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The Development Path of the Miskolc Agglomeration (1970–2015)

Andrea KRISTÓF

University of Nyíregyháza, Institute of Tourism and Geography
e-mail: kristof.andrea@nye.hu

Abstract. The historical development of the socio-economic, environmental effects of the agglomerating process in the region of Miskolc has remained an unexplored area. The economic crisis and the signs of crisis present in the Miskolc agglomeration too have changed the attitudes of settlements towards agglomerating and suburbanizing processes. These changes also affect the suburbanizing processes in the Miskolc agglomeration, i.e. the intensity of suburbanization is decreasing. The suburbs of Miskolc have become more fragmented and polarized in terms of the society and economy. The geographical separation of high- and low-status suburbs proves the ever-increasing segregation within the metropolitan area.

Keywords: suburbanization, suburbs of Miskolc, agglomeration, segregation, metropolitan area

I. Introduction

Most studies dealing with the socio-economic changes in the agglomerations of Hungary are primarily concerned with Budapest and its surroundings as well as with large cities (e.g. Győr, Pécs, etc.) and their neighbourhoods most strongly affected by dynamic economic growth. Hungarian geographers define differently the agglomerations of Hungarian cities in time and space; moreover, the special set of concepts used by different branches of science also results in different interpretations (e.g. Tímár 2006, Nagy–Tímár 2010, etc.). One of the biggest shortcomings of research produced over the past half century is that it has not explored properly the historical stages and characteristics of the agglomerating process in the Miskolc metropolitan area. With respect to the historical background, it is important to emphasize that the development of agglomerations in Hungary was not a sudden moment but rather a long development path (Tóth 2006). One of the basic tasks of the historical research of agglomerations today is

still to interpret this development path and examine those factors that have led to the development of agglomerations and determined their evolution.

There is no consensus among scientists regarding the starting date, dynamics, and stages of development of the agglomerating process around Miskolc (e.g. Tóth 2004, 2006; Kőszegfalvi 2006, Kovács 2003, etc.). The reasons behind this may include the different interpretations of the extensive (e.g. population growth, housing construction, the establishment of the basic infrastructure network) and the intensive stages (a contiguous, physically integrated area of settlements is created, and formerly autonomous settlements may merge together; the system of linear infrastructure intertwines and integrates the whole area of the agglomeration, etc.) of the agglomerating process. The different pieces of research so far have focused on a specific point in time and have not dealt with the changes of factors in time that resulted in agglomerating processes and the changes in the geographical extension of the Miskolc agglomeration.

The aim of my study is to present how the socio-economic development (from simple migration to intensive agglomerating processes) of the past half century has affected Miskolc and the settlements located within its narrower socio-economic neighbourhood as well as the changes in vertical relationships and the horizontal extension of this settlement group (defined as agglomeration since 1970). This process has resulted in the restructuring of the agglomeration around Miskolc in two phases and in the social, demographic, economic, and functional differentiation of settlements.

II. Formation of the Miskolc Agglomeration

Miskolc lies at the meeting point of the Bükk Mountains and the Cserehát (the Miskolc Gate and its broader surroundings), and geographical energies, economic geographical position, and urban structure have always determined local people's living environment. From the second half of the 19th century, the development of the city accelerated and from the 1880s it became the centre of one of the fastest developing heavy industrial regions of historical Hungary. The city's population increased almost two and a half times between 1870 and 1910, and the surrounding settlements – which were formerly autonomous, but now they are part of Miskolc – also showed similar population dynamics (*Table 1*). The explosive population growth strongly correlated with the development of heavy industry.

Table 1. *Population change in settlements attached to 'Greater Miskolc' (1870–1949)*

Settlements	1870	1880	1910	1930	1941	1949
Miskolc	21,535	24,319	49,182	61,559	77,362	103,690
Diósgyőr	4,312	4,630	17,204	20,854	26,539	N/A
of which: Vasgyár and Újdiósgyőr	N/A	approx. 2,000	7,771	6,187 +3,479	6,886 +2,452	N/A
Pereces	N/A	N/A	2,312	3,007	2,902	N/A
Görömböly	1,175	1,160	1,840	2,296	2,845	2,177
Hejőcsaba	1,542	1,570	3,184	6,356	5,036	N/A
of which: Martintelep	N/A	N/A	493	1,935	1,331	N/A
Hámor	1,011	827	978	1,053	1,030	1,321
Szirma	1,114	1,163	1,545	1,794	1,899	1,958
Total	**30,689**	**33,669**	**73,933**	**93,912**	**114,711**	**109,146**

Source: edited by the author according to census data (1870–1949)

The role and position of Miskolc, whose relationships with settlements in southern Borsod were intensifying, fundamentally changed with the Treaty of Trianon. Before the Treaty of Trianon, Miskolc was the 12th most populous city in historical Hungary, whereas after the treaty it became the 6th one. Miskolc became the leading city (with no other competing cities such as Kosice) of the region, and it turned into the industrial, commercial, financial, and cultural centre of Northern Hungary.

Between the two world wars, the close relationships among Miskolc and the surrounding settlements were also reflected by the dynamic population growth. The population of the city together with that of Diósgyőr grew to over 100,000 as early as 1941 (*Table 1*), and it was only a matter of time before the functionally integrated settlements would be merged through law ('Greater Miskolc'). The idea of creating 'Greater Miskolc' occurred as early as at the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries, but it became reality only in 1945, when Diósgyőr, Hejőcsaba, and Tapolca (which was separated from Görömböly) were attached to Miskolc. The area and population of 'Greater Miskolc' increased further in 1950, when Görömböly, Hámor, and Szirma were also attached to its area; thus Miskolc became the second largest city in Hungary (*Table 1*, *Map 1*).

At the dawn of the Second World War, the intensity and depth of the socio-economic relationships probably reached the level what is called today 'settlement group'. Partly due to special circumstances, the precursors of the Miskolc agglomeration should primarily be investigated in this settlement group.

Map 1. *Territorial expansion of Miskolc, changes in built-up areas (1773–2015)*

After the Second World War, the primary goal of the fundamentally altered settlement policy was to establish the conditions for socialist industrialization at the level of settlements, but at the same time industrialization was also one of the most important tools of settlement development. In this respect, the development of Miskolc was prioritized and the city also received distinguished political attention. Research on Hungarian settlement groups and agglomerations (e.g. Fórizs 1967, Perczel 1964, etc.) has shown that the concentration of socialist productive forces played the most important role in the formation of agglomerations. Margit Fórizs grouped 35 settlements into the Miskolc settlement group based on four factors (healthcare, secondary education, retailing, and industrial commuters). The most striking features of this process for researchers investigating the extent of agglomerating in Hungary were rapid population growth and extensive commuting, although the intensity of these factors (especially of the former one) has significantly decreased since the end of the 1980s. Besides the geographical concentration of industrial production, the population and infrastructure development also supported the formation of agglomerations (Kőszegfalvi 1979). When the proportion of industrial commuters was examined, it was found that in 1960 the number of commuters arriving in Miskolc was the second highest in Hungary after Budapest. At that time, the number of inbound commuters was 24,197 (24.6%), which added to the number of local workers in Miskolc (73,918), which means that there were almost 100,000 jobs in the second most populous city of Hungary (*Table 2*). Meanwhile, the number of inbound commuters in the case of other Hungarian cities with a population over 100,000 was under 10,000 (e.g. the number of inbound commuters was 8,896 in Pécs, 8,518 in Szeged, and 7,900 in Debrecen).

Table 2. *Inbound commuters in Miskolc in the percentage of active earners (1960)*

Settlements	Commuters	Active earners	%	Settlement	Commuters	Active earners	%
Hejőbába	519	768	67.6	Szikszó	790	3,072	25.7
Sajóbábony	975	1,497	65.1	Vatta	140	552	25.4
Felsőzsolca	1,026	1,695	60.5	B.szt.lászló	95	375	25.3
Szirmabesenyő	710	1,454	48.8	Taktaharkány	448	1,790	25.0
Alsózsolca	792	1,752	45.2	Mályi	195	796	24.5
Kistokaj	225	500	45.0	Emőd	631	2,597	24.3
Nyékládháza	567	1,353	41.9	Gesztely	226	942	24.0
Arnót	188	492	38.2	Ónod	268	1,125	23.8
M.nyárád	306	818	37.4	Aszaló	253	1,066	23.7
Onga	571	1,607	35.5	Sajópetri	153	669	22.9
Tiszalúc	658	1,860	35.4	Sajóecseg	86	446	19.3
Hejőkeresztúr	159	451	35.3	B.aranyos	113	647	17.5
Sajókeresztúr	187	589	31.7	Taktaszada	175	1,039	16.8
Berzék	147	476	30.9	M. keresztes	467	2,785	16.8
Sajólád	311	1,050	29.6	Mezőkövesd	1,620	9,670	16.8
Halmaj	218	749	29.1	F. dobsza	111	800	13.9
Bőcs	335	1,156	29.0	Mezőcsát	440	3,222	13.7
S.pálfala	99	342	28.9	Boldva	120	987	12.2
B.szt.kereszt	157	543	28.9	B.ábrány	114	938	12.2
Hernádnémeti	448	1,588	28.2	Sajóvámos	124	1,221	10.2
Harsány	266	970	27.4	Szerencs	251	4,054	6.2
Kisgyőr	244	935	26.1	Sajószt.péter	224	5,073	4.4

Source: edited by the author based on census data (1960)

The fact that more than 30 thousand (30,479) people migrated to Miskolc between 1949 and 1960, which is the third highest number after Budapest (267,663 people) and Pécs (30,596 people), well illustrates the extent of the population concentration. The regional gravity intensity of Miskolc is shown by the fact that 48.3% of in-migrants arrived from the county (Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén), 27.5% arrived from neighbouring counties, 15.3% from other counties, and 8.9% from Budapest.

The above data unambiguously suggest that by 1960 Miskolc had fulfilled the criteria for the first stage of the agglomerating process (developing functional relationships among settlements such as commuting between the place of residence and work), i.e. it is evident that Miskolc and the surrounding settlements together had become an agglomerating region. The basis for further development was created by the socialist socio-economic policy, which started in the 1960s and evolved in the 1970s (such as collectivization, industrial development, investments in infrastructure, etc.), as well as by political conditions (e.g. new economic mechanism etc.) and by the National Settlement Network Development Concept (1971).

III. The Development of the Miskolc Agglomeration (1970–1990)

During the second stage of the agglomerating process, settlements interlock in space (Enyedi 1984, Tóth 1988, 2004) and later they coalesce (e.g. a common infrastructure network is established; a contiguous, physically integrated settlement area emerges, etc.). We can speak about an agglomeration when functional and spatial relationships are well established. In this respect, at the end of the 1970s, only the agglomerations of Budapest and Miskolc were regarded as fully developed in Hungary (Kőszegfalvi 1979, Süli-Zakar 1985, Tóth 1988).

Several pieces of research have been conducted on the agglomerative gravity intensity of Miskolc and the surrounding settlements, some of them (e.g. Koleszár 1980, Lukács–Perger 1975, Süli-Zakar 1985, etc.) focusing on a central issue (e.g. demographics, labour force commuting, retail gravity zones, etc.), while another group of researchers identified the area of the Miskolc agglomeration according to complex indicators (e.g. Szántó 1979, Süli-Zakar 1989, etc.).

Lukács and Perger (1975) identified the Miskolc agglomeration on the basis of 23 indicators (e.g. concentration of productive forces, population and supply of services, etc.). They grouped those settlements into the agglomeration whose indicators were the closest to those of Miskolc, used as a benchmark, while the minimum was represented by the average of the villages in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County. After the weighing of the indicators, they set up three categories (outer, middle, and inner zone) that simultaneously indicated gravity intensity.

Being an industrial centre, Miskolc concentrated a great number of productive forces, which was a fundamental prerequisite for the further development of the agglomeration. In the 1980s, there were not only future visions of the Miskolc agglomeration but also of the Miskolc-Sajó Valley agglomeration as well as of the Borsod heavy industrial agglomeration. The rapid development of Miskolc caused a significant extensive agglomerating process in the Sajó Valley, and close relationships were built among Miskolc and neighbouring settlements, including mining villages. As a result of this process, the occurrence of a polycentric settlement structure along the Ózd-Kazincbarcika-Miskolc-Leninváros heavy industrial axis was predicted. However, the significance of the heavy industrial companies was not an adequate condition for further development (e.g. heavy industrial companies employed approx. three-quarters of heavy industrial workers of Miskolc at the beginning of the 1980s; there were more than one hundred industrial sites in Miskolc in 1980, which made up for one third of all industrial sites in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County). The extensive industrial growth of Miskolc was coupled with a geographical expansion as well (*Map 1*), many settlements being attached to the city between 1950 and 1981 (e.g. Lyukó, Bükkszentlászló, Garadna, Lillafüred, Pereces, Ó- and Újmassa, etc.);

thus, Miskolc had become one of the largest (area: 224 km^2) industrial cities of Hungary.

One of the most important tools for turning Miskolc into a socialist heavy industrial centre, which culminated at the middle of the 1980s, was the Lenin Steelworks, having more than 18,000 workers and more than 1 million tonnes of annual output. The population of the city reached its maximum at that time with more than 211,000 inhabitants. Miskolc's significant population growth, besides the natural increase, was due to the positive net migration rate and to the administratively enlarged urban area. The population of Miskolc was 181,398 in 1970 and 208,103 in 1980 (*Table 3*).

In the 1970s, the restructuring of the Hungarian settlement network also became more marked; different settlement structures evolved, and their development accelerated. According to Koleszár I. (1980), the gravity functions of Miskolc were wide-ranging, with one of the most significant gravity factors being undoubtedly the demand for labour. This is hardly disputable in the case of an industrial city like Miskolc, especially during the era of the 1960s and 1970s characterized by extensive industrialization and investments. The heaviest out-migration was characteristic of the villages in Abaúj-Torna and Zemplén, which had few arable lands, as well as of the settlements in the Borsod Plain, whose agricultural density used to be quite high previously.

Zs. Szántó (1979) showed that according to the investigation of the concentration of the productive forces by 45 factors, besides the Budapest agglomeration, the agglomerations of Pécs, Miskolc, and Lake Balaton as well as the agglomerating region of Komárom – moreover, potential agglomerations (e.g. Veszprém) and settlement groups (e.g. Nyíregyháza) – could be identified.

With regard to the above mentioned topic, it is important to mention that a significant dispute arose among Hungarian geographers on the developmental stages of settlement groups and agglomerations in the 1980s. In his 1985 paper, Professor József Tóth described this process in three stages: 'In our understanding, settlement groups, unified settlement groups, and agglomerations are elements of a developmental process caused by geographical concentration which is realized during urbanization. Further distinctions between different settlement structures can only be made on the basis of formal factors.'

Out of the 32 settlement formations in Hungary, György Kőszegfalvi (1979) classified 3 as agglomerations, 5 as agglomerating regions, 3 as urbanizing regions, 8 as small and 8 as large settlement groups surrounding cities, and 5 as twin or triad cities. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) officially identified settlement groups (for the first time, at the beginning of the 1980s) on the basis of Kőszegfalvi's work (Pálné Kovács–Rechnitzer 1982). In 1985, the HCSO started to introduce settlement formations in Hungary and document their changes and development on the basis of approx. 40 selected data and indicators.

The complex examination of the settlements of the Miskolc agglomeration was realized by cluster analysis at the beginning of the 1980s. Aggregate indicators were created for settlements surrounding Miskolc on the basis of demographics, the concentration of industrial productive forces and factors describing urbanization and infrastructure. Éva Valér (2010) explored the peculiarities and geographical changes of the process of agglomerating in Hungary between 1970 and 1990 through factor analysis of 30 socio-economic indicators. She showed that in the case of an agglomeration or an agglomerating region at least 5 out of the 30 indicators should be above the national average in at least 5 neighbouring settlements. In her opinion, the intensive migration towards cities and the preference for developing cities in the 1970s did not support agglomerating; thus, by 1980, the area and the functional spectrum of agglomerations had decreased in a number of regions. On the other hand, the 1980s were characterized by strengthening agglomerating tendencies. There was not only an increase in the number of settlements representing spatial concentration but also a spatial concentration within each settlement: moreover, the proportion of settlements representing high levels of spatial concentration also grew within each region. According to her, this process affected the Miskolc agglomeration as well since the number of settlements in this area was 33 in 1970 and 1980, while in 1990 there were already 55 settlements.

Signs of crisis, which destabilized the position and development of the socialist Hungarian economy, first appeared in the region of Miskolc at the beginning of the 1980s. These caused fundamental changes in the position and conditions for the development (or rather stagnation) of Miskolc and its agglomeration. The development path of planned co-centres (Kazincbarcika, Tiszaújváros) of the agglomeration deviated from Miskolc and the settlements around it. The number of settlements in the Miskolc agglomeration was first reduced to 17 and later to 13 (*Table 3*).

Table 3. *The population of settlements in the Miskolc agglomeration (1949–2015)*

Settlements	1949*	1960*	1970**	1980**	1990**	2001**	2011**	2015**
Miskolc	**109,841**	**144,741**	**181,398**	**208,103**	**196,442**	**184,125**	**167,754**	**159,554**
Alsózsolca	3,093	3,819	5,116	5,590	5,723	6,044	5,766	5,683
Felsőzsolca	2,932	3,647	5,026	6,125	6,939	7,027	6,613	6,521
Onga	2,515	3,070	3,456	3,616	4,042	4,761	4,858	4,746
Arnót	894	962	1,143	1,560	2,082	2,557	2,597	2,420
Kistokaj	839	1,044	1,157	1,245	1,489	1,868	2,078	2,084
Mályi	1,138	1,690	2,080	2,500	3,353	4,152	4,124	4,016
Sajóbábony	867	2697	3,117	3,416	3,291	3,137	2,887	2,786
Sajóecseg	689	943	1,148	1,201	1,062	1,065	1,051	1,040
Sajókeresztúr	818	1,285	1,462	1,520	1,506	1,513	1,549	1,483
Sajópálfala	605	626	646	725	732	786	744	728

Settlements	1949*	1960*	1970**	1980**	1990**	2001**	2011**	2015**
Sajóvámos	1,856	1,944	2,084	2,201	2,171	2,227	2,185	2,122
Szirmabesenyő	2,589	3,210	4,347	4,769	4,836	4,729	4,438	4,181
Total	**18,835**	**24,937**	**30,782**	**34,468**	**37,226**	**39,866**	**38,890**	**37,810**
Miskolc district	**164,785**	**209,373**	**252,613**	**283,878**	**274,953**	**268,437**	**250,530**	**240,279**

* present population
** resident population

During the examination of expected labour conditions in the region of Miskolc, István Süli-Zakar showed that the economy of the Miskolc agglomeration was not without its problems (e.g. the 80–90% share of the heavy industry, the one-sided sectoral structure of industrial workers, the negative net migration rate partly due to the previous fact, etc.). The economic difficulties of the basic sectors of the industry were already reflected in the demographics of the Miskolc agglomeration. Süli-Zakar identified an agglomeration of 14–15 settlements in the inner zone of the agglomerating region around Miskolc as the strongest economic centre. He anticipated that it would be especially hard to achieve a balance between the economy and the settlement network due to the sluggish economic restructuring and to population decline. He envisioned that the so-called 'unemployment inside the factory gate' would not be sustainable over the long term. According to Süli-Zakar, the development of services in the region were hampered by the lack of capital (while other sectors would not be able to employ the workforce that was not needed in the industry any more), which might result in the rapid population decline of the Borsod industrial region and the Miskolc agglomeration as well as in the slowdown of the agglomerating process (Süli-Zakar 1989).

IV. Suburbanization in the Miskolc Agglomeration (1990–2015)

Suburbanization was detectable in all Hungarian urban regions from the beginning of the 1990s, and the changes occurring due to this process (e.g. population decline in the core cities, population increase in the suburban zone, boom in the housing market, appearance of gated communities, etc.) were fundamentally different from the former characteristics of agglomerating (e.g. Barta–Beluszky 1999, Dövényi–Kovács 1999, Tímár–Váradi 2000, etc.). Out of the Hungarian urban regions, in my previous studies (Kristóf 2013, 2014, 2015), I examined and explored in detail the suburbanization and its consequences as well as its special determining factors in the Miskolc agglomeration. Based on statistics, in this paper, I outline the most important socio-economic characteristics of the past 25 years (1990–2015) of suburbanization in the Miskolc agglomeration. In this framework, I have examined the changes in the demographics and some

social factors of the agglomeration as well as migration trends determining suburbanization. Examination of the Miskolc suburbia from this point of view is important because both statistics and empirical studies show that the new socio-economic processes have reached the Miskolc agglomeration too and are characterized by special features (*Table 4*).

IV.1. Changes in Population

The Miskolc agglomeration is the largest population concentration in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County. It accounts for 13.8% of the area and 36.7% of the population of the county, which means that 251,901 people lived in the core city of the agglomeration and in the 35 settlements belonging to it as of 1 January 2015. The city and its agglomeration have been characterized so far by different demographical tendencies. The population of Miskolc has been continuously declining for three and a half decades, while the population of the suburbs grew dynamically until 2005; however, since then, a differential decline has been observable (*Table 4*). The general demographic state of the settlements is well represented by the fact that in the past ten years there has been an increase in the population of only three suburban settlements (Kistokaj, Kisgyőr, and Bükkaranyos). The reasons for the increase are unique and special in all three cases: Kistokaj profits from the proximity of the southern industrial park of Miskolc, while Kisgyőr and Bükkaranyos have become increasingly popular suburbs due to their favourable potentials of nature and landscape.

Table 4. *The population of the settlements of the Miskolc agglomeration and suburbia (1990–2015)*

Settlements	1990	2001	2005	2011	2015
Miskolc	**196,442**	**184,125**	**175,059**	**167,754**	**159,554**
Miskolc aggl.	**92,719**	**97,451**	**96,471**	**94,212**	**92,347**
of which the settlements of the Miskolc suburbia:					
Alsózsolca	5,723	6,044	6,191	5,766	5,606
Arnót	2,082	2,557	2,650	2,597	2,387
Bükkaranyos	1,122	1,393	1,490	1,448	1,499
Bükkszentkereszt	1,374	1,274	1,215	1,206	1,179
Felsőzsolca	6,939	7,027	7,220	6,613	6,486
Kisgyőr	1,572	1,609	1,665	1,642	1,677
Kistokaj	1,489	1,868	1,916	2,078	2,083
Mályi	3,353	4,152	4,205	4,124	3,929
Nyékládháza	4,432	4,906	5,008	5,023	4,865
Onga	4,042	4,761	4,915	4,858	4,764
Szirmabesenyő	4,836	4,729	4,581	4,438	4,111
Total	**36,964**	**40,320**	**41,056**	**39,793**	**38,586**

Source: edited by the author based on TeIR and HCSO-TSTAR data

The population of Miskolc decreased by approx. 37 thousand people between 1990 and 2015, which was to a lesser extent due to the aging of the population and to a greater extent to out-migration. The population decline of Miskolc accelerated especially in the 1990s, when the decrease was virtually 12 thousand. The massive out-migration of the 1990s was the cumulative result of a number of urban development processes. Meanwhile, the population of the agglomeration zone around Miskolc only grew by five thousand people between 1990 and 2005. There were only few settlements in the Miskolc agglomeration where significant population growth occurred (*Table 4*). Suburbs accounted for 90% of the population increase; however, the increase was different in the settlements of the agglomeration according to geographical position and environmental conditions as well as to the socio-economic status of settlements.

IV.2. Migratory Trends

In the course of analysing suburban migratory trends, it is worth mentioning that there is a strong tendency for Hungarian people to own their houses or at least flats, which is a 'natural' drive for migration. On the other hand, there exists another tendency, which decreases migration, namely that owning a house means more ties and less mobility.

In the case of the Miskolc agglomeration, the sole financial source of building or buying homes in the suburbs has been provided by the selling of apartments in blocks of flats, i.e. the Western-European type of residential suburbanization has not been typical.

Table 5. *Net migration rates of settlements in the Miskolc agglomeration and suburbia (1990–2011)*

Settlements	1980–1990		1990	1990–2001		2001	2001–2011		2011
	n. i.*	migr.**	pop.***	n. i.*	migr.**	pop.***	n. i.*	migr.**	pop.***
Miskolc	**1,487**	**-13,148**	**196,442**	**-6, 785**	**-5,532**	**184,125**	**-8, 425**	**-7,946**	**167,754**
Miskolci aggl.	**2,927**	**-1,253**	**92,719**	**1, 058**	**3,674**	**97,451**	**-1, 764**	**-1,475**	**94,212**
of which the settlements of the suburbia:									
Alsózsolca	308	-175	**5,723**	355	-34	**6,044**	161	-439	**5,766**
Arnót	170	352	**2,082**	107	368	**2,557**	34	6	**2,597**
Bükkaranyos	-39	-10	**1,122**	16	255	**1,393**	30	25	**1,448**
Bükkszentkereszt	21	-22	**1,374**	-96	-4	**1,274**	-85	17	**1,206**
Felsőzsolca	368	446	**6,939**	193	-105	**7,027**	58	-472	**6,613**
Kisgyőr	7	-67	**1,572**	-18	55	**1,609**	-39	72	**1,642**
Kistokaj	39	205	**1,489**	9	370	**1,868**	-27	237	**2,078**
Mályi	168	685	**3,353**	4	795	**4,152**	-72	44	**4,124**
Nyékládháza	57	185	**4,432**	-67	541	**4,906**	-204	321	**5,023**
Onga	213	213	**4,042**	278	441	**4,761**	58	39	**4,858**

Settlements	1980–1990		1990	1990–2001		2001	2001–2011		2011
	n. i.*	migr.**	pop.***	n. i.*	migr.**	pop.***	n. i.*	migr.**	pop.***
Szirmabesenyő	144	-77	**4,836**	-123	16	**4,729**	-238	-53	**4,438**
Total	**1,456**	**1,735**	**36,964**	**658**	**2,698**	**40,320**	**-324**	**-203**	**39,793**

* natural increase, ** net migration rate, *** population

Source: edited by the author based on TeIR and HCSO-TSTAR data

Regarding migratory processes, the most important two decades of suburbanization were between 1990 and 2011, when three-quarters of the out-migration took place. Between 1990 and 2005, out-migration from Miskolc grew faster than in any other periods in the past; however, only one-third of this migratory process headed towards the Miskolc agglomeration (*Table 5*). The change in the tendencies of the decade between 1980 and 1990 is shown by the fact that besides the negative net migration rate natural population decline also became characteristic – as a result, the population decline of Miskolc accelerated. One of the results of migratory processes, one of the most important cornerstones of suburbanization is that during the examined two decades all suburbs except for Alsó- and Felsőzsolca had positive net migration rates. The role of six settlements (Arnót, Mályi, Kistokaj, Nyékládháza, Onga, and Bükkaranyos) was outstanding since they accounted for 90% of the migratory gain of the agglomeration. From 2005, the positive net migration rate decreased drastically, which was due to the fact that the suburbanization process ground to a halt. Temporary out-migration from Miskolc declined, while temporary in-migration significantly increased.

Deindustrialization and long-lasting depression of the industry coupled with the loss of hundreds of jobs contributed to the former population decline of Miskolc as well as to the social restructuring of the surrounding areas. Lower-status layers of society were gradually forced to relocate in less favourable parts of the city or to low-status surrounding settlements. Due to the cumulative results of the above factors, the population of Miskolc decreased by almost 30 thousand people during the two decades between 1990 and 2011. The net migration rate of the city was negative both with respect to the agglomeration and to the suburbia. Between 1995 and 2005, approx. 36 thousand people moved out of Miskolc permanently, while approx. 25 thousand moved into the city. 80% of those who moved out of Miskolc remained in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County (KSH 2006). However, due to the prolonged socio-economic crisis, out-migration from Miskolc has been continuous ever since.

However, migration towards the Miskolc agglomeration and the suburbia was less dynamic than what could have been expected from demographics. This is partly due to the fact that part of this suburban-type migration remained within the city, i.e. people moving did not cross the administrative borders of Miskolc. There were approx. 5–6 thousand cases of pure residential suburbanization between 1990 and 2001, i.e. when someone moved from the city centre to the

suburbia. Overall, according to the analysis of migration trends between 1990 and 2011, it can be stated that approx. 6–8 thousand people moved to the suburbia, which cannot be regarded as a massive process (*Table 5*).

IV.3. Changes in the Demographic and Social Composition

The past decades of ongoing suburbanization in the Miskolc agglomeration has also changed the social, economic, and land-use characteristics of the surrounding, once rural settlements. Since 1990, two major socio-spatial processes have been observed in the Miskolc agglomeration. On the one hand, the occurrence and general strengthening of the wealthier middle class and, on the other hand, the increasing settlement-level differentiation of the lower status layers of society. One of the results of this process is that by now a contiguous eastern slum zone with marked presence of the ethnic minority (the Romani) has appeared in the Miskolc agglomeration. These trends are well represented in statistics (e.g. housing construction, comfort of dwellings, employment rate, unemployment rate, etc.), of which this study analyses three indicators (age structure, percentage of the population with tertiary education, and tax base of personal income tax) that show the strongest correlation with the above mentioned processes.

IV.3.1. Changes in the Age Structure

Research results regarding the Budapest agglomeration (e.g. Dövényi–Kovács, 1999 Barta–Beluszky 1999, etc.) have shown that in the middle of the 1990s young couples in their thirties and forties with small children were overrepresented among people moving to suburbs, and this was also true of people with a degree. This was also characteristic of the Miskolc agglomeration; however, the once young generation who had moved to suburbs has now become middle-aged and some of them are already pensioners. This makes the leaders of suburban settlements face new challenges, who have to adapt to the altered needs of local residents. The aging of the population is a general tendency in Hungary, although this process affects Miskolc and its agglomeration differently (*Table 6*).

Table 6. *Age structure of Miskolc and the agglomeration (1990, 2011)*

Settlements	unit	1990			2011		
		0–14	15–59	60–x	0–14	15–59	60–x
Miskolc	people	40,853	122,925	32,664	2,2831	104,101	40,822
	%	20.8	62.6	16.6	13.6	62.1	24.3
Miskolc agglomeration	people	21,811	56,941	13,967	15,688	59,030	19,494
	%	23.5	61.4	15.1	16.6	62.7	20.7
of which the settlements of the Miskolc suburbia:							

| Settlements	unit	1990			2011		
		0–14	15–59	60–x	0–14	15–59	60–x
Alsózsolca	%	25.1	61.6	13.3	20.9	60.5	18.6
Arnót	%	28.5	61.0	10.5	17.1	65.2	17.8
Bükkaranyos	%	21.8	59.0	19.2	18.4	63.6	18.0
Bükkszentkereszt	%	21.8	62.4	15.8	11.6	63.3	25.1
Felsőzsolca	%	24.1	62.9	13.0	17.0	61.4	21.6
Kisgyőr	%	22.3	57.6	20.1	18.1	62.0	19.9
Kistokaj	%	25.4	61.5	13.1	17.9	66.7	15.3
Mályi	%	26.7	62.5	10.8	12.9	67.4	19.7
Nyékládháza	%	22.4	62.5	15.1	13.6	60.8	25.6
Onga	%	25.1	60.9	14.0	19.6	63.7	16.8
Szirmabesenyő	%	21.0	64.0	15.0	11.9	64.2	23.9
Miskolc	people	**8,899**	**22,923**	**5,142**	**6,545**	**25,106**	**8,142**
suburbia	%	**24.0**	**62.0**	**14.0**	**16.4**	**63.1**	**20.5**

Source: HCSO Statistical Yearbooks of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County

During the two decades between 1990 and 2011, the values of the aging index fundamentally changed in Miskolc and in the agglomeration. The proportion of the 0–14 age–group in 2011 was only 13.6%, which is 7.2% less than in 1990, and the decrease was just slightly smaller in the 35 settlements of the agglomeration. However, there are great differences among suburban settlements. Besides the halving of the 0–14 age-group (e.g. Szirmabesenyő, Mályi, Bükkszentkereszt, etc.), five settlements preserved a youngish age structure (*Table 6*). In the case of four out of these five settlements (Alsózsolca, Arnót, Bükkaranyos, and Onga), besides suburban processes, the higher percentage of the Romani also contributed to the relatively favourable age structure. In the case of Kistokaj, however, this is not the case since it is a typical suburban settlement whose population increased by 25% between 1990 and 2005. Young generations (between 30 and 40 years) moved to the settlement, and the majority of them are still active; so, the aging of the population is not or hardly detectable.

IV.3.2. Percentage of the Population with Tertiary Education

Regarding the level of education, the percentage of the population with tertiary education in the 25–X age–group indicates the differences of suburbanization at the level of settlements. The percentage of the population with tertiary education in Miskolc was 23.7% in 2011, while in 9 settlements of the agglomeration this figure was between the rate of Miskolc and the county average (14.2%). However, examination of the percentage of the population with tertiary education shows significant geographical differences at the level of settlements (*Map 2*). In 2011, the percentage of the population with tertiary education was higher than the average of the suburbia (18.2%) in several settlements (e.g. Kistokaj (23.1%), Mályi

(22.5%), Felsőzsolca (19.7%), Arnót (19.5%), and Nyékládháza (18.9%), etc.). The significant geographical differences in the percentage of the population with tertiary education are partly due to differences in the social status and residential preferences of people moving out of Miskolc, i.e. these figures indirectly show the group of settlements which has been more strongly affected by suburbanization.


Source: Edited by the author based on HCSO data

Map 2. *Percentage of the population with tertiary education in the 25–X age–group (2011)*

In 15 settlements of the Miskolc agglomeration, the percentage of the population with tertiary education is between 5 and 10%. The percentage of the population with tertiary education is especially small in settlements characterized by peripheral location, poor accessibility, aging population structure, high unemployment rate, and high percentage of the Romani.

IV.3.3. Differences in the per Capita Tax Base of Personal Income Tax

The annual value of the per capita tax base of personal income tax reflects the socio-economic level of the development of settlements as well as the geographical disparities among the settlements of the Miskolc agglomeration. In addition, this figure also shows the heterogeneity of the social groups that are involved in residential suburbanization. Due to residential suburbanization, the value of the per capita tax base of personal income tax in the settlements of the Miskolc suburbia is above the county average (*Map 3*).

Source: edited by the author based on HCSO data

Map 3. *Per capita tax base of personal income tax (2011)*

The most popular suburban settlements have the highest values, while the lowest figures are characteristic of the eastern suburban settlements where lower educated and lower income groups are concentrated. The value of tax base of

personal income tax per tax payers and per capita was the highest in Kistokaj (1,012,000 forints) and the lowest in Köröm (190,000 forints). The values of only six settlements were higher than that of Miskolc (779,000 forints per capita), and only five more settlements reached 90% of the value of the core city. Those settlements (9 pieces) where the value of the tax base of personal income tax was between 75 and 90% of the value of Miskolc were grouped into a third category, while in the remaining 21 settlements the value of tax base of personal income tax was below 75% of that of Miskolc (*Map 3*).

So far the characteristics of suburban processes taking place in the Miskolc agglomeration have been analysed through statistics. On the basis of this analysis, it can be concluded that settlements showing suburban characteristics within the Miskolc agglomeration are not homogenous: different zones of the agglomeration are characterized by different structures. The maps shown above represent well that the status of the people who moved to the southern and western sectors of the Miskolc suburbia has been higher than that of the local residents. On the other hand, lower-status people have moved to the eastern and north-eastern parts of the Miskolc suburbia. By now, the villages and towns (e.g. Onga, Alsó- and Felsőzsolca, etc.) of the eastern parts of the suburbia around Miskolc, where low status in-migrants settled down, are struggling with serious socio-economic problems (e.g. increasing out-migration, disappointment of the suburban generation, etc.) the roots of which should be explored by questionnaire surveys.

V. Summary

The historical development of the socio-economic, infrastructural, and environmental effects of the agglomerating process in the region of Miskolc has remained an unexplored area even today. No thorough investigation of the specific factors of the agglomerating process around Miskolc as well as the exact identification of the horizontal extension of these factors have been carried out. The economic crisis, the general economic difficulties of Hungary, and the signs of crisis present in the Miskolc agglomeration too have changed the attitudes of settlements towards agglomerating and suburbanizing processes. As a result, former policies supporting extensive development are being replaced by more intensive settlement development ideas that aim for a more efficient stabilization of the population and exploitation of the local resources. These changes also affect the suburbanizing processes in the Miskolc agglomeration, i.e. the intensity of suburbanization is decreasing. The suburbs of Miskolc have become more and more fragmented and polarized in terms of the society and economy. The geographical separation of high- and low-status suburbs proves the ever-increasing segregation within the metropolitan area.

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On the Track of the Szekler Village *Tízes*
The Model-Like Potential of the Szekler Village *Tízes* on the Eve of the 21st Century

Tünde AMBRUS

Sapientia Transylvanian Hungarian University
e-mail: tundea@gamma.ttk.pte.hu

Abstract. The object of this study is the existence of the village *tízes* (organization in structures by ten) as space-specific elements in Szeklerland and the social problems at the turn of the centuries (involving the population, the community, the culture, and the economy). The study is the result of a historical-geographical survey of the cultural space in Szeklerland within a larger research. The main purpose is to make an attempt to form a historical, system-based perspective, make people aware of the material and spiritual value of the Szekler *tízes* as well as contribute to the subsistence of the *tízes* and the reinterpretation of the notion of value in the 21st century, using my own means and modalities. The subsistence of the Szekler village *tízes* is not required by the subsistence or restoration of the romantic, spiritual goods or the community organization but by the necessities of the entire community.

Keywords: Szekler village *tízes*, the *szeg*, the organization of the settlement and the community

1. Introduction/Topic

My last study and conference – as the genesis of the formation of the *tízes* is still not clear – was concluded by the following sentence (to comfort myself):

> The formation and accurate reconstruction of the Szekler village *tízes* may remain an eternal mystery to us, but the purpose of the present study is not to solve the problem of the formation of the *tízes* but to point at what the *tízes* means to us today, to realize the value and magnificence of history and time, to recognize the settlement-organizing pragmatism based on wisdom, the complex and organic model whose norms were matured by our ancestors using a systematic thinking during the centuries and whose viability was secured by the walkable path.

I have been urged to conduct further research since then, and I have been concerned with the question of whether this conclusion, which suggests some kind of resignation, can permanently be drawn. As a conclusion of this line of thoughts, I decided to make a new step on the border of general settlement history, geography of population, and dynamic cultural geography, stipulating that in this specific interdisciplinarity it is not practical to 'measure everything' as the self-conscience, the voluntary and emotional vibrations, the heritage, the identity, the faith, and the genius loci cannot be quantified, but their effects are significant. Thus, I tried to uncover, re-examine, and put in a reconstructed light, without any prejudice and with plenty of curiosity, a big part of the material which had been published in my studies concerning the space-specific Szekler village *tízes* (Ambrus 2012: 247, 2014: 89) and add my new research results and evaluations. All the people who were dealing with the history, settlement history, and military organization of the Szeklers as well as those who evidently mentioned the *tízes* and contributed with new pieces of knowledge are also present in the study (Orbán 1869–1871; Szabó–Szádeczky 1895, 1927: 7–252; Szádeczky 1927: 286–293, 1915: 4–6, 17–20, 1902: 24–47; Bartalis 1933: 6–8, 124–158; Kring 1934; Endes 1938: 5–238; Milleker 1939: 4–9; László–László 2005: 128–137; Benkő 1853; Bierbauer 1942, 1986; Györffy 1973: 57–64, 1990: 5–43, 1995: 37–41; Imreh 1973, 1983: 7–271; Tarisznyás 1982: 5–87; Garda 1994: 3–98, 2001, 2002; Köpeczi 1993; Vámszer 1977, 2000; Zayzon 1997: 1–5; Kállay 1829; Egyed 1981: 191–244, 1999: 5–58, 1997: 358–367, 2009, 2016: 348–369; Sófalvi 2003: 16–34, 2006: 5–26; Bárth 2007; Botár 2008).

In my research, I have constantly been concerned with the question of how the strength of the community, which dictates the individual what to do in a given situation, is born and what makes it live. This strength represents much more than what the written, but mostly unwritten, laws of the village ossify in the memory of the individual with their centurial proof. How did he recognize that in a given time a given territory can be defended from the intimidation of state socialism and the illusions of the development of our age with the strength of the community? The Szekler village *tízes* represents the essential answer to this question: the strength of the community is, at the same time, the wisdom of the people, and it is not only the – sometimes rigid – regulator of the economic and social life but a consequent and security-offering morality and a 'helping hand' in fighting the difficulties of life. In this context, the object of the present work represents the existence of the Szekler village *tízes* as space-specific elements, the strength of the community which originates in it, and the diverse problems of the 21st century (connected to communities, culture, religion, population, economy, and politics). The last directive raises further actual questions. Why are the existing communities falling apart? Why are the Szeklers alienated? Why do they want to emigrate in great numbers? Why is the imitation of the other cultures and the aspiration to be different gaining more and more space? Where is the receptibility, predisposition to

the common good? Where is the common sense? Why does the man of today think that the world began with him, and it will end with him? Why are the generations in conflict with each other and why are they not connected to ensure the viability of the responsible community? Why are we not present where we should be present and where we are present, we are there without full commitment? Mainly, why can we not recognize that the strength of local communities can compensate, in our days as well, the central will and intimidation, which produce conflicts?

The present work contributes to the completion of the already uncovered pieces of knowledge: it is the interpretation, on the level of the entire community, of the space and the community. This interpretation was born within the cultural landscape examination of Szeklerland, in the field of historical geography, as part of a larger research. Actually, while I am putting the Szekler village *tízes* on the balance of the organically developing models which grow from the base, I am trying to prove, rethink, and preserve in the 21st century and draw the attention to the value-bearing character and complexity of a space and age spirit and paradigm. It is of utmost importance to get to know and let other people know the systems of relations which formed the Szekler society, which had a specific structure, a separate jurisdiction and distribution of tasks, and which worked, in many cases, with a quite wide autonomy. As a conclusion, I can summarize – using the cause and effect logic – the main purposes of the research focused on the value-bearing character of the *tízes* in the following points:

– to prove that:
  – we can form an accurate image of the history of a group of people not only through certified data, records, and artefacts of archaeological excavations but the whole picture must also be revealed through the perspective and in the context of the community and the system,
  – the world of the *tízes* organized and developed an order which constituted the basis of the relationship between people and the development of the smaller–larger communities,
  – there is a *genius loci* in the world of the *tízes* – the spirit of the place, the atmosphere –, which constitutes the basis of thinking and action,
  – the self-preservation in the different periods of life is the result of a different learning process,
  – the future of a given territory is ensured by the community strength of those who live in it;

– to contribute to making people and communities aware of the spiritual and material values of the Szekler organization of communities and thus to their subsistence;

– to give the opportunity to the young generations to get to know the system perspective of their ancestors and the present of their *tízes* heritage, which stretches towards the future;

– to contribute to the reinterpretation, in the 21st century, of the value awareness, according to which the strength of the real community strengthens a person in his/her essence;

– to make people aware of the fact that the life of a person living in a real community is made richer by the very fact that s/he lives in a community;

– to make people aware of the fact that smaller communities can do more for each other;

– to suggest that going back to the value-bearing norms of the *tízes* does not mean a regression;

– to contribute, as some sort of auxiliary or background science, to the complex work of settlement development or leading an institution;

– the leaders of different settlements or institutions (administrative, cultural, or ecclesiastic) should realize that there lies an enormous strength in the real communities, but it takes a hard and consequent work to establish these communities, keep them alive, and ensure their healthy functioning;

– the Hungarian population of the Carpathian Basin as well as the whole Europe can recognize (in the political situation caused by migration on the eve of the 21st century) the continuity in the life of the Christian communities, pluralism, the importance of togetherness and social diversity.

With this study, using my own methods and means, I am trying to strengthen our self-knowledge, which constantly requires growth, our sense of where we belong, our faith, and indirectly our sense of identity because these make communities really successful.

2. Research Methodology

In order to be able to analyse and evaluate the processes and phenomena which are deeply embedded in the Hungarian historical sciences but which have not received the well-deserved attention yet, on the basis of information taken from the largest circle possible and the principle of triangulation (Babbie 2000), we applied several – primary and secondary – methods.

During the primary research, I used mental mapping and the connected questionnaire survey from the quantitative and qualitative information gathering methods, which are actually based on the common research of geographers and psychologists: psychologists offer the research methods, while geographers bring the geographical topic. The procedure colligates the cognitive and spiritual abilities which allow us to gather information from the spatial environment and to analyse and interpret the processes which have led to the formation of the spatial attitude (Downs 1970 qtd by Cséfalvay 1989, Lakotár 2006: 7–13, Gál 2006: 201–210). The work carried out so far proves that, by applying these procedures, historical

sciences (in this case, historical geography and history) can integrate the results of other sciences (anthropology, economy, social psychology, sociology, etc.).

Through the observation on the field and the interviews made with the locals, I searched connections between the real facts. I visited the old people who were raised mostly in the *tízes* culture. I asked questions related to the existing and supposed system of the settlement parts with a historical and diachronic purpose. I used the received data to interpret and evaluate the geographical space.

The secondary research involved the investigation and processing of the historical, ethnological, and linguistic specialized writings of Szeklerland (mentioned above). The source material was the first and most important methodological tool for me as this exposed the interpretation problems of the notion, the formation, and the development of the *tízes.* I completed the investigation of the specialized literature with the investigation of maps and the examination of the village morphology.

3. Research Results

According to the methods I used, I present the results and evaluations of the complex cultural landscape examination, which was performed within historical geography, grouped in four categories, from six perspectives:
   – the review of the subject basis of the research:
        – the meaning of the *tízes* lexeme,
        – the historical background of the Szekler *tízes*;
   – the village *tízes* in the focus of settlement geography:
        – when the *tízes*, the *szeg* give value to the region;
   – the village *tízes* reflected by mental maps:
        – the methodology of empirical research,
        – the analysis and evaluation of the data of the mental maps referring to space; the way the interviewed see their village;
   – when the given space and time gives the opportunity to recognize the strength of the community:
        – the inner organization of the *tízes* and the *szeg.*

4. Discussion

4.1. The Review of the Subject Basis of the Research

4.1.1. The Meaning of the Tízes Lexeme

When we want to define *tízes* as a common noun, we have more possibilities. In Szekler dialect, it means part of a village, but it does not only refer to the place where the given part of the village lies, but it involves the objects, processes, and phenomena which are connected to this place. The *tízes* as a concept of settlement geography can be interpreted as the smallest unit or the administrative unit of the organization of the Szekler society. Moreover, it can also be defined as a basic unit of the organization of the community and economy.

The words *szeg* and *szer* can be considered its synonyms. There is a method (*szer*) in organizing the order (*rend* = order, *szer* = method, *rendszer* = system), in healing (*gyógy* = healing, *gyógyszer* = medicine). The prefixes *al-* (lower), *fel-* (upper), and *közép-* (middle) reflect the spatial relations. They reflect the way the individual uses the space. If the surface rises, then he uses *fel-* (up, upper), if it descends, then the given part of the settlement is given the prefix *al-* (down, lower). The area situated between these two is evidently called *Középtíz/ Középszeg* (the *tízes,* the *szeg* situated in the middle).

In time, new forms of denomination have appeared. The names given according to different families, nationalities (*Cigónia-*, *Olászer* – the *szer* populated by people of Gypsy and Romanian origin), leading families (Ambrusok szege: the *szeg* of the Ambrus, Sándor szeg: the *szeg* of the Sándor), nicknames (Gyehenna: the *szer* of Gehenna, Izraeliták szere: the *szer* of the Israelites), humour (Poklonfalva: the *szer* of Hell, Bolha szer: the *szer* of Fleas, Pottyond: the *szer* of Flop), trades (Bíró szeg: the *szeg* of the Judge, Pap szeg: the *szeg* of the Priest, Kovács szeg: the *szeg* of the Blacksmith), physical characteristics and qualities (Sánta szer: the *szeg* of the Limping, Szőke szer: the *szer* of the Blond), or natural characteristics (Rezalja: Under the Copper, Vízeleje: the *szeg* of the Well-Spring, Vízmejéke: the *szeg* of the Waterfront, Tószer: the *szeg* of the Lake, Felfalu: the *szeg* of the Upper Village, Oltelve: the *szeg* of the Olt River, Kotormány: the *szeg* of the Pile). There are also parts of villages named with Arab numbers (Három tízes: the *tízes* Three; Első, Második tízes: The First and Second *tízes*) or Roman numbers (Ditró: I–VI. Tízes: the *Tízes* I-VI) and parts of villages which have an inexplicable name, of unclear origin (Csáburdé, Doboly, Bakmáj, Bedecs, etc.).

These geographical names were not created by science or politics. People perceived, in the given cases, the variety of types of relief, the division according to different families and nationalities or the characteristics of the landscape based on their humour and gave the names of the parts of villages accordingly.

The linguists believe that we can find false *tízes* names and the proliferation of *tízes* names in the above-mentioned nomenclature (Csomortáni 1997: 344–350).

4.1.2. The Historical Background of the Szekler Village *Tízes*

When we make inquiries about the topic of the *tízes*, we encounter three universal questions: where, how, and when.

We can answer the most easily and shortly to the question of *where*. Although the *tízes* were born in the space structure of Szeklerland, there are some other settlements in the Carpathian Basin (for example, Kolozsvár, Eger, Debrecen, Szombathely, Sopron, etc.) where the local people formed their own spatial and territorial division, inner administration, and social organization based on the decimal system. These were called *tized* (Bárth 2007, Petercsák 2016). However, in the course of history, the *tized* division started to fade, and the quarter division started to prevail. In the regions of the Carpathian Basin where the *gyepű* were formed, in many places, the traces of this specific settlement structure – which was suitable for the military technique of the age – may be detected. In his works, Györffy (1973: 57–64, 1990: 5–43, 1995: 37–41) emphasizes that the *tízes* organization counts as an ancient oriental lowland plain institution, which was preserved by the military order. King Saint Stephen renewed and expanded it probably because he recognized the fact that the *tízes* form of organization was not unknown in the Christian European states either. Thus, in the age of the establishment of the Hungarian state, the organization in *tízes* and százas (in units of one hundred) was compatible with the organizational traditions in units of ten and one hundred of the European states, which were built on the ashes of the Roman Empire. That is why traces of division in *tízes* and *tized* could be found by Györffy (1926) in Hajdúböszörmény and Hajdúszoboszló, by Milleker (1939: 4–9) in Kecskemét, by Zoltai (1939) in Debrecen, by Csizmadia (1942, 1983) in the cities beyond the Danube (Győr, Szombathely, Kőszeg), by K. Kós (1979: 471–478) in Szék, and by Bárth (1984, 1986, 2002, 2007) in Kecel, Kalocsa, Gyulafehérvár, and Kolozsvár. In addition, the *tized* also had a role in the administration of settlements which were formed in the 18th and 19th centuries. Thus, the question is given: if there was such a system within the Carpathian Basin, if they realized the pragmatism, the viability, the value-bearing character of the organization in *tízes*, the strength of the community and the role of the laws and organizing principles, which were formulated by the given communities, in the relationship between people and nature and between each other, then what role did the Szekler *tízes* have in it as a viable, model-like settlement organization?

We are still answering the question of *where* when we look closely at the spatial structure of the inter-Carpathian basins in Szeklerland, and we find out that today's villages which were formed from the *tízes*, *szeg,* and *szer* are mainly

situated on the edge of the basins and on the sole of the valleys, that is to say, where the streams enter the basin. This could not have happened differently in the 13th century either. They had to settle down on the edge of the inter-Carpathian basins, where the rivers Olt, Maros, and Küküllő and their tributaries exited the valley, in order to dissolve the contrast between free view and hiding, while they had to find food as well – so, the natural endowments had to be optimal. This starting point is also valid if we examine the *tízes* from the perspective of the interaction of the natural endowments and social functions (the protection of the borders, farming, and the organization of communities). Living in the age when Europe abandoned its Christianity, we have to place our conceptual definitions on the subject basis provided by the historical past and the headway of viability.

When answering the question of *how*, we have to take into consideration two organizing principles, the natural endowments and the historical reality, because our ancestors developed their settlements and today's settlement parts according to the necessary defence dictated by the conquest of the land and the natural endowments.

It is well-known that the conquest of the country began at the end of the 9th century. The conquering Hungarians settled in the compact regions of the Carpathian Basin, which lay out of the sphere of the great powers of the age and did not belong to any unitary state. After the settlement in the newly conquered regions, the Hungarians who arrived in the Carpathian Basin built their system of defence, which had different strategical concepts based on *gyepűk/gyepűkapuk* ('vulnerable' points) and *gyepűelve* (natural defence line) based on the variety of forms of relief, their morphological elements, and their natural borders. The starting point of the organization of both the strategy and the tactics was the existence of the natural-geographical conditions in the given geographical space. They realized that the defence of the territory had to be in perfect harmony with the natural endowments because these defined the practical or impractical character of the artificial system of defence. Thus, the natural line of defence provided by the Carpathians had a prominent role in the elaboration of the defence strategy. On the plains, the wetlands and the swamps, while on the mountainous regions the various morphological forms (mountains, valleys, and narrows) provided the opportunity for military use.

The reliable community and organization of the Szeklers, which had a very important military role at the time, could have made Prince Árpád sign the treaty of adherence (Egyed 1997: 358–367, 2009, 2016: 348–369). A compact landscape is given; there is a reliable group of people who were born to be soldiers and who could handle weapons well. Thus, the quarters of the Szeklers were placed on the most endangered edges of the land in order to protect the newly conquered territory; they were settled in the most vulnerable points. They received the task of guardians. With the pact made at the moment of the adherence, the Szeklers could skip the phase of servitude. The tax of the Szeklers was paid with guarding and fighting.

As the front of the conquerors was oriented towards the West, they developed the first guardian settlements at the western, northern, and south-western vulnerable gates. They fortified the hills following the valleys (Danube, Pinka, Zala, Kerka, and Drau rivers) with gradually advanced outposts along all their lengths. Two significant guardian settlements were formed at the westernmost border: the first one in the micro-region which belongs to the Szalai Gate and the valley of the middle part of the Kerka (Lower-*Őrség*; *Őrség* – guardian settlements), while the second one in the valley of the Pinka (Upper-*Őrség*). Further two groups defended the Mosoni Gate in the north-west and the line of the Drau in the south-west (*Figure 1*).

In the 21st century, the attacks of the eastern nomadic peoples (the Cumanians and the Pechenegs) became more and more frequent; so, some Szeklers were settled down at the western part of historical Transylvania and later in South-Transylvania to protect the southern borderline. The people who assumed the defence reached their final territory of settlement, today's Szeklerland, starting from the middle of the 12th century (Köpeczi 1993, Kánya 2003: 27–65, Bereznay 2011: 77–83) (*Figure 1*). This historical event explains the fact that we can find the specific settlement structure, morphology, and settlement names of the western border region (Őrség, Göcsej) in the easternmost *gyepű* gate, which is Szeklerland (Ambrus–Csapó 2007: 43–49).

Source: Kánya 2003: 28, ed. by Ambrus 2010: 37

Figure 1. *The scheme of the Szeklers' settlement in the Carpathian Basin*

They did not need to build a continuous, artificially fortified defence line towards the mountains like at the western borders. There they obstructed the paths to the valleys, and they formed observation posts and lurking-places in the region of the sources (Fodor 1936: 113–144). Therefore, the military task took priority when they settled down or located the Szeklers. They had to form the settlements in unity but grouped in space. They had to adapt to nature, by all means, when they planned their future. They realized that the perfect source of wisdom is nature itself. Nature implicitly dictated the order, but it needed a wise organizer.

Presumably, they settled down (or located) in the form required by the military lifestyle, the smallest military unit, the *tízes*, and later they defined their own direction of development as they were looking for higher dimensions of their existence (economic, religious, and cultural). During the centuries, the organic system of the *tízes/szeg* defined the lifestyle and life quality of the inhabitants of the settlements. The *tízes/szeg* acted as an integrative power – it organically unified its inhabitants on the level of the community. This little autonomous form of organization became the bearer of rights and responsibilities.

The answer to the question of *when* is much more difficult to give. Today, it is still difficult to give an exact answer to that question in the absence of certified historical data, which could be our source. That is probably why since the last century until our days several historical and ethnological specialized works just mention the *tízes* when they write about the Szeklers. However, the researchers must have felt the weight of it falling into oblivion.

Most of the famous specialists (Orbán 1869–1871; Szabó–Szádeczky 1895, 1927: 7–252; Szádeczky 1927: 286–293, 1915: 4–6, 17–20, 1902: 24–47; Bartalis 1933: 6–8, 124–158; Kring 1934; Endes 1938: 5–238; Milleker 1939: 4–9; László–László 2005: 128–137; Benkő 1853; Bierbauer 1942, 1986; Györffy 1973: 57–64, 1990: 5–43, 1995: 37–41; Imreh 1973, 1983: 7–271; Tarisznyás 1982: 5–87; Garda 1994: 3–98, 2001, 2002; Köpeczi 1993; Vámszer 1977, 2000; Zayzon 1997: 1–5; Kállay 1829; Egyed 1981: 191–244, 1999: 5–58, 1997: 358–367, 2009, 2016: 348–69) connect the *tízes* to the remnants of the military organization from the age of the settlement of the Hungarians. They interpret the development of the later social and economic *tízes* structures as a system. However, ethnologist János Bárth changes the direction set by the work of the above-mentioned researchers, and he is backed up in his views by the archaeologist of Szeklerland (Botár 2009). They create a new horizon as far as the genesis of the *tízes* is concerned. János Bárth refers to the absence of the oldest written relics when he affirms that it was not the accommodation to the military organization that created the *tízes* but the practicality and need of organizing the growing community in the 17th century, which was revived and kept alive by the power structures in the modern age.

According to my point of view as a settlement geographer, the formation and development of the settlements reflect the occupation of the inhabitants (in this

case, defence); so, the military duties took priority in the age of the settlement (resettlement) of the Szeklers. As a conclusion, the existence of the military organization of the Szekler *tízes* cannot be overlooked if we search the conditions of the formation of the settlements.

> Moreover, it would be strange now, in the 21ˢᵗ century, to see that the people who assumed the duty of protecting the borders, who preserved the best their spatial [sic!] and territorial division, inner administration, social organization and archaic language organized according to the Hungarian grammatical structures, could change them where there was no need for it because it was not required by the rational peasant mind or the 'high demographic increase' (Ambrus 2012: 247)

Although the birth rate was relatively high, the deaths, the epidemics, the Tartar and Turkish invasions considerably decimated the population. I think that there was not a bigger need for organization in the later centuries of the Middle-Ages than in the time when the attacks of eastern nomadic people had to be parried. At the same time, I support those thinkers who believe that we cannot draw an accurate historical picture only on the basis of written data.

4.2. The Szekler Village *Tízes* in the Focus of Settlement Geography

The settlement is the object of many sciences (geography, sociology, ethnology, anthropology, demography, statistics, law, administration, etc.), but it is not uncommon in the everyday language usage either. The representatives of these sciences are trying to embed it in their own conceptual toolbar and find principles until the phenomena and processes examined by the given discipline become predominant and the aspects of the given science dictate the essence of the definition. At the junction of these sciences, the settlement can be regarded as the 'nucleus of the whole society' (Tóth 1998: 389–393). These nuclei are situated very far from each other, others partly or entirely fuse, but apart from the given distance – provided that the outer powers cannot loosen them – the togetherness, the sense of identity or otherness are obvious. According to the classic phrasing of Tibor Mendöl, the settlement is a spatial unity of the dwelling and working place of a group of people (Mendöl 1963: 12–31). Of course, we understand that the definition is out-of-date at the point that we cannot speak about the unity of the dwelling and working place in many cases today. The spatial function ceases to exist at the moment when these two functions are performed in different settlements. Recognizing the untenable nature of the definition of Mendöl, the revision was successfully carried out by Pál Beluszki and József Tóth (Beluszki 1995: 12–36, Tóth 1998: 389–393); namely, Pál Beluszki speaks about the functional unity instead of the spatial unity.

In today's geography, the concept of geographical space has become a systematizing, synthetizing category of the natural environment and the society. In order to perform the theoretical construction, we have to use the factors which define the space as tools of the analysis. We can use the tetrahedron-model (*Figure 2*) conceived by József Tóth as a guideline in the interpretation of the geographical space. This model pictures well the complex character of space.

ABC$_\Delta$ – natural sphere
ABD$_\Delta$ – social sphere
BCD$_\Delta$ – economic sphere
ACD$_\Delta$ – infrastructural sphere

Source: Tóth 1998: 389–393

Figure 2. *The tetrahedron model of the settlement*

The tetrahedron model helps us to look at (or transmit) space as the cooperating system of social, economic, infrastructural, and natural spheres, as each sphere interacts with the other three along the edges. That is to say, the tetrahedron model is expressive also because the alteration in the weight of a factor from inside the system also affects the weight of the other three factors. Thus, it expresses the interdependence of the enumerated four factors (nature, society, economy, and infrastructure) and the fact that if there is an intervention, the geographical space reacts systematically. For example, when a settlement is depopulated, this alteration appears immediately in the economic and infrastructural sphere, but nature also dictates another order.

4.2.1. When the Tízes and the Szeg Add Value to the Landscape

The landscape as a functional system involves the settlement. The settlement is an organic system, a specific ecosystem which combines the characteristics of the natural systems (geological, meteorological, hydrological, botanical, pedological, and the relief) with the characteristics of the human systems (social, economic, and technological). The material and proportion of the artificial and

living elements differentiate the settlements from each other and from the natural systems (Hajnal 2006, 2010). With the help of the tetrahedron model referring to settlements as conceived by József Tóth – being aware of the changed historical background –, I consider that the *tízes* and the *szeg* are today cultural formations of capital where the social, economic, and technological spheres, which play part in the structure of the space, constitute an organic part of the culture, but their physical foundations and the conditions of development are defined by the natural environment and its resources.

At the beginning of the 21st century, when we want to define the ancient, specific structure and spatial organization of the villages of Szeklerland as geographers, as researchers, we find out that it is an impossible endeavour. On the one hand, methodological descriptions were not made and mapping work has not been done for many centuries or has not survived because of the vicissitudes of history. On the other hand, the social and technological structures of the last century/centuries (infrastructural development) and the consequences of the demographic growth reorganized the spatial expansion of the once separate villages, *tízes* and *szeg*. In most of the settlements, the *tízes* and the *szeg* have partly or completely coalesced by now. However, there is a standing-ground because we recognize in the space, in a smaller proportion, the net of the remote, separate village parts, which remind us of their original state. These relics represent the decisive phases of the genesis of the landscape and define the basic structure of the space even in our days. They reflect the process of the formation, the development, the coalescence and the organization into an autonomous settlement of the village *tízes* and *szeg*. They deserve to be taken into consideration with regard to the whole society.

We can mention the *tízes* of Csíkmindszent and Csíkszentlélek (*Figure 3*), which were formed through deforestation as typical examples of the spatial conservation of the *tízes*. The two settlements of today attest the traces of the archaic settlement order, the historical process which occurred in the structure of the space and the formation of the landscape. They settled down in the space in unity although separated in space, in groups belonging to different families.

The separate *tízes* of Csíkmindszent and Csíkszentlélek are territorial forms of specific units, which organize the society in our days as well. If we study them, we can understand, to a great extent, the formation of the settlement network, settlement structure, and settlement morphology of Szeklerland. The *tízes* are situated 100–500 metres from each other and are composed of 20–80 houses or families. They probably had a looser structure in the past, but the fathers split a building plot to their sons from their own parcels. The parts of the settlement are separated from each other as little villages (*Figure 3*). This dispersion makes the locals jocularly say: Mindszent (All Saints) – 'there everybody/everything is saint here and there'.

Source: Rákossy 2005: 10–11; based on the illustrated county atlas – 2005, ed. by Ambrus, 2012
Figure 3. *The tízes of Csíkmindszent és Csíkszentlélek today*

In our days, out of the ten *tízes* of Csíkmindszent, three *tízes* (*Prédák*, *Templom*, and *Józsa*) have coalesced (*Figure 3*). Since the end of the 19th century, since the driveway was built on the slopes of the hills, the inhabitants of the *tízes* have been building their houses along the new road. We can find this tendency primarily in the *tízes* of *Nagy*, *Józsa*, *Templom*, *Kisboroszló*, and *Fitód*. Every *tízes* is composed of a few streets.

If we look at these relics with the imagination of a vivid settlement researcher, it is not difficult to recognize that the order of the settlement was grouped in administrative units, according to the needs and requirements of the later ages. That is to say, the *tízes*, which are actually separate in space even in our days, are enumerated along with the closest settlement parts in spite of the fact that they were separately working, viable social formations themselves.

The adverse natural conditions (the bad quality of the plough-land, its limited expansion, the lack of rivers or streams, and isolation) caused the slow growth and the conservation in a more primitive stage of the village *tízes* and *szeg*, or, in some cases, the depopulation, the atrophy, or disappearance of certain village parts. On the other hand, the favourable conditions (the opportunity for economic and infrastructural development or demographic growth) resulted in

spatial growth, expansion, or coalescence (*Figure 4*). The village parts which were articulated with plough-land, pasture-land, and mountains formed a unitary settlement block, and the distance between them diminished with the growth of the built-up area. The village types of various morphology, with an organization by *tízes*, *szeg* or *szer*, were formed according to the endowments of the space (*Figure 4*). Endes (1938: 5–238) sums up this specific phase of the settlement-historical development as follows: 'The *tízes* became villages in time and the *tízes* became their *tízes*...'

Source: Rákossy 2005: 10–11; based on the illustrated county atlas – 2005, ed. by Ambrus, 2010

Figure 4. *Partly or completely coalesced settlement parts in Csíkszentdomokos, Kászonok, Csíkszentgyörgy, Csíkszentmárton, Csíkszentmiklós, and Csíkdánfalva*

4.3. The Village Tízes Reflected by Mental Maps

4.3.1. The Purpose and Methodology of the Empirical Research

The present empirical research focuses on finding out how stable the Szekler village *tízes*, the Szekler *tízes* community proved to be despite the gradual changes in the different juridical institutions, which were dictated by history, and to what extent the unique 'solutions' of history – the settlement parts of today – are reflected in people's minds (Cséfalvay 1990: 145–165). I performed the survey in the villages of Csíkszék and Kászonszék – 11 villages in total.

When I formulated the hypotheses, I relied on the historical specialized literature of the chosen topic and on the structural interviews conducted on the field. Thus, as a thinker who assumes functionality, I formulated the hypotheses in a way that makes the verification of my conceptions referring to the characteristics of the local society possible.

The starting hypotheses of the mental mapping are:

– the essence of the *tízes* and the *szeg* have not disappeared in the conscience of the inhabitants of the examined settlements;

– the inhabitants possess an accurate knowledge of the places, they are familiar with the geographical position of the *tízes*, and they can accurately name them;

 – they are familiar with the multitude of daily used cross-roads;

 – the sacral relics and buildings, which bear the religious messages expressing the spatial possession of the *tízes*, are very important to them;

 – the ancient centres (junctions) of the *tízes* fell into oblivion;

– their maps certify the specific organization of the village of today, which was formed from the *tízes*;

– it can serve locality, togetherness and can make the sense of identity stronger.

The list of tasks connected to mental mapping is composed of two parts: the actual mapping and complementary questions. In the case of the actual mapping, the interviewed people had to draw the map of their village in a blank 17 x 16 cm square from memory, without using any tools. The complementary questions focused on references of content, which contributed to the continuity of the 'discussion' and, through their controlling role, to the exploration of consciousness and the gathering of conscious elements.

The knowledge connected to space (the processing of placement, shape, extension, rupture lines, and borders) was carried out essentially in the head, with the help of the first military survey (1769–1773) as well as the collation of the maps received from the Rákossy (2005: 10–11) Illustrated County atlas and the National Cadastral and Real Estate Registration Agency (Agenția Națională de Cadastru și Publicitate Imobiliară). I did not use any computer programs because these are not as flexible in the redaction as the processing of the mental maps would require. The data which could be processed with traditional statistical procedures were processed with the SPSS 7.5 for Windows computer program.

When I analysed the information-bearers referring to space, it was important to take into account the fact that the mapping work relies on measurable data which refer to space and which are considered to be objective while the graphical editor of the mental map relies on its perception of the space. In this study, I present the received results through the example of seven mental maps (*figures 5–6*).

4.3.2. The Way the Interviewed People See Their Village. The Analysis and Evaluation of the Data Referring to the Space of the Mental Maps

On the one hand, for the individuals, the space has a symbolic significance which frames and defines the mentality, faith, and behaviour of the locals, the all-time functioning of the community, the rules of access to the resources. On the other hand, it strengthens their sense of belonging, which constantly needs to be augmented, their self-knowledge, and, indirectly, their sense of identity, the basis of which is historical reality. An adequate behaviour and mentality as well as a specific lifestyle which suits the natural and social structures is connected to this reality, the conscious reminiscences of which are carried in their way of thinking. This principle is certified by the results of the mental mapping which was performed among the local inhabitants.

During the analysis of the mental maps, I realized that the placement, shape, extension, and proportion of the mental spaces rarely correspond with the specialized cartographic work (*Figure 5*). Everybody has a mental map onto which the spaces of the everyday activities are carved and which contains detailed (familiar) and blurred places reflected by the level of elaboration of the images because living in a space can redraw the physical characteristics and the real image of the given place. So the distortions are not the results of some unintentional mistakes, but they reflect the way the individual uses the space.

*Source: ed. by Ambrus, 2010 – based on the survey carried out among the local inhabitants*

Figure 5. *The way the inhabitants of Csíkmindszent, Kászon, and Csíkszentmiklós see their village*

On the basis of the information-bearers of the above presented three mental maps, we can state that Szeklerland, with its space-forming elements, can be classified in the group of regions with a high level of uniqueness, as they represent well the phases of development of the *tízes* (conservation, partial coalescence, complete

coalescence), and they still leave their mark on the basic structure of the region as well as the knowledge and view of space of the people. So, the essence of the *tízes* did not disappear in the group of the inhabitants of the examined settlements. The three drawings represent the mental maps of three old inhabitants, and they reflect well the division in *tízes*. We can state that the *tízes* communities define the structure, morphology, and organization of the settlements. They have a defining role in the settlement parts, the routes, and the neighbourhood relations. It is remarkable that the inhabitants separate *tízes* and *szeg* with clear lines, even in places where they have already coalesced, signalling and documenting their sense of identity belonging to different *tízes* (*Figure 5*).

An important element of the samples is the stream (*Figure 5*). On 40% of the drawings, we can 'read' the watercourses which cross the village. This proves that water is a significant settlement-organizing element in the conscience of the interviewed people as there is no life without water. It is well-known that the eastern Szeklers always tried to build their houses and stay close to the indispensable watercourse because of the characteristics of the relief.

The religious objects on the field have an important role in the conscience of the authors of these maps as the representations of the symbols of the sacral relics (crosses, crucifixes) get a prominent place, often at the centre of the *tízes* (*Figure 5*). These crosses, or, as the locals call them, crucifixes, can be regarded as the symbols of the possession of a community over the space. The nodes, or centres are situated at the point where more roads meet and the unbuilt space widens. They can be identified on several drawings. As the *tízes* and the *szeg* have already coalesced, nowadays, people do not use the nodes as centres, but they just travel, walk across them. That is why they can be outlined with more difficulty, they can only be defined as the intersections of roads. However, the field objects (wooden crosses) signal that they represent important mental spaces to them.

Source: ed. by Ambrus 2015 – based on the mental maps of the survey with questionnaires

Figure 6. *The way the newly-settled inhabitants of Csíkszentlélek and Csíkmindszent see their home settlement*

The specialized literature connected to mental maps (Lynch 1979: 537–558; Cséfalvai 1990, 1994, 1989; Letenyei 2006: 147–185; Lokatár 2006: 147–185) agrees on the fact that a geographical space becomes cognitive in the moment when it gets a name. We can think about a given space only by referring to the name of the mental space. The research certifies with data the fact that the names of the *tízes* and the streets have a much more determining role in forming the maps 'living in the heads' for those people who have roots in the settlement than for those who have recently moved there, mostly from Csíkszereda (*figures 5–6*).

The drawings of the newly-settled are much more modest (*Figure 6*). 28.57% of the interviewed did not even make a drawing. Very frequently, the streets appear without names (*Figure 6*). The lines are unclear, they often make corrections and use searching lines. The contour of the *tízes* appears on none of the drawings, although this could represent the starting point (*Figure 6*). The so-called 'my own house' strongly emerges from the elements of the iconic maps with a considerable size, at the centre and highlighted. It is remarkable that the participants in the survey illustrate only the village part or fragments of the village part where they live. We can read from these drawings the representation, the introduction as an attraction (*Figure 6*). The analyst may have the feeling that these authors think that Csíkszentlélek, on a smaller scale, and the whole world, on a larger scale, began with them.

It cannot be incidental that the village part that was formed in the last two decades as the consequence of disurbanization is not called, by analogy, New *tízes* but 'New quarter' (*Figure 6*). This fact leads us to the world of negative prejudice.

4.4. When the Given Space or Time Offers the Opportunity to Recognize the Strength of the Community

The *tízes* and the *szeg* stand apart from the other settlements of the Carpathian Basin and beyond not only through their structure, morphology, landscape-forming power, historicity, and nomenclature but also through the fact that their inhabitants recognized the strength of the community, which was necessary for the efficient defence and the possibility for a later inner social-economic-cultural organization.

It is possible that the presence of the Szeklers in the Carpathian Basin has to be divided into two parts: before the need for defence and after it. Assuming the defence of the border meant an opportunity for them, as well, to survive, they had to realize at that very moment, in that specific location that strategy based on systems of the Hungarian kings was not just an opportunity but also an occasion for creating their own home and changing their lifestyle they had led until then. After the settlement of the Hungarians in their homeland, the Szekler mission

itself, the defence of the borders 'placed these people on their places'. In case of emergencies, they had to be more 'creative' and stick together. Those who did not stick together were doomed. Those who did not pay attention and were not receptive had to learn at their own expense. They had to figure out on their own what they had to do. If there had been no order until then, assuming the duty of defence made them create order, they had to see help or, in today's expression, partner in the fellow-being within the community. The alliance of every person was sacred. They had to stick together to be able to organize; otherwise, the enemy would have swept them away. They knew that it would be a sign of weakness if they had not performed the assumed duties assigned to them.

The reassuring strength was born within the community. The thoughts, the words, and the actions had to be in harmony. They realized that they are responsible for their fellow-beings. Thus, they arrived at the necessity of the process and phenomenon of 'collective soldiering' (Egyed 1997: 358–366, 2016: 348–369), which meant a burden at the level of both the community and the individuals. In the course of the defence, they learned that they could not turn back life, they had to pay attention to each other and to what and how they acted. They had to draw conclusions from their own successes or failures. The roots of crisis could always be found in a mistake in thinking, in mentality. The mentality which was based on the community, the perseverance, and the faith made them capable of recovering from the difficulties of defence.

Although the word 'community' has a bad status in our days because its real meaning and its practical usage got separated in the political development of the recent past and became a false tool taken from the property-room of an already disappeared world, the concept was preserved to express the once existing but still desired human relationship. I call 'community' the human coexistence whose norms are formed and applied by the community itself and where the interest, the system of values, and the conscience are common. We can regard a given group of human existence as a real community if several of the enumerated factors predominate there, and they are present in the life of the individual with as great an intensity as possible.

They recognized the essence of the strength of the community later, on which they based their economy, their religious and cultural life, even their law-making system, the respect of the law and the punishment of the malfeasance (of course, they would not have been real Szeklers if there had been no arguments, malfeasances, or even lawsuits). The inhabitants of the Szekler village *tízes* and *szeg* weathered the storm formed around the defensive duty and transformed it into a protecting, economic, spiritual, and mental system of values and into nourishment. That is to say, the community of the *tízes* transferred the strength of the community and the efficiency in organization, which was the creation of the military technique, to the fields of cultural and economic life and faith. As

a result, the organization of the defence, the need for discipline, regulation, and subsistence created social, economic, and cultural communities, organizational units. They had enough faith, perseverance, and diligence to recover from any bad event that happened to them.

They were convinced that the order always had a method (*szer*) of being applied, and the order, the organization always led to tranquillity, imperturbation, and peace. They did not study personalistic philosophy, but they interpreted the person not in itself but through his relations with other people. They were aware of the personal pronouns (I, you, he, she, we, you, and they) and the relationship between them. They were not preoccupied with how something could not be carried out. They did not look for excuses, they acted and worked, searched solutions, and created useful, beautiful, pleasant, and valuable things. If they tripped and fell, they could stand up. They organized their community life with elementary power. However, these communities were formed from within, as the results of an organic development. They were not regulated, controlled, midwifed, and nursed by executive bodies from the county, by Bucharest or Brussels, proving their superiority.

We have to realize that the strategies, projects, and applications created in the 21st century and this period loaded with chemicals and stimulants cannot replace the strength of the community. The crises and absurdities of today also originate in the faults in thinking and the alienation of the selfish individuals. The path that we have been walking on since the change of the political regime is very narrow, and there is an abyss on both of its sides. However, if we are optimistic, we can come to the reasonable conclusion that sinking is the price of rising.

It is easy to say now that, given the historical situation, the revelation, the alliance of the people, and the reasonable action, which, adapted to the given situation, were quite natural things, but they recognized the essence of this 'strength' also in the course of later difficulties and joys.

As a partial conclusion, we can state that thinking and acting in a community are the results of a learning process. The individual is born – in a normal case – in a family. The first learning mechanisms reach him there. However, the cousinship leads him towards a greater community, and this is completed with the local society and the natural residential community. I call these communities (family, relatives, *tízes*, and *szeg*) the learning scenes of the primary communities. But I consider that the religious, nursery school, and school communities also belong here. Ultimately, the human existence is continuously situated in a social field, but the individual's quality of life is significantly influenced by the first learning scenes of the primary communities.

4.4.1. The Inner Organization of the Tízes and the Szeg

The Szekler village *tízes* can be considered as remarkable scenes of the primary communities, where the receptive individual could lay the foundation of his basic human character and models. The communities thought and acted according to a long-term ethical process of subsistence. They kept in mind the point where this delicate balance could be realized. In these organizations of the communities, we can discover the vision of viability and the actual functions of the community: socialization, mutual support, economic prosperity, and social control. I will try to prove this with examples of community organizations listed in this chapter and explain it with community-forming factors.

The *tízes*, as a social unit, meant a group of households. Although it was divided into smaller groups by spheres related to economy, religion, cousinship, and proximity, it was mainly the *tízes* and the *szeg* that colligated the families, which were farming separately and had separate housekeeping and religious beliefs, into an organic organizational framework which functioned as a unit, as a community. New organizations were formed within the *tízes*, which appeared on the field of economic activities, culture, or practising religion. These community organizations which were based on the common interest, system of values, and conscience can be regarded as the common social capital of the Szeklers. They helped them survive and evolve.

The community organizations identified in the examined field, in the course of the empirical research, are presented in *Table 1*, grouped in five categories. The next subsection focuses only on the communities connected to getting water, as I wished to present the answers to the formulated questions and the findings in correspondence, according to the associative logic.

**Table 1.** *Community organizations in the examined settlements*

LN	Factors which influence the inner community organization	Community organizations
1.	Communities which are connected to the life-giving water	fountain communities
		spring communities
		livestock-watering communities
		water-conduit communities
		bridge communities
2.	Communities which are connected to practising religion	rosary associations
		church choir communities
		the community of wooden crosses or crucifixes of the *tízes*
		the community of tinklers and mass-houses

LN	Factors which influence the inner community organization	Community organizations
3.	Communities connected to culture (in the proper sense)	the community of customs and traditions connected to the turning-points in people's lives
		the community of dance groups
		architecture, as the common cause of the community
4.	Communities connected to farming	sheepfold associations
		commonage associations
		voluntary, cooperative work
		hemp-steeping communities
5.	Morphogenetic and surface-morphological cultural landscape elements, connected to economic structures as increments of the creativity of the community	the community of the *muzsda*
		the community of border mounds

Source: surveys performed in the period of 2006–2016; ed. by Ambrus, 2017

The inner organizations were not only formed but were maintained and kept alive with ethical rules from generation to generation, throughout the centuries. This fact made me wonder when I got to the supplementary list of questions connected to mental mapping: 'What formed and maintained the communities?'

The interviewed people consider that religion is a determining factor among the elements of content of the cognitive images connected to maintenance (86.2 % of the interviewed). The proportion of those who think that the economic life and the customs and traditions connected to the important moments in people's lives (birth, marriage, and death) contributed to the subsistence and development of the communities is over 20% (*Figure 7*).

Source: the supplementary questions connected to mental maps; ed. by Ambrus, 2016

Figure 7. *The factors that influenced the formation and subsistence of the communities*

4.4.2. The Community Organizations Connected to the Life-Giving and Life-Ensuring Water

Fountain Communities

The inhabitants of the *tízes* usually used stream-water for washing and watering the animals. The water needed for drinking and cooking was primarily provided by natural freshwater springs and dug fountains. As they did not dig fountains on the building plot of every house, the *tízes* fountain got the role of providing these people with water. A *tízes* fountain could gather a community of several families (10–20).

Most of the time, the *tízes* fountains were situated in the widened square, as the optimal access to it was an important aspect. The inhabitants of the *tízes* carried out the digging of the fountain, the installation of the fountain mechanism, and the related repair works with voluntary, cooperative, and common work (*kaláka*). The work in *kaláka* means helping work, which is primarily based on the regulation of the relations between the individual and the community. Several fountains were named after the families that lived around it (for example, in Csíkbánkfalva, the locals can recall the square of the fountain of the Sánta family, but the location of the fountain fell into oblivion).

Frequently, the fountain as a landmark gave the inspiration to the locals when they named the streets (for example, the *Kicsikút* – Little Fountain – street in Csíkszentdomokos). These spaces became the scenes of community formation and local social relations due to the presence of the fountains. They often announced the news in front of the fountains. This was the place where the children played, the young fell in love, the women gossiped and exchanged information, and the men discussed their everyday problems.

Note: 1., 3. – Csíkszentmiklós, 2. – Csíkszentgyörgy (photos by Erőss 2009)
Figure 8. *The 'tízes' fountains in the spatial structure of the settlements*

During the work on the field, I realized that the exploration of the old *tízes* fountains and fountain-community networks is impossible at the beginning of the 21st century. We can only make deductions from the nomenclature (*Kicsikút* Street) and the interviews with the elderly referring to the existence of the old *tízes* fountains and their spatial division. This is primarily due to the fact that the technological structures of the 20th century (infrastructural development) rearranged these inherited relics and social self-organizations. The traditional *tízes* fountains lost their original function and their community-forming role. Naturally, there are settlements where people recognized the uniqueness and strength of these fountains. The local government, the commonage, or the descendants of the fountain communities restored them, and today the inhabitants of the given *tízes* maintain it together (*Figure 8*). The following adage is relevant here: we can build a larger building but not an older one. In this case: we can build a larger fountain but not an older one.

Well-Spring Communities

The springs, which spout their high-quality and cold mesothermal *borvíz* (naturally sparkling mineral water), which were located close to the inlot, and which were formed as a result of the early post-volcanic activities, played an important role in the everyday life of the inhabitants. The elderly reported 'miraculous recoveries' from rheumatic diseases (informants: Ambrus 2010, 2012, 2014; Both 2016; Bors 2008; Domokos 2016; Erőss 2014; Ferencz 2016; Kánya 2014; Sándor 2016).

The *borvíz* was available to the people only thanks to the *tízes* and the *szeg*, which maintained the order. They needed an outlet tool through which the *borvíz* could be drawn. The locals called this tool *küpü* (*Figure 9*). A fence was raised around the spring, and a path was carefully laid to it. Straying from the path raised ethical questions. It was not appropriate to tread down the plants of the hayfield.

Even in our days, there are *tízes* communities which, as a result of modernization, had the water of the mineral water springs laid at the centre of the *tízes* and equipped the final station of the running water with a fountain mechanism – for example, the community of Háromtízes, in Csíkszentgyörgy, along the Fiság Stream (*Figure 10*). Even today, the order-keeping *tízes* communities sometimes organize a *kaláka*, a voluntary, common work, to repair these relics. They even express their aesthetic need by decorating them with flowers.

Figure 9. *A 'küpü' on the mineral water spring – near Csíkszenttamás*

Figure 10. *A mineral water fountain in Háromtízes, Csíkszentgyörgy*

Livestock-Watering Communities

Other representative examples of thinking in a community are the drinking-troughs for animals (*Figure 11*). These were the products of livestock farming on the alpine pastures belonging to commonage associations on the territory of the forests situated along the alpine pastures or often on built-up areas. The drinking-troughs were built and maintained together. Consequently, the stock-watering communities are also worth keeping count of in the present inventory.


Photo by: Ambrus 2012

Figure 11. *Drinking-troughs on the territory of a commonage association*

Bridge Communities

In the case of the linearly developing *tízes*, along the rivers, the crossing on the streams situated in the inlot and the outer areas was ensured by planks or footbridges of different sizes, made of stone or wood. Due to the big burden and the ravages of the floods, they had to be constantly repaired. Their maintenance and servicing was the duty of the given *tízes*, and this work was most of the time performed in a *kaláka*, common work. We can also say that the society of the *tízes* which owned a bridge was divided into bridge communities. Ethnologist János Bárth reconstructed three bridge communities along the Fiság Stream (*Figure 12*).

In the past, bridge communities elected a bridge adjudicator. The elected bridge adjudicator took an oath, and he took over and directed the work. The farmer living near the bridge was often entrusted with the frequently appearing repairing tasks by the general meeting of the *tízes*. The diligent bridge repairer could expect a reward for his activities performed in the interest of the community. The inhabitants of the *tízes* and the *szeg* also helped each other. In need, they assisted the building of the crossings on the territory of the other *tízes* with wood or stone because their inhabitants and livestock also used them.

Source: based on Bárth 2007, ed. by Ambrus 2010

Figure 12. *The bridge communities of the 'tízes' of Jenőfalva, in Csíkszentgyörgy*

Water-Conduit Communities

At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries – according to the needs of the age –, some *tízes* formed water-conduit communities (for example, the *tízes* along the Fiság). This happened because there was an increasing need for running water, and frequently the local self-government, due to financial reasons, could not undertake the building of a water-conduit which could cover the *tízes*. That is why, the *tízes*, which recognized the advantages of the traditional community organization, tried to exploit the opportunities offered by nature on their own, 'behind the mayor's back' (Ex verbum: György 2007).

Water-conduit communities were formed in the place where there was somebody who organized the association, roped in the specialists, did the administrative work, purchased the necessary material, and mobilized the neighbours for the common work (*kaláka*). Those who entered the community declared the seriousness of their intention with their signature. During the work, the excavated, coated, and covered reservoirs were made. The water flew through a pipeline to the houses of the inhabitants which lived in that part of the village.

Some good examples of these communities are the water-conduit community of the Bor Stream, in the *tízes* of Jenőfalva, the water-conduit community of Hiászópataka, whose water-conduit system was built in the spring of 2005 (as an example of the reasonable traditional management but 'behind the mayor's back' because of economic-political reasons), the Sás Garden, belonging to the *tízes* of Három, and the water-conduit community which exploited the Monyasd Stream (2002). Based on the instructions given by the informants, (Kánya 2014, Kersztes 2014, Czikó 2014), two of my students went to the reservoirs and, following the lines of the water-conduit, charted the families that used the water of a given stream. Their schematic drawings appear on *Figure 13*.

Source: based on the work of Lívia Domokos 2014, ed. by Ambrus 2016

Figure 13. *The schematic drawings of the water-conduit communities of the Bor (a.), Hiászó (b.), and Monyasd, (c.) springs in Csíkszentgyörgy*

On the whole, we can state that the *tízes*, which was based on traditional rules, was formed as the sustainable combination of the structures of the entire local society, and it went along the phases and stages of farming and cultural life. It is not only the totality of individual goods and success, but it is more than that: it is the common orientation of proper thinking and the pragmatic series of

actions, the synergy of small communities. In these organizations, not only the initiative came from 'below', but the local people also recognized in them the complex process and effect of the organization of communities. They realized that they could not stop at the phase of the initiative. Thus, the efficiency of the economic prosperity led to the substantial essence of the inner control. Although we frequently assert the positive aspects of the development from below, the authorities of the county, the country, or the European Union still regulate, control, intimidate, and punish from above.

Postface

While Europe is striving to find its own unity among the future powers, beyond its cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity, a unity which is different from the subjection to the great corporations of selfish individuals, the *tízes*, makes us think about the message transmitted by a community whose unity comes from deep and is not based on a vision of identity but the revelation of the specific value which offers increment to the whole society. We can describe or prove the historicity of a compact space or community, interpreted from a natural or social point of view, not only with the help of written documents but also with the cooperating power of the given community, the wisdom with which it ripened and built its lifestyle, system of values, ethical norms, spiritual and material values as well as with the bearers of the genius loci. Thus, the 'income' of the population of Szeklerland does not exclusively originate from economic sectors (for example, the production of food and industrial raw material), projects, applications, and chemicals but also from performing the public, cultural, and religious duties.

The beginning of the 21st century confirms in traces the strength of the communities, the presence of the norms of the well-ripened culture, and the otherness. Perhaps, after a few decades, we will realize that the survey was carried out just in time. There were still people to be interviewed as the results still confirm the strength of the communities and their norms, the spirit of the place, and the presence of this well-ripened folk culture. Perhaps, we will have to admit that the so indispensable real communities will not be brought back by any projects, strategies, applications, or chemicals neither by Brussels nor by Bucharest. It is possible that, with the tendencies of globalization gathering ground, a confused and disconcerted system of values or conscience of norms will lead to inorganization and, ultimately, to the disintegration of the whole healthy social system. I have mentioned only the spirit of the place so far, but it is closely connected to the spirit of the age, which expresses the relations of the given age with life, the laws of the world, and the human beings. The spirit of every age is deposited, it leaves a trace after itself. Statal socialism or the aspirations

which chase the false illusions of the 21st century and urge globalization are not exceptions to this rule. As the researcher of the topic, I can only assume that in case of an emergency the creativity of people grows, and there still might be a chance for the reorganization and survival of the communities based on real values. We will be able to transfer knowledge and wisdom to the 3rd millennium, as well, and responsibly maintain the genius of the place. We will be able to relate to the knowledge, the norms, and the wisdom that could be used for the benefit of the community by the individuals living in the *tízes* and the *szeg*.

The *tízes* is a historical and system-based model in the 3rd millennium as well, which could mean a framework for settlement development and, in a larger sense, regional development. The tradition of the Szekler *tízes* could mean the basis of the future because we cannot find a better option than this complex, organic model. It can mean a capital for the entire society if our conceptual definitions rely on the bases dictated by history and the characteristics of the region. Consequently, the talent of the recognized *tízes* could reconcile the old and new dichotomy.

At the current 'turning-point' in the history of Szeklerland, the Szekler village *tízes*, with its delayed development but its special model as a well-ripened basic unit of community oganization and economic organization, can fit in the science and practice of economy planning and controlling, which evolves through itself, and the headway of the renewed mentality that relies on systems. If this mentality appears well in the *tízes* culture, the existence of the people will be richer.

Based on the research results, I think that we can get out of the impasse of the negative evidence if we relate to the complex, well-ripened, organic community models based on subject bases because it seems that nobody has devised a better one. If one is in an impasse, he can recoil when he hits a wall and be stuck there, but, as a committed member of a community, he has the ethical duty to serve the will to live, to find the way out, and the recoil in the impasse does not always mean a withdrawal, but it can be a wise quest for the right way, the hope to find and see the right path.

On the basis of the already existing research results and the orientation of the present work, I can state the following as a thesis:

– We still have to research the *tízes* because there are still things to be researched. We still have things to lose and there are still things to be won.

– It is a compact space, interpreted in a natural and social respect, and the historicity of the community living in this space has to be viewed, interpreted, described, and proved in connection with it.

– The well-ripened spiritual values of a community (family, settlement, settlement part, region, micro- or macro-region) and the wisdom with which it has ripened and built its lifestyle, ethical norms, and models 'produce' a defining system of values. Following the good examples is a wise purpose and a practical wisdom.

– The historicity of a space and the historical events which formed the community of a given settlement define its system of values. It is not better or worse than the communities, families of the other settlements in the Carpathian Basin or the other detached ethnical groups on the earth. It is just *different*.

This study tries to prove that exact otherness; maybe it presents the complex, organic Szekler village from a new point of view, as a settlement organization which can function as a model. The Szekler village *tízes*, as a unique spatial and settlement category in its own kind, as a geographical and community-organizing entity and value, colligated the necessity and the inspiration, the will for local action. I think that development, which is a continuous phenomenon, should be accomplished in a way that does not lead to the disappearance of the subsistence-ensuring *tízes* communities, as the model of organization, functioning, and development offered by a viable, sustainable system could offer the basis for human systems and the development of smaller or larger communities in our days. The wise energy of the present and the future lie in the strength of real communities. That is why we have to strengthen the communities in their existence. That is one of the challenges of today's science, churches, and politics. In the social environment of our age, it would actually be natural if science and politics focused on strengthening the self-organizing abilities of local communities and on the opportunities that lie in the support given to community organization and community development. However, science and politics should just appear in the world of the *tízes*, which have a specific past, people should start to think on their own, and not just try to make the decaying social tendency more endurable. They cannot maintain the faith, the school, the church, or the economy of a weakened community with EU applications and trendy projects or chemicals. If the EU could stick to its original, basic concepts, it would not promote or be interested in what the newly joined countries can copy from it but how they can enrich its culture.

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1. AMBRUS, Antal: 65 years, 2010, 2012 – Csíkszentmiklós;
2. AMBRUS, Pál: 90 years, 2010, 2012 – Csíkszentmiklós;
3. AMBRUS, Rozália: 88 years, 2010, 2012 – Csíkszentmiklós;
4. BORS, Julianna: 89 years, 2008, 2010 – Pottyond;
5. BORS, Lajos: 90 years, 2008, 2010 – Pottyond;
6. BOTH, Veronika: 76 years, 2016 – Csíkszentdomokos;
7. CZIKÓ, Gergely: 66 years, 2014 – Csíkszentgyörgy, Három – tízes;
8. DOMOKOS, Borbála: 66 years, 2014 – Csíkszentgyörgy, Három – tízes;

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15. SÁNDOR, Erzsébet: 77 years, 2016 – Csíkszentdomokos.

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Old and New Criteria for the Governance of Political and Economic Structures on the Basis of the Bible and the Quran[1]

Norbert VARGA
University of West Hungary, Benedek Elek Faculty of Pedagogy
e-mail: vnorberrt@gmail.com

Andrea SZIKRA
University of West Hungary, Benedek Elek Faculty of Pedagogy
e-mail: szikra.andrea@bpk.nyme.hu

Abstract. This study presents a sociological analysis of the Holy Books of two world religions (the Bible and the Quran) since, according to prognoses and risk analyses, a political, economic, cultural, and religious confrontation between the world religions will be unavoidable. Special economic and political aspects also contribute to the up-to-datedness of the topic in the democratic world; in fact: the economic crisis at the beginning of the 21st century, the difficulties of managing the crisis with traditional micro- and macroeconomic tools as well as the Europe-wide issue of migration processes. These challenges have directed our attention to alternative economic solutions and policy options, including theories on ethical basis. Modern academic discourse has recently started to direct research at leadership skills as acknowledged forms of talent. The priority of moral talent is never disputed in the Bible and the Quran, more so by certain leaders holding political or economic positions.

Keywords: Bible, Quran, leadership talent, social and economic structures, morality

Introduction

This study presents a sociological analysis of the holy books of two world religions (the Bible and the Quran) since, according to prognoses and risk-analyses, a political, economic, cultural, and religious confrontation between the world religions will be unavoidable. Special economic and political aspects

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1 This study is based on the following work: Varga, N. (2013): A Biblia és a Korán politika- és gazdaságképe.

also contribute to the up-to-datedness of the topic in the democratic world; in fact: the economic crisis at the beginning of the 21st century, the difficulties of managing the crisis with traditional micro- and macroeconomic tools as well as the Europe-wide issue of migration processes. These challenges have directed our attention to alternative economic solutions and policy options, including theories on ethical basis. Economists and political scientists, functioning on the basis of the Christian social education, primarily analyse the works of Christian philosophers, the encyclical letters, constitutions and apostolic exhortations of popes, announcements of episcopal synods, and they go back to the original source, the Bible, only to a lesser degree. Therefore, the aim of the study has been to analyse how wealth and society appear in the primary sources.

In Judaism and Christianity, the Bible is considered to be holy and inspired by God; in Islam, the same attributes are given to the Quran. Followers of these religions believe that their respective holy books can serve as guidance in human life. Jesus and Muhammad proclaimed eschatological prophecies, which defined history as a *sui generis* phenomenon. Modern man is compelled to act in the same fullness of times until the end of history, when God's kingdom is finally realized on Earth. Social choices seem to have special significance during crises; however, there are clear signs of divergences between actors with powers of decision making in the European Union, considering the reasons and managing of migration as well as the responses to various problems. A specific piquancy is given to the situation as migration can also be approached as an interaction between Islamic and Christian culture.

The Biblical and Quranic images of society and economy become relevant as research tasks in contexts where questions about man and society are raised. Revealing social-economic structure is clearly not one of the primary aims of the Bible; the same cannot necessarily be claimed about the Quran. As a consequence of the above, the following methodological principles have been formulated:

1. Social and economic questions can be answered only by adopting an open attitude towards the Biblical and Quranic witness about God and not by excluding theology as an academic discipline.

2. At the same time, academic analysis makes it necessary to treat the holy books as historical documents even if such a treatment involves the risk of misinterpretation.

3. It is one of our fundamental theses that social and economic processes cannot be interpreted without the study of the cultures based on the religious cults in question.

4. Although it is not directly relevant to the topic of this article, it is important to point out that the holy books are not the only sources of either Christian or Islamic ideology, but they are the most authentic and most relevant ones; therefore, they must be given priority over other sources.

5. The basic approach taken in this study is the acknowledgement of the influence of personal values, goals, morality, and religion on the actions and private life of the individual as well as on social and economic behaviour (Ockerfels 1992: 5).

6. The discussion of the topic requires the application of both the historical-critical method (although many claim this framework to be outdated, it has obvious benefits pointed out by Beyme 1992) and comparative methodology suggested by Hopkin (2002) and Beyme. The two methodologies strengthen and complement each other, and together they enable the formulation of a taxonomy.

7. In the case of the holy books, disregarding the historical context, it also entails that certain passages or verses gain universal sense, thereby creating the possibility for an infinite number of interpretations.

Good Practice of Power

According to Ogilvie (973), Jackson and Butterfield (1986), the outstanding performance and leadership ability based on social skills just as social consciousness manifest themselves in the frame of talent. Csíkszentmihályi and Robinson (1986) go further, evaluating the social, economic actor with extraordinary abilities as the relation of culturally determined functional potentials and the personal skills and abilities needed for interactions in the real world. In their opinion, a time/biological dimension should also be taken into consideration as it shows that personal skills may change with the passage of time.

Both the Old and New Testament and the Quran consider that the source of any form of power, thus state and economic power as well, is God, to whom every social actor is responsible. That can be the reason that Jesus refers to the upper world in his answer to Pilate, which is subordination for the prefect, as Gál (1987) states. Buber (1998) sees that policy is never a monologue but a dialogue between the politician and God, the 'listener'. That explains why the policy of King Ahaz is unacceptable for the Prophet Isaiah (Isa. 7.f.). Ahaz separated the sacred sphere from politics in absolute terms, which is why Isaiah declares a rival king in the form of 'Immanuel' (Isa. 7.14), who is faithful to God, therefore a theopolitician. This is the new generation of public actors who get the motivation for their political and economic activities from God.[2]

The political, economic leader cannot abuse his power as it leads to oppression. The phrase 'the sceptre of their oppressor' (Isa. 9.4) at the Prophet Isaiah symbolizes the cruel reign and governance. Rózsa (2001) sees the lack of freedom and independence as well as economic exploitation in this policy. A

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2   According to Allport's (1980) definition, in which motivation is the stimulating power of personality.

politician can never become a tyrant. It is well reflected in the satirical song about the Babylonian King who fell into 'Sheol', the state of complete weakness, on the judgement of Yahweh (Isa. 14.15–18). We can interpret the seriousness of the judgement properly if we keep in mind that demitization of death was considered important in Israel. Muhammad often threatens his opponents and the sinners that Hellfire will be their resting place forever (2:206). We have to mention here that theological concepts of the Pre-Islamic Arab culture did not contain the vision of 'Hell', the 'Abode of the Dead'. Belief in the underworld had no roots, so the Prophet's serious words could not particularly have a demoralizing effect on the man of the era.

Man, as the image of God, precludes the possibility that someone may tyrannize others. The poem Rom 13.3 assumes that everyone wants to live without the fear of power. The division of the Kingdom of Israel and the rebellion against Rehoboam was also caused by the fact that the king obliged the tribes to statute labour (1 Kings 12.11). The Quran suggests the legitimate nature of hierarchy among people (4:69; 6:165); however, Muhammad refused to take the prophets, including himself, as lords (3:79–80). Simon (1994) argues that the ayah 4:69 shows a particular hierarchy between the most excellent ones when it distinguishes the 'prophets', the 'steadfast affirmers of truth', the 'martyrs', and the 'righteous'. However, in earthly life, even 'wrongdoers' (6:129) might be the possessors of power. A parallel can be drawn between the concept of power in the Quran (4:58–59) and European contract theories[3] because both consider the relation of the ruler and the subject as a deposit where the people is the legitimate possessor of power. Politicians should listen to their conscience to make sure to avoid dictatorial performances. Davis and Rimm (1985) find that talented people are more susceptible to moral dilemmas and are able to understand other persons' feelings and expectations. Both the two authors and Abroms (1985) warn that higher moral thinking is not always symbiotic with the concrete activity.

Members of the elite should become the servants of their people, but if rejected they can reckon that they have to share the fate of Rehoboam. According to Eliade (2006), the Ebed-Yahweh Songs (servant of Yahweh) in Deutero-Isaiah give a radically new description of the qualities of the real king and indicate the social unrest caused by the existing ruling system. This ruler turns his back to those who strike him and turns his cheeks to those who pluck them (Isa. 50.6, 53.3), carries the sorrow of others (Isa. 53.4) and changes roles with the oppressed and sets them free by carrying their iniquities. The ideal ruler reaches this by having the kings of the world be silent before him (Isa. 52.15). The text not only teaches a mere paradox but also stresses that the most humiliated is the real lord, and this way it is strongly emphasized that the real public figure regards his profession as a service. The teachings of Jesus and Muhammad point out that tribulation and

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3   Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

persecution is not a tragedy if it is guided by a righteous purpose. They also draw our attention to the fact that their followers will have difficulties in the world (John 16.33, Q 68:4). Jesus gained his kingdom by drinking the chalice of suffering (John 19.1–11). While the Jewish interpreted his indignity as the loss of power and authority, the New Testament suggests just the opposite on the basis of Psalms 22.7. The Prophet also experienced the feeling of exclusion from the tribal society when he was deprived of the support of his clan. According to the Quran, he did not even forget that he became an orphan and lived in need (93:6–11, 94:1–4).

A Political-Economic Leader as Hero in War and Peace

The political and economic leader has to become an example (Deut. 17.19) who represents his compatriots and can be faithful to them. The way Yahweh behaved with his people in the wilderness showed the significance of the motive of faithfulness. The Old Testament judges human co-habitation in terms of faithfulness to the community when Saul argues that David is truer than him. The king referred to the fact that David had taken their community relationship more seriously and drawn more attention to it than Saul himself (1 Sam. 24.18). The social aspects of faithfulness are mentioned in the Quran as well, and it also points out that unfaithfulness costs dearly. Following the battle of the trench, the Banu Qurayza is cruelly punished, their men are executed, and their families are enslaved (33:27).[4]

However, the politician should keep themselves away from ultra-nationalist manifestations and ideology. In the Old Testament, ultra-nationalism is fed by the inappropriate interpretation of Yahweh's power (Isa. 1.10–20). The devastating political effect of chauvinism is presented by the reign of Zedekiah (2 Kings 25.f.). Jeremiah, on the other hand, serves as an example for the opposite as he could have been committed to the establishment because of his origin, but he refused to serve extreme national politics. This way, as Komoróczy (1992) argues, he represents the archetype of critical intellectuals who, according to Bultman's theory (1998), should not primarily lead their life on standard human judgements (1 Cor. 7.23). Muhammad is also able to keep extreme views under control; he prefers seeking compromise instead. We can think of his relationship to the Quraysh when he raises the pagan Mecca to the cultic centre of the Abrahamic religion and guarantees the central position for Mecca this way. Following this line, he plants the Mecca pilgrimage (3:97) into Islam. After occupying the town, he turns to the Quraysh leaders with the gesture of condonation and provides them high-prestige positions within the Islam community as well.

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4   In his research, Bobzin (2000) exempts Muhammad from massacre and finds one of his fighters, Sad ibn Muad, responsible for it.

In the Bible and the Quran, the fact of war is not a unique, unusual phenomenon. According to the Old Testament, the military confrontations of Israel can be interpreted as the war of God.[5] From Gnilka's (2007) point of view, Joshua 3.5–11 only comes close to the concept of 'holy war', whereas the authors consider that these verses substantially include sacred war by all means. Armed wars formed an integral part of the anointed ruler's functions; therefore, he was expected to be skilled in the art of war as well. Thus, King David can chant it proudly in his song of praise: 'teaching my hands to do battle, and making my arms like a bow of brass' (2 Sam. 22.35). In Rad's (1951, 2000) opinion, the priority of the military leader's function is not conquest but liberation as well as protection of the people.[6] Regarding the military strategies of the ruler, the Law of the King (Deut. 17.14–20) serves as a guideline, and it also ordains that irresponsible military ambitions should be avoided. This expectation can be even stronger in case it means a political-economic dependence from an empire (Isa. 30.1). King Josiah's performance in 609 BC was idiosyncrasy as the fate of Judah was determined by the major powers. The king was not able to comprehend or influence these power relations; thus, changes and new configurations were formed over his head. Consequently, the intervention of Judah into world politics could only happen blindly and led to failure. For the New Testament, military skills and abilities became less relevant and the apocalyptic vision of war made people horrified (Mark 13.7).

Muhammad was not brought up at a princely court, which is why he was not socialized to the art of war. In the field of warfare, the inexperienced Muslims made several false strategic decisions. In various cases, Abd Allah bin Ubayy, the leader of the Medina Hypocrites, worked out more professional military tactics than the Muslims (3:154). In spite of that, Muhammad had an excellent sense to select his military strategists as time went by. Khalid ibn al-Walid, from a Meccan tribe, who defeated the Muslims in the Battle of Uhud (3:152), became a victorious military leader of the Prophet some years later. However, the Quran (3:172–174, 8:17) makes it obvious that military victory depends on Allah's decision. Muhammad always rejects military merits attributed to him and ascribes them to divine intervention. The ayah 8:17 has been interpreted in various ways. Islamic tradition views that magical power is dominant considering the military role of the Prophet (Simon 1994), while the European researcher (Watt 1956) barely finds profane combat actions. In the Quran (21:81), Solomon is invested with supernatural power, which is also sufficient to control jinns, whereas the Prophet is supported by angels in the battles. According to the Quran (4:95–96), those 'who strive and fight' in

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5   Ex. 15.3–4, Josh. 10.14, 1 Chron. 14.14–15, 2 Chron. 14.10, Judg. 5, 23.31.
6   It is essential to look towards another aspect since Hinduism represents a similar view when discusses the duties of Kshatriyas, the second class of the four social orders according to the caste system of Hindu society, as Szenkovics (2012) claims.

military conflicts are preferred over those ones who remain at home, which makes participation in armed conflicts even more noble. The Prophet strongly chastises (9:24) disobedient people who shirk military service. Military actions may even change the order of worship; in case of danger, a special religious service is also permitted (4:101–103).

Neither the Prophet's Arab contemporaries had professional military knowledge. At the battle of Badr (8:7, 3:13, 3:123), Muhammad, who had to face superior numbers, defeated the Meccans due to their excellent strategic location and the suitable age and ideological preparation of Muslim fighters. The Quran (8:60) draws attention to the importance of proper technical preparation as well. During the 'battle of the trench', they used a new military technology against the army that fielded ten thousand men: 'nomen est omen' the Muslims dug trenches around the undefended parts of the oasis. Prolonged siege and poor weather conditions caused the sinking of confederate morale. Importance of protecting human life also appears in warfare, and it is served by new inventions such as the coats of armour created by King David (21.80). The Quran also lays down army regulations for prisoners of war (8:67–71). Economic considerations can also be significant in this question as ransom paid for captives meant an important source of income. Asserting 'utilitarist' aspects caused a decline in military performance in many cases (8:67). Muhammad built excellent communication and information channels to their military successes (9:61). Salamon and Munif (2003) suggest that rapidity and the intensive psychic state were the keys of success against the proficient and well-equipped mercenary armies of empires.

Fitting abilities effectively to a certain social environment belongs to the intellectual dimension of talent defined by Arroyo and Sternberg (1993). This teleological conception involves the recognition of insurmountable obstacles as well as a shift towards a more optimal environment. All the reckless and premature actions seem to be suspicious (Prov. 19.2), so self-restraint becomes a significant feature (2 Tim. 1.7, Titus 1.8). The fall of Saul was also caused by his inability to make sensible, considered decisions (1 Sam. 10.9–13). Patience ('sabr') is a key concept in the Quran (it occurs 103 times), which is rooted in the concept of virtue ('muruwwa')[7] from pre-Islamic times and an important feature of the warrior (2:250). However, Gedaliah's fate warns us that blind nationalism will always take actions against peace policy.

The king brings peace (Psalms 72, 3.7), which is a beneficial condition and the most optimal one. Peace is more than merely the antithesis of war; nevertheless,

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7   Gecse (1980) attributes the following meanings to this term (which is considered a fundamental ethical concept for Bedouin tribes): masculinity, courage, blood feud, and hospitality. Goldziher (1980) reflects the meaning by the word 'virtue' and defines it as a religion without a specific moral philosophical content (however, he erred in combining the concepts of religion and morality). Armstrong (1998) and Watt (2000) recommend 'tribal humanism' as a terminus technicus.

it is not Paradise on earth but the state in which things and the human world are intact and fulfil their intended purpose. Peace turns into the opposite of war and takes on a political meaning as soon as the established beneficial state of affairs is threatened by external enemies. Buber (1998) states that the essence of Isaiah's theopolitical teaching is the call for serenity and peace (Isa. 18.4, 32.15), which reflects his ideas about the proper political attitude. Jeremiah points out that in times of political struggle and war the alternatives of submission or resistance are guided by practical considerations and not by principles; it is impossible to outline general norms based on historical incidents because in some cases one is needed, in other cases the other. The work of Jesus on earth was characterized by the advocacy of peace. It is a greeting of peace that he sends out his 72 disciples with (Luke 10.5–6), and upon weeping over Jerusalem he explicitly claims that the society cannot perceive the practicalities that would serve its peace (Luke 19.42). The Messiah draws a sharp line between the profane and the transcendent interpretation of peace by saying: 'Peace I leave for you; my Peace I give to you. Not in the way that the world gives, do I give to you.' (John 14.27).

Some Elements of the Optimal Economic System

Politicians and economic leaders need to fight against harsh economic systems that undermine social equality and consign the poor to slavery (2 Kings 4.1). Rulers should not acquire wealth with the sole purpose of ensuring better livelihood for themselves or in a way that would increase social burden on others. Instead, they should help the oppressed and the pauper in regaining their freedom and use positive discrimination in this area of life as well. Several books in the Old Testament (Ex. 22.24, Lev. 25.36) highlight the importance of lending money, at the same time stating that creditors are not allowed to charge interest on loans given to members of their own faith community. The Book of Deuteronomy (15.7–10) goes even further in pointing out that the duty of granting loans to those in need applies even in the seventh year, 'the year of release'. Wages must not be kept low by the elite driven by self-serving greed or egoistic indulgence. This commandment was brought into King Jehoiakim's attention by the Prophet Jeremiah, who also warned the sovereign that acting against it would prove ignorance of what it takes to be a legitimate monarch in JHWH's eyes (Jer. 22.13–19). It is on the same basis that Allah condemns the elite for trying to exclude social groups other than their own from the economic competition. They want to make trade optimal for themselves by changing the condition 'Lengthen the distance between our journeys' (34:19). The Quran clarifies its teaching in economic terms and uses the logic of merchants to claim that fair and honest investments on earth yield profit in the afterlife (2:261).

Surah 64 is titled 'The Mutual Disillusion', an expression taken from trade and applied to those who leave the true way. In verse 6:31, the words 'those will have lost' – another term from the world of business – are used to describe those who 'deny' the benefits of meeting Allah. Indulgers of worldly desires will be 'fully repaid for their deeds' (11:15), but they will not escape punishment in the afterlife, either. According to an interpretation of verse 70:18 by Salamon and Munich (2003), the collection of private wealth can be considered legitimate only if there is a hint for social motivation. An important segment of social redistribution is revealed in verse 9:60, which codifies the group of those eligible for sadaqa.

The Prophet makes a lot of effort to regulate the rules of inheritance (2:180–182, 5:106–108). Social anomy is a result of a shift from a matriarchal establishment to a patriarchal one. In the matrilineal structure, guardians were appointed on the female line and managed the assets with communal interests in mind. Watt's analysis (1956) claims that the emergence of patrilineality entailed a new phenomenon: the guardian stepped forth as an individual and passed property down on the male line. In this new structure, guardians often abused their rights and treated the assets trusted to them as their own. Frequent cases of abuse are assumed to have been postponing the marriage of female orphans or, upon marriage, withholding their dowry (4:4). Quranic instructions (4:7) put an end to the legal practice of depriving widowed wives or daughters of the deceased father of their share of inheritance. Levirate marriage (Deut. 25.5–10) was a widespread institution in the Middle East in ancient times. The Quran (4:19) prohibits abuse within this type of marriage, makes it unlawful to deny bridal money, and forbids women to bail themselves out.

Some researchers[8] argue that by questioning the established practice of usury and charging interest, Muhammad created a unique economic philosophy influential to the present day in the Islamic world. The Prophet arrived at his ideas about gradually abolishing usury and interest. The verses originating from the Mecca period (3:130, 30:39) already speak disapprovingly of such ways of acquiring wealth, but this disapproval is crystallized into explicit prohibition from ayah 4:164 onwards. In the Arabic system, if a debtor could not repay the debt and the interest, new interest was levied on top of the previous one. The Prophet's aim was to have debtors' earlier usuries cancelled after their conversion to Islam (2:278–281).[9]

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8   Watt (1956), Firth (1963), Rodinson (1978), Rostoványi (2004), Kaleem and Ahmed (2010) – these sources also indicate the differences in the interpretation of usury and interest. In Balala's reading (2011: 47–54), the prohibition of 'riba' refers to trading with credit, whereas the prohibition of 'gharar' is meant to apply to trade with unnecessary risks and uncertainty. He also claims that the undifferentiated identification of 'riba' with interest by most contemporary researchers of law and Islamic finance is a mistaken interpretation.

9   Islamic types of banks, which are becoming increasingly widespread in Europe as well, do not recognize the option of granting loans on interests but allow for a 'system of dividends'. To avoid interest, they use the system of Profit and Loss Sharing. Mainstream Islam only accepts one sort of loan, that of a charitable loan (qard hasan), which is a loan free of interest, and

Madigan (2008: 109) carries out an interesting comparative analysis between the semantics of the Arabic word 'rabb' and the English 'lord'. The English expression is a blend from the words 'loaf' and 'ward', which clearly shows that a lord used to be a bread-keeper responsible for providing his folk with food. In Arabic language, 'rabb' is a synonym for sovereignty (including God), and this meaning, similarly to that of the English 'lord', involves the idea of fulfilling fundamental human needs. This suggests, in a theodicean reading of the holy books, that we owe each segment and moment of our existence to God honoured as Lord. In the New Testament, the story of poor Lazarus (Luke 16.19–31) can be mentioned as a parable with a socializational intention and one that attacks self-serving affluence. This does not mean that the Gospel according to Luke would deny or belittle the economic system. Money is referred to in derogative terms as the 'iniquitous mammon' (Luke 16.11); even so, it has to be handled faithfully, and that entails refusing interest and usury (Luke 6.35). The Quran uses phrases with negative moral overtones to talk about worldly finery and vanities because these distract us from transcendental qualities. In Kaleem and Ahmed's (2010) interpretation, verses 17:26–29 are directed against wastefulness, extravagance, and hoarding wealth in precious metals; at the same time, the text encourages meaningful spending especially for the sake of the common good. The importance of protecting communal and private property is shown by the fact that stealing a quarter of a dinar or more was punished, in a uniquely Arabic way, by cutting off the thief's hand (5:38). Besides the geopolitical features, it is the strong social sensitivity of Islam that is revealed by a practice linked to sacrifice as well: the flesh of the sacrificial animal offered to God does not feed gods but is supposed to be given to the poor.

Politicians and economic leaders have to carry out planning even if they have limited command over the future (Prov. 21.31, 16.9). In order to become a competent leader, an individual has to master six areas (Sisk 1993), and one of these is orientation towards the future. Sensible men reckon with the unpredictable discrepancy between their plans for the future and the actual realization of these plans. Disregarding this deficit threatens with misunderstanding the role of a political or economic leader and mistaking human beings for God. Both the Book of Proverbs and the Quran (18:32–44) warn their readers against false certainty in believing that man can control the future. Both texts point out that although unpredictability cannot be totally eliminated, its level can be decreased. That is the reason why in verse 1:6 of the Quran and verse 27.11 in the Book of Psalms God the Creator is asked to lead believers on a straight path. This request is even more emphatic in the Quranic approach (3:8) due to the lack of a clear-cut decision between free will and predestination. Murjites,

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payback time is not set in advance. The Quran (2:245, 64:17) interprets it as a loan given to God, and it serves as the basis of microfinancing institutions (MFIs) in the 21st century.

Mutazilites, and Kharijites professed their belief in free will and excluded the possibility of Allah setting human heart to do wrong. They described the ability to choose as the most significant attribute of human beings because this is what others base their judgements about an individual on. In ayah 17:16, another Quranic tendency is manifested: it implies that the omnipotence of God predetermines everything. Fatalistic interpretations were encouraged by the fact that Muhammad experienced failure after failure at the beginning of his career. Occasionalism was established by Asari (873–935) as a theory that could mediate between the two schools. According to him, the omnipotence of the deity leaves space for individuals to 'receive' or internalize God's decision. According to Galwash (1968), mainstream Sunnism denied free will and defined human life as fate, that is existence independent of the individual. This approach changed in the 20th century due to what Gnilka (2007) identifies as the decolonizational struggle, since the dogma of predestination legitimizes existing social and economic structures. Shia sociologist Shariati (1979) finds no antinomy between determinism and human freedom.

Politicians and economic actors need to take it into account that future circumstances are uncertain (Eccles. 8.7); even their own future condition is beyond their control (Eccles. 9.1b). When analysing the Quranic verse 19:21, Asad (1980) suggests that God sometimes induces events that seem unpredictable and incomprehensible to human beings. This leads Al-Ghazali (2000) to wonder why Jews do not acknowledge the all-surpassing power of God.[10] He also reminds public actors that large-scale reforms fulfilling all needs, dissolving all violent divisions, and eliminating all oppressive abuse cannot be carried out without JHWH's or Allah's contribution. This reflects the way such reforms are inseparably linked to Jesus and his mission in the New Testament (Rev. 21).

Epilogue: Is There Any Hope?

As we have seen, modern academic discourse has recently started to direct research at leadership skills as acknowledged forms of talent. Holy books clearly describe the aspects of managing social-economic structures; moreover, the religious texts encourage public actors to follow these models. The priority of moral talent is never disputed in the Bible and the Quran, more so by certain leaders holding political or economic positions.

In the ummah, the optimal Islamic community, each person is an individual in a spiritual and legal sense but is realized as a member of the community from political and economic aspects. The Quran did not abolish stratification based on tribal affinity and kinship, it only complemented it with the principle of

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10   The Quran accepts the teaching of Mary's virgin birth.

redistribution on religious grounds. This created a very strong sense of social sensitivity within the Islamic economy at all times since in the Quran (2:275) trade and charity are closely linked. The guiding principle is that positive economic activity is encouraged, whereas the possibility of making profit by charging usury or without taking a risk is rejected. Charity reduces the level of inequality in the society, and helping the poor is blessed by God. The concept of charity is not limited to money and benefits in kind: those in need should also be provided with knowledge and experience. Nevertheless, the Quran does not wish to abolish the unequal distribution of wealth in society.

The methodology of Muhammad's understanding of society and economy is close to that of the Old Testament inasmuch as it is motivated by divine inspiration. The presumption that political and economic status originates from God leaves no place for compromise, and the human component seems impotent. The current restoration of the right cult also entails a change in social-economic relations. Relationship to God determines the way the individual relates to other human beings and to the social-economic environment. Based on the model of the Quran and the Old Testament religion, economy and political aspects cannot be separated from each other. By contrast, such a separation is possible in the New Testament because of its claim that the whole message of the Bible refers to Christ.

It follows from all this that there is a marked difference between Jesus' and Muhammad's attitude to social-economic structures: the teachings of Jesus remained radically eschatological in nature, whereas Muhammad's revelations took on worldly features. The community of the Old Testament generally accepted and accepts the theory of "dina demalchuta dina – the law of the land is the law" (Ben-Dor–Pedahzur 2008: 228.), which ensured their survival under the reign of a foreign power for thousands of years. Obviously, it did not exclude the possibility of creating a body politic, but it is an eternal question who is entitled to do that. In history, it was attempted several times to construct a political formation – referring to the Messiah. The community of the New Testament continued to be described in religious terms that influences social-economic structure this way; however, following the example of Jesus, it does not appear as an independent political entity. By derogation, the community of the Quran has political and economic attributes. Muhammad did not define in the Quran what political or economic system should serve as a framework for the Islamic society, but the main organizing principle is doubtlessly 'al-islam din vad aula', that is Islam is the symbiosis of religion and state. For Muslims, any political or economic system can be legitimate only if it guarantees the attainment of Islamic goals.

Based on the teachings of the Bible, Wolf (2001) draws the conclusion that whoever abandons the God of Hope (Deus spei), that is the deity in whom the faith of Israel's patriarchs, prophets, great kings, and the Jesus of Nazareth is grounded, and uses the virtue of humanity as an independent capacity to worship the Idol of

Hope (Deus spes) instead, either imposes inhumanely impossible requirements on human beings or relativizes the expectance of the new world in a miserable way. Hope as expressed in the Bible promises new creation, which surpasses the potentials of politicians and economic leaders. At the same time, this promise encourages them to take the steps that lie within their scope of competence in order to achieve the intended goal. Followers of the Old Testament experience the hope in Earth at every Sabbath. The Quran (16:8) extends hope by calling attention to Allah's ability to create several things that no one knows about but which are helpful for mankind. As Hentschel (2008) maintains, the Epistle of Paul to the Colossians (3.10) expresses the hope that guarantees constant innovation for humans as creation is permanently renewed in the image of its maker.

Such a promise about the God of Hope provides public actors and economic leaders with a weapon against two kinds of disappointment. Some find consolation in life after death and cause disappointment by keeping hope in the black box of the immutable history. Others claim that they have the power to create the heaven of salvation even on Earth and cause disappointment by hopelessly ruining the present. As a contrast, public actors and economic leaders oriented towards the future can trust the word of promise and, as such, are able to remain radically hopeful despite the relativity of small steps and the irreversibility of future.

The unceasing contraction of the world cannot promote to interpret the above discussed questions; however, the continuous pulsation of the world makes it possible to extend the 'hermeneutic circle', i.e. the circle of common, thinking people since both holy books address all creatures of God. Therefore, the authors highlight the necessity of academic and interdisciplinary dialogue between cultures and cults, and they hope that as a 'spill-over' effect it can gradually extend to social and economic leaders as well.

The question needs to be asked whether there is any hope to manage on the basis of holy books, the cataclysms leading to the economic crisis in 2008, and the migration flows. Our answer is clear: yes, there is; however, it is necessary to lay down that it demands a Copernican revolution, which also means a paradigm shift for economic and political decision makers. It seems that instead of economic and political decisions claimed to be rational, we receive eternal economic and political principles from the transcendent era that was almost never taken seriously and was exiled in the world of irrationality by leaders of modern-day Europe. However, the implementation of these principles is always an individual decision, the honesty of which can become transparent in the decision-making process.

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Politically Motivated Hungarian Migration to the Netherlands in (the Second Half of) the 20th Century: Data, Concepts, and Consequences

Zsuzsanna TOMOR

Department of Public Governance and Management
University of Utrecht
e-mail: z.tomor@uu.nl

Abstract. This paper draws on an empirical research on the acculturation of Hungarian refugees in the Netherlands. After the bloody repression of the Hungarian uprising against the Soviet rule in 1956, approximately 200,000 people escaped Hungary. Out of them, 5,000 people started a new life in the Netherlands. Despite extensive documentation and memoirs, no systematic research exists on the fate of these Hungarians. With this research, we attempt to fill this knowledge gap by gaining insight into their integration path. By applying a qualitative–interpretative research method, we gathered personal narratives from Hungarian ('ex-') refugees in the Netherlands. We analyse their incorporation into the Dutch society according to various acculturation theories and discuss the (contextual) circumstances influencing these dynamics. The findings show that these Hungarians have successfully acculturated into the host society. They got entirely embedded in the institutional, sociocultural, and economic fabric of their new home country (assimilation) while also maintaining their original culture and identity (integration). Determining factors are the reception and opportunity structure in the host country, the refugees' young age and willing attitudes to integrate, their grown hybrid identities as well as cultural compatibility.

Keywords: (Hungarian) refugees, migrants, integration, acculturation, migration to the Netherlands

Introduction

Unlike the Hungarian anti-Soviet revolution of 1956, not much is known about the approximately 200,000 Hungarians who in its aftermath left the country and resettled somewhere else (Lénárt 2006, Várdy 2001). How did they make it through alienation, homesickness, and in a culturally strange environment? How

did they cope in times when world politics made home visits impossible and when digital information and communication possibilities did not yet exist?

This exploratory research attempts to fill some of these knowledge gaps by providing an insight into the experiences of these refugees. It is a complex development with loss and regeneration. Integrating into a new society is a creative process of exploration, shaping new homes and identities. Based on their past, perceptions, and motivations, refugees may differ from (voluntary) migrants that influence the path and outcomes of their integration in the host society (Gilad 1990, Black 2001, Joly 2002, Barlay 2006).

This micro-sociological study focuses on a small segment of Hungarian refugees. Our aim is to shed light on the nearly 5,000 Hungarians who settled in the Netherlands. Based on various theories on refugee and acculturation processes, we have developed a conceptual framework for our fieldwork in order to answer the following research question: *What are the main characteristics of the acculturation process of the Hungarian refugees in the Netherlands?*

By applying oral histories, this paper investigates how these Hungarian people experienced the circumstances of their refuge and their acculturation in their new country. We have gathered personal narratives by conducting in-depth individual interviews with twenty-four Hungarian ex-refugees and, in some cases, their family members.

We aim to contribute to the body of related literature by adding empirical insights in the integration dynamics of a specific, understudied group of refugees within a specific historical context. A further merit of the research is testing various theories in a micro-level reality.

Besides contributing to the social history of both the sending and reception countries, the unfolding global events enhance the public relevance of this research. Politically, economically, and environmentally driven large population shifts generate fierce discussions in the political and societal arena in the question of integration. The paper hopefully provides politicians and societal organizations more understanding of the role of contextual influences and critical factors in refugees'/immigrants' successful integration in the country of settlement.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Based on a literature and documentation study, Chapter Two provides an overview on Hungarian migration waves and their circumstances in the period between the end of the Second World War and 1956/57. Chapter Three presents various refugee theories and acculturation concepts. Subsequently, in Chapter Four, we present our conceptual model applied for studying the acculturation of politically motivated Hungarian émigrés in the Netherlands. In Chapter Five, we evaluate the research findings, which finally lead to our conclusions in Chapter Six.

2. Hungarian Migration Waves to the Netherlands in the 1940s and 1950s

Based on a literature study, in this section, we explain the most important emigration waves from Hungary in the first half of the 20th century. We also present their wider sociopolitical background in order to understand the flight, the orientation, and integration of the refugees in the land of exile. Our research concentrates on the refugees of 1956 who established their new home in the Netherlands. However, where possible, we also describe earlier refugee waves in order to compare immigration patterns, integration experiences, and outcomes across various refugee groups.

2.1. The 45ers

This emigration wave around 1945 was mainly produced by the Second World War and consisted of some 70,000 Hungarians. They represented many shades of the societal stratification and political views (Borbándi 1985, Pomogáts 2000). The core of this migrant population belonged to the conservative political, social, and military elites of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and heavily patriotic people. 'Aristocracy, gentry and upper middle classes, including the professional military and gendarme officers, the upper and middle level state bureaucracy and many of the professionals of interwar Hungary' (Várdy 2001: 322). The represented petty bourgeoisie included 'village teachers, shopkeepers, artisans and some of the well-to-do members of the landed peasantry' (Id.: 323). In addition, both Hungarian Nazis and Jewish survivors characterized this group.

The motives of their flight were diverse too. A large share of them remained loyal to the old social system of the Monarchy and refused the democratization of 1945. They often had something to fear and were reluctant to subjugate themselves to the Soviet military occupation. Based on Kunz's definition (1969, 1973), we could describe them as events-alienated refugees: the communistic regime labelled them as enemies, which marginalized them in the mainstream society (Borbándi 1985, Szarka 2002). They are anticipatory refugees (Kunz 1969, 1973) because they foresaw political developments which they perceived unfavourable and unacceptable. Their financial means and high education level enabled them to prepare and permit the flight before the further deterioration of the politico-societal situation.

After the first period of their stay in Austria and Germany, the majority of these displaced people emigrated overseas, mainly to North America. To a lesser extent, they fled to countries in Europe or in other continents (Israel was a favourite destination).

They were initially convinced that, after the collapse of the Soviet domination, they would soon return home. During their exile, they perpetuated their previous ideological views and social conventions (Szarka 2002, Rainer 1988). They expected to resume their social and political positions when they would go home to Hungary. They launched political activities by establishing schools to educate the younger ones in political, religious, and ideological fields: This 'was a virtual copy of the pre-war system [in Hungary], which in those days still centred on the highly regarded slogan "God, Motherland and Family"' (Várdy 2001: 324). They cultivated their standpoints at their places of settlement 'until the very end' (Ibid.).

2.2. The 47ers

The following huge refugee wave from Hungary set out in the years 1946–1947–1948. This layer of refugees had already direct experiences of the Soviet occupation and the institutionalized new political order. However, they were not necessarily against the new developments. They understood certain regulations such as the abolition of the old privileges and aristocratic titles, the land reform, the installation of the republic, and the life improvements for the lower social classes (Borbándi 1985, Kósa 1957).

The Communist Party received only a minority of the votes during the free elections in 1945. Nevertheless, it was able to gradually grab the power since it received the backing of the Soviet military power (1956-os Intézet 2000, Rainer 1998).

Despite their support of social transformations, a growing amount of people decided to flee as a result of terror, general oppression, and unlawful regulations (Borbándi 1985, Kerkhoven 2006). The large-scale nationalization, the oppression of the classes of the nation's enemies (aristocrats, capitalists, middle-class citizenry, and land-owner farmers), and the government's absolute loyalty to the Soviet Union were major elements in constructing the Hungarian version of Stalinism (Kósa 1957, 2006; Douwes 2006). People growingly saw emigration as unavoidable as they felt their life in danger and had no possibilities any longer for free speech and assembly (Borbándi 1985).

On the contrary to the émigrés of 1945, these Hungarians mostly acted individually. They dispersed throughout the whole of Europe or moved forward to overseas countries in North and South America and Australia. The extent of these refugee waves was substantially lower (around 44,000 persons) than the one in 1945, though their political significance was much stronger (Lénárt 2006, Borbándi 1985).

This refugee flow also had varied social and political patterns. Beyond individuals supporting the democratization, there were also people outside the political system and institutions of Hungary. They either participated in

the pre-1945 political system and considered refuge earlier as unacceptable or fought against the Nazi regime. Among them were also people who took part in establishing the new political order after the Second World War and were ready to accept a human and tolerant socialistic Hungary.

The totalitarian regime under the leadership of Mátyás Rákosi and Ernő Gerő thrusted an essential part of democratic politicians into exile, together with numerous valuable people whose professional knowledge and capacities were badly needed for the nation (Gati 2006, Várdy 2001).

These refugees shared a common feature in that they represented a politically strongly committed group. They emigrated in order to pursuit their political strive in exile and initiated political institutions and networks shortly after their arrival.

The relations among the waves of the 45ers and the 47ers were tense and hostile. The refugees of 1947 viewed democracy as an alternative to the communist system. They opposed the authoritarian regime which, on the contrary, most 45ers promoted. The antagonistic relations and the deep-seated animosity between these immigration groups were exacerbated by blaming each other for the political turbulence at home. The 45ers were accused of serving Hitler and assisting the deportation of their hundreds of thousands of Jewish compatriots, while the 47ers were held responsible for co-operating with Stalin and supporting the foundation of the communist system in Hungary (Borbándi 1985, Dreisziger et al. 1992).

From the view of the Hungarian diaspora, the refugees of 1947 had more opportunities and a better position to become successful. They could count on the sympathy of the West, which recognized the democratic government as a winner of the elections before the power take-over by the communists. The 45ers were regularly associated with the Nazi servants of Germany, which, despite their high intellectual and managerial capacities, had a (negative) influence on their fate (Puskás 1985).

2.3. The 56ers

Revolution and the Mass Flight

Hungarians increasingly criticized the political regime with its immense oppression. They demanded the retreat of the Russian army and the restoration of national freedom and democracy. Spontaneous, unorganized assemblies in October 1956 swelled into a revolution (Barlay 2006: 16). Two weeks later, the Soviet intervention bloodily pulled down the uprising and the short independence (Douwes 2006, Hellema 2006). A new, Soviet-faithful government was installed, which, despite its conciliating commitments, shortly started the merciless reckonings (1956-os Intézet 2009, Segers et al. 2006).

Due to the still open borders and chaotic situation, around 200,000 people fled Hungary in this period. They were pouring into neighbouring Austria and later to Yugoslavia (Nemes 1999; Hellema 2001, 2006; Lénárt 2006; The Economist 1957).

Reaction of the West

The Cold-War-induced political climate explains the extensive media coverage and concern of the West on the refugees' situation. On the one hand, Western governments had a sense of guilt due to their lack of support for the revolution (Nemes 1999, 56-os Intézet 2009). On the other hand, Western countries made use of the symbolic function of the Hungarian uprising. The ideological polarization in superpower politics boosted the combat between communism and capitalism: 'This fight has been a desperately serious threat to the Soviets, and strengthens all free countries, including ours, against world Communism' (The International Rescue Committee, 1957).

Hence, the Western world welcomed the Hungarian refugees with open arms. They, together with the UN, set up a grand programme to mobilize large-scale assistance (Hellema 2001, 2006; Barlay 2006; Lénárt 2006).

Destinations

Nearly all refugees wanted a new life in the United States, being the traditional emigration destination for Hungarians. They had though no preference towards other countries, and their destination was often a matter of chance (*Table 1*). The problem of rapidly placing several thousands of refugees invoked arbitrary methods. Directing happened quickly after the refugees' confirmation to go to a certain country and a quick medical test: 'They arrived, often shocked and fearful, in a country about which they knew nothing but which they believed to be hostile' (The Economist 1957: 380).

Table 1. *Destinations of the approximately 200,000 Hungarian refugees*

Place of resettlement	Share %	Number
Canada	8	16,000
United States	16	32,000
Switzerland	6	12,000
Austria	23	46,000
Britain	11	22,000
Yugoslavia	9	18,000
West Germany	6	12,000
Other European countries	14	28,000
Rest of the world	7	14,000

Sources: The Economist 1992, Douwes 2006, 56-os Intézet 2009

Flight Motives

According to The Economist (1957), Western countries made a great mistake 'to think of the Hungarian exodus in terms of premeditated escape from communism' (Id.: 379). Unsatisfied Hungarians could have left the country earlier since the destalinization process in the 1950s made border controls much less strict.

The literature review discloses a wide variety of motives of the Hungarian refugees. The uprising triggered the act of flight as 'for most of these young men and women, their eventual escape was not a conscious journey to a paradise of western freedom and opportunity. Some seized the chance, others were blown out of their country as of by an earthquake…' (Id.: 380).

Decisions to run away were made in 'fear, anger and in the turmoil of a mass flight' (Ibid.), and refugees had their own motives to escape: political reasons and fear for revenge and deportation, socioeconomic deprivation, adventurers who joined others in their escape, individuals in the hope of higher life standards in the West, or people with financial or family circumstances who cherished the wish to emigrate already before the revolution (Puskás 1985, Ten-Doesschate 1985, Kuyer 1963, Várdy 2001, Borbándi 1985).

Refugee Characteristics

As opposed to the majority of the earlier political émigrés, often middle-aged people with a family, the greater part of the 56ers consisted of unmarried youth, around the age of 20. Nearly half of them had good transferable technical degrees from higher educational institutions or (technical) high schools. The other half included skilled or unskilled labourers, who could immediately get employed in the Western industrial societies. They were mostly males and originated from either Budapest or the Western regions of Hungary (KSH 1957, Lénárt 2006, Várdy 2001).

The politically conscious individuals had a wide range of ideological views. Compared to the 45ers and 47ers, this refugee wave represented different societal origins. These refugees were the products of 'a forced social engineering' and coerced indoctrination and 'were saturated with the proletarian mentality of the communist world' (Várdy 2001: 327).

The value system and social manners of the 56ers and those of the earlier migration flows differed sharply, which created tense relationships. The immigrants of 1956 had no respect for titles, positions, and hierarchies, which made them labelled by older Hungarians as proletariats and peasants, being ordinary, coarse, and boorish (Kerkhoven 2006, Nemes 1999).

Due to their one-sided (technical) education, they were deficient in human and classical subjects, which contributed to their 'low level of national pride and

consciousness' (Várdy 2001: 329). It was reinforced by the 'denationalization' of the Stalin-type regime, which made patriotism a crime.

On the contrary, the exiles who arrived in the years 1945–1948 were patriotic or nationalistic owing to their deep knowledge of the country's history. Maintaining Hungarian traditions and fostering glories of the past shaped their way of thinking (Hellenbart 2009, Kósa 1957).

Despite the strained relations among the Hungarians, the Revolution was a crucial common issue in the diaspora. Therefore, the already settled Hungarians could only think of narrow co-operation with the newcomers (Borbándi 1985).

Reception

The warm reception in the Western societies had an encouraging influence on the personal and professional progression of '56 refugees. While the West treated the earlier waves of post-war exiles as nearly war criminals, they greeted the 56ers as anti-Communist heroes.

However, the initial guilty emotions, sweeping over the capitalist world, had a short life. The refugees' stories became tedious in the reception societies, and 'the sense of responsibility spent itself without awakening much curiosity and understanding' (The Economist: 379). Integration troubles occurred in some countries where the population did not understand what was going on in the minds of the escaped Hungarians. These refugees landed in a capitalistic country, which they learned to despise and fear.

If receiving countries were more imaginative and organized concerning the refugees' reception, many problems could have been avoided (Hellenbart 2009, Kritzwiser 1957, Hellema 1995). Around six percent of the refugees returned shortly to Hungary. Most returnees were from Belgium (15%), the Netherlands, and Switzerland (7–8%) (KSH 1957). Their decision of homecoming was driven by a variety of issues such as their detrimental personal fate, their disillusionment in the West, homesickness, social and cultural clashes in the new environment, and illusions about opportunities at home (Tóth 2009, Lénárt 2006, Borbándi 1985).

3. Refugee and Acculturation Theories

In this part, we present various concepts regarding the integration of refugees in their new country. Beyond acculturation models, we include elements of refugee theories, which explain the dynamics and consequences of the newcomers' resettlement.

Definition

Although the distinction between refugees and (voluntary) migrants is often blurred, this study accentuates their difference. According to various authors (Kunz 1981, Black 2001, Joly 2002, Barlay 2006), the refugee is a distinct social type as s/he moves from his/her home country to a new place against his/her will. The doubt to uproot oneself and the lack of positive migration motives to resettle somewhere else are the refugees' main characteristics, deviating from voluntary migrants (Kunz 1981, Oravecz et al. 2005). In this research, we apply Bernard's description:

> Refugee exodus, by individuals or groups, is forced, sudden, chaotic, generally terror-stricken, and at least initially productive of social and psychological disruption.....Some refugees, it is true, have fled because of less dramatic pressures. They have felt intellectually stifled, politically oppressed, economically or culturally regimented, and to such an extent that they believed they were compelled to leave and could no longer stay even if they were tempted to do so for other motives. The vast majority of refugees, however, are afflicted by the more overwhelming fears of death and loss of freedom. (Gilad 1990: 52)

Homeland-Related Factors

Refugee theories are comprehensive in that they enable to better understand the relationship between the various phases of displacement and incorporation within a new societal setting. These phases refer to the preceding situation including the refugees' characteristics, perceptions as well as the homeland-related circumstances, the flight itself, the resettlement and post-resettlement periods including the experiences and integrating outcomes in the host society (Kunz 1981, Pedraza-Bailey 1985, Black 2001, Oravecz et al. 2005, Bolzmann 1994).

The previous section illustrated the role of motivational factors in the dynamics of leaving the home country (e.g. *anticipatory or acute types* of Hungarian refugee movements). In this chapter, we highlight contextual dimensions of refugee theories which may affect resettlement outcomes.

Various theories on refugees (Kunz 1981, Bolzman 1994, Joly 2002) emphasize individuals' ideological-national orientation in the host country, which may affect their integration. Attitudes towards the home country define the refugees' behaviour in as well as their commitment and adaptation to the receptive society.

For instance, certain groups lead a life in an idealistic settlement according to their specific religious, ideological, etc. motivations, while others invest all their efforts to prepare a revolution in the home country to overthrow the political

system. Clinging firmly to their political commitment, their past and homeland, they consider themselves temporary inhabitants in the place of exile. They take the new society into account as far as it has relevance to their partisan endeavour and return project (Joly 2002).

Refugees might also feel guilty because they do not share the fate of their left-behind countrymen. They can perceive every attempt to integrate into the new society as treason. The ethnic community can play a strict social control over the individuals. They can request from members to show solidarity, historical responsibility, to strive for the freedom of their compatriots at home, and get prepared for the return (Bolzman 1994, Kunz 1981). Again others will head for a full assimilation process and for material success in order to forget the past and get rid of disgrace.

Beyond these more extreme attitudes, the realists aim at an integrated accommodation (Kunz 1981) in the new society, in which they acknowledge their societal role of both the past (there) and the present (here). After recognizing the point of no return, these refugees re-orientate themselves within the reception society. They develop a positive attitude towards their country of resettlement and a new beginning. They may fully assimilate if they, prior to the flight, did not form a community and if the host country encourages it. Fragmentation within this refugee population occurs if these refugees were not part of a minority group in the home society that may further intensify due to intra-group competition and by forces of the host society (Joly 2002, Bolzman 1994).

Eloquent sociopolitical changes in the native land, for instance, democratization processes, may confront one-time refugees to distinguish myth from reality: either to return to their homeland or to stay in their second home. This post-exile stage may force refugees to evaluate their adaptation in the one new society. The time spent in the host country, the disparities of the economic level between the two countries as well as supportive measures of governments may influence their choice (Pedraza-Bailey 1985: 14, Kunz 1981, Joly 2002).

Factors Related to the Host Society

The structure and nature of the host country is of elementary importance for the refugees' resettlement chances and outcomes. At their final destination, the refugees start to re-orientate by exploring the norms and practices of the receptive society. Their vital purpose is to find a 'niche' for themselves in which they can consistently combine their past and their future expectations (Kunz 1981, Bolzman 1994, Oravecz 2005).

Table 2 provides an overview of the three main aspects of the host society, which influence how the refugees adapt to their new surroundings. Cultural compatibility refers to the sociocultural distance between the home and the host society, such as language, values, or traditions. A linguistically strange

environment may give the refugee the feeling of loneliness, while the inability to accept unaccustomed habits can aggravate it by diminishing social contacts.

Population and economic policies, including the opportunity and labour market structure of the host country, can also have determining effects. Countries with an augmentative strategy and shortage in manpower welcome refugees and migrants and provide them with opportunities. Desirable newcomers are seen as contributors to the national economic progression (Salomon 1991, Gold 1993, Lucassen 2005).

Table 2. *Host-related factors*

Cultural compatibility	Language
	Values
	Traditions
	Religion
	Politics
	Food
	Interpersonal relations
Population and economic politics (opportunity and labour market structure)	Augmentative, growth-oriented
	Self-sufficient
Social attitudes	Monistic-assimilationist
	Pluralistic-integrationist
	Sanctuary societies – tolerant

Sources: Kunz 1981: 47, Lucassen 2005

Demographically self-sufficient countries are less keen on receiving large swaths of refugees. Notwithstanding, these societies are not preoccupied with the question of immigration and could provide a more tolerant environment. More mature and self-assured countries in the 1960s, such as the Netherlands, Great Britain, Switzerland, or France, accommodated the refugees' own choices to preserve their traditional values and homeland orientation (Kunz 1981, The Economist 1957).

The (lack of/) presence of a supportive social space of the host country to stimulate positive acculturation is influential too. Monocultural societies tend to have less generosity towards immigrants – clinging to their own culture – than pluralistic ones. Integration-oriented policies inspire migrants to assimilate, though homeward-looking individuals are often exposed to stress due to emotionally laden decisions (Kunz 1973, 1981). The availability of rights is vital in that they can assure opportunities to generate cultural, economic, and social capital (Hatoss 2003: 71, König 2009).

Furthermore, if the refugees in the new environment meet people from their own cultural and national/ethnic background, the integration process can accelerate. Their guidance on the reactions and behaviour from members of the

receptive society can motivate the newcomers to identify with the new country (also Hatoss 2003, Bosswick et al. 2006).

Finally, geopolitical circumstances can affect the way states relate to refugees and immigrants. The enmities of the Cold War fundamentally changed the approach of Western countries towards refugees (Salomon 1991, Gold 1993): setting up generous programmes were not based 'on humanitarian motives but the desire to discredit the communist nations from which they [had] fled' (Gold 1993: 202, Salomon 1991). Political refugees thus 'became touching symbols' upon which legitimate foreign policy could be built (Pedraza-Bailey 1985: 7, Barlay 2006).

Acculturation

When refugees recognize that their stay is not temporary anymore, their attention towards the host society intensifies. This phase of mobilizing resources to reposition in a new surrounding is at the core of acculturation theories. They comprehend 'those phenomena which result when groups of individuals from different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with each other, and subsequently, there are changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups' (Navas et al. 2007: 68). We enrich this definition with the concept of 'psychological acculturation' (Graves 1967), which does not only entail ecological, sociocultural, and institutional group changes but also mental adjustments in attitudes, values, lifestyles, and identity.

Berry's (1974, 1980) acculturation model (*Table 3*) categorizes immigrants according to their orientation. At their first intercultural encounter in the dominant (host) society, they are confronted by two major questions: 1) Is sustaining the original cultural heritage important? 2) Is it necessary to engage in contacts with the members of the dominant receptive country? (Ward 2008: 106).

Table 3. *Berry's acculturation model*

Participation	Cultural maintenance	
	Yes	No
Yes	Integration	Assimilation
No	Separation	Marginalization

Source: Ward 2008: 106

The answers lead to four possible acculturation outcomes (*Table 3*). For instance, integration occurs if both cultural maintenance and intercultural contacts are important, while, if neither dimensions are crucial, migrants become marginalized (Bosswick 2006: 11).

In studies in the 1920s and 30s, integration and assimilation were interchangeable concepts, where assimilation referred to successful integration into a new society.

However, academics have since then developed a sharp demarcation between the two notions (Navas et al. 2007, Hoffmann-Nowotny 1986, Bolzman 1994).

Assimilation is seen as a 'one-sided process in which immigrants and their descendants give up their culture and adapt completely to the society they have migrated to' (Bosswick et al. 2006: 4, Bolzman 1994). However, others (Alba 1999, Esser 2004) argue that this term has become so distorted that it only implies a 'unidirectional and suppressive process' (Bosswick, 2006: 6). In their opposition, they claim that assimilation is much more about the lessening of social difference between groups, such as values or income disparities.

The term integration signifies the process of intensifying relationships within a societal scheme and including new actors into its institutions. Hence, integration is the outcome of the 'conscious and motivated interaction and co-operation' between persons and groups (Bosswick et al. 2006: 2, Lockwood 1964). Based on Berry's model, numerous empirical examinations indicate that integration is the most preferred strategy by immigrants and refugees. In psychological and sociocultural terms, they found integration the most adaptive process that produced the most positive outcomes (Ward 2008: 106).

In their understanding acculturation as a complex non-exclusionary process, other researchers (Navas et al. 2007, Lucassen 2005, Reinsch 2001, Doomernik 2002, Dreisziger et al. 1982, Esser 2002) developed a more integral and nuanced framework.

They split acculturation into two various domains – structural and (cultural-) identificational –, which can result in divergent strategies and outcomes (*Figure 1*). For instance, 'assimilation' may occur in certain spheres of life in order to survive (work, economics, labour market), while other areas (culture, identity, language, family, religion, ways of thinking) may show the patterns of 'integration'.

Sources: Lucassen 2005

Figure 1. *A revised acculturation model*

The structural dimension (*Figure 1*) refers to the socioeconomic position the individual gains in the new society. This signifies the achievement of status in several fields such as economy, labour market (professions), systems of education, welfare, and housing. The position acquired in the central institutions of the reception society, and not in (ethnic) subsystems, indicates the level of being recognized (Phenninx & Martiniello 2004).

Identificational integration (*Figure 1*) relates to the process of gaining the necessary knowledge, cultural standards, skills and competencies which enable the refugee to act successfully in the new society. It implies individual cognitive, behavioural, and attitudinal transformation and also whom/what immigrants and their descendants identify themselves with (ethnicity, nationality, culture, etc.). Immigrants' identification with the central societal institutions of the host society and sharing its goals are necessary to integrate. Cultural and identificational acculturation is a pre-condition to become structurally integrated (Bosswick et al. 2006).

Identificational integration relates to the connection to both the new home country and the level and ways refugees handle their original culture and identity.

The abrupt transformation of the sociohistorical context produces a multifaceted challenge for migrants and refugees. Migration is an experience of a 'wholesale loss of one's meaningful and valued objects: people, things, places, language, culture, and it not only puts one's identity on the line but puts it at risk' (Bledin 2003: 99). Adults can find themselves thrown back to their adolescent period with identity confusions (Ward 2008).

People become aware of their cultural-ethnic identity when it gets separated from its original environment (Rapport et al. 1998, Sengun 2001). In the act of 'othering', individuals and groups set their own cultural frameworks against external ones (Crang 1998, Rapport et al. 1998). Such cultural boundaries secure an own identity. Members of a(n) (imagined) community (Anderson 1983) collectively experience the belonging to the same species and culture (Crang 1998, Bledin 2003).

However, social exchanges in the new environment trigger refugees to re-establish their self-image. Change and continuity are intertwined, meaning adaptation to a new (critical) situation while also considering the past: the person in question is not only an 'immigrant to' but also an 'emigrant from' (Bledin 2003: 101, Hatoss 2003). As a consequence, initial 'othering' can gradually give way to embrace both the original and the new culture.

Immigrants with dual cultural identities and sense of belonging feel emotionally attached and committed to the country of resettlement while maintaining their positive affinity towards their roots. Multiple identities and bicultural competencies can function as an enrichment rather than competing and can become an asset for both the individual and the host society (Bolzman 1994, Hatoss 2003, Collier et al. 1988, Lavie et al. 1996, Sik 2000, König 2009).

Nevertheless, Bosswick et al. (2006) warn that biculturalism will result in additional resources only in the case of highly educated migrants. Semi-biculturalism and semi-bilingualism, characteristic of low-skilled individuals, often turn into mobility trap and loss of opportunities (Bolzman 1994, Côté 2006).

Furthermore, dual identity can also result in ethnocultural identity conflicts (Baumeister et al. 1985, Ward 2008). The multiply referred selves can become incompatible and compete with each other. Such a cultural distance occurs most conspicuously in case of migrants whose native countries do considerably differ in culture and language from those of their new society. Such identity struggles lead to the absence of commitment to the place of resettlement or intergenerational conflicts (Ward 2008).

The mobilization of co-ethnic individuals in the form of associations or organizations can be an initial mechanism to create a sense of belonging in a new environment (Bozic 1999). Community networks can support entrepreneurship, economic possibilities, sharing the language, and maintaining of ethnic traditions (Bolzman 1994, Gold 1992). However, the sole integration into (ethnic) subcultures, outside the core institutions of the new country, can give rise to 'segmented assimilation' (*Figure 1*: Path 2), which produces societal marginalization.

Moving to a new sociocultural milieu implies a more mobile and broader concept of home and belonging. For the ones alienated from their native country, home is something plurilocal, 'it is neither here or there…rather, itself a hybrid, it is both here and there – an amalgam, a pastiche, a performance' (Rapport et al. 1998: 7). Diaspora members live in 'third time-spaces' (Rushdie 1991), imaginary homelands, wherein they occupy a space between two cultural assemblages of the country of settlement and 'back home' (Lavie et al. 1996, Crang 1998). This socialization process demands creativity, acceptance, and approval from immigrants in order to avoid isolation and rejection (Bledin 2003, Bhabha 1994).

Identity construction, similar to other aspects of acculturation, has a multifaceted, selective, and dynamic nature and is further influenced by a wide-ranging array of elements such as the refugees' personal features, resources as well as the societal background in both the home and host society. For instance, the new ways the society at large categorizes immigrants also influence their self-definition (Hatoss 2003, Oriol 1984).

4. Conceptual Framework

Based on the previously elaborated theories, we constructed a conceptual framework for our empirical investigation. The model introduces potential relations between factors that may influence the refugees' acculturation form and degree.

The framework specifies two main acculturation dimensions – structural and (cultural-) identificational – which interrelate with each other. The individuals' own assets, such as personal traits, background, and resources, may have a determining power on acculturation. We stress the importance of external agencies – the home- and host-related components – by illustrating their potential effects on the individual(s) or groups that on their turn indirectly lead to specific acculturation outcomes.

Since 'refugees do not live in a vacuum' (Pedraza-Bailey 1985: 4) but at the intersection of personal troubles and historical issues (C. Wright Mills 1961), the wider sociopolitical context is of substantial importance. These forces impact on the refugees' fate, perceptions, and actions concerning their flight and acculturation. In order to find an answer to our main research question, we draw on the linkages of the conceptual model to postulate the following sub-questions:

1. What characterizes the refugees' behaviour and orientation towards the home country and the land of exile?

2. How have the receptive attitudes and the opportunity structure of the Netherlands effected the acculturation progression of the Hungarians?

3. Which dimensions did the Hungarian refugees perceive as the most critical in their acculturation development?

4. What characterizes the relationship among the members of the Hungarian community in the Netherlands and what is the function of Hungarian associations?

5. How do the Hungarians identify themselves in relation to either cultural/national identity and sense of belonging?

6. To what extent do acculturation outcomes differ in the case of various refugee waves?

5. Evaluation of the Research Findings (2000)

Although the limited number of interviewees does not allow general statements, the personal narratives enable us to sketch regular patterns of the acculturation of Hungarians in the Netherlands. Along the themes of the sub-questions, we structure and present our findings in this chapter.

5.1. The Refugees' Orientation towards the Home Country and the Land of Exile

The majority of the interviewed Hungarians did not deal with political issues before the exile, and this did not change in the reception society. They considered fighting against the Hungarian dictatorship from abroad impossible: 'What could

we have done then? Against the strong military grip of the Soviet Emporium on the country?'[1]

Initially, many 56ers hoped to return within a few years 'if the communist system was going to be brought down at home' or if the situation would have 'normalized there within 10 years'. At the outbreak of the 1956 uprising, many refugees of the earlier migration waves also thought that their return was near.

Despite these hopes, refugees quickly recognized the need to adapt to the new situation. Accepting the norms of the Dutch society was natural for them. Already from the outset, learning the language, finishing studies, or acquiring a job were their priorities: 'To make it in life, to succeed in the career and get material advances'. The interviewees agree that starting anew somewhere is 'to take up the rhythm of the new country and to adjust….otherwise it will not work'. They had no illusions of the rich West either. They did not expect to get things for free as they knew that they would have to work very hard to achieve something.

In the dictatorial period of the 1950s, Hungary was an isolated country wherein inhabitants 'knew nothing about the world and did not speak any languages'. The novelties in the new country, their curiosity and learning appetite were overwhelming. Leading a loose life, being free to do anything one wanted were entirely new life aspects, unusual in the tyrannical climate of the home country.

Hungarian refugees established associations and clubs in order to nurture their cultural heritage (see more details below). The social elite of the diaspora aimed to cultivate and educate their compatriots according to democratic values and historical awareness.

The majority of the interviewed did not feel guilty for leaving their homeland as the flight was necessary to save life. Only few of them blamed themselves because of the left-behind Hungarians. They felt guilty or as traitors because friends or relatives were cut off from any opportunities at home or had a tragic end: 'It was not us who were the heroes….the heroes are those who remained in Hungary and got through all of this.'

The refugees kept their contacts with their family and friends in Hungary. This happened through letters by a coded language or occasionally by telephone since a personal visit was impossible in the first 10 years. The post-revolutionary retaliatory measures in Hungary would have exposed them. With the softening political regime in Hungary at the end of the 1960s, they started to visit Hungary. As of the early 1970s, the Hungarian regime, in dire need of cash and hard currency, initiated a charm offensive in the form of tourism or investments to attract back 'our compatriots broken away'. The secret police, nonetheless, kept record of Hungarian visitors from the West.

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1   In the followings, the quoted parts of the interview were translated into English by the author.

5.2. The Receptive Attitudes and the Opportunity Structure of the Netherlands and Their Effects on the Acculturational Development of the Hungarians

The Dutch reacted fiercely and enthusiastically upon the political uprising in Hungary (Hellema 1990, 2006). Prominent people and politicians in The Hague condemned the Soviet intrusion and expressed their disgust and worries for human rights violation. Spontaneous demonstrations and protest gatherings swept over the whole country (Douwes 2006, Herczegh 2002). This firm standpoint in the Netherlands can be explained by the long tradition of anti-communism as well as by opportunism, evolving by the actual geopolitical circumstances (Hellema 1995).

Nevertheless, Cabinet Drees reacted reserved and declared that the Netherlands could not do much for Hungary. They refused the first requests for political asylum (Hellema 1995: 180). Dutch cabinet members disagreed whether and to what extent the Netherlands should take refugees. The actual economic difficulties and the housing problems in the country reinforced the unwillingness. Finally, labour market shortages played a decisive role to allow some 5,000 Hungarian refugees. The condition was that the new migrants would only temporarily stay in the Netherlands. However, other countries were reluctant to accept more refugees.

The First Chamber criticized the cabinet for its opportunistic attitude of making virtue out of necessity by recruiting people for national socioeconomic targets. The Dutch selection team in the camps severely screened the refugees to choose people who were politically trustworthy and not communist, not poor and not gypsies (Hellema 1995: 181, 2006; Kövi 1987). The Dutch government behaved as a 'tight book-keeper' (Hellema 1995: 181) to keep state expenditures minimal. The share of the Hungarians in the Netherlands was therefore significantly lower than in other states (Nemes 1999; Douwes 2006; Hellema 1990, 2006).

However, upon their arrival, Hungarian refugees had a very warm and impressive welcome. Queen Juliana greeted them personally. A National Commission for the Hungarian Refugees was set up to coordinate all tasks concerning their reception and integration (Van der Graaf, 2006, Tóth 2006; *Figure 1*). The civil society extensively contributed too to ease the suffering and difficulties of the refugees (Douwes 2006, Kerkhoven 2006).

Even after 50 years, the interviewed people express their enthusiasm and gratitude for their reception in the Netherlands. The respondents pointed to the liberal, open, and tolerant attitude of the Dutch as main causes of this sympathy. They have not encountered discrimination because of their Hungarian origin.

The personal chronicles also recollect the abundant economic and institutional opportunities. Although they were moneyless those days, Hungarian refugees did not have to suffer hunger or any inconveniences. With the support of the

University Asylum Funds (Universitair Asielfonds), a high proportion (95%) of the refugee students acquired a university degree within a few years.

The newcomers could benefit from the Dutch opportunity structure and labour market. 'Everyone could get a job where he or she wanted [to] or to start up studies at preference'. Working-class people were offered to follow trainings of craftsmanship and could shortly find a job in factories and mines. Their fair remuneration was suitable to lead a decent life and secure stable home circumstances for the family.

Although in that period no official integration policy existed in the Netherlands, the Dutch state did its utmost to encourage the incorporation of the refugees into the economic and social structure. Having learnt from the integration problems of the Ambonese in the early 1950s, the authorities prevented the geographical clustering of the Hungarians. The refugees were gradually distributed in and within Dutch municipalities (Jansen 2006: 120).

The respondents who arrived with the wave of 1947/48 did not receive such a devotion. They came individually and not in a mass flight after a thwarted liberating revolt. At the beginning, the Dutch distrusted them as Hungary used to be an ally of Germany in the war. Some experienced an initial hostile treatment of a Nazi collaborator. Other respondents, though, valued the good-willing, supportive, and polite Dutch. While in Germany Hungarian exiles always remained 'Der Ungarn', the Dutch approach put their personality and deeds centrally.

5.3. The Most Critical Dimensions in the Acculturation Development

Being torn out of their home and family, the first times were difficult for the Hungarian exiles. The unfamiliar environment with its different cultural practices, not knowing the language and, for many, the long process of acquiring a university degree 'all required a great deal of patience, deliberation and endurance of us'.

At the same time, their accounts relate to a smoothly-going integration, a fluent life switch in the Netherlands. They recall that 'we simply accepted that this is another culture, and this is the key of success'. Due to their young age, they could be flexible, and they avoided conflicts. Their zealous efforts to build up a new life, their suddenly gained freedom and joy and 'the possibility to live as a human' probably faded the cultural differences. They recollect no homesickness or alienation.

Despite post-war hostilities, emigrants of the 1947/48 waves could continue in the Netherlands the type of life they had conducted in pre-communist Hungary. They recognized a similar societal structure and way of life.

Nevertheless, oblivion and the long time passed ever since can clarify the overtly positive personal accounts. Hungarian psychologist Professor Ottó Táborszky, who assisted the refugees at the beginning, argues that both students

and workers went through significant ordeals in the first stages. Young refugees were confronted by two major aspects: to get used to a strange environment so that it does not feel alien anymore and to accept that the homeland had been lost.

The refugees' acclimatization occurred in various phases.

The first, short phase was an optimistic period in which the exiles thought that everything was possible in a free country. Their euphoria bore high expectations.

This joyous chapter was soon followed by a longer period of disillusionment. Confronted by a culture shock, they endured estrangement and emotional problems. They sought each other's company to reflect on the new setting and to criticize the Dutch customs. Eating habits, the religiously pillarized society, and boarding-house lodgings were the most unpleasant experiences. They felt alone, insecure, and not being loved, which could lead to depression, paranoia, or aggression. They distrusted both the Dutch and the fellow Hungarians. Many suffered from homesickness, some committed suicide.

Some interviewees complained that 'we worked like slaves for a few cents, they exploited us', what was opposed by other Hungarians, blaming their negative personal attitudes. Some also recalled miners in Limburg, who caused bad reputation for the Hungarian community. These people, in the hope of 'quick money without hard work', got disenchanted and returned to Hungary. Some of them had a tragic and derelict life as they could not find their place anywhere anymore.

Temperament was another major theme in the (perceived) cultural gap. Hungarians said to be accustomed to talk a lot and passionately about literature, poetry, history, and other cultural and life matters, while 'the Dutch are much more pragmatic and are prone to measure everything in material sense only'. However, others cherished 'the Dutch mentality of giving room to all opinions, fitting to my own way of doing and thinking'.

After learning the background of the local practices, the majority of the Hungarian refugees accepted the differences in the sense of 'live and let live'.

The next stage covered the period of realism when the refugees objectively compared the diverse cultures. This was exchanged by the last stage when the immigrants realized that cultural differences are normal in life. Dealing with this subject can even bore them.

5.4. The Characteristics and Function of the Relationship among Members of the Hungarian Community and Their Associations

The respondents evaluate the attitudes within the Hungarian community differently. This reveals that the Hungarians, despite the mass escape, did not form a group. They represented various social classes, had different political views and interests, and developed diverse lifestyles. The only mutual issue, the escape from Hungary, was insufficient to mould a staunch community.

The interviewed from the 1947/48 refugee waves made vast efforts to prepare the reception of their compatriots in 1956. They arranged the practical issues so that the newcomers could rapidly start to accommodate: 'they organized many things perfectly. They assisted as translators and set up trainings in Hungarian for the workers'. Being in the neighbourhood of the 'old' Hungarians gave them emotional support, encouragement, and friendship in time of exploring life in the new country.

Some from the 1947/48 streams were of opinion that the 56ers did not mix with them for some years as 'they wanted to be among themselves, sharing the same experiences'. Coming from politically different milieux, they did not understand each other at the beginning.

At the same time, the arrival of the new Hungarians meant a refreshment of blood in the extended network of existing associations. It resulted in a revival of activities related to the Hungarian culture, traditions, and sometimes preparation for liberating the beloved country of birth. Many shared the idea that an exile should adapt to the new society without ignoring the key features of its cultural and moral heritage: 'A refugee is, however, not simply an immigrant. He left his country for moral reasons! He left his country with an obligation for the country, for the people he left (…) You have your duties for both the Netherlands and Hungary in an ideal sense' (Tóth 2006).

The consolidation under the Kádár government brought political changes to Hungary in the 1970s. This produced conflict within the (elitist) cultural societies of the diaspora. Some saw the time ripe to carefully open towards Hungary and to invite writers, artists, and scientists. Others morally opposed any interaction with the official authorities of Hungary due to the lack of a democratic, pluralistic political system.

Club formations among Hungarians often took place through localized networks, based on, for instance, sharing similar education, religious background, and comparable societal values. However, many have not become members of Hungarian associations. They felt no need for a similar institutionalized framework or had no time due to their busy lifestyles. Many are satisfied with their friends of Hungarian, Dutch, or other origins, and intend to keep their relationships on personal ties.

Nowadays, longstanding organizations fight against extinction. 'There are many of us who have died….we are getting smaller and smaller'. They hope that the recently arrived Hungarians might be a solution, although their newly formed associations display other preferences to preserve ethnic practices.

5.5. Self-Identification Relation to Cultural-Ethnic Identity and Sense of Belonging

For all respondents, the Hungarian identity means their historical, cultural, and emotional roots. This is something organic which dominates their minds and hearts. They remained Hungarians, and externalities cannot overrule it. The Hungarian spirit and way of thinking was sowed in their youth, by cultural customs and by reading literature, poetry, and history. Their (Dutch) spouses confirm this and add that their husbands have a typical Hungarian character.

Having Hungarian companionship did not only provide solace at the initial phase but also strengthened their feeling of belonging to the nation outside the territories of Hungary – just like visiting their country of origin as of the end of the 1960s.

Some underline that being a 'real Hungarian' should also be manifested by deeds – for instance, by participating in Hungarian activities –, while others do not need intense interaction within the community to maintain their Hungarian identity. Reading Hungarian books, journals, listening to Hungarian music, or watching Hungarian television are other ways to cultivate the ethnic legacy.

Notwithstanding, a dual mentality characterizes most respondents. They have an emotional world of a twofold belonging. After 50 years in the Netherlands, they consider it natural that they possess many Dutch features. In the socialization process in their new home, they internalized other ways of feeling and thinking.

Being a 'Dutch with Hungarian origin', a 'Hungarian living in the Netherlands', or 'feeling neither Dutch nor Hungarian' express their dual sense of identity and the sense of in-betweenness. Leaving an isolated Hungary half a decade before and nurturing an old and a new cultural identity made them respect and be open towards different cultures. Identity has a situational nature as they feel different everywhere: 'in the Netherlands, I am a Hungarian, while in Hungary I am a Dutch'. Beyond a specific nationality, some respondents accentuate their European or cosmopolitan personality.

Multiple identities enriched these Hungarians instead of an internal conflict: 'they get along well, they do not quarrel with each other'. Being Dutch equals with the issue of existence, based on rational grounds. Their thankfulness and solidarity towards the Netherlands fortify their Dutch identity.

Intergenerational upbringing was another way of fostering the cultural heritage. In households of Hungarian parents, they spoke Hungarian but also gave full attention to the Dutch language for the sake of their children's educational advancement. They are disappointed that their efforts did not make their children 'real Hungarians' with a deep cultural and historical interest: 'we tried everything, but it is not possible to bring the feeling over in a dominating alien society'.

In mixed households, which is most of the cases, Dutch is the lingua franca, which hindered even more to transfer the linguistic and cultural heritage. During an active professional life, Hungarian fathers could not have much influence. Most of the respondents take it as a realistic outcome and are satisfied with their children's sympathy towards their parents' old homeland.

This fits the notion of 'the economics of language' (Bordieu 1997), which discloses the gradual abandoning of a language that does not have a significant economic and societal function. Despite supply by the first generation, there is little or no demand from the second and third generations.

Their home is dual too. In the Netherlands, they built up their professional and family life, but during each visit to Hungary they feel at home too. They occupy no single cultural spaces and are entangled in circuits of cultural, social, and economic ties in both countries. Having a second residence there enables them a dioecious life.

However, they did not intend to permanently return to Hungary, even after its democratization at the end of the 1980s. Due to their embedded existence in the Netherlands, they have not felt themselves refugees for a long time. They deliberately chose to start a new life and to remain in the new country. Also, the borderless world and the modern technologies make communication much easier nowadays. In addition, the old homeland became a different place from the one they had left behind five decades ago. They share the same language, but the words carry dissimilar meanings. Socialization in the democratic West and in a communist system produced various mentalities and world views.

Their experience varies concerning how people in Hungary look at them. Family relations are mostly pleasant and friendly, and relatives in Hungary often provided them with moral support. They also experienced antipathy, misunderstanding, and prejudice: 'for you, it is easy to talk….you left and live cheerfully in the West'. This can make them feel ashamed. Furthermore, some returned émigrés displayed an arrogant attitude, feeling superior as Western citizens. The interviewed persons, nevertheless, understand why Hungarians reject the advice of their emigrated compatriots on their daily life and politics: 'They made it all through in the old system, they remained, and we took a flight…..people who left are definitely gone…they should now not tell Hungarians how to act.'

5.6. Acculturation Outcomes of Various Refugee Waves

Despite the differing flight and arrival circumstances of the various refugee waves, Hungarians acculturated within the Dutch society very successfully.

They conquered the initial difficulties which were different for the various refugee flows. Due to the absence of a solid diaspora, the earlier migrants (of 1947/48) could not count on the help of other Hungarians in the Netherlands.

Nor did their arrival trigger sympathy among the Dutch people due to world war memories. They were more exposed to loneliness and had to counter the acculturation problems on their own.

On the contrary, the first stage of the 56ers' arrival was more favourable than their fellow sufferers a decade before. They were received in the Western world as anti-communist heroes and also supported by the Hungarian Diaspora. Therefore, their expectations were high concerning an easy adjustment and fast economic advances in the Netherlands. Being educated by communist ideology, some of them overestimated the role of the state in caring for its citizens. That explains the substantial amount of returnees to Hungary. Notwithstanding, the ones who remained emphasize their individual approach of will-power and point to their own determination to perform independently of external assistance and care.

The earlier refugee flows display no or limited return patterns. They arrived from a Hungarian (capitalistic) societal system which more or less matched the political and economic circumstances in the Netherlands. They considered strong individual responsibility and natural endeavour in order to integrate.

We cannot make a noteworthy distinction on the acculturation outcomes between the various refugee flows. The respondents perceive their own life and integration path satisfying. They could live up to their own personal convictions, lifestyles and could pursue their professional careers. They acquired good positions in many facets of the Dutch society: in the business, politics, science as well as in the domain of art and culture. Most working-class refugees could build up a pleasant existence too.

Respondents proudly stressed the successful achievements of the Dutch-Hungarians in general. They explain their success and recognition with their flexibility, adjustment capacities, and talent.

6. Conclusions

The refugees of 1956 arrived to a very different country than left-behind Hungary. Landing in a free, democratic country was an appalling contrast to the state oppression, poor economic circumstances, and a widespread societal distrust in their homeland.

Their flight was involuntary though undertaken out of free choice driven by the (perceived) deterioration of the political and economic situation in the homeland and the anxiety of retaliation. They left suddenly, contrary to the earlier, anticipatory refugees, whose fear was not based on an imminent life-threatening situation.

Pre-'56 refugees refused life under the unfolding communistic regime while the 56ers already had tangible experiences of the Bolshevik experiment. After

a short period had passed, hoping to return, they realized that they would stay long or definitively. Their main concern therefore was to start to build a life in the new country.

Their immigration was twofold in that it meant the loss of homeland, on the one hand, and the challenge to create a worthwhile life to deserve the recognition of the host society, on the other hand. Their acculturation occurred in various stages. The initial hardships of alienation and homesickness were mastered by their strategies to tackle the difficulties.

The emigrant existence is the art of learning to surrender. It is about renouncing issues which used to be organic part of the past. The Hungarian immigrants strived for success, and they knew that they had to work harder for it than the natives. Acculturation is a creative and innovative process where they had to replace the losses of their home country, community, family, status, property, culture, and personal identity.

Hungarians from various refugee waves could entirely incorporate into the Dutch society. Their life paths show upward social mobility and active socio-institutional participation in the Dutch society with the retaining of their original culture. This verifies the theoretical insight of Navas et al. (2007) in that various life spheres show various acculturation patterns: while the societal-economic realm is characterized by assimilation, the maintenance of the original culture and identity underlines integration (*Figure 1*: Path 4).

The Hungarians accepted the social and institutional system of the Netherlands and its goals, without repudiating their cultural and national origins. The Dutch values and norms fit their cultural roots (cultural compatibility). They became active in the Netherlands while keeping narrow emotional and physical ties with their native land. Having fluid identities is a unique feeling that brings a particular state of emotions and consciousness. Nonetheless, their biculturalism was not hindering but inspirational to advance, to experiment, and to find a home.

The research reveals a combination of factors that contributed to their fruitful acculturation.

Their young age and thus flexibility, their friendly reception, and the opportunity structure in the Netherlands were decisive. Most of them entered into interethnic marriages that enhanced the pace and intensity of their adjustment. They put maximum effort to gain the necessary knowledge, skills, and competencies to be successful in the reception society. They fostered positive attitudes and behaviour towards the Netherlands and were willing to participate in the society. Their deliberate aspirations to reach self-reliance, work hard, and make their new life blossoming are crucial. Integration was for them a tool and not a barrier to progress in the new environment.

The availability of rights and crucial institutions in the host society, such as education, welfare, or housing, provided opportunities to create economic, cultural,

and social capital. The growth-oriented economic objectives of both the reception country and the refugees combined well for the successful outcome. In addition, the refugees' geographical spreading by the Dutch authorities helped to prevent settlement concentration, which might have hindered integration. Their interethnic relations were inclusionary in that group boundaries dissolved harmoniously. The interviewed Hungarians feel entirely accepted by the Dutch people.

The Hungarian community was a heart-warming experience for the refugees of 1956. Beyond emotional support, the collective fostered mutual symbolic resources such as the language, traditions, and the common history of their country of birth. The community did not function though as a mobility trap but as an adaptive support for getting embedded in the mainstream society in all aspects.

The majority does not intend to return to Hungary anymore. The time spent in the Netherlands, their family as well as the differing mentality, worldviews, and lifestyles of the émigrés and the Hungarians in the homeland are herein vital factors. They have become a different type of Hungarians of dual orientation, being entangled in circuits of cultural, social, and economic ties in at least two countries.

Nevertheless, a gradual assimilation process is taking place due to the vanishing Hungarian identity of their descendants. They could not or only partly transfer the cultural heritage to the next generations. Unlike the 'islands' of little Hungary in the US or Canada, for instance, the Hungarian community in the Netherlands is far too small to keep up continuity or call it a diaspora. It is weakening and threatened by extinction. A comparative study on the acculturation of Hungarian refugees in other countries would enable to better understand the relationship between context-specific determinants and integration outcomes.

Furthermore, research on the Hungarian newcomers of our times could provide insights into the differences and similarities of emigration experiences then and now. The geopolitical circumstances of the Cold War, making émigrés impossible to visit the native country, perhaps also played a role in the successful acculturation of the refugees. These times, Hungarian migrants do not face this anymore. In addition, today's information and communicational technologies assist contacts and lives in separate (virtual) worlds, regardless of time and space. Their impact on migration patterns is another promising research avenue for the future.

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Trilingual Internet Use, Identity, and Acculturation among Young Minority Language Speakers: Some Data from Transylvania and Finland[1]

László VINCZE

Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki
e-mail: laszlo.vincze@helsinki.fi

Tom MORING

Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki
e-mail: tom.moring@helsinki.fi

Abstract. The purpose of the present paper is to explore the dynamics of trilingual Internet use and its relation to minority language identity and acculturation among young Swedish speakers in Finland (N = 201) and Hungarian speakers in Transylvania (N = 388). Typically, a feature of linguistic minorities, trilingualism, provides speakers with the competence to move outside their original cultural realm, a feature that is rewarding at an individual level but may form a threat to the minority language culture. The results indicate in both contexts an extensive use of English alongside the minority language and a restricted amount of use of the majority language on the Internet. Majority language and English-language Internet use are strongly related to acculturation towards majority language speakers and English speakers in both contexts. Majority-language Internet use is significantly and negatively associated with minority language identity among participants in Transylvania but not among participants in Finland. Most interestingly, however, English-language Internet use is significantly and negatively related to minority language identity in both contexts. The findings and their theoretical implications are discussed.

Keywords: Hungarians in Transylvania, Swedish in Finland, Internet, English, trilingualism

1. Introduction

English-language Internet use has become a common phenomenon among young people in different countries and contexts (Leppänen et al. 2009, Leppänen & Peuronen 2012, Thurlow & Mroczek 2011). Apparently, the Internet is not the only way of disseminating the English language; however, it is one of the most influential and vibrant means. Not surprisingly, in light of the digitalization of the media and entertainment industries, more and more scholars have raised their concern about the possible negative side effects of the diffusion of English, usually pointing out the role of English in 'modern homogenizing pressures' (Edwards 2005: 471) and as a challenge for linguistic and cultural diversity (e.g. Crystal 2011, Edwards 2010, Gil 2010, Kraus 2009, Philippson & Skutnabb-Kangas 1997).

Although the headway of English has often been discussed with respect to linguistic globalization and as a threat for linguistic diversity globally, little attention has been paid to how English may affect the survival prospects of languages at a regional level. This is of importance because regional bilingualism and multilingualism entail not only the coexistence of different languages but also discrepancies in size and power relations, which usually divide the regional linguistic landscape into minority and majority languages. Obviously, minority languages are often contested or even challenged by the surrounding majority languages, which involves that minority language speakers frequently pursue an everyday struggle for the use and, relatedly, the existence/retention of their languages. In circumstances like these, the emergence of English constitutes a special challenge. Whereas the regional majority language can be regarded as a natural and 'default' rival language for the minority languages, English enters the regional linguistic landscape as a particular third language, and as such it may be seen as an additional, a second competitive language, particularly for minority languages.

As shown by the EU language survey (Special Eurobarometer 386 2012: 15–37), language proficiency in the total population in Finland and Romania is usually limited to mother tongue plus one foreign language; 75% of the total population in Finland and 48% in Romania would be able to have a conversation in a second language. Trilingualism (mother tongue plus two languages), a typical feature of minority language speakers, is less common in the total population, 48% and 22% respectively. The numbers fall significantly when asking who would be able to communicate online in English, to 51% in Finland and 24% in Romania.

As we have seen in earlier research conducted in Finland, this difference in proficiency between language groups is also clearly visible in the language preference when browsing on the Internet. The Swedish minority in Finland is divided into three groups of relatively equal size, Swedish (44%), Finnish (32%), and English (24%). Mother tongue speakers of the majority language

predominantly used Finnish (92%) and only marginally English (8%) as their preferred language for browsing (Vincze & Moring 2012, 2013).

Against this background, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we inspect the linguistic dynamics of Internet use focusing on the use of the minority language, the majority language, and English among young minority language speakers. More specifically, we aim to ascertain to which extent the different languages are used in various forms of Internet-based behaviours. Second, we will examine how the Internet use of the different languages is connected to minority language identity and acculturation. Acculturation is usually defined as a cultural and psychological change deriving from intercultural contact, that is contact with another culture (e.g. Berry 2012, Sam & Berry 2010). As intercultural contact may take place via diverse channels, several studies revealed the importance of media use – i.e. having contact with another culture via media – in the process of acculturation (Dalisay 2012, Moon & Park 2007, Raman & Harwood 2008, Reece & Palmgreen 2000, Stilling 1997, Woo & Dominick 2003). Yet, while these studies addressed the role of media effects on acculturation into one specific cultural outgroup, the present study will compare how Internet use in the majority language and English associates with the extent to which people adopt cultural features of majority language speakers and native English speakers.

We collected data among young Swedish speakers in Finland and Hungarian speakers in Transylvania, Romania. In terms of ethnolinguistic vitality (Giles, Bourhis, and Taylor 1977), there are considerable differences between the two minority groups, that is they can be characterized by different degrees of demographic capital, status, and institutional support. In particular, Hungarian in Transylvania presents a case in which lower status and weaker institutional support are accompanied by a moderate demographic capital, whilst Swedish in Finland may be considered as a language with high status and institutional support but a lower demographic position.

2. Method

2.1. Participants

Paper-and-pencil questionnaire data was collected among students in two Hungarian schools in Transylvania ($N = 388$) and three Swedish schools in Finland ($N = 201$). The average age of the respondents was $M = 16.09$ ($SD = 1.18$) in Transylvania and $M = 17.42$ ($SD = .58$) in Finland. In Transylvania, 47% of the respondents were males and 53% females, whereas in Finland 48% of the respondents were males and 52% females.

2.2. Measures

Internet language. Participants were asked to assess the proportion (%) of the use of the minority language, the majority language: and English in four domains representing major Internet-based behaviours, (1) browsing, (2) use of social media, (3) information seeking, and (4) interpersonal communication. The subscales were summated in such a manner that they express the total amount of the use of the three languages. The internal consistency of the summated scales was good in both regions. Specifically, in Transylvania for Hungarian Internet use, it was α = .83, while for Romanian Internet use and English Internet use was α = .85. Similarly, in Finland for Swedish Internet use, it was α = .82, for Finnish Internet use α = .87, and for English Internet use α = .84. Detailed results about the subscales are presented in the *Results* section.

Minority language identity. Minority language identity was measured with three 5-point items. Participants were asked how glad and how proud they were to be a Hungarian in Transylvania and a Swedish-speaking Finn in Finland respectively. Also, they were asked how strongly they are attached to their minority language community. The scale had good reliability in both Transylvania (α = .72) and Finland (α = .82). Higher values on this scale indicate higher identification with the minority language group.

Majority language and English acculturation. Four 5-point items were used based on the psychological acculturation scale (Tropp et al. 1999) to measure acculturation into the culture of majority language speakers and into an English-language culture. The items were chosen so that they can measure comparable and meaningful aspects of acculturation. The four items were identical in both regions and also for both the majority language and English. Participants were asked to what extent they feel comfortable with the given language group; to what extent they feel they share most of their beliefs and values with the given language group; to what extend they understand people in the given language group; and to what extent they feel confident that they know how to act within the given language group. The scales had good reliability in both Transylvania (for English α = .79, for Romanian α = .77) and Finland (for Finnish α = .86, for English α = .76). Higher values on this scale indicate higher levels of acculturation.

3. Results

3.1. Internet Use

A two-way within-subjects analysis of variance with language and domain as factors was performed to assess the differences in language use across the various domains among respondents in Finland. The main effect of language was

significant, $F(2, 392) = 44.42$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .19$, but the main effect of domain was not, $F(3, 588) = .68$, $p = .57$. The interaction term between language and domain was also significant, $F(6, 1176) = 134.20$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .41$. The pairwise comparisons indicated that the use of Swedish and the use of English varied significantly across the four domains at the level of $p < .001$. However, with respect to Finnish, the difference was significant only between browsing and social media. The results are depicted in *Figure 1*. Higher scores indicate more use of the given language.

Figure 1. *The use of different languages on the Internet (%) among participants in Finland*

Also, a two-way within-subjects analysis of variance with language and domain as factors was performed in Transylvania to assess the differences in language use across the various domains. The main effect of language was significant, $F(2, 730) = 365.60$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .50$, but the main effect of domain was not, $F(3, 1095) = .95$, $p = .42$. The interaction term between language and domain was also significant, $F(6, 2190) = 242.18$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .40$. The pairwise comparisons indicated that the use of Hungarian and the use of English varied significantly across the four domains at the level of $p < .001$. However, with respect to Romanian, it was only social media which significantly differed from browsing and interpersonal communication. The results are depicted in *Figure 2*. Higher scores indicate more use of the given language.

%

Figure 2. *The use of different languages on the Internet (%) among participants in Transylvania*

From a comparative perspective, it can be seen that in regard to English the difference between the regions is most perceptible in browsing and the use of social media. Whereas in these domains participants in Finland reported a higher degree of use of English and low levels of the local languages, participants in Transylvania reported a similar amount of use of Hungarian and English and low levels of Romanian. When it comes to information seeking, there is only a slight difference between the regions; in this domain, participants use mostly their own language or English, while the use of the majority language is considerably less. Finally, with respect to interpersonal communication, it is remarkable in both regions that participants favour the use of the minority language, whereas the majority language and English are somewhat pushed back. All in all, English appears to be stronger in Internet use among participants in Finland than in Transylvania, and, noticeably, the weakest language in Internet use is the majority language, invariably in both regions.

3.2. Minority Language Identity and Acculturation

Mean values of the levels of minority language identity and acculturation are summarized in *Figure 3*. An independent-samples *t*-test indicated that participants in Transylvania (M = 4.24, SD = .86) identified slightly lower with the minority language than participants in Finland (M = 4.38, SD = .71), t(461) = -2.07, p < .05, η^2 = .01. Next, a split-plot analysis of variance with region as a between-subjects factor and acculturation (majority, English) as a within-subjects factor was performed to assess the differences in acculturation. The main effect of region was significant, F(1, 558) = 385.36, p < .001, η^2 = .41. Post-hoc *t*-tests

demonstrated higher levels of majority acculturation in Finland ($M = 4.05$, $SD = .81$) than in Transylvania: ($M = 2.88$, $SD = .85$), t(572) = -15.77, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .30$. Likewise, the post-hoc comparisons indicated higher levels of English acculturation in Finland ($M = 4.03$, $SD = .66$) than in Transylvania: ($M = 3.01$, $SD = .86$), t(486) = -15.79, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .34$. Neither the within-subjects effects, $F(1, 558) = 1.29$, $p = .26$, nor the interaction term, $F(1, 558) = 2.70$, $p = .10$, were significant. In other words, participants in both regions reported the same levels of majority and English acculturation.

Figure 3. *Mean values of minority language identity and acculturation with majority and English language*

3.3. Associations between Internet Language, Minority Language Identity, and Acculturation

Finally, correlational analyses were conducted to check the associations between Internet language, minority language identity, and acculturation. For the sake of clarity, we report only coefficients which are of major interest.

For Finland, the results of the correlational analyses are summarized in *Figure 4*. As can be seen, Swedish language identity, Finnish language acculturation, and English language acculturation were significantly and positively related to Internet use in the given language. Swedish language identity was not significantly related to Finnish-language Internet use, but it was significantly and negatively related to English-language Internet use. In other words, higher levels of Internet use in English is linked to lower identification with the Swedish language.

Figure 4. *Correlations coefficients*

* p < .05
** p < .01

For Transylvania, the results of the correlational analyses are summarized in *Figure 5*. As can be seen, Hungarian language identity, Romanian language acculturation, and English language acculturation were significantly and positively related to Internet use in the given language. Hungarian language identity was significantly and negatively related to both Romanian-language and English-language Internet use. That is, higher levels of Internet use in English or Romanian are linked to lower identification with the Hungarian language.

Figure 5. *Correlations coefficients*

* p < .05
** p < .01

4. Discussion

The purpose of the present paper is to shed some light on the dynamics of trilingual Internet use and its relation to minority language identity and acculturation among young Swedish speakers in Finland and Hungarian speakers in Transylvania.

In line with earlier studies (Vincze 2012, Vincze & Moring 2012), the results demonstrated the extensive use of English on the Internet in both research contexts. Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, it was also shown that English actually appears to pose a greater challenge for the use of the minority language in both regions than the local majority languages do. Indeed, while participants in Finland as well as Transylvania mostly favour the local minority language and English when using the Internet, the local majority languages seem to 'retreat to the margins' in Internet use.

Next, correlational analyses indicated strong relationships between online language use in English as well as in Finnish and acculturation towards the respective language-related cultures. That is, more use of the majority language and English on the Internet is connected to higher levels of acculturation in each language group. This finding is consistent with earlier studies (see e.g. Dalisay 2012, Moon & Park 2007, Raman & Harwood 2008, Reece & Palmgreen 2000, Stilling 1997, Vincze & Gasiorek 2016, Woo & Dominick 2003). This highlights the prominent role of media use in acculturative processes. However, it is vital to note that studies have seldom addressed the media–acculturation link from the perspective of a third language.

Results also indicated that majority-language Internet use was significantly and negatively associated with minority-language identity among participants in Transylvania, but this relationship was *not* statistically significant among participants in Finland. One potential explanation for this inconsistent finding may be related to the demographic differences between the two research contexts. Indeed, whereas most of our Transylvanian participants are coming from Hungarian-dominated municipalities, where real-life contact with Romanian speakers is limited, our participants in Finland live in municipalities which are populated mostly by Finnish speakers providing frequent contact with the Finnish language and culture in everyday life. Consequently, while majority-language Internet use may deviate considerably from the everyday cultural experiences of our Hungarian-speaking participants, majority-language Internet use just 'fits' everyday cultural experiences of our Swedish-speaking participants. That said, the Internet cannot be seen as a major source of Finnish-oriented acculturation among our Swedish-speaking participants; rather, Finnish-oriented acculturative processes take place through real-life contact with Finnish speakers in the surrounding local environment.

Undoubtedly, our most striking finding is related to the association between English-language Internet use and minority language identity. As it was demonstrated invariably in both regions, English-language Internet use was meaningfully and *negatively* related to minority language identity. Although the effect sizes suggest weak relationships, this finding is of special importance as it is consistent across the two research contexts. Indeed, to our knowledge, no other studies have revealed this pattern among minority-language speakers yet.

The implications of these results are manifold and to some extent paradoxical for the sustainability of the minority language community. As has been noted elsewhere (Lambertz & Mukhametshin 2010), the trilingual competence of the minority community is an asset for the individual speaker who can often gain from these skills not only culturally but also professionally and economically. However, at an aggregate level, these skills may form a threat towards the sustainability of the linguistic community, particularly in situations where the minority language offers lesser opportunities than the majority language – as we can see from our results, particularly English may form a threat here (Kornai 2013; Moring, forthcoming 2017).

These risks, which in the first phase form a threat to the trilingual minority language community, would be, in a longer perspective, counterproductive to the interests of the countries where minorities reside as the benefits from language proficiency would disappear. At the same time, the individual benefits experienced by the minority-language speakers may also lead to a migration of majority-language speakers towards the minority community. This process has been observed, for example, in Finland, where bilingual families with one Finnish parent and one Swedish parent predominantly (65%) tend to register the Swedish minority language as mother tongue for their children (Finnäs 2013: 23). However, irrespective of this surplus in the form of registered mother tongue speakers among children, the gross figures for the Swedish minority language community have shown a tendency to shrink due to a higher level of migration among Swedish speakers. Between 2000 and 2015, almost 10% of the Swedish population in Finland migrated, mainly to Sweden (Kepsu 2016: 4). Thus, the net balance of these processes for the size of the language remains between neutral and slightly negative. Clearly, the study at hand requires further research to validate the findings and to probe deeper into a discussion about their consequences. Among the limitations and shortcomings, for one thing, the findings presented here are based on cross-sectional data. This does not allow for the ascertainment of causality or its direction. This caveat should be kept in mind when inferring the relationships between the concepts used in the study such as minority language identity and Internet language. Also, it is necessary to emphasize that by referring to English we focused merely on the language of Internet use and ignored the cultural content of Internet use. This, in fact, impedes us to draw

unambiguous conclusions about the cultural implications of online behaviour. More particularly, while our focus was on the levels of acculturation in the group of native English speakers, it is highly likely that the greatest part of English-language Internet use does not have such a straightforward cultural direction and does not imply contact with native English speakers and the Anglo-American culture. Apparently, one should also consider other cultural concomitants of English-language Internet use, most importantly the development of international identities and internationalization, i.e. using English without being connected to any specific cultural group.

The scope of the present study opens several paths for further research. An obvious corollary would be the investigation of the relevance and bearings of English-language Internet use among other linguistic minorities. Also, future research should thoroughly examine the potential linguistic, cultural, and psychological antecedents and consequences of English-language Internet use by means of comprehensive conceptual models. Additionally and importantly, a particularly fruitful avenue for future work could be conducting longitudinal studies to inspect the possible impacts of Internet use on the retention of minority languages at individual as well as aggregate levels. This type of research could also be informative with respect to policies that societies may consider in order to maintain and further enhance trilingualism as a cultural and economic asset.

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Between the Word of the Law and Practice: a Case of the Hungarian Speakers in Serbia[1]

Marija MANDIĆ
Humboldt University of Berlin, Institute for Slavic Studies
e-mail: marija.mandic@hu-berlin.de

Sandra BULJANOVIĆ SIMONOVIĆ
University of Belgrade, Philological Faculty
Department of Hungarian Language and Literature
e-mail: sandra.buljanovic@gmail.com

Abstract. The paper initially presents the Serbian legislative framework relevant to the use of minority languages. The ethnolinguistic vitality of the Hungarian-speaking population in Serbia is then analysed, particularly in the Serbian province of Vojvodina. The paper then focuses upon the sociolinguistic survey of Hungarian language use in Belgrade. The emphasis is placed upon the survey responses related to the awareness of language rights among the Hungarian speakers.

Keywords: language rights, Serbia, Hungarian minority, Vojvodina, Belgrade, sociolinguistic survey

1. Language Rights in Serbia

The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, as the fundamental legislative document, was adopted by referendum in 2006. The Serbian language and Cyrillic script were thus proclaimed official in the state (CONST: Article 10). The rights of persons belonging to national minorities are regulated in the Constitution's third section (CONST: articles 75–81). In the sphere of language rights, national minorities are entitled to the official use of their languages and scripts (CONST: Article 75/3). Language rights are explicitly defined in Article 79 dedicated to 'Right to preservation of specificity'. Persons belonging to national minorities are ensured the right to use their symbols in public places, have proceedings

conducted in their native languages before state bodies; they are also guaranteed the right to education in their native languages in state institutions, to use their name and family name in native language in official personal documents, to write traditional local names, names of streets and toponyms in native languages. In areas where they constitute a significant majority of the population, they are also afforded the right to complete, timely, and objective information in their native language as well as to establish their own mass media. The requirements which must be met for persons belonging to minority groups are regulated in detail in special laws.

The Law on Official Use of Languages and Alphabets was passed by the Parliament of Republic of Serbia in 2005 and modified in 2010 (cf. The Law 2010). Minority language rights are regulated in its third section: *The Official Use of Minority Languages and Scripts.* According to the 2010 Law, if the proportion of minority members in a local municipality, according to the last Population Census, reaches 15% percent or more, then the minority is entitled to use its native language and script as an official language in local self-government, alongside Serbian (The Law 2010: Article 11).[2] If the number of minority members reaches at least 2% of Serbia's total population, they are entitled to communicate with state officials in their native language and have a right to get official documents in their native language.[3] In municipalities in which a minority language is not in official use, a member of a national minority has the right to use their native language and script in legal proceedings and to demand that all legal documents which are related to him/her personally are written in his/her native language and script (The Law 2010: Article 16).

In addition to the aforementioned laws, Serbia has also ratified many international documents and agreements that regulate the use of minority and regional languages. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) was ratified in 2006, when Serbia took over obligations for the following languages: Albanian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Romani, Romanian, Ruthenian, Slovak, Ukrainian, and Croatian (The Ratification of ECRML: Article 3). In 2003, Hungary and Serbia and Montenegro concluded a bilateral accord on the mutual protection of their respective national minorities.[4]

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2   The official use of minority languages means that the language can be used in local municipality administration, in front of civil court, in communication between local officials and citizens, in personal documents, in election procedures. Minority members' reaching at least 15% of the total population within a local municipality also entitles them to write in their native language and script administrative names of the state institutions, names of streets, settlements and their parts (The Law 2010: Article 11).

3   If the number of minority members does not exceed 2% of Serbia's population, they are entitled to exercise their language rights via the local municipalities, which should cover all the translation expenses regarding communication between minority members and state officials (The Law 2010: Article 11).

4   Agreement between the Republic of Hungary and Serbia and Montenegro on the Protection of

The Serbian northern province of Vojvodina similarly adopted *The Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina* in 2009, in which 10 national communities were recognized with full equality and collective rights under the law; these are: Serbs, Hungarians, Slovaks, Croats, Bunyevs, Montenegrins, Romanians, Roma, Ruthenians, and Macedonians.[5] The Statute of Vojvodina recognizes six official regional languages, which are used in the provincial government and the official domain: Serbian, Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, Croatian, and Ruthenian.[6] In a nutshell, Serbia – and especially its region, Vojvodina – can boast about liberal and advanced legislation on minority protection and language rights.

2. Hungarian Minority in Serbia: Demography, Language, Institutional Support

Giles, Bourhis, and Taylor employed the analytical framework of ethnolinguistic vitality to determine the social and psychological factors influencing the vitality of an ethnic group (1977: 308). These authors identified three specific types of variables which seem to affect group vitality, as illustrated below in *Chart 1*.[7]

This concept seems adequate for grasping the complex picture of the Hungarian minority in Serbia. According to the demographic indicators, such as birth and emigration rate, and status indicators, such as educational and economic level, Hungarians can be viewed as a community with low vitality. Yet, according to the historical and language status and institutional support, they seem to constitute a vital community. In the following sections, we shall analyse the Hungarian minority with regard to demography (2.1), the status of minority and its language (2.2), and minority institutional support (2.3).


Rights of the Hungarian Minority Living in Serbia and Montenegro and the Serbian Minority Living in the Republic of Hungary, signed on 21 October 2003 (Ratification of Agreement 2004).

5   Article 6 reads as follows: 'Within the scope of its rights and responsibilities, the AP Vojvodina shall contribute to the exercise of a full equality, guaranteed under the Constitution, of Hungarians, Slovaks, Croats, Montenegrins, Romanians, Roma, Bunjevac, Ruthenians, Macedonians and persons belonging to other numerically smaller national minorities – national communities living in its territory and the Serbian people' (STATUTE VOJ: Article 6).

6   Article 24 reads as follows: 'In addition to Serbian language and Cyrillic script, Hungarian, Slovak, Croatian, Romanian and Ruthenian languages and their scripts shall be in official use in authorities of the AP Vojvodina, in conformity with the law. Within the scope of their competences, authorities of the AP Vojvodina shall undertake the measures to ensure a consistent exercise of the official use of languages and scripts of national minorities – national communities stipulated by the law' (STATUTE VOJ: Article 24).

7   Although this analytical framework proved fruitful for sociolinguistics (cf. Vučković 2004; Petrović 2009; Ilić [Mandić] 2014), Petrović (op. cit. 45) points out that it may lead to a simplistic typology of ethnolinguistic groups.

Chart 1. *Taxonomy of the structural variables affecting ethnolinguistic vitality (Giles, Bourhis, Taylor 1977: 309)*

2.1. Demography

Almost the entire Serbian Hungarian population (98–99%) lives in the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina (in Hungarian: Vajdaság), which has an autonomous status. Vojvodina has traditionally been a multiethnic and multilingual region – at present, out of 45 municipalities, 41 are multiethnic (Beretka 2014: 251).[8] However, in Vojvodina, two ethnic communities are the most numerous – Serbian (67%) and Hungarian (13%) (Đurić et al. 2014: 107). Practically, two-thirds of the Hungarians are concentrated in the northern part of Vojvodina, where they make up the absolute or relative majority in eight municipalities.[9] In that way, Serbian Hungarians form more or less a compact territorial continuum with the neighbouring Hungary, which has had an ambivalent influence upon their ethnolinguistic vitality. On the one hand, in the northern and western Hungarian settlements, most of the everyday communication takes place in Hungarian

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8   According to the Serbian law, 'in order to consider a municipality to be multiethnic, 5% of the total number of its inhabitants should belong to a national minority, or the number of all national minority members in total should be at least 10% of the total number of inhabitants' (Gojković 2009: 4).

9   The municipalities with an absolute and relative Hungarian majority are: Kanjiža (in Hungarian: Kanizsa, or Magyarkanizsa with 85.1% Hungarians), Senta (in Hungarian: Zenta, 79.1%), Ada (in Hungarian: Ada, 75%), Bačka Topola (in Hungarian: Topolya, 57.9%), Mali Iđoš (in Hungarian: Kishegyes, 53.9%), Čoka (in Hungarian: Csóka, 49.7%), Bečej (in Hungarian: Óbecse, 46.3%), and Subotica (in Hungarian: Szabadka, 35.6) (cf. Đurić et al. 2014: 111).

language within the 'Hungarian world' (Brubaker et al. 2006: 266), while social interactions with non-Hungarian speakers are less frequent and marked by social distance (Rácz 2014). On the other hand, the closeness of the Hungarian border reduces the necessity and willingness of the Serbian Hungarians to integrate into the Serbian society and fosters their emigration from Serbia to their kin-state of Hungary, which is an EU Member State, unlike Serbia. This presents the possibility to move further on to other western lands.

According to the last Serbian census held in 2011, 253,899 respondents claimed Hungarian ethnicity, which makes 3.53% of the country's total population; 243,146 gave Hungarian as their 'mother tongue', which amounts to 3.4% of the population (2011 census: 22, 55, 63, 71–73; Đurić et al. 2014: 102).[10] Their cultural and political centre is the town of Subotica (in Hungarian: Szabadka), in which there lives every fifth Hungarian in Serbia (50,469). Likewise, Hungarians are concentrated in the following cities: Zrenjanin (in Hungarian: Nagybecskerek) (12,350), Novi Sad (in Hungarian: Újvidék) (13,272), and Sombor (in Hungarian: Zombor, and before Czoborszentmihály) (9,874) (Đurić et al. 2014: 111). The majority of Hungarians in Serbia are Roman Catholics by faith (88.35%), while a smaller group is Protestant (mostly Calvinist) (6.25%) (Đurić et al. 2014: 192).

Although according to the last, 2011 census, Hungarians are the biggest minority in Serbia, the population decline of the Serbian Hungarians over the last five decades appears to be severe, as illustrated below in *Table 1*.

Table 1. *The number of ethnic Hungarians and the total population of Serbia according to the population censuses of 1948–2011 (Đurić et al. 2014: 98–99, 152)*[11]

Year	Hungarians in Serbia	Hungarian native language[11]	Proportion of Hungarians in Serbia (%)
1948	433,701	/	6.64
1953	441,907	442,423	6.33
1961	449,587	449,432	5.88
1971	430,314	430,621	5.09
1980	390,468	374,639	4.19
1991	343,800	348,320	4.39
2002	293,299	286,508	3.91
2011	253,899	243,146	3.53

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10   The legal instructions given to the enumerators said that, according to the Serbian Constitution (CONST 2006), citizens were not obliged to declare themselves in terms of their religion or ethnicity. The 2011 census allowed responses with double declaration of the ethnicity (Serb-Hungarian, Macedonian-Serb, etc.) for the first time. As regards religion, it is not clear whether it refers to active or traditional believers, that is the religion their parents or the family belonged to through generations. In the Serbian censuses, 'mother tongue meant the language which a person learned to speak in its [their] earliest childhood, that is, the language the person considers as its [their] mother tongue if several languages are spoken at the household' (Population Census 2011: 12, 14).

11   Data on mother tongue were not collected in the 1948 census (Đurić et al. 2014: 149)

The critical demographic trend of the Hungarian population has been evident since the 1960s, and in the past five decades the Hungarian population in Serbia has decreased by nearly half. It needs to be mentioned though that a population decline has been a characteristic of almost all communities in Serbia – both minority and majority – for the past two decades. The only exceptions to this demographic trend are the Roma and Bosniaks, who are on the demographic rise (Đurić et al. 2014: 80, 103–104). The reasons for the drop in population in Serbia are the results of the long-standing harsh economic crisis, low birth rate, and high immigration rate. Regarding minorities, assimilation proves to be a consistent source of population decline (Id.: 182). The demographic shrinkage among Hungarians is especially worrying since it began already in the 1960s, a period in Yugoslavia marked by economic and social prosperity.

According to the 2011 census, the birth rate among Hungarians is below the national average (1.96%), and it is approximately 1.80%; the average age in Serbia is 42.2 years, whereas among Hungarians it is 45 years (Đurić et al. 2014: 121, 130). The emigration rate of the Hungarians from Serbia is also above the national average (Id.: 182), and it has increased substantially since the adoption of the amendment of the Hungarian Citizenship Act (2010). This act entitled individuals who were Hungarians by way of ancestry or ethnicity to Hungarian citizenship so long as they could prove knowledge of the Hungarian language. These individuals have been able to apply for naturalization and Hungarian citizenship on preferential terms since 1 January 2011. In that way, Hungarian citizenship was easy to attain for Hungarians living outside of Hungary. This policy, however, created many controversies, counter-measures, and resistance, especially in Slovakia and Romania (Csergő, Goldgeier 2013: 109–110; Arraiza 2013; Blokker, Kovács 2013). In Serbia, it was mostly seen as an opportunity to get a passport to a country belonging to the European Union. Thus, it has been taken as an advantage not only by Hungarians but also by many Serbs and people stemming from mixed marriages, who fulfil the Hungarian citizenship requirements.

2.2. Status

The Hungarian presence in the province of Vojvodina dates back to the 9th century, to the establishment of the Hungarian Kingdom (1000–1946). For centuries, Hungarians had full or limited territorial sovereignty in the region. This historical legacy gave shape to the national and historical awareness among the Hungarians in Serbia, which reinforced a feeling of belonging to comparatively more prestigious culture than the Serbs (Rácz 2017: 190, Rokai et al. 2002).

According to the last, 2011 census, however, the educational attainment of Hungarians is lower than the Serbian national average: 44.47% of Hungarians have elementary school either with four (28.85%) or with eight classes (28.85,

and almost the same number of them – 45.19% – have secondary education, while 9.22% have college or university degree (Đurić et al. 2014: 135). The economic activity of Hungarians is also slightly below a very poor national average: only one third them is employed (30.59%), two-thirds are economically inactive (retired, renters, children, pupils, students, housewives/men, others) (61%), and the others are unemployed (8.21%), (Id.: 139).

○ - Municipalities of Vojvodina where Hungarian language is in official use (2003 data)
Opštine Vojvodine u kojima je u službenoj upotrebi mađarski jezik (podaci iz 2003)

Picture 1. *Vojvodina municipalities where Hungarian is in official use*

Language loyalty among Hungarians is tightly interwoven with a sense of national belonging. According to the 2011 census, there is a high level of correspondence between ethnicity and mother tongue speakers among Hungarians, i.e. almost 96% of declared Hungarians gave Hungarian as their mother tongue. Our findings suggest that the status of Hungarian language in Serbia can be described as a satisfactory one. Namely, Hungarian and its script, as already mentioned, is one of the six official languages of Vojvodina, alongside Serbian, Croatian, Slovak, Ruthenian, and Romanian (STATUTE VOJ: Article

26). More than 10% of the population in more than one third of all Vojvodina municipalities speaks Hungarian natively, whereas in half of all municipalities Hungarian native speakers represent at least 5% of the population (Đurić et al. 2014: 173). In more than 31 towns and municipalities, Hungarian is in official use, which makes around 65% of all Vojvodina municipalities. The picture below illustrates the official data from 2003, when Hungarian was in official use in 29 municipalities.[12]

2.3. Institutional Support

Hungarians in Vojvodina are institutionally and culturally a very well organized minority. They are politically organized into several minority parties, among which the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians is the biggest and the most influential one.[13]

Hungarian as a language of instruction is used at all levels of education. In the Province of Vojvodina, 79 primary and 37 secondary schools offer complete education in Hungarian. Overall, 18,857 children attend primary and secondary schooling in Hungarian, as illustrated in the following table.

Table 2. *Complete education in Hungarian (Report 2016)*

	Number of schools	**Number of classes**	**Number of pupils**
Primary schools	79	1,252 + 153 mixed classes	13,346
Secondary schools – Gymnasium, vocational and technical schools	37	262 + 37 mixed classes	5,511

In addition, Hungarian is taught as an optional subject, *Hungarian with Elements of National Culture*, in 79 primary schools, whereby 2,978 pupils are instructed in this subject. *(Report 2016)*

Hungarian is also a language of instruction at some faculties in Vojvodina: Department for Hungarian Studies at the Philosophical Faculty of the University

12   Provincial Secretariat Republic of Serbia. Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. Provincial Secretariat for Education, Regulations, Administration and National Minorities – National Communities. Available at: http://www.puma.vojvodina.gov.rs/dokumenti/ostalo/sljezik.pdf – last time visited on: 30 December 2016.

13   For the party's name in Hungarian and the website, see: Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (in Hungarian: Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség – http://www.vmsz.org.rs/sr). Other large Hungarian political parties in Serbia are: Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (in Hungarian: Vajdasági Magyarok Demokratikus Közössége – http://www.vmdk.org.rs/sajtovisszhang), Civic Alliance of Hungarians (in Hungarian: Magyar Polgári Szövetség – http://www.mpsz.net), Democratic Party of Vojvodina Hungarians (in Hungarian: Vajdasági Magyar Demokrata Párt – http://www.vmdp.freewebspace.com), The Movement of Hungarian Hope (in Hungarian: Magyar Remény Mozgalom – http://www.mrm.rs), and The Party of Hungarian Unity (in Hungarian: Magyar Egység Párt – http://www.mep.org.rs/index.php/hu) – last time visited on: 30 December 2016.

of Novi Sad and Hungarian-Language Teacher Training Faculty of the University of Novi Sad, which are located in Subotica.[14]

One of the most important institutions is the Institute for the Culture of Vojvodina Hungarians in Senta. Besides, there are many theatres with performances in the Hungarian language: The Novi Sad Theatre, The Hungarian Drama in the National Theatre in Subotica, The Hungarian City Theatre 'Dezső Kosztolányi' in Subotica, The Chamber Stage in Senta, The Travelling Ensemble 'Tanyaszínház', etc.[15]

On its Channel 2 (RTV 2), Radio Television of Vojvodina, the public broadcaster in the province, broadcasts programmes in 9 minority languages, alongside Serbian: Hungarian, Slovak, Ruthenian, Romanian, Bunyev, Ukrainian, Romani, Croatian, and Macedonian. The TV programme in Hungarian, however, is the most represented one among minority languages, with 12 hours and 50 minutes a week of the original RTV 2 production and a total of 42 hours a week, which includes the original production, other TV productions, and reprises. There is also the private Pannon Radio and Television Programme from Subotica, with full-day programmes in Hungarian, and some other private local stations.[16] Hungarian speakers regularly follow, via satellite and cable TV, channels from Hungary. Radio Novi Sad 2 (RTV2), the Vojvodina Radio, and the Catholic-Church-run Radio Maria broadcast full-day radio programmes in Hungarian; additionally, almost every settlement with significant numbers of Hungarians has a local radio station, e.g. Szabadkai Magyar Rádió (RTV Pannon, Subotica), Rádió Régió (Bačka Topola), etc.[17]

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14   For the names in Hungarian and the websites, see: Department for Hungarian Studies at the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Novi Sad (in Hungarian: Újvidéki Egyetem BTK, Magyar Nyelv és Irodalom Tanszék – http://www.ujvidekimagyartanszek.ff.uns. ac.rs), Hungarian-Language Teacher Training Faculty of the University of Novi Sad (in Hungarian: Újvidéki Egyetem Magyar Tannyelvű Tanítóképző Kar – http://www.magister.uns.ac.rs) – last time visited on: 7 February 2017.

15   For the names in Hungarian and the websites, see: Institute for the Culture of Vojvodina Hungarians in Senta (in Hungarian: Vajdasági Magyar Művelődési Intézet – www.vmmi.org), The Novi Sad Theatre (in Hungarian: Újvidéki Színház – http://www.uvszinhaz.com/?lang=hu), The Hungarian Drama in the National Theatre in Subotica (in Hungarian: Szabadkai Népszínház Magyar Társulat – http://www.szabadkaiszinhaz.com), The Hungarian City Theatre 'Dezső Kosztolányi' in Subotica (in Hungarian: Kosztolányi Dezső Színház – http://www.kosztolanyi. org), The Chamber Stage in Senta (in Hungarian: Zentai Magyar Kamaraszínház – https:// www.facebook.com/Zentai-Magyar-Kamarasz%C3%ADnh%C3%A1z-511139032267680/ about/), The Travelling Ensemble *Tanyaszínház* (in Hungarian: Tanyaszínház – http://www. tanyaszinhaz.com/magunkrol.html) – last time visited on: 7 February 2017.

16   For the names in Hungarian and the websites, see: Radio Television of Vojvodina 2 (in Hungarian: Vajdasági Rádió és Televizió – http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/program/drugi-program), Pannon RTV (http://pannonrtv.com/web2) – last time visited on: 7 February 2017.

17   For the names in Hungarian and the websites, see: Radio Novi Sad 2 (in Hungarian: RTV Újvidéki Rádió 2 – http://radiomap.eu/rs/play/novi-sad-2), Hungarian Vojvodina Radio (in Hungarian: Vajdasági Magyar Rádió – http://vajdasagradio.info), Radio Maria (in Hungarian: Mária Rádió – http://www.mariaradio.rs), Szabadkai Magyar Rádió (http://www.szbadkairadio.com), Rádió Régió (http://regioradio.co.rs); last time visited on: 7 February 2017.

Hungarians have *Magyar Szó*, a daily paper published in Hungarian. There are also other newspapers and magazines published in Hungarian, e.g. *Hét Nap* (weekly), *Képes Ifjúság* (weekly – a journal for teenagers published by *Magyar Szó*), *Jó Pajtás* (weekly – a journal for children), *Temerini Újság* (weekly – a local paper of Temerin), *Vajdaság Portál* (Vojvodina portal), *Dél Hír* (Internet news portal), *Napló* (informative and cultural magazine), *Pres Szó* (web portal), *Autonómia – A vajdasági civil portál* (Vojvodina portal for civil society), *Szabad Magyar Szó* (web news portal), *Vajdaság Ma* (informative portal), *Hungarológiai Közlemények* (journal for Hungarian language, literature, and folklore published by the Department of Hungarian Language), *Híd Kör* (monthly – Vojvodina Hungarian literature, art, and social science journal), etc.[18] In addition to current publications, there were also very influential journals for literature, art, and social criticism that played an important role in the Hungarian culture of Vojvodina, but these are currently no longer being published, e.g. *Üzenet* (quarterly – magazine for literature, art, social criticism, and social sciences; last issue in 2006), *zEtna – Magazin a vulkán alatt* (monthly – web magazine and reading room; last issue in 2012), *Létünk* (quarterly – a journal for social, scientific, and cultural issues; last issue in 2015), *Ex Symposion* (quarterly – a journal for literature, art, philosophy, and social criticism; last issue in 2016), *Családi Kör* (weekly – family journal; last issue in 2016), *DNS* (magazine for culture; published by the Hungarian scientific conference of Vojvodina students), etc.[19]

Vojvodina Hungarians also have several publishing houses such as: Forum Publishing House, which publishes books mainly in Hungarian by Hungarian authors from Vojvodina; the publisher zEtna, founded by the *zEtna* magazine, publishes books in Hungarian and Serbian. It has also organized the Literary Festival in Senta since 2004.[20] It is also noteworthy to mention Dombos Fest,

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18   For the websites, see: *Magyar Szó* (http://www.magyarszo.rs), *Hét Nap* (http://hetnap.rs); *Képes Ifjúság* (http://www.kepesifi.com), *Jó Pajtás* (http://www.jopajtas.com), *Temerini Újság* (http://temeriniujsag.info/fooldal), *Vajdaság Portál* (http://www.vajdasag.eu), *Dél Hír* (http:// delhir.info), *Napló* (http://naplo.org), *Pres Szó* (http://www.press-szo.com), *Autonómia – A vajdasági civil portál* (http://hu.autonomija.info), *Szabad Magyar Szó* (http://szabadmagyarszo. com), *Vajdaság Ma* (http://www.vajma.info), *Hungarológiai Közlemények* (http:// ujvidekimagyartanszek.ff.uns.ac.rs/index.php/kiadvanyaink/hungarologiai-kozlemenyek), *Híd Kör* (http://www.hid.rs/hidkor.php); last time visited on: 7 February 2017.

19   For the websites, see: *Üzenet* (http://www.zetna.org/uzenet.html), *zEtna* (http://www.zetna. org), *Létünk* (http://www.letunk.rs), *Ex Symposion* (http://exsymposion.hu), *Családi Kör* (http://www.csaladikor.com), *DNS* (http://dns-online.hu). *The New Symposium*, a literary and art magazine, was especially influential and respectable among the Hungarian intellectual elite: it was founded in 1965 and was published until 1992, when the Yugoslav wars broke out. In 1993, the journal *Ex Symposion*, which continues the legacy of the *New Symposium*, was founded in Veszprém.

20   For the websites, see: Forum (Hun. Forum Könyvkiadó; http://www.forumliber.rs); Zetna Literary Festival (*A zEtna (Minden) Irodalmi Fesztiválja* – http://www.zetna.org/zek/folyoiratok/87/0/ index.html).

which has been organized since 2001 in Mali Iđoš (in Hungarian: Kishegyes). Being very innovative and popular among a young audience, it has become an important musical landmark and symbol of identity and alternative Hungarian culture in Vojvodina.[21]

3. Hungarian Speakers in Belgrade

Although the province of Vojvodina is commonly considered to be the genuine cultural centre of Serbian Hungarians, Belgrade (in Hungarian: Belgrád, and historically Nándorfehérvár) also has a long tradition of Hungarian presence. Bolyai Society, functioning as a cultural centre, was active between the two world wars. The Hungarian Cultural Society of Belgrade was founded in 1940 and played an important role until 1956, when it was closed due to the consequences of political events in Hungary.

According to the censuses of 1921–1991, the number of Belgrade residents who claimed Hungarian nationality or native language did not vary considerably: it was never below 1,500 but never exceeded 6,000 residents.[22] The last population census, held in 2011, gives the following figures: 1,659,440 inhabitants are registered in the city of Belgrade, with Belgrade appearing to be an exceptionally monolingual city with 94.8% of Serbian native speakers (2011 census). However, the census-taking practices should be considered in terms of what Foucault (1994) conceives of as a 'technology of power' that not only records but also contributes to creating identities by providing categories for enumeration. Thus, it may be inferred that the number of Belgrade minority members and Serbian non-native speakers is far greater than estimated. Data from the 2002 and 2011 censuses show that the number of individuals claiming Hungarian ethnicity as well as the number of Hungarian native speakers declined by 18% (language speakers) and 13% (ethnicity) within a span of 10 years, which is following the declining demographic trend of the entire Hungarian population in Serbia (cf. censuses of 2002, 2011) – cf. *Table 3*.

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21   For the website, see: Dombos Fest (http://www.dombosfest.org); last time visited on: 8 February 2017.

22   Data collected by the censuses show the following figures related to the Hungarians in Belgrade: in 1921 – 1,478 (native speakers – NS); in 1931 – 5,792 (NS); in 1948 – 3,427 (nationality – N); in 1953 – 3,817 (N); in 1961 – 5,043 (N); in 1971 – 4,511 (N); in 1981 – 3,297 (N); in 1991 – 2,402 (N) (cf. population censuses of 1921–1991). All relevant census data can be obtained at the Archive of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite).

Table 3. *Population census: native speakers of Hungarian and ethnic Hungarians in Belgrade (population censuses of 2002, 2011)*

Population Census in Serbia	Respondents with Hungarian as 'mother tongue'	Respondents with Hungarian ethnicity
Census 2002	1,604	2,080
Census 2011	1,330	1,810

In Belgrade, there have been no Hungarian or bilingual (Serbian–Hungarian) kindergartens, primary, or secondary schools up to now. Nevertheless, Hungarian can be studied at the university level, at the Department of Hungarian Language and Literature, Faculty of Phililogy, University of Belgrade.[23]

In 2002, 'The Club of Hungarians in Belgrade – The Hungarian Society for the Cultivation of Culture' was founded by the Federal Ministry of Justice; but the society is no longer active. In addition, the Jesuit church of St. Peter in downtown Belgrade brings together believers every Thursday with masses held in Hungarian.[24] The church now has a library with a collection of 750 religious books in Hungarian – the legacy of Father Lórant Kilbertus and Father Imre Polgár. The collection is being renewed by Enikő Varga's donation. The library receives current journals and magazines in Hungarian, such as *Vetés és Aratás* and *Hitélet*, on a regular basis. Another place where Hungarians meet regularly is the Belgrade centre of the main Hungarian political party, *Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians*; its Belgrade centre was founded in 2011. It organizes Hungarian language courses and cultural gatherings: lectures, promotions, exhibitions, parties, etc.[25] In 2011, Hungarikum centar, a supermarket shop specialized in selling consumer products from Hungary, opened in Belgrade. Aside from commercial activities, it also organizes various cultural events with the Hungarian Embassy and provides basic tourist information about Hungary.[26]

Since 2014, the life of Hungarians in Belgrade has drastically changed. When Collegium Hungaricum was founded, it had a special status among other

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23   The Department was founded upon the initiative of Professor Sava Babić, fairly late (1994) compared to the university tradition of Hungarian Studies in Vojvodina.

24   Belgrade and this church have a long history of Jesuit tradition and Hungarian language use for religious, educational, and preaching purposes. Jesuits came to Belgrade in the early 17th century, and they used Hungarian from the very beginning. The first Jesuit church was built in 1732, and Hungarian language was, alongside German and Croatian, actively used in religious sermons in the first half of the 18th century. By the 19th century, there were no Jesuits residing in Belgrade, but they came back in 1929. In the following years, the parish was formed (cf. Cetinić et al. (ed.) 1981). During the 1990s, there were classes in Hungarian held in the church by theologian Enikő Varga.

25   Cf. The Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (in Hungarian: Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség; Srb. Savez vojvođanskih Mađara) (http://www.vmsz.org.rs/szervezet/belgradi-varosi-szervezet; https://www.facebook.com/SVM. Beograd); last time visited on: 11 February 2017.

26   Cf. Hungarikum centar (http://www.hungarikumcentar.rs); last time visited on: 11 February 2017.

Hungarian cultural institutions which were part of the Balassi Institute Network (in Hungarian: Balassi Intézet).[27] In other words, Collegium Hungaricum serves as 'a strategic bastion for Hungary's presence in international research and science'.[28] There are only six Collegium Hungarica worldwide: in Vienna, Berlin, Paris, Rome, Moscow, and Belgrade. Thus, the official Hungarian cultural policy recognizes Belgrade as a strategically very important centre. The Institution is located in the heart of Belgrade and has significant cultural activities. It organizes lectures, exhibitions, literary and artistic gatherings, concerts, debates, etc. All activities are in Hungarian; Serbian is only used as a second language. It has therefore become a crucial gathering place not only for Hungarian-language speakers living in Belgrade and its neighbourhoods but also for all those who are interested in Hungarian culture.

The Hungarian speakers in Belgrade regularly follow Radio Television of Vojvodina II and satellite programmes from Hungary. The younger speakers are following Hungarian websites on the Internet. At the annual Belgrade International Book Fair, Hungarian books are exhibited on the stand of National Minorities and The Hungarian Publishers Association, where presentations and lectures are held in Hungarian.

In our paper, Balla et al. 2012, we argued that Hungarians in Belgrade did not create any solid speech community until 2012; they were rather individuated persons who gathered in small family circles, at church, or at university. Nevertheless, after Collegium Hungaricum was founded, the use of Hungarian language and the state of the Hungarian community in Belgrade has significantly changed. We can now speak of the loosely structured community of the Belgrade Hungarians.

3.1. Survey on Hungarian Language Use in Belgrade

Research on the Hungarian language use in Belgrade was carried out by the Institute of Balkan Studies SASA and the Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade. The survey was based upon questionnaires, which were disseminated among the Hungarian-speaking population in Belgrade, e.g. students of Hungarian,

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27   The Balassi Institute's (in Hungarian: Balassi Intézet) programmatic aim is to spread and promote Hungarian culture abroad and to introduce the traditions and cultures preserved by Hungarians to other cultures. It has a network of 23 cultural institutions located in 21 countries as well as three cultural diplomats. The goal of Hungarian institutes abroad is to promote and support Hungary's cultural heritage, the encouragement of international cooperation in culture and science, the furthering of Hungarian-language education and the introduction of Hungary's culture and society to foreign audiences by means of various programmes (http://www.balassiintezet.hu/en/balassi-institute-hq; https://www.facebook.com/collegiumhungaricumbelgrad); last time visited on: 11 February 2017.

28   Cf. The Balassi Institute (in Hungarian: Balassi Intézet) (http://www.balassiintezet.hu/en/balassi-institute-hq); last time visited on: 11 February 2017.

Hungarian natives, and citizens who, due to various reasons, happened to know and use at least some Hungarian. We used a quantitative approach to database analysis, employing sociolinguistics in its basic form, which implies a correlation of the language parameters with the social ones in order to identify the social context in which they appear (Filipović 2009: 24).

The questionnaire was modelled after others used in the sociolinguistic research focusing on Hungarian-speaking communities (cf. Gal 1979, Wasserscheidt 2010). It is divided into three sections:

A. domains of language use – questions on the language use across various domains,

B. communication – questions on the language use in different communicative settings, and

C. attitudes – questions on the attitudes on language use.

Respondents were offered to choose between two questionnaires, one in Serbian and one in Hungarian. The survey was voluntary and anonymous, and the respondents were asked to give only personal data necessary for statistical purposes, such as age, gender, education, place of childhood and pre-university schooling, and place of residence. In addition to the survey questionnaires, we also used the method of participant observation in order to complement our data.

3.2. Survey Results: Respondents' Stratification and the Domains of Language Use

Sixty respondents have filled out the questionnaires so far; 35 in Serbian and 25 in Hungarian. The respondents' personal data show that they make up a very heterogeneous group: 34 of the respondents were women, compared to 26 men; the respondents' ages ranged from 18 to 77. Regarding education, there were around 80% with either a junior college degree or a university diploma, and 20% had a high school diploma.[29] The majority of the respondents grew up either in Vojvodina (55%) or in Belgrade (30%), finished school and university in Belgrade, and work and live in Belgrade permanently. The questionnaires do not allow us to draw any conclusion about the ethnic composition of the families. Participant observation, however, suggests that Hungarian-speaking respondents who come from Vojvodina are more likely to originate from endogamous marriages, while respondents who grew up in Belgrade are more likely to be from exogamous marriages. According to our survey, the majority learnt Hungarian either during childhood – i.e. Hungarian native speakers – or at the university – i.e. Serbian native speakers.

The survey results and the participant observation also show that Hungarian is actively used in the domains in which its use is institutionalized: the Department

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29   Junior college (in Serbian: 'viša škola') is a type of lower university education that lasts for two years.

of Hungarian Language and Literature, the Catholic church of St. Peter, the Belgrade centre of the political party *Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians*, the Hungarian Embassy, and Collegium Hungaricum. However, due to the very small number of speakers, Hungarian is almost never or very rarely used in public services and in public places, e.g. in government offices, markets, or at a doctor (Balla et al. 2012).

3.3. Hungarian Speakers in Belgrade and Language Rights Awareness

A sociological survey which was carried out in 2002 among minority groups suggested that Hungarians in Serbia were poorly informed about their minority rights, which was a surprise in view of their long-standing presence and relatively high average educational level. According to the 2002 survey, few Hungarian respondents knew that inhabitants of municipalities constituting over 15% of population were entitled to use their mother tongue in communication with public services (19%), to obtain public documents (24%) and IDs (25%), and to use their language in judicial and administrative proceedings (33%) (cf. Briza et al. 2002: 105–114).

In our sociolinguistic survey (2012–2015), we also examined the level of language rights awareness among the Hungarian speakers in Belgrade. The question samples which relate directly or indirectly to language rights were the following:

6. I avoid using Hungarian in public:
☐ yes ☐ no
If 'yes', why? _____
17. Which language do you use in your personal documents?
☐ Hungarian ☐ Serbian ☐ both languages ☐ _____
18. Do you know that you are legally entitled to:
– have your name and family name written in Serbian and Hungarian in your personal documents? ☐ yes ☐ no
– use Hungarian in city hall and court? ☐ yes ☐ no

It is important to emphasize that the majority feels free and relaxed (84%) when using Hungarian in public. The respondents' comments show that if they avoid speaking Hungarian in public it is due to the fact that either they do not have anyone to talk to who comprehends Hungarian, or they do not yet speak it proficiently.

Our survey demonstrated that around 60% were familiar with the right to use Hungarian language in court and city hall: 52% of the respondents who filled in the questionnaires in Serbian language and 76% of those who filled them in in

Hungarian. However, almost the same number of respondents were not aware of the right to use Hungarian language in the issuing of documents: more than half of the respondents who filled them in in Serbian and 47% of the respondents who filled the questionnaire in in Hungarian. Only 16% of the respondents use these language rights in the issuing of documents, i.e. 41% of those who filled the questionnaire in Hungarian; meaning that they have documents in two languages, Serbian and Hungarian. Comparing the results from the survey in 2002 and our survey from 2012–2015, it can be seen that the level of language rights awareness, although still not satisfactory, is on the rise among members of the Hungarian minority community.

4. Conclusions

Serbia, and especially its northern province, Vojvodina, adopted a series of very progressive laws for minority language protection and regulation of the minority language rights. However, as is the case with many countries, sometimes, the word of law does not correspond with practice. Thus, one challenge appears to be the lack of knowledge and information among members of the minority community. The other challenge we can find is in the sphere of the implementation of laws. Namely, sometimes the laws are hard to implement due to the lack of funding and skilled administration.

In the paper, we analysed the ethnolinguistic vitality of the Hungarian minority in Serbia and the language rights awareness. According to demographic indicators, status and institutional support, the Hungarian minority shows a rather complex picture. On the one hand, it can be described as a shrinking community, with very low birth rate and high emigration rate. According to the historical and language status and judging by the institutional support, it seems to be a vital and developed community. Although the Hungarians are concentrated in the Serbian northern province of Vojvodina, in this paper, we focused on the Hungarians of Belgrade. In our sociolinguistic survey conducted among the Hungarians of Belgrade, we came to the conclusion that awareness of language rights is not very high, although the Hungarians generally have strong historical and national awareness. Our survey showed that almost two-thirds of the respondents were familiar with their right to use Hungarian language in court and city hall. However, almost the same number of respondents were not familiar with the right to use Hungarian in issuing of documents, while less than 20% of the respondents actually use Hungarian in their personal documents.

We argue that the lack of knowledge about minority rights among the members of minority communities and the lack of support in their implementation contribute to the marginalization of the minorities. In countries which are still in

some kind of transitional process – as is the case with Serbia –, the law adoption process thus should place a special emphasis on the law implementation and the general level of awareness among the population regarding these legislative measures.

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University Events – Scientific Conferences

'Geopolitical Processes and Its Possible Effects' Geopolitical and International Relations Conference

Dezső SZENKOVICS

Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, Cluj-Napoca
Department of International Relations and European Studies
e-mail: szenkovics@kv.sapientia.ro

The interinstitutional relations between Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania (SHUT) and the University of Pécs are old and very close, but the above mentioned conference was the first one organized by the two institutions in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár. The third organizing partner was the Pallas Athéné Domus Concordiae Foundation of the Central Bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank – MNB).

During the two-day conference organized in the period of 30 June–1 July 2017, more than 40 papers were presented in the plenary session and the following four panels. The conference took place in the main building of the Faculty of Cluj/Kolozsvár of Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania.

The conference started with a plenary session with three lectures. The first one was given by Mr Norbert Csizmadia, President of Pallas Athéné Geopolitical Foundation, who presented the possibilities and the role of Hungary in the new global geopolitical trends. The second lecture was presented by Mr Márton Tonk, PhD, Dean of the Faculty of Cluj/Kolozsvár of SHUT, who dealt with the current challenges of the Hungarian higher education system in Transylvania, with a special focus on demographic trends and educational policies. The last lecture of the plenary session was presented by Mr Zoltán Dövényi, PhD, Head of the Doctoral School of Earth Sciences of the University of Pécs, who was focusing on the migration processes Hungary is confronting nowadays.

The first thematic panel, entitled *Geopolitical Dimensions*, included 11 presentations with a special focus on several aspects of the geopolitical processes, such as the American geopolitical thinking in the 21st century, Cuba's geopolitical environment, geopolitics and economic processes, etc.

The second thematic session, entitled *Economical Processes and Their Effects*, also had 11 presentations grouped around topics such as geographic and

economic regions in Europe, the past and the present of the Hungarian bank sector, the potential impacts of the multi-speed EU concerning the main policies of the European Union, and several other economic aspects.

One of the most compact panels was the third one, entitled *International Relations and Power Relations*. All the 11 presentations of this session were dealing mostly with the geopolitical role and position of a state or a region/ integration. The presenters tackled topics such as the Hungarian–Vietnamese relations, the development of the Silk Road railway built between China and Europe, the question of unity and diversity of the geopolitical positions in Central and Eastern Europe, the development of the relationship between Mexico and the United States of America, the geopolitical challenges and possibilities India is facing at the beginning of the 21st century, the challenges of the Japanese economics in the light of demographic tendencies, or the economic outcomes and external relations of the Eurasian Economic Union.

The last panel, entitled *Focus on Eastern and Central Europe*, included 10 presentations with a special focus on topics such as the geopolitics of Romania, innovation and creativity in the V4-countires, the possible geo-economic effects of the New Silk Road on the Central and Eastern European countries such as Hungary, or the impact and effects of dual citizenship given by the Hungarian state on the identification process with the political community and on the willingness to emigrate from Romania, etc.

The conference was a good occasion for the researches, professors, and students (PhD and MA) to meet each other, to establish new professional relations, and to strengthen the existing cooperation between the two universities. At the same time, this event was an excellent opportunity for the participants to get acquainted with the research topics of the other university. All in all, the conference is considered to be a great success, and so the representatives of the two universities agreed that similar events would be held in the future too.

'Home-ness – Strangeness' (*Otthonlét – idegenség*) Political Science Conference and Institutional Network Building

Tibor TORÓ

Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, Cluj-Napoca
Department of International Relations and European Studies
e-mail: torotibor@sapientia.ro

In 2006, the teaching staff of the Institute of Political Sciences at ELTE Law in Budapest invited the staff of the Hungarian Political Science Department of Babeș–Bolyai University for a joint conference, where the members of the two departments could present their research, and professional research ideas could develop. A similar conference took place in 2011 in Budapest, where, as many of the political scientists present at the first conference had joined another institution, the political scientists from the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Sapientia University where invited as well. At the conference entitled *Challenges and Dilemmas in Central and Eastern Europe*, 16 political scientists participated, eight from the inviting institution from Budapest and eight from Cluj. From the two younger Transylvanian institutions, all generations of political scientist participated at the conference.

The *Otthonlét – idegenség* conference organized in the period of 22–24 June 2017 is the third round of meetings between the three institutions. After 6 years of omission, at the initiative of the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Sapientia University, a third conference was organized, where 18 political scientist where invited, 9 from the Institute of Political Sciences at ELTE Law in Budapest and 9 from the two local institutions. Similarly to the tradition of other years, all presenters connected the title of the conference to their own research interest. In the light of recent developments in migration, security policy, and minority politics, the title was very actual as the dilemmas related to foreignness and integration are present in each and every society. A novelty of this conference was the fact that beyond the two university departments political scientists from the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities were invited, too, for the first time.

The presentations were organized in five thematic blocs, where, as far as possible, members of all institutions were included. In the first thematic session, entitled *Dual Citizenship and the Hungarians outside the Borders of Hungary*, the speakers – Levente Salat (Political Science Department, Babeş–Bolyai University), Ágoston Mráz (Institute of Political Sciences at ELTE Law), Tamás Kiss (Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities), and Gábor Sugatagi (Institute of Political Sciences at ELTE Law) – presented well-documented cases on how the dual citizenship law of Hungary affects Hungarian and Romanian home affairs and what the challenges in political theory are when describing these issues.

In the second thematic session, entitled *Political History and the History of Political Thinking*, three researchers from the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Sapientia University presented their researches. Barna Bodó presented ongoing research on interwar agrarian politics and the work of József Venczel, a Transylvanian Hungarian interwar social scientist. János Kristóf Murádin talked about the activity of the Transylvanian Party, a party that represented Transylvanian Hungarians in the Hungarian Parliament between 1940 and 1944, after the second Vienna Award. Last but not least, Dezső Szenkovics analysed the political theory of Mahatma Gandhi, focusing on his criticism towards the West.

The third thematic session, entitled *Discursive Political Science and Collective Memory*, gathered presentation from discursive political scientists such as Balázs Kiss (Institute of Political Sciences at ELTE Law), Miklós Bakk (Department of International Relations and European Studies at Sapientia University), András Karácsony (Institute of Political Sciences at ELTE Law), and Gábor Illés (Institute of Political Sciences at ELTE Law). The presenters tackled a wide area of issues: boundary construction of political communities, social memory, post-truth politics, and territorial autonomy; however, from a common paradigm and methodological stance: discourse analysis and symbolic politics.

The fourth session, entitled *Foreign Policy and Advocacy in Central and Eastern Europe*, focused mostly on ethnopolitics as three of the presenters, Tamás Szabó (Political Science Department, Babeş–Bolyai University), Tibor Toró (Department of International Relations and European Studies at Sapientia University), and István Gergő Székely (Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities) talked about different issues related to Hungarians in Transylvania, while Sándor Pesti (Institute of Political Sciences at ELTE Law) presented a thorough analysis of the foreign policy of the Hungarian Government and the Orbán cabinet.

The last session, entitled *Ethnicity, Migration, Minorities in Western Europe*, gathered presentations from three young researchers of the Institute of Political Sciences at ELTE Law on current issues in ethnicity and migration policy. Gergely Ablaka presented an interesting case study on the Iranian community in the United States, a community with several internal cleavages and lower lobby

potential than other similar ethnic communities. Eszter Petronella Soós talked about the changing aspects of the French nation and how ethnic and religious minorities are integrated by the French State. Last but not least, drawing on a Foucaltian paradigm, Attila Antal presented some biopolitical aspects of the migration crisis.

All in all, the conference was a success both professionally and from an institutioxnal perspective as well. It has strengthened the relationship between the political science workshops in Budapest and Cluj, and it presented well the developments within the research interest of the involved institutions. While most researchers from Cluj focused on different aspects of ethnopolitics, researchers of the Institute of Political Sciences at ELTE Law in Budapest had a wide area of interest ranging from home affairs to foreign policy.

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