miao, or Manchu, although all three peoples are more numerous than the Mongols, who can nevertheless point to a Mongolian Autonomous Region.

The discrepancies in treatment accorded various groups with regard to political equality extend to the spheres of cultural and economic equality as well. Within the Soviet Union, for example, the number of years of education in which instruction is available in one's own language exhibits sharp differentials. As one descends from the level of the union republics through the autonomous republics and autonomous regions to the

autonomous areas, the opportunity for instruction in the language of the titular nation correspondingly diminishes. Thus, whereas people with a union republic are able to complete both primary and secondary education (a total of ten years) in their own language, most groups with only an autonomous republic enjoy the possibility of but seven years of instruction in their own language, a few are limited to only four years, and one group (the Karelians) has no native language schools whatsoever. Within China also, certain minorities, such as the Manchu, are without instruction in their mother tongue. As to Vietnam, even during the period when autonomous regions were permitted to exist, only four of thirty-seven officially recognized minorities were given any schooling in their own language, and for these four exceptions all instruction above the fourth year was conducted in the Vietnamese language. Somewhat similarly, within the Soviet Union and China, the language of the dominant group (Russian and Mandarin Chinese respectively) monopolizes nearly all instruction beyond the secondary level.

So too with regard to economic equality. Income levels vary substantially among groups. In the case of the oldest Marxist-Leninist state, for example, the *per capita* product of the wealthiest union republic within the Soviet Union is more than two-and-one-third times that of the poorest.³² We conclude, therefore, that George Orwell's all too often paraphrased epigram concerning the nature of equality under Marxist-Leninism most aptly applies to nations: all are equal but some are more equal than others.

Marxist-Leninist governments have therefore either ignored Lenin's prescriptions on the national question or have applied them most unevenly. Moreover, even those governments that have imperfectly implemented Lenin's formula for solving the national question have demonstrated broadly held skepticism concerning its wisdom, by simultaneously introducing risk-reducing policies. The major hedging devices that have been employed can be grouped under (1) language policy, (2) the recruitment and purging of elites, and (3) the redistribution and gerrymandering of national groups. Here limitations on space mandate that we limit ourselves to the briefest outline.³³

Language

In the area of linguistic policy, Marxist-Leninist states have exhibited an evolutionary, three-stage pattern. (1) *Pluralism*: The first stage is characterized by official preoccupation with encouraging (some of) the individual languages. Any official pressure to learn the state's dominant language is muted or indirect. (2) *Bilingualism*: This stage is characterized by growing overt pressure to learn the state's dominant language, culminating in making this step mandatory. In the case of the Soviet Union, for example, study of the Russian language became compulsory in 1938. (3) *Monolingualism*:

This final stage, though nowhere yet achieved, is heralded by pressures for making the dominant tongue the sole language of instruction and the sole official language.³⁴

These stages overlap and reinforce one another and are often pursued concomitantly. Moreover, their evolutionary nature need not be reflected in chronological evolution. In this realm of linguistic policy, governments have been known to push forward or retreat precipitously in response to community forces. During the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, for example, pressures were exerted immediately to enthrone Mandarin as the sole language of China. But following the demise of each of these programs, policy reverted abruptly to the stage of "the flowering of the nations." But despite such irregular patterns, it is evident that the ostensible encouragement of national languages has come to be tempered in practice by the encouragement of bilingualism, and, further, by psychological and other inducements to adopt the state's principal language as one's own.

The techniques employed to ensure this progression toward unilingualism are numerous and diverse. The following are but a few of the more important: (1) Schools with instruction conducted in the state's dominant tongue are created everywhere, whereas those conducting instruction in any other language are limited solely to the appropriate autonomous unit. Thus, the many people living outside of their titular unit (or those without such a unit) have no opportunity to attend their "own" schools. (2) Even if living within their autonomous unit, parents are encouraged to send their children to the school conducting instruction in the state's dominant language, because fluency in that language is one key to social mobility. (3) Whenever possible, minority-language schools are merged with dominant-language schools, and the number of courses offered in the minority language is subsequently progressively curtailed. (4) Those desirous of an education conducted in their own language increasingly find this realizable, if at all, only at the lower levels. Higher education is customarily restricted to instruction in the dominant language. For those who wish to continue their education, this is a persuasive reason to attend the dominant-language schools from the outset, so as to be better prepared for later training. (5) Monopoly over the publishing industry permits the government to determine the number and the nature of publications to be allocated each language. In many cases, the entire literature of a discipline is monopolized by the dominant language, thus demanding great fluency in that language on the part of anyone desiring to pursue research in the field. (6) Examinations, interviews, and other such prerequisites for entering a profession are also apt to be conducted solely in the dominant language. (7) Minority languages are themselves brought to resemble more closely the dominant language by impregnating the former with vocabulary and grammatical forms drawn from the latter,

as well as by requiring that all minority languages be written in the script of the dominant language.³⁵

The desire of any government, Marxist-Leninist or otherwise, to promote unilingualism is quite understandable. Polylingualism offers numerous impediments to economic efficiency and state integration. The point, however, is that Marxist-Leninist governments have been promoting linguistic assimilation, while maintaining the guise of orthodoxy with regard to Leninist national policy and the promotion of the flourishing of national forms.³⁶ Nor is this the extent of the apostasy. Departing from Lenin's notion of language as pure form, his successors have viewed it as a major determinant of primary group-identity. A move toward linguistic assimilation is perceived as a move toward psychological assimilation. As succinctly stated in a Vietnamese publication: "The fate of the language of a people is always linked to the destiny of that people."³⁷ Or, as phrased in a Soviet publication: "Groups of people who have changed their language in the course of time usually also change their ethnic (national) identity."³⁸ A Soviet scholar echoes: "If linguistic and ethnic affiliation do not coincide, the result is inevitably a change in one's national awareness."³⁹ Official avowals of their Leninist orthodoxy to the contrary, the actions of Marxist-Leninist governments and the writings of their theorists betray a conviction that language is much more than just form.

The Recruitment and Purging of Elites

None of the Marxist-Leninist states have honored the notion of national in form with regard to cadres. As made explicit in the 1961 program of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, the "continuous exchange of trained personnel among nations" is a fixture of official policy. This departure from the Leninist scheme is a surprising one. As a blueprint for nurturing Marxism within a single, integrated, multinational structure, Leninist national policy would seemingly mandate that the visible central organs of authority reflect the ethnonational complexity of the entire population, while the more localized visible power-structures reflect the unique national coloration of the immediately surrounding populace. In particular, one would expect that the visible elite within an ethnically delineated autonomous unit would risk undermining the very *raison d'être* of such administrative units, namely, to convince each national group that it has its own, truly autonomous political organization, if the elite were drawn from outside the indigenous group. Yet, the governments have felt that the need to resort to such a hedging device outweighs such a risk. The resulting dilemma faced the Chinese Communist Party shortly after its assumption of power. Even while in the midst of a propaganda campaign whose slogan was that territorial autonomy would make each national group "the master of his home," governmental spokesmen concomitantly insisted that Han Chinese cadres

were to be permanent members of that household. "If it is considered that by assuming control of one's own homeland . . . there is no need for the support of the Han people and cadres—then it will be an obvious mistake which must be prevented . . ."⁴⁰

The cutting edge of such a cadre policy is somewhat blunted by the practice of assigning members of the local national group to positions of great visibility and little power. Meanwhile, members of the state's dominant ethnic element tend to hold the key positions of power, particularly those responsible for internal security. Thus, in all Marxist-Leninist states the dominant group is customarily disproportionately represented in the upper echelons of the military; combined with the practice of assigning minority personnel serving in the military outside of their homelands, this procedure minimizes any danger of the homeland serving as a focus for a secessionist movement. Both aspects of this military personnel policy came to the fore in Yugoslavia in the early 1970s, when angry Croatian spokesmen pointed out (1) that only 15 percent of all Croatian recruits were performing their military service within Croatia (despite an earlier wrung concession promising that 25 percent would so serve), and (2) that Serbs and Montenegrins, though together accounting for only 43 percent of the population, represented 85 percent of all army officers. A somewhat similar if less dramatic situation prevailed in Czechoslovakia, wherein the Slovaks (30 percent of the population) accounted for only 20 percent of all military officers and for an even smaller percentage of people at the higher echelons of the Ministry of Defence.⁴¹ And in the case of the Soviet Union, one study indicated that all of the commanders-in-chief of the country's military districts were Russian.⁴² Similar considerations help determine the national composition of the police of both the overt and secret variety.⁴³

Staffing key slots with non-indigenous personnel is only one aspect of a cadre policy aimed at nullifying any potential nationalist threat. Another is the periodic purging of leaders, who have been drawn from the local group, for alleged nationalist deviations. Still another practice is the placing of primary responsibility for the monitoring of cadre policy on the local scene in the person of a non-indigene, whose primary loyalty to the center is further ensured by limiting the duration of his assignment in the locale.⁴⁴ *In toto*, such practices add up to an impressive system of hedges, but they also represent a sharp departure from the Leninist notion of territorial autonomy.

Gerrymandering and Population Redistribution

Governments have traditionally attempted to blur ethnic divisions within their territory. Certainly, they have seldom exalted them. By contrast, Lenin's plan for dividing the territory into autonomous units would highlight and institutionalize ethnonational divisions. His rationale was that

the giving to territorially compact people their own administrative division would blunt, if not sate, the titular people's desire for political independence. The guiding rule for such a scheme was one people, one autonomous unit. But as a result of gerrymandering and population redistribution, the ethnic homogeneity of the ostensibly ethnically delineated constituent units within Marxist-Leninist states has been severely compromised.

From the beginning the Soviets demonstrated a flair for gerrymandering. In some cases, borders were drawn in a manner that divided a people, while, in other cases, borders were drawn so as to incorporate alien groups. In the Central Asia area, for example, the authorities feared that excessively large and unmanageable groups might evolve in the shape of a Bukharan, Turkic, or Muslim national group. Therefore, after a short interlude during which the Soviets consolidated their power, the region's political borders were drawn so as to divide the inhabitants into a number of units and thus encourage a sense of separate national identity on the part of the Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks, all peoples whose sense of national consciousness at that time was in a very inchoate state. By contrast, in the Caucasus, the authorities were confronted with the Armenians and the Georgians, each of whom had a developed sense of national consciousness that had already manifested itself in separatist movements. This situation was therefore met with the opposite stratagem of grouping these two peoples, along with the Azerbaidzhani, in a single Transcaucasian Federated Republic, a solution that prevailed until 1936. Moreover, when this unit dissolved into three union republics, there was little attempt to draw their borders in the closest possible conformity to ethnic distributions. In particular, territories in which Armenians predominated were made part of the Azerbaidzhani and Georgian Republics.⁴⁵

Some appreciation of the extent of the gerrymandering engaged in at the time of creating the autonomous units within the Soviet Union can be gleaned from the following data. In nine of the twenty-seven union and autonomous republics whose name in each case implied the predominance of a single national group, the titular group did not in fact even account for a majority of the population. In no case did its proportion reach 90 percent, and the median proportion it represented was less than two-thirds.⁴⁶ In addition, there were three autonomous republics whose ethnic heterogeneity was at least suggested by their official designations, each of which contained the names of two ethnic groups.⁴⁷ The title of yet another autonomous republic made no mention of any ethnonational group; its highly heterogeneous population was grouped under the name of the region, Dagestan. Thus, the theory of Leninist national policy to the contrary, most people, including those purportedly assigned their own unit, found themselves sharing an autonomous unit with large numbers of aliens.

Almost equally injurious to the principle of one nation, one autonomous unit were the large numbers of people left outside of the unit bearing their designation. In three of the twenty-seven previously mentioned cases, *a majority of the group's members remained outside*. In half of the cases, less than 80 percent of the membership resided within the confines of the unit bearing their national name.⁴⁸ Recalling that residence within one's own autonomous unit would become a prerequisite for schooling conducted in one's native language, the impact of this gerrymandering upon the rate of acculturation must have been marked.

Subsequent redistribution of population within the Soviet Union has further vitiated the principle of ethnonational autonomy. Particularly pronounced has been the impact of migrations by the state's dominant group. Since 1917, there has been a dramatic influx of Russians into all non-traditionally Russian homelands. As of 1979, Russian accounted for more than 7 percent of the population of each of the Union Republics other than Armenia. The range was from 2.3 percent in the case of Armenia to 40.8 percent in the case of Kazakhstan, with a mean of 16.7 percent and a median of 12.3 percent. The penetration was more dramatic yet with regard to the autonomous republics within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The percentage of Russians within these sixteen republics ranged from 14.7 percent to 73.5 percent with a mean of 45 percent and a median of 44.1 percent. In five of the sixteen autonomous republics, the Russians constituted an absolute majority, and, in four others, they were the largest single ethnonational group.

The overall results of gerrymandering and population redistribution upon the ethnic homogeneity of the republics has been enormous. With regard to the fourteen non-Russian union republics, the titular group typically accounts for less than two-thirds of the republic's population (a mean of 64.6 percent and a median of 68.6). In no case does it account for 90 percent of the entire population, and in two cases it fails to account for a majority.⁴⁹ Again, even more striking is the case of the autonomous republics within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. In only two of the sixteen cases does a single, non-Russian people account for a majority of the population.

The ethnic homogeneity of China's autonomous units has been similarly diluted. The centrally ordered migration of millions of Han Chinese into the hinterlands has been combined with extensive gerrymandering to render the titular national groups a certain minority in four of the country's five autonomous regions (China's most prestigious level of autonomy) and a most probable minority in the other. Furthermore, these same policies were carried over to the next lower level of administrative unit, the autonomous district. In only eight of the twenty-nine districts existing in 1965, did the titular group represent a majority of the population. In two others,

the titular group was reported to account for precisely fifty percent. This left nineteen of the twenty-nine districts in which the titular element was a minority. Moreover, five of the eight cases where the titular group was in a majority were districts principally populated by Tibetans. All five districts were part of a contiguous Tibetan homeland and should logically have been made part of an enlarged Tibetan autonomous region. They too were therefore a reflection of a hedging against the principle of ethnic autonomy, rather than an honoring of it. Moreover, in one of the three remaining possible examples of honoring the principle, the dominant group (56.3 percent of the population) had to share the ethnic designation of the district with another people, though the latter accounted for only 2 percent of the population. Thus, out of thirty-four autonomous regions and districts within China, we are reduced to two that could possibly be said to reflect Lenin's plan to grant territorial autonomy to concentrated peoples. In one of these, the titular group represented a bare majority (56.4 percent) and in the other 81.4 percent. Neither would therefore qualify as ethnically homogeneous.

Yugoslavia too bears the imprint of intense gerrymandering. Here, however, the intent was somewhat different. Elsewhere, gerrymandering had been employed as a means of neutralizing or undermining nationalistic inclinations on the part of minorities. This was a goal of Yugoslavian authorities as well. But, in addition, the authorities were anxious to diminish the relative strength of the state's largest ethnic element. Inter-ethnic animosities, particularly those between Serb and Croat, had been the cancer of prewar Yugoslavia. In large part because of their numerical advantage, Serbs had tended to dominate the state, and the allegation of Serbian hegemony had been a rallying cry for Croatian nationalists. Parcelling the Serbs out among several autonomous units would reduce the advantage of numbers and thereby assuage the fears and jealousies of numerically smaller groups, most particularly the Croats. At the same time, those Serbs who found themselves outside the Serbian republic would serve the same protective function relative to minority nationalism as do the Russians and Han Chinese who live in minority areas within their respective states. Particularly important in this regard was the decision to permit the return to their prewar homes of large numbers of Serbs who had fled Croatia to avoid genocide at the hands of the Croats during World War

In addition to weakening the concentration of Serbs by apportioning them among a number of republics, the Serbian community was further fractured through the creation of two autonomous provinces within the Serbian republic (the only republic to be so subdivided). The two provinces were purportedly created to extend recognition to the Albanian and Hungarian minority respectively, and the borders of these two provinces should therefore have closely followed the delineation between Serb and non-Serb. In

each case, however, the territory was expanded beyond that populated by the minority in a manner that *needlessly* incorporated large numbers of Serbs. In the case of one of the provinces, so many Serbs were incorporated that they became a powerful majority, thus questioning the ostensible rationale for the province.

The overall impact of the original delineation of republican borders upon the ethnic composition of Yugoslavia's six major constituent units proved to be a profound one. In one case, the result was the absence of a majority ethnic group. Only in two republics did the titular group account for 90 percent of the population, and subsequent migration has reduced the titular group's percentage in one of these republics from 90.7 percent to 67.2 percent. Today, with a single exception, minority peoples account for at least 20 percent of each republic's population.

Similar practices have been employed within Czechoslovakia (against the Hungarians), Rumania, and Vietnam. Authorities in the last named state appear particularly intent to bring about immediate dilution of minorities. Despite earlier promises to the contrary, the country's current five-year plan calls for the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of hill tribesmen in lowland communities and the moving of millions of Vietnamese into the traditional homelands of the minorities. Here as elsewhere, dilution, rather than autonomy for compact groups, has proven to be the rule.

To recapitulate briefly: The communist parties of all Marxist-Leninist states are committed in principle to Leninist national policy. In practice, however, only a few have introduced the policy's *sine qua non* of a system of territorial autonomy. Those few have manifested a fundamental skepticism concerning the wisdom of Lenin's policy, by encumbering it with a series of hedging devices. Thus hedged, the practices of states with regard to their national question differ dramatically from the practices prescribed by Lenin. Lenin's prescription for manipulating the national aspirations of minorities within a revolutionary or pre-revolutionary situation remains in the Marxist-Leninist arsenal of proven weaponry. Despite much lip-service to the contrary, Lenin's prescriptions for taming nationalism in a post-revolutionary situation fail to achieve their intended results.

Notes

- 1 The word *nationality* is also used in Marxist literature to denote a people who have never progressed beyond a semi-feudal stage and are therefore not a nation. See, for example, I. Groshev, *A Fraternal Family of Nations* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967, p. 6: "Before the formation of nations there were various small communities, such as clans, tribes and nationalities."
- 2 As set forth in the *Manifesto*: "The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralized means of production, and

has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralization. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments, and systems of taxation, became lumped together in one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class interest, one frontier and one customs tariff."

- 3 See, for example, the accepted Soviet Union position in Groshev, pp. 6-7. "The nation, as a new form of community, emerged when feudalism disintegrated to be superceded by capitalism. . . . Nations appear and develop as a result of the elimination of feudalism and the rise of capitalism, which establishes economic links and forms a home market, thus evolving a common economic life which unites the separate parts of a nation into a single whole." For the Chinese position, see Chang Chih-i, "A Discussion of the National Question in the Chinese Revolution and of Actual Nationalities Policy (Draft)" translated by George Moseley, *The Party and the National Question* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), p. 35: "It is recognized in Marxist Leninism that 'nations are historically determined. . . , having been formed at the time of the collapse of feudalism and the rise of capitalism.' We endorse this thesis." (Mr. Chang's article was written in 1956.)
- 4 S. Bloom, *The World of Nations; A Study of the National Implications in the Work of Karl Marx* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), p. 26. For a generally concurring opinion, see R. Rosdolsky, "Worker and Fatherland: A Note on a Passage in the Communist Manifesto," *Science and Society*, XXIX, No. 3 (Summer 1965).
- 5 See Bloom, p. 20.
- 6 In a report delivered at the 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party on April 23, 1923, Stalin favorably quoted Lenin: "Marx had no doubt as to the subordinate position of the national question as compared with the 'labor question.'" J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question: Selected Writings and Speeches* (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p. 159.
- 7 *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Part II. Translation approved and annotated by Frederick Engels in 1888.
- 8 The expression appeared as part of the Proclamation on the Polish Question endorsed by the London Conference of the First International. The Proclamation noted "the need for annulling Russian influence in Europe, through enforcing the right of self-determination, and through the reconstituting of Poland upon democratic and social foundations." Cited G. Stelkoff, *History of the First International* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1968), p. 85.
- 9 See, for example, J. Brauthal, *History of the International. Vol. I: 1864-1914* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1967), p. 331, where the author notes that Marx drafted the Programme for the Geneva Conference of the First International held the following year (1866), in which "the right of self-determination, 'the right of every people' in Marx's words, was demanded." See also the Programme of the Second International as endorsed at the London Conference of 1896: "The Congress declares that it upholds the full right of self-determination of all nations . . ." Cited in S. Shaheen, *The Communist Theory of National Self-Determination* (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve Ltd., 1956), p. 26.
- 10 The pertinent sections can be found in Robert Conquest, *Soviet Nationalities*

- Policy in Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 16. The First Congress had also proclaimed "the right of national self-determination." See Shaheen, p. 17.
- 11 See, for example, V.I. Lenin, *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, Selected Writings* (New York: International Publishers, 1951), p. 14 for his comment in the "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," written in 1914: "It means that 'self-determination of nations' in the program of the Marxists cannot, from a historical-economic point of view, have any other meaning than political self-determination, political independence, the formation of the national state." See, also, his comment in "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Thesis)," written in 1916 (*Ibid.*, p. 73): "Victorious socialism must . . . given effect to the right of the oppressed people to self-determination, i.e., the right to free political secession."
 - 12 Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
 - 13 Cited in Alfred Low, *Lenin on the Question of Nationality* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1950), p. 68.
 - 14 This is apparently what Lenin meant in 1914 when he stated that while recognizing "the right of self-determination, to secession, seems to 'concede' the maximum to nationalism (in reality the recognition of all nations to self-determination implies the recognition of the maximum of democracy and the minimum of nationalism) . . ." Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 46. See also his comments of the following year on page 72: "We demand the freedom of self-determination, i.e., independence, . . . not because we dream of our own economically atomized world, not because we cherish the ideal of small states, but on the contrary because we are for large states and for a coming closer, even a fusion of nations . . ." And his 1916 comment on page 76: "The more closely the democratic system of state approximates to complete freedom of secession, the rarer and weaker will the strivings for secession be in practice." See also Groshev, p. 33 for Lenin's comment: "recognition of the right to secession *reduces* the danger of the 'disintegration of the state.'"
 - 15 Low, p. 99.
 - 16 Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 51. Emphasis added.
 - 17 See, for example, his 1916 statement: "The various demands of democracy, including self-determination, are not absolute, but a *small* part of the general democratic (now: general Socialist) *world* movement. Possibly in individual concrete cases, the part may contradict the whole; if so it must be rejected." Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 104. On another occasion, when referring to self-determination, he noted "the necessity of subordinating the struggle for this demand, as well as for all the fundamental demands of political democracy, to the immediate revolutionary mass struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeois governments and for the achievement of socialism." Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
 - 18 *Ibid.*, p. 23. ". . . the proletariat confines itself, so to say, to the negative demand for the recognition of the *right* to self-determination, without undertaking to give *anything at the expense of another nation.*"
 - 19 Stated by Lenin in 1916 (Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 111). See also Stalin's comments in 1913: "Social Democrats, while fighting for the right of nations to self-determination, will at the same time agitate, for instance, against the secession of the Tartars, or against national cultural autonomy for the Caucasian nations;

- for both, while not contrary to the rights of these nations, are contrary 'to the precise meaning of the program,' to the interests of the Caucasian proletariat." Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
- 20 "The question of the *right* of nations to self-determination, i.e., the guarantee by the constitution of the state of an absolutely democratic method of deciding the question of secession, must now be confused with the question of the *expediency* of this or that nation's seceding. The Social Democratic Party must decide the latter question in *each separate case from the point of view* of the interests of social development as a whole, and the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism." Cited in Bertram Wolfe, *Three who Made a Revolution*, 4th rev. ed. (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 589-90.
 - 21 See the quotation of Lenin in Low, p. 86: "A Social Democrat belonging to a small nation must place the weight of his agitation on . . . 'voluntary amalgamation' of nations. He may, *without violating his duties as an internationalist*, be in favour *either* of the political states X,Y, Z, etc. But in all cases he must fight *against* small-nation narrow mindedness, insularity and aloofness, he must fight for the recognition of the whole and the general and for the subordination of the interests of the particular to the interests of the general."
 - 22 Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 64. The insistence on regional autonomy was a rebuff to the position of the Jewish Bund, Bauer, and Renner, which maintained that each ethnic group should be granted autonomy without regard to geography.
 - 23 Cited in Wolfe, p. 585.
 - 24 "We are for large states and for a coming closer, even a fusion of nations. 24." Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 72. "The aim of socialism is . . . not only to bring the nations closer to each other, but also to merge them." *Ibid.*, p. 76. "The proletariat supports everything which contributes to the elimination of national differences, . . . everything which makes the relations of the nationalities to each other increasingly more intimate, everything which leads to the amalgamation of nations . . . the amalgamation of all nationalities in a higher union." Cited in Low, pp. 115-116. A Ukrainian Social Democrat was castigated for rejecting "the interests of union, of amalgamation and assimilation of the proletariat of two nations for a passing success of the Ukrainian national cause." *Ibid.*, p. 61.
 - 25 See, for example, his private letter of 1913, cited in Wolfe, p. 584, in which Lenin opined that the adoption of Russian by non-Russians "would be of still greater progressive significant if there were no *compulsion* to use it." See also Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 103. "All this will until the state withers away, be the basis for a rich cultured life, the guarantee of an acceleration of the voluntary establishment of intimacy between and amalgamation of nations."
 - 26 One of Lenin's last acts was a letter criticizing the oppressive policy of Stalin toward Georgians as counter-productive. It is reprinted in Conquest, pp. 146-147.
 - 27 Cited in Groshev, p. 34.
 - 28 Stalin was later (1917) to underline the pivotal role of a party devoid of national proclivities in Leninist national policy. "Thus our views of the national question reduce themselves to the following propositions: (a) the recognition of the right of peoples to secession; (b) regional autonomy for peoples which remain within the given state; (c) specific laws guaranteeing freedom of development

- for national minorities; (d) a single, indivisible proletarian collective body, a single party, for the proletarians of all the nationalities in the given state.” From “Report on the National Question” in Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
- 29 For details, see Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 45–171.
 - 30 The two exceptions are North Korea and Cuba. The governments of these states do not deny the validity of Leninist national policy, but rather deny its pertinence to their state on the ground that their populations do not contain any minorities. The claim is essentially valid in the case of North Korea. However, in the case of Cuba, this position conveniently ignores the platform of the Cuban Communist Party during the 1920s and 30s, when it was committed to a separate Black Republic to be carved from Cuban territory.
 - 31 Table A.15 in Zev Katz, *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 452.
 - 32 For greater detail, see Chapter 9, *Reinforcements for the Forms* in Connor, pp. 254–387.
 - 33 All three stages are discernible during the first fifteen years of Tito’s reign. However, stout resistance to pressures for rapid assimilation resulted in a major retreat during the 1960s, and it may be that the Yugoslavian leadership has dropped the aim of linguistic assimilation.
 - 34 Thus today on neither side of the Sino-Soviet border do publications appear in the Arabic script traditionally used by the various Turkic peoples. Those on the Soviet side have been forced to accept the Cyrillic script, while those on Chinese soil have been forced to accept a Chinese phonetic script called *p’in-yin*. The Chinese script serves a two-fold purpose: it renders the people of the border area somewhat immune from written propaganda materials emanating from the Soviet Union and still makes it easier for these people to learn to speak Chinese than would be the case were they to adopt the pictographic, non-phonetic system of written characters traditionally used by the Chinese.
 - 35 Lenin had believed that strict adherence to the notion of national flourishing would ultimately lead to the *voluntary* adoption of a single language. It will be recalled that in 1913 he opined that the adoption of Russian by all peoples of the USSR would be “progressive” if “there were no compulsion to use it.” See above, footnote 25.
 - 36 Dang Thai Mai, “The Vietnamese Language, an Eloquent Expression of Our National Vitality” in *Vietnamese and Teaching in D.R.V.N. Universities* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1968), p. 64.
 - 37 A Chinese editorial in the *Peking Review* [17 (July 19, 1974), p. 19], caustically cited this from the Soviet publication, *The Handbook of World Population*. The identical quotation is cited from a different Soviet source by Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1968, p. 187.
 - 38 A.I. Kholmogorov, *International Traits of Soviet Nations* (Moscow: “Mysl” Publishing House, 1970). Translated in *Soviet Sociology*, XII, p. 5. For additional, Russian language source material expressing this same linkage between language and identity, see Robert Lewis, Richard Rowland, and Ralph Clem, *Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 115 Kholmogorov (page 17) also makes clear that bilin-

- gualism is viewed as a step toward unilingualism.
- 39 *People's Daily*, September 9, 1953. Again in 1957, the Party was forced to remind the minorities that it had never promised to remove Han cadres from minority areas. See June Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 156.
 - 40 H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 482, 483.
 - 41 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The study of Ethnic Politics in the USSR," Prepared for the National Symposium, *The National Problem in the USSR and Eastern Europe under Brezhnev and Kosygin*, University of Detroit, October 3-4, 1975, p. 31.
 - 42 In Yugoslavia, Serbs and Montenegrins (43 percent of the population) accounted for 70 percent of all higher personnel in the Ministry of the Interior in 1971. See David Dyker, "Yugoslavia: Unity out of Diversity?" in *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, ed. Archie Brown and Jack Gray (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1977), p. 88.
 - 43 For an intriguing study of this practice in the USSR, see John Miller, "Cadre Policy in Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU First and Second Secretaries in Non-Russian Republics of the USSR," *Soviet Studies*. XXIX (January 1977), pp. 3-36.
 - 44 The Nagorno-Karabak Autonomous Region was, for example, made part of Azerbaijan although Armenians accounted for more than 80 percent of the population. Subsequent demands for its union with Armenia have been met with purges. See Ann Sheehy, *Recent Events in Abkhazia Mirror the Complexities of National Relations in the USSR*, RL 141/78, Radio Liberty Research (June 26, 1978).
 - 45 Derived from data principally found in Table 9 of Ralph Clem, *Population Change and Nationality in the Soviet Union, 1926-1970*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation submitted to Columbia University, 1975. Excludes three autonomous republics for which data were not available.
 - 46 The name of one of the three (the Karelio-Finnish ASSR) was subsequently changed to the Karelian ASSR. However, the lack of reality that may exist behind the ethnonational designations of administrative units was here presented in the sharpest relief, for at the time of the unit's creation less than one percent of the population was Finnish. Moreover the Karelians were themselves but a fraction (less than one-fourth) of the total population.
 - 47 From data in Table 5 in Clem, *op. cit.* Needless to say, not all of the excluded people lived in immediately adjacent territory, and there are many, therefore, who could not have been included in the appropriate ethnic unit. But, as noted above in the case of the Armenians, large numbers, who were in contiguous territory, were excluded. With specific regard to the country's second largest ethnic element (the Ukrainians), the borders of their republic could have been broadened to include many more of them.
 - 48 These figures reflect the 1979 census. The 1959 census figures would have reflected greater ethnic heterogeneity, for in nine of fourteen republics the titular nation increased its percentage of the population. This development was not due to a slackening of Russian in-migration, for there was a net in-migration in

twelve of the fourteen cases. The principal explanation is that differences in the natural increase of Russians and non-Russians were so substantial as to more than offset the increase in Russians due to in-migration. A secondary factor was the tendency of some non-Russians (particularly the Armenians) to relocate in their ethnic homeland.

- 49 The policy of sending young Chinese into the hinterland antedates the Cultural Revolution, but it received a huge impetus during that period. It is estimated that more than 16 million people were ordered to “go west young man” between 1968 and 1978, and that 10 million of these remained there as of late 1978. (See the *New York Times*, December 5, 1978.) There were later indications that many of these youths would be permitted to return.

The Hungarian Minority of Czechoslovakia and its Press

Magda Ádám

In Czechoslovakia the number of ethnic Hungarians changed frequently over the past fifty years. Of the 896,271 Hungarians registered for the present area of the country by the last Hungarian census, that of 1910, only 650,597 remained by 1920. By 1930 their numbers had decreased further still, to 596,861. In the wake of the Vienna Award of 1938, the Hungarian census again registered 800,000 ethnic Hungarians in the area annexed to Hungary, besides whom there were another 53,128 left in Slovakia. After 1945 the plan was to resettle Czechoslovakia's Hungarians in Hungary. As a result of this population transfer, some 117,000 Hungarians were relocated in Hungary. An additional 41,640 Hungarians were deported to the Sudetenland in westernmost Czechoslovakia, while those Hungarians who remained in Slovakia were compelled to request "re-Slovakization." Although their disadvantaged status ceased after 1948, their number fell to 368,000 in the 1950 census. Following further improvement in their situation, those declaring themselves Hungarian rose to 534,000 in 1961 and to 573,000 by 1970. However, we know their real number to be around 650,000.

During these decades the ethnic composition of Slovakia's formerly almost homogeneous Hungarian communities has changed, as migrations and resettlement gave rise to mixed populations in them. This trend affected mainly cities with Hungarian majorities in 1910. In these communities their proportion dropped from 93.8 to 17.5 percent. The loss is particularly conspicuous in Kassa [Kosice] (down from 75.4 to 3.9 percent), in Léva [Levice] and Losonc [Lucenec]. With the exception of Komárom [Komarno] the Hungarians became a minority in other cities as well: Érsekújvár [Nové Zámky], Rimaszombat [Rimavská Sobota], Rozsnyó [Roznava]. In Pozsony [Bratislava] a mere 9,932 Hungarians lived in 1970 despite that city's vast demographic growth of the past decades. This compares with 31,705

Hungarians registered there in 1910. Hungarian populations have disappeared almost completely from the towns located in Slovakia's traditionally Slovak-speaking areas. . . .

In the rapidly developing local administrative centres the decrease of the Hungarian population was greater than average: their ratio dropped from 93.8 to 52.5 percent. In five of the fourteen communities of this kind (Pozsonypüspöki [Podunajské Biskupice], Galánta [Galanta], Szenc [Senec], Vágsellye [Sal'a], Szepsi [Moldava nad Bodvou]) they lost their absolute majority, but elsewhere too, their ratio declined significantly.

Most successful in preserving their original character were the villages where the proportion of the Hungarian population was still 75 percent even in 1970, as compared to 98.2 percent in 1910. In 182 of the 491 settlements in this category Hungarians accounted for over 90 percent of the population even in 1970. Their former majority was still preserved in 422 communities, but in 69 they became a minority. The latter figure does not include the 60 settlements that had a Hungarian majorities in 1910, where the latest Czechoslovak censuses registered Hungarian populations of more than 10 percent or less than one hundred people.

The demographic conditions of the Hungarian-populated communities scattered in a belt of several hundred kilometers north of Hungary have changed a great deal since 1910. The number of Hungarians rose the most in the Csallóköz and the Bodroghöz, that is at the westernmost and easternmost edges of the Hungarian settlement area. On the other hand, there was a conspicuous decline in their numbers in the vicinity of Léva and Kassa. This is partly due to the magnitude of the deportations there and is in part connected with low birthrates. . . .

A county-by-county analysis of the settlements with one-time Hungarian majorities revealed that even in 1970 Hungarians continued to constitute a sizable majority of the population in settlements formerly belonging to Győr County (95.8 percent), in the Dunaszerdahely district of Pozsony County (92.0 percent), in the Csallóköz district of Komárom County (87.3 percent) and in the Bodroghöz district of Zemplén County (86.6 percent). Also, their ratio remained over 70 percent in the Somorja, Galánta and Udvardi districts, in the formerly Hungarian villages of Esztergom, Hont, Gömör, Torna and Ung counties. This means that from Gutor to Szob settlements with Hungarian majorities still flanked the Danube. The Csallóköz core of the Hungarian settlement area in western Slovakia also remained almost completely intact. Contiguity with the Hungarian settlements situated along the River Ipoly is ensured by the populous communities of Komárom and Esztergom counties.

In this area the Hungarian population declined primarily along the Hungarian-Slovak linguistic boundary. In Pozsony County the number of Hungarians decreased mainly in local administrative centres, but in the Szenc

district the smaller villages were no exception either. The absorption of the Hungarian population of the communities situated in a Slovak linguistic environment in the vicinity of the town of Nyitra increased, and the Slovak penetration of Nagysurány [Surany] broadened.

Even greater changes can be observed in Bars County, where the 50 settlements near Léva lost their one-time Hungarian majority or their entire Hungarian population. For the time being it cannot be determined whether the decrease in the Hungarian population was mainly due to the prevalence of the one child only family model, the resettlements, re-Slovakization and migration, or whether the censuses are actually distorting the situation.

The narrow band of Hungarian settlement stretching towards the north-east in Nógrád County is in the process of gradual break-up between Zsély [Zel'ovce] and Losonc. In the vicinity of Fülek [Fil'akovo], however, it once again broadens and some 200 Hungarian villages, mostly sparsely populated, line up, primarily on the territory of Gömör County, up to the Torna Plateau. In this general region, the Hungarian majority has eroded in the towns and the more rapidly developing villages, as well as in some settlements along the linguistic boundary.

The situation is far more serious in Abaúj County, where the Hungarian population of Czechoslovakia suffered its greatest losses. Between Kassa and the Hungarian border the latest Czechoslovak censuses did not register any Hungarian population at all in communities with one-time Hungarian majorities. In another thirteen settlements their proportion dropped to below 50 percent. In this region the number of Hungarians had decreased by some 50,000 between 1910 and 1970. As a result of this, the line of Hungarian settlements formerly stretching up to Eperjes [Presov] along the Hernád River was further reduced. Gradually, even the remaining Hungarian diaspora faded into oblivion. . . .

Similarly, a substantial decrease can be observed in the Sátoraljaújhely district of Zemplén County, where eighteen communities with one-time Hungarian majorities are missing from the Czechoslovak census of 1970. In another five settlements their ratio dropped to below 50 percent and almost everywhere the number of Hungarians decreased significantly. On the other hand, the Hungarian villages in the Bodroghköz district and those with Hungarian majorities that at one time belonged to Ung County, solidly retained their considerable Hungarian majorities; however, they are totally isolated from the rest of the Hungarian-populated areas of Czechoslovakia. Numbering some 50,000 and concentrated in 50 settlements, this group has even shown slight population increase over the past few decades.

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The historical self-awareness of Czechoslovakia's minorities leaves a great

deal to be desired. Amongst the factors contributing to this state of affairs special mention must go to the total absence of historical scholarship on the history of the Hungarian minority. The products of interwar bourgeois historiography are unknown. Indeed, in practical terms, they are accessible to those interested, mostly amateur researchers, only in Budapest. The most serious reason, is, however, the dogmatic approach to tradition, under which *only the revolutionary traditions* are considered worthy of exploration and publication. . . .

Concerning the origins of Czechoslovakia's Hungarian minority, it was only in the course of the debates of 1968 that Hungarians pointed out that it was not of their own free will that they ended up living in Czechoslovakia. (Today Czechoslovak historical scholarship also acknowledges the violation of the principle of national self-determination with respect to minorities living in Czechoslovakia.) Generally, however, it is customary to stress that the post-war peace settlement brought about the liberation of the small nations of central Europe. Seen from this perspective, the birth of the bourgeois democratic Czechoslovak state is seen as significant progress in every respect.

Two things deserve special mention from the first twenty years of the Hungarian minority's history. The first is the idealized image presented in the periodical *Sarló* [Sickle]: a straight and smooth path from the recognition of national and social problems to the acceptance of communist ideals, the formulation of a new democratic definition of being Hungarian for all Hungarians, the uncritical acceptance of minority messianism. The second is the stereotype investigation of the activities in southern Slovakia of the Czechoslovak Communist Party—making a contribution only to scholarship on local history. Of the latter, attention is regularly being focused on the Whitsun strike by agricultural workers in the community of Kosut in 1931, in which several people died. (Special attention is paid here to the role of István Major, a leading functionary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.) The same holds true for the anti-fascist rallies of 1938. Special attention is paid to the writings and reminiscences of the labour movement veteran Dezső Roják. His works and the tone of the contemporary Czechoslovak communist press, incidentally, indicate that amongst the Hungarian minority of the interwar period the Czechoslovak Communist Party, which advocated a radical programme of national self-determination, enjoyed broad-based support. (It is quite another matter and characteristic of Czechoslovakia's present nationalities policy that all of these events, persons and movements are presented in Slovak scholarship in a way that the minority connections of the southern Slovak communist movement are impossible to discern.). . . .

The subject of the "years of homelessness" between 1945 and 1948 surfaced in the press of Slovakia's Hungarian minority only during the Prague

Spring. Although in the rehabilitation documents of the condemned Slovak communist leaders, the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Central Committee denounced the negative policy pursued against the Hungarian minority after the war, the act of rehabilitation itself remained rather ambiguous. According to the rehabilitation documents, the anti-Hungarian measures expressed the opinion of the entire leadership of the party at the time. . . .

Traces of the Hungarian minority's Magyar historical consciousness in Slovakia's Hungarian press are for the most part confined to the post-1948–49 period. In connection with the various anniversaries of the launching of *Új Szó* (New Word) [in late 1948] and of the founding of CSEMADOK (Csehszlovákiai Magyar Dolgozók Kulturális Egyesülete; literally: the Cultural Association of Hungarian Workers in Czechoslovakia) [1949], this organization's weekly, the *Hét* (Week), carried a grandiose article series of recollections from the “torch-bearers”—official appraisals from the national and district leaders of the organization and from the Slovak leaders in charge of the nationalities question in the district councils. There is not very much in these recollections beyond an enumeration of cultural and organizing activities. There is no mention in them of the cultivation of the language, only a discussion of amateur theatricals and folk song competitions. Admittedly, the latter, too, have always possessed a community-forging power. However—and this is characteristic of amateur movements—organizational instability and general apathy are growing in the ranks of the minority. This is seemingly contradicted by the constant growth of CSEMADOK membership: in the seventies it rose from 55–60,000 to 80,000. (It must, however, be noted here that only a very tiny proportion of the membership is in fact active, and that recruitment is rather routine—for example involving pupils in schools, and so on.)

Whereas in the fifties CSEMADOK—much like the minority cultural federations in Hungary at the time—was considered “a lackey dressed in folk dress,” by the end of the sixties had tried to turn into a kind of ethnic lobby. After being officially reprimanded in the seventies, its leadership adopted a bureaucratic style and, under the slogan of “quality in cultural work,” it shifted the emphasis to ideological work. . . .

It is important to add that the dearth of publications in the field of historical scholarship has prompted literature and literary history to undertake the task of creating a healthier historical self-awareness for the minorities. However, this is a rather difficult undertaking on account of a very narrow readership and because it demanded daring and inventiveness on the part of writers. The results of these efforts are not comparable to those prevalent in Hungary. . . .

Each year, two Hungarian historical anniversaries are marked by Slovakia's Hungarian minority press: 1848 and 1919. The former usually consists of a report on the traditional ceremony staged annually at the Petőfi statue in Pozsony. Invariably, there are articles on the role of the Hungarian War of Independence in European progress and on the "procrastinating" and "misguided" minorities policy of the Hungarian Revolution. As it has already been indicated, . . . not even in 1968–69 did Pozsony's Hungarian journalists indulge in the euphoric spirit of 1848. Their commemorations always remained within the conceptual sphere of central European national interdependence and brotherhood. . . .

In connection with the subject of Hungarian historical consciousness attention should be paid to the questions raised in the literature of Slovakia's Hungarian minority that probe the relationship of collective Hungarian history and the traditions of the Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries. In one study examining the theoretical problems of Hungarian historical scholarship in Czechoslovakia, Sándor Varga, the CSEMADOK secretary in 1968–69, attempted to clarify this theme in 1977: "The notion of a Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia was non-existent prior to 1918. . . ." Precisely for this reason the history of this ethnic group up to 1918 is an organic part of the history of the Hungarian state and nation. In 1918, this segment of the Hungarian people became, almost overnight, an adjunct of an entirely different, new, political and economic entity. The two to three years that constituted the transition were unable to change significantly the Hungarian people's centuries of tradition and customs. A situation arose whereby groups of the Hungarian people differing from each other in many regards (here the author is thinking of the ethnic sub-groups of the Hungarian regions of Slovakia: the Mátyusföld, Garammente, Csallóköz and the Palócság) suddenly came to possess numerous common traits. They became the "Hungarians of Czechoslovakia. . . ."

Before we turn to the examination of the treatment of the Hungarian minority's historical anniversaries, mention must be made of the fact that the more extensive and more unequivocal commemorations than those found in either the Transylvanian or Vojvodina press, indicate that the Hungarian minority in Slovakia adheres to universal Hungarian traditions, perhaps, to a greater extent than the Magyar minorities of Rumania and Yugoslavia. . . . The great Hungarian men of letters are regularly present in the Hungarian press of Slovakia on the pretext of their connections with Upper Hungary. . . .

The Hungarian press of Slovakia is not, however, concerned only with the classical Hungarian literary heritage. The achievements of post-1945 Hungarian culture may also be found in the three papers investigated in

this study, albeit to a far lesser extent. As a matter of fact in this regard the second half of the seventies witnessed a conspicuous setback. (This was especially noticeable in book distribution, restricted opportunities for subscribing to journals published in Hungary, and in the misunderstandings which surfaced in connection with the publishing of works by certain Hungarian writers.)

In the seventies, during the aftermath of the “crisis period,” writing about the historical traditions of minorities became rather restricted. Contemporary reporting was confined to such themes as the actions of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in southern Slovakia with respect to the Hungarian minority, and its leaders of Hungarian nationality. At the same time, writing in the *Sarló* became confined to Edgár Balogh, László Dobossy, Ferenc Horváth, and a few others who turned communist and also won admission to the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Subjects such as Czech-Hungarian and Slovak-Hungarian attempts at *rapprochement* and cooperation, also came into focus. . . .

Naturally, the Hungarian minority’s historical consciousness is already dominated by the events of Czechoslovak history. Whilst the anniversary of the establishment of the Czechoslovak state—following the practice of the Czech and Slovak press—passes almost unnoticed, the anniversaries related to party history (the forming of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [1921]; the electing of the Gottwald leadership [1929] . . . and so on) are given prominence. Also, each year the lessons of the year 1938 furnish an opportunity in the minority press, too, for praising the positive role played in the struggle against fascism by Czechoslovakia’s emerging united front—under communist leadership.

In the discussions of the wartime resistance movements the subject that dominates is the Slovak National Uprising. In fifteen years of commemorative literature only one negative comment can be found. In his August 1969 recollections, the scholar and teacher Kálmán Hamar of Nyitra lamented that the internationalism of the uprising’s leaders suddenly disappeared into thin air after 1945. Only the anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia and of the events of 1948 in Czechoslovakia are marked for comparable attention in the Hungarian minority press.

Celebrated under the name February Victory, the anniversaries of the “people’s democratic” takeover of 25 February 1948 serve as an opportunity for discussing the consequences of “Ice-Breaking February” on nationalities policy—to use the expression of Andor Sas, a former incumbent of the Chair of Hungarian Studies at the University of Bratislava. The usual cue for this is the stereotype cliché according to which the “taking over of power by the working class also of necessity raised the prospects of a positive solution of the nationality question.”

It has already been mentioned that the anniversaries of the launching of

Új Szó, CSEMADOK and the other Hungarian cultural institutes provide ample opportunity for the evaluation of the post-1948 period. . . . It usually becomes the task of literary historians to debate the truth or otherwise of the tenet "starting from scratch." Its real basis is the void in the wake of the expulsion to Hungary of the majority of the Hungarian intelligentsia, its "voluntary" departure and the three- or four-year gap in the functioning of the Hungarian schools and press. The enthusiastic will to act of the emerging new Hungarian minority intelligentsia in the years of the personality cult . . . was not followed by steps to institutionalize minority public life. . . .

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It may be stated that no relations exist on a regular basis between the Hungarians of Czechoslovakia and those living in Rumania and Yugoslavia. Some rare contacts in fact do take place—a case in point is, for instance, cooperation between the pedagogical research institutions of Bratislava and Novi Sad [Újvidék], over the methodology of teaching the majority language to minority children. But apart from this, mention in Slovakia's Hungarian media of the Hungarian minorities living in other countries is few and far between. Zoltán Fonod's 1970 report on his trip to Transylvania is a unique exception in the history of *Új Szó*. It is another matter that in spite of all this, these contacts are clearly discernible in the realm of literature. Thanks to the relationship between Gyula Duba and Ernő Gáll, reviews of the works of Hungarian writers living in Rumania and Czechoslovakia are published several times a year in both *Irodalmi Szemle* [Literary Review] and in *Korunk* [Our Time]. On the other hand, more recently, there is less and less in the one- or two-page literary columns of *Hét* or *Új Szó* from the works of the outstanding representatives of Transylvanian literature.

The new Hungarian literary generation in Slovakia appeared on the scene around 1968. Under the banner of avant-garde rebelliousness it turned its back on the former united Hungarian literary and cultural front in Slovakia. Strangely enough, it regarded the youth rallying around *Új Symposion* [New Symposium] of Vojvodina as its paragon. . . .

Hungarian writers in Slovakia have pressed for more regular contact with their counterparts in Rumania and Yugoslavia—mainly in the realm of book publishing and book distribution. They did so in vain. László Dobos had, at the time, planned to launch an East-Central European paper, similar to *Korunk* [Our Time] of the interwar period, covering all the Hungarian minorities. Subsequently he was attacked for this idea too.

As regards the irregularity and superficiality of these contacts, let it suffice to mention that we have failed to encounter a single article analyzing

Yugoslav practice in nationalities policy. . . . It is in the introductions to book reviews that one might come across facts pertaining to and analyses of the situation of the Hungarian minority in Rumania and Yugoslavia. From these it turns out that even in Pozsony the network of Hungarian minority institutions in Vojvodina are seen as an example, a goal to be attained. . . .

On the basis of a comparison of the condition of the Hungarian minorities we believe that the Hungarian minority living in Yugoslavia is better off than its counterparts in Rumania and in Czechoslovakia—in every way. Despite its occasional drawbacks, “self-management” in Yugoslavia has provided the opportunity for the establishment of a network of institutions which rendered minority rights (also theoretically existent in Czechoslovakia) attainable in practice. In contrast, the basic principle of Rumanian practice is a “self-sufficiency” of sorts, which, it is true, regards the Hungarian minority as an active factor. On the other hand, however, it makes every effort to impede or make impossible contact with Hungary—contact indispensable even in the case of the Hungarians of Transylvania. The aim is clearly to speed up the process of assimilation.

In Czechoslovak practice neither the principle of “self-management,” nor that of “self-sufficiency” are asserted. The minority is the passive subject of the state’s policy under the full control of the majority nation, just like the “self-sufficient” Hungarian minority of Transylvania. Because it is not “self-sufficient,” but rather, the beneficiary of support from Hungary, it cannot put in a claim for the development of its own cultural institutions, or secondary and higher education networks. (It is another matter that at one time the promise was made that the lack of higher education in Hungarian would be compensated by scholarships to Hungary. However, today there are fewer and fewer opportunities for this. A case in point is the discontinuation of training for actors in Hungary.) There is no need, the authorities claim, for another daily newspaper . . . or a Hungarian scientific journal . . . since in any case Hungarians are “reading” (would like to read) the papers published in Hungary and watch Hungarian television.

This ambiguous minorities policy practice in Czechoslovakia already boasts significant *results*: the weakening of ethnic consciousness amongst the ranks of the Hungarians living in Slovakia has reached a stage when, even in the short run, it may corroborate the Slovak and Czech claims that the nationality question no longer exists in Czechoslovakia. . . .

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Editors’ note: This paper is an excerpt from a larger study by Magda Ádám on the subject of ethnic awareness, patriotism, and internationalism as revealed in the media of the Hungarian minorities of Czechoslovakia,

the USSR, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Parts of this larger work have been translated from the Hungarian with the help of Zsuzsa Béres of Budapest. Funds for financing this and other translation work have been received from the Soros Foundation. Presumably because this original study was prepared for a strictly Hungarian audience, geographic designations were given in it only in Hungarian. Whenever such names came up for the first time, we included their appropriate or closest present-day Slovak equivalents in parentheses. It might be added here that if a place has a distinct Magyar name, Hungarians will use that name, even if the particular location is beyond the borders of Hungary. For example, they always call Vienna by its Magyar name “Bécs,” and never the German “Wien.”

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Author's note: Research on the subject has been based primarily on the following press publications of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia: *Új Szó* [New Word], *Irodalmi Szemle* [Literary Review], *Hét* [Week].

Hungarian Minority Education in Czechoslovakia: A Struggle for Ethnic Survival

Karoly Nagy

Most of Czechoslovakia's 579,600 Hungarians live in Slovakia.¹ 1,084,000 Hungarians were annexed there without their consent after the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. According to 1980 census data, in 451 Slovak towns Hungarians still constitute the majority of the population.²

Slovakia's Hungarians are subjected to a political, economic, social, and cultural existence of double jeopardy. On the one hand they are deprived of a democratic life with guaranteed human rights and freedoms. They are, like all citizens of the country, ruled by a communist one-party dictatorship. On the other hand Hungarians are also subjected to additional pressures, discrimination, and deprivations, resulting from governmental policies of denationalization, of forced assimilation.³

Nowhere is this policy more flagrant and damaging than in the educational sector, which, next to the family, is the most important institution of language and culture preservation. School closings, discontinuation of Hungarian language use and instruction, political-social pressures on parents to enroll their children in Slovak-language schools, all add up to a dangerously diminishing opportunity for ethno-cultural continuity. School enrollment statistics show that, besides studying the Slovak language which is compulsory in all schools, the chances for Hungarian and other national minority students to receive instruction in their own language is steadily diminishing. An example: in the 1977–78 school year 76 percent of all Hungarian students attended Hungarian elementary, high and vocational high schools and Slovak schools which offer at least some Hungarian instruction. Five years later, in the 1982–83 school year, this ratio decreased to 72 percent, or 62.5 percent, if we add the ratio of industrial schools.⁴ It should be added that in the past thirty-eight years the government has eliminated 340 Hungarian elementary schools in Slovakia.⁵ It has also completely discontinued the higher education programmes in Hungarian teacher training.

Throughout his life, Oszkár Jászi (known to North American audiences as Oscar Jaszi), the turn-of-the-century Hungarian scholar and publicist, consistently argued and struggled for the rights of the national minorities.⁶ He leveled his strongest criticism against the forced assimilation practices of his own Hungarian government and society at the beginning of the century, upholding ethnic autonomy as the only humane, democratic and practically, even politically viable principle. He wrote in 1911: "There exists a universal, minimal national minorities programme, common to all national minority questions of the world, without the solution of which nowhere in the world was it ever possible to achieve peace, order and cooperation. This programme can be succinctly summarized thus: . . . good schools, good government administration and good jurisdiction which can be good only if offered in the people's own language."⁷ Jászi was a socialist, but he also recognized that international solidarity is not possible without recognizing the importance of national or ethnic identity first. He wrote: "Mankind is made such that there is only one road leading to internationalism: the one through national existence. There is no other cultural recipe possible."⁸ In his 1926–28 monumental work about the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy he also bemoaned the fact that the new rulers of the dismembered Monarchy's successor states continued the inhuman forced assimilation policies which had been the chief obstacles to Central European cooperation in the past.⁹ He wrote: "We can witness that the same policies which gave a pretext for dismembering Hungary are now practiced by the former victims of that policy."¹⁰ "The new ruling nations, in some places, are practicing the same political and cultural methods, which were used before the war by the Germans, the Hungarians and the Poles to maintain their hegemony over the people they ruled." "Some of the victorious people did not learn from the tragic fate of the Habsburg Empire and most of these old methods live on in education as well as in administrative life. Excesses of the most flagrant nationalistic fever are poisoning the air in some places."¹¹

After the Second World War the peace treaties again thrust all the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Rumania and Yugoslavia into minority status. With the possible exception of the latter country, the communist one-party governments demonstrated more continuity than discontinuity during the past forty years with regard to discrimination against the Hungarian minorities. What Jászi observed in 1928, still applies today: some of the victorious people did not learn from old mistakes, most of the old forced-assimilation methods are still practiced in education as well as in administrative life, excesses of the most flagrant nationalism are poisoning the air in some places. To be sure, Jászi did not have any illusions about

anticipating democratic humanism of the new "socialist" ruling model. After visiting Hungary in 1948, on the eve of the Communist Party's total take-over there with the support of the Soviet occupying forces, he bemoaned the fact that "the increasingly permeating atmosphere is that of Eastern totalitarianism and the omnipotent state" "copying Russian dictatorship in every essential aspect."¹² He argued that "Austrian absolutism and the Nazis were annihilated in vain if the country submits itself now to a new, ruthless imperialism."¹³

Subsequent events have proved Jászi's forebodings all too correct, and not only for Hungary: totalitarian dictatorships suffocated the Soviet-dominated regions of Europe for about a decade to come. And, although after violent upheavals of protest in East Germany and Poland, after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the "Prague Spring" of 1968, economic reforms and a semblance of democratization have achieved some movement from totalitarianism towards authoritarianism in Hungary, Czechoslovakia is still suffering from a very predominantly anti-democratic dictatorship in all spheres of life and Rumania's population is completely subjugated by a totalitarian police state. It is in these latter two countries that minorities—Hungarian, German, Ukrainian, Jewish, and others—suffer from the most persistent and systematic discrimination, described by some as European Apartheid, cultural genocide, or ethnocide.

* * * * *

During the night of May 10, 1984, Dr. Miklós Duray was arrested for the second time in Bratislava (Pozsony), Slovakia's capital city, where he works as a geologist.¹⁴ He was charged by the police under sections 112 and 199 of the criminal code, i.e.: "perpetrating activities damaging to the external interests of the Republic" and "propagating false, inciting rumors"—charges usually leveled against political dissidents there—punishable with a maximum penalty of three years and six months respectively. Dr. Duray was imprisoned in solitary confinement, he was not permitted even to see a lawyer, or a visitor. On September 29, the police dropped the two charges and submitted a new indictment against him, this time: Section 98 of the penal code: i.e.: "subversion," which carries a penalty of one to five years imprisonment, but, if committed with the aid of a foreign power, three to ten years. Later, he was granted permission to be visited by his wife during Christmas and on two other occasions, and they placed him in a cell with others. On May 10, 1985, at 12:30 p.m. he was released under the terms of a limited amnesty, with all charges withdrawn.

What did Dr. Duray in fact do to deserve to be imprisoned for 470 days from November 10, 1982 to February 22, 1983 and from May 10, 1984 to May 10, 1985?

Miklós Duray was born on July 18, 1945, in Losonc (Lucenec). He describes, in his autobiographical work: *Kutyaszorító*¹⁵, how he began, as a student in the 1960's, to participate in political life, in Hungarian student clubs and associations. He became one of the leading organizers of the Hungarian democratic youth movement in Slovakia. The movement and its leaders suffered from increasing political and police pressures until, finally, they could no longer continue their functions. He became keenly aware, during his years as a student activist, that Hungarians and other national minorities suffer discrimination in all walks of life. The official anti-minority policies and practices are fanned and made worse by Slovak anti-Hungarian nationalism which, like racism and anti-Semitism of other times and places, permeates the entire social fabric.

During the spring of 1978, alarming news of a comprehensive governmental policy plan reached some Hungarian minority circles in Slovakia about "educational reorganization." According to the plans, from the fall of 1978 the language of instruction was to be changed in all Hungarian schools to Slovak, in all classes above the fifth grade, with the exception of four subjects: Hungarian grammar and literature, geography and history. This would have meant that the Hungarian schools would have become Slovak schools with only some subjects taught in Hungarian.

A sharp protest by a substantial number of concerned Hungarians made the government postpone the plans for a few months. It was during this year that, as one of the acts of protest, Miklós Duray and others, founded the "Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia" (Csehszlovákiai Magyar Kisebbség Jogvédő Bizottsága). The Committee began to conduct a clandestine information and protest campaign. In November of 1978 the government's Department of Education, jointly with the Slovak Communist Party's Central Committee, officially revealed their "educational reorganization" plan, a version of the previously tabled programme. This time the popular protest was even more vigorous and widespread than before. Even the governmental "Nationality Secretariat" and the officially approved—and controlled—Hungarian cultural organization, the CSEMADOK (Csehszlovákiai Magyar Dolgozók Kultúregyesülete, i.e. Czechoslovak Hungarian Workers' Cultural Association) officially registered their disapproval.

The Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia (CDRHMC) managed to intensify its activities. Their letters reached many thousands of citizens, and they succeeded in smuggling their memoranda, situation reports and documents to Hungary as well as to Austria, France, West Germany and the United States, where they received increasing publicity. They sent petitions to the Czechoslovak government, letters to the leaders of Charter 77—the dissident group of Czechoslovak intellectuals (of which Duray is a member)—and presented

a detailed memorandum to the 1980–81 Madrid Review Conference of the Helsinki Agreement (the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), and in 1981, a comprehensive documentary study to the London Minority Rights Group. All of these were published in a number of languages in Western countries. The police reacted by increased harassment of the group with repeated house searches, interrogations, and surveillance, and by the arrest of Miklós Duray on November 10, 1982,

An international campaign of protest ensued. Government officials, writers (including Irving Howe, Susan Sontag and Kurt Vonnegut) newspapers, organizations (Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation and many others—in Europe and in the United States), demanded Duray's release. There were also rumours of meetings, even negotiations between some of Hungary's and Czechoslovakia's party and government officials, but there were no Hungarian governmental public statements made then, either about Duray's arrest, or about any other acts of discrimination against the Hungarian national minorities in East Central Europe. At the time there was no discernible official Hungarian policy in existence on this issue. Apparently, the Hungarian government of the time was not aware of Jászi's admonition, made after the 1920 dismemberment of Hungary, that the country's subsequent policy must "demand with uncompromising intransigence that Hungarians not only be citizens with equal rights within their new states, but that they can stay Hungarians in their language and culture, in full undisturbed spiritual contact with the 7–8 million Hungarians left in the old motherland."¹⁶ After a two-day trial, on January 31 and February 1 of 1983, Duray was released but the charges against him were not withdrawn.

The government's campaign to liquidate Hungarian schools continued. Between February and November of 1983, two versions of governmental legislative proposal were revealed. The November 25 version—Resolution 345, clause 32a—contained two paragraphs which, in effect, aimed at providing legal foundations for the elimination of Hungarian, German, Polish, and Ukrainian minority language schools. It stated: [in paragraph 4] "The Ministry of Education can authorize some subjects to be taught in the Slovak or Czech language in the nationality-language schools if the locally responsible national committees, based on agreement with the students' parents, submit proposals to this effect." And [in paragraph 5] "The Ministry of Education can decree some definite subjects in some schools to be taught in other than the schools' language of instruction." All citizens, ruled by dictatorial governments, know what phrases, like "based on agreement with the students' parents" really mean. In actual practice they give license—even an instruction—to local party and government officials to "obtain" such "agreements" from the parents by all the means that the local powers control. And they do control virtually all the means: jobs,

income, housing, travel, health, children's school admissions and grandparents' retirement pensions, just to mention some of the most obvious ones. Pressures on parents to discontinue the maintenance of their minority language and culture have been systematically applied all along—the present legislation would have legalized, expanded, and accelerated the denationalization programme with the force of law.

CDRHMS again organized a protest campaign. Miklós Duray wrote a letter to President Gustav Husak, dated February 12, 1984, pointing out that the proposed legislation is unconstitutional, because the 1960 Constitution and 1968 Constitutional Law Concerning the Nationalities, guaranteed the right of the country's national minorities to maintain their schools and to develop their cultures in their own languages. During the early spring of 1984, more than ten thousand citizens from all walks of life wrote letters of protest to various governmental and party forums. Again, the protests were partly successful.

The Slovak National Council's April 2, 1984, session enacted the Governmental legislative proposal except for paragraphs 4 and 5. What limited the protesters' success was a statement of the Minister of Education, Juraj Busa, which declared that the excluded paragraphs would be put in effect by Ministry ordinances.

On May 10 Duray was again arrested. This time an even more widespread international protest ensued. This activity must have been at least partly responsible for his release, with amnesty, on May 10, 1985. Hungarian and non-Hungarian writers, intellectuals, politicians, organizations and individuals in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, in Western Europe, the Americas, even in Australia and Japan, wrote thousands of letters, made official statements, publicized their indignation, demanding Duray's immediate release. In a letter after his release, thanking everyone for their actions and expressions of solidarity, Duray wrote: "International support and help was effective not only to me, personally, but even more to the cause of minority rights which must be part of the conscience of international politics."¹⁷

* * * * *

The historically consistent cause-and-effect relationship which exists between political democracy and opportunities for minority culture maintenance is evident in the case of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. The fate of Hungarian language and culture there depends, to a large extent, on whether or not Czechoslovakia will be able to democratize its society."

The struggle of Hungarians for cultural survival in Slovakia is a democratic movement. Its practices and expressions emphasize constitutionally

guaranteed legal rights, freedom of choice, of information, of expression, of conscience. In fact, the movement attempts to translate the formally pronounced legal rights to actual practices, thus it strives for the democratization of society at large.

No actions or pronouncements bear any signs of chauvinism on the part of the Hungarians struggling for national survival in Slovakia. They do not seem to answer anti-Hungarian nationalism with counter-nationalism. In fact, they always emphasize equal regard and equal rights for both majority and minority groups. This stance might have been one of the reasons that prompted a number of leading Czechoslovak intellectuals to write open letters to their government demanding Duray's release. The Hungarian minority leaders base their struggle on the principles of self-determination. And as Hungarian thinker István Bibó asserted in 1972: "The principle of self-determination. . . , when taken seriously and applied in practice, is the only realistic antidote to states and complexes of superiority, of subjugation and of fear, which give birth to nationalism."¹⁸

The role of the Hungarian government regarding the case of Duray was that of a woefully unfulfilled historical responsibility. When citizens in dozens of countries raised their voices demanding the fulfillment of basic human rights for oppressed Hungarian minorities, Hungary's government remained silent. An example of this malign neglect: no Hungarian embassy or consulate in any country has any information in any language about the Hungarian minorities, in spite of the fact that about one third of the approximately 16 million Hungarians of the world live outside of Hungary's present borders.

Sustained international awareness and readiness for active support does seem to help human life and human rights efforts of groups and individuals in a world community of increased communication capabilities, increasing interdependence and growing nuclear danger. Hunger in Ethiopia, Apartheid in South Africa, the oppression of the Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe, terrorism in the Middle East and Latin America, suppression of the Solidarity movement in Poland, affects us all, therefore is the responsibility of us all. We need to increase our will, ways, and means of fulfilling our responsibility.

Notes

- 1 Official census data are usually unreliable. According to reliable estimates, Czechoslovakia's Hungarian population is between 600,000 and 700,000.
- 2 Juraj Zvara: *Nemzet, nemzetiség, nemzeti tudat* [Nation, nationality, national consciousness] (Bratislava, 1985), p. 138.
- 3 For recent documentation of these policies and practices, see: Kálmán Janics: *Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority* (New York: Social Science Monographs, Columbia University Press, 1982), and János Ölvedi, *Napfogvat-*

- kozás [Eclipse], (New York: Püski, 1985).
- 4 *Szlovákiai jelentés a magyar kisebbség állapotáról* [Slovakian report on the state of the Hungarian minority], (Paris: Magyar Füzetek Könyvei 4, 1982), p. 42; and Zvara, pp. 192f.
 - 5 *Szlovákiai jelentés*, p. 34; and Zvara, pp. 98 and 192–93. For 1988 data see: *Új Szó* (Bratislava) 25 Feb. 1988, and *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), 4 April 1988.
 - 6 For the historical literature on Jászi see note 10 of this volume's introductory essay.
 - 7 György Litván and János F. Varga eds., *Jászi Oszkár publicisztikája* (Budapest: Magvető, 1982.), p. 158.
 - 8 *Ibid.*, p. 172.
 - 9 Oszkár Jászi, "Miért nem sikerült a Dunavölgyi Federációt megalkotni" [Why the creation of a Danubian Federation did not succeed], *Látóhatár* (Munich, 1953), pp. 1f.
 - 10 Oszkár Jászi, *A Habsburg-monarchia felbomlása* [The dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1983), p. 422.
 - 11 *Ibid.*, pp. 559–60.
 - 12 Oszkár Jászi, *Marxizmus vagy liberalizmus* (Paris: Magyar Füzetek Könyvei 6, 1983), pp. 211–212.
 - 13 *Ibid.*
 - 14 Data in this section, unless noted otherwise, were derived from personal sources and from: *In Defense of Hungarian Schools in Slovakia: Documents*, (New York: Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, 1984).
 - 15 Miklós Duray, *Kutyaszorító* [fig.: being in a quagmire], (New York: Püski, 1983).
 - 16 Oszkár Jászi, *Magyar kálvária, magyar feltámadás* [Hungarian calvary, Hungarian resurrection] (Munich: Aurora, 1969), pp. 170f.
 - 17 "Duray Miklós levele" [A letter by Miklós Duray], *Nyugati Magyarság* [Hungarians of the West] (Calgary, Alberta), September, 1985.
 - 18 István Bibó: "The Principle of Self-determination," in *Democracy, Revolution, Self-determination—Selected Writings* (New York: Atlantic Research and Social Science Monographs, forthcoming).

APPENDIX

Table 1.

Number of Hungarian elementary schools in Slovakia, 1950–1988

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of Hungarian Elementary Schools</i>
1950	609
1970	490
1982	295
1985	277
1988	269

Table 2.

Hungarian Students Receiving all
or Some Hungarian and only Slovak Instruction

School Type	Percent of Hungarian Students Receiving all or some Hungarian Instruction		Percent of Hungarian Students in Schools Offering only Slovak Instruction	
	<i>1977–78</i>	<i>1982–83</i>	<i>1977–78</i>	<i>1982–83</i>
Elementary	79	76	21	24
High	83	75	17	25
Vocational High	67	64	33	36
Industrial	n.a.	35	n.a.	65
Total:	76	62.5	24	37.5

Soviet Nationality Policy in Carpatho-Ukraine since World War II: The Hungarians of Sub-Carpathia

S.B. Vardy

The land that since World War I has been known variously as "Carpatho-Ruthenia," "Sub-Carpathia," "Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia," and since World War II also as "Carpatho-Ukraine" and "Trans-Carpathia" did not even have a name of its own, let alone a specific identity before the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire—and therein historic Hungary—in 1918. For a whole millennium it was simply part of the Kingdom of Hungary, or to be more exact, of the northeastern Hungarian highlands. It had become part of the country in the late 9th century, when the majority of the conquering Hungarians crossed the Carpathian Mountains at the Verecke Pass—the gateway to Carpatho-Ruthenia and to the whole Carpathian Basin.

Following the Hungarian conquest, this mountainous region of less than 5,000 square miles remained part of Hungary right up to the end of World War I, when in consequence of the Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920) it was transferred to the newly founded Czechoslovak state. After Hitler's dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939, Carpatho-Ruthenia was reincorporated into Hungary. Then, at the end of World War II, it was lost again, this time to the Soviet Union. The Soviets acquired it on the basis of a Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement (June 29, 1945), one year after effective control had already been taken over by the Soviet Army.

To the Hungarians, the loss of Carpatho-Ruthenia meant basically the loss of an ancient Hungarian land, and—after 1945—the intrusion of the dreaded "Eastern Colossus" into the Carpathian heartland. To the Soviets, on the other hand, this transfer was the "reunion" of an allegedly "ancient Slavic homeland" to the "mother country" that came a thousand years too late, i.e. after a millennium of dominance by the "Hungarian aristocracy and capitalists."¹ Ever since 1945 this fiction of "reunion" has been the main theme of all Soviet historical and political pronounce-

ments concerning this region notwithstanding the fact that prior to 1918 Carpatho-Ruthenia has never had any connections with any of the earlier Slavonic states. Moreover, the great majority of the local Ruthenians or Rusyns have migrated to the area only between the 14th and 17th centuries. This influx, combined with their natural growth in the hidden and protected valleys of the northeastern Carpathians, gradually made them into the majority nationality in that area. Thus, by 1910 the region's population of 571,488 was composed of 319,361 Rusyns (55.8 percent), 169,434 Hungarians (29.7 percent), 62,182 Germans (10.9 percent), 15,382 Rumanians (2.7 percent), 4,067 Slovaks (0.7 percent), and 1,062 others (0.2 percent).²

Given the nature of these nationality statistics and the lack of any historical claims by the Czechs and the Slovaks, Carpatho-Ruthenia's attachment to Czechoslovakia in 1918–1920 was motivated purely by political considerations, and more specifically by French interests in the area. It certainly violated the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination—both of the largely anational Rusyns whose only perceptible loyalty was to Hungary (their forced identification with the Ukrainians came later), and of the Hungarians who now were forcibly detached from the mother country. Political and administrative power in Carpatho-Ruthenia fell into the hands of Czech “carpetbaggers” who, while bringing elements of modernization to the province, treated its population rather offhandedly. They also introduced land reform at the expense of the Hungarian landowners, but left the landless Hungarian peasantry out of the benefits of this long overdue socio-economic transformation. Thus, of the 260,115 holds (372,000 acres) expropriated and distributed, Hungarians received only 19,000 holds (27,000 acres).³

In addition to offhand treatment by Czech administrators, the Hungarians also had to suffer mistreatment at the hands of the increasingly intolerant and aggressive Slovak and Ukrainian nationalists. Czechs and Rusyns were forcibly settled in pure Hungarian villages, where they were given free lands and funds for building homes and churches. The same villages were also compelled to open Czech, Slovak and Ukrainian schools at the same time when the nearly 200,000 strong Hungarian population of Carpatho-Ruthenia during the 1930s had only a single Hungarian secondary school at Beregszász (Berehovo, Beregovovo).

In 1939, after Czechoslovakia's dismemberment, the Hungarian army reconquered Carpatho-Ruthenia, and did so with Polish approval. At that time Stalin still regarded the views of the Ukrainian nationalists concerning the future of that province as not even worthy of consideration. In the course of World War II, however, Stalin's views changed, and by 1944 he openly demanded that “Carpatho-Ukraine” (a newly fabricated term) be united with Soviet Ukraine.⁴ It was this demand that found fulfillment on

June 29, 1945, with the already mentioned Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement of that date.

The Soviet Takeover

We know very little about the months and years that followed the Soviet acquisition of Carpatho-Ruthenia, except that the new authorities did everything in their power to clean out all pockets of resistance. The two nationalities who suffered the most were the Hungarians and the Rusyns who refused to be categorized as “Ukrainians.” The new Soviet authorities were unusually harsh with the members of the Greek or Byzantine Catholic clergy, virtually all of whom supported the idea of a distinct Rusyn nationhood. But of all the people of Carpatho-Ruthenia, it was the Hungarians who suffered the most. According to spotty reports that appeared in the contemporary Western press, all manifestations of Hungarian national consciousness were suppressed, including even the speaking of Hungarian. Moreover, a sizable portion of the Hungarian male population was deported to the interior of the Ukraine. Much of this was being done in secret, although reports of the consequences of this deportation did seep across the new Soviet-Hungarian border. There were also reports about the massacre of some of the resisting peasants, e.g. in Nagydobrony (Velikaya Dobron) where allegedly the population was decimated in the summer of 1945 (July 8).⁵

Most of the repercussions following the Soviet takeover constitute a tightly kept secret. Yet, some of these were alluded to in an article by two Hungarian literati from Carpatho-Ruthenia in 1970 in the Hungarian periodical *Tiszatáj*.⁶ Moreover, sections of it were also republished recently in a major compendium of Hungarian literature abroad. Writing very carefully the two authors alleged:

The pseudo-state that came into being on the area of Sub-Carpathia—i.e. *Zakarpatska Ukraina*—existed from November 1944 until January 1946. The policy of our power structure . . . was dominated only by two considerations: those of Ukrainian nationalism and the personality cult, both of them amplified by the conditions of the war. The unlawful and discrediting measures [of this policy] brought irreparable harm and dealt a powerful blow to the Hungarians of Sub-Carpathia. . . . At the end of 1944 the whole Hungarian adult male population was temporarily deported into the inner regions of the Ukraine, from where they were able to return only after several years . . . Hungarian secondary schools were abolished . . . This policy of discrediting [the Hungarians] continued to a certain degree even after January 1946 when Sub-Carpathia received a new status. Only very slowly and only in certain areas did it gradually begin to approach the norms of Lenin-

ist nationality policy . . . Not until 1954–1955 did the initial signs of relaxation appear, when Hungarian secondary schools were gradually reopened, at first in the cities and then also in the villages . . .⁷

The history of those bitter transitional years is still largely unwritten and the living witnesses are fast passing away. The latter include also the noted Sub-Carpathian Hungarian poet Vilmos Kovács (1927–1977), one of the authors of the above article, with whom the author of this study was still able to speak one year before his death, at the time when Kovács was desperately trying to emigrate to Hungary.⁸

Carpatho-Ruthenia's Hungarian Population

According to the Soviet census of 1979, there were 171,000 Hungarians in the Soviet Union, of whom 164,000 lived in Carpatho-Ruthenia.⁹ Their actual number, however, is probably closer to 200,000, as a sizable portion of them declared themselves “Ukrainians” or “Russians” so as to enhance their career opportunities. This is indicated, among others, by the fact that there are many more who claim Hungarian as a mother tongue, than those who claim to be of the Hungarian nationality. (According to one estimate for the year 1979, the figures are: 200,000 to 220,000 [mother tongue] versus 180,000 [nationality])¹⁰ If we take 200,000 as a working figure—which is also used by most of the Hungarian newspapers—this still speaks of a sizable population loss since World War II. In 1941 the same province had a Hungarian population of 223,649, which in the meanwhile should have grown to nearly 300,000. While much of this loss is permanent—i.e. the direct result of World War II and its consequences—some of it is only apparent. Given the right circumstances, the number of the Sub-Carpathian Hungarians would undoubtedly go up significantly through the simple process of self-reclassification. Even so, however, they would still constitute only 20 percent of the province's population of 1,183,000 (1984) as opposed to the 30 percent prior to 1918.

The majority of the Hungarians live on the southern and western fringes of Carpatho-Ruthenia, directly adjacent to today's Hungary and to their fellow Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. The district of Beregszász, for example is 95 percent Hungarian, and there are also significant and compact Hungarian ethnic islands in the districts of Munkács (Munkachevo), Nagyszőlő (Vinogradovo, Sevliush) and Ungvár (Uzhorod, Uzhgorod). With a few exceptions, these Hungarians keep close to one another and refuse to mix with the Rusyn/Ukrainian and Russian majority. This fact is acknowledged, among others, by a Soviet ethnographic report published in a 1970 issue of the *Sovietskaya etnografiya*, which reads as follows:

The largest national minority with the longest history of settlement here are the Hungarians (c. 160,000) who live in well-defined settle-

ments on the southern and western lowlands [of Carpatho-Ruthenia]. During the two months of our expedition we have visited twenty-seven Hungarian villages of between 500 and 7,000 inhabitants. The population of the great majority of these villages is almost exclusively Hungarian. From among the many nationalities they live in proximity only with the Ukrainians [i.e. Rusyns] and the Russians, who are employed largely in the local educational and health institutions. In these villages the Hungarians are strongly attached to their national traditions. Even today only a few of them speak Russian or Ukrainian, notwithstanding the fact that these languages are taught in the Hungarian schools. Hungarian-Ukrainian marriages are rare . . . There are also villages of mixed nationality in the region, but in those villages the nationalities are locally segregated . . .¹¹

The content of this quotation is most revealing. It tells us both of the Soviet tactics to denationalize the Hungarians by filling their local educational, cultural and health institutions with Ukrainized Rusyns and Russians (who are usually zealous advocates of their respective nationalities), as well as of the Hungarians' strong resistance to this denationalization effort. They simply refuse to learn Russian and Ukrainian, and also decline to marry outside their own nationality. This form of resistance, however, also has its drawbacks. The most significant is that it condemns most of the Hungarians to a perpetually lowly position in society, as any form of social advancement immediately implies both the need to know Ukrainian and Russian, as well as the showing of at least some outward signs of assimilation.

It should be noted here that while official publications identify the two dominant nationalities as "Ukrainians" and "Russians," the former of these are really Rusyns, although a large number of them did become Ukrainized. As such, there are in effect three East Slavic nationalities in the province of whom the Rusyns—who have remained faithful to their own nationality—are the least influential. The most vocal and intolerant toward Hungarians are the "Ukrainians" who have either fallen under the influence of the unusually emotional and demanding Ukrainian nationalism, or opted to go along with the official line simply for opportunistic reasons. The Russians, on the other hand, are newcomers to the area who were settled there as a result of the conscious effort on the part of the Soviet Government to Russify the cities of Carpatho-Ruthenia. The Rusyns who have remained faithful to their own nationality generally sympathize and fraternize with the Hungarians. They do so not only because of their common traditions, but also because of their commonly shared intense dislike of the intolerant Ukrainian nationalists as the "vostoknichiks" or "Eastern carpetbaggers." As a matter of fact, many of the Rusyns also speak some Hungarian and—if our sources are right—they often use Hungarian in the presence of the

Russians and the Ukrainians so as to prevent the latter from following their conversations. In this connection it should also be mentioned that, contrary to the overbearing Ukrainian nationalists, the newly settled Russians have no anti-Hungarian feelings. They generally look up to the Hungarians as representatives of the envied Western culture and way of life, and many of their women dream of marrying Hungarian intellectuals. They generally regard a marriage to a Hungarian as a significant step upward; a phenomenon which is also evident from the attitude of the bedazzled Russian tourists in Hungary. Hungarian men, on the other hand, generally enter such marriage primarily for existential reasons, regarding it as the surest way to advance their career opportunities. While perhaps questionable ethically, this attitude is the direct result of the unwritten law which proclaims that only Hungarians with Russian or Ukrainian marriage partners have a chance to rise significantly in Carpatho-Ruthenian society.¹² Of these two partners, however, the Russian wife appears to be preferable. She ties the Hungarian to the first among the two dominant nationalities, and—so we are told—it also saves him from the constant barrage of emotional pressures represented by the insatiated Ukrainian nationalism.

Education, Ideology and Historical Thinking

It is one of the unwritten laws of national minority life that the continued existence and future of a national minority depends to a large degree on its ability to cultivate and perpetuate its language. Once it loses its language—i.e. once it becomes linguistically assimilated—it also loses its identity as a separate nationality. And it is in this area, or rather in the area of the cultivation of their language where the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia are most endangered, despite their well-known resistance to denationalization.

We already know from the cited report by Vilmos Kovács and András Benedek that in the decade between 1944 and 1954 all Hungarian secondary schools were closed, and only in the late 1950s were the Hungarians again given the chance to study in their mother tongue. Even then, however, they faced the problem of not having Hungarian teachers and thus being taught by Rusyns or Ukrainians who could barely speak their language. The reasons behind this shortage of Hungarian teachers were: first, at the end of World War II most Sub-Carpathian Hungarian intellectuals fled or were deported; second, until 1963 there was no institution of higher learning in Carpatho-Ruthenia that was equipped to train Hungarian teachers in their own mother tongue.¹³

As we know from a number of recent reports in Hungarian newspapers and periodicals, in the early 1980s there were about 70–72 Hungarian schools in Carpatho-Ruthenia, which are divided into the following three categories: 1) Hungarian schools where the language of instruction is Hungarian, but often with one day per week being a “Russian Day” when only

Russian is used; 2) bi-lingual schools that have parallel Hungarian and Russian or Hungarian and Ukrainian classes; and 3) amended Hungarian schools where special Russian or Ukrainian speaking classes have been set up for Hungarian children.¹⁴ Of these three types, it is perhaps the third type that is the most dangerous, for it usually results in the forced enrollment of Hungarian students in Russian or Ukrainian classes in purely Hungarian villages. The parents are usually pressured into enrolling their children in such classes so that the few artificially settled Russians and Ukrainians would have their own school. Such is the case in Nagydobrony, for example, whose 6,550 inhabitants contain only 270 newly settled Ukrainians and Russians (i.e. 4 percent of the population), yet its Hungarian school now has parallel Russian classes. And what is even more meaningful, 99 percent of the students in these Russian classes are Hungarians.¹⁵

As opposed to this special treatment of a few newly settled Russians and Ukrainians in purely Hungarian villages, Hungarians in mixed villages are given very few chances to study in their own language—in direct violation of the Soviet Constitution. One of the examples is the town of Rahó which has a Hungarian population of 1,400 (12 percent of the population and equivalent to a medium-size village), yet there are no Hungarian schools. There are many other towns and villages where half of the population is Hungarian, yet they either have no Hungarian schools at all, or at best Hungarian children can study in their own mother tongue only in the first three grades. Then they usually have to transfer to Ukrainian schools, with all the disadvantages this involves. In most instances Hungarian children in these towns are not even permitted to study Hungarian language and literature on an elective basis, even though there are Hungarian teachers who would be willing to teach them.¹⁶

The number of the Hungarian schools is on the decline. Thus, whereas in 1968–1969 there were still 93 purely Hungarian schools and only 6 mixed schools, by the following year the former had declined to 68, while the latter increased to 29. During the same timespan there was also a 10 percent decline in the number of students enrolled in Hungarian schools from 22,800 to 20,873.¹⁷ Of the 70–72 Hungarian schools of the early 1980s, about 31 were ten-year schools, i.e. a combination of primary and secondary schools typical of the Soviet educational system.¹⁸ There are, however, no Hungarian kindergartens that supply the early foundations of education in the mother tongue. Hungarian children therefore are unable to familiarize themselves with the basic concepts of education in their own language. This generally confuses them and hinders their education once they enter Hungarian schools. To avoid the resulting problems, many parents give in to the relentless pressures from kindergarten teachers and local administrators, and enroll their children in Ukrainian or Russian language schools. Often these pressures are all the more successful as the parents

are given to understand that enrolling their children in Hungarian schools in effect puts them at a disadvantage as compared to those who study in Ukrainian or Russian.¹⁹

The results of this policy of discrimination are clearly evident already on the secondary level. As there are no Hungarian technical high schools in the whole province, all children who wish to study one of the technical fields have to enter a Russian or Ukrainian school. Moreover, they also have to take their entrance examinations in one of these languages—with the predictable results.

This also holds true for the entrance examinations at the Uzhorod State University, even though this is a clear violation of the students' rights as guaranteed by the constitution. As discussed in a special report by a Hungarian literary circle known as the "Forrás Studió," which after its disbandment in 1971 became a kind of "protest group," local and university officials always find a way to prevent the graduates of Hungarian schools from competing on an equal basis.²⁰ The result is that Hungarians enter the province's only university in much fewer numbers than do the Ukrainians and the Russians. In 1970, for example, only 9.4 percent of the admitted students at Uzhorod State University was Hungarian, which is barely half their share of the population.²¹ This, in spite of the fact that Hungarians traditionally constituted the most educated segment of Carpatho-Ruthenia's population. Given this situation, the future of Hungarian education in that province is rather bleak. But what is perhaps even worse, this bleakness also extends to the spirit and content of their education. This is particularly evident from what they are permitted and obliged to read and to study about Hungarian history, literature and culture in general. And it is also evident from the professional difficulties faced by Hungarians enrolled at the 10,000–11,000 student Uzhorod State University.²²

First to be noted is that of the nearly 1,000 Hungarians studying at this university only a small fraction can study a few of the subjects in their native tongue, while the rest of them study only in Ukrainian or Russian. These few "privileged" students are those enrolled in the Department of Hungarian Studies established in 1963 for the purposes of training Hungarian teachers for the re-established Hungarian schools of Carpatho-Ruthenia. After an initial annual number of 20 enrollees, today the Department admits only 10 students per year. But as even these ten graduates have difficulties in finding appropriate positions, in 1979 the Department had only two applicants.²³

The training of these students is also rather deficient for—as pointed out recently by a member of the faculty—they are only taught Hungarian language, linguistics and literature, but not the technical language of the various disciplines they are obliged to teach in the primary and secondary schools. Thus, these future educators are compelled to acquire the

basic linguistic skills of their disciplines on their own, which is all the more difficult as the acquisition of the appropriate Hungarian books is next to impossible. In the early 1980s the faculty of the Department of Hungarian Studies consisted of three linguists (István Kótyuk, Imre Zékány and Katalin Horváth) and three literary scholars (Vera Vaszócsik, Erzsébet Gertvay and Sándor Fodó). It is chaired, however, by the Rusyn-Ukrainian Linguist Petro Lizanec, who is also the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and is dubbed as a "lover of our language." It is indicative of the Department's quality and ideological orientation that—outside of a few courses on Ukrainian-Hungarian and Russian-Hungarian literary connections—the bulk of its literary offerings consists of such courses as "Lenin's Image in Hungarian Literature," "Sevchenko and Hungary," "The Problem of Internationalism and the Critique of Hungarian Bourgeois Nationalism in Hungarian Literature," "Anti-Religious Motifs in Hungarian Literature," etc.²⁴

In addition to performing their teaching duties, the faculty members are also engaged in research. But their topics are usually limited to the Hungarian folklore, ethnography, and linguistics of Carpatho-Ruthenia, without any possibility of studying their own people's history. This is all the more significant as it is precisely in the area of history and historical consciousness where the province's Hungarians are subjected to the greatest degree of psychological emasculation.

One of the best examples of this phenomenon is the scandalously primitive "prize winning" work with the title: *A boldogság felé. Kárpáton túl vázlatos története* [Towards Happiness. The Outline History of Trans-Carpathia].²⁵ Published in 1975 by the foreign language publishing house of Uzhorod/Ungvár, the Kárpáti Könyvkiadó, this work was authored by a collection of allegedly distinguished academicians. Its quality and tendentious nature, however, is revealed by its very title, which hardly needs any explanation to a Western scholar. The millennial history of this region—which suddenly was renamed Trans-Carpathia, even though it was on "this" side of the Carpathians, i.e. "inside" the Carpathian Basin ever since creation—is depicted as a thousand year long struggle of the "oppressed Ukrainians" to reach eternal happiness inside the "Soviet heaven." To quote:

For many centuries Trans-Carpathia had been forcibly torn from the motherland, and its working people suffered under the relentless social, economic, political and national oppression of Hungarian aristocrats, Austrian barons, Czech capitalists and their 'own' exploiters. Notwithstanding all this, however, the toilers have preserved their language and culture, as well as their feelings of unity with the Ukrainian people and with their common historical traditions. Through many centuries they have sustained themselves with the desire of reunification . . . [Thus] the reunification of Trans-Carpathian Ukraine with Soviet

Ukraine in 1945 was the triumph of historical justice. It was a turning point in the history of the province and a shining example of the implementation of the wise Leninist nationality policy of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Government . . . The many centuries of heroic struggles of the toilers of Trans-Carpathia . . . thus came to a [triumphant] end . . . with the province's liberation and reunification with its motherland, Soviet Ukraine.²⁶

This type of political oratory, combined with half-truths and conscious misinterpretation of historical facts, makes up much of the content of this volume. And it is being passed off as the first "scientific history" of Carpatho-Ruthenia that is to replace all earlier works produced by "bourgeois falsifiers of history." This itself could still be passed off as irresponsible pamphleteering were it not for the fact that the book was authored by a dozen Soviet historians based on the "archival sources" of three countries and the "published results of Soviet scholarship;" and were it not that in 1974 it was awarded an "Honorary Diploma" in Moscow as a work of great historical significance, and that its content is basically identical with the type of "history" that the psychologically emaciated Hungarians of the region have been obliged to study and to teach as the "true history" of their more immediate homeland ever since Carpatho-Ruthenia's incorporation into the Soviet Union.²⁷ Given the above, the content of this work has to be regarded as the true reflection of the mentality that dominates historical thinking and scholarship in Carpatho-Ruthenia.

Journalism and Book Publishing

Nominally the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia have several Hungarian newspapers. These include the four-page daily *Kárpáti Igaz Szó* [Carpathian True Word] which appears in about 38,000 copies, as well as several tri-weekly papers and other occasional publications.

Between 1946 and 1965 the *Kárpáti Igaz Szó* was simply a verbatim translation of the Ukrainian *Zakarpatska Pravda*, but in the latter year it became an independent paper under the editorship of the poet and novelist László Balla (born in 1927) who is one of the three Hungarian members of the Soviet Writers' Union (the other two being Borbála Szalai and Károly D. Balla, László's son). In actuality, however, the *Kárpáti Igaz Szó* and its sister papers have no real independence. They are basically Soviet Ukrainian papers in the Hungarian language, with only a small percentage of their space devoted specifically to Carpatho-Hungarian matters. Moreover, they lack all elements of the Hungarian spirit. Nor can they represent the interests of the Hungarian minority against the universal *Gleichschaltung* represented by the Soviet mentality and Ukrainian nationalism that dominate all aspects of social and intellectual life in the province. This as-

sertion holds true for all Hungarian language papers of Carpatho-Ruthenia, including, in addition to the *Kárpáti Igaz Szó*, such tri-weekly papers as the *Kárpáton túli Ifjúság* [Trans-Carpathian Youth] which is the Hungarian translation of the province's official Komsomol paper; as well as the *Vörös Zászló* [Red Flag] of Beregszász, the *Kommunizmus Fényei* [Lights of Communism] of Ungvár, and the *Kommunizmus Zászlaja* [The Communist Flag] of Nagyszőlős. The very titles of these papers are indicative of their content. Thus, outside of a few original literary pieces by local authors, they are filled with political propaganda reminiscent of the darkest years of Stalinist rule in Hungary (i.e. the age of Rákosi). Most of the articles are written by various party functionaries and deal with the alleged bliss of the workers in the Soviet paradise and with their efforts to outdo themselves for the good of the socialist homeland. The papers are also filled with praises for the Communist Party, with the achievements of the collective farms and factories, and with the allegedly best ways to implement the "Leninist methods of production." It really takes a person reared in the atmosphere of that Soviet dominated province to be able to endure the content of these papers.²⁸ No wonder that Hungarians of the much more liberal Hungary of today are not given the opportunity to read them, and apparently not even the Hungarian National Library (Széchényi Library) has a complete run of them.²⁹ The only visible bond between Hungary and these "Hungarian papers" of Carpatho-Ruthenia seems to be the daily programme of Hungarian Television, which is printed regularly in the *Kárpáti Igaz Szó*. The Carpatho-Hungarians' ability to receive Hungarian radio and T.V. programmes, however, is also a matter of concern to the Soviet Ukrainian masters of the province, for these programmes constitute a perpetual and readily available bond between these "lost" Hungarians and their former mother country. Moreover, they also constitute a basis for comparing the two worlds and two cultures—which usually turns out to be most unfavourable for the Soviets. But they do help the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia, for they keep the spirit of survival alive among them.

If the picture of Hungarian journalism in Carpatho-Ruthenia is bleak, so is the general picture of book publishing. Hungarian language works are published almost exclusively only by the Kárpáti Könyvkiadó of Ungvár, which also publishes works in Russian, Ukrainian and Moldavian (i.e. Rumanian in Cyrillic alphabet). Founded in 1945 and reorganized in 1964 as one of the seven publishing houses of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, in the early 1980s the Kárpáti Könyvkiadó published 91–93 titles per year. In 1981 36 of these titles were Hungarian language publications, including 10–12 indigenous works and about two dozen joint publications with various Hungarian publishers. This sounds rather impressive until we look at the titles of these works and examine their content. Our skepticism is also substantiated by some of the recent pronouncements of the Kárpáti

Könyvkiadó's director, Boris Gvaradionov. "Our main goal," said he in an interview, "is to make available in sufficient number of copies the necessary political, ideological and sociological works . . . in [minority] languages: such works as those of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, the constitutions of our republic and of the Soviet Union, their election laws, the documents of the Five Year Plans and of the Party Congresses, atheist brochures, as well as other works needed for the ideological struggle. On top of this all, we also publish works in three broad areas: Specialized works on industry and agriculture. . . , touristic works. . . , and works of *belles lettres*."³⁰ Ultimately, therefore, the majority of the so-called "Hungarian publications" turn out to be Marxist ideological works, Soviet propaganda pamphlets, and various trade books. Only in the category of *belles lettres* does the Hungarian element finally enter into the picture; although even there a goodly number of them are translated Russian and Ukrainian literary works. The rest are carefully selected Hungarian classics, pieces of modern Hungarian literature, and works by local Carpatho-Hungarian authors.

The first Hungarian work ever published by the Kárpáti Kiadó was a volume of poetry by the already mentioned László Balla, which appeared in 1951 under the title *Zengj hangosabban* [Sound Off Louder]. Balla was soon joined by Vilmos Kovács (1927–1877) with his *Vállani kell* [I have to confess] in 1957, and then by several other local authors. The number of the Carpatho-Hungarian literati has reached a point where today there are perhaps two dozen of them working and publishing about the life and problems of that most forgotten Hungarian minority in the Carpathian Basin. We are told that nowadays these authors collectively publish about two or three small volumes per year. Most of these are works of poetry or short stories, but occasionally there are also some anthologies and sociographical or life reports. If we consider that between 1975 and 1981 fourteen of these volumes have appeared in print (including two anthologies), then the two volumes per year, as claimed by Gvaradionov, appears to be correct. The most frequently published authors include László Balla, Magda Füzes, Balázs Balogh, Károly D. Balla, Dezső Csengeri, Borbála Szalai, Károly Lusztig and Csaba Márkus. Their works are usually published in 1,000 to 2,000 copies, but the collective allotted annual space for all of these works is only 8–12 printer's sheets (c. 128–196 regular pages). The remaining 15–19 printer's sheets (c. 240–304 pages) of the 27 printer's sheets allotted to Hungarian *belles lettres* and scholarly works per year are usually reserved for the *Kárpáti Kalendárium* [Carpathian Almanach] published annually ever since 1957 in about 15,000 to 19,000 copies.³¹ Printed in large format, the *Kárpáti Kalendárium* usually runs into 130 to 150 pages. It is filled with the usual political and ideological articles, and yet it is still called a "kind of anthology" and an outlet for Carpatho-Hungarian

authors.³² And in a sense it is a literary outlet, for next to the many ideological exhortations and commemorative articles concerning the various milestones of Soviet and Ukrainian achievements, it also published some *belles lettres* (i.e. 20 poems, 2–3 short stories, etc.), as well as a few short, popular and timid historical articles by local Hungarian historians.

Another “kind of anthology” is the slender volume that is published every five years by the “József Attila Literary Circle” (“József Attila Irodalmi Studió”). The most recent one is a slight volume of 64 pages entitled *Lendület* [Impetus]. It appeared in 1982 on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Soviet Union, and contains contributions by fourteen poets and writers.³³ As emphasized in the introduction to this volume, the goal of the Literary Circle and its almanach is to advance the cause of a “subjectively partisan socialist-realist literature that is imbued with revolutionary romanticism.”³⁴ Although this work does contain some valuable contributions—most of which are written in the traditional poetical forms—it also has its share of political sloganism. The two most evident examples are Éva Finta’s introductory ode to Lenin (“Leninhez”) and her crude lyrical description of the alleged relationship between an American arms manufacturer and his workers (“Egy amerikai fegyvergyáros meglátogatja a munkásokat” [An American arms manufacturer visits his workers]).³⁵ The almanach closes with a brief description of the history and activities of the “József Attila Literary Circle,” which appears to be an officially sponsored organization under the guidance of the *Kárpáti Igaz Szó* and long-time editor, László Balla.³⁶

Occasionally the Kárpáti Könyvkiadó also publishes Hungarian works in the so-called “scholarly” category. But the only two that Director Gvaradionov was able to mention are a collection of historical studies by János Váradi-Sternberg (*Utak és találkozások* [Paths and Encounters], 1971; 2nd ed., 1974) and an unnamed atheist work by Aladár Szikszai.³⁷ The most recent work in this category is Váradi-Sternberg’s *Századok öröksége* [The Heritage of Centuries], which, published jointly with the Gondolat Kiadó of Budapest in 1981, contains another collection of the author’s historical studies and essays.³⁸ These studies deal with various aspects of Russian-Hungarian and Ukrainian-Hungarian historical relations, and their tendency is to demonstrate that the influences coming from those “great” Slavic neighbours were usually beneficial to Hungary and the Hungarians.

Historical works—whether in article or book form—all follow the “official line” to a point that they have little credibility with the professional historian either in Hungary or in the United States. The historical interpretations found in these studies are generally disgusting to a Western historian—as is particularly evident from the already mentioned *magnum opus* of Carpatho-Ukrainian historiography, *Boldogság felé* [Towards Happiness]. But this is even more true for the textbooks, most of which are ver-

batim translations of Ukrainian originals published by the Radanska Skola of Kiev. A few exceptions are those that deal with Hungarian literature, which are usually prepared by local Hungarian authors, with due attention to the official guidelines concerning literary selections and interpretations.³⁹ But while literary scholars share a slight leeway, no such opportunities exist for historians. As a matter of fact, no Carpatho-Hungarian historian is permitted even the slightest role in authoring works that deal with the history of Carpatho-Ruthenia as a whole—be these popular works or textbooks. All these historians can do is to “accept” and recite the official version that is being passed off and taught as their nation’s history in that region.

Preservation of Traditions

Although the life of the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia is far from easy, and although they are constantly subjected to a demeaning interpretation of their history and national traditions, their attachment to the history and those traditions appears to be unbroken. Naturally, they can show this attachment only within certain limits, i.e. by emphasizing the role of those historical personalities who can qualify as “forerunners of socialism.” These include some of the most prominent national heroes of Hungary’s many revolutions against external and internal oppressions, such as Prince Ferenc Rákóczi (1676–1736) and Lajos Kossuth (1802–1894) as well as such local heroes as Rákóczi’s peasant general Tamás Esze (1666–1708). These “acceptable” national heroes are then placed next to the various heroes of Soviet communism, although still remaining in the latter’s shadows.⁴⁰

However timidly, this national spirit is also evident in the renewed interest in Hungarian folk traditions of Carpatho-Ruthenia, even though up to now this interest could only be expressed in publications with “folkloristic characteristics.”⁴¹ It is indicative of the situation, however, that the ethnographic research conducted by the Institute of Ethnography of the Soviet Academy of Sciences—which also dealt with the folklore and folk habits of the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia—was conducted only by Ukrainians. This was probably done consciously, for it is unlikely that the whole province does not have a single Hungarian ethnographer qualified and willing to do research on the ethnography of his own people.

Religious Life

Ever since the Union of Ungvár of 1646, the dominant religion of Carpatho-Ruthenia was Byzantine Catholicism, better known locally as Greek Catholicism. There is also a small Roman Catholic minority, as well as a similarly small Calvinist (Reformed) religious community, both of which are almost exclusively Hungarian. Moreover, since the early 19th century there was also a growing Jewish community. Most of the immigrant Jews, how-

ever, became Magyarized in the late 19th and early 20th century to a point where during the interwar years—when Carpatho-Ruthenia was part of Czechoslovakia—these Hungarian Jews constituted a significant portion of the most nationally conscious Hungarians in the region.⁴²

Following the Soviet takeover, the Byzantine Catholic majority (most of whom were Rusyns) was immediately forced into union with the Ukrainian-Russian Orthodox Church. This compelled the Byzantine Catholic Hungarians, and even many Rusyns, to make a choice between Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. Virtually all of the Hungarians chose the latter alternative, but so did a number of the Rusyns. This in effect means that those Rusyns who opted for Roman Catholicism joined Hungarian Catholic parishes and are attending the mass in Hungarian.⁴³ But as active membership in these religious bodies involves many disadvantages the number of these Rusyns is relatively small.

Nor do we know much about the fate of the Calvinists, although a recent report in the official papers of the Hungarian Reformed Church, the *Reformátusok Lapja* (December 14, 1980), speaks of about 80 congregations.⁴⁴ In 1979 their bishop, Pál Forgón, was awarded an honorary doctorate by the Reformed Theology of Budapest. Significantly enough, however, Forgón received his degree in company of the Ukrainian Metropolitan of Kiev, who was also awarded a similar doctorate by the Hungarian institution.

Notwithstanding these signs of existence, however, the situation of the Catholic and Calvinist Hungarians in Carpatho-Ruthenia is very difficult. Religious life is frowned upon and both churches suffer from the shortage of clergymen. According to a report dated 1976, a single Catholic priest or Reformed minister is often obliged to take care of as many as five congregations. But at least they are tolerated, which is not true for those of their co-religionists who live on the other side of the Carpathians in Soviet Ukraine proper. But practicing one's religious beliefs does imply the acceptance of a lowly position in contemporary Soviet society. And this also applies to the priest and the ministers who are prevented from teaching their respective religious beliefs, while at the same time being compelled to praise the alleged virtues of the atheist state even during regular religious services.

Relationship to Hungary and to the Hungarians of the Mother Country

As is evident from the above, the situation of the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia is rather grim, and to many ethnically conscious Hungarian intellectuals there, it probably appears virtually hopeless. To the latter, resettling in Hungary is the ultimate and mostly unattainable dream. Today's Hungary represents to them the envied world of Western Civilization, and all that it implies in human dignity, personal freedom and cultural achievements. They are convinced—as are most Hungarians of Hungary—that

the real Iron Curtain is not between Hungary and Austria, but rather between Hungary and the Soviet Union. To cross this formidable barrier is painful even for a Hungarian from Hungary who knows that he will shortly return. To the Hungarians from Carpatho-Ruthenia, however, it is both painful and next to impossible. They view it as an almost impenetrable wall that—according to one of the resettled Hungarian intellectuals—“locks them into a culturally and psychologically alien world that gradually suffocates them.”⁴⁵ This wall is penetrated regularly only by the Hungarian radio, television, and some of the Hungarian books and newspapers. But hearing, seeing and reading about the “world beyond” only whets their appetite, and—in a sense—makes their life even less bearable. Even so, virtually every Hungarian in the province is glued to the T.V. set every night except Monday (the day off for the Hungarian State Television), for they need the inspiration that these T.V. programmes represent. Naturally, this “inspiration” is resented by the local authorities who often regard it as a source of “alienation” from the Soviet way of life and from their cherished Ukrainization programme. Some Hungarian intellectuals, on the other hand, occasionally also give vent to their own resentments. Such was the case in the early 1970s, when a group of young writers, the members of the banned “Forrás Studió,” drew up a carefully written petition against the officially-sponsored Ukrainization of the Hungarian schools that violated the terms and spirit of the Soviet Constitution.⁴⁶ But they were soon silenced, and they were also forced to terminate their studies. In time, however, some of them were able to resettle in Hungary. This improved their lives radically, but it also cut them off permanently from their more immediate homeland.

How do Hungarians, and in particular, Hungarian intellectuals in Hungary view the plight of their brethren in Carpatho-Ruthenia? The average Hungarian of the early 1980s knew and cared very little about this problem. Not so the nationally conscious Hungarian intellectuals however, who were ever more aware of the plight of their Hungarian brethren in most of the neighbouring states. But while in those days they were permitted to talk, and occasionally even to write, about the problems of the Hungarians in Transylvania (i.e. Rumania) and Slovakia (i.e. Czechoslovakia), no one dared to raise openly the difficulties of the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia (i.e. the Soviet Union). The weight of the powerful Soviet state was simply too much, and all attempts at demanding intercession were quickly silenced.

The reports that appeared in Hungarian newspapers about life in Carpatho-Ruthenia were almost always one-sided and rosy.⁴⁷ But few of the caring and knowing Hungarians seemed to believe in the veracity of these reports—be they by local Quislings or by ideologically committed and thus “unseeing” Hungarian publicists. Some of the Hungarian intellectuals

presented lengthy reports to the Hungarian Party leadership, protesting these unrealistic portrayals.⁴⁸ They did so, however, without the hope of success, for no one in Hungary dared to challenge the great Soviet neighbour. Nor could such a challenge be anything but self-defeating at the time, especially in light of Hungary's disagreements with some of her other neighbours (particularly Romania, and to a lesser degree, Czechoslovakia).

Recent Developments: the late 1980s

From the perspective of the early 1980s—when this study was researched—the fate of the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia appeared rather grim and hopeless. Their numbers were small, they were cut off from their motherland by the nearly impenetrable wall of the Soviet-Hungarian border, and they were subjected to a relentless process of denationalization.

But those were the years before the age of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. With the advent of Gorbachev's *perestroika* things began to change for the better. While conditions are still far from what they used to be or ought to be, Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia are now at least able to express their attachment to their culture, learning, and history, and—on a modest level—they are even permitted to give vent to their feelings of Hungarian patriotism.

The improvement in the situation of the Carpatho-Hungarians is best measured by the fact that recently a good number of the Transylvanian-Hungarians who are fleeing Ceausescu's dictatorial regime in Rumania and who are unable to find their way into Hungary, have chosen to try their luck in Carpatho-Ruthenia.⁴⁹ This means that contrary to traditional perceptions about relative freedom in the socialist countries, nowadays even Soviet rule is viewed as preferable to Ceausescu's unbearably oppressive rule in Rumania. And at least some of the changes in this perception are the direct results of the visibly improved conditions of the Hungarians in Carpatho-Ruthenia, which are manifested in a number of significant developments.

Among these developments is the fact that the number of Hungarian schools seems to have increased. A report, dated January, 1988, speaks of 83 schools, of which 56 are complete ten-year schools (offering high school diplomas, according to the Soviet system of education), and 27 are incomplete, eight-year schools.⁵⁰ These numbers by themselves may or may not mean too much, for they do not tell us anything about the "Hungarianness" of these schools. For example: How many of these institutions are "mixed schools" where Hungarian children are compelled to study various subjects in Russian or Ukrainian? What is the "Hungarian" content of the subjects taught in these schools? Is the Hungarian heritage of these children discussed in a positive or in a negative manner? All of these are decisively important considerations.

Similarly positive are the developments connected with the University

of Uzhorod [Ungvár], where the Department of Hungarian Studies appears to have increased its enrollment. According to a recent statement by Vera Vaszocsik, an Associate Professor of Linguistics at that institution, the Department now enrolls about one hundred students in its five-year programme. If this report is true, it means that the Department of Hungarian studies at Uzhorod is back to its original quota of 20 students per year, which is certainly far cry from the situation in 1979 when only two prospective students applied. Vaszocsik also claims that since the Department's foundation in 1962, they have graduated around 320 students.⁵¹ This works out to about 13 students per year. All this seems to indicate that the nadir in Carpatho-Hungarian university studies reached in 1979 is now a thing of the past. With the increased number of graduates from the Department of Hungarian Studies, Hungarian intellectual and cultural life in Carpatho-Ruthenia is once more assured of some dedicated flagbearers.

This somewhat optimistic view is reinforced by another report, also dated January, 1988, according to which students of Hungarian schools in Carpatho-Ruthenia will finally be given the chance to study the history of their nation from the beginnings right up to our own period.⁵² If true, this will be a "first" in the region's history since its annexation by the Soviet Union. The question is: Will this "History of Hungary" offered in the schools of Carpatho-Ruthenia be a reasonably true overview of the nation's past, or will it simply reflect the primitive interpretation found in the above-mentioned history of Carpatho-Ruthenia, *A boldogság felé* [Towards Happiness]?⁵³ In the latter case, the Hungarian children of Carpatho-Ruthenia will have gained very little. Certainly, the most recent anthology of Carpatho-Hungarian literature on the period since World War II (*Sugaras utakon* [On Illuminated Paths], 1985) does not seem to be very encouraging in this regard.⁵⁴ While this work is by far the largest and most comprehensive compendium of the region's Hungarian literary creativity of the period since World War II—published on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Carpatho-Ruthenia's annexation by the Soviet Union—its introductory study still reflects the officially-sponsored historical myth of "reunification."⁵⁵ But as this claim of "reunification" appears under the name of the regional party secretary, Mikola Semenyuk, it may no longer reflect the views of the current "reform scholarship" encouraged by Gorbachev. Thus, one can still hope that—given the new openness advocated by the Party leadership—Soviet historians will have the moral courage and the intellectual strength to cleanse their professional works and their history textbooks from such officially-sponsored falsifications of history.

Other important signs of change for the better include: The increasing number of joint publications by the Kárpáti Könyvkiadó [Carpathian Publisher] of Uzhorod and various Hungarian publishing houses of Budapest; the significantly increased opportunities for Carpatho-Hungarian authors to

publish their works in Hungary; and the fact that since May of 1988 the only Hungarian newspapers of the province, the *Kárpáti Igaz Szó* [Carpathian True Word] can also be purchased in Hungary.⁵⁶ The latter change is all the more meaningful as during the 1970s not even the National Széchényi Library in Budapest was able to subscribe to this newspaper.

Although some things have changed for the better, many of the negative trends mentioned in connection with the 1960s and 1970s are still present in the mid- and late-1980s. Thus, according to some sources the number of Hungarians in the province continues to decrease.⁵⁷ While this may simply be the result of self-reclassification for reasons of social mobility, it is still a dangerous sign. Moreover, Hungarian churches—which are among the most important preservers of Hungarian nationality—are still suffering from state intervention. Because of their inability to train priests or ministers, they are chronically undermanned, and face the possibility of total extinction. This is best demonstrated by the fact that the 31 functioning Catholic parishes—during World War II there were 41—are kept in existence by a total of only 10 priests, whose average age is around 70 years.⁵⁸ How long will they be able to continue their pastoral work without replacements? The situation is equally critical among the Hungarian Calvinists. While we do not know the ages of their ministers, we are told that their 81 congregations are kept going by a total of only 21 “clergymen”—including 13 ministers, 4 assistants, and 4 students of theology.⁵⁹ Without some significant changes in the attitude of the state, they too face gradual extinction.

Problems still abound. But the positive changes of recent years are such that they may yet result in breaking down the formerly impenetrable walls that ever since 1945 had separated the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia from their motherland. Should these changes continue, the lives of these Hungarians will undoubtedly improve. These reforms will certainly lessen—although never fully eliminate—their feelings of isolation, and their belief that they were forcibly torn from their nation and from the intellectual and spiritual world of Western Civilization to which they had belonged for over a millennium.

An important manifestation of this feeling is the fact that psychologically they still view themselves as being part of Hungary and of the West in general. This is demonstrated in a multitude of different ways, including the way they keep time. Thus in Carpatho-Ruthenia if anyone inquires in Hungarian as to what time it is, he is automatically told only the Budapest time. Moreover, even though their whole life cycle is perforce geared to Moscow time—which is two hours ahead of Budapest—“most of their wrist-watches are still running according to Budapest time.”⁶⁰ Along the same lines, the region’s Hungarians also tend to adjust their life styles to radio and television broadcasts from Hungary, with little attention to broadcasts from Kiev or Moscow. They also pay more attention to the goings-on in the Hungarian

Parliament than to events taking place in the Supreme Soviets of the Russian or Ukrainian capitals. They likewise read only Hungarian newspapers on a regular basis (e.g. *Szabad Föld* [Free Land], *Új Tükör* [New Mirror], *Nők Lapja* [Ladies' Journal], *Élet és Irodalom* [Life and Literature], etc.) and—except for official announcements in the party papers—they pay little attention to Russian and Ukrainian periodicals. For this very reason, most Carpatho-Hungarians are more familiar with intellectual and cultural developments in Hungary, than with similar trends in the Soviet Union.⁶¹ All this makes it amply clear that the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia cannot accept their intellectual-spiritual separation from Hungary as final, nor acquiesce to their forced “transplantation” to the Byzantine-Slavic world of the Eastern Slavs.

In the course of the past four decades, Carpatho-Hungarians were saved from total assimilation and denationalization by a number of factors, including self-isolation, rural existence, lack of geographical mobility, and resistance to intermarriage. With the rise of industrialization and urbanization the role of these methods of self-preservation are bound to decline. But should the current reforms continue, the Hungarians' resolve to survive will undoubtedly be strengthened by their increased contacts with the cultural and intellectual life of Hungary. And as we read the tacit profession of faith in their nationality by the youngest members of the Carpatho-Hungarian poets,⁶² we also have to profess our belief in the certain survival of this small segment of the Hungarian nation in the Carpathian Basin.⁶³

Notes

An earlier and much shorter version of this study appeared in *The Hungarians: A Divided Nation*, ed. Steven Borsody (New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988), pp. 209–22.

- 1 Molotov's speech at the signing of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of June 29, 1945, as quoted by Frantisek Nemec and Vladimir Moudry, *The Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia* (Toronto, 1955, rep. Westport, 1981), p. 170.
- 2 Statistics quoted by Oscar Jaszi, “The Problem of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia,” in *Czechoslovakia*, ed. Robert J. Kerner (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949), pp. 193–215.
- 3 János Ölvedi, “A magyarság helyzete Kárpátalján” [The Conditions of the Hungarians in Sub-Carpathia], *Katolikus Szemle*, XXX, 2–3 (1978), p. 159.
- 4 Eduard Táborisky, “Benes and Stalin—Moscow, 1943–1945,” *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIII, 2 (1953), pp. 154–181, especially pp. 167–175.
- 5 While some of the claims concerning Nagydobrony (Velikaya Dobrón) appear to be far fetched, there is no doubt that atrocities did take place. On the extreme claims see László Árkay, “Helye a térképen üres. Rekvium Nagydobronyért” [Its Place is Empty on the Map. Requiem for Nagydobrony], in *A XVI. Magyar Találkozó Krónikája*, ed. János Nádas and Ferenc Somogyi (Cleveland, 1978), pp. 67–70; and György Stirling, “Nagydobrony, a magyar szuper-Lidice”

- [Nagydobrony, the Hungarian Super-Lidice], in *Katolikus Magyarok Vasárnapja* (Youngstown), October 1, 1978.
- 6 Vilmos Kovács and András Benedek, "Magyar irodalom Kárpát-Ukrajnában" [Hungarian Literature in Carpatho-Ukraine], *Tiszatáj*, XXIV, 10 and 12 (October and December, 1970), pp. 961–966, 1144–1150.
 - 7 *Ibid.*, pp. 1144–1150. See also *A határon túli magyar irodalom*, ed. Miklós Béládi (Budapest, 1982), p. 162.
 - 8 The conversation took place in the summer of 1976 in Budapest.
 - 9 These new statistics are cited in Csaba Skultéty, "A kárpátaljai magyarság szellemi élete" [The Intellectual Life of the Hungarians of Sub-Carpathia], in *Magyar Mérés*, III, ed. Éva Saáry (Zurich, 1980), pp. 123–124. Skultéty's 22-page (121–142) study is the best recent examination of this question.
 - 10 See *A határon túli magyarság olvasáskultúrája* [The Reading Habits of Hungarians beyond our Frontiers] (Budapest: Országos Széchényi Könyvtár, 1985), p. 38. For the year 1959, the *United Nations Demographic Handbook* (New York, 1964), p. 319, gives the figures as 154, 733 (H. nationality) and 164, 033 (H. mother tongue). On this question of "mother tongue" versus "nationality" see Alfred Bohmann, "Russians and Russification in the Soviet Union," *Aussen Politik* (English Edition), XXXII, 3 (1981), pp. 252–262. This work was brought to my attention by Professor Andrew Ludanyi of Ohio Northern University.
 - 11 *Sovjetskaya etnografiya* (1970), as quoted by Ölvedi, "A magyarság helyzete," p. 162.
 - 12 Skultéty, pp. 126–127.
 - 13 Kovács-Benedek, pp. 1144–1150.
 - 14 See for example Miklós Zelei, "Magyar művelődési élet Kárpát-Ukrajnában. Interjú Fodó Sándorral, az Ungvári Állami Egyetem tanárával" [Hungarian Cultural Life in Carpatho-Ukraine. Interview with Sándor Fódó, Professor at the Uzhorod State University], *Magyar Hírlap*, September 29, 1979. For some of the earlier reports see Ölvedi, pp. 342–344.
 - 15 "Részlet a Forrás Stúdió 1971 szeptember-októberi beadványából" [Selections from the September-October 1971 Petition of the Forrás Stúdió], typescript, p. 5. This is a petition sent to Moscow by the soon after disbanded circle of young poets and writers. Hereafter quoted as "Forrás Stúdió." It was later published in the *Nemzetőr* [National Guardian] (Munich), 28/402–404 (Sept., Oct., Nov., 1983), under the title: "A tűz nem alszik ki" [The Flame Will Not Go Out].
 - 16 *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
 - 17 *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4.
 - 18 Zelei, "Magyar művelődés," and other recent sources. In contradiction to the information found in the above sources, a recent representative work still uses the unrealistically high figure of 100 Hungarian schools, among them 20 high schools. Cf. Peter Lizanec, "A magyar nyelv és irodalom oktatása az uzsgorodi Állami Egyetemen" [The Teaching of Hungarian Language and Culture at the Uzhgorod State University], in *Hungarológiai oktatás régen és ma* [Hungarian studies formerly and now], ed. M. Judit Róna (Budapest, 1983), pp. 36–40. One of my sources, who is most knowledgeable in Carpatho-Ruthenian affairs, claims that today there is only one Hungarian high school in the whole province, namely at Péterfalva.

- 19 "Forrás Studió," p. 1.
- 20 The disbanded "Forrás Studió" was replaced in 1971 by the officially sponsored "József Attila Irodalmi Studió" (JAIS), which unites some of the younger literati who behave. Occasionally it also publishes small anthologies of its members' works. On the disbandment I rely on the oral reports of some of the local literati, as well as on an unpublished report that mentions this affair. Concerning the JAIS see the summary of its foundation and history by György Dupka, "Visszatekintés alkotóközösségünk tíz esztendejére" [Remembering the Ten Years of our Creative Circle], in *Lendület. Ifjúsági Almanach* [Impetus. Youth Almanach] (Uzhorod, 1982), pp. 60–62.
- 21 "Forrás Studió," pp. 7–9.
- 22 While all of the other sources speak of 10,000 students, Lizanec's recent study (note 18) mentions 11,000.
- 23 On the foundation and achievements of the Department of Hungarian Studies see Lizanec, pp. 36–40. Concerning the lack of applicants see Zelei, "Magyar művelődés."
- 24 Lizanec, p. 37.
- 25 *A boldogság felé. Kárpáton túl vázlatos története* [Towards Happiness. The Outline History of Trans-Carpathia] (Uzhorod, 1975), 296 p.
- 26 *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4, 182.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p. 4. The authors include: M.V. Arsentyev, E.A. Balahuri, I.M. Hrachak, O.D. Dovhanich, V.I. Ilko, V.M. Kerenchanin, K.O. Kutsenko, S.O. Mishchenko (editor-in-chief), N.P. Mishchenko, V.V. Palyok, M.V. Troyan, and I.H. Shulha. It was approved by Professor I.I. Kompaniyets.
- 28 Concerning Hungarian journals, book publishing and literary activities in Carpatho-Ruthenia see Kovács-Benedek, pp. 961–966, 1144–1150; Ölvédi, pp. 344–347; Skultéty, pp. 128–130, 133–136; József Máriás, "Sorok Kárpáton túl magyar irodalmáról" [Observations Concerning Hungarian Literature in Trans-Carpathia], *Korunk*, XXXIX, 4 (April 1980), pp. 312–314; András Görömbei, "Kárpát-ukrajnai magyar írók" [Hungarian Writers of Carpatho-Ukraine], *Alföld*, XXXII, 11 (November 1981), pp. 18–26; and the recent summary in *A határon túli magyar irodalom*, pp. 159–174, which is based to a large extent on the above-cited Kovács-Benedek article.
- 29 The National Széchényi Library's incomplete collection of the *Kárpáti Igaz Szó* was put together from the private collections of a number of Hungarian literati.
- 30 "Testvérkiadók: Pozsony, Ungvár, Újvidék, Bukarest" [Sister Publishers: Bratislava, Uzhorod, Novi Sad, Bucharest], *Kritika*, 5 (May 1981), pp. 3–7, quotations pp. 4–5. This general picture was reinforced by a more recent interview with Boris Gvardionov, "40 éves a Kárpáti Kiadó" [The Carpathian Publisher is 40 Years Old], *Könyvvilág*, 30/8 (August 1985), p. 3.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 5. I have examined the 1976 and 1980 issues of the *Kárpáti Kalendárium*.
- 32 "Testvérkiadók," p. 5.
- 33 *Lendület. Ifjúsági Almanach* [Impetus. Youth almanach] (Uzhorod, 1982), 64 p. The earlier volumes include: *A várakozás legszebb reggelén* [On the Most Beautiful Dawn of Expectation] (Uzhorod, 1972), and *Szivárványszínben* [In Rainbow Colors], (Uzhorod, 1977). Cf. Máriás, "Sorok," p. 313.
- 34 *Lendület*, p. 3

- 35 *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.
- 36 Dupka, “Visszatekintés,” in *ibid.*, pp. 60–62.
- 37 “Testvérkiadók,” p. 5. The second enlarged edition of Váradi-Sternberg’s work appeared under the title: *Utak, találkozások, emberek* [Paths, Encounters, Personalities] (Uzhgorod, 1974).
- 38 This work also appeared in a Russian edition (Uzhgorod, 1979). It contains 29 short, mostly popular articles, stretching from the early 18th century to the post-World War II Years.
- 39 See for example the following two textbooks: Gizella Drávai, *Magyar irodalom az Ukrán SZSZK magyar tanítási nyelvű középiskoláinak 9. osztálya számára* [Hungarian literature for the 9th grade of the Hungarian language secondary schools of the Ukrainian SSR], 4th rev. ed. (Kiev-Uzhgorod, 1971), 472 p.; and László Balla, *Irodalom az Ukrán SZSZK magyar tanítási nyelvű középiskoláinak 10. osztálya számára* [Literature for the 10th grade of the Hungarian language secondary schools of the Ukrainian SSR] (Kiev-Uzhgorod, 1975), 487 p. Drávai’s work covers Hungarian literature in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, while Balla’s book covers 20th century Hungarian literature up to 1945. They also cover contemporary Ukrainian literature, with about two-fifths to one-third of the text devoted to the latter. The selections and interpretations all are geared to demonstrating the ever presence of class struggle in Hungarian society.
- 40 Skultéty, pp. 137–138.
- 41 “Magyar néprajzi kutatás a szomszédos országokban” [Hungarian Ethnographic Research in the Neighboring States], *Valóság*, XVIII, 6 (June 1975), pp. 29–44, especially 39–40.
- 42 Concerning religious life in Carpatho-Ruthenia see Walter C. Warzeski, *Byzantine Rite Rusins in Carpatho-Ruthenia and America* (Pittsburgh, 1971); Paul Robert Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus’, 1848–1948* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978); and some of the studies in *The United Societies of the U.S.A. A Historical Album*, ed. Basil Shereghy (McKeesport, Pennsylvania, 1978).
- 43 Skultéty, pp. 138–139.
- 44 “A Kárpátontúli Református Egyház életéből” [Concerning the Life of the Trans-Carpathian Reformed Church], *Reformátusok Lapja*, XXIV, 50 (December 14, 1980).
- 45 In the course of the 1970s and the early 1980s I have spoken with half a dozen Hungarian intellectuals from Carpatho-Ruthenia, including the now deceased Vilmos Kovács, as well as with several others who monitor developments in that province. The views presented here are based on these conversations.
- 46 Based on a “Special Report” (typescript) prepared by one of the intellectuals who monitor the position of Hungarians in Carpatho-Ruthenia.
- 47 I was told that examples of such one-sided reports include those by László Balla, the editor of the *Kárpáti Igaz Szó (KISz)*: “A nagy szovjet család kis magyar közössége” [The small Hungarian community of the great Soviet family], *KISz*, March 28, 1971; *idem*, “Elidegenedés?” [Alienation?], *KISz*, August 21, 1971; and *idem*, “Visszapillantás” [Reflections], *KISz*, August 14, 1975. Of similar nature are also the following reports; János Siklós “Barangolás a Kárpátok

- alatt” [Wanderings under the Carpathians], *Népszava*, February 6, 1972; *idem*, “Nézelődés a világban” [Looking around in the World], *Délmagyarország*, July 4, 1972; János Komlós, “Meg kell mondanom” [I have to tell you], *Népszabadság*, October 10, 1971; and Miklós Róttman, “Új idők harsonája” [Trumpets of the New Age], *KISz*, March 8, 1975. I was also warned on the use of statistics concerning Hungarian schools and publications, which usually present a much brighter picture than reality.
- 48 I was able to consult one of these 160-page reports written by a literary scholar in the late 1970s, wherein the anonymous author complained bitterly about the unfair portrayal of Hungarian reality in Carpatho-Ruthenia by the authors of the above-cited newspaper articles.
- 49 The flight of Hungarians from Transylvania (Rumania) to Carpatho-Ruthenia was revealed on July 16, 1988 on the Budapest Radio, when György Márvány interviewed two prominent Carpatho-Hungarian intellectuals, György Dubka, an editor of the Kárpáti Könyvkiadó [Carpathian Publishers] and Sándor Horváth, a staff member of the daily *Kárpáti Igaz Szó*. Cf. “Hungarians from the USSR Interviewed in Budapest,” in The British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, July 19, 1988, Tuesday. Page: EE/0207/A2/1.
- 50 György Halász, “Magyar kultúra Kárpátalján” [Hungarian Culture in Sub-Carpathia], *Magyar Hírek*, XLI, 2 (January 22, 1988), pp. 14–15.
- 51 *Ibid.*
- 52 *Magyar Hírek*, XLI, 12 (June 24, 1988), p. 4.
- 53 See note 25 above. For translated excerpts from this work, See Annex II of my study on the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia in *The Hungarians*, ed. Borsody, pp. 225–27.
- 54 *Sugaras utakon. A kárpátontúli magyar nyelvű irodalom antológiája 1945–1985*. [On Illuminated Paths. An Anthology of Trans-Carpathian Hungarian Literature 1945–1985] (Uzhorod: Kárpáti Könyvkiadó, 1985), 344 pp. Cf. Gyula Balla’s review of this work in *Confessio. A Magyarországi Református Egyház Figyelője* [Confession. Observer of the Reformed Church of Hungary], X, 3 (1986), pp. 92–94. For additional information on this and related topics, see also: Lajos M. Takács, “A kárpát-ukrajnai magyarság irodalmi életéről” [About the Literary Life of the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ukraine], in *ibid.*, pp. 86–87; András Stumpf Benedek, “A kárpát-ukrajnai magyar lakosság és a könyv” [The Hungarian Population of Carpatho-Ukraine and Books], in *A határon túli magyarság olvasáskultúrája*, pp. 38–44, and Gyula Balla, “A kárpátaljai (kárpát-ukrajnai) magyar irodalom regionális hagyományairól” [About the Regional Traditions of Sub-Carpathian (Carpatho-Ukrainian) Hungarian Literature], in *Magyarságkutatás. A Magyarságkutató Csoport Évkönyve* [Hungarian Studies. Yearbook of the Institute of Hungarian Studies], ed. Gyula Juhász (Budapest: Magyarságkutató Csoport, 1987), pp. 299–309.
- 55 Cf. Mikola Semenyuk’s introduction to *Sugaras utakon*.
- 56 See especially the recent summary article on the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia by Ferenc Szaniszló and László N. Sándor, “Lajos Lajosovics és a többiek” [Lajos Lajosovics and the Rest], in *Magyar Hírlap melléklete* [Supplement to the Hungarian News] of Budapest (January 30, 1988), pp. 4–5. See also *Magyar Hírek*, XLI, 12 (June 24, 1988), p. 4.

- 57 *Kárpáti Kalendárium 1985* [Carpathian Almanach 1985] (Uzhorod: Kárpáti Könyvkiadó, 1984), p. 136.
- 58 "Jelentés a vallási életéről" [Report about Religious Life], in *Kettős Járom Alatt* [Under Two Yokes] (Cleveland), XV, 2 (December 1987), p. 18; reprinted from the Hungarian Catholic newspaper, *Új Ember* [New Man] of Budapest.
- 59 Halász, "Magyar kultúra Kárpátalján," p. 15.
- 60 *Ibid.*
- 61 While much of this information is based on personal conversations with Carpatho-Hungarian intellectuals, some of it can also be found in Szaniszló and Sándor, "Lajos Lajosovics," pp. 4–5; Halász, "Magyar kultúra Kárpátalján," pp. 14–15; Takács, "A kárpát-ukrajnai magyarság irodalmi életéről," pp. 86–87; and Benedek, "A kárpát-ukrajnai magyar lakosság és a könyv," pp. 38–44.
- 62 See the literary anthologies cited in footnotes 33 and 54 above.
- 63 For additional recent writings on matters relating to Hungarians in Carpatho-Ruthenia, see Csaba Skultéty, "Magyar költő Kárpátalján. Kovács Vilmos halálának tizedik évfordulójára" [A Hungarian Poet in Sub-Carpathia. On the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of Vilmos Kovács's Death], in *Új Látóhatár* [New Horizon] (Munich), XXXVIII, 4 (December 15, 1987), pp. 546–550; Anonymous, "Kárpátaljai magyar balladák" [Hungarian Ballads of Sub-Carpathia], in *Hazai Tudósítások* [News from the Homeland], XXXIII, 2 (January 15, 1986), pp. 12–14; and Mária Ortutay, "A Magyar Művelődésügyi Minisztérium kiküldöttjének jelentése" [Report by the Emissary of the Hungarian Ministry for Culture], in *Kettős Járom Alatt*, XV, 2 (December 1987), p. 18; reprinted from the June 1987 issue of the Budapest periodical *Kortárs* [Contemporary].

The Hungarians of Yugoslavia: Facing an Uncertain Future

Andrew Ludanyi

The people of Yugoslavia are one of the most diverse in all Europe ethnically and linguistically. Besides the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—who compose the bulk of the country's population—there are Hungarians, Albanians, Germans, Rumanians, Turks, Macedonians, Bulgarians, and some other nationality groups in the country.¹ At the present time Yugoslavia's leaders are attempting to give these different peoples a common state allegiance as well as an opportunity to maintain their cultural diversity. This policy has prevailed since Tito and the communists have taken over the direction of the the country's political destiny.²

The purpose of the present study is to examine Yugoslavia's "nationality policy" towards the Hungarians. It will provide an overview of past and current Yugoslav policies and thereby try to contribute to an understanding of the present communist "solution" of the nationality question. As Robert Lee Wolff points out: "One [cannot] understand Balkan affairs past or present without a close acquaintance with her minorities and their traditions."³ This observation applies not only to Yugoslavia and the Balkans, but to East European affairs in general.

The present study will be confined to those Hungarians who live in what might be called "ethnic islands," it will not consider the fate of those Magyars who are scattered throughout the Yugoslav countryside or live in cities such as Zagreb and Belgrade. In particular, the examination will focus on the Hungarians living in the Darda triangle (Baranya), the Vojvodina (the Vajdaság, which is composed of the Backa [Bácska] and part of the Banat [Bánság]) and those parts of Croatia and Slovenia where they still have identifiable communities. It is these yet undispersed and unassimilated Magyar strongholds that have been cause for political friction between Hungary and Yugoslavia in the past, particularly during the interwar years and the heyday of the Cominform.

East Central Europe's Hungarian minority problems arose with the political re-shuffling of boundaries that followed World War I. Yugoslavia—at first called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes⁴—obtained her “share” of Magyars through the Treaty of Trianon of 1920 which ceded to the new south Slavic state not only Croatia-Slavonia, but also Medjumurje (Muraköz), Prekomurje, the Darda triangle, Backa, and part of the Banat.⁵ The cession of these areas was carried out under the principle of “self-determination of peoples,” but in reality it reflected the desires of French foreign policy in East Central Europe.⁶ It was also a reward to the Serbs for their support of the Entente cause in World War I.⁷

The Magyar population of these areas was almost 400,000 in 1931 according to the Yugoslav census of that year. This large minority was located in the country's ethnically most diverse area.⁸ No ethnic group composed a majority of either the Darda Triangle, Backa, or Banat—or of all three taken together. The three largest ethnic groups were, of course, the Magyars, Germans and South Slavs (including Croats, precani Serbs, Socki, and Bunyevci). Before the Second World War they each composed roughly one-third of the population of these areas.⁹

Before discussing the position of the Magyar ethnic group in the interwar years, it is necessary to reflect at least briefly on the pre-World War I ethnic history of these areas. This is necessary because the relations between the Hungarians and Serbs and the other peoples of the Vojvodina have molded the context of their present interactions and expectations.

Geographically the Vojvodina is an extension of the great Hungarian Plain which lies at the centre of the Carpathian Basin. Because it is geographically part and parcel of these lowlands, its history has usually been determined directly by the people who controlled the Carpathian Basin as a whole. The Magyars ruled it until the battle of Mohács in 1526. In the years preceding this battle the area's population was predominantly Magyar. Even Belgrade (called Nándorfehérvár by the Magyars) was for a long time a Hungarian fortress. Following the Turkish victory over the Hungarians at Mohács the area underwent a drastic ethnic change. Turkish depredations completely depopulated and devastated the area. Only after the ascendancy of Habsburg Austria did the area regain some of its population. However, the ethnic make-up of this new population was no longer predominantly Magyar. It had become mainly Serbian and German.¹⁰

The Habsburg policy for this area was motivated by considerations of the external as well as the internal security of the Empire. It involved a re-colonization scheme that would provide an effective defence against the Turks while at the same time it would strengthen Austrian hegemony. Vienna's policy favoured Serbian and German colonists rather than Hun-

garians because of the anti-Habsburg attitudes of the latter.¹¹ Consequently the population of the region became a patchwork of different nationalities. However, at the end of the 18th century Magyars again began settling in this region. They filled up especially those areas which became reclaimed through the drainage of swamps. Thus, by 1920 (when the Treaty of Trianon dismembered Hungary) the Vojvodina's population had become one-third South Slav, one-third German and one-third Hungarian.¹²

The rise of nationalism among these different ethnic groups became evident in the early part of the 19th century. The Hungarians exerted more and more effort to make the character of the Vojvodina more "Magyar." The South Slavs resisted this policy. When the Hungarians sought to throw off the yoke of Habsburg absolutism in 1848–49, the Serbs and Croats of the area sided with the latter. Habsburg practice of *divide et impera* thus prevailed. However, Austrian absolutism failed to reward the Serbs and Croats for their assistance. Instead, they were told in 1867—when Austria and Hungary had buried some of their differences—to seek a *modus vivendi* with the Magyars.¹³ The national consciousness of both the Serbs and the Croats soon would "cross the Rubicon." Most of them could no longer look on themselves as "Hungarians of Slavic ancestry." Thus, when the Austro-Hungarian monarchy dissolved at the end of World War I, they turned to the creation of a South Slav state as the logical expression of their national self-determination. In the closing months of World War I, Serbian and French troops occupied all of southern Hungary, including the Vojvodina.¹⁴ The Treaty of Trianon put its seal of approval on most of these military acquisitions.

In the newly-formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes the position of the Magyar ethnic group underwent a drastic change. From a position of most favoured they were pushed into the position of least favoured. Their treatment was, of course, tied directly to both domestic and foreign policy developments.

As part of France's scheme for a new international order in East Central Europe, the new South Slav kingdom was placed in direct opposition to Hungary and Bulgaria. Such opposition did not have to be fostered since the kingdom had gained territories at the expense of both these other states. The latter desired a revision of this post-war territorial settlement. In the face of such desires, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes looked to France and other "satisfied" powers (Czechoslovakia and Rumania) for allies.¹⁵ In this conflict the Magyars of Yugoslavia—as well as the Bulgars and pro-Bulgar Macedonians—became mere driftwood tossed hither and thither in the uncertain stream of East Central European power politics. In other words, the Magyar minority's condition of existence was always contingent on Yugoslavia's policies *vis-à-vis* Hungary.

Yugoslavia's nationality policy was even more closely tied to its quest

for political unification. While the idea of a South Slav state had long been the fervent wish to many Croatian and Serbian intellectuals, when such a union was finally realized dissension immediately arose regarding its character. The Serbs wished a centralized union dominated by themselves. The Croats, on the other hand, wanted a federal state which gave at least the three major South Slav nationalities an equal voice in the policies of the country.¹⁶ To bridge this rift the Serbs not infrequently used the minorities either as countervailing forces *vis-à-vis* the Croats, or as scapegoats—personifying the dangers of external subversion—against which it was the duty of all good South Slavs to unite.

Yugoslavia's German minority was frequently used as a countervailing force. It was in most cases—excepting the small numbers living in northern Slovenia—far removed from the Austrian border. In contrast to this, the Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Albanian minorities presented a direct threat to the frontiers of the country. Thus, the Magyars were well suited to fulfill the scapegoat role. They were viewed as a potential force of disruption which had to be hemmed in and weakened wherever possible.¹⁷

The policy chosen to ward off the Magyar "threat" was to isolate Hungary diplomatically. To this end Yugoslavia joined Rumania and Czechoslovakia in the Little Entente, a diplomatic and military alignment of states directed primarily against Hungary.¹⁸ Besides surrounding Hungary with a ring of hostile states, Yugoslavia also attempted to impede contacts between the Magyars of Hungary and those that lived in Yugoslavia. This was done by denying visas to prospective travelers thus discouraging visits across the borders.¹⁹

In Yugoslavia itself, the government resorted to a two-front campaign to weaken the Magyars politically. It used both outright repression and the more sophisticated, time-tried Habsburg policy of divide and rule. The application of these policies was often simultaneous, but at certain times one was preferred over the other. In the immediate post-World War I years repression was utilized more frequently but in the 1930s the government was more successful in playing the non-irredentist minorities against the Magyars.²⁰ These tactics were used in almost all areas of life, including the political realm, as well as the educational, cultural, religious, economic, and social aspects of existence.

The Magyars were effectively excluded from both national and local political affairs. But the other minorities were only slightly better off than the Magyars, as ordinary Serbs themselves were limited in the extent to which they could participate in political affairs. In fact, after 1929, the vast majority of Yugoslavia's inhabitants was barred from political life by King Alexander's dictatorship.²¹ On the whole, however, the government's authoritarianism weighed heaviest on the Magyars and some of the other irredentist nationality groups.²²

The exclusion of Magyars from political life was evident in the prevailing patterns of electoral practices and political appointments. In the elections to the Constituent Assembly Magyars were not admitted to the voters' lists. In the 1923 election to the *Skupstina* (National Assembly) not one Magyar deputy was elected, while the much smaller Rumanian minority secured one deputy and the German minority (which had about the same population as the Magyars) secured eight.²³ In the 1925 elections the Magyars were again barred from the *Skupstina* while the Germans elected five Deputies. Only in 1927 did the Magyars finally elect three Deputies when they ran under the party auspices of the Serbian Radical and Democrat parties. In this same election the Germans secured six mandates. When in 1929 the Dictatorship dissolved all parties, the Germans were allowed one senator and two deputies and the Magyars were allowed one deputy on the government list.²⁴ As the above data indicates, the Magyar minority was barred from effective representation while the Germans were given a favoured though token status. In this both the policies of repression and of *divide et impera* are evident.

In local government and in the civil service the same pattern prevailed. A few examples may be cited as representative. Even after the most "liberal" election opportunities of 1927, "there were in the whole Vojvodina only 10 German and 6 Magyar village notaries, against 114 Slavs (nearly all Serbs)."²⁵ After the eclipse of this "liberal" interlude and the establishment of the Dictatorship, local officials were again appointed rather than elected. In 1930 the appointments to the City Council of Zenta (a city that was over 86 percent Magyar) included 4 Magyars out of a total of 38 Councilors.²⁶ This pattern of discrimination was also present in the country's civil service. Under the Vidov Dan Constitution of 1921 (which was superseded by Alexander's Dictatorship in 1929) Article 19 stated that admission to public service required at least 10 years of residence in the Kingdom for all citizens whose nationality was not Serb, Croat or Slovene.²⁷

Besides barring the Magyar population from participation in government, the Yugoslav state also demanded that in public discourse they use only Serbo-Croatian. This language demand was not confined to government transactions (e.g., Court proceedings, written communications to authorities, etc.), but also applied to utterances made in public places like cafes and street corners.²⁸ Shops had to use the "state language" as well and could resort to Magyar only when the customer was totally unable to communicate otherwise. Non-governmental or "private" clubs were required to use the state language to keep minutes and to "conduct business." Street names and shop-signs also had to follow this pattern. If a private business refused to do so, it had to pay a surtax for the privilege of having its shop-sign appear in Magyar or German besides Serbian (i.e., in Cyrillic).²⁹

This intolerance carried over to the economic and social existence of the

Magyars. Their cultural, educational and economic position was in many ways subject to this same stifling grip of Serbian nationalism. The most far-reaching effects were felt in the immediate post-Trianon period.

The "land reform" carried out in the Vojvodina during these years is a good example of economic subjugation. Prior to the World War the land distribution in the area was undeniably inequitable. But this inequality did not involve "national discrimination." Because the area had been re-colonized by the Habsburgs with Serbs and Germans, the population was, in large part, composed of free-holders. However, the Magyar inhabitants were not so fortunate. Due to their late arrival in the region, they were settled on lands reclaimed by the drainage of swamps. This involved vast expenditures that could be covered only by the government and the landed gentry (whose members became the owners of much land in the region). Thus, among the Magyar inhabitants of the Vojvodina, great class differences existed. There was a small upper layer composed of landed aristocrats and Jewish merchants, and a large class of impoverished farm labourers.³⁰

When the Serbs undertook their land reform after incorporating the Vojvodina into Yugoslavia, they resorted to discrimination on the basis of nationality. They broke up the large landed estates and redistributed them among Serbs, leaving the impoverished Magyar peasants as landless as they were before the reform.³¹ In fact, Magyars, Germans, and other "a-national" elements, were not only left out of the reform, but they were barred from buying land within a 50 kilometer zone of the Yugoslav-Hungarian border.³² In this way, the land reform which had seen most of the land confiscated in the Magyar areas of the Vojvodina, turned out to be a means by which the Magyar masses were kept impoverished. More important, it became the pretext for bringing in new colonists—called *dobrovoljci*—from Serbia who were settled in these Magyar populated areas. These new Serb settlers diluted to some extent the compact Magyar areas and also gave the state "dependable" inhabitants along its northern borders.³³

While discrimination in the agricultural realm was responsible for most of the misery experienced by Hungarians, there were similarly unfavourable trends in other areas of their economic life. Many Magyars were forced to seek employment in the interior of the country due to the hiring policies of manufacturers in the Vojvodina: they tended to hire only a certain minimum quota of non-Serbs. Magyar firms, on the other hand, were "to take on Serbian Directors or to place a certain number of [their] shares at the disposal of the Government."³⁴

While all these policies of Serbianizing were objectionable, it was the attempt to Serbianize their tongues and their hearts that made Magyars most resentful of Yugoslav rule. The intellectual and spiritual life of the Magyars was closely tied to the fate of their churches, schools, and folk culture. The

Yugoslav government, however, made every attempt to limit the Magyar character of each. In a sense they all became subject to restrictive state supervision. This supervision affected the churches first, then the schools, and then the total cultural-intellectual existence of the Magyars.³⁵

The churches have played a national as well as a religious role in the history of most Eastern European countries.³⁶ This also holds true for the churches of the Vojvodina. Most Roman Catholics in this area were Magyars (the remainder were Swabians, Croats, Sokci and Bunyevci) while the Serbs were Serbian Orthodox. In this way the churches reflected the national aspirations of their adherents. To curb the Magyar "national" role of the Roman Catholic Church the Yugoslav government pared down its jurisdiction and powers and also transformed the ethnic composition of its hierarchy. This was accomplished through a Concordat with the Holy See which re-drew the boundaries of the Church's dioceses so that these would correspond to new state boundaries. Once this was done, the clergy of the Vojvodina became subject to the Croatian prelates in Zagreb and the Papal Nuncio at Belgrade. In this way the Hungarian influence through the Catholic Church became inoperative.³⁷

The churches of Yugoslavia were also subjected to control by the state through the subsidies given to them. This determined the extent to which churches could carry on their traditional activities. As C.A. Macartney has pointed out, the Roman Catholics and Protestants received less than their "fair share" relative to churches representing other nationality groups.³⁸ However, this aspect of Yugoslav policy was rationalized in most Serb nationalist quarters as necessary to stem the influence of a-national institutions.

Much more disruptive for the minorities than this discrimination in the allocation of subsidies, was the policy of depriving the Catholic Church of its traditional role in education. All the Church's schools were transformed into state schools controlled directly by the Ministry of Education in Belgrade. For the Magyars this meant the loss of education in their own language. Only in the first four elementary grades were they left with Magyar instruction. In all education above that level instruction was given exclusively in Serbian.³⁹ However, even the number of elementary schools left to the Magyars was well below that which their numbers would have warranted. In 1934 they possessed only 157 school units (sections and classes combined) as opposed to the 693 school units which they had before World War I.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the content of education was often little above the level of indoctrination in Yugoslav nationalism, taught by a staff that was at least one-third Slav even in the Magyar school units.⁴¹

The discriminatory policies of the state also made their presence felt in the Magyars' more general cultural life. Cultural associations were not allowed to form until the Dictatorship of 1929 enabled the Magyars to orga-

nize a "Popular Cultural Association" at Veliki Beckerek (Nagy Becskerek) and the "People's Circle" at Subotica (Szabadka).⁴² Otherwise, the policy of national discrimination remained the same. Concert programmes had to contain a certain number of Serb numbers and cultural or folklore programmes had to keep down the number of Hungarian national dances to one or two.⁴³

This discriminatory policy prevailed as long as Yugoslavia's foreign policy continued to place it in opposition to Hungary. The assassination of King Alexander in 1934 by a Macedonian terrorist, however, altered the general foreign policy orientation of Yugoslavia. By 1936–37 there were definite signs of a *rapprochement* with Hungary.⁴⁴ This also became perceptible in the easing of repressive measures against the Magyars of the Vojvodina. Unfortunately, the clash of the great powers again threw a monkey-wrench into this process of accommodation. German and Italian ambitions stood in the way of Serbian-Magyar reconciliation.

When Hitler's armies marched into Yugoslavia, it was already on the verge of disintegration. Hungary joined the powers dismembering Yugoslavia—in spite of Paul Teleki's suicide. In light of their interwar experiences, it is not surprising that most of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina welcomed the Hungarian reacquisition and occupation of the Backa (Bácska) and the Darda triangle (Baranya). However, the occupation was a short-lived respite and led to some adverse short-term consequences. Among other developments, the occupying troops were responsible for atrocities that were committed at Novi Sad.⁴⁵ After the retreat of the Hungarian army and the advance of the Red Army and the partisans, retaliation was wrought upon the local Hungarians rather than the perpetrators of the excesses. At any rate, at the end of hostilities the Hungarians of the Vojvodina were viewed as a minority that had attempted to "desert" Yugoslavia during the partisans' fight for Yugoslavia's preservation.

These changed conditions dramatically affected majority-minority relations. The new ethnic balance in the revived Yugoslav state as well as in Tito's partisan movement, provided the basis for this new policy. Tito's personal leadership and the ideological commitments of the Party set the stage for more integrationist and tolerant ethnic policies.

* * * * *

The war also had far-reaching demographic consequences. As was pointed out above, in the interwar period the population of the Vojvodina had been roughly one-third German, one-third Hungarian and one-third South Slav. However, the last years of the struggle and the immediate post-war consolidation enabled the new rulers of Yugoslavia to drastically alter the

ethnic profile of the region. They obliterated the three-way ethnic balance of the population via deportations, emigration and executions.

The first census after the war (1948) indicates the magnitude of the transformation. The Vojvodina's German population was reduced from 317,000 in 1931 to about 32,000 in 1948. From an ethnic and political perspective this resulted in a completely different Vojvodina. It produced a Slav-dominated province by increasing the share of the Serbs in the population to over one-half (841,000 in 1948), from their previous number of 462,000 in 1931. It also increased the overall proportion of the South Slavic population with the influx of new settlers from Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and elsewhere. Thus, the post-war ethnic profile of the Vojvodina was about one-fourth Hungarian, over one-half Serb and nearly one-fourth other South Slavs. (The rise of the Serb, Croat, and other Slavic share of the population was achieved in large part, by the extensive colonization of the lands left vacant by the deported Germans.)⁴⁶

More recent population trends in the Vojvodina altered this post-war profile slightly. In recent years the Hungarian population has declined even further, while the South Slavic population has continued to increase at a steady rate. For example, the Serb population of 841,000 of 1948 grew to 1,089,000 in 1971, and to 1,107,378 in 1981, while the Hungarian population of 429,000 in 1948 decreased slightly to 424,000 in 1971, and to 385,356 in 1981. On an all-Yugoslav level this demographic stagnation has even more adverse consequences. While Yugoslavia's population as a whole increased from 18.5 million to 22.5 million between 1961 and 1981, the Hungarian population during the same period dropped from 504,000 to 426,867. At the same time, the Albanian population of 915,000 increased to 1,730,878. From a bio-political perspective, in contrast to the dynamism of the Albanians, the Hungarians are in definite decline within the overall population. This demographic stagnation may be the result of their more effective "integration." It could also be a sign of their alienation if the population losses were due to emigration, a low birthrate, or assimilation by other ethnic groups.⁴⁷

The wartime struggles and the trauma of internecine ethnic conflict convinced the leaders of at least the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) that a new approach was needed for the solution of the nationality question. Tito and his followers were able to bridge some of the conflicts already during the war through their leading position at the head of the partisan guerrilla forces. As Milovan Djilas has pointed out in one of his essays:

It is incontestable that in the massacres going on between Serbs and Croats the Yugoslav state would have disappeared had not the Communists appeared on the scene. They had all the conditions for such a role: vision, organization and leadership. The Communists were im-

pervious not only to the demoralization of the ruling classes, but also to the chauvinistic excesses. They were the only party that was *Yugoslav* [emphasis in original] in the composition of its membership, in its political practice and—interpreted narrowly—in its internationalism.⁴⁸

Thus, the communist-dominated partisans saw the key to successful resistance against the Germans in trans-ethnic unity. Such unity could be attained only if the programme and objectives of the partisans were divorced from the narrow ethnic squabbles of the past. Since Tito and the Yugoslav communists dominated the partisans, the ideological orientation of the leaders enabled the movement as a whole to rise above the nationalist conflicts. Liberation from the German yoke provided the unifying ideal. Thus, partisan groups came into existence in all parts of the country—even the Vojvodina—fighting for the common cause of national liberation.⁴⁹

Unlike other newly established communist states, Tito's Yugoslavia did not depend primarily on the Red Army either to ensure the establishment of a communist government or to eradicate domestic opposition. Although the Red Army played a key role in the liberation of Belgrade, North-East Serbia, and the Vojvodina (thereby crushing the major centres of nationalist Cetnik resistance), the partisans were able to assert their own control over most of Yugoslavia. At any rate, the new order under the CPY was eminently qualified to consolidate communist power and eliminate domestic opposition. The process of consolidation had particularly far-reaching consequences for the ethnic destiny of the Vojvodina. Under the pretext of eliminating "war criminals" and "collaborators," communist security units imprisoned or executed about 150,000 *Volksdeutsche* and 30,000 Hungarians. But the most extensive demographic changes were caused by the deportations of the German population (about 450,000) and about 40,000 of the Hungarians.⁵⁰ Almost all other ethnic groups also suffered. However, it is safe to say that these liquidations—with the exception of the Germans, and possibly the Hungarians—were motivated more by considerations of ideology and power, than by ethnic animosity. Whatever the motivation, in the case of the Hungarian liquidations, the result was to deprive Yugoslavia's Magyars of their leaders. Fortunately, these drastic and inhuman policies were part of power consolidation rather than a permanent feature of Yugoslav nationality policy.

The non-South Slavic and former "enemy" nationalities continued to be treated as second-rate citizens during the period of the Tito-Stalin conflict. Their rights were partially restored and their existence became more bearable only after—many years after—the Cominform's anti-Titoist campaigns ended. From that time to the early 1980s their status as minority nationalities steadily improved, although there were some set-backs along the way. In this evolution of relations, the official self-definition of Yugoslavia via

the partisan experience, its acceptance of the premises of Marxist-Leninist nationality policies, the increased representation of some minorities in the Party, and the copying of Soviet federalism, together established the setting for inter-ethnic relations.

The historical experience of World War II consecrates the partisan leaders as the saviors of national independence and honour. At the same time, it provides a common enemy, a common danger against which all Yugoslavs must unite. This outside threat is German imperialism. Even in present-day Yugoslavia the German threat is viewed as the foremost symbol of outside interference, against which constant vigilance is needed to preserve the independence of the country.⁵¹ It had been routinely played up in the press and in governmental foreign policy pronouncements until the normalization of relations with West Germany. After the split between Tito and Stalin, the danger of Cominform intervention was utilized in a similar way. But the German threat (in the symbolic sense) is more effective because it is based on a bloodier historical experience and is more easily fitted into the ideological prerequisites of contemporary Yugoslavia.⁵²

The partisan myth is not just based on antagonism to Germany, it also contains a sense of mission, giving it a supranational appeal. According to the myth, the partisans of World War II were fighting not just against Germany but also against world reaction and racism. The legacy of fighting these retrograde tendencies has given the present-day leaders the reputation of being true internationalists. As leaders of the "progressive forces" of history, they have depended on the unity and solidarity of all nationalities within the country. Although at first the partisans were mostly Serbs and Montenegrins, after 1942, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and other nationalities also joined the movement in increasing numbers. Thus the partisans became a genuinely all-Yugoslav antifascist alliance, which fought to rid the whole country, and not just certain parts, of the German occupation.⁵³ One has to be in Yugoslavia only a few days to feel the pervasive role of the partisan myth. This distinctively communist Yugoslavian political culture is manifest everywhere. One encounters its manifestations in the partisan ethos of the government and in the day-to-day life of the people. Radio programmes devote a great deal of attention to it. For example, programmes called "partisan songs" are a part of the weekly schedule of most Yugoslav radio stations. Besides radio and television, the myth is propagated in schools, history books, journals, and the press.⁵⁴

Even the Hungarians of the Vojvodina have the opportunity to participate in this myth. Although most Hungarians were not sympathetic to the partisan cause and had actually favoured the re-annexation of the Vojvodina to Hungary, during the last few months of the war, the partisans established a special brigade composed of Hungarian "volunteers." It was called the Petőfi brigade in honour of the Hungarian revolutionary poet who died in

1849. This unit actually saw action against the Germans in the battle of Bolman. Although the Hungarian contribution to the partisan cause was limited to this one brigade in one battle, a great deal has been made of it by Yugoslav historians.⁵⁵ With this one historical episode they have been integrated into the destiny of the Yugoslav political order.⁵⁶

This self-definition myth is also based on the pragmatic political realization that no one South Slavic nation is able to rule Yugoslavia by excluding the others from power. This had been tried by the Serbs—the most numerous nationality—during the interwar years and it had devastating consequences. To the leadership in the CPY it became obvious that the new Yugoslavia must involve both symbolically and in reality *all* the major South Slavic nations in the decision-making process. Somehow the interests and political influence of these peoples had to be balanced. The major balancer became Tito personally and the Party's control mechanisms by which internal cohesion and discipline could be maintained.

The pragmatic recognition of power relations was rationalized by the ideological requirements of Marxist-Leninist nationality policy and the Soviet pattern of federalism. These were incorporated into the Yugoslav constitutional order together with the partisan myth. While in the earlier two constitutions (1946, 1953) the link was only implicit, it has been made explicit in the later documents (1963, 1974) through the enumeration of certain "basic principles." Incorporating the ideals of the wartime struggles and some of Yugoslavia's own ideological innovations, the 1963 Constitution states: "The peoples of Yugoslavia, on the basis of the right of every people to self-determination, including the right to secession, on the basis of their common struggle and their will freely declared in the People's Liberation War and Socialist Revolution, and in accord with their historical aspirations . . . have united in a federal republic of free and equal peoples and nationalities."⁵⁷ The Constitution of 1974 re-states this principle in the following way:

The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession, on the basis of their will freely expressed in the common struggle of all nations and nationalities in the National Liberation War and Socialist Revolution, and in conformity with their historic aspiration, aware that further consolidation of their brotherhood and unity is in the common interest, have, together with the nationalities with which they live, united in a federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and founded a socialist federal community of working people—the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.⁵⁸

These declarations go far beyond most East European constitutions and, in fact, beyond anything that the Yugoslavs themselves consider feasible

or desirable. For this reason, both the right to secession and the right to self-determination are not mentioned in the body of the constitutions.⁵⁹ Still, their inspirational use in the introductions indicates confidence in the durability of Yugoslavia's unity. A similar confidence is nowhere evident in Rumania or Czechoslovakia, where "indivisibility" is tirelessly stressed.

More than fourteen years have passed since the adoption of the 1974 Constitution. Over-all, it has reinforced rather than changed existing policies. However, in some instances this basic law is more precise. The two quotations above illustrate the change. While the earlier introduction refers rather loosely to peoples and nationalities, the 1974 Constitution distinguishes between "nations" and "nationalities." The distinction is important because—while both nations and nationalities are to be guaranteed "equality" and "freedom" within a "socialist federal community of working people"—only "nations" have the theoretical right to self-determination and secession.⁶⁰ Throughout the Constitution of 1974, reference to "nations" means the South Slavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes), while reference to "nationalities" means the non-South Slavs (Albanians, Hungarians, Rumanians, etc.). In other words, Yugoslavia's *Staatsvolk* or *Staatsvölker* are the South Slavic "nations," whereas the "nationalities" are national minorities who are co-nationals with the *Staatsvölker* of the neighbouring states.⁶¹ In constitutional practice, the distinction has always existed. However, since about 1966 the "official" position has stressed symbolic equality rather than the majority-minority relationship.

This symbolic equality, however, has never provided the Hungarians with a proportional share of decision-making roles either in the military, central administration, or the local and provincial levels of decision making. Party membership of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina has grown from 7.4 percent of the total in 1953 to 9.3 percent in 1968, to 10.4 percent 1976, to 11.0 percent in 1982.⁶² This growth of membership indicates greater involvement, but it is still not in proportion to the Hungarian share of the population, which is close to 20 percent in the Vojvodina. It is ironic that the overall population of the Hungarians has been declining since the 1961 census while their Party membership has more than doubled in that time period. At any rate, this development seems to have had little effect on the ability of Hungarians to cope with the socio-economic forces that seem to undermine their ability to maintain their culture in the Yugoslav environment.

Their ability to persist culturally has been more closely related to the need for over-all ethnic/nationality harmony in the country. The ideological and constitutional definition of nationality rights reflects this. Yet even these are at times amended by political events on both the international and domestic front. The Tito-Stalin split of 1948, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the purge of Ranković in 1966, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia

in 1968, the Croatian unrest of 1970–71, as well as the Albanian stirrings of 1968, 1981–82, 1986–87, have perhaps been the most important such events.

The first of these events, the confrontation between Tito's Yugoslavia and Stalin's Cominform, had negative repercussions in the short-run and positive consequences in the long-run on Yugoslav inter-ethnic relations. In the long-run the consequences were positive because they enabled Yugoslav domestic affairs to develop independently of Soviet foreign policy demands. Thus, while the rest of Eastern Europe continued to toe the Soviet policy line on nationality issues, the Yugoslavs went their own way and began to experiment with different policy options in this area. The first policy adopted, independent of the Soviet example, was a direct response to the pressures of the 1948 confrontation.

After June 28, 1948, when the Yugoslav party was expelled from the Cominform, it became clear that the split in the "Socialist camp" was final. Stalin, of course, hoped that the expulsion would lead to Tito's demise and Yugoslavia's re-incorporation into the bloc. To make certain that Tito would not survive, Stalin unleashed a campaign of vilification against him personally and the Yugoslav revisionists in general. The campaign included a concerted propaganda drive by Yugoslavia's neighbours as well as economic, military, and political quarantine. One aspect of this campaign was to discredit Yugoslav nationality policies and to foment unrest, particularly among the national minorities. Each one of the neighbouring bloc states was given the assignment to stir-up discontent among fellow nationals in Yugoslavia. All of these criticisms equated the Titoist policies with "chauvinist pan-Serb" aspirations.⁶³ However, the campaign was limited to the border-zone national minorities and was not extended to the traditional rivalry between Croats and Serbs. As Robert R. King points out, the objective was not to destroy Yugoslavia, but to topple Tito and to bring the country back into the camp.⁶⁴

Some unrest was actually generated by this campaign, but it was not enough to coax any one of the minority nationalities into rioting or rebellion. Individual cases of desertion from the armed forces and illegal border crossings were the extent to which the campaign activated the minorities.⁶⁵ Since these minority inhabited areas also coincided with the first lines of military defence, the concentration of Yugoslav military units in these areas acted as a deterrent to opposition to Tito. In this way, the unrest that was generated, actually failed in its objective. At the same time, it made Yugoslav policy-makers more aware of the vulnerability of their border areas. This sense of insecurity resulted in more centralized solutions to the nationality question in the 1950s.

The Constitution of 1953 as well as the policy statements of many government and party officials reflected a commitment to "Yugoslavism" or

*“jugoslovenstvo.”*⁶⁶ By stressing a trans-ethnic national consciousness they hoped to defuse the local nationalisms of Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, and other South Slavs and replace it with a more generalized sense of loyalty to undergird the Yugoslav state. Although this focus on *“Staatsvolk”* role and self-consciousness of the Slavic peoples was not really concerned with the minority nationalities, it also had consequences for their existence. By de-emphasizing the role of the Republics, it tied the fate of non-Slavic minorities more closely to federal standards than might have been otherwise. This was inadvertently to their benefit. Yet in terms of formal self-government this period circumscribed the autonomy of the Vojvodina and of Kosovo-Metohia. These provinces were constitutionally inferior to the republics and in fact were dependencies of the Serbian Republic. This status did not change significantly even after the general turmoil that swept Eastern Europe in 1956.

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Of all the Hungarian minorities in Eastern Europe, the Hungarians of the Vojvodina remained the most passive during the Revolution of 1956.⁶⁷ There are a number of possible explanations for this. First, the Hungarians in this area suffered greatly at the end of World War II for their “national” solidarity with Hungary during the war.⁶⁸ In other words, they may have been more effectively intimidated than their fellow Hungarians in Transylvania, Slovakia or Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Second, Yugoslav treatment of Hungarians was improving rather than deteriorating at the time of the Revolution.⁶⁹ Thirdly, the Yugoslav government did not immediately go on record opposing the Hungarian Revolution. In its initial phases, Tito sympathized with Imre Nagy and the revolutionary developments in Hungary. Tito turned against the revolution only when the hegemony of the communist party became directly threatened.⁷⁰ Thus, in the Vojvodina, the Hungarian response to the events of 1956 was, on the whole, low key.

Another reason why the revolution’s impact was limited was the fact that the Yugoslav authorities effectively isolated the Hungarian refugees streaming across their borders from the local Hungarian population. Aside from some contact at local border crossing points like Osijek (Eszék), where some “fraternization” was inevitable, most Hungarians were whisked to camps which were separated from the Hungarians of Yugoslavia by distance or administrative obstacles.⁷¹ At any rate, of the roughly 20,000 Hungarians who escaped to the West via Yugoslavia, most did not have an opportunity to discuss their experiences with the Hungarians of the Vojvodina, or Croatia, or Slovenia.⁷² Their impact was probably much more significant on the Yugoslav nationalities, particularly Croatian university students who

seemed to have become restive during the days of the Revolution.⁷³ However, this never became a mass movement of dissent. For the most part, Yugoslavs observed events in Hungary with apprehension, and wanted to keep out of the conflict.

Most of the reactions to Hungary's revolution occurred at the governmental level in Yugoslavia. These reactions were closely linked to the broader questions of the international setting and the recent moves to normalize Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The revolution in Hungary put Tito and his regime in an awkward position. Although he favoured the loosened hold of the Soviet Union over Hungary (as well as Poland), he also feared the emergence of a nationalist government in Budapest.⁷⁴ When it became apparent that Imre Nagy was no longer in complete control and the revolution had taken on an anti-communist character, Tito, too, called for intervention.⁷⁵ In the final analysis he was more secure with a pro-Moscow government than a government which might have a nationalist orientation. After all, a government of the latter stripe might raise revisionist claims to the Vojvodina and other Hungarian inhabited areas of northern Yugoslavia. By November 4th, therefore, the Yugoslav reaction reflected a kind of Little Entente bias. Although it never reached the hate-mongering intensity of the Czechoslovak and Rumanian anti-Revolutionary campaign, in essence it arrived at the same conclusion: the revolution must be crushed in order to contain Hungarian nationalism.

The events of 1956, however, led to strains in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. This was apparent in Tito's fear of Soviet use of the Red Army after quelling the Hungarian Revolution. After November 4th, he ordered the strengthening of Yugoslav military units along the Hungarian border. He also provided Imre Nagy and his entourage with temporary political asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest. Nagy's subsequent arrest outside the embassy by Soviet agents continued to complicate Soviet-Yugoslav relations.⁷⁶ Furthermore Tito's Pula speech—while it justified the Soviet intervention—criticized the Hungarian and Soviet leadership's handling of the whole crisis. Thus, Yugoslavia's relation to the Hungarian Revolution—as ambivalent as it was—led in the short-run to a deterioration of relations between it and the Soviet Union as well as the new Kádár regime in Budapest.

The Hungarians of the Vojvodina—unlike their fellow Hungarians in other neighbouring states—did not become a casualty of these events. In terms of immediate effect, the revolution led to tightened security and military preparedness in the Hungarian inhabited areas. These, however, were probably aimed to dissuade the Soviets from a strike into Yugoslavia. They were not responses to Hungarian unrest. In the long-run, the Hungarians of the Vojvodina did not face an erosion of their rights as a minority nationality. If anything, from 1956 through the 1960s to 1970–71, their

educational and cultural institutions seem to have been strengthened.⁷⁷ In fact one of the most significant statements on minority nationality rights was proclaimed just three years after the revolution. It was issued by the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1959. The statement set forth the general principles of inter-nationality relations, stressing that minorities in a sense can have two allegiances, one—mainly cultural—to their ethnic nation, while the other is to their country of residence.⁷⁸ More recently there has been some erosion of these rights, but it does not seem to be a result of a systematic campaign of Serbianization. Furthermore, this erosion is unrelated to the Revolution of 1956.

More important in altering the situation of Yugoslavia's minorities, was the shifting power-balance within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in favour of the decentralizers. This shift was evident in policies adopted in the early 1960s and in the Constitutional revisions of 1963. This revision further extended decentralization by providing more "self-government" on the local level, while restricting the possibility for ethnic groups to act in concert against the interests of the federation. In effect, it was a unifying instrument that did not, however, impose a unitary structure.⁷⁹ Finally, the shift in power was evident to everyone when Alexander Ranković was forced to resign in 1966. As the defender of centralism and "Yugoslavism" he had tried to keep the reformists at bay. With his eclipse from power the ethnic consciousness of the various parts of Yugoslavia could again manifest themselves more openly, particularly among the South Slavic "nations" within their respective republics. On paper even the non-Slavic "nationalities" had gained. However, their gains were to some extent undercut by the new vigour of republican level decision-making. It is not a coincidence that the unrest among the Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia reached the boiling point just at the height of the process of decentralization in 1968.

With the ouster of Ranković, the decentralization process picked up momentum. At the symbolic level it provided the Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo with virtual constitutional equality with the six republics. Yet the continuing process of decentralization did not accord more "self-government" to either the Hungarians or the Albanians as distinct nationalities. In fact, the process of decentralization encouraged greater expectations, only to frustrate them at the level of the Serbian Republic. These frustrations in turn led to strained relations not so much between the Hungarians and the Serbs, but between the Albanians and the Serbs. These strains surfaced in the Vojvodina in the late 1960s and at the height of the Croatian self-assertion movement of 1970–71. Two incidents are particularly revealing. One involved László Rehák, the foremost Hungarian communist scholar of the nationality question in the Vojvodina. The subject of the "Rehák Affair," was one of the most prominent representatives of

the Hungarians in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Yet, when, as a representative in the Serbian Republic Assembly, he dared question the foot-dragging of the University of Novi Sad administration in setting up a Hungarian Studies Institute, the Serbian press immediately attacked him as a "nationalist" and whipped up enough opposition to block his election to the vice-presidential post of the Serbian Republic Executive Committee.⁸⁰

The other example occurred at a much less visible level, but also points out the limits of tolerance toward criticism of the treatment of nationalities. This second case involved a student at the University of Novi Sad who expressed his frustrations in an article in the periodical *Új Symposion*. He contended that Hungarians were the "niggers" of Yugoslavia, since those who spoke Hungarian in public places (i.e., department stores) were treated as second-rate members of society.⁸¹ For having published the article the student was stripped of all his organizational responsibilities (as Hungarian language programme co-ordinator of the Novi Sad Youth Council), was deprived of his scholarship, and was labeled a "nationalist" trouble-maker. Furthermore, the periodical itself had to make a public apology for allowing the article to be published.⁸²

In both these instances the treatment of minority representatives, at different levels of social and political life, defined the context and limits of minority rights within the Serbian Republic. However, for the Hungarians of the Vojvodina this type of government-initiated harassment is the exception rather than the rule. For the average person the occasion for nationality discrimination occurs within a social rather than a political or economic context. For example a negative atmosphere prevails in public facilities like stores, taverns or restaurants which makes people hesitate or refuse to communicate in Hungarian. On one occasion, I witnessed a group of young people being harassed because they had been singing Hungarian songs in a tavern. To avoid being beaten up the group had to vacate the premises. On another occasion, I witnessed on a bus ride between Novi Sad and Subotica, a bully and his friends making crude passes at Hungarian girls, feeling secure that the prospects of nationality confrontation would make the Hungarian men escorts hesitate to put them in their place. Finally, at the lowest levels of administration, whether in a post office, travel agency, or a police station, the people who deal with the public are unwilling or unable to speak the minority language.⁸³ A more aggressive campaign of bilingualism in street signs, postal forms, and the instruction of public servants could have beneficial results. Until such a programme is adopted, the social atmosphere will remain intimidating and stifling for the average person with a minority background.

It is in response to these circumstances that the treatment of Hungarians received international press attention at the end of 1982. Gyula Illyés, the "grand old man" of Hungarian letters, gave an interview to the *Frankfurter*

Rundschau on December 21, 1982. In this interview he asserted that even in Yugoslavia (and not just in Rumania and Czechoslovakia) the Hungarian population is threatened by assimilationist pressures. The contradiction between the officially prescribed position, and the actual status of Hungarians, is just unreconcilable. A flurry of orchestrated outrage followed. The "old man" of Yugoslavia's Hungarian writers, Imre Bori, was given the assignment to reject the allegations. Bori's "rebuttal" appeared in *Magyar Szó* on February 20, 1983 and was also published in *Borba*. It was followed by an article in *Vecernji List* on February 25, 1983 protesting Illyés's intrusion into Yugoslavia's domestic concerns. None of Illyés's concerns (demographic stagnation, drop in bilingual instruction, etc.) were addressed, he was simply told to butt out.⁸⁴

To be fair, the central government in Belgrade tries to improve the social atmosphere that surrounds majority-minority relations. However, even the best intentions of the federal government encounters the stubborn discriminatory legacy of the past. This legacy is composed of ingrained biases and established modes of reaction which had received official encouragement in the interwar years. To overcome this legacy requires persistent effort at reform not just on the federal level, but on the level of the Serbian Republic, the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the city, commune, and workers' councils levels that mold the day-to-day activities and existence of *all* the inhabitants of the Vojvodina.

In the Slovenian Republic such commitment and effort has been demonstrated in recent years. True, Slovenia has a much smaller minority population to contend with. There are only 9,496 Hungarians in Slovenia out of a total population of 1,891,864 inhabitants in that republic.⁸⁵ Nonetheless, this small Hungarian minority, as well as the Italian minority, is a constant concern of the Ljubljana administration. The Slovenian Republic provides them with bilingual educational institutions and various opportunities for preserving their cultural identity. One of the most important of these is the right to have institutionalized "national" representation in defence of their cultural and other interests. Furthermore, the government actively supports efforts to monitor the minority's capability to maintain its communal links in other republics and to its "mother" nation.⁸⁶

Although in comparison the efforts in the Vojvodina fall short of the Slovenian Republic, on the formal level the Magyars there still have incomparably greater cultural and educational opportunities than in the interwar years. Under Tito, and under his successors, the Yugoslav state has respected the right of the Magyars to maintain themselves as Magyars. It has provided them with educational institutions, cultural facilities and publishing opportunities which are doing a credible, although diminishing job in serving the Hungarian cultural interests of the Vojvodina.⁸⁷

Yugoslavia's self-image and the image it wants to project to the outside

world tends to reinforce these commitments. It has been the scene of numerous international conferences and symposia dealing with the problems and needs of minorities. Probably the most significant such conclaves have been the UN sponsored meetings at Ljubljana (1965), Ohrid (1974), and Novi Sad (1976), and the ECSC follow-up conference held in Belgrade in 1977.⁸⁸ At gatherings such as these the Yugoslavs have frequently presented their nationality policies as a model to the rest of the world. For the Yugoslavs, being a role model for multi-ethnic societies is at least as important as being a champion of non-alignment. In their international relations, these aspects of purpose and self-definition are frequently presented as complementary.⁸⁹ The minorities, in fact, are viewed as a means of building bridges between different—usually neighbouring—members of the international community of states.⁹⁰

For the Hungarians of the Vojvodina this role of being a bridge to Yugoslavia's northern neighbour, is both acceptable and beneficial. The reason for this is that Hungary has reciprocated Yugoslav overtures in this potential problem area—excepting only the period of the Cominformist aberration—by providing its South Slavic minorities (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes) with extensive cultural opportunities and by also stressing their “bridging” role toward Yugoslavia.⁹¹ This mutuality has been expressed in various ways between the two states. Cultural exchange programmes of various sorts have been its most obvious manifestation. Dance groups, exhibits, films, books, periodicals and other cultural products have crossed the border in both directions on a regular basis. Sister cities in the two states have also provided exchange opportunities on a more localized level. Finally, the two states have assisted their respective minorities on the territory of their neighbour, by providing them with textbooks, curricular assistance, and even educational opportunities at the teacher training or university levels.⁹²

This reciprocity has been threatened only when relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia deteriorated. These low points were the above mentioned Cominform crisis of 1948, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its repercussions, as well as the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. During the latter, Soviet and Hungarian military units were actually drawn up along Yugoslavia's borders. In response Yugoslavia mobilized its own military units in the Vojvodina, including Hungarians who had been conscripted into the Yugoslav armed forces. However, this confrontation was brief, and at least between Hungary and Yugoslavia, normalization followed. It should also be pointed out that this crisis did not lead to defections among the respective Hungarian and South Slav minority populations of either Yugoslavia or Hungary.⁹³

Only the Albanian population registered its discontent at this time. Albanian unrest has also resurfaced more recently in the crisis of 1981–82 and 1986–87.⁹⁴ However, the unrest in the south has not led to similar

disenchantment in the north. If anything, the Hungarians have been utilized to demonstrate contentment *vis-à-vis* the unrest of the Albanians. In the final analysis, the relatively good relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia, and the constantly re-occurring strains in the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia, account in part for this difference. True, there are other important considerations that have to be taken into account, but these domestic factors could probably find solution within the context of *real* pluralism combined with a rational economic development programme.

The Albanian stirrings warn us not to draw hasty conclusions about the Yugoslav "solution" to the nationality question. The discontent in Kosovo and the passivity in Vojvodina might also indicate that the "solutions" that were applied in the two instances were different. Or, if they were the same, that within different contexts these "solutions" may not always be solutions. Continued study and comparison of the Kosovo and Vojvodina experiences is in order.

* * * * *

In the meantime, some tentative conclusions can be drawn from the present analysis about the fate and the future prospects of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina. On the positive side of the ledger, their treatment—aside from the immediate post-war years and during the Cominform conflict—has been much better than before the war *and* it is also tolerant and pluralistic in comparison to the fate of Hungarians in contemporary Rumania, Czechoslovakia or the Carpatho-Ukrainian S.S.R. On the negative side, however, like the Hungarian minorities in the above cited states, they are subject to the whims of a changing constellation of power within a one-party autocratic political order. Within this context Lenin's "democratic centralism" can override the interests, needs, and rights of any subgroup or its institutions. Unless "democratic centralism" is wielded by leaders committed to ethno-cultural pluralism (as was the case with Tito), this aspect of the Yugoslav political order remains a sword of Damocles over minority existence. This is apparent in the different treatment of Hungarians in the Slovenian Republic and in the Vojvodina. The developments in Kosovo should also caution us against assuming that conditions will continue to be characterized by cultural tolerance on the official level. In this sense, we should always remember that historical development is not a clearly defined highway into the future, and that everything may be subject to change. Yet, if change brings the sword of Damocles down on the Hungarians and other minorities, it is not likely that the Yugoslav state will itself survive. Recent history in the Vojvodina and other parts of Yugoslavia supports the observation that the very existence of its unity—legitimacy of its present order—depends on the cultural pluralism that it can secure for *all* its inhabitants.

Notes

- 1 For the population statistics of Yugoslavia see: *Yugoslavia: History, Peoples and Administration*, B.R. 493 A, Geographical Handbook Series (Great Britain, 1944), p. 76; Theodore Schieder, ed., *Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien in Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen Aus Ost-Mittel-Europa*, 5 vols. (Bonn, 1961), 5:11A; George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism* (New York, 1961), table 3-1, p. 29; *Jugoslavia 1945-1964: Statisticki Pregled* (Belgrade, 1965), table 3-13, p. 45; *Statisticki Godisnjak Jugoslavije 1973* (Belgrade, 1973), table 202-203, p. 351; *Statisticki Godisnjak Jugoslavije 1982* (Belgrade, 1982), table 203-5, p. 437.
- 2 Yugoslav nationality policies since World War II are discussed in J. Frankel, "Communism and the National Question in Yugoslavia," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XV (April, 1955), 49-65; Evengelos Kofos, "Balkan Minorities Under Communist Regimes," *Balkan Studies*, II (1961), 42-46; Paul Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism," *Slavic Review*, XXII (March, 1963), 64-81; George Schopflin, "Nationality in the Fabric of Yugoslav Politics," *Survey*, XXV (Summer, 1980), 1-19; and Andrew Ludanyi, "Titoist Integration of Yugoslavia: The Partisan Myth and the Hungarians of the Vojvodina, 1945-1975," *Polity*, XII (Winter, 1979), 225-252.
- 3 Robert Lee Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 50.
- 4 Although officially Yugoslavia was called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes until 1929, in this study "Yugoslavia" will also designate the pre-1929 Kingdom.
- 5 For an extended treatment of this treaty—although somewhat biased against the Magyars—see Harold Temperley, "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn," *Foreign Affairs*, VI (April, 1928), 432-447.
- 6 It also reflected Entente fears of the spread of communism. At this time Béla Kun had just established a communist dictatorship in Hungary. *Ibid.*, pp. 434-435.
- 7 *Ibid.*, pp. 432-441.
- 8 "Population Structure and Trends," *Yugoslav Survey*, III (Jan.-Mar., 1962), 1078. This is also indicated by Temperley, "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn," p. 437, when he admits that the "smaller allies" were opposed to a plebiscite, because "both issues and populations were so mixed and intermingled in both the Banat and the Backa that the result sometimes might not have been favourable to the Allies."
- 9 Due to the elimination of the German minority the South Slavs now compose three-fourths of the population of the Vojvodina. Only in the northern half of the Backa do the Magyars still outnumber the south Slavs.
- 10 The almost complete de-population of Magyars can be explained by the fact that as the inhabitants of the plains and lowlands they had to bear the brunt of the Turkish onslaught. The re-population of the area by "soldier-colonists" of Serb and German ethnic background receives extensive treatment in Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Military Border of Croatia 1740-1881* (Chicago, 1966). For the demographic explanation see József Kovácsics (ed.) *Magyarország történeti demográfiája: Magyarország népessége a honfoglalástól 1949-ig* (Budapest, 1963).

- 11 For a time the Magyars were even officially banned from settling in the Vojvodina by the Habsburgs. See C.A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (London, 1937), p. 384.
- 12 This comparison is based on *ibid.*, p. 381, and Schieder (ed.), *Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien*, Band V, p. 11E.
- 13 Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time*, pp. 76–77; Oscar Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago, 1929), pp. 90–99, 108–118.
- 14 Z.A.B. Zeman, *The Break-Up of the Habsburg Empire, 1914–1918* (London, 1961), p. 244.
- 15 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, “Yugoslavia Today,” *Foreign Affairs*, I (June, 1923, 98–99.
- 16 Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time*, pp. 120–122. For a somewhat different interpretation see Bogdan Raditsa, “Yugoslav Nationalism Revisited: History and Dogma,” *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XXI (Jan., 1962), 482–483.
- 17 Armstrong, “Yugoslavia Today,” pp. 98–99; Eduard Benes, “The Little Entente,” *Foreign Affairs*, I (Sept., 1922), 68–69.
- 18 *Ibid.* For a more extensive treatment also see John O. Crane, *The Little Entente* (New York, 1931).
- 19 Armstrong, “Yugoslavia Today,” p. 98; Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 429.
- 20 *Ibid.*, pp. 433–434, 409.
- 21 *Ibid.*, pp. 395–397. Also see Hamilton Fish Armstrong, “The Royal Dictatorship in Yugoslavia,” *Foreign Affairs*, VII (July, 1929), 600–615.
- 22 Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, pp. 408–409, points out that the weight of “unenlightened” government fell on the Magyars due more to the pressure of the Serbs in the Vojvodina than to the Serbs in control of the government at Belgrade. According to the same source, the Serbs of Serbia were more intent on repressing the “autonomist” tendencies of the Croats than the irredentism of the Magyars.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 410.
- 24 *Ibid.*, pp. 410–411.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p. 411.
- 26 *Ibid.*
- 27 *Ibid.*, p. 413.
- 28 Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time*, p. 156.
- 29 It was, however, permitted for shopkeepers to use both the Cyrillic and the Latin alphabet provided the text was in Serb. *Ibid.*; Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, pp. 412–414.
- 30 *Ibid.*, pp. 398–403. Also see Bogdan Smiljevic and Dorde Knezevic, *A legujabb kor története* trans. Kálmán Csehák (Subotica, Yugoslavia, 1965), pp. 72–73, for a communist Yugoslavian view of this land reform.
- 31 According to Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 427: “the Magyar labourers and dwarf-holders who, as a class, needed land more urgently than any other section of the population, came away empty-handed. There are today [1937] probably anything between 80,000 and 120,000 landless agricultural labourers in the Vojvodina, and some three-quarters of these are Magyars.”
- 32 *Ibid.*

- 33 *Ibid.*, pp. 401–403, 426–428.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 428.
- 35 Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time*, p. 156.
- 36 In Rumania the religious affiliations of the people provide “national identification” also. Almost all Rumanians are Orthodox or Uniate Catholic while the Magyars and Germans are Roman Catholic and Protestant. Another example of this would be the close identification of Polish nationalism with the Catholic Church.
- 37 Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 424; Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time*, p. 156.
- 38 Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 425, footnote 1.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 418; Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Times*, p. 156.
- 40 It should be pointed out, on the other hand, that some of these 693 school units teaching in Hungarian prior to World War I, were instruments of “Magyarization.” Thus, the comparison is not altogether fair.
- 41 Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, pp. 420–421.
- 42 *Ibid.*, pp. 422–423.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 414.
- 44 For a discussion of this change in Yugoslav foreign policy see Hamilton Fish Armstrong, “After the Assassination of King Alexander,” *Foreign Affairs*, XIII (Jan., 1935), 224–225; J.B. Hoptner, “Yugoslavia as Neutralist: 1937,” *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XVI (July, 1956), 156–176.
- 45 The most detailed study of the Novi Sad events is János Buzási’s *Az újvidéki “razzia”* (Budapest, 1963).
- 46 For an excellent overview of population changes in Eastern Europe, see Leszek Antoni Kosinski, “Population Censuses in East-Central Europe in the Twentieth Century,” *East European Quarterly* 5 (1971): 274–301.
- 47 For speculations about the Hungarian demographic picture in Yugoslavia, see Károly Mirnics, “Fogyatkozásunk számadatai: Nemzetiség politikusainknak ajánlva,” *Új Symposion* (Novi Sad), February 1971, p. 112; Csaba Utasi “Bízalmatlanság vagy primitívizmus?” *Új Symposion* (Novi Sad), May 1971, pp. 216–217. For the most recent changes also see *Statistički Godisnjak Jugoslavije 1982*, p. 437.
- 48 Milovan Djilas, “The Roots of Nationalism in Yugoslavia,” in *Parts of a Lifetime*, ed. Michael and Deborah Milenkovich (New York, 1975), p. 397.
- 49 *Ibid.*, pp. 397–399; Danilo Kecić, “Figyelő: A JKP a Vajdaságban a felkelés előkészítésének és megindításának napjaiban,” trans. József Kollin, “Other Similar Threat Must Never Again be Allowed to Appear,” *Socialist Thought and Practice* 15 (1975): 3–29.
- 50 George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism* (New York, 1961), pp. 40–41, 91–95; Stephen Kertesz, *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1953), pp. 57–58; Zoltán Dávid, “A magyar nemzetiségi statisztika multja és jelene,” *Válóság*, XXIII, No. 8 (Aug., 1980), p. 92. For some more conservative estimates regarding the Germans, see Leszek A. Kosinski, “Internatinal Migration of Yugoslavs During and Immediately After World War II,” *East European Quarterly*, XVI, No. 2 (Summer, 1982), pp. 187–89, 196.
- 51 Boris Zihlerl, *Communism and Fatherland* (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Knjiga,

- 1949), pp. 5–6, 28–29, 33–36; Kecić, “Figyelő: A JKP a Vajdaságban,” pp. 786–792; Josip Broz Tito, “What We Need is Peace,” *Socialist Thought and Practice* 16 (April–June 1966): 51; Koca Popović, “Power–Politics—the Greatest Danger,” *Socialist Thought and Practice* 15 (April–June 1965): 32–44; Punisa Perović, “Twenty-five Years of the Yugoslav Revolution,” *Socialist Thought and Practice* 16 (April–June 1966): 3–28; Smiljević, *A legújabb kor története*, pp. 206–216.
- 52 Dietrich Schlegel, “The Shape of Yugoslavia’s Foreign Policy,” *Aussenpolitik, English edition* 23 (1972): 462–463; Smiljević, *A legújabb kor története*, pp. 244–248; Hoffman, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism*, pp. 128–151; Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time*, 352–377; Slobodan Stanković, “Cominformist Trials in Yugoslavia,” *R.F.E. Research*, RAD Background Report 11 (Yugoslavia), 15 January 1976, pp. 1–4; *Yugoslavia’s Way: The Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia*, trans. Stoyan Pribechevich (New York, 1958), pp. 65–67, 72–74, 76–79.
- 53 Hoffman, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism*, pp. 69–80; *Yugoslavia’s Way*, pp. xviii–xix, 18–19; Zihlerl, *Communism and Fatherland*, pp. 20, 28–29; Djilas, “The Roots of Nationalism,” pp. 397–398.
- 54 Radio Belgrade had “Partisan Songs” as a regular programme on Saturday mornings at 10:15 a.m. “Belgrádi Műsor,” *Dolgozók* (Novi Sad), 22 July 1966, p. 14. Good examples of this role of history include: Smiljević, *A legújabb kor története*, pp. 146–224; Kecić, “Figyelő: A JKP a Vajdaságban,” pp. 784–792; Kecić, “Emlékalbum a Forradalom 20. évfordulójára,” pp. 981–983. The film industry has been particularly active in furthering the partisan myth. One of the reasons why the Hungarian language publication *Új Symposion* came under extensive criticism in December 1971 was that it had published a very negative film-review of one such myth-perpetuating film. This film also received a mixed reception and a great deal of attention in other Yugoslav publications at the time (that is, “Sujteska affair”). See Miroslav Mandić, “Vers a filmről: Szonett avagy tizennégy verssor,” *Új Symposion* (Novi Sad), September 1971, pp. 376–379; “Az Újvidéki Ifjúsági Tribün közleménye az Új Symposion betiltott számaiban megjelent írásokról,” *Új Symposion* (Novi Sad), December 1971, p. 442.
- 55 Kecić, “Emlékalbum,” pp. 981–983; Smiljević, *A legújabb kor története*, pp. 146–224; János Herceg, “Petőfi a partizánok között,” *Kortárs*, 17 (January, 1973): 189–190.
- 56 This “integration” has been less consistently pursued in other areas. For example, in anthologies of Yugoslav literature the Hungarian and other minority writers have either been ignored or forgotten. István Bosnyák, “Nemzetiségi monológ,” *Új Symposion* (Novi Sad), March 1968, p. 4.
- 57 “Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” *Collection of Yugoslav Laws*, ed. Borislav T. Blagojevic (Belgrade: Institute of Comparative Law, 1963), pp. 3–4.
- 58 *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, ed. Dragolub Durović, Marjan Barasić, et al., trans. Marko Pavicic (Belgrade, 1974), p. 53.
- 59 On this point compare and contrast the “Socialist Constitution of 1963,” *Collection of Yugoslav Laws*, pp. 3–4, with “Constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia” (30 January 1936), in *Constitutions of Nations*, ed. Amos J. Peaslee (Concord, New Hampshire, 1950), III, art. 1, p. 522, and with “Fun-

- damental Law Pertaining to the Bases of the Social and Political Organization of the Federal Organs of State Authority (13 January 1953)," in *Constitutions of Nations*, ed. Amos J. Peaslee, 2d ed. (The Hague, 1956), III, art. 1, p. 766.
- 60 *Constitution of 1974*, p. 53.
 - 61 Robert R. King, *Minorities Under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension Among Balkan Communist States* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), p. 1, defines *Staatsvolk* as the "major nationality, the dominant nationality of a state, as opposed to the national minorities or subject nationalities of the state."
 - 62 A. Ludanyi, "Illúziómentes gondolatok Erdélyről, a Vajdaságról, és rólunk," *ITT-OTT*, IV, 11 (September, 1971): 12; Steven L. Burg, "New Data on the League of Communists of Yugoslavia," *Slavic Review*, 46 (Fall/Winter, 1987): Table 11, p. 560.
 - 63 King, *Minorities Under Communism*, pp. 68–69, 71.
 - 64 *Ibid.*, p. 71.
 - 65 Schopflin, "Nationality in the Fabric of Yugoslav Politics," p. 4.
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 - 67 King, *Minorities Under Communism*, p. 86. Much of the following discussion is based on my study "The Revolution and the Fate of Hungarians in Neighboring States" in *The First War Between Socialist States: The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and Its Impact* ed. Bela K. Kiraly, B. Lotze, and N.F. Dreisziger (New York, 1984), pp. 397–399.
 - 68 For some details see Elemer Homonnay, *Atrocities Committed by Tito's Communist Partisans in the Occupied Southern-Hungary* (Cleveland, 1957). György Szigethy, *Szemtanúja voltam Tito délvideki vérengzésének* [I was a witness to Tito's Atrocities in the Southern Territories] (Cleveland, 1956).
 - 69 George Klein, "Yugoslavia," in *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in Retrospect* ed. Bela K. Kiraly (Boulder, Colo., 1978), pp. 104–105.
 - 70 Bennett Kovrig, *Communism in Hungary: From Kun to Kádár* (Stanford, Ca., 1979), pp. 313–314.
 - 71 Based on personal testimonies of three 1956 refugees I had the opportunity to interview during 1981 and 1982. One now resides in Chicago, one in Cleveland, the third in New York State.
 - 72 *Ibid.*
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 - 75 Kovrig, *Communism in Hungary*, p. 314; Tibor Méray, *Nagy Imre élete és halála* [The Life and Death of Imre Nagy] (Munich, 1978), pp. 329–330.
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 - 79 Frederik W. Hondius, *The Yugoslav Community of Nations* (The Hague, 1968), p. 336; Hoffman, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism*, p. 213. Also compare "Constitution of 1946," arts. 90–114, pp. 535–538, with "Fundamental Law of 1953," arts. 3, 4, 6, 7, 100–114, pp. 767–768, 788–790.

- 80 Csaba Utasi, "Ki a nacionalista? Gondolatok egy csúfondáros 'hadjárat' végén," *Új Symposion* (Novi Sad), April-May 1967, pp. 40–44; István Bosnyák, writing in the same issue, pp. 44–45.
- 81 Sándor Rózsa, "Mindennapi abortusz," *Új Symposion* (Novi Sad), August 1971, pp. 344–345.
- 82 "Az újvidéki Ifjúsági Tribün közleménye az Új Symposion betiltott számaiban megjelent írásokról," *Új Symposion* (Novi Sad), December 1971, p. 442; Az Új Symposion szerkesztő bizottsága, "Szerkesztőségi közlemény." *Új Symposion*, p. 441.
- 83 Personal observation (1966) in the Putnik (Yugoslav travel agency) office in Subotica. I stood in line behind a Hungarian woman who asked for information in Hungarian. She was tersely rebuffed in Serb. When I asked for information and a ticket in Hungarian sporting an American passport, this same Putnik official answered politely in Hungarian. This incident, as well as the others described here, are based on my journal notes that I recorded on my trips to the Vojvodina in 1966, 1976, and 1982.
- 84 Stephen Borsody, ed., *The Hungarians: A Divided Nation* (Bethany, Connecticut, 1988), Annex II, pp. 203–205.
- 85 *Statisticki Godisnjak Jugoslavije* 1982, p. 437.
- 86 Hajós, "A nemzetiségek jogi helyzete," pp. 41–49; Silvo Devetak, et al. *The Italian and Hungarian Nationalities in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia* (Ljubljana, 1983).
- 87 See my dissertation "Hungarians in Rumania and Yugoslavia: A Comparative Study of Communist Nationality Policies" (Louisiana State University, 1971), pp. 277–287.
- 88 Dusan Popovski, "Respect for the Rights of Ethnic Minorities," *Socialist Thought and Practice*, XVI, No. 12 (Dec., 1976), pp. 63–64; István Fehér, "Egyenjogúság és az Oktatás," *Hid*, XL No. 10 (Oct. 1976), pp. 1253–54.
- 89 Popovski, "Respect for the Rights of Ethnic Minorities," pp. 58–59.
- 90 Atif Purivatra, "Tito's Contribution to the Theory and Practice of the National Question," *Socialist Thought and Practice*, XIX, No. 2 Feb., 1979), pp. 69–73; Borsody, *The Hungarians*, pp. 201–203.
- 91 László Kóvágó, *Nemzetiségek a mai Magyarországon* (Budapest, 1981), pp. 88–89, 135–142, 182–188.
- 92 *Ibid.*, King, *Minorities Under Communism*, p. 143; István Szeli, *A magyar kultúra útjai Jugoszláviában* (Budapest, 1983), pp. 113–138.
- 93 Schopflin, "Nationality in the Fabric of Yugoslav Politics," p. 4.
- 94 See Georg von Huebbenet "Yugoslavia After Tito," *Aussen Politik* [German Edition] XXXII, No. 3 (1981), pp. 265–268; John Block, "Tensions Grow Between Albania, Yugoslavia Over Kosovo Region," *The [Toledo] Blade*, May 25, 1981, p. 2; Marvine Howe, "Yugoslav Official Calls Riots a Surprise," *New York Times*, April 7, 1981, p. 3; David Binder, "In Yugoslavia, Ethnic Strife and Fear of War," *New York Times*, November 1, 1987, pp. 1, 6.

Anti-Magyar Propaganda in Rumania and the Hungarian Minority in Transylvania

Louis J. Elteto

That relations between Rumania and Hungary have never been good is a tragic fact that need not be elucidated to anyone even slightly familiar with the history of the two nations.¹ Yet after the consolidation of the communist system following World War II, both Rumania and Hungary took scrupulous care, in the name of socialist brotherhood, to censor anything that might be even slightly offensive to the other. This did not entirely apply to Rumanian history books, to be sure, in which the omissions of fact about Transylvania's past were as insulting from a Hungarian viewpoint as the additions of myth (doubly so in the case of compulsory textbooks issued for the use of Hungarian minority schools), but it was true enough of literature and of journalism in general. For three decades, nothing negative could appear in Hungary about Rumania, and nothing bad in Rumania about Hungary—at least not about contemporary Hungary. Criticising the past from a Marxist viewpoint was, of course, not only permitted, but mandatory, and if the exploiters of yesteryear happened to have been Magyars, what of it? The same class was, after all, also a target in books and journals across the border; but so were the “fascists” of the recent past, a term that in time came to mean chiefly the Hungarians. Since Rumania, which had also been fascist until the summer of 1944, had managed to finish the war an anti-fascist victor, while the Hungarians had persisted in waging war against the Soviet liberators (and their eager, fresh Rumanian allies) to the bitter end, the latter retained the distinction of having been the fascists who had been overcome, alone in fact in the entire socialist camp after the East Germans were transubstantiated into a new nation. Here, too, then, Rumanian writing was not very different from that which could be found in Hungary: only what was self-flagellation there, often became, in Rumania, anti-Hungarian bias duly concealed under political labels.

The literary *modus vivendi* that had evolved between the two states be-

gan to deteriorate in the 1970s. The reasons are too complex to treat here, but they have much to do with the methodical development of a new, or renewed official Rumanian nationalism, in which the minorities of Rumania, particularly the Hungarian, came to be seen as a negative and potentially dangerous element. The net effect of the new policies has been a heavy-handed, at times brutal cultural repression of Rumanian-Hungarians, a suppression that has continued to worsen. The campaign to cripple or to eliminate Hungarian schools, churches, theaters, publications, radio and television programming in Rumania, and the tragic fate of many Hungarian intellectuals living in the country has been well-documented in the Western press during the last decade, as have various pronouncements made by members of the Rumanian government, notably Nicolae Ceausescu, declaring Rumania to be a unified nation state in which minorities are at best a temporary irritation.

Whatever the reasons for the resurgence of Rumanian nationalism, a parallel development in Hungary is certainly not among them. In fact, a major criticism of the Kádár regime among Hungarian intellectuals has been precisely that it has been too slow to react to these Rumanian initiatives. Although the new policies generated some internal resistance among the Hungarian minority in Rumania, overt response from Hungary remained negligible for a long time. Not only were the government and the Party silent on the issue: so were Hungarian writers, who were not allowed to speak out against what was happening to their fellow Hungarians next door. The only exception was the late Gyula Illyés, Hungary's most prominent poet, who dared—or was permitted to—raise his voice against the new Rumanian political course in several interviews and articles both in Hungary and abroad, but even his message was meek and late, years after the anti-Hungarian campaign had begun. How gently even he had to tread may be seen from the tenor of the two-part article he published on the matter in *Magyar Nemzet*, a large circulation daily, in which he could not yet even name Rumania, though the reference was obvious enough to his readers:

According to authentic data and verifiable complaints, minority groups numbering several hundred thousand, even a million, have no universities of their own. Nor are there any institutes of higher education in their mother tongue, and soon they will not even have their own secondary schools, as the existing ones are being standardized to give instruction in the [official] language of the state; as a result, the youth of the national minority cannot learn a trade in their mother tongue. Europe's largest national minority is Hungarian; approximately 16 to 18 percent of a total of 20,000,000.²

This much was possible; but when Illyés tried to summarize the broader question in book form, he failed. His volume, *Szellem és erőszak* [Spirit

and Tyranny] had already been produced by Magvető Publishers in Budapest when permission to release it was withdrawn, and the stock was first warehoused, then shredded.³

Illyés was promptly called a fascist in Bucharest, and other writers in Budapest came to his defense,⁴ but there the matter seemed to rest as far as the Hungarian general public was concerned—which paid scant attention to the entire affair at the time. Illyés continued to play the champion of the Hungarian minorities among Hungarian intellectuals at home and abroad until his death in 1983, and did as much as he could to make everyone aware of the problem. Yet his efforts did not lead to an open discussion of the issue in Hungary—the subject remained official taboo.

In Rumania, literary works dealing with the topic of the Hungarian tenure of Northern Transylvania during World War II had started to appear in the early 70s; F. Pacurariu's novel, *Labirintul* [Labyrinth] (1974) deserves special mention among these productions, because it was awarded the grand prize of the Rumanian Writers' Union. But about this time, preparations were being made for the publication of *Arhanghelii Cruzimii*, a volume that represents the opening shot in a literary propaganda campaign, the first in a series of inexpensive, popular works written with the intention of whipping up nationalist sentiment and anti-Hungarian feeling among the Rumanian populace.⁵

That a connection exists between Illyés' articles and the launching of work on *Arhanghelii* is made very probable by the date of an alleged letter—March 10, 1978, a few weeks after the appearance of the second *Magyar Nemzet* installment—from one Radu Alexandru to the editors of the periodical *Vatra*, asking them to launch an investigation "to establish the truth" in the name of the 29 victims of a massacre committed by Hungarian field gendarmes on October 16, 1944 in the village of Moisei, Maramures, in which his father had been shot. What makes the letter less than credible is its style: Alexandru, who claims to be a simple factory worker, clothes his appeal in references to patriotism, a concern for national history, Cosbuc, Caragiale and Slavici, and of course Ceausescu. There are even two very appropriate quotations from "Excelenta sa." In any case, the resulting volume, from the pens of Dr. Gheorge I. Bodea and Vasile T. Suciu, appeared in Tirgu Mures in 1982, in the appropriately titled series "Documentele Continuitatii" (Documents of Continuity, a reference to the official view of Rumania's uninterrupted past since pre-Dacian times to the present). The delay of four years between the beginning of the project and the final publication could, of course, be explained by the requirements of careful research and investigative reporting, but could also have been caused by a hesitation on the part of the publisher, or of higher authorities, to permit the work's printing and distribution. Its release meant, after all, a radical departure in censorship policy, and there can be no doubt that the

possible benefits and negative consequences of publication were debated at length. If so, the Rumanian hawks won out in the end.

That this line of speculation is not at all far-fetched becomes apparent from an interview that Ion Lancranjan, Rumania's ablest propagandist, granted Mariana Braescu, of *Scinteia Tineretului*.⁶ In it, he outlines the difficulties he experienced in having his works published. Certain writers, whom Lancranjan labels "business intellectuals," did not sympathize with him, and the atmosphere in the Cultural Council reminded him of an inquisition: the aesthetic value of his works was questioned, and he was accused of political irresponsibility. He attributes his "victory" to the fact that there were, nevertheless, a few sober voices in among his colleagues, and adds that the negative manifestations are a result of the "spirit of the past," against which he, and the Party, are struggling.

Arhanghelii Cruzimii is a propaganda work pure and simple, no matter what the truth is about the alleged massacre of Moisei. It is meant to be read with fist clenched. If Rumania had a free press, it would not be worth a comment; but in a country that exercises complete central control over the printed word, its appearance on the bookstands ultimately had to be approved by the highest authority. Therein lies its only significance.

There seems to have been no reaction whatever in Hungary to *Arhanghelii*. That is hardly surprising: the only possible rejoinder would be to publish a similar expose about a massacre in which the butchers were Rumanian and the victims Hungarian. If the Hungarians have not done this, it is not for want of material.

But Lancranjan's *Cuvint despre Transilvania*, which appeared at the same time as *Arhanghelii*, was a horse of another colour.⁷

In spite of the troubles Lancranjan had in publishing this and other works, he is an important and popular writer who has won many a distinction: among others, the State Prize for Literature and the prize of the Rumanian Writers' Union for his novel *Cordovanii* (1963). The style he adopted in *Cuvint*, while perhaps too romantic for the sophisticated reader, is just right for the masses at whom he aimed it. Marketed by the Publishing House for Sport and Tourism, the cheap (8 lei) paperback had a run of over 50,000 copies⁸ and was sold out within a week; its black-market price immediately jumped to 100 lei.⁹

Cuvint is a collection of essays written during the years 1967–82. Lest any miss its aim, it was given its imprimatur on March 15, 1982—Hungary's national holiday. It immediately received wide coverage and positive reviews in the Rumanian press—in *Luceafarul*, the publication of the Rumanian Writers' Union, in *Flacara*, the organ of the United Democratic and Socialist Front, and in *Scinteia Tineretului*, the organ of Communist youth, among others. The reviews, some of which were nothing less than odes to the work and its author, continued throughout the months of April and May.

The book itself consists of four parts: “Rapsodie transilvana” [Transylvanian Rhapsody], “Meleaguri natale” [Native regions], “Patriotismul—o necesitate vitala” [Patriotism—a vital necessity], and the essay that gave the collection its cover title, “Cuvint despre Transylvania.” The first three parts (pp. 5–119) consist of geographic, historical and ethnic sketches of Transylvania, past and present, in which however there is no mention whatever of any of the area’s several minorities—which, in Orwellian style, have become collective unpersons, unpeoples, despite the fact that Transylvania’s history was, for centuries, chiefly their history—of the Germans and Hungarians who built the country’s cities and towns, and created its cultural landscape. Lancranjan’s main purpose in these essays is to whip up patriotic feeling and to underline the dogma of continuity, the 2000-year-old xenophobic struggle against “the foreigner.” His Rumania is a nation state, in which there can be no room for others: “For we are . . . a single people and single country,” indeed, a people whose greatness exceeds the borders of the state, for “if you go toward the West [toward Hungary!] you will meet our people . . . if to the South, as well . . . and to the East, and to the West . . . And here, in Transylvania, too, for we were and we are the original people . . .”¹⁰—and so forth, for 114 pages of preaching about the homeland, patriotism, the one and indivisible Rumanian nation, the one and indivisible Rumanian past and future.

Had Lancranjan stopped here, there would in all likelihood have been no comment from Hungary. But in his main essay, “A Word about Transylvania,” he goes much further in attacking the “foreigner” directly, spouting not only patriotism this time, but also a paranoid fear of, and hatred for, Hungary and Hungarians that remind us of the worst propaganda of the interwar years. Hitler raved like this once, against the Jews.

At first he repeats the dogma again: the Rumanian peasant was “in the beginning a Dacian, then a Roman, and later became a Rumanian in the course of natural continuity, upon which archaeological and linguistic research cast ever new light, without being able to clarify it completely. Not because there is anything mysterious or miraculous about this indubitable continuity, but because it is so real and natural . . . so obvious that it has no need of proof . . .”¹¹ And the minorities had better accept this obvious truth that has no need of proof: “Taking into account that I am living and working in a new, socialist country, in which the national minorities have equal rights—the brotherhood we have sought and are seeking can be realized only if they [the minorities] accept certain vital and real historic facts of ours as self-evident, and not merely pro forma, out of politeness: our constancy and continuity, the permanent majority of Rumanians in Transylvania, and the irreversibility of our great Unification.”¹²

Transylvania has always been Rumanian soil, “where other nationalities immigrated or were brought in as colonists: the Hungarians, the Germans

and the Szekelys.” The colonization was, furthermore, a foreign plot: it was not “limited to Transylvania, but extended to the whole country; its aim was to disperse, to break a more than obvious unity.”¹³ The basic character of the Rumanian people was molded in its long resistance to outside forces. And there are “those who still hope and want Transylvania to fall into foreign hands . . .” Some of the plotters are living among the Rumanians, others just across the borders. “We must not forget that, with regard to Transylvania, there have been and there are revisionist tendencies, that irredentism rears its head from time to time, either nearby or further away, from outside, preaching unity and brotherhood to our faces, while stabbing us in the back.” And while the minorities have been repressed, as they properly should, they are nevertheless ingrates, for “unashamedly they exploit, overtly or covertly, all social and political repression, turning them into banners for their loathsome ends . . .”¹⁴ So much for internal and external appeals for basic human rights for the Transylvanian German and Hungarian minorities.

Though Kádár’s Hungary had been diffident and deferent toward Ceausescu’s Rumania, Lancranjan advances the preposterous claim that the “present situation—in spite of all social and political differences—is reminiscent of the times after World War I and after 1930, when they kept pointing their fingers at Transylvania, without which Hungary could not be ‘great’ . . .”¹⁵ And, without naming him, he twice misquotes János Kádár as having said, in Budapest in 1966, and in Helsinki in 1975, that “The Trianon treaty was an imperialist dictate, which dismembered Hungary and awarded Transylvania to Rumania,” and that “In our century, after the vain sacrifices of World War I, the territory of defeated Hungary was reduced by one-third.”¹⁶ In fact Kádár’s first statement had been aimed largely at Hungary’s former leaders: “The imperialist dictate of Trianon following World War I served as an excuse for the ruling classes to whip up extreme nationalist, chauvinist sentiment, the hatred of neighbouring nations,”¹⁷ while the second reads as follows:

It is our conviction that the primary desire of all European nations is peace. If possible, this is even more true in the case of the Hungarian people, which has lived for centuries at a cross roads of armies, and has spilled immeasurable quantities of its blood in order to survive and to protect its state against the threat of destruction. In our century, after the vain sacrifices of World War I, Hungary, defeated, shrank to one-third of its former territory; in World War II, having bled on the wrong side as a consequence of its rulers’ sins, it lost eight percent of its adult population, and the country became a pile of ruins.¹⁸

Lancranjan’s malice knows no end. He quotes a certain *levente*¹⁹ named Torday from a *brosura*, a pamphlet, of 1940, titled *Without Mercy*: “I won’t

wait for the war to come. I won't wait. I'll wipe out every Vlach [Rumanian] who crosses my path. I'll wipe out every one. There'll be no mercy! By night, I'll put Vlach villages to the torch; I'll put their inhabitants to the sword; I'll poison their wells, and kill even their babies in their cribs."²⁰ What Rumanian can read this and not see red? And Lancranjan implies that this represented an official view, a "part of an integral system of racist propaganda," which still typifies official and unofficial Hungarian sentiments. But while he admits that its author, Döcső was a hack writer, Lancranjan does not tell his readers that Torday is a fictitious character in a fourth-rate dime novel written at a time when Hungary was on the brink of war with Rumania,²¹ and knows fully well that they, living in socialist Rumania, cannot even imagine that in Horthy's much maligned Hungary any fool could publish almost anything he pleased.²² Lancranjan attacks, over and over again, Hungarian historiography concerning Transylvania; he insults prominent Transylvanian Hungarian writers, such as József Méliusz,²³ for their loyalty to their native land. He refutes the idea, advanced not only by Hungarians in the past, but also by Germans and even Rumanians, that Transylvania could have been the Switzerland of the East, in no uncertain terms: "Transylvania could never become an Eastern Switzerland, because from the most ancient times a single nation has lived, worked, loved and dreamed on both sides of the Carpathians . . . [where] in the natural course of things a definite civilization and a definite nation has come into being: the Daco-Roman, or Dacian, or Rumanian, as it finally came to be known . . ."²⁴ It was, he suggests, the Rumanians who civilized the Hungarian barbarians who invaded the area, because the Rumanians were Christians long before the Hungarians. According to him, "the minority status of Transylvanian Hungarians did not begin in 1918 . . . but at the time of their coming to Transylvania, where the original population was already in the majority and living a developed, stable social and political life . . ." He refers to alleged anti-Rumanian articles in the contemporary Hungarian press (without naming names or giving titles), articles that have never existed.²⁵ Through and through, Lancranjan twists facts, and heaps insult upon insult—so much so that the work would not be worthy of notice, let alone a reply, were it not for the circumstances of its publication, its reception, and its conclusion, which has found an alarming echo at the highest level of the Rumanian government.

As we have seen, there was opposition to Lancranjan among his colleagues, and perhaps even in certain lower-level political circles. That is, from the standpoint of the minorities, a hopeful sign, for it means that there are—there must be—decent people of good will in some of those positions; it cannot, after all, be imagined that those who opposed the publication were all members of the Hungarian minority, nor that they were really afraid of Hungarian reaction. The sad thing is that the book was published after all,

that those who objected were overruled—and that it was followed by such positive critique in the Rumanian press. Artur Silvestri compares the work with “an ‘icon’ or a ‘bible.’”²⁶ Mihai Ungheanu praises it at length, and goes so far as to label it a rejection of Marxist interpretations of Transylvania’s history; his review is, if anything, even more blatantly anti-Hungarian and abrasive in tone than Lancranjan’s work. He speaks of “aberrations,” “theses of Hungarian revisionism tenaciously preached to this day,” of “danger-signs,” “backward, propagandistic views,” of “a rekindling of a chauvinistic way of thinking.” “Lancranjan proposes that we look upon Transylvania without idealism and prejudices,” he writes. “There are theses that must be rejected fully. Among these is the misleading proposition that Rumania is a multinational state. . . .”²⁷ In an interview, F. Pacurariu, himself a prize winning writer and former Rumanian ambassador to Argentina, Uruguay, and Greece, has this to say about *Cuvint*:

This book is a hymn of gratitude for Transylvania, which is our nation’s hearth and refuge; it is a lyric discovery of our country. It reflects sincere patriotism, an understanding of true Transylvanian reality. This book is a rejection of all those erroneous and tendentious views and opinions which certain people have formed about the Transylvanian situation (past and present).

Some of our friends and non-friends (Blaga would have called them devils and satans), knowing the passion I demonstrate for the past and present problems of which Lancranjan speaks, have told me, without having read the book, that ‘they had heard that there are certain assaults [against some people] to be found in the book.’ I have told them, and I wish to repeat it here, that this is a deeply thought-out work, a book written with a sense of responsibility. It should, therefore, not be judged from hearsay, one needs to meditate properly upon it, because, as all books, this one, too, could be perfected. Had I been asked, I would have suggested that the writer omit certain quotations, and find others, weightier ones, more moving ones, more tragic ones in the interest of fraternal understanding among the peoples living in this region. I say this fully conscious of my responsibility: this is an honest and just book, which is worth reading and discussing openly and honestly . . .²⁸

The essay’s most alarming thesis is that the Hungarian minority in Rumania is somehow responsible for many of the country’s post-war ills. Taking a page from the writings of his spiritual ancestors, the leaders of the Iron Guard, who had viewed modern history in terms of a Jewish plot, Lancranjan blames, *mutatis mutandis*, the Hungarians for the painful upheavals of the transition to the socialist system. Hungarian chauvinists and non-chauvinists (they are all the same) infiltrated and headed the organs of

the Rumanian Party and state, even the *Securitate*. The Rumanians' mistake is to have granted them too much freedom. Thus, they have "more printing (publications and book titles) in their mother tongue than we Rumanians have," he complains, though he admits that this is only "relative to the proportion of the Hungarian population of Rumania." And, he continues hysterically, the more concessions they are given, the more they demand. "What if one day they ask us, in the most democratic manner possible, to pick up our rivers and move from this land, what are we Rumanians going to do then? Will we grant this wish, too, or what are we going to do?"²⁹ It is as if Lancranjan were anticipating the words of his Leader, Nicolae Ceausescu:

We committed a grave error in giving the minorities so much freedom. We have allowed them too much; that is why they have become such nationalists and chauvinists. The minorities endanger our country's independence, sovereignty, and territorial inviolability. We have to change this in the future. I have decided, and I am convinced that you, comrades, will agree with me, that in this regard we must take the most resolute steps against all hostile manifestations, that we must resolutely beat back all their demands.³⁰

There were, to my knowledge, only two responses to *Cuvint* in Hungary: by György Száraz, whom Lancranjan had personally attacked,³¹ and by Pál Köteles. Both essays are lengthy, calm refutations of Lancranjan's most outrageous claims, in which the quotations and summations serve not merely as points to refute, but also—and principally—to familiarize the Hungarian public, which had no access to the original, with the general content and tone of the work. Of the two reviews, that of Száraz is the more detailed; it is polite enough to be almost conciliatory, though it does not lack firmness in its conclusion:

Lancranjan demands unconditional understanding, unconditional respect, and unconditional capitulation of me. I ought not know the names Bethlen and Bocskay, the two Bolyais, Misztótfalusi, or Kőrösi Csoma; I should not know Zágony, the churches with the wooden spires; I should deny that Várad was . . . the city of Ady; I should spell Dózsa: Doja, Erzsébet Szilágyi as Elisabeta Salajan, and refer to Csikszereda as Miercurea Ciuc even when speaking Hungarian . . . This would be the price of his friendship, of his toleration . . . [But] though I call it Maros, the river will still be his Mures, the Aranyos will remain Ariesul to him, and the Szamos Somes. But he is jealous perhaps for my even knowing the names—of villages, of mountains, and of people—he is proud of, and begrudges me the respect I bear for the feelings attached to the names, though he has no use for my

respect. For all that I love the Miorita, the world of the doinas and the ballads, I love the quiet European spirit of his countryman, Lucian Blaga, and the Mezőség means to me not only Zsigmond Kemény and András Sütő, but also Dan Pavel, who died so young—and this makes me no less, and no worse a Hungarian.

I'm sorry he cannot understand that.³²

Köteles, in turn—perhaps for having experienced socialist brotherhood first hand in Rumania, which he had succeeded in leaving only recently—is less patient with Lancranjan, calling his work exactly what it is: a collection of propaganda essays.

His fabrications and his labels are an insult to the Hungarian people, and with that [category], to the human dignity of the Hungarians who have shown that they are loyal citizens of Rumania . . . We cannot just dismiss the book. We cannot pretend that we know nothing of it, that we have not heard of it or seen it, that we therefore have nothing to say about the matter. We do!

[Lancranjan] thinks some of us worry unduly about the fate of the Hungarians in Rumania. This book is the very proof that no such worry can be excessive or uncalled-for.³³

Though Száraz, an important member of the Writers' Union and a chief contributor to the influential periodical, *Élet és Irodalom*, was able to have his article published with impunity, Köteles was soon censored for his efforts—not for the Lancranjan review per se, to be sure, rather for publishing some of his essays, the Lancranjan piece among them, abroad, in the Western, emigre press. Upon his return from a lecture tour in the United States and Canada, he was officially silenced, and his contract with a regional journal terminated. He has yet to be published since, in spite of strong domestic and foreign protests in his behalf. For all its liberality, present-day Hungary still does not permit its writers freedom of speech and press in certain questions, and that of the Hungarian minorities has been near the top of the list of taboos for a long time.³⁴ [Editors' note: the situation has changed in Hungary and some of Száraz's writings have appeared in print after this study had been written.]

But no matter how much official Hungary would like to have ignored Rumanian propaganda, it has not been able to do so. In 1986 alone, three more cheap, high-volume anti-Hungarian works left Rumania's presses: a collection of historical documents and two novels, Doru Munteanu's *Black Friday*, and Lancranjan's *Torrid Autumn*.

As could be expected, Lancranjan's 239-page opus is the most vicious of the three. Its plot is a life-and-death struggle between Gyuri, a Hungarian peasant who had fled from the *puszta* to Transylvania and who is an atheist,

a mass murderer and a war criminal, with Ion, a noble, naive, kindly, religious and melancholy Rumanian, whose ancestors, it goes without saying, have tilled that very land from time immemorial. Gyuri's crimes, which Lancranjan renders in naturalistic detail, consist of having repeatedly murdered Rumanians of all kinds: teen-agers, priests, mothers and babies. He had choked them, disemboweled them, machine-gunned them. Although Gyuri had confessed his deeds after the war, he was not brought to justice, because those in charge at the time in Rumania were themselves Hungarians. Now it is up to Ion to take vengeance personally on Gyuri and on his whore of a wife, who sleeps with Rumanians only to mock them later. (Her mother, too, had been a whore, the slut of Hungarian counts.) Gyuri had been trained for his role as mass murderer in Hungary in the 1930s. He could have emigrated to Australia, which is full of Hungarian war criminals, but feels safer in a Rumanian village, because Rumania's laws are lax and its people kind and understanding.

But the primitive framework is merely a vessel for Lancranjan's propaganda. What he had outlined in *Cuvint* he now fleshes out in conversations between the principals and in internal monologues. Among his major ideas: it is not the Hungarian ruling classes alone who are guilty, as the Marxists teach, because *all* Hungarians are potential mass murderers; militarism and a thirst for blood is their nature. There is no way Hungarians can ever wash the blood of innocent Rumanians they have been butchering for centuries from their hands, therefore, there can be no equality between Hungarians and Rumanians, the butchers and the butchered. All Hungarians are perfidious scum, whether they are priests or Communist activists, all their preaching about equality is for the purpose of preventing the Rumanians from taking a just vengeance for the past, now that they could do so. Yet such revenge must be personal, for Rumania is still ruled by foreigners. Neither the Party nor the state can be trusted. The author has Gyuri recall the words of a Comrade Zoltán, an officer of the Rumanian *Securitate*: "We Hungarians can achieve what we could not reach after the First World War. We can use—we must use!—socialism and the rights they have given us to fight for Great and Eternal Hungary, to seize all power here in Transylvania, so that when the opportune moment comes we can unite with the Motherland, for we who live here and those over there are one body and one soul."³⁵

Though Ion decides to be Gyuri's personal prosecutor, judge, jury, and hangman while the two are alone in the mountains,³⁶ he does not carry out his plan. Instead, after nearly two hundred pages of pregnant conversation, Lancranjan's *deus ex machina* intervenes: a storm arises, and Gyuri is struck by lightning. Ion, noble soul that he is after all, saves his life, whereupon another bolt of lightning strikes Ion dead. Gyuri recovers but loses his mind: he imagines he is Árpád, the king of the wild boars.³⁷ In the

end, he is turned over to the police, because people suspect he has murdered Ion. In spite of this clever twist, one has the impression that Lancranjan is really suggesting that it is all right even for private Rumanians to murder Hungarians.

Otherwise, the work seems to reflect the pseudo-religious, mystical-fascistic spirit of the Iron Guard. Lancranjan believes that whatever is Rumanian is holy,³⁸ and that his peasants are still a pristine race that follows the teachings of "ancient kings and popas."³⁹ Organically one with the soil, the Rumanian peasant should stay on the land, learn the tradition from the village priest and the teacher, who alone may be trusted, and fight against the seductions of the city, of Hungarian clergy, agitators, intellectuals and whores.

It is hard to believe that such a book could be written in the Europe of the 1980s, harder still that it could be issued. Since Ceausescu's Rumania is not a country in which any fool may publish whatever he pleases, one must conclude that this, and similar works, are indeed "part of an integral system of racist propaganda" sanctioned by the very highest levels of the Rumanian Communist Party.

Hungary, for its part, has not reacted to the new provocations, but the release of a new, three-volume *History of Transylvania*⁴⁰ by the Hungarian Academy of Science in November, 1986, may mark a move toward a tougher stance against the Ceausescu regime. Commissioned in 1976, it is anything but a reply to the propaganda works under discussion: rather, it is a serious scholarly effort not meant for the casual reader, who will hardly want to pay its hefty price of 950 forints. Nor is it an apology aimed at the West: Hungarian in language, it is not immediately accessible to most Western scholars. But its release created quite a stir in Hungary, where Transylvania could hardly be mentioned before; and with the prestige of the Academy, and of Minister of Education Béla Köpeczi as editor-in-chief behind it, it is perceived by many as a long-overdue response to Rumania, whether or not that was original aim of the undertaking.

It is not my task to comment on *History of Transylvania* here, even briefly. The three volumes will stand or fall in the light of competent, objective, scholarly criticism. So far, there has been none of that from the Rumanian side, only vituperative invective. But then what hope can there be for a calm dialogue at present, when Rumania's leader himself is a true believer in the Daco-Rumanian national-socialist doctrine, which—though it needs no proof, as Lancranjan assures us—not only Hungarian scholarship, but *all* serious scholarship, must question?

In a speech held before a joint meeting of the Council of Workers of Hungarian Nationality of Rumania and of its German equivalent, Nicolae Ceausescu commented on the new history book as follows:

Can anyone change history? Can anyone alter the fact that 2500 years ago Herodotus called the Dacians living in this parts . . . 'the best and the bravest' of the Thracians? . . . Can anyone change the fact that Burebista created a unified state, that Decebal improved upon it, and that the Dacians fought the Romans for centuries. . . ? . . . Why deny the existence of another people, [even] though that people has lived here for over 2500 years, and did not retire before the migrating peoples, but fought back, defending its soil and existence?

It is hard to comprehend the reviving of Horthyist, fascist, chauvinist, and among these also racist theses. How could one imagine that a scientific academy would allow the publication of writings and works that are insulting to other peoples? What kind of scholarship is this? Whom does such scholarship serve, if not the most reactionary, imperialist circles?⁴¹

The Hungarians are quite mistaken if they think they can achieve peace, truth, and justice, or even a partial meeting of the minds through rational discussion with the current Rumanian leadership and with the writers and "scholars" that leadership has fostered: for what they are up against is an irrational, pseudo-religious fanaticism. As such, it is anachronistic, and because it is that, it will end soon. It will be ended by the Rumanian people themselves, its most numerous victims, led by those whose love of Rumania is mature enough to blossom without being nourished by the hatred of their neighbours.

Notes

- 1 The uninitiated will find *Transylvania—The Roots of Ethnic Conflict* by John F. Cadzow, Andrew Ludanyi, and Louis J. Elteto, eds. (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1983) an excellent introduction to the overall subject.
- 2 "Válasz Herdernek és Adynak" [An Answer to Herder and Ady], *Magyar Nemzet*, December 22, 1977 and January 1, 1978.
- 3 As might be expected, a few copies were saved and made their way to the West, where the work is available in various pirated editions through Hungarian booksellers, also in English translation.
- 4 Viz. e.g. the article by Mihnea Gheorghiu, President of the Rumanian Academy of Social and Political Sciences, in *Luceafarul*, May 6, 1978, which makes malicious use of the title of a 1946 novel by Illyés, "Hunok Párizsban" [Huns in Paris] for a heading; and the reply by Zsigmond Pál Pach, "A Dunánál, itt élnek kell" [At the Danube you must live] in *Élet és Irodalom*, July 8, 1978. For additional details about this entire "debate," see Elemér Illyés, *National Minorities in Romania—Change in Transylvania* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1982).
- 5 Dr. Gheorghe I. Bodea and Vasile T. Suciú, *Arhanghelii Cruzimii*. Documentele Continuitatii, (Tirgu Mures: Revista Vatra, Biblioteca de Historie, 1982), p. 5.
- 6 *Scinteia Tineretului*, April 11, 1982, 3.

- 7 Ion Lancranjan, *Cuvint despre Transilvania* (Bucharest: Editura Sport-Turism, 1982).
- 8 Pál Köteles, "Töprengés egy torzkép előtt," [Meditation upon a Caricature] in *Külön égbolt* [A Firmament Apart] (Calgary: Corvin Publishing, Ltd.), 77–92. Reprinted from *Tiszatáj* (Szeged, Hungary), September, 1982.
- 9 "Nemzetiségi Szemle" [Minority Review] 1982/3, "Egy szó Erdélyről. Ion Lancranjan könyve." [A Word about Transylvania. Ion Lancranjan's book.] Typescript. (Budapest: Állami Gorkij Könyvtár, 1982), p. 1.
- 10 *Cuvint*, p. 80.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 127.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 128
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 129
- 14 *Ibid.*, p. 130.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 131.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 132.
- 17 *Hazafiság és internacionalizmus* [Patriotism and Internationalism] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1968), p. 310. From Kádár's report to the Ninth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.
- 18 János Kádár's speech at the Helsinki conference, July 31, 1975. *Népszabadság*, August 1, 1975, p. 1.
- 19 Member of a paramilitary youth organization in Hungary, 1928–1944.
- 20 *Cuvint*, p. 133.
- 21 Csaba Dücső, *Nincs kegyelem* (Budapest: Centrum, 1939), 188 pp.
- 22 Titus Popovici accuses a Hungarian emigre organization, the Hungarian Freedom Fighters' Federation, of using a somewhat edited version of Dücső's words in a flyer aimed at inciting anti-Rumanian feeling among Hungarians living in the West. See his article "Módszerek és stílusok a szándékos történelemhamisítás szolgálatában" [Methods and styles in the service of the intentional distortion of history] in the Apr. 2 issue of *A hét* (Bucharest), as translated from *Romania literara* of March 26, 1987. I have not been able to verify that such a document exists, though it may for all that: here, too, any fool can publish almost anything he pleases.
- 23 Méliusz raised a protest against the chauvinism expressed in *Cuvint* with the Rumanian Writers' Union and with the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party. Concurrently, he wrote a review of the work for *Luceafarul*. It was not published; but Lancranjan was allowed to reply to the unpublished critique with a volume, *Vocatia constructiva* (Bucharest, 1983).
- 24 *Cuvint*, p. 136.
- 25 For example, he cites *Magyar Hirlap* of December 25, 1979; there was no such issue. He quotes from *Acta Ethnographica* of April, 1979; there is no such issue either, nor is that journal numbered that way. The passage he quotes is not to be found in the entire 1979 volume. *Cuvint*, p. 163.
- 26 *Flacara*, April 9, 1982, p. 9.
- 27 *Luceafarul*, April 10, 1982, p. 2.
- 28 *Luceafarul*, May 15, 1982, p. 3.
- 29 *Cuvint*, p. 175.
- 30 Speech at the November 9, 1984 conference of the Communist Party of the

Municipality of Bucharest, a preparatory meeting for the 13th Party Congress of November 19–22, 1984. *Hungarian Human Rights Bulletin* (New York) 3 (March, 1985), 11.

- 31 *Cuvint*, p. 182.
- 32 György Száraz, “Egy különös könyvről” [About an odd book], *Valóság* (Budapest) 10, 1982, 105.
- 33 Köteles, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
- 34 Stefan Pascu and Stefan Stefanescu, eds. *Jocul periculos al falsificării istoriei* [The dangerous game of falsifying history] (Bucharest, Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica), 20 lei; Doru Munteanu, *Vinerea neagra* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia), 11.50 lei; and Ion Lancranjan, *Toamna fierbinte* (Bucharest, Editura Militara), 12 lei.
- 35 *Toamna*, p. 50.
- 36 *Ibid.*, p. 199 *et seq.*
- 37 Árpád is the name of the semi-legendary leader of the Hungarians during their conquest of the Carpathian Basin in 896 a.d.
- 38 *Toamna*, p. 195.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 190.
- 40 *Erdély története*, ed. Béla Köpeczi *et al.* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1986).
- 41 *Előre* (Bucharest), March 1, 1987.

REVIEW ARTICLE

A History of Transylvania: Its Impact and Reception

Thomas Szendrey

Béla Köpeczi, ed. *Erdély története*. 3 vols. Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1986.

History should be written *sine ira et studio*, but that is never wholly possible; nor can it ever measure up to the Rankean ideal, but nonetheless should attempt to approach it. These volumes on the history of Transylvania certainly attempt this in spite of the great temptations and difficulties involved in writing about this part of the world and its competing nationalisms.

However, there is another factor in the writing of history than the scholarly intentions of the historians, namely the political-cultural context in which one of necessity must live and work. Then there is also the network of world politics and the particular place in it occupied by both reader and writer, which in turn gives rise to interpretations and evaluations, indeed misinterpretations and re-evaluations based upon subjective interests. This is something no writer or historian can fully anticipate or control. The work has a life of its own and becomes a part of the consciousness of its readers, living on and influencing life in its myriad dimensions. This review is thus an expression of this consciousness in the life of one historian, hopefully a fair and meaningful one.

A detailed and comprehensive three volume history of Transylvania has been published under the aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and edited by the then minister of cultural affairs Béla Köpeczi, a literary and cultural historian of some renown. The work has generated more controversy among historians, politicians, and the public in Hungary, Rumania, and indeed throughout the world, mostly on account of the bitter response

it has elicited from Rumanian academic and political circles. This has been augmented and followed by the defence of the volumes by spokesmen for the Hungarian government as well as those for the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.¹ Furthermore, scholars throughout the world, especially those concerned with the history of East Central Europe and also those dealing with minority issues, have also responded to the volumes and the controversy surrounding them in both the media and scholarly publications.² One needs to add that if the interest extends beyond purely academic circles and is perceived in political terms, even the language of publication, i.e. Hungarian, mostly ceases as an issue of concern. After all, numerous significant and controversial books have been published in the Hungarian language without generating interest and controversy of this magnitude, extending from the pages of leading world newspapers to the halls of the U.S. Congress and beyond.

Obviously, there must be a number of reasons for this vast interest in a rather lengthy (almost 2,000 pages) and detailed scholarly work dealing with a small and isolated geographical entity populated mostly by Hungarians, Rumanians, and Germans; a part of Rumania since the peace treaties after World War I, it was for most of its history a part of the Hungarian kingdom and also for approximately 150 years an independent principality quite conscious of its Hungarian ties. The interest is certainly not evoked either by the style and detail of the three rather hefty volumes, representing difficult reading even for one well versed in the history of the people and nations involved. Perhaps the interest can be explained in part because nothing comparable has been written or published in Hungary for more than forty years; this, however, would only explain the interest in the volumes by Hungarians and Hungarian-reading specialists and scholars dealing with these topics. Nonetheless, any reawakening of interest in the history of Transylvania and its peoples in any context is welcome.

The concern and interest of Rumanian historians and the reading public in Rumania should be and is self-evident. The volumes deal with topics which involve their ancestors in Transylvania, the development of the Rumanian nationality there, and their status in the region, among other issues.³ Nonetheless, the volumes deal with these topics in a way which often challenges the assumptions of Rumanian national sentiment and especially Rumanian nationalist historiography. Indeed, the response to these volumes borders on politically induced hysteria, by no means a proper response to volumes from which chauvinistic mentality and tone, which had marred some other writings on this theme, are decidedly missing. One cannot but believe that the Rumanian response, especially by its political leaders and many of its historians and writers, is unwarranted and unjustifiable.⁴

There must be more to the generally expressed Rumanian attitude toward these volumes than a concern with scholarship and alternative in-

terpretations; the tone of the writings and polemics directed against the work certainly points in such a direction. In the judgment of this reviewer this something else is the politization of scholarship, especially history, to serve the goal of creating a unitary national state by the current regime at the expense of destroying the national past of the major ethnic minorities in Rumania today, namely the Hungarians and Germans of Transylvania. The changes in nationality policies the past twenty years certainly point in this direction. Consider the following; many local archives, especially in Transylvania have been gathered together and forcibly removed to Bucharest and other locations; decrees have limited education in the languages of the minorities and publication opportunities have been greatly restricted. The list could be extended to include political and socio-economic decisions which have impacted negatively on the quality of life in Rumania, but these have also affected all citizens of the state regardless of nationality and have led to some limited manifestations of dissatisfaction with the regime and the unparalleled and unprecedented number of refugees (and not just ethnic Hungarians) seeking refuge in Hungary and elsewhere.

All of these events have had an impact on the conscience of peoples throughout the world, especially in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada (which together with Hungary sponsored a resolution on human rights at the Vienna conference on cooperation and peace) and which has resulted in some unpleasant and damaging political publicity for the Rumanian regime. Quite simply, the fate of the largest national minority in East Central Europe—the Hungarians of Transylvania—is a matter of some concern and this is by no means totally unrelated to the history of Transylvania and its peoples. Thus, the publication of this three volume *Erdély története*, by the publishing house of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, has once again focused attention on an issue which for the past forty years has been kept alive mostly outside of Hungary. It is to this situation that we must now turn.

With the imposition of Soviet hegemony over East Central Europe in the immediate post-World War II era, it was stressed that the imposition of a new internationalist ideology would remove or at least alleviate the national antagonisms of the region. Given the extent and depth of nationalist sentiment this did not and has not happened, but two consequences of the somewhat altered nationality situation in post-war East Central Europe must be noted nonetheless. First of all, the peoples of the region suffered a similar fate under native Stalinist regimes. Secondly, the Hungarian minority in Rumania obtained more autonomy, especially in educational and cultural matters, than during the Ceausescu years. It was undoubtedly the situation of the Hungarian minority, especially during the past few years, which led to the decision on the part of the Hungarian Academy of Sci-

ences (with the necessary consent of the government) to proceed with the publication of this work.

In a preliminary review of this work, Nandor Dreisziger noted that the publication of these volumes was a "debt paid in Budapest,"⁵ after more than forty years of official silence about Transylvania. One might extend this observation by noting that the historical consciousness of the elder generation had not forgotten about Transylvania, but had no forum to express its concern. The younger generation, meanwhile, generally only knew about Hungarians living in Rumania and was mostly unaware of the historical connection between Hungary and Transylvania. It was the joint activity (still mostly unrecognized) of Hungarians in the western world and the writings and activities of writers such as Gyula Illyés and Áron Tamási on behalf of the Hungarian minorities which awakened the consciousness of many Hungarians and brought about a renewal of interest and concern with Hungarians beyond the borders of Hungary in the early 1970s.⁶ Hungarian writers and scholars in the Western World had not been affected by Budapest's non-concern for Transylvania (and the Hungarian minorities in general) and had kept alive in their consciousness the historical connection of Hungary and Transylvania, even if not always with the necessary critical spirit. One could thus argue that the confluence of concern for Transylvania by Hungarians throughout the world was united by the rising intolerance of the Ceausescu regime toward its minorities generally and the Hungarian one specifically. The most recent manifestations of this concern were the huge demonstration in Budapest on June 27, 1988 and the ongoing activity of the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation and other such organizations in the United States and elsewhere.⁷ All of these and other activities are tied in with the renewed interest of Hungarians with Transylvania and the publication of these three volumes is also tied in with this, even if only indirectly, with the consequences of its publication, and certainly not with the intentions of its writers who consistently maintained a sense of scholarship and a moderate tone in their work. In spite of the extent and quality of the three volumes (and the large number of copies sold and distributed), for many people it still remains a mostly unread symbol of care and concern resting on their bookshelves for others to see. It should be noted that the scholarly level and sometimes turgid style ill suits this work for a popular audience. For academics and scholars, however, it is and remains an essential and latest component of an on-going tradition of historical writing on Transylvania. Its impact could nonetheless be multiplied by publishing a one volume summary in both Hungarian and other languages so that its values and accomplishments may become known in wider circles. Nonetheless, it still remains our task to discuss it and its place in the long tradition of Hungarian historical writing on this topic.

Even a cursory examination of the development of Hungarian historiography will confirm that the history of Transylvania has always been a significant component of it. From the earliest chronicles, through the writings of the Renaissance and humanist scholars, the accounts of seventeenth century memoir writers, and extending into the era of modern and contemporary historical scholarship, Hungarian and Transylvanian history have generally been treated as parts of an integral entity, even when some parts were independent or under foreign rule at different times in a more or less common past. One should also add that this common history included the past of the non-Magyar peoples who also live in Transylvania.

These historical writings before the eighteenth century generally dealt more with the monarchy and aristocratic and military elements of the society and did so generally without sharply distinguishing ethnic or national background; that was not their primary consideration. With the eighteenth century—and accelerating in significance—there commenced a great interest in the past which resulted in the formulation of national histories for the various peoples of Europe generally, but especially for those who lacked a distinct historical tradition of their own. It was thus during the late seventeenth and mostly during the eighteenth century that there developed distinct historiographical traditions in Transylvania among Hungarians (in addition to the already developed currents of Hungarian historiography), Rumanians (in conjunction mostly with the Moldavians and Wallachians), and Saxons (also distinct from other German historical developments). Needless to say, these emerging traditions could best be described as incipiently self-conscious, leading eventually to a fully developed romantically inspired nationalism.

Some examples of this development can be pointed out here, but it is not possible to provide a comprehensive account of these historiographical traditions.⁸ Nor do the volumes discussed in this review provide more than an episodic and scattered historiographical account—one of their most obvious shortcomings. A distinctive historiographical tradition emerges from the writings of Gábor Bethlen, prince regnant of Transylvania in the early seventeenth century, including especially the writings of Bethlen himself, that of his court historian Gáspár Bojthi Veres and also János Kemény among others.⁹ This tradition was continued apace during the balance of the century and even beyond. A few examples may be noted: Péter Apor, *Metamorphosis Transylvaniae* (1736); Péter Bód, *Magyar Athenas* (1766); also the historical writings of Mihály Cserei, Pál Debreczeni Ember, József Benkő, and János Kénosi-Tőzser. Among the Saxons one must take note of Marton Schmeizel who taught a generation of Saxon historians in Transylvania. Hence in the centuries during which modern historical scholarship

developed, the Hungarian and Saxon scholars of Transylvania produced valuable work.

Rumanian scholarship in Transylvania also began to develop in the early and mid-eighteenth centuries and found support among the Rumanian aristocracy and clergy. Especially significant was the political and scholarly work of Inochentie Micu-Klein and his activities were significant for the subsequent development of Rumanian historical consciousness,¹⁰ specifically the first formulation by him of the theory of Daco-Roman-Rumanian continuity in 1735. There were hardly any other significant formulations before this time.

The ongoing interest in and concern with the past of the various peoples who populated Transylvania through the centuries received an obvious impetus from the gradual extension of nationalism to more and more elements of the population. Historical writings increased in number and became the foundation of those historically based ideologies which became and continue to be significant for shaping and influencing the historiographical tradition and historical-political consciousness of these peoples. The strict devotion to scholarly canons characteristic of many (by no means all) eighteenth century works gradually gave way to historical writings and attitudes characterized by a sense of romantic nationalism; this may have been helpful for the development of literary and cultural life in a national context. It was certainly not favourable for the maintenance of the commitment to finding out what happened, so essential to the continued writing of sound history. Indeed, the historical works of the first half of the nineteenth century (with very few exceptions) were characterized more by a love of nation than dedication to historical truth. A romanticized version of the history of the peoples of East Central Europe became—and continues to persist in some form—as a component part of the respective historical mythology of these peoples. This has not been salutary for either scholarship or the promotion of understanding among these peoples. The political history of Transylvania is certainly a telling and instructive commentary on this situation.¹¹

Late nineteenth century historical writing (and this historiographical tradition continued certainly until 1914) found itself ensnared in a political-cultural conflict. As it moved away from many of the illusions of romantic historiography toward a more positivist and scientific historiography, the historical consciousness of their readers (the educated public generally) was still informed—indeed captivated—by prior vision. Thus scholarship, while moving away from that vision found itself out of touch with a nationalist inspired political system. The activities of scholars and writers such as Sándor Szilágyi, Henrik Marczali, and Imre Mikó among others, thus did not always mesh with popular ideals and aspirations about past, present, and future. Rumanian historical scholarship also became substantially more

nationalistic (cf. Xenopol, Iorga, etc.) for the reason that historical studies and consciousness emanating therefrom served Rumanian nationalist aspirations.

This politization of historical scholarship led to mutual recriminations and fostered attitudes of hostility and misunderstanding. All of this was then caught up in the throes of World War I and its all too well-known consequences, specifically the division of Austria-Hungary by the peace treaties of St. Germain and Trianon.¹² Nor did this fail to have an impact on scholarly life generally and historical writing specifically. While some attempts were made to maintain the necessary dedication to the principles and moral demands of historical scholarship, the shock of Trianon—probably the greatest tragedy in the history of the Hungarian nation¹³—was simply too much and the revisionism born of the dismemberment of Hungary acted as an impetus to politicians and very many scholars and historians to point out the injustices of the changed situation for Hungarians in this region of Europe. Thus, a new revisionist historiography was born and while in the hands of competent historians (such as Gyula Szekfű, Bálint Hóman, Sándor Domanovszky, and Imre Lukinich among others) it retained a sense of qualified professionalism, qualified, however, only in the context of revisionist attitudes; the other characteristics remained on the same high scholarly level as previously.

Revisionism became the central concern of the political and cultural life of inter-war Hungary and resulted in some very obvious dislocations in the historical consciousness of very many Hungarians; often it led to highly unrealistic political and cultural attitudes and fostered the acceptance of catastrophic and radical historical and political visions.¹⁴ For example, at the time of the second Vienna Award (1940), when a part of Transylvania was restored to Hungary, a commemorative album entitled *Erdély* (Transylvania) was published with the participation of many of Hungary's most esteemed scholars and politicians and this undoubtedly reflected rather evidently the revisionist program and its attitudes.¹⁵ However, even this volume still exhibited a substantially more moderate tone and was characterized by more respect for the standards of language and scholarship than the most recent (since the mid-sixties) Rumanian government sponsored historical or other writings on Hungary.¹⁶ Needless to say, not all writings produced by Rumanian and Hungarian writers and scholars about each other are characterized by such invective. It is precisely these three volumes which provide numerous examples of understanding and cooperation among the various peoples inhabiting Transylvania.

Movement away from excessively revisionistic attitudes on the part of Hungarian scholars and historians can be noted by the early 1940s; one must mention the establishment and work of the Teleki Institute; also, Gyula Szekfű's book *Etat et Nation* (1942) represents a movement away

from revisionism as did the writings of László Gáldi and László Makkai; the latter wrote a number of books including *Erdély története* (1946) and edited the second volume of the work under review.

The changed attitude was in no small measure the result of World War II; revisionism—or at the very least its most outspoken version—was tempered by the crucible of war and defeat, the consequence of which was the reconfirmation of the Trianon frontiers at the Paris peace conference of 1947. The imposition of Soviet hegemony over East Central Europe after the war engulfed both Rumania and Hungary and this common condition caused more concern for the Hungarians and Rumanians respectively than the nationality disputes; immediate post-war relations between the various peoples were better, though by no means free of conflict and controversy. Hungarian historians in post-war Transylvania carried out some historical work characterized by sound scholarship and a somewhat more conciliatory spirit—especially the work of Lajos Kelemen and his students—but this nonetheless remained the work of a tolerated minority; the same is true with regard to the work of Imre Mikó.

The Rumanian historical attitudes were mostly maintained, but were marked by an ever increasing Marxist character. This also was true of the scholarly work of the national minorities. Although hampered by the restrictions of this ideology, the internationalist attitudes of the Soviet imposed regimes somewhat attenuated nationality conflicts, at least until the late 1950s. Since that time the increasingly intolerant nationality policy of the Bucharest regime has weighed ever more heavily on the nationalities, especially the large Hungarian minority. Indeed, there has been and continues to be a strongly chauvinistic tone to Rumanian political and cultural policies. This was also evident in the planning and execution of the International Congress of Historical Sciences held in Bucharest in 1980.

On account of the close connection between some elements of Hungarian revisionism and Nazi Germany—most manifest in the German role in the two Vienna awards—the post-war regimes were not particularly receptive to the revisionism of the pre-war years, but were nonetheless somewhat concerned with the fate and future of the Hungarian minorities. This changed abruptly with the imposition of the Soviet-backed communist government in 1948 and revisionism—and even nationalism—became in effect taboo subjects. Hungarian nationalism and concern with Hungarian populations in the so-called former succession states were neglected and proscribed. The struggle against nationalism and its manifold manifestations occupied the time of many historians and ideologues. Although there remained some minimal evidence of concern with the minorities, the issue continued to be neglected and even actively discouraged until the early 1970s, at which time a few studies on Hungarian minorities once again appeared and some public attention was once again focused on these issues.¹⁷ With the excep-

tion of a few relatively minor and highly specialized historical writings on the minorities, the three volume *Erdély története* published in 1986 was the first comprehensive history of Transylvania published in Hungary since the volume also entitled *Erdély története*—by László Makkai some forty years earlier. His scholarly activity thus provides the only continuity of writing on Transylvania in Hungary today.

The Rumanians had not destroyed so completely the historical consciousness of their people regarding their claims to Transylvania and the myth of Daco-Roman continuity and had made these claims known to the world, especially since 1963. This situation, coupled with the seemingly more independent line of Rumanian foreign policy, has created much good will for Rumania and has also contributed indirectly to a wider acceptance of her “historically-based” claim to Transylvania. The ever increasing repression of the national minorities by the Rumanian government during the past two decades, however, has recently elicited extensive opposition from human rights groups, including among others Amnesty International, and increasingly from other nations and even regional organizations. The force of this pressure was then compounded by the publication of these volumes and its sponsorship by the highly regarded Hungarian Academy of Sciences. This has resulted in more pressure upon the cultural life of the Hungarians in Rumania and led to a worsening of Hungarian-Rumanian relations. By declaring those issues which are fundamentally supportive of Rumanian chauvinism historical mythology, the work angered and provoked the Rumanian government; thus this history of Transylvania not only became a scholarly concern but entered the political arena. Rumanian government reaction to these volumes has been virulent in the extreme and the academic and cultural media have taken their cue from the government response.

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In this connection it may be useful to examine the motivation of Hungarian historians for producing this work; it should be evident from the amount of work and effort that went into it that it has been in the planning and writing phases for a number of years and thus could not have been motivated by strict political considerations alone. In another sense, however, it represented an ongoing concern which had been kept under political wraps for quite some time; the history of Transylvania, after all, has always been a part of or intimately related to the history of the Hungarian people for a thousand years and has always been studied or written about by Hungarian historians as they dealt with the history of Hungary. The publication of a separate or specific history of Transylvania, however, has been subjected to political restraints for many years since 1946. Hence, the publication of

these three volumes now is not totally unrelated to either the political vicissitudes of the last forty years in Hungary specifically and the Soviet bloc contextually; nor is it unrelated to the much longer tradition of Hungarian historical writing about Transylvania.

The reasons motivating the publication of these volumes were stated and specified in a lecture given by Zsigmond P. Pach (academician and director, Institute of History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences) entitled "Why do we write the History of Transylvania," presented to a professional conference devoted to this topic and published in the literary-cultural weekly *Élet és Irodalom* (Life and Literature).¹⁸ Pach makes three key points in his lecture. First of all, he rejects any association with prior Hungarian nationalism and revisionism, stating in the process that they as Marxists are opposed to all kinds of nationalism and also reject nationalist Hungarian historical writings. Secondly, Pach rejects with equal vehemence the older, newer, and most recent formulations of Rumanian nationalist historiography as well, specifically the theory of Daco-Roman continuity and the related "historical rights" of the Rumanians to Transylvania. This brief critique is then concluded with a third point, namely the unwillingness of Hungarian historians to engage in a nationalist dispute, stressing instead that the history of Transylvania forms an integral part of both Hungarian and Rumanian history and that historical scholarship should not be used to deny the existence or rights of the other.¹⁹

This statement, while undoubtedly academic in tone, and not dealing specifically with the political dimension of the conflict over Transylvania and the human and national rights of the minority populations, nonetheless stands out in bold relief from the bulk of the Rumanian statements and reviews of these three volumes. The reaction of the Rumanian party and political leadership, as first formulated by Ceausescu and repeated by numerous others on many levels and at different forums, accused the Hungarian government of fascist tendencies, Horthyite revisionism, and the utter falsification of history, among other similar charges and characterizations. Many of the statements were then repeated in not only the popular, but also the professional and academic media and official government publications in foreign languages. The vehemence and tone of these responses and reviews have even been noted by western scholars who have reviewed these volumes in literary and professional reviews. Herewith are but two examples. Norman Stone, writing in the *Times* (London) *Literary Supplement*, concludes as follows: "Meanwhile, the sheer hardship of life, in terms of hunger and cold and darkness, is the one thing that has remained genuinely internationalist in present-day Rumania. That darkness, to judge from the over-reaction of the Rumanian Academy of Sciences to a scholarly work of high standard, goes far."²⁰ Another reviewer, Martyn Rady, writing in the *Slavonic and East European Review*, writes the fol-

lowing: "Nevertheless, despite the evident scholarship of its contents and the impressive—and hitherto unsullied—reputation of its individual contributors, *Erdély története* has been roundly condemned in Rumania as a mischievous work which deliberately falsifies the historical record."²¹ It should be noted that this review attempts sympathetically to understand the Rumanian version of Transylvanian history and the Rumanian point of view.²²

Professional reviews of this work inevitably praise its scholarly tone, comprehensiveness, organization, and the conscious effort to incorporate the history of the Saxons and Rumanians. While written from a Hungarian perspective, its discussion of the Rumanian role in the history of Transylvania is quite detailed and balanced; there is no denial of their role and place in Transylvania and the chauvinism expressed by some Hungarian statesmen and writers in the latter nineteenth century is as roundly condemned as the formulations of Rumanian historical mythology. There is some disagreement on the interpretation of the role of the Rumanians in the 1848 revolutions, but then Hungarian historians are not agreed on similar issues concerning 1848 in other parts of Hungary either. There is a very detailed discussion and analysis of the early settlements which conclude, on the basis of archaeological and historical analysis, that the theory of Daco-Roman continuity is not tenable; it should be stressed that some Rumanian archaeologists also dispute that point on the basis of archaeological and historical evidence.²³

It may be instructive to point out that the periodization and some of the discussion is based upon self-confessed Marxist categories, but this is generally subdued and thus only marginally evident. Furthermore, the books are supplemented by comprehensive bibliographies; further documentation can be found in the notes which are not as extensive as one is used to in historical monographs. However, this is not so much a monographic study than a synthesis and if viewed in that context the documentation can be judged as sufficient. There is one disturbing element and that is the excessive role assigned to the history of economic affairs and the vast amount of such detail; this is especially evident in the third volume covering the period since 1830. Intellectual and cultural affairs are not given as much prominence as one would have desired and the role of the churches is mostly limited to their political role. The rich spiritual and theological heritage is not given its proper estimate. These comments notwithstanding, the work achieves its major goal of presenting a synthesis of the history of Transylvania.

Having previously noted the response of Rumania's political leadership to this work, a brief characterization of the reviews and statements of some Rumanian scholars may also prove instructive. Sadly, however, these statements in their essentials follow the lead and tone of the political declara-

tions; indeed it was expected, even mandated that this be so. The work under discussion is generally characterized as a malevolent work which deliberately falsifies history in the service of Hungarian revisionism. An essay by Titus Popovici entitled "Deliberate Falsification of History: Method and Style" manages to gather more invective—punctuated by personal insults against one of the major authors, László Makkai—and distortion into fifteen pages than most writers. Just one example, and by no means the most offensive, is the following: "I shall endeavor to describe the content of *Erdély Története*, a still-born product of a gang-rape of history, showing no leniency to the 'intellectual' stature of the authors of this hybrid concoction which displays a distressing simplicity and lack of sophistication even in the use of nuances."²⁴ One should add that the description of the content assumes the work to be a cheap pulp novel, a characterization varied and repeated any number of times. Obviously, this kind of writing is best left without comment.

Another such critique, while somewhat more subdued in tone, discusses mostly the first volume, specifically the archaeological chapters written mostly by András Mócsy. Not satisfied with disagreeing with Mócsy's conclusions, which is after all a right any reviewer and critic possesses, they constantly characterize it as tendentious and non-scientific; however, the constant repetition of charges without substantial contrary evidence does not qualify as a critical assessment.²⁵

The attribution of ill will, obvious chauvinistic attitudes, the falsification of history—charges constantly repeated—is also typical of an article entitled "A Conscious Forgery of History under the Aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences."²⁶ After a brief review of some contested points typical of most Rumanian critical observations on these themes, the authors, including Stefan Pascu, a leading Rumanian historian specializing in the history of Transylvania, assert "that the national question has been fully and finally settled,"²⁷ thereby denying even the very existence of minority populations in Rumania. After this political assertion, the review goes on to castigate some of the writers personally and bemoans the lack of attention to twentieth century developments, specifically noting that the volume does not mention what the reviewers characterize as the great industrial accomplishments of socialist Rumania.

While it is correct that the history of Transylvania published by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences treats the history of Transylvania beyond 1918 only very briefly in a postscript type of chapter, even that fact may be explained by other considerations. The historical sources and the necessary critical analysis has not as yet been completed and finalized, but more to the point; these events are still too close in time to allow the necessary perspective for a nuanced, sound, and balanced analysis. The events of World War II, the passions engendered by human rights issues, the current

situation of the Hungarian minority there, are all factors which make it emotionally difficult to achieve the necessary scholarly striving for some semblance of objectivity.

The history of twentieth century Transylvania still remains to be written. In this connection, it should be stated that the publication of these volumes has already engendered a renewed interest in the past and present of Transylvania. This interest must be maintained and it is surely to be hoped that cooperation with historians from Rumania, and especially, the involvement of historians from Transylvania's minorities in the future will be possible once the tone changes and the minorities in that country can once again continue to develop their cultural identity. In spite of the hope here expressed, the prospects appear even dimmer if one examines the future of education and cultural life for the minorities there. The destruction of villages planned by the Ceausescu regime, which elicited a huge demonstration in Budapest, also pushes the possibility of intellectual and cultural cooperation further into the future. Even in this context, one of the marchers in the Budapest demonstration carried a sign which read: "We do not wish the return of Transylvania, but rather the restoration of a more human life in Transylvania."²⁸ This sentiment should be read in the light of the statements cited from the reviews published in the Rumanian media.

One can only hope that an abridged English language edition will be made available so that the knowledge about Transylvania in the Western World will become more balanced and more extensive.

Notes

- 1 Statement of the Hungarian government as given in *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), April 2, 1987.
- 2 See for example a review by Norman Stone "Bad blood in Transylvania," *Times Literary Supplement*, October 2-8, 1987, p. 1066.
- 3 These were probably the most sensitive issues in the eyes of the Rumanian reader. The reviews to be cited later tend to confirm this.
- 4 A judgment shared by most reviewers; cf. Stone review cited in note 2.
- 5 Notes by Nandor Dreisziger on recent works related to Transylvanian history, printed in the newsletters of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada and the American Association for the Study of Hungarian History during 1987-88.
- 6 The writings of Gyula Illyés were instrumental in awakening interest in the fate of Hungarian minorities. Some of his essays and poems encouraged many others, such as Sándor Csoóri and István Csurka.
- 7 The Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, an organization of mostly young Hungarians in the U.S. and Canada has been actively involved in the political arena, relief work, and publications. It has issued a number of reports on the situation of Hungarian minorities, and established a broad base of support. There are also numerous other organizations active in the support of human rights in Transylvania in the western world.

- 8 Two articles by the current writer may be of some interest in connection with these matters: "Hungarian Historiography and European Currents of Thought," in *Society in Change: Studies in Honor of Béla K. Király*, ed. S.B. Vardy (Boulder, Co.: *East European Quarterly*, 1983), pp. 391–411; "Inter Arma: Reflections on Seventeenth Century Educational and Cultural Life in Hungary and Transylvania," in *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary*, ed. Béla Király and János Bak (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982), pp. 315–334.
- 9 László Makkai, ed., *Erdély öröksége* (Budapest: Franklin Társulat, 1941), vol. 4.
- 10 *Erdély története*, vol. 2, pp. 1030–1034.
- 11 Much of the historical mythology can still be found in the public consciousness.
- 12 Trianon formed the basis of the Hungarian revisionism and the attempt to undo some of it was the basis of inter-war Hungarian revisionism.
- 13 The comment that Trianon was the greatest tragedy in Hungarian history was once made to this reviewer by John Lukacs. It is certainly comparable to Mohács. Hungarian historians are finally coming to terms with it once again. See the text of a radio interview conducted with a number of Hungarian historians by András Gerő, "Trianon a történelemben és a történeti tudatban," *Világosság*, April 1988, pp. 219–237. It should be stressed that only 3 pages deal with Trianon in the three volume *Erdély története*, almost shockingly disproportionate.
- 14 Some of these would include the various theories about the supposed Turanian and Sumerian origins of the Hungarians; also evident were the number of right radical political organizations.
- 15 *Erdély* (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1940). The volume was also published in a number of foreign languages.
- 16 Compare with some of the Rumanian reviews of the *Erdély története* cited later in this review.
- 17 It is only now that there is ready acceptance of books on minority issues in Hungary.
- 18 *Élet és Irodalom*, Oct. 23, 1987 as reprinted in *Látóhatár*, Jan. 1988, pp. 147–152.
- 19 *Ibid.*, pp. 151–152.
- 20 Stone, review in *Times Literary Supplement* cited in note 2.
- 21 Review of *Erdély története* by Martyn Rady, *The Slavonic and East European Review*, vol. 66, no. 3 (July 1988), p. 482.
- 22 *Ibid.*, pp. 484–485.
- 23 *Erdély története*, vol. 1, p. 301.
- 24 Titus Popovici, "Deliberate Falsification of History: Method and Style," *Romanian Review*, vol. 41, no. 5, p. 87.
- 25 Dumitru Berciu *et al.*, "Fallacious Theses on the Making of the Romanian People and Language," *Romanian Review*, vol. 41, no. 7, pp. 74–88.
- 26 Stefan Pascu *et al.*, "A Conscious Forgery of History under the Aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences," *Romanian Review* vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 3–21.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p. 19.
- 28 *Tüntetés a Hősök Terén* (Budapest: Eötvös, 1988), p. 15.

ERRATUM

In our previous number, Vol. XV, No. 2 (Fall 1988), an error crept into the endnotes of the article by József Vekerdi, "The Gypsies and the Gypsy Problem in Hungary." On page 23 notes 2 and 3 became merged during the process of electronic typesetting putting subsequent notes out of alignment with the numbers in the text. The editors greatly regret this mistake and the inconvenience it caused to everyone concerned.

