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# Party-Based Euroscepticism in the Visegrád (V4) Countries

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**Abstract.** After the electoral breakthrough of Eurosceptic parties at the latest European parliamentary election, Euroscepticism has become a hot issue once again. However, it is clear that Euroscepticism is not a single phenomenon but a very complex one. Eurosceptic MEPs sit at almost every group of the EP; they have different views on society, economy and on the European integration in some respects. As far as the Visegrád Countries are concerned, the Eurosceptic parties of the region have been a significant reinforcement to the critics of the EU since 2004. This paper focuses on the nature of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. Keeping the classification of Taggart and Szczerbiak, I found that there are four main types of party-based Euroscepticism in this region: sovereignty-based, leftist/anti-capitalist, periphery-based and redistribution-based.

**Keywords:** Euroscepticism, parties, European Union, Visegrád Countries, EP elections

The problems of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (e.g. in Poland and the Czech Republic), the strengthening of Eurosceptic parties, such as Jobbik in Hungary and the crisis of the eurozone (the fall of Slovak government in 2011 for instance), have once again put the critics of the European Union in the limelight in the Visegrád Countries (V4). Since the EU accession has started in 2004, lots of parties have gained European Parliamentary seats which have criticized the EU. Despite the fact that these parties are ideologically very different, they are often labelled as Eurosceptics without making a difference between them. However, the phenomenon of Euroscepticism in V4 countries is so complex and diverse that it needs further categorization. This paper focuses on the types of party-based Euroscepticism in two ways. First of all, I update the classifications of Taggart and Szczerbiak. Secondly, I analyse the reasons of Euroscepticism because they are important but less researched. Taggart and Szczerbiak argue that the main reference point is the relation to membership. They use two categories: 'hard Eurosceptic' parties think

that their countries should withdraw from the EU, while ‘soft Eurosceptics’ do not form a principled opposition to European integration (Taggart-Szczerbiak, 2008: 8). Similarly to Taggart and Szczerbiak, Kopecký and Mudde (2002) state that Eurosceptics differ from Eurorejects in the relation to EU-membership.

I analyse the parties having at least one seat in the national or European Parliament. This means 6 Eurosceptic parties. During my work, I have taken into account the statements of the literature about Eurosceptic parties. In order to get a detailed picture of Eurosceptic parties, I have analysed the programmes and manifestos of these parties and investigated the parliamentary and European Parliamentary votings on the Treaty of Lisbon. I argue that Eurosceptic parties in V4 countries are quite different and at least four types of Euroscepticism could be differentiated: sovereignty-based Euroscepticism, leftist Euroscepticism, periphery-based Euroscepticism and redistribution-based Euroscepticism. It is quite interesting that Eurosceptic parties in Eastern Europe do not really reflect on the democracy-deficit of the EU; so, this type of Euroscepticism clearly lacks in this region.

Sovereignty-based Euroscepticism means if a party opposes the integration or a part of it because it impairs its country’s sovereignty, or if the national sovereignty and/or the real or perceived occurrence of the national interest’s damage stands in the centre of the party’s critique. I classified here Neo-liberal Eurosceptic parties as well. These parties criticize overregulation; however, it is a question of national sovereignty: what is regulated in Brussels, cannot be regulated at national level. Leftist Euroscepticism rests on two pillars. One of them is that anti-capitalist attitude which aims at socialism or at the creation of a kind of proletarian union. It is the Marxist-Leninist and Trotskyist parties’ own. On the other hand, a kind of leftist Euroscepticism stands out along the new left parties’ classical values (anti-globalization, social sensitivity, anti-capitalism in some cases and pacifism).

Periphery-based Euroscepticism is the critique of the Eurosceptic parties in the periphery countries of the European Union and which originates from the fact that these countries are poorer than the core countries of the EU. So, these parties experience the FDI from the centre as colonization. Usually, these parties criticize the decision-making process dominated by France and Germany. In the case of the post-communist countries, it is coupled with the fact that these member states joined the EU later and with worse conditions.

Redistribution-based Euroscepticism is when a party’s critique against the EU is drawn up by a redistribution issue. On the one hand, the source of these criticisms is the fact that some policy areas have a decreasing share from the EU budget (e.g. Common Agricultural Policy). Therefore, the favoured member states of these policy areas have been interested in the maintenance of the status quo. The other subtype of this category has become visible in connection with the crisis of the Eurozone. Its essence is that the Eurosceptic parties of richer member states claim that their countries should not finance the countries in trouble.

I think I need to define some notions at this point. First of all, I define party-based Euroscepticism because it has several definitions (e.g. Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008; Kopecký and Mudde, 2002; Harmsen-Spiering, 2005; Kaniok, 2009; Sørensen, 2007). Naturally, it focuses on parties and does not pay attention to voters. Secondly, the subject of the criticism has to focus on European integration instead of public policy. For example, party A criticizes the environmental policy of the EU because it does not serve sustainable development, while party B criticizes it because it means a further deepening of the integration. In this case, only party B is Eurosceptic. Hence, a Eurosceptic party is a party which opposes or criticizes the current European integration, some parts of it, or its decision-making process or mechanism, where the criticism is basically principal-based, not policy-based.

This paper has three main parts. First of all, I define party-based Euroscepticism and make a literature review. I comment on the categorization of Taggart and Szczerbiak, and later on the classification of Kopecký and Mudde because both have some problems. In the second section, I demonstrate the methodology of the research. Thirdly, I examine Eurosceptic parties in the Visegrád Countries. At the end of the paper, I analyse the investigated parties according to the nature of their Euroscepticism.

## **1. Concepts of Party-Based Euroscepticism**

### **1.1. First Steps**

Before the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty (early 1990s), Euroscepticism was not a hot issue in European politics. Naturally, there were some Eurosceptic parties (e.g. communist parties), but as the phenomenon was marginal the literature has not drawn attention to it. This situation changed in the early 1990s when the ratification process of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) called some Eurosceptic parties and movements into life such as the June Movement in Denmark, the UK Independence Party or the Movement for France.

As a reaction to the emergence of the parties which had criticized the European integration, Paul Taggart (1997, 1998) defined Euroscepticism:<sup>1</sup> '[e]uroscepticism expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration' (Taggart, 1998: 366). In my opinion, this explanation seems to be good at first sight. The trap of this designation becomes clear after seeing the classification of Taggart. He differentiates three types of Euroscepticism (Taggart, 1997: 3):

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1 Ernst B. Haas (1958) also researched the parties' relation to the European integration; however, he did not define the concept of Euroscepticism.

- (1) Anti-integrationist position means that a party opposes the very idea of the European integration.
- (2) There are those parties that are sceptical about the current European integration because it is too inclusive (i.e. these parties desire less integration).
- (3) There are those parties that are sceptical that the EU is the best form of the integration because it is too exclusive (i.e. these parties prefer deeper integration).

The first category is very clear and unequivocal. The two latter groups need some attention. Taggart demonstrates that parties being sceptical about the EU because of its inclusivity argue that the EU is trying to combine elements that are incompatible. These parties often cite the rights and sovereignty of the member states. Contrarily, parties criticizing the EU because of its too exclusive nature sometimes conclude that the European Union excludes the poorer regions of the world or cuts across the interests of the working class (Taggart, 1998: 366). It means that either these parties prefer another form of integration (e.g. workers' union) or a deeper integration.

I think this categorization evolves a major problem of the conceptualization of Euroscepticism. Taggart thinks that every critique that reflects on the current European integration process is a Eurosceptic behaviour. This could be at least questionable. Can those parties that criticize the European Union because of its exclusivity be labelled Eurosceptic? As far as I am concerned, I simply cannot accept this point of view. There are only a few cases when parties rejected a European treaty because it did not include any real improvement in the European integration process: e.g. the Humanist Democratic Centre (CDH) in Belgium did not support the ratification of the Treaty of Nice (Deschouwer and Van Assche, 2008: 80). But nobody says that CDH is a Eurosceptic party.

## **1.2. Hard and Soft Euroscepticism**

The first real milestone of the research of Euroscepticism was the classification of Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (2000). They differentiate two sides of Euroscepticism. These definitions have been clarified during the recent years; so, I concentrate on the very last designations.

Hard Euroscepticism is where there is a principled opposition to the EU or the European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008a: 7).

Soft Euroscepticism is where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership, but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008a: 8).

Szczerbiak and Taggart emphasize that hard Eurosceptic parties oppose the intergovernmental form of the economic integration (i.e. the original form of the EEC) as well (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2000: 6). This is an important statement because most of the Eurosceptic parties prefer intergovernmental co-operations. However, parties being in favour of utopian conceptions, such as proletarian union, are included in the hard Eurosceptic category.

Kopecný and Mudde find some weaknesses of the concept of Taggart and Szczerbiak. First of all, they find that soft Euroscepticism is too inclusive because it includes every insignificant disagreement with any policy decision (Kopecný and Mudde, 2002: 300). Taggart and Szczerbiak allege that the subject of soft Euroscepticism is only the planned and further extension of EU competencies (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008b: 242). Secondly, Kopecný and Mudde note that the clear distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism is blurred when the authors argue that ‘hard Euroscepticism can be identified by the principled objections to the current form of European integration in the EU’ (Kopecný and Mudde, 2002: 300). Thirdly, Kopecný and Mudde argue that it is not clear that hard and soft Euroscepticism reflect on the relation to the idea of the European integration or on its embodiment, the European Union (Kopecný and Mudde, 2002: 300).

Finally, I state that Taggart and Szczerbiak do not make any difference between the status before and after the EU accession. It is a mistake because parties that opposed joining the EU do not wish to withdraw their countries from the EU in every case (e.g. the Austrian greens opposed joining the EU and promoted the maintaining of the country’s EU membership). The lack of this distinction could cause the overestimation of the number of hard Eurosceptic parties and thereby it could lead to incorrect conclusions, which do not help the understanding of the phenomenon.

### **1.3. Kopecný and Mudde’s Alternative Classification**

As far as Kopecný and Mudde are concerned, they create an alternative classification based on the Visegrád Countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary). The authors conclude that there is a difference between the relation to the idea of the European integration and the European Union itself. They use Easton’s (1965) model on the support for political regimes (diffuse and specific support). As Kopecný and Mudde show, the diffuse support for Europe is the support of the idea of the European

integration, while the specific support concerns the European Union (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002: 300). These two dimensions give a matrix (Table 1).

**Table 1.** *Classification of Kopecký and Mudde*

	<b>Europhile</b>	<b>Europhobe</b>
<b>EU-optimist</b>	Euroenthusiast	Europragmatist
<b>EU-pessimist</b>	Eurosceptic	Euroreject

*Source: Kopecký and Mudde, 2002: 303*

Kopecký and Mudde point out that the supporters of the EU are EU-optimists, the rejecters are EU-pessimists, while the supporters of the European integration are Europhiles, and the rejecters are Europhobes. These categories create four groups. Parties which combine Europhile and EU-optimist positions are Euroenthusiasts. Eurosceptics support the idea of the European integration, but they are pessimistic about the current form. Groups that oppose both the general idea and the current form of integration are Eurorejects, and finally, parties that do not support the idea, but they support the European Union, are Europragmatists (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002: 302–303).

Taggart and Szczerbiak criticized this classification in some ways. Firstly, they say that the category of ‘Eurosceptics’ is too exclusive because it does not include the principled opposition. Secondly, the authors find the ‘Europragmatist’ category illogical. Kopecký and Mudde categorized as Europragmatist parties such as Mečiar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) or the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKgP) in Hungary (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002: 316). I think of Karen Henderson’s phrase, ‘phony Europhile’ (Henderson, 2008: 284). Finally, Taggart and Szczerbiak argue that the ‘Euroenthusiasts’ category is too inclusive because there are differences between parties supporting the current integration process (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008b: 243–244).

Agreeing with Taggart and Szczerbiak, I think there is another major problem with the classification of Kopecký and Mudde. It seems very clear that the category of ‘Eurosceptics’ is not a principled opposition of the EU but only a critique of the current European integration. From this point of view, it is more or less the same as Taggart and Szczerbiak’s soft Euroscepticism. Along the same principle, Eurorejects can be categorized as hard Eurosceptics.

Despite their problems, I think both classifications could be useful to analyse the parties’ relation to the European Union. In this paper, I focus on the current European integration process, so I use hard and soft Eurosceptic categories. However, these definitions are not enough to understand the nature of Euroscepticism in CEE countries. To solve this problem, I examine the reasons for which Eurosceptic parties criticize the European Union.

## 2. Methodology

In this paper, I examine the Euroscepticism of parliamentary parties in CEE countries. In this field, the most serious question is the indicator of Euroscepticism. Taggart argues in his first study on the phenomenon that the relation to the Maastricht Treaty is a good indicator of it because it reappraised the European Union; Eurosceptics could express their opposition this way and general support of the EU declined in public opinion (Taggart, 1998: 366–367). I think, Taggart's suggestion is basically good, and this method is useful later as well because the changes of Euroscepticism can be followed easily through 2-3 treaties within a decade. The most serious question in connection with the indicator is its operationalizability. My aim is to choose a simple and easily operationalizable indicator (Taggart and Szerzbiak, 2008b: 246). The examination of party programmes could be misleading: it can happen that a hard Eurosceptic party moderates itself in government or neutralizes the European issue and changes its European policy like the French Communist Party did in 1997 (Benedetto and Quaglia, 2007: 482). A similar problem could arise during the analysis of parliamentary votings: the two green parties and the People's Union (VU) in Belgium rejected the Nice Treaty simply because they did not feel it European enough (Deschouwer and Van Assche, 2008: 82). 'Honest' voting can come to the European Parliament, but parties becoming relevant that time (e.g. Freedom and Solidarity in Slovakia) would be omitted from the research in this case.

Different treaties deepening the European Union – more precisely, parties' standpoints on them – create very good bases, sufficiently dense clues and opportunities for operationalization. Therefore, classification based on the relation to the European Union has a benefit because it is always current as the reform of the European Union is continuously on the agenda – which cannot be said about the relation to the membership (hard and soft Euroscepticism).

I perform the synthesis of the three methods: considering party programme as a base, I examined the reason if a party did not vote in accordance with its party programme. I found cases in which the certain party was either in government position, changed its standpoint, or some other domestic factor may have affected its decision. Kaniok argues that it is important to examine parties' rhetoric (Kaniok, 2009: 166); however, I disagree with this statement. Rhetoric is for voters, but a party which supports the deepening of the European integration while its leader criticizes the European Union in some other issues cannot be deemed as Eurosceptic.<sup>2</sup>

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2 Some leaders of non-Eurosceptic parties have argued many times against the idea of federal Europe. For example, then French president Nicolas Sarkozy said in the European Parliament in 2008 that building a Europe against the nation-state would be a historical mistake (BBC, 2008). German Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasized in an interview that she does not see any reason to transfer further powers to Brussels (Spiegel, 2013). Furthermore, Frits Bolkestein, former European commissioner and ex-leader of the Dutch liberal party (VVD), agreed with his party's

### 3. Party-Based Euroscepticism in V4 Countries

Table 2 shows Eurosceptic parties at the time of the EU accession. Although there have been major changes within the party systems of the Visegrád Countries, it could be a good starting point. In the Czech Republic, the Communist and Civic Democratic Party are still relevant; however, ODS has lost most of its voters since then. The Republican Party does not exist anymore, but Tomio Okamura's Dawn party (Úsvit) gained mandates last autumn and the Party of Free Citizens (Svobodní) won a European Parliamentary seat in May. In Hungary, the Euroscepticism of the Fidesz can be questionable, while MIÉP was replaced by Jobbik on the right of the political spectrum. The Hungarian Workers' Party has never had any parliamentary seats. As far as Poland is concerned, Self-Defence and LPR lost their parliamentary representations in 2007 and became insignificant parties. Polish People's Party abandoned its Euroscepticism, which focused on the circumstances of the accession. Law and Justice remained the only relevant Eurosceptic party, though Korwin-Mikke's Congress of the New Right (KNP) gained 4 EP seats and has a real chance to become a relevant actor of Polish politics. Euroscepticism in Slovakia was a marginal phenomenon before the economic crisis. HZDS lost its representation in 2010 and its Euroscepticism is also disputed because the party's MPs and MEPs voted in favour of all major deepening efforts of the European integration. The Euroscepticism of the Christian Democrats and the National Party has to be tested, and in 2010 another Eurosceptic party broke into the Slovak political scene: Freedom and Solidarity (SaS).

**Table 2.** *Classification of Eurosceptic parties in CEE countries*

Member state	Hard Euroscepticism	Soft Euroscepticism
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) Miroslav Sládek Republicans (RMS)	Civic Democratic Party (ODS)
Hungary	Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP)	Fidesz Workers' Party
Poland	Self-Defence (SRP) League of Polish Families (LPR)	Law and Justice (PiS) Polish People's Party (PSL)
Slovakia	Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) Slovak National Party (SNS) Real Slovak National Party (PSNS)	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) Direction (Smer) Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)

*Source: Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008a: 12*

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European spokesperson, who stated that European federalists, such as Guy Verhofstadt, mean greater danger to the united Europe than right-wing populists such as Le Pen (NOS, 2013).

I examine the nature of relevant Eurosceptic parties' Euroscepticism below, focusing on the relation to the European Union, on the one hand, and on the drivers of Euroscepticism, on the other. I also analyse the parties' standpoints on the Lisbon Treaty and other European issues if necessary.

### 3.1. Poland

In Poland, during a several-year period after the EU accession, hard Eurosceptic parties played an important role. The League of Polish Families campaigned against joining the EU, while Self-Defence did not have a clear position about the membership (Markowski and Tucker, 2010: 527). After a long internal debate, the Polish People's Party was in favour of the membership (Riishøj, 2007: 517); however, the party criticized the circumstances thereof. Law and Justice also supported to join the EU despite the fact that party leader Jarosław Kaczyński expressed his doubt about the conditions of the accession (Szczurbiak, 2008: 231–232).

In 2005, PiS won the parliamentary and presidential elections and formed a one-party minority government, which was joined by LPR and Self-Defence in 2006. One year later, disagreements between Law and Justice and its coalition partners resulted early parliamentary elections, which were won by the centre-right, pro-European Civic Platform (PO). LPR and SRP lost all of their parliamentary seats. As Table 3 shows, Law and Justice has remained the only relevant Eurosceptic party in Poland. Although the party's club in the Sejm was divided over the Lisbon Treaty, party leader Jarosław Kaczyński voted in favour of the ratification.

**Table 3.** *Voting on Lisbon Treaty (Poland)*

Party group (club)	Sejm				European Parliament			
	Yes	No	Abst.	Absent	Yes	No	Abst.	Absent
<b>Civic Platform</b>	206	0	0	3	13	0	0	0
<b>Law and Justice</b>	89	56	12	2	0	0	8	0
<b>Democratic Left Alliance</b>	37	0	0	3	4	0	0	1
<b>Polish People's Party</b>	31	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
<b>League of Polish Families</b>	-	-	-	-	0	2	0	0
<b>Self-Defence</b>	-	-	-	-	2	0	0	0
<b>Others</b>	21	0	0	0	9	9	0	3
<b>All</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>

*Source: Sejm, 2008; European Parliament, 2008*

The nature of PiS's Euroscepticism is based on two pillars. The party has criticized the conditions of Polish membership, declaring that Poland is only a second-ordered member of the community (Szczerbiak, 2008: 233). This argument is clearly an Eastern European type of Euroscepticism focusing on the circumstances of the EU accession (e.g. agricultural subsidies). On the other hand, in its party programme, Law and Justice emphasizes the importance of defending national sovereignty (PiS, 2014: 150). Another Eurosceptic party gained European Parliamentary seats in May: Janusz Korwin-Mikke's Congress of the New Right (KNP). KNP is in favour of a free-trade area, but it strongly opposes any EU regulation and institution (KNP, 2014). Basically, it is a Neo-liberal critique which propagates deregulation. In this sense, KNP's Euroscepticism belongs to the sovereignty-based Euroscepticism.

### **3.2. The Czech Republic**

Euroscepticism has always been a mainstream phenomenon in the Czech Republic because in the first half of 90s then Prime Minister Václav Klaus expressed his doubt about the European integration process. Klaus led his party (Civic Democratic Party) until 2002. In this era, the ODS, which was one of the two largest parties in the Czech Republic before 2013, was a clearly anti-federalist Eurosceptic party. Klaus and his party's Euroscepticism based on three pillars. Firstly, as a pro-free market party, ODS criticized the overregulated EU (a clearly Hayekian argument) (Hanley, 2004a: 693). Recently, the ODS has moderated its Euroscepticism, but Klaus uses primarily this argument to attack the European integration. Secondly, the Civic Democratic Party stated that the EU enlargement is a self-interested approach of the old member states (Hanley, 2004b: 526). Finally, the ODS tried to define itself as a defender of national interest, i.e. a vindicator of the Czech national sovereignty.

In addition, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia is a constant actor of the Czech political scene as well. The party was against the membership (Hanley, 2004a: 702–704); however, it did not play any role in the campaign of the referendum. After the accession, the KSČM's Euroscepticism has softened (Neumayer, 2008: 147) and accepted the idea of a confederal or a moderately federal Europe as a reality (Handl, 2005: 133).

As Table 4 shows, the Communist Party was against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, while the Civic Democrats were divided on the issue. In the latter case, Mirek Topolánek, the then prime minister and leader of the party, not only voted for the treaty but also tried to gather enough MPs for the successful ratification (in the Czech Republic, a three-fifths majority is needed to adopt such treaties). The changing attitude of the party led to an open breakup between ODS and the incumbent president, Václav Klaus. Klaus started to support minor libertarian

Eurosceptic parties such as the Party of Free Citizens (*Svobodní*), which won a European Parliamentary seat in May and joined the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and the Direct Democracy (EFDD) group in the EP.

**Table 4.** *Voting on the Lisbon Treaty (Czech Republic)*

Party group	House of Representatives				European Parliament			
	Yes	No	Abst.	Absent	Yes	No	Abst.	Absent
<b>Civic Democratic Party</b>	33	37	9	0	0	0	8	1
<b>Czech Social Democratic Party</b>	71	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
<b>Communist Party (KSČM)</b>	0	23	2	1	0	4	0	2
<b>Christian and Democratic Union</b>	12	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
<b>Green Party</b>	4	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
<b>Others</b>	5	1	0	1	2	2	0	1
<b>All</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>

*Source: Poslanecká Sněmovna, 2009; European Parliament, 2008*

The basis of the Civic Democrats' Euroscepticism has not changed since the 90s. The party still uses pro-free market (ODS, 2104: 5) and sovereignty-based (ODS, 2014: 3) arguments against the European integration; however, it has moderated itself and has become a more conformist Eurosceptic party. As far as KSČM is concerned, its Euroscepticism has softened and it is basically anti-capitalist; nevertheless, the party tends to criticize the bureaucracy and the democratic deficit of the EU as well (KSČM, 2014). Dawn's (Úsvit) party programme is very short-spoken on the European integration, but it is clear that the party wants to reform the EU.

The Party of Free Citizens (*Svobodní*) wants to withdraw Czech Republic from the EU and emphasizes the 'undemocratic' nature of the European Union and the necessity of defending national sovereignty (*Svobodní*, 2014: 8–9). The party is also in favour of deregulation and free-market.

### 3.3. Slovakia

As opposed to the Czech Republic, party-based Euroscepticism has been a marginal phenomenon in Slovakia. There was a consensus among main parties about EU accession. The Slovak National Party is clearly Eurosceptic; however, the party lost its parliamentary representation in 2012. The Christian Democratic Movement abandoned its Eurosceptic agenda; most of its Eurosceptic members

left the party and founded the Conservative Democrats of Slovakia (KDS) and the New Majority (NOVA). These parties formed a joint list at the 2014 European Parliament election with the Civic Conservative Party (OKS) and have a real chance to gain one seat.

Voting on the Lisbon Treaty was not a test of party-based Euroscepticism but one more battle between the leftist-nationalist government and the centre-right opposition. The Christian Democratic Movement and the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union boycotted the voting, while the Party of Hungarian Coalition, ensuring the necessary majority, voted with the government (Table 5).

**Table 5.** *Voting on the Lisbon Treaty (Slovakia)*

Party group	National Council				European Parliament			
	Yes	No	Abst.	Absent	Yes	No	Abst.	Absent
<b>Smer (Direction)</b>	50	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
<b>Slovak Democratic and Christian Union</b>	0	0	0	30	3	0	0	0
<b>Party of Hungarian Coalition</b>	19	0	0	1	2	0	0	0
<b>Slovak National Party</b>	18	0	0	1	-	-	-	-
<b>Movement for a Democratic Slovakia</b>	14	0	1	0	3	0	0	0
<b>Christian Democratic Movement</b>	0	0	0	9	0	0	3	0
<b>Conservative Democrats of Slovakia</b>	0	4	0	0	-	-	-	-
<b>Others</b>	2	1	0	0	-	-	-	-
<b>All</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>

*Source: Národná Rada, 2008; European Parliament, 2008*

According to this voting, neither the Direction nor the HZDS can be considered as Eurosceptic, even SNS is a soft Eurosceptic party voting in favour of the ratification because of their governmental engagement. Nowadays, the only relevant Eurosceptic party in the Slovak political scene is the Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) party. SaS was against the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) despite the fact that it caused the fall of the centre-right government in which the party took part (Gyárfášová and Bútorová, 2013: 93). It stated that Slovakia should finance Greece despite the fact that Slovakia is a poorer country than Greece. It is a typical example/argument of redistribution-based Euroscepticism. The party is against further deepening the EU because it limits Slovak sovereignty (SaS, 2012: 56). SaS has a Neo-liberal Eurosceptic attitude

as well, opposing economic homogenization (Mesežnikov, 2013: 65). The New Majority (NOVA) gained a European parliamentary seat in May 2014, and it is against the concept of the United States of Europe and reducing national sovereignty (NOVA, 2014: 6).

### 3.4. Hungary

In Hungary, party-based Euroscepticism was not a visible phenomenon after 2002, when the Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIÉP) lost its parliamentary seats. Only the nationalist MIÉP campaigned against the EU membership, while there was a relatively stable consensus among mainstream parties about the necessity of joining the EU.

**Table 6.** *Voting on the Lisbon Treaty (Hungary)*

Party group	National Assembly				European Parliament			
	Yes	No	Abst.	Absent	Yes	No	Abst.	Absent
<b>Hungarian Socialist Party</b>	184	0	0	6	8	0	0	1
<b>Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union</b>	114	1	5	19	11	0	0	0
<b>Christian Democratic People's Party</b>	1	3	8	11	1	0	0	0
<b>Alliance of Free Democrats</b>	19	0	0	1	2	0	0	0
<b>Hungarian Democratic Forum</b>	6	1	1	3	1	0	0	0
<b>Others</b>	1	0	0	2	-	-	-	-
<b>All</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>

*Source: Országgyűlés, 2007; European Parliament, 2008*


Although Fidesz is often categorized as Eurosceptic, as Table 6 shows, its MPs and MEPs voted in favour of the Lisbon Treaty (and in favour of the Fiscal Compact as well). However, it is true that the party uses a confrontational rhetoric against Brussels, but it does not reflect on deepening the European integration, only on some domestic issues (e.g. overhead reduction, pálinka etc.).

In 2009, a new nationalist party, the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) broke into the political arena at the European parliamentary elections. One year later, the party also gained seats in the National Assembly. Basically, Jobbik supports the concept of the Europe of Nations. The party criticizes the European Union in two main ways. On the one hand, Jobbik considers the integration as a threat to Hungary's national sovereignty; so, the party's Euroscepticism is

primarily sovereignty-based. On the other hand, it sees the European integration process as the colonization of Hungary by Western Europe (Jobbik, 2014: 32), which is a typical argument of the Eurosceptic parties at the periphery of the EU.

#### 4. How is Party-Based Euroscepticism in V4 Countries?

Eurosceptic parties of the Visegrád Countries meant a serious resupply of party-based Euroscepticism after the Eastern enlargement (Figure 1). While the rate of Eurosceptic MEPs in old member states dropped in 2004, the same rate was extremely high in the Visegrád Countries in 2004. Nevertheless, in 2009, the rate of Western European Eurosceptic MEPs stagnated, but the total number of critics reduced due to the V4 Countries. Five years later, in 2014, the number of Eurosceptic MEPs grew significantly, while its rate did not change in the V4 Countries; so, the importance of Eurosceptic parties in CEE declined.



*Source: Own calculations based on results*

**Figure 1.** Rate of Eurosceptic MEPs

As far as the nature of Euroscepticism in the CEE region is concerned, there are four major types of Eurosceptic arguments. Like in Western Europe, sovereignty-based Euroscepticism plays an important role in the Visegrád Countries as well. The question of national sovereignty is important to the major Eurosceptic parties: Law and Justice, Congress of the New Right, Civic Democratic Party, Freedom and Solidarity and Jobbik. ODS, KNP and SaS criticize the European Union on a Neo-liberal basis as well. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia represents leftist Euroscepticism in the region.

Finally, there is a special type of Euroscepticism which originates in the conditions of EU accession, on the one hand, and it is based on the feeling that old member states colonize the region, on the other. It seems to be region-specific;

however, Greek, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese Eurosceptic parties also have used similar arguments in recent years. Nationalism, anti-capitalism, anti-globalism and other specific interests (e.g. agriculture) could be the reason of this form of Euroscepticism as well. In the Visegrád Countries, Jobbik uses periphery-based Eurosceptic arguments because of the party's strong nationalist and protectionist stance. Law and Justice and Polish People's Party also criticized the conditions of EU accession, focusing on agriculture. The Civic Democratic Party has had some similar arguments as well. Basically, periphery-based Euroscepticism is one of the main types of the phenomenon in the Visegrád Countries; however, neo-liberal stances play an important role as well.

**Table 7.** *Classification of Eurosceptic parties in the V4 Countries*

	<b>Hard Eurosceptic</b>	<b>Soft Eurosceptic</b>
<b>Sovereignty</b>	Party of Free Citizens	Law and Justice Congress of the New Right Civic Democratic Party New Majority
<b>Leftist</b>		Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
<b>Periphery</b>	Movement for a Better Hungary*	
<b>Redistribution</b>		Freedom and Solidarity

\* Jobbik hovers between hard and soft, as well as between sovereignty and periphery-based Euroscepticism.

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# The ‘Europe Idea’ and the European Civilian Crisis Management. The Evolution and Development of the Civilian Crisis Management in the EU

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**Abstract.** Public support for the European foreign policy and crisis management inside Europe is high. The crisis management is said to be the field where the development of the EU’s foreign policy can be perceived in the most expressive way. But is there any sense in having a Common Security and Defence Policy at all? How could an economic entity become a political community as well? Most of all, is there any connection between the ‘Europe idea’ and the civil crisis management? The author tries to deliver his views in the current essay. However, besides giving a short overview of the history of the EU’s civil crisis management, this essay also portrays how the history of the European civil crisis management connected to the European integration and the idea of Europe over the years. The crisis of the Eurozone is also an opportunity which can improve other parts of the European integration like civil crisis management. In the author’s opinion, it is worth following this path.

**Keywords:** ‘Europe idea,’ common foreign and security policy, civil crisis management, integration.

## Introduction

This essay – despite its title – does not summarize the history of the EU’s civil crisis management in the first place. The reason is that the mentioned topic has already been elaborated in depth by others in the literature; thus, the content is available for anyone who is interested in it. The current document will contain rather ‘flashes’ which followed the idea of the European unity, by now through the development of the co-operation of the EU foreign policy in this area.

I am convinced that there are no coincidents. Therefore, it did not happen accidentally either that, out of an economic community, such a capacity expanded which protects European values in countries beyond the EU borders,

being potential candidates for EU membership and also in far-off Asian or African countries which will never belong to the EU. However, it is without doubt that in the field of civil crisis management lots of self-explanation problems exist. Many times, it is not completely clear what the European Union expects with launching a certain civil crisis management mission in the affected area (Jacobs 2011: 2, 3; Mirelingen-Ostraikaute 2006: 141; Juncos 2007: 70). In spite of these facts, the civil crisis management capacity of the EU showed a definite improvement in the last decade and became a significant cohesive factor in my opinion.

This study does not undertake to review the founding and amending treaties besides the changes adopted at the EU summits. This essay rather aims at introducing how the idea of the unified Europe has appeared and developed in the history of the EU civil crisis management.

## 1. Robert Schuman and the Civil Crisis Management?

Robert *Schuman* was predetermined for the creation of the united Europe by his whole life and political career.<sup>1</sup> Although his name is first of all connected with the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community, his perceptions about the future Europe were far beyond his period and also that of ours. Schuman's outstanding virtue lies in that even after the two world 'burns' he was able to initiate peacemaking with the old enemy, Germany ('Vergebung statt Vergelung'), and start a completely new process, the European integration.<sup>2</sup> He saw it rightly that the European peace can be established by a European federation (Schuman 1991: 17, 120), but the European integration can be created only step by step. This unity can be achieved through common successes, results which generate solidarity between the members, based on Schuman's opinion (Schuman: 18). Such kind of tool and capacity is the EU's civil crisis management capacity, in my eyes. The common successes achieved in this field can help to create the European identity which they tried to bring into being, e.g. by the common currency, the European citizenship, the Schengen area and the Erasmus Programme until now. The civil crisis management missions and their results also carry in themselves the opportunity for the member states to recognize the values to be protected commonly.

The civil crisis management confronts the member states with such problems and threats, which have effect on all of them and which need a common action, carrying, therefore, the possibility of a common success story – this is the real

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1 However, Schuman's reconciliation policy was first of all based on his faith in God (Elting 1997: 4–17).

2 This was expressed by Francois Mitterrand more precisely (Schuman 1991: 15). The foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community also had a more practical reason, namely to avoid war with establishing the international control of the necessary raw materials (Schuman: 133).

point of the European soul (Schuman: 33). I feel really appropriate what Walter *Hallstein* said once by stating that the member states can react to future problems only commonly because these problems affect all of us.<sup>3</sup> To put it another way, as Schuman remarked: 'Peace as well as safety have become indivisible' (Schuman: 39). In the frame of the civil crisis management, the member states realize that the problems have to be solved by joint efforts. Furthermore, Schuman has properly highlighted that Europe needs to act quickly regarding the building up of the European unity (unities) because the failure of the UN is getting more and more obvious (Schuman: 119). The EU crisis management – considering its set of tools – means an absolutely new dimension of the civil crisis management in general, exceeding the frame of the UN missions.<sup>4</sup> To solve the new kind of crisis, the EU's wide range of tools seems to be the most suitable way.

The significance of the crisis management lies in what is stressed both by the European Security Strategy and Schumann: peace can be preserved by tools which are in proportion to the possible threats (Schuman: 159).<sup>5</sup> Building up a rule of law or a public administration, or solving ethnic tensions can not be executed (only) by military forces. For this purpose, the tools of the civil crisis management and the synergy of the civilian-military crisis management ability appear to be the right 'weapon'.

## 2. The Pleven Plan and the Western European Union

According to some theories, the European integration was determined to turn into a common foreign and security policy.<sup>6</sup> However, without a doubt, the beginning of the European integration was not about the united Europe as a civil power; moreover, the founding treaties did not even contain relevant regulations. Notwithstanding, it has to be highlighted that, for example, due to the opinion of Francois *Duchene*, it was an intention already at the beginning of the integration to establish a real, civil power (Gazdag 2005: 43).

Keeping in mind that the so-called Pleven Plan belongs to the prehistory of the European military crisis management, it is not detailed in the current

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3 'Europe shares a lot of things: those memories, which are called history, those performances, which it can be proud of and those events, which it is ashamed of, its happinesses and its sufferings and, last but not least, its tomorrows.' (Kecskés 2005: 19)

4 A lot has changed since the first UN mission (1948).

5 According to the European Security Strategy: 'This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.' European Security Strategy, 2003: 15.

6 This is the so-called development logic thesis (Gazdag: 49).

study, neither is the European Defense Community (EDC)<sup>7</sup> nor the Treaty of Brussels.<sup>8</sup> Certain relations can be remarked between these early initiations and the prehistory of the civil crisis management, though. The plan of French Prime Minister<sup>9</sup> René *Pleven*, called the Pleven Plan,<sup>10</sup> tried to move on towards a common European army (multinational force) in the history of the European integration, but without success. From the view of the current essay, the relevant questions are: what would have been the purpose of setting up a European army and can any kind of relationship be perceived between the Pleven Plan and the later civil crisis management at all? The purpose of the Pleven Plan was, first of all, not a question of integration but rather the ambition to put the West German rearmament supported by the USA under European control (Gazdag: 135, Dedman 2010: 70–71). The Pleven Plan and the EDC proved to be a big step forward in the history of the integration indeed because it would have realized a foreign- and security political co-operation<sup>11</sup> as a reponse to the upcoming crisis in the actual global political environment. In those environments, this was the only choice for the development of the European crisis management.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, the member states waived certain part of their sovereignty by signing the agreement regarding the EDC and established their own institutional structure of the foreign-policy integration. That was the point where the question of European defence and integration connected until the refusal of the French national assembly.<sup>13</sup> It is important and interesting to underline that it was not the USA who tried to let fall the above plans, namely the common European security and defence policy.<sup>14</sup>

The history of the Western European Union (WEU) is strongly linked to the history of the European crisis management.<sup>15</sup> The European (civil) crisis management had operated inside the WEU created by the Treaty of Brussels to be amended in 1954<sup>16</sup> until the CFSP came into being.<sup>17</sup> The role of the WEU was to ensure a European platform for the Atlantic Alliance incorporated in the NATO and it involved the

7 International treaty concluded on 27 May 1952 by and between Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries (Treaty of Paris).

8 That was the so-called five-party convention aiming at the European regional security, concluded on 17 March 1948.

9 It actually stemmed from Jean Monet.

10 It was adopted by the French National Assembly on 24 October 1950.

11 It was a unique idea in the economic integration so far (Dedman: 79).

12 See later (Article 3): the end of the bipolar world order.

13 On 30 August 1954, the French National Assembly refused to put the question of the EDC on the agenda at all (Gazdag: 153–154; Dedman: 77).

14 Moreover, in Dulles' opinion, the USA expected a Europe to be able to establish unity in the long run, which would preserve internal peace and prevent external aggression (Dedman: 77–78).

15 Besides that, the aim encoded in the European Defence Community, the control over the army industry of West Germany, was ensured by this institution for France (Gazdag: 178).

16 Concluded on 23 October 1954 in Paris.

17 The clear border-line was the creation of the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) in 1999.

former Second World War enemy, West Germany, into the common foreign policy discourse (Gazdag: 173). However, during a significant period of the functioning of the WEU and the Cold War, due to the relations of international politics – first of all, the bipolar world order –, the issue of the civil crisis management could not come up because there was not an international conflict or conflict inside a state worth for the two sides generating another world war (see for example the Cuban missile crisis or the Hungarian Revolution of 1956).

Following the end of the bipolar world order, both the end of the Cold War and the conflicts inside the states facilitated the creation of the European crisis management. The task sharing was basically simple: the European Communities were responsible for economic issues,<sup>18</sup> while the WEU for the security ones. The demise of the WEU had been coded in advance since its tasks corresponded with the tasks of the NATO in practice; moreover, the WEU recognized the primacy of the NATO (Horváth-Sinka 2000: 93; Gazdag: 174, 258). Notwithstanding, as a puffer institution and talking shop, the WEU fit into the conceptions of the EU member states willing to preserve the primacy of the NATO till Saint Malo.

The WEU meeting of 19 June 1992 in Petersberg (Bonn) can be seen as a turning point. That was the first time for the WEU to speak out its intention to be ready to provide assistance for crisis management and crisis prevention, including the peacekeeping action of the UN and the OSCE.<sup>19</sup>

After the declaration of Maastricht,<sup>20</sup> the Petersberg declaration was a step forward on the road wished by the European leaders for the WEU as a defence component of the EU. The Petersberg tasks<sup>21</sup> were deemed to be a decisive jump in the history of the civil crisis management, although these tasks – or at least their wording – had a military character.<sup>22</sup> The activity of the WEU in the field of the European crisis management did not change a lot; even after the Petersberg tasks had been determined (Pagani 1998: 738), the WEU did not carry out civil crisis management actions in a substantial way (Bailes-Messervy-Whiting 2011: 69, 79). However, many civil crisis management missions were accomplished by the WEU between 1990 and 1999, for example in Albania or Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bailes-Messervy-Whiting: 28). Noteworthy is the crisis management action in Mostar (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1994–1996) led jointly by the EU and WEU (Reichel 2010: 60–125).

After a while, the competence of the principal and political leader was taken over by the EU from the WEU (Bailes-Messervy-Whiting: 37), and then the EU obliged

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18 The joint name of the European Coal and Steel Community, European Atomic Energy Community, European Economic Community between 1967 and 1993.

19 Western European Union Council of Ministers. Bonn, 19 June 1999. Petersberg Declaration. Article I. 2, 8.

20 WEU meeting, 10 December 1991.

21 Humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping tasks, security forces tasks during the crisis management, including peacemaking.

22 Petersberg declaration. Article I.4.

itself contractually to carry out these tasks. After that, the WEU has completely lost its importance, and on 30 June 2011 it terminated its activity formally, too.

### 3. The Beginning of the EU's History of Civil Crisis Management

The collapse of communism affected decisively the European crisis management: by the disappearance of the bipolar world, the conflicts between the states (blocs) had been replaced by the conflicts inside the states. The dissolution of the Soviet empire and its alliance gave rise to the old conflicts suppressed so far, meaning mostly ethnic problems. The new-born states were not able to govern themselves in many cases (e.g.: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia).

These new conflicts needed new-fashioned, complex crisis management, where the main figures of the crisis management so far (UN, OSCE, NATO) appeared not to be appropriate. In relation to the UN mission in Congo (1960–1964),<sup>23</sup> the circumstances had been changed profoundly and the EU was the one having the necessary tools in this new age. In the meantime, the EU had also become the world's biggest charity provider: in 2000, it provided more development assistance and charity than the USA and Japan together (Gazdag: 351).<sup>24</sup> The effective and actual form of the stand-alone European civil crisis management was brought to the scene by the butcheries on the Balkans in the 90s and by the fact that the available tools for the EU, even that time, seemed to be more suitable compared with the ones at the NATO's disposal to carry out stabilization and reconstruction tasks after the conflict (Chivvis 2010: 5). Although the military crisis management capacity was more emphasized at the beginning of ESDP in 1999, the civil crisis management also appeared at that time on this field of the foreign and security policy of the Union.

The inception of the history of the EU civil crisis management is tied to the European Commission (Halonen 2006: 16–17). One of the first civil crisis management missions of the EU in Mostar in the period of 1994–1996 was led by the Commission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the EU asserted the civil administration in the city.

The next step was the establishment of the CFSP (second pillar) by the Treaty of Maastricht of 1993<sup>25</sup> as it lifted up to contractual level that the member states want to co-operate to a certain extent in the field of foreign policy, too.<sup>26</sup> Initially, the implementer of the CFSP was the WEU. The aims of the CFSP (including especially

23 It is deemed to be a crisis management mission of first generation.

24 27,367 billion euros.

25 The Treaty of Maastricht was signed on 7 February 1992 and came into force on 1 November 1993.

26 See the Treaty of Maastricht, Title V.

the strengthening of the EU member states' security besides maintaining peace), more precisely, its protection, forecasted the necessity of shapening the civil crisis management of the EU (Gazdag: 254).<sup>27</sup> Ferenc *Gazdag* refers to the importance of the Treaty of Maastricht rightly from the point of view of this essay, suggesting that this topic (CFSP) could not be disregarded during the negotiations anymore; the decisions of the CFSP became legal obligations for the member states (Gazdag: 254).<sup>28</sup> The Treaty of Maastricht introduced the so-called joint action, serving as the operational frame of civil crisis management. The number of these actions reached 117 even in the period between the Treaty of Maastricht and Amsterdam (Gazdag: 243). The WEU was determined to be an organic part of the integration in the Treaty of Maastricht and got involved explicitly into the EU crisis management.<sup>29</sup>

The inclusion of the Petersberg tasks into the Treaty of Amsterdam<sup>30</sup> proved to be a decisive step in the European crisis management, as thereby the (civil) crisis management got into the conceptions of the European integration in the narrow sense from the WEU or, in other words, from this time on, the EU accepted its role in this field openly and under the 'main institution'. Having the civil crisis management integrated into the Treaty of the European Union is deemed to be an innovation in world politics, taking into account that civil crisis management had not got such a distinguished role before at treaty level in any other international organization (Pagani 1998: 741). It is worth mentioning that the integration of the Petersberg tasks into the EU did not abolish in itself the crisis management role of the WEU (Pagani: 745). On the other hand, even before being integrated into the EU, the EU had the opportunity to get the WEU to implement its crisis management decisions (Pagani: 748).<sup>31</sup> As already mentioned, after the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Petersberg tasks have become an integral part of the CFSP.<sup>32</sup> Even this amending treaty failed to integrate the WEU into the EU, but the relation between the two organizations was definitely strengthened, indeed.<sup>33</sup> I would also like to refer to the introduction of the constructive abstention from a civil crisis management point of view, because it ensured some place for co-operation beside the unanimous decision-making before deciding on launching a civil crisis management mission.<sup>34</sup> Amsterdam had an impact on the financing of the

27 See the Treaty of Maastricht, Article J.1, 2, 4.

28 See the Treaty of Maastricht, Article J.1, 2, 4.

29 'The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.' – Treaty of Maastricht, Article J.4.2.

30 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 17.2. It was included into the treaty at Swedish and Finnish suggestion.

31 Treaty of Maastricht, Article J.4.2.

32 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.7.2.

33 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.7.3.

34 See the behaviour of Cyprus with regard to the adoption of the joint action initiating the EULEX Kosovo mission.

civil crisis management missions, too, by including the operational costs of the Petersberg tasks beside administrative costs at the expense of the EU budget.<sup>35</sup>

The Nice summit of 2000 put the enhanced co-operation into the CFSP, having consequences also on the civil crisis management, since the enhanced co-operation could be expanded also on launching and managing a civil crisis management action.<sup>36</sup>

## 4. The Evolution of the EU's Civil Crisis Management on the Edge of the New Millennium

The independent European civil crisis management was initiated and determined by the EU summits in Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Göteborg.<sup>37</sup> First of all, in Cologne (3–4 June 1999), the European leaders – touched by the horrible events in Kosovo – decided to set up an independent European crisis management capacity.<sup>38</sup> Another decision made in Cologne was to mandate the EU with the exclusive implementation of the Petersberg tasks,<sup>39</sup> by ending the WEU's activity.<sup>40</sup> The General Affairs Council was mandated here to create the necessary conditions and take the required measures in order to reach the aims. This work was left for the Finnish presidency ('as a matter of priority').<sup>41</sup> Both the Cologne summit and the wording of its conclusions were influenced by the war in Kosovo. Therefore, the necessity of the European military crisis management capability was predominantly emphasized here.<sup>42</sup>

35 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.18.3.

36 EU Treaty amended by the Treaty of Nice, Article 27 b.

37 Actually, the process began in 1998 in Saint Malo, which was important for military crisis management.

38 'We are convinced that to fully assume its tasks in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management the European Union must have at its disposal the appropriate capabilities and instruments.' Cologne European Council 3–4 June 1999. Conclusions of the Presidency. Annex III – European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence. Article 2.

39 '...we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the "Petersberg tasks". To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action...' Cologne European Council 3–4 June 1999. Conclusions of the Presidency. Annex III.1.

40 Gazdag, 286. p. Cologne European Council 3–4 June 1999. Conclusions of the Presidency. Annex III.5.

41 Cologne European Council 3–4 June 1999. Conclusions of the Presidency. Article 56.

42 It also mentioned that the strengthening of non-military tools and their better co-ordination are necessary. See Article 56 of the declaration.

At the Helsinki summit (10–11 December 1999), the final conclusions recognized the primacy of the UN in the field of maintaining the international peace and security.<sup>43</sup> The decision to establish the mechanism of civil crisis management was made in Helsinki in order to develop the tools of the civil crisis management more efficient and co-ordinative.<sup>44</sup> The so-called *Action Plan for Non-Military Crisis Management of the EU* was adopted here.<sup>45</sup> A deeper examination of this document would exceed the frames of this essay; however, it has to be mentioned that it aimed at strengthening and supporting the launch of the EU's independent civil crisis management actions.<sup>46</sup> The Helsinki declaration initiated the procedure<sup>47</sup> leading to the determination of four strategic areas of the civil crisis management at the Feira summit (19–20 June 2000): police, rule of law, public administration and civil protection.<sup>48</sup> It was later expanded by monitoring missions, the assistance for the so-called special representatives<sup>49</sup> and SSR (security sector reform),<sup>50</sup> as well as assistance in the field of DDR<sup>51</sup> (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration).<sup>52</sup> Another decision made at the Helsinki summit was the establishment of a new institution: the CIVCOM (Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management)<sup>53</sup> constituted in May 2000 has become a relevant factor in the development of the European civil crisis management since the strategies to be followed in different areas of crisis management are determined by this body. It also monitors the activity of all the ongoing EU civil crisis management missions.

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43 Presidency Conclusions. Helsinki European Council. 10 and 11 December 1999. See Article 26 of the declaration.

44 See Article 28 of the declaration.

45 Presidency Conclusions. Helsinki European Council. 10 and 11 December 1999. Annex 2 to Annex IV. Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union.

46 Furthermore, it aimed at the coherence inside the pillar system, the EU's consent to actions initiated by other organizations and at the coherence between national, collective and NGO resources and strengthening responsibility.

47 See Article 29 of the declaration. At the Helsinki Summit, a decision was made to draw up a report about target numbers (Headline Goal) the EU member states want to achieve in the field of crisis management. The European leaders decided here on the creation of the rapid reaction capacity, the determining of the frame and methods thereof, the staff required for it and the necessity of determination of the material and financial resources (action plan). In this regard, an inventory, a database and a survey are prescribed by the annex of the declaration (ANNEX 2 to ANNEX IV).

48 Santa Maria Da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000. Conclusions of the Presidency. Annex I – Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy. Appendix III.B.

49 Special representative of the EU in specific areas.

50 Many names are used in the literature: Security Governance Reform, Security Sector Reform or Security System Reform. The first mission of that kind was the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

51 The first mission of that kind was the Aceh mission in Indonesia.

52 The areas of civil crisis management are still expanding: civil crisis management action can focus on defending human rights, border control and certain monitoring activities, too.

53 This body is integrated into the General Secretariat of the Council and consists of delegates from the member states and also from the Commission and the Council.

At the Feira summit, the EU expressed its support for third states to be involved in the European crisis management.<sup>54</sup> Here, the civil crisis management meant to be the primacy of police assistance.<sup>55</sup>

At the Nice summit (7–10 December 2000), there did not happen any crucial change with regard to the civil crisis management, except for making clear that the EU is mandated on the police field both with strengthening and replacing domestic police forces (Halonen: 21).<sup>56</sup>

At the Göteborg summit (15–16 June 2001), the integral approach of the crisis management, the civil protection and the involvement of non-member states in the European crisis management were stressed.<sup>57</sup> In June 2001, here was the so-called Police Plan adopted.<sup>58</sup> Also, the attention was drawn to the necessity of the complex training for people being employed in terms of civil crisis management (Halonen: 22).<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, new aims were set in the field of the rule of law, civil protection and public administration.<sup>60</sup> Göteborg was the place where member states spoke out their will of concentrating civil crisis management in the field of the rule of law, after having recognized it as a precondition of peace and security.<sup>61</sup>

At the end of the process, at the Laeken summit (14–15 December 2001), the EU could firmly announce its ability to launch crisis management actions independently (Nowak 2006: 24). In this respect, the Laeken declaration has to be highlighted again because it evaluated the EU and the integration process clearly more than a pure economic entity.<sup>62</sup> The Laeken declaration announced the

54 Santa Maria Da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000 Conclusions of the Presidency. Artilec C.10.

55 ‘Recognising the central role of police in international crisis management operations...’ Santa Maria Da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000 Conclusions of the Presidency. Appendix IV.A.1.

56 Presidency Conclusions. Nice European Council Meeting. 7, 8 and 9 December 2000. Annex II to Annex VI. II.2.

57 Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy. Annex III: New Concrete Targets for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Article 16, 43–44.

58 Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy. Annex I to the Annex.

59 Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy. Annex III. 18.

60 Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy. Annex III: New Concrete Targets for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Article 17.

61 Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy. Annex III: New Concrete Targets for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Article 2.

62 ‘The European Union has thus gradually come into being. In the beginning, it was more of an economic and technical collaboration. Twenty years ago, with the first direct elections to the European Parliament, the Community’s democratic legitimacy, which until then had lain with the Council alone, was considerably strengthened. Over the last ten years, the construction of a political union has begun and cooperation been established on social policy, employment, asylum, immigration, police, justice, foreign policy and a common security and defence policy.’ Presidency Conclusions

European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001. Annex I.I.

EU to take part as a crisis management actor in the new world order.<sup>63</sup> Another important perception to be mentioned in the Laeken declaration was the need for the joint development and for the co-ordination of the capacity of military and civil crisis management.<sup>64</sup>

## 5. Civil Crisis Management Actions

The first chapter of the European civil and military crisis management is linked to the Balkans.<sup>65</sup> No doubt, it was influenced by the fact that in the 90s the EU was not able to perform an effective crisis management and consequently to prevent the bloody events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.<sup>66</sup> By launching the European Union Police Mission (EUPM)<sup>67</sup> in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the first civil crisis management mission on the EU's part in 2003, the EU browsed to a completely new part in its European civil crisis management book. This mission was followed shortly by many others. Another five missions have been initiated on the Balkans by the EU; with two exceptions, all of them were civil crisis management actions. EUPM was also the EU's first police mission,<sup>68</sup> while the first rule of law mission was the EUJUST THEMIS<sup>69</sup> and the first monitoring mission the EUJUST LEX.<sup>70</sup> In the development process the EU has reached by now the level of being able to launch and manage several civil and military – and also hybrid<sup>71</sup> – crisis management actions simultaneously, even in different continents. Speaking about the reality, in June 2013, this meant twelve ongoing military and civil crisis management missions altogether.<sup>72</sup>

The EU came out of the Balkans to the edge of Europe, to the Caucasus relatively quickly. As the first rule of law mission, the EUJUST THEMIS lasted from July

63 'The role it has to play is that of a power, resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world's heartrending injustices.' Presidency Conclusions European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001. Annex 1. Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union.

64 Presidency Conclusions European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001. Annex 2. Declaration on the Operational Capability of the Common European Security and Defence Policy.

65 See, for example, Operation Althea, Operation Concordia, Operation Proxima missions.

66 The lack of crisis management capability was in Jacques Delors's words: humiliation (Dedman: 183).

67 Its start was decided at the Sevilla summit in June 2002. This mission is also worth mentioning because here the EU took over the task of the UN (United Nations' International Police Task Force).

68 2,300 people worked in the mission during the years, which cost 32,940,897 euros.

69 EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia.

70 European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq.

71 See, for example, the European Union civilian military supporting action to the African Union Mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS).

72 <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/> (Last access: 27.08.2013.)

2004 to July 2005, also becoming a relevant part of the European civil crisis management history. The potential of the European civil crisis management was proved by the fact that the EU appeared on other continents in the framework of the ESDP, beyond localizing the dangers directly threatening the European borders. The first mission to Africa was the EUPOL Kinshasa<sup>73</sup> in April 2005, while in Asia the Aceh mission meant the beginning in September 2005.<sup>74</sup> The most serious undertaking by the EU in Asia in the field of civil crisis management is considered to be the still ongoing EUPOL Afghanistan initiated in mid-2007.<sup>75</sup>

Another point worth highlighting is the first civil-military (hybrid) mission in the European crisis management history, the AMIS, initiated by the EU in Sudan in 2005.<sup>76</sup>

The appearance of the EU in the Middle East is again considered a significant event in Palestine (EU BAM RAFAH, EUPOL COPS)<sup>77</sup> in November 2005, at least in a symbolic sense; however, the efficiency thereof is highly disputed.<sup>78</sup> In my opinion, Palestine is the right place where one of the political preconditions – i.e. the trust of the people living in the affected area – of the successful civil crisis management towards the EU is given, in contrast with other international organizations and states.

Without a doubt, launching the rule of law mission in Kosovo (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo) in February 2008 was a crucial juncture,<sup>79</sup> which indicated a new level in the European civil crisis management due to its staff number and to the complexity of tasks. Concerning the way how to handle its relations with Russia, the EU's presence in Georgia from October 2008 can be seen as an important milestone after the conflict between Russia and Georgia.<sup>80</sup>

The strength of the EU civil crisis management is confirmed by its being able to maintain four military crisis management actions and twelve civil crisis management missions at the same time. Moreover, only one of them can be found in Europe in a narrower sense (EULEX Kosovo), while six of them proceed in

73 EU police mission in Kinshasa, from April 2005 till June 2007 in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

74 Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) from September 2005 till December 2006.

75 EU Police mission in Afghanistan. It was launched by the EU in June 2007 and is still ongoing. About 550 people work in the mission with the participation of 24 EU member states and Canada.

76 European Union civilian-military supporting action to the African Union mission in the Darfur region of Sudan. From July 2005 till December 2007.

77 EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPS): started its activity in 2005 and is still ongoing. EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM RAFAH): started its activity in November 2005 and is still ongoing.

78 Ladzik 2009: 5.

79 The mission started practically in December 2008.

80 European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, started in October 2008 and is still ongoing

Africa and two in the Middle East.<sup>81</sup> Further elaborations would exceed the limits of this essay; however, we should mention that Europe is aware of Africa's future possible impacts and dangers to Europe. It feels also the responsibility for solving the conflict in the Middle East, while in Asia the EU's tasks are based on the transatlantic alliance. Last but not least, by considering the extension of the civil crisis management area, the conclusion can be drawn that the EU defines its defence zone increasingly broader and, on the other hand, it assumes its value-mediating role even more often (Németh 2013: 342–360).

## 6. Documents Related to the Civil Crisis Management after 2003

In the European civil crisis management history, the *European Security Strategy* from 2003 has to be assigned a distinctive role. The core relevance of this document was that it defined the EU's future foreign policy programme in a comprehensive way. One of the basic perceptions of the document is 'preventive engagement,' which means showing commitments to prevent threats. Two of the five biggest dangers to the EU are connected to civil crisis management according to this document: organized crime and problems concerning failed states. The Security Strategy clearly refers to the fact that the solution for the challenges can not be a purely military one.<sup>82</sup> The EU has to be even more active in crisis management – claims this document.

According to the literature (Halonen 2006: 24), the next period of the European civil crisis management began in 2004 with adopting the *Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP*.<sup>83</sup> It was created after the adoption of the European Security Strategy and the accession of the Eastern European countries to the EU. The document refers to the experiences with regard to the European civil crisis management resulted by the EU expansion in May 2004. According to the action plan, the complexity of the crisis situations requires multifunctional crisis management on the EU side.<sup>84</sup> The action plan emphasized the importance of the monitoring missions as well as the united training and co-operation between military and civil crisis management.

As a summary, I would like to highlight in relation to both above-mentioned documents that these considered the crisis management as a complex task requiring both military and civil crisis management activities on the EU's part.

81 And one in the Caucasus, in Georgia.

82 'In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.' European Security Strategy, 8.

83 Adopted by the European Council on 17-18 June 2004.

84 Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP. 3.

The enlargement of 2004 was a new chapter in European crisis management, taking into account that, as of 1 May 2004, the Balkans, Ukraine and the Caucasus<sup>85</sup> became the direct neighbourhood of the EU. On the other hand, the new member states were more capable of carrying out civil crisis management than military contributions.

In December 2004, the Council adopted the *Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) 2008*, whose implementation had been started in 2005. It was later amended in 2007, resulting in the *CHG 2010*. The CHG 2008 was the first attempt at defining which capacities are needed by the EU to achieve the aims determined in the European Security Strategy (Rintakoski 2006: 214).

The – finally failed – Constitutional Treaty<sup>86</sup> would have brought significant changes first of all in the field of military crisis management.<sup>87</sup> However, the Constitutional Treaty would have extended notably the contractual definition of the Petersberg tasks because it would have expanded the opportunity of crisis management to common disarming actions, military advising and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict tasks in order to stabilize the situation.<sup>88</sup> The so-called special amending clause<sup>89</sup> would have been also important in the EU decision-making concerning the civil crisis management since it would have changed the exclusive principle of the unanimity towards the possibility of deciding by qualified majority within the frame of the intergovernmental co-operation. The Constitutional Treaty would have extended the cases of the decision to be made by qualified majority by involving the European decision accepted at the proposal of the High Representative<sup>90</sup> if the European Council had requested him for submitting it.<sup>91</sup>

The Treaty of Lisbon<sup>92</sup> was an important milestone for the European civil crisis management, too. I am not going into the details of this amending treaty; however, some points thereof are considered to be crucial in this regard. It enlarged the Petersberg tasks with disarming actions, military assistance and advising, post-conflict stabilization tasks and the fight against terrorism.<sup>93</sup> The Treaty of Lisbon does not make it possible for the member states attending the permanent structured co-operation<sup>94</sup> to initiate a crisis management action on their own,

85 The latter one only across the sea.

86 Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe. Signed by the leaders of the Member States on 29 October 2004.

87 See the European Defence Agency, institutions of permanent structured co-operation and the collective defence and solidarity clause.

88 Constitutional Treaty, Article III-309. (1).

89 Constitutional Treaty, Article III-300. (3).

90 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

91 Constitutional Treaty, Article III-300. (2) b).

92 Signed on 13 December 2007 by the Member States.

93 Treaty of Lisbon, Article 28b.

94 It is linked first of all to the military crisis management; see the Treaty on the European Union,

thereby overruling the principle of unanimity in the decision-making (Quille 2008: 6–7),<sup>95</sup> preventing the split of the unified European crisis management. The opportunity of qualified majority cases has been extended by the above explained case concerning the Constitutional Treaty by the Lisbon Treaty<sup>96</sup> and the special amending clause has been integrated into the Treaty on the European Union. The Treaty of Lisbon established two new institutions involved into the civil crisis management, the European External Service and the European Defence Agency.<sup>97</sup> Last but not least, the Lisbon Treaty<sup>98</sup> tried to solve the immediate financing problems of the civil crisis management mission.<sup>99</sup>

## **7. The Presence and Future of the European Civil Crisis Management**

Speaking briefly about the European civil crisis management today, I would like to summarize it with the following statement: the geographical area to be affected by the missions is extending, the staff number involved in the missions is growing and the tasks of the missions are becoming more and more complex. These tendencies prove in itself that the European civil crisis management has become much stronger during the last 10 years. According to Gazdag, the development of the EU's foreign policy can be perceived in the most expressive way in the field of crisis management (Gazdag: 339).

In my opinion, the EU has found its task and identity in the field of the civil crisis management much rather than in military crisis management; the number of the ongoing civil crisis missions proves it: in 2013, this number was 12:4 in favour of civil crisis management actions compared with military crisis management missions.

Important conclusions can be reached by scrutinizing some facts. Looking at the contribution of the Member States to the staff of the civil crisis management missions, we can see Italy, Germany and France in leading position, while from Eastern Europe, Romania has to be mentioned. In spite of its population

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Article 42 (6).

95 See the Treaty on the European Union, Article 28a (4).

96 Decision made on the proposal of the High Representative of the CSDP. Treaty of Lisbon, Article 34.b), i) and iv).

97 Treaty on the European Union, articles 27 (3) and 45 (1).

98 See the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 47.d) regulating the immediate access to the EU's resources in order to launch civil crisis management undisturbed in case of a respective decision of the Council of the European Union. The Treaty also regulates the creation of a starting fund to finance mission-preparing activities not to be borne by the EU's budget.

99 However, civil crisis management missions had been financed even before that from the CFSP budget, contrary to the military missions (principle of 'costs lie where they fall' and the Athena mechanism).

and the international weight of the country, Great Britain and Spain neglect the ‘European idea’ inside this area of the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy),<sup>100</sup> while Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Hungary provide vital forces for the European civil crisis management.<sup>101</sup>

To form a clear idea of how much the European civil crisis management has developed, please, take a look at the numbers of the first and last (at least so far) civil crisis management action on the Balkans. The EUPM financed its activity in 2012 with a budget in the amount of 5.25 million euros, while the EULEX Kosovo budget amounts to 111 million euros annually. The staff number in EUPM was 774, in the EULEX Kosovo 2,250.<sup>102</sup> The numbers show a European civil crisis management needing more and more people. Beyond the contributions from the member states, the number of the staff coming from third states and that of the international and national employees are increasing.<sup>103</sup> The number of the civil crisis management missions, the task to be carried out and the staff increase have a clear impact on the CFSP (CSDP) budget: it is nine times higher than it was at the beginning (Greco, Pirozzi, Silvestri 2010: 106; Grevi-Helly-Keohane 2009: 405).<sup>104</sup>

If I had to forecast the future connection between the ‘Europe idea’ and the civil crisis management, I would mention the followings. The crisis of the Eurozone likely ‘improves’ or may promote<sup>105</sup> other areas of the European integration such as the civil crisis management. In the course of the extension of the civil crisis management, the democratic principle should be respected and strengthened, which means a civil crisis management functioning controlled by the people on a daily basis (democratic accountability, Greco-Pirozzi-Silvestri: 105, 109–110). To be successful in spreading the ‘Europe idea,’ a joint approach has to be agreed in foreign policy between the Member States, at least in strategic issues (Greco-Pirozzi-Silvestri: 106; Grevi-Helly-Keohane: 405). The EU should be aware of handling it in an international environment established before the EU would step on this stage. Therefore, a smooth co-operation with the other international organizations is highly recommended and welcome in the field of civil crisis management, too.<sup>106</sup>

All things considered, in my opinion, the connection between the ‘Europe idea’ and civil crisis management is that the latter turned out to be a source of

100 The renamed ESDP after Lisbon.

101 The above-mentioned conclusions are based on pieces of information of April 2009 (Grevi-Helly-Keohane: Annex 2).

102 <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/info/whatisEulex.php> (Last access: 27.08.2013).

103 Civilian CSDP Missions: lessons and best practices (Report 2009). May 2010: 3.

104 From 47.5 million euros to 406 million euros. Civilian CSDP Missions: 4.

105 Because the EU tries to reach success in other fields, thereby reassuring its citizens’ belief in European integration.

106 The co-operation with NGOs is also necessary because of the experiences these institutions have in the field of crisis management. They can also help in forecasting a crisis (Rintakoski: 208–209).

European identity (a tool to strengthen this identity), just like the freedom of movement inside the Schengen area, the European citizenship and the euro.<sup>107</sup>

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# Linking Trust and Civil Society

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**Abstract.** Numerous studies show a correlation between social capital and government efficiency, although the direction of causality is still debated. The study attempts to examine the relationship between government and civil society with a special focus on the civil society's role in creating social capital. More precisely, it seeks to reveal (i) the root cause of a deficient collaboration between government and civil society, (ii) the dynamics of the relationship between NGOs and the government and (iii) it is an analysis of the trust between the two actors. On the basis of quantitative and qualitative research, the study concludes that at the basis of a deficient relationship between the government and the civil society lays a fragmentation of the latter and its lack of trust in the central government, emphasizing the governments' crucial role in creating social capital.

**Keywords:** civil society, government, government efficiency, social capital, trust, contracting out, social services.

## Introduction

Social capital plays an important role in building trust, facilitating exchange and creating ties with public institutions. According to Coleman's (1988) definition, social capital is both a private and a public good. It stands for the benefits of an individual or a group of individuals and it is directed by norms of reciprocity, peer pressure and gain or even loss in reputation, thus facilitating collective action.

Woolcock (1998), Putnam (2000), Woolcock and Narayan (2000) have identified three different dimensions of social capital: bonding, bridging and linking. Bonding capital refers to social capital found within groups that are built on similarity, intimacy or informality such as family members or close friends. Bridging capital denotes links among diverse groups of individuals outside the individual's personal network. Linking capital refers to links between individuals and groups with position of power. Linking networks empower individuals to have direct influence on those with formal decision-power. These links connect citizens with members of the parliament, policy makers, businesses or other institutions. It plays a vital role in the effectiveness of institutions by making it possible to

connect directly with elected officials, therefore increasing accountability and transparency (Grootaert et al., 2004: 4).

Because of its influence on a variety of sciences, there are various ways to measure social capital, among which trust and social norm indicators, associational activity of a society, trust in various institutions and individuals but also ethnic diversity or social mobility could be used as an indicator of social capital. In the view of Woolcock (1998), trust is a product of social capital, therefore an indicator of it. Uslaner (2003) has developed a typology to better define trust; he differentiates between generalized, moralistic and social trust. This paper treats social capital with a special focus on linking networks and trust.

While the direction of causality is still debated in literature, there is proof that social capital and government performance are related (Ferguson's et al 2005, Cusak 1999, Pierce, Lovrich and Moon 2002, Knack 2002). Carver et al. (2003) state that the third sector has a major role in creating social capital. Contrastingly, Brehm and Rahn (1997) state that confidence in government creates social capital rather than civil society contributing to the creation of social capital.

The present paper examines the relationship between civil society and government, and the role civil society plays in creating social capital, with a special focus on linking trust. The study starts off with the premise that through their various connections with the community members and other institutions, civil society organizations contribute to the creation of social capital. After a brief presentation of the research questions, hypothesis and the data selection, in the first part, it compares a social service offered by both state institutions and non-profit-organizations examining the services' efficiency. In the second part, using qualitative data, it shows the dimensions of the relationship between government and the NGOs. Finally, using quantitative methods, it compares the level of trust in various institutions, paralleling this data with the values of generalized interpersonal trust. Examining how the level of trust in these institutions has changed over the past five years, gives us a better understanding of the trends and challenges of this field.

Romania's civil society plays an important role in politics, economics and, possibly, in creating social capital. While there is not a universally agreed definition of civil society, according to the legislation, it has three components in Romania: associations and foundations, mutual aid societies and co-operatives. Protected units, another important component of the civil society, exist under the form of associations and foundations. Taking into consideration their economic role, a commonly encountered name used in the literature is social economy.

According to *Atlasul economiei sociale* (2012: 8), the economic impact of the Romanian social economy for the fiscal year of 2010 was quite significant. According to the data, 100,591 individuals were employed and the overall income of the sector was of 1,746,148 euros. At present, over 70% of the registered civil society organizations are associations. Next in line are the foundations with

27%. The remaining 2% is equally divided between federations and unions. Associations and foundations have various activity fields, among which, based on the evolution of their income, charities or NGOs offering social services are the most significant. Therefore, this paper examines the relationships between government and NGOs offering social services.

## Research Questions and Hypotheses

The relationship between government and civil society organizations can be examined through various indicators, among which, one of them could be the received public funding. According to FDSC's (Foundation for Development of Civil Society) *Barometrul liderilor ONG 2012*, the majority of non-profit organizations appear to have been receiving public funding. However, it is important to mention that most of these organizations have received important grants through various European financing mechanisms. The value of the public funding received from Romanian local or central government in the percentage of their total income is less than the income generated through the mechanism of 2%,<sup>1</sup> which involves community implication, donation and civic spirit. At the same time, more than half of the non-profit organizations declare that they do not dispose of the revenues needed to maintain their programmes and barely a third of them consider that they have the necessary non-financial assets.

Based on this indicator, we can conclude that the relationship between the government and the NGOs is deficient and there is room to improve it. But what is there at the basis of this poor relationship? Are there insufficient public funds that could be made available to NGOs and to their programmes, or there is a lack of trust between the two actors, and the government prefers to deliver itself the services instead of dealing with a partner that it cannot trust? The first hypothesis can be stated as follows:

(H1) The reason behind a deficient collaboration between the Romanian government and the civil society is the lack of trust from the government's side.

If there is a lack of trust in the NGOs from the government's side, is it because the third sector is considered to deliver services that are of a lower quality or at a higher price than the state can offer them? Considering the very nature of the non-profit organizations, their profit-sharing policies and the used volunteer workforce, we can assume that the NGOs are able to offer services more efficiently than state institutions. Therefore, the next hypothesis is:

(H2) NGOs use their connections and mobilize various resources, and because they reinvest in their services the actors of the third sector are able to offer quality services at a lower cost than the state institutions.

1 More at: <http://doilasuta.ro/content/>

NGOs are mission driven; they reinvest their profits in their services and mobilize various resources to obtain their goals. They work with the government and various international institutions from which they receive subsidies; they collaborate with companies in order to gain material or financial support for their projects and with various volunteers of different age-groups and social backgrounds. We can assume, therefore, that by engaging various actors in furthering their mission and obtaining their goals, NGOs create social capital. The last hypothesis of this study:

(H3) By having various connections within the society in which they operate, non-profit organizations contribute to creating social capital.

## Data Selection

In evaluating the efficiency of the services offered by both the state and the civil society, I chose a particular service that is offered by both actors, namely residential elderly care. In choosing this particular service, the growing importance of residential elderly care services has played a major role.

Similarly to the majority of European countries, Romania's population is aging. The changes in the demographic structure have a great impact on the various economic, social and political processes. Along with the aging of population, certain social benefits, such as pension, medical health care and financial aid systems, have to be granted for a longer period of time. The growing life expectancy, the decreasing mortality and fertility rate cause the aging of Romania's population. While in the past years the number of retired persons has increased, it has been registered a decrease of the working population; therefore, the demographic dependency ratio has grown. Accordingly, from 315.1 retired to 1,000 employees that were registered in 1990, this ratio increased to 1,140.1 retired to 1,000 employees in 2011.<sup>2</sup> In these conditions, civil society organizations have been impressing in providing social services for the elderly: according to statistics, about 50% of the NGOs deliver social services and more than 58% of older people receive monthly social services from non-governmental organizations.<sup>3</sup>

Taking into consideration the high number of non-profit organizations involved in offering welfare benefits and social services to the elderly and the urgency of the matter, the paper focuses on examining the working relationship between the NGOs active in this field and public institutions.

Between January and June 2013, I conducted a research using both quantitative and qualitative methods – more precisely, a semi-structured interview. To have a

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2 More at: [http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-finante\\_banci-13620098-analiza-imbatranirea-romaniei-cateva-date-grafice-cifre.htm](http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-finante_banci-13620098-analiza-imbatranirea-romaniei-cateva-date-grafice-cifre.htm).

3 FDSO (2010) Romania, 2010. Sectorul neguvernamental – profil, tendințe, provocări.

representative sample, all accredited institutions providing residential care services for the elderly in Cluj-Napoca were contacted. Out of six contacted institutions five have answered to my request and three of these are operated by NGOs. To outline an overview of the phenomenon, we contacted and interviewed officials of the Local Government, more precisely, representatives of the local government's Social Assistance's Directorate, except the human resource development department and one employee of the County Council. Out of the thirteen contacted public officials four have answered favourably to the interview request. The representatives of the public authorities are aged between 29 and 40 years, with a university master's degree in a social services-related field. Using one particular service as the basis of comparison with the actors being involved in this particular service, the study is not representative for the entire non-profit sector, but it does show certain tendencies.

## **Comparative Analysis of Social Services**

The purpose of this study was to examine the efficiency and the effectiveness of the services offered by NGOs comparing with the ones offered by the state institutions. In order to evaluate the services, I have conducted an interview and visited the sites.

Taking into account the conditions encountered in nursing homes administered by NGOs as well as those under the leadership of public authorities, in the following, I will highlight a number of strengths and weaknesses for each one of them. In this paper, I have addressed issues such as service type, how the organization evaluates its own work, the flexibility of the organization, the main costs, the most important sources of income, the amount that a beneficiary must pay to receive services, challenges that the organizations face, the ratio of employees and beneficiaries as well as matters regarding partnerships with other organizations or institutions.

After the discussions with the authorities, I concluded that the topic of the elderly as well as the provision of services offered to this group are important to the local government, which was also on the public agenda. It is a pressing social problem that there were approximately 200 individuals at any time on the waiting list for the public elderly homes. Depending on the level of disability, dependency and the degree of care the person needs, the individuals are prioritized, after which a decision on acceptance is made. In addressing the urgent social problem, the local government offers services to individuals who do not need constant care in their own homes. In this sense, a caregiver visits the assisted person on a weekly basis.

Regarding the funding of non-governmental organizations which offer social services for the elderly, representatives of public authority stated that 'approximately 50% of social services are provided by NGOs from public funds'.

According to their opinion, providing social services and receiving a subsidy from the local government means ‘contracting out’; and in this sense the social services are already contracted out to non-profit organizations. However, the local government finances mostly organizations that provide services such as hot meals or home-care services.

There are strict regulations for private providers regarding the quality of services, but there is lesser precision in terms of available funding. Private providers are not financially integrated into a solid system in order to receive public funding, aside from grant programmes. The legal basis for this grant scheme is Law 350/2005<sup>4</sup> on the regime of grants from public funds allocated to non-profit activities of general interest and Law 34/1998<sup>5</sup> on associations and foundations, which addresses social service units.

Regarding the long-term strategy in the elderly care, authorities have expressed a desire to create a programme similar to the one already existing in the United States, which encourages the legacy system. Based on this mechanism, the elderly will donate their properties to the government in exchange for residential care.

## **Residential Elderly Care Units of NGOs**

Non-governmental organizations excel in collaboration with other similar third-sector organizations or institutions. They have shown interest and willingness to collaborate with organizations having similar profile and activities. Representatives of these NGOs state that collaboration with other institutions having similar interests plays a crucial role in daily activities, even if this collaboration does not have a legal frame.

NGOs mobilize their resources creatively and their capacity to attract material or financial resources is infinitely higher as compared with the public institutions. However, public funding for social services provided by NGOs is still limited. Since 1998, subsidy per beneficiary covers only a small part of the costs, while other operational costs still remain uncovered, and the subsidy given is conditioned to increasing the number of beneficiaries instead of focusing on the quality of the services.

Caring for one beneficiary in a public home costs between 1,700 and 2,700 RON / month, whereas in private homes operated by NGOs this is between 1,500 and 2,000 RON / month. While the main sources of income for public nursing homes comes in 80% from the state budget and in 20% directly from the beneficiary, NGOs receive 200 RON per beneficiary on a monthly basis through the already mentioned public funding. Thus, taking care of one person in an elderly care

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4 More at: [http://www.ccja.ro/pdf/x\\_Legea\\_350\\_05.pdf](http://www.ccja.ro/pdf/x_Legea_350_05.pdf).

5 More at: <http://www.legex.ro/Legea-34-1998-14529.aspx>.

home operated by a non-profit organization is more cost-effective compared with those nursing homes run by the public institutions.

The main costs the private homes identified are the costs related to the personnel and food, since none of the visited institutions have their own kitchen. In the public nursing homes, the main costs are as follows: personnel, food, medicines and operational expenses.

Another area where NGOs perform better is the caregiver–beneficiary ratio. NGOs have more employees who are in direct contact with the beneficiaries, and this ratio is also increased by the presence of volunteers who offer periodic services and organize group or individual activities. Furthermore, in assisted home living run by the NGOs, the staff showed a higher interest in customizing services according to the beneficiaries' personal needs. This is linked to a more family-like atmosphere created in the assisted homes run by NGOs. Note that the number of the average private homes' available places is at 20, while in the public home in Cluj-Napoca the capacity is of 110 places. Due to this, public homes lack privacy; even a spacious room seems crowded having 14 beds. NGOs offer the option to their beneficiaries to dispose of single-bed rooms for a somewhat higher contribution, an option that does not exist in public institutions.

Both entities operate with internal regulations and procedures clearly established; however, NGOs have shown increased flexibility when it comes to making changes associated with the programme, activities, food served on demand or caregivers – 'we have one day a week to cook exactly what they like' (private home). Regarding the procedures by which a person can take a place, they are not as complicated as in the nursing homes run by public institutions, and they are less bureaucratic. In comparison, the process of institutionalization in the public system must pass through several stages and is subject to many rigors. On the basis of a verbal and/or a written notification, the procedure begins with the initial evaluation of the case. Based on these data, in conjunction with the information in the dossier prepared (it includes copies of the identification documents of the applicant and his/her family, medical evaluation, documents certifying the status of the person), they determine the placement in a social unit if the requirements are fulfilled, or, on the contrary, the person in case will receive support and guidance towards another service, so as to prevent institutionalization. Adults in need, homeless, without family or income, individuals who are in a situation of dependency and self-care capability is limited or absent have priority.

Due to sponsorship, both NGOs and public nursing homes have managed to obtain the necessary medical equipment (beds, special mattresses, wheelchairs) to carry out the activities under good conditions.

Private homes 'have the right to select their customers'. If there is an institutionalized person who creates problems for the whole group, there is a possibility for that person to be asked to leave. It turned out from discussions with representatives of

private homes that they often faced problems with people having severe mental health issues and they had to refuse them because they were not qualified enough to accommodate their needs: 'We cannot admit people with mental disorders.' On the other hand, public homes accept everyone, with no discrimination.

Some areas that need to be improved can be pointed out. An area of perfection for NGOs is the qualification of their staff members. Since they do not have the most qualified professionals, they are able to offer only limited medical services. All the subjects agreed upon the need for an 'in-house doctor' twenty-four-seven, because all the nursing homes visited have a doctor who comes maybe two times a week or when there is an emergency. One of the homes visited has contractual collaboration with a retired doctor who works voluntarily, but this is not enough taking in consideration the needs of the elderly.

As a conclusion, the third sector relies very much on interpersonal relationships. They seem to understand that people make institutions work together, rather than some strict forms and regulations. On the other hand, public institutions co-operate mostly with public authorities (police, local authorities, hospitals). However, they collaborate with NGOs when it comes to assist the resident people in need. Services offered to beneficiaries are more flexible, the environment is more family-like and there is a certain privacy; the beneficiary-caregiver ratio is better and offering the services costs less.

## **Residential Elderly Care Units of Public Institutions**

In terms of services, public nursing homes have an advantage as they provide comprehensive medical services at a superior quality. All private institutions offer about the same range of services such as housing, personal care, rehabilitation, socialization, recreation, but beside these the public home care offers total medical services. Public sector homes provide more extensive medical services given that they benefit from the presence of a permanent internal doctor. Looking from this perspective, the services they offer are very much like those we encounter mostly in a hospital, which may give the impression of a less comfortable and welcoming environment as opposed to the nursing homes operated by non-profits.

In order to support and carry out their activities and programmes, public homes receive public funding on a normative basis. Eighty percent of their resources come exclusively from the state budget and 20% as contribution from the beneficiaries.

Talking about aspects that support improvements, in Cluj-Napoca there are no nursing homes or care centres but rather a hospital for the elderly. The two nursing homes are not in the town and because of that they are not easily accessible. So, the major problem regards the access to the services but also their quality since friends and relatives find it hard to visit the residents, what leads to social isolation.

The second major downside is considered to be the lack of occupational therapy and leisure programmes, because watching TV cannot be considered an appropriate activity and they do spend most of their free time in front of the TV. A possible explanation could be that in the assisted living homes run by public institutions the ratio between client and caregiver is higher. Because of that, the caregivers do not have enough time to offer a more personalized care. In this sense, a private nursing home has an open partnership with the Faculty of Social Assistance, through which they provide various activities to fill in the beneficiaries' free time in a more interesting and stimulative way.

In the case of the public institutions' collaboration, these are grounded on a rigid legal system, trust not playing any role in their partnerships. Moreover, representatives of public institutions seem to be very reluctant in working with NGOs; they even seem not to recognize the difference between mission-driven organizations and profit-driven companies. It appears that the base of their mistrust is a lack of understanding of how NGOs can run institutions without having a stable, fixed income. 'I cannot understand how an NGO can operate without a fixed and regular income source,' said the administrator of a public nursing home.

Public nursing homes offer a more medically-centred care; however, there is a significant percentage of beneficiaries who do not need more medical care than the ones in the homes operated by non-profits. Even in their case, providing similar services to those offered by NGOs to their beneficiaries has a higher cost. The difference between the lowest costs per beneficiary is 200 RON on a monthly basis for each individual. Not only that non-profits are able to provide housing, provision and leisure time activities at a lower cost, but their services are more flexible, their venues easily accessible, the living conditions are better and they offer a more family-like environment. Furthermore, the beneficiary-caretaker ratio is better than in the case of public homes.

As a conclusion, with all of their limitations, NGOs do offer better services at a lower cost. Hence, they would be well suited to extend the current partnerships and take over more service delivery from the state. This way, the government would be able to address pressing social issues in a more efficient way. Private-public partnership and contracting out might be a solution to improve the government's function.

## **Relationship between Government and NGOs**

As the previous empirical research pointed out, we can conclude that non-profit organizations do offer residential care services for the elderly very efficiently. Would there be a reason behind the lack of spectacular result in the collaboration between public and private institutions other than effectiveness? Is it simply

because public institutions do not trust the civil society? And if the local government does not trust the third sector, what would the reasons be?

In the following section, through a series of semi-structured interviews, I will analyse the various aspects of the collaboration between the third sector and public institutions, remaining within the frames of residential services offered to the elderly.

## **Public Institutions Considering Their Constituencies**

Even though the responses are not consistent, it seems that local officials do not hold thorough public consultations; they do not seek out actively neither their own specialists' nor the NGOs' experience, input or opinion. Contrastingly, the majority of the representatives of public institutions consider that NGOs' ideas and inputs are incorporated into the policies. On the other hand, NGOs are rather disillusioned by this process. '... They would only ask for our opinion before the elections. After that, we do not hear about them a word.' – an NGO representative.

Another person, in this case, an employee of a public institution, states that when elaborating policies, their opinion and expertise is usually not requested. 'In 2010, they did not ask us, the social workers, anything, and they took the decision of solving the situation of the Roma by themselves. And the results? We all are going to work in the next ten years to take them out of the slums.' Since 2010, however, the consulting process has been continuously improving, today's biggest challenge being the underrepresentation of the civil society. With a great number of small NGOs that do not step up united to make their voices heard, the consulting process resumes only to a few very active individuals. 'Not many of them came [representatives of NGOs]. It is always the same persons – they do not represent the whole civil society' (civil servant).

## **Local Government Communicating with the Civil Society**

The majority of the respondents agree that communication is somewhat poor. According to the NGOs, the local government does not communicate well, excepting one single elected official. The basis of this positive response might lay in a shared ethnic background and mother tongue, respectively in the willingness of this person to use it in official matters, too. Contrastingly, the public officials miss the dialogue and the participation in the consultations of more NGOs.

## **Perception on Local Government Services**

Generally, it is agreed that local government services are good and enhance the inhabitants' lives. However, there are some observations regarding poor customer service coming from both sides. According to this, the quality of customer service depends on whether the citizens have a prior personal relationship with the clerks or not. Another remark referring to the poor customer service points out the challenges caused by a modest infrastructure and the lack of timely and efficient internal communication of the public institutions. 'Once we got a phone call asking about the plumbing services. We were wondering whether the local government had started to offer plumbing services and they forgot to tell it to us or this was a simple mistake.'

## **Collaboration between NGOs and Local Governments**

Offering social services for the public creates tremendous possibilities of co-operation between the state and the third sector such as pointing problem areas, finding common solutions and creating a helping and lifting environment. The extent to which this partnership deepens is influenced by factors such as the legal environment, institutional structures, financial mechanism etc. In examining the working relationship between the local government and the charities, I have examined how many times and in what area the institutions have worked together. The financial support received from the state is also an indicator of the relationship's quality; therefore, a set of questions examined the financial aspects of the collaboration.

The three social service providers have tried to collaborate with the local government for several times: mostly, in order to obtain the necessary permits, licences and the much needed funding. Non-profit organizations believe that the collaboration was mutually beneficial although one always has to make compromises. Even though certain organizations have received financial support from the public institutions since the amount was limited and covered a minimal part of their needs, this support is not greatly appreciated. Not surprisingly, these representatives of the civil society have not tried to work with the local authorities in elaborating public policies. They rather see the government more like an institution from where they need certain authorizations necessary to prove their legitimacy and from which they expect exclusively funding for their own projects. There is no mentioning of identification of common interests, goals and means, and this leads to a deficient working relationship between the state and NGOs. From the NGOs' point of view, it is unimaginable to have common projects or common solutions that could answer the communities' needs.

## Contracting Out

Throughout the world, governments have been making several reforms in their public services due to the citizens' pressure for improved service quality and efficiency, new demands, fiscal pressure and even globalization. A vital element of this change in public services has been a significant increase in private–public partnerships, more precisely, in the government contracting with non-profit and for-profit organizations to provide the necessary public services. Governments routinely contract out many essential public services: social services, transportation, education and child protection. While in many countries most of the services are contracted out, allowing the government to take its steering role instead of rowing, the Romanian perspective is rather offering subsidies through grants.

In this case, beside the government maintaining its role of monitoring, it delivers itself services side by side with the non-profit organizations, often competing with each other for beneficiaries and state funding. In this climate of competition and perceived government hostility, having a contracted out service seems unimaginable for the representatives of non-profits and hard to accomplish for the majority of the public officials.

On the part of public officials, there is more openness for having the services contracted out, although they point out some deficiencies, mainly the logistical challenges of having to work with many small NGOs instead of dealing with clusters or umbrella organizations. In their opinion, contracting out would solve the issues related to the extreme workload of public officials, on one hand, and to the rising unemployment of the youth, on the other hand, and would increase the efficiency of the public administration. 'It would be much easier to have the NGOs do the job and we could just verify them. It would make much more sense; but no, we like these giant institutions. And at the end of the day, we are surprised that we cannot access the available EU funds – *fata morgana*.'

## Political Influence

Contracting between the government and the civil sector has been receiving widespread attention from the state, the civil society, scholars and citizens. Private–public partnerships always raise policy debates on how public money should be spent and whether the partnerships' criteria are fair or whether there is a political implication behind certain contracts. In the following section, I will try to find answers regarding a possible political influence. Non-profit professionals are aware of a certain influence political parties try to exercise on the third sector. According to two responses, the institutions that they represent resist to this pressure, while the third one does not show a sharp delimitation against politics.

‘I think that political parties should represent the will of the citizens – and we are all citizens, aren’t we? We should get involved, go and vote for the party that represents the ideology we believe in. After all, this is the basis of democracy.’

Public servants are more distant regarding an affirmation on the matter of political influence on the third sector, and ultimately the spending of the public money. They consider that it is impossible to have a direct influence on the civil sector firstly because non-profits give a lot of importance to their professional image and secondly because no one really knows if the voting promises in exchange for some extra benefit are honoured or not.

## **Trusting the Civil Society**

Since in Romania the partnership between private and public entities is reduced to giving subsidies and grants, it raises the question whether at the heart of this deficient system is a lack of trust towards the third sector. The following section will examine to what extent public administration’s employees think that NGOs abide by the law or the results communicated by them represent the truth. Since there is a possibility that the government could consider that the third sector’s programmes are not in line with the general objectives or might not respect the privacy or defend the beneficiaries’ rights, the paper will try to give answers to this dilemma too.

An additional source of distrust between government and civil society might be posed by the way the third sector solves its problems and communicates; therefore, this study examines this question too.

## **Abiding by the Law**

All of the asked public servants considered that NGOs predominantly respect the law. If there are some exceptions, these are around some bureaucratic procedures and motivated by a want to use the available funds directly on offering better social services instead of spending it for getting some licences or paying various fees. ‘They cannot allow themselves not to respect the law – it is a matter of professional pride for them.’

The elderly home care representatives unanimously responded with a ‘yes’ to this question; however, there are some cases when they recognize that they bend the rules. These are cases that regard the privacy of their beneficiaries, and they are not willing to report to the state their beneficiaries’ stated income or use of working language in the institution. ‘You cannot take the right from a dying person to speak his or her mother tongue.’

Some other cases when non-profits bend the law involve a perceived sharp inconsistency between the reality of social work and the existing regulations. ‘Many of the regulations were made by individuals who have no clue of social work. They do not look at many things and important things, such as inflation, overhead costs etc., are not taken into consideration. The completed official forms do not reflect the reality; they skip over many important things but ask for things that one cannot accept.’

Abiding by the law certainly appears to be a virtue of the civil society; however, that does not imply that the official data delivered to the authorities always correspond to the reality. The following part will answer the question whether official data delivered by non-profits is truthful. At a closer look, it becomes obvious that some of the data are not exactly what we would call ‘the whole truth and nothing but the truth’. Behind this double-sided reporting lies a deficient system that not only does not encourage recognizing or learning from failures, but it does not even consider realities of life such as death. ‘It is a little bit like in the socialist era: the central authorities have demanded 100 percent all the time. Well, even today, we all write down that we have accomplished the targets and goals in 100 percent and just do our best. Some of the expectations are simply absurd – they do not understand that an elderly will not rise up from the death and die again when it is more appropriate. [...] We receive a monthly subsidy for each person, but in order to obtain it, we have to have all the time the exact same number of beneficiaries. If somebody dies on a Friday evening, there is nobody here in the weekends to take on a new person. That process needs a social worker, it has legal involvements and a lot of paperwork and our social workers do not work on weekends.’

Even civil servants recognize the absurdity of the system’s requirements and point out the impossibility of recognizing failures. In these cases, civil servants act empowered, although in the currently existing legal frames they are not invested with any decision power.

## **Protecting the Beneficiaries and Representing Their Interests**

Both institution types agree that NGOs do protect their beneficiaries, respect their privacy and represent their interest. ‘Non-profit organizations function based on certain accreditations. If they do not respect the mentioned requirement, they will lose their beneficiaries, especially if they receive subsidy form the government. And also, it is a personal character of their employees – they are truly caring and attentive.’

## **Problem Solving**

A possible cause of an imperfect collaboration between state and third sector could be the lack of a constructive way to solve problems. Public officials believe that NGOs solve their problems constructively. At the same time, they seem to leave out of consideration something that they themselves have pointed out as an area of improvement for NGOs. Namely, the fact that getting involved in public consultations, lobbying, initiating programmes or a closer collaboration with public authorities would be also a sign of solving the communities' problems in a more constructive manner.

## **Communication**

Beyond respecting the legal requirements, having mechanisms that encourage straightforward reporting and protecting the beneficiaries, there is also a need for efficient communication in order to build trust. The following section will analyse the way non-profit organizations communicate and how this communication is perceived by the local government.

It results from the interviews that non-profits are viewed as good communicators but generally lack visibility and the know-how of promoting themselves. 'When there is an extraordinary case through which they are all affected, they do get together and voice their opinion, but normally they communicate only in their small, internal circles. One cannot see them or hear them.'

## **Efficiency and Effectiveness**

Due to the volunteers' working hours, various donation programmes and funding mechanisms, non-profit organizations are considered to run services more efficiently, however sometimes struggling with their sustainability. 'Many of them have issues regarding sustainability. For example, ASM has built a large centre, fully armed with state-of-the-art equipment, but it was not sustainable. Today, it functions under the tutelage of the Mayor's Office.'

## **Selecting Partners**

This part of the research tries to find an answer as to whether the process through which the actors of private-public partnership are perceived as fairly selected. According to the data, this is perceived as generally free of corruption but raises

questions of equity: ‘Imagine that you only have X amount of money to divide between all the NGOs. What would you rather finance: a project through which a few students organize a table-tennis championship or a cheerleading competition that takes place downtown? And also, next year will be the European cheerleading championship and they want to organize it here. To whom would you give the public money to?’

As a conclusion, while there are many areas that need improvement in the collaboration between government and civil society, according to the data presented, government officials do trust the civil society. They believe that non-profits protect the interests of their beneficiaries, they are able to offer good services at a lower price, have dedicated and qualified staff members and abide by the law. The majority tends to understand possible small differences between reported financial data and reality; moreover, they do not condemn it because it is perceived to be reinvested in the quality of services.

On the other hand, there are various valid arguments why the outsourcing would not function presently. First of all, the legal mechanisms are not in place and are not precise. Public officials are not given credit and power of liberty to independently judge the individual cases. In addition, the generational gap among the employees results in a significant difference in their values, which causes internal conflicts and a decreased capacity in adopting new working methods. Even if the legal structure and institutional will to adopt methods of contracting out existed, the Romanian public sector would still face several challenges. Firstly, civil society does not have a strong voice, and NGOs are not visible. Secondly – related to the first one –, NGOs’ civic participation is extremely low. Its root cause might be that the mechanisms of public consultation are not properly functioning, or that the civil society does not perceive it as the best way to voice their opinion.

## **Analysis on Trust**


While the study examines the extent to which civil society and local government trust each other, it was important to see how the level of the generalized trust compares to the linking trust. I have examined the evolution of trust in various institutions as well as the linking network’s various dimensions.

The generalized interpersonal trust was measured using four different questions; trust is calculated taking the average of these questions. The first question, the most commonly found in surveys, is: ‘Generally speaking, to what extent do you think that most individuals can be trusted?’ The answers are coded in the following way: 1 = (to a very small extent), 2 = (to some extent), 3 = (neither to a small nor to a great extent), 4 = (to a great extent), 5 = (to a very great extent).

According to this coding scale, the answers show a rather neutral perception since the average score is 3.14.

The second question, ‘Generally speaking, to what extent do you agree that nowadays one cannot trust anybody?’, differentiates between a general lack of trust and a low trust in the majority of individuals. Similarly to the first question, the answers are coded from 1 = (to a very small extent) to 5 = (to a very great extent), and with its average of 1.47 point it supports the idea according to which a neutral response to the first question does not necessarily mean a lack of trust.

The next dimension of the generalized interpersonal trust refers to trusting strangers. The next two questions examine the lack of trust versus caution when dealing with strangers. The third question, ‘To what extent do you trust a stranger?’, has the very same results (3.14) as trusting most individuals. Being cautious when around strangers scored on the same scale as used earlier an average of 3 points, showing that the interviewees demonstrate more trust than restraint around strangers.



Source: European Quality of Life Survey 2012


**Figure 1.** ‘Would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?’

The outcomes of the survey are in line with the findings of the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. This survey uses a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), and the Romanian generalized interpersonal trust is at the mean.

We have seen that a relatively low level of generalized trust characterizes the subjects of this interview. This context is important to consider when interpreting the data on the topic of trust in various institutions.

Trust in institutions varies over time and depends on several factors; therefore, the survey distinguished two time dimensions through which trust might have varied: we have asked about the trust in a particular institution five years ago, respectively at the present. To the question ‘To what extent do you trust the

following institutions?,' the possible answers given are coded as follows: 1 = (to a very small extent), 2 = (to some extent), 3 = (neither to a small nor to a great extent), 4 = (to a great extent) and 5 = (to a very great extent). Trust in each institution is calculated through the mean of trust in past and trust at present.



Source: own survey data


**Figure 2.** *Trust in institutions*

According to this, the non-profit organizations are ranked as the most trustworthy, followed by the European Union and by the businesses. The least reliable institution in the opinion of the survey's respondents is the central government.

Such a low level of trust in the central government certainly influences the quality of democracy and the public participation. However, if there were a significantly higher level of trust in the local government, decentralization could bring significant improvement both in civic life and in government efficiency. While the answers denote a higher level of trust in the local government and the Mayor's Office, both being coded at 3.14, it does not show a significant trust in the institution since the generalized interpersonal trust was ranked at the very same level. Note that there is a distinction made between the representative of the Mayor's Office and the institution itself.

In other words, we could say that the local government and the Mayor's Office are trusted to the same extent as the majority of people or even strangers, whereas there is a clear distrust towards the central government.

In trying to figure out the areas of necessary and possible improvements regarding trust, I have analysed the evolution of trust in institutions, comparing the results of five years ago to those of the present time.



Source: own survey data


**Figure 3.** Changing trust

As the data shows, generally, trust has declined in the past five years. While it is argued that subjective well-being and, therefore, economic conditions influence the increase or decrease of trust, I think that it is worth pointing out that trust in businesses has not declined as opposed to public institutions. On the contrary, businesses are among the few institutions in which trust has grown over the past five years. Likewise, trust in civil society has increased over the past few years, mainly because they have started to hire more individuals with professional qualifications.

The level of decrease in most of the institutions remains at the same level, namely at 0.14, excepting mass-media, where there is a steeper fall. This can be explained by individual cases where mass-media was not perceived as objective in some of its reporting.

Apparently, the local government and the Mayor's Office hold steadily the trust of its citizens, which could be a promising sign for all citizens in this case. The local government is considered to have programmes with a positive influence on the majority of the inhabitants, this score being marked as its strongest point. While some individuals did not know how efficiently it operated, the majority believes that this institution uses its resources in a disciplined way.

Public administrators believe that the office does create partnerships with the civil society to solve problems more efficiently; however, they are not so sure about the openness of the dialogue.




Source: own survey data

**Figure 4.** Perception of the Mayor's Office

Trust towards the local government and some of its functions and results is highly appreciated, and this could be a starting point to an open dialogue. Unfortunately, in the perceptions of the NGOs, this is the weakest point of the institution; moreover, from the open-ended questions, we find out that regarding the dialogue interviewees have mentioned a single person who is open: a relatively newly elected public official. In this case, it is clear that we can talk about particularized or bounding trust and not the needed linking trust.

The second dimension of the linking networks is the degree to which the civil sector engages in a dialogue with leaders of public institutions. The aspects of engagement were examined asking 'To what extent do you think that your voice is heard by the local officials?,' respectively 'To what extent do you think that your suggestions were taken into consideration when elaborating public policies after public consultations?' The answers are coded in the already used system: 1 = (to a very small extent), 2 = (to some extent), 3 = (neither to a small nor to a great extent), 4 = (to a great extent) and 5 = (to a very great extent).

Interpreting these answers by simply looking at the quantitative data might be misleading since from the open-ended questions we find out that the interviewees see the collaboration with public institutions in a narrow perspective: either obtaining necessary permits and authorizations or receiving funding for their programmes. Trying to collaborate in the matter of various policies has not been an issue for these NGOs.



Source: own survey data

**Figure 5.** *Engagement in dialogue*

The NGOs' reticence in public consultations and the lack of getting involved in the civil life seems to have various explanations. A first explanation could be that NGOs do not wish to have closer relationships with political parties or elected public officials and wish to stay completely neutral. Starting to work with politicians is perceived as a threat to offering social services to individuals regardless of age, ethnic background and religious or political views. A second reason could be related to the extremely low level of trust in the central government. The majority of public consultations regarding public policies are initiated by the central government or its agencies; therefore, the wish to collaborate in matters of common interest might have been outmatched by the lack of trust. From the open-ended questions, we can also find answers that point out the deficiencies of these public consultations, the main problem being the lack of timely notification about these debates.

Measuring the three dimensions of linking networks, namely, trust, engagement and connections, shows us a lack of trust in the central government and mass-media. NGOs are not engaged in a dialogue with the representatives of public institutions, and when there is a connection it is a personal one, based on similarities. As a conclusion, the linking trust needed in creating reliance between third sector and public sector is extremely weak and because NGOs operate on basis of bounding trust they do not contribute to creating social capital.

## Conclusions

The present study started off from the theory that the third sector creates social capital (Carver et al. 2003). In the context of social service delivery, this would practically mean that NGOs play a crucial role in creating cohesive partnerships and linking networks.

The hypothesis regarding the government's lack of trust in civil society proves to be contradicted by the data presented in the paper. Non-profit organizations are considered to be trustworthy; however, there are several reasons behind the unproductive collaborations. One of them is the institutional incapacity to monitor and evaluate services contracted out. Additional reasons are mostly related to historical legacies, infrastructure and communication.

While the study brings substantial evidence regarding the efficiency of the non-profit organizations and to the premise that they are able to mobilize various resources, it also shows that these resources are mobilized almost exclusively due to bounding networks. NGOs do offer a superior quality of service as opposed to the ones offered by the state; however, a tighter collaboration between civil society and state institutions seems unimaginable for the representatives of these non-profit organizations. Public authorities are generally regarded by the NGOs as 'outsiders' from where they have to obtain licences, permits and which occasionally offer grants, rather than becoming lasting and real partners with common interests in offering improved quality services. Links with public authorities are based on personal contacts, and instead of creating linking networks NGOs operate on the basis of personal favours or informal social capital, similarly to other transitioning countries' phenomena.

Operating on the basis of bounding networks could be explained with the fact that public policy elaborations are mainly initiated by the central government, the institution in which respondents have the least amount of trust. This low trust of the civil society in the central government could be one of the main reasons of the poor collaboration between the government and the third sector. This suggests that public institutions influence the creation of social capital and not the NGOs are the ones to contribute to its creation.

Although two hypotheses were disproved by the collected data, the study succeeds in bringing a detailed perspective on the major obstacles of improving government efficiency and creating linking trust. While the paper focuses on a smart niche of the collaboration between civil society and local government, the study offers a detailed overview of the core challenges of improving the Romanian government's performance. The possible solutions that were suggested in the literature, such as contracting out or building social capital, are proven to have major obstacles that are related to the lack of trust in the central government. To be able to extend the present study's conclusions, further research would be

necessary, comparing more services and collecting data from more constituencies on a national level.

As a conclusion, the presented data suggest that the central government plays an important role in influencing social capital as opposed to the idea of civil society building linking networks with the public institutions. In a society with a great economic inequality and a low social capital, the third sector's role remains a rather limited one, restricted to delivering subsidized services.

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# The Relations of the *Keresztény Magvető* (*Christian Sower*) and the State between 1971 and 1989

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**Abstract.** After the nationalization in 1948, all Transylvanian periodicals of the Hungarian historical churches were banned. Relaunched in 1971 and up until the changes in 1989, the journal *Keresztény Magvető* was bordered by ideological and editorial concepts. The analysis tracks the process of editing the journal, starting with the collection of the publications, throughout the typographic works and until distribution. The main aspect is the relationship of the editorial committee with the Department of Religious Affairs, the representative of the state, as this relation was defining the existence of the journal in the specific period. By approving the *Keresztény Magvető*, the State Security Forces had a better possibility of control, while also using the periodical for the popularization of the positive image of the country.

**Keywords:** press history, Hungarian, church, communism, censorship

## Introduction

The issues of the *Keresztény Magvető* journal published between 1971 and 1989 represent a particular period in the 152-year-long history of the journal. Relaunched in 1971 and up until the changes in 1989, the journal was bordered by ideological and editorial concepts which it had not been faced with before. In Transylvania, during the studied period, the Hungarian clerical press was represented by only two publications: *Keresztény Magvető* and *Református Szemle*.

In 1968, the Unitarian Church organized in Cluj its memorial synod to celebrate 400 years of existence. In preparation for the event, the leaders of the Church expressed their desire to request the relaunch of a church journal from the Council of Religious Affairs of Romania. The frequent discussions and agreements in this period wanted to benefit from the relatively favourable period regarding the Hungarian community at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. Nevertheless, the relaunch of the journal was a difficult process.

As we know, the communist regime was an anticlerical, anti-church regime. Church persecution was not directed against certain denominations or ideologies but generally against faith and believing. Every Church and denomination had to suffer. The system of state power made every effort on the spiritual and material levels to control the Churches. In the new political context, the Church, recognizing the inequalities in position and force, tried to reposition itself in the social, political and economic system, so that in the period of 1970–1980 it became entirely subordinated to the nationalist communist power, automatically acting upon all of its orders.

Being integrated into the system manifested itself by the development of self-censorship. Starting with the 1960s, the church journals, authorized with difficulty, tried to offer contents that distanced itself from the favourite topic of the totalitarian system, which did not accept former institutions and organizations that had been banned since 1948.

In the mid 1970s, the system was characterized by an inflexible and hostile attitude towards the issue of minorities. The aim was the homogenization of society, a purpose masked by emphasizing total equality and peaceful coexistence. In the 1980s, the term ‘coexisting nationalities’ was already replaced by ‘Romanians of Hungarian nationality’.

The Department of Religious Affairs controlled the Churches, and thus all problems regarding the two church journals – among which, that of the censorship – were resolved by the staff of this department. However, after approving the printing, distribution and the control of the typographical works, the requirements the church was faced with were the same as those regarding the daily newspapers – an issue discussed in detail in the thesis.

Along with self-censorship and censorship, under the communist regime, the informal practice also had an important role, interweaving all institutions and organizations. The informal relations completed and, in some cases, replaced the means of official, formal censorship.

## Historical Context

The *Keresztény Magvető* was first published at the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as a theological-scientific journal, preserving its aims in the 20<sup>th</sup> century as well; starting from 1861 until WWI, the journal underwent an important period of development, of appreciation in church life but also in the history of the journal. In the historical and political situation following 1921, the Church and the *Keresztény Magvető* journal had to take on the spiritual strengthening of the Hungarians in Transylvania, now in minority fate. After the political changes in 1944, the Unitarian Literary Society was reorganized, but it could not take on

the publication of the *Keresztény Magvető*. After the nationalization of 1948, all minority organizations and associations were banned and abolished, and so were church publications.

In 1968, the Unitarian Church celebrated 400 years of its existence, but at the time of the commemoration – due to the suppression in 1949 – it did not have its own written press. Thus, church leaders, preparing for the commemorative synod, formulated the necessity and the proposal for the relaunch of a Unitarian journal in order to mark the 400-year anniversary of the existence of the Church. Based on the editorial plan, elaborated by János Erdő, they came to the decision to relaunch the journal *Keresztény Magvető*, as the need for such a publication was great. The Church needed a journal through which it could keep the relationship – even unilaterally – with the believers, inform them about church events and, last but not least, publish theological articles and sermons in order to improve the knowledge of priests and theologians. The historical importance of the journal was considered a defining argument in the relaunching process, in the request addressed to the Department of Religious Affairs.

On receiving the approval, the Church leadership accepted the censorship of the totalitarian regime as well as the continuous confrontations with the Department of Religious affairs, a department which – through the authorization of the relaunch – could control part of the Church's activity and claim the uncontrolled distribution of the collections of sermons circulating informally. At the same time, they used the journal's distribution abroad in order to strengthen and remedy the image of the state. The Romanian communist regime considered it very important to continuously remedy the image of the Romanian state on the international level, and for this they used the promotion of the ideal situation of coexisting minorities; thus, the Unitarian journal came to be presented at international exhibitions. Thus, the decision to relaunch the journal was not made by the Church – it only expressed an opinion.

## **The Role and Importance of the *Keresztény Magvető***

Between 1970 and 1980, the *Keresztény Magvető* fulfilled its purpose only partially. The first part of the thesis deals with the detailed presentation of the contents of the journal, which helps in understanding the editorial process as well as in sketching the relationship with the Department of Religious Affairs and in presenting the socio-political system of the era. The actual role of the editorial board was a formal one: on the one hand, the existence of the board was a requirement in the case of every journal, while, on the other, in the relationship with the Department of Religious Affairs, the staff, who took responsibility regarding the contents published in the journal, was clearly defined.

The writings published in the headings *Tanulmányok* (Studies) and *Szószék – Úrasztala* (The Pulpit – the Lord's Table) had an important role in the training of the priests; nevertheless, they did not offer the possibility to discuss the issues of the Hungarian community in Transylvania.

Censoring the journal led to the situation in which its pages presented church and social life in general and in a euphemistic way. The important social changes – problems caused by the swift increase in urban population and emigration – hardly ever appeared in the journal. But the annual reports of the bishops include allusions to these subjects.

The basic articles with a political-ideological content were compulsory, being present in every issue of the journal. The editing of these articles was constrained; they were published without the name of the author, thus signalling to the readers that they were mandatory; nevertheless, responsibility is collectively borne by the editorial board, as they could not be linked to individuals. The annual reports of the bishops contain the description of their visits abroad, the programmes of the guests arriving from other countries. It is a matter of course that these writings were in the focus of the secret police.

In this period, the news regarding international peace movements were also mandatory, mainly because of state propaganda, but not only in this journal but in all periodicals published in the country. The basic articles with political content were full of positive thoughts of a happy future, very distant from the everyday social reality. International peace, social equality, the economic prosperity were put in the service of the faith of the common building of socialism. The bishop's reports told about the activities within the Social Unity Front, the peace movements, and at each meeting church councils sent reverential telegrams to the president of the country, the texts of which had to be published in the *Keresztény Magvető*. The interfaith theological conferences were events organized under the forced pressure of the Department of Religious Affairs, the presence being mandatory and the reports of the events being published in the journal.

In the late 1970s, the rupture between reality and the image presented by the propaganda became even larger, so that it signalled the decline of the ideology. The myths, such as international peace, the international determining role of the country, economic well-being and the active role of the church in the state, became parts of the totalitarian propaganda.

The thematic and formal frame of the journal *Keresztény Magvető* was a very rigid one, as the system of headings, the features of the cover set during relaunch did not change over the 18 years. The editorial board was also changed due to merely objective reasons. The form and aspect of the journal *Keresztény Magvető* was simple, specific of the era. Issues that were sent abroad were to be printed on a better-quality paper. The thin and low-quality paper, the lines printed very close to each other made reading the journal difficult. Nevertheless, there was

no other possibility, and with the lack of paper the editorial boards were happy that the journal was published at all. The writings presented in this chapter were published on the first pages of the journal: the New Year's pastoral letter, the political editorial, the occasional writings are the ones featured on these pages, all being means of the propaganda. The total control offered the power the possibility to launch the process of indoctrination with only one aim: the emphasis and the generalization of the perfect character of the system and the reality of its historical role.

This chapter also includes how the Department of Religious Affairs appears and is represented on the pages of the journal. The readers of the *Keresztény Magvető* were informed about this institution only through the bishops' reports. In every episcopal report, Bishop Lajos Kovács addressed in a few lines the relationship of the Church with this department, praising and thanking the department and its staff on every occasion for the given support.

The external relations of the Church – similar to other activities – were closely controlled by the state in the studied period. Bishop Lajos Kovács travelled a lot abroad, not only due to the fact that he was the only one among the official representatives of the Church who had a diplomatic passport, but also because between 1975 and 1978 he was the President of IARF, a title that made these trips necessary. In his reports published in the *Keresztény Magvető*, he presented every foreign visit with great detail.

## **Work in the Editorial Board**

This chapter of the thesis deals with the process of editing the journal. The censorship characterized by severity, a rigid framework and extenuating bureaucracy made the process of publishing every issue extremely difficult. Very few priests assumed the authorship of their writings as, after passing self-censorship, it went under the censorship of the Department of Religious Affairs – being modified by the latter. Collecting the texts represented a very challenging task, undertaken by only one person, the responsible editor, János Erdő. His relentless work and attention made the publishing of the journal possible in this period. Severe even to himself, the editor defined a level of quality which became another factor hindering publishing. He frequently put aside writings about which he considered that they did not reach this level.

This delayed publishing could not be remedied. János Erdő fulfilled his task of editing the journal; nevertheless, his preoccupations as a professor and a scholar, respectively the hampered collecting of the writings did not allow keeping deadlines. The delays were due both to the editorial committee – through the editing of the issues on time –, which was also dealing with church affairs, as

well as to the Department of Religious Affairs – through the delay of approvals and overloaded printing.

Starting with 1977 – by the order of the Department of Religious Affairs –, systematic editorial meetings were introduced. At these meetings, usually János Erdő held a presentation on the situation of the issue in the process of being authorized, and then they discussed the editing of the next issue. The meetings were formal – this fact was confirmed by our researches. The majority of the editorial tasks were fulfilled and performed by János Erdő, and on the occasion of these meetings he presented his colleagues everything the Department of Religious Affairs pointed out.

The modalities of the contact between the Church and the Department of Religious Affairs regarding the *Keresztény Magvető* are important. The informal relations, also included in the system, strengthened the existing frames of the contact, but they also made solving the problems possible.

The publishing of every issue of the *Keresztény Magvető* depended on the publishing and distribution authorization on behalf of the Department of Religious Affairs. Most of the time, these authorizations could be urged by telephone. After the printing command, the employees of the Church used various methods to expedite the printing of the journal but also to ensure the amount of paper needed for the issue. Due to the fact that, during the studied period, the Department of Religious Affairs decided upon the amount of paper the Church would get based on its publications every year, the Church had to buy this amount from a certain deposit; however – especially in the 80s –, they found themselves in the situation in which they did not find paper in the deposit and had to purchase it elsewhere. The paper was then sold to the printing house for the publications of the Church. These being done, the issues of the journal were distributed: out of the 500 copies, 100 were sent abroad, the rest in the country. The parishes and most priests received one copy for free. Less than 100 copies were left to subscribe for the lay readers. We can thus state that the distribution of the journal was very restricted, as it reached only a limited group of readers, which was determined by the totalitarian regime.

The relationship of the journal with the Unitarian Church in Hungary was a restricted one because of the distant relationship between the two countries and the Churches. Here are presented the writings that refer to the Unitarian Church in Hungary, but the thesis contains details regarding the opposite pole of the relationship: the church forums in Hungary, the Unitarian journal *Unitárius Élet* and its reports with *Keresztény Magvető*. Regardless of the common institutional past, the relationship of the two Churches in the years between 1970 and 1980 only survived at the protocol level. Only this was possible in the conditions of totalitarian socialism through the journal *Keresztény Magvető* or through the contents and possibilities of reciprocal visits.

## **The Regime Change in the Issues of the Journal after 1989**

Under the influence of the 1989 social and political events, at the beginning of 1990, the Church faced new challenges from several directions, among which, the fate of the journal became a minor problem for a given period.

Today, *Keresztény Magvető* is part of the national heritage, included in a theoretical framework, where the form of memory has become a means of historical and historiographical problematizing. According to Pierre Nora, the present is predisposed to auto-historicizing, and in my opinion this is true in the case of the Church as well. The journal was preserved up until the present day thanks to responsibility and precaution. We may ask what the future brings. Faith in progress today is replaced with keeping and salvaging values. The *Keresztény Magvető* needs to find its way to the future in this social context.

We consider that the hypotheses of the research are valid; nevertheless, the thesis has not exhausted the subject: for the imaging of the recent part, there is need for the document of the Department of Religious Affairs, still unexplored. At the same time, the documents in the archives of the secret police are being processed; their contents will complete the interpretation of the *Keresztény Magvető*. The thesis refers to these studies, but these analyses are very important. The approach of the topic does not contain a detailed information regarding the perception of the readers. The research is based on the issues of the journal published in the studied period, the documentary sources of the central archives of the Unitarian Church, of the Church in Hungary, the texts of the interviews conducted with individuals who have information on the editing of the journal. In a following stage of the research, I consider it important to study the circle of subscribers to the *Keresztény Magvető*, among which, the priests who published rarely or were not at all present in the highlights of the journal, as well as the simple readers.

The importance of the thesis lies in the presentation of the history of a Hungarian clerical journal from Transylvania from the recent past. The scholarly literature does not contain data regarding such research, the study of the clerical press from this period.

The present thesis can complete the history of the Unitarian press in Transylvania by bringing facts and new information for the history of the Hungarian press in Transylvania in the recent past.

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# Motivations Influencing the Choice of School in the Hungarian-Language Public Educational Institutions in Zoboralja<sup>1</sup>

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**Abstract.** The paper examines the Hungarian parents' motivations behind their choice of school in areas of internal diaspora of Hungarians in Slovakia. These motivations are highlighted through both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis with the target group being Hungarian parents in Zoboralja. The paper argues that the background of these parents' respective choices includes mixed marriages, identity, local residence and prestige of language.

**Keywords:** choosing motivation, language planning, prestige of language, internal diasporas

## Introduction

The choice of school is a priority issue, a key element of the survival of the Hungarian communities in all the countries having minority Hungarian population in the Carpathian Basin. Important researches have been carried out in the last decades in this topic; therefore, nowadays a lot more is known about the special situation, problems, education etc. of the Hungarian communities living in the Carpathian Basin.

A part of the linguistic researches approaches the topic from the educational language, the survival of the school network of the mother tongue within the choice of school, usually related to the frequency of use of the linguistic variable. However, psychological and psycholinguistic approaches can also be identified (Csernicskó-Göncz 2009, Göncz 1999, Kelemen-Szoták-Göncz 2009, Kolláth-Varga-Göncz 2009). Based on my earlier researches on the topic, carried out in Transcarpathia, it can be concluded that parents' motivation in the choice of

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school for their children is based on pragmatic and practical reasons; however, certain motives related to ideologies and stereotypes can also be mentioned (Séra 2010, 2012). I also examined the question in the diaspora territory, important for the Hungarians living in Transcarpathia, where some motivations can be more frequently detected in the parents' and the teachers' opinion. Based on the results of my research carried out in Beregrákos (Rakoshyno), the most important motive is the (Ukrainian and Hungarian) language use. The analysis of the interviews carried out in the town shows that choosing a school of the majority of the population has become preferential even there, where the circumstances of choosing a Hungarian educational institution have had more favourable conditions so far. The scenes for using the Hungarian language for children coming from ethnically mixed marriages have become narrower as in many cases the language of the majority has become dominant in the communication within the family and with friends (Séra 2013b: 136).

My presumption is that similar tendencies can be detected among the Hungarians living in Slovakia in the diasporas. This study presents the results of my researches carried out in Zoboralja.<sup>2</sup> The aim of the research was to examine the strategies for the choice of school of the Hungarian children and parents living in the Hungarian diasporas in Slovakia. What kind of similarities can be detected – if any – regarding the choice of school and which factors influence the choice?

Based on demographic data, it is common that a greatest population of Hungarians living in diasporas in Slovakia can be found in the Hungarian settlements of Nitra District, besides bigger cities. The number of children has significantly decreased in the past year, which consequently affects the Hungarian-language school network operating in the region (Morvai –Szarka 2012: 556).

My research topic is the following: Besides the decreasing demographic effect, what other factors influence the Hungarian-language education in Nitra District and what influences the parents/children in their choice of school?

## The Situation of Hungarian Education in Zoboralja

The most numerous Hungarian populations living in internal diasporas<sup>3</sup> (Bodó 2010) in Slovakia can be found in Nitra District. According to the results of the census of 2011, 10,956 persons claiming themselves Hungarian lived in Nitra Zoboralja, which represents 6.7% of the local population.

2 Zoboralja or Zoborvidék is a historical area in Slovakia situated at the southern ends of Tribec Mountains (northeast from Nitra). Today it is considered to be the northeast, still coherent isle of Hungarian language within the Carpathian Basin.

3 The author prefers to apply the definition based on the paper of Barna Bodó, who points out the difference between diaspora and internal diaspora, describing the latter as a situation where the given ethnic/minority group has remained on their historical residence instead of emigrating.

The demographic decrease experienced Europe-wide has an effect on the Hungarian minority as well. The demographic decrease of the above-mentioned settlements thus also influenced the proportion of the Hungarian population.

The number of elementary school students has decreased by 27% in the last ten years in Slovakia. The number of Hungarian students living in Slovakia has become 3% lower (of 24%) compared to the national average.

The number of the Hungarian students of Nitra District shows almost the double of the national decrease (49%), whereas the proportion of students attending the Hungarian-language schools of the county is also as low (47%) as it was ten years ago<sup>4</sup> (cf.: Morvai 2013. 63). Hungarian-language elementary schools can be found in the following settlements in Nitra District: Dolné Obdokovce (Alsóbodok), Čechynce (Csehi), Jelenec (Gímes), Kolíňany (Kolon), Žirany (Zsére), Veľký Cetín (Nagycétény), Veľký Kýr (Nagykér) and Pohranice (Pográny). All of these institutions are consolidated elementary schools, except for the one in Veľký Kýr (Nagykér). Secondary school can only be found in Alsóbodok. However, there are villages of significant Hungarian population, according to the results of the census of 2001, in Zoboralja, where Hungarian-language classes/institutions no longer work. These are the following: Branč (Berencs), Klasov (Kalász), Veľké Chyndice (Nagyhind), Nitra (Nitra), Nitrianske Hrnčiarovce (Nitragerecsér) and Host'ová (Nitrageszte).

**Table 1.** *The number of students of the age of 6 years in Zoboralja (Zilzi 2013: 313)*

School	Academic year								
	2004/ 05	2005/ 06	2006/ 07	2007/ 08	2008/ 09	2009/ 10	2010/ 11	2011/ 12	2012/ 13
Elementary school of Dolné Obdokovce (Alsóbodok)	5	8	7	3	2	4	0	0	5
Elementary school of Čechynce (Csehi)	1	6	0	3	1	4	2	3	4
Elementary school of Jelenec (Gímes)	0	0	1	3	2	0	0	1	3
Elementary school of Kolíňany (Kolon)	4	6	3	4	6	4	2	2	4

4 Data referred to students studying in public schools. Source: www.uips.sk.

School	Academic year								
	2004/ 05	2005/ 06	2006/ 07	2007/ 08	2008/ 09	2009/ 10	2010/ 11	2011/ 12	2012/ 13
Elementary school of Veľký Cetín (Nagycétény)	11	7	9	5	4	7	2	5	3
Elementary school of Veľký Kýr (Nagykér)	9	9	5	4	4	9	5	0	5
Elementary school of Pohranice (Pográny)	2	6	6	5	2	3	4	2	2
Elementary school of Žirany (Zsére)	3	3	1	1	4	0	2	1	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>29</b>

## The Importance of Choosing the Educational Language for People Living in Minority Communities

One acquires knowledge of the world around himself by the cognitive function of the language. The following statement can be accepted as a socio-linguistic or anthropological principle: the most optimal for the child's growth is to get acquainted with the world in the family's language and to start and carry out his studies in this language (See: *The Use of Vernacular Languages in Education*, edited by UNESCO, 1953).

Cummins distinguishes between two linguistic competences: *communication* and *cognitive* competences. Learning, acquiring and using certain knowledge is only possible if one possesses the *CALP* (cognitive academic learning proficiency) of the given language. According to this principle, the most ideal for the minority students (for example students of the Hungarian minority communities in the Carpathian Basin, among others) is learning in their mother tongue (Cummins 2008: 71–83).

Analysis on linguistic politics and minority education can be found in both the international and the Hungarian literature. The professionals of a community draw up the linguistic and educational targets based on these researches.

Some questions of bilingualism and multilingualism, educational questions and linguistic planning related to the minority community are also treated in

Upper Hungary ('Horné Uhorsko'), in co-ordination with the Hungarian linguistic research network of the Carpathian Basin, among others. (Including but not limited to: Skutnab Kangas, Toves 1997, Philpson 2009, Crystal 2003, Cummins 2008 in the international literature and: István Lanstyák, János Péntek, István Csernicskó in Hungarian literature.)

Analysis of the choice of school can be found in different fields of sciences. In her book, sociologist Zsuzsanna Lampl is looking for an answer to the following questions: *What kind of relationship can be detected between national identity and the use of mother tongue? And how are these two factors related to the choice of school?* Lampl comes to the conclusion that among the factors influencing the identity of the Hungarians living in Slovakia the most important one is the language of education. Furthermore, the choice of school is more than the result of an isolated decision: i.e. parents who attended Hungarian elementary school are more likely to enrol their students in a Hungarian elementary school, contrary to parents who attended Slovakian elementary school despite of their Hungarian origin and Hungarian communication background in the family (Lampl 1999: 106).

Anna Sándor, linguist and dialectologist, carried out researches in Kolíňany (Kolon). She also described in her research the youth coming from mixed marriages attending Slovakian schools. She found that those who attended Slovakian-language schools use Hungarian language in less fields of the communication than Slovakian. The prestige of Hungarian language and the positive relation to the mother tongue is stronger among those people who attended Hungarian-language schools (Sándor 1997, 2000).

Patrik Tátrai examined the relationship between the geographical environment and the ethnic structure at one part of the Hungarian-Slovakian language border, in the Hungarian settlements of Nitra District. As regards the choice of school, he makes the following statement, among others: 'The choice of school also depends on external factors such as the existence of Hungarian school in the neighbourhood and the costs that the family has to bear if their child attends it. These factors also contribute to the fact that the number of Hungarian children attending Slovakian school is extraordinarily high. Children coming from mixed marriages attend Slovakian institutions with almost no exception and many Hungarian families also prefer the Slovakian schools.' (Tátrai 2003)

Annamária Bálint and László Vincze examined secondary school students in two towns, in Kráľovský Chlmec (Királyhalmec) and Veľké Kapušany (Nagykapos) in 2008. In their research, they used the quantitative method. The researchers came to the conclusion that Hungarian students and those coming from mixed marriages are more likely to choose Slovakian-language schools in South-Eastern Slovakia when living in cities, when the language spoken in the family is Slovakian, when parents have different mother tongue and where the parents did not attend Hungarian-language elementary schools (Bálint–Vincze 2009: 126–130).

One more research carried out in 2013 on the choice of school has to be mentioned. The research was carried out by Tünde Morvai and László Szarka in Gömör and Zoboralja. They tried to explore the motivations of the choice of school by qualitative methods. According to Tünde Morvai's study, the majority's choice of school was accompanied by a constant uncertainty based on the interviewees' opinions, although cases of mixed marriages also affected it (Morvai 2013: 73).

## The Situation of the Hungarian Diasporas in Upper Hungary

The term diaspora is a special Hungarian expression of internal use and strongly differs from the international expression of Diaspora. The choice of the location of the research was based on the below definition of diasporas.

'Internal diaspora ("szórvány" as Hungarians call it) is (was) formed as a consequence of historical process (new circumstances caused by cataclysm, borders that have been moved). In the case of the members of internal diasporas, events that caused their minority status just happen(ed), while being member of a diaspora is a matter of a personal choice even in cases when there was a political pressure that caused it. Internal diaspora is the phenomenon of living in the same place despite of a changed political and ethnical medium. Internal diaspora means undertaking continuity.' (Bodó 2010)<sup>5</sup>

Diaspora regions and regions that are on the way to become diasporas can be found in all the bigger Hungarian regions outside of Hungary. As this question cannot be separated from the national policy, it is important to mention that the Forum of Hungarian Representatives of the Carpathian Basin adopted a diaspora strategy in 2010, based on which communities in the following situation can be considered as diasporas:

– **absolute diasporas:** where the linkage with the Hungarians is based on the sense of origin and the protection of the language – if there is still something to protect – is important for maintaining this sense of origin mostly because of the actual daily needs.

– **Hungarian minority living in cities:** although, based on their proportion, they already form an absolute minority in the bigger cities, the Hungarian community still possesses its own, remarkable internal social life, in which the role of the Hungarian language is based on the linkage with the community.

– **enclave Hungarians:** settlement or subregion in which the Hungarians still form the majority at the local level, or at least have leader positions in the settlement or in the subregion, and this ensures the daily functions of Hungarian language besides identity.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.acta.sapientia.ro/acta-euro/C1-1/euro11-4.pdf>

– **situation close to diaspora:** those settlements or regions of the Hungarians living in a block that have undergone ethnic changes due to migration processes either in a consciously planned way and facilitated by governmental or other (e.g. ecclesial) means, or by ‘natural,’ i.e. economy-based way; and where the situation of Hungarians being the local majority is expected to be lost in the future.<sup>6</sup> The Hungarian population of several isolated settlements and towns lying in Slovakia around the Hungarian-Slovakian border can already be considered as diasporas, such as Senec (Szenc), Levice (Léva), Lučenec, (Losonc), Bratislava (Pozsony), Kosice (Kassa) and Nitra (Nitra).

According to the Diaspora Strategy<sup>7</sup> elaborated by the Hungarian Coalition Party, the language border territory of Zoboralja and Bars County is the most endangered of becoming diaspora, and eventually assimilated in the future.

## Research Methodology, Locations

According to what has been settled in the research plan, researches were carried out in the Zoboralja region, in those settlements of Nitra District where Hungarian schools/classes are still in operation. These settlements of Nitra District are the following: Dolné Obdokovce (Alsóbodok), Čechynce (Csehi), Jelenec (Gímes), Kolíňany (Kolon), Žirany (Zsére), Veľký Cetín (Nagycétény), Veľký Kýr (Nagykér) and Pohranice (Pográny).

In line with the research plan, I managed to have questionnaires filled out by the parents of children attending Hungarian schools/classes in all the above-mentioned settlements, except for Kolíňany (Kolon), and make interviews with the school directors. I completed the predetermined locations with Veľký Kýr (Nagykér) in Novy Zamky (Érsekújvár) District, where I made a focus group interview with the 4<sup>th</sup> grade students of the elementary school and I made a semi-structured interview with the school director and also with one local leader.<sup>8</sup>

During the time spent in Bratislava, I examined the network of Hungarian-language schools in these settlements and the motives behind the choice of school with the co-ordination of local linguists.

6 Diaspora strategy of the Forum of Hungarian Representatives of the Carpathian Basin. Date of download: 01/02/2014. However, it should be noted that there are different opinions on this matter. See more: <https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/bod%C3%B3/148f4f91870f56f0?projector=1> Date of download: 14/10/2014.

7 [http://www.duray.sk/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=383:toembbll-szorvanyba-az-mkp-strategiai-tanacs-szorvany-program-mhelyenek-javaslat-ladanyi-lajos-es-duray-miklos&catid=1:dm-cikk&Itemid=60](http://www.duray.sk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=383:toembbll-szorvanyba-az-mkp-strategiai-tanacs-szorvany-program-mhelyenek-javaslat-ladanyi-lajos-es-duray-miklos&catid=1:dm-cikk&Itemid=60)

8 As the first four grades were all consolidated classes in the six settlements, I did not make a focus group interview in these cases. Only in Veľký Kýr (Nagykér), in Novy Zamky (Érsekújvár) District did I find a school where the education was assured in separate classes in the four grades. Therefore, I made the focus group interview here.

- Methods applied in my researches:
- Review of literature, analysis of statistical data
  - Filling questionnaires with students of the first four grades of elementary schools and the analysis of these questionnaires
  - Making interviews with school directors and teachers and the analysis of the interviews
  - Focus group interview in the 4<sup>th</sup> grade.

**Table 2.** *Interviews made at Zoboralja<sup>9</sup> (own source)*

<b>Name</b>	<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Code</b>
Elementary School of Dolné Obdokovce (Alsóbodok)	director	A_I_1
	teacher	A_T_2
Elementary School of Čechynce (Csehi)	director	CS_I_3
	day care teacher	CS_N_4
Elementary School of Jelenec (Gímes)	director	G_I_5
Elementary School of Veľký Cetín (Nagycétény)	director	N_I_6
	teacher of the first four grades	N_A_7
Elementary School of Veľký Kýr (Nagykér)	director	N_I_8
	mayor	N_P_9
	focus group interviews	N_F_10
Elementary School of Pohranice (Pográny)	director	P_I_11
Elementary School of Žirany (Zsére)	director	ZS_I_12
	parent	ZS_I_13
Zoboralja Non-Profit Association	president	Z_E_14
CSEMADOK – Slovakian Hungarian Social and Cultural Association	member	CS_E_15

**Table 3.** *Interviews made in Nitra District (own source)*

<b>Name of School</b>	<b>Total number</b>	<b>Number of interviews</b>
Elementary School of Dolné Obdokovce (Alsóbodok)	5	3
Elementary School of Čechynce (Csehi)	12	8
Elementary School of Jelenec (Gímes)	6	6
Elementary School of Veľký Cetín (Nagycétény)	17	11
Elementary School of Pohranice (Pográny)	9	7
Elementary School of Žirany (Zsére)	6	5

9 Interviews are coded and where the study quotes the interviews it is also marked with the above used codes.

Qualitative and quantitative methods were both used in the research in a complimentary way. Thus, I managed to make 15 interviews, one focus group interview and 40 questionnaires (It is to be noted that there are 55 students in the first 4 grades.) during the fellowship.

According to the qualitative methodology, I typed each word of the interviews, and then I analysed them using the *ATLAS. TI 5.0* text analysing software. In the first phase of the analysis (reading), I created codes that later on I organized into bigger, so-called code families, taking into consideration the frequency of the codes. Although the quoted interview parts would later refer to the specificities of the language, I completed them in some points with words in brackets in order to make the text more understandable and to reveal the hidden content of the text.

Based on it, I distinguished between the following code families: *Hungarian school (the prestige of the language)*; *mixed marriage*; *motivations for the choice of school*; *history (intimidation)*; *vision*.


In the second part of the study, three code families will be presented in details.

## Analysis of the Questionnaires

The questionnaire contains the following topics: personal data, identity and language use, choice of the language of education and educational aid.

All but one respondent claimed themselves Hungarian. Similar data can be detected as regards the mother tongue: everyone but one person claimed using the Hungarian as mother tongue.


Most of the respondents in question use the Hungarian language the most frequently, followed by those who use both (Slovakian and Hungarian) languages, whereas three of the respondents use the Slovakian language most frequently.



**Figure 1.** Which language is used more frequently? (N: 40) (own source)

The questionnaire also asked about the level of language knowledge (Hungarian, Slovakian and Roma), and the respondents could choose from the following levels: as a mother tongue; at a very high level; at high level; at low level; only a

few words; I do not speak, but I understand, and I do not speak at all. 33 persons speak Hungarian as a mother tongue and 7 speak it at a very high level. The next figure shows the knowledge of the Slovakian language based on self estimation. 10 out of all the respondents speak the state language as a mother tongue and 20 of them speak it at a very high level (see Figure 4). These results confirm the earlier researches, according to which, from the point of view of the Hungarians living in diasporas, speaking the State language is not a problem as the Slovakian language is present in their daily communication both in formal and informal scenes (Sándor 2001, Séra 2010, Tátrai 2002).



**Figure 2.** *At which level do you use the language? (N: 39) (own source)*

While the language of education in the parents' elementary school was mainly the Hungarian (34 of them attended Hungarian-language elementary school and 4 of them Slovakian), the educational language of the secondary school shows a more miscellaneous picture: 24 persons studied in Slovakian and 15 in Hungarian. All but one respondent having finished college completed their tertiary studies in Slovakian language. These results are also representative of the local Hungarian educational system. The Hungarian-language educational network has been significantly reduced in Zoboralja in the past years. The drop in the number of children resulted in the closure of schools in several settlements; therefore, those who attended Hungarian-language schools did not have the opportunity to continue their studies in Hungarian in the same settlement (cf.: statistical data. Source: [www.uips.sk](http://www.uips.sk)).

The questionnaire also aimed at revealing whether there was any relationship between the language use of people coming from mixed marriages and those

coming from homogenous families. Out of the 40 respondents, only 5 lived in mixed marriages and in these cases the spouse’s nationality and mother tongue was Slovakian; therefore, the language of the communication with the children was also Slovakian.




**Figure 3.** *The spouse’s nationality and language of communication (own source)*

Mixed marriages are considered an important milestone in the process of assimilation of the Hungarian minority community. Both the Slovakian and the Romanian researches show that the number of children coming from mixed marriages is considerably higher in the diasporas and that there is a relationship between the family’s ethnic structure and choice of school. My researches carried out in Transcarpathia draw attention to similar conclusions (see: Ferenc-Séra 2012 op. cit., Papp 2012). Other linguistic researches also confirm that the language use of children living in mixed marriages is most influenced by the family and the environment, depending on which family member or friend (speaking Ukrainian, Hungarian or Russian) the person spends the most time with using Hungarian. (Bartha 1999, Csernicskó 2009, Karmacsi 2011: 343–349).

The second part of the questionnaire aims at identifying in detail the motives behind the choice of educational language.

All of the respondents claim that one has to learn Slovakian in Slovakia, ‘because this is the State language’ (according to 30 persons) and ‘in order to get along better’ (according to 5 persons).

Regarding the children’s studies in kindergarten and elementary school, the questionnaire asked which educational language had been chosen for the child in these institutions. Results show that 18 persons chose mixed-, 19 persons chose Hungarian- and 2 persons chose Slovakian-language kindergarten for their children. These results are not surprising as in many settlements Hungarian-language kindergarten groups do not exist officially; thus, there is not even a chance to choose.




**Figure 4.** *Language of education at kindergarten (own source)*

For the question on the choice of the educational language, three respondents replied as having chosen Slovakian-language elementary school for their first child and four respondents replied as having chosen Slovakian-language class for their second child.

All of the respondents (40) replied positively on the question as to whether they were satisfied with their decision or not.

Based on the replies, two main motives influenced the choice of the given school: (one of) the parent(s) attended the same school (12) and this is the language in which the parent(s) would like their child to continue his/her studies (16).



**Figure 5.** *Why did you choose the school of that educational language? (N:33) (own source)*

Although there is a certain dominance of the choice of language in the choice of school, the motive based on the family model also has an important role. These results can be found in both the qualitative research carried out in Transcarpathia and the interviews made in Upper Hungary.

The last part of the questionnaire examined the factors influencing the choice of school, with special regards to the aid policy. I wanted to know whether and at which level the educational aid granted by the Hungarian Government can influence the choice of school in Zoboralja.


All of the interviewees have already heard of the aid.

**Table 4.** *What do you think this aid is used for? (own source)*

‘I do not know what this aid is for and I do not think this is a good idea. When someone claims himself Hungarian, it is not for money, neither now, nor at any other time.’	Negative judgement
‘Hungary helps to decrease the costs and is interested in supporting Hungarians living abroad to study in their mother tongue.’	Promotion of studying in the mother tongue
‘To give a hand for Hungarians living on the other side of the border.’	Existence of support
‘To cover the costs of beginning the school, and this is very helpful.’	Financial support
‘To help parents at the beginning of or during the school year (bag, shoes, exercise books).’	Financial support
‘To help the students living in Upper Hungary.’	Existence of support
‘To increase the number of Hungarian students.’	Promotion of studying in the mother tongue
‘To ensure that Hungarian children can attend Hungarian school.’	Promotion of studying in the mother tongue
‘To inspire students attending Hungarian school.’	Promotion of studying in the mother tongue
‘To enable more children to study in their mother tongue.’	Promotion of studying in the mother tongue
‘To contribute to the purchase of materials.’	Promotion of studying in the mother tongue

The open question of this question block is: ‘What do you think this aid is used for? Please write it down in a couple of sentences.’ The replies show that the majority of the respondents (total respondents: 11) are aware of the principles based on which the Hungarian Government grants this aid. The left column of the table contains the answers and the right column shows my statements based on them.

Those parents, who answered the question as to what they spend the educational aid on, replied as follows: on the child’s books (22); on the child’s clothes (6); on the child’s excursions (2); on the child’s toys (1).



**Figure 6.** *What do you spend the aid on? (own source)*

## Analysis of the Interviews and Focus Group Interviews

Taking into consideration the space limitations of the study, the following analysis concentrates on the most frequent code families of the interview, i.e. opinions on the language and the choice of school.

### Hungarian School (the prestige of the language)

In order that a language can survive, it is indispensable that this language has speakers and that a forum exist where this language can be spoken. The survival of Hungarian language in Slovakia is strongly related to the prestige of the mother tongue and the appearance of language in the widest possible scenes.

Some of the interviewees believe that less and less people use Hungarian language in Zoboralja and there are more and more communication situations in which they cannot – or in many cases do not want to – express themselves in Hungarian.

When a stranger arrived, he had to assimilate and learn the (Hungarian) language. Now he does not have the chance for that because everyone speaks to him in Slovakian. (A\_I\_1)

This part of the interview contains several important statements: on the one hand, the prestige of Hungarian language was higher in the given community. A 'stranger' is presumably someone who was born outside the settlement and in order that this person can become part of the community he has to learn the language of

the majority, in this case, the Hungarian language. On the other hand, the second half of the quoted sentence shows that the prestige of the Hungarian language has become lower and that the scenes of the language use have become narrower.

And this is our biggest problem, and the effects of it. When someone from here works in any of the offices or in one of the many hypermarkets or who knows, in the hospitals as a nurse, this person spends the whole day in a Slovakian environment and speaks all day long Slovakian, of Slovakian topics and problems. Thus, there are no places, workplaces where 3-4-5 Hungarians would be together and could discuss Hungarian issues together. While this is the case in the block territory, even in a shop or in a factory, Hungarians are together and can deal with the questions of Hungarians. But not here. (Z\_E\_14)

The story shows the linguistic characteristics of the bilingual diaspora environment, which have been proved by several other researches as well. (Including but not limited to: Cserniczkó 2009, 2005; Lanstyák 2002; Lampl 2009; Péntek 2002).

Whether a community is in a given stage of two or more languages, whether there is a balanced bilingualism, or bilingualism dominated by the mother tongue or even bilingualism dominated by the language of the majority, this can be determined by the appearance of the mother tongue in the different scenes of language use and in communication.

At home, (we) only (speak) Hungarian. We live in diaspora, and it was very frequent that when we went to see the doctor or went to the shop or anywhere else outside the family, we met Slovaks more often. (N\_I\_9)

According to István Lanstyák, linguist in Upper Hungary, ‘The main question is what kind of opportunities Hungarians living in Slovakia have for using their mother tongue in the different scenes of the private and the public life. The less these speakers depend on the other language, the more their bilingualism remains dominated by the mother tongue, and thus their mother tongue stays less affected by the other language.’ (Lanstyák 2005: 66.).

A: Today’s children are not taught the Hungarian language. They do not speak (Hungarian) any more.

Q: Even if the grandmother still speaks Hungarian?

A: The grandmother spoke Hungarian but the grandchild does not speak it any more. *Maybe the grandchild calls the grandmother “Nagymama,” but he speaks to her in Slovakian.* The problem here is that children are not even taught in Hungarian. This is mainly true for Jelenec (Gimes). In the neighbouring

villages, in Koliňany (Kolon) and in Žirany (Zsére), not that much, but in Jelenec (Gímes) this is very true. (G\_I\_5)

As it has already been mentioned, one can draw conclusions on the social processes happening in a multilingual community, based on the use of languages. The above-mentioned quote describes well the process happening in the community, i.e. the third generation does not speak Hungarian even with the grandparents; so, the family has undergone the shift of languages (from Slovakian to Hungarian) in two generations. The quote does not specify the reason behind: was it due to a mixed marriage or due to a conscious decision? The story only shows the result.

A: Because so far, at least, children studying in the Slovakian class went out on the corridor and spoke Hungarian.

Q: Not anymore?

A: No, not anymore. Parents speak Hungarian to each other but speak Slovakian with the children. (ZS\_I\_12)

The results of the focus group interviews made in the 4<sup>th</sup> grade show similarities in the language use.

Q: And which language do you speak with them?

A: Slovakian with those who speak Slovakian. And Hungarian-Slovakian with those who (speak) Hungarian.

Q: Hungarian-Slovakian, what does it mean?

A: They speak Hungarian and Slovakian too, or both. (N\_F\_10)

As regards the language use, it is important to mention the communication in the electronic space, the language of the TV and the language of listening to music as this information can also tell a lot about the linguistic stage of a community.

Q: In which language do you watch TV?

A1: In Hungarian and in Slovakian.

Q: Do you enjoy that as well? Do you understand it?

A1: Sports are all in Slovakian.

Q: Who do you pull for? Are you a football fan? Or what (kind of fan)?

A1: Football and hockey.

Q: And in which language do you watch TV?

A2: In Hungarian, in Slovakian and in English. (N\_F\_10)

As the support for the State language is high in the diasporas, knowing the Slovakian language does not mean a problem – compared to, for example, the

block Hungarian regions –, and therefore the language of both watching TV and listening to music cannot be limited to one but rather to two or even more languages.

## Mixed Marriage

The next code family is also related to language use.

Some statistical data at the beginning of the study have already pointed out the change in the proportion of those Hungarian students who benefit of education in the majority language instead of education in the mother tongue in Zoboralja.

But, unfortunately, due to the politics and maybe to marriages as well – there are more mixed marriages nowadays –, children coming from mixed marriages are enrolled to Slovakian classes.

They are here, they are Hungarians, they speak Hungarian and they enrol their children to Slovakian-language schools and classes. (A\_I\_1)

Among the close and far relatives of the respondents, there are some with whom the respondents do not speak Hungarian anymore, and this is mainly due to the consequences of the mixed marriages.

Nowadays, it happens that even if both parents are Hungarian they enrol their children to Slovakian-language elementary school, but those who go there usually come from mixed marriages. When I look at the list of students in the class, I rarely find someone called Száraz, Veres or Kovács. I find names reflecting that either they got married here or they bought a house here. This characterizes the kindergarten as well. (N\_I\_9)

According to the results of a survey that was made by the B Fókusz Institute in 2011 in the four bigger regions of the Carpathian Basin, the majority studying in the State language come from mixed marriages (Lanstyák 2005: 66).

I also had classmates, how should I say, coming from a half Slovakian, half Hungarian environment who graduated in Hungarian secondary schools, and *of course they claimed themselves Slovakian* and they still claim themselves so. This is an extremely complicated thing. Who arrives at this point, why and by what? If I knew the answer, believe me, I would tell you. (A\_T\_2)

This part of the interview underlines those results of the researches that prove that the identity, the use of the mother tongue and the educational language are strongly interrelated.

Researches prove clearly that a considerable part of those Hungarians who graduated in non-Hungarian schools claim themselves of having non- (or not exclusively) Hungarian identity (Csernicskó 2009, 2011; Gereben 1999; Lanstyák–Szabó Mihály 1997; Göncz 2005; Dobos 2011 op. cit., etc.).

## **Motivations for the Choice of School**

From kindergarten to university, the choice of school determines one's career and social mobility in large. Conscious and less conscious decisions are all based on real or imagined ideas and motives. Although the choice of the educational language at kindergarten and elementary school is the parents' decision, getting into the tertiary education and other future plans are based on the person's decisions. These decisions, however, are considerably determined by the continuity of the educational language, i.e. in which school children started their studies.

Based on the interviews carried out in the seven settlements, the decision on the choice of school is influenced by three main factors: *sample tracking*, *aid policy* and *success*.

What kind of school parents choose for their children also depends on the number of students in the class, whether the child will have a mate to share the table with and who the child will have daily contact with. Based on the stories, the choice of both the Hungarian and the Slovakian school is affected by the so-called a) *sample tracking*.

I simply cannot explain it. A father said that *it was trendy* to send his child to Slovakian (school). And I am very keen on (accepting) that it really is. Like the sheep effect, when one goes and the others follow him. (A\_I\_1)

Yes, and now the situation is that, as there are only one or two children, he does not enrol his child (there), because he would not have friends. (A\_T\_2)

Following the family sample can also be detected in the interviews, i.e. parents enrol their children to Slovakian- or Hungarian-language schools because they or their relatives or maybe even the brothers and sisters also studied in the same school.

A1: I think my mum studied here.

A2: My dad (studied) here.

A3: I think my mum studied here. (N\_F\_10)

The choice of school can be influenced by the political processes, the aid policy of the mother country and the economic factors. These factors can influence

positively and negatively the decision in the moment of choice. In Transcarpathia, for example, the Hungarian educational network has been negatively affected since 2008 by those governmental measures that lowered the prestige of the school network of the mother tongue, suggesting that studying in the mother tongue is less valuable as one cannot graduate and apply for further studies in his/her mother tongue (Csernicskó 2009 op. cit., Séra 2013b).

Another important factor is b) *the question of the aid policy* that could strengthen the education in the mother tongue in Upper Hungary as well. Educational aid was discussed both in the questionnaires filled in with parents and in the structured interviews.

Not really, because so far I have seen that the Rákóczi Association made real efforts to help parents. I have not really noticed it. Receiving it helps parents, but I do not think that it is given to Hungarian parents to encourage them to enrol their children to a Hungarian school. (A\_I\_1)

A: Some time ago, when it all started, helping parents financially, the aid was called 'in the homeland in Hungarian'. Schools could dispose of at least 1/3 of the money. I think having the money in our hands was more effective as we could buy school materials on it and could take the children to excursions. We could do things that parents might not spend on today. Because if I tell the parents to pay 40 Euros and we are going to visit Budapest, it is not sure that the parents will pay this money. But if the money is here, in the school, then I can take the necessary money for that and take the children to Budapest. (G\_I\_5)

It has to be noted that in this environment the aid policy, i.e. the educational aid, does not play any role in the choice of the Hungarian class. In my survey made in Munkács (Mukacheve), Transcarpathia (in big city diasporas), similar results were recorded, i.e. the choice of school did not depend on the above-mentioned aid.

One of the most frequent motives behind parental decisions is the misbelief that if the children study in the school of the majority, they will get along and succeed better. The motive of c) *success* can also be detected in the interviews.

They also reason that if they study there *they will be able to succeed better*. But I can show you 100 persons who studied there believing that they will succeed better and they do not get along better than those who studied in the Hungarian school. These latter succeeded even better, as the proportion of people who studied at college in this village is higher than those who studied there (in the Slovakian school). (CS\_E\_15)

So, there are people who do not go anymore to the Hungarian community because they want to *succeed better*. I even know somebody who *feels ashamed for* having chosen Slovakian school for his children, but he did it anyway. What should I say? So, this is it. This is someone very close to me, almost a relative, and we try to avoid the topic because we would only fight about that. I cannot understand his reasons. (P\_I\_11)

Other motives can also be found in the interviews that are presented in the figure below.

The choice of Hungarian-language school is presented on the right-hand side of the figure, while the left side presents the motives and results related to the choice of the Slovakian-language school.




Figure 7. Motivations of the choice of school (own source)

## Conclusion

In this study made in Zoboralja, based on the questionnaires and interviews made with the directors of Hungarian schools, students and their parents, I tried to discover the motives that have an effect on the choice of elementary school.

As only fifty students study in the seven mentioned institutions, I decided not to make a deeper analysis and compare the dependent and independent variables. However, certain characteristics can be determined even from these forty questionnaires. The questionnaires show that all respondents are bilingual

at a certain level and use both languages in their daily communication and in the offices. Half of the respondents speak Slovakian as a mother tongue – based on self-claim – and one third of them at a very high level. Nonetheless, it has to be noted that parents living in mixed marriages use Slovakian language in their daily communication both with their spouse and with their children. As regards the choice of the language of education, it can be pointed out that the respondents (18) chose presumably the mixed educational language kindergarten for their children because there were no other possibilities in the settlement; so, there was not even a chance to choose from the kindergarten groups. As regards the motivations for the choice of school, it is important to note that almost half of the respondents (16) chose the Hungarian-language language school because it was important for them that their children continue their studies in this language, although following the family sample was also dominant, i.e. my child studies here because I also studied here. The last part of the questionnaire focused on the educational aid. All of the respondents heard from the aid and most of them (22) spent it on the child's books.

The analysis of the interviews revealed many hidden motives and narratives that colour the image of the situation of the Hungarian education and the factors affecting the choice of school in Zoboralja. Most of them confirm the already existing researches; however, they differ significantly from my researches carried out in Transcarpathia. While, based on my researches carried out in Beregrákos (Rakoshyno) and Munkács (Mukacheve), the linguistic factor is a 'white flight phenomenon' and the inadequate knowledge of Hungarian language characterizes the choice of school in the diasporas, the most important factor in Slovakia is the drop in prestige of the Hungarian language.

The space limitations of this study do not permit the detailed presentation of those main code families that can be found in the interviews, yet it can be said that the most common topics of the stories and interviews were the prestige of the Hungarian language, the mixed marriages and the motives behind the choice of school.

Although it is not analysed in details in this study, I have to mention in the conclusion that meditating on the vision and the survival of the school plays an important role in the interviews made with the school directors. Under the new Slovakian law on education, the entire Hungarian education will be ceased from 2015, as classes having less than eleven students cannot continue the operation. As, based on the present data, there will be no first grade students in any of the schools except for Veľký Cetín (Nagycétény), there are concerns that Hungarian-language education will be degraded and terminated in this region in the next two years.

After all, one can ask whether there will be Hungarian education in Zoboralja in ten years. Will there be Hungarian parents who may change this tendency?; is the enrolment programme and the diaspora strategy for slowing down or

eventually stopping the language shift in this region and, at the same time, the individuals' language change?

Answering the above questions and making action plans cannot happen without scientific researches, and this is what this study also tried to contribute to.

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# Protestant Education behind Policy: The History of the *Lutheran Collegium* in Eperjes, Austria-Hungary in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century

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**Abstract.** After a long period of struggle, the Protestant education in Austria-Hungary had been given the opportunity to gather pace at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The major institution in Eperjes (today Prešov, Slovakia), the Lutheran Collegium started to evolve into a multidisciplinary college. Its communities' life increased, its management differentiated and the whole atmosphere became adequate for giving such personalities to public life like Kossuth and Hodža or Záborský and Petőfi. The Collegium was not anymore merely a high-quality standard but a centre of Protestant intellectual life too. The Revolution in 1848/49 broke short its previously constant progress, but the following Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867 gave it a fresh impetus. The teachers of the Collegium deserve a special emphasis because of their outstanding role in both scientific life and education in the whole 19<sup>th</sup> century.

**Keywords:** Austria-Hungary, Protestant schools, Protestant education, 19<sup>th</sup>-century education, Collegium of Eperjes

## The Antecedents

Eperjes (Prešov), the southern urban and commercial centre of Sáros County, was also an educational and religious centre in the former upper Hungary. Both Lutheran and Greek Catholic denominational and educational life was concentrated there. The Lutheran Collegium was one of the most important schools in Hungarian history; famous politicians and artists were educated there. New political ideas emerged in those communities composed by the later leading personalities and, last but not least, it was a centre of Protestantism in Hungary. The famous old Collegium in Eperjes had developed from a former eight-grade high school at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, but the origins of the school reach back to the 16<sup>th</sup> century. The first Lutheran Lyceum was established in 1531, inviting scientists to teach from Krakow, Wroclaw and mostly from Wittenberg. The leading Protestant personalities decided to create a legal and theological

Collegium in 1665, and the institution opened two years later, but in a Catholic dominance its early life did not last too long and was prohibited in 1671. During the following century, many attempts went all awry, triumphed by Jesuits, and Lutheran education and ownership began again only in 1775 (Munyay 1835).

## The Rise of the Collegium in the Forties

The acceptance of the general school system caused changes in the Lutheran schools' lives for a while in the 1840s. In Eperjes, a new elementary and another school for girls functioned separately from the Collegium, and during the following years the Collegium operated only as a high school again and offered a partial juridical and theological education in the higher classes. The importance of the latter increased when an independent theological course started. The history of these transformations is dating back to the foundation of the Department of Law, which had already been formed in 1815 and a two-year course for legal studies had existed since 1822. These two courses were not part of the grammar school virtually but created a higher educational level by giving a College-like training.

Along with the gradual development of the school, the number of teachers was also increasing: from five in the 1820s to twelve in 1847. Almost all of the professors studied at a foreign – mostly German – university (Wittenberg, Jena, Halle, Greifswald, Dresden, Göttingen), but some of them completed their studies in Paris or Vienna and all could speak several languages (ŠOAP EKP 266). Management was also evolving during that time. The patronage committee made decisions in financial questions and the rector governed education only. The latter status was filled originally by a theology teacher, who held the position until his retirement; but the system had gradually changed into a three-year period at first and to a one-year period after 1842. In the forties, various scientists held the position: Antal Lajos Munyay theology professor, András Vandrák<sup>1</sup> philosophy professor and Frigyes Hazslinszky<sup>2</sup> biology professor. The latter became one of the most important personalities in the life of the institution and a famous academic of the century.

The dynamic progression of the Collegium in the forties manifested itself in the increasing number and changing composition of students. The total number of students was increasing sharply and had already exceeded four hundred. This number was twice of that at the beginning of the century (ŠOAP EKP 255).

1 Antal Lajos Munyay (1787–1849) Lutheran theology teacher. Munyai András Vandrák (1807–1884) teacher at the Lutheran Collegium in Eperjes, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He studied in Jena, Germany, and taught logic, psychology, metaphysics, aesthetics, Latin and Hungarian literature.

2 Frigyes Hazslinszky (1818–1896) botanist, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and pioneer of mycology.

Students arrived not only from Eperjes and Sáros, the County around the city (the rate of those was about twelve percent), but many of them came from the eastern part of the country: from Zemplén, Gömör, Szepes, Abaúj, Borsod and Szabolcs counties. At the Collegium, there were also students coming from much greater distance at that time: they were from Liptó, Pest, Túróc, Zólyom, Hont and Bács counties, and even from Torontál, Temes or Arad counties from Transylvania and Partium. Students also arrived from Czech counties, Austria and Galicia too. The denominational composition changed interestingly. While in the first third of the century only Lutheran students were at the Collegium, in the forties, many of them were Calvinists, Orthodox, Jews or even Roman Catholics. In the school year of 1847/48, the 176 students of the grammar school were composed of 92 Lutherans, 26 Calvinists, 6 Catholics, 5 Orthodox and 9 Jews (ŠOAP EKP 246).

The Collegium paid attention to employing qualified and progressive scientists, but they were also interested in creating a familiar atmosphere. Inside the walls, a liberal and democratic spirit prevailed, which attracted protestant families to send there their children. Despite their dominance, other families also sent there their children, especially those who had a similarly modern world view; thus, many illustrious future writers, scientists and politicians grew up there. Inter alia, Lajos Kossuth, Artúr Görgey, Arisztid Dessewffy, Michal Hodža,<sup>3</sup> the later representative of the Slovak national movement, Ferenc Pulszky, Dániel Irányi politicians, Jonáš Záborský, Jozef Srnka and Jan Hvezda poets studied in the institution. On the lists of the students, we can find the names of Gyula Sárossy, Frigyes Kerényi, Kálmán Lisznyai, Imre and Sándor Vachot, prominent representatives of romanticism and also Lajos Haán later historian and member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, or even János Hunfalvy, the founder of the Hungarian scientific geography and Ágost Greguss aesthete (Kónya 1993).

Despite all the successes, the institution faced serious financial difficulties. Its main supporters were the Hungarian Lutheran Church's Diocese of Tisza and the two Lutheran Confessions of Eperjes: the German and the Slovak. The amounts allocated to their budget proved insufficient and the existence of the institution depended on gifts, fundraisings and funds created earlier. Patrons came mostly from the ranks of the nobility of Sáros and Zemplén counties. They donated thousands of gold or even lands and estates to the Collegium. Considering all of this, the professors' financial situation did not improve during the mid-century. It was very typical that many of the professors preferred the holy office, founding a company or getting afloat an enterprise to the Collegium. Their salary was composed of different

3 Lajos Kossuth (1802–1894) politician, Governor-President, Financial Minister and leader of the Revolution, one of the most important personalities in Hungarian history. Artúr Görgey (1818–1916) was a general, Secretary of War and Marshall of the Armies during the Revolution. Arisztid Dessewffy (1802–1849) Major General, leading personality and martyr of the Revolution. Michal Hodža (1811–1870) Lutheran Priest, Slovak National revivalist, poet and linguist.

parts: free accommodation in the flats belonging to the school or in the Collegium itself, a garden area (cabbage patch) and a maximum of 200 gold per annum. They could expect an additional cash allowance from the Diocese and claim a part of the tuition fee. They received name-day gifts from the students and a couple of cubic yards of wood from the city. The rector had a special bonus too (ŠOAP EKP 266).

Many other buildings belonged to the Collegium over the School House. The Alma Mater offered accommodation and daily meal for a part of the students. Famous collections of the Collegium were formed in the forties: the natural and the numismatic collections. The Szirmay<sup>4</sup> Library (Szinnyei 1909) had a great importance; it was founded by the superintendent, who gave 15,000 books and established a payment fund for the library of the school.

## The Importance of Societies

The fraternities of the nationalities played an important role in the life of the Collegium. They were organized along the lines of the German Student Societies. Students got closer to policy making and progressive political trends with the help of the younger professors. These organizations were centres of literature, poetry and language development, but they were also centres of national reform aspirations. Just like in other cities (Pozsony/Bratislava, Sopron, Késmárk/Kežmarok), the scope of them went beyond the walls of the Collegium and took an important place in the cultural and social life of the city. Fraternities officiating in Hungarian protestant schools had a greater role in developing national and political reformation movements, which is clearly visible, paradoxically, in the prohibition of them by Metternich in 1837.

The main emphasis in the Collegium of Eperjes was on humanities, especially on Latin and on ancient classical authors just like everywhere in the era. In addition, Hungarian language, geography, arithmetic or natural science were reputed as second-class subjects. Philological societies were formed though to postulate Hungarian as a school language but without success. Science – in a similar way – fought against the dominance of humanities because the unbalanced education was inconsonant with practical life in their opinion. In 1846, the Lutheran Church adopted Hungarian as the language of teaching, based on the Zay-Ugróczi curriculum (A magyarhoni, 1842). The role of science has increased also in education since then. Although most professors were advocates of modernization, there were negative elements of life. Unfortunately, not only Metternich but also the Lutheran Diocese of Tisza prohibited any kind of Slovak Society and prescribed Hungarian as the universal teaching language, ‘anywhere where possible,’ at their Rozsnyó

4 Antal Szirmay (1747–1812) nobleman, donator, High Committee of Zemplén County and historian.

(Rožňava) Session on 17<sup>th</sup> August 1841 (Gömöry 1933). In his Paragraph (1844. II. 9.), the Kaiser ordered that Hungarian language was needed to be the teaching language of public education in Hungary. It was a great step in the Hungarian National Movement but against any other nationalities' interests.

The Slovakian literary and debating society ceased and the Slovak language was taught only in theology classes and in the Teacher-Training College. More theologians were laid off because of their activities in the field of Slovakian culture. Mihály Greguss and András Vandrák were committed to liberty, equality, the idea of fraternity, the freedom of conscience, religious equality and the freedom of scientific research, as it was expressed in the 20<sup>th</sup> law article of 1848.

The Collegium – because of its high standards – was placed second in the rank of Lutheran schools in Hungary before 1848, leaving behind the lyceums of Késmárk (Kežmarok) and that of Sopron. Only the famous Lyceum of Pozsony (Bratislava), which was established in 1606, could take precedence over it (Hörk 1896: 149). The management was at pains to develop the Collegium into a full university during the forties, but this effort was not successful due to the political events that took place.<sup>5</sup>

The earliest literary and debating society, the Ústav československý (Czechoslovakian Institute) was founded in the 1820s. The second one was founded soon afterwards: it was called Slovenský spolok (Slovakian Society) and in 1832 the students at the Theology Faculty established the Spoločnosť homiletickú slovenskú (Slovakian Homiletic Society) and the Knižownu československú (Czechoslovakian Library) (ŠOAP EKP 371). They read out Slovak preaching and sang Slovak songs at the meetings, and had direct connections to the Slovakian Student Societies of Pozsony, Késmárk and Lőcse (Levoča). After the prohibition, the homiletic society was renewed in the forties, but its effect was reduced; thus, it dissolved soon thereafter (Kónya 1996). The Hungarian Society was founded in 1828. Mihály Gregus philosophy professor undertook a large part of establishing the Society and its Library. The organization set targets to officiate in Hungarian, to develop language skills and to study literature (ŠOAP EKP 722). After Greguss, the president of the Society was always a professor of the Hungarian Language. The Society was not even ceased after its prohibition in 1837, but it transformed into a course. The former president of the Society became its private tutor, and the legal operation was restarted in 1839.

In the following years, the Society was growing larger. Its members read out their own works and translations at the meetings, from which the best were noted in the Merit-book (ŠOAP EKP 720). Some poems or shorter epic pieces were published by the Hungarian literature papers. According to Géza Bodolay,

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5 The idea of developing a University came up in the 1760s already, but it had no chance because of the Catholic dominance in political life. An even earlier attempt failed at the time of Ferenc Rákóczi II., which was decided at Rózsashegy (Ružomberok) in 1707.

these poems can be characterized by the little bit strange Biedermeier style of the era, with the exception of folksong-like scripts. Their importance – compared with the previous period – is their relation to the subject of love, or this relation itself was expressed in them emotionally (Bodolay 1963). Their yearbook called *Jácint* was published in 1838. Many later poets, scientists and public figures were members of the Society; their leaders were in connection with the outstanding personalities of the reform movement and the anti-Habsburg, liberal opposition.

The *Deutsche Verein* (German Society) was the fourth organization, established in 1842 (ŠOAP EKP 129). Despite that German language continued to hold its strong position and the many German students who studied in the school, the Society did not enjoy greater support than others and its activity was limited to cultivating German language and literature. The rather small and closed company did not prepossess the life of the city or the Collegium. It is noteworthy that there was a remarkable willingness for co-operation between the Societies that were lacking any nationalism or hate. At the same time, the students' activities in different societies strengthen this viewpoint of the contemporary observers.

The later influential leader and professor of the Collegium, Frigyes Hazslinszky, moved to Eperjes around this time. He came from Vienna in 1846 and became independent of his previous employers partly by the help of his friend Rector Günther and his family. For example, they gave an expensive Plössl microscope to Frigyes as a gift to support his research. Thus, he became one of the first to use such an instrument in Hungary; even the Botanical Department at the greatest university did not have one. He wrote several textbooks on mineralogy, chemistry and geology at that time.

## The Surrounding City: Eperjes

Eperjes could not be considered a great city in this period: its population was only 9,550 in 1850 and had increased to 11,596 by 1868, but it had decreased to 10,872 by 1880. There is a clear stagnation considering the population in 1890: 11,203 and in 1900: 14,447. The process broadly represents the whole area: the increase in smaller cities slowed down in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the population composition is rather medieval-like than modern. Changes occurred anyway: immediately after the legalization of urbanization for Jews, their number boosted radically in towns. They were only 82 in Eperjes in 1850, but this number had exceeded 2,673 by 1910. As a consequence, former wealthy German families began to be replaced by Jewish merchants and lawyers. During the Dualism, the latter owned almost all of the shops and two-thirds of the houses on the Main Street; only two consumer co-operatives and five shops remained in the hands of the old families. Craftsmen, mostly tailors, shoemakers and doctors, lawyers and other officials on the upper

floors continued to live in these houses. Sons of the old merchant families went on to become clerks: they became doctors, solicitors, judges and engineers, but the demand for these jobs did not increase at the same rate as their growing number; thus, most of them emigrated to other regions, especially to Pest.<sup>6</sup> Shops could be found only on the central street in this oval, Czech-pattern built city. Most of the wealthier citizens and clerks, teachers, priests lived in the newly built quarter called Tabor. The row of school buildings and dormitories surrounded with gardens was built in a semicircle along with the city promenade. The row started at the Kassai Street with the Greek Catholic Academy of Theology, the Greek Catholic Secondary School and the Teacher-Training College; and a little bit further there were the Primary School and the Royal Catholic High School. The public Teacher-Training Institution stood at the inner side of Stefánia Boulevard followed by the State Elementary School, a kindergarten and then the Roman Catholic Upper High School for Girls, the Middle School, another kindergarten and finally the Israelite Primary School and High School for Girls. The Lutheran Collegium was on the Main Street. Along with the four big institutions, there were also the Lutheran School for Girls, the Trade School and a Roman Catholic Primary School.

Industry and trade were losing ground during this period and the former competition of guilds was replaced by the feud among denominations. Mostly, the Greek Catholic Church developed in the era of Dualism. Their bishopric, college, two of their high schools and one primary school were in Eperjes and they also opened two boarding schools there around this time. Earlier, lively trade moved to Kassa (today Košice). Twenty merchants of the twenty-four on the Main Street were German in the 16<sup>th</sup> century: they were the elite in the city. Only a couple of craftsmen lived there besides them who reached the Northern Sea and Constantinople with their goods. They transacted the giant wine trade of Tokaj to Poland. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Eperjes maintained its importance only as an educational centre. Small signs of differentiated development were the opening of a vinegar factory in 1848 and a liquor factory in 1852. The railway between Eperjes and Kassa was opened to traffic on the 1<sup>st</sup> of October in 1869, which would reach even Tarnov in 1879. It was connected to Bártfa (today Bardejov) with a regional railway in 1893. But all of these were not enough to restore the earlier busy trade. The number of guilds was decreasing too: the previously famous weaving industry seemed to be vanishing at the beginning of the century. The latter was revitalized by the 8<sup>th</sup> law article in 1872 which dismissed the guild system. A new weaving factory was established in that year: Solomon Bloch's First Damask Weaving Factory. Only a few years had passed and they used 42 looms and 50 weavers were employed in the factory (Tóth 1912: 495). Only gold- and silversmiths, clock-makers, coach-makers, joiners and shoemakers remained untouched and took on their old crafts. The first mill was founded in 1859 with 140 workers: they exported flour to Austria and Germany.

6 Eastern part of later Budapest.

The Eperjes Folk Bank Stove Factory was opened with 80 employees in 1855 and won a prize later at the Millennium Exhibition. There was also a cheese factory, a creamery, a pig farm and six nation-wide fairs were organized annually, but despite all of this the city could not be called a dynamically developing settlement. More and more county noblemen were moving to Eperjes; thus, their importance was growing along with the increasing participation of Jewish capitalists (Dziák 1915).

The elite was composed of employees at the county tribunal, the district court, the financial management board and other state and municipal offices in Eperjes in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. At the same time, more than eighty teachers and schoolmistresses lived within the city walls, which was a considerable number compared to the population but understandable because of the many schools. More and more Slovak peasants and craftsmen moved to the town from the villages around during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. As a result of these changes, the denominational composition has changed in the population: the onetime strong Lutheran stratum lost its earlier significance and the dominance of the Catholic population became overwhelming and irreversible.

**Table 1.** *Denominational composition of Eperjes in 1782, 1851 and 1910*

	Roman Catholic	Greek Catholic	Lutheran	Jewish
1782	4,484	0	1,314 <sup>7</sup>	0
1851	5,604	793	1,158	82
1910	10,160	1,744	1,304	2,673

*Source: censuses of 1782, 1851, 1910*

Different social clubs operated in Eperjes at that time like the Széchenyi Circle, the Rákóczi Catholic Circle, the National Farmers' Union of Sáros County, and also several newspapers, magazines were published like the *Papers of Eperjes*, the *Sáros*, *The Eperjes* and the *Nasa Zastava*. In the years preceding the revolution, the youth were under the influence of poets Mihály Tompa, Sándor Petőfi and Sándor Vachott. Patriotic and Hungarian literary meetings were held by them led by three teachers: Antal Munyai from the Theology Department, András Csupka from the Department of Law and András Vandrák literature professor. The later director, Frigyes Hazslinszky, just arrived at the institution at that time.

## The Revolution and Its Consequences

The revolutionary events at the end of the 1840s and the subsequent developments had had an impact and dominated the fate of the institution. The Hungarian Revolution broke out on 15 March in 1848 and most of the students and teachers

<sup>7</sup> Lutherans and Calvinists together.

in the Collegium accepted the movements and the democratic changes with enthusiasm. The institution was already a kind of centre for democratic forces in the town and it was not a coincidence that several personalities of the revolution, such as Lajos Kossuth, Arisztid Dessewffy, Dániel Irányi, Ferenc Pulszky and Artúr Görgey, were former students of the Collegium. After the outbreak of the armed conflict, the normal educational process of the school could not be maintained. At the end of May, teaching was ceased and many of the teachers and students themselves took part in the fighting events during the following months. The National Guard was formed with 46 persons in the spring already led by József Benczúr, and even Hazslinszky and Vandrák put on the uniform (Hörk 1896: 51). They only took part in the battle of Kassa in December. Before the Army of the Kaiser occupied Eperjes, some stayed with the Hungarian Army, but the rest had to adjust to the new situation. The building of the Collegium was damaged in the following months and in addition the Russian Army intervened, occupied it and transformed it into barracks, hospital and warehouse in the summer. The teachers did not receive salary; thus, after a while, they had to ask to suspend scholarships in advance. It is true that there was not really teaching at that time and stipends could be distributed to teachers. Frigyes Hazslinszky took part in the Battle of Kassa as a militiaman on 10-11 December; one of his colleagues fell next to him. This personal experience horrified him and made him run home and engross in science and teaching. But, nevertheless, he can be found among those Protestants who would later fight against the patents (Vasárnapi Újság, 797–798).

After the war of independence, on the 24<sup>th</sup> of October in 1849, the Kaiser created the K. K. Kaschauer prov. Distrikt-Schulbehörde,<sup>8</sup> which worked under the control of the Military Ministerial Commissioner until the formation of a new Council of Department in Kassa. Haynau disestablished the Hungarian Protestant Churches' Constitutions and removed the Church leaders from their offices on 10 February 1850. He appointed administrators instead of superintendents and abolished the institution of secular guardianship (Vandrák 1867). Besides, the Entwurf der Organisation der Österreichische Gymnasien und Realschulen<sup>9</sup> related to Leo Thun was extended to Hungary and to Protestant schools by Regulation nr. 473 on 20 December 1850. They had to work according to the regulation; otherwise, they would lose their right to issue state-approved certificates. A specialization system was introduced into schools: eight teachers had to teach in eight classes under the governance of an elected or appointed director but directly under government jurisdiction. Legal and theological courses were to be shaped into independent academies. German, Hungarian and Slovak language teaching was prescribed in the fields of mathematics and natural sciences by the regulation. Teachers were aware that this was a development, but they felt that a foreign

8 School Board of Kassa District.

9 Plan of the Organization of Austrian High Schools and Middle Schools.

imperial will was forcing them to lose their national character and autonomy. On the other hand, they had no appropriate financial coverage for such an implementation of improvements. German became the language of teaching, and admission of Catholic students into Protestant schools was limited until 1855.

The famous Collegium of Eperjes, where Petőfi and Kossuth studied, had just tied itself up into knots at that time. The Austrian Government was watching the Collegium with hostile eyes from the outset; thus, Vienna did not provide any support for them and even took further administrative steps to undermine their situation in the following years. Vandrák and Hazslinszky got more offers afterwards; the former one was called to Sopron and the latter one to Pozsony (Bratislava) to teach; however, they insisted all along on staying with the school. The abolishing of the Kossuth Notes caused another problem just like burning the securities of the Pester National Bank, causing the bank to lose almost all of its possessions. Furthermore, the Collegium lost many of its sponsors after the fall of the revolution. Finally, they get financial support for two professorships and another class for the theology faculty from the Lutheran Church of Tisza Diocese. The death of András Csupka, the leading professor of law, further aggravated the situation in 1851 as long as after some struggle they had to cease the education of legal studies in the following year. In the 1851/52 school year, only 260 students studied in the Collegium, which was the half of the number reported before the revolution; half of the newly admitted students came from Eperjes or Sáros County (ŠOAP EKP 249). Despite all the changes, 40 Catholic, 15 Calvinist and 12 Jewish pupils attended the school along with the 73 Lutheran students. In the same year, nine teachers of the twelve avowed themselves German: their political views and nationality was recorded. Frigyes Hazslinszky, András Vandrák and József Herfurth considered themselves Hungarian henceforward, even in the register.

## **The Recovery in the 1850s and 1860s**

After a great deal of difficulty, in 1855, the government finally recognized the institution to be public; tuition fees were raised, interests were called from debtors; thus, the teachers' salary could be raised. The latter was between 400 and 600 forints, close to the salaries of the teachers in public schools (ŠOAP EKP 266). The greatest support – beside the Diocese – came from the Gustavus Adolphus Union. Hazslinszky who also worked as a treasurer in the institution, started to sort out the relationship between debtors and the Collegium. He travelled across the whole Zemplén County in 1858 and went to Gőlnicbánya (Gelnica) in 1860. His trips were also used to collect money in form of donations. This activity of him resulted in surprise sometimes: he reported – and asked the Collegium what to do – on the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 1858 that he received two barrels of

wine instead of 75 forints, but no one offered more than 32 for the wine when he wanted to sell it. The school had made provision that teachers had to receive the wine for 40 forints, which was to be deducted from their salaries. Hazslinszky was in a difficult situation also when Ferenc Pulszky raised the rate of the Collegium's capital and he had to get it across, or when he had to manage the mortgages and bonds that belonged to the heirs of Károly Pulszky. In such cases, he corresponded for some length of time with the superintendent as to whether they were covered by the decision or not (Frigyes Hazslinszky's Letter). Once he quarrelled even with the government when he did not get the thousand-forint debt of Ferenc Pulszky after the revolution leader's property was confiscated. This case was successful finally, only the tax was deducted from it, generating another discussion. Despite ground floor rooms were rented, many teachers left their career because of the great difficulties. Even most of the primary school salaries were higher than theirs at that time.

The difficult financial and legal situation continued in the 1850s. The Collegium applied for public assistance in 1856, but their application was rejected. Hazslinszky visited the Nature Explorers' Grand Assembly in Vienna in the same year. A hundred forints were granted him from the almost empty safe, hoping his journey would be successful in collecting donations. Five years later, Professor Karl Lintner was sent to Germany to raise money. These fundraising tours were fruitful partly because former student Kossuth used his influence. Kossuth was the leader of the War of Independence and the later Minister of Finance; he had lived in London since 1851. He built up effectively a great social network abroad to help the Hungarian resistance against the Austrian suppression, especially among Protestants (Hörk 1894). In the last year of Kossuth's stay in London, before he left to Turin, the composition of students was still strongly mixed; certainly, the majority – 61 students – was Lutheran, but 31 Jewish, 24 Catholic and 18 Calvinist pupils also studied in the Collegium. Only one third came from the county around Eperjes (ŠOAP EKP 249). The thirteen teachers' salary did not increase; only the deans of the Law and Theology Departments had a tolerably high income of a thousand gold annually. The Faculty of Law was renewed and worked in its new form until 1876.

In such circumstances, they still managed to reopen the law faculty with two classes. The management would have liked to renovate the building for the 200 year-jubilee of foundation by 1867. Kálmán Rochlitz, a former student who lived in Melbourne, made an offer – as a sign of gratitude – to open a bazaar in Australia of objects from Hungary, whose income could be used for the instruction. Teachers liked the idea and sent two thousand different things worth about ten thousand forints and 1,880 forints in cash for the expenses. However, the following year, the company went bankrupt whereon Rochlitz suggested sending the objects to London to sell them. This, in turn, was not considered worthy for the fame of the school

neither by the management nor by the special committee – led by Hazslinszky – created to solve the situation. Meanwhile, it turned out that, on top of it all, neither the traditionally great patronage of the Pulszky family nor its members, Mrs. Ferenc Pulszky and her son Ágost Pulszky (founder of the Society for Social Sciences), had any chance to give any financial support. Therefore, they decided to organize lotteries and made sixty thousand lottery tickets that were not sold out, when the draw was postponed to the autumn of 1867. Despite all difficulties, they proceeded to construction in 1866; the new building's inauguration ceremony was held on 10 September 1867. The construction cost 34,408 forints; 6,996 forints had to be added from the till. Despite these, Hazslinszky succeeded in increasing the 27,284-forint capital to 68,747 forints in the period between 1859 and 1863. The process did not stop and the Collegium's capital increased to 91,001 forints in 1865 and to 96,652 in 1870, while it was boosted to the amount of 260,000 for 1867. He was honoured for the obtained results and his honorarium was raised from 50 to 150 forints. The constructions continued in 1873 and another investment began to be implemented in 1884 but this time with a public support. Unfortunately, on 6 May 1887, a great fire burnt down two-thirds of the city and caused a million-forint damage; however, generous contributions helped to finish renovations in the same year (Dívald 1887).

Theology education changed to a four-grade system in 1884. The teachers' salary reached again the level of those teaching in public schools: 1,000 gold annually (ŠOAP EKP: A professzorok // The Professors). Although Hazslinszky was the treasurer only until 1874, he could collect 3,670 forints for the Collegium in Budapest even in 1878. Instead of the previously rejected state aid, Tamás Vécsey,<sup>10</sup> former student and then parliamentarian, could manage to obtain a loan of 20,000 forints in 1873. Disbursement, too, took place on unfavourable terms; thus, the Collegium tried to pay it back as soon as possible (Mayer 1896). Frigyes Hazslinszky got 600 forints annually for serving as a treasurer and received free accommodation: a flat in the building of the Collegium and 1/15<sup>th</sup> of the school's cabbage patch. He had the same salary in the 60s with an extra 150 gold of supervisory bonus and 200 gold extra pay as a rector. But he never betrayed the Collegium despite a more prestigious job – the director of the Botanical Department at the University of Pázmány Péter in Pest – was offered to him at that time.

## After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise

The situation of the Collegium was mended after The Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867. Legal training also developed into a four-year system based on a ministerial decision and the Training-School Institute for Boys with its technical

10 Tamás Vécsey (1839–1912) jurist, professor, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Rector of the University of Budapest and noted scientist of civil law (Glatz 2003).

elementary school moved from Nyíregyháza to Eperjes in 1872. Only 31 of the 155 newly admitted students came from Sáros County around Eperjes in 1870. Most of them stemmed from counties neighbouring Sáros. Along with the 64 Lutheran students, 41 Calvinist, 24 Jewish, 20 Roman Catholic, 5 Greek Catholic and one Orthodox pupil studied there at that time (ŠOAP EKP 249). The total number of students was 375 in the following year (213 Lutherans of them) and already 23 teachers worked in the school (ŠOAP EKP 12). The Collegium continued to evolve during the Dualism: they had 40 teachers in 1892 and the rector's authority was not limited only to the common affairs of the schools. Academies were headed by deans and high schools by directors. The institution of directors worked as a collective management body and three boards managed the life of the institution: a Labour, a Finance and an Audit Committee (A Tiszai Á. H 1892/93). After obtaining the state aid, the financial problems were solved rapidly; earlier funds were completed by ten more, exceeding the former amount by tens of thousands of gold.

Although organizational activity started to revive in the era, it cannot be compared to that in the forties. It did not have such social and political importance, and the organizations founded then were influenced by nationalism rather than by patriotism. We can find such names as Pavol Országh Hviezdoslav<sup>11</sup> (Sziklay 1965) among the members of the Slovak Society (Slovenská Společnost) operating in the sixties. The Hungarian Society was renewed, but the Hungarian, German and Slovak Homiletic Societies remained small with few members. Many of the literary and debating societies, professional development associations came to life and operated in the Academy of Law and in the Teacher-Training College. The atmosphere of Hungarian dominance had a negative impact on the life of the school: all pan-Slavic activities were strictly punished. For example, Gustav Marsall and eight of his companions were excluded from the Academy of Law and the Teacher-Training College because of the foundation and participation in a Slavic secret association in 1882 (Az Eperjesi ker. ev. 1881/82).

When Frigyes Hazslinszky arrived to Eperjes, he had already had a herbarium of 376 species he could present at the meeting of the Hungarian Doctors' and Nature Explorers' Association. Each item was collected from around the city. The Association was established following a German model by Ferenc Bene<sup>12</sup> and Pál Bugát<sup>13</sup> in 1841. The Association operated for almost a whole century (1841–1933), but its organization differed from the German model. It had a constantly working central committee and lectures were divided into professional groups. Its

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11 Pavol Országh Hviezdoslav (1849–1921) is still one of the most popular Slovak poets, the pioneer of modern Slovak poetry.

12 Ferenc Bene (1775–1858): doctor, he introduced the smallpox vaccination in Hungary.

13 Pál Bugát (1793–1865): ophthalmologist, founder of the Natural History Society and Chief Medical Officer of Hungary during the Revolution. After the fall of the Revolution, he lost both his occupation and any chance for one; thus, he started to study linguistics, especially Finnish and Turk languages (Szinnyei 1891).

original medical and scientific character was retained later, but the professional groups were supplemented with archaeological and sociological groups already in the 1840s. The Society's foundation was a turning point in the history of the institutionalization of Hungarian science – many of the prominent scientists were members of it. The organization held its annual meetings in different towns: a total of forty over the course of its existence. During its first decade, the meetings were annual, but after the Revolution they could organize it less frequently. The given city's lords or prelates were asked to be the chairmen and scientists held the positions of vice-presidents and secretaries. The most important activity was a consequence of its nature. Each meeting was held in a different city, providing an opportunity to explore the specific questions of an area more profoundly and to draw the national attention. Many publications were published about the meetings: events, texts of lectures and the organizing city's or the larger landscape's scientific description and also many scientific books.

## The Most Important Professor: Hazslinszky a Little Closer

Hazslinszky turned his attention to mycology at that time. Initial failures dissuaded him for a while; thus, he started to arrange his collections of juveniles first (Hazslinszky 1855). Afterwards, he began to realize his dreams of youth: systematizing the whole Hungarian flora. He moved on slowly with a persistent and painstaking work but finally reached a success. He was a pioneer in the microscopic research of Hungarian cryptogam flora. In 1864, encouraged by his students, he wrote the *Flora of Northern Hungary*, followed by the *Botanical Handbook of Vascular Plants in Hungary* in 1872. The previous work was the first real Hungarian handbook for plant identification. *The Algae of Hungary and of the Neighbouring Countries* was published in 1867, another one in 1870 and one more on lichen in 1884. He published a book about mosses in 1885 with the title *Moss Flora of the Hungarian Empire*, but his interest had been predominantly focused on mycology since 1864. A series of synthetic books had been published since 1875: seven bigger issues and many smaller ones altogether. He discovered more than a hundred new species (although this was not an outstanding achievement in that period) and he was always striving for perfection, mostly in his descriptions. He wrote once to Lajos Jurányi:<sup>14</sup> 'because detailed knowledge of a species causes more joy than discovering a hundred new ones in the spirit of the botanic explorers of our time'.<sup>15</sup> He conducted breeding

14 Lajos Jurányi (1837–1897): botanist, pioneer scientist and member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and of the Royal Botanical Society in Edinburgh. (Szinyvei 1897)

15 In identifying the species, he considered both the morphological features and the evolutionary viewpoint.

experiments and initiated them across the country, systematizing his results. The number of his works was over a hundred during his half-century career. He gave his mineralogical, animal and other collections to the Collegium; his fossils came into the possession of the Geological Institute, while the Botanical Collection of about 11,200 species went to the National Museum.

He helped other scientists, students or amateurs but released any financial benefits; he lived secluded, merely for scientific success and he even sought to invigorate economic life. His series of works on soil science published in the *Economic Papers* in 1866 is a fine example of this.

He managed to gain adherents for cement production and grindstone mining already in 1860. He characterized his own professional activity modestly: 'I can barely say anything about my works because of my rare time for science; so many profane duties for what my subsidiary office obliges me.' In addition, he performed the job of a teacher in the Collegium and filled the position of rector ten times and the position of high school director twice. He taught history, German language, Latin, drawing, economy and Hebrew language. He was a committed teacher: he taught Hebrew at the faculties of Theology and Economy as well as at the Academy of Law, and drawing at the Teacher-Training College only because the Collegium did not have money for an adequate teaching staff, and he found this the only way to protect the institution from closure. And, finally, he also managed the Szirmay Library. He did all of this for a modest financial reward since he remained the secondary school teacher till the last, just as he was invited in 1846. At the beginning, he received a 120-gold salary and the same amount for managing the library. Contrary to the custom, he used the polite form of advocating already in the fifth grade, but he used informal methods even in the eighth grade whenever a student was unready. This resulted that those pupils remained out of favour as long as they had not learned the lesson. However, if somebody was interested in any part of the curriculum, Hazslinszky treated him willingly even outside the classroom. He went out regularly with his students or showed them the plants he got from abroad to identify. Although he was not a good speaker, everybody loved his lectures because not the amount of knowledge was important, but the understanding. He often embellished his lectures with stories and sought to educate students to autonomy and independent thinking.

'A good teacher does what he can do according to his talent; otherwise, he is not a teacher!' – he said in his own words (Mayer 1897). He emphasized the development of thinking as a teacher and as a man; this made him a main attraction of the Collegium beside András Vandrák. He died of heart attack on 16<sup>th</sup> November 1896; he worked even in the last hours of his life. He never looked for entertainment; his only hobby was his backyard. He formed his opinion slowly but remained consistent; scientific debates inspired him but always covered the front quarrels. Loving nature and being close to it meant harmony and the signs

of divine thought for him. Sometimes he was accused of not being pious, but he himself wrote for the survival of Theology in 1874: 'In hard times, against a great enemy, our predecessors established this institution and took charge of its wealth, and would we consider ourselves unable or incapable of taking care of this heritage in much better circumstances, protected by sacred, inviolable law granting the freedom of religions? Verily, the real reason of such nonsense does not lie in the financial but rather in the spiritual poverty of ourselves, the lack of benignity, the guilty un pitying towards the sacred cause of Protestantism.' (Mágócsy-Dietz 1899)

Although he did not participate directly in the social or the political life of the city and that of the county, his patriotism and dedication for science were manifested in his letter to Lajos Jurányi in 1873 as follows: 'the country is poor, very poor because people do not understand that only the superiority of our scientific literacy will be able to captivate the multicoloured nationalities.' This was one of his greatest enemies: indifference... 'the insuperable stolidity, which is surrounding the scientist with stifling atmosphere and which is not recognized enough by the leaders of our society and which does not care about healing.' (König 1897: 413)

He made a similarly dedicated attempt at creating a Hungarian nomenclature, to evolve it in the field of botany, where Latin and German were usual at that time. He had significantly less success in this area; maybe he had no talent for Hungarian because his family returning from emigration spoke mostly German or maybe because he was far from the centre of neology. As a teacher, he did not teach in the Prussian way, according to rigorous principles: he used demonstrative methods ahead of his time but was one of the lasts who taught without textbooks. Derivations of examples and correlations were on the blackboard and waited to be worked up at home. Every school note needed to be elaborated independently: that was the way how he helped to increase comprehension instead of conning.

Despite his puritan lifestyle and as a consequence of his nature to avoid self-interest, in 1873, he had to sell his unique paleontological collection of necessity, which he had accumulated for twenty-four years. 'Because in my destitution I cannot cope with buying scientific books, because I have debts to redeem.' (Frigyes Hazslinszky's Letter) He offered the collection to the National Museum and received 1,500 forints, even though the more than 1,500 pieces cost him much more money and energy. Many fossils that Hazslinszky discovered himself were from the Eocene and Miocene ages and four of them were named after him. Later, he had to hand over one of his botanical collections to the Collegium for a modest life-annuity. Only the eighties brought him some improvement in his financial circumstances: his salary was raised to 1,353 gold and 96 deniers (ŠOAP EKP: 173).

His name was well-known abroad because he published in German, English<sup>16</sup> and French journals. He kept up a vast correspondence with European, American and Australian colleagues, who presented him with plants and sometimes with a

16 He learned English only at the age of 55 to be able to read articles in original.

microscope. He became member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1863 (Országos Középiskolai 1896: 180). He was also member of the Natural History Society (1886), the Hungarian Geographic Society (Természettudományi Közlöny 1886: 102) and the Société Mycologique de France in Paris (1889), but many other societies also elected him honorary member. Fourteen species were named after him.<sup>17</sup> Despite his family had noble origins, which was confirmed by the Kaiser in 1890 (Oklevél 1904: 305), and that he was a great scientist of his era – who spoke German, Latin, Slovak, Greek, Hebrew, French and English (ŠOAP EKP: 150) –, he never held himself any of them.

## The Sad Termination of the Collegium

The Collegium was largely closed in 1919, after Hungary lost its territories in the First World War, including Eperjes. The Czechoslovakian Government diminished theology and transformed the High School and the Teacher-Training College into Slovakian-language education institutions; the latter one was transferred to public service. Hungarian language was not allowed to be taught in any school, not even as a foreign language. The Lutheran Middle School was also closed down. The only church-run survivor, the already Slovakian-language High School was socialized in 1926 (Gömöry 1933). The Academy of Law moved to Miskolc immediately in 1919, where it was socialized in 1948 and closed down in the following year; but the professors and teachers of the Theology Faculty and the Teacher-Training College were waiting for years before moving to Miskolc or Budapest and became teachers in other institutions (Boleratzky 2009).

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




## Book Appearances 2014

Books published in 2014 by members of the Department of European Studies.

1. Márton Tonk: *Minority and Community. Studies on the History, Theory and Educational Policy of the Hungarian Minority of Transylvania*. The Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, Cluj-Napoca, 2014. 148 p.



The volume makes an attempt at offering a representative and comprehensive perspective on the research and professional activity of the author in the past fifteen years. The main topics of the studies are national minority theory, the history of minority thinking and philosophy, as well as Hungarian-language educational policies in Romania, aiming at offering an overall presentation of the professional path of the author in these fifteen years. The starting points of the professional ‘itinerary’ are the themes of Hungarian thinking and philosophy in Transylvania, as well as research projects through which certain specific problems of social and political theory can be discussed (also connected to the Hungarian minority community of Transylvania); and by their

help, minority theories and rights can be analysed (in a larger, more general, European context), and researches and ‘case studies’ conducted about Hungarian educational policies in Transylvania.


The first thematic structure of the volume (Chapter: *The History and Theory of the Hungarian Minority of Transylvania*) includes analytical studies in the area of history of thinking and (national) Hungarian philosophy (with special emphasis on Hungarian thinking in Transylvania). It discusses issues such as national philosophy ‘identity,’ the history, historiography and the present state

of Hungarian thinking in Transylvania, and of minority theory within it, with a special in-depth focus on the thinkers of the so-called ‘Cluj school of thought’ between the two world wars. Within the frames of these studies, a special accent is laid on ‘identity problems’ and the central paradigms of national philosophical historiography, and a detailed analysis of the work of one of the important authors of the ‘Cluj school of thought’ is presented.

In the second unit (Chapter: *Minority Rights and Educational Policy*), the author gives an insight into the situation and the problems of minority protection on a European level, and – as a ‘case study’ of domestic minority protection and right enforcement – into the specific situation and challenges of Hungarian-language education policy in Romania. The issues discussed within the frames of the latter theme are primarily organized around Transylvanian Hungarian-language higher education policy and strategy, respectively the issues of university-level education in the Hungarian language, the intention of the author being to present and argue over their professional, minority policy, demographic and institutional strategy contexts.

**2. Szenkovics Dezső: *Móhandász Karamchand Gándhi filozófiai gondolkodásának központi fogalmai.*** Kiadók: Pro Philosophia Alapítvány, Egyetemi Műhely. Kolozsvár, 2014. 225 old.

**Dezső Szenkovics: *The Core Concepts of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s Philosophical Thought***



It has passed more than six decades since *Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi* suffered a violent death. It all happened on January 30, 1948: he was on his way to his usual place of worship, where he would say the prayers in front of large audiences, when a Hindu extreme nationalist, namely, Nathuram Vinayak Godse, got close to him and fired three gunshots, putting an end to Mahatma’s life. Gandhi’s last words bear witness to his life-style, philosophy and strong belief: ‘Hey Ram,’ that is, ‘Oh, God’ – these were the last words that left the lips of the great Indian freedom fighter, spiritual leader, political and religious philosopher.

Gandhi’s death meant the end of a chapter in the history of modern India and

the beginning of a new era in world history at the same time. It may seem coincidental, but Mahatma's death marked the closing of probably the most significant period in the history of modern India. Hereby, I am considering the period hallmarked by the joy of attaining independence and shaking off the colonial status as well as bearing the burdensome consequences of separation. August 14 and 15, 1947 mark the moment of Pakistan's and India's official establishment as independent and separate states only to see the world shocked at Gandhi's ironic death shortly afterwards: 'the apostle of non-violence' became the victim of violence; on the face of it, the dark forces of evil and hatred gained victory over the good and the righteous.

However, I tend to share the opinion that Gandhi's death turned over a new leaf in the book of world history. A process started then that has never stopped evolving up to this day, which we may define most appropriately as the processing, systematization and interpretation of Gandhi's personality, life and philosophy. At the same time, we could also witness another process, pertaining strictly to the Gandhian philosophy and idea of life as several other sets of examples standing for the practice and adoption of non-violent resistance can be found outside the Indian borders, such as the movement led by Martin Luther King Jr. in behalf of the black people's equal rights in the United States of America, the South African anti-apartheid efforts, or the Solidarity's activity in Poland, who pursued a non-violent conflict resolution method in order to wind up the communist dictatorship.

According to the central proposition of my book, the Indian nationalist movement characterized by Gandhi's personality could surpass any other previous nationalist movement and achieve most of the goals on its agenda, thus becoming highly effective, because, on the one hand, Gandhi considered politics as sort of practising religion on an everyday basis while, on the other hand, in perfect line with his previously mentioned conviction, he conferred a new, politically and socially comprehensible, additional meaning to the ancient, well-known and widely understood religious concepts. Consequently, he succeeded in forging the socially, religiously, linguistically and culturally fragmented and heterogeneous Indian society into one nation for the time of the movements for independence. Furthermore, another ambition of my book is to answer whether the Gandhian ideas have their relevance in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, whether they have a message waiting to be decoded and put into practice, and whether the Great Soul's philosophy, propagations and actions have any actual *raison d'être* in our ever-globalizing world.

Besides formulating the hypothesis, the introductory part of this volume touches upon several vital issues. This section is dedicated to the personal, subjective factors which motivated me in choosing the topic and are tightly connected to my study trips in India carried out in 1996 and 1998. In addition

to this, the first part of the book discusses the methods adopted in preparing and compiling my paper, which rest upon text analysis and interpretation, on the one hand, and – in the case of the concepts central to the Gandhian philosophy – etymological, morphological and semantic analysis, on the other. Immediately following the presentation of the applied methods, you can find a short summary of the research results obtained prior to writing my thesis and this book.

The introductory part mentions in particular a brief presentation of the works I consider the most standard in terms of Gandhi's research history, which I classified into three categories based on Chakrabarty's typology: biographical works (biographies by Romain Roland, Louis Fischer, Kathryn Tidrick, Joseph Lelyveld and Jad Adams), standard works treating the socio-philosophical aspects of Gandhi's philosophy (Raghavan Iyer, Joan Bondurant, Bhikhu Parekh and Bidyut Chakrabarty). As for the third category, it is made up of works that give us a historical reading of the topic in question, which, however, are not meant to be treated within the scope of my thesis since they cannot really provide any additional information on Mahatma to those already available to us through the biographical monographs.

My brief survey on the research on Gandhi touches in particular upon the fact that Romanian literature has almost no mention of Gandhi despite an explosive increase seen in the number of works published on Eastern religions and cultures in the dawn of the nineties. While there is a worldwide interest in Mahatma's personality and activities, there is an almost complete, baffling absence thereof in Romania.

Acknowledgements close the introductory section, where I express my gratitude to those who have contributed to my work either professionally or with their helping attitude.

The second part of the book is an attempt at presenting Gandhi, the man, without trying to provide with an overall picture. As a matter of fact, it is not my intention to give a biographical presentation of Mahatma, as we can find hundreds of such works written in the last few decades; instead, I would like to draw attention to the way he speaks about himself (this is the actual aim of the first subchapter: *Gandhi, in the Light of His Biography and Works*). Then again, the second subchapter (*Gandhi's Image As Seen by Friends, Colleagues, Biographers, and Researchers*) tries to turn our attention to the many faces – present both in the West and the East – of one of the most eminent personalities of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, placing in the limelight the opinions of his contemporaries and those of various prominent personalities, members of the subsequent generations.

The third chapter, bearing the title *The Historical and Social Context of Gandhi's Work in India*, is dedicated to help the reader see the events that took place in India at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and in the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and place them into a historical and social context in order to gain a better insight into

the Gandhian oeuvre. First and foremost, the correct understanding of Gandhi's life-work presupposes the reader to form the right picture of the characteristics and relevant events pertaining to the historical period under discussion. The first subchapter (*Gandhi's Years Spent in England and South Africa*) treats Gandhi's time spent in England and South Africa, since both his three years spent in England and those two decades spent in South Africa significantly determined the career and philosophy of the Great Soul. The second subchapter (*Historical and Political Situation in India in Gandhi's Time*) deals with the Hindu and Muslim origins of the Indian national awakening. Distinct attention is paid to the role and impact of the Hindu religious reform movements (Arya Samaj, Brahmo Samaj and Ramakrishna Mission), as well as to the presentation of the objectives set by the moderate and radical Hindu nationalist movements that developed in the bosom of Hinduism. A separate subchapter is dedicated to treat the appearance of Muslim Nationalism and its most relevant representatives. Two subchapters cover the Indian National Congress: while the initial part touches upon the circumstances of its establishment, its original objectives and the adopted methods, the second part gives a presentation of the Congress found under the leadership and influence of Gandhi.

The fourth chapter of my book (*Key Concepts in Gandhi's Philosophy*), which represents the actual core of my paper, has its ambition to make an analysis of the categories central both to the Gandhian philosophy and one of the most extensive socio-political awakenings in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, bringing about a wave of national revivals that would spread across an entire continent. I discuss the etymology of the categories of *satya*, *ahimsa*, and that of *satyagraha*, which rests upon the previous two; I look into their original meaning embedded in the religious tradition and present the changes and developments in content and meaning that complement the above-mentioned categories of religious origins inside the Gandhian philosophy.

Within the scope of the very same chapter, I give a brief introduction of the religious and philosophical influences that played the greatest part in shaping the Gandhian philosophy. Hereby, I consider certain deep and decisive spiritual influences with stimulative effects on Gandhi such as Hinduism, Christianity or Lev Tolstoy. Furthermore, besides presenting the basic principles, Chapter 4 guides us through the stages of development in the Gandhian philosophy by investigating the statements: 'God is Truth' and 'Truth is God'.

These analyses are based upon the primary bibliography, especially the writings published by Gandhi himself and the various analyses of the Gandhian oeuvre. To a great extent, the sources of texts attached to Mahatma's name are made up of his biography published in English as well as in Hungarian, a work of translation published under my editorial care, entitled *Hind Szvarádsz, avagy az indiai önkormányzat* [*Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule*], and the *Collected*

*Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, a collection of texts published in the form of 98 volumes of electronic books and internet databases.


At the same time, my analyses of the Gandhian life-work and categories rely in a large measure on the most relevant researchers' (Ajay Shanker Rai, Bal Ram Nanda, Bhikhu Parekh, Bidyut Chakrabarthy, Douglas Allen, David Hardiman, Edward Thompson, Glyn Richards, Joan V. Bondurant, Kathryn Tidrick, Raghavan N. Iyer, Ravindra Varma, Terrence J. Rynne etc.) viewpoints and theories.

Chapter 5 (*The Relevance of Gandhian Principles in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*) is founded on the hypothesis that the Gandhian oeuvre as well as the principles and teachings formulated therein have their own message and relevance both for the individuals and the societies existent in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It is my strong belief that Gandhi's life and philosophy as well as the warnings it gives voices to and the consequences deducible therefrom can provide an answer to the problems our presently globalizing world suffers from such as religious fanaticism, worldwide terrorism, economic crisis originating from the moral crisis of the individual and the society, the ever-extending ecological footprint etc. I am convinced that Gandhi's message has a concrete and actual relevance, with the only question remaining as to whether we are or will be able to decode this message as both individuals and societies, and apply it on an individual and societal level. In other words, with full knowledge of the present problems and future challenges, we may pose the question whether we, as (groups of) individuals and societies, will be able to achieve a certain level of mental development that would enable us to properly understand and adopt the Gandhian principles on an everyday basis.

The last chapter of the book sums up the final conclusions. In the light of the above, it can be said that the issues discussed in the present research are at the crossroads between history and the history of religion, as well as, between the philosophy of religion and political philosophy. The subject itself gives room for this sort of categorization as it makes use of a historical framework to analyse the Great Soul's philosophical dimensions and visualizes the socio-political processes that may be considered the direct consequences of his life-work and the tightly related activities. Certain concepts that appear in the thesis – truth, god, love, non-violence etc. – belong to the domain of philosophy, while others – non-violent resistance, independence, local government etc. – fall within the thesaurus of political philosophy and political science. At the same time, it also needs mentioning that Gandhi's case does not allow of such a surgical scientific separation between these concepts since his own interpretation does not distinguish religion from politics at all; in his view, religion is politics itself, as our belief in God and Truth, the continuous search for them has to determine every single moment of the human life. Therefore, it becomes impossible to draw a fine line between religion, philosophy and politics in Mahatma's case.

3. István Horváth – Ibolya Székely – Tünde Székely – Márton Tonk (eds.): *Minority Representation and Minority Language Rights*, Scientia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2014. 440 p.

**Dezső Szenkovics: *Introduction: Quo vadis European Union?***



The most popular and well-known motto of the European Union, ‘United in Diversity,’ came into use in 2000. According to the official website of the European Union, the concept ‘signifies how Europeans have come together, in the form of the EU, to work for peace and prosperity, while at the same time being enriched by the continent’s many different cultures, traditions and languages’.

As we have quoted, the linguistic diversity is considered by the European Union as a real value of the Old Continent which has to be protected both by the European Union and the 28 member states. The slogan, as a statement, as a declarative goal and nothing more, sounds very good, but can we possibly say that the problem of the minority language rights in the member

states of the European Union and in those where negotiations are carried on regarding the conditions, terms and time of the accession are satisfactorily and definitely solved?

The conference entitled ‘Minority Representation and Minority Language Rights’ (MIREMIR), which has been organized in co-operation with the Department of Juridical Sciences and European Studies of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, the European Studies Department of the University of Amsterdam and the European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on Federalism and Regionalism, has covered two important topics of the minority issues, trying to find an answer for the above-formulated question. One of these topics is concerning the problem of minority representation, involving issues related to autonomy and minority self-government, electoral politics and parties. On the other hand, as we can see in this volume, the problem of language rights, language policies and of the real-life practices of European minorities

living inside the EU or in countries willing to become member states of the EU was the second important topic of the conference.

Before we try to give an overall picture of the published presentations of the MIREMIR conference, we have to mention that MIREMIR is part of a series of conferences organized by the Department of Juridical Sciences and European Studies of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, analysing different issues of the minority status. The first international conference held in Cluj took place between 27 and 29 March 2008. The conference entitled 'Nations and National Minorities in the European Union' dealt with issues related to the status and future of national minorities within the European Union. The second conference took place between 17 and 19 June 2010 and was entitled 'Minority Politics within the Europe of Regions'. It was a natural and logical continuation of the first conference, but at this time the focus was moved to topics such as language rights and cultural policies, ethno-regionalism and autonomy, the past and the present of ethnically and/or religiously divided societies. During the conference, there was a special panel investigating the situation and the protection of national minorities in Romania.

It took another two years till the third conference, which was held between 11 and 14 October 2012. The main theme was selected by the organizing institutes in a way which made possible the continuation of the previous two conference's tradition.

The present volume of studies includes those essays and studies which were presented at the conference. As we can see, there are five major chapters, each of them dealing with a special issue such as language rights, language policies and everyday practices, historical and international legal perspectives of the minority rights, existing autonomy and minority self-government models in Europe, topics related to the political representation of the minorities etc.

With no claim of being exhaustive, let me draw your attention to a few studies reflecting on interesting and special minority issues, problems.

One of these studies is signed by Türk Fahri and Karamucho Sencar. The study deals with the language rights of the Turkish minority in Kosovo from 1974 till nowadays. If in the former Yugoslavia the use of the Turkish language in public places, local administration and education was a constitutional right for the Turks living in Kosovo, the situation has changed to a great extent in the last two decades, and the Turkish language has lost its official language status.

In this volume, you will find two extremely interesting studies (signed by István Szilágyi and Endre Domokos), both of them focusing on the Spanish Constitutional model adopted in 1978 and its direct consequence, the Catalan autonomy, as a practicable and applicable models for the Hungarian minorities living in Central and Eastern Europe/the Carpathian Basin.

Last but not least, I would like to draw your attention to the study investigating the problem of ‘unemployed graduates’ in Romania. The paper signed by Márton Tonk and Tünde Székely is based on a research project regarding the implementation and consequences of the Bologna Process. The authors state in this study that the Bologna Process – after five years of being implemented in the Romanian universities – has not been able to produce the expected major goals such as student mobility and the preparation of the graduates for the expectations and demands of the labour market.

Taking one thing with another, we can consider that the MIREMIR conference was a great opportunity for the researchers concerned in minority issues to share their problems, experiences and results. At the same time, we are firmly convinced that this new volume of scientific studies will have an important role and contribution in the field of minority researches and will be used in the teaching process by those who are preoccupied by these topics.

**5. Tonk Márton: *Világnézettől közösségig*.** Válogatott filozófiatörténeti és kisebbségelméleti tanulmányok. Kiadók: Pro Philosophia és Egyetemi Műhely, Kolozsvár, 2014. 200 old.



The volume is a collection of studies on the history of philosophy and the theory of minorities published by the author in the recent years. The volume offers a representative insight into the most important issues and dilemmas of our time.





## University Evenings – Scientific Conference

### **Soviet Deportations in the Carpathian Basin between 1944 and 1945. Conference within the ‘Malenkaya Rabota’ Memorial Year**

Between 16 and 19 October 2014, the Faculty of Sciences and Arts of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania organized and hosted a very important international conference in the theme of the Soviet deportations of civilians in the Carpathian Basin. The conference was one of the scientific meetings organized in the Memorial Year 2014-2015 all over the Central European region on the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Soviet occupation of this part of Europe.

The conference was only a part of a great memorial week with a lot of programmes. It began on 14 October 2014, when it was inaugurated a memorial plaque in the Házsongárd Cemetery in Cluj, in memory of the deportation of the 5,000 Hungarian civilians from Cluj to the Soviet Union in October 1944. After that, the memorial week continued on 16 October 2014 with the opening ceremony of an exhibition of ‘Malenkaya Rabota’ souvenirs and fine arts creations made by artist M. Lovász Noémi from Cluj. It was followed by a round table with ‘Malenkaya Rabota’ survivors and their relatives from Cluj. All these programmes as well as the conference entitled *Soviet Deportations in the Carpathian Basin between 1944 and 1945. Conference within the ‘Malenkaya Rabota’ Memorial Year*, which started next day, on 17 October 2014, were held in the building of the Faculty of Sciences and Arts of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania in Cluj.

14 lecturers from 4 European countries – the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Hungary and Romania – took part at the two day-long conference. First day, at the opening ceremony of the conference, the official programme started with greeting the representatives of the organizing and co-organizing institutions: the Faculty of Sciences and Arts of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, the Local Government of the German Minority in Szerencs and the International Association of GULAG Researchers. In the name of the Faculty, Radu Lupescu, PhD, Assistant Professor, Head of the Department of Juridical Science and European Studies and János Kristóf Murádin, PhD, Assistant Professor, Chancellor of the

Faculty of Sciences and Arts held their welcome speeches, followed by Attila Árvay, President of the Local Government of the German Minority in Szerencs and András Majorszki, President of the International Association of GULAG Researchers.

They were followed by a very interesting plenary lecture held by Zalán Bognár, PhD, Associate Professor at the Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary, Faculty of Humanities, Institute of History. His presentation entitled *‘Malenkaya Rabota’ in the Carpathian Basin, in Hungary – Data, Facts, Interpretations, Connections* dealt with the interpretation problems related to the notion of ‘Malenkaya Rabota’ (forced labour in the Soviet Union). There were presented different ways of classifying the victims of ‘Malenkaya Rabota’ in the Carpathian Basin, as well as various groups and types. It was also made a determination of the effective number of the groups and of the total number of those deported as civilians from the population of 14.7 million inhabitants of Hungary at the time, based on different data. The lecturer spoke about the manageability of the data, the interpretation of Soviet and Hungarian archive data and the reasons why they are so different.

After that, during the first day of the conference, five more lectures were held in two sections: the first, named *The World of Soviet Labour Camps*, contained the presentation of Áron Máthé, PhD; a historian-sociologist, member of the Committee of National Remembrance, whose lecture entitled *GULAG, Malenkaya Rabota, Soviet Detention – Interpretation Issues*, was followed by another presentation held by Stepan Cernousek, a Czech researcher, Chairman of Gulag.cz Association, in the theme of *The Virtual Tour of the Gulag*. St. Cernousek described their three expeditions in Russia with the aim of visiting former labour camps and making documentary films on them. At the end, Jan Horník, another Czech researcher from the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes, Prague, was speaking about the Gulag captivity of the Czechoslovak Citizens.

The second section entitled *Malenkaya Rabota in Hungary I – The Camps of the GULAG* contained two more presentations: Eleonóra Matkovits-Kretz, the chairman of the National Circle from Pécs-Baranya of the Germans of Hungary, spoke about the calvary of the Germans from Hungary at the end of World War II, followed by Richárd Tircsi, a Hungarian Chief of Ministry Department at the Ministry of Human Capacities, who presented in a very interesting way the deportation of Germans from Szatmár County to ‘Malenkaya Rabota,’ with a focus on two settlements. The first day of the conference ended with the presentation of documentary films on Soviet forced labour camps.

The next day, 18 October 2014, started with the third section of the conference, entitled *Malenkaya Rabota in Hungary I – Memory and Commemoration*, in which András Majorszki, President of the International Association of GULAG Researchers held his lecture entitled *‘Malenkaya Rabota’ – People from Ond at*

*Forced Labour in the Soviet Union (1945–1947) (Circumstances of Deportation)* and Attila Árvay, President of the Local Government of the German Minority in Szerencs, described in detail the Regional Malenkaya Rabota Monument in honour of the victims, which will be inaugurated in November this year at Szerencs, Hungary.

*Deportations in Subcarpathia and Transylvania* was the title of the next section, built up by three presentations: György Dupka, PhD, the General Editor at Intermix Publishing House, Ukraine, described in its lecture the exertion of the principle of collective guilt against Hungarians and Germans in Sub-Carpathia (the implementation of the decisions of the Military Council of the 4<sup>th</sup> Ukrainian Front as reflected by the reports of the NKVD in 1944–1946). Levente Benkő, a private researcher, and editor of the *Művelődés* cultural review in Cluj dealt with the internment of Hungarians and Germans, as well as with the atrocities against Hungarians in the Fall of 1944 in Romania and, finally, János Kristóf Murádin, PhD, historian, held his presentation about the deportation of Transylvanian Hungarians and Germans into the Soviet Union in 1944–1945. Murádin spoke in detail about the remembrance of the deportations too.

The last section of the conference, with the title of *Deportations in Transylvania*, was composed exclusively of researchers from Romania: Alpár-Csaba Nagy, PhD, Assistant Professor at Babeş–Bolyai University, Faculty of Reformed Theology, in his presentation entitled *National Traumas – Local Remembrance*, spoke about the atrocities committed by the Hungarian, Romanian and Soviet army forces against the local civilians in the villages around Cluj in 1944. In the followings, Annamária Papp, journalist, private researcher at the *Szabadság* newspaper's editorial office, presented her work of interviewing some deportees from Cluj in the Soviet Union and, at the end, István Lajos Józsa Chairman of the Committee for the Preservation of Military Traditions from Turda (CPMTT) described the activity of the CPMTT.

The conference finished with several book presentations and, on the last day, 19 October 2014, there was organized a guided tour for the lecturers in the famous Házsongárd Cemetery in Cluj, during which they visited the memorial plaque of the Hungarian civilians from Cluj deported in the Soviet Union, inaugurated a few days before. The lectures presented during the conference will be published next year in the form of a scientific book.

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## The EU-Camp 2014

The Hungarian Youth Conference in Romania in collaboration with the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania and the Kós Károly Academy, with the support of Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, organized the European Union Camp for youth and students in the period of July 8–13, 2014. The eleventh edition of the traditional EU-camp took place in Marosfő (Izvoru Mureşului, close to Gheorgheni, Harghita County).

In this year's EU-Camp, the main issue was: *How longer Europe?* Within this framework, there were held lectures and debates concerning the 2014 election campaigns, Europe's present and future, and the topics of multilingualism and multiculturalism.

Our university was one of the organizers; that is why we were allowed to have our traineeship there for one week. Several generations took part in this camp. I was surprised that a fifth-grade student was also interested in politics.

The day we arrived, we were given numbers and were organized in groups according to what political group we represented. After all of the groups were formed and they presented themselves, they were each assigned a team leader. We found out that the group members were selected by a draw. Completing the tasks required much time and a positive attitude on the part of those present.

In addition to the lectures, we had to find time to start campaigning as well; so, it was a bit tiring. In the second half of the camp, the leaflet and the flag turned out to be more and more important, and the battle was won by the environmentalist team. At night, we enjoyed the concerts given by amateur or experienced bands. The nightly programmes, such as the slam poetry, the campfire, the yarding system etc. helped us to get to know each other better.

The camp was not only about embracing politics and economy, but it also provided us with an enriched professional experience.

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