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Hungarian Studies Review

Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Spring, 1986)

Endre B. Gastony describes the efforts of Hungarian Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya to preserve peace in Europe during the late summer of 1938. M.D. Birnbaum examines contacts between Dubrovnik (Ragusa) and the Kingdom of Hungary during the Renaissance. Rose Stein writes on the library of Matthias Corvinus. J.B. Hattendorf, László Kürti, Alexander Fodor and others review books on Hungarian history, culture and religious life.

Hungarian Studies Review

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The Editors
Hungarian Studies Review
University of Toronto
21 Sussex Ave.
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Hungarian Studies Review Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Spring 1986)

Our Contributors

ENDRE B. GASTONY teaches history at Augustana College, Sioux Falls, South Dakota. M.D. BIRNBAUM is a frequent contributor of our journal. ROSE STEIN is librarian in Columbia University's Butler Library.

From the Editors' Desk

The following brief news items might be of interest to our readers:

For 1986 our journal has received an "operating grant" from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. This welcome help will make it possible for us to avoid a deficit this year and even to produce somewhat bulkier-than-usual issues.

During 1986-87 Professor George Bisztray will be on sabbatical leave in France. For this period N.F. Dreisziger will man the journal's editorial office at the University of Toronto. Susan Papp has left the journal to take up a full-time position with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

Production expenses (as opposed to administrative and miscellaneous costs) for our journal in 1985 were $5,467.89. Of this $1,120 was covered from a grant received earlier from the Ontario Government's Ministry of Citizenship and Culture, and from a "matching grant" given in 1985 by the Hungarian Research Institute of Canada. Much of the balance was covered by our income from subscriptions.

Preparations are well-advanced to make the fall, 1986 issue of our periodical into another "special issue" commemorating the 100th anniversary of the beginning of Hungarian settlement in Canada. The volume will be a collaborative effort with the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada. To finance its publication, we have applied for help to the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada and

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Hungarian Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya, Hitler, and Peace in Europe, August - September, 1938*

Endre B. Gastony

Kálmán Kánya was the "grand old man" of Hungarian foreign affairs between 1933 and 1945. As an Austro-Hungarian diplomatic official, his career commenced as early as 1893, at as diverse locations as Constantinople, Kiev, Vienna, and Mexico City. At the end of the First World War, Kánya returned to his native Hungary, where he had a major share in establishing the independent Hungarian diplomatic service. During a long span of political activity, he played a role, for example, in blocking King Károly's return to the Hungarian throne in 1921 and participated in formulating the terms of the intended Hungarian armistice with Stalin in 1944. He reached the height of his career as foreign minister during 1933-1938, a position he fulfilled with vigor, despite his sixty-three years of age at the time of his appointment. During 1919-1925, Kánya served as deputy foreign minister and was the Hungarian representative in Berlin from 1925 until 1933.[1]

Kánya was blessed with a well developed intellect, which was tempered with a healthy spirit of realism. He was also a man of determination and courage, yet a sense of caution seldom deserted him. As foreign minister, he employed his talents for maintaining his small and truncated Hungary's security, during the overlapping eras of French-Little Entente dominance and Germany's ascendancy under Hitler. As his most ambitious undertaking, he attempted to build a multilateral grand alliance consisting of Hungary, Germany, Italy, Austria, and perhaps Poland, with which he intended to strengthen Hungary's security and thereby to advance the cause of Hungarian irredentism also, hoping in the process to reverse the territorial decisions of the Treaty of Trianon. Though his grand alliance proved to be beyond the realm of the possible, Kánya continued on a course of measured Hungarian-

German friendship, though far from unreservedly so, and he persisted in efforts toward territorial revisionism. It is in these regards that Kánya became the crucial Hungarian figure in the events that transpired during August-September, 1938, between Hungary and the Little Entente at Bled, and almost simultaneously, between Hungary and Germany in Kiel and Berlin.

Both sets of these events were closely associated with the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938, culminating in the four-power Munich Conference. During the tumultuous weeks of August and September, Hitler attempted to lure Hungary into participating in a military attack on Czechoslovakia, possibly a quite disastrous move for the country. Hungary's revisionist aspirations thereby would have had a chance of being attained in the North, but Kánya realized that much more was at stake, because a German-Czechoslovak-Hungarian clash could easily escalate into a wider war. Kánya's and Hitler's intentions and wills clashed in the process. In the end, the Hungarian government refused to take part in such a risky undertaking. It is possible to say that the Hungarian "no" to Hitler had a determining role in bringing about the Munich solution — which kept the peace and averted war in 1938. This basically fortunate turn of events for both Hungary and Europe is attributable, to no small measure, to the diplomatic skill and political caution of Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya.

* * *

During 1938, Kánya and his colleagues witnessed from Budapest a curious transitionary period in European political relations. The international structure created after the First World War was still largely intact. To a fairly high degree, European peace and stability continued to rest on the domination of the continent by France and her allies: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania, more or less augmented since the mid-1930s by the Soviet Union. Britain usually supported this continental constellation.[2]

But the French-British-Little Entente hegemony in Europe was placed under an increasingly bold challenge by a resurgent Germany under the leadership of Hitler. As the most dramatic manifestation of this tendency, during March, 1938, Hitler occupied and annexed neighboring Austria. Western Europe reacted only with mild protests. As far as Hungary was concerned, this successful modification of the status quo was a promising sign, but hardly an unqualified one. In the spring of 1938, a powerful Germany had appeared on the doorsteps of Hungary, the whole

Danube basin, and the Balkans. The western half of Czechoslovakia was surrounded by German territory on three sides. For better or for worse, the natural weight of Germany would become once again a very significant factor in the life of East Central Europe.[3]

In making his strategic territorial gains, Hitler very ably exploited the irrational spirit of nationalism widely influential in the 1930's. By making his demands usually in the name of national self-determination, he sounded a generally accepted moral justification. The incorporation of Germanic Austria into the Third Reich seemed to substantiate his claim. This is how Kánya perceived the situation, as he reported to the foreign affairs committee of the Hungarian parliament after the *Anschluss:* Hitler was interested only in *"Blut und Boden."* But in reality, the Fuehrer envisioned the establishment of German supremacy over the continent, with a possible acquiescence on the part of the British Empire. The next step was intended to be the forceful creation of an Eastern *Lebensraum,* stretching to the Urals and Volga. Various degrees of domination and exploitation were held in store for the peoples of this vast region, including the Hungarians. The "superior" German *Volk* would forge a great territorial empire over the "inferior" masses of the "East." Rivaling in size and importance the United States, Germany would thus become a world power, capable of participating in global politics at least as an equal of either the British Empire or the United States.[4]

Though quite familiar with expansionistic geopolitical theories emanating from the NSDAP, Kánya was hardly in a position to discern fully how seriously these views were held by Hitler. Kánya was traditional European diplomat who considered Hitler as a similarly traditional politician, with whom it would be possible to deal according to generally accepted principles and procedures. Kánya believed, moreover, that Hungary and Germany were tied together by the force of past association, by comradship-in-arms, and by the similar fates suffered in the First World War and in the subsequent peace settlement. It was only later that Kánya — and the world — would comprehend that Hitler was, in reality, a dangerous adventurer.[5]

Hungary's international position in the interwar era was quite precarious. It is true that Hungary was a member of the tripartite Rome Pact since its founding in 1934, along with Italy and Austria, but the Rome Pact was only a consultative political agreement, accompanied with certain bilateral economic arrangements. It did not contain any military clauses, as the fate of Austria in 1938 clearly indicated. In any case, the Rome-Berlin Axis of 1936 overshadowed

the significance of the Rome agreements for Italy. It is not that Kánya had not made an effort to improve Hungary's international situation by other steps. From 1933 until late 1936, he had diligently worked for the creation of a large multilateral alliance consisting of Hungary, Austria, Italy, Germany, and perhaps even Poland. Actually, he had intended to enlarge and strengthen the Rome Pacts in this fashion. After some encouraging advances, his "grand design" had failed to materialize. Hungary's prospective allies had not seen their interests sufficiently served by such an alliance, which, in essence, would have been a recreated version of the pre-war Triple Alliance. Hitler had been particularly disinterested in a scheme that had run on a collision course with his vision of a German-dominated "new Europe."[6]

Another option for increasing Hungary's security was the possibility of her making up with her neighbors: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania. In principle, the pragmatic Kánya was not averse to this eventuality, but serious territorial disputes stood in the way. Initially, Kánya and most Hungarian politicians had demanded the return of all the lost territories of the fallen Great Hungary. Eventually, the Hungarian ruling oligarchy, as well as the public, probably would have been sufficiently satisfied with the return of the mainly Hungarian (Magyar) inhabited regions alone. But the beneficiaries of the Treaty of Trianon, banded together in the Little Entente alliance, had not been really willing to hand back any significant territory. In response, Kánya had torpedoed, time after time, such efforts toward Danubian international cooperation in the mid-1930's, as the proposed Danubian Pact or the so-called Danubian Confederation. Stubborn Hungarian irredentism and Little Entente intransigence left Danubian Europe in a state of disunity and vulnerability.[7]

Subsequent to this cluster of events, Kánya had formulated and initiated a so-called policy of free hand from late 1936 on. As an able politician, Kánya had placed his policy in a positive light: Hungary would not chose sides in Europe until she became certain which side would become supreme.[8] Astute observers fully realized the practical wisdom of that position, for after all, Hungary's national security and perhaps even her survival were at stake. However, it should not be forgotten that Hungary's unaligned position had not been entirely a matter of free choice. It had been more a product of necessity, in light of the failure of Kánya's planned alliance and in view of the country's irreconcilable differences with the Little Entente. Kánya's policy, nevertheless, offered certain advantages. Kánya could now attempt to turn to either side — to Germany and

Italy or to Britain, France, and the Little Entente. Should Germany's resurgence elevate her to the position of the arbiter of East Central Europe, Hungary would readily attempt to exploit that opportunity in pursuit of her self-interest. The same stood for Britain, should she decide to pay significant attention to Danubian Europe.

The facts of geography and Hungarian irredentist yearnings imposed on Kánya's policy numerous constraints. Far away Britain, even if concerned and willing, had a great deal of difficulty in exerting significant influence in East Central Europe. France's alliances with the Little Entente made a pro-Hungarian French policy unlikely. Similarly, Britain could support Hungarian revisionism only at the risk of alienating the Little Entente. Yet, most likely, only with the active cooperation of the Little Entente could Britain have any significant political power in Danubian Europe, unless extraordinary conditions surfaced.[9] While Britain's and France's options were fairly limited in the region, neighboring Germany's opportunities and advantages, as friend or foe, were significantly more numerous: familiarity with the region, geographic proximity, similarities in political and social development, economic compatibility, not to mention the fact that Germany had consciously remained uncommitted to any one of the small states of the area.[10] It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that even while attempting to implement an independent foreign policy, Kánya's and his colleagues' steps would lead to Berlin and Rome significantly more often than to London and Paris during 1936-1938. Still, in dealing with Berlin and Rome, Kánya jealously guarded Hungarian sovereignty and he demanded that Hungary be treated according to the principle of equality. On the other hand, in dealing with British and French diplomats, Kánya kept the lines of communication open, often speaking with surprising candor. He continued his diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Union on the "correct" level. In other words, during 1936-1938, Kánya was careful not to burn his bridges toward London, Paris, and Moscow. Hungary, unlike Germany and Italy, continued to remain a member of the League of Nations and, for the time being, she would not join the Anti-Comintern Pact.[11]

A common distaste for the existence of Czechoslovakia, which contained large minorities of Germans and Hungarians, served as a strong incentive for cooperation between Budapest and Berlin. Hitler viewed Czechoslovakia as an artificial creation. Because of the long history of Germanic domination over the Czechs, he considered Bohemia and Moravia as the rightful possessions of the Third Reich. Besides, he desired a short border, in place of the

extensive German-Czechoslovak frontier. During his famous conference of November 5, 1937, he expressed his intention of dealing with Czechoslovakia and Austria soon. The situation became more acute after the so-called May Crisis. During May 20-21 1938, the Czechoslovak army partially mobilized on the German and Hungarian frontiers. Reports of German troop movements, it appears, had been interpreted in Prague as an impending attack. Britain and France, in turn, firmly expressed their support to Czechoslovakia. Whether or not a German attack was intended, none came. In the eyes of the world, the Fuehrer, much to his chagrin, appeared to have backed down. From this time on, he was even more determined to smash the Czechs militarily. On May 30, he signed "*Fall Gruen*", the plan for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia. The participation of Hungary and Poland was expected, particularly if the war remained a local one.[12]

Hungary's approach to Czechoslovakia was somewhat similar to Germany's. Hungary hoped for the return, based on historical grounds, of the former Upper Hungary, that is Slovakia and Ruthenia. Budapest disregarded the fact that the Slovaks, the great majority of the population, wanted to remain in Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, a significant Hungarian minority, living in the southern strip of the region, did wish to return to Hungary. Other factors entered as well. Czechoslovakia was the leader of the Little Entente. She was tied by military alliances to France and to the Soviet Union. Prague was, in Budapest's view, active in disseminating anti-Hungarian propaganda in the West. The mobilization of the Czechoslovak troops on the Hungarian frontier in the May Crisis further aggravated relations between Budapest and Prague.[13]

Hungarian and German designs on Czechoslovakia, consequently, coincided quite naturally. When Prime Minister Kálmán Darányi and Kánya visited Germany during November 22-25, 1937, Hitler frankly explained his intention of destroying Czechoslovakia and suggested that Hungary could then recover Slovakia. The Hungarians were gratified, though Kánya stressed to Hitler that "Hungary had no intentions whatever of achieving her revisionist aims by force of arms and thereby unleashing a European war." But, at the same time, Kánya expressed willingness to make a final settlement with Yugoslavia, in return for that country's neutrality in a German-Hungarian local conflict with Czechoslovakia. Simultaneously, Kánya quite likely also sought Germany's guarantee of Yugoslav neutrality. Hitler and Goering were happy to see an end to Hungarian revisionist effort in all directions and they promised to intercede in Belgrade. Thereby Hungarian and German foreign

policy goals reached a high degree of congruity, though Hitler was rather reluctant to go as far as guaranteeing the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier.[14]

As the November meetings in part illustrate, Kánya envisioned the recovery of former Upper Hungary in the case of the following eventualities: 1. Czechoslovakia would disintegrate into its components because of internal antagonisms and/or as consequence of Hitler's pressure; 2. Czechoslovakia would be defeated in a local war by the combined armies of Germany, Hungary, and Poland, with the political support of Italy, should international conditions permit a local war; and finally, with the means of peaceful international diplomacy, including the possibility of great power conference. Kánya was willing to employ any of the methods of traditional power politics for achieving results, as long as the consequences would not be self-defeating, as for example a Little Entente attack or a major European war.[15]

Consequently, during the first months of 1938, Kánya made serious efforts for reaching understandings or creating alliances with Czechoslovakia's neighbors and/or enemies — Poland, Italy, and Germany. Kánya and Horthy visited Warsaw during early February, but not much was accomplished because Kánya and Foreign Minister Jozef Beck did not relate well to each other. Eventually, Kánya clarified his position to Beck in a letter on March 2: "We are determined to take part in every anti-Czech action which might appear necessary, therefore it would be desirable to begin discussions about details, including those of a military nature, as soon as possible."[16] These contacts materialized to some degree, for example in regard to intelligence gathering. In April, Kánya indicated that Hungary aspired to the whole of Upper Hungary, a claim Beck eventually accepted. Beck and Kánya agreed in May that they would make the same demands for the Polish and Hungarian minorities that Germany would demand for the Sudetens. In this way, the two sides reached a general understanding about proceeding against Czechoslovakia jointly, but a specific alliance was not agreed upon.[17]

A similar statement can be made about Kánya's efforts toward Italy. Hungarian-Italian diplomatic exchanges were mainly centered around the neutrality of Yugoslavia in case of a Hungarian-Czechoslovak clash. During mid-May, Kánya sought a bilateral agreement with Rome, in place of the defunct Rome Pact, including assurances of Italian support to Hungary in case of Yugoslav attack. But Mussolini and Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano were unwilling to make a formal written commitment.[18] Kánya pressed

on, nevertheless. On July 18, he and Prime Minister Béla Imrédy held discussions with Mussolini and Ciano in Rome. Here the Hungarian Foreign Minister conjured up the ingenious proposal of resuscitating the Rome Pact by substituting Yugoslavia in place of the fallen Austria. The issue was still Yugoslav neutrality, of course. Though Kánya admitted that Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Stojadinovič appeared to be ready for a conditional neutrality toward Hungary, it was difficult to know how Stojadinovič would actually behave in case of a Danubian war, emphasized Kánya. In order to assure Yugoslavia's "absolute" neutrality, Kánya requested a preferably written Italian-Hungarian agreement in the form of a military guarantee against Yugoslavia. But Mussolini and Ciano were still unwilling to provide a written guarantee, though the Duce most likely made a verbal assurance to that effect. If that represented a degree of assurance for Hungary, Kánya and Imrédy must have been very much cautioned by Mussolini's rather offhand subsequent reference to a possible wider war, involving not only Italy, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, but France as well.[19]

It is in the light of Kánya's alliance making efforts toward Poland and Italy — though more or less fruitless — that the upcoming Hungarian visit to Germany should be viewed. Kánya was an active creator of policy, not simply someone passively reacting to unfolding events around him. It should also be realized that his intended alliances were not designed simply for their possible military applicability, but more so, in Kánya's mind, they were considered as providing a political deterrent, in order to allow Hungary to accomplish her goals toward Czechoslovakia with only a local war, should that be necessary.[20] That Kánya placed a high value on alliances can be shown by one of his own pronouncements. Austria had fallen, he explained to the foreign policy committee of the Hungarian parliament on March 23, 1938, because she had possessed no military alliances. Consequently, she had been "forced to rely exclusively on her own armed strength for the defense of her independence."[21]

Naturally, Hungary's options toward Czechoslovakia would be determined not only by German, Italian, Yugoslav, and Polish attitudes, but also by the stance of France and Britain. But during the months prior to the Hungarian visit to Germany, signals emanating from London and Paris were mixed. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his French counterpart, Edouard Daladier, often seemed eager to appease Hitler by limited concessions, only to follow with strong pronouncements about their willingness to resist aggression militarily if necessary. The *Anschluss*

was greeted by the West with only token expressions of displeasure. On the other hand, Paris and London responded to the May Crisis with strong representations to Berlin. Yet the negotiating mission of Lord Runciman, commencing with the end of July, seemed to point, once again, in the direction of a negotiated settlement in the Czechoslovak crisis. Kánya, observing what appeared to be rather constant Western vacillation, could not rule out the possibility of either a peaceful or a military response by the West to Hitler. Nor could, indeed, anyone else, including, most likely, the two Western prime ministers themselves.[22]

* * *

These tendencies acquired concrete form during the Hungarian state visit to Germany. The delegation — consisting of Horthy, Imrédy, their wives, Kánya, Minister of Defense Jenő Rátz and a sizable number diplomatic and military officials — left Budapest by a special train in the late hours of August 20, 1938. From the beginning, it was evident that the German government was placing very high importance on the visit. A triumphal arch greeted the delegation at the new German-Hungarian frontier, an elaborate welcoming was staged at the *Westbanhof* in Vienna, and the railway route was decorated with a profusion of flags all the way across Germany to Kiel.[23]

As it arrived at Kiel in the morning of August 22, the Hungarian party was greeted by Hitler, Ribbentropp, Goering, Admiral Raeder, and other German officials. The exceptional display of ostentation continued here and throughout the journey. The professed rationale for the visit, the launching of the cruiser *Prinz Eugen,* followed shortly at the Krupp shipyards during the same morning. In arranging the visit, the hosts obviously had not been unmindful of Regent Horthy's well known former career as an admiral of the Austro-Hungarian navy. Mme Horthy christened the ship successfully and, together with other ladies and guests, she later boarded the oceanliner *Patria.* Horthy and Hitler proceeded to the yacht *Grille,* from her deck they watched an impressive naval parade in the harbor, and then cruised out onto the Baltic, in order to view extensive naval maneuvers held on the open sea.[24]

Hitler wasted no time in coming to his real objective concerning the Hungarian state visit. In the late afternoon of August 22, during the return trip to Kiel on the *Grille,* he drew Horthy into a face-to-face discussion. The Fuehrer fairly bluntly exposed to the Regent the essence of the military plan "*Fall Gruen,*" expressing his

determination to attack and to destroy Czechoslovakia, with the intention of absorbing her western half into Germany. Hitler requested Horthy that Hungary attack Slovakia from the south as Germany marched against Bohemia and Moravia. The territory Hungary conquered, she could keep, suggested the Fuehrer. According to Horthy's own account, "I replied with all the courtesy but with great firmness that there could be no possibility of Hungarian participation," because of the peaceful nature of Hungarian revisionist intentions and due to Hungary's military unpreparedness. From the German record, the bulk of which had been most likely orally transmitted by Hitler to State Secretary Ernst Weizsäcker, a seemingly contradictory picture emerges. First, Weizsäcker places the Hitler-Horthy meeting for the morning of August 23, simultaneously with the Ribbentropp-Imrédy-Kánya discussions, and not for the afternoon of August 22, as stated in Horthy's memoirs. Perhaps there were two meetings between Horthy and Hitler at the opening of the visit or perhaps one or both sources are somewhat inaccurate in this regard. Second, the Weizsäcker memorandum states that "Horthy had expressed himself to the Fuehrer in more definite language. While not keeping silent on his misgivings as to the British attitude, he nevertheless made it clear that Hungary intended to cooperate." The contradictory nature of these statements is probably more apparent than real. Actually, the two statements should be perceived as mostly complementary, if we understand that, after the fact, both Horthy and Hitler must have wished to place a different emphasis on what had transpired, for the sake of appearances. Consequently, Horthy most likely did express Hungary's general intention of moving against Czechoslovakia, as the German records indicate, but not in the fall, because of her military unpreparedness and her fear of a general European war, involving Britain, France, and perhaps the Soviet Union, the Regent stated. At this stage of the discussion, Hitler lost his temper and the meeting came to an abrupt end.[25]

Historical literature occasionally labels Hitler's offer to Horthy as an "alliance." This interpretation is not entirely accurate, for a variety of reasons. What Hitler offered was a coordinated German and Hungarian military attack on a third country, and in the course of the discussion, he did promise arms shipments to Hungary. But that was all. There is no indication that Hitler desired to put anything in writing. He mentioned nothing about dispatching troops for Hungary's assistance against Czechoslovakia, should the need arise. By not raising the topic, he underlined his unwillingness

to promise a military guarantee against another possible antagonist, namely Yugoslavia. Consequently, Kánya's subsequent reference, phrased as a "military convention," is perhaps the most appropriate in describing what Hitler had in mind.[26]

Hitler's eagerness for luring Hungary into cooperation is explicable on both political and military grounds. A combined German, Hungarian, and Polish attack would lift the burden of sole responsibility from the shoulders of the Fuehrer. A united assault by three of her neighbors would illustrate to the world the "artificial" nature of Czechoslovakia. The march of three armies, moreover, would provide the likelihood of a rapid victory, on which Hitler heavily counted for the prevention of possible Western intervention. The southern (Austrian) theater of German operations was seriously handicapped by transportation problems: there was only one railroad line in existence for deploying troops against the southern, and unfortified, frontier of Bohemia and Moravia. It is not surprising, therefore, that Hitler intended an important role for the Hungarian politicians and soldiers.[27]

Horthy was not entirely surprised by Hitler's request. For many years, Budapest had shared with Berlin the hope of moving against Czechoslovakia some day. The Hungarian-German discussions of November, 1937, had strongly reinforced these expectations. The fate of Austria had been another indication of possible future developments. In fact, on the day of their departure and even during the journey by train, the Hungarian politicians had received warning messages from a few of Germany's uneasy military leaders about Hitler's exact intentions: Czechoslovakia would be attacked in late September or early October, even at the risk of a major European war.[28]

With its guard up, the Hungarian delegation, before arriving to Kiel, had formulated a general response, almost certainly under the guidance of Kánya, to a likely request or demand by Hitler. The position stated that "Hungary, for the benefit of her own goals, is also determined to move against Czechoslovakia, however, the timing can not be determined; the fall of this year is not very suitable, because our preparations are not sufficiently advanced."[29] It is most probably this line of argument that Horthy conveyed to Hitler aboard the *Grille* on August 22.

Despite its brevity, the Hungarian statement of position is factually quite valid. Hungary was indeed unprepared militarily, particularly against a well-armed Czechoslovak army deployed behind strong permanent fortifications along the Danube frontier.[30]

But the crux of the matter lay beyond military considerations. As Kánya understood and stressed to his colleagues, Hungary was very much unprepared diplomatically. Yugoslavia's neutrality in case of a German-Czechoslovak-Hungarian clash was still uncertain. The same was the case for Romania. To date, Germany had been unwilling to guarantee Yugoslav neutrality. Mussolini, as well, would not make the same commitment for Hungary's benefit, in any other but rather offhand oral form. Poland had not desired to tie herself to a Hungarian alliance either. It is not surprising therefore, that the unfavorable international situation was the uppermost factor for the leading figures of the Hungarian delegation, we must add, down to the last man. During the discussions in Germany, however, Hungary's military unpreparedness served as a convenient excuse for fending off Hitler's requests.

Throughout the visit to Germany, the issue of Yugoslav neutrality, consequently, hung over Kánya's head as a Damoclean sword. The Hungarian Foreign Minister comprehended with a great deal of trepidation that a local Hungarian-Czechoslovak conflict, in cooperation with Germany, could very well result in an East Central European war, should Yugoslavia decide to march. He understood that in Belgrade, especially on the political "left" and in the military, a strong pro-Czechoslovak sentiment continued to exist, with the possible effect of firming up the Little Entente alliance. If Yugoslavia would march, Romania would likely follow. But a Yugoslav military action would quite likely force Mussolini's hand. With Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Italy all in the conflict, how long could France refrain from honoring her alliances and for how many days could Britain remain on the sidelines? How would the Soviet Union react?[31]

The Hungarian Foreign Minister knew fully well that the interlocking sympathies, commitments, and alliances could, with ease, escalate a local German-Czechoslovak-Hungarian conflict, via Yugoslavia, into an East Central European war, which could rapidly drag Italy, France, Britain, and other states into a major European or world war. Much to his credit, Kánya discerned the existence of these dangerous linkages underneath the uneasy surface of European international life and he was very cautious not to make the wrong move and thereby trigger the outbreak of a major conflict. This is not surprising, particularly from a former Austro-Hungarian diplomat, who had witnessed from far away Mexico a similar interlocking chain of events plunge Europe into a world war during the summer of 1914. The resultant First World War, after all, had

culminated in the defeat and disintegration of Austria-Hungary and it had led to a drastic truncation of Hungary in the Treaty of Trianon. In 1938, Kánya feared, the effect of irresponsible adventurism would be even worse — a Hungarian national suicide.[32]

Given the possible unfavorable consequences, many European politicians would have recoiled from any action under ordinary circumstances. But the circumstances were hardly ordinary for Hungary. Having lost in the Treaty of Trianon two-thirds of her territory and three fifths of her population (including three million Hungarians), Hungary was permeated, no less in 1938 than before, with a strong irredentist spirit for the recovery of as much lost territory as possible. Kánya was not an exception in this sense. He was a spirited nationalist and a determined revisionist, though his policies were very much guided and moderated by his sense of political realism. He was willing to act "if the chances of success were only sixty or seventy percent," according to his own admission in reference to regaining territory from Czechoslovakia.[33] For Kánya, the primary condition for that eventuality, however, was that a German-Hungarian move against Czechoslovakia would remain a local one. In Kánya's mind, it was Yugoslavia's action or inaction that would keep such a conflict localized or not, as we have seen. The most certain way to assure that condition was to wrest from Berlin a guarantee, given to Hungary, of Belgrade's neutrality. Naturally, the Western spirit of appeasement would have to continue unabated, otherwise a localization of the conflict would also be impossible. It is with these general concerns and specific objectives in mind that we should consider another concurrent manifestation of Kánya's foreign policy — the discussions between Hungary and the Little Entente.

* * *

The negotiations with the Little Entente, in view of their far-reaching and manifold ramifications, shed a great deal of light on the extreme complexity of Kánya's foreign policy and they clearly underline the aging, white-haired Hungarian Foreign Minister's diplomatic brilliance. Kánya had sent out feelers in late 1936 for the possibility of commencing discussions. It had not been an accident that Hungary's first steps toward her neighbors had been taken shortly after Kánya's realization that his multilateral grand design would not materialize. Ostensibly, Kánya's goal was the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. As

the negotiations had begun in early 1937, Hungary had sought the Little Entente's recognition of her military equality, that is, her right to rearm openly. In response, Hungary would promise a pledge of non-aggression toward her neighbors, based on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which these states would reciprocally affirm. Before too long, Kánya had also insisted on bilateral minorities agreements between Hungary and each of the states in question, professed to be necessary for the protection of the Hungarian minorities detached from the homeland by the Treaty of Trianon. This last effort had been undoubtedly sincere, but it also served the ulterior purpose of becoming an instrument for breaking up the Little Entente, as we shall see.[34]

As the negotiations had begun — through normal diplomatic channels, at Geneva, and at Sinaia in Romania — at first Czechoslovakia proved to be quite eager for a settlement, in the hope of making a headway toward the formation of a bloc against German expansionism. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, attempted to edge toward Berlin, in a fence-straddling effort between the two sides, and consequently seemed willing in the spring of 1937 to come to a separate agreement with Hungary. But her two partners had vetoed the move in the council of the Little Entente. Conversely, during 1937, Romania had been the most reluctant to come to terms with Hungary, because of the sensitive Hungarian minority issue in Transylvania. Britain and France favored a settlement of antagonisms in Danubian Europe, for much the same reason as Prague. Berlin and Rome were somewhat puzzled by the entire proceedings. Budapest provided different versions of the negotiations to the Axis capitals and to the West. After delays and interruptions, the meetings continued, and in May, 1938, Kánya had succeeded, with Stojadinovič's cooperation, on a key point. Yugoslavia and Romania would negotiate with Hungary on the minority issue without Czechoslovakia's participation. But no immediate agreement had resulted, because Bucharest had balked at the last moment. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Emil Krofta was beginning to see the handwriting on the wall, as he had reproached the Hungarians in May: Budapest desires no settlement with Prague, but wants to split the Little Entente and awaits the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Now Prague had become the main opponent of reconciliation, while the new Romanian government had proved to be more agreeable. In May, Bucharest had issued a Minorities Statute. The statute was not particularly far-reaching, but Kánya had jumped at the opportunity in early August and had signaled the Romanians

that the time had arrived for the conclusion of the Hungarian-Little Entente negotiations. On August 19, the day before the Hungarian delegation's departure to Germany, the two sides were still holding discussions.[35]

The timing of the subsequent Hungarian agreement with the Little Entente had been more of a design on Kánya's part than an accident. Hitler's decision for the dates of the Hungarian state visit had been made in April and the Little Entente had set the next meeting of its council for Bled, Yugoslavia, as its May meeting, when the dates of the Hungarian delegation's journey to Germany had not yet been made public. But Kánya had been cognizant of the timing for both of the planned events and he had decided to profit from the opportunity provided by their fortunate congruence. It had not been an accident that Kánya had expressed his readiness for an agreement with Romania on August 9, just two days before the Hungarian press had announced, on August 11, the dates of the impending state visit to Germany. In fact, it was the Hungarian Foreign Minister who had drafted and had proposed the communique that the two sides accepted, after minor modifications, and published in the evening of August 23, 1938, simultaneously at Bled and Budapest, though in different formats.[36]

The communique represented the published component of the so-called Bled agreements. In it, the Little Entente accepted Hungary's military equality and all four states renounced the use of force as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, in the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.[37] Simultaneously, a confidential agreement was concluded on the Hungarian minority issue between Hungary, on the one side, and Yugoslavia and Romania on the other. During the morning of August 23, both components of the Bled agreements were signed by György Bakácz-Bessenyey, the Hungarian representative in Belgrade, and by Prime Minister Stojadinovič of Yugoslavia.[38] Before departing for Germany, Kánya had raised his demands for the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia to the level of "sovereign self-administration," designed to be unacceptably high for the Prague government. An agreement between Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the nationality issue, therefore, was not possible, but was to be handled through future bilateral discussions.[39] Kánya, by stressing the importance of the minority agreements, was consequently able to have the entire Bled agreements considered by all participants — including Prague — as only a temporary agreement, which would become final, as an agreement complex, once a Hungarian-Czechoslovak minorities

accord would also be reached.[40] It should be stressed that Kánya was in control of the Hungarian side of the proceedings at Bled, with the help of telephone and telegraph communications from Kiel. The final permission for the signing of the documents had to come from the officials of the foreign ministry at Budapest, because Kánya was at sea at the time — but Kánya gave his retroactive assent, as well as the approval for the publication of the final communique.[41] It should be mentioned that Czechoslovakia was willing to acquiesce in an unequal treatment by Hungary only under the pressure of London and Paris. Yugoslavia and Romania, on the other hand, were playing a double game, during and after the Bled meeting. In fact, subsequently to their signing, each of the governments interpreted the agreements somewhat differently, depending on the time and place, to suit that particular country's immediate political interests.[42]

Another rather important facet of the Bled agreements was the divergence of prevalent perceptions about their nature and importance. In the Little Entente capitals and in Western Europe, particularly in the popular press, the Bled accords were considered as permanent and therefore a significant victory for anti-German cooperation in Danubian Europe — just at the time when the Hungarian delegation was feared to be concluding an offensive alliance with the Third Reich. In this regard, an important fact is that Kánya wished to utilize the perception of permanency for increasing the importance of Hungary in the eyes of the German leaders. On the other hand, when the situation in Germany did not develop as expected, Kánya would be forced to emphasize the Bled agreements' "temporary" nature.[43] The value of Kánya's delicate diplomatic construction was not only that the agreements could be perceived in two contrasting fashions, but that they could be made final in either direction as well, as the train of events would necessitate. Should German expansionistic pressure require it, Hungary would be in a position to conclude a permanent agreement with Czechoslovakia and the entire Little Entente. Or, on the contrary, she could refuse to come to a permanent agreement with the same, thereby allowing the whole agreement complex to lapse, as it would in actuality happen. In this sense, the Bled agreements represented the brilliant climax of Kánya's policy of free hand.

The delineation of Kánya's motives may reduce our perplexity over the seemingly complicated and contradictory developments at Kiel and Bled. First and foremost, Kánya strove to enhance Hungary's importance to Germany. Hitler had rejected the Hun-

garian grand design, much to Kánya's chagrin. The Hungarian Foreign Minister would now play his trump card — as he had threatened then German Foreign Minister Konstantin Neurath in late 1934 — of making up with the Little Entente or at least appearing to do so.[44] This was done hardly out of spite, but rather as a result of cool calculation. Most likely, Kánya still hoped during August of 1938 to wrest from Hitler his guarantee of Yugoslav neutrality, considered indispensable for the safety of Hungary's rear in case of her participation against Czechoslovakia. Secondly, Kánya was indeed attempting to break up the Little Entente. If successful, Hungary would gain a welcome relief from coordinated pressure and intimidation by Prague, Belgrade, and Bucharest. But more importantly, by isolating Czechoslovakia from her allies, Hungary would make an advance diplomatic preparation for the eventuality of a local conflict for the recovery of Slovakia and Ruthenia. Third, with the Bled agreements in hand, the Hungarian delegation in Germany would be able to minimize the chances, though fairly remote, of being meted out the same type of intimidating treatment that had been accorded to Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg by Hitler and his generals at Obersalzberg on February 12, 1938.[45] Hungary would not be pressured into a premature war against Czechoslovakia, particularly if the situation could degenerate into an East Central European, European, or world war. If pressure were applied, Hungary could attempt to retreat into the company of her newly-found Little Entente friends, honor her pledge of non-aggression to Czechoslovakia and hope at the same time for Western support.

All told, in pursuit of her irredentist goals, Hungary still continued to count heavily on Germany's and Italy's international support, as Kánya had revealed to European diplomats over the years and as he had repeated to the members of the foreign policy committee of the Hungarian parliament time after time.[46] Hungary was unable to escape the deterministic conditions of her history and of her geography and she could not overcome the lack of serious interest in her problems on the part of other major European states. Kánya's entire foreign policy approach during 1937-1938 did indeed represent a "policy of free hand," because Hungary did not unreservedly commit herself to any one state or configuration of states. But, in reality, it was a policy of free hand only to the extent that Hungary's escape routes were left fairly open. Perhaps Kánya's line should be labeled as a "policy of safe escape." Yet, at the same time, because Kánya did not base the course of foreign affairs on

sentiment, he would have been entirely willing to change sides, if Britain and France, despite the odds, would have made their power effectively felt in distant East Central Europe.

* * *

In the meanwhile, the Hungarian-German discussions continued in Kiel, but in an increasingly somber atmosphere, as the news of Bled rapidly spread. Kánya and Imrédy met with German Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentropp aboard the Patria during the morning of August 23, as the entire entourage sailed to the island of Heligoland, for inspecting its fortifications and its military bases.[47] Understandably, Ribbentropp was highly perplexed about Bled. But Kánya was in a self-confident and even arrogant mood. He had created conditions at Bled that he would now attempt to exploit for Hungary's benefit. The negotiations with the Little Entente were "historical" and had brought nothing new, Kánya claimed. The Bled communiqué actually to be issued in the afternoon had not been really justified by the negotiations, he continued; in any case, the approval for the communique had been given by his subordinates; and finally, the whole matter was not really timely any more. But Ribbentrop could not be that easily put off. The Bled communique will not lead to Yugoslav neutrality; Hungary is blocking the way of her intervention in Czechoslovakia; morally it will be more difficult for the Yugoslavs to abandon their Czech allies; it will be so perceived that Hungary is moving away from the German-Czech conflict; and she is consequently renouncing revisionism — so ran the counter argument of the German Foreign Minister.

Kánya's rejoinder, unfortunately, is only touched upon in the German minutes and there is no extant official Hungarian record of the meeting. It was at this stage that Kánya, most likely, attempted to use his Bled leverage to the advantage of attempting to secure, once again, a German guarantee of Yugoslav neutrality. The German minutes reflect the situation to some degree. In response to Ribbentropp's query as to what the Hungarians would do if the Fuehrer would implement his decision of responding to new "Czech provocations" with the use of force, Kánya's main concern surfaced: "Yugoslavia must remain neutral if Hungary were to march northward" against Czechoslovakia. Moreover, Hungarian rearmament had just begun and would require one or more additional years to complete. But Ribbentropp was not willing to reply any

more affirmatively than "the Yugoslavs would take care not to walk into the pincers of the Axis powers." The German Foreign Minister made similar assurances for Romania, France, and England. Quite likely, it was somewhere at this stage of the discussions that Kánya, seeing his hopes dashed anew, lost control of his tongue, and made a few sarcastic remarks at the expense of his German counterpart, which the latter would never forgive. In other words, "the direct danger of Hungary's unprotected flanks" continued to be a serious and unresolved concern for Kánya and Imrédy. If Yugoslav (and consequently Romanian) neutrality could not be assured, then Hungary would not march: this was the most crucial conclusion of the meeting. In all, the diplomatic skill of a small and unarmed country's foreign minister could not overcome a German policy of self-interest.[48]

While Yugoslav neutrality seemed to be principally Kánya's preoccupation, Prime Minister Imrédy voiced his firm conviction that in the case of a German-Czech conflict, France would certainly intervene. The Hungarian position by the end of the meeting was summarized by Weizsacker as: "The Hungarian reply still remained subject to conditions," and "No definite political basis for this — the exact moment for Hungarian intervention — was agreed." These lines indicate that the Hungarians, at this stage, were still largely repeating their original position formulated before arriving at Kiel.[49]

The politicians from Budapest could at least take solace in not having been subjected to pressure or having been given an ultimatum by Hitler and Ribbentropp. When, in the afternoon of the same day, Imrédy met briefly with Hitler, the Hungarian Prime Minister "was most relieved when the Fuehrer stated to him that, in this particular case, he required nothing of Hungary." But, the Fuehrer continued, "he who wanted to sit at the table, must at least help in the kitchen." Apparently, Hitler had overestimated the Hungarian willingness to march.[50]

One additional meeting might have taken place between the two sides on August 23, perhaps in the evening, because Weizsacker's memorandum concludes with the statement that "Hungary is convinced that she will not be able to intervene until some 14 days after the outbreak of the war."[51] This is a surprisingly novel position, which to some degree represents a Hungarian willingness to assume additional risks, even with an unprepared army, for the sake of making a significant irredentis territorial gain. Given its technical nature, there can be little doubt that Foreign Minister Kánya played

a determinant role in creating the position. But, after careful consideration, it becomes plain that the new Hungarian formula was still a cautious one, if we keep in mind the mitigating impact of a number of significant political-military linkages present in the European and East Central European strategic situation. Two Weeks after the outbreak of a German-Czechoslovak war, the belligerency or non-belligerency of France and Britain would have been a settled matter, thus the possible outbreak of a major European war would have been a foregone conclusion and Hungary would have been in a position to act accordingly. Equally importantly, as long as Hungary stayed out of a German-Czechoslovak war, Yugoslavia and Romania would have had no justification for marching against her, particularly in view of the Bled agreements. On the other hand, if France and Britain would not have fought against Hitler, and after fourteen days Hungary would have joined a victorious Germany in the occupation of a defeated Czechoslovakia, it would have been very unlikely that Belgrade and Bucharest, under the circumstances, would have attacked Hungary. In both instances, she could reasonably expect not to be considered the instigator of an East Central European war. This line of thinking, inferred from the various Hungarian positions on the subject, unmistakenly carries the intellectual stamp of Kánya. The latest Hungarian position was somewhat more risky than the original stand, but because the functioning or non-functioning of pertinent international linkages had been taken into consideration, it was not radically more so. In this fashion, it is a fitting testimony to Foreign Minister Kánya's political flexibility.

On the morning of August 24, the *Patria* sailed with the entire party from Heligoland to Hamburg. From there Horthy and Hitler and their respective entourages traveled by separate trains to Berlin. On the way to the Presidential Palace on the Wilhelmstrasse, Horthy and Hitler greeted an enthusiastic crowd from an open car they rode. The day ended with an official state banquet, during which the usual complimentary toasts were made. The next morning, a major military parade was held in the capital in honor of the guests, who, along with the military attaches of many countries, seemed properly impressed with Hitler's latest military hardware. The evening was capped with a gala opera performance of *Lohengrin*.[52]

During the 24th, the impact of the Bled communique, published the evening before, was now fully felt. The popular press in Western Europe, in the capitals of the Little Entente, and even in Budapest, interpreted it as a major anti-German victory. On top of it, the Czechoslovak and Romanian ministers to Berlin, along with other

"friendly" diplomats, appeared at the Berlin railway station to greet, above all, Horthy's train. Hitler was so incensed that he gave a good dressing down to his master of ceremonies and he toyed with the idea of canceling the opera performance.[53]

Kánya soon realized that the Bled communique had overreached its purpose. Its negative impact, combined with the Hungarian refusals to march, created an uncomfortably tense atmosphere in Berlin. Understandably, form this time on, keeping alive the damaged Hungarian-German connection became his and the delegation's central preoccupation. In this spirit, Imrédy and Kánya gave a press conference during the morning of August 25. The Prime Minister spoke in enthusiastic terms about his impressions in Germany and stressed that the Bled accords represented only an "intention." Kánya categorically stated that the agreements would not be in effect until a full agreement had been reached with Czechoslovakia on the minority issue.[54]

Because Hitler would not see him, Kánya requested, for the same day, an interview with Ribbentropp.[55] Ribbentropp's opening comments indicated how low German-Hungarian relations had sunk, as Kánya feared. The Czech and Western press were jubilant over the Bled communique, the German Foreign Minister remarked, which was interpreted abroad "as a rift in the German-Hungarian friendship and as a renunciation by Hungary of her revisionist aims." Comprehending how high the stakes had become, Kánya decided to be entirely frank about Bled, repeating his arguments about the preliminary nature of the agreements, the tactic of upping demands to Prague, and the likelihood that neither Budapest or Prague would actually honor what they had signed. Ribbentropp became only partially appeased as he agreed with Kánya that the true meaning of Bled would depend on how the (inspired) Hungarian press would treat it in the days ahead. Next, Kánya came forward with a completely new stance: because Hungary's military strength had in fact improved, by October 1 she could participate in an attack against Czechoslovakia. It is difficult to know if this was a new Hungarian view or Kánya's own personal stance. In any case, it represented a major concession to Germany, because the new position disregarded the requirement of even relative certainty about Yugoslav neutrality, committing Hungary to attack simultaneously with the Third Reich. The interpretation of Kánya's motives is also difficult. It could have constituted a sincere but desperate act on Kánya's part for maintaining Hungarian-German friendship or could have been only a momentary tactic for appeasing a perturbed Ribbentropp — as Horthy would later explain in his memoirs.

Because no member of the Hungarian delegation — including Kánya — would repeat the position again, it must have been the latter, though an uncharacteristically unsafe one. The Reich Foreign Minister, unconvinced, did not even respond.[56]

Another face-to-face meeting between Hitler and Horthy in the afternoon of August 25 only aggravated the tensions. In the meantime, Horthy and General Walther Brauchitsch, the commander-in-chief of the German army, had shared their misgivings about a possible war on Czechoslovakia. Having learned that this had happened, Hitler opened with recriminations to Horthy, which the latter did not accept kindly. Nothing was agreed upon once again. The Regent attempted to appease the Fuehrer, perhaps after this meeting sometime, by offering to intercede in Warsaw on Berlin's behalf concerning the Corridor issue. But the former advised against any such steps.[57]

What Hitler could not accomplish with the politicians and diplomats, he next tried with the Hungarian military. Probably in the morning, before the delegation left Berlin on August 26, Hitler met with General Rátz. The Fuehrer gave Rátz the full treatment: He was determined to settle accounts with the Czechs; Germany was superior militarily to the West; and Britain and France would not intervene. The novel element in Hitler's line of argument was the raising of a supposed Polish threat. Poland would probably intervene, claimed the Fuehrer, in which case Slovakia would fall into her hands and Hungary would be left with nothing. Consequently, this was the last chance for a Hungarian revisionist success in that region. But Rátz would not succumb to Hitler's blandishments. The Hungarian military was in the first stage of reorganization, he replied, thus the fall would be particularly unsuitable for a campaign. In any case, Belgrade's neutrality was uncertain, Rátz continued. Should Yugoslavia fight and should Mussolini honor his verbal promise by coming to the aid of Hungary, the conflict would cease to be a local war, because "there would be growing repercussions," argued the Hungarian Minister of Defense. Hitler disagreed and there was no meeting of the minds between the two sides once again. Still, Hitler brought up the need of the *Luftwaffe* for direction-inding stations and emergency landing space in Hungary. Rátz gave his assent and so would his political superiors. The meeting closed with Hitler's assurance of his readiness to authorize German-Hungarian military staff discussions. Until the very end of the Hungarian state visit, Hitler continued to assign a crucial role to Hungary in his plans against Czechoslovakia.[58]

On August 26, the Hungarians traveled to Potsdam. Imrédy and Kánya held a short meeting with Ribbentropp in the Charlottenburg Palace. Kánya continued his retreat on the Bled accords by claiming, inaccurately, that Hungary had not signed any agreements with Czechoslovakia because of the minority issue, but only with Yugoslavia and Romania. In other words, Kánya had given up on attempting to explain the diplomatic complexity of the Bled agreements, instead, he resorted to dissimulation in order to assuage his German counterpart. In his defense, it should be stressed that the multiplicity of reasons for which the Bled agreements had been necessary before the visit to Germany, were no longer timely at the visit's end. Imrédy, in his turn, stressed once again to a largely silent Ribbentropp his opinion that France would go to the aid of Czechoslovakia in the case of a German attack. The discussions were obviously deteriorating to a totally non-productive level.[59]

In the afternoon, Horthy went to Karinhall, Hermann Goering's hunting lodge in the Schorfheide forest. Because the weather was poor, not much hunting was done, thus there was time for discussion. Horthy brought up the possibility of postponing the war with Czechoslovakia until the spring, to which the pliable Goering responded in a fairly positive sense, which the Hungarians accepted with delight at first, until they realized the emptiness of the Reich Marshall's words. Goering also showed understanding for the Hungarian need of being assured about Yugoslav non-belligerency. Though he was certain of Stojadinović's neutrality, Goering promised to get in touch with Belgrade on the issue and to report back to the Hungarians. If that promise sounded encouraging, another topic brought up by Goering must have been like cold water on the guests. The Reich Marshall inquired whether Hungary would be in a position to supply gasoline to Germany "in case a possible conflict lasted for any length of time." Imrédy politely declined, but the implication of Goering's words must have been unmistakable — a major war was not being ruled out by one of the chief figures of the Third Reich. On the evening of August 26, the delegation departed by train to Nuremberg for a short sightseeing visit there on the next day and then continued back toward home.[60]

The German Minister to Hungary, Otto Erdmannsdorff, traveling with the delegation back to Budapest, was a witness to the final Hungarian reaction to the visit. Horthy was almost apologetic: he had for years desired the rapid success of Hungarian revisionism, but was now forced by the international situation "to sound a warning note." Yet Imrédy would not repeat his forebodings —

which he had given four times in Germany — about the likelihood of French intervention. Perhaps he was beginning to have doubts about the validity and wisdom of his position. But Kánya was certain and satisfied: "The Hungarians would fight even if the chances of success were only 60-70 percent. But they could not be expected to commit suicide." Stojadinovič would not provide a definite reply; whether or not Yugoslavia would fight would be determined by the attitude of France and Britain; should Mussolini respond to a Yugoslav attack on Hungary, the main strength of the Italian forces would be tied down on the French frontier and the remainder would quickly become held up in the impassable Karst mountains on the Yugoslav border — so reasoned Kánya and the group. That is, Hungary would be thrust into the flames of an East Central European and a much wider war. As Kánya confided to a fellow Hungarian diplomat about Hitler a few days after the state visit: "That madman wants to unleash the war whatever the cost."[61] But in 1938, Hungary wanted no part in the tragedy of another major war.

Yet, during the first weeks of September, a peaceful solution to the German-Czechoslovak antagonism was becoming more and more a possibility. As Neville Chamberlain gained the initiative in the direction of securing a diplomatic solution, Budapest was becoming increasingly hopeful that the same approach would be applied to the Hungarian minority issue in Czechoslovakia. In fact, Chamberlain sent a promise to Budapest on September 19, through an intermediary, stating that "I wholeheartedly sympathize with Hungary, which has no reason for anxiety. I am carefully keeping Hungary's situation in mind." He urged a continuation of Hungary's "peaceful and calm attitude."[62]

Hitler, on the other hand, began to fear that a peaceful cession of Sudeten German territory would rob him of the opportunity of conquering all of Bohemia and Moravia. Consequently, the Fuehrer reverted to his original intention of a coordinated outside military attack on Czechoslovakia. With this in mind, Hitler invited Imrédy and Kánya back to Germany. On September 20, the two Hungarians flew on Hitler's airplane to Berchtesgaden. There they were treated by the Chancellor to a variation on a familiar theme: He was determined to destroy Czechoslovakia within three weeks, even if it meant world war, but France and Britain would not fight; he would be brutal in presenting the German demands to Chamberlain at Godesberg; the best solution was a military one, but there was a danger that the Czechs would accept every demand; this was the last chance for Hungary to take part — most likely simultaneously with Germany, we would have to infer. Imrédy presented the Hungarian

stance, while Kánya held his tongue. The Prime Minister expressed surprise at the tempo of events; Budapest expected a conflict within a year or two; Hungary would make additional military preparations, but these could not be expected to be completed in fourteen days, in any case, the pro-French Yugoslav military had to be taken seriously. In all, Imrédy, with a fine sense of oblique diplomatic language, said "no" to Hitler once again, and even seemed to have backed down on the promise of August 23 for possible action fourteen days after a German move. With his silence, Kánya seconded all of this.[63]

For Hitler, the Hungarian refusal of August and September of 1938 represented a critical setback. For psychological, political, and military reasons, a Hungarian military attack was a key component of his expectations for defeating Czechoslovakia militarily and thereby wiping her off the map. But as a result of the refusal, he was forced to revise his intentions downward. The Fuehrer, in fact, was rapidly becoming a prisoner of his own expansionistic design. Following his secret directives, the German National Socialists in the so-called Sudetenland caused serious clashes with the Czechoslovak authorities during 1938. With demagogic mastery, Hitler whipped the populace of Germany into a state of high emotionalism about the condition of their kin beyond the frontier, for example, by his Nuremberg speech of September 12, in which he now openly claimed the right of national self-determination for the Sudetens. Having created the crisis, during which his demands became far reaching, the Fuehrer could ill afford, politically speaking, to back down again, especially in view of the May Crisis. His generals, however, were apprehensive as usual, his ally Mussolini advised caution, and the British Prime Minister worked with determination for a peaceful solution. In fact, after Chamberlain's meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on September 15, London and Paris began to advise Prague for conceding to the Fuehrer's demand for the Sudetenland. In other words, Britain and France were now willing to grant what Hitler's propaganda demanded, the "liberation" of the Sudetens from the control of Prague. But, as we have seen, in reality the Fuehrer desired not an ethnic or "partial," but a territorial or "total" solution, by destroying Czechoslovakia entirely. However, the remaining credible justification for the latter eventuality was a Hungarian military participation against Czechoslovakia, which Budapest continued to decline. Having been backed into a corner by circumstances, Hitler glumly resigned himself to the road of negotiation, which culminated in the Munich Conference of September 29-30, 1938. Its end product was an ethnic solution and

decidedly a peaceful one — at Czechoslovakia's expense. Under Neville Chamberlain's leadership, this diplomatic conference turned over to Hitler only the mainly German inhabited border regions of Bohemia and Moravia.[64] All said and done, Hitler was unable to have his war, much to his chagrin. We must admit that the Hungarian refusal to march, in this regard, was more crucial in preventing a war in 1938 than a multiplicity of other factors so obviously also present. Hungary, herself, fell between two stools at Munich, because neither Hitler nor Chamberlain would champion her cause. That was left to Mussolini, who had been briefed by István Csáky, the Foreign Ministry's *Chef de Cabinet,* hurriedly flown from Budapest to Munich. Csáky stated the Hungarian case as a demand for the same treatment for the Hungarian minority as for the Sudetens, coupled with plebiscites for Slovakia and Ruthenia. The Duce transmitted only the first part of the message and the conference decided that the case of the Hungarian and Polish minorities should be settled by bilateral discussions within the next three months, otherwise the four powers would meet again.[65]

After the event, Hitler himself considered Hungary responsible for his inability to have his war with Czechoslovakia. When the Hungarian-Czechoslovak bilateral territorial discussions bogged down during October, former Prime Minister Kálmán Darányi was sent to Germany to plead the Hungarian case to Hitler. At a meeting in Munich on October 14, the Fuehrer was full of recriminations about Hungary's past sins. He had warned the Hungarians often, "on board ship" at Kiel and also during Imrédy's and Kánya's visit to Berchtesgaden; but Herr Kánya expressed only doubts; Hungary constantly repeated the justness of her claims, but was unwilling to gain these by aggressive means; the moment had passed; if it had come to a war, Hungary would have had all of Slovakia; and, he had cautioned Kánya that if he would not act, he would "come up short."[66]

When the new Hungarian Foreign Minister, István Csáky, saw Hitler in Berlin on January 16, 1939, the latter was still incensed about the Hungarian refusal and was even more explicit. During the crisis, while Poland had taken some measures, Hungary had "slept." Germany would not sacrifice herself "for friends who would leave her in the lurch at the critical moment." "In a total solution, which he would have preferred," Hitler continued, "it would have been a matter of indifference" if Hungary had occupied Slovakia. "If the Hungarians had cooperated at the right time, he could have laughed in Chamberlain's face at Godesberg," because "at that time the whole

question had only been whether to solve the problem ethnographically or territorially." "For the latter," the Fuehrer went on, "the matter would have had to be represented as a general Central European conflagration." Because "his desire to get the Germans back had been fulfilled, he had not been able to wage war," complained Hitler. It would be difficult to find a more telling testimony about the major role that Hitler had assigned to Hungary in the Czechoslovak crisis and it would be problematic to uncover more revealing information about the significant and frustrating impact Hungary had in the matter of war and peace in 1938.[67]

There was a multitude of other reasons for the maintenance of peace in the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938: the Czechs and Slovaks decided not to stand up to Hitler militarily; in the spirit of appeasement, France and Britain desired not to see another world war unleashed; the Soviet Union was therefore conveniently released form her treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia; the Little Entente proved to be weaker than expected; and Chamberlain's proposal for an ethnographic solution carried so much appeal to a frightened European population — including the Germans — that Hitler did not dare avoid a peaceful diplomatic solution at Munich.[68] This is a decisive point. By standing on the twin principles of "peace in our time" and national self-determination, even for the Sudeten Germans, Chamberlain was able to capture the high ground of moral righteousness, in light of which a German military attack would have seemed nothing but unmitigatedly naked aggression. Hitler knew this well and that is why he sought so desperately a convenient excuse, as a bellicose Hungarian accomplice, for launching his war nevertheless. But the Hungarians proved to be unwilling to deliver that excuse or to play that role.

In this regard, most of the credit belongs to Foreign Minister Kánya. With his keen mind, he clearly comprehended both the short and long-term international consequences of every possible Hungarian step. In this spirit, Hungary acted cautiously and responsibly in the crisis. Moreover, Kánya shrewdly perceived the existence of a multitude of international linkages in sympathies and alliances, which, if allowed to become operative, could have easily escalated a German-Czechoslovak-Hungarian conflict into an East Central European war with the intervention of Yugoslavia, which in turn could have led to a major war, via Italy, through France, all the way to Britain and beyond. The aging diplomat understood as well that a German-Czechoslovak-Hungarian conflict could have triggered, conversely, a German-French-British-Italian conflict, which then

could have also escalated into an even larger war, once the Little Entente had taken its cue from the West. As it turned out, war did not come in 1938. But there is no justifiable reason to believe that it could not have broken out, had Hungary decided on a military adventure, giving Hitler a convenient excuse for unleashing his armies. That is the overriding significance of the Hungarian "no" in 1938. The tragedy of 1914 would not be risked or repeated, as far as Kánya and his government were concerned, even if Hungarian revisionist yearnings, bordering on obsession, would have to remain unfulfilled. Though war did not come in 1938, we should not forget that it would come in 1939, when, just as Kánya had feared, a Central European-East Central European war, in this case between Germany and Poland, would result in a major European and eventually world conflict.

Kánya's motives were first of all based on self-interest — the security of Hungary — but that was precisely his appointed responsibility in the Hungarian government. He carried out his task with skill, determination, and courage, thereby, incidentally, earning the undying hatred of Hitler.[69] Though he was far from naive, there is good reason to believe that Kánya wished peace and security for the whole of Europe as well. He was willing to accept and even to cherish a community of European nations, existing side by side, each in its legitimate sphere, guided by the principles of traditional European diplomacy, and kept in check by the balance-of-power system. His stand against the Danubian *status quo* was counterproductive for stability in that region, but there is no reason to believe that his actions would have degenerated into irresponsible adventurism, even if Hungary had been stronger militarily. Kánya's sarcastic tongue was sometimes out of control and he might have occasionally lost his temper, but he would never have intentionally acted against the best interests of his country.

Even Hungarian revisionism benefited from his accomplishments. Though he would have preferred another four-power conference for settling the deadlocked Hungarian-Czechoslovak territorial discussions, he consented to German-Italian arbitration, which resulted in the so-called First Vienna Award of November 2, 1938. In the Belvedere Palace, Ribbentropp and Ciano therewith awarded to Hungary the mainly Magyar inhabited southern strip of Slovakia and Ruthenia. Kánya, incidentally, gave free reign to his arrogant tongue against the participating Slovak politicians. Ironically, the demarcation line drawn was rather fair, though neither side, naturally, was satisfied with it. In any case, peaceful revisionism had made headway and subsequently Britain orally accepted the

settlement, which Kánya considered important for the sake of its permanency.[70]

* * *

The August and September of 1938 represented the climax of Kánya's long diplomatic career. His complex maneuvering in Bled, his able stand at Kiel, his cautious withdrawal in Berlin, his indirect — and unheralded — peace keeping role at the Munich Conference, and his irredentist success in Vienna, all speak well for the Hungarian Foreign Minister. Yet he would be forced out of office shortly, at the end of November, as a misadventure for the recovery of Ruthenia backfired in Budapest's face. In that connection, Kánya proved to be a convenient scapegoat. He was served up, moreover, as a sacrificial lamb to Hitler for everything that had transpired at Bled and Kiel, as Hungary joined in late 1938 a growing Danubian competition for Hitler's full favor. Still, Kánya continued to be respected by the Hungarian ruling oligarchy as someone who could be called upon for advice in a difficult situation. Kánya would die tragically in February, 1945, ironically, in the whirlwind of the very world war that he had tried so painstakingly to avert in 1938.[71] In all, he was the best diplomat interwar Budapest had to offer, and both Hungary and Europe benefited.

Notes

*The author would like to thank the financial support of the Augustana Research and Artist Fund of Augustana College, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, which made the preparation of this article possible.

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37. DIMK, II, no. 301a, 294, 294a, 295, 298. NYT, *ibid.*
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40. Ádám, pp. 259-260. NYT, August 24, p. 2 and August 28, p. 4.
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43. NYT, August 25, p. 8, Ádám, p. 262.
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46. DIMK, I, no. 35, 167, 250, 448.
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53. Horthy, pp. 164f. Pritz, p. 664. Macartney, I, p. 243.
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57. Horthy, p. 165. DGFP, D, V, no. 52. Pritz, pp. 666-667.
58. Rátz Memorandum, pp. 4-7. Pritz pp. 672-674. Another valuable treatment of the August visit is Thomas L. Sakmyster, "The Hungarian State Visit to Germany of August, 1938: Some New Evidence on Hungary in Hitler's Pre-Munich Policy," *Canadian Slavic Studies,* 3 (1969), pp. 667-691. The article contains the minutes of the Rátz-Hitler meeting from the Rátz Memorandum.
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61. DGFP, *ibid.* Hory, p. 33.
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Renaissance Contacts Between Dubrovnik (Ragusa) and the Kingdom of Hungary

M.D. Birnbaum

During the rule of the Angevin dynasty (1308-82) in Hungary, towns and cities increasingly assumed greater political influence. The first treaty between the King of Hungary and Dubrovnik (in those days Ragusa) was signed in 1358, during the reign of Louis (Lajos) the Great. According to its text, Dubrovnik was to pay the king 500 gold ducats and 300 perpers annually, a sum that previously went to Bosnia and Serbia for protection against enemy attacks. Dubrovnik, in addition, promised to honor the king and his heirs in church services three times a year; to fly the king's flag on land and on its vessels; and, in case of a royal visit, to treat the guests to two dinners and two suppers at the city's expense. The king's friends were declared Dubrovnik's friends, and his enemies the adversaries of the city.[1]

As was the case with most towns in Hungary, in Dubrovnik too the terms defining the city's obligations and privileges were occasinally amended by subsequent Hungarian kings. From 1358 on there is an abundance of documented interchange between Buda and Dubrovnik in the archives of the latter, and this is a crucial source of information as in Hungary, owing to the numerous wars and foreign occupations, much of the documentary evidence disappeared or was destroyed.

The archival material of Dubrovnik testifies to the fact that the Crown frequently turned to Dubrovnik and asked for information on or for its mediation with Venice, the Turks, or the Bosnians. Dubrovnik's importance for Hungary was growing as time passed. In 1378 Sigismund (Zsigmond) of Luxembourg reconfirmed and added to its privileges. He later became a refugee and the city's guest after his resounding defeat at Nicopolis (1396). Following Sigis-

mund's death, Albert II immediately reconfirmed Dubrovnik's privileges, and so did the next king, Vladislas I, in 1444.

Johannes (János) Hunyadi, regent of Hungary and internationally one of the most important figures in the wars against the Turks, took the Ragusan ambassador along with him when, in Wiener Neustadt, he negotiated the terms of a new campaign. Also, in 1447 Dubrovnik offered Hunyadi 2000 gold ducats in support of his war effort.[2]

During the rule of Hunyadi's son Matthias Corvinus (1458-90), many important Croatian personalities emerged to serve at the Buda court. Johannes (János) Vitéz, archbishop of Esztergom, and primate of Hungary and Croatia, who had already served Hunyadi, comes readily to mind. At his episcopal court in Várad and later in his archdiocese, Vitéz surrounded himself with humanist scholars and artists from all over Europe, and as patron of many a budding scholar — among them Janus Pannonius, Petrus Garazda, and Johannes Vitéz Jr. — he almost single-handedly created a proper ambience for Renaissance culture in Hungary-Croatia.[3]

It is only natural, therefore, that cultural relations between Hungary and Dalmatia became especially lively during the rule of Matthias. This was the most felicitous period in the history of independent Hungary, as well as the height of the Italian-influenced Buda Renaissance.

For the years 1459-90 twenty different Ragusan ambassadors to Buda are known, and that number does not include the scores of one-time legates or scientists, merchants and church dignitaries who had functioned as occasional envoys. The list includes Marin and Sigismund di Giorgi, several members of the Gundulić (Gondola) family of whom Jacobus Marin was ambassador to the Buda court four times (1459, 1464, 1470, and 1471); three members of the Gučetić (Gozze), and three of the Palmotic (Palmotha) families.[4]

Among the most important ambassadors was Alexander de Ragusio who later became Abbot of Telk. He was also dispatched to Skanderbeg, and, in 1465, to the Signoria. He returned twice to Dubrovnik (in 1469 and 1472) during his tenure as legate.

With the rule of Matthias also begins what we would call in modern terms the "brain-drain" from Dalmatia. Dalmatian scientists and artists were frequent travelers to Italy but traveling to Hungary on a grand scale also started during this period.[5]

Matthias' second wife, Beatrix of Naples and Aragon, had two successive Dalmatian father confessors. She herself chose Antonius de Jadra, but the pope appointed Christophorus Ragusinus, bishop

of Modrus, instead.[6] Later the bishop became a personal friend of the queen and had great influence at the Buda court.

On the more mundane side, Matthias' own barber and *familiaris* (royal servant) also came from Dubrovnik. Stefanus de Ragusio, *barbitonsor regis,* became a wealthy man in Buda. He owned a large house there with a sizable orchard. When in 1506 he returned to Dubrovnik, he brought along a letter from the next king, Wladislas II, in which he was referred to as "*servitor serenissimi regis Hungariae.*"[7]

Several Dubrovnik patricians sent their offspring into royal service. All five sons of Damiano Marino de Giorgi, the Ragusan ambassador, became Matthias' *parvuli* (pages). They later received lucrative positions and special privileges.[8] Beatrix too had a Dalmatian *familiaris*. Nicolaus Castro of Senj.[9]

Traveling medical doctors were a familiar phenomenon throughout Europe and the Near East, thus it is not surprising that, in 1463, Dubrovnik agreed to send Magister Johannes Petrus to join Matthias' camp, presumably at Jajce.[10]

In 1459, one of the most famous Dubrovnik scientists, Johannes Gazulo, was invited to become a court astronomer. He declined, yet retained amicable relations with Hungary. In the 1460s, he received a letter from Janus Pannonius in which the bishop of Pécs asked for further books on astronomy and on measuring instruments.[11] The instruments could have been meant for Buda, for Esztergom, or even for Pécs where it is assumed that one of the towers was built for a planetarium. Janus did not initiate any building of note at his Pécs see. This tower is the only construction that can be identified with his tenure there. He did little to embellish his cathedral. Sigismund Ernuszt, who followed Janus in the see, was urged by his father to restore it.[12] Ernuszt did indeed begin the renovation of the cathedral. He also commissioned work at Djurdjevac, on the Drava River. A handsome red marble shield bearing his family crest (dated 1488) shows the expertise of the artisans working for him.[13]

The building boom that characterized Matthias' rule brought scores of architects and sculptors to Buda, and along with them came *lapicidae* (stone cutters), various artisans, and skilled laborers. Of them the most significant figure was Giovanni Dalmata (Ivan Duknović) who probably spent three years (1487-90) at Buda. (He also appears in Hungarian sources as Ioannes Duknovich da Tragurio.)[14] This original artist left the hallmark of his genius on each piece he created, revealing a mixture of refined realism and tender lyricism.[15]

Matthias obviously appreciated the Dalmatian sculptor's unique talent. This is reflected in the tenor of the royal deed.[16] As is known, Ludovicus Cerva Tubero has also written about Duknović, referring to Matthias' gift, the castle at Majkovec, on the Sava, from which Bartholomaeus Berislavus (Prior Varanensis) later removed the sculptor by force.[17]

Giovanni Dalmata worked at the royal court, but also for Johannes de Zokol (Szokoli), bishop of Csanád, who commissioned him to carve an altar for the Paulist church at Diósgyőr, in the late 1480s. This altar fragment is further proof of the range and quality of works that adorned the various regional ecclesiastic buildings of Hungary during that period, of which so few have survived the wars of the centuries that followed. It is also assumed that Giovanni Dalmata was entrusted (by the king himself) with Matthias' tombstone at Székesfehérvár.[18]

Another artist from Trogir, Jacobus Traugirus, was active in Hungary during the same period. He worked in stone and perhaps also in bronze. He has been identified by some art historians as Johannes Statilić, about whom Nicolaus Istvánffy and Jerolim Kavanjin the Split historian both wrote, the latter mentioning his work at Vác.[19] In the lapidary collection of the Pécs cathedral, a red marble rosetta — similar to those found in Buda, Split, Hvar, Trogir and Sibenik — is also from the workshop of Jacobus Traugirus.[20] Marble fragments of a fireplace excavated in the fort of Márévár in the vicinity of Pécs, convinced Hungarian scholars that the owner, Voivod Paulus Bakić, also used Dalmatian artisans, probably from the Pécs workshop.[21] Since the remodelling of the building took place between 1527 and 1533, the presence of Dalmatian craftsmen testifies to the longevity and vitality of the Pécs workshop.[22] The Dalmatian *lapicidae* remained popular at the royal court even after Matthias' death. In the 1490s Ragusan masons and stone-cutters were recorded in Wladislas' service.[23] They probably began working at the court during Matthias' lifetime and remained there after the ruler's death.

The Dubrovnik *lapicidae* had a long-standing reputation for excellence. As early as 1466 Johannes Thuz of Lak, ambassador to Dubrovnik, later Croatian-Slavonian ban, wanted to hire stone-cutters and carpenters for his own court. At the same time the Ragusan Council decreed that Paschoe Michelievich (Paskoje Miličević), *ingenarius prothomagister* (master-engineer), travel to Hungary with the envoys, Johannes Rozgonyi and Johannes Thuz.[24] As is known, Paskoje Miličević built the old harbor in Dubrovnik, and his

fame reached Matthias who immediately pleaded that he join the Buda court.[25]

The most sought-after *lapicida* was Johannes Grubanić, whose testament serves as a revealing document. The signatories to his will prove that in 1487 at least four more wealthy Ragusan stone carvers lived in Buda. Grubanić himself owned a house in Buda, one in Šibenik, and a third in Zadar.[26]

Works of the famous Dubrovnik silversmiths also found their way to the royal palace and to the cathedrals and churches of Hungary. Candelabra, bowls, drinking vessels, and goblets testify to their expert art. Gifts were sent to Matthias by envoys on special occasions such as the celebration of this victory over Bohemia (1468) and at the time of his wedding to Beatrix (in 1476), with separate gifts to the bride.[27]

Not only did the royal couple receive gifts but so did the Hungarian envoy to Dubrovnik. Records also show that Archbishop Vitéz was presented with silver dishes in 1470.[28] The silversmith Johannes Progonović, whose work can still be found in the Dubrovnik cathedral, is identified as the creator of a number of gifts sent to the Hungarian court.[29] It is noteworthy that by the 1490s Dubrovnik turned less generous, and after a long discussion in the Council, Wladislas' gifts were considerably reduced.[30]

Not all the presents sent by Dubrovnik were locally produced; some were ordered from Italy. But, as is known, there were several Dalmatian artisans active in Italy, among them Luca de Ragusa, who forged some pieces which Ercole d'Este sent to Matthias from Ferrara. Moreover, the Ragusan style became known as an independent type of design. In 1525 Yppolito, archbishop of Esztergom, referring in his inventory to a number of silver items, had them listed as executed "in modo raguseo," and recorded two candelabra "ad modum ragusino."[31]

There is a strong possibility that as far back as during Matthias' rule silversmiths from Dubrovnik were employed at the Buda court. In 1505, after the death of the natural son of a Ragusan silversmith, the father was listed as Nicholai Pasqualis Lenaić increasing the plausibility that some Dubrovnik silversmith moved to Buda as early as the fifteenth century. In addition, in the 1508 inventory of the Eger diocese, there are silver articles mentioned: among them two in "Ragusan style."[32]

The most typical features of the Renaissance are the increase in humanist contacts, the travel of scholars, and the distribution of books. This is the time when humanists move from one center of

learning, or from the service of one monarch or prelate, to another. And this is the time when private, secular libraries begin to grow. This was the case in Hungary with the collections of Johannes Vitéz, and Janus Pannonius whose libraries, later confiscated, formed a part of Matthias' famed Corviniana. The lively trade in books involved primarily Italy, but frequently also Dubrovnik. It has been recorded that Johannes Vitéz, perhaps the best-read individual in Hungary of his time, turned to Dubrovnik to obtain Cicero's *Epistolae familiares* for himself.[33] Franko Vasilević (Francho Vasiglievich), a Ragusan citizen, probably also purchased codices for Matthias.[34]

A controversial issue is the Buda illuminating workshop of Felix Ragusinus whom several scholars — with the notable exception of Jolán Balogh — identified as Feliks Petančić, earlier ambassador to Wladislas II.[35] Petančić was the author of *Itineribus in Turciam libellus*, first published in Vienna in 1522 (reprinted in Venice in 1542), and frequently quoted both by contemporary "turcologists," and travelers to the Holy Land.[36] Nicolaus Olaus referred to Felix Ragusinus in his *Hungaria* when describing the court of Buda, Matthias' treasures, and the Corviniana. He placed him in the illuminators' workshop and commented on his knowledge of Greek, Latin, Chaldaic and Arabic.[37] Although I too believe that the Cassianus codex, earlier attributed to him, was not his work,[38] I accept the views of those who hold Feliks Petančić and Felix Ragusinus to be identical.[39]

Italian merchants, especially from Florence, had simultaneous contact with Dubrovnik, Zagreb and Buda.[40] Antonio Melini, a Florentine merchant living in Dubrovnik, had a brother Ridolfo who had his business in Buda, and through him Antonio also traded with Hungary.[41] Nichus Pribissaglich (Pribisaglić), twice ambassador to Hungary, was a respected merchant in Ragusa.

Matthias most probably never visited Dubrovnik, although it was thought for a while, based on an official invitation by the City Council dated November 3, 1463. There is also a letter by him to Samko de Ragusio (December 24, 1480), in which he refers to having been his guest. But the Ragusan also owned property in Zagreb, and the king's letter thanking Samko for his hospitality is also dated from Zagreb.[42] Thus it is more plausible that, for want of documentation of the royal visit in the Dubrovnik archives, Matthias' letter refers to his having been entertained in Zagreb.

Instead, there is much information about Matthias and his court that has come down to us directly from Ragusan sources. The king's summer residence was described by Janus Dubravius in his *De*

piscinis ad Antonium Fuggerum.[43] Dubravius traveled in Hungary after Matthias' death and wrote about the famous fountains and fishponds he had seen, comparing them with those he had visited in Bohemia.[44] It was the Ragusan poet, Aelius Lampridius Cervinus (Ilija Crijević, 1463-1520) who, on May 4, 1490, delivered a funeral oration over Matthias, eulogizing him as a great ruler and a glorious fighter against the Turks. He also emphasized the king's turning the Buda palace into a citadel of learning. As almost every contemporary, when referring to the palace, Crijević too mentioned its kudos, the prodigious library of Matthias.[45] The same poet also wrote epitaphia in Matthias' memory.[46] The king fared less well in the work of the Ragusan Ludovicus Cerva Tubero (Ludovik Crijević Tuberon, 1459-1527), who, strongly criticizing Matthias in his *Commentariorum de rebus suo tempore...*, stated that he only cared for his own glory.[47]

Dubrovnik's privileges were confirmed in 1465 by Matthias, who sent out letters to the *ordines* and the free towns in which he reminded them of the special protection of the Crown the Ragusans enjoyed. In 1466 he commended Dubrovnik *en bloc* to Ferdinad of Naples, and in 1470 the city received additional privileges from the Hungarian king.

After the death of Matthias, Dubrovnik turned its hopes to the next ruler, Wladislas II, who in 1493 indeed confirmed all privileges that had earlier been granted the city. Yet soon thereafter, in 1493, with their usually perfect foresight, the Ragusans strengthened their contacts with Emperor Maxmilian. He began to use their information regarding the Ottoman danger, about which they regularly advised the Emperor.

Wladislas too was aware of the Turkish army's advances but did little else than watch the slow disintegration of the kingdom of his famed predecessor. Ineffective as he was in politics, Wladislas made no lasting impression on Hungary's cultural life either. His humanist court was made up of holdovers from Matthias' people. The most important Croatian scholar in his court was Petrus of Warda, archbishop of Kalocsa, a relative of Johannes Vitéz. He was educated in Vienna, at Vitéz' expense. His humanist activities connect him with yet another member of the same family. It was he to whom Matthias entrusted the collecting of Janus Pannonius' epigrams. During Wladislas' rule Cervinus sent his poetry from Dalmatia to the king in hopes of being invited to the court, but despite having sought Archbishop Szathmári's support, the invitation never came.

The next king, Louis II, who followed his father on the throne in

1516 only to die at the battle of Mohács ten years later, did not improve the quality of intellectual and artistic life at his court either. The Jagiello kings, although expected to act as Renaissance patrons of the arts, had little interest in the muses. The gradual depletion of the Corviniana (through the giving away of volumes, and through general indifference and neglect) was the beginning of the final destruction of the treasures of the Hungarian court.

Yet, when Suleiman entered the deserted streets of Buda on September 8, 1526, he was still mesmerized by the beauty of the city and the splendor of the royal palace. "I wish I could move this castle to the shore of the Bosporus," he allegedly said.[48] He was of course unable to move the entire palace, but he did the best he could. Laden with the priceless tomes of the library, which Naldo had not so long before called the "sanctuary of wisdom," Suleiman's galleys made several trips from Buda to Constantinople. He had the bronze statues, the silver candelabra, and the precious gold and silver dishes — the pride of the Dalmatian artists — moved to his palace in Istanbul. Soon the fabulous capital became but a shadow of its former self, its memory kept alive merely in the descriptions of Olaus and a few others.

With the Turkish conquest of Hungary, Hungarian-Dalmatian (especially Ragusan) relations ended. The relationship was not restored after the departure of the Turks from Hungary 150 years later. The Kingdom of Hungary had become a part of the Habsburg realm. And so did Dubrovnik: on August 24, 1684, it accepted the sovereignty of Emperor Leopold I.

Notes

1. A few paragraphs later it is, however, stated that if the king decides to wage war against Serbia or Venice, the Ragusans may still continue trading with them. One of the most important items in the treaty was the one that permitted Ragusan citizens to be tried in Dubrovnik, even if they had been charged elsewhere.
2. In 1461, however, Joannes Gazulo visited the pope and asked that the city's taxes to Rome be reduced as Dubrovnik had already contributed to Hunyadi's crusade.
3. It would fall outside the scope of this study to discuss in detail the intellectual contributions of Vitéz and his group. For more on the subject, cf. among others *Johannes Vitez de Zredna. Opera quae supersunt.* Ed. by I. Boronkai, Budapest, 1980; M. D. *Birnbaum. Janus Pannonius: Poet and Politician*, Zagreb 1980, (henceforth Birnbaum, followed by page no.). Ivan Česmički *Janus Pannonius, Pjesme i epigrami*, translated by Nikola Šop. Zagreb, 1951; and R. Gerézdi, *Janus Pannoniustól Balassi Bálintig.* Budapest, 1968.
4. The records are available in the archives and were published by J. Gelcich and L. Thallóczy, *Diplomatarium relationum reipublicae Ragusanae cum regio Hungariae,* Budapest, 1887, (henceforth Gelcich followed by page number). I. Mitić has published a book about the consuls from Dubrovnik, *Konzulati i Konzularna služba starog Dubrovnika* (1973), but there is still need for a work connecting their function and the

broader influence of the patrician families of Dubrovnik and how they affected the history of Hungary and Croatia.
5. There were, of course, earlier feelers to Dubrovnik from Buda. For instance, in 1413 Master Bartholo, a medical doctor, sent his apologies from Ragusa to the court and decided not to leave his home town.
6. The latter was most probably instrumental in calling the king's attention to his nephew, Felix Petancius (Petančić) Ragusinus.
7. Gelcich, 814.
8. Gerolimo Marino (who later became captain of Senj), Guigno Niccolo, and Pasquale began their careers at Buda. (*Annales Ragusini*. Zagreb, 1883, 58).
9. He is listed as Nicolas de Castro Segnie, "Italicus Familiaris" (published in *Beatrix-okiratok*. Budapest, 1914, 101), quoted by J. Balogh, *A művészet Mátvás király udvarában*, Budapest, 1966, I. 696, (henceforth Balogh followed by volume and page number).
10. Gelcich, 760.
11. The correspondence was published by Gelcich, 613 and 741.
12. Birnbaum, 116 and 122.
13. The marble shield of Ernuszt is presently exhibited in the Povijesni Muzej Hrvatske in Zagreb. Adela Horvat's *Izmedzu gotike i baroka*, Zagreb, 1975, provides a good bibliography on the subject.
14. I have no intention of even referring to the rich scholarly literature that treated each work of this artist. For a concise bibliography cf. Balogh, I, 490-3.
15. A number of his works (some in fragments) are still at the center of discussion in the art circles of contemporary Hungary and Yugoslavia. Especially Balogh is unwilling to credit him with the famous double portrait of Matthias and Beatrix. (For more on this cf. Schallaburg, 1982, 201-4). For a long time Balogh maintained that Giovanni Dalmata, active in Rome, and Ivan Duknović were two different people, but in recent years she has accepted a number of attributions. Among views claiming Giovanni Dalmata as the sculptor of the marble relief, cf. mostly K. I. Prijatelj, *Duknović (Giovanni Dalmata)*. Zagreb, 1957. Numerous artifacts and fragments bearing the mark of Dalmatian masters, especially of Giovanni Dalmata, were recently brought together and put on a permanent display in the National Gallery of Budapest.
16. The Latin text was published, among others, by Balogh, I, 489.
17. Ludovicus Cerva Tubero, *Commentaria de temporibus suis*. Liber III: X, also quoted by Balogh, 490.
18. This is also mentioned in Tubero, *op. cit.*
19. According to Balogh, Kavanjin mistakenly identified Giovanni Dalmata as Statilić (Balogh, I. 493). Several Croatian scholars, among them K. Prijatelj (who identifies him as Jacobus Statilić) and C. Fisković (who believes that the issue has to be further researched) do not share Balogh's view. (Cf. *Bulletin Instituta za Likovne Umjetnosti*, JAZU, VII, 1959.) Balogh considers Jacobus Traugurinus "a figment of the imagination," arguing that there exists no contemporary document about him in Hungary.
20. For more on this, cf. O. Szőnyi, A pécsi pšpöki múzeum kőtára, Budapest, 1906.
21. Schallaburg, 1982, 571-2.
22. The fragments are presently housed in the Renaissance Lapidarium of Pécs.
23. For more on this, cf. C. Fisković's contribution at the *Journées internationales d'histoire de l'art*. Budapest, May 4-8, 1965.
24. The text was published by Gelcich, 771.
25. Here we may also talk about a two-way flow. In 1470, Dubrovnik in turn hired two Hungarian engineers. For more on Miličević, cf. L. Beritić, *Dubrovački graditelj*. Split, 1948.
26. Grubanić died on December 2, 1487. His statement was published and partially quoted by Balogh, 498. Miho Puhera of Hvar, Frano Radov and Juraj Librarij of Zadar also worked at Buda for a while.
27. Balogh, I. 365-6.

28. Gelcich. 798.
29. By the same token, one of the reliquaries of the cathedral bears the signature of a Szeged silversmith.
30. Gelcich, 819.
31. Quoted by Balogh. I, 365.
32. *Ibid.*
33. Gelcich, 751.
34. *Ibid.*, 759.
35. Among others F. Rački (In *Starine*, 1872), and later F. Bánfi, "Felix Ragusinus," *Janus Pannonius*, I, Rome, 1947, 679-706, and several Hungarian and Croatian scholars thereafter.
36. For more on this, cf. the forthcoming work by M.D. Birnbaum, *Humanists in a Shattered World: Croatian and Hungarian Latinity in the Sixteenth Century*. Los Angeles, UCLA Slavic Studies. 14 (in press).
37. *Hungaria-Athila.* Ed. by K. Eperjessy and L. Juhász. Leipzig, 1939 (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Medii Recentisque Aevorum*, Saec. XVI).
38. By the time the Cassianus codex was completed, he had left Hungary.
39. Balogh based her conviction on the findings of P. Kolendžić in the Dubrovnik Archives. According to those, Felix Petančić was a dubious character, always in financial trouble. Yet the same discoveries further convinced Kolendčić that the two were the same. My only doubts are due to the absence of any reference by Olaus' to his having been a diplomat in his youth. Knowing Olaus' interest in diplomatic missions it is curious that he did not mention this about Felix Ragusinus.
40. Cesare Valentini, Ferrarese ambassador, wrote to Eleonora, Princess of Ferrara, that merchants from Florence had arrived in Zagreb, via Hungary. (*Magyar Diplomácziai emlékek*, 1877). Large Italian merchant houses had "branches" in Buda and in Dubrovnik. The Benizzis lived in Buda but also had a son who represented another Florentine firm in Dubrovnik. Another Benizzi was listed as creditor of the Marinović merchant house in Dubrovnik. For more on this, cf. Balogh, 596-623.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Published, among others, by J. Teleki, *A Hunyadiak kora Magyarországon*, V, Pest, 1865, 167.
43. Posonii, 1547.
44. In addition to Olaus' *Hungaria*, this is the most important source on the architecture and plumbing system of Matthias' buildings. Olaus also recorded for posterity the once famous *Fons musarum* in his *Hungaria.*
45. "Oratio funebris in regem Matthiam," published in *Analecta recentiora*, 1906, 44-66.
46. *Ibid.*, 66-7.
47. Ed. by Johannes Georgius Schwandtner, Vienna, 1748, Tom. II.
48. Recorded by Evlyia Čelebi and quoted by L. Zolnay, *Az elátkozott Buda. Buda aranykora.* Budapest, 1982, 335.

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Matthias Corvinus and His Library

Rose (Rózsi) Stein

Hungary in the fifteenth century was threatened by the danger of Turkish invasion. Only a central power, such as that created by King Matthias (Mátyás) Corvinus (1440?–90), could muster enough strength to withstand the onslaught of the Turks.

Matthias's whole regal concept since 1458, the year of his coronation, was centred on the unification of European strength against this menace. In his domestic politics he preferred common men of talent to the dissenting oligarchy; abroad he made alliances to build an empire. His great personal qualities, his political concepts, and his pursuit of dynastic policy led him to prefer the humanistic spirit of the Renaissance to that of medieval scholasticism. A love of lavish splendour and culture resulted in a flourishing of royal residences in Buda and Visegrád, both situated on the Danube, and to the establishment of the Bibliotheca Corvina in Buda in 1471.

Matthias Corvinus did not claim any substantial heritage of manuscripts as his own; a small number of codices originating from the collections of earlier kings of Hungary formed the nucleus of his library. Louis (Lajos) the Great, of Angevin lineage, ordered the illuminated chronicle of Hungary's history to be executed by Márk Kálti, a Hungarian canon. It contained the history of the Magyars until 1330 and included miniatures and the portrait of Louis the Great.

Another patron of codices was Sigismund (Zsigmond) of Luxembourg, king of Hungary and later ruler of the Holy Roman Empire (1368-1437) whose *Liber de Septem Signis* also came into the Corvina Library.

The sidereal sciences: astronomy and astrology, stood in high favour in Matthias's court. His interest in both was demonstrated by a globe placed at the entrance of the library, showing the constella-

tion of stars at the time of his coronation as king of Bohemia (twenty years after having been elected king of Hungary). The palace was also decorated with the twelve signs of the zodiac carved from wood and gilded.

The library itself consisted of two spacious rooms with vaulted ceilings; one housed the Latin the other the Greek and oriental manuscripts. The rooms were arranged somewhat similarly to those of the Laurentiana in Florence. The reading pulpits were covered with red velvet decorated with gold. Books were arranged "in foruli" (on shelves) with a label attached to each one. They were shielded by curtains of silk interwoven with gold. The books in the lowest section were only encased, not labelled.

There was a royal couch between the two rooms for the king so that discussions with his scholars, as well as reading would be more relaxing. Sometimes, appropriately for a great builder, he enjoyed reading Vitruvius and Leon Battista Alberti: sometimes he conferred with diplomats and envoys of foreign courts. It can be said that this bibliophile, when not at war, made the library the centre of his activities in cultural and political matters as well. The passionate collector was well known to his contemporaries; this was the origin of the dictum that to earn the good graces of the sultan one had to send him beautiful odalisks but to earn those of Matthias one had to present him with books that he enjoyed "avec une sensualité cérébrale" (A. de Hevesy's expression).

Archbishop János Vitéz, possessor of the first great library before Matthias, was his preceptor from his early youth. The archbishop transmitted his humanistic interest to the young king, and this was a decisive factor in the foundation of the Corvina library. A nephew and another pupil of Vitéz was the well-known humanist and poet, Janus Pannonius (1434-72), the bishop of Pécs. He was sent by his uncle to the humanistic school of Veronese Guarino (1370-1460) in Ferrara, and through him many of his former fellow students, later great humanists themselves, were invited to Buda. In 1465 Janus Pannonius went as ambassador to Italy where he made contacts with the Academies of Florence and Rome and also purchased manuscripts for Matthias. At that time he was introduced to the most important personage in the book trade, Vespasiano da Bisticci, through Galeotto Marzio (1427-97), who later held the office of historian at the court of Buda until the king's death.

Vespasiano's shop bore the inscription "Vespasiano procurante," since he served the Medici, Matthias Corvinus, Federico da Urbino (Montefeltro, 1422-82) and many other bibliophiles. His opinion was that it is shameful to house printed books together with worthy

handwritten codices. This remark may have reflected some bias against the new trade of printing. In his memoirs Vespasiano accused King Matthias of ingratitude toward János Vitéz, one of his shop's regular customers.

The historical background of this remark, which later had some impact on the holdings of the Corvina library, was as follows: the oligarchy rebelled against the strong rule of the king. János Vitéz, who lost his influence on his former pupil, led the insurrection. Matthias, after quelling the rebellion, confiscated many treasures of the magnates, among them the Latin manuscripts of János Vitéz and Janus Pannonius.

The year 1476, when Matthias married Beatrix, daughter of the king of Naples, furthered his interest in the miniators of Naples and also those of Ferrara, the court of his queen's sister, especially since his contacts with Vespasiano da Bisticci had been severed owing to the latter's opinion about the royal ire towards János Vitéz. At the time of his marriage the library contained about one-third of its subsequent total.

Italian humanists and artists followed the young queen to join those who already resided there and Matthias's aim began to form out of "Pannonia altera Italia." Famous names at the court of Buda were Antonio Bonfini (1434-1503), the humanist who wrote the history of Hungary in a style imitating antiquity; and Galeotto Marzio, librarian and preceptor of the king's natural son, János Corvin, whom Matthias hoped to make his successor. Galeotto collected anecdotes about the king as well as his witty and clever remarks and formed a kind of biography from these mosaics entitled: "Galeotti Martii de Egregie Sapienter locose Dictis ac Factis Regis Matthiae ad Ducem Johannem Eius Filium Liber."

Johann Müller of Königsberg, called Regiomontanus (1436-76), was a renowned astronomer and a special favourite of the king, who invited him to the court of Buda. Later he was a professor at the Academia Istropolitana (Pozsony-Bratislava). In 1467 he wrote the "Ephemerides Budenses." In time he left Hungary to establish a printing press in Nürnberg in 1471.

Lodovico Carbone (1436-82), professor at the University of Ferrara, dedicated his work "Dialogus de Mathiae Regis Laudibus" to the king (Budapest, Hungarian Academy of Sciences). In this eulogy he alluded to the king's dream of being chosen Holy Roman Emperor.

Even before his marriage to Beatrix a great scriptorium was installed in Buda, where a staff of thirty men worked as painters, miniators and scriptors, according to the report of Bishop Miklós

Oláh. One of the superintendents of this scriptorium was Bartolomeo Della Font (Bartholomaeus Fontius, 1445-1513) of Florence. On occasion complete codices were executed here; others were ordered from Italy, where four masters in Florence were engaged to copy Greek and Latin manuscripts. Often added in Buda were the decoration of the borders, the coats-of-arms of Hungary and of the king with symbols to illustrate Matthias's personal qualities such as the dragon representing courage; the beehive representing industry; the well representing profoundness of thought; the hour-glass representing right timing of action.

The codices of the early period were primarily decorated in the so-called style of the Danube valley (A. de Hevesy), which evolved from Tyrol to the Carpathian Mountains. The charming freshness of local plants, flowers and fruits bordered the text (e.g., "In Ptolemaeum" by Regiomontanus).

The king turned to Italy for more sumptuous manuscripts. Francesco d'Antonio del Chierico was the illuminator of the "Corvin Psalterium" (Wolfenbüttel, Staatsbibliothek). The Canto del Garbo shop was the work place of the brothers, Gherardo and Monte del Fora, masters of the Codex "Hieronymus" of the Vienna National Library. More ornamental was the art of Attavante degli Attavanti (1452-ca. 1517), whose shop provided thirty-one of the known Corvina, eighteen of his own handiwork, for example, the "Brussels Missal."

Matthias's imperial ambitions were expressed on some manuscripts, for example, the codex of Didymus Alexandrinus's "De Spiritu Sanctu" (New York, P. Morgan Library) where the initials on the frontispiece "M A" stand for Matthias Augustus. This codex was illuminated by Gherardo and Monte del Fora and written by Sigismundus de Sigismundis in 1488. The political tendency in the illustration of the frontispiece is further enhanced by the picture of János Corvin in addition to the portrait of the king and queen.

Some codices of the later period were called the Beatrix codices, as the one by Giovanni Ambrogio da Predis (b. ca. 1455) known as the "Marlianus" Corvina with the coat-of-arms of János Corvin and Bianca Sforza (Volterra Library) as evidence of a marriage plan. The superb "Sforza Book of Hours" was planned originally as a wedding gift from Bona Sforza to her daughter. The illuminations are attributed to Ambrogio da Predis. After the death of Matthias (1490) the marriage was called off, and Bianca married Emperor Maximilian I in 1493. The pages referring to Matthias Corvinus had been removed but were later reinserted by the order of Emperor Charles V.

The king showed a keen interest in the content of books. Some records of printed books in his possession can be found. Marsiglio Ficino (1433-99), an Italian philosopher, sent him his work printed in Basel in 1461. Taddeo Ugoletti (d. ca. 1514) wrote to the king that Bonfini would bring some printed books from Rome.

In 1470 the provost, Bishop László Ḱarai (d. ca. 1485), was on a diplomatic mission to Rome. At that time he acquired some familiarity with the new art through the printers Sweynheym and Pannartz. In Rome Karai also met Andreas Hess whom he invited to set up a printing press in Buda. Hess ordered the type used by Sweynheym and Pannartz to be cast in Hungary, and he used it to print the *Chronica Hungarorum* and *Magni Basilii de Legendis Poeticis*. As King Matthias was involved in warfare at that time, he did not show great interest and the dedication of these works quoted Karai as the books' patron.

A Hungarian scholar, József Fitz, studied the history of many printing presses in Rome and compared the type used by Hess with that of Georgias Lauer. Fitz came to the conclusion that Hess had been apprenticed in Lauer's shop and that Lauer's type was used in Buda. Hess's shop, the first Hungarian printing press, was manned by fourteen men besides himself.

Fitz also cited the fact that the king had sent Blandius, one of his illuminators, to Rome to buy books. On this occasion Pomponius Laetus (1428-97), the editor and corrector of the Lauer shop, sent a gift to the king, the printed edition of Silius Italicus's "Punica." Matthias thanked him in a gracious letter, referring to the great pleasure he had derived from several readings of a work printed with so much care and fine ornamentation.

Fitz's book about Hungarian printing, *A magyar nyomdászat, könyvkiadás és könyvkereskedelem története*, adds more to our knowledge about the king's contacts with the printing trade. The Corvina contained a great number of contemporary works, some quite simple in appearance. Bishop Miklós Oláh reported in his "Hungaria" that the books were arranged by classes in the library; consequently handwritten and printed works were shelved together. It is also of interest that all three of Matthias's librarians: Galeotto Marzio, Taddeo Ugoletti and Bartholomaeus Fontius, were exposed at one period of their lives to experience in a printing shop.

Besides the printing press of Andreas Hess, which operated, as far as is known, from 1473 to 1749, another press was established in Brünn in 1486 that also belonged to Matthias's kingdom. In Buda, a prosperous publisher-businessman, Theobaldus Feger, ordered

liturgical books for the sees of Zagreb, Olmütz, etc., to be printed in Germany under the king's patronage. There is every reason to believe that the king's library had included works such as the *Thuróczy Chronicle*, printed in Augsburg, or the *Missale Strigoniense*, printed by Anton Koberger in Nürnberg (1484).

The king's versatile mind also made modern use of a new art. He ordered propaganda leaflets to be printed in Germany and had them posted on buildings in Vienna before he occupied that city. Although none of these has been found, the facts can be ascertained from a written complaint by Emperor Frederic III, who was driven out of Vienna by Matthias. This document was addressed to the Councils of Nürnberg and Strassburg, objecting to their permitting such printing to be done.

In 1666 Austrian Emperor Leopold I sent his librarian, Peter Lambeck (Lambecius, 1628-80), to the Sublime Porte in search of the remnants of the Corvina taken from Buda earlier by the Turks. Lambeck was conducted into a crypt-like room where 300-400 stacked volumes presented a dismal picture. He stated that many of them were printed books. After lengthy persuasion he was able to rescue three codices (housed today in the National Library in Vienna).

The bindings of the codices show great variety. Some were bound in the Italian manner in red silk or velvet. More important are those which reflect the king's own taste. These are covered with calfskin or maroquin, and the centrepieces bear the royal coat-of-arms. The ornamentation with blind tooling and guilding is enclosed in a rectangle. The covers had a balanced appearance, some of them reminiscent of the harmony of the sixteenth-century Grolier bindings. Others were richly ornamented in the Renaissance style. The binding of "Xenophon" (Vienna, National Library) had patterns of Hungarian motif in the floral design.*

János Csontosi, the former curator of the Hungarian National Museum, gave us the description of the Corvina returned by the Sultan to Emperor Francis Joseph I. As a gesture of courtesy the damaged original bindings had been removed and the codices were rebound with great care in leather. One side of the cover carried the insignia of Matthias, the opposite side that of the Turkish Empire. The original bindings could not be recovered.

Special mention should be made of the "Graduale" (National Széchényi Library, Budapest). It was a gift from Charles VIII, king of France, in return for the lavish presents of Matthias, who sought his alliance against Frederic III, the German emperor.

The codex (503 × 370 mm) contains 201 leaves and is bound in

leather. It was made in France about 1487 by French scribes and miniators. Four initials were added in the scriptorium in Buda, the initial "I" having been executed by Giovanni Cattaneo de Mediolano (d. ca. 1531). This Dominican monk, master of the "Averulinus" Corvina in Venice, found his way to Buda through the court of Ferrara in 1482. The description of the historiated initial "I" on leaf 7a of the "Graduale" (185 × 195 mm), entitled "The entrance of the Jews in the Holy Land" (The Land of Milk and Honey), is as follows. The landscape of the miniature was a riddle until recent years; now it is accepted as the contemporary picture of Visegrád, the royal residence on the Danube. Against the hills and fortresses in the background and the gentle slopes in the middle ground with trees full of fruit, a scene is depicted of a peasant milking a goat and another tending sheep. In the left-hand corner, half-hidden by the column-shaped "I" a beehive (also an emblem of Matthias). On the road a procession of richly clad men is led by Joshua. These men are to be viewed as a group of humanists with the king in their midst. Two of them carry codices. One personage deserves special attention, since he is dressed in Dominican garb and his face is portrait-like, presumably the artist himself. God the Father in his Glory, surrounded by seraphim and holding the Hungarian orb in his hand, blesses the scene from above.

The initial "I" is represented as a purple column decorated with green acanthus leaves and the halls so familiar to the style of Lombardy. Remarkable for their local importance are the tulip-like flowers and a figure of the child Hercules (in humanistic interpretation Matthias himself) strangling the hydra. The latter motif is represented on the Matthias fountain in the court of Visegrád made out of red marble, the spouts of which poured forth different precious wines on festive occasions. This fountain was reconstructed during the excavations of Visegrád carried out after World War II.

The bottom of the column shows a putto playing the lute, with a white dog, a frequently applied motif in the Lombard school, listening attentively. The dog probably stands for the artist in the interpretation of Dominicans as "Domini canes," the faithful dogs of the Lord.

The miniature is in a frame on a golden background with the familiar attributes of the horn of plenty, flowers in a harmonious blending of the colours of purple, blue and green with white bells between. Although the style of the bordering flowers reoccurs in other works of the Lombard school, it may be that their shape represents the influence of the surroundings and is a mixture of the styles of the masters of Italy and Hungary.

Matthias died suddenly in Vienna in 1490, and the ensuing years of indecision offered easy spoils to anyone. János Corvin was the first to try to save his patrimony. Queen Beatrix, when her marriage plans to Matthias's successor, King Wladislav, were not realized, took her treasures back to Naples. Wladislav, himself a weak ruler burdened by debts, was easy prey to the cupidity of foreign potentates (e.g., Emperor Maximilian I) and ambassadors; he even distributed codices as gifts.

After the defeat of the Hungarians by the Turks at Mohács in 1526, where King Louis (Lajos) II died in battle, his widow, Maria, a Habsburg, brought some Corvina to The Netherlands, for example, the "Corvin Missale" (Madrid, Escorial Library). After Turkish troops sacked Buda, 7,000 chests of loot were shipped via the Danube to Istanbul. Some manuscripts were sold and became known as the "Budenses," enjoying great popularity from Venice to Paris.

No catalogue of the library has yet been discovered and the exact number of the holdings of the Bibliotheca Corvina since 1471, the year of its beginnings, is unknown. Today the Corvina are dispersed in many countries. Most are in Hungary; others can be found in England, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Germany, Italy, Turkey and the United States.

Author's note:

* Earliest record of gold-tooled binding: record of payment to Baldassare Scariglia for binding seven volumes in Cordovan leather tooled in gold for Corvinus (Document of 1480 from Naples).

Editor's note:

A selected bibliography of the subject, prepared by the author, is available from our journal's editorial office.

Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Spring 1986)

Book Reviews

Linda and Marsha Frey, *A Question of Empire: Leopold I and the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1705*. Boulder, Colorado: Eastern European Monographs, 1983. 165pp. [Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, as Eastern European Monograph number cxvli and Brooklyn College Studies on Society in Change number 36.

"A Question of Empire: Leopold I and the War of the Spanish Succession" is an enticing title. It suggests to the casual browser that here is the much needed, in-depth study of the Austrian court in terms of the ebb and flow of court opinion and politics as it touched on the stressful relationship between Leopold's foreign policy and his imperial ambitions. A close reading of the book reveals something quite different: an 88-page essay describing European international affairs in the period 1701 to 1705 with only a superficial summary of Austrian views. As such it is useful, but it does not reveal the nature of conflicting opinion within the court or the sources and nature of the views which were the foundation of policy. It is disappointing to find that 77 of the tiny book's 165 pages are neither text nor interpretation, but lists of sources and a bibliography. On reflection, so heavy a weight of scholarly apparatus seems unnecessary.

Readers of this journal will want to look particularly at pages 69-74 and 80-84 to find the authors' views on Hungary. There, too, one will find only a general summary of well-known events. Of course, this is very useful, but specialists will be frustrated by the want of depth, detail and scope.

In discussing Hungary, as with other subjects, the authors continually cavil about the failure of Austria's allies to understand her. "What was said and ignored about Austria and Hungary became more important than what Austria and Hungary actually

were," they write (p. 73). True enough, but the authors seem to fail to understand that it is in the nature of alliances and international politics that this is so. It is nothing unusual. Moreover, the authors fail to link this fact with the purposeful misrepresentations which were made at the time, particularly those received by the Dutch and the English.

The Freys have given us an essentially correct summary of events, but they leave us with a strange view of the leaders who dominated the European stage in the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession. First, we meet Charles II of Spain, "neurotic, indecisive and vacillating," as well as "nervous, weak-minded, melancholy, conscience-ridden like his predecessors." Then there is the "shy and reserved future king Philip V, easily led and like his father, lazy." In due course, we meet the "irritatingly indecisive" Leopold I, "silent and reserved." Then there is Prince Euguene, "reserved, austere, taciturn," but whose "taciturnity and reserve would be submerged by a firey vitality." In Holland, there was Pensionary Heinsius, "whose decisiveness and fervour of youth had been replaced by "vacillation and vagueness." And in England, the "curt, undemonstrative" William III was followed by "Anne, reserved, suspicious and easily hurt and offended." She was a "dull dumpling of a Queen," whose husband, George of Denmark, was "lethargic, clumsy, shy, often silent." One could go on with such quotations, but this is enough to suggest the authors' iconoclastic portrayal of the great. The descriptions may well carry a grain of truth in them, but if they do, the authors have failed to explain how European nations managed their foreign affairs under such weak-kneed individuals during a critical juncture in European history.

The Freys' book contains far too much general background to make the substantial contribution which is needed for this period. It does fill the gap of years which John P. Spielman glossed over in his biography, *Leopold I of Austria* (1977). Yet the background in Spielman's book, when combined with the depth provided by Charles Ingrao's *In Quest and Crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy* (1979), gives greater understanding to the process by which Austrian policy was formulated and how her imperial ambitions related to her foreign policy objectives.

John B. Hattendorf
Naval War College

Tokaji, András. *Mozgalom és Hivatal. Tömegdal Magyarországon 1945-1956*. Budapest: Zeneműkiadó, 1983. 285pp., tables, notes, charts, index, bibliography.

Tokaji's book presents a detailed and careful account of popular songs (known also as workers' songs, *Arbeiterlied, revolutsionnaia pesna*) in Hungary from 1945 until 1956, a year that brought its decline and sudden end. The author is primarily interested in the cultural process that transformed Hungary's musical tradition and, based on the earlier patterns of songs such as the well-known "Volga Boatmen," "Internationale," "Carmagnole," "Ça Ira," "Marseillaise," etc., helped the emergence of a new socialist musical culture. In Part I he describes the political changes and cultural revolution in Hungary that followed World War II. Here we begin to understand the real meaning of this musical tradition in its socio-cultural context, for the first time examined with clarity and objectivity. The core of the book is Part II in which texts, songs and melodies are transcribed and carefully analysed. This study illustrates the virtue of keeping music and lyrics in juxtaposition.

Developed from the author's longer thesis (originally in four volumes), at the Institute for Culture, this book looks at the changes in Hungary affected by the outcome of World War II and views politics and culture as one and the same in the immediate postwar decade. The major thesis of "Movement and the Office" is that after 1945 a country of ten million suddenly experienced a change never felt before: a fundamental transformation of the country's social, economic and political systems that made Hungary a socialist nation-state and a powerful ally of the Soviet Union. The musical culture that grew out of this societal process is what the author tries to understand in its proper context. This book is not, as the writer admits himself (p. 22), a study in musical aesthetics. Rather it is a scholarly analysis in the sociology of music. One look at the author's notes and references will convince the reader; for Tokaji uses the works by Th. Adorno, György Lukács, Hanns Eisler, A.N. Szohor, K. Marx and others.

By far the greatest attention is devoted to the analysis of the songs and their meanings, with extensive discussion contributing to the tonal analysis. This and the section that analyses the lyrics of this truly socialist/proletarian song culture, made in the "surge of the socialist realism," leave the reader well informed on the symbolism, social context and overwhelming political importance given to them

in those years (pp.167-99). Commissioned songs, such as "Hands Off from Korea," "Rákosi Is Our Leader," "Ode to Stalin," "Stalin Cantata," "Greetings to Comrade Stalin," and others, the author argues, were to reflect the heroic fight of the Hungarian proletariat against capitalism, the peaceful building of communism, the unwilling commitment to Stalin, the crushing of bourgeoisie elements and art forms in Hungarian society and the basic concern of communism.

In this period of Stalinism, former musical institutions, organizations, choruses and newspapers were described as "unsuitable" and "undesirable." Folk music, reflecting the life-styles of the peasantry and their former (i.e., feudalistic) tradition, was looked upon with official disfavour and banned in certain instances. Even the works of B. Bartók and Z. Kodály were questioned and scrutinized for their possible anti-state and anti-government characteristics (pp. 133-35). We learn from Tokaji that pentatonic melodies of folk songs were described as "too pessimistic" in official party meetings and newspapers; and that the use of such scale was not suitable to express "real socialist meaning" (p. 192). The author, a thorough sociologist and interpreter, provides us with a balanced view of the social and political milieu and official policy that helped the mass production of this socialist realist song-tradition. From detailed transcripts of meetings of party officials, policy-makers, cultural leaders, composers, singers and musicians, he discerns the major themes of these songs. It is ironic, however, that the party bureaucrats and the blind policy-makers, in their cultural inquisition, could not produce anything of considerable artistic merit. For example, and Tokaji proves this beyond any doubt, several so-called "truly socialist" songs were written in the style of military marching songs fashionable in the Habsburg army; or some were simply plagerized versions of turn-of-the-century Viennese operettas (pp. 188-89).

The "Movement and the Office" is a readable work on an important topic and makes a credible case in discussing an era that was until very recently a taboo in Eastern Europe. This is a valuable contribution to the study of music and politics and should be read not only by ethnomusicologists but historians and sociologists as well. András Tokaji's book can be recommended, at the very least, for its outstanding treatment and analysis of the role that music played at the beginning of the socialist transformation in Hungary. We are fortunate to have him as a spokesman for the intriguing music tradition of a culture that has been known only for its folk music. I expected much less from this book and I received much more than I had hoped. I thoroughly enjoyed the book, its humour

and style, and learned about an era that we heard of only from our parents whisperings. I only wish there had been more. Let us hope that this scholarly study will be translated and published in English as soon as possible. Clearly the sociology of music is coming of age in Hungary.

László Kürti
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Aladár Komjáthy, *A kitántorgott egyház* [The Uprooted Church] Budapest: A Református Zsinati Iroda Sajtóosztálya, 1984. 279pp.

This book is a fascinating account of the establishment of the Hungarian Reformed Church in North America. Upon reading this book one can understand why millions stayed glued to their television sets last year when the author read passages from his forthcoming book in Budapest. This study was born on American soil; it grew from a Ph.D. thesis completed at Princeton. It covers the history of the Reformed Church from the end of the last century to the end of World War II. This church was officially founded by the Rev. Gusztáv Jurányi in Pittsburgh in May 1891.

However, Komjáthy considers the founding father of the church to be Rev. Ferenc Ferenczy, the third minister of that congregation. From 1893 until his death in 1898, he managed to establish Reformed churches in eight cities, including New York and Chicago. The author's description of life in these parishes is a deep insight into the enormous difficulties that the early Hungarian immigrants faced. The book is also an analysis of the vicissitudes of the Hungarian Calvinists in North America. It is pointed out that for many years the leading dignitaries of the Reformed Church in Hungary ignored the existence of the church on the American continent. Even when relations were established, the mother country's attitude remained ambivalent towards those who had left it.

Before World War I, elements of the Hungarian establishment encouraged immigration to America. This was thought to be a means of getting rid of "anti-social" elements and troublesome ethnic minorities. The attitude of the government changed completely when hard-working, law-abiding Hungarians left for the New World in large numbers. Some never returned, some returned

"as convinced Democrats or Republicans." Hungary's behaviour towards the Reformed Church in America was constantly subject to political considerations. The author of the book thoroughly documents every move made by Hungary towards the church and its repercussions in Calvinist parishes in America.

Apart from being a meticulous historian presenting a large amount of new material, Komjáthy is also a distinguished stylist. He belongs to the long line of Hungarian Calvinist ministers who have a passionate love of and appreciation for the language. While reading Komjáthy's book the reader is immersed in the purest Hungarian. Its form is rooted in the classical tradition as far back as Gáspár Heltai.

The reviews published in Hungary proclaim Komjáthy's book to be an outstanding contribution to the history of Hungarians living abroad. Some express the hope that the book will function as "an important supporting pillar in the bridge to be built towards the Hungarian diaspora." No doubt most readers will come to a similar conclusion.

Alexander Fodor
McGill University

Mályusz, Edith Császár. *The Theater and National Awakening: East Central Europe*. Translation and introduction by Thomas Szendrey. Atlanta: Hungarian Cultural Foundation, 1980. 349pp.

This ambitious work attempts to trace the role the theatre played in the emergence of a national consciousness, as well as the influence that an emerging national consciousness had on the evolution of national theatres in Austria, Hungary and the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia. This is never really accomplished for reasons that will be discussed below. A great deal of information is given on theatrical troupes and conditions in the three countries from the eighteenth century through the 1860s. The introductory section, containing only one chapter entitled "The Three Chief Actors," gives a brief yet adequate historical preamble, emphasizing the role of the House of Habsburg in each of these national movements. The rest of the book is divided into three parts: "Antecedents of the National Theater in East-Central Europe," "The Struggle for the

Development of the National Theaters," and "On the Threshold." The table of contents seems to suggest an orderly development of the theme that the author unfortunately fails to live up to. Part of the problem is that the framework is imposed from above rather than being developed from the needs of the material. The material presented is rich and diverse, but there are few clear guideposts for the reader: dates are given haphazardly, historical and literary figures are not always identified on first mention, and their significance is seldom made clear. Much irrelevant information is given, and often the relevant information is hidden in the oblique style and the author's assumption that the reader is already familiar with all of the information, and therefore an enigmatic reference is all that is needed as proof of an argument. The notes also fail to provide the often necessary factual underpinning for each thesis advanced.

The three introductory chapters of Part I sketch the factors in the development of a theatre and theatrical tastes in Austria, the Czech lands and Hungary. The threads reach back to the seventeenth century, and while historical and social developments in each region affected the emergence of the theatre, certain factors were common to all of these lands: the patronage of the court (or lack of it), the language and social composition of the cities, the touring companies and the opportunities for education and training. In the Czech lands musical interests proved an important factor; in Hungary, the role of the counties and of the gentry, as well as of the important provincial cities, was considerable.

The six chapters of Part II form the nucleus of the book where the thesis presented in the title is partially developed: Austria's pre-eminent position gradually declined and the national theatres gained increasing independence. Joseph II is credited with establishing a good German theatre in the Hof- und Nationaltheater; he encouraged the formation of German theatres in other cities of the empire as well, and the Viennese example could certainly inspire others. In the Bohemian and Moravian cities the Czech troupes competed rather successfully with the German companies which were often jealous of them. A Czech lower middle class did, however, exert some influence by the end of the eighteenth century, whereas no similar groundwork was laid in Hungary. Some significant differences between the Czech lands and Hungary are mentioned, though the lack of order and oblique style make the author's arguments difficult to follow. In Hungary the "aristocracy" (lower nobility in the counties rather than the magnates, so "gentry" would probably be a better term) played a more important role than in

Bohemia and Moravia. Also, the national theatres in Transylvania provided a training ground for Hungarian actors and acting companies; on the other hand, the jealousy of the German-language theatres of the Hungarian cities proved no less an obstacle to the fledgling companies here than in Prague or Brunn. Reference is also made to the characters of early showmen who often destroyed the troupe through bickering and dishonesty.

The early decades of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of some significant dramatists and theatre directors (Grillparzer, Raimund, Nestroy, Schreyvogel) in Austria, but the restrictions of censorship soon forced them to withdraw their plays or to modify their productions. The Czech national theatre became stronger, and Mályusz states that there were no real economic or linguistic difficulties. This is an over-simplification. Moreover, she also argues that the tension between German- and Czech-language productions continued, with Czech productions generally relegated to the less lucrative periods of the day or week.

Mályusz suggests that the acquisition of a suitable theatre building and the development of a good repertory of quality plays were the catalysts needed for a national theatre to become established. However, she mentions many other factors and topics, all of them presumably influential yet too briefly noted and without her demonstrating their relationship or relevance to the thesis. Furthermore, it is highly questionable whether the simple formula of plays and good actors would have been the solution to the development of a theatrical tradition. Many other factors did influence this process, as the author herself implies later. Some of these were the changing nature of the cities (the German population being diluted by Hungarian settlers on the one hand, and their becoming quickly "Magyarized" on the other); the contributions of often viable touring companies to the development of both a more unified language and the beginnings of critical review; the inception of dramatic theory in the emergence of the "critical schools" in the persons of Vörösmarty, Bajza and Toldy; the significance of the *Honművész*. Even the Diet of 1832 made a contribution.

The final chapter, "By way of Epilogue," attempts to tie off loose ends. It gives an overview of the decline and rise of Austrian theatre in the nineteenth century and some more information on the problems Hungarian theatre in Pest faced in the early years (repeating information from previous chapters), as well as the decline of German theatre in Pest, which was destroyed as much by natural disasters as by the loss of audience. The section on Czech

theatre best fits into an epilogue as it traces the increasing good fortune of those groups through the 1860s.

It is unfortunate that the material gathered here has not been better organized and presented. The general organizational problems were discussed above. The presentation is marred by sentences and paragraphs that lose themselves in irrelevant details. For example, on page 29, Mályusz writes, "one of the scions of the Haugwitz family also participated in school drama. This family had estates in Moravia, and the 'Black Army' of Matthias Corvinus was named after one of its members. (Its captain was the 'black' Haugwitz.) Two young noble boys of Olmütz also appeared in the play on that occasion." What does the Black Army have to do with a school drama in the Scottish Benedictine School? More importantly, what was the contribution of the Haugwitz family or of the Scottish Benedictine School to national drama? The author often loses sight of her subject. Her writing lacks a clearly perceived thesis and outline to guide the development of the narrative and to organize ideas. This difficulty is aggravated by an oblique style. Perhaps the former is the result of the latter. In any case, a style characterized by vagueness and indirectness confuses rather than illuminates.

The obscure style, as pointed out earlier, is not a simple failure of grammar and rhetoric, which fault might be attributed to the translator had he not done a generally good job with a very difficult text. The obscurity is based to a large degree on the author's failure to support her conclusions with a clear line of argument, or conversely, to present facts without marshalling these to a conclusion.

On page 64 she refers to the bourgeois theatre as a "new concept," yet nothing in the chapter which these comments conclude indicated that the types of theatre discussed were "bourgeois." Later, in speaking of the increasingly repressive control of the Habsburg Court over the theatre, she states: "Podmaniczky retained his position: neither the ruler nor the palatine had any illusions concerning him, since it was widely-known that in 1790 he had conferred with the Prussians over the dethronement of the Habsburgs." (p. 145) Distrusted as he was, how did Podmaniczky retain his position? The reader is left to guess. Similarly, after introducing Fedor Grimm as a person who speculated on the possibilities of a permanent theatre in Buda, she states, "In the fall of 1835 he retired from the theater." (p. 277) What, then, was the point of the preceding passage? The reader is constantly confronted with such disappointments. Or, a theatrical personality might be described as

"sweeping the high-hearted citizens of Pest off their feet," even though "they did not understand any of his words.... He ranted through the presentation, his declamation failed to move his audience, and he never learned to recite a poem." (p. 81) Yet, no explanation is given for his success in spite of these shortcomings.

In the reference to Róza Széppataky in connection with József Katona: "No one could count on the favors of the nineteen-year-old Róza Széppataky (later Madame Déry): the young actress, engrossed in her artistic ambitions, did not bestow her favors on anyone in particular. Katona, therefore, made a decision." (pp. 259-60) Since the decision was to join the theatre only as an amateur actor, the passage suggests that Katona might have made the theatre his career if Róza had given him her favours. Yet, there is no proof of this, nor does anything else in the passage suggest that. What is one to do with the remark?

The translator points out in his preface the difficulty he faced with the documentation because one note was used for several passages of text. Thomas Szendrey seems to have untangled this problem in most instances, although a few cases of misappropriation remain. Note 13 in Chapter 2, for example, comes almost four long paragraphs after the statement it supports, and the statements on Renaissance culture are documented by reference to the language of the Chancery. In most cases the documentation is cumbersome as generally accepted facts are backed up by numerous references while less obvious and accepted facts lack support. Essential information that should be in the text, on the other hand, is given in the notes. Obviously, these are faults in the structure of the book that neither a translator nor an editor should have to solve.

The bibliography is extensive (159 entries), and like the notes, attests to thorough research. Works range from basic reference and source books to biographies and works on the economic and social conditions of the eras covered, to individual plays and anthologies. It can serve as a bibliography for any number of research topics. A list of relevant archives and libraries with major collections is included; this information would be known to any serious student, but might be helpful to the beginner.

A fairly long index is included, but its usefulness is questionable since names are not always given in full, e.g., Ádam, 225 or Árpád, 111 do not mean much. When the full name is given, or the person is so well known (Beethoven) that a last name is sufficient, the entry is more helpful, but inconsistencies in the form of the name remain.

While the foregoing has touched on translation to some extent, and it is often hard to identify whether a particularly obscure

passage is so as a result of the original obtuseness or the failure of the translation, some specific comments are in order. Admittedly, the greatest difficulty was in the original text, yet the translator has too often stayed with a literal translation that made little sense in English or which was ungrammatical. The manuscript should have been revised for proper grammar and rhetoric. Inconsistencies and inaccuracies abound here no less than in the text so that the meaning of the original is further obscured. (Or did the translator have difficulty understanding the author's intentions? In that case, close consultation might have been the only solution.)

Even a literal translation should not keep double negatives such as "could not obtain a free hand in only a single country," (p. 195) or "no one, nowhere" (p. 297). Verb tenses are also misused as are adjectives: "Bayer would not have done so if he were aware," (p. 116), or "this children's troupes." Sometimes the translation is simply inaccurate as when idiomatic expressions are translated word for word so that "szeget szeggel" becomes "nail for nail" rather than "tit for tat." Other phrases include: "become suspicious" for "fell under suspicion," or "reminiscent" for "reminded," "interpreted" for "intercepted," "compatible to" for "compatible with" or "comparable to" — it is not clear from the context which would be more accurate. Adverbials, particularly "however," are misused. Even the titles of plays do not escape the problem of re-translation: Grillparzer's *Ein Bruderzwist in Habsburg* is given as *Ein Bruderzwist im Hause Habsburg*, and Körner's *Zriny* as *Zrinyi*.

Inconsistencies, whether the translator's or the author's, leave questions in the mind of the reader. "Buda" is cited when the Prague "Bouda" is being discussed. In the passage on Mária Bátori she is suddenly called "Mary." Titles and quotations are likewise sometimes translated and sometimes given in the original. There seems to be no method, and the reader is thus forced to guess at the original title or the English title in order to identify the work. He is at the very least curious about the original language of the letters, plays and other quoted material.

A good editor and a thorough copy editing would have benefited the book, though without extensive revision the major organizational problems would have remained. It is unfortunate that this publisher, who specializes in Hungarian subjects, does not strive for quality. While this work is far more useful and potentially far less damaging to Hungarian studies than many other publications of this and similar publishers, it does fall short of scholarly standards.

Enikő Molnár Basa
Washington, D.C.

Sándor Csoóri, *Memory of Snow.* Translated by Nicholas Kolumban. Penmaen Press (Great Barrington, Massachusetts), 1983. 67 pp. $22.50 hardcover, $8.50 paperback.

This selection of poems is the first book to appear in English by the outstanding contemporary Hungarian writer Sándor Csoóri, author of seven volumes of poetry and seven volumes of prose and co-author of several filmscripts, including *Ten Thousand Days,* winner of the Grand Prize at the Cannes Film Festival. *Memory of Snow* is therefore not only a welcome publication but a necessary one and should appeal both to students of Hungarian literature and to the more general poetry-reading audience.

Csoóri, born in 1930, began writing in the early fifties, during the days of the Thaw. From the start he resisted schematism, the subordination of the individual to State ideology. This volume clearly displays that spirit. In a prefatory statement, Csoóri says that a fundamental concern of his is to "preserve the 'I' in our war against dehumanizing impersonalization." The opening of "A Poem for My Well-Wishers" derives from that concern:

> You wanted me to calm down,
> to grow a beard, to look for a pin
> in the hush of a warm, womanly corner.
> A pin that could be used for murder.
> I didn't stay here with your babbling mouths.
> My body longed instead to be a guest
> in the mountains that are covered with bunchberries.

The book is appropriately divided into three sections that progress in an unbroken line from this individual "I," the foundation for all action, to some Thou outside the self—Csoóri is a master of the love-lyric—and from there even further outward to the larger community of the national, as in "Poland":

> Poland—a statue of Christ, struck by lightning.
> July sunlight roams over your blackening wounds
> and flies kiss your bones.

The book's first poems are implicit in its last ones, and vice-versa. All the poems seem to spring impassioned from a single source.

An Italian aphorism claims that translations are like spouses—beautiful ones are apt to be unfaithful and faithful ones are apt to be ugly. Unfortunately, this reviewer is not qualified to judge these translations against the originals. Nevertheless, as independent

English poems, Kolumban's translations offer some clear advantages over the next most readily-available selection, Daniel Abondolo's in Albert Tezla's *Ocean at the Window: Hungarian Prose and Poetry Since 1945* (U. of Minnesota, 1980). Kolumban's, with their naturalness of tone and rhythm, carry considerable energy along their lines, whereas Abondolo's have a constrained quality, as if the tether of the original language pulled at them. (For example, notice the important differences between Kolumban's "The women come to make love / and stool pigeons to flatter. / Their chins are covered / with tobacco stains" and Abondolo's "women come to love / and informers, their chins flecked with tobacco, to flatter.") Csoóri's poetry has been praised in Hungary for its "freshness and exhilaration." Kolumban, a poet himself and the editor and translator of *Turmoil in Hungary*, an anthology of 20th-century Hungarian poetry published in 1982 by New Rivers Press, demonstrates the justice of that description by his work in *Memory of Snow*. In "People, Branches," "the world is filled with silence," an evil silence suggesting repressions of various sorts. But Csoóri imagines a resolution:

> Maybe I should learn to love someone again:
> her breath,
> the noise her clogs make
> on the stairway.
> I'd listen to her hair crackling
> as she pulls the comb through.
> A year would pass and another
> and the sounds would return to me
> like the swallows from Africa
> that screech in the dark —
> the voices of dishes
> the voices of countries
> the rain that kicks the windowsill,
> the crackle of spring's shoulder blades
> from under the Beethoven mane of the clouds,
> the voice of a small leaf —
> they all would whisper in my ear:
> we were once and will be again.
> People, branches, murmuring.
> Sweet words.

Murmuring and sweet words, indeed. Kolumban, with Csoóri as his guide and stimulus, translates into English as if he were making it all up, and delighting in doing so.

Some readers might regret the absence of an introduction. How these poems fit into Csoóri's long career is not clear. No dates accompany individual poems, nor do we know what principles of selection Kolumban followed, or if Csoóri himself had a hand in the formation of this book in any way. Some words on the challenge of translating Csoóri might have been interesting and helpful. Still, the very surrender of the entire book to the words of Csoóri, in preface and poems, serves as a moving tribute to him and highlights his powerful voice.

According to Miklós Vajda, in his introduction to *Modern Hungarian Poetry* (Columbia U. Press, 1977), few of the other arts have ever flourished in Hungary the way poetry has. Cities could be destroyed, but poetry, partly thanks to memory, could not. These poems are in part about that very history. Although "misery has nailed [him] to a bed" and his spine is "derailed," his

> breath escapes
> with the early morning
> blackbird
> and races with a stagecoach,
> pulled by birds,
> through the buffeting forest.

Resurrection is a motif of this book. History is present as a constant challenge but never a determinant. The "unconquerable hen" amidst "the dead of the war" has "collared the longest spring worm / in the world!" The poetry of Csoóri shuttles vitally between these two poles of the war-dead and the spring worm. Paradoxically, the poet transcends Hungarian history not by resisting it but by giving himself wholly to it.

Nicholas Kolumban and Penmaen Press have performed a valuable service. The book, handsomely printed to meet the high standards of Penmaen books, is graced by a woodcut portrait of the poet by Michael McCurdy. *Memory of Snow* is a must for any library that wishes to represent 20th-century international achievement in literature and for any individual interested in the same.

Philip Dacey
Southwest State University, Marshall, Minnesota

Editor's Note:

This review was accepted for publication before our Journal's policy on reviewing translations of poetry had changed.

Continued from page 2
to the Hungarian Research Institute of Canada. The editors of the planned volume will be Professors M.L. Kovacs (of the University of Regina) and N.F. Dreisziger. The articles for this "special issue" will be selected from among the papers that had been given at the first two annual conferences of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada and those that have been submitted to our journal in the past two years. Work on the volume is behind schedule — please accept our apologies for the lateness of the 1986 issues.

The third annual meeting of the Hungarian Studies Association will be held in conjuction with the gathering of the Canadian Learned Societies, at the end of May, at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. Those interested in attending and/or in giving papers, should contact Professor Robert Blumstock, of McMaster's Department of Sociology. Our journal will be pleased to consider papers given at this conference for publication in one of its future issues.

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Hungarian Studies Review

Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Fall, 1986)

Special Issue:

THE TREE OF LIFE:

ESSAYS HONOURING A HUNGARIAN-CANADIAN CENTENARY

Studies by M.H. Krisztinkovich, N.F. Dreisziger, Adele Csima, Stephen Satory, Robert Keyserlingk, Victor Buyniak and M.L. Kovacs.

Hungarian Studies Review

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The Editors
Hungarian Studies Review
University of Toronto
21 Sussex Ave.
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This issue is published with the help of grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Multiculturalism Sector of the Secretary of State of Canada.

Hungarian Studies Review Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Fall 1986).

Our Contributors

Maria Horvath Krisztinkovich most recently published in our journal in 1981.

N.F. Dreisziger has been the editor or co-editor of this journal since its inception.

Adele Csima is a scientist who teaches in the University of Toronto's Department of Preventative Medicine and Biostatistics.

Stephen Satory is working toward his Ph.D. in music at the University of Toronto.

Robert H. Keyserlingk teaches history at the University of Ottawa. One of his recent studies appeared in the *Canadian Historical Review.*

Victor O. Buyniak is chairman of the University of Saskatchewan's Department of Slavic Studies.

Historian Martin L. Kovacs is about to become Professor Emeritus at the University of Regina. He has published in our journal on several occasions.

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Hungarian Studies Review Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Fall 1986).

Dudley Bard, Gazi Rocksámán, and the Tree of Life: Perspectives on Canada, Hungary and Hungarian-Canadians

An Introduction by N.F. Dreisziger

Dudley Bard was the illegitimate son of Prince Rupert of Rupert's Land fame. Gazi Rocksámán is the media name of L.G. Waszlavik, a colourful figure within present-day East European counter-culture. The Tree of Life is the name of an orchestra in Toronto made up of young Hungarian-Canadian musicians. The three have no apparent relationship to each other. Similarly, the possibility of historical ties between Canada and Hungary, between the culture of Canadians and that of Hungarians (in Hungary and in other ancient Hungarian homelands in the neighbouring countries of Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R.), might appear to many people to be limited or even improbable. Yet, as some of the essays in this anthology reveal, an inter-relationship does exist among those enumerated, just as links between the ancient lands of the Hungarians and Canada go back at least three centuries.

Proving the existence of hitherto little-known relationships, as well as of the products of cultural cross-fertilization between Hungary and Canada, is only an incidental aim of this volume. Its primary purpose is the celebration of a number of anniversaries, the most relevant being the centenary of the beginning of Hungarian settlement in Canada.

Hungarian immigration to this country is usually dated from 1886 mainly because the best-known of the early Hungarian colonies, the Esterhaz settlement (not far from the present-day city of Esterhazy — named after the colony's founder) was established that year. There had been individual Hungarians who had come to this land prior to 1886, but our knowledge of where they settled and for how long, is sparse. Thanks to Professor M.L. Kovacs's researches, we know more about the Hungarians who came to Canada in the mid-1880s, especially the group that established the colony of

Esterhaz.[1] Alas, the other contemporary Hungarian settlements, the one at Hunsvalley and the other at Lethbridge (both in the old North-West Territory), are less familiar as their history still awaits the attention of researchers.

Writing a historical outline of the Hungarian-Canadian community's evolution since 1886 is not the purpose of this publication. The subject is much larger in scope than can be adequately handled in a small volume, and it has already been substantially covered elsewhere, to a large extent by the editors of this collection.[2] Nevertheless, three papers in this volume deal with some aspects of the Hungarian-Canadian community's development.

The essay covering the longest time-span is Dreisziger's study of the evolving urban-rural distribution of Hungarian Canadians from the 1880s to the 1980s. This paper pays special attention to the forces that played a role in the transformation of a largely rural immigrant community into a predominantly urban one. One of the important determinants in this development, according to the article, was the increasing propensity among more recent Hungarian arrivals to settle in the cities, or to re-migrate there after a temporary stay on farms or in other non-urban settings.

While Dreisziger's paper deals with the historical statistics of Hungarian-Canadian demographic evolution since 1886, Professor Adele Csima's paper compares some aspects of Canada's as well as the Hungarian-Canadian groups' demography with that of the population of Hungary. In the third paper dealing with Hungarian Canadians, Stephen Satory outlines certain facets of the cultural life of this ethnic group as it existed nearly a century after its modest beginnings in the 1880s. Satory finds, in the Hungarian community of Toronto, a great deal of dynamism and sophistication. He discovers that some members of this group devote themselves to very specialized cultural pursuits, such as the study of the authentic music and folk-dancing of the ancient Hungarian villages of northwestern and northeastern Rumania (Transylvania and Bukovina-Moldavia respectively). His paper outlines the multi-layered interactions between Hungarian-Canadian society and elements of Hungary's community interested in ethnomusicology and folk-dancing (which in the same period was also involved in the study of the authentic music and dancing of the old and culturally unspoiled Hungarian communities in Rumania).

* * *

For Hungarians, 1986 was not only the centenary of their

beginnings in Canada, but a year of several other notable anniversaries. One of these was the trecentenary of the reconquest of Buda (the capital of medieval Hungary) from the Turks after nearly 150 years of Ottoman rule. In 1686 an international army, outfitted and commanded by some of the Christian rulers of Europe, successfully besieged the old Hungarian capital, at the time a frontier post of the Ottoman Empire. It was in this struggle that the young Dudley Bard lost his life and thereby entered the pantheon of heroes of Hungarian history. As Maria H. Krisztinkovich's opening paper points out, this fact was not the only connection that Prince Rupert's family had to Hungary. The Prince's own godfather was another — and much better-known — Hungarian hero, Gábor Bethlen, Prince of Transylvania and for a brief time the ruler of much of Hungary. In the figure of Prince Rupert then, aspects of Transylvanian, Hungarian and Canadian history converge, mainly as a result of historical coincidences, the most important being the Protestant Reformation. Krisztinkovich outlines how developments associated with the spread of Protestantism led to Bethlen being chosen as Rupert's godfather, and hints at the fact that Rupert's association with Canada was in part the result of these same factors.

* * *

Another milestone marked by Hungarians in 1986 was the thirtieth anniversary of their uprising against Soviet rule. As far as the Hungarian-Canadian community is concerned, the most significant outcome of this event was the arrival in Canada of the "refugees," a group of about 37,000 newcomers that constituted the largest ever influx of Hungarians to this country. The direct and indirect consequences of this development are touched on in the three essays that deal with Hungarian Canadians. Some of the immediate and long-range effects on the *Magyar* community's demography are discussed in Dreisziger's paper and, to a lesser extent, in Csima's. Some of the long-term cultural consequences of the coming of the refugees can be gauged from Satory's article. The importance of the refugee's cultural legacy becomes clearer when it is pointed out that Toronto's Kodaly Ensemble was itself largely the creation of refugees. This institution played a dominant role in virtually all of the Toronto area's Hungarian folk-music and folk-dancing activities since its founding. It should be mentioned that Satory's paper, written in 1985, marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Kodaly's establishment.

The Kodaly Ensemble itself evolved from a cultural association

dedicated to the maintenance of folk-singing, dancing and music, as these were known to its members before their arrival in Canada, into an institution with a flexible and sophisticated approach to its multi-faceted work (research, teaching, repertoire selection, performing and so on). One of the remarkable aspects of the Ensemble's evolution was the close attention many of its leaders paid to developments in Hungarian ethnomusicology and folk-dancing in Eastern Europe. Satory explains how the young men and women leading the Ensemble introduced the *táncház* movement to Canada, a movement dedicated to the study of the authentic, still unadulterated Hungarian dances of Transylvania and other Székely districts of Rumania. The Tree of Life [*Életfa*] orchestra was a Canadian part of this movement, concerned with its musical aspects.

* * *

Robert Keyserlingk's and Victor Buyniak's papers in this collection do not deal with strictly Hungarian subjects. The former discusses the evolution of attitudes to the study of Austro-Hungarian history in Britain especially during the Second World War. The latter evaluates the results of Canada's policy of multiculturalism during its first fifteen years of existence (1971-86). Both papers are of interest to Hungarians in Canada and elsewhere. In the last paper in this volume Professor M.L. Kovacs examines the impact of ancient Hungarian religious traditions on present-day Hungarian culture. This study reveals a truly remarkable persistence of religious and cultural influences and their ability to take on new forms and to interact with new trends and ideas. One colourful figure Kovacs mentions is László Gazi (*Gazember*, i.e., the Rogue) Rocksámán, who is at once a member of the East European "rock" culture, and a twentieth century representative (admittedly self-proclaimed) of an ancient Eastern pagan tradition. Rocksámán's cultural preoccupations are global. It might be said that in his figure East and West meet and centuries are transcended. He stands for universal culture in time and space.

* * *

Several of the essays in this volume touch on the subjects of culture transfer and cultural cross-fertilization. The opportunities for these arise occasionally through the historical interactions of states or statesmen such as described in the study by Krisztinkovich. A more likely originator of culture transfer from one nation to another, from one part of the globe to another, is the process of international

migration. The Hungarian-Canadian community is a product of such migration and, as such, it is an agency of culture transfer. As explained in Satory's essay, this community is responsible not only for bringing certain Hungarian cultural traditions to Canada, but also for keeping this country in touch with new developments in the culture of the East Central European lands where Hungarians reside. Conversely, Hungarian Canadians (and Hungarians in other Western countries) no doubt contribute to the introduction of Western cultural influences and trends to their ancestral lands. While no claim can be made for the fact that the Hungarians of the West are alone or even largely responsible for the high degree of awareness in Hungary of cultural trends in Western Europe and North America, their frequent contacts with Hungary no doubt reinforce this awareness. Phenomena such as represented by Waszlavik are prominent in Hungary, despite the fact that a "counter-culture" is barely tolerated in Communist societies.

The essays in this volume, by touching on the themes of culture transfer, culture maintenance and cultural cross-fertilization, hint at the unity of Hungarian and Western history and culture in general and the affinity and compatibility of the culture and history of Hungary and Canada. Dudley Bard is a symbol of this historical unity. He was the son of a prominent seventeenth-century European and British historical figure — himself the godson of a major Hungarian personage — who gave his life for a "Christian," that is a "European" Hungary.

While Bard is someone who today lives on in Hungarian national mythology, Waszlavik the "Rocksámán" is part of the present. He, and others like him who combine modern Western influences with the cultural legacy of an Eastern past, suggest the compatibility of these values and traditions. The existence of the Tree of Life orchestra in Toronto in the 1980s, inspired by the ancient folk-music of the Székely villages of Transylvania, Moldavia and Bukovina, is proof of a most remarkable culture transfer and cultural cross-fertilization, as well as of the potential unity of aspects of Eastern and Western cultures.

A great many other examples of historical and cultural interconnections and interactions between Western — in particular Canadian — and Hungarian history and culture could be cited both from the essays that follow and from the available literature. Nevertheless, a comprehensive examination of these ties still awaits the efforts of scholars in the arts, humanities and the social sciences. It is hoped that this small collection of essays will help provide inspiration for such work.

* * *

The preparation of this volume was the idea of members of the executive of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada, an organization dedicated to the study — and the popularization of the study — of Hungary and things Hungarian. The purpose was to publish much of the proceedings of the Association's 1986 conference held at the Learned Societies meeting in Winnipeg. As the Association's conference was organized by Professor Kovacs, the papers were collected by him. They were edited, revised and re-typed in the fall and winter of that year. A few had to be translated into English. Several of the papers were still not in publishable shape in the spring of 1987 when the printing of the volume had to get under way. These as yet incomplete or unrevised studies may be published at a later date in an "occasional volume" of the Chair of Hungarian Studies at the University of Toronto, as a companion volume to the present "special issue."

It remains to offer a few acknowledgements. The 1986 issues of our journal are published with a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. For its 1986 meeting the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada had a conference grant from the same agency. This financial assistance enabled Professor Kovacs to organize the Association's meeting in Winnipeg and to do the lion's share of the initial editing of the papers. To assist in the publication of these manuscripts, we received a publication grant from the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada (Multiculturalism Sector). For this support we are most thankful. Copy editing on the volume was done in part by Ms. Anne McCarthy of Toronto. She also helped prepare the manuscripts for electronic typesetting.

Notes

1 M.L. Kovacs, *Esterhazy and Early Hungarian Immigration to Canada* (Regina: Canadian Plains Studies, 1974). For further bibliographical references see below, in the notes to the study by N.F. Dreisziger.

2 See Dreisziger, Kovacs, *et al. Struggle and Hope: The Hungarian-Canadian Experience* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982).

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Prince Rupert, Godson of Gábor Bethlen

Maria H. Krisztinkovich

Prince Rupert's life is familiar to Canadian readers and scholars. Not so well known are Rupert's and his family's connections to Hungarian history, which were predominantly Calvinistic, like Rupert's own roots.[1] The countries in this Protestant power-play were: his father's homeland, the Palatinate; his grandfather's England; his parents' kingdom, Bohemia; his godfather's principality, Transylvania; and his Protestant aunts' and uncles' Holland and Sweden. Five of Rupert's many brothers and sisters also left their mark on history. They lived through the Thirty Years' War, of which Rupert's family was partly the victim, and partly the cause.

Various writers have referred to the compelling personality of the prince by using colourful epithets: the Son of the Winter King, Robert le Diable, the Dark and Handsome Prince, the Cavalry Leader, the Mercenary of the King of Hungary, the Prince Without a Principality, the Would-be King of Madagascar, the Buccaneer, the Pirate, the Robber Prince, the Recluse Rupert, and so on, which reveal many facets of Rupert's life story, except for a generally ignored one: Prince Rupert was godson of Gábor Bethlen, Prince of Transylvania and, for a brief time, King of Hungary.

Here we must resist the temptation to immerse ourselves in the tales of Rupert's romantic life of adventure and prowess, or in the portraits displaying his martial good looks. It is no exaggeration, perhaps, to claim that Rupert was the most talked about person of his era. This he achieved both through his exploits on behalf of the Stuart cause and through his varied life-style. While historical gossip bequeaths to us the image of a true seventeenth century cavalier, episodes unmentioned indicate a very private Rupert, a scientist, an inventor, a gifted artist — a man far ahead of his century.

* * *

Rupert's mother, Elizabeth, daughter of James I of England, gave birth to her third son shortly after her own coronation as Queen of Bohemia (27 December 1619). Her husband, Frederick V of the Palatinate (Frederick I of Bohemia), was by tradition chief among German princes, the "Electors of the Holy Roman Empire." Both parents were good-looking, charming, spirited and learned, and committed to the Reformed Church. That is why they were invited to the throne of Bohemia. At that time, Czech nobility had not yet realized that the people of the Palatinate were offering more pronounced support for the extreme reformers.[2] Their outlook was closer to what the extremists at that time called "illumination." In seventeenth century Bohemia, any religious deviation meant confrontation with the Habsburg Emperor, then the foremost protagonist of the Roman Catholic Church. Thus, some malicious Jesuits felt prompted to prophesy that Frederick's Czech kingdom would not last longer than the winter. Sadly for the inhabitants of the Palatinate, this prophecy was fulfilled, and Frederick is known as "the Winter King" to this day.[3]

Even though Rupert was born into an ephemeral royal reign, the citizens of Prague celebrated the event joyfully since the child was their first indigenous prince. Elizabeth informed her father, James I, that: "The King [her husband] hath bidden Bethlen Gábor, the Prince of Transylvania, to christen this little boy. He [Bethlen] is altogether of our religion." To this, Eliot Warburton, Rupert's biographer, added the following remark: "...this ingenious and daring savage [Bethlen] was selected as sponsor... as he... had almost secured for himself the Kingdom of Hungary."[4] Bethlen sent Imre Thurzó, a diplomat in his stead to the christening of Rupert. Warburton has this to say: "His representative, count Thurzó, in complete armour, received the child from the archbourgravine, and transferred it from his mail-clad arms to the gauntleted hands of the deputies of Lusatia, Moravia, and Silesia; such martial dandling suited well with the future fortunes of the child."[5] Another English writer described Thurzó as "a splendid if barbaric figure."[6]

These remarks are misleading; Bethlen, although warring and preoccupied with balancing the fate of his country between two formidable enemies — the Turks and the Habsburgs — nevertheless, patronized science, literature and art. His reign was called the golden era of Transylvania. Thurzó, his envoy to Prague, was the author of several Latin rhetorical works, and Chancellor of the University of Wittenberg.[7]

An eighteenth century account of the events can be found in the work of the Hungarian historian, István Katona:

> Imre Thurzó set out for Kassa (Kaschau, Kosice) in spite of the glacial weather, on the fourth of March 1620. On the tenth, he was greeted by the citizens of Kassa. There he obtained from Bethlen documents, instructions and other instruments regarding the plan of a Federation between Gábor Bethlen and the new King of Bohemia. On the seventeenth of March, Imre Thurzó began his mission. Passing through his own domain at Biccse, he reached Prague on the thirtieth of March. Before the gate of the city, the Nobles of Bohemia and the Provinces received him with great pomp. Coinciding with this diplomatic mission, says an eyewitness, were the solemnities of Rupert's christening. In the Cathedral of Prague, Thurzó lifted the infant in his arms and held it over the baptismal font. A son of a Protestant King was thus baptized Robertus, or Rupert, by another Calvinist sovereign. On behalf of Gábor Bethlen, Thurzó negotiated matters of a Protestant alliance to be formed against the Habsburg Emperor. At the same time, he acquitted himself of yet another mission, presenting splendid gifts sent by the godfather for the royal family. For Frederick, he brought from Hungary a white Asiatic horse with oriental carpet saddlery and trappings; for the Queen, various objects, such as rare stones exquisitely cut; a kind of Cambric or linen embroidered and studded with precious stones; all in "oriental" style. Bethlen regaled his godson Rupert with a precious sword encrusted with turquoise stones.[8]

In Katona's history we also find the voluminous correspondence between Frederick and the so-called ingenious and savage Bethlen.

The Fall of 1620 brought disaster. At Prague's White Mountain, one of the shortest battles in history was lost by Frederick within an hour. While the king and his family were entertaining English envoys in Hradcany Castle, the Czech army was overwhelmed by the Imperial forces.[9] By the time Frederick had risen from the table, his fate had already been decided. The family had to evacuate Prague immediately:

> Much frenzied packing was done on the dark November afternoon, but Frederick's chamberlain, on a last progress through the deserted royal apartments, discovered something important which had been left behind. He picked it up, and hurrying down to the courtyard, was just in time to catch the last coach drawing

> away from the palace doors. Not until the bundle thrown in ... rolled ... onto the floor of the carriage and burst into a roar, did his astonished fellow-travellers discover that the infant Prince Rupert was amongst them.[10]

Such was the first recorded episode of Rupert "the Adventurer."

The Battle of White Mountain ended the dream of both Bethlen and Frederick, of a federation of Protestant princes. Their defeat on the battlefield brought the greatest disaster upon their subjects. Of special interest was the exodus of thousands of Anabaptist settlers from Frederick's lost realm. These people in particular brought upon themselves the wrath of the Imperialists. After his coronation, the Anabaptists had paid their respects to Frederick while he was travelling around his new kingdom. He had stopped at Alexovice (Mährisch Kromau, Krumlov), where the Anabaptist Hutterite Brethren presented the king with a finely wrought iron bedstead, various precision knives and fur-lined gloves. For the queen they offered their renowned majolica ware.[11] The presents had impressed Frederick deeply. He wrote to his queen that if only these interesting people lived nearer Prague, he would like to visit their colony more often.[12] It was not by chance that Bethlen hurried to their assistance, transferring the industrious craftsmen from beleaguered Moravia to his Transylvanian estate at Alvinc.[13] The Hutterite connection — considered minor, or neglected altogether by historians — can be followed throughout the rest of Rupert's and his family's life.

The infant Rupert and his parents first found refuge with the Elector of Brandenburg, brother-in-law of Frederick; later they stayed with his uncle, Prince Maurice of Orange, in Holland. During most of the Thirty Years' War, the Palatine refugees enjoyed the hospitality of the latter, a great naval and military strategist in the Netherlands. He was Rupert's beloved benefactor and mentor through his formative years. Rupert was able to witness the movements of the Dutch fleet and to hear about adventures and explorations in the New World. It was in Holland that he first learned about endeavours to relocate thousands of Protestant refugees overseas. It is conceivable that the Hutterite Brethren shared, with their patrons from the Palatinate, their earlier experiences on Canadian shores since their first scout made the trip in 1595. This scout, Johannes Sermond, reported directly to Maurice of Orange at The Hague on his return, four years later, from his Labrador voyage.[14]

Rupert was barely twenty years old when he was captured in battle

by the Austrians. The young warrior spent four years in captivity at the Castle of Linz (1637-41). He occupied himself with self-education, drawing, experimenting in chemistry, playing tennis and falling in love with Countess Kufstein, the daughter of his jailer. The affair changed Rupert from a reckless young soldier into a mature person with avid interests in science, the arts and beautiful and erudite women. Warburton, Rupert's biographer, reflected on the impact of his time in captivity: "So long ago as 1637, when immured in the Castle of Linz, he had exercised his active genius in some etchings that still remain, and bear that date."[15]

During the scourge of the Thirty Years' War, when 500,000 men, women and children were put to the sword in Germany alone and whole provinces were ravaged to utter desolation, the Palatinate was also in shambles. This situation earned Rupert the name "Prince Without a Principality." In 1648, the war was over and the Emperor mellowed towards the children of the rebellious Frederick. Notwithstanding the reconciliation, the Palatines still refused to give the Habsburgs the title of Emperor because their father was not consulted at the time of the election. They stubbornly called the Kaiser "King of Hungary."[16]

When peace returned, it brought back a semblance of religious tolerance. Rupert's older brother, Charles Louis, was restored as Elector to a portion of the Palatinate, holding the position from 1648 to 1680. Charles Louis set his mind exclusively to rebuilding the homeland of his parents. He withheld Rupert's part of the inheritance and spent the family funds on founding his residence and the new capital, Mannheim. Charles Louis invited Hutterite settlers from Hungary and Transylvania, promising them religious freedom. Many Anabaptists from the counties of Nyitra, Pozsony and the town of Alvinc moved to Mannheim.[17] While this haven of religious tolerance prospered, Rupert continued his existence as prince without a principality, travelling over land and sea to fight on various battlefields. Charles Louis had reason to keep Rupert out of the Palatinate. Rupert had courted the Countess Louise von Degenfeld, maid-in-waiting to the Electress, and written a love letter to her. Unfortunately, this letter reached the Electress, who was herself interested in Rupert.[18] When the countess openly refuted her alleged coldness, Rupert realized that his letter had got into the wrong hands. The Electress realized it also. She raided Degenfeld's quarters, finding many letters in Latin, written not by Rupert, but by her own husband, the Elector Charles Louis. When the ensuing scandal abated, the Elector divorced his wife and married Louise morganatically.

Rupert stayed away from Mannheim for the rest of his life. Significantly, around this time, after secretly negotiating with settlers from Hungary, the family renewed its ties with Transylvania. Henrietta Maria, Rupert's sister, a great beauty, was to wed Sigismund Rákóczi, son of the reigning Prince George Rákóczi I, in 1651.[19] The marriage negotiations, between the Palatines — poor, but proud of their prestigious pedigree — and the Rákóczis — rich, but regarded as "Asiatic barbarians" — reveal the uninformed prejudice of the time. Charles Louis could cover, only with great difficulty, the expenses of his sister's Hungarian wedding, providing the bare minimum for the princess's trousseau;[20] still he persisted in being difficult, even condescending towards the Hungarians. Later, Henrietta Maria's happy letters appeased him. The princess fell in love with Sigismund, and he with her. She wrote: "I wish my lord could be so happy as to be known to your Highness, for I feel sure you would like your brother-in-law, and would see that people had spoken more lies than truth in their reports."[21] Reports about the magnificence of George Rákóczi and Susanna Lórántffy's court did the rest. The two families were already connected through Gábor Bethlen's marriage with the sister of the Elector George William of Brandenburg. This new bond between Protestant princes was eyed with suspicion in Vienna. Historians laconically mention the tragic, untimely death of the lovers: on 18 September 1651, Henrietta Maria's life ended, followed by Sigismund's a few months later. Only Caspar Maurer, in his *Ungarische Chronica* (1664), dares to hint at foul play.[22]

It appears that Rupert next sought employment at the Viennese court. His intention was probably to recover some of the money due him after the peace treaty but withheld by his brother Charles Louis. When the Imperialists under Montecuccoli assembled at Nagyszombat (Tyrnau, Trnava), Rupert was also on hand as a Lieutenant Field Marshal in the army.[23] However, he never fought on Hungarian soil, in spite of his appointment and the sobriquet "Mercenary of the King of Hungary." According to Warburton, he had been sent by Charles I on a secret mission to the Emperor.[24] Rupert was welcomed by his Austrian relatives in Vienna, despite his stubborn refusal to become a Catholic. Driving the Turks out of Hungary was the ultimate adventure at that time. Not so for the common people, however, who suffered at the hands of both the foreign adventurers and the Turkish armies. It is difficult to understand how the Hutterites of Hungary could manage to negotiate and accomplish their immigration to the Palatinate, unless they were patronized by one of the Protestant adventurers. There must have been a certain

reciprocity between patrons and emigrants. We know Bethlen had availed himself of the services of simple itinerant "pharmacists" in order to have letters delivered to the King of Sweden.[25] There is also a record of the use of double-bottomed barrels of Tokay wine for hiding messages. In light of this, Rupert's preoccupation in Vienna with arranging for a quantity of Hungarian wine to be shipped to England — "four tonnes, or eight pipes, which I hope will serve our Court this winter" — takes on a different meaning.

Rupert returned to London and laboured heartily in his own laboratory and forge. The *Royal Society Transactions* record many of his inventions, for instance, his method of producing a gunpowder ten times more powerful, even underwater, than that normally used at the time in mining. In his mature years, Rupert perfected the instruments of his own invention in a special lab at Windsor Castle. An experimental toy, a bubble of glass, bears his name, "Rupert's Drop." There were other similar experiments done in the potter's kiln. One of these might have led to the first porcellanous substance used for ceramics in England. According to Johann Joachim Becher — Rupert's director of mines and a famous economist and scientist — such ware was sold in London around 1680.[26] In a chapter, entitled "Haffnerey und Pottebackerey," in one of Becher's books, he mentions a Hungarian potter who probably assisted Rupert with this particular technology. It cannot be just another coincidence that around this time the Hutterites were on the move again. The so-called "Hungarian potter" of Rupert's retinue was likely a refugee from Mannheim. After the death of Charles Louis in 1680, the Palatinate was claimed by Louis XIV on behalf of Elisabeth Charlotte of Orleans. France invaded the territory, burned Mannheim, and reinstated Catholicism, forcing Protestants to flee. Elisabeth Charlotte (Charles Louis's daughter) had frequently visited the Hutterite *Bruderhof* in Mannheim as a child; at an advanced age in 1718, she still recalled clearly having watched them at work, saying "one made handsome knives of fragrant wood, and another was a potter."[27]

Rupert's involvement with the two adventurer-explorers Radisson and Groseilliers, who approached him for sponsorship of their voyage to Hudson's Bay, is well known, but rarely interpreted as a natural consequence of their having been Huguenots.[28]

Returning to the private life of Prince Rupert, around the year 1665, Rupert fell in love with Francesca, the daughter of Sir Henry Bard, Lord Bellamont. Little is known of this affair except that its issue, an illegitimate son, the gallant Dudley Bard, died 300 years ago in Buda, at the age of twenty. He had joined the army of Charles

of Lorraine in an adventurous march to liberate the city from the Turks. On 13 July 1686, during a desperate attempt to scale the walls of the fortress of Castle Hill, the young warrior lost his life. The place where he fell was close to the former Haymarket (Széna Tér, now Moscow Place) in Budapest, near the Nádor Laktanya (Palatine Caserne).[29] Hungary can claim the son of Prince Rupert as her own martyr.

Notes

1. The bits and pieces of data to the present topic were found in the course of my research endeavour on the origin of Canadian Hutterites; the work has been enhanced by my efforts in collecting Hutterite artifacts, especially their famous majolica-ware, which they produced in Hungary in the seventeenth century.
2. That is, Huguenots, Socinians, Anabaptists (Mennonites, Hutterites), Quakers; and later, Rosicrucians and Labadists.
3. The Battle of White Mountain (8 November 1620) proved disastrous for Frederick and the Bohemians.
4. Eliot Warburton, *Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers* (London: R. Bentley, 1849), p. 33.
5. George Malcolm Thomson, *Warrior Prince* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1976), p.
6. Bethlen Gábor (Gabriel Bathlen), Prince of Transylvania from 1613 to 1629, made his state the centre of culture and of Protestantism in Hungary, as well as a vital factor in European politics.
6. Márton Tarnóc, *Erdély müvelödése Bethlen Gábor és a két Rákóczi György korában* [Transylvanian Culture in the Era of Gabriel Bethlen and the Two George Rákóczis] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1978), p. 119.
7. Tibor Wittman, *Bethlen Gábor* (Budapest: Müvelt Nép, 1952), p. 110.
8. István Katona, *Historia critica Regum Hungariae Stirpis Austriacae*, Tomulus XI, Ordine XXX (Buda: University, 1794), pp. 362-63.
9. Thomson, p. 7.
10. Patrick Morrah, *Prince Rupert of the Rhine* (London, 1976), pp. 18-19.
11. Frantisek Hrúby, "Die Wiedertäufer in Mahren," in *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 30 (1933), p. 27. See also A.J.F. Ziegelschmid, *Die älteste Chronik der Hutterischen Brüder* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Carl Schurz Memorial Fondation, 1943), p. 723.
12. Johann Christoph von Aretin, ed., "Sammlung noch ungedruckter Briefe des Churfürsten Friedrich V., von der Pfalz, nachherigen König von Böhmen, in den Jaren 1612-1632," in *Beyträge zur Geschichte und Literatur aus der Pfalzbaierischen Centralbibliothek zu München* (Munich: Scherer, 1806), p. 140.
13. Jacob Werner, *Hauss-Buech: Darein Wie Brueder zu Allwintz vnser Haus*, etc., Durch wz mitel wier aus dem Marhern in Sibenbirgen komen vnd hie Niderglassen Haben, 1623. Codex, Archives of the former Catholic Bishopric at Neutra. First published by József Vágner in *A nyitrai püspöki könyvtár katalógusa* [The Catalogue of the Episcopal Library of Nyitra] (Neutra, 1886). A microfilm printout by Paul S. Gross, Spokane, Washington, n.d., 72pp.
14. "In seiner Aussfahrt auss Indien ist er accompaigniret gewesst mit 8 indianischen Legaten, deren Dolmetsch er gewesen, und mit inen ankomen gen Mitelburg und darauff mit inen gezogen nach Herzog Morizen in Hag. Alda er sich 1 gantzes Jar in den Niderlanden auffgehalten." M.H. Krisztinkovich, "Bonne Esperance and the Hutterites: Further Notes on a 16th-Century Migration Plan," paper presented at the American Educators Association (Hungarian Studies) conference, University of Toronto, 1986.

15. Warburton, vol. 3, p. 431. Not many of Rupert's "mezzotints" have come down to us. See also Evelyn, *Sculptura* (London, 1755), p. 127 (Chapter 6).
16. Elizabeth Godfrey, *A Sister of Prince Rupert* (London: J. Lane, the Bodley Head, 1909).
17. Friedrich Walter, "Sekten Niderlassungen in Mannheim unter Karl Ludwig," *Mannheimer Geschichtsblätter* II:3 (March 1901), pp.56-62. See also F. Walter, *Geschichte Mannheims von den ersten Anfängen bis zum Übergang an Baden 1802* (Mannheim, 1907), p. 171; Josef Beck, *Die Geschichtsbücher der Wiedertäufer in Osterreich-Ungarn* (Vienna: Bohlau, 1883); Fontes Rerum Austriacarum II:43, p. 492 (In disem 654 Jar, im Octobris haben wir aus der Pfalz bericht und anlass empfangen, daz wir gelegenheit haben kondten, allda ein gemain auffzurichten); also Ziegelschmid, p. 612.
18. Charlotte of Hesse-Cassel. See Morrah, p. 294.
19. Sigismund Rákóczi, second son of George I and Susanna Lórántffy, sympathized with the Puritans. His role in the employment of John Amos Comenius is well known. Sigismund was the founder of the library at the College of Sárospatak, Hungary.
20. This "bare minimum," of course, included such necessities as Henrietta Maria's attendants — two ushers, a court preacher, a physician, a secretary, two pages, two lackeys, a tailor, four coachmen, two footmen, a groom, a cook, a mistress of the robes, four maids-of-honour, two princely ladies' maids, a sewing maid, two laundresses, and a number of servants to look after the attendants. Godfrey, p. 238.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
22. Caspar Maurer, *Ungarische Chronica* (Nuremberg: M. & J. Endter, 1664), pp. 244-45: "Im Jahr Christi 1651, hatte Sigismundus der jüngere Fürst in Siebenbürgen mit Henrietta geborner Pfaltzgräfin bey Rhein Hochzeit, welche aber beyde bald darauf, so wol der Fürst, als die Fürstin mit Todt abgangen, man sagt dass man ihnen mit Gifft soll vergeben haben."
23. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
24. Warburton, p. 445.
25. Wittman, pp. 69, 109-10: "The Danish King's emissary to Bethlen had to dress like an apothecary in order to gain access to the Prince; Bethlen, in return, sent his message to Sweden inside barrels of Tokay wine." Pharmacists and barber surgeons were usually Anabaptists in Hungary.
26. Johann Joachim Bechers, *Närrische Weiszheit und weise Narrheit...*(Frankfurt: Johann Peter Zubrod, 1682), pp. 48-50.
27. "Mannheim," in the *Mennonite Encyclopedia* 3, p. 469.
28. Peter C. Newman, *Company of Adventurers* (Markham, Ont.: Penguin Books, 1985).
29. Károly Horváth, "Angol-magyar kapcsolatok" [English-Hungarian Connections], in *Országos Magyar Hadimuzeum-Egyesület* [National War-Museum Society of Hungary], ed. Elemér Czakó (Budapest, 1928), p. 15.

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Immigration and Re-migration: The Changing Urban-Rural Distribution of Hungarian Canadians, 1886-1986

N.F. Dreisziger

The settlement of Hungarians in Canada is traditionally dated from 1885-86 when *Magyar* and Slavic peasants from Hungary established the earliest Hungarian colonies on the Prairies. The first such colony came about near Minnedosa, Manitoba, and the second, near the site of Esterhazy, Saskatchewan. These early Hungarian settlers in the Canadian West were transmigrants from the United States, in particular, from the mining and smelting towns of Pennsylvania. In the 1890s they were followed by more of their countrymen, most of them coming directly from Hungary. Although by this time a few immigrants from that country were showing up in Canadian cities, the vast majority of Hungarians in Canada were rural residents. Even two decades after the turn of the century, in 1921, when Canada's population was divided equally between rural and urban inhabitants, nearly 74 per cent of Hungarians in the country still resided in rural districts. In fact, 68 per cent of them lived in largely agricultural Saskatchewan.[1]

Sixty years later, in 1981, the census results spoke of a very different Hungarian-Canadian ethnic group. First of all, it was no longer based in Saskatchewan or even in the Canadian West. According to the census data of that year, a little more than half of Canada's Hungarian population (51 per cent to be exact), resided in Ontario. At the same time Saskatchewan's share declined to 9.5 per cent.[2] Second, even greater changes had taken place in the group's urban-rural distribution. At the time of the 1981 census, 82 per cent of Hungarian Canadians were urban residents. Farm population (as distinct from non-farm rural people) among them had declined to a mere 6.4 per cent of the total.[3]

This paper will outline this dramatic transformation and will try to determine its probable causes. It will suggest that the changes

wrought in the urban-rural distribution of the Hungarian-Canadian community were caused not only by evolving economic and social conditions in Canada, but also by the changing nature of the immigration from Hungary. In arguing this, the paper wishes to highlight the close relationship that exists between immigration (or, more precisely, the nature or characteristics of a wave of immigrants) and the newcomers' choice of destination in Canada, as well as the re-migrations that they often undertake after arrival.

This essay will also try to determine the main stages and most important turning-points of the transformation of the Hungarian-Canadian community from a largely rural society to a predominantly urban one. It will also pay some attention to regional trends in the urbanization of Canada's Hungarian population, and will note major local deviations from regional and provincial tendencies displayed by Hungarian-Canadian communities. While it is evident that the foresaking of a predominantly rural lifestyle for an urban one has wrought extensive and significant changes in the Hungarian-Canadian community's economic, social and cultural circumstances, the details of this transformation, and its impact on the lives of individual Hungarian Canadians, can not be examined here as an exhaustive treatment of these themes would require more space than is available in this volume. In fact, such a treatise might well constitute a series of future papers or even a book.

* * *

Although, as has been noted, the vast majority of early Hungarian newcomers to Canada settled in farming districts, there always were a few *Magyar* immigrants who preferred to work and live in cities or other non-agricultural settlements. The very first of these were the people who took employment in the coal mines of Lethbridge in the District of Alberta during the second half of the 1880s. They were followed by other Hungarians who sought work in other mining towns of the Canadian West.

At the turn of the century, Hungarians began to appear in Canada's industrial centres as well. There are records of their presence in Niagara Falls, Ontario, and North Sydney, Nova Scotia. In the former location they were being employed in the construction of hydro-electric generating stations, while in the latter community they worked in iron foundries. In both locations it seems, they were brought in from the United States.[4]

Soon after the turn of the century, Hungarians began to appear in other Canadian industrial centres as well, for instance, in Windsor,

Galt, Welland, Brantford, and Hamilton. In the latter two centres they even established several lay and religious organizations.[5] In the meantime, the urbanization of Hungarians began — continued, if we consider turn-of-the-century Lethbridge an urban centre — in Western Canada as well. There, the largest colony of *Magyar*s grew up in Winnipeg. It started around 1900 and became a colony of several hundred people in a few years. By about 1910 it had become one of the most advanced Hungarian colonies in Canada in terms of the number, variety and size of its immigrant institutions.[6]

The First World War brought important changes in the life of Canada's Hungarian community and, in particular, in the process of its urbanization. In many respects, the war caused setbacks in the development of the Hungarian ethnic group's institutional life. The restrictions placed on organizations of "enemy aliens," and the general climate of public opinion which made life for Hungarians in Canada unpleasant, resulted in a decline of community life in many Hungarian colonies. At the same time, the internal migrations that the war induced, resulted in the emergence of new concentrations of Hungarians in the country, mainly in industrialized Central Canada. As a result of wartime migration to manufacturing centres, the Hungarian colonies in cities such as Hamilton and Brantford continued to grow, and Hungarians began appearing in several Ontario centres where they had not lived before. The largest growth was recorded by the Hungarian colony in Welland. By the time of the 1921 census, Welland would have over two hundred Hungarian residents, with hundreds of other Hungarians living in adjacent industrial centres.[7]

The decade of the 1920s was to bring even more dramatic changes in the development of Canada's Hungarian community, and especially in its urban-rural distribution. The most important general cause of these changes has to be sought in the evolution of Canada's economy in this period. The continued development of manufacturing, the rapid growth of the cities of Central Canada, and the existence of major public works programmes such as the construction of the Welland Canal, help to explain the influx of Hungarians into the urban centres from Windsor to Montreal. The more specific cause of the drastic transformation of the group in the 1920s was the arrival in Canada of over 27,000 new Hungarian immigrants mainly during the second half of the decade. Since this development constituted the immediate cause of the beginning of rapid urbanization for the Hungarian-Canadian ethnic group, it must be examined in some detail.

* * *

Two external factors should be mentioned in order to make clear the historical context of the influx of Hungarians into Canada during the 1920s. One of these was the imposition of "quota laws" on immigration into the United States. The other development that was to have a profound effect on the movement of Hungarians out of East Central Europe in the 1920s, was the dismemberment of the Kingdom of Hungary after the war.

The overall effect of the introduction of the "quota system" in the United States was the stimulation of the immigration of Hungarians to Canada. Prior to 1914, the destination of most overseas emigrants from Hungary was the American Republic. With the "quota," the door became shut to the vast majority of *Magyar*s seeking to start life anew in "America." Increasingly, people wishing to leave Hungary and settle overseas looked to Canada as a possible place of emigration.

The dismemberment of Hungary in the wake of World War I had a similar effect. It should be explained that the peace settlement with Hungary awarded two-thirds of the old Hungarian Kingdom's territory to the so-called successor states: Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia (the states that arose mainly in the place of the dissolved Habsburg Empire). Much of this territory was inhabited by non-Hungarians; however, some of it had mixed population, or even largely Hungarian population. The overall result was that, as a consequence of the peace settlement, well over three million Hungarians found themselves under alien rule. Some of them were forced to leave their native villages or cities. Most of these tried first to start life anew in what was left of Hungary, but found economic conditions there unattractive and, as a result, decided to emigrate overseas. Some among those who stayed under Czech, Romanian or Yugoslav administration, found life in their new country of residence, and especially service in their armed forces, unpleasant. Many of these people, too, eventually decided on emigration to the New World. Their decision was made easier by the local authorities. Apparently, the Yugoslav and Romanian governments of the time, while discouraging the emigration of South Slav and Romanian elements respectively, were quite happy to see the Hungarians leave.[8]

While the post-war peace settlements were in a large part responsible for the immigration to Canada of those Hungarians whose homelands were transferred to the successor states, they also

created conditions that tended to induce more residents of Hungary itself to contemplate emigration than would have been the case without the imposition of an onerous peace settlement. By creating severe economic dislocations in the country (through disrupting internal trade patterns, transportation, labour supply etc), the peace treaty with Hungary caused much hardship for the people of that country, and encouraged some of them to emigrate.

The influx of Hungarians to Canada that started in 1924 — after restrictions on their entry were relaxed by Ottawa — differed in some respects from that which had taken place before 1914. An important difference from our point of view was the fact that the social composition of the new wave of Hungarian immigrants was somewhat different from that of the old. While a large majority of the newcomers hailed from Hungary's villages, there were hundreds among them who were not agricultural workers, but middle-class elements whose jobs or lands were lost when Hungary was dismembered. At the same time, the members of the new immigration tended to be people with better education than their pre-1914 equivalents. Most of them were people who had some familiarity with city life.

There were important Canadian conditions that contributed to the flight of the new Hungarian immigrants away from agricultural work during the 1920s, and at the same time, their migration from the prairie provinces (where most new arrivals were directed by Canadian immigration authorities), to the cities of Central Canada. One of these was the growing dearth of good agricultural land available for homesteading. The result was that by the second half of the 1920s, immigrants to the prairie provinces were being settled mainly in northern districts with lands that could only be described as marginal. In the meantime, farms with better land, in regions with more hospitable climates, went up in price and were beyond the reach of impoverished newcomers. At the same time, there was also a decline in the demand for most types of farm-work. Increased mechanization of farm operations in the West reduced the need for farm labour. At certain stages of the agricultural season, such as at harvest-time, help was still needed, but this type of employment was not conducive to the permanent settlement of newcomers on the prairies. Employment conditions for agricultural workers began deteriorating even before the economic crash in 1929 and became very bad with the onset of the Great Depression in the fall of that year.[9]

The coming of thousands of Hungarian immigrants who were not so strongly inclined toward farm-work as their pre-1914 counter-

parts had been, and the increasingly unfavourable conditions for agricultural pursuits on the prairies resulted in a near-wholesale transformation of Hungarian-Canadian society during the 1920s.[10] From an ethnic group that was predominantly rural-based and centred on the prairie provinces, within a decade the Hungarian-Canadian community became a group characterized by a nearly even distribution between rural and urban residents, and between residents of the largely agricultural prairie provinces and those living elsewhere, especially in Central Canada.

A brief look at the group's census statistics will illustrate the magnitude of its transformation in the 1920s. Despite the great influx of Hungarians, between the censuses of 1921 and 1931, Saskatchewan's Hungarian population increased by only 48 per cent. At the same time, Ontario's underwent an eight-fold increase, and Quebec's (more precisely, that of the City of Montreal) increased from a few hundred to over four thousand.[11] The change in the group's urban-rural ratios in this period is equally impressive. As it has been mentioned, in 1921 three out of every four Hungarian Canadians were rural residents. Ten years later, almost half had become urban dwellers. In 1921, only 11 per cent of them lived in cities (as opposed to towns and other non-rural communities); by 1931, this figure had grown to 30 per cent. From being the 25th-most-urbanized Canadian ethnic group in 1921, Hungarians moved to the rank of 12th within the course of a decade.[12]

This transformation resulted in a large growth of individual urban colonies of Hungarians in Canada. Existing urban concentrations doubled, trebled and quadrupled in size as a result of the influx of Hungarians into Canada's cities. Remarkable was the growth of the size of the Hungarian colonies in medium-sized cities such as Windsor, Welland, and Niagara Falls. Among larger industrial centres, Winnipeg and Hamilton experienced a large increase in the size of their Hungarian colonies. The former had the largest and most influential urban Hungarian community in the West, while the latter was called the "Hungarian capital of Eastern Canada" by a visiting journalist from Hungary.[13] But the most remarkable growth took place in the Hungarian colonies of Canada's two largest cities, Montreal and Toronto.

The beginnings of Montreal's Hungarian community go back to before 1914. There is even evidence that the few score of Hungarian-speaking Jewish residents of that city had a synagogue of their own prior to 1914.[14] Nevertheless, substantial growth in the size of the city's Hungarian colony had to await the second half of the 1920s. Once this growth started, it was very rapid. Within a few

years, the number of Montreal's Hungarians grew from a few hundred to several thousand. With the increase in numbers came the establishment of immigrant institutions. The first to get started were the ethnic churches: a United Church congregation and then a Roman Catholic parish. These were followed by lay organizations, serving social purposes or acting as meeting grounds for special groups of Hungarians or other immigrants from Hungary. For example, the late 1920s saw the establishment of the Székely Cultural Society, for Hungarians from the Székely counties of eastern Transylvania; and also the German-Hungarian Club for German-speaking newcomers from Hungary.[15] There can be no doubt that the beginning of religious and lay ethnic community life in the city played a role in attracting additional Hungarian immigrants.

The story of Toronto's Hungarian community is similar. Many of the early Hungarian-speaking settlers in the city were Jews. The mass influx of Hungarians into Toronto did not start until the second half of the 1920s. The increase of the colony's size was followed by the establishment of Hungarian congregations and social clubs.[16] It is interesting that, while by the end of the decade, Toronto's Hungarian colony had become one of the largest in Ontario, nevertheless many of the leading immigrant institutions of Hungarians in the province remained in smaller cities with older Hungarian colonies. Two of the largest Hungarian sick-benefit associations in Ontario, for example, continued to operate out of Hamilton and Brantford long after Toronto's Hungarian colony surpassed those of these two cities in size.[17]

Census statistics reveal that the group that led this flow of Hungarians into the urban centres of Canada during the 1920s was the latest wave of arrivals. By the time of the 1931 census, 62.4 per cent of those Hungarians who had entered Canada after 1925 were now urban residents. For the groups that came in the previous five years, the figure was 54 per cent. For the pre-war generations, the figures were much lower. Only 39 per cent of those who came between 1911 and 1920 were city dwellers in 1931. For those who came before 1910, the figure was 29 per cent.[18]

* * *

One of the consequences of the Great Depression for the Hungarian-Canadian community was the interruption of the group's rapid urbanization that had started in the 1920s. A reason for the termination of the mass influx into the cities was the decline

in the immigration of Hungarians. Still another reason was the fact that, in the 1930s, many immigrants' search for a place to eke out a living led them to a rural setting, in parts of Canada other than the prairies.

Immigration of agricultural labourers into Canada did not cease immediately with the onset of the Depression in the fall of 1929. During the following spring and summer, newcomers continued to arrive, only to swell the ranks of the unemployed in the country. Even after a ban was placed by Ottawa on the entry of additional masses of farm-workers, a trickle of Hungarian immigration proceeded as wives and children continued to join young men who had arrived in Canada before the Depression.[19] No doubt many of these also ended up in Canada's cities.

The historical evidence regarding the internal migrations of minority groups in Canada is meagre. The standard source that helps historians to gauge the results of these migrations is the Canadian census. Unfortunately, the censuses rarely coincided with the main stages of Canada's demographic and economic evolution. Had a census been taken in the fall of 1929, we would have a more accurate record of the state of the Hungarian-Canadian group's demographic evolution both during the 1920s and during the Depression years. Unfortunately, the census was taken in the summer of 1931, and its statistics incorporate in them not only the demographic trends of the 1920s, but also the impact of the first year-and-a-half of the Depression period.

There can be little doubt that the initial impact of the Depression on the Hungarian-Canadian community was to accentuate its rapid urbanization. As economic conditions became very bad on the prairies, the traditionally wheat-growing area of the Canadian West, Hungarian agricultural workers, as well as families driven off their homesteads, headed for the cities in search of employment. Not finding any means of livelihood there either, they continued their search for months, and in some cases, for years. In the end, some Hungarian immigrants were able to find work in parts of Canada where little or no concentrations of Hungarians had existed before. In the West, Hungarians found employment or farming opportunities in the agricultural districts of the Lower Fraser and Okanagan valleys of British Columbia, and in the sugar-beet growing regions of Southern Alberta. In Ontario, they found a livelihood in the so-called "tobacco-belt," in the vicinity of the towns of Delhi and Tillsonburg.[20]

The overall result of these migrations was a slight setback to the process of the Hungarian group's urbanization. The census statistics

confirm this fact and reflect the demographic transformation that the Depression wrought in Canada.[21] Although the Depression gradually began to lift during the late 1930s, there was no dramatic improvement in the employment prospects of Hungarian Canadians until the second or third year of the Second World War. It is reasonable to suppose then, that the results of the June 1941 census reflect predominantly the changes in Hungarian-Canadian urban-rural distribution that had been caused by the Depression. It may be useful to look at some of the 1941 census results not already mentioned earlier.

The 1941 census is particularly useful to the student of Hungarian-Canadian history. It prompted many questions and, more important from our point of view, it avoided the practice, all too prevalent in later censuses, of lumping Hungarians together with "other Europeans" when reporting the answers to these questions. The overall result is that the 1941 census tells more about Hungarian-Canadian urban colonies than most other censuses.

The 1941 data reveal remarkable similarities and dissimilarities about the various Hungarian-Canadian residential concentrations in Canada's cities. It shows, for example, that many of them were very much the products of the "new" (i.e. post-1924) immigration, while a few others were obviously communities of the pre-1914 wave of immigrants and their descendants. The best example of the former was the largest grouping of Hungarians in Canada, the *Magyar* colony of Montreal. About 80 per cent of its membership was made up of immigrants (as opposed to Hungarian Canadians born in this country). It may be assumed that the remainder was made up mainly of these newcomers' children. Moreover, the census data also tell that a vast majority (94 per cent) of the immigrant members of this colony, came to Canada after 1921. In this respect, the Hungarian colonies of Toronto, Windsor, Calgary, and even to some extent that of Hamilton, were similar to Montreal's. All were made up largely of immigrants. Three out of every four Hungarian Canadians in Toronto, and two out of every three in Windsor and Hamilton, were immigrants rather than Canadian-born. Much like in Montreal, post-1921 arrivals predominated in all of these cities' Hungarian colonies.[22]

At the opposite extreme was the Hungarian colony of Regina. Though it did not appear a very important centre of Hungarian community life in 1941, that city had the largest Hungarian community west of Ontario. It was very much a concentration of the early immigrants and their descendants. First of all, nearly

two-thirds of its members were Canadian — more precisely, Saskatchewan-born. Furthermore, even among the city's immigrant Hungarian population, pre-1921 arrivals predominated, though only by a narrow margin.[23]

Between the extremes of the "new" Hungarian-Canadian urban settlements (Montreal, Calgary, Toronto), and the archetype of the "old" (Regina), stood the Hungarian colonies of Winnipeg and Vancouver. Almost half the Hungarian population of each was made up of the Canadian-born, while the predominance of the post-1921 arrivals was not so sharp among the immigrant population as it was in the case of the "new" settlements (a little more than 70 per cent, as opposed to over 90 per cent).[24]

Some of the data in the 1941 census allow us to speculate where some Canadian-born members of Canada's Hungarian urban colonies came from. For each Hungarian-Canadian metropolitan colony, it is possible to establish what proportion of its second- and third-generation ethnic population were born outside of the province of their 1941 residence. In this regard, too, the census reveals extreme differences among the various Hungarian-Canadian urban groupings. The data reveals, for example, that over 98 per cent of Regina's Canadian-born Hungarian population was from Saskatchewan. The extreme opposite case was the Hungarian-Canadian colony of Vancouver: nearly two-thirds of its Canadian-born members were from outside of the "home province." These figures might suggest that Vancouver's Hungarian colony was the product not only of immigrant Hungarians from Europe, but of Canadian-born Hungarians from various parts of Canada. At the same time, Regina's *Magyar* colony was hardly touched by the interprovincial migration of second- and third-generation Hungarian Canadians. It is quite interesting that in this respect, Montreal's Hungarian colony, which differed so much from Regina's in the "vintage" of its members, was also one that had been quite unaffected by the in-migration of Canadian-born Hungarians from provinces other than Quebec. Only one per cent of the Montreal colony's population was made up of such transmigrants. Toronto's colony differed in this respect considerably; 6.2 per cent of its members were born in Canada outside of Ontario.[25]

The 1941 census offers some concrete data on the place of last permanent residence of Canada's immigrant population.[26] These statistics help us in determining to what extent the urban colonies of immigrant Hungarian Canadians were made up of transmigrants (i.e. of people who previous to the time of the census had resided in

another province of Canada). More important, these data also reveal in which province these people had lived prior to their settlement in their 1941 place of residence.

As has been mentioned earlier, Vancouver was the home of the largest proportion of the Canadian-born Hungarian-Canadian transmigrants in the country. The statistics regarding the last permanent place of residence of Hungarian immigrants confirm that this city was also the home of the largest proportion of immigrant Hungarian transmigrants. Nearly 60 per cent of the city's immigrant *Magyar* population had resided, prior to settling in Vancouver, in a province other than British Columbia. Two other Hungarian-Canadian urban colonies had a fair number of transmigrants among their immigrant population: Toronto and Windsor. In both places, one out of every four Hungarian immigrants had lived outside of Ontario since their arrival in Canada. The Hungarian-Canadian immigrant urban colony with the smallest portion of interprovincial transmigrants was, as might be expected, Regina. Apparently, only people who had not tasted life in any other part of Canada but Saskatchewan tended to settle in that city.

In talking about Saskatchewan, it should be mentioned that that province was the single most important source of Hungarian immigrant transmigrants for every major Hungarian-Canadian urban colony. Every one of these groupings of Hungarians received more interprovincial transmigrants from Saskatchewan than from any other single province, although in the case of Vancouver those coming from Alberta, and in the case of Toronto those coming from Manitoba, were a very close second. Toronto, Hamilton and Windsor among them accounted for more than four hundred of these Hungarian transmigrants from Saskatchewan. There can be little doubt that, as the Canadian economy continued to gear up for war production during the second half of 1941 and thereafter, even more Hungarian Canadians in general, and more Hungarian Saskatchewanians in particular, were attracted to industrial centres such as Vancouver, Windsor, Hamilton and Toronto.

* * *

1941 brought a turnabout in Canada's economic development. Jobs became plentiful in the country's growing war-time industries, and men could work to their hearts' content. Historians are fortunate to have a detailed and probably quite accurate account of the impact of these new economic conditions on Hungarian Canadians. During 1942, as part of the federal government's efforts

to improve relations with Canada's immigrant ethnic community, a few individuals were commissioned to report on the state of affairs of a small number of Canadian ethnic groups. Probably the best of these reports was done on the Hungarians.[27] Its author was a certain "Dr." Béla Eisner, a leading figure of Montreal's Hungarian community. His report depicts not only the economic conditions of Hungarians in Canada at the time, but also their state of attitudes. Both lent themselves to feverish economic activity on their part. Most members of this group were very anxious to make up for the missed economic opportunities of the 1930s, and worked as much as they could, in order to save as much money as possible. Many of them seemed to have been certain that the abundance of jobs was a temporary, wartime phenomenon and that, come the end of the war, devaluation and depression would follow, and immigrants would lose their jobs in the factories. This attitude tended to reinforce the immigrants' determination to earn as much as they possibly could while the special conditions lasted, and to save or invest the money they had earned. In southern Ontario's cities especially, Eisner saw unparalleled efforts by Hungarians to make the most of the economic upturn.

In the West, the situation was somewhat different. Gradually, better economic conditions were returning to the farms, but with wages having gone up, it was not possible to attract agricultural workers to the farms. In the cities of the West, job opportunities for Hungarians were not as plentiful as they were in Ontario, for example. Although Eisner does not discuss the issue of transmigrations, it is evident from his report that conditions were ripe for the continued influx of Hungarian Canadians from the prairies to the manufacturing centres of Canada, and it was undoubtedly taking place. Unfortunately, once again we have to say that census statistics do not show this wartime migration accurately. As it has been mentioned, the 1941 census came too early to indicate this trend, and the next census incorporates into its results the impact of six post-war years, and the beginning of a new wave of Hungarian immigration to Canada. Nevertheless, the 1951 census data are interesting, and they document the transformation that the Hungarian-Canadian group's urban-rural distribution had undergone in the decade after 1941.

The 1951 census, despite its annoying practice of frequently lumping Hungarians together with "other Europeans," still allows us to get glimpses of some aspects of the transformation wrought by the war in Hungarian-Canadian society. This can be done by looking at the statistics regarding the pre-1941 arrivals, i.e. the members of

the "old" (as opposed to the post-1945) immigration, wherever such figures can be found. These figures indicate that during the war, another massive shift had taken place in the geographic distribution of Hungarian Canadians, on the whole in favour of Ontario. Among cities that made substantial gains were Toronto, Hamilton, Vancouver and Calgary. In fact, in 1951 the city with the largest concentration of pre-1945 Hungarian immigrants was Hamilton. The second was Toronto. For this category of Hungarian Canadians, the City of Montreal in 1951 stood only third.[28]

* * *

On the eve of the 1950s, Hungarian-Canadian society was on the threshold of a transformation even greater than that caused by the war years. This was the coming of a new wave of immigrants during 1948-52, only to be followed by still another, a much larger wave half a decade later. The movement of the post-World War II refugees began in the 1948-49 fiscal year, when 1,400 Hungarians arrived in the country. They were followed by 1,600 in the following year, and about 2,000 in 1950-51. In the 1951-52 fiscal year a total of about 4,500 Hungarians entered Canada. While Canadian officials directed many members of the new immigration to various parts of Canada, including the West, by the time of the 1951 census most of them were living in Central Canada's cities. Nearly 1,100 of them seem to have settled in Toronto alone. Montreal was the second most desirable place of settlement for them; 800 of them chose it as their home. Hamilton was selected by some 250. In the West, only Winnipeg attracted more than 200 of the newcomers.[29]

The above statistics deal either with the pre-1941 immigrants or the post-Second World War arrivals. Despite the deficiencies of the 1951 census, much interesting information can be gleaned from its data on Hungarian-Canadian society as a whole, the Canadian-born as well as the "old" and the "new" immigrants, all included. The first fact that should be mentioned in connection with this census is that it marked the point of no return in the movement of Hungarian Canadians to Central Canada and to Canada's cities. In 1951, 53.4 per cent of Hungarian Canadians, that is, 32,309 out of 60,460, lived in Central Canada, predominantly in Ontario.[30] The province with the second largest *Magyar* population (12,470) however, continued to be Saskatchewan. The urban-rural ratio for the whole group had also shifted irreversibly in favour of the cities. The 1951 census showed that 33,217 Hungarians, or 54.9 per cent of them, lived in Canada's towns and cities.[31]

For Hungarian-Canadian society, Quebec remained the most urbanized province. There, 95.6 per cent of Hungarian Canadians lived in cities, i.e. in Montreal and sister municipalities. For Ontario, the figure was 68.4 per cent. Saskatchewan remained the "least urbanized" province, with only 17.9 per cent of its Hungarians living in urban centres.[32]

The three largest Hungarian-Canadian urban colonies in 1951 were in Hamilton, Montreal and Toronto. They each numbered somewhat in excess of 3,000 members, more if we count neighbouring municipalities or suburbs. Other large centres were: Windsor (2,044), Welland (1,456), Calgary (1,204), Regina (1,157), Vancouver (1,054), Winnipeg (943), Brantford (900) and Lethbridge (832).[33]

The census figures also permit us to establish which sections or parts of Hungarian-Canadian society were most urbanized and which were the least. While only 48.1 per cent of Canadian-born Hungarians were urbanized, 61.4 per cent of immigrant Hungarians lived in cities by 1951. For those who had come before 1911, the urban-rural ratio was quite low, only 42.3 per cent. For later arrivals, the ratios were much higher: for the very numerous 1921-30 group for example, it was 61.1 per cent, and for the latest (post-1945) newcomers, it was just over 70 per cent.[34] The trend was evident: every new wave of immigrants from Hungary was more likely to settle in cities than the previous one. It is not surprising then, that the arrival of still another, even larger, wave of Hungarian immigrants during the second half of the 1950s would reinforce the demographic trends set in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.

* * *

There can be no doubt that one of the most important events in the evolution of the Hungarian-Canadian ethnic group was the arrival, in the wake of the 1956 events in Hungary, of some 37,000 refugees. This group represented the largest wave of Hungarians ever to come to Canada. Its arrival had an impact on every aspect of Hungarian-Canadian evolution, including urban-rural distribution.[35] The fact is that the coming of the refugees reinforced the long-standing trend of increasing concentration of Hungarians in Canada's industrialized provinces and in particular, in large cities.

The 1961 census confirms this observation. It indicates that 47 per cent of the newcomers had settled in Ontario. Quebec became the home of nearly 23 per cent, and British Columbia, of 12 per cent.

Alberta received 9 per cent of the refugees, while Manitoba, Saskatchewan and the Atlantic provinces received the remainder.[36]

What is even more interesting from our point of view, is that nine out of ten refugees had settled in cities. The metropolitan area that received the largest group of them was Toronto. Nearly 8,700 refugees had settled in that city by 1961. Montreal, whose cosmopolitan atmosphere must have been a great attraction to many Hungarians, became the home of well over 7,000 of the newcomers. Vancouver received about 2,200 of them, and Winnipeg 1,740. The next most popular cities for the refugees were Calgary and Hamilton. A good number of them chose Edmonton and Ottawa as places for settlement. The influx of refugees to these and other urban centres helped to increase the urban-rural ratio of Hungarian Canadians to nearly 75 per cent.[37]

With the arrival of the refugees in 1956-57, large-scale immigration from Hungary came to an end. Hungarians continued to come to Canada in small numbers, in part as a result of family unification programmes throughout the 1960s and even later. Hungarians have continued to leave Hungary — legally or illegally — to our days, and many of these more recent emigrants have made their way to Canada. Occasionally, Hungarians have come to Canada from countries other than Hungary. For example, in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, hundreds of Hungarian citizens of that country came to Canada as refugees.

While new immigration had little influence over urban-rural distribution after 1960, natural population growth (or the lack of it) and internal migrations continued to influence the geographic distribution of Hungarian Canadians. Their distribution throughout Canada kept changing. The changes were recorded by the censuses. From 1961 to 1981 three of Canada's provinces (and here we ignore Atlantic Canada which was never the home of much more than one per cent of the total Hungarian-Canadian population) had a declining Hungarian population. The province that experienced the steepest relative decline was Quebec, whose 12.3 per cent share of the total in 1961 had declined to 8.4 by 1981. The causes of this trend have not been studied in detail. In part, they may have been economic; however, Quebec's "quiet revolution" and the rise of French-Canadian nationalism might have been a contributing factor in the obvious exodus of Hungarians from the province. Almost as steep a decline as Quebec's was experienced by Saskatchewan. The third province to experience a decline in the size of its Hungarian population (from 5,443 in 1961 to 4,160 twenty years later) was Manitoba.[38]

The provinces that have experienced a relative if not always absolute increase in the size of their Hungarian-Canadian populations were Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. After 1971 the growth recorded by the census is only relative, as in 1981 the census for the first time accepted "multiple ancestries" with the result that the number of people in Canada who gave Hungarian as their only ancestry declined considerably.[39] In the case of Ontario, and to a lesser extent Alberta, this "relative" growth was very gradual, while in the case of B.C., it was a little steeper. In 1961 that province was home to just about one in ten Hungarian Canadians. By 1981, the figure was close to one in seven. Incidentally, by that year, Ontario's share of the total Hungarian-Canadian population exceeded 50 per cent for the first time, although by a narrow margin only (0.8 per cent).[40]

Urban ratios (i.e. percentage of the urbanized) also kept changing, although rather slowly. For the group as a whole, that ratio had reached 80.8 per cent by 1971. For 1981, the figure was 82.1 per cent. Furthermore, by then, nearly half (49.1 per cent) of Hungarian Canadians were living in centres of over 500,000 inhabitants.[41] Urban ratios for the provinces ranged from 94.5 per cent for Quebec, to 50.1 per cent for Saskatchewan. For those living in centres of half-a-million or over, it went as high as 89 per cent (Quebec).[42]

Conclusion

From being one of the least urbanized groups in Canada at the end of the nineteenth century, Hungarian Canadians have become one of the most urbanized today. Even in 1921, when for the first time half of all Canadians were found living in cities, three-quarters of Hungarian Canadians were rural residents. Today, when three out of four Canadians live in cities, the figure for Hungarians is greater than four out of five. The explanation for this transformation does not lie entirely in the changes that Canada has undergone in the past several decades. Definitely, the evolution of the Canadian economy has had an important impact on the movement of Hungarians from the farms to the cities. Such developments as the increasing mechanization of agriculture, the decline of the West's wheat economy, the advent of large-scale manufacturing, and then the rise of an economy based largely on service industries, all helped to propel Hungarian Canadians from rural to urban settings, or to prompt newcomers to head straight for metropolitan centres. Had these been the only factors though, Hungarian-Canadian society's

urbanization would not have proceeded at the pace it did, and certainly not at a much greater speed than that of the Canadian population at large.

It has been suggested in this paper that an important factor in the rapid urbanization of Hungarians in this country has been the coming of newer waves of Hungarian immigrants whose social and occupational composition varied, and whose members' propensity for rural or urban life differed — in some cases considerably. The periods of extensive re-migration of Hungarian immigrants, and of rapid growth in Hungarian-Canadian urban colonies coincided with, or followed in the wake of, the arrival of a new wave of *Magyar* immigrants. This trend has been confirmed in the census results of 1931 and 1961. It has also been demonstrated that those who flocked to the cities in ever increasing numbers, since the turn of the century, were the members of the most recent stream of Hungarian immigrants.

It has been pointed out that the first group to give a massive boost to the urbanization of Hungarian Canadians was the immigration influx of the 1920s, and that the social composition of this group of new arrivals differed to some extent from that of the pre-1914 wave. The desire of Canada's immigration officials to exclude non-agrarian elements notwithstanding, many Hungarians entered the country who were not entirely or even primarily "agricultural" types. Some of them were *declasse* middle-class elements, former members of Hungary's bureaucracy or nobility, whose jobs or lands were lost when Hungary was dismembered. Others were people with rural backgrounds who had had a taste of city life acquired, in many cases during the war when peasant soldiers took their leaves in cities or were stationed in or near them. The overall consequence of their coming to Canada was an increased likelihood for their eventual settlement in urban areas.

The argument that the social and occupational makeup of the 1920s immigration differed from its pre-1914 counterpart should not be over-stressed. Despite the presence of many hundreds of non-agricultural types among these newcomers, the overwhelming majority was of peasant stock. Most of these people probably would have preferred to settle on Canadian farms, had economic conditions in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s been favourable to such a lifestyle. However, in the case of the post-1945 Hungarian newcomers, the argument concerning the differing nature of each new immigration stream reinforcing the trend toward urbanization becomes stronger.

According to Canadian immigration records, the majority of the

postwar Hungarian immigrants (or "displaced persons") were agricultural workers or labourers who were expected to find employment on Canada's farming, mining, or lumbering frontier. But the records are misleading. Many people denied their schooling and training if they felt that doing so would improve their chances of admission into the country.[43] Though it is not possible to make an accurate guess, it is probable that a large portion of displaced persons were well-educated or highly trained workers or professionals unlikely to settle permanently in rural areas. In fact, it is well known that such people were disproportionately represented among the masses of people who fled from Hungary at the end of the war and after. It was these people who had the most to lose as the result of a Russian occupation of their country, and they were the most likely to flee. Poor peasants and workers, unless they had been officers in Hungary's armed forces or police during the war, had fewer reasons to leave.

While the conditions that governed the departure of the displaced persons from Hungary had little to do with the exodus of the refugees in 1956, research has revealed that the refugees also constituted a special element in Hungarian society. The social, occupational and even religious composition of this group tended to make for the rapid urbanization of its members once they began settling in Canada. One of the most remarkable features of the refugees as a group was the predominance of young people among them. Of the 37,565 Hungarians who entered Canada in 1956-57, almost a third were under the age of twenty-four, while only about 5,000 were over forty-five.[44] Thousands of them were university students, intent on careers as professionals and on urban life. Among the refugees, Jews were disproportionately represented. It has been estimated that almost 7,000 Hungarian Jews entered Canada after the revolution.[45] Hungary's Jews were highly urbanized, and there is every reason to believe that the overwhelming majority of those that came to Canada settled in the main centres of Jewish-Canadian culture: Montreal and Toronto. But it is the occupational composition of the refugees that helps to explain best why they headed for and remained in Canada's urban centres.

According to well-informed sources, professional and intellectual elements were over-represented among the refugees. Nearly a quarter of refugee men and more than a third of refugee women belonged to this category.[46] A great many of them were engineers, medical doctors and technicians. A large portion of the refugees, especially refugee men, were skilled workers: mechanics, metal workers, electricians, pipe fitters and so on. Apparently, agricultural

workers were hardly to be found among the mass exodus from Hungary.[47] The majority of the refugees came from Hungarian cities — in particular, Budapest. In view of these facts, it is not surprising that the vast majority of these newcomers settled in Canada's metropolitan centres — despite the fact that on arrival they tended to be directed elsewhere by immigration officials.

Once the large, active Hungarian communities were established in major Canadian cities, as they were in Montreal and Toronto in the 1920s and in Vancouver in the late 1950s, they tended to serve as magnets for Hungarians who had settled elsewhere in Canada. Thus, the movement to the cities, quite heavy during and immediately after the arrival of a new wave of Hungarian newcomers to the country, continued — albeit somewhat more gradually — even after the new arrivals had established themselves in their new Canadian environment.

During the mid- and late 1930s, the Depression thwarted, and in some regions even reversed, this trend toward increasing urbanization. In the 1960s and the 1970s, however, there were no major economic or political developments that would have had similar results. The main exception was the Province of Quebec — in particular, Montreal — where the political atmosphere of the time resulted in an outmigration of Hungarians. Elsewhere in Canada, the growth of Hungarian Canadian urban communities continued, even in these decades, partly at the expense of rural settlements. As a result of these processes, Hungarian Canadians, at one time comprising one of the least urbanized groups in the country, have become one of the most urbanized. As it has been outlined in this paper, the explanation lies only partly in the changing economic and social conditions of Canada. Of course, the general trend to an increasingly urban life in North America was an important determinant. The fact that by 1921 only half of Canada's population was living in the cities, while by the 1980s a little over three-quarters were, had a definite impact on Hungarian-Canadian lifestyles as well. As it has been mentioned, however, the re-settlement of Hungarian Canadians in Canada's cities took place at a much more rapid pace than that of the Canadian population as a whole. This paper has attempted to show that an important cause of this phenomenon has been the post-World War I arrival of three new waves of Hungarian immigrants, each with a social and occupational composition that differed from that of the previous one, and each made up of people with social and educational backgrounds that varied from those of the previous waves.

The propensity of Hungarian immigrants for country or city

living should not be seen as a factor that worked independently from or contrary to other economic and social forces that prompted newcomers to re-migrate after their initial settlement in Canada. In most cases, the various factors resulting in re-migration undoubtedly reinforced each other. This had also been the case over hundred years ago when bad economic conditions in the mining and iron-producing towns of Pennsylvania, along with a nostalgic longing for the agricultural way of life, induced the first Hungarian-Canadian pioneers to abandon their urban lifestyle and return to that of their peasant forefathers.[48] During the century that followed, the Hungarian immigrants' preference for city life combined with economic and other forces and resulted in a population flow in the opposite direction: from the countryside to the cities. It remains to be seen whether the second century of Hungarian-Canadian evolution, in an age that promises to bring ever more rapid technological and societal change, will reinforce the trends of the first, or reverse them.

Notes

My research on the history of Hungarians in Canada has been supported through the years by grants from the Multiculturalism Sector of the Secretary of State of Canada, for which I am thankful. An earlier and shorter version of this paper was read at the meeting of the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association in 1985. Graphs and pie-charts illustrating that presentation are available on request; their publication would have driven the cost of printing this volume sky high. I am indebted for comments on this paper to Professor M.L. Kovacs and two anonymous readers. Perhaps I should add that the paper I prepared for the 1986 meeting of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada could not be printed in this volume as it had been accepted for publication elsewhere prior to the conference.

1. *Census of Canada, 1921,* Vol. I. Table 24.
2. Canada, Statistics Canada, *Update from the 1981 Census, Highlights on Ethnicitiy...* (Ottawa, 1983), pp. 1-3.
3. 1981 Census of Canada, Population: Ethnic Origins (Ottawa, 1984), Table 2. These figures are based on people with Hungarian only (as opposed to Hungarian and other) ethnic origin.
4. N.F. Dreisziger *et al.* (eds.) *Struggle and Hope: The Hungarian-Canadian Experience* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), pp. 94f. Unless otherwise noted, references are to the chapters written by myself; and, unless otherwise noted, references to my works are to various parts of this book.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 95f.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 95 and 105.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
8. Information from Robert England, personal interview, Victoria, October 1984. England was the Canadian National Railways' immigration agent in these countries during the late 1920s.
9. For detailed descriptions of these conditions, especially as they pertained to Hungarian newcomers to Canada, see the reports of Hungarian Vice-Consul for

Winnipeg, István Schefbeck Petényi, to the Hungarian Foreign Office in Budapest. Cited in Dreisziger, note 62, p. 134. See also *ibid.*, pp. 139f.
10. Dreisziger, chapter 5 "A Deacade of Setbacks: The 1930s."
11. Dreisziger, pp. 101-03.
12. For more details see *ibid.*, pp. 108f.
13. Ödön Paizs, *Magyarok Kanadaban* [Hungarians in Canada] (Budapest, 1928). Hamilton's Hungarian colony is described in fair detail; see pp. 198-206.
14. Dreisziger, p. 103. Much useful information is available on Montreal's early Hungarian community in Mihály Fehér, *Jubilee Album, Magyar Reformed Church, 1926-1966* (Montreal, 1966).
15. Dreisziger, pp. 103f.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
17. *Ibid.*
18. N.F. Dreisziger, "Aspects of Hungarian Settlement in Canada, 1921-1931," in M.L. Kovacs (ed.) *Hungarian-Canadian Perspectives, Selected Papers* (Ottawa, 1980), special issue of the *Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies* Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring, 1980), pp. 51f.
19. Dreisziger, *Struggle*, p. 144.
20. *Ibid.* Also: Linda Degh, *People in the Tobacco Belt: Four Lives* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1975).
21. Dreisziger, *Struggle*, p. 146. In 1931 almost a half of Hungarians in Canada (49.5 per cent), were urban residents. Ten years later, only 47 per cent were. Regional or, more precisely, provincial trends are also interesting. In Alberta, urban-rural ratios declined during the decade from 31.4 per cent, to 24.7 per cent. In Manitoba, a similar trend prevailed. In the prairie region, only Saskatchewan experienced a slight increase in the urban-rural ratio of its Hungarian residents: it went up from 18.6 per cent to 20.7. Elsewhere in the country, Ontario saw the decline of the urban-rural distribution of its Hungarian population from 73 per cent to 63 per cent.
22. Calculations based on figures provided in the *Census of Canada, 1941*, Vol. IV, Table 22: "Population by birthplace, racial origin..." and Table 27, "Immigrant population by period of immigration..."
23. Calculations based on data provided *ibid.* Many of Regina's Hungarian-speaking residents were Székelys from the former Austro-Hungarian province of Bukovina. They formed the backbone of the Regina Hungarian Cultural Club. Information from Professor Kovacs.
24. Calculations based on figures provided in the *Census of Canada, 1941*, Vol. IV, Table 22.
25. Calculations based on data provided in Table 21, *ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*, Table 25 "Migrant population by place of last permanent residence,..."
27. Béla Eisner, "Report of my Good-Will Visit to the Communities of Hungarian Origin..." ms. Most of the Eisner papers are in my possession.
28. *Census of Canada, 1951* Vol. II (Ottawa, 1953), Table 60.
29. *Ibid.*, Table 61. Dreisziger, pp. 195f. Also: Susan M. Papp, "Hungarian Immigration After 1945," in Susan M. Papp (ed.), *Hungarians in Ontario*: special double issue of *Polyphony*, Vol. II, Nos. 2-3 (1979-80), pp. 45ff.
30. *Census of Canada, 1951,* Vol. I, Table 32, "Population by origin and sex, for provinces and territories,..."
31. *Ibid.*, Table 33. The ratio of those living in "big cities", those with populations of over 100,000, was only 25.6 per cent.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*, Table 35.
34. *Ibid.*, Vol. II. Table 40.
35. For a detailed treatment of the impact of 1956 and the coming of the refugees on Hungarian-Canadian society see N.F. Dreisziger, "The Impact of the Revolution on Hungarians Abroad: The Case of the Hungarian Canadians," in B.K. Kiraly, B. Lotze, and N.F. Dreisziger (eds.) *The First War Between Socialist States: The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and Its Impact* (New York: Social Science Monographs, Brooklyn

College Press, 1984), pp. 411-25. Also: S.M. Papp, "Flight and Settlement: the '56ers," in Papp, pp. 63-70.
36. Dreisziger, *Struggle*, p. 210.
37. *Ibid.* For these data see *Census of Canada, 1961*, Vol. I, Part 3, Table 125.
38. For a brief discussion of post-1961 demographic trends see Dreisziger, pp., 221f.
39. The complete picture became clear late in 1983 when, in response to a request by the staff of the Multiculturalism Directorate, the data on Hungarians of all origins were released by Statistics Canada. Still later these data were published. The figures are:

Persons of Hungarian and British origin:	14,325
Persons of Hungarian and French origin:	2,680
Persons of Hungarian and other origin:	9,375
Persons of Hungarian, British, French and other origin:	1,425
All Hungarian categories (including "Hungarian only")	144,195

I am indebted to John Kralt and Judy Young, both of the Multiculturalism Directorate, for passing this information on to me.
40. 1981 Census of Canada, Population, Ethnic Origin, Table 1, "Population by Ethnic origin..."
41. *Ibid.*, Table 2.
42. *Ibid.* The data for the whole of the country are:

Province:	% urbanized	% in cities with 500.000 or more
Quebec	94.5	89.0
Ontario	86.0	50.1
Manitoba	81.9	67.3
Saskatchewan	51.7	n.a.
Alberta	82.6	57.0
British Columbia	81.2	46.2

43. Papp, "Hungarian Immigration," pp. 45 and 47. Also, Dreisziger, p. 196.
44. Gerald S. Dirks, *Canada's Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism?* (Montreal: McGill Queen's Press, 1977), p. 203.
45. B.L. Vigod, *The Jews in Canada* (Ottawa, Canadian Historical Association, 1984), p. 6.
46. Miklós Szántó, "Kivándorlás, emigráció, emigrációs politika" [Emigration, The Emigration, Emigrant Politics], *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), Vol. 37, No. 5, p. 95.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 96. The exception to this generalization is the people who fled from the villages along the Austrian, and to a lesser extent, the Yugoslav border. Many among these were agricultural types.
48. Martin L. Kovacs, "From Industries to Farming," *Hungarian Studies Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Spring 1981), pp. 45-60.

Hungarian Studies Review Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Fall 1986).

Some Demographic Comparisons between the Present Canadian and Hungarian Populations

Adele Csima

Canadians of Hungarian origin may have several reasons to be interested in a demographic comparison, especially of health and mortality statistics, between their old country and their new one. Many of us still have close ties with the homeland, having relatives and friends in Hungary whose well-being is of concern to us. We are also interested in how immigration has improved our living conditions. Canada can serve as a golden standard, since her mortality rate is among the lowest in the world, and her standards of health care, socio-environmental conditions and nutrition among the best. Recent studies have shown how immigrants adapt to their new country. The longer the immigrants are in the land, the more they become part of the general population statistics. We may conclude that environmental factors are more strongly tied to disease development than are genetic factors.

Population Size and Density

Canada is the second largest country (in area) in the world; Hungary ranks 105th among 215. In terms of population, the gap is not nearly as wide — Canada with 25 million is 31st and Hungary with 11 million is 57th.

Canada's population density is among the world's lowest, with 2.6 inhabitants/square kilometre. Of its 10 million square kilometre total area, 7 per cent is covered with lakes, and only one-third of the remaining land is developed. In contrast, Hungary's area is less than one hundredth that of Canada, but her population density is 115/square kilometre. This is more than five times that of Canada's

most densely populated province, Prince Edward Island, and 11 times that of Ontario.

In spite of Canada's low population density, more Canadians than Hungarians live in cities of more than 100,000 population. Canada has 25 such cities, containing 52 per cent of her population, while Hungary has only 9 similar cities, representing 31 per cent of the total population.

Hungarians in Canada, defined as those reporting Hungarian as their mother tongue, comprise only one-third of one per cent of Canada's population. Of these 83,700 people, only 64,700 were actually born in Hungary. They favour urban living, with 59 per cent being inhabitants of cities of greater than 100,000 population.

Population Growth

A fundamental fact about population is its rate of growth, affecting almost every aspect of national life. In recent years Canada's population increased annually by 8 per 1,000 population. The world average is 18. It has been predicted that Canada's annual level of growth will increase to anywhere from 11 to 28 per 1,000 and thus, by the year 2000, Canada's population will be 30 per cent higher than now, about 31.6 million.[1]

Hungary is one of a handful of nations with a negative growth rate. In Europe, only West Germany and Denmark share this characteristic. Hungary's population decrease was 2 per 1,000 population in 1984. In the last five years the population decreased by about 50,000, and it is projected that the net loss will continue at the same rate, which means that by the year 2000, Hungary will have lost 150,000 citizens.[2]

Population change is influenced by birth, death and net migration (difference between immigration and emigration). Later we will examine all these factors separately.

Age and Sex Structure of the Two Populations

Examining a graph of the population "pyramid" offers us insight into the present age and sex composition of a population, as well as some important historical and current changes and trends. *Figure 1* shows a Canadian and a Hungarian pyramid. (See the "editors' note" at the end of this paper) The vertical axis measures age by

years, with young people at the bottom and the elderly at the top. For each age group, a bar is drawn proportionately to represent the percentage contribution of that age and sex group to the total population. On both pyramids we see that the right side (females) is larger than the left (males), indicating that there are more females than males in the total population. Males represent 49.6 per cent of Canada's population, but only 48.4 per cent of Hungary's. This phenomenon is found in most developed countries, and it is mainly due to men dying at an earlier age than women. Worldwide, for every 1,000 girls, 1,050 boys are born. Although three male infants die for every two female, the excess of boys continues into the teens. Alcohol-related accidents are the main cause of death among adults in their early twenties, but since they are much more frequent among males, the ratio of males to females declines even further, until by age 40 there are 991 men for every 1,000 women in Canada — and only 910 in Hungary. The sex ratio steadily decreases at higher ages, as heart attack, as the primary cause of death in the over 60 age group, also occurs more frequently among males. Now there are about 680 males per 1,000 females in both countries. Health professionals believe that this disparity will disappear in thirty or forty years because of the changing lifestyle of women. With more of them smoking and working in high-pressure executive and business positions, they are also being subjected to more health risks.

Neither is there much difference between the two population pyramids in the old-to-young ratio. One new problem common to all developed countries is the aging of their populations. With birth-rates decreasing and lifespans increasing, the "grey revolution" becomes alarming. Twenty years ago, 11 per cent of the population of Canada was over 60; now it is 15 per cent. Hungary is worse off in this respect, with corresponding figures of 14 per cent and 18 per cent. The problem of an aging population is that more and more people will have to be supported by a smaller and smaller tax-base, and health services will be severely strained.

The most dramatic difference between the two pyramids is one of contour. The Canadian curve is relatively smoother, showing the effect of the postwar baby boom, with a bulge at the 33-36-year-old level in 1981 (i.e., born in 1945-48). Some decline in fecundity seems to have started in 1964-65.

The erratic contour of the Hungarian pyramid allows for a wide range of speculation as to the reasons for each bulge and dip. The large gap at ages 65-68 reflects the loss of life during the Second World War in the 21-25-year age group. The losses are about equal

for both sexes. Canadian war losses were not substantial enough to show up on the pyramid. The 1945 baby boom is noticeable to a degree among the 39-year-olds on the Hungarian graph, but a much larger boom seems to have occurred in 1953-56. This may be due to changes in abortion laws and government policies in promoting fertility; it could also partly be due to the political changes in and after 1953. After the 1956 revolution, the decline can be partially explained by the emigration of a large number of women of child-bearing age.

The next increase in births, in 1975, may have been due to the introduction of the "gyes" (maternity assistance) programs, which allowed the mother to stay at home with the baby for three years with 75 per cent of her salary. This program is still in effect, but the initial enthusiasm for it has worn off. A recent survey indicated that financial difficulties and a lack of housing are the major reasons for the overall decline in the birth-rate since 1975.[3]

Marital Status

The marital status of each age group is also indicated. Canada has more single people over 15, 31 per cent (men) and 25 per cent (women), than Hungary with 23 and 14 per cent respectively. The percentages for the over 40 age group are more similar, 8 and 7 versus 5 and 4. On the other hand, Hungary has twice as many divorced people per population as Canada, and somewhat more widows and widowers. In both countries there are about five times as many widows as widowers. The average age difference in couples is 2.2 years in Canada and 3.1 years in Hungary. People also marry later in Hungary, at 27.7 and 24.6 years of age for males and females respectively, while in Canada, males were married at an average age of 25.7 and females at 23.5 in 1981. Five years previous, both of the averages were two years lower in Canada,[4] but in Hungary they have been constant for at least ten years.[5]

The marriage rate has declined slightly in both countries, while divorces are rapidly increasing. The divorce rate in Canada has doubled in the last ten years and we have now reached the stage whereby every third marriage is expected to end in divorce.[6] In Hungary this rate is even higher; 39 per cent of marriages end in divorce. There the increase has been slower; it was already 24 per cent in 1970, but still it has doubled since 1960. There has been no change in the duration of marriage. The median is around 10 years in Canada and 8.5 years in Hungary.[7]

Birth Rate

The decreasing rate of birth is a widespread phenomenon in developed nations, but in most countries the decrease is not as pronounced as that observed in Hungary in the last few years. *Figure 2* shows the difference between Canada and Hungary in live births per 1,000 population from 1960 on.

Another measure of fertility is the number of children a woman is likely to bear in her lifetime, expectations being based on present fertility rates within the different age groups. Canadian and Hungarian women are predicted to raise an equal number of 1.7 children. To maintain either population, 2.2 children are needed per woman, and each child must survive to adulthood. In Canada immigration as well contributes to population, and this explains the positive growth, while Hungary is actually losing people.

Decreasing fecundity also manifests itself in the largeness of the family. In Canada the average size has decreased from 3.1 to 2.9 in the last five years, and in Hungary from 2.8 to 2.7 in the same period. It might be noted here that Hungarians are the least prolific ethnic group in Canada.

The improvement of birth control in technological societies is largely responsible for the general decrease in birth-rates. In spite of this, abortion laws still have an effect on overall fecundity. In Canada, where only therapeutic abortions are permitted, 17.8 abortions occur for every 100 live births. This statistic has not changed in the last five years.[8] In Hungary it is relatively easy to get an abortion for any of several reasons, which has led to an average for all age groups of 62 abortions per 100 live births. However, 40 to 49-year-old women undergo 741 abortions for every 100 live births. The average rate for all age groups was twice as large in the 1960s and 1970s, but since 1975 it has been fluctuating between 50 and 60. The following are the most common reasons for abortions:[9]

Woman not married	23%
Too many live children already	21
Woman over 35	21
Illness	15
No place to live	9
Other social problems	11

Migration

In the last decade, the Canadian population had a net annual

increase of about 100,000 through immigration, though there has been a decline in both immigration and emigration since 1974. In 1981 some 129,000 people entered the country and 42,000 left. *Figure 4* shows the country of origin of the immigrants in 1981. Emigration was mainly to the United States and Great Britain.[10]

Between 1956 and 1958, close to 40,000 Hungarians made Canada their home. In more recent years, about 500 Hungarians have received resident status each year. Fifty per cent of Hungarian immigrants have chosen Ontario as their place of residence, but compared to the population of the province, Saskatchewan has the highest percentage of Hungarians (1.1 per cent). Next is the Yukon Territory (0.83 per cent), and Ontario is third (0.69 per cent). Newfoundland is the least favoured province, by far.[11]

Hungarian demographic documents do not contain information about migration out of the country, probably because of the very small number of occurrences. Statistics on people coming to live in Hungary do not exist either. It is safe to assume that there is some immigration to Hungary as well, from neighbouring countries and through the return of former citizens.

Mortality Rates

A major factor in population dynamics is longevity. A Canadian male born in 1981 is expected to live 71.9 years; a female, 79.0 years. Hungarians are not quite so fortunate. Their males can look forward to 65.6 years and the females to 73.5 years. Canada has one of the highest life expectancy rates in the world; the highest is to be found in Japan, with 73.4 and 79.1 years respectively.[12]

The infant mortality rate has a considerable influence upon the calculation of life expectancy, first, because it is relatively high compared to other mortality rates among the young, and second, because it causes the greatest loss in total life years. Differences in health standards among countries are often (incorrectly) linked to infant mortality alone. In this century, this rate has declined everywhere. In Canada it has fallen from 102 per 1,000 live births to 9 per 1,000 today. The main reasons are improved nutrition, health care and living conditions, and fewer children born to older mothers. In Hungary in the same period, the rate went down from 193 to 19, but it is still more than twice that of Canada. Prematurity and low birth weight, risk factors for infant mortality, are said to be on the rise in Hungary, possibly as a result of the frequent abortions.

Mortality rates in all other age groups also declined over the last

decade in Canada, with a steady decrease throughout the older age groups. *Figure 5* shows the changes in male mortality rates by age during this period, for Canada and for Hungary. Only the male curves are presented because, while the female curves show very similar patterns, the changes are much smaller. As the graph indicates, Hungary's mortality rate is on the increase, especially for middle-aged males. The country shares this characteristic with very few other nations. The largest increase occurred in the 55-59 age group, from 14.8 to 22.7 male deaths per 1,000 population, a 53 per cent increase.[13]

Moreover, in comparing the present mortality rates for the two countries, we see that Canada has a lower rate than Hungary in every age group, for both sexes (see *Figure 6*). The largest differences in percentage may be seen when we compare middle-aged males (35-49) in both countries. At ages 40-44, the Hungarian death rate of 7 per 1,000 males is 2.5 times higher than the Canadian rate of 2.8.[14]

Causes of Death

The leading causes of death are similar in their order of importance in the two countries, but not in degree. We see from *Figure 7* that cardiovascular diseases are responsible, to roughly the same extent in both countries, for the largest proportion of deaths. Cerebrovascular deaths (strokes) are much more common in Hungary than in Canada, and more common with females than with males in both countries. All cancers, and those of lungs and breasts in particular, are more preponderant in Canada. Accidents claim slightly more Canadian males than they do females, but more women than men in Hungary, while liver complications, probably alcohol-induced in most cases, are more common in Hungary for both sexes. In fact, deaths due to liver disease are 3.7 times more frequent for Hungarian males than for their Canadian counterparts, and 3.4 times for Hungarian females.[15]

Figures for specific age and sex groups differ markedly from figures for the general population. Pronounced discrepancies can be found between the two countries, as for instance among 10-24-year-old males, for whom accidents are responsible for 65 per cent of the deaths in Canada, though only 44 per cent in Hungary. On the other hand, cardiovascular disease in Hungary takes a much larger toll among 25-44-year-old males than it does in Canada, with 22 and 17 per cent respectively.

Suicide and homicide are also bigger problems in Hungary than in Canada. The following table offers a comparison:

Suicide (and Homicide) Rates per 10,000 Population

Country	Males	Females
Canada	2.1 (0.29)	0.7 (0.17)
Hungary	6.7 (0.40)	2.6 (0.21)

When we break down these figures by age groups, we find that in Canada, the rates are almost the same across the board except for a slight increase with age; however, there is a wide range in the Hungarian rates, rising in the higher age groups from 1.7 to 25.0 per thousand of population among males. At age 15-19, the rate is actually smaller than in Canada, but after age 65, it is six times larger.

Males are murdered more often than females in both countries, but the discrepancy between the sexes is slight.

Changes in Cause-Specific Mortality Rates in the Last Decade

The 20 per cent increase in the Hungarian mortality rate during the last decade is evident in almost every cause-specific death rate other than that regarding infectious diseases. The largest absolute increase was observed in strokes and heart disease, but the highest *percentage* increase was registered by liver diseases, which went up by a staggering 204 per cent, according to the following table:[16]

Cause of death	Per cent increase
Liver diseases	204
Respiratory diseases (bronchitis, asthma, emphysema)	136
Lung cancer	60
Suicide	32
Stroke	31
Cancer (all sites other than lung)	16
Heart diseases	15

The Canadian mortality rate decreased across the board by 4 per cent between 1971 and 1981. But there are some causes of death for which the rate is rising. The most striking of these is lung cancer in

females, which rose by 140 per cent. It is obviously tied to the increase in smoking among women. Lung cancer deaths increased in men also, by 40 per cent. Other rises in death rates are also connected with lifestyle. Liver disease deaths went up 28 per cent for males and 18 per cent for females, and suicide 23 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively. All cancer other than that of the lungs increased by 7 per cent for both sexes. These hikes are smaller than in Hungary, but in view of the improvements in other rates they are reasons for concern. Health professionals have realized that emphasis has to be shifted from curative practices to prevention through programs encouraging a healthier lifestyle.

Lifestyle Factors

The health of an individual is largely dependent on his lifestyle. Some aspects are completely controlled by the person, such as smoking, alcohol consumption and physical activity. Reports linking cigarette smoking to lung cancer began to appear as early as the 1920s. Since that time, there has been considerable accumulated evidence associating smoking not only with many forms of cancer, but also with cardiovascular diseases, bronchitis and perinatal mortality when the mother smokes.

In spite of this, average tobacco consumption among persons 15 or over increased steadily in Canada in the last 25 to 30 years. Although the number of male smokers has declined since 1970, the number of female smokers has stayed the same in most age groups, and in the 15-19 group it even increased. At present about 44 per cent of males and 36 per cent of females smoke in Canada. The highest percentage of smokers is in the 20-25 age group, with 52 per cent for males and 49 per cent for females. The sex difference in smoking behaviour is somewhat less marked in the younger than in the older generations and is almost non-existent in the 15-19 age group.[17]

Smoking is slightly more popular among Hungarian males than among males in Canada, but surprisingly, Hungarian females smoke considerably less than their Canadian counterparts. In Hungary, 47 per cent of males aged 15 and over smoke. The rate is highest (60 per cent) for the 30-35-year-olds. Afterwards there is a gradual decline to 23 per cent at age 85 and older. The overall smoking rate for females is 21 per cent; at its highest it is 40 per cent in the 25-30 age group, but it declines sharply after that to 4 per cent for those 60 and over.[18] Compare this to 16 per cent for the same age group among Canadian women.

Moderate consumption of alcohol should not pose a health hazard, but beyond a certain level, which varies with the individual, it becomes harmful. Besides a largely increased risk of accidents, alcohol dependence may lead to cirrhosis of the liver, some forms of cancer and mental diseases. Alcohol consumption has been steadily increasing in most civilized countries since 1970. In Canada it has increased by 34 per cent in the last decade. About 80 per cent of the adult population drink occasionally, and two-thirds consume an alcoholic beverage at least once a week. Only 5 per cent are former drinkers. There are more male drinkers in every age group than females, and the biggest difference occurs among those who have more than two drinks per day. Twenty per cent of all males and 5 per cent of females belong in this category.[19]

According to the Hungarian report, only two-thirds of the males and slightly more than a quarter of the females consume alcohol occasionally or regularly, that is, at least one drink per week. These numbers are even lower than the Canadian figures of 70 per cent and 50 per cent respectively. The discrepancy may indeed be due mainly to the reporting system. The Canadian survey reported the frequency and quantity of alcohol consumption, but the Hungarian survey simply asked people if they drank regularly, occasionally, or not at all, leaving it up to them to decide what occasional meant.[20] It is noteworthy that even among the 15-19 age group in Canada, for whom it is unlawful to drink, 75 per cent said they were at least occasional drinkers.

While smoking and drinking are hazardous, physical activity carries with it many benefits such as lower heart-rate, blood pressure and level of stress and tension. On a five-point scale, 26 per cent of Canadian males and 18 per cent of females belong to the very active, and 20 per cent of both sexes to the moderately actively, groups.[21] The Hungarian data were collected on a sport-participation basis. Competitive, organized sporting activity was reported by 4 per cent and 2 per cent of the male and female groups respectively, and leisure-time sport participation by 15 and 11 per cent. It would not be fair to compare very active Canadians with Hungarian sport participants because of possible differences in what is meant by "sport" for members of both nations.

The lifestyle characteristics described above do not explain the distinctions between health levels as measured by life expectancy and mortality rates in either country. To understand the reasons for these variations, other lifestyle factors such as eating and sleeping habits, leisure-time activities and drug use should be looked at and other determinants of health status examined, i.e., environmental

factors and respective health-care systems. Biological disparities between the individuals of the two populations cannot be important factors since differences in health levels are only present in certain age categories.

Notes

1. *Population Projections for Canada and the Provinces, 1972-2001* (Statistics Canada: Catalogue 91-514), p. 61.
2. *Az 1984. évi mikrocenzus adatai* [Data of the Microcensus of the Year 1984] (Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1984), p. 5.
3. Unpublished survey results. Survey conducted by the author.
4. "Tables of the 1971 and 1981 Census Data." Printed by special request, by Statistics Canada Microfilm Records. Requests can be made to Statistics Canada Offices, 25 St. Clair Avenue East, Toronto.
5. *Demográfiai évkönyv 1983* [Demographic Yearbook 1983] (Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1983), pp. 48, 49.
6. *The Canada Yearbook 1985* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada), p. 46.
7. *Demográfiai évkönyv*, p. 82.
8. *Canada Yearbook*, p. 107.
9. *Az 1984. évi mikrocenzus adatai*, p. 163.
10. *Canada Yearbook*, p. 47.
11. "Tables...Census Data."
12. *1986 Britannica Book of the Year* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1986).
13. *Demográfiai évkönyv*, pp. 171-72.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 173, and "Tables...Census Data."
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 196-97.
16. *Ibid.*
17. J. Ableson, P. Paddon, and C. Strohmenger, *Perspectives on Health* (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1983), Catalogue 82-540 E, pp. 30-32.
18. *Az 1984. évi mikrocenzus adatai*, p. 120.
19. Abelson, *et al.*, *Perspectives*, p. 26.
20. *Az 1984. évi mikrocenzus adatai*, p. 120.
21. Ableson, *et al.*, *Perspectives*, p. 34.

Author's note: The quoted figures cannot be found in the sources referred to, but have been arrived at through calculations using the basic data contained in the statistical tables provided in the sources.

Editors' note: Some of the charts and graphs illustrating this paper could not be printed for financial reasons. They are available (in photo-duplicated form) on request from our journal's editorial office.

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Táncház: Improvisatory Folk-Dancing and String Playing in Toronto's Hungarian Community

Stephen Satory

"Music is historically constructed, socially maintained and individually adapted;" this paradigm has been proposed by Tim Rice, as a paraphrase of Clifford Geertz.[1] I will adapt the above model for use in this paper in discussing the dynamics of folk music and also of folk-dancing in the Hungarian community of Toronto where I conducted field research from November 1984 to March 1985. Rather than dealing with Hungarian folk music generally, this paper will focus on its most recent importation to Toronto, the so-called *táncház* (dance-house) tradition of improvised dancing and Gypsy-style string band music.

Toronto's Hungarian traditions were historically constructed in three periods of immigration. The first period was the 1920s and 1930s; the second, the years directly after the Second World War; and the third, following the Revolution of 1956.[2] It is the immigrants of the last wave, the wave of 1956-57, who were largely responsible for the founding of several cultural and musical organizations in Toronto.[3]

The Hungarian Canadian Cultural Centre was founded in 1974 and has been the home of several organizations. The Kodaly Dance Ensemble, founded in 1963, rehearses there every week and has a combined membership of fifty to sixty dancers in the junior and senior groups. The senior group has ten to twelve couples, dancers ranging from fifteen to forty years of age. The Kodaly Chorus, the Ensemble's immediate progenitor, was founded in 1960. Nowadays it rehearses at the Cultural Centre as well, and has a membership of forty-five singers, largely first-generation immigrants in their forties, fifties and sixties. Further, a *citera* (zither) orchestra called the *Szivárvány Együttes* (Rainbow Ensemble) was begun in 1982 by István

Erdélyi. It has a membership of fifteen to twenty children, between the ages of ten and sixteen.

In addition, there are two string bands which rehearse in various members' basement recreation rooms. One group, *Életfa* (Tree of Life) was initiated in 1982-83 as the "house band" of the Kodaly Dance Ensemble and has three, sometimes four, players: a *primás*, or lead violin; one or two *brácsa* or viola players; and a *bőgő* or string bass player. Another string band, which has operated independently for nine years is *Feketeföld* (Black Earth). Unlike *Életfa*, *Feketeföld* has two lead violins or *primas-es*. *Primás* Árpád Verseghy — the founder of the group — can play all of the instruments, in the tradition of the Transylvanian village bands.[4]

It was in 1971-72 that the *táncház* movement was initiated in Hungary by the urban musicians, Béla Halmos and Ferenc Sebő. They had made extended folk music collecting trips to Hungarian villages in Transylvania, which had been under Romanian administration since the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. Halmos and Sebő managed to smuggle their field recordings across the border from Romania to Hungary. Almost at once, this Transylvanian village tradition of dance and music became an extremely popular means of entertainment and socializing in the newly founded *táncház* clubs of Budapest.

In Toronto, *táncház* dancing was first introduced in 1975-76 at rehearsals of the Kodaly Ensemble by its present leader, Kalman Dreisziger. The first Transylvanian string band was the *Mezőségi Banda*, the forerunner of *Feketeföld*, which made its first public appearance in 1976.[5]

The *táncház* tradition has been transmitted to Toronto in the following ways: firstly, musicians and dancers like Kalman Dreisziger have visited Hungary, often to attend workshops and seminars in string playing and dancing.[6] Moreover, they have brought back to Toronto cassette tapes of field recordings as well as many folk instruments and costumes. Secondly, Hungarian teachers of string playing and folk-dancing have visited Toronto to give *táncház* courses and seminars.[7] Thirdly, young Hungarians like Verseghy have encountered Hungarian and Transylvanian village music by obtaining recordings in libraries and in record shops.[8] Fourthly, members of Toronto's string bands have brought from Hungary and consistently used at rehearsals the transcriptions of dance tunes made by Halmos; these transcriptions contain skeletal melodies, conventional chord symbols and some song texts which are sung occasionally by the dancers. And lastly, folk musicians have used the well-known, fully detailed phonetic transcriptions of two Transylva-

nian village repertoires, which were published in Budapest in 1954 and 1955 by the ethnomusicologist, László Lajtha.[9]

Knowledge of Hungarian culture can be obtained in the new urban environment of Toronto through various other Hungarian organizations and institutions like the Hungarian scouting movement, various youth clubs and the Saturday Hungarian school held at the Cultural Centre. It is available at non-Hungarian institutions as well, for example in public libraries and in high school and university courses.

Before a discussion of the social maintenance of *táncház* dancing and music, it is necessary to define the improvisatory nature of *táncház*. Árpád Verseghy has related that the Transylvanian *primás* - who was invariably a Gypsy — originally played solo at village dance occasions; the *brácsa* and *bőgő* were added only in the late nineteenth century.[10] Given the framework of a village's specific style of musical ornamentation and the structure of the tunes, the *primás* was at liberty to improvise. To a limited extent, the *brácsa* and *bőgő* players could also add notes and change rhythms in improvisatory fashion. But it was invariably the *primás* who started the tunes, and the others followed suit only after they recognized the tune in question.[11]

Indeed, it is the improvisatory possibilities available to the Transylvanian village dancer that gave the dances of Transylvania their strongest definition. This was attested by the dance historian, choreographer, György Martin, when he wrote: "The stylistic essence of the general dance performance practice of the Carpathian Basin is an unusually large amount of individual improvisation."[12] The Carpathian Basin includes Hungary as well as Translyvania. In Hungary improvisatory dancing has long been on the decline, whereas in Transylvania's isolated Hungarian community, it has survived to the present day.

In an attempt to define the nature of *táncház* dancing, George Tömössy described a dancer's task as follows: "You're given a motif which fits a certain rhythm in the dance. You have to become accustomed to spotting a certain rhythm and a sequence of rhythms and applying certain combinations of steps and that can only be done through practice and listening to the music."[13] In fact, the freedom of the *táncház* dancer's improvisation is limited by three factors: specific musical rhythms and melodies that give rise to related, similarly specific, dance steps; the choice of steps which is limited by the style boundaries of the locality from which the dance and the musical dialect springs; and a certain limitation on style that is imposed by the community of dancers and musicians in Toronto and Budapest inasmuch as it was in the original Transylvanian

villages. As Linda Dégh wrote: "The creative freedom of the performer is limited by the traditional material and its controlling guardian, the community."[14]

The means by which *táncház* music and dance are socially maintained are highlighted by comparing the three venues in which *táncház* music and dance are preserved. In the Hungarian villages of Transylvania, *táncház* activity took the form of Friday evening get-togethers in community halls, in barns, in villagers' living rooms. There the dancing, accompanied by Gypsy string music, functioned as entertainment for villagers young and old, providing dancers with occasions for impromptu socializing and furnishing gainful employment for the members of the Gypsy string bands.[15]

In Hungary a strong tradition of choreographed dancing has been maintained, with government support, since the 1950s. Beginning in 1971, however, *táncház* clubs were founded in Budapest and other Hungarian cities to teach young people to improvise, using village dance dialects.[16] Moreover, recreational *táncház*-es transplanted village music and dancing onto city soil with success, thereby affording city dwellers, especially young people, opportunities for recreation and socializing in the improvisatory spirit of the villages. Today in Budapest, *táncház* sessions continue to be offered every day of the week.

Consistently with the pervasive world of rock and roll, several current Hungarian *táncház* bands like Muzsikas have introduced "Western" influences into their recordings. Thus, blues numbers — with harmonica and electric bass — alternate with village dance pieces. Furthermore, a number of *táncház* clubs have recently incorporated South Slavic dance-house styles (which are reportedly easier to perform than Transylvanian dialects) and Gypsy dances.[17]

The reasons for the consistent popularity of the *táncház* movement in Hungary are twofold: first, Hungarians need to make a palpable connection with the isolated Hungarian community of Transylvania — with the recent gradual easing of political tensions in Hungary, there has been growing concern in Hungary, and Canada as well, for the well-being of the oppressed Transylvanian Hungarians and a renewed interest in Transylvanian village life.[18] Second, in the continuing urban youth scene of Budapest, the *táncház* clubs are the direct descendants of the ballroom dance schools of the 1920s and 1930s and of the rock and blues clubs of the 1970s. Thus, the young people of Budapest and of other Hungarian cities have frequented dance clubs for several generations.

In Toronto it is the choreographed dancing that has been very successful.[19] However, most dancers and the community at large

however, have shown little interest in the *táncház* movement as a whole.[20] Why has the movement not been more popular in Toronto? The reason lies in the discrepancy between *táncház* and the values espoused by the local Hungarian community which are, in the words of informant Gabor Vaski, "goal orientation and hard work."[21]

Goal orientation is indeed not present in *táncház*, beyond the learning of dance dialects for their own sake. *Táncház* is improvisational, experimental, with no performing occasion in mind. Conversely, choreographed dancing does provide young dancers with the goal of gaining the approval of their parents and the community. Most of Toronto's Hungarian folk-dancers see *táncház* dancing not as hard work, but as an "unstructured activity." In it there is no regimentation, no obligation to participate, no commitment to stay. It has been described as a "free-for-all," with lots of smoking, drinking and telling of jokes — in short, a party atmosphere. All of these features clearly oppose the ethic of hard work that the immigrant Hungarian community is committed to foster.

Moreover, in being an art tied to the dialects of specific villages, *táncház* lacks the generalized Hungarian-ness of many choreographed dances, like the *csardas* and the *verbunkos*. Consequently, it also lacks the approbation that choreographed dance performances receive at patriotic ceremonies, like the commemorations of the Revolutions of 1848 and 1956. And lastly, choreographed dancing is preferred to *táncház* because of the community's interest in promulgating a concert tradition: most Hungarians do not participate in folk-dancing and are certainly not interested in learning difficult *táncház* dance dialects from remote Transylvanian villages, but they are a willing and supportive audience for "presentational" dancing.[22]

So, the *táncház* tradition with its recreational and improvisational nature has not "caught on" in Toronto on a community-wide basis. It can, however, be said to serve the needs of at least a small number of individuals, who come to it with a variety of unique backgrounds, unique even if they are united by their membership in the Canadian-Hungarian community. Several of these dedicated individuals continue to feel responsible for transmitting *táncház* to the Hungarian community.[23]

Táncház has been adapted and expressed by individuals in a variety of ways. It has served as a means of retaining and reinforcing ethnic identity for twenty-two-year-old Gabor Vaski. A full-time student of classical music and jazz, Vaski expresses his Hungarian-ness through dancing in the Kodaly Dance Ensemble, by playing *bőgő* in the *Életfa* band and by studying Hungarian language and

literature at the University of Toronto. He has visited Hungary twice, in 1975 and in 1980. He said in an interview that, "being Hungarian is extremely important to me, second only to my ambition to be a successful musician."[24]

Kalman Dreisziger, forty years of age, works in an advertising agency. He joined the Kodaly Dance Ensemble in 1964 and became its leader in the late 1970s. He has returned to Hungary on several visits, but it was during his visit to Transylvania in 1975 that he attended a *táncház* in the living room of a farmhouse. For him, *táncház* has served as a vehicle for nostalgia, the wish to re-experience the village life of a bygone era. He wrote in a recent article: "There is a need for Canadian dancers to make a link with Transylvanian dance culture, so that if they should go to Transylvania, they would fit right in ... they could enter into the ancient community and dance and make music with its members."[25]

Folk-dancing and playing in string bands has created strong friendships for many members and an opportunity for teamwork. Fifteen-year-old George Tömössy, in his third season as a dancer in the Kodaly Ensemble, said in an interview: "The fact that I'm with other people and the fact that we're making an effort to achieve something gives me a good feeling." He also valued the opportunity that dancing affords to keep in trim, "working up a sweat every Tuesday night."[26]

Violinist and *primás* Mária Kovács (pseudonym), twenty-six years old, began studying violin at the age of seven and played in the Toronto Symphony Youth Orchestra for three years. She first encountered *táncház* music in 1982 in a seminar given by the visiting Bela Halmos in Toronto. She was so taken then with *táncház* music that to focus on it, she gave up her classical music activity altogether.[27]

For thirty-four-year-old violinist and *primas* Árpád Verseghy, *táncház* is an all-consuming hobby. A professional music teacher, he has a large collection of field and studio recordings and makes his own folk instruments, the most recent of which is an authentic *cimbalom*.[28]

Táncház dancing affords individual dancers the enjoyment of their own virtuosity. The difficulty of the steps and the concentration needed to match the appropriate steps to musical cues provide a physical, intellectual and artistic challenge.

In conclusion, *táncház* has provided a focus of interest for young and energetic individual folk artists in the Toronto Hungarian community. These individuals have hoped to replicate the resounding success of the *táncház* movement in Hungary. However, most

dancers and the community as a whole have resisted the advance of this unique, improvisational art, preferring to stay with the pre-rehearsed, choreographed performances. The Hungarian community's preference for choreographed, presentational dancing can thus be understood in terms of its need to have a finished product, a demonstration of achievement at hand. In Hungary *táncház* has been steadily maintained alongside choreographed dancing, but in Toronto, most community support has gone to choreographed dancing. Despite the fact that the *táncház* tradition does not involve the whole of the community, it does remain a very rich source of culture for certain dedicated individuals.

Notes

1. See Clifford Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp.52,145. Professor Rice's paraphrase was first given on Feb. 20, 1985 in the Graduate Ethnomusicology Seminar, University of Toronto.
2. See Susan M. Papp-Zubrits, "Reflections of the Members of Three Waves of Hungarian Immigrants in Ontario," in *Roots and Realities among Eastern and Central Europeans* (Edmonton: Central and East European Studies Association of Canada, 1983), pp.155-64.
3. See George Bisztray, "Why 1956? Recent Cultural Changes in the Hungarian Community," in *Roots and Realities among Eastern and Central Europeans*, pp. 165-71. See also George Zaduban, "Hungary," in *Encyclopaedia of Music in Canada* (Montreal: Fides, 1983), p. 439.
4. See László Lajtha, *Körispataki Gyüjtes* [Körispatak Collection] (Budapest: Zenemükiadö, 1955), p. 9.
5. From interviews with Árpád Verseghy, Dec. 19, 1984 and Feb. 20, 1985. The group was initially called *Mezöségi Banda* because most of its repertoire at first originated in the Mezöség region of east-central Transylvania. Within a few months, however, its repertoire of various villages' dance music had considerably broadened, and the name *Mezöségi Banda* became too specific and narrow in the view of the band members. Thus the name change to *Feketeföld* soon followed.
6. From interviews with Mária Kovács (pseudonym) Feb. 15, 1985, with Gabor Vaski Feb. 7, 1985 and with Kalman Dreisziger Dec. 30, 1984 and Feb. 15, 1985.
7. For example, Béla Halmos, "the foremost teacher of Transylvanian-style violin playing" (Árpád Verseghy, Feb. 20, 1985) gave a seminar in Toronto in the summer of 1982; Matyas Pribojszki, the greatest Hungarian *citera* player of our day, gave a course in citera playing in Toronto in 1983.
8. It was the discovery at the Toronto Public Music Library of a record album of Hungarian folk music, published by UNESCO that first awakened the interest of Árpád Verseghy in village music-making and led, thereafter, to informal music-making sessions with friends and eventually to Gypsy-style string band playing in Toronto, that is, to Mezosegi Banda and Feketefold.
9. See Lajtha's very informative and vivid descriptions of village life and village Gypsy bands in the introductions of the two volumes, *Széki Gyüjtés* [Szék Collection] (Budapest: Zenemükiadó, 1954) and *Körispataki Gyüjtés* [Körispatak Collection] (Budapest: Zenemükiadó, 1955).
10. From the interview with Árpád Verseghy, Feb. 20, 1985. See also Bálint Sárosi, *Gypsy Music* (Budapest: Corvina, 1978).
11. See Lajtha, *Körispataki Gyüjtés*, p. 10.

12. See *Magyar Néptánchagyományok* [Hungarian Folk-Dance Traditions], ed. B. Andrásfalvy, etc. (Budapest: Zenemükiadó, 1980), p.12.
13. From the interview with George Tömössy, Feb. 26, 1985.
14. As quoted by Stephen Erdely in "Traditional and Individual Traits in the Songs of Three Hungarian Americans," in *Selected Reports in Ethnomusicology* III, no. 1, ed. J. Porter (Los Angeles: University of California, 1978), p.102.
15. See Lajtha, *loc. cit.*
16. See János Szász, "Beszélgetés Martin Györggyel az új folklórhullám és néptáncmozgalom elözményeiröl" [Conversation with György Martin Concerning the Sources of the New Folklore and Folk-Dance Movement], in *Kultura es Kozosseg* [Culture and Community] IV (Budapest, 1981).
17. From the interview with Árpád Verseghy, Feb. 20, 1985.
18. For accounts of the cultural, political and economic oppression of the Hungarians in Transylvania, see Anonymus Napocensis, "Methods of Rumanianization Employed in Transylvania," in *Witnesses to Cultural Genocide*, ed. G. Schopflin (New York: American Transylvanian Federation and Committee for Human Rights in Roumania, 1979); Ferenc Kunszabo, "Modernized Genocide," in *Transylvania and the Hungarian-Roumanian Problem*, ed. A.F. Sanborn and G.W. de Czege (Astor, Florida: Danubian Press, 1979); Bulcsu Veress, "The Status of Minority Rights in Transylvania: International Legal Expectations and Roumanian Realities," in *Transylvania: The Roots of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. J.F. Caldow, A. Ludanyi and L.J. Elteto (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1983); see also Katherine Verdery, *Transylvanian Villagers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
19. From interviews with Kalman Dreisziger (Dec. 30, 1984 and Feb. 15, 1985), Árpád Verseghy (Dec. 19, 1984 and Feb. 20, 1985), Mária Kovács (Feb. 15, 1985) and Gabor Vaski (Feb. 7, 1985).
20. *Ibid.*
21. From the interview with Gabor Vaski, Feb. 7, 1985.
22. Interview with Mária Kovács, Feb. 15, 1985.
23. See Kalman Dreisziger, "Magyar néptánccsoportok felelössége" [The Responsibility of Hungarian Folk-Dance Groups], in *Magyar Népmüvészet Kanadában* [Hungarian Folk Art in Canada] I, no. 1 (Dec. 1983).
24. Interview with Gabor Vaski, Feb. 7, 1985.
25. See Kalman Dreisziger, *op. cit.*
26. From the interview with George Tömössy, Feb. 26, 1985.
27. From the interview with Mária Kovács, Feb. 15, 1985. 28. From the interview with Árpád Verseghy, Dec. 19, 1984 and Feb. 20, 1985.

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The Rehabilitation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: British Postwar Planning in the Second World War

Robert H. Keyserlingk

In the interwar years, academics tended to consider the Austro-Hungarian Empire a "failure" and focussed their attention on the nationalities of eastern Europe. Then after 1945, a revolution occurred and there arose a truly remarkable proliferation of specialized studies on the Habsburg lands and peoples. A 1964 survey revealed that between the wars Austro-Hungarian history had been an inert area of academic publishing. Yet since the Second World War it has spawned 83 major books and 366 learned articles by 175 North American academics.[1] This achievement was celebrated in 1966 by an international conference of Habsburg scholars at Indiana University, at which Paul Schroeder reported with satisfaction on the past generation of an expansion in Habsburg studies in North America, while Adam Wandruska and Fritz Fellner reached the same conclusion with regard to Europe.[2]

At this meeting, Wandruska posed the question of why after 1945 there had appeared so many "Habsburg" publications. He gave, as the main reason, the postwar search within Austro-Hungarian history for a multinational model, or a solution to the evils of integral or extreme nationalism in the Danubian area.[3] After the Second World War, the main cause for the collapse of the region into disunity and conflict was seen to be nationalism. Perhaps the old multinational empire had, after all, something to teach the world. In 1968, the doyen of this new historical school, Robert Kann, proudly reflected that at the end of the war he had selected the nationality problem in the Austro-Hungarian Empire as his Columbia University thesis topic for this reason:

> It occurred to me to compile and comment on the various attempts that had been made towards a solution of the nationality

> problem in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in order to investigate to what extent they might correspond to the upcoming problems of a peaceful order in Europe. ... What interested me above all were the modifications of basic ideas of the nationality problem in a changing historical framework — possibly a framework of the future.[4]

The new postwar sympathy for the Habsburg monarchy of the previous generation represented a reversal in mood, from national towards multinational answers.

This paper will link this shift in sentiments to official post-World War II British plans for central and southeastern Europe. Assisted by some of the best academic minds available, the British and the American governments came to the conclusion, during the war, that Austria, Hungary, and the successor states were too weak to be set up again as independent states, but must instead be formed into some sort of Danubian federation; an Austria-Hungary without the Habsburgs. Despite Russian reservations, this federative program was to remain basic Allied policy to the end of the war. Whereas during the First World War propagandists had called for the dismemberment of the Empire in the interests of nationalism, by World War II, planners felt the breakup of Austria-Hungary had been a mistake and hoped to re-establish a multinational solution for the area. In the process, the old Austro-Hungarian Empire was rehabilitated. As the wartime academic planners returned to the universities with their new "multinational" conclusions, this view entered the mainstream of academic historical interest. Although this study will discuss the British side of the story, it is important to note that the Americans came to a similar conclusion during this period.

The Second World War was fought by the West, at first, not to bring about change in the international order, but to rescue Europe from Hitler; a later aim was to rebuild Europe on a sounder basis. The planners were certainly unable, at least in the early stages of the war — during which their own nations' existence was threatened — to conceive that the hostilities would end in a completely unexpected fashion with a weakened Britain, a strong Soviet presence in eastern Europe, and a United States deeply implicated in European affairs. Thus, planning in a wartime vacuum became, in effect, a series of historical seminars about the peace of 1919 and its consequences, rather than an analysis or speculation about an as yet unknown future of a very different nature. The net result was a sharp repudiation of some of the basic principles of the post-World War I

treaties, especially the touchstone of nationalism as a historically legitimate organizing factor for political life in central and south-eastern Europe.

Between the wars, the mysterious arena of foreign affairs was opened up for the first time to public and academic scrutiny, creating a large pool of interested citizens and scholarly experts. Wilson's 1917-19 "Inquiry," a private group of scholarly advisers to the peace conference, was the harbinger of change, which became more general as broader groups of people began asking how it had been possible for the nations to have fallen into such a bloody and costly war and unsatisfactory peace.[5] Large public, and publicly funded, bodies appeared on the scene to arouse public opinion about international relations that, before the war, had been the preserve of statesmen and professional diplomats. Two powerful (and public) international affairs organizations sprang from the British and American delegations to the 1919 Versailles conference: the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in London and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in New York.[6] Other interested groups, such as the various League of Nations and peace societies, prospered as well. New chairs of international affairs were established at universities, and history courses stressed international affairs more than ever. Public political inquiries studied the causes of war and the foundations of peace.

In the First World War, there had been little attempt to discuss a comprehensive peace settlement while hostilities continued. In the Second World War the planners hoped to avoid what they saw as the mistakes of the previous war by scanning the past for clues to a better future. Their historical approach was reinforced through a unique cooperation between official diplomatic planners and highly qualified academic experts from the universities, the RIIA and the CFR. Many of these leading outside experts pressed into planning service in the Second World War were the same scholars who, in World War I, had praised the principle of nationalism as the only basis for a legitimate and secure peace in Europe. In 1939 when the tragedy of war exploded once again, the scholarly RIIA and CFR almost immediately initiated studies on the future peace and offered their vast resources for research and planning to the Foreign Office and the State Department. The offers were gratefully accepted by busy diplomatic bureaux overwhelmed by the rush of day-to-day events, in this way encouraging — in the official World War II planning process — a historical and academic slant to postwar peace problems.

British wartime political planning was centred in the Foreign

Office, which made sure that it maintained its predominant influence over the process. The Foreign Office produced the government's long, thoughtful background planning papers and policy recommendations for the War Cabinet, based on position papers written for it by Arnold Toynbee's RIIA independent wartime research branch, the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS), and its successor, the Foreign Office's Research Department (FORD). The FRPS was a research, and eventually a planning, agency organized in 1939 by Toynbee and staffed largely by academics, which operated until 1943 as a branch of the RIIA at Balliol College, Oxford. The FORD eventually took over this work when Toynbee and some of his staff entered the Foreign Office directly in 1943.

Toynbee was no stranger to the Foreign Office, having been active there as a young man during the First World War, if only as a propagandist. Early in that war the Foreign Office established a four-man Political Intelligence Department under the chairmanship of the eminent historian Sir James Headlam-Morley.[8] His staff consisted of the two young historians: Toynbee and Lewis Napier, as well as two Australian brothers, Allen and Rex Leeper. Their activity at the Foreign Office under Headlam-Morley had more to do with propaganda than with the historian's craft, as Toynbee later admitted. One of Toynbee's first tasks was to edit the Blue Book on the treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. He also collaborated with Lord Bryce on official propaganda publications about alleged German atrocities in Belgium and France, an activity he later regretted, writing that "we behaved irresponsibly."[9] Like others of his generation, Toynbee believed strongly that nationalism was the force of the future and deserved to take the place of the old multinational empires in eastern Europe. His first books on the virtues of nationalism for Europe were published during this phase of his career.[10]

Five years after RIIA's foundation, Toynbee joined its staff in 1925 as research director, remaining active in that position for over thirty years.[11] He had just left his chair of Byzantine and Greek studies at the University of London, after supporting the Turkish side in the Greco-Turkish War, and gratefully accepted the new position.[12] Until 1939 Toynbee spent half his time on the *Survey* and the rest on his other activities as a professor of international relations at the University of London and as author of the multi-volume *Study of History*, which began to appear in print in 1934 under RIIA sponsorship. In theory, Toynbee completely supported the RIIA aim of encouraging the writing of objective, non-partisan studies of

international affairs, and then the Nazi threat became serious and he felt moved to take sides and warn against it.[13]

The year 1938 was a great lesson, as the *Anschluss* and threats of war over Czechoslovakia caused some to begin to listen to Cassandras such as Toynbee. At the same time, the Foreign Office became aware that it was unable to keep up with the Nazis' new, hyperactive style of foreign policy initiatives. Its small staff could do nothing more than try to cope with its traditional diplomatic activity, leaving it powerless to meet any additional crisis or task.[14] Rex Leeper, Toynbee's old colleague from the days of World War I Foreign Office propaganda work and now an official in the F.O., turned to his influential friend for advice and assistance.[15] The result was the formation at Oxford of a nominally independent, but in reality Foreign Office-supported, research organization run by Toynbee, the FRPS.

They agreed Toynbee would recruit a large team of international affairs experts from the RIIA in London, as well as from the universities, to operate as a semi-independent, confidential information and intelligence group for the Foreign Office. In return, the government would subsidize the group's work.[16] Toynbee made an agreement with Oxford to set up his new group at Balliol College. He attached to it other eminent specialists in international affairs, including Professor Robert W. Seton-Watson (one of the most powerful voices during the First World War in favour of the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire).[17] This arrangement was formally confirmed between RIIA and the Foreign Office on the eve of the second war, in August 1939.[18] Toynbee collected a large staff of 121.[19] Oxford and its colleges agreed to cover the salaries of 11 of Toynbee's academic assistants.[20] At the end of 1940, Toynbee reorganized FRPS's research structure on a new basis of geography and included a separate unit for the "Danubian Countries," which was to consider the crucial postwar problems of those nations.[21]

One of the first postwar planning papers requested of the FRPS by the Foreign Office dealt with the sensitive problem of the Danubian region or as one official worded it (apparently not realizing that the term had no relevance in the context of the day), "the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy."[22] Long before officials considered entering into the difficult question of Germany's reconstruction, in 1941 they took up the problem of how to avoid another German, or perhaps Soviet, threat to the splintered and weak area of Austria, Hungary and the successor states in southeastern Europe. The FRPS was commissioned to see whether this region should be returned to its prewar condition as a collection of independent

countries, or whether this area would stand a better chance politically, economically and strategically in the postwar world if its nations aligned themselves in some sort of eastern European bloc.[23]

It quickly became evident that official Foreign Office and academic FRPS opinions on the Danubian question were similar. Prewar official reports had long pondered this intractable Danubian problem from the viewpoint that the internal instability of these countries and their sharp, irreconcilable interstate rivalries had allowed Germany to move easily into the area. The victors of the First World War had expected the region to become sufficiently strong and prosperous to resist German and Soviet pressures, but these hopes were dashed in the interwar period.[24] Such Foreign Office views did not differ, in essence, from those held before the Second World War by the scholarly RIIA experts.

Between the wars, nationalist ideologues such as Toynbee and Seton-Watson had begun to reverse their positions. In 1929, in his *Survey of International Affairs*, Toynbee had compared the area's weakness and rivalries and the Franco-Italian competition there to the situation immediately preceding the outbreak of the First World War.[25] Seton-Watson, who had once been a leader in the campaign for national independence in the region, and who saw that ideal as the only practical and historically justified solution for the crumbling Austro-Hungarian Empire, by the 1930s, also came to the reluctant realization that the importance of the question of frontiers in southeastern Europe had to be reduced in importance in order to arrive at some sort of supranational economic and political union or federation.[26] His son Hugh took up his father's cause during the war.[27] A 1939 RIIA study on southeastern Europe, although concentrating specifically on the Nazi threat, was able to record only geographical, political, economic, and cultural friction in the area, rendering it impotent and indefensible.[28] Thus, even before FRPS was established in 1939, official and academic minds had moved towards the notion of a federative solution as the only possible route out of the Danubian labyrinth for Austria, Hungary and the successor states.

The 1941 FRPS paper on southeastern Europe, therefore, not surprisingly suggested that the countries of the Danube should form a multinational Danubian state of some sort after the war. The organizational approach to the problem was to forecast the future on the basis of the past, generally a not unreasonable strategy in the eyes of historians. Almost its entire thirty-two pages were devoted to reviewing the sad history of southeastern Europe since 1918. Its multinational recommendation was arrived at as a historically

determined conclusion. No attempt was made to speculate about the role of Soviet Russia there. This was probably not too surprising because at the time, the Russians were still battling for their lives and their continued survival was in grave doubt. On the other hand, one of the advantages of the federation proposal was that it countered not only a possible German threat, but it might counteract any Soviet pressure as well.[29] When the document was adopted almost unchanged by the War Cabinet as official policy two years later in 1943, the military situation of the Soviets had changed dramatically, yet the same purely historical arguments regarding a revived, postwar German threat were still mustered.[30]

Southeastern Europe, or as the paper termed it, "Danubia," had finally fallen prey to undesirable forms of nationalism. What this bold admission represented was a savage repudiation, on the part of Toynbee, Seton-Watson, and the other FRPS experts, of what they had once called for as the only possible solution for the region. The League of Nations had provided a wholly inadequate interstate bond, and there had not been, after 1918, the hoped for movement towards voluntary political and economic cooperation between the states. Any evolution in this direction, essential for the well-being of all the nations in the region, had been rendered sterile by local interstate rivalries. These rivalries, and the ensuing regional weakness, had allowed Germany easy penetration of the area in the 1930s, first economically, then politically and, in the end, militarily. A later Foreign Office memorandum said: "The time for a healthy and independent Danubian union, in which Austria could have found her natural function as an experienced and cultured 'older brother' of the successor states, had gone."[31] Instead of giving the region the benefit of their greater experience, Austria and Hungary, still smarting from the loss of their conationals and the breakup of their economic hinterland in the First World War, had done their bit to regain lost territories and rend asunder the post-1919 territorial arrangement.

Ironically, the one-time critics of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire now found themselves cast in the role of its defenders in more modern dress. The failed 1919-39 model of independent eastern European states dominated their thinking. The national principle had obviously proved to be unworkable in a "Danubia," as its people were too intermixed and too inclined towards emotional displays ever to coexist in peace and order, and so some other supranational idea had to be introduced. The FRPS's chastened historians and planners now admitted that the easy application in 1919 of the national principle to the region had been a misapplica-

tion of a sound western idea in a totally different and inappropriate context. At the basis of the area's tragedy lay the "enthusiastic application of Western ideas torn from their Western context." One of the main derivatives of this shattering new wisdom was that the old, multinational Habsburg state, as viewed from 1938, seemed to have been much more successful than it had appeared prior to and during the First World War. What then of the future? Once touted in its innocent, untried youthfulness as the area's road to salvation, nationalism had instead turned into the disease of the age. To attempt to reorganize the area after the war as it had existed after 1919 would simply be to insist on marching down the same suicidal road, leading again to a weakened and isolated Austria, another *Anschluss* by an aggressive Germany, and renewed German penetration into and control of the weak states of the Danubian region. A second Austrian *Anschluss*, the inevitable first step in this evil process, had to be avoided. Hungarian national resentment, too, had to be moderated.

Consequently, the British planning paper under discussion recommended it was time to realize that before 1914, "a more practical alternative appeared to be not the maintenance of the unities of Austria and Hungary, but the application within them of national and cultural autonomy."[32] This inclination to historical revisionism led the planners to the seemingly inevitable conclusion that the postwar interests of Europe and the Danubian states — not excluding Austria and Hungary — would best be served by following the historic path set by pre-1914 Austria-Hungary, only without the Habsburgs this time. The substance of the planners' major recommendation, the creation of a Danubian federation supported economically and diplomatically by the West, was modelled on the old Empire. Federal institutions, along with local and cultural autonomy, should combine to create a large, tolerant Danubian state able to form and maintain a large internal market and to defend itself against any renewed German aggression. "It needed the cataclysm of this war to open the eyes of European public opinion to the need of Danubian unity." The paper took it for granted that not only the British, but also the various peoples of "Danubia" would have reached this same enlightened view by the end of the war. Churchill favoured it in general, and there appeared to be no other possible solution.[33]

In mid-1943, Toynbee and some FRPS staff were taken directly into the Foreign Office, and their federative Danubian recommendation became official policy. The Foreign Office appointed the FRPS staff as temporary civil servants within its growing Research

Department — FORD — and there they remained for the duration of the war. The FRPS's multinational and federative Danubian concept was recommended by the Foreign Office to the War Cabinet as by far the "most attractive solution to the region's problems," and was adopted as government policy. This notion was to serve as an end in itself rather than as a public policy, as there still existed too many variables in the equation. For the moment, such a "confederation" had to hover in a fairly "nebulous" state, as it was not yet apparent whether Poles, Czechs, and Russians were attracted to the plan. However, as the Foreign Office noted, it represented a solid goal to be pursued. It was "desirable to work for ... a Central (or southeastern) European confederation," although matters did not need to be rushed.[34] In accepting the federative concept in June 1943, the War Cabinet agreed with both the goal and this loose schedule for realization.[35]

This Second World War rehabilitation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by official and academic postwar planners later led to interesting repercussions concerning the direction of scholarly activity in the postwar era. Many FRPS and FORD experts returned at the conclusion of hostilities to academic posts and continued to write in the same vein about southeastern Europe. Toynbee's first postwar RIIA *Survey of International Affairs* sounded like an echo of the 1941 FRPS Austrian paper and the 1943 Cabinet decision. It again blamed the 1938-39 collapse of southeastern Europe on mistakes by the 1919 victors.[36] "The history of the Versailles system in eastern Europe," the *Survey* judged, "showed in microcosm what the League of Nations showed in the world at large, that sovereign states are incapable of disciplined co-operation for a long period in defence of a static international order."[37]

True to these same wartime insights, Toynbee's FRPS colleague, historian C.A. Macartney (whose first university scholarship had been decided by a college board on which Toynbee sat), was still warning, in 1962, about the dangers of national independence in southeastern Europe. In effect, the Soviets had imposed by force a type of multinational structure on the region. Should Soviet control over the area one day disappear, Macartney questioned whether independent states in "Danubia" could offer a viable alternative:

> To put back the fourteen national states of the interwar period, with their interwar frontiers, would be to invite a repetition of the former failure. ... The solution of the East European problem lies in the creation of some larger multinational state with special institutions appropriate to the special conditions of the area.[38]

The question is still raised today.

In this way, the revised standard historical version of the multinational Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and the adverse role of nationalism devised during World War II continued after 1945 to influence historical studies. The negative side of nationalism was now heavily stressed, and as eastern Europe fell under Soviet domination, national archives there remained closed to westerners. A remarkable revival of interest in, and nostalgia for, the old Austro-Hungarian Empire as a field of study and possible model for the political, economic, and cultural problems of southeastern Europe was witnessed. This trend became transatlantic, for, at about the same time, the Americans arrived at similar conclusions based on their own wartime study of Austria-Hungary and "Danubia."

Notes

1. Cited in the introduction to "The Nationality Problem in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century," *Austrian History Yearbook* 3 (1967), Part 1, p. 7.
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3. Wandruska, pp. 307-10.
4. Robert A. Kann's curriculum vitae (*Lebenslauf*), written in 1968 for his election as corresponding member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, is discussed in Stanley B. Winters, "The Forging of a Historian: Robert A. Kann in America, 1939-1976," *Austrian History Yearbook* 17/18 (1981/1982), p. 6. Kann's completed doctoral thesis, dating from before the Second World War, and concerning the Habsburgs, was expanded by the author into his famous two-volume work *The Multinational Empire* (New York, 1950).
5. E. Gelfand, *The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919* (New York, 1963).
6. Council on Foreign Relations, *A Record of Fifteen Years* (New York, 1937), pp. 22-25. Lawrence Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy* (New York, London, 1977), despite its aggressively Marxist thesis, contains good information.
7. G. Stanley, "Great Britain and the Austrian Question, 1938-1945" (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1973), p. 85ff; R. Wagenleitner, "Grossbritanien und die Wiederrichtung der Republik Österreich " (Ph.D. diss., University of Salzburg, 1975), p. ivff. Other major committees included the Armistice and Civil Committee, Ministerial Armistice and Terms Committee and the Civil Administration Committee under Attlee, which became the Armistice and Postwar Committee in 1944.
8. A.J. Toynbee, *Acquaintances* (London, 1967), p. 167ff.
9. A.J. Toynbee, *The Armenian Massacres in the Ottoman Empire* (Blue Book, London, 1917), also in French; and *The German Terror in Belgium* and *The German Terror in France*, 2 vols. (London, New York, 1917); "... We were also naively sure that our cause was one hundred per cent righteous .... We behaved irresponsibly in shutting our eyes to the possible long-term consequences of our hand-to-mouth acts," Toynbee, *Experiences* (New York, London, 1969), pp. 304-05; T.W. Wilson, "Lord Bryce's Investigation into Alleged German Atrocities in Belgium, 1914-1918," in *Journal of Contemporary History* 14 (1979), p. 369ff; M.L. Saunders and P.M. Taylor, *British Propaganda During World War One, 1914-1918* (London, 1982), p. 137ff; W. Lacquer,

in *The Terrible Secret* (London, 1980), p. 9, blamed this type of World War One propaganda, later unmasked as false, as one of the chief reasons the World War Two Jewish massacres received so little credence.
10. A.J. Toynbee, *Nationality and War* (London, 1915); *The New Europe* (London, 1917).
11. Toynbee, *Experiences*, p. 611ff; M.L. Dockrill, "The Foreign Office and the Proposed Institute of International Affairs, 1919," *International Affairs* 56 (1980), p. 667; Council on Foreign Relations, *Record of Twenty-Five Years*, p. 5ff.
12. A.J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (London, 1922). Also D. Kitsikis, *Propagande et pressions en politique internationale. La Grece et ses revendications a la Conference de Paix* (Paris, 1963), pp. 454-57.
13. A.J. Toynbee, *Toynbee on Toynbee: A Conversation Between A.J. Toynbee and G.R. Urban* (New York, 1974), p. 57; *Acquaintances*, pp. 110ff; see his "The Issues in British Foreign Policy," and "After Munich," in *International Affairs* 17 (1938), pp. 307-37, and *International Affairs* 18 (1939), p. 1ff.
14. P.M. Taylor, *The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda, 1919-1939* (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 218ff, 271ff. Also F.H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations* 1 (London, 1979), pp. 5, 10, 17.
15. P.M. Taylor, "'If War Should Come': Preparing the Fifth Arm for Total War," in *Journal of Contemporary History* 16 (1981), pp. 43-47. M. Balfour, *Propaganda at War* (London, 1979), p. 90.
16. Press Surveys of the FRPS are published in *The Review of the Foreign Press, 1939-1945* (Munich), 27 vols.
17. RHLB (Foreign Office) to Robert W. Seton-Watson, 12 October 1939, Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 898 (Political Warfare), p. 29.
18. F. Ashton-Gwatkin, *Report on FRPS*, 10 January 1941, PRO, FO 898, p. 29.
19. Including the following academics, together with some of their writings: C.A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors, 1919-1937* (London, 1937) and *National States and National Minorities* (London, 1937); I.F.D. Morrow, *The Peace Settlement and the German-Polish Borderlands* (London, 1936); Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans* (London, 1938); R.W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Rumanians* (London, 1934) and *Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers* (London, 1934); and Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1934-1939), *The Problem of International Investment* (London, 1937), *Central and Southeastern Europe: Syllabus for a Study Group* (London, 1938). Included among the 121 were 23 paid research assistants, 24 volunteer researchers and 74 assistants and clerical staff.
20. Some of the volunteers were eminent professors as well. For instance, N.H. Baynes worked on his two-volume annotated *Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922 to August 1939* (London, 1942), while with FRPS. M. Balfour, *Propaganda at War*, p.59ff.
21. Toynbee's coordinating committee consisted of himself, Sir J. Hope Simpson and Professors Paton and Price. Eleven subcommittees were established, including "The German State and Nazi Regime," "Regional New Orders," and "The Danubian Countries: States and Peoples." See Ashton-Gwatkin Report, p. 29.
22. R. Shackle, an officer in the FO German Department, to Ashton-Gwatkin, 18 June 1941, and note of 23 July 1941. PRO, FO 371, 26537.
23. W. Selby to O. Harvey, and Walford to Harvey, *op. cit.*, 26538.
24. Stanley, *Great Britain and the Austrian Question*, pp.22ff.
25. A.J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs* (London, 1929), p. 153.
26. Robert W. Seton-Watson, *Treaty Revision...*, pp. 69-71.
27. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918-1941* (London and Hamden, Connecticut, 1943, 1962), p. 411.
28. RIIA, *South-Eastern Europe: A Political and Economic Survey* (London, 1939).
29. Toynbee to R. Makins, enclosing Laffan's draft FRPS memorandum on Austria, one copy for Sir Anthony Eden, 2 October 1941. PRO, FO 371, 26538.
30. The 1943 War Cabinet decision read, "There was general agreement that we

should aim at a Central European or Danubian Group centred in Vienna. ..." PRO, Cabinet Documents 65/34, WM 86 (43), 92-93, 218, of 25 May 1943.
31. Memorandum on Austria, 2 October 1941. PRO, FO 371, 26538.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*
34. Foreign Office memorandum, 3 April 1943, PRO, FO 371, 34466.
35. David Stafford, *Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945* (London, 1980), p. 34; Foreign Office telegramme to Moscow, 25 September 1943, and Dominions Office print to Dominions, 19 July 1943, PRO, FO 371, 34466.
36. M. Wright, "Eastern Europe," in A.J. Toynbee and F.T. Ashton-Gwatkin, eds. *Survey of International Affairs: The World in March 1939* (London, 1952), p. 206ff. Ashton-Gwatkin had been the official in the FO in 1942 responsible for recommending attachment of the FRPS to the Foreign Office. See his Report.
37. Toynbee and Ashton-Gwatkin, *Survey*, p. 236.
38. C.A. Macartney and A.W. Palmer, *Independent East Europe* (London, 1962). See also RIIA, *The Balkans Together with Hungary* (London, 1945); A.J. and A.V. Toynbee, *The War and the Neutrals* (London, 1956); and Hugh Seton-Watson, *The "Sick Heart" of Europe: The Problem of the Danubian Lands* (Seattle, 1975).

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Fifteen Years of Official Multiculturalism in Canada: Its Impact on Heritage Languages and Cultures

Victor O. Buyniak

The policy of Multiculturalism, as declared by the federal government in 1971, gave ethnic groups in Canada greater impetus and desire to pursue their linguistic and cultural development. Multiculturalism, as such, existed before and continues to exist in Canadian society because of the efforts and willingness of the members of these groups to preserve their own cultural traditions. Its official implementation was a political response to this prevailing social phenomenon. Right now, about one-third of the Canadian population is of origins other than Anglo-Celtic or French.

The initial euphoria was dispelled long ago when the declaration of the policy was not translated into pragmatic and tangible form. And it has been the view of many leaders that the official declaration of Canada as a multicultural society has in fact led to more divisiveness within various cultural groups than may have been the case before 1971. Since that time many new groups have come to the fore both because of numbers, recent immigration, and their obtaining a certain economic status wherein their members could devote more time to their cultural pursuits. Yet the perception is that the administration of the multiculturalism programs has tended to favour not only particular groups, but also certain cultural organizations and groups within those bodies — which has led in some cases to a distrust of the government, as well as of those who seem favoured by government largesse. It is commonly perceived that this is not entirely an inadvertent result of the administration of the policy, but rather an attempt by those who administer the programs to prevent some form of common action and political unification of the various cultural groups. There seems to be an endemic fear within the government of a strong third political force.

Whereas in the 1970s the purpose of the Policy of Multicultural-

ism was to support, foster and encourage the cultural development of the various ethnic groups in our society, in the 1980s it has become a social tool to effect change and affect perceptions. It is seen as an instrument of social change. The bureaucrats no longer appear to respond to demands and initiatives for support, but have chosen instead to become the initiators, attempting to mould these groups, especially the young, to their perception of what a multicultural society should look like.

For a while, there was a lack of certainty among the ethnic groups that Canada was officially multicultural. This notion was not dispelled when, during the course of the negotiations on repatriating the Constitution, the concept of multiculturalism was virtually ignored. An official policy of the Canadian government seemed to have no place in the document that was to set the legal parameters for this society. Only after numerous groups made vigorous submissions on the necessity of including reference to the Policy of Multiculturalism was anything added. It was essential that the preamble make reference to the fact of multiculturalism. Perhaps the best that could be hoped for was achieved by the insertion of Paragraph 27, which states: "This charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians." This was far short of declaring Canada officially multicultural, but it certainly allowed room for the courts to build on that idea.

The Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the new Canadian Constitution did entrench linguistic and cultural dualism at the heart of Canadian Confederation. While the spokesmen or advocates for multiculturalism in education are right to take official bilingualism for granted, what they forget is that English and French are not just languages of communication, but languages of culture as well, and that the charter is therefore a powerful weight in favour of biculturalism. No one would maintain that German, Italian or Spanish can be official languages of communication in Canada. However, they and others are languages of culture, or at least of cultural identity, and access in the state school systems to courses in minority languages — where numbers warrant — must be on the same basis as access to English and French if multiculturalism is to have a living base and some guarantee against degenerating into superficial folk cultures. Within a multicultural framework, there is room for everybody's "identity agenda." Within a multicultural framework, it is fairly easy to accommodate everyone interested in acquiring the skills associated with official bilingualism. But in order to safeguard the minority language educational rights, some

amendment must be added to Paragraph 23 in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms allowing primary and secondary school instruction in a language other than English or French, where the number of students justifies it. In a multicultural society, each individual must have the opportunity to acquire such languages as will meet not only his communication needs, but his cultural needs as well.

Since matters of education lie predominantly within provincial jurisdiction, it is imperative that there be contact between provincial and federal officials. Where language policies and programs in multicultural education are concerned, what is needed most are annual federal-provincial conferences, involving ministers of culture and education, to consider fundamental issues with the explicit understanding that bicultural individuals who are bilingual or trilingual are among the country's most valuable assets. Thanks to the financial support for multicultural programs, it has been possible to establish and operate a number of bilingual or even trilingual schools or classrooms in Canada.

Federal support for heritage language instruction is rooted in the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1969). The Commission concluded that:

> because of the interdependence of language and culture, we must consider the teaching of languages other than English and French in the educational system as an important aspect of any program to preserve the cultures of those of non-British, non-French origin.

It was further resolved that, "because the survival of a language is greatly affected by the support it receives in the 0-14 age bracket, the most extensive effort should be made at the elementary school level." Specifically, the commission recommended that the teaching of languages, other than English and French, and cultural subjects related to them be incorporated as options in the public elementary school program where there is sufficient demand for such classes. Where demand and resources permit, it may also prove feasible that some instruction in the related cultural subjects can be offered using the appropriate language as the language of instruction.

After the proclamation of the Policy of Multiculturalism, this recommendation was translated into the following: support for the development of teaching materials, subsidies to supplementary language schools, provisions for the hiring of cultural and language advisers, the sponsorship of heritage language conferences and the establishment of a National Heritage Language Centre at the

University of Toronto in 1984. Specific functions of the centre were in the areas of materials production, teacher training and research. Because education in Canada is a provincial responsibility, direct federal support for heritage language instruction is confined to schools and programs that exist outside the formal educational system. However, substantial grants have been awarded to groups and individuals engaged in the development of teaching and resource materials for core and bilingual programs.

The Trudeau government had announced it would transfer $600 million to the provinces for minority language education for 1984 through 1987. All provinces offer minority language education through their school systems as well as teaching English or French as a second language. Since 1970, Ottawa has contributed almost $2 billion to the provinces to help pay for those services. The payments are based on a complex formula that takes into account student enrolments and the education cost per student in each province. The agreement signed at that time was to transfer more than $190 million to the provinces in 1983-84, representing a $15 million increase over the previous year's assistance. The budget was to grow by 5 per cent in each of the following years. Of course, a very high percentage of these sums went to official language programs. Nevertheless, in the 1983-84 budget year, $4.26 million went to minority-language programs, a very substantial increase from previous years. By comparison, in the same year, the total annual budget of the Ministry of Multiculturalism was $24 million. In addition to the various heritage-language bilingual schools in larger centres, schools that have been incorporated into regular educational systems, and federal and provincial grant structures, support supplementary language schools conducted by various ethnocultural community organizations. It is estimated that close to 100,000 students are enrolled in such institutions in Canada.

The present federal government is committed to the policy of multiculturalism, but budgetary restraints make it mandatory to eliminate or decrease a number of existing programs. Thus the approach of the government has changed. Today, multiculturalism is, to a great extent, identified with the idea of visible minority groups. There appears to be a perception that among those of Anglo-Celtic and French origin there is little knowledge of or interest in the multicultural policy. It is perceived in the eyes of many that the government has diverted the aims of the multicultural policy from that of fostering, encouraging and supporting development of culture to that of combating discrimination and prejudice, a role that appears to be more fitting for the Ministry of Justice. That

goal is certainly laudable, but it is not something that should be the primary focus of a multicultural policy.

In implementing multiculturalism the government is seen to be moving towards the absorption of all cultural groups. Many groups are being assimilated rapidly. There are notable exceptions, especially among those whose country of origin is under totalitarian rule or is in some way endangered as a political entity. But other than its recognition of multiculturalism, the government has never given much substance to the policy. It is more the proverbial greasing of the squeaky wheel. Many groups appear to have been bought cheaply through handshakes, photographs and letters. This has led to cynicism, especially among the young.

However, despite the criticism levelled at the government, progress has been made. In addition to the already mentioned aid from government agencies for ethnic schools and cultural organizations, several chairs of ethnic studies have been founded at Canadian universities. Visiting professorships, scholarships, institutes and learned societies for the individual ethnic groups have been financed, and funds have been allocated for scholarly conferences, research and publications. All this has been made available through federal and provincial bodies. Much more can be done in the field of interchange within cultural groups themselves. A multicultural policy should exist to encourage the various groups to pool their resources.

Some criticism has also been expressed regarding the composition of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, which has been set up to advise the government on matters of multiculturalism. It has led to a genuine belief among younger community leaders that the council is an "ethnic senate" where appointments are made to reward loyalty. The suggestions and recommendations of the various ethnic groups have been made in order to identify individuals "in touch" with their community. Under the new government, the Consultative Council has been reduced from its previous 100 members to 30. However a Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Multiculturalism, consisting of fifteen parliamentarians, was established in June 1985.[1] The new Minister of Multiculturalism, the Honourable Otto Jelinek, was appointed on 20 August 1985. Of Czech origin, Jelinek came to Canada as a young boy. The expectation of the "ethnic" public has been only partially fulfilled, though, since the upgrading of the federal Ministry of Multiculturalism to a more senior position did not occur — the portfolio has been transferred to a minister who already holds another ministerial responsibility.

But on 15 November 1985, Jelinek told the annual general meeting of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism that Prime Minister Mulroney had agreed to double the number of ethnocultural appointees on various government boards and commissions, an increase from 10 per cent to 20 per cent. There are now some 1,500 such positions. The minister added that he personally would not be satisfied until the proportion reached 30 per cent to approximate the percentage of Canada's population that is not Anglo-Celtic, French or native.[2] He also stated that despite a threefold increase in funds, there was not nearly enough money available for support in the development of heritage-language supplementary schools.

All in all, there is still hope for multiculturalism, even in these times of monetary constraints. Although the government's concept of multiculturalism may differ from that of the individual ethnic groups directly affected by it, the introduction of the policy was a definite, positive step. It gave the ethnic communities additional stimulus and encouragement to continue, more rigorously and with greater enthusiasm, in their efforts for their own linguistic and cultural preservation. And the fiinancial support of the government is a very important component of this policy because it allows them to realize, if only partially, these aspirations.[3]

Notes

1. In the spring of 1986 the Standing Committee on Multiculturalism of the House of Commons was reduced from 15 to 7 members; see: *Saskatchewan Multicultural Magazine* V:2, p. 17.
2. For some of the new appointees to such positions, see: *Cultures Canada* V:15 (1986), pp. 12-13.
3. The newest development in this respect was the organization, in Toronto, on 11 and 12 April 1986, of the Multiculturalism and Business Conference in order to capitalize on the full economic potential of Canada's multicultural population. For details, see: *Cultures Canada* V:15 (1986), pp. 1-6.

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Primordial Hungarian Beliefs and Modern Literature

Martin L. Kovacs

In the opinion of historians of religion, the adoption and practice of monotheism, over time, does not exclude the possibility of reversion to some of the beliefs and rites of a much earlier level of development. In fact, it has been maintained as an axiom that a "dialectic of the sacred" has been at work in religious experiences all the time, predicating the possibility of "spontaneous reversal of any religious position."[1]

It may be possible that the unusually great interest in primaeval beliefs, on the part of Hungarians, in the last 100 years or so, as well as today, derives from the above tenet. The pagan Hungarians did not have shamanism alone as their religion. There were adherents to several religions among them, including probably Jews and Mohammedans. Nevertheless, there are only small fragments of these religions hidden in the beliefs, customs, and folklore of the common people of Hungary.[2]

Undoubtedly, it is the *táltos*, a shamanlike figure among the primordial Hungarians, who has attracted most attention from scholars and the general public alike. It is not our purpose to discuss, in this paper, the multifarious descriptions of this priestly figure, but rather, to present its many images created in the minds of modern poets, writers, dramatists and scholars.

First of all, it must be stated that in certain regions of Hungary, people believe that some members of their communities deserve the name *táltos*; not in the old sense of controlling the weather, or fighting another *táltos*, but by being unusually clever or proficient in some area of life.[3]

Nowadays, the *táltos* has transferred himself, to a large extent, into the realm of fairy-tales, as shown by several recent scholarly investigations. Thus, one author has been able to trace 468 versions

of the fairy-tale about the tree that reaches up into the sky. The same author points out that the *táltos* person often has his *táltos* horse in the fairy-tale because the two of them can carry out superhuman and supernatural feats only if they are together. A further interesting finding is that "the horse of the *táltos* hero in the fairy-tale is identical with the shaman's drum; through the agency of the latter, the shaman can fly as fast as thought, and overcome or escape the harmful powers."[4]

Ágnes Kovács provides documentary evidence in support of the existence of female *táltos*es from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, as seen in the records of local witchcraft trials.[5] These female *táltos*es are born with teeth and acquire their *tudás* (magic) in trances. They are known to fight, in animal form, male *táltos*es, even suspended in mid-air.[6] Nevertheless, it is the *táltos* boy who has a horse, never the *táltos* girl.[7] As folklore figures, both the *táltos* man and the *táltos* horse possess superhuman knowledge, they are seers who are able to recognize promptly the malice of witches and other superhuman beings.[8] Yet the *táltos* is not malicious, because he helps his relatives, his friends, or even strangers against the wicked.[9] This is only possible for him, since he can foresee the future. During witchcraft trials, the claim was also made that the *táltos* is the elect of God, and his task is to fight devils and witches.[10]

Consequently, there evolved a peaceful coexistence of Christian ideology and *táltos* beliefs. Ágnes Kovács concludes that Christianity has absorbed not only pagan elements, but also the *táltos* tradition; that is why the latter has survived.[11]

It seems to be a well-established finding that the qualities of the *táltos* may derive from those of the *hérosz*.[12] The descent of the *heros* is partly or completely mythical because it is the triumphant instinct of life that creates for man a new friend in the *táltos* whose magical power is heroic, yet he lives among people. Thus, the *táltos*, still alive until recently, is a "culture *hérosz*" of the folk-tales. The *táltos* may become a *hérosz* as a successful practitioner of an art or plyer of a trade in folk tradition:

> He who'd play the bagpipes well,
> First must needs descend to hell.
> There he may acquire the skill
> To play the bride's dance with a will.[13]

We cannot review heroic poetry as such in this paper, but some reference should be made at least to "Zagon, the High Priest of Haddur, the Protector God of the Scythians," who produces a ball of

flame in the sky as a sign, found in one of the earlier examples of heroic poetry in Hungary.[14]

In some literature there is only an indication of the influence derived from ancient tradition. Thus, Mihály Gál, the young farmer's hand, was taken advantage of by the farmer and the local dealer. With the help of his two small oxen, Mihály turned against his adversaries and outwitted them. He called his oxen *táltos-ökrök* without actually producing any evidence that they could be regarded as *táltos*es. Nevertheless, the reader senses the presence of a magical power.[15]

Some researchers have come to the conclusion that animals as well have a rank order and that birds of the eagle family, like the *turul*, constitute totems of the royal progeny. One of the myths of the Buryats explains that the eagle was chosen by the benevolent spirits to become the shaman of man. Dezső Dümmerth explains that the term "shaman" refers to the figure who acts as a priest and magician, as well as an intermediary between the gods and man.[16]

The king sent from heaven tends to be the same kind of intermediary and exceptional individual as the shaman is with his people, curing illnesses, foretelling the future, and ridding his tribe of maleficent spirits. Also in respect of animallike ancestors, the ordinary people cannot but utilize the power of the shaman and the magus.[17]

The animal form of the animal forbear has the function of drawing attention to certain characteristic attributes: "he is as strong as a bear" or "he comes from heaven like a bird." In other words, the ancestors assume animal forms because they accept a mission of higher standing, either to undertake the healing of their people, or an even higher task. At a later stage of development, the totemic notions change into symbols. In the present case, as part of religious progress, the *turul* grows into a winged messenger not unlike the visions of the prophet Isaiah that at times refer to animals, often winged, that deliver various tidings. If this reasoning is applied, it is more understandable why shamans would put on wings or animal skins when performing their rites: to indicate that the nature of their effort is of the highest order, as is the case with healing or serving his people's well-being.[18]

Dümmerth assumes that Emese, owing to inherited beliefs and her imagination, not only underwent the birth process, but also prior fertilization by the *turul* bird; consequently, she could have been capable of communicating with the spirits. The boy she carried, Álmos, was in any case the son of the chieftain, Ügek, who was also of the clan *Turul*. Thus the bird in Emese's dream also seems

to have continued Álmos's descent from the powerful clan. Furthermore, the dream served as evidence that Álmos was superior to his father, because he resembled the familial ancestor, and therefore Álmos would become a powerful leader.[19]

Perhaps some kinds of totem animals provided Károly Bari with inspiration in certain aspects of his poetry. Maybe he is the "*Táltos* Boy" in his poem of the same title:

> I play smoke on the flutes of chimneys.
> Furious wind pounds my drums.
> The knives of fates dance before me.
> A skull snarls under the threshold.[20]

It is thus possible that the "Shaman's Cry" represents his own lamenting:

> What country is your country, King Dúl,
> If it trusts future to disguise?
> Famous tatters guard her crown.
> I am a shaman; fire barks from my throat.[21]

In this context, a strange occurrence may be mentioned wherein the impact of primaeval beliefs was so great that the individuals affected were overwhelmed by it, with dire consequences. Pál Demény, in his reminiscences, describes one of his fellow-prisoners in 1939. The man liked to call himself "Virrasztó Koppány" (Koppány the watchful), in reference to Koppány, the uncle of (St.) Stephen I, the first Christian King of Hungary, who represented not only the principle of seniority in succession, but also the old pagan religion of the Magyars against Stephen. He had returned to the primaeval religion and not only adopted the *turul*, the totem bird of the Árpádian rulers, but also some of the pagan customs, such as the periodic sacrificing of the white horse. The latter act was merely symbolic; a few pounds of horse meat consumed in the open air in the company of a friend and believer. He would go out to the farmers in the Tisza region and offer medicinal water and ointments for illnesses. He believed in his own powers and had several dozen followers. The "pagan *táltos*" was imprisoned for "stirring up disaffection" among the people in an unspecified way.[22]

In connection with *rejtőzés* (ritual seclusion), Károly Viski[23] refers to János Arany's *Toldi*:

But he does not die, only in the manner
In which the person goes into a deep trance,
And when he comes out of it after a while,
One can hear wondrous accounts from him.[24]

Arany's lines may imply that Miklós Toldi had become either a "*regős*" or, more likely, a certain type of *táltos*. But Arany's choice of *elrejtezik* (deep trance) seems to refer to shamanic concealment connected with the inhaling of smoke or vapour in order to induce a trance.[25]

It is interesting that some of the greatest Hungarian poets should have come from the same area: the Sárrét and the Érmellék. János Arany from the westernmost region, Nagyszalonta; Ady from Érmellék in the northeast; and as to the Sárrét proper, one can refer to Imre Nagy, a folk poet of more recent years than the other two. Another important difference that characterizes Nagy is the fact that he was a truly "peasant" poet. Living from 1896-1942, a good portion of his life coincided with that of Endre Ady, of whom Nagy was not only very fond, but whose poetry was a great influence on him.

Nagy was a significant person in the village society of Sárrétudvari and was invariably invited to weddings in order to toast the young couples with wedding rhymes, often of his own devising. Imre Nagy is now a recognized poet in Hungary, and a representative volume of his poetry was in its third edition in 1986.[26] Nagy is not only a poet of the Sárrét areas, but is also deeply affected by their traditions, which includes his "Storm-Steeds that kick up sparks/In wine, in song, in flower, and in hearts." His "storm-steeds" have "flaming manes" and when the poet cracks his "flame whip," the Duna and Tisza "leap over their banks."[27]

Perhaps his most explicit poem, in the present context, is "Lócsontváz a pusztán" (Horse Skeleton on the Puszta):

Asia puffs its winds now,
And this is, perhaps, a dream of the Orient:
The skeleton of a horse, its skull,
Glows on the incline of the Orhalom.

As if my fate were dreamt up by the Orient:
An anthill disintegrates under my feet.
The Sun rises like a fiery wasp,
And my fingers drum in the dusk.

On the horse-skull, which
Now is the storm-shelter for worms and crickets.
Its two eye-pits, still containing
The magic of the *táltos*es, stare at the sky.

As if I were calling the Sun to account
For its nippers, for its snickers,
For its stone-hardened hoofprints in the *puszta*,
For its saddle embroidered with flowers.

Asia puffs its winds now;
Our horse stumbles with Hunger and thirst;
His mane and tail fall in the wind,
For we do not pray to the Sun.

The fate of horses is the sorrowful Magyar fate.
The grass burns out; the well dries up;
And instead of the horse, the sweep of the well neighs —
And the Orient rebels in dreams.[28]

Not everyone views the Hungarian plain and its cultivators in the same vein as does Imre Nagy. Indeed, even the tillers of the land seem not quite natural in the poetry of Dezső Kosztolányi; he refers to the Magyar farmer as "an enigmatic Oriental *táltos*," or "an emissary of proto-Hungarians who had survived all tribulations." Some of his actual lines:

He walks, leaving his wistful, sleepy
Horse alone to do the ploughing,
At times flinging out his arms like a *táltos*.
The snow-white frills of his shirt shine, glistening.[29]

Béla Pomogáts affirms that Kosztolányi (unlike Ady) was interpreting popular life in the style of the *Szecesszió* (Art Nouveau) of the early 1900s. His observations of village life were characterized by a distant unfamiliarity; he saw peasants only through the windows of passing trains.[30]

A novel has been written by László Gasparovich on the life and customs of the people of Hungary during the reign of Prince Geyza, the father of Vajk, later Stephen, the first King of Hungary.[31] The author does his best to provide a sense of the social and cultural conditions in the country at the time. *Taltos*es of different kinds

appear, including a Greek one (a conditional one, should his wife want to have one); also carvers and *regős*es turn up, working on "magic poles." Besides, reference is made to Emese's dream about the *turul*.

Stage acting, as well as primaeval beliefs, are discussed by Tekla Dömötör in one of her studies.[32] She praises Ferenc Hont's volume for the particular attention with which he treats monodrama, which he calls *táltos szinjatszas* (*táltos* acting).[33] Then Dömötör goes on to point out that foreign researchers, like Mircea Eliade and Carl Niessen, have identified the theatrical ingredients in the work of the shaman when he acts out his journey upwards (or downwards) to meet with spirits. Dömötör suggests that the shamanic rites of the early Magyars, too, included similarly theatrical elements.[34] In any case, she reminds us that the shaman of the primaeval Hungarians was only an "Actor," as with other pastoral peoples, and not the "stage manager at their communal festivities." His primary task was to maintain contact with the spirits, as well as to perform such other duties as healing. His *révülés* was awe-inspiring, but otherwise it did not affect the viewers with any degree of *ecstasis*. Dömötör draws our attention to a significant folk-cultural change — persons assumed to have supernatural powers have ceased to have any function in such folk activities as the *jeles napok* (the marked days of the year). The specific figures affected are the *táltos*, *halottláto* (seer of the dead), *nézö* (seer), *javas* (healer) and so on.

Historical plays that include aspects of primaeval beliefs have always been fashionable in Hungary. The following two plays were described to the present writer and referred to as most popular. First, *Assist the King!* by József Ratkó: the three main figures — King (St.) Stephen I, the Old Man and the High Priest — are presented in the situation of casting an account. Their self-examination is marked by the approach of death. The High Priest is threatened owing to the untimely and fatal accident sustained by his pupil, Stephen's only son and heir, Prince Imre. The Old Man (a *táltos* and *regős*), who represents the past, senses his own early end.

The long dialogues between the High Priest and the Old Man — that is, the new and the old outlooks — dominate the play. Thus the High Priest acknowledgingly remarks, "He is, it is true, a pagan, yet he acknowledges God. He is wise. Whatever he says is no dull prattle. His words are most profitable to his listeners." With these words, he expresses his opinion that it was an error to apply force against the Old Man's notions. In the end King Stephen states: "I have robbed my kin. I have turned them out of their nature and taken away their past. I have deprived them of their songs." The *táltos* presented in

the play, "the pagan devil," in other words, the Old Man, would like to appear as an ally of the Christians. For, according to the playwright's sources, shamans would refer to themselves as "baptized." They raised their voices in *regős* songs: "We are not devils, but St. Stephen's servants." Of the writer's friendly feelings towards the Old Man — indeed, he has an important role in the play, at the beginning and at the end — a portion are given to Vaszoly, who is much different from Ady's Vazul, which is also indicated by the Magyarization of his Byzantine Bulgarian name.[35]

Magda Szabó's *Béla Király* deals with a later era, in which German cultural and other influence is revealed. It was during Lent 1241 that a threatening message was received from Batu Khan, prompting the king, Béla IV of Hungary, to give it serious deliberation in his council. Indeed, Hungary was on the eve of the devastating invasion by the Mongol armies led by Batu. Szabó dramatizes the period and underlines one potential weakness of Hungary in the continuing clash between Christians and the remnants of the primaeval religion, known to us even today.[36]

In the second scene, Father Paul, Inquisitor-General of Hungary and King's Confessor, and John the Teuton, the papal legate, carry on a discussion in which Paul represents moderation against followers of older, pagan beliefs. John wants to know why Paul does not take stronger measures against the pagans, to which Paul replies that kindness is a more effective instrument than coercion.[37] John states, "I am convinced you will give an explanation that is not only acceptable, but also adequate, to explain why the Holy Inquisition in Hungary, placed under your direction by the Holy See, defends pagans and hampers them from salvaging their salvation, at least through receiving worldly punishment." Paul counters, "Father Legate, these are not pagans; these are Christians, just like you or I"[38]:

JOHN: Take the village of Káld. A shaman denuded a body, closed it into a chamber among heated bricks, and thrashed it red with switches of birch. It was immoral sorcery.

PAUL: But the person was healed, Father Legate.

JOHN: And the songs at the water of the fountain? The bone-setter at Sumeg? And the godless one who was cutting cataracts and giving his blessings to the falcons?

PAUL: It is a folk-custom. It is as old as history. And besides, the patient recovered.[39]

The case of László Waszlavik — "Gazi" — may be regarded, in the present context, as the latest symptom in the process of intellectualization of the *táltos* heritage in Hungary. Young Gazi is representative of the rock-and-roll generation, a phenomenon that has come to that country somewhat belatedly. A student of languages, including English, he has acquired a deep interest in rock music. What is surprising for us, however, is a large sign found in his garden with the English inscription, "East and Global European Rock-Shaman."[40] This was revealed in an interview, in part to show how László came to organize a rock competition of shamans and to adopt his present stage name and shamanic office. According to Gazi, shamans in their day were actual sources of knowledge. They were at once physicians, biologists, diviners, meteorologists, advisers and clairvoyants. By acquiring the formal vocabulary of shamanism, Gazi thought to pay tribute to this primaeval concept of encyclopaedic learning. The shaman's job in his society was to collect observations, societal and purely physical, and then hand them down. It could be said that the shaman was the forerunner of the library and the modern computer centre. Gazi's shaman staff displays a number of symbols that are in themselves unimportant, but which take on a deeper meaning when regarded as symbols. Along with the feather, the velvet ribbon, cables and carved signs, there is also a computer service part.

"One of my musical routines is called 'medvetor (bear feast) in Atlantis'," Gazi says. "*Medvetor* is meant to be a shamanistic intellectual ceremony in which individual pieces deal with Hungarian studies in a visionary manner from pagan Magyar symbolism to the era of the East-West conflict."[41]

A new period is about to begin in fine arts, Gazi says, which he supports. He sees an eventual return to established values, their reassessment, and he hopes to see new life infused into old ideas. "The essential thing is that the fundamental method of art is irrationality. There is a trend to get the world to use scientific method in obtaining knowledge, but this has its own limits. Where there is no go with rationality, the magic, irrational approach will help." Gazi sees shamanship as a "game of irony" in which images are important. He has chosen, through the ritual of rock music, a typically eastern European "mask." Working with several media — pictures, music, tones, movement, sight, lecturing, action, movies and other elements — Gazi feels he can compete within the context of contemporary communicational expectations. According to him, television offers such heavy competition that subtlety is the only way to deal with it. And so he favours innovation in Bartok's manner as

well, by building upon Hungarian roots and traditions.[42] Perhaps there is more to it than impishness when he declares, "A shaman corner is mine in life. ... And anyone I point my shaman shaft at may have a good time, or maybe an evil one."[43]

It has been the intention of this essay to provide a sample of a larger study on some wider aspects of primordial Hungarian beliefs and their influence upon select regions on this side of the ocean and in Europe.

Notes

1. Mircea Eliade, *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy*, trans. from the French by W.R. Trask (New York: Bollinger Foundation, 1964 (1951)), pp. xviii-xix. Bollinger Series LXXVI.
2. László Kósa, *Hagyomány és közösség: Magyar népi kultúra és társadalom* [Tradition and Community: Hungarian Folk-Culture and Society] (Budapest: Kozmosz, 1984), p. 91.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Ágnes Kovács, "Az égig érö fa meséjének magyar redakciói és samanisztikus motivumaik" [Hungarian Versions of the Fairy Tale About the Tree that Reaches up to the Sky, and Their Shamanistic Motifs], *Ethnographia* XCV:1 (1984), pp. 16-29.
5. Ágnes Kovács, "Táltos Mesehösnök" [*Taltos*-Heroines in Folktales], in *Folklór, életrend, tudománytörténet: Tanulmányok Dömötör Tekla 70. születésnapjára*, eds. Géza Balázs and József Hála [Folklore, Pattern of Life, History of Knowledge: Essays on Tekla Dömötör's Seventieth Birthday] (Budapest: Ethnographical Research Section, The Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1984), p. 132.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
12. Cf. C.M. Bowra, *Heroic Poetry* (London: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 566-67.
13. "Aki dudaś akar lenni,/ Pokolra kell annak menni./ Ott kell annak megtanulni/ Hogyan kell a dudát fujni." Cf. Olga Nagy, "A táltos ember meg az ördög cimborája" [The *Taltos and the Devil's Crony] in Hösök, csalókák ördögök: Esszé a népmeséról* [Heroes, Will-o'-the-wisps, Devils: An Essay on Folktales] (Bucharest: Kriterion, 1974), p. 59.
14. Sándor Aranyosrákosi Székely, *A székelyek Erdélyben: Hösköltemény, három énekben* [The Székelys in Transylvania: Heroic Epic in Three Cantos], ed. by György Borbély (Torda: Harmath, 1895). Székely (1797-1852) was a secondary-school teacher, minister and later a Unitarian bishop.
15. István Asztalos, *Táltos-ökrök: Kisregények, elbeszélések* [*Táltos* Oxen: Short Novels, Stories] (Budapest: Magvetö, 1985), pp. 337-90.
16. Dezsö Dümmerth, *Álmos, az áldozat* [Álmos, the Sacrificial Offering] (Budapest: Panorama, 1986), p. 53. *Turul* occurs also in old personal and place names: *Castrum Turul* (where the wife of László IV was held captive); *Comes Turul* (donation of his property); and the provostship Turul (see Arnold Ipolyi, *Magyar Mythologia*, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Magyar Kultúra, 1977), vol. I, p. 317).
17. Dümmerth, p. 56.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

20. Károly Bari, *A varázsló sétálni indul* [The Sorcerer Is About to Take a Walk] (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1985), p. 81: the poem "The *Táltos* Boy" [Táltosfiu].
21. *Ibid.*, p. 93: "Shaman's Cry" [Sámánsirás].
22. *Kritika* (a periodical, Budapest) 2 (February 1985), p. 22.
23. Károly Viski, "Drámai hagyományok" [Traditions of the Drama], in János Berze Nagy, *et al.*, *A magyarság szellemi néprajza* [An Intellectual Ethnography of the Hungarians], vol. 3 of a 4-volume series entitled *A magyarság néprajza* [An Ethnography of the Hungarians] (Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1935), p. 371.
24. Cf. Albert Lehr, *Arany: Toldi*, 2nd ed. (Budapest, 1890).
25. Cf. J. Balázs, "The Hungarian Shaman's Technique of Trance Induction," in *Popular Beliefs and Folklore Tradition in Siberia*, ed. V. Diószegi (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1968).
26. Imre Nagy, *Tücsök a máglyán* [A Nobody at the Stake], introduction by József Pintér, biography by Endre Bakó (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1986).
27. *Ibid.*, p. 19: "A nap ostoros legény" [The Whip-Lad of the Sun].
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29: "Lócsontváz a pusztán" [Horse Skeleton on the Puszta].
29. In Béla Pomogáts, *A tárgyias költészettől a mitologizmusig: A népi líra irányzatai a két világháború között* [From Objective Poetry to Mythologism: Trends in Popular Lyric Poetry Between the Two World Wars] (Budapest: Akadémia, 1981). Literary-Historical Series, No. 36, Mihály Czine, ed., p. 66.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
31. László Gasparovich, *Keleti szél* [Eastern Wind] (Budapest: Magvetö, 1985), pp. 253-397.
32. Tekla Dömötör, *Naptári ünnepek — népi szinjátszás* [Calendar Feasts — Folk-Theatrical Arts], 2nd ed. (Budapest: Akadémia, 1979).
33. Ferenc Hont, *Eltünt magyar szinjáték* [The Vanished Hungarian Theatrical Art] (Budapest, 1940). Cf. Dömötör, p. 56.
34. Dömötör, p. 58.
35. Béla Márkus, "József Ratkó's 'Assist the King': A World Premiere at the Zsigmond Moricz Theatre." *Szabolcs-Szatmári Szemle* XX:1 (1985), pp. 117-22.
36. Magda Szabó, *Béla Király: Történelmi dráma trilógia a meráni Gertrúd fiáról* [King Béla: A Historical Drama Trilogy About the Son of Gertrud of Meran] (Budapest: Magvetö, 1984).
37. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.
40. Ágnes Sexták, "Gazember a Rocksámán: Beszélgetés Waszlavik 'Gazember' Lászlóval" [Rogue, the Rock-Shaman: Interview with "Rogue" László Waszlavik] *Mozgó Világ* (Budapest), no. 8 (August 1986), p. 105.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 108-09.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 110-11.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 113.