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In this issue Oliver Botar traces the evolution of the fortress and city of Buda during the time of the Turkish occupation of Hungary, Thomas Szendrey writes on attitudes in Hungary to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Robert Blumstock examines Arthur Koestler's Hungarian literary connections, and Laszlo K. Gefin analyzes two Hungarian poets' responses to Allan Ginsberg's poem "Howl."

Hungarian Studies Review

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The Editors
Hungarian Studies Review
University of Toronto
21 Sussex Ave.
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OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Oliver A.I. Botar is a doctoral student in Art History at the University of Toronto. He studied urban geography at The University of Alberta, and holds two Masters degrees from the University of Toronto: one in Urban Planning and one in Art History.

Thomas Szendrey is Professor of History at Gagnon University in Erie, Pennsylvania. He has published extensively on Hungarian cultural and intellectual history.

Robert Blumstock of McMaster University's Department of Sociology is a regular contributor of our journal.

Poet, literary critic, and translator, Laszlo K. Gefin teaches in Concordia University's Department of English.

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From European Capital to Ottoman Outpost: The Decline of Buda in the Sixteenth Century

Oliver A. I. Botar

It is generally thought that August 29, 1541, the date of the occupation of Buda by the Ottoman Turks, signalled a complete break in the development of the Hungarian capital. "The flowering urban life of one of Europe's most beautiful and... largest metropolises was brought to an end by the start of the Turks' 150 year occupation."[1] In actual fact, however, if there was one "event" that constituted a decisive break in the life of the city, it was the siege of 1686. Indeed the victorious Habsburg forces found only one *Magyar* family in Buda upon its recapture.[2] What this paper will attempt to demonstrate while describing the changes in Buda during the course of the 16th century, is that on the one hand major changes to the city reflecting Ottoman influence began after 1526, and on the other that it was during the Fifteen Years' War waged by the Habsburg Empire in an attempt to recapture central Hungary — fifty years *into* the Turkish occupation — that the old Buda finally "disappeared." Ottoman rule changed the city's administrative, political, demographic, religious and economic life, as well as its appearance. This essay will try to describe these changes as well as argue the point that the European character of Buda survived to a great extent until the turn of the 17th century.

Before beginning, it should be noted that what is now Budapest, during the 15th–17th centuries, consisted of three royal free towns: Buda, the new capital; Óbuda, the old capital; and Pest, a lively commercial town on the left bank of the Danube. There were also several suburbs of Buda at least one of which, the Víziváros (Water-Town), was walled. In the interest of brevity, this study will concentrate on Buda and its immediate environs and will make only occasional references to the other locales.

I. Historical Background

The Turkic Ottomans conquered their first major city, Bursa, in 1326, exactly 200 years before their victory over the Hungarians at Mohács.[3] After their first European conquest (Tzympe, in 1352),[4] they began to pose a potential threat to the Medieval Hungarian kingdom. The threat finally materialized with the massive defeat of the Hungarians at Mohács in Southern Hungary on August 29, 1526. The death of the young King Louis II while retreating from the battlefield left the country without a leader. The Hungarian nobles subsequently elected two kings, John of Zápolya, crowned on November 10, 1526, and Ferdinand of Habsburg, crowned on November 3, 1527, but elected earlier that year. This resulted in a disastrous civil war that ended not only with John's death in 1540 but also with the disintegration of centralized power in Hungary and the occupation of one-third of the country by the Ottomans after 1541.[5]

Buda itself fell to the Ottomans under curious circumstances. Since King John was vassal to Sultan Suleyman II (i.e., he paid an annual tribute), he ultimately depended on the Sultan's support for the maintenance of his power. After John's death in 1540, Buda, occupied by his widow Queen Izabella, saw the last of several sieges of the civil war. Ottoman aid to defend Buda against Ferdinand's troops was received in 1541, and the Habsburgs were soundly defeated. It was thereafter that the Ottomans' imperialist ambitions became evident. On the pretext of "viewing the town," some of the Sultan's troops entered and promptly occupied it, taking Izabella's troops completely by surprise.[6] This bloodless coup, staged on the anniversary of the defeat at Mohács, was the start of the 145-year Ottoman occupation of Buda. The peaceful nature of the take-over, the essentially friendly relationship between Queen Izabella and the Sultan and the general tolerance shown by the Ottomans to subject peoples were the prime reasons that the subsequent changes to Buda were of a gradual, rather than a sudden nature.

II. Administrative Changes

The bizarre turn of events on August 29, 1541, brought with it considerable changes to the administrative and legal life of the capital. The transfer of power was peaceful (the most peaceful conquest the city had experienced since 1526), except that the conquerors on this occasion had a different religion and culture and represented a foreign power intent on incorporating the kingdom into its empire.

Buda had been a bilingual (German-*Magyar*) royal free town since 1244 with a twelve-member council and a magistrate (mayor). The German-speaking burghers dominated the council membership until 1439, after which six councillors were to be *Magyar* and six German. The mayor, who previously had to be German-speaking, was to be German one year and *Magyar* the next. Latin and German had been the languages of letters, but with the increasing urbanization and cultural development of the *Magyars*, their language came to the fore by the early 16th century.[7]

The breakdown of the old administrative system began with the evacuation of the population in advance of the invading armies in 1526. Though life soon returned to a semi-normal state, the chaotic alternation of kings at Buda weakened the council's fibre and culminated in the disaster of 1529: Buda, which was then in Ferdinand's hands, was besieged by King John's troops, aided, at John's request, by an Ottoman army. After Ferdinand's defeat, the German-speaking patricians who had supported Ferdinand (an Austrian) were promised safe passage from the town. The Ottoman troops slaughtered them outside the city walls, however, as their fellow *Magyar* citizens watched helplessly from inside Buda. Some scholars call this event the greatest single break in the continuity of Buda's civic life, since these patricians, their families and forebears had established the city and had dominated its administration for the previous 300 years. The council list of 1530–31 demonstrates 50 per cent continuity with the previous year, mainly because the *Magyar* patrician families were left intact.[8]

In 1541, a month and a half after Buda had been occupied by the Ottomans, the Sultan issued the following proclamation:

> Everyone in the vilayet of Buda must stay in their places. No one will ever cause them or their children harm. All their property, their houses in the towns and villages, their shops and other buildings and their vineyards and gardens: they may dispose of them as they wish, give them away or transfer property rights in any other way and in the event of their death the property rights pass on to their heirs.[9]

The basic continuity of property and economic life thus ensured, the Ottomans began to set up their new administration. This engendered drastic changes because the Ottoman concept of town, *sehir*, was different from the European one. "Free towns," that is ones which were self-governing, were unknown in the empire; all power was vested in the Sultan and was exercised through his

governors known as *Bejlerbejs*.[10] Furthermore, towns were not viewed as unified communities of citizens, but as collections of separate communities divided along religious rather than ethnic lines, usually occupying separate quarters or *mahalles*. In Buda they recognized four such groups initially: the *Gavurs* (Western Christians, in this case mostly *Magyars*), "Copts" (Eastern Christians, mostly Gypsies), Jews and Moslems. All these groups were organized into distinct bodies and administered separately. By 1557 Dalmatian-Italian traders, mainly from Ragusa (Dubrovnik) had their own community as well.[11]

The town council, which had been dominated by the *Gavurs* and had previously ruled the town, now became a body that represented *Gavur* affairs only. The mayor even received a regular income from the new administration as well as certain tax exemptions. This payment symbolized the "mayor's" dependence on and subservience to the Ottoman administration. Furthermore, the position of mayor was denigrated to "mayor of the *Gavurs*," on an equal footing with the Jewish *Kethüda*, the Dalmatian-Italian Prefect and the Copt *Kenéz* ("Gypsy Vojvod"). There was, to all outward appearances, continuity in council life. Initially Mayor Miklós Turkovics and his council members and clerks retained their positions. Many soon left, however, and Werbőczy, the former captain of the regiment at Buda was named "head mayor" of all Hungarians. During his brief term he attempted to represent his people in this capacity and take their problems and complaints to Üzün Suleyman Pasha, the *Bejlerbej*, calling upon Hungarian law for support. It seems that the Pasha soon tired of this, however, for he apparently had Werbőczy poisoned on one of his visits.

Regular council elections and the use of the old seal of the free royal town for documents continued for the duration of the occupation. These councils soon became aware of their actual role, however (note Werbőczy's case), and referred to themselves as the "Mayor and Councillors of the Christian and Hungarian Eclesiae of Buda." This body issued edicts only when it was permitted to do so by higher powers and was often used as a mouthpiece toward Europe by the Ottoman government. Indeed the council and mayor soon lost all real power and acted solely as a liaison between the authorities and the *Magyars*. No records remain of the Jewish *Kethüdas* or the Copts' *Kenézes* during the entire period of occupation, and it is very likely that these community leaders did not keep written records or issue documents. Also, since the Copts soon converted to Islam, they lost their community status. While it is obvious that the maintenance of council elections and the continu-

ance of the keeping of records had little more than symbolic value during the term of occupation, it is difficult for us now to imagine the importance that even such tokenism had for the *Magyars*, who had ended up as the smallest community in Buda by the 17th century.

Magyar community leaders dealt with the lowest level of the Ottoman administration. The *Emins* and *Basis*, each of whom had his own office, administered such things as market weights and prices, the collecting of ferry duties and the infidel head-tax. The *Sehir emin* was in charge of religious affairs for all the communities and directed the general administration of the town in conjunction with the *Sehir Kethüdazhi* (town manager). These were titular positions only, however, and involved no real political power. Higher offices were for the *vilayet* (a military-administrative division of the empire) of Buda which, for most of the remainder of the 16th century, included all of Ottoman-occupied Hungary as well as northern Bosnia. The *Defterdar* was an important high official in charge of financial matters such as tax assessment and collection, as well as the handling of income from the Sultan's property. The Sultan owned all property in the empire except for private homes, gardens and vineyards. Thus there were no landlords in the European sense of the word.

The position of *Kadi* (judge) was a curious combination of the legal and the administrative. *De jure*, Hungarian law remained in effect for the *Magyars* and, as had always been done, the mayor was responsible for dispensing justice. In actual fact, however, Hungarian law was recognized and allowed to be exercised only in so far as it did not contradict Ottoman law. Any litigation the mayor *Kethüda, Kenéz* or the Prefect could not handle were brought before the *Kadi*. Everyone was allowed to appear before the *Kadi*, though an infidel's evidence was not admissible and a non-Moslem defendant had to have Moslem witnesses to support his case. This, in addition to the infidel head-tax already mentioned, was demonstrative of the way in which all non-Moslems were treated as inferiors. (Even this, however, was in sharp contrast to the fact that Christian rulers in general did not tolerate the existence of Moslem communities at all under their rule.) If the *Kadi* could not handle a case, he would refer it to the *Mufti*, an expert in Koranic law, or *Seriat*, which was supreme in the officially Islamic Ottoman Empire, though its everyday civil application was carried out through the *Kanun* or civil law.

Appeal was possible to the highest official of the *vilayet* government (centred in Buda), i.e., to the *Bejlerbej*. The *vilayet* of Buda was

not only the westernmost, it was also among the last ever established, and so its *Bejlerbejs* enjoyed great prestige in the empire.[12] The *Bejlerbejs* were very powerful: they were military and administrative leaders with the power to overrule any lower legal decision. They were also the final court of appeal, apart from the Sultan himself. Because of this power, they posed a potential threat to the Sultan's authority and so were replaced, often killed, to prevent them from gaining too much support or popularity in their *vilayets*. Thus during 145 years of Ottoman occupation, 75 people served 99 terms of office as the *Bejlerbejs* of Buda. Of these twenty ended their lives by strangulation in office at Buda or at other appointments. Good *Bejlerbejs* were sometimes sent back to Buda for several terms of office — but they never got too attached to their constituency; the average term of office was one-and-a-half years.

The *Bejlerbejs* of 16th century Buda were very conscious of their power and even had royal pretensions. Examples of this include Sokullu Mustafa Pasha's adoption of the royal "we" — not in use in the East — and the holding of elaborate court *divans* in the apartments of the Royal Palace where the *Bejlerbejs* were forbidden to live. (Such use of the Royal Palace ceased after the Fifteen Years' War.) Sokullu Mustafa Pasha, of Bosnian origin, served the longest term of office (1566–1578). This era has often been called the "Golden Age" of Ottoman rule at Buda because he founded so many institutions, and arranged for them to be properly housed.

In summary, administrative changes in Buda started immediately after the occupation, though the Ottomans allowed at least the appearance of continuity for the existing communities. With the drastic decline in the number of descendants of the original inhabitants by the 17th century, however, only traces of the former administrative system were left.

III. Population and Ethno-Religious Changes

Changes in population and in the ethno-religious composition of Buda began when the first refugees from the Szerémség (the region around Belgrade) arrived after their homeland was conquered in the early 1520s. Further change came when the Queen, on hearing of the approach of the Ottoman forces on August 30, 1526, fled with her court to Pozsony (also known as Pressburg, now Bratislava). This move led to mass-panic and most of the population (about 8,000 in the town proper) followed suit.[13] According to the Ottoman historian Ibrahim Pecsevi, the majority of those who remained were taken back to the empire with the Ottoman armies; the Jews were

settled at Saloniki, and the Christians in the Jedikule quarter of Istanbul.[14] In actual fact, however, some residents, including Franciscan monks, were killed, and according to István Nemeskürty, the Jews were sold into slavery because they had supported the Hungarians.[15]

Though the Ottoman armies looted and then burned Buda, they spared the Royal Palace. When the armies returned to the empire soon after, the refugees returned and reoccupied their homes, which were of stone and thus repairable. Some of those who had not fled town, including the Jews, had been lost, but their place was taken by refugees from the south.[16]

Before the siege of 1529, some of Buda's German-speaking population left in the face of the approaching armies. Most of those who did not, were massacred — as has been mentioned above. Thus, one of the two major ethnic components of Buda was almost annihilated twelve years before the actual occupation began. It was after this event that Buda began to take on the ethnic composition of a Balkan city. An Ottoman garrison, including the first group of Moslems to live in Buda, was stationed in the town from that time on. (As we shall see, not all members of the Ottoman forces were Moslems.) Balkan traders began to make their appearance at the markets of Buda after 1530. Few people suspected at that time that soon these exotic-looking people would come to form the majority of the population. In 1539 and 1540 Jews of indeterminate origin settled in the old Jewish quarter.[17] It may be that some of these families were among those who had been deported in 1526.

The year 1541 brought with it further shifts in population. The Queen and her modest court moved to Transylvania a few days after the Ottomans occupied Buda, causing many of the court nobles to move as well, though a few (Werbőczy, for example) elected to stay and help the remaining population. Since few expected the occupation to last for very long, some of the burghers also remained, and of those who left, most went to Royal Hungary or even to less conspicuous towns in Ottoman-occupied Hungary. As the tales of horror associated with the Ottomans proved to be unfounded, some of those who left soon returned. The Dalmatian traders, the Balkan-Slavs who had come after 1530, and the Greek Orthodox Gypsies all elected to stay.[18] Some of the Jews who had been deported in 1526 returned after 1541, and by 1547 (including those who had come in 1539–40) there were 75 Jewish families in Buda.[19]

The most immediate demographic effect of the occupation was the contingent of soldiers and officials who settled in Buda, initially without their families. According to estimates, three thousand

soldiers and some officials, most of whom were probably of Balkan-Slavic origin (and many of whom were Greek Catholics) remained in Buda after the conquering forces left. It is an interesting fact that ethnic Turks were actually in the minority among the occupying forces at Buda from the start. It is for this reason that it is a misnomer to use the term "Turks," as many historians do, to describe these occupying forces.[20]

The tax assessments taken by the *Defterdar* in 1546, 1559, 1562 and 1580 provide valuable clues to the ethnic composition of Buda's population during the first period of the occupation.[21] If one estimates about five members per household, then the non-Moslem population of Buda in 1546 was around 2,000.[22] Their ethnic make-up was as follows: 60 per cent *Magyar*, 20 per cent Jewish and 20 per cent Gypsy. As the years progressed, the percentage of *Magyars* tended to decrease, that of the Jews tended to remain constant, while that of the Gypsies increased. The Gypsies converted to Islam by 1580 and were subsequently not treated as a separate group, while most of the Jews moved to Székesfehérvár after 1598 to avoid the constant warring. Their numbers began to increase again only after 1627.[23] The Dalmatians also left during the Fifteen Years' War. It has been estimated that by 1580 there were 1,200 to 1,300 non-Ottoman people in Buda and 2,500–2,600 Ottoman soldiers, officials and traders (with their families) both Moslem and Greek Catholic. Of these people, 75 per cent were southern Slavs, the rest Turkish, Albanian and Greek. As an Italian traveller noted in 1567, "almost every 'Turk' here spoke Croatian."[24]

The high mortality rate between 1546 and 1559 (e.g., 209 of 366 *Magyar* men enumerated were dead by 1559) was probably due to an outbreak of plague in the early fifties. That the *Magyars* found life under Ottoman rule tolerable is illustrated by the fact that only seven families left during 1546–59. Two were noted as having "escaped," although what was meant by "escape" is not specified. Because of the high death-rate, and because the *gavurs* were not permitted to settle in Buda, however, the *Magyar* population declined by 59 per cent. Thus the number of *Magyar* families decreased from 269 in 1546 to around 190 by the 1560s. Their numbers were even more drastically reduced during the Fifteen Years' War starting in the early 1590s, especially during the sieges of 1598, 1602 and 1603. By the 17th century there were very few *Magyars* left in Buda.

The city's ethnic groups were geographically segregated during the 16th century. At first the Hungarians lived in its larger, northern end (north of the old Szent György tér — St. George's Square). The

Dalmatians and Jews lived there as well, each on their traditional streets. Soldiers and traders occupied the southern end of the town, that nearest the palace, as well as the palace area itself, where barracks were set up. By the end of the century, as the numbers of *Magyars*, Dalmatians and Jews decreased, the houses north of St. George's Square (by that time known as Orta Mosque Square) were for the most part owned by the Balkan newcomers.

By the 17th century Buda had been transformed from a town with two major and two minor ethnic groups into a Balkan-type town made up of a dozen nationalities, speaking several languages and belonging to different religions. The majority of the population was Balkan-Slav, and theirs were the most commonly spoken languages. The dominant social group was the Moslem-Turk and Balkan-Ottoman military-official class. The official language was Turkish, although documents were also issued in Hungarian as the need arose.

It is noteworthy that the Reformation spread throughout Hungary during the Ottoman occupation.[25] It created internal dissent in a community that could ill afford such divisions. Indeed it has been suggested that the Ottomans were a mediating force in these disputes, forcing all the Christians of Buda to share the Church of Mary Magdalene, for example. The Ottomans even allowed the Church to retain some of its property in order to sustain itself. In 1547, for example, it still owned a mill on the Danube and had two schools associated with it, one Catholic and one Protestant. There was even an organist among the *Magyars* in 1547. A report of 1555 stated that the Catholics used the choir of the church, and the Protestants the nave, suggesting that already then the Protestants outnumbered the Catholics. In a later report in 1587, Reinhold Lubenau noted a wooden partition dividing the nave into two sections. By that time the *Magyars* were said to have been Protestant and the Catholic community made up of Dalmatians.[26] It seems that not only had the *Magyars* become Protestant, but they had further converted from their original Lutheranism to Calvinism (the Hungarian Reformed Church) and even Anabaptism.[27]

The continuity of Roman Catholic life in Buda seems to have been broken by the wholesale departure of the Dalmatians after the sieges of 1598 and 1602 during the Fifteen Years' War, and it did not resume until 1635 when Bosnian Catholics settled there.[28] As a sign of the Ottoman administration's displeasure at this attempt to recapture the city, they closed down the Church of Mary Magdalene in 1595, and it was later converted into the Fetih (Victory) Mosque. In contrast to the fate of Catholicism, Protestant *Magyar* life

continued in Buda. Despite their vastly reduced numbers, the Protestants maintained their school, and in the 17th century they even acquired an old church, although they sometimes had to rely on ministers coming up from Óbuda to conduct their services.[29]

Jewish sources indicate that Buda became a seat of Talmudic learning during the 16th century, making it "a great city of the wise and learned, one of the strongest communities of the diaspora." There were three synagogues, one for the German-speaking Jews (Ashkenazim), another for the Spanish Sephardic Jews from Salonika and still another for the Syrian-rite Jews.[30] As has been mentioned, the Jews of Buda moved to Székesfehérvár during the Fifteen Years' War to escape the fighting.

Thus we can see how fragmented the various religious communities were. The dominant Moslem class consisted of Turks, Bosnians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, Gypsies and Albanians. The Orthodox Christians were made up of Balkan Slavs and Greeks, and the Roman Catholics of Dalmatians, later some Bosnians and a few Croatians. The Protestant *Magyars* were divided into Lutheran, Calvinist and Anabaptist groups. The Jewish community consisted of German and Polish Ashkenazim, as well as the more recently arrived Sephardic and Syrian Jews. Nevertheless, the continuity of all the communities of medieval Buda, with the exception of the Germans, was maintained until the Fifteen Years' War. This war not only caused the central Christian church of Buda to be closed down, but it also resulted in the departure of the established Dalmatian and Jewish communities and in the further drastic reduction in the number of *Magyars*. By the 17th century, only a minuscule *Magyar* community remained as a remnant of the original population.

IV. Physical Changes

The physical aspect of Buda changed the least during the second half of the 16th century. This is not particularly surprising since throughout their history the Ottomans captured towns intact whenever possible, and then used them for their own purposes, making changes only as the need arose. They were not city-builders and, consequently, did not have the skill or tradition to expand Buda. Nevertheless, the Ottomans viewed towns in general, and Buda in particular, in a way totally different from that of the original population. They regarded Buda first and foremost as a military stronghold, a garrison town on the northwestern marches of their empire. This was in stark contrast to what Buda had been previously, the Gothic-Renaissance capital of a Christian kingdom.

Nevertheless, upon taking a town the Ottomans claimed that they would raise it to a level of "higher flowering," based on the twin pillars of Islam and the military.[31] The first structural change that took place was the conversion of the "den of infidels" — the Church of the Virgin Mary (formerly the German parish church) — into a "house of God," a mosque. The mosque was originally named after Sultan Süleyman, the Sultan during whose reign the town was conquered, but it later became known as the Büjük (Great) Mosque because it was the largest religious structure, and it finally became known as the Eski (Old) Mosque because it had been the first to be established.

In preparing the church for the thanksgiving service after the conquest of 1541, all unnecessary objects such as pews, statuary and pictures were removed. Since any pictorial representations of sacred themes were considered blasphemous by the Moslems, the paintings, frescoes and mosaics that decorated the interior of the church were plastered over. Decorative quotations from the Koran were then painted on the plaster along with some geometric or floral patterns. The building was then outfitted with the necessary equipment such as the *Mihrab* (a nook where the Koran is kept) and the *Minbar* (a stand from which the Koran is read out loud). The floor was covered with carpets, their patterns oriented towards Mecca. Later, minor structural alterations were made: the bricking up of the bottom three-quarters of the windows to reduce incoming light and the construction of wooden balconies around the steeple to enable the *Muezzin* to call the faithful to prayer from "the four corners of the Earth."[32]

Two other churches were soon converted to mosques in Buda, the Royal Chapel in the Palace — which became the Seraj (Palace) Mosque — and St. George's Church — which became the Orta (Central) Mosque. (Minarets were often added to converted churches.) Historian Győző Gerő has pointed out that the conversion of the churches, the extant centres of town life, into the new focal points, the mosques, did much to preserve the traditional urban structure of Buda. The maintenance of the old market places also had this effect. Other, less centrally located churches were used for non-religious purposes, and the Church of Mary Magdalene was retained for use by the Christians until 1594.

A more obvious change in the townscape than the conversion of churches into mosques was the alterations made to the streets.[33] Hundreds of small wooden, thatch and mud booths that served as little shops, workshops and stables now crowded the streets. Narrow lanes replaced the formerly wide avenues to serve as pedestrian

walkways. The streetscape was thus significantly altered without any major structural changes taking place.

In addition to their new appearance, the newcomers did not look upon these streets as the original inhabitants did. The Ottomans, in the Eastern mode, did not orient themselves according to streets, but rather according to *mahalles*. Arabic in origin, *mahalle* referred to a quarter centering on something, usually a mosque, and usually named after it. It was the focal point of the *mahalle*, rather than its boundary, that was definite. However, the area inhabited by a particular religious or ethnic group (such as the Jews, for example) could also be considered a *mahalle*, even if it did not have one focal point in particular.[34] In Buda the city assessment of 1547 referred to two quarters, the Jewish and the Coptic, as *mahalles*; the rest were regular street names with the word *mahalle* attached.[35] As Ottoman life developed in Buda, these European street names disappeared and Eastern-style *mahalle* names appeared. By the time of the 1563 assessment, the old street names had been dropped, though there is evidence that some streets actually did acquire Turkish names in common usage. It seems that in the end, just as Gothic churches were converted as well as new buildings constructed to serve as mosques, the Ottomans adopted both systems of orientation and used whichever was more convenient.[36]

It has often been said that the Ottomans built nothing at Buda. Yet it is only fair to point out that Buda was already extensively developed, and that they did not tear anything down, but rather converted existing structures to their own use. In the Viziváros and in Pest, for example, where fewer existing structures met their needs, the Ottomans built extensively. The only new mosque in Buda proper was the one built in the former Royal Gardens in the Jeni Mahalle (New Quarter). Of the several mosques built in the Viziváros (or Varos as the Ottomans referred to it) and the Tabán (Turkish: Debaghane), the best examples are Tojgun Pasha's mosque, apparently designed by the great Greek-Ottoman architect Kosua Sinan in 1553–56, and Osman Bej's mosque, which survived well into the 18th century.

On the Buda side of the Danube the hotspring baths (*ilidje*) formed an impressive group of buildings, giving the town here an Eastern character. Buda had been famous since medieval times for its hotsprings and its baths.[37] The Ottomans, for whom baths were extremely important, began building new ones soon after 1541. By 1686 nine baths were counted on the Buda side alone. Interestingly enough, though most of the Western travellers during the occupation (Werner, Gerlach, Wratislaw, Lubenau, Brown, etc.) found

them to be the most impressive new aspect of Ottoman Buda, the baths were almost invariably omitted from the engravings of the town. This was possibly because the baths, which were low-domed structures, did not have enough of a vertical component to interest the late medieval town-view artists, who were still obsessed with verticality.[38] The best of the baths were, as were the mosques, in the late 16th century Ottoman-Turkish "classical" style, in the mode of the Sinan school but Bosnian-provincial in character.[39] At least three of these were founded by Sokullu Mustafa Pasha in the 1570s: the Yeshil Direkli Ilidjesi (Bath of the Green Column) in the Debaghane (the modern Rudas Baths), the Király Bath in the Varos and the Császár Bath (1570) outside the walls, north of the Varos. Another one, the Debaghane Ilidjesi (modern Rác Bath) also survives in the Tabán. There were at least two *hamams* (Turkish steam baths) in Buda, one in the *Bejlerbej's* Palace (built somewhere near St. John's Church) and one in the Hamam Jolu (Bath Street). These, as well as the *Bejlerbej's* Palace, were built around the turn of the century, when the Fifteen Years' War forced the *Bejlerbej* to take up residence in the castle.[40]

Other types of buildings were constructed as well. Next to the Büjük Mosque was the *bezistan* (covered market) of Buda, where hardware was sold. Another aid to commerce was the *han* (caravanserai), several of which were built on the Buda side of the Danube, one near the Yeshil Direkli Ilidjesi in the Debaghane.[41] Several schools (*madrasas*), minor mosques (*mechets*) and soup kitchens (*imarets*) were constructed as well — as the need arose and as the bequests of private individuals made possible.[42] Six *tekkes* or *dergahs* (Dervish monasteries) were also built near Buda, the most famous one being Gül Baba's, whose *türbe* (small mausoleum) still survives.[43] The Ottomans also constructed fortifications: walls, earth berms, towers and rondellas, a few of which survive to this day.[44]

We can see then that the Ottomans did build extensively during their stay. The worsening economic situation, however, and the fact that needs were by then largely met, put an end to such activity by the 17th century.

In contrast to the construction and maintenance of public structures, which was a very important aspect of Ottoman community life, little attention was paid to the private sphere. Thus, houses were usually left structurally untouched. The rooms were subdivided with partitions of wattle and daub, and windows blocked with bricks, mud or straw. When the houses fell into disrepair, improvements were attempted through replacing brick-vaulted ceilings with flat tile roofs and stone balconies with wooden ones. As

houses deteriorated completely, they were replaced with Turkish-Balkan style brick, wood and tile houses. This was true only in the suburbs, however, where the stringent construction standards of Buda proper (including limestone construction) had not applied before the occupation.[45]

This did not impress Western visitors to Buda during the occupation. Indeed, almost all of them noted the general decay of the town. As early as 1555 the German traveller Hans Dernschwamm noted that:

> One house after the next is falling into ruin and [the Turks] build nothing, only just enough for a Turk to live in .... The houses have become pig-sties because they have blocked the old large windows and doors to such an extent that they are unrecognizable. They do not use the cellars, which are filled with trash and dirt. Booths have been built in front of them on the streets .... The Defterdar lives in the old Fugger house, but a wooden stable extending to the old town hall has defaced it.[46]

Later, in 1573, during the builder Sokullu Mustafa's term of office, Habsburg ambassador Stephen Gerlach gave the following account:

> one must be sorry that this beautiful town has become a pig-stye and dog-house, because only the outer walls of the once fine buildings survive; the interiors are ugly and plain: the beautiful balconies and windows are destroyed, filled with mud. It must have been a glorious city. Here (as elsewhere) the Turk builds nothing and repairs nothing.[47]

This general impression of decay was noted by many other visitors as well.[48]

Of course these were Western Europeans looking at what had been a European town, maintained by European standards. There were several reasons for the low level of maintenance at Buda. First, Balkan-Turkish standards of housing were generally lower than in Europe; and consequently expectations were low. Indeed Busbecq claimed that the Moslems found it somewhat immoral to build or maintain fancy houses — the dwelling places of our short transient lives maintained as if men wanted to live forever. It was the public buildings such as baths and mosques that money was spent on.[49] Moreover, much of the Ottoman population at Buda was military in nature. Often soldiers lived without their families in these houses, or even if their families were with them, they would never stay for very

long; and so it was not in their interest to keep the houses well maintained. Also, one did not want to display too much private wealth even if one had it, because of the high taxes. This was true especially for the *gavurs*: "Never was the hiding of money more in vogue than then," writes the historian Ferenc Salamon.[50] Furthermore, even if one wanted to implement repairs, it was difficult to get permission to do so. While there is no record of a *mimar-aga* (building inspector) in Buda, as there was in other Ottoman cities, numerous records remain describing the difficulty and the bribery necessary to gain permission, especially for *gavurs*, to repair their homes and churches. *Gavurs* were also subject to height restrictions, i.e., they could not have houses taller than those of Moslems, which were already low by European standards. If repairs to churches were allowed, these were not to constitute improvements over the original state, and so repairs necessarily involved a decline in standards of construction, e.g., from a tile roof to a thatched one.[51]

Buda had sustained much damage, even before 1541, during the sieges of 1526 and the civil war, but repairs had always been carried out according to the old standards. As limestone buildings tended to be replaced with wooden and wattle and daub structures, however, the danger of fire increased. Thus, major fires broke out in 1566, 1577 and 1583. There were also gunpowder explosions in 1578 and during the Fifteen Years' War in 1603 and 1606. The gunpowder explosion of 1578 was the most serious disaster Buda had ever seen. It destroyed many houses, severely damaged the Royal Palace, blew cannons into the Danube and killed two thousand people.[52] These fires and explosions probably did more than anything else to change the face of Buda.

As a quasi-public structure with little or no public use during the Ottoman era, the Royal Palace fell into ruin. As mentioned, the *Bejlerbejs* were forbidden to live there. Presumably the Sultans wanted to prevent any pretensions to royalty and power from arising among the *Bejlerbejs*. The Ottomans, ever since Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent had ambled around the palace in 1526, had always referred to the palace with great appreciation. In the 1660s the historian Evlia Chelebi "went down on his knees" to thank Allah for allowing him to see the legendary "Kizil Elma" (Golden Apple — as the Ottomans referred to the palace).[53] It is not surprising that the Ottomans should be so proud that one of the major Medieval-Renaissance royal palaces in Europe was in their possession. What is surprising is that given this admiration, they should allow it to deteriorate to such an extent. This probably would not have happened had people other than transient soldiers been

allowed to live in its various wings. It had no enemy — as the churches had — but it had no benefactor either, and slowly, through fires, explosions and general neglect, it fell into ruin, a ruin completed by a gunpowder explosion during the siege of 1686.

V. Economic Changes

The decline of Buda's economic might began with the loss of property associated with the 1526 evacuation and burning of the city,[54] and with the loss of the economically dominant German segment of the population in 1529. These German burghers had had strong financial and trade connections with southern Germany and these ties were largely severed. Indeed, as an indication of its decreased confidence, the Fugger Bank closed its Buda office some time during the early 1530s — dealing a serious blow to the town's economic life. The nearly simultaneous appearance of Balkan traders from the south demonstrated the shift in economic orientation being caused by the Ottoman threat,[55] still several years before the actual takeover in 1541. The occupation did bring with it significant changes to Buda's economic life, but, given the Ottomans' *laissez-faire* policy with respect to the market-place and to industry, the remaining Hungarians were free to carry on with their established trades and commercial activities.[56]

Tax records show that between 1558 and 1590 (along with their numbers as a whole), the total number of non-Moslem tradesmen at Buda declined from 124 to 42.[57] Meanwhile the number of trades pursued by the non-Moslem population declined from 28 to 16 during the same period. Significant, however, is the fact that the proportions of the various industrial sectors as percentages of the total changed little among the non-Moslem population between 1558 and 1590 (the food and clothing sectors remaining the most important), except for a marked increase in the metal-working industry — perhaps a reflection of a response to the increased local market for metalware among the Ottoman peoples of Buda.

This overall continuity in sector proportions of non-Moslem industry is indicative of a continuity in the industrial life of the remaining Hungarians at Buda up to the start of the Fifteen Years' War in 1591. Indeed it has been pointed out that the elimination of the German-speaking segment of the population in 1529 meant increased economic opportunities for the *Magyar* burghers; and the influx of Ottoman soldiers and administrative personnel after 1541 meant — after the initial insecurity was overcome — increased local

markets for some of their goods. In 1547, for example, 23 flour mills were in operation at Buda (milling being largely in *Magyar* hands at that time). A generation later, however, 44 were in operation.[58]

The continuity of the commercial activities of the remaining Hungarians was aided, as mentioned, by the Ottomans' *laissez-faire* attitude to the market-place — there was no discrimination against non-Moslems in the commercial field, as there was in personal taxation and in the judicial system. The Hungarians' traditional coinage (the *forint* i.e. the Hungarian Florin) and system of weights and measures were respected, although Ottoman coinage (the *gurus* and *akche*) and measures tended to gain in importance as the level of Hungarian commercial activity declined over time.

While Hungarians at Buda were free to trade, the Ottoman occupation brought with it new circumstances for commerce — changed tariffs and tariff borders, vastly altered transportation conditions, and new markets. Buda was an important trading centre up to the time of the Fifteen Years' War, as shown by tariff records of the period.[59] As expected, the percentage of Moslem traders eventually increased. By the 1580s, for example, 60 per cent of the traders were Moslems, while 30 per cent were Christians and 10 per cent were Jews. Christians and Jews actually handled 60 per cent of the *value* of goods, however, emphasizing their continuing importance. Several *Magyar* traders of Buda were known to have had large-scale trading operations because of their links with traditional commercial partners in the West.[60] Indeed, the *Magyars* handled most of the trade with the West. Western goods such as textiles, knives and helmets — which were traded for cattle and other agricultural products — were available in Buda as long as these trade connections were maintained. A cache of money, belonging, in all likelihood, to a *Magyar* trader at Buda and hidden during the early 1570s, included coins from all over Germany, Austria and the Low Countries, as well as from Venice.[61]

That this Western trade was significant at Buda during this period is demonstrated by the fact that in 1571, fully one-third of the textiles imported to Buda were of Western origin.[62] Western trade dried up after the 1580s, however, probably due to Ottoman administrative measures — possibly linked to the increased tension that was soon to result in war.[63] Commercial interaction with the West almost disappeared with the onset of war in the 1590s.[64] This no doubt ruined the remaining Christian traders who had depended on this trade for their livelihood. The subsequent unavailability of Western goods on the markets of Buda made life for the



Fig. 1.
M. Mevian (Merian) Buda (and, in the background, Pest) as seen from the West, ca. 1683. Etching and engraving. 19.4 × 32.7 cm.



Fig. 2.
J.N. Hallart, after N. Wening. Siege of Buda in 1684 as seen from the north. At the upper left, Pest. Óbuda, at lower centre. Tabán (Debaghnane) at upper centre. Viziváros (Varos) at centre. Engraving and etching. 28.4 × 40.3 cm.

remaining descendants of the pre-1541 population even more uncomfortable, and was one more factor that led to their mass-departure during the war.[65]

VI. Conclusions

In drawing conclusions from this study it is important to keep in mind that in Ottoman-occupied Hungary, Buda represented one of three types of towns, that of the Ottoman garrison town and administrative centre. This type of settlement is to be distinguished from the suburbs of these towns (such as Óbuda, for example) and the unfortified mezővárosok (agricultural towns), which remained *Magyar*-populated, unoccupied by Ottoman forces and largely self-administering during the Ottoman period. These retained their *Magyar* character far more than did fortified towns such as Buda, Székesfehérvár and Gyula, for example. Even nearby Pest saw a far greater survival of *Magyar* life within its walls during the 17th century than did Buda.

While the occupation of Buda by the Ottomans in 1541 caused great changes in the life of the city, it is hoped that this study has demonstrated that: 1) the shift from European capital to Ottoman outpost began as early as 1526, and 2) there was considerable continuity in the life of the capital after 1541, and the final extinction, so to speak, of the European life of the city came with the Fifteen Years' War — sixty years into the occupation.[66] Indeed, it has been pointed out elsewhere that it was the Fifteen Years' War, rather than the Ottoman conquest itself, which constituted the greatest catastrophe for the people and the economy of the Hungarian Kingdom during the Ottoman period.[67] The important thing to remember here is that it was warfare, rather than the occupation itself, which caused the greatest damage to Hungary at the time.[68]

In the case of Buda, the city passed into Ottoman hands without a struggle, so there was no physical destruction associated with the act of occupation itself. By order of the Sultan, there was continued ownership of private property, a large degree of personal security under the circumstances — initially, the option to leave was also provided — and a high level of continuity in industrial and commercial life. There was, in addition, some degree of administrative and judicial tradition carried on in the form of a modicum of self-government for the remaining original inhabitants and the retention of the symbols of their former government. Though taxed for their Christianity, the remaining population was free to exercise

and change its religion, and was under no particular pressure to become Moslem.

The deteriorated political climate associated with the Fifteen Years' War, however, saw the closing down of Christian churches at Buda and the restriction of their traditional commercial ties with the West. The physical destruction caused by the sieges of the war, the fires and explosions associated with it, and the concomitant loss of population through death and emigration, meanwhile, caused the near-extinction of *Magyar* life within the walls of the former capital. Thus, while the period after 1541 had seen a steady decline in specifically *Hungarian* life in the capital, it was the Fifteen Years' War that constituted its death blow. Had the united Habsburg forces succeeded in recapturing Buda at that time, one could have assumed the continued presence of Hungarian life in the city. As it happened, such continuity — unlike even in nearby Pest and Óbuda[69] — cannot be assumed.

Notes

1. László Zolnay, *Ünnep és hétköznap a középkori Budán* [Feastday and Workaday in Medieval Buda] (2nd ed.; Budapest, 1975), p.8.
2. *Ibid.*, p.9 and Sándor Takáts, *Rajzok a török világból* [Sketches from the Turkish World] (Budapest, 1915), p. 114. It should be noted that medieval Hungary was a multi-ethnic kingdom consisting of large numbers of Germans, Slavs, Wallachians (Romanians) and smaller numbers of Jews, Dalmatians, Italians, Frenchmen and others, as well as the dominant *Magyars*, the ethnic group then still in the majority. Therefore the term "*Magyar*" will be used to denote that ethnic group, whereas "Hungarian" will be used to denote that which is of or from the Kingdom of Hungary. The term "Ottoman" denotes the conquering group commonly known as "Turks." The latter term refers to another dominant ethnic group, that of the Ottoman Empire. Modern-day Turkish historians also prefer the use of the term "Ottoman" in such cases, since many, indeed most of the conquering people in Hungary were Balkan Slav, Albanian or Greek in origin.
3. Gyula Káldy-Nagy, *Harács-szedők és ráják* [Plunderers and Rajas] (Budapest, 1970), p.11.
4. *Ibid.*, p.13.
5. Of the many historical treatments of this period, see, István Nemeskürty, *Önfia vágta sebét* [His Son Inflicted the Wound] (Budapest, 1975), pp.205–500; and, by the same author, *Ez történt Mohács után* [This Happened after Mohács] (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1968).
6. Lajos Fekete and Lajos Nagy, "Budapest története a török korban" [The History of Budapest in the Turkish Age], in *Budapest története a későbbi középkorban és a török hódoltság idején [The History of Budapest during the Late Medieval Period and during the Turkish Occupation]*, eds. László Gerevitch and Domokos Kosáry (*Budapest története* [The History of Budapest], Vol. II [Budapest, 1973]), pp.229–30.
7. *Ibid.*, pp.218–19. See also: Martyn C. Rady, *Medieval Buda: A Study of Municipal Government and Jurisdiction in the Kingdom of Hungary.* (Boulder, Colorado, 1985).
8. *Ibid.*, p.218.

9. *Ibid.*, p.397.
10. The more commonly used term "Pasha" refers to the military rank of the individual *Bejlerbejs*, most of whom were "Pashas."
11. On Buda's Ottoman administration, the source was Fekete and Nagy, pp.397–407.
12. Káldy-Nagy, p.93.
13. *Ibid.*, p.108. Káldy-Nagy gives this figure as the approximate population in 1494–95.
14. Fekete and Nagy, p.200.
15. Nemeskürty, p.245.
16. Fekete and Nagy, pp.201–02.
17. *Ibid.*, pp.213–15. In all probability they too came from the Balkans.
18. *Ibid.*, p.385.
19. *Ibid.*, p.386. Twenty-five of these seventy-five families were listed as being of "recent Balkan origin." It is likely that some of them were returnees.
20. See *ibid.*, pp.386–87, and Káldy-Nagy, p.112 for the number of Ottoman soldiers in 1543. The ethnic Turks remained a minority for the entire occupation period.
21. Nemeskürty, pp.109–13.
22. Káldy-Nagy, p.115–16; 390 heads of households were counted in 1546, plus 19 singles.
23. Fekete and Nagy, p.386. On this see also David P. Daniel, "The Fifteen Years' War and the Protestant Response to Habsburg Absolutism in Hungary," *East Central Europe*, VIII, 1–2 (1981), pp.38–51; and Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus* (New York, 1972).
24. Fekete and Nagy, p.387.
25. Nemeskürty, p.519.
26. Albert Gárdonyi, "Buda és Pest keresztény lakossága a török hódoltság alatt" [The Christian Population of Buda and Pest during the Turkish Occupation], *Tanulmányok Budapest múltjából* [Studies from Budapest's Past], V (1936), p.15.
27. *Ibid.*, p.16.
28. Fekete and Nagy, p.227.
29. The material for the preceding section was from *ibid.*, p.411 and Gárdonyi, pp.14–15 unless otherwise indicated.
30. Fekete and Nagy, p.413.
31. *Ibid.*, p.360.
32. Győző Gerő, *Az oszmán-török építészet Magyarországon* [Ottoman-Turkish Architecture in Hungary] (Budapest, 1980), pp. 31–32; Lajos Fekete, "Mohamedán vallási és szellemi élet a törökkori Budán" [Moslem Religious and Intellectual Life at Buda during the Turkish Period], in *Tanulmányok Budapest múltjából* [Studies from Budapest's Past], IX (1941), p. 120.
33. Fekete and Nagy, p.353.
34. Gerő, pp.30–31.
35. Káldy-Nagy, pp.108–09.
36. Fekete and Nagy, p.348.
37. *Ibid.*, p.361.
38. Gerő, p.33.
39. *Ibid.*, pp.124–25.
40. Győző Gerő, *Turkish Monuments in Hungary* (Budapest, 1976), pp.31–39.
41. Gerő, *Az oszmán-török...*, pp.32–34.
42. Káldy-Nagy, pp.101–04.
43. Veli Bej's *türbe* has not survived. Fekete and Nagy, pp.416–17 and Gerő, *Turkish Monuments ...*, pp.34–35.
44. Fekete and Nagy, p.360.
45. Zolnay, p.69 and Káldy-Nagy, p.66.
46. Káldy-Nagy, p.106.
47. *Ibid.*, p.107.
48. Busbecq, 1554; Schweiger, 1576; Wratislaw, 1591; Bocatius, 1605; Leszlie, 1666.

49. Ferenc Salamon, *Magyarország a török hódoltság korában* [Hungary during the Age of the Turkish Occupation] (Budapest, 1926), p.186.
50. *Ibid.*, p.193.
51. *Ibid.*, pp.189–91. 52. There were more fires in 1625, 1627, 1635, 1658, 1660 and 1669.
53. Fekete and Nagy, pp.363–64.
54. *Ibid.*, p.201.
55. *Ibid.*, pp.214–15, and Vera Zimányi, "Gazdasági és társadalmi fejlődés Mohácstól a 16. század végéig" [Economic and Social Development from Mohács to the End of the Sixteenth Century], *Századok* CXIV, 4 (1980), p.545.
56. *Ibid.*, p.215.
57. Fekete and Nagy, pp.367–68. The material for the remainder of this passage is also from this source.
58. *Ibid.*, p.367.
59. *Ibid.*, p.376.
60. Káldy-Nagy, pp.120–22.
61. Lajos Huszár, "A Fortuna utcai éremlelet Budán" [The Coin Find of Fortuna Street at Buda], in *Tanulmányok Budapest múltjából VII (1939), pp.181–87.*
62. Fekete and Nagy, p.377.
63. Ibid.
64. *Ibid.*, p.379.
65. *Ibid.*, p.380.
66. Fekete and Nagy, p.387.
67. Takáts, p.111.
68. This point is emphasized throughout Gárdonyi, "Buda és Pest...," especially pp.13, 23 and 18.
69. *Ibid.*

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Remembering 1956: Some Reflections on the Historical Consciousness of a New Generation

Thomas Szendrey

In any discussion of the issues of historical consciousness — specifically the impact of historical knowledge upon the thought patterns, emotional and spiritual dimensions of human events, indeed the very life and future of a given generation at a certain moment in human history — there comes to mind a whole series of observations and maxims about the impact of historical knowledge upon life. This is especially the case for that modern man who lives in one of the most historically conscious eras of human history and whose thought-processes have become permeated with the historical dimension of our human existence. Furthermore, human beings today are not always properly aware about what informs or ought to inform their consciousness about past and present and the relationships involved.

Before turning to the specific context — namely the historical consciousness of a new generation on Hungary and, indeed, among Hungarians beyond the Hungarian frontiers — one must at the very least spend a few moments and deal with the more general dimensions of the concern, which are as significant as the details about the thought and attitudes of one generation at a particular confluence of the historical process, only because we inevitably know more about the particulars and have generally failed to attend to those general and mostly philosophical issues which make possible even the meaningful discussion of the particular. Thus, historical consciousness, to be a positive and productive phenomenon must be based upon pertinent and proper historical knowledge and by proper is meant (for our purposes) the most nearly accurate, truthful, and comprehensive account achievable, not necessarily only in its details, but more in terms of the verisimilitude of the over-all presentation. In terms, after all, of the quality of historical

knowledge, achievable comprehensiveness in details is a responsibility of the historian; verisimilitude — as well as the ability to perceive connections among events, ideas, and attitudes — belong to the level of virtue and excellence in historical scholarship.

That great wit and also great historian (indeed a significant advocate of the philosophy of history) Voltaire quipped that history was written by the winners; if we were to accept all the implications of this pithy observation, it would be best to stop at this point and accept the fact that the history of the 1956 revolution in Hungary has already been written by the winners, or by those who have joined in some way the winning side. Some of their books have even been published in English language editions to make their version better known beyond the borders of Hungary. I am, of course, making a specific reference to the book of János Berecz as his work was obviously intended to present (to use Voltaire's dictum once again) the version of those who have emerged victorious.[1] In connection with this, however, it should be stressed that one of the things most historians know only too well is how ephemeral the notion of winners and loosers really is, even if one remains on the rather simplistic level of unexamined judgment. As historians it is obviously our fundamental obligation to search for and present the attainable truth in a truthful context. Hence, we must not accept the winner's version, although we disregard it at our peril, because the official accounts of winners sometimes harden into — sad to say — accepted historical "sources" and interpretations with the devastating consequences not only for the attainable historical truth, but also for the destiny of a people and the resultant false and thus damaging historical consciousness of many individuals, indeed sometimes of a generation or more. This concept of historical consciousness, specifically the notion of false consciousness, is not exactly unknown to Marxists and plays a role in the shaping of the proper understanding of history central to their system. The constantly revised versions of the so-called *Short Course* history of the Communist party produced in Stalin's time, or for that matter the constantly revised encyclopedias according to the dictates of the interests of the ruling elements, are some examples of the damage which can be done by the constant shifting of facts and interpretations.[2] However, let us instead turn to some examples of this from both the earlier and later eras of Hungarian history. The examples are intended to illustrate the pervasive and sometimes perverse power of historical consciousness as it is taught or communicated to a people. This is one reason why historians should be more concerned with the uses to which their scholarship is sometimes put

and thus concern themselves more with the teaching of history in the schools and the implicit — sometimes even explicit — views and conceptions of history in literary works, films, and cultural products generally. Winners, that is official historians — and certainly ideologues in power — did not and do not neglect these matters and are aware of their significance in shaping the historical consciousness of peoples.

Numerous contemporary Hungarian writers are well aware of the role of literature in contributing to the development of a better informed and more sophisticated and nuanced historical consciousness.[3]

Permit me to cite in this connection from a recent and highly acclaimed novel by Erzsébet Galgóczi: "Do you know, my dear, what great force has that truth which has been documented and committed to writing?"[4] Galgóczi also cites Maxim Gorky in this connection, namely the role of historical knowledge in shaping historical consciousness, to wit: "Gorky writes somewhere that only that has occured, the history of which has been written. This is true. Peoples will sooner or later forget about which they are constrained to be silent, about which even the written word remains silent. But what occurs when the account of an event is falsified...? Will that event always be perceived that way by future generations?"[5] The applicability of this to our present concerns should be rather obvious and the implications hopeful. Many Hungarian writers and intellectuals still remember the events of 1956 differently than the official account.[6]

However, let us turn to examples from other eras. These may be instructive, but as is the case with all examples, are by no means totally similar. The kings of the Árpád dynasty, and even later rulers of the Hungarian kingdom, had their official chroniclers — and after the Renaissance era we sometimes characterize them as court historians — portray their deeds and ancestors in such a way as to obviously promote the image, that is foster a sense of both past and present, so as to justify the then current situation and power status of the king and the nobility. Among others, the *Chronicle* of Anonymous is but a case in point. Future historians using this chronicle, even with the best of intentions and the most sophisticated critical methods, are nonetheless dealing with "official" history, as is the historian who uses, with even the utmost discretion and good will, the first accounts of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 published by the information office of the Council of Ministers,[7] or for that matter some of the ideologically motivated writings of journalists, participants, indeed even historians, published in Hungary during

the past thirty years.[8] The differences between the two eras are, of course, accentuated by the greater ideological commitments of our own times.

If, in point of fact, there were not other accounts — here disregarding opposing ideologically motivated writings, sometimes masquerading as history or chronicle — the virtual monopoly of information, no matter whether a consequence of a mostly unlettered population, as in the thirteenth century, or a population whose historical consciousness has been limited by the cultural, educational, or media policies of a regime which has made a conscious effort to control information (the degree of success or failure is but a marginal issue in the context) is more or less similar in its effects. That is why one must go beyond or transcend official histories — or historical accounts written by winners — and turn to the accounts of those who have suffered the events, have lived to write about them, and can produce that memoir literature and those historical studies which, while also suffering from the immediacy to the events, can nonetheless provide a perspective no amount of retrospective historical writing, even outstanding critical writing, can provide. That is why the accounts and writings of those who were ostensibly loosers are so necessary for any historical account pretending to completeness and comprehensiveness. Just to conclude this point, it might be added that such retrospective completeness (always limited by our human condition) was not really possible before the advent of an obvious and appreciated interest in history as a mode of thought which began emerging in the seventeenth century, and in spite of the protestations of some historians to the contrary, has been growing apace since that time, making an interest in the historical an obvious and permeating influence on our cultural condition.[9] Can one really appreciate the extent to which illusions and ideals are fostered by the historical imagination today?

One could cite another example from the early history of the Hungarian people which has had an extremely negative impact upon their historical consciousness, namely the search for ancestors and relatives amongst peoples who cannot be demonstrated to have had any conceivable — not to mention significant — contact with the Hungarians during the early phases of their history.[10] I mention this issue not in order to discuss it, but to point out that the propensity of many throughout our history to base their awareness of and appreciation for the past upon legends and obvious, but emotionally satisfying, misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the past, should serve to caution us against similar attitudes toward the history of more recent times. There can also be no doubt that

attitudes of despair engendered by a seemingly hopeless world situation can lead to serious difficulties on the level of historical consciousness and understanding.

The emergence of a more independent (and thus not official) historical profession has somewhat attenuated the preponderance of so-called winner's history, but by no means completely so and not to the same extent in different societies and nations. Futhermore, the appearance of socio-political systems informed by an obvious and stated commitment to a certain and certain-directional explanation of the nature and course of historical developments (such as the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of history officially dominant in Hungary today) have served to reintroduce perhaps in a somewhat different, but also more effective manner than in times past, problems and issues associated with official historiography; however, one must have a nuanced view of these matters, but not one so nuanced as to disregard (perhaps misunderstand) the issue of the relation of historical scholarship and politics. There is, after all, a large and impressive body of writing on this very significant issue of concern not only to historians, but to all who are concerned, or should be, with the impact of political considerations on our historical consciousness.[11]

To expand and deepen our understanding of the historical consciousness related problems of the 1956 revolution, it is useful to examine some of the issues pertinent to the revolutions of 1848 and its consequences.

After the defeat of that revolution many of its leaders were either exiled, executed, imprisoned, or went into hiding. Efforts were made, and not for the first time, to write the history of such events and causes from the point of view of the winners, in this case the Habsburgs and their supporters. Their version of Hungarian history was taught in the schools and was also reflected in much of historical and other writings, as well as in numerous manifestations of cultural and political life. However, there were widespread opposition movements, especially in the intellectual realm, and some of Hungary's outstanding historians wrote their accounts of the revolution and the subsequent war for independence while in exile. Their works were available in their homeland only clandestinely and mostly under assumed names; the most important of these writings were those of Mihály Horváth.[12] It was these works, among numerous others, written and first published during the years of Horváth's exile, which ultimately prevented serious dislocations in the historical consciousness of many Hungarians during the era 1849-1867 and even beyond. Knowledge about the revolution

was maintained in spite of official displeasure and efforts to inculcate another version of the events. Indeed, those official histories and the textbooks based upon them have been mercifully forgotten.

One should also point out — as it was pointed out to this writer by a Hungarian dissident in 1984 — that after the execution of the thirteen military leaders of the revolution and the war for independence at Arad (a fact well known to even otherwise poorly informed individuals) the bodies were turned over to their families for proper burial. A comment by Christopher Dawson in his book, *The Gods of Revolution* may be instructive as we continue: "Only a dying civilization neglects its dead" (p. xvii). They were certainly not treated as shamefully as the victims of either the Rákosi years in Hungary, those executed with Imre Nagy, nor for that matter the many young revolutionaries buried in unmarked graves in the now famous section 301[13] or in a special plot at the Kerepesi cemetery in central Budapest, the only location where participants in the 1956 revolution were buried in large numbers and contiguously. It was only through the actions of some yet unnamed individuals that the plan of the authorities to raze these graves has, to the best of my knowledge, not been carried out.[14] Quite simply, the lack of knowledge about these gravesites (and what they represent in terms of the contemporary history of Hungary) and the almost absolute insistence of the authorities that this not become public knowledge has had and continues to have, in my estimation, a very negative impact on Hungarian society generally. More specifically, it reacts negatively in terms of perspectives for the destiny of the country and its peoples and casts a long shadow over any meaningful historical outlook. It is the source of historical and psychological wounds. There are very obvious socio-psychological impacts and consequences of this wounded historical consciousness and these can be meaningfully illustrated by quoting a passage from the concluding pages of Boris Pasternak's novel *Dr. Zhivago*:

> Microscopic forms of cardiac hemorrhages have become very frequent in recent years. They are not always fatal. Some people get over them. It's a typical modern disease. I think its causes are of a moral order. The great majority of us are required to live a life of constant, systematic duplicity. Your health is bound to be affected if, day after day, you say the opposite of what you feel, if you grovel before what you dislike and rejoice at what brings you nothing but misfortune. Our nervous system isn't just a fiction, it's part of our physical body, and our soul exists in space and is inside

us, like the teeth in our mouth. It can't be forever violated with impunity.[15]

Extending upon this description of a situation in which the events of the past as experienced are not permitted to exercise their expected (if left unhampered) impact upon the historical consciousness of an individual to the socio-political context and the study and practice of history as an activity with a public dimension (historians write for their desk drawers even less than literary figures do), it should be expected that the imposition of a false sense of history would also have similar negative social effects.

This is certainly the case when one reflects — it is not really proper to say examine in this context because all one can do is reflect upon shared personal experiences and draw inferences from what one hears and reads — upon the fundamentally warped, if not partially schizophrenic, historical and social consciousness in Hungary today. Futhermore, many social indicators used to characterize the situation of Hungarians today, such as high suicide rates, alcoholism, inter-generational conflict, excessive and obvious materialism, loss of perspective, cynicism, while instructive, do not call direct attention to what was described by Pasternak in the passage cited above.

In my estimation — based to a great extent upon some focused conservations with Hungarian scholars concerned about the future of Hungary and the historical consciousness of the populace, conducted both in Hungary and here during the past three years — one can point out that the high incidence of suicide and stress-related health problems exact a heavy toll from precisely that category of individuals (the middle-aged intellectually and spiritually sensitive element) most concerned with the future of their nation.[16] The inability or the unwillingness for whatever reason, to freely examine all — and not just those officially allowed or tolerated — past events, individuals, and ideas, are enervating the collective nervous system of the most valuable members of an entire generation. It certainly is not a healthy situation. This , however, is the context in which one must examine the impact of the 1956 revolution upon Hungarian historical consciousness during the past decades.

In the study of the events of the Hungarian revolution — after an initial campaign to discredit it in any possible manner until approximately 1962 — it has, until quite recently, been generally glossed over and neglected, simply forgotten about. At the present time, after it became obvious that the younger generation was very interested,[17] and the elder generation — including but by no means

limited to the dissident community — had not forgotten the essence, even if it sometimes remembered poorly or only subjectively the particulars of those events, the regime moved from relative silence to misinformation — indeed disinformation — mostly tendentious presentations of the events or purported events in great detail to overwhelm by excessive particulars and carefully chosen facts to make points supportive of the regime and the Soviet Union. This is exemplified quite evidently in the book by János Berecz; he introduces his discussion of the events between October 23 and November 4, 1956 thus: "It is equally important that these conclusions [drawn from the discussions of the events] should be passed on to the coming generations of a constantly renewing society, in order to help them avoid errors and avert new tragedies. This is at least as important as the need to recognize the new demands of new periods."[18] Having stated the purpose of his book in avowedly political terms and noting further that interest in these events (calling it a counter-revolution) is not declining, he does his best to explain its history in terms of the interests of the regime.

Not intending to analyze in detail the attitudes and methodology of the Berecz volume, at least two examples can be cited to indicate some of the shortcomings. First of all, in what purports to be a scholarly work, sources are cited very selectively and often key statements are left without documentation whereas relatively minor points are overdocumented. The goals of the revolution, expressed perhaps most compellingly in the list of demands generally known as the fourteen points, are never cited in full, only four of the fourteen being mentioned.[19] The unrestrained use of ideological jargon is also most disturbing in what was meant to be a scholarly work.

Berecz attacks any number of times the so-called "class enemies" who in his estimation are still not reconciled to what he characterizes as thirty years of progress in Hungary. This progress is undoubtedly real and cannot be denied or dismissed, but it is limited to realms other than the basic demands and concerns of the 1956 revolution. Nor does Berecz neglect the *émigrés*, realizing that many of the writings and sources concerning the revolution have been written or published by individuals who left the country at different times after the defeat of the revolution. He in effect dismisses their efforts in the following words:

> The *émigré* reactionaries who lament their wrecked hopes, contimue to pursue a blindly incorrigible approach, deploring the passing of the ultimate opportunity for a take-over in Hungary.

> Some who played an important role in those days are overwhelmed by nostalgia and nurse fresh hopes. They are certain to suffer new disappointments, for they have broken away from Hungarian reality and the actual power relations.[20]

While it is true that there may be a danger that those who recall their participation in great events or upheavals may distort the events or perhaps view them too subjectively; it is, however, also true that this danger is easier to rectify by subsequent historical criticism than the conscious elimination of sources and obvious distortion. Ideological jargon is also made meaningless by the passage of time and thought. Nonetheless, there is no substitute for immediacy and closeness to the events, but that by itself represents only the material indispensable for the study of history, not the historical work by any means.

There can be no doubt that those who chose to emigrate at the time of a great national tragedy (there is a significant tradition for this step in the turmoil typical of the history of East Central Europe and the significance and subsequent role of the *émigré* was explained poignantly by Comenius, exemplified by Rákóczi and Kossuth among many others) bear a special responsibility to preserve their memories and the documents illustrative of their actions and times. While their activities are not the only component of the future historical account of those events, they remain nonetheless a unique part of it.[21]

There are, of course, a number of other equally significant components, including the residue of such experiences as are passed on through the forms and conventions of the culture itself, as well as the sources and documents zealously guarded by those in power. Only all of these elements together can eventually contribute — in the hands of a good historian — to the acceptable telling and the necessary retelling of the account of the revolution, as well as its cause and consequences.

However, the possibility of doing this well is strongly influenced by the continuity and character of the historical consciousness of a people over the course of many generations. It has been one of the recurring negative elements in the formation of the historical consciousness of the Hungarian people that very often one generation could not pass on directly its experiences and struggles to the next. The desire to do so was certainly there, but the interests of the power structures, both foreign and domestic, inevitably contributed to fractures in the tradition. The great fractures of the late seventeenth century, which were the consequences of the end of

Turkish dominance and the imposition of Habsburg hegemony, as well as the significant religious divisions, have been healed or have healed themselves as a result of subsequent events and movements,[22] but the possibility of such fractures have been by no means eliminated. The tradition of the 1956 revolution has only been incompletely passed on by the generation which made it to those who were their successors. The restoration of the continuity of tradition is always essential to the formulation and continuing vitality of a sense of historical consciousness. This too is one of the building blocks of that past consciousness so essential to the continuance of a nation and its peoples as an entity having both meaning and value beyond the satisfaction of fundamental needs.

In spite of the many difficulties inherent in the practice of history itself and coupled with the numerous concerns of the maintenance of the consciousness of the revolution, the historian must nonetheless maintain a sense of qualified optimism that the story will be told. Whether the story itself — and ever since the time of Herodotus the story has been the meaningful element — will create the needed conditions for the positive elucidation of the meaning of the revolution remains in the realm of speculation and hope, indispensable characteristics of both history and life.

However, that is beyond the competence of the historian to discuss.

Notes

1. János Berecz, *Counter-Revolution in Hungary: Words and Weapons.* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1986); translation of the second expanded and revised Hungarian edition of 1981. Berecz is secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.
2. This point is briefly and compellingly discussed by Stephen F. Cohen. "Stalin's Afterlife", *The New Republic*, December 29, 1979.
3. See especially the writings of István Csurka, *Az Elfogadhatatlan realitás* (New York: Püski, 1986), pp. 47–71.
4. Galgóczi, *Vidravas* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1984), p. 246.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
6. Csurka, pp.49–53.
7. I am making specific reference to the following series, but there were other similar publications; *Ellenforradalmi erők a magyar októberi eseményekben*, 4 vols. (Budapest: A Magyar Népköztársaság Minisztertanácsa Tájékoztatási Hivatala, no date, but app. 1958); also *Nagy Imre és bűntársai összeesküvése*, same publication details.
8. A good selection of such writings published in Hungary can be found in any bibliographical guide to materials on the Hungarian revolution, esp. the bibliography compiled by Ivan Halasz de Beky. One particularly offensive example is Ervin Hollós, *Kik voltak, mit akartak*, second corrected edition (Budapest: Kossuth, 1967).
9. Concerning these points see especially the writings of John Lukacs, *Historical Consciousness* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), *passim*.

10. For a very recent discussion of these points see my introduction to the posthumous volume; Bálint Hóman, *Ősemberek, ősmagyarok* (Atlanta, GA.: Hungarian Cultural Foundation, 1985), pp. 11–17.
11 For a discussion of this point in a Hungarian context Ferenc Glatz, *Történetiró és politika* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1980) and Zoltán Horváth, "Hungary: Recovering from the Past", in Walter Laquer and George Mosse, eds., *The New History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 221–235.
12. Mihály Horváth, *Magyarország függetlenségi harcának története*, 3 vols. (Geneva, 1865); published also in Hungary after 1867.
13. Michael T. Kaufman, "Section 301, Where Hungary's Past is Buried", The New York *Times*, June 23, 1986, section A1, pp. 1 and 5; also, personal communications to this writer.
14. Personal communication to this writer; I also saw some of the collected materials pertaining to the Kerepesi cemetary gravesites.
15. Boris Pasternak, *Dr. Zhivago* (New York: Modern Library, 1958), p.483.
16. Based upon discussions with a number of Hungarian scholars and writers.
17. Evidence of this can be obtained from the proceedings of the Fiatal Irók József Attila Köre; based upon discussions with a participant in their meetings. More recently there has been evidence of interest in 1956 among students and writers as well as in dissident circles; some of this was tied to the thirtieth anniversary in 1986 and caused some concern to the authorities. I followed these developments in the October and November 1986 issues of the *Foreign Area Broadcast Service*, Eastern Europe.
18. Berecz, p. 7.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 142. A recent review of the Berecz volume by Ivan Volgyes in the *American Historical Review* (vol. 92, no 4, Oct. 1987, pp. 1003–1004) expressed similar concerns.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
21. The problem of *Zeitgeschichte* or the study of our own times is discussed by many philosophically inclined historians and is of some interest in the elucidation of these matters. However, it should be extended by a discussion of the psychology of memory and its ramifications for the analysis of memoirs.
22. For a more detailed exposition of these ideas see my article "Inter Arma...; Reflections on Seventeenth Century Educational and Cultural Life in Hungary and Transylvania", in János Bak and Béla K. Király, eds., *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary* (New York, 1986, dist. by Columbia University Press), pp. 315–334.

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Arthur Koestler: Hungarian Writer?*

Robert Blumstock

As long as the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party defines the parameters of what is, and what is not acceptable literature, Arthur Koestler's books will never be best sellers in Hungary.

Koestler was always out of step with the politics in the land of his birth, both in his youth as a Zionist, and later as a member of the Communist party. By the time he abandoned political questions in mid-life, Hungary was behind the Iron Curtain, and his anti-Communist reputation was hardly appropriate for encouraging a welcome reception in Hungary. Although his subsequent endeavors in attempting to bridge the gap between parapsychology, mysticism and science were less tainted with political sentiments, acceptance continued to elude him and his work in the land of his birth.

Irrespective of the frequency of the changes in the character of the regimes in Hungary during his lifetime, Koestler remained attached to his origins, and was very much a part of the Hungarian intellectual diaspora. I have argued elsewhere that his ties to both his Hungarian and Jewish roots were a continual psychological and intellectual stimulant.[1] His last major work, *The Thirteenth Tribe*, was his final attempt to resolve the Hungarian-Jewish dilemma. His solution was neither better nor more original than anyone else's of his generation, nor of subsequent generations, who even at this juncture, more than forty years after the Holocaust, are uncertain what it means to be both Jewish and Hungarian.[2]

In present day Hungary, writers, journalists and editors, perplexed by their country's relative freedom, still cannot quite bring themselves to openly accept the Koestler oeuvre, even though there is a limited and grudging acknowledgement of those portions of it, which do not conflict with Hungary's current ideological posture. This reluctant recognition was quite apparent when shortly after

Koestler's death, two memorial pieces appeared, one in *Valóság* written by Mihály Sükösd[3] and the other in *Nagyvilág*, by Erzsébet Vezér.[4]

Sükösd writes in considerable detail on Koestler's life and work, and suggests that Koestler's lack of "identity" caused him to be available for messianic and utopian commitments, only to eventually shun these involvements and to "blindly hate" that which he had once revered.[5] Although Sükösd does not deny Koestler's Hungarian origins, he does assert that Koestler cannot be included among Hungarian writers, since he never wrote anything in the Magyar language.[6] Further, and more telling Sükösd argues that Koestler's life does not provide much of an example for Hungarians to emulate. Sükösd contends that Koestler's various attempts to solve his inner emptiness through ideological attachments are seen as having driven him, in the latter half of his life, to purely solipsistic concerns: death, suicide and parapsychology.[7]

In contrast Vezér's piece offers a more tempered view of Koestler and his Hungarian ties. She notes that even after many years away from Hungary he continued to define his mother tongue as Hungarian,[8] and that he even remembered two lines of a patriotic poem that he had written as a child.[9] He was also proud of the fact that during his visit to Western Turkestan, in the 1930's he felt quite at home, since this was the area from which the Hungarians originated, and he was only the second Hungarian after Rusztem Vámbéry to have visited there. Vezér also notes Koestler's attachment to Endre Ady and Attila József, and though his last visit to Hungary was during the 1930's, and Hungarian came slowly and at times awkwardly, he still wished to speak in Hungarian to other Hungarians.[10]

Rather than the empty shell which Sükösd portrays Koestler as being, Vezér describes Koestler as a paradigmatic figure of our age: the tragic symbol of the intellectual who has lost his beliefs.[11]

A more substantial memorial for Koestler was published in Hungarian in 1985, but not in Hungary.[12] The editor of the memorial volume, Béla Hidegkúti, drew together several pieces originally published in English by George Orwell, György Mikes, T.R. Fyvel, and W.H. Thorpe. There are also sections written by György Faludy, and David Martin (an Australian writer of Hungarian background) both translated from English and an excerpt by Koestler from the *Invisible Writing*, much of which is devoted to his attempt to translate Attila József into English.

Hidegkúti in the preface notes that to this point nothing has been written in Hungarian about Koestler, and this book is an attempt to

present, in Koestler's native language, a brief introduction to what Koestler's life meant to those who knew him.

Given the fact of his eminence and his recent death, fragments of his work during his "acceptable" period, when he was a member of the German communist party, from 1931 to 1937, have recently appeared in some popular journals. Why this should be the case is no easy matter to explain. The convolutions of the reasoning behind such publication decisions go beyond the simple fact of recalling an illustrious career. Part of the motivation for this belated and cautious recognition may derive from the fact that although his books are not readily available, Koestler is well enough known for some samples of his work to appear. Another reason for publishing him now may be to contrast his early work with the recent publication of *Darkness at Noon*, which appeared in a Hungarian translation printed in Switzerland shortly before his death and which has been reprinted in a *samizdat* edition, in Hungary in 1985. It may be that the young and ill informed may not know much about his communist past, and by publishing work written during his communist period, Koestler as a subsequent critic of communism would be seen as a renegade and consequently his ideological critique discredited. Finally, publishing him may be a way for the official press to play a quasi-oppositional role in presenting Hungarian readers with the unstated premise in Koestler's transition from believer to opponent of communism. This posture is about the only one available to reproach the control exercised by the party, as any more direct criticism is prohibited.

The first piece to appear was in the February 1986 issue of *Új Tükör*.[13] It was entitled "Spanyol testamentum" (Spanish Testament) and taken from the book by the same title, which was originally published in German.[14] This brief excerpt is based on Koestler's Spanish Civil War experiences and describes the reaction of a prisoner to the random elimination of his fellow captives. In this situation where no one knew when it would be his turn to die, a paralysing fear gripped those awaiting their fate. They retreat into themselves in anticipation of their final moment. Interestingly enough, the book from which this piece was taken is the only one of his books that was reviewed in a Hungarian journal shortly after its original publication.[15]

In the foreword to the *Új Tükör* piece, a brief biographical note mentions that Koestler became one of the spokesmen of anti-communism. Reference is made to his other interests, for example that his favorite poet was Endre Ady, his best friend was Andor Németh, that he played chess with Frigyes Karinthy and that he

knew Attila József. Significantly the title of his major anti-communist work, *Darkness at Noon*, never intrudes. Although it is mentioned that his father was Hungarian, his mother Czech, and that he was born in Budapest, his name is given as Arthur Koestler which — considering the usual manner in which Hungarian names are written, with surname first — labels the author as a foreigner. However, since he established himself in the West as Arthur Koestler, the editors may have felt that because he did not write this piece in Hungarian it would be inappropriate to define him as Hungarian. More simply, it may have been that since he had made his reputation in the West he would be recognized easily enough by writing his name in the usual Western fashion.

The second piece entitled "Bizalmas küldetés" (Secret Mission) also appeared in 1986 in *Nagyvilág*[16] in an issue devoted to reminiscences of the Spanish Civil War by well known Soviet, Spanish and Western writers including George Orwell.[17] This article was excerpted from a German language edition of *The Invisible Writing*.[18] The selection deals largely with events during the Spanish Civil War, when Koestler was asked to look through the papers and documents left behind in Madrid by right-wing politicians.

Prior to this the only other work of Koestler's to appear in an official Hungarian journal is a translation of an obituary he wrote on the occasion of Attila József's death, which originally appeared in German in *Das Neue Tagebuch*, on May 13, 1939, a left wing journal produced by émigrés in Paris between the years 1933 and 1944. This was recently translated into Hungarian and appeared in *Mozgó Világ*.[19]

During the 1930's Koestler did write a play in German, *Bar du Soleil* (Twilight Bar) which was translated into Hungarian, by Andor Németh, but not produced in Hungary. In fact Koestler lost the manuscript, and later while in France re-wrote it. It was produced in Paris, but it only played a few performance.[20]

During his lifetime, this lack of recognition from his native land troubled Koestler.[21] While his Jewish origins presented him with continual problems which he felt compelled to confront, his Hungarian ties were, as for many of his generation, something which he took for granted. In the period during which he grew up in Budapest, conscious assimilation by Jews into the Hungarian mainstream was defined as the means by which to gain entry into the whole of European culture.

While it is unlikely that any changes will be made in the definition of Koestler as a Hungarian writer, there is now evidence available which indicates that Koestler did indeed write in Hungarian.[22] Two

articles appeared in the July–August and October 1927 issues of *Múlt és Jövő*, a Jewish periodical which was published in Budapest from 1911 until February 1944. At the time these articles were published, Koestler was 22 years old and had been in Palestine for about a year. Not surprisingly both articles deal with Jewish themes for it was during this period that Koestler was committed to the Zionist cause.

It was precisely at this point that Koestler had reached an impasse in his Zionist commitment. During the winter of 1926–27 he had become involved with *The Nile and Palestine Gazette* which was financed by the German legation in Cairo.[23] This venture ended after the paper had published three issues, and Koestler felt his career had reached a dead end.[24] At this crucial juncture, the possibility arose of becoming the executive secretary of the Revisionist movement[25] in Berlin and he decided to go there by way of Budapest in the Spring of 1927, thereby enabling him to see his parents, whom he had not seen for about a year. He arrived home without sufficient funds to continue his journey. In order to obtain the necessary funds to pursue his undertaking, he went to the editor of the *Pester Lloyd* with five travel pieces on Palestine and Egypt, along with an article that his mother had managed to get published for him in the *Neue Freie Presse*. The editor, whom Koestler identifies as Mr. Vészi-Weiss, but who was known as József Vészi, was an elderly gentlemen, who was impressed with the fact that such a young man had been published in the *Neue Freie Presse*. Vészi selected three of the articles, and paid Koestler on the spot. With this money, (half of which he gave to his father), Koestler set out for Berlin.[26]

The job of executive secretary turned out to be somewhat less than its title suggested and after four months Koestler applied for and got a position with the Ullstein Press as their correspondent in Jerusalem.[27] But now, the problem of returning to Jerusalem presented itself, and as was his typical predicament, he had very little money, only enough to get to Vienna. Once in Vienna, the pursuit for funds continued and he managed to obtain a contract with the *Neue Freie Presse* for two articles a month on Palestine, but Koestler was too timid to ask for a salary advance to pay his fare back to Jerusalem. Seeing his plight his good friends managed to scrape up enough money to pay the fare to Budapest.

Once back in Budapest, he again went to the editor of the *Pester Lloyd* showing his new credentials. He was now met with derision by the editor, who rebuked him by saying "You are a big shot now, so what do you need me for?" Vészi told him to "Scram."[28]

Undoubtedly Vészi no longer saw in Koestler the neophyte journalist who needed help, but someone who, if he were as accomplished as he maintained he was, did not really need to publish in his paper.

It was during this brief interlude in Europe that Koestler's articles were published in *Múlt és Jövő*. The first article is entitled "Miért küzd a revizionizmus?" (For What Does Revisionism Struggle?).[29] It describes the problems in Palestine and the positions taken by the Revisionists in opposition to the Zionist leadership. Koestler was a follower of Jabotinsky and he discusses the proposed political and economic programs of the Revisionists to ensure a viable Jewish homeland.

There is an anomaly in the presentation of this short article. In the brief introduction to the piece, the editor, József Patai, notes that Koestler had visited him within the past few days; yet Koestler's name is written Arthur Koestler which would define the author as a non-Hungarian. At this point Koestler was a rank novice, and not the international personality he was later to become. This name ordering raises the question about whether Patai and Koestler actually met. If they had met it seems unlikely that they would have spoken in German and that they would have been unaware of the other's ability to speak Hungarian. As this first article was published in the July–August 1927 issue, it is possible that Koestler may have met with Patai during this brief period prior to his leaving for Berlin. However Koestler, in his autobiography, does not mention any meeting with Patai, but only with Vészi who, one could surmise, was well acquainted with Patai. Given this, one possible explanation for Koestler's name written as if he were a non-Hungarian is that the article was written in German, the language in which Koestler was obviously most comfortable,and was one of the articles not selected by Vészi who may well have passed it on to Patai. Vészi likely told Patai about Koestler's coming from Tel Aviv and his innocence and inexperience, and since this article deals with Revisionism, Vészi may well have felt that the *Pester Lloyd* was not the appropriate place to publish it. Once Patai received it, he translated it into Hungarian. He may then have met with Koestler and decided to write Koestler's name in the Western manner as an indication of the far reaching character of the editorial links which *Múlt és Jövő* enjoyed.[30] It is hard to imagine Koestler not mentioning his meeting with Patai. Certainly the possibility exists that he simply forgot, as this was quite a frantic period for him. They may also have met after Koestler returned to Budapest in the summer of 1927; that is after his Berlin sojourn.[31] As the first article was only published in the July–August

1927 issue, and Koestler returned to Jerusalem in September, it is possible that they met during this second visit to Budapest, and that Patai accepted this first article in German in order to help Koestler get back to Jerusalem.

There is much less to speculate about in the second article. It is not a political report, although its political overtones are clear, but a short story entitled "Meta."[32] Now the author's name is given in proper Hungarian fashion as Koestler Arthur, even though within the title of the piece, Tel-Aviv is mentioned as the origin of the author. Quite possibly after the acceptance of the first article, Koestler wrote the second one in Hungarian in a simpler vein, with its political intentions veiled in a story about the hazards of being young and Jewish in the Hungary of the late 1920's.

In the story a young boy, Wajsz, tearfully describes to his father a game which was played in school during recess. The game, Meta, is one in which each boy first picks a nationality. They then gather around a ball. Someone calls out the name of a nationality and the one called has to grab the ball and try to hit one of the others with it. If a boy is hit five times, he is out and the game is over. Now as Wajsz is near the end of the alphabet, all of the other boys choose their nationalities before he does. Given this, Wajsz chooses to be Jewish. The other boys quickly gang up on him and he is hit by the ball five times and the game is quickly over. The teacher then tells him, that since he lost, he can now be the first to choose a nationality in the next game. In something of a pique he again chooses to be Jewish and the second round of the game begins. This time, however, someone else's nationality is called and he, Wajsz, throws the ball hard enough to cause the boy to fall, while he, Wajsz falls against a wall.

In describing this to his father, Wajsz says that as a consequence of the other boy's falling, the teacher gave him a demerit for his poor conduct. He tries to dismiss this punishment by saying that it does not really matter, as he will emigrate eventually to Palestine. His father quite upset at the boy's attitude, tells him to stop that kind of talk.

The boy continues by saying that in the next class, religious instruction, the teacher told his class that the mission of the Jews is to suffer until such time as the Messiah comes, because that is God's will. Wajsz then asked his religion teacher if it was part of God's plan for the Jews to be singled out in the Meta game, and if attempts to strike back should be punished by a demerit from the teacher. The religion teacher avoided the question and said that if he was given a demerit he probably deserved it. Wajsz then tells his father that he

will no longer allow himself to be bullied and that he is now a man. He fully intends to go to Palestine where he will obtain a sling shot and, like King David, will slay all those who try to take advantage of him.

This simple story is an explication for Revisionism as well as a critique of Jewish life in Hungary. The uncompromising posture of the boy is a means of justifying the "tough" image fostered by Revisionism, while the choice of Jew as nationality is intrusive, as Hungarian Jews made a constant point at this time of arguing that they were not a nationality, but only a religion. The whole point of the story is a reaffirmation of Koestler's own ideological commitments at the time.

These two articles are probably the only ones Koestler ever had published in Hungarian during his lifetime. Now that he had obtained both the contract with the *Neue Freie Presse* and the Ullstein position, the German audience was obviously far larger than he could have reached by writing in Hungarian.

Neither article is likely to influence anyone about Koestler being included among the ranks of the great Hungarian literary giants. In fact he well knew that much of what he wrote as a young man was quite forgettable.[33] However, with the inclusion of this material into the Koestler oeuvre, there is clear evidence of his brief Hungarian literary career.

Koestler frequently admitted that his early publications were often written under the duress of survival and that he lost track of them. Surely these articles pale in comparison to his later work, but it is certain that he would welcome their rediscovery.

Notes

* The research upon which this article is based was supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada grant no. 410-84-1370.

1. Robert Blumstock, "Going Home: Arthur Koestler's Thirteenth Tribe," *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1986), pp. 93–104.
2. *Medvetánc*, No. 2–3. This publication was sponsored by The Young Communist League's Social Science Committee at Loránd Eötvös University in Budapest. About half of this issue is devoted to papers dealing with Jewish themes. See especially, "Hogyan jöttem rá, hogy zsidó vagyok," [How I Came to Know That I am Jewish] by F. Erős, A. Kovács, and K. Lévai, pp. 129–144.
3. Mihály Sükösd, "Sors és sorstalanság: Arthur Koestler," [Destiny and Lack of Destiny: Arthur Koestler] *Valóság*, December 1983, pp. 109–119.
4. Erzsébet Vezér, "Az ismeretlenbe kilőtt nyíl nyomában: Arthur Koestler útja" [In the Track of Arrow in the Blue; Arthur Koestler's Road]. *Nagyvilág*, August 1984, pp. 1228–1241.
5. Sükösd, p. 116.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 116–117.
8. Vezér, p.1239. It should be noted that Koestler probably did not mean this literally since his mother hated living in Hungary, and she never learned to speak the language properly. See *Arrow in the Blue* (London, 1952), p. 27.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 1240.
10 *Ibid.*, p. 1239.
11 *Ibid.*, p. 1241.
12. *Koestler Emlékkönyv* [Koestler Memorial Volume] (Chicago, 1985) edited by Béla Hidegkúti.
13. *Új Tükör*, Vol. 23, No. 6, February 9, 1986, pp. 18–19.
14. Arthur Koestler, *Menschenopfer unerhört...* (Paris, 1937). This book first appeared in French, with the title *L'Espagne ensanglantée*. When it was published in English its title was *Dialogue with Death*.
15. *Századunk*, Vol. 12, No. 6–7, p. 216, 1937. Although the Horthy regime was virulently anti–communist, it was possible for Koestler's work to be reviewed in Hungary, if not published at that time.
16. *Nagyvilág*, July, 1986, No. 7, pp. 1017–1019.
17. George Orwell's *Animal Farm* has also appeared in Hungarian, as *Állati gazdaság*, Chicago, 1985. It is available in Hungary as a *samizdat* publication issued by the AB Független Kiadó in 1985.
18. *The Invisible Writing* (Boston, 1954), Chapter 23, "In Dubious Battle," pp. 323–335.
19. Arthur Koestler, "Egy halott Budapesten" [A Corpse in Budapest], *Mozgó Világ*, June 1983, No. 6, pp. 62–64. This short obituary is placed in context by Erzsébet Vezér in "Véletlen találkozások József Attilával," [Chance encounters with Attila József], *Ibid.*, pp. 60–62.
20. Iain Hamilton, *Koestler* (New York, 1982), pp. 115–118.
21. George Mikes, *Arthur Koestler* (London, 1983), pp. 12–13.
22. In the latest edition of *Világirodalmi Lexikon* (Budapest, 1979), p. 392, it is suggested that Koestler may have written a piece in Hungarian entitled "A század párbaja" [The Duel of the Century] for the London-based Hungarian language journal, *Irodalmi Ujság*, October 13, 1957, since no translator is noted.
23. *Arrow in the Blue*, p. 155.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
25. "Revisionism is associated with Vladimir (Zev) Jabotinsky (1880–1940). Its main principles were the emphasis on the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish state on both banks of the Jordan, its sharp opposition to what Jabotinsky regarded as Chaim Weizmann's policy of appeasement vis–a–vis the British and the Arabs, its hostility to socialism as a 'foreign creed' within the Jewish national movement, and its belief in the efficacy of military means to win Palestine for the Jewish nation." Ezra Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe between the World Wars* (Bloomington, 1983), p. 76.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 156–157. For more information on József Vészi, see *Zsidó Lexikon*, ed. Péter Ujvári (Budapest 1929), p. 948. Vészi was a prominent figure in the Budapest Jewish Community, but he may well be best remembered for the fact that his daughter Margit, was the first wife of the playwright Ferenc Molnár.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 162–163.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 164–165.
29. Arthur Koestler, "Miért küzd a Revizionizmus" *Múlt és Jövö*, July–August 1927, pp. 262–264.
30. *Múlt és Jövő* was an important educational forum for Hungary's Jews about Palestine and Zionism. However, Zionism had clear political implications, which were avoided by defining the role of *Múlt és Jövő* as educational and cultural, and not political. Patai had wide contacts with other Jewish publications and the cover of the journal indicates that *Múlt és Jövő* had correspondents in Berlin, Prague and Vienna.

See Oral History Interview with Professor Raphael Patai, February 20, 1980, *Columbia University Oral History Project*, pp. 3, 21.

31. *Arrow in the Blue*, pp. 164–165.
32. Arthur Koestler, "Meta," *Múlt és Jövő*, October 1927, pp. 339–340.
33. *Arrow in the Blue*, p. 172.

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"Through Images Juxtaposed:" Two Hungarian Poetic Responses to Allen Ginsberg's "Howl."

Laszlo K. Gefin

Allen Ginsberg's poem "Howl" was published by City Lights Books in San Francisco on November 1, 1956. Two events marked the thirtieth anniversary of the publication: first, there appeared an annotated edition of the poem, containing facsimiles of original drafts, author's emendations, correspondence, and other paratextual material.[1] The publisher's blurb on the front flap of the book's jacket states what should by now be a critical common-place, namely that "Howl" is "a prophetic masterpiece that helped change... the course of American poetry in this century." Second, the Modern Language Association at its 1986 convention in New York allocated a special session to honoru both poem and poet. The session leader, Professor Gordon Ball, introduced the panel and the subject of the session by saying that to many readers "Howl" has come to represent "the greatest achievement in American poetry since T.S. Eliot's *Waste Land*," and "one of the most influential poems of the past generation."[2] These statements round out a host of similar comments made by poets and critics during the past decades, affirming Ginsberg's, and "Howl"'s significance and influence in America and Western Europe.[3] Also, both poet and poem have received unusual attention among poets in the Central and Eastern European countries behind the Iron Curtain, as well as Polish, Czech, and Hungarian writers living in the west. It is not difficult to imagine that a poem such as "Howl," which was found shocking, daring, and iconoclastic even by more tolerant western standards, should be particularly offensive and/or liberating in the repressive and centrally controlled atmosphere of socialist literatures. "Howl"'s transgressions of social, religious, nationalistic, and above all sexual taboos ought to have influenced the poetic practices and attitudes of a wide variety of poets, loosening up old forms, inspiring more free expression.

Such an image is not wholly inaccurate from a somewhat distant, generalizing vantage point, but the issues involved are not so simple. If we consider, moreover, that of all the litera-tures of East-Central Europe, Hungarian is perhaps the prudest, most "Victorian" ("Francis-Josephian?") and self-censored, it should be more than just a routine scholarly exercise to assess the influence of Ginsberg's "Howl." It may be worth demonstrating (1) the effect of the poem's formal innovations; (2) the resistance to, or acceptance of, Ginsberg's verbal "excesses;" and most important, (3) what attitudes did the poem engender and/or change toward American literature and American reality as a whole on the part of Hungarian writers.

The aim of this brief study is to attempt to assess this influence, but even at the risk of stating the obvious, I should begin by saying that poetic influence is the most difficult intertextual, or *transtextual*, "fact" to prove,[4] especially if one does not subscribe wholeheartedly (as in my case) to Harold Bloom's theories of poetic influence, their stress on anxieties of filiation, and consequent, mainly unconscious battles with, misprisions and misreadings of, the fateful poetic ancestor(s). Bloom's thesis, that "the profundities of poetic influence cannot be reduced to source study, to the history of ideas, to the patterning of images" is a de facto dismissal of textual evidence as a basis of establishing relationships of influence between literary works of art.[5] In contrast, I believe that as in all cases of attempted proof and validation, persuasive evidence can only come from the texts themselves, from the transtextual and contextual play and echo of signifiers, juxtaposed or, even if only conceptually, "superposed," in a variety of configurations.

An instance of just such transtextual genealogy may be observed in the new annotated edition of "Howl," where Ginsberg himself provides the reader with a mini-anthology of "precursor texts" to the poem (175–188). On reproducing *in extenso* various poems by Christopher Smart, Guillaume Apollinaire, Kurt Schwitters, Vladimir Mayakovsky, William Carlos Williams, and others, Ginsberg notes that "these poems were familiar to me by summer 1955," and adds that "memory of these verse rhythms superimposed on my own breath passed into the inspiration of 'Howl'." The mystery of precisely how these lines and rhythms "passed into" the mind of the poet is of course impossible and fruitless to probe; but from the little collection a great deal becomes evident. Taken singly, the precursor poems identify certain verbal, figurative, rhythmic, and other components that became changed and fused by Ginsberg during the writing of the poem; taken together, they testify to a basic poetic attitude, a poetic-philosophic-existential *stance* on Ginsberg's part

that made him receptive to all of them, in spite, or perhaps because, of their thematic differences. Thus, "Howl" is both a textually provable composite and a poetic whole with its own unique combination and shift of tones, redoublings, pathos and parody. With "Howl" "superposed," as it were, on now this, now that precursor text, simulating the effects of a palimpsest, overlaps of certain similar (though never identical) modes of diction, figuration, and rhythm may be shown to actually exist: the long line is Whitmanesque, the brash tone resembles Mayakovsky's, the repetitive syntax recalls Christopher Smart, the ellipses (such as "hydrogen jukebox" and "skeleton treasuries") may have been inspired by the surrealists, etc. In their fusion, of course, the final product can be seen to have been transformed into something wholly Ginsbergian, but still sharing with all precursor texts a spiritual kinship in terms of revolutionary fervor, a transgressive desire to "recreate the syntax and measure of poor human prose" (6), all of it suffused with a tenderness and compassion for which Whitman's "adhesiveness" is the most appropriate term.

Ginsberg's generosity of providing readers with a list of his own predecessors is unique, and I have not seen it repeated by Hungarian poets, particularly in relationship to "Howl." In my search for evidence I have looked at only those writers who have demonstrably been associated with Ginsberg's poetry, and I have finally settled on two poets who are also translators of "Howl." For the sake of contrast, I chose one poet from Hungary proper, and another from outside Hungary.. The former, Ottó Orbán, lives in Budapest; the latter, György Vitéz, has lived in Montreal, Canada since 1957. Needless to say, I am not interested in comparing their translations of "Howl;" that exercise may in any case be of some limited profit to Hungarian readers only.[6] As stated above, my interest lies solely in establishing evident links, echoes, traces of transmission that testify to some forms of domestication, ingestion, and continuation of the spirit of "Howl."

As demonstrated by a common interest in Ginsberg, the works of the two poets in question are linked by a number of resemblances (although, as we shall see, the resemblances are superficial). Both are in their early fifties; both are innovators, though Vitéz has gone much further than Orbán in deconstructing traditional poetic patterns in his experiments with unusual word couplings, puns, cutups, and the like. Vitéz has increasingly used language, as suggested by John Cage, as "material" — i.e., without the customary respect and awe for the sanctity of tradition and language evinced by all Hungarian poets of his, and the older, generation — including

Orbán. In fact, evidence and influence of the Ginsbergian spirit as embodied in "Howl" is the best litmus test by which the signal differences between Orbán's and Vitéz's basic poetic attitudes may be most conveniently and conclusively measured. For this reason, I have concentrated on a single poem from the canon of each writer, both texts dealing with the art of poetry and the poet's role in contemporary society, which will make it possible for me to reveal "through images juxtaposed" ("Howl" 6), truths about both their positions and dispositions.

Of the two poets, it is Orbán who invokes quite frequently Ginsberg's name, makes references to his visits to America, and generally employs Ginsbergian devices, such as long lines, a good deal of confessional autobiographical data, and a large, at times loud public and/or prophetic voice. Orbán, however, stylistic and formal elements to the contrary, can hardly be considered anything but a very distant poetic comrade of the Beat writers. His strongly entrenched European, or more particularly Central-European, bias has prevented him from becoming truly receptive to the wide cosmic sweep of poets like Ginsberg, Corso, Ferlinghetti, and others. In several poems written over the past decade and a half, Orbán's references to his friendship with Ginsberg, his view of American poets and literature in general, and matters having to do with America have been characterized by a condescending desire to show up their naivete and amateurishness in contrast to the socially committed public stance he claims to profess.

The most telling example is found in the provocatively titled poem "Ginsberg Budapesten" [Ginsberg in Budapest]. Here Orbán asks several important and vexing questions regarding the role poets may play in the present age — an age when they are either ignored or viewed with hostility, depending on their place of residence. Orbán imagines two possible choices available to poets, as follows:

> Should we be Buddhists or quarrelsome queers in New York riding on the broomsticks of our obsessions to the witches' sabbath of our angelic dream talk or on the contrary keeping our fingers on the pulse of events do we know more or less what's on the mind of the average citizen under definite circumstances?[7]

From the way Orbán positions and articulates his choices, there seems to be no contest as to the alternative he prefers. Buddhists and "queers" (the Hungarian term employed by Orbán is the partly homophonic yet still homophobic *homokos*, a slangy variant of

buzeráns, the Czech form of which [*buzerant*] Ginsberg carefully noted in his memorable poem "Kral Majales")[8] are grouped together, and since the reference to Ginsberg is obvious, his being both Buddhist and homosexual, the terms serve as indices to a kind of Ginsbergian pseudo-alternative or artistic irresponsibility. This is followed by the image of the Ginsbergian poet as a devotee of the occult. Orbán alleges that instead of concepts or ideals, such a poet can have only obsessions, which then can only transport them to some weird non-place, outside the sphere of normal socio-historical human reality, to the *walpurgisnacht* of their "dream talk." "Dream talk" is Orbán's patronizing term for a poetic language that has transgressed the rules and regulations of traditionally sanctioned *rational* discourse, while also being a reference to the language of dreams, i.e., the unconscious — in other words, the very essence of Ginsberg's and the surrealists' attempt at unifying through ecstatic poetic language the artificially separated conceptual pairs of conscious/unconscious, rational/irrational, etc.

The putdown is followed by the obviously privileged image of the poet as some sort of physician, fulfilling his properly defined duties. Even if we disregard the incongruity of the image — a medical [medicine?] man taking the pulse of some such nebulous entity as "events" and then reading the mind of something equally abstract like the "average man" — there remain some problems with the role of the poet as diagnostician. One implication is relatively straightforward: the image may allude to the poet as shaman and tribal encyclopedist, endowed with obviously superior knowledge vis-à-vis the "average citizen." On another level, Orbán (unwittingly?) invokes the Marxian substructure/superstructure dichotomy in terms of which the poet first examines the fundamentally determining economic and material factors in a given grid of "definite circumstances," proceeding only then to find out about the citizen's mental and cultural welfare, the latter being at all times dependent on the former. In socialist realist terms, it means the praxis of "going among the people," mingling with workers and peasants, learning about the way they live, listening to them ("what's on their minds"), and then write about them in a responsible and sensible manner. Considering the fact that in the more liberal political climate in Hungary no writer would dream of reinstating such practices (reminiscent of the Rákosi era of the late 1940's and early 50's), Orbán's references are somewhat anachronistic, to say the least.

Another overtone embedded in the image of the poet as man of science recalls Stalin's infamous designation of writers as the "engineers of the soul," and Zhdanov's subsequent degradation of

them to the middle rungs of the party hierarchy. Whether on the most lowbrow, schematistic level, or employing sophisticated literary styles, the writer in the Stalinist era had no other role than to articulate the program of the party for the masses. For Orbán to invoke, albeit obliquely, this veritable ghost from the past, and with it, on the one hand, all the still untold suffering of individual writers, and, on the other hand, the still unassessed cultural damage caused by Stalin's (and his Hungarian representatives') policies, is far more "irresponsible" than any poetic "dream talk."

"Ginsberg in Budapest" ends on a somewhat paradoxical note. Before Ginsberg's departure from the Hungarian capital Orbán says farewell not only to the American poet, but to other things as well:

> G'bye Allen g'bye I take leave of our muddled salvation of the howling poem of our youth of the illusions of the sixties when we imagined the intellectual as a knight in the shining armor of his reform projects we have nothing in common though it's good to know our essence is the same.[9]

It is in this leave-taking that the superficial resemblances between Orbán's and Ginsberg's (and, as we shall see, Vitéz's) poetic attitudes disappear, to give way to substantial differences. Orbán renounces the enthusiasm and fervor of his youth, discarding in the process the "howling poem" (i.e., "Howl") as so much embarrassing excess baggage, discomfitingly reminding him of a poetic and human identity with which, as with Ginsberg, he has "nothing in common." Orbán's farewell to his past is not fraught with nostalgia or regret: if anything, he sounds blithe and relieved, as if to suggest that the arduous enterprise of pulse taking and mind reading allows no sentimentality or even memory. Be that as it may, to speak of an identical "essence" uniting Ginsberg and himself — this being their never-ending curiosity of asking questions about the world — is a little disingenuous; for the questions the two poets ask, the answers they receive, and the "reports," medical or otherwise, in which they articulate them are irreconcilable. Poetic curiosity is not an ideal attribute devoid of historical contingencies — a fact one should not forget even when playing doctor.

György Vitéz's poetic program is markedly different from Orbán's, not the least because of having lived outside of Hungary for three decades. Instead of finding and/or inventing reasons for living and writing in North America (in contrast to Orbán who in several poems finds it necessary to justify why he has not emigrated

to America),[10] he has devoted his energies to attempt to answer other questions. For example, what are the outer limits of consciousness and poetic communication; how can one engage in newer and newer explorations and experiments without severing one's connections and commitments to the "howling poems" of one's youth.

Vitéz's relationship to Ginsberg's work in particular, and American poetry as a whole (apart from "Howl," he has translated several works by Wallace Stevens, William Carlos Williams, and Sylvia Plath, in addition to poems by a number of important Canadian writers such as Al Purdy and Gwendolyn MacEwen)[11] is less obviously visible than Orbán's. Yet the spirit seems to be closer than in the work of any Hungarian writer writing at home, except some of the most talented members of the newer generation of poets.[12] It is no exaggeration to say that Vitéz (and a few other Hungarian writers who settled in Canada and the United States after 1956: Tamás Tűz, József Bakucz, András Sándor, László Baránszky) succeeded in flying by the Joycean "nets" of nationality and religion/ideology. Although he continues to write poetry in his first language, even there by both necessity and inclination he has shown an openness and inclusiveness, a serious playfulness which in not typical of poets who remained geographically, psychologically, and culturally bound to Hungary, to Europe. In this context, then, "Howl" could show possibilities of new poetic structuring, a welcome nonrationality of diction and metaphor. Perhaps even more important, Ginsberg's poem could come alive and stay alive for Vitéz because it spoke in its frenzied eloquence of a common experience — of exile, of pain, of otherness, of being homeless, marginal, and unaccepted. But it also spoke of a need for communion, and Vitéz's poetry, in spite of its having evolved to a level of incessant word play and various ingenious language games — a practice which, in George Bisztray's estimation, may be fraught with the danger of reducing poetry to "an endless combination of signs"[13] — has preserved a will to maintain some form of meaningful communication. In a relatively early poem, entitled "Amerika" [America], most of the issues relevant to his relationship to Ginsberg, and a declaration of poetic intentions may be observed.[14] Apart from the title, the poem has little or nothing to do with Ginsberg's poem by the same name; more significantly, Vitéz's "America" replays in its own way the suffering, accusation, and reconciliation of "Howl."

The poem recounts a bus trip from Boston to Montreal, the scene of some harrowing feelings of alienation and disorientation resulting from the poet's inability to feel at home in his new-found environment. Part I begins with questions:

> What night is this, the darkness playing with its crumbling blocks what roads are we rushing on, what country is this, why is the bus empty as it takes me over the horizon? Why has the March snow melted on the hills of New Hampshire? (The rocks of the moonscape — Vermont — make the heart run faster why why the anxiety, — one wipes sweating palms on trousers as the snubnosed bus with its shiny underbelly lunges through the gates of a small town.[15]

In the poet's feverish mind one question stumbles after another, communicating his overwhelming sense of estrangement from even the most familiar components of the landscape, as if he were on a strange planet, and the seemingly recognizable elements were some sort of deceptive camouflage. The lonely traveller feels trapped in the bus, like a latterday Jonah inside his whale; also like the biblical prophet, the poet appears reluctant to play the customary poetic/prophetic role. For in partial answer to his angst-ridden questions, the reality he sees around him does not appear to be in need of a voice from the desert:

> The peace is palpable over the houses hushed in dreams of sauerkraut not even the ghosts of the TV screen can scream it away. For here soldiers in wigs (history book) and redskins (Last of the Mohicans) were shooting at each other with arrows, whatever.[16]

The confrontation with a reality known up till now only from history books and novels becomes less threatening precisely because of the humanizing memories of those books; yet the difference between the world of books and the actual world of experience is not dissolved. Additional answers begin to emerge in Part II:

> I've stumbled into a world where the children of the rich have long hair and would mop up the superhighways with their tears if the police would let them. I've come to a city where the poor fattened up on sweet nothing carve their fear with switchblades into the bent backs of the passers-by under the mile-long shadows of towering Babels erected not by arrogance but by guilt.[17]

The tone of the poet's critique of America, underneath the whimsical, deadpan exterior, is serious and cutting. Its social psychology is sound, devoid of the usual cant of pseudoexplanations coming from the right, offering racist and other accounts for crime and delinquency; if anything, Vitéz's assessment is basically

Marxist. The assumption that the "towering Babels" — echoing the skyscrapers and "robot apartments" in the Moloch section of "Howl" — are built by "guilt" rather than "arrogance" refers both to America's super-power status and to the Puritan past, as well as the guilt felt by the white conquerors over the disinheriting of the indigenous population.

Like Part II in "Howl," the second section of Vitéz's "America" ends on a note of disillusionment and despondency, as when the poet characterizes his journey as "a pilgrimage robbed of any dignity," while seeing the highway with disquieting foreboding: "Its end plunges into the sea. Dolphins are going to be marching on it one fine day."[18]

In the third and final part, however, the tone changes, and a very different question is asked:

> But what if I did not lose my way? Here can bloom conscience, this Sensitive Plant, waving to shimmering stellar wonderlands. And Liberty, at home under the redwoods, lifts up in her gigantic hands all her children who want to live who ride in boats on mountain lakes, who walk behind pineapple harvesting machines, who, like this bus driver, stop for a moment to say a few human words to the traveller who thought he was lost, and to his surprise finds himself among friends.[19]

The adjective "human" to the words spoken by the driver is doubly significant: apart from the connotation of general human friendliness, it finally dispels the traveller's oppressive feeling of alienation as if he were on an other, nonhuman planet. In the belly of that monster of a bus he finds another human being as much in need of human companionship as he is. The criticism of America, of American capitalism has not been revoked, but now it stands qualified, attesting to the traveller-poet's ability to move beyond the alien *surface* of this brave new world to the *substance* of a different, yet common humanity.

Without once explicitly alluding to anything remotely connected with Ginsberg or "Howl," Vitéz's "America" works through analogous stages of poetic unfolding. In its tripartite structure it creates an initial environment of estrangement and bewilderment, giving rise to a strong yet playfully figurative indictment of America, ending on an affirmative note, on a note of renewed faith in the possibility of some form of meaningful *communitas*. The guarantee for such a renewed "contract" comes from Vitéz's unsentimental recognition of the crucial ideal of freedom, for only in its light may

the ills of society be seen for what they are: *ills* that can be remedied. In contrast to Orbán's notion of the poet as a functionary of some healing pretensions, Vitéz offers no practical solutions; he quite unceremoniously affirms the poet's role as witness, even that of a suffering witness, whose testimony may be useful to others. Likewise, he exhibits no interest in probing the mind of his new found companion; their act of communication is devoid of any ulterior motives on either side. The words exchanged are in truth an exchange of gifts, one of the most ancient and reas-suring modes of human communication. Ginsberg's own "I'm with you in Rockland" in Part III of "Howl" is just such a gift extended over physical and mental distances to his friend Carl Solomon. In both cases, the verbal gifts are life-restoring, redemptive gestures, without which no truthful poetic account can be imagined.

The two Hungarian poets' responses to "Howl," then, have mapped out widely differing areas of poetic attitudes and concerns. It would seem that Orbán, either unconsciously or as a result of deliberate choice, refuses to part with wornout notions about the poet's task; his translating and reading of "Howl," his exposure to novel poetic avenues other than those of the nineteenth century bring out in him not the rebel but the zealous "doctor." The innuendo of his "Ginsberg in Budapest" — that the Ginsbergian and other similar poetic alternative is a kind of dabbling in idle witchcraft, and is without seriousness and a sense of responsibility — is repudiated not only by the Vitéz poem chosen as an example but most resoundingly by "Howl" itself, to say nothing of Ginsberg's later poetry. One of the most memorable passages in "Howl" can be found in Part III where the poet-narrator and Carl Solomon, in the real and imaginary madhouse "hug and kiss the United States under [their] bedsheets, the United States that coughs all night and won't let [them] sleep" (8).

It is perhaps redundant to point out that this image has "nothing in common" with Orbán's image of the poet as diligent diagnostician, with its lingering sense of self-importance and self-privileging. In a magical moment of reconciliation (of which the ending of Vitéz's poem, as suggested, is a poignant counterpart) the metaphysical entity of the United States is metamorphosed into a sick child, whom the two outcasts in the asylum "hug and kiss." The tenderness and delicate pathos of the scene has none of the clumsiness of "what's on the mind" of the benighted citizen. But that Ginsberg's image evinces a true sense of responsibility and the most mature way poets can respond to an unhealthy social or spiritual climate — that is, by showing tenderness and solicitude — is, I feel, beyond dispute.

After all, the illness of this "child" may not be fatal; for underneath the immediately worrisome exterior the loving poet — a sibling rather than an authoritarian parent — may glimpse its true and healthy soul: Liberty. And despite switchblades stuck in innocent bystanders, despite all the mindless and oppressive evidence of various manifestations of Moloch and other ills, the "Sensitive Plant" of conscience can flourish only under its protection.

The ideal of freedom and genuine human contact, then, are the crucial *loci* where, if "superimposed" over one another, Vitéz's text may be seen to merge with Ginsberg's. Instead of indebtedness or influence, it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of a free meeting of minds; but then *influentia* is just such a meeting, a flowing-together, fruitful and *responsible*. There is little doubt that its transmission from Ginsberg via Vitéz (and other poetic intermediaries) to younger poets in Hungary and elsewhere, is assured.

Notes

1. Allen Ginsberg, *Howl*, ed. Barry Miles: Harper & Row, 1986. All references in this paper are to this edition.
2. Professor Ball is the editor of two important collections of Ginsbergiana: *Allen Verbatim: Lectures on Poetry, Politics, Consciousness* (1974) and *Journals Early Fifties Early Sixties* (1977). The members of the MLA Panel on "Howl" included Ann Charters, Barry Miles, Marjorie Perloff, and the present writer.
3. See Daniel Hoffmann "Poetry: School of Dissidents," in *Harvard Guide to Contemporary American Writing*, ed. Hoffmann (Cambridge, 1979), 517–521. Also George Bowering, "How I Hear 'Howl'" in *On the Poetry of Allen Ginsberg*, ed. Lewis Hyde (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984) pp. 370–378. See also in the same collection by the present writer,"Ellipsis: The Ideograms of Ginsberg," pp. 272–287.
4. The term "transtextual" is Gérard Genette's, referring to all types and modes of one text's relationship to another; see his *Palimpsestes: la littérature au second degré* (Paris: Seuil, 1983), p. 9.
5. Harold Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 7.
6. I would like to set the record straight, however, by stating that György Vitéz, and not Ottó Orbán, is the first Hungarian translator of the poem, a fact missing from the bibliography section in the annotated edition as provided by Bill Morgan. Vitéz's translation was published in Montreal, on 28 May 1960, in 100 copies, with notes.
7. The poem appears in the volume *A visszacsavart láng* [The Flame Turned Low] (Budapest, 1979), p. 84. It should be noted that in a later poem written about Ginsberg and himself ("Vendégelőadók" [Guest Lecturers], *Élet és Irodalom* XXX, 35 [29 August 1986], 1), Orbán appears in a more generous mood. Yet he is still bent on making distinctions between the two of them, unabashedly in his own favour, as when he describes Ginsberg on a Budapest street demonstrating the healing powers of a Chinese dance, while he himself continues to have faith in the wild horse under the reins of "logic" (i.e., poetry). Translations in the paper are my own.
8. In *Planet News* (San Francisco: City Lights, 1968), p. 89.
9. The Hungarian original is as follows: Viszlát Allen viszlát zavaros üdvösségünk fiatalságunk nagyhangú versétől búcsúzom a 60-as évek illúzióitól amikor az

értelmiségit reformkori páncéljában pompázó lovagnak láttuk semmi közünk egymáshoz de jó tudni hogy lényegünk közös

10. See for example "Miért nem élnék Amerikában?" [Why I would not live in America], in the volume *The Flame Turned Low*, p. 77.

11. The translations of Canadian poems have appeared in the anthology *Gótika a vadonban* [Wilderness Gothic] (Budapest: Európa, 1984). 12. Younger Hungarian writers unburdened by the literary past include Tibor Zalán, Imre Péntek, Ernő Endrődi Szabó, Judit Kemenczky, Endre Kukorelly, János Géczi, János Sziveri, Endre Szkárosi, to mention only some of the most important. One recent anthology of young poets: *Lélegzet* [Breath/Inspiration] begins with a translation of Ginsberg's essay/manifesto on poetic breath and oral expression. It also includes a text by a new poet, János Kurdi Fehér, which begins "Allen Ginsberg, újra kell futózni a koponyát" [Allen Ginsberg, we'll have to retread the skull].

13 See George Bisztray, *Hungarian-Canadian Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 49.

14. The poem has appeared in Vitéz's first (belated) volume of poetry, *Amerikai történet [American story]*, Paris 1975.

15. The Hungarian original is: Micsoda éjszaka ez, egymásraomló kockáival játszik a sötétség milyen utakon robogunk, — milyen országba tévedtem, miért üres a busz mely hetedhéthatárra visz? Miért olvadt el New Hampshire dombjain a márciusi hó? (A holdbeli táj — Vermont — sziklái megfuttatják a szivet miért, miért szorong az ember, — nedves tenyerét nadrágjába törli mikor egy kisváros ajtaján belódul a törpeorrú fényeshasú gépezet.)

16. The Hungarian original is: Érezni lehet a békét savanyukáposztás álomra szenderült házak fölött még a televizió (ejtő)ernyős kisértetei sem tudják elhessegetni Itt parókás katonák (történelemkönyv) meg rézbőrűek (Utolsó Mohikán) lövöldöztek egymásra nyíllal, miegymással.

17. The Hungarian original is: Olyan világba botlottam hol a gazdagok gyermekei hosszú hajat növesztenek és könnyeikkel mosogatnák föl a nemzet szuper– országútjait ha a rendőrség megengedné nekik. olyan városba kerültem hol olcsó hús híg levével fölhízlalt szegények bicskával vésik félelmüket a járókelők meggörnyedt hátába nem gőg, de bűntudat emelte bábel–tornyok mérföldes árnyékában

18. The Hungarian original is: méltóságától megfosztott zarándokút, and, Egyenesen a tengerbe lóg a vége. / Egy szép napon delfinek fognak vonulni rajta

19. The Hungarian original is: De hátha nem tévedtem el? Itt kivirágzik a lelkiismeret, ez az Érzékeny Palánta, villódzó csillag-szépségek felé integet. És fölemeli nagy tenyerébe a vörösfenyök alá költözött Szabadság élni kívánó gyermekeit kik a tengerszemeken csónakáznak, kik az ananászszedő gépek mögött ballagnak kik, mint ez a buszsofőr, egy pillanatra megállnak, hogy emberi szót szóljanak az utazóhoz aki azt hiszi eltévedt és meglepődik, hogy hirtelen társakra akadt.

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Book Reviews

Count István Bethlen, *Hungarian Politics During World War II. Treatise and Indictment.* Countess Ilona Bolza (editor). Munich: Rudolf Trofenik, 1985.

For the historian of interwar Hungary, the discovery of a previously unknown manuscript of Count István Bethlen creates a sense of anticipation and curiosity. Hungary's Prime Minister for a decade beginning in 1921 and a leading political figure in the 1920s and during World War II, Bethlen left behind no memoirs or first-hand accounts of the key events in which he participated. Unfortunately, this 27 page treatise, written in July, 1944 by Bethlen while in hiding during the German occupation, contributes very little to our knowledge of specific events of interwar Hungarian history. It does, however, offer insights into Bethlen's political philosophy and his state of mind at a time when Hungary was plunging headlong toward disaster.

Bethlen's treatise, which was entrusted in 1944 to a family friend, Countess Ilona Bolza, is a thorough indictment of the policies of those Hungarian leaders who had advocated that Hungary join with Nazi Germany in the war against Soviet Russia. In 1944 Count Bethlen could feel fully justified in producing such an indictment. Ever since 1939 he had argued privately that Germany could not win the war and that Hungary could best protect its national interests by a policy of armed neutrality. In 1940 he had opposed Hungary's signing of the Tripartite Pact and in 1941 he had urged that Hungary refrain from joining the campaign against the "Bolsheviks." In his 1944 treatise Bethlen argued that these decisions in 1940–41 were the "fatal blunders" that pushed Hungary down the

"slippery slope" that transformed the country into nothing more than a German "Gau" or protectorate.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Bethlen's treatise are the thumbnail sketches he offered of the leading political figures of interwar Hungary. Although Bethlen's assessments seem generally to be balanced and insightful, he did not hesitate to point out the shortcomings of his colleagues. Count Gyula Károlyi had "very little imagination." István Csáky was too naive and László Bárdossy was "too weak." Béla Imrédy lacked a "balanced judgment or balanced character." Even Pál Teleki, whom Bethlen in general praises, is described as "no great judge of men." The reader is left to draw the inference that Hungary would have been in much more capable hands if Bethlen had been prime minister during the critical years before and after 1941.

Bethlen's sketch of Gyula Gömbös merits special mention, for the two men were often bitter political rivals who represented the two dominant wings of right-wing politics. Yet Bethlen wrote a remarkably balanced appraisal of Gömbös, who is depicted as a man of "lively imagination" and a "great deal of political appeal." His anti-Semitism is described as comparable to that of "any decent Hungarian" who reacted with disgust to the events of 1918–1919. Looking back from the perspective of 1944, Bethlen found little fault even with Gömbös's foreign policy. Collaboration with the Axis powers, Bethlen argued, was the correct policy at the time, since Hungary's aspirations for territorial revision could not be fulfilled in any other way. No one could have predicted the unfortunate policies Germany and Italy would follow in later years. Of course, Bethlen found much to fault in Gömbös's political style. Gömbös, he wrote, was the personification of a condottiere, reveling in conspiracies and secret societies and undermining parliamentary government. This kind of activity poisoned Hungarian political life and made possible the kinds of irresponsible acts that were committed in later years.

Bethlen's treatise reflects the thinking of perhaps the most capable and perceptive of all interwar Hungarian statesmen. His condemnation of the "barbaric persecution of the Jews" and his spirited defense of freedom of the press and parliamentary government reveal a commitment to humanitarian and liberal principles. Yet the reader will be struck by the degree to which even Bethlen remained in the grip of a highly emotional nationalism and certain right-wing ideas. In the summer of 1944, when the very independence of Hungary was in jeopardy, Bethlen was still searching for a way to preserve Hungary's territorial gains from the period 1938–1941. He seemed to believe that the Vienna Awards and the

Hungarian occupation of parts of Yugoslavia had been carried out "in accordance with international law," and that the victorious great powers should be able to understand this. That as late as July, 1944 even István Bethlen should suffer such an illusion is a striking demonstration of the way in which hatred of the Trianon Treaty and belief in the justice of Hungary's cause had pervaded the thinking of Hungarians in the interwar period.

Thomas Sakmyster
University of Cincinnati

Egon F. Kunz. *The Hungarians in Australia* Melbourne: Australian Educa Press, 1985. Australian Ethnic Heritage Series. 148 + viii pages.

In the 1970s the Government of Australia, much like its Canadian counterpart, intensified its efforts to emphasize the multicultural nature of the country's society. One of the products of these efforts was, like in Canada, the start of publication of histories of the country's ethnic groups. The volume on Australia's Hungarians appeared in 1985, three years after the Canadian equivalent was published by the writer of these lines (in collaboration with M.L. Kovacs, Paul Bődy and Bennett Kovrig).

In selecting E.F. Kunz to write the volume in question, the editors of the Australian series had made a wise choice. Kunz is a long-time student of ethnic and immigration history, and is an experienced researcher. One of his fields of expertise is nineteenth century Hungarian migration to Australia, the story of which he had told before, in *Blood and Gold: Hungarians in Australia* (Cheshire, 1969). This story is summerized and updated in the present volume, offering fascinating reading on the careers, fortunes and misfortunes of the refugees of the 1848–49 revolutionary war (and even a few of their predecessors) in a distant and developing land. The chapters dealing with such early migration are followed by those covering the last decades of the nineteenth century, and the first decades of the twentieth. In this period only a few hundred Hungarians made it to the south seas continent. They ranged from poor peasants (attracted by offers of free land), to highly educated or trained individuals. Many of them were refugees from the territories that had been detached from historic Hungary by the post-World War I peace settlement.

The book's second half is devoted to a study of the waves of

Hungarians that went to Australia during and after the Second World War, and after the 1956 uprising in Hungary against Soviet rule. One chapter deals with the migrations, another with community life and institutions, and a third with the contributions of the newcomers to Australian life. In taking the story up to the 1980s in fair amount of detail, this book is more useful and more complete than the volume on the Hungarians in the Canadian series, yet it devotes considerably less space to the economic and social aspects of migration and immigrant life.

The Hungarians in Australia is a well-written and well-crafted book. It offers a good balance between descriptions of events in the country of origin and the country of adoption. Though it has been written mainly for the general public, it offers much to academics as well. The omission of footnotes — evidently publisher's policy — is regrettable, but it is not a disaster in the case of this work as researchers can consult Kunz's other works on the subject. And, even in the absence of these, it is evident that the book is based on a wide variety of sources. For curiosity's sake it might be mentioned that these include a description of an encounter between a Hungarian immigrant to Australia and a young Austro-Hungarian naval officer visiting the country in 1893. The latter was none other than Nicholas Horthy, the Regent of Hungary in the interwar years.

Kunz's work is very much "traditional" history. It stresses political developments and biographies. In making judgements on controversial issues in Hungarian (and Hungarian-Australian) politics, Kunz is reasonable and judicious. His book makes fascinating reading for anyone who is interested in the history of Australia, and/or the story of the Hungarian diaspora.

N.F. Dreisziger
The Royal Military College of Canada

In forthcoming issues:

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Special issue: Twentieth Century Hungarian Avantgarde. Edited by Oliver Botar.

Esther Levinger. "Kassák's Reading of Art History."
Diane Kirkpatrick. "Time and Place in the Work of László Moholy-Nagy.
Sylvia Bakos. "Nature and Intellect: The Ideas of the Emergent Hungarian Avantgarde."
Oliver Botar. "Kassák and the American Avantgarde."
Alain Findeli. "De la photographie à la peinture: la leçon de László Moholy-Nagy."
Gyula Marosán (documents).
Moholy-Nagy (documents).

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Special issue: Hungarian Minorities in East Central Europe.
Edited by Andras Ludanyi and N.F. Dreisziger.

Walker Connor. "Leninist Nationality Policy: Solution to the National Question?"
Károly Nagy. "Hungarian Minority Education Problems in Czechoslovakia."
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Andrew Ludanyi. "Hungarians in Communist Yugoslavia 1945 to the Present."
Károly Jókay Ihász. "The 'Official' Position of Contemporary Hungary on the Nationality Question."

HSR

Hungarian Studies Review

Vol. XIV, No. 2 (Fall, 1987)

In this issue Peter Hidas examines the relationship of Hungary's public and the Habsburg military in the decade after the Hungarian War of Independence of 1848–49, Magda Némethy writes on László Németh's ideas on education, and Francis S. Wagner writes on the situation and treatment of Gypsies in post-1945 Hungary. In a review article, Géza Jeszenszky examines recent works on the controversial Hungarian statesman, István Tisza. These studies are followed by reviews of two "foreign language" works relating to Hungary and Hungarians.

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The Editors
Hungarian Studies Review
University of Toronto
21 Sussex Ave.
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REVIEW ARTICLE

The 1987 issues of the *Hungarian Studies Review* are published with the help of a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

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OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Peter Hidas teaches history at Montreal's Dawson College. He has published widely on the history of nineteenth century Hungary.

A retired high-school teacher in Toronto, Magda Némethy is the daughter of László Németh.

Former diplomat, librarian and author, Francis S. Wagner last published in our journal in 1983.

Géza Jeszenszky is a Budapest-based historian who has taught for some time in the United States and has published widely on early twentieth century Hungarian history and Hungarian-British relations.

Hungarian Studies Review Vol. XIV, No. 2 (Fall 1987)

The Army of Francis Joseph and Magyar Public Opinion, 1849–1859

Peter Hidas

1. The Sources

Mid-nineteenth century measurements of public opinion do not meet modern standards. Deficiency in methodology, however, can be compensated with the introduction of supplementary data and historical analysis. In attempting to give a reasonably accurate picture of public opinion vis-a-vis the Habsburg army in Hungary in the 1850's, the researcher must turn first to contemporary public opinion reports or *Stimmungsberichte.*

Initially, the *Stimmungsberichte* were prepared bi-weekly, then monthly, bi-monthly and, from 1855, quarterly. The degree of reliability is higher at the beginning of the decade and at the lowest administrative level. Such reports, which were filed regularly with the Ministry of Interior, were to aid the government in Vienna gain an accurate picture of the reaction of the Hungarian people to various governmental measures and international events. The government attempted to secure accurate reporting. Questionnaires were distributed. Reports from the same districts were demanded from the civil administration, the army, the police and/or the gendarmerie.

As authorities did at the time, we can now compare the reports to test their reliability. The lowest common denominator of such reports were, and still can be, generally accepted. In addition, one can put more faith in army reports since they had less political axes to grind after 1850 and because they presented more straightforward reports than the others. The accounts of the civil servants should be given some credence since they were written by local officials familiar with their districts—and with the reliability of their informers. On the other hand one should note the interest of the police

and gendarmerie to reassure their superiors that, as a result of their hard work, all was well in Hungary. Similar inclinations of local officials to present a rosy picture, however, were balanced by their desire to obtain popularity at home through the easing the burden of their charges.

In addition to the *Stimmungsberichte*, other sources which also reflect public opinion are available. The Hungarian press mirrors the views of certain intellectuals and nobles. Freedom of the press was curtailed little in the early 1850's. The peasants expressed themselves through collective appeals, demonstrations, violent actions and draft dodging, or through submission. The gentry and the middle classes showed their emotions through collaboration or resistance as did the aristocrats. Contemporaries later wrote of the heroic days of passive resistance in the age of darkness. Romantic and nationalist historians were happy to elaborate on such themes. Their works demand utmost skepticism. The reports of government agents provide a better guide to public opinion in mid-nineteenth century Hungary.

2. Army of Occupation

During the summer of 1849 there were three armies in Hungary: the Austrian, the Russian and the Magyar. By the end of the year there was only one, the Austrian. The Magyar soldiers were heading for home, the Russian interventionists were returning to their bases in Poland and southern Russia, while a quarter of Francis Joseph's armed forces settled down in Hungary for a long stay. His entire Third Army had been entrusted with the pacification of Hungary until 1868.

The actual size of the Austrian armed forces fluctuated from month to month and place to place. It is difficult to establish the size of the units stationed in Hungary at any given time. Usually, about half the army was on active duty. There were mass call-ups and mass furloughs, depending on the international situation and the domestic state of the economy. In January, 1848, 250,000 men were on active duty out of a total of 400,000.[1] The official tally of 1861 indicated a peace-time force of 280,000 and a war enrollment of 630,000.[2] To end the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence, General Haynau employed 175,000 troops to suppress the Magyars. Soon many units were transferred to Bohemia to face the Prussians. More followed when war appeared to be imminent in 1853.[3] Between 1849 and 1867 the average size of the Third Army can be set around 40,000. According to the *Ordre de Bataille und Dis-*

location of the Third Army,[4] in the first month of each year the number of soldiers present in Inner Hungary was as follows:

1861	1862	1863	1864	1865	1866	1867
46,000	48,000	41,000	36,000	39,000	41,000	48,000

Of these many were Magyars. Their presence was contrary to the traditional policy of assigning draftees away from their home province. Any significant breech of that policy can be taken as a sense of security by the authorities, although the question of emergency, that is, a shortage of other troops, should not be excluded as another plausible explanation.

For the 1850's the sources are less revealing. Professor Rothenberg states that in 1850 there were 90,000 soldiers stationed in Hungary and the Military Border Districts, but he does not give the ratio.[5] The First Cavalry Corps in Hungary registered 10,634 men, 25% below the figures of the 1860's.[6] There are no other indicators which point in the same direction. Recruitment remained steady until the 1860's. Hungary always raised a single *Feldjäger* (chasseur) battalion, the 23rd, from 1849 to 1860. The requirements were then substantially increased. The situation was similar in the other parts of the Empire.[7]

Table One
Distribution of Chasseur Regiments in the Austrian Empire

Year	Hungary and Transylvania	Bohemia-Moravia	Austria
1817	nil	7	5
1853	1	10	8
1857	1	8	8
1860	4	11	10
1867	2	18	13

Hungary provided 14 full infantry regiments both in 1853 and 1857 but in 1860 the counties sent enough recruits to fill 23, and, in 1867, 27 infantry regiments.[8] Thus, one can conclude, despite the gaps in the data available, but taking into consideration population growth of the first half of the nineteenth century, that neither the Habsburg army nor the number of troops assigned to Hungary changed significantly between 1849 and 1860. As a matter of fact the

soldier/civilian ration decreased between 1817 and 1860 except for the years 1848–1849.

3. Army and Politics

The army was one of the traditional pillars of the Habsburg Empire. Vienna and the army, however, did not always see politics eye to eye as Hungary was reconquered in 1849.

A cabinet minister wrote to Commander-in-Chief Prince Windischgrätz on December 27, 1848 suggesting the division of Hungary into semi-autonomous districts of nationalities. Windischgrätz ignored the plan. The general, an ultra- conservative federalist, with influence at the court and a large army behind him, pressured the Liberal Centralist Austrian government of 1849 to cooperate with a group of Hungarian aristocrats, the so-called Old Conservatives. At a meeting on 6 January 1849, the Cabinet reluctantly authorized negotiations with the most active loyal aristocrats for the purpose of forming an unofficial council to advise the Government on the reorganization of Hungary.[9] The Committee soon began its work but could achieve little, since the Cabinet, anxious to restrict their activities, sent a senior civil servant to oversee, in fact, confine, the Council's activities, to the application of governmental policies.[10] This was not to the liking of Windischgrätz. Without waiting for instructions from the Liberal Centralists, the Prince began to pursue his own Hungarian policies independently of the Viennese Cabinet but with the support of the Old Conservatives. As his forces entered Hungary in January 1849, Windischgrätz appointed provisional royal commissioners to assist the military in pacifying and administering Hungary. The commissioners were, without exception, Hungarian Conservatives.[11]

On 15 January 1849 László Szögyény-Marich, former Vice-Chancellor of Hungary and now a leading Old Conservative, received Windischgrätz's invitation to take immediate charge of Hungary's political administration. According to Szögyény-Marich the offer was accepted at their 17 January meeting on the condition that Hungary's integrity along with the country's constitutional institutions would be preserved. Magyar hegemony was to be safeguarded and, as a consequence, the official language of public administration was to remain Magyar.[12] On January 20th Szögyény-Marich occupied his post at Buda and began organizing various governmental offices.[13] The civil administration's leading personnel were recruited exclusively from the ranks of the Old Conservatives, who were determined to shape Hungary as they had proposed in their

memoranda to the Crown. In Pest County, Commissioner Antal Babarczy obtained authorization from the Military for the parallel display of both Imperial and Hungarian colours. Similar concessions were granted in Fejér and Veszprém counties.[14] Szögyény-Marich protested every step the Liberal Centralists had taken towards the separation of Croatia from the Kingdom of Hungary. On the publication of a new centralist constitution in Vienna, Szögyény-Marich, along with the Unofficial Advisory Council, submitted his resignation in protest. None of the resignations materialized when Windischgrätz reassured the federalist Old Conservatives of his continuous support.[15]

The Prince disapproved of Minister-President Schwarzenberg's Hungarian policies. Windischgrätz condoned the exclusive use of Magyar as the language of public administration despite the Government's explicit instructions to the contrary and in contrast with his personal preference for the German language. Pre-1848 institutions were restored at Buda and several officials were told outright not to maintain direct communication with the Liberal Centralist ministers without the Commander-in-Chief's authorization—in distinct contravention of earlier instructions to Windischgrätz by the Minister of Interior, Bach.[16]

The Liberal-Centralist ministers understandably prepared for the moment when they could convince the Emperor of the absurdity of the situation, the incompatibility of aristocratic federalism in alliance with a military clique and liberal centralism with a wider social base. It was Kossuth who unintentionally came to their rescue. His army mounted a successful spring campaign, shattering Windischgrätz's military reputation. On 6 April, 1849 the commander-in-chief was dismissed. When Windischgrätz's replacement, Lieutenant-General Baron Ludwig Welden, misunderstanding the existing political situation, invited the Old Conservatives to assist him in establishing a military dictatorship in Hungary, he met the fate of his predecessor.[17]

4. Haynau

The Cabinet now selected General Haynau to command the Third Army and to bring Hungary under martial rule. He was well qualified for the task being a fine commander, popular with his troops,[18] and because of his past successes at suppressing local rebellions in Lombardy. Haynau lived up to his reputation by defeating the Hungarians without decisive support from the Russian interventionist forces, and by retaining control over Hungary until the

government became firmly established and the threat of a new uprising, if there was one, completely disappeared. Nevertheless, the Liberal-Centralist government did not intend to give a free hand to the military. On 4 June 1849 Baron Karl Freiherr von Geringer, Councillor in the Ministry of Interior and Bach's trusted official, was appointed commissioner in charge of the civil administration in Inner Hungary.[19] Geringer and Haynau, the latter having become military governor of Hungary just five days earlier, were to apply Bach's centralist reform program to the pacified country.

At first there was little disagreement between Haynau and Vienna. Francis Joseph and his Cabinet were determined to treat the Magyar leaders with severity and punish the most dangerous revolutionaries. The young Emperor personally accepted Schwarzenberg's arguments on the necessity of expiation and terror.[20] Haynau, a mean, suspicious and hysterical person, agreed wholeheartedly:

> I would hang all the leaders, shoot all the Austrian officers who had entered the enemy's service, and reduce to the rank of private all those Hungarian officers who had earlier served us either in civilian capacities or as sergeants. I accept the responsibility for this terrible example to the Army and to the world.[21]

During the autumn months Haynau and his military courts delivered a dreadful blow to Hungary. Death sentences were pronounced and actually carried out on 114 individuals, 89 of whom were former Imperial officers.[22] An additional 386 persons were sentenced to death but their sentences were commuted to prison terms. Not less than 1756 people were jailed.[23] England, Russia and France exerted pressure on Austria not to persecute the Hungarian insurgents after their demise. Although the Viennese government rejected all interference in the internal affairs of the Empire, by the end of August 1849 the Cabinet began to yield. Haynau was instructed to moderate the policy of reprisal.[24] The general became infuriated. Neither he nor his officers had much respect for the Liberal-Centralist ministers. The generals and other senior officers, according to Adolf, a well informed spy in Pest, were Absolutists and only the junior officers cared for the March Constitution and the new policies of the government.[25] Haynau and his coterie felt that only military dictatorship could serve the Emperor and his glory. With great gusto Haynau embarked to discredit the ministers and create a new image of the Military.

The Hungarian press watched his shenanigans with amazement. The *Pesti Napló* reported on March 21, 1850 that Haynau has freed the revolutionary F. Shuller, who was recently sentenced to death. The paper reported eight more such reversals on April 4th. In the same month the general authorized a benefit concert for the political prisoners at the National Theatre.[26] Soon the Haynau Institute was established to aid the veterans of both sides.[27] Five colonels of the Kossuth army, who were recently sentenced to 18 years each, were suddenly released and their confiscated estates were also returned. An additional sixty officers were set free from the military prison of Arad.[28] Twenty six members of Hungary's revolutionary parliament who in 1849 participated in the dethronment of the Habsburgs were freed after sentencing.[29] In July Haynau was dismissed. The cabinet gradually deprived the army of its major role in pacification. The subsequent commanders of the Third Army, Count Wallmoden- Gimborn and Baron Appel, were political nonentities. By the time Archduke Albrecht took command in 1852 the Liberal-Centralists were on the run. The absolutist Emperor took Absolutist ministers and advisors thus eliminating the need of army politics.

5. Conscription

The army of Francis Joseph was thoroughly old fashioned. Gentlemen officers whose promotion was usually due to their high position in society and common soldiers whose very presence in the army was connected to either their low social or anti-state behaviour could not constitute a modern army.

Recruitment policies were part of the problem. Many of the officer corps were recruited from abroad, mainly from Germany and some from England. By 1859, 52% of the officers were "foreigners." Such commanders had little understanding of their men.[30] As a punitive measure, the government intended to enroll the whole Kossuth army, both the regular soldiers, the *honvéds*, and the local militia, the national guardists, under the imperial colours.[31] On 20 August 1849 100,000 men were ordered to report to recruiting stations. This was a serious mistake. Neither the army nor the civil service had the capacity to handle so many recruits. In the early part of 1849 not even Kossuth was able to find enough soldiers for his revolutionary armed forces. His national guardists began to drift home in droves. The summer brought defeat, desire for family and civilian life. There was resistance to the Austrian draft too, and those who were caught in the new round up, particularly the former *honvéd*

officers who were enrolled as ordinary soldiers in various Imperial regiments, eventually became a volatile element.[32]

Once in the army the new recruits talked among themselves of politics, often in the presence of police spies. Defection was frequent. They promised each other of beating Haynau to death, hanging the Kaiser and rushing home in case of a new rising.[33] The drafted *honvéds* had to be guarded. Every tenth soldier escaped from a Pécs transport.[34] Geringer reported to Vienna that the gendarmerie was unable to catch all the draft dodgers and that many newly enlisted men were in hiding.[35] Some villages refused to send a single soldier to the recruiting centres.[36] Others aided the deserters or threatened the guards of the new recruits. The 37 draftees who ran away at Dunaföldvár took their guards' weapons and began terrorizing the collaborators of Paks. The local administrator requested the dispatch of soldiers, who duly arrived but refused to deal with the situation. The case was left with the mere 36 gendarmes who handled the security of the whole county.[37]

As the regime moved towards consolidation, the army released most of the veterans of the War of Independence, including those who were potential hazard to army discipline. Haynau freed all national guardists and *honvéds* over the age of 38, sons without brothers and those who paid the Treasury 500 *forints* or supplied substitute. The defenders of Fortress Komárom, the last Hungarian stronghold, received amnesty.[38] Before the end of 1850 the Minister of War exonerated draft dodgers who were on the run, or in jail or who were about to be tried.[39] Searching for volunteers was temporarily suspended in Hungary.[40] The Emperor pardoned those officers who had left the Imperial Army without the retention of their ranks.[41] In January, 1851, several categories of ex-*honvéds* were released and the following summer the Minister of Interior terminated the *honvéd* draft altogether.[42] The Imperial Script of October 12, 1851 ordered the reduction of army staff and the dissolution of reserve *honvéd* regiments. Many other types of regiments were also disbanded or reduced. Masses of soldiers were sent on unlimited furlough.[43]

From mid-1851 drafting became a routine matter accepted by the population as part of life. The government remained cautious; despite the increased population most counties were required to supply the same number of recruits for their regiment in 1853 as in 1817.[44]

Table Two
Infantry Regiments Raised in
Inner Hungary and Transylvania

Crownland	Year			
	1817	1853	1857	1860
Hungary	10	14	14	23
Austria	10	9	9	9
Bohemia	9	7	4	10
Galicia	11	11	11	13
Moravia	5	4	4	4

Table Three
Population of Selected Hungarian Counties

County	Year			
	1821[45]	1847[46]	1857[47]	1869[48]
Máramaros	159,000	177,000	185,000	221,000
Heves-Borsod	369,000	320,000	350,000	528,000
Bereg	110,000	126,000	138,000	160,000
Békés-Csanád-Csongrád	167,000	368,000	483,000	514,000

New regiments were established by the counties of Máramaros, Heves, Borsod, Bereg, Békés, Csanád and Csongrád, where the population growth was well above average.

The call-up for military service was administered by the civil service usually once a year, between February and April. Married people, only sons of elderly parents, civil servants, priests, teachers and college students with good marks were exempted.[49] The Liberal-Centralists democratized the process; for a while no cash payment

was authorized for release from military duty. Later the old system was reintroduced but the cost of exemption was too high for most noblemen to take advantage of. The charge was 1500 *forints*, the average yearly salary of county chiefs.[50] Among those who were of draft age only 10 to 25 per cent were actually taken for the usual eight- year stint. In the Buda District, for example, 30,114 men registered for military service in 1856. Only 67 paid the exemption fee, 3975 were absent without cause and 8542 moved, emigrated or died since the census of 1851. The actual contingent drafted numbered 3940 men.[51]

The drain on manpower was not overwhelming. Secret agents reported few complaints. According to one such agent grievances about call-ups ceased once the *honvéds* and the National Guardists were released.[52] Brigadier-General Heyntzal reported in 1852 on the prevailing satisfaction in his district over the universality of the levy.[53] Two years later the army's agents noted a similar mood among the peasants while the police observed the outrage of better families concerning the outlawing of substitution. In fact, in 1854 large contingents were secured by the enlistment of volunteers in the Nagyvárad District.[54] A contemporary police gazette listed by district the names of all draft dodgers wanted between 1852 and 1854. There is no evidence of mass avoidance of service. The list contains a meager 69 names for Szabolcs County, 240 for Somogy, 133 for Békés and 610 for Abauj-Torna for the first half of 1852. By the end of the year there were 764 on the Szabolcs county list. Next year the Somogy county list shrank to 50, 2/10,000 of the population. From Nyitra, only 149 made the list, and from the populous town of Nagyvárad, only 16 draft dodgers were wanted by the police.[55] Only by the end of the decade was the rhythm of drafting interrupted by hard times, political troubles and military defeats.

In 1859 the officers of the 46th Infantry Regiment began to complain about the high frequency of desertion of new recruits.[56] The Sopron District public opinion report, for the first time spoke of opposition to the draft and blamed it on labour shortages. The *Stimmungsberichte* speculated on the possibility of criminal elements volunteering to obtain arms and then might join the deserters to threaten public order.[57] Another report frankly stated that the so-called volunteers were actually now "roped in".[58] Next year more and more furloughed soldiers would not return to their units. Military authorities, however, were reluctant to admit to such breeches of discipline which would damage regimental reputation.[59] In Gömör County the peasants of Osgya openly debated ways and means of preventing the draft of their youth. In Zemplén County

some peasants blamed the local nobility's renewed political opposition to the government for the recently increased drafting quotas.[60] The draft for 1860 had to be suspended. The peasants rejoiced.[61]

Between 1849 and 1859 the soldiers were simply "putting in time." In 1859, they were asked to fight and possibly die for the Emperor, fight and die far away from their homes. After 1848, after emancipation, this was too much to ask.

6. Servicing the Army

Quartering, corvée and the occasional use of the army to dampen the class struggle in the countryside created conflicts between soldiers and peasants. On the other hand, the use of soldiers in the aid of flood victims and in the prevention of natural disasters, such as floods, eased the tension between the army and the lower classes. The generally apolitical behavior of the peasantry, which was partly due to their increased standard of living in the 1850's, meant law and order in Hungary and the correspondingly reduced role of the army as a policing force.

The presence of three armies in Hungary in 1849 imposed immense burden on the population. The economic hardship hit the peasants worst since they were the primary suppliers of soldiers, foodstuff, quarters and transport facilities. According to a county official, there were more troops in Pest County than the population could possibly feed. The leftover crop was not enough for the support of the villagers. The situation at one point became critical because the Austrian army used the peasants' essential draft animals.[62] The Town of Vác complained that the presence of cavalry battalions and their 2700 horses led to the impoverishment of the population.[63] Often the problem was the unfair distribution of quartering obligations among districts.[64] At time payment for quartering was avoided but the new county chiefs made their protests at Pest effectively.[65] In 1851, a new law regulated services for the army: barracks were built, cash payments were made obligatory and a fairer distribution of the burden attempted.[66]

Services rendered to but not paid for by the imperial army during the Hungarian War of Independence became tax deductible.[67] In the 1850's the army either paid with money or tax vouchers or a combination of the two. The use of vouchers occasionally caused problem in the cash-starved countryside. According to a Trencsén County report when the initial cash payments for food transport from army depots was replaced with tax vouchers, the few additional pennies the peasants received was not enough to buy fodder for

the draft animals for the two-three day trip.[68] Difficulties multiplied during the Crimean War when large Austrian units were moving across Hungary towards the eastern and southern extremities of the Empire. The First Cavalry Corps, for example, stayed in the Kassa District for more than three months in 1855. People complained and claimed that the soldiers paid and treated their hosts better in Galicia, Bukovina and Transylvania.[69] Similar grievances were filed from other districts.[70] During the previous year the problems were not as severe. The 7th Gendarmerie Regiment reported that the population despite the extraordinary demands for quartering and draft animals, expressed no dissatisfaction to date. The local Viceroyalty Office in the same district observed that the villagers were doing their best, but hinted at the existence of political tension. The officials of the Pest and of the Nagyvárad districts expressed their astonishment over the fact that the peasants performed transport service "accurately and willingly" not excluding harvest time.[71] The reason for cooperation was economical rather than political. The *Stimmungsberichte* show the complete disinterestedness of the peasants in the Eastern Question and other foreign policy issues. What mattered was the extra income from transport, housing the army and the increased agricultural prices. There was a good harvest in 1854. Nevertheless, prices kept climbing and contemporaries attributed the rise to army procurement.[72] By 1855 increasing demands began to interfere with production. The vouchers disturbed the accounting of the peasants. Wherever quartering was used as a punishment to a community, and that was done sparingly, resentment flared.[73] The main body of the peasantry cooperated with the army. They posed no security problem and showed no great hostility towards the army.

With the exception of the years 1849 and 1862, there were few recorded peasant disturbances in Hungary between 1849 and 1867. Political demonstrations were not numerous when compared with occupations of the former commons or properties of estate owners and with contract breaking incidents. Less than ten per cent of the conflicts involved death or injury.[74] In the history of Hungarian peasantry the significant dates were not August of 1849, the surrender at Világos, or 1860, the end of Neo- Absolutism, the year when a deal was struck between the Hungarian nobility and Francis Joseph, but April of 1848, 1853 and 1862. In 1853 the emancipation which began in 1848 was finalized. The number of conflicts between authorities and the peasantry declined until the early 1860's, when returning anti-Habsburg county officials rekindled the class struggle.[75]

Law enforcement, in any case, was within the domain of the gendarmerie from 1850. The army was rarely called in by this new police force of about 1500 men, mainly composed of Magyars and former army men, who in time earned the respect of the population. The gendarmerie was feared by all, including the army and as a result the commanders were reluctant to involve their troops in political oppression. The role and influence of the army in political affairs was gradually reduced. From November, 1850, the civil and military administration of the country was separated. Already in July the military courts were excluded from the purge of the civil service and educational institutions. The military courts, nevertheless, remained active and retained wide jurisdiction until 1854, when in the midst of the Crimean War, the state of siege was lifted.[76] Contemporary Hungarians could not understand this latter development because at the time, war was not far from the borders.[77] The reduction of the standing army by 109,000 men and the parallel war preparations of the Third Army further confused the public.[78] In fact, in many parts of Hungary there were no soldiers within miles.[79] The High Command felt secure enough to use Magyar units to replace those garrison battalions which moved to the Principalities to face the Russians.[80] In 1857 a further reduction of the Third Army was ordered along with the dissolution of army security forces.[81] The High Command properly conceived that the security situation in Hungary did not demand the active participation of the army in political administration. The weak internal cohesion of the military establishment in the 1850's cannot be explained with the destructive influences of the heavy commitment of the Austrian army to the maintenance of internal security.[82] Neither can Solferino be blamed on Austria's inability to deploy her entire armed strength in the field in 1859 because of the alleged need to have large formations in Hungary and Croatia to guard against uprisings.[83] An explanation for the behaviour of Magyar units in Italy 1859, mass desertion and general unreliability, must be sought elsewhere, certainly not in the Hungarian domestic scene, but possibly in the impact of exile propaganda and in the influence of the enrolled former Kossuth officers.

Between 1849 and 1859 the most radical wing of the nobility in exile, in the army or in retreat in the countryside, was politically discredited; resistance to the regime could be but minimal. The aristocrats campaigned with the support of the gentry against the Liberal-Centralists but failed to obtain political concessions, although they contributed to the destruction of the reformist cabinet and its replacement by a much worse one from the Hungarian point

of view, the Absolutist- Centralist regime. The bulk of the gentry faithfully adhered to the aristocratic leadership; the Old Conservatives waited patiently for concessions, collaborated massively, caused no trouble and required no military measures. Only after Solferino, when the Hungarian nobility rediscovered the weakness of the Habsburg Empire and discarded the inefficient Old Conservative leadership, was the army called upon to restrain and bully nationalist gentry-led demonstrators in the towns of Hungary. But before 1859 many nobles collaborated. They may have snubbed army officers at balls or longed for Austrian involvement with defeat in the Crimean conflict but their faith in the Old Conservatives, their disappointment with 1849, their fear of the gendarmerie and the lower classes, their post emancipation economic malaise politically paralyzed them for a decade. The army was not one of their main concerns and the army viewed them as impotent dreamers. In 1859 and 1866 the roles were reversed; as the weaknesses of the army became obvious so grew the influence of the Hungarian nobility. The Austrian Liberal-Centralists were swept away, the peasantry neutralized, and the Absolutist-Centralists' credibility destroyed on the battlefields. Now the gentry could reach out for political power, for a deal which included the replacement, at least in Hungary, of the Habsburg army with a Hungarian one. The deal was struck in 1867. A new army was created a year later.

Notes

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67. Oszkár Sashegyi (ed.), *Munkások és parasztok mozgalmai Magyarországon, 1849–1867* [Labour and Peasant Demostrations in Hungary, 1849–1867] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. 1959), p. 82.
68. HNAAAA, D 44 816/1852.
69. *Ibid.*, 772/1855.
70. *Ibid.*, 1771/1853, 1755/1855.
71. *Ibid.*, 3701/1854.
72. *Ibid.*, 554/1854, 117/1855, 1755/1855.
73. Sashegyi, *Munkások*, pp. 62-68, 137; *Pesti Napló*, 10 July 1851.
74. Sashegyi, *Munkások*, *passim*.
75. György Szabad, *Forradalom és kiegyezés válaszútján (1860-61)*[At the Crossroads of Revolution and Compromise, 1860–61] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1967), *passim*.
76. Sashegyi, *Az abszolutizmuskori levéltár*, pp. 221-223.
77. HNAAAA, D 44 1351/1854.
78. Paul W. Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War* (New York, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1972), p. 85.
79. Sashegyi, *Munkások*, p. 225.
80. HNAAAA, D 44 3701/1854.
81. HNAAAA, D 44 10/1858.
82. Rothenberg, *The Army of Francis Joseph*, p. 46.
83. Rothenberg, "The Habsburg Army and the Nationality Problem," p. 74.

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Education for Quality of Life in the Works of László Németh

Magda Némethy

To become a respected author in a small East-Central European country such as Hungary is far from easy, and a rather special task. The role of, as well as the results expected from, authors is very different from that of writers living in the West. The reason lies not only in linguistic limitations, but also in the fact that only a few million people understand the language. The task of "men of letters" in Hungary could easily be construed as a mission. Authors can become an integral part of, and foster social processes, sense the subconscious needs of society and then attempt to respond.

From time to time, an author's intentions may be misunderstood. His vision may be mistakenly regarded by others as a political program. But literature aims higher than politics, anticipating future alternatives, rather than merely those of the present. Such anticipation can also occur in the fields of sociology and education, and, it is true, even in politics, but it should never be confused with a definite program.

László Németh alerts us to the problems of the future through his works and suggests how to avoid such problems with a foresight involving local and universal concerns of human interest. The lifework of Németh (1901–1975) spans forty-five years and acts as a sensitive gauge reflecting successive waves of social needs in Hungary. Though he had ceased writing a number of years before his death, his works are more timely now than when they were written. This essay seeks to introduce Németh, particularly in the context of his world of ideas that he regarded as "long-range weapons," and to expound such views of his that may be applicable today in suggesting solutions for the future.

Active young people of today are not likely to find the time or patience to pore over Németh's multifaceted collected works, which

fill some fifty volumes, even if they are able to read Hungarian. They may know some of his novels, or perhaps they have seen one of his plays performed, but the true measure of his message, and the genius with which he parlayed it, is best seen in his essays and articles. The yield of his last working years, in particular, offers valuable insight distilled from a lifetime of experiences and struggles.

On his father's side, Németh came from Transdanubian peasant stock. His father was the first educated man in the family, a secondary-school teacher, and a model for his son. Németh went through medical school in Budapest, but he was more interested in literature. Christmas 1925 was an important milestone in his life, for that was when he married and, coincidentally, also launched his literary career by winning a short-story competition sponsored by the magazine, *Nyugat* (The West), the most prestigious and significant Hungarian periodical of the day.

After that, Németh decided to devote his life to literature, but he almost always had other jobs on the side. He worked variously as a dentist, a medical doctor in the school system and a secondary-school teacher like his father. Of his large family, four of his daughters reached adulthood. During the siege of Budapest in 1945, Németh's family home and his library were destroyed. When the war was over, he chose to live mostly in the country, first at Hódmezövásárhely and then at Sajkód, a small settlement on Lake Balaton's Tihany peninsula.

Németh's education was particularly broad in that he kept up his studies in the natural sciences based on his university training and was widely read in history as well as world literature. He had a strong critical acumen for picking out literary talent both in Hungary and abroad. He could read in 15 languages and, therefore, knew contemporary literature in a variety of original tongues. Németh came to grips with all forms of literary expression, and while his results were outstanding in all *métiers*, he forsook a solely literary career. When he was twenty-four he tried to become the "organizer of Hungarian intellectual forces."[1] For twenty years he strove to fulfill this goal; only as a result of decades of tribulation did this aim evolve into a pedagogic one.

Finding insufficient opportunities for publication, Németh launched his own one-man periodical, *Tanú* (Witness), of which seventeen volumes were published between 1932 and 1937. The magazine was intended to be a means of inquiry and information. He said, "My periodical is inspired by...the anguish in ignorance... I regard the essay as the genre of public learning.... I want this periodical to be the chlorophyll of our intellectual life... through which

knowledge is converted into attitude... and into morality."[2] Németh recognized the risk of an education with an over-emphasis on humanistic aspects. He believed that such an education would eventually lead to a schism between humanism and science and was always the proponent of a synthesis of the two.

In 1934, Németh was appointed director of literary programs at Radio Budapest. He attempted, subsequently, to develop the station into a cultural organ. From the outset he warned that radio (and by extension, all mass media) could educate people, but it could also just as effectively mislead and stupefy them. The 1930s were perhaps Németh's most creative period, in which ideas and programs for change that had inspired him up to then began to crystallize in writing.

For Németh, the ideal person was in harmony with his environment, was well balanced, and had fully developed his potentials. He wanted to invent a way of establishing a truly up-to-date cultural fabric for Hungary. According to him, a cultured person "understands his mission, and his actions become an integral part of the problem-solving process of humanity."[3] Quality was the central theme of Németh's world of ideas, and he set this down as a guiding principle not only for himself and his work, but also for his fellow-men.

In 1925, José Ortega y Gasset's *Revolt of the Masses* outlined the domination of a gray mediocrity in all walks of life; for Ortega, "the masses" signified a segment of society that lacked outstanding qualities. Németh confronted this concept with one of his own: the "revolution of quality." He first mentioned the term in 1933, in *Tanú*, and later incorporated it into most of his writings. In the capitalist and Marxist systems alike, the most important consideration seems to be quantity; Németh sought to establish a system whereby value would be measured on a scale of quality. "Quality," in this sense, should be the leading principle not only in regard to social structure, but in all walks of life. Németh opposed the soulless nature of labour and hoped to see mere bread-winning converted into interesting work. Every office or workshop could in effect be a kind of laboratory in which experimentation would enrich daily work. All that was needed was for people to find a means of converting their work-places into "laboratories." Németh believed that such an idea of "quality," in tandem with a more equitable distribution of goods and services, could be achieved best through a socialistic order, albeit a qualified one—qualified in that he saw a classless society more as a populace of intellectuals than as representing the lowest common, proletarian, denominator. In future, not only would the propor-

tion of intellectuals in society increase rapidly, but also, in his vision, almost all jobs would require more brain power; thereby, most industrial and agricultural occupations would be almost considered intellectual pursuits. He said, "The motto 'proletarians of the world, unite' [implying that we must sink to a proletarian level] was a nineteenth-century slogan. Today I tend to hear a more optimistic slogan: Let's all become intellectuals."[4] Németh was not referring to the old-fashioned middle class as his ideal (he was actually quite critical of this segment of society), but a new group of intellectuals he wished to cultivate and develop through his writings. He himself was the most typical representative of this group.

At a 1943 conference in Balatonszárszó, Németh outlined the immediate tasks of the "new intellectual."[5] Analyzing the causes for, and possible solutions to, Hungary's wartime woes, he was moved to ask:

> What is the reason for the intense suffering, unknown for the last few centuries, that has suddenly been dumped onto humanity? The cause is mechanized despotism on the part of marauders in alliance with new technology. Despots believe the soul of a nation is measured by the amount of weaponry it has. They seek to change nations into hordes of collectives, and attempt to replace our high, God-inspired standards with low ones of their own invention. They control our dreams by artifice. While "plunder" and "impotence" are contradictory terms, still, when men ally themselves with machinery, people are impotent to stop the plunder, and the machines will not cease oppressing our souls. As if we haven't got enough problems fighting our day-to-day enemies, we also have to wage war against this man-machine centaur. The beast will trample the crop of our diligence until God, in the embodiment of heroism, nobleness and self-sacrifice, converts these horrid machines into domestic animals of love.[6]

What should the new man of intellect be like? If reform is merely external and superficial, instead of being tied to the reform of human integrity as well, the "new order" cannot be much of an improvement over its predecessor. Instead, certain qualities—greater nobility, more self-criticism, stronger morals, a heightened sense of responsibility and higher ideals of life—must be developed. Németh's version of socialism based on quality had nothing to do with wielding power; rather, it represented a moral standard. His

model human being would be of strong morality and have a great sense of culture. "Quality" would be inseparable from his flesh, and would characterize his disposition. Németh considered that idea important, saying "man weighs only the secondary matters with his brain, but uses intuition to decide about destiny."[7] A small nation's right to survive, he reasoned, should be dependent on the fact that it exemplifies the best qualities of the individual, in macrocosm.

The years 1944 and 1945 brought many changes in Németh's life. His home was destroyed in the war and he moved to the country. From that point on, he was no longer a part of the intellectual ferment of Budapest or of the launching of new programs at the war's end. He could quite easily have been liquidated during the Rákosi régime. Until 1956 he lived in constant fear for his life. In the interim, he earned his living mostly by translating from at least six languages. Also in this period, Németh developed into a true educator, teaching at a country school for five years, a period he later recalled as being a very happy time. Though writing was always a lifelong passion for him, he was very much an educator at heart, and in that role he still strove to develop his ideal of the moralistic human being and the exemplary lifestyle for his nation.

Miklós Béládi very aptly characterized Németh's method thus:

> László Németh did not surround his writings with a scaffolding of abstract nomenclature. However, it would be wrong to conclude that he undervalued theoretical ideas as opposed to practical ones. He thought highly of ideas in general; only the morality of a sound lifestyle was more important to him. Ideas interested him in so far as they were vehicles for clarifying real-life problems. Technical questions in the field of natural sciences were interesting to him because they represented a part of life, and his outlook on literature was also scientific.[8]

As an educator, Németh was a man of logic, insight and synthesis. He approached the teaching of humanistic subjects in a scientific way and stressed the integral nature of the "two cultures." Quality of life was very much dependent on one's system of values, and was closely related to one's knowledge and education.

In September of 1945 Németh wrote the booklet, *Reorganization of Public Education.*[9] In it he made a number of suggestions that he hoped would be implemented for the reform of school system from the elementary to the university level. The end of the war, in his view, should have made his suggestions for reform particularly time-

ly. With a postwar growth in prosperity, intellectual progress should also occur. He recommended six elementary grades, followed by six secondary that would emphasize four different streams of scholarly activity, that is, humanities, technology, agriculture and administration. Németh proposed three years of industrial or agricultural training for particularly weak students. All high schools would teach the four major streams, but in varying proportions according to the schools' mandates.

In his work *Negyven év* (Forty Years), Németh summed up this immediate postwar period thus:

> On the surface it may have seemed that I was concerned solely with compiling a new curriculum, yet in reality I wanted to see produced a new man of world civilization. This would be reflected in the aspirations of the curriculum. In my first article, "The Reorganization of Public Education," I defined these aspirations: school should become a concentrated preparation for life, giving a wide view on the world, as well as on vocations. At its best, education should instill a high level of brotherhood in the populace and produce a society in which people respect one another's work. My book was the first to suggest to the Hungarian public that agricultural and technical training be introduced into the curriculum. During the years I taught at Vásárhely, my goal was to prepare notes on the lessons I taught and from them to compile four textbooks, one each on history, natural sciences, applied mathematics and languages. It was also my desire to introduce an innovative model for textbooks; the books would start off with a survey of the subject, proceed to the main lessons, then some short articles to stimulate more interest, and end up with a guide to further reading, a bibliography and a glossary. I intended such textbooks to serve as a kind of Noah's Ark for the preservation of the elements—and particularly the sparkle and buoyancy—of Western civilization. But though I attempted to work on them even during the years I was slaving as a translator, unfortunately only a few fragments of my four textbooks actually got written.[10]

It is regrettable that the Hungarian regime in the late 1940s, when instituting educational reforms, gave no serious considerations to Németh's ideas and suggestions for practical changes.

In 1961, with many years of teaching behind him, he turned again to the subject of education in a series of essays published under the title, *A második hullám* (The Second Wave).[11] His four major themes were still the foundation of an ideal curriculum, guided by historical principles; in his approach to the teaching of history, Németh followed and used chronology as much as possible. He believed education should give an overview of the subject to the student, but the real goal was "to understand our place in the world, and to mould our existence into a useful component in harmony with the rest."(p. 320)

The most timely essay for today's world in *The Second Wave* is "Ha most fiatal lennék" (If I Were Young Today) (pp. 331–47).

In it, Németh suggested that though most young people enjoyed better economic conditions now than several decades earlier, they are none the less not happier. The fact of having more free time than ever before was a mixed blessing. He said, "The more independence and leisure time young people have, the more they must face the new task of creating their selves. In the past, young people used to be shaped by a long work-day or, if they were not working, by need and distress."(p. 332) Németh reasoned that, "as the free time not occupied by work and sleep continues to grow, everybody's life becomes like a small 'research institute,' in which individuals and families must make informed decisions on the use of leisure hours, and intelligent choices concerning entertainment and education." (p. 333)

> This is not a trifling question. Work, in healthy surroundings, cannot ruin people; on the other hand, free time, if not applied properly, can have a disastrous effect. History has shown... many examples of children, born into a rising social class with a historic mission, suddenly finding themselves secure and prosperous, and beginning to decay morally because of it.(*Ibid.*)

Németh wished to see people to arrange their lives according to his philosophy of life in general, which is not to say that he regarded the world necessarily in the same way as the good Christians of the past, as a place of trials and tribulations. Nor did he see earthly existence as a difficult, but important, test that would entitle him to salvation in the next world. However, he found he could not conceive of the world in the popular conception, as being a garden of pleasure in which one gets by with a little bit of work, or if one were clever enough, with the right kind of maneuvering.

For a truer perspective, Németh started by analyzing the functioning of the universe:

> What is this enormous machinery of magnificent order, and yet sometimes of exasperating irrationality?... How could it be seen in any other way but as a field of enormous possibilities? Not only possibilities already realized, but also those latent under the surface. A chemist would easily understand what I mean. Where were those many hundreds of thousands of organic and inorganic compounds before they were called up in the last century by chemical technology? Obviously they were present in our world, but undeveloped. Life, too, was latent until—perhaps only on our planet with its favourable conditions, or maybe at distant points in the universe as well, like the tips of a Christmas tree—life was activated, just lit up. Since then, life has dashed through infinite varieties and forms before human awareness suddenly burst forth.... The fact that I am the proprietor of such an awareness, although it sometimes makes me uncomfortable, is nevertheless marvelous.... (p. 334)

László Németh saw life as a voyage in which we pass through the landscape of various ages. On a voyage, our perception is more acute than at other times, and we are more like travellers in our first years of life, living in a state of searching interest, trying to understand human secrets and the depths of social relationships. Why, he asked, can we not sharpen our attention with the passing years, instead of allowing it to fade and become sluggish. Németh did indeed believe that we could sharpen our sense of discernment, that the possibility exists now more than ever:

> If on leaving... I were asked what provided me with my greatest joy in life on earth, I should say it was learning. Not the learning that leads to an examination, but the inquiry conducted out of curiosity—for instance an excursion into a new language, and through that, into an unknown world, into a science or into an occupation. (p. 335)

Németh believed that broadening one's base of experience and knowledge was what made life intriguing. It was his opinion that the current problems inherent in learning derived from the lack of a program with an overview; people rushed through studies selected

purely at random, rapaciously, and the result of such a grasping greed was that one was unable to construct a proper model for oneself of the world. He recommended that introducing the spirit of natural sciences into life, conducting experiments and making observations, would make the onerous seem interesting and the infamous, instructive. He even likened the bench of the galley to a laboratory bench. Moreover, Németh claimed, the new-found interest would light the soul and keep it alert, increasing the capacity to learn. On the other hand the worries and pains that gnaw into the soul tend to dampen our enthusiasm for the world around us.

He postulated that most suffering comes from our improper comprehension of the second major proposal of our invitation to life. In fact, while life can be likened to a voyage, it can also be considered a process of sculpturing. Man exists not merely to admire already realized potentials in the world; the latent possibilities of our world must be continually developed, our lives and ourselves shaped, bent or carved into the best possible configuration. Németh saw morality as being a regulatory system that serves to bring the most out of a person after biological development was complete, and ambition as its impulse. However, he warned that the wrong kind of ambition, infusing us at a tender age, might lead to a great deal of unhappiness.

For Németh, the right kind of ambition was cause-centred rather than self-centred; those with the right kind would become advocates of a beautiful, majestic purpose. Proper ambition, he reasoned, would not only prevent great suffering, but it would enable one to develop fully:

> People grow like trees, groping in all directions with their roots, their connections. Taller and healthier foliage may be produced by developing more and better connections in the world. Someone who takes his mother, his child, his friends, his homeland seriously, will become wealthier in the process, no matter what these relationships come to later. The wrong kind of ambition cuts off, tears up, rots away these fibres with its impatience and tough competitive spirit. It locks the soul into a shell of offensive self-adulation, and the spirit withers away. On the other hand, the right kind of ambition turns the attention to a purpose, to work and to people, by seeking out, like a tree, new nutritive minerals that will help it broaden its root system. (pp. 338f)

Németh felt that no one field of endeavour, whether artistic, scientific or political, had a monopoly on either the creative or the destructive forces of such opposing ambitions. There are those in all walks of life who are quite willing to bend the rules in order to succeed at any cost, being interested in appearances alone, while some turn their attention to the reason behind their labours:

> [...] the real strength of a society lies not in its rocket-like talents, but in the values of ordinary people working at ordinary tasks in society. In practice, however, the age of free enterprise turned the self-asserting instinct of the young towards careers that are spectacular and lucrative. (p. 339)

Real success, to Németh, consisted of a harmoniously developed and well-balanced life, which would share its warmth with others. The dignity of such a life could be recognized immediately; people sought its secrets and tried to follow its prescriptions.(p. 340) "If I were one of the young people of today," he said, "I should seek to associate myself with major exploratory interests in life."(p. 341)

Németh was indeed inclined to express opinions on a multitude of subjects, for instance, on the closely connected themes of work, leisure and education; he cautioned people not to let their work and their interests become separated, but to do what they enjoyed, if possible. He also said man ought not to live only to consume; "It is sad that a significant part of mankind spends life in acquiring and consuming the available products. We can protect ourselves from this danger through self-control and self-development." Németh believed the dividing line between real entertainment and real learning should not be too distinct.(p. 344)

He also had things to say about the perennial battle of the sexes; for one thing, although conditions for good male-female relationships were more favourable than those of a few years earlier, relationships had not adequately improved. However, he noted, the sexes are not segregated today, and women can earn a living and, therefore, do not depend on men. Divorce is a means whereby people can extricate themselves from failed marriages, yet there are even more problems related to "love" than ever before. The reason for this, as he saw it, was that:

> [...] our imagination and taste are directed towards certain stereotypes by movies, the arts and fashion. There are only a few (not necessarily the best) individuals in the opposite sex who approach this stereotype; others are regarded as

> merely a compromise or a substitute. By challenging these stereotypes, literature and—particularly—the visual arts are able to help perceive the charm often mixed with plainness in real individuals. This then should facilitate the physical approach of the souls; it should teach our sensuality to be more spiritual, and at the same time, more realistic.(p. 345)

An even more serious problem, as he saw it, was that the feeling of economic security eventually leads many to plunge into pleasure, and love itself is made indistinguishable from mere physical pleasure. All the other values one's partner might have, we do not bother to discover, or these facets become boring and we neglect them. Furthermore, he warned us not to take marriage too selfishly or too carelessly. One should not get involved in a marriage impulsively or at too early an age. Németh said he himself approached marriage with a pledge of semi-asceticism, and this tack was rewarded with the moral support necessary for such an undertaking.(p. 345)

At times, when parents are disappointed in their lives or marriages, they transfer their aspirations and ambitions to their offspring, and an exaggerated "cult" of children follows. There is a limit to how much care and pleasure a young person needs and, indeed, can absorb. Exaggerated attention, whether in the form of indulgence or pretense, results in more harm than neglect does:

> The ability of a child is neither our disgrace nor our honour. It is drawn through the lottery of genetics from the properties of our ancestors. It is wise... to regard children as our portion of man's future. They are small bodies, in which we have to support sprouting potentials with a continuous radiance of good will.(p. 346)

In *Sajkódi esték* Németh also published an essay on religious education ("A 'vallásos' nevelésről," pp. 9–73) Religious upbringing, he reasoned, should have as its goal the development in the child of a pious awareness of the integration of the universe that would include a sense of responsibility towards his own potential, as well as an interest in, respect for and compassion towards all men and all forms of life.(p. 52) Németh's idea of an ideal educator was of one who set an example that would motivate youth to direct themselves toward, and imitate, true nobility of conduct. "The family or the classroom should have an atmosphere [as it is ultimately the atmosphere that is effective in education] in which the instinct of self-assertion is converted to morality."(p. 60)

Németh felt we should regard the universe with awe and balance our own self-admiration with a healthy respect for the world:

> Where this respect is replaced by disregard or insolence, man becomes his own God, [...] and instead of developing himself further, he cuts off all roots of self-evolution. For his interrupted growth he begins to compensate with hollow delusions. People develop themselves through their relationships; these are the root-tissues which provide nutrients necessary for man's unfolding.(p. 36)

In other words, people can best develop through synthesizing a respect for the universe with good relations with their fellow-men. In his last productive years, Németh sensitively analyzed the very same problems in his novels, *Esther Égető* and *Compassion*, and in his play, *The Large Family*.

He considered morality, rather than pleasure, to be the motivating life force and understood that to accept moral guidance requires considerable effort and self-discipline, but the reward would be a better society and a richer life. He asked us, does not the blessing of human intellect oblige us to preserve, use and further develop our intelligence? Readers, whether they agree or disagree with Németh's program for life, should nonetheless give some thought to his suggestions and think of them as an antithesis to our chaotic present.

Notes

1. László Németh to Ernő Osváth, editor-in-chief of the *Nyugat*, December 1925, Vienna. Petőfi Irodalmi Múzeum, Budapest.
2. *Tanú*, I:1 (1932).
3. László Németh, *Sajkódi esték* [Evenings in Sajkód] (Budapest: Szépirodalmi 1961). Our source: a reprint in Németh's collected works, vol. 16, 1974. Quotation on p. 293. All subsequent references to this work are incorporated in the text.
4. László Németh, *Az értelmiség hivatása* [The Mission of the Intelligentia] (Budapest: Turul, 1944).
5. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
8. Miklós Béládi, "Minőség és erkölcs Németh László gondolatvilágában," in *A mindentudás igézete* (Budapest: József Attila Kör, 1984) p. 214.
9. László Németh, *A tanügy rendezése* [The Reorganization of Public Education] (Budapest: Sarló, 1946). More recently reprinted in *A kísérletező* ember (Budapest: Magvető, 1973).
10. László Németh, *Negyven év* [Forty Years] (Budapest: Magvetö / Szépirodalmi, 1969), p. 28.
11. Published in the collective work *Sajkódi esték*, pp. 291-361. The page references are in the text.

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The Gypsy Problem in Postwar Hungary.

Francis S. Wagner

Historical Background

It appears that more publications deal with Gypsies than with any other ethnic group. Already in 1914 George F. Black compiled a Gypsy bibliography listing 4,577 published works. The body of material that has been written about them has grown steadily since. Yet the Gypsies remain one of the most mysterious and least-known peoples. Though research institutes like the prestigious Gypsy Lore Society (with its highly esteemed *Journal*) and several other institutions and periodicals have tried to encourage research on them, many questions remain unanswered. This is partly responsible for the negative policies most governments have followed concerning Gypsies in the course of modern history.

The ancient home of the Gypsies was located in India. From there they migrated between the eleventh and sixteenth centuries and mingled with peoples of the Near East, Northern Africa, then through the Balkan Peninsula they entered Eastern, Central and even Western Europe. Their mixing with other peoples was limited so that this itinerant race has retained its distinctive phenotype until now.

Gypsies were mentioned in European chronicles as early as 1322 in Crete, 1346 in Corfu, and 1370 in the Peloponnesus. Their appearance was recorded in 1407 and 1414 in Germany, 1416 in Transylvania, and in 1417 in Moldavia and Hungary. Sigismund, King of Hungary, Bohemia and other realms had given a letter of safe-conduct to one of the first groups of Gypsies entering Western Europe in the fifteenth century. This letter of safe-conduct, dated 1423, said among other things:

> "...Our faithful Ladislas, Chieftain of the Gypsies and others dependent on him have humbly besought us... our special benevolence. It has pleased us to grant their request... If the aforesaid Ladislas and his people present themselves in any place within our Empire... we enjoin you... to favor and protect them in every way... And if any trouble or disturbance should arise among them... Ladislas alone, shall have the power of judging and acquitting..."[1]

Being a migratory people with no steady occupations, there was little possibility of modifying their primitive culture. Due to the almost complete lack of acculturation, they were stigmatized by chroniclers as "liars, thieves" who devoted themselves to "pagan customs." This negative characterization evidently led to cruel persecutions in all countries, especially wherever they appeared in larger numbers. In 1725 Frederick William I of Prussia condemned all Gypsies over 18 years of age to be hanged. The situation did not differ essentially in France, England or Spain.

During the same century, in the spirit of the Enlightenment, some rulers started regulating Gypsy life in order to raise their socio-economic status to the level of non-Gypsy serfs. In the Habsburg Empire, Maria Theresa (1740–1780) and her son, Joseph II (1780–1790), tried to abolish the Gypsies' nomadic way of life by issuing appropriate decrees. In 1761 the Emperess prescribed that Gypsies should settle down permanently. Maria Theresa issued another proclamation in 1773 to improve the socio-economic position of Gypsies. The new law instructed local authorities to demolish all Gypsy huts and to provide solidly constructed houses for them. The decree threatened to punish those Gypsies who abandoned their new houses by imprisonment. Furthermore, the law proclaimed that Gypsy women and children should wear the same national costumes which were peculiar to the peasantry of the region. Also, the institution of Gypsy vaivodes was abolished, and Gypsies were placed under the jurisdiction of non-Gypsy village judges. This same decree prescribed that Gypsy children be educated by peasants under the supervision of local parish priests with the hope of settling them in villages as artisans. Needless to say, this experiment failed completely.[2]

The 1848–1849 revolutionary years did not affect Gypsy affairs in the Habsburg Monarchy. While serfs were emancipated, Gypsies remained outside of the society's mainstream. As elsewhere in Europe, they continued to live from one day to the next, moving

from place to place and committing offenses to obtain food and other basic necessities.

The lifestyle of Europe's Gypsydom helped spawn the ideology of racial superiority. The apostles of this new "science" were English, American, French and German thinkers who pioneered the theories which very soon deeply affected the philosophy of nationalism. Comte Joseph de Gobineau (1816–1862), influenced by American authors on the "inferiority" of Negroes, prepared his *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines.* Since discrimination is unfortunately a barely controllable human instinct, many a scientist, historian and politician utilized it to justify his own standpoint and sentiment on inter-ethnic affairs. Racist explanations of history—that is, doctrines about the survival of the (biologically) fittest and other relevant speculations— won wide acceptance in some countries, foremost of all in Great Britain, the United States, and Germany. With the growing popularity of such theories in Central Europe, significant progress in the status of Gypsies did not occur for a considerable period of time.

Archduke Joseph's initiatives in the closing years of the past century to settle the Gypsies of the Habsburg realm permanently, belonged to the very exceptional cases. His well-compiled *Cigány nyelvtan* [Gypsy Grammar] (Budapest, 1888) was a major linguistic accomplishment. But most of his Central European contemporaries had become influenced by the theory of racial superiority. Among them was publicist Kálmán Porzsolt, who in the August 6, 1907, issue of *Pesti Hirlap*— Hungary's leading newspaper—asserted that "Civilized state has to exterminate this [Gypsy] race. Yes, exterminate! This is the only method." Even Dr. Antal Hermann, Jr., the son of a liberal-minded, internationally famed ethnographer, in a public lecture in 1913 emphasized: "The nomadic life of Gypsies is full of mysticism, romanticism, stealing, burglary, kidnaping of children, animal poisoning, and murder."[3]

Despite the wide-spread prejudice in Hungary and elsewhere against the Gypsies, no legislative measures tried to change the existing conditions. In the meantime only a few individuals and their families became assimilated; the overwhelming majority of Gypsies did not change their much-criticized lifestyle. This situation remained basically unchanged even during the interwar years.[4]

During the Second World War the Gypsies' situation greatly deteriorated throughout Central and Eastern Europe. In the Germany of 1941 Gypsies could only be found in concentration camps. Thousands of German Gypsies perished there. About 80,000 of Gypsies from East Central European countries also lost their lives in

Nazi extermination camps.[5] The defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 brought relief for what was left of this ethnic group. Yet, as the years passed, it became more and more obvious that the "Gypsy problem" was not going to disappear.

Population

Because Gypsies have been a nomadic people since their origins, there are no reliable census figures about their numbers. Nowadays an estimated 7–8 million Gypsies live the world over. They can be found everywhere with the possible exception of Japan. Hungary's Gypsy population is on the rise, while non-Gypsy population in the past decades has been stagnant. In 1976 their estimated number was 320,000;[6] in 1978, according to Miklós Gerencsér, it was about 350,000.[7] The latest figure was given in June 1985, according to which out of Hungary's total population of nearly 11,000,000, approximately 3.7 per cent is Gypsy.[8]

As a consequence of Hungary's increased industrialization as well as urbanization, more and more Gypsies have settled in industrial centers and big cities, especially in Greater Budapest, the country's largest industrial center. In Pest County alone there were more than 20,000,[9] and in the likewise well-industrialized Borsod County, Gypsies constitute 9.05 per cent of the population.[10]

Language

The Gypsy problem in the Danubian region has not been adequately studied from the standpoint of ethnology. Nevertheless, there is a general understanding that all tribes (groups) belong to the same stock. Experts usually do not go further, and as a rule, the distinction is made linguistically. The ancient Gypsy (Romany) language is spoken only by a very small and diminishing fraction.

Gypsies in Hungary can be classified by dialect into three kinds: Hungarian, Rumanian and Walachian Gypsies. The Hungarian Gypsies, whose mother tongue is Hungarian, do not understand the ancient Romany (Gypsy) language. This group is relatively susceptible to assimilation. Roman Gypsies are those who speak a dialect of the Rumanian language. They are in some degree bilingual. They can speak or at least understand Hungarian. The members of the third group, the so-called Walachian or Olah, speak the original Romany; most of them understand some Hungarian.

The above linguistic classification is all the more significant, because it corresponds to specific cultural, and socio-economic

categories of the aforementioned groups (tribes) within the otherwise fairly heterogeneous Gypsydom.[11]

Socio-Economic Development

It seems to be a generally accepted view in Central and Eastern Europe that there was no social (class) stratification among Gypsies. This view is not in accordance with the facts. Gypsy society was never completely classless, and probably continues to be socially variegated even today. Different occupations reflect appropriate social status. "Vaivodas," the leaders of their communities, used to rely for their status upon the relatively more cultured and wealthier strata of their communities. Also, musicians were socially higher placed than, for instance, makers of adobe bricks or basket weavers belonging to the same tribe or clan. Undoubtedly, horse dealers were also higher ranking than unskilled labourers within the same Gypsy community. The lack of communications between the members of different tribes and clans can also be explained as a basically social phenomenon brought about by occupational differences more than by ethnic dissimilarities. Gypsies with Hungarian or Slovak mother tongues have tended to be more "civilized" (i.e. assimilated) than others, and there have always been many musicians among them. Rumanian Gypsies were chiefly wood- and forest workers, while Walachian (Olah) Gypsies were mainly versed in metal working and horse trading.[12] Those Gypsies who were more civilized and economically better off than the majority of their communities tended to separate themselves from Gypsydom and emphasize their "similarity" with non-Gypsy citizens. Without any doubt Gypsy society has also been built upon social classes. However, among the Gypsies these classes were (and are) less well developed than in bourgeois and socialist societies in which social hierarchies are quite marked.

In Hungary tremendous socio-economic changes have occurred in the wake of the Second World War. In accordance with these phenomena, authorities had sought new ideas and methods in approaching the Gypsy question. A 1961 decision of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party dealt with housing, settlement, employment and education of Gypsy citizens. In its spirit a 1964 government decree ordered the dispersion of Gypsy settlements in order to integrate Gypsies into national life. In the course of its enforcement, however, some local authorities allocated better houses for them but in completely segregated Gypsy areas.[13] As late as 1971, 70 per cent of Gypsies lived in segregated settlements under very primitive cir-

cumstances. By the early 1980s, only about 20 per cent of them had lived in segregated areas, under somewhat improved conditions.[14] The ultimate purpose of the fair housing policy was to make possible the change in their way of life. Therefore, Gypsy families were supposed to be relocated in purely non-Gypsy environments so that Gypsy ghettos could be eliminated. This policy was pursued, for example, by the city of Salgótarján where in 1977 Gypsies formed 5 per cent of the total population.[15]

Better housing, specifically oriented sanitary measures,[16] systematic child welfare have contributed to the rapid growth of the Gypsy population through natural reproduction. Still another factor in the transformation of Hungary's Gypsy society was increased participation of Gypsies in the labour force. In the early sixties only 20 per cent of Gypsy men had permanent jobs in industry and on state farms; as of 1971 there were already 30 per cent.[17] In the early eighties, 85–90 per cent of men and 40–50 per cent of women worked.[18]

Culture and Education

Although the distinctive physical characteristics of Gypsies cannot be discounted, these factors in themselves are not decisive determinants in inter-ethnic relations. Folk customs, rites, language—and above all, ideology—should be taken into consideration. Among these factors the role of language is not all-important since the majority of Gypsies have, after all, forgotten their original (Romany) mother tongue. Only 65,000 of them are able to speak the Gypsy language in Hungary.[19] Despite the fact that their migrations from India had occurred centuries ago, Gypsies everywhere in the world have preserved the main characteristics of their cultural identity. This is partly due to their isolation from outside influences. Distinctive elements of their heritage are evident the world over, yet Gypsy culture has its regional characteristics, too. For this reason the culture of neighbouring peoples should sometimes also be taken into consideration in analyzing Gypsy phenomena.

There can be little doubt that Gypsy concepts and practice of religion, ritual, folk medicine and ethics, to mention only a few, fundamentally differ from their non-Gypsy counterparts. Their religious views and customs shed some light on their philosophy of life. The whole problem goes back to the times when Gypsydom was presumably a uniform ethnic (racial) entity and migrations did not bring them into contact with so many different civilizations. It seems to be an established fact that Gypsies have always followed the religion of the majority peoples of the territories they have lived in.

In Hungary it was the Catholic Church. Not a single Protestant can be found among them in Hungary. A few of them belong to the Greek Catholic Church; they had entered Hungary from Rumania in recent decades. But it would be erroneous to think that Gypsies' Christianity is identical with that of non-Gypsies. Their denominational belonging means nothing more than the fact that Gypsy children were baptized in Catholic churches. The texts of the New Testament have not influenced either their folklore or religious life to any degree. Gypsies are not churchgoers, and do not participate in religious ceremonies at all. Even wedding ceremonies are conducted in a very non-religious manner by vaivodas or Gypsy judges, or, if they do not exist, by the oldest man of their community. The name of God hardly occurs in their usage. The concept of God does not play any central role in their thoughts. Thus blasphemy is unknown. Similarly, the existence of the other world is not a theme in their beliefs. Gypsy Catholicism is a kin to Monophysitism in which the human and divine in Christ constitute only one nature. The name of Christ does not appear in Gypsy folklore and that of Holy Virgin very rarely. Fasting is also an unknown institution in Gypsy life. These criteria of Catholicism are characteristic of those Gypsies only who are not yet assimilated to any degree culturally, that is, of the overwhelming majority of Gypsies.[20] One factor has partly been responsible for this type of religious view and practice: the lack of spiritual care on the part of the churches. With the exception of the administration of baptism, Gypsies have been neglected and left out of the missionary work.

To help Gypsies to adopt to society, education should play an all-important role. In the past, neither the state nor society took the education of Gypsies seriously. Emperor Joseph II (1780–1790) tried to do so. On ascending the throne he issued a decree that all Gypsy children should enroll in schools. Soon 8,388 Gypsy children were placed in state-owned educational institutes and 9,463 on farms under the patronage of foster parents. Within a few years all of them ran away. By the advent of the twentieth century, the Kingdom of Hungary had compulsory universal education at the elementary level. Law No. XXXVIII of 1868 laid down a new system under the direction of József Eötvös, head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education. At a later time, but still years prior to the turn of the century, sweeping reforms were initiated to modernize secondary schools in order to raise the standards of education in line with Western patterns. Despite these then up-to-date efforts, Gypsies were not affected by them. At the end of the nineteenth century, only 1 out of 400 vagabond Gypsies was able to read and write; only 3 or

4 were literate out of 100 semi-vagabonds; and 93.5 per cent were illiterate among the permanently settled Gypsies.[21] According to a survey compiled in 1971 by the Sociological Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, only 39 per cent of the Gypsy population over age 14 were illiterate. By the early 1980s, 96 to 100 per cent of Gypsy children of public school age were enrolled in general schools, and 45 to 62 per cent of pre-schoolers were attending kindergartens.[22]

In Hungary compulsory education begins at the age of six and lasts for eight years. The trouble starts immediately with the registration of Gypsy pupils according to reports by teachers. Some parents do not even know the age of their children, and a proportion of parents living in Gypsy settlements consider schooling as meaningless. Because of the disadvantageous family background, Gypsy children's psycho-physical development falls short of the level of non-Gypsy classmates. It is in most cases insurmountable. For example, the Hungarian vocabulary of six-year-old Gypsies is reported to consist only of 30–40 words. The result is that at least 50 per cent of them become drop-outs already at the end of the first school year, and some of the remaining 50 per cent do not pass because their substandard performance cannot even be measured.

One attempt aimed at improving conditions was the creation of desegregated schools. Many teachers and most of the parents of non-Gypsy children had deemed this ineffectual. They argued that under the socio-economic and cultural conditions of the times, Gypsy students were unprepared to fulfill the curriculum requirements. Furthermore, the behavior of Gypsy and non-Gypsy students in too many cases resulted in conflicts among the students. Because the percentage of drop-outs among Gypsy students in desegregated schools was extremely high, all-Gypsy schools came to be favoured by some experts as a means of changing the situation.

There are several factors that preclude the necessary cooperation between Gypsy and other school children in integrated schools. Perhaps one of the most important is that Gypsy children do not like to engage in communal play. As a result, "white" children tend not to make friends with Gypsy ones. Therefore, the feeling of togetherness can develop very rarely among these children of different races. Another fundamental gap existing between Gypsy and other children is that Gypsies at school age find it difficult to understand any kind of abstraction.[23] Abstract terms, even the concept of time, seem to be outside of the grasp of Gypsies. This is another very serious disadvantage of theirs in the educational process, not to men-

tion the lack of discipline which is a family heritage of Gypsy children.

With a view to raising the intellectual level of Gypsy children, kindergartens in cities and specially designed preparatory (pre-school) courses in villages have tried to close the gap. Local councils have provided children with clothes and shoes—otherwise Gypsy children could not attend schools during rainy and colder seasons. Administrative and school authorities had done much to raise Gypsies from their poverty-stricken conditions to the living standards and cultural level of the majority population.

Schools and other forms of education are only capable of creating a lasting basis for effectively regulating inter-racial relations. We should not overlook the difference existing between European civilization and the primitive cultural characteristics of the Gypsies. Under current socio-economic and cultural circumstances, there is little hope for the process of acculturation in any direction. Both cultural spheres are almost hermetically sealed off from each other and therefore from influencing each other. All the more it is necessary to emphasize the significant role of education which, combined with a proper social policy, could create a healthier social and cultural environment for the underdeveloped Gypsies.

In the early 1980s, there were still striking differences between Gypsies and the majority population at the expense of their undisturbed coexistence. The thin stratum of Gypsy intellectuals and other middle-class elements did not modify the situation to any degree because their number was low and they tended not to participate in efforts aimed at improving the socio-economic and cultural status of Gypsydom.

Myth and Reality

There can be no question in anyone's mind that the post-1945 regimes in Hungary, just like elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, have treated Gypsies in a positive, humane way, in contrast to the previous governments' practices. The socio-economic and cultural level of many Gypsies was elevated. By the early 1980s many of them held permanent jobs; however, still only 1.5 per cent of working Gypsies had become skilled workers.[24] It is also true that as a concomitant phenomenon of this progress, the community or "ethnic" consciousness of Gypsies had grown, and began exhibiting some of the symptoms of the American Black separatist movements. These ethnically conscious Gypsies preferred to live in ethnic

quarters, to work in all-Gypsy units, and wanted segregated schools where Romany was one of the languages of instruction.

Hungary, whose nationality policy recognized the legitimate existence of ethnic minorities, has treated the "Gypsy question" quite flexibly. In connection with Gypsies, the concepts of race, ethnicity, as well as social stratum, are equally significant in policy implementations.[25] This point of view is more realistic and opens the door equally either to assimilation or to self-determination. Three of the basic tasks of integrating minorities in mainstream national life: housing, employment and education have been relatively well-handled in Hungary. But prejudice against Gypsies by the overwhelming majority of the public continued to exist. There are two reasons for this. One of them is the so-called "Gypsy criminality." The crime rate of Gypsies is twice as high as that of non-Gypsies.[26] The other factor feeding racial hostility toward Gypsies can be found in the Gypsy-oriented welfare policies of the governments. Indeed, Gypsies are in an ever-increasing magnitude welfare recipients (free housing, clothing, school supplies, low-interest loans, etc.) which fosters resentment against them on the part of the poverty-stricken portion of Hungary's non-Gypsy population.

The integration of Gypsies into Hungarian society was also hindered by the fact that Gypsy tribes are endogamous and, therefore, intermarriage is practically a non-existent phenomenon in their society. Moreover, the white partner in the mixed marriage was often considered a Gypsy by non-Gypsies. Consequently, mixed marriage as a means to promote the integration process has not been a viable option.

Although there had been tremendous changes in the positive direction, Gypsydom in Hungary from 1945 to the early eighties had failed to produce its own leadership, and Gypsy participation in public life was negligible. Their educated and other middle-class individuals and families constituted a thin stratum many of whose members disavowed their Gypsy extraction. All these facts in one way or another tend to aggravate racial animosities. In the sixties and the seventies, the situation of Hungary's Gypsies had constantly been in a process of change, undeniably for the better, especially if it is compared with wartime and pre-1945 conditions. But the "Gypsy issue" was by no means solved, and the principles and methods applied still represented an inadequate, partial treatment of the problem.

Notes

*Editors' comment: this paper is an abbreviated version of a study dealing with the Gypsy question in Hungary and Czechoslovakia from 1945 to the early 1980s. In a future issue of our journal we expect to publish another paper on the Gypsies of Hungary which will deal mainly with important recent developments (including the growth of Gypsy separatism) concerning the Gypsy problem in Hungary.

1. Bart McDowell, *Gypsies, Wanderers of the World* (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 1970), p. 83.
2. Eva Davidova, *Bez kolib a siatrov* (Kosice, 1965), pp. 19-21; and Hóman-Szekfű, *Magyar történet* (1943), p. 523.
3. Antal Hermann, Jr., *A temesmegyei cigányok* (Temesvár, 1913), p. 14.
4. In 1927, for example, the parliament of Czechoslovakia enacted a law which forbade their wandering but the country's authorities never implemented it. Davidova, p. 43.
5. (Mrs.) I. Kozák, "Historians and Witnesses; A Symposium," *The New Hungarian Quarterly* XXX, no. 96 (Winter 1984), p. 90; and B. Sabacka, *Problematika cikanskeho obyvatelstva* (Brno, 1970), p. 2.
6. Zsolt Csalog, *Kilenc cigány* (Budapest, 1976), p. 1
7. Miklós Gerencsér, "Egyenjogu állampolgárok," *Népszabadság* XXXVI (January 1978), p. 5.
8. (Mrs.) István Kozák, "Még egyszer a borsodi cigányokról," *Népszabadság* XLIII (June 1985), p. 8.
9. Gerencsér, p. 5.
10. Kozák in *Népszabadság*, p. 8.
11. Zsolt Csalog, "Etnikum? Faj? Réteg? *Világosság* XIV, no. 1 (Jaunary 1973), pp. 38–41.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
14. István Tauber and Katalin Vég, "A cigányok bünözésének néhány összefüggése," *Magyar Jog* 29, no. 8 (August 1982), p. 694.
15. Péter János Sós, "Utolérni," *Magyar Hirek* XXX, no. 9 (May 1977), p. 45.
16. István Hooz, *A cigány és nem cigány anyákról, valamint újszülötteik közötti fontosabb különbségekről* (Budapest, 1973).
17. Tauber and Vég, p. 694.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Csalog, *Kilenc cigány,* p. 238.
20. László Szegő, "Babonaság és vallás a magyarországi cigányoknál," *Világosság* XIV, no. 1 (January 1973), pp. 44–48.
21. László Siklós, "Cigányok a társadalom szoritásában," in *Irószemmel*, ed. György Nemes (Budapest, 1973), pp. 257–58.
22. Tauber and Vég, p. 694.
23. Siklós, pp. 260-63.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 255.
25. See the No. 1016/VII.12 of 1972 Decree issued by the Council of Ministers on further tasks in conjunction with the improvement of the position of the Gypsy population, in *Magyar Közlöny,* no. 47 (July 1972), pp. 633–34.
26. Tauber and Vég, pp. 692–701.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

István Tisza: Villain or Tragic Hero? Reassessments in Hungary – Verdict in the U.S.

Géza Jeszenszky

István Diószegi, *A magyar külpolitika útjai* [The paths of Hungarian foreign policy]. Budapest: Gondolat Könyvkiadó, 1984.

Gábor Kemény G. (coll. and ed.), *Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarországon a dualizmus korában* [Documents on the history of the nationality question in Hungary in the age of dualism]. Vol. VI. 1913–1914. Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1985. x, 341 pp.

József Galántai, *A Habsburg-monarchia alkonya. Osztrák–magyar dualizmus, 1867–1918* [The twilight of the Habsburg Monarchy. Austro-Hungarian dualism, 1867–1918] Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1985, 390 pp.

Ferenc Pölöskei, *Tisza István*. Budapest: Gondolat Könyvkiadó. 1985. 281 pp.

Gabor Vermes, *István Tisza. The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of a Magyar Nationalist*. New York: East European Monographs. Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1985. ix, 627 pp.

István Tisza was twice Prime Minister of Hungary and was the most influential statesman of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy between 1913 and 1917. Highly respected and admired by some, he was feared and hated by many of his contemporaries. Not only the

Emperor-King Francis Joseph, but also Kaiser William of Germany considered Tisza as the man sent by Providence to save the tottering Habsburg Monarchy. This belief was shared by a group of devoted followers in Hungary, and by some even in Austria. On the other hand, those who did not come under the spell of this robust personality saw Tisza as a new Anti-Christ, the servile arm of "Vienna" and the Habsburgs, an arch-reactionary landlord; and the poet Ady's epithets "firebrand," "the wild crazy man from Geszt" became firmly imprinted in the minds of generations of Hungarians. Although in the eyes of many, the fall of the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy and the Trianon Peace Treaty meted out to Hungary vindicated most of Tisza's policies, and a kind of cult emerged around his figure in interwar Hungary. After 1945 the verdict delivered by Tisza's opponents was revived, and not only Stalinists but many of their victims, too, regarded Tisza as an arch-conservative, a callous defender of an unjust system, a warmonger personally responsible for the outbreak of the First World War and for Hungarian participation in it. In Western Europe opinions about Tisza were similarly divided, but after 1914 the critical view got the upper hand and Tisza was called one of "the men who floundered into the war."[1] Furthermore, he was included among the greatest war criminals of 1914–18.[2] According to one widely known work, the Hungarian Prime Minister "surpassed even his father's dictatorial position" in keeping both the "nationalities" and "the Magyar masses excluded from political life."[3] An Italian historian called him "stubborn and brutal" in defending "the supremacy which the Magyar historical classes had managed to maintain for many centuries."[4] The balanced comments of the American Arthur J. May were rather exceptional.[5]

The emancipation of Hungarian history writing from the vulgar, Stalinist version of Marxism was bound to lead to a more serious and objective study of Tisza's character and historical role. This was not easy because at first Tisza's one-time political opponents, radicals like Oszkár Jászi, the Social Democrats and Mihály Károlyi had to be rehabilitated. When these people were given fair (occasionally, as in the case of Károlyi, too generous) treatment after decades of abuse, it was not the occasion to revise Tisza's portrayal, no matter how fine the scholars dealing with Károlyi and his allies were. Péter Hanák, however, in a brilliant chapter representing the great transformation in Hungarian historiography, offered a character sketch which can probably be accepted by admirers and foes of Tisza alike.[7] The collection and publication of the major documents on the treatment of the non-Hungarian national minorities of Hungary made it clear that Tisza could not be put in the same category

as the exponents of national chauvinism, so vociferous around the turn of the century.[8] Ferenc Pölöskei, after studying the political history of the last decade of Austria-Hungary, began to point out that Tisza served the interests of the ruling classes better than his nationalist opponents, and that he was far-sighted enough to attempt some compromises with the non-Hungarians, notably the Rumanians.[9] Another noted historian, József Galántai, wrote extensively on the war years, using both Hungarian and foreign sources. He unearthed many details about Tisza's impact on Hungarian (and European) history, but refrained from offering an overall judgment on the controversial statesman.[10] The same can be said of István Diószegi, whose exemplary studies of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy contained much on Tisza's role in policy-making, without explicitly challenging the one-sided traditional accounts.[11] Still, the findings of both authors proved invaluable in judging Tisza by the facts; their opinion on some crucial issues of Tisza's political life will be mentioned below. Since all the above authors (Hanák, Pölöskei, Diószegi and Galántai) wrote chapters for volume seven of the massive ten-volume history of Hungary, this "definitive account" or "authorized version" is also mostly free of extreme language and traditional bias in connection with Tisza and his times.

Understandably it was a difficult task for people professing radical or some type of socialist convictions to show much understanding towards a Hungarian count and landlord who opposed the introduction of universal suffrage in the belief that it might prepare the ground for a socialist revolution. Some felt there was no need for any substantial revision concerning Tisza. István Király, an influential and for some time even popular professor of literature, in his massive studies on Ady, upheld the simplistic image: Tisza was defending "the utterly obsolete, great estate and haute bourgeois reaction," his second premiership in 1913 was "the victory of counter-revolution," in the July 1914 crisis he bent under German pressure, and as a man he was "haughty, arrogant, a born insolent, an insensitive oligarch."[12] Another literary historian, Béla G. Németh, was more sophisticated, but still unable to break some taboos. While admitting Tisza's "willpower, determination... hard discipline in work, moderate lifestyle, fairness in financial matters... subjective moral values," Németh saw him as a radical Old Conservative, whose narrow Hungarian gentry horizon made him unable to realize "the hopelessly antiquated and doomed nature of the existing structure."[13] How deep-rooted the highly negative Tisza portrait became can be seen by the fact that in a recent issue of *Irodalmi Ujság* (published in Paris), a poem by George Faludy (the highly respected

exiled poet who lives in Canada) put Tisza in the same category with Horthy, Rákosi and Kádár (themselves strange bedfellows), while G.M. Tamás, a learned political scientist and essayist, widely regarded as one of the best minds of the Hungarian "democratic opposition," described Tisza as a romantic anti-capitalist, an early embodiment of modern right-wing radicalism.

As part of a series of paperbacks devoted to Hungarian "popular" history (*Magyar História*), Pölöskei wrote a short but well-illustrated biography of Tisza, which tried to bridge the abyss between the two extreme judgments.[14] In his general remarks Pölöskei repeated such traditional charges as "a statesman bent on containing progress," (p. 8.) whose purpose was "the liquidation of the liberal features of the 1867 arrangement," (p. 133.) and whose legislation, consolidating the power of the state, prepared the ground for the legal system of the postwar counter-revolutionary regime (p. 185). However, the extensive quotations from Tisza's speeches (delivered mainly in the House of Representatives), indisputably show another side of the statesman: an unmistakably liberal attitude in dealing with a large number of issues, forceful reasoning based on an impressive command of facts and laws, serious efforts to promote social welfare (mainly among the industrial workers), determination to uphold and expand cultural and educational freedom and pluralism (parallel with a concern over the dominating influence of German culture), and a willingness to meet the cultural (and to a limited degree even the political) demands of the non-Hungarian minorities, most notably the Rumanians. Pölöskei supplies convincing statistics on how Rumanian church schools prospered under Tisza: well over two thousand elementary and ten secondary schools as well as seven seminaries (theological colleges) were recipients of substantial financial support from the state (pp. 69–70). The author, however, deems these concessions to be the products of foreign policy considerations, which is an over-simplification. The general tendency of the book is to present Tisza in a more favourable light (mainly through his own words and actions), without giving him credit for his more liberal policies and without explicitly revising the traditional image. Pölöskei was definitely selective in using some of the evidence: he gave a one-sided account of Tisza's family background, and in the chapter on the relation between Tisza and Ady, he was silent about the latter's (and Jászi's) earlier admiration for the young politician who was seen as the champion of a liberal revival in the government party. The rather perfunctory treatment given to the war period was also unfortunate because in many ways those were Tisza's finest years, a time when he was at the height of his prestige and power.

Tisza was the only Hungarian who played a truly significant, "history-making" role in European politics in this century, and even if he had not been such a complex man, he would clearly have deserved a more substantial biography than Pölöskei's short version. In fact such a work appeared only a few weeks later, but in English and in the United States. The massive volume of Vermes, the result of years of meticulous research and thinking, is based on all available evidence provided by Hungarian and foreign archives (ranging from letters deposited with the Hungarian Calvinist Church to foreign ministry documents found in Vienna, Berlin, London and Washington, and sources in the Hoover Institute at Stanford) as well as on hundreds of published works and periodicals. There is no doubt that Vermes has produced a very authoritative account of Tisza's life, but how far has he succeeded in evaluating and judging this hotly debated personality?

This reviewer has no doubt that Vermes succeeded in a major revision of the portrait of Tisza: the prevailing black and the occasional white are replaced by the vivid colours of reality. Not that the author was simply indulging in the fashionable art of revisionism. Vermes is a traditional historian, who collected far more evidence than he could dream of putting into print, who thought more than twice about each statement and whose conclusions sound almost irrefutable.

Since the book was written mainly for non-Hungarian readers, it was necessary to devote considerable space to the presentation and explanation of the history of Hungary from 1867 to 1918. Vermes went far beyond giving only the necessary facts: his remarks and conclusions—usually very sound and convincing, occasionally provoking—are the results of decades of study and thinking on the strange course of Hungarian history. He hit upon what he called the basic Hungarian dilemma: Hungarians rightly perceived that their position was extremely precarious. They had only a relative (less than fifty per cent) majority over the Croatians, Rumanians, Germans, Slovaks, Serbs and Rusyns populating the historic state, which was next to two German and one Slavic great power as well as surrounded by two small nations, Serbia and Rumania, both eager to increase their territory at the expense of Hungary. The awareness of these threats might have made the creation of a centralized, even a dictatorial state an almost logical answer, but the widely professed traditions of Hungary (the genuinely liberal Age of Reforms and the 1848 April Laws) prohibited such a course. Yet completely liberal policies (inevitably leading towards full democracy) involved the danger of accepting the partition of the historic territory along eth-

nic lines. The solution was to be a unique "liberal nationalism" or "national liberalism," a determination to maintain the supremacy of the Hungarian element without using real repression, which was best represented by father and son, Kálmán and István Tisza. Proving the liberal elements of the latter's policies as well as illustrating the shortcomings of this liberalism is the major achievement of Vermes.

Tisza was no dictator. He never dreamed of using power in an unlawful way, curtailing the personal freedom or material well- being of his many political opponents. (The attempted modification of the standing orders of the House in 1904 and the forceful ejection of unruly elements from Parliament in 1912 can be regarded as infringements of the existing laws in order to enforce the rule of the majority. Vermes neither condones nor condemns them.) Whereas Tisza's liberalism is evident in his theoretical beliefs and doctrines (e.g., in the issue of the separation of Church and State, or in the internal matters of his own Calvinist Church), and some of his unenlightened agricultural policies can be explained by the narrow observance of *laissez faire*, his stubborn opposition to any substantial expansion of voting rights, his belief that rural unrest (including that of non-Hungarians) was the result of unscrupulous agitators and could be dealt with by police measures, was certainly conservative behaviour. The subtitle of Vermes' book is, therefore, a direct hit. But most of these conservative policies were in fact the result of consideration for the national interest and were meant to serve the maintenance of the Compromise and of the hegemony of the Hungarians in Hungary.

The most novel (and probably the most controversial) chapter of the biography ("The Clash of Ideas") shows how traditional liberalism (often called Old Liberalism, or conservative liberalism), represented mainly by the pro-Compromise ("67-er") government party, was on a collision course with the young, radical progressives of the journal, *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century), and of the Society for the Social Sciences. This reviewer accepts Vermes's thesis that the two groups had far more in common than they—and posterity—realized: philosophically they had the same roots, they were equally in favour of capitalist progress, industrialization and urbanization. They differed on the pace and depth of the social and political consequences they deemed desirable, and the momentum and rhetoric of their conflict, augmented by the generation gap, led to an apparently irreparable and lifelong struggle. Although both Tisza's followers and their "progressive opponents had a mutually shared belief and interest in preserving freedom against extremists,

both on the Right and on the Left," this was not realized, and "at the end there could be no peace or even a workable truce between those who wished to give history a push and those who allowed for only small changes within a controlled social and political environment." (p. 177)

The volume's other central theme is Tisza's nationalism, in contemporary parlance—whether he was a tool of "Vienna" (i.e., the Habsburg establishment), or the truest Hungarian patriot. Vermes very convincingly shows that István Tisza saw far more clearly the internal and external dangers facing Hungarians than most of his contemporaries, but he thought that they could be successfully countered by maintaining the Austrian connection ("dualism") and showing national unity. When both were threatened by the Party of Independence (which, incidentally, did not call for complete national independence, only for a looser connection with Austria), Tisza quoted Kossuth's plan for a confederation of Danubian nations as proof that the Hungarians were not strong enough to preserve real independence if they stood completely alone. (For the same reason Tisza was a firm supporter of the Dual Alliance with Germany, although his political and cultural sympathies lay with the English.) Tisza felt it was his mission to save the unity of the nation from the impact of the programs which undermined it: narrow-minded chauvinism, radicalism, socialism and the separatist dreams of Rumanians and Serbs, but only by legal means, mainly in Parliament and in public debate. He was also ready to fight for the rights of Hungarians embodied in the law, especially in the letter and spirit of the Compromise of 1867, and worked for the expansion of these rights so that Hungary could achieve real parity with the Austrian half of the Monarchy. While he was always mindful of the prerogatives and feelings of Francis Joseph, he was determined to oppose the absolutist ambitions of the military and of the Heir Apparent, Francis Ferdinand, who, in turn, considered him the most dangerous of all Hungarians, a new Prince Rákóczi.

Vermes pays due attention to what is little known, that Tisza was perhaps the most tolerant member of the Hungarian political establishment on the issue of national minorities. Not that he was ready to go as far as Mocsáry or Jászi in meeting the political demands of the non-Hungarian leaders, but he offered them substantial cultural and educational concessions. The most recent Hungarian documentary collection shows that these were quite far-reaching by contemporary (not to mention present- day East European) standards, and the promises were matched by deeds such as the introduction of minority languages into the state schools, or supporting the prin-

ciple that minorities are entitled not only to equal rights but to some extra rights.[15] In 1913 and 1914 Tisza made repeated efforts to come to an understanding with the Rumanian National Party. Vermes suggests that failure to do so might have been due to the advice of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Recent research by Z. Szász has proved that beyond doubt.[16]

Well over half of Vermes's book deals with the last six years of Tisza's life. Some may find this proportion unwarranted, but if one considers what an important role the Hungarian Prime Minister played during this period both in Hungary and in Europe, or what a large amount of published and unpublished, but relatively little-used, sources are available, one is inclined to approve such extensive coverage. Tisza used his constitutional right to influence foreign policy; this was not too difficult with the nonchalant foreign minister, Berchtold, and was quite necessary after the Balkan Wars. Galántai thinks that Tisza's course, launched in 1913 and followed through the July crisis of 1914, which proposed building up Bulgaria as the cornerstone of the Monarchy's Balkan policy, was not a bad one from the point of view of preserving peace, at least for several years.[17] Diószegi, on the other hand, called attention to another, seldom noticed element: from 1913 Tisza's major effort was to bring about a *rapprochement* with Russia as the best guarantee against the irredentist ambitions of Serbia and Rumania.[18] In contrast Vermes, perhaps lending too much importance to Tisza's March 1914 memorandum, considers the Bulgarian proposal and the concomitant arguments addressed to Emperor William on a diabolical *entente* plan to encircle Germany, as "motivated by self-defense but aggressive in its potential consequences." (pp. 212–214)

The differences between these three authors extend to their explanation of Tisza's behaviour in July 1914. Why did he abandon his opposition to the war? Galántai ascribed the greatest importance to Tisza's concern for Transylvania and to the guarantees supplied by Germany that, in case of a wider conflict, Rumania would stay neutral and, further, that Germany was ready to adopt Tisza's proposal about bringing Bulgaria into the Triple Alliance.[19] Vermes is more inclined to accept the conventional view, notably that Tisza's volte-face was caused not so much by direct German pressure but by his realization that lack of action may endanger future German support in the Balkans, if not the German alliance itself, and also damage his own reputation as the man on whom one could build a consistent policy. So he accepted the possibility of war, with a heavy heart and not unaware of the high risks involved (217–235). Diószegi's most recent explanation adds a more unorthodox and

not unconvincing element. It was neither German pressure nor assurance that prevailed over Tisza's reluctance. The Hungarian Prime Minister had two internal factors to consider: the attitude of the Hungarian Parliament and that of the Monarch. Hungarian public opinion—like public opinion in other countries—was in favour of war in 1914. When Tisza, after repeated attempts, failed to change Francis Joseph's conclusion that the only solution to the Southern Slav menace was war, he had no choice but to resign or to devote all his energies to the war effort.[20]

Tisza's handling of the Hungarian war effort was remarkable. His sense of mission was stronger than ever, he felt he had to deal with all major and minor issues himself, whether they concerned the alliance with Germany, negotiating with Italy and Rumania, wrangling with Austria over constitutional questions and the food supply, or looking after the families of soldiers on the front. Special Hungarian interests appeared to weigh on him more heavily than ever, but he continued to believe that their safeguarding served also the best interests of the whole Monarchy. That is why he was so rigidly opposed to any constitutional changes that threatened the dualist structure, whether uniting the Poles under the Habsburgs, adopting the program of a Greater Croatia, or allowing regional autonomy. His major concern was to maintain internal stability and cohesion, and when that became increasingly difficult, he could think of no other course than resistance to bending under popular pressure. When at the end of the war Charles tried to save his Empire by federalizing the much weakened Austria, Tisza finally endorsed the platform of his parliamentary opponents (personal union) since he was unable to think in new terms, more in line with the new realities.

In the chapters on the war period, Vermes shows that he is not only able to offer interpretations that rise above the earlier debates, but can use his many primary sources to create an impressive new conception of his subject. Tisza's wartime foreign policy has hardly been studied, and the fact that he had made sincere and serious efforts to restore peace must come as a surprise to most readers. As far as war aims are concerned, he was the most moderate of all the leading politicians of the Central Powers. His critics would say that this was so only because he wanted to save historic Hungary. It was not only his personal tragedy that when the Entente was at last ready to negotiate with Austria-Hungary, at the very beginning of 1918, he was already out of office. He—unlike Károlyi, the man of faith *and* illusions—was aware of the plans to carve up Hungary, and since he could not accept peace on such conditions he saw no alternative but putting all his hope in the strength of the German army. Tisza

was never good in reacting to unpalatable situations. When he admitted that the war was lost his whole utopian vision of a strong, stable and traditional Hungary collapsed. The unknown assassins' bullet killed a man who was already paralysed in spirit.

The long gestation of Vermes's work may explain why factual mistakes are virtually absent. Naturally many questions can be raised about its proportions, some of the interpretations or epithets, the inclusion or omission of some details. A few examples: Vermes did not mention that the 1905 elections were exceptionally fair (which must have contributed to the defeat of the government), and that it was a personal victory for Tisza: he defeated his great rival, the younger Andrássy, in Deák's one-time Pest seat. It is unlikely that Jászi would have agreed to be called "the Jewish sociologist," (p. 154), and Mihály Réz, respected by many contemporary social scientist (e.g., Bódog Somló), was perhaps not the representative of "the secular extreme Right." (p. 169) Vermes found (or ventured to say) very little on the human side of Tisza. This was unavoidable given the reserved, almost shy nature of the man, whose private life has remained a secret (speculations about his affairs with women and visits to brothels are probably completely unfounded). Moreover, there is some evidence which runs contrary to the widespread view about the coldness and lack of human feeling in this Puritan: in close family and friendly circles his inner warmth penetrated his shield. If Vermes had seen the British Consul-General's reports from Budapest he would have found much sympathy with "the sheer anchor" of the Monarchy: praise of his controversial steps regulating Parliament, appreciation of his 1910 Arad speech (which paid eloquent homage to the martyrs without hurting the dynasty) and understanding for his opposition to universal suffrage. Later, however, the anti-German group in the Foreign Office drew a different picture: Clerk, Vansittart, and especially Crowe, denigrated the Hungarian Prime Minister in numerous minutes. Tisza's close German connections usually hid his British sympathies. It is telling that when *The Economist* criticized the 1913 Suffrage Bill and compared its results to England in the 18th century, Tisza, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives, answered in a letter which pointed out that in 1910 the proportion of voters (6.5 per cent) was considerably higher than in the United Kingdom before 1867, "scarcely less than the ratio of English electors from 1868 to 1885 (about 7 per cent), and that the Reform Bill recently passed in our Parliament will have the probable result of bringing the number of electors very near to two millions (21 per cent). Don't you think this is a fair dose of democracy in a country so much behind England con-

cerning the culture and welfare of the lower classes?"[21] Vermes is correct in pointing out that Tisza's attitude to "the lower classes" was largely that of the kind, parochial landlord of Geszt toward his honest, industrious, but uneducated peasants. It is less clear what Tisza's feelings were towards the bulk of the bourgeois element. How closely did he control or influence *Az Ujság*, their popular, liberal daily?

In an earlier article, Vermes quoted Aristotle's description of the tragic hero, whose "misfortune is brought upon him not by vice and depravity but by some error of judgment or frailty."[22] Vermes sees Tisza's tragedy not in the assassination of the by then lonely and much-cursed political leader on October 31, 1918, in the hour of collapse and revolution, but in Tisza's stubborn determination to uphold and further aims that, in the long run, proved unattainable. Tisza tried to increase the strength and influence of Hungary over Austria, and also *vis-á-vis* Francis Ferdinand, the Austro-German nationalists, the Social Democrats, the Christian Socials, as well as all the Slavs of the Monarchy. Tisza wanted to see an industrialized, technologically advanced and prosperous Hungary, where social peace prevailed because the rapidly growing working class, the agrarian masses, the *nouveau riche* and the non-Hungarian national minorities accepted their current position and even their limited perspective. He was sincerely determined to uphold the liberal traditions of Hungary: political freedom and a constitutional, parliamentary government, while maintaining the political and economic hegemony of the traditional leading elements (the aristocracy, the landed and the landless nobility, the deferential upper middle class), who all share a common mentality and value system.

All that was clearly too much, even for a man of Tisza's strength, but the pursuit of such impossible aims may sound more quixotic than tragic. Nevertheless, Tisza's figure does not really recall Cervantes's hero. He was sufficiently realistic to know that for his aims it was essential to conserve the narrow franchise, the highly uneven distribution of land and wealth, and a system of government where the vast majority of citizens had little say in the decisions affecting them. But all that was not based on a conservative political philosophy, only on the realization of the foreseeable and probable consequences of political democratization. Thus Tisza, in his Hungarian patriotism, felt he had to fight these unwelcome eventualities. So Tisza was perhaps a noble character and a man of good will with unrealistic and both politically and morally questionable aims. To add to the tragic strain: his conviction in the correctness of his own views and actions stood in marked contrast to his repeated failures

to command a majority for his policies, and, in addition, he was notorious for his inflexibility even in dealing with his own class. As a devout Calvinist he believed that Providence had selected him to fulfill a mission, and it was his duty to face all obstacles. For some time he appeared to have prevailed, and between 1913 and 1916 he and Hungary wielded political influence unmatched since the fifteenth century. But finally Tisza had to see that Fate turned against him and the distant events of the world war led to the collapse of the whole structure, erushing this modern Samson. What might be called his final tragedy is that despite having had many enthusiastic and passionate supporters (certainly not all opportunists), history failed to justify him, and posterity has been harsh to him. Now Gabor Vermes, in this massive and convincing work, does not acquit Tisza, but gives him justice.

Notes

1. Sir Lewis Namier, *Vanished Supremacies. Essays on European History* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1958). Penguin ed., 1962, pp. 115–20.
2. Prompted by Wickham Steed and R.W. Seton-Watson, *entente* opinion held that Tisza and his Hungary were primarily responsible for the outbreak of World War I. See esp. R.W. Seton-Watson, *German, Slav and Magyar* (London, 1916), and the two men's numerous signed and unsigned articles in *The Contemporary Review*, *The Edinburgh Review*, and extensively in *The New Europe*. Cf. Hugh and ChristopherSeton-Watson,*The Making of a New Europe. R.W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (London: Methuen, 1981).
3. A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809–1918*(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948), Penguin ed. 1964. p. 239.
4. Leo Valiani, *The End of Austria-Hungary* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973) p. 39. The list of non-Hungarian authors critical or extremely critical of Tisza includes most of the recognized experts on twentieth-century Austria-Hungary.
5. Arthur J. May, *The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867–1914*(New York: Norton, 1968), pp. 353–54.
6. While Ferenc Mucsi and György Litván in their numerous writings on early 20th century Hungary were rather taciturn on Tisza, the biographer of Károlyi used very harsh words on him: caesaromaniac, warmonger, intoxicated with power, obsessed. Tibor Hajdu, *Károlyi Mihály. Politikai életrajz* [Mihály Károlyi. A political biography] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1978), pp. 42, 71, 105, etc.
7. E. Molnár, E. Pamlényi and Gy. Székely (eds.) *Magyarország története* (Budapest: Gondolat Könyvkiadó, 1964), pp. 159–60.
8. Zoltán Szász, "A román kérdés Tisza István első kormányának politikájában" [The Rumanian question in the policy of István Tisza's first government], *Történelmi Szemle* (1968), Vol. 11, no. 3. Gábor Kemény G. (coll. and ed.), *Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarországon a dualizmus korában* [Documents on the history of the nationality question in Hungary in the age of dualism] Vol. V, 1906–1913 (Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1971). See esp. docs. 62, 72, 77, 86, 110, 122, 133.

9. Ferenc Pölöskei, *Kormányzati politika és parlamenti ellenzék, 1910–1914* [Government policy and parliamentary opposition] (Budapest: Akadémiai Könyvkiadó, 1970). *Idem*, "István Tisza's policy toward the Romanian nationalities [sic!] on the eve of World War I," *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* (1972), Vol. 18, nos. 3–4.
10. József Galántai, *Magyarország az első világháborúban, 1914-1918* [Hungary in World War I] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1974); *idem*, *Az első* világháború [The First World War] (Budapest: Gondolat Könyvkiadó, 1980); *idem*, *A Habsburg-monarchia alkonya* [The twilight of the Habsburg Monarchy] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1985).
11. István Diószegi, *Hazánk és Európa* [Hungary and Europe] (Budapest: Gondolat Könyvkiadó, 1970); *idem*, *Hungarians in the Ballhausplatz. Studies in the Austro-Hungarian common foreign policy* (Budapest: Corvina Press, 1983); *idem*, *A magyar külpolitika útjai* [The paths of Hungarian foreign policy] (Budapest: Gondolat Könyvkiadó, 1984).
12. István Király, *Intés az őrzőkhöz. Ady Endre költészete az első világháború éveiben* [Warning to those on guard. The poetry of Endre Ady in the years of the first world war] (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1982), Vol. 1, pp. 30, 51; Vol. 2, pp. 142, 339.
13. Béla G. Németh, "Herczeg Ferenc és Tisza István," *História* (1985), no. 3, p. 25.
14. Ferenc Pölöskei, *Tisza István* (Budapest: Gondolat Könyvkiadó, 1985), p. 281.
15. *Iratok*, Vol. VI., esp. documents 1 and 26.
16. Zoltán Szász (ed.), *Erdély története. Harmadik kötet, 1830-tól napjainkig* [History of Transylvania. Vol. 3: From 1830 to our days] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1986), pp. 1681–87. Keith Hitchins did not draw this conclusion yet, "The nationality problem in Hungary: István Tisza and the Rumanian National Party," *The Journal of Modern History*, (1981), Vol. 53, no. 4. 619–51.
17. Galántai, *A Habsburg-monarchia alkonya*, pp. 286–87.
18. Diószegi, "Tisza István és a világháború," in *A magyar külpolitika útjai*, pp. 280–282.
19. Galántai, *A Habsburg-monarchia alkonya*, pp. 289–94.
20. Diószegi, "Tisza István és a világháború," pp. 284–87.
21. *The Economist*, 24 May 1913, pp. 1293–94. Tisza's letter was a response to a report which called the reform "an autocratic arrangement for giving unlimited power to the social tyrants of Hungary" (March 8, p. 583), and to the May 3 leader, which praised the democratic franchise of Austria.
22. Gábor Vermes, "Leap into the Dark: the Issue of Suffrage in Hungary during World War I," in *The Habsburg Empire in World War I* ed. by Kann, Kiraly and Fichtner (Boulder: East European Quarterly, distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 1977), p. 42.

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Book Reviews

Georg Stadtmüller, *Begegnung mit Ungarns Geschichte. Rückblick auf ein halbes Jahrhundert* (München: Rudolf Trofenik, 1984). Pp. 67 plus Index.

At first glance, this slender volume appears unorganized and fragmented. Two dozen chapters, some only one page each, record the personal experiences and reveal the intimate thoughts of Georg Stadtmüller, a noted German-born expert of Hungarian history. These reminiscences span the past fifty years, and include incidents in the author's homeland and eastern Europe. The topics are diffuse. One chapter features an encounter with Cardinal Mindszenty in Vienna, whereas several others explore conversations with famous Hungarian, Austrian, and German specialists in Hungarian studies. Stadtmüller also discusses the events of his youth, his professional training and career development, as well as his adventures during World War II and after. A few chapters offer brief insights into specialized problems in Hungarian and central European history. Read singly, each chapter merely whets the reader's appetite for more information. Considered jointly, however, the chapters coalesce into a leitmotif characterizing Stadtmüller as a sensitive human being and competent scholar.

A four-chapter unit forms the most interesting part of the book. Stadtmüller shares his impressions as a student and scholar caught in the meshes of the Third Reich's higher education bureaucracy. In the late 1930s, Stadtmüller became the unwitting victim of an invidious plot, hatched, he believes, by one or more envious colleagues who coveted his academic position. These antagonists never levelled explicit charges, but managed to remain anonymous, while weak-spined National Socialist university officials did nothing. His friends advised against confrontation as being counterproductive, possibly

dangerous. However, Stadtmüller intimates, had he joined the National Socialist Party, these difficulties would have disappeared. Failure to conform, however, eventually resulted in dismissal and conscription into the armed forces, where Stadtmüller spent an eventful two-year tour of duty as interpreter-translator in partisan-ridden Yugoslavia. The author's account of the German army's precipitate flight from the country near war's end has all the elements of a latter-day Odyssey. These experiences might have been expanded into a separate book.

In other chapters, Stadtmüller comments urbanely and objectively on a multitude of individuals, situations, and ideas, nearly all of them relating to Hungary. Unlike many contemporaries, Stadtmüller recognized the importance of Hungary as east-central Europe's cultural centre, notwithstanding the ravages of World War I that terminated Hungary's effectiveness as a political power. He recapitulates popular sentiments in 1938 Austria, where people of all political persuasions supported *Anschluss* with Germany. This contradicts the still prevalent but erroneous notion of Austria as a Nazi rape victim. During a 1938 stay in Budapest, however, Stadtmüller discovered that most Magyars classified the Third Reich as a menace to the survival of their country. At that time, Stadtmüller questioned the Hungarian-born cultural historian Julius von Farkas, who dreaded not only the Germans, but Hungary's other neighbours. All of them apparently wished to see Magyar influence entirely disappear.

Stadtmüller's chapters drawn from the annals of Hungarian history are not as interesting as the rest of the book. Most readers would wish to learn far more concerning "Silesia and Hungary during the Turkish Wars," or "Silesia under Bohemian and Hungarian Rule," than the cursory treatment can possibly provide. Moreover, the author offers no rationale for having chosen these topics. However, this is a minor complaint. Whatever the reader's preferences might be, this modest book contains ample material to attract the attention of most area specialists and laymen.

Thomas Spira
University of Prince Edward Island

Valev Uibopuu. *Meie Ja Meie Hoimud. Peatukke Soomegrilaste Minevikust Ja Olevikust* [We and Our Kin-People. Chapters on the Past and Present of the Finno-Ugrians]. Lund, Sweden: Eesti Kirjanike Kooperatiiv, 1984. Pp. 203; 89 maps and diagrams; extensive bibliography.

Approximately twenty-five million people in the world speak Uralic languages, most of them Finno-Ugric. Dispersed geographically from Western Siberia (Ostyaks and Voguls) to the shores of the Baltic Sea (Finns, Estonians, remnants of Livs), and from the tip of Scandinavia (Lapps) to the Danubian basin (Hungarians), this diverse group of peoples has rarely been covered by a single monograph. Uibopuu is to be congratulated for filling this void with substantial skill. The volume under review is certain to serve as a key reference work for some time, even though its publication in Estonian will likely limit its general use.

Uibopuu, who was born in 1913 in Vana-Antsla, Estonia, and earned his doctorate in Finno-Ugric languages at the University of Lund in 1970, served as lecturer and docent there from 1971 to 1981. Although he has published a number of scholarly articles and monographic works, Uibopuu is perhaps better known as a literary figure. His career as a creative writer began as early as 1936, and by the time the present treatise appeared, he had produced at least six volumes of short stories, seven novels, two children's books, and countless reviews and popular essays. His works have been translated thus far into Finnish, Swedish and Latvian.

The volume in question has already been reviewed thoroughly by language specialists (see, for example, Mana, no. 54, 1986). The objective here is to offer insight for the general reader, the Finno-Ugric area specialist. Indeed, Uibopuu notes that the search for "roots" is an important contemporary phenomenon, but one which must intellectually transcend an individual's personal quest. Ancestry must, in the end, be perceived and therefore pursued at the collective level. He believes that language serves as a useful point of departure to this end for the scholar because language is the key element in most national identities. It is further evident from the work that Uibopuu feels that language alone is insufficient to provide the definitive answer to the origins of people.

The book is organized into three main parts, as follows. Part I presents an overview of general language studies and classificatory schemes. There is also an overview of the emergence and development of Finno-Ugric language studies.

Part II offers an excellent discussion of the difficulties of the search for a common Uralic (Finno-Ugric plus Samoyed) ancestral area, a topic which has attracted quite a bit of scholarly attention and popular fancy from the early 19th century onward, including attempts to link the Uralic and Altaic language families. Uibopuu not only reviews these pursuits critically, but he supplements existing linguistically based conjectures with evidence drawn from ethnography, and even genetic studies. The significance of this broad-based approach lies in the fact that while the Finno-Ugric languages are related to each other, these languages are spoken by peoples who evidence tremendous diversity as to physiology, material, spiritual and social culture, civilizational influences, and general history. The various peoples are, in summary, as widely different from each other as the distances in their geographical dispersion.

Uibopuu himself appears, in the light of the multitude of evidence, to share the conclusion of the Finnish scholar Erkki Itkonen that the search for a geographically narrowly defined ancestral territory is an illusive task, even a misdirected one. Rather, the evidence suggests that the Finno-Ugrians have been spread across the northern Eurasian landmass from the Baltic to Siberia for thousands of years, with the exception of the Hungarians, who migrated to their present homeland "only" a millennium ago. In any case, their dispersion appears as old as the period marked by the retreat of the last ice age. In part, their territorial base was sliced in half by the much later eastward and northward spread of the eastern Slavic tribes, some of whom subsequently came to be known as Russians.

The third and longest part of the book devotes a separate section to each of the Uralic language groups from Lapp to Samoyed. Each of these sections contains historical, demographic, and geographic overviews, as well as a discussion of the language and its related literature. There is no other recent work from which so much summary information might be gleaned on the Finno-Ugric nationalities.

Although the work is clearly descriptive rather than analytic, in a brief conclusion Uibopuu does offer several general points. He asserts, first of all, that "it is time to end the description of the Finno-Ugric peoples as if they were ethnographic elements left over from the previous century" (p.273). Second, "It is also time to end the search for the ancestry, relationships and primordial home of these peoples on the basis of romantic and incomplete concepts... It must be recognized that linguistic relationships and racial relationships need not be mutually inclusive" (p. 273).

And third, "it is time to end the exaggerated emphasis of the smallness of these peoples... Among the 62 language groups in Europe, Hungarian is in 12th place [in the number of speakers], Finnish in 20th, Mordvian in 30th, Estonian in 36th, Votyak in 39th... place. In comparison, it should be emphasized that Icelandic, with its 210,000 speakers (in 1972) is in 48th place among European languages" (p. 274).

At the same time, Uibopuu takes note of the fact that irrespective of the question of size, the circumstance of the Finno-Ugrians is rather serious, and in some cases even somber, foremost due to the encroachments and pressures of the Russians over the past few centuries. The point is perhaps best illustrated in the case of the Mordvians. Several Finno-Ugric language groups have disappeared completely in modern history, and several others are nearing extinction. Among the existing 19 Uralic peoples, only the Hungarians, Finns and Estonians have successfully developed a high culture in the native tongue. They are also the only ones to have preserved or achieved national sovereignty in modern times.

In general, Uibopuu to his credit has made use of a very wide range of current studies from around the world. His expertise is evident throughout. The 89 maps and diagrams make the discussion more comprehendible. Yet these have been extracted from a number of interdisciplinary sources in at least six languages, and this makes their perusal a bit cumbersome, especially as to place names and legends. Nevertheless, it will take some time for anyone to surpass the quality of this volume as a comprehensive guide to the Finno-Ugric peoples.

Tõnu Parming
University of Maryland

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Obituaries

Dieter P. Lotze was born in 1933 in Hannover, Germany. He studied German and English Philology and Comparative Literature at Berlin Free University and Innsbruck University. His doctoral dissertation dealt with Imre Madách and the German world of letters. Since the early 1960s he, along with his Hungarian-born wife Barbara, had taught at Allegheny College, in Meadville Pennsylvania. Dieter Lotze had published numerous scholarly studies, including books on Wilhelm Busch and Imre Madách (both published by Twayne Publishers). He contributed articles to our journal in 1979 and in 1984. Professor Lotze died after lengthy illness.

Michael Sozan was born in 1938 in Hungary. He arrived in the United States after escaping from his homeland in 1956. He studied at New York's Union College, and at the University of Syracuse, where he earned his doctorate in 1972. Later he became a professor of anthropology at Slippery Rock University (Pennsylvania). Dr. Sozan was the author of numerous studies, many of them dealing with the Hungarian minority in Austria. During the last months of his life he was revising a paper for publication in our journal. The paper remained unfinished.

Ferenc A. Váli (1905–1984) was raised in Hungary. He received his first doctorate from the University of Budapest in 1927, and his second from the University of London five years later. Before the Second World War he was a university teacher, after the war he entered government service. In 1951 he was imprisoned on political charges. He was released in 1956, escaped, and came to the United States. Later he became Professor of International Relations at the University of Massachusetts, in Amherst. Professor Vali was an expert on international and minority law and published numerous articles and books on these and other subjects. One of his studies appeared in the 1976 volume of our journal.