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Contents

Editorial Foreword

In his book titled "Small Places, Large Issues" (1995), Thomas Hylland Eriksen makes reference to Kirsten Hastrup's words, according to which through the works of anthropologists the familiar becomes exotic and the exotic becomes familiar. I think that this observation is true not only in the case of the analysis of distant, less known cultures, but also regarding the adjacent, East-Central European societies. Thus, the observation suits the analysis of those social processes which are taking place in the post-socialist region that produces more and more hardly translatable social phenomena. The understanding of these phenomena—besides the measuring of the administrative, legal, statistical, etc. parameters of the so-called Europeanization—needs sustained intellectual work. The anthropological approach, while it can reach both those phenomena which seem to be very familiar, can also provide the essential distance for the interpretation of these facts. For me, the fact that this discipline has a major role in the understanding of what is occurring throughout this region is beyond any doubt.

In the present issue of the *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae – Social Analysis* we intended to offer a space for such approaches, which assesses the importance of the above mentioned intellectual endeavor. The analysis of the period before 1989 is very important, since previous models continue to exist even nowadays. There are increasing numbers of signs which suggest that besides the analysis of certain periods, the interpretation of those processes which go beyond these tracts can provide useful conclusions. The case studies approach the identity structures of several social groups and localities, but interpersonal observations are also worth mentioning. The research perspectives are various, and they cannot be otherwise, because the teaching of cultural anthropology and anthropological research still has not been institutionalized in the countries of the region in such a way that it could offer a framework of systematical studies. Thus, the thematic diversity, the differences between the approaches are, after all, the proofs of this situation.

Turning back to the already mentioned work of Eriksen, I think that we can agree with him regarding the observation that cultural globalization leads to uniformity and homogenization, but also to newer cultural differences occurring at the places of encounter between global and local. As a reproach to uniformity, or in parallel with it, complexity is reproduced. This is the case of those post-socialist regions within which previous models of life conducts, behavioral habits, knowledge and cultural patterns are still persisting and individual and

group identities are produced as the result of global – local projections. Such reproduction of complexity provides new challenges for the anthropologists both in terms of perspectives and methods. With this end in view, I think, we must take part in the understanding of these processes and, maybe, even in the search for solutions. We thank the authors of this thematic issue for being partners in this work.

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Guest editor

Ethnography in the Securitate Archive

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Abstract. Throughout the former Soviet bloc, numerous countries have made available the archives of their communist-era secret police, often in connection with the practice of "lustration" aimed at cleansing the body politic of former secret police collaborators. Because the "truth" value of what is in these archives is often problematic, they are best viewed as sources of data about the organization that created them. This article provides some ideas toward illustrating what an ethnographic approach to the archives might consist of.

Keywords: Secret Police, communism, Romania, archives.

> "In the socialist bloc, people and things exist only through their files. All our existence is in the hands of him who possesses files and is constituted by him who constructs them. Real people are but the reflection of their files" (*Belu Zilber*).[1]

Following the disestablishment of Communist Party rule in the Soviet bloc, political pressure arose in nearly every East European country to cleanse the polity of legacies of the prior regime.[2] Former Party officials were to be banned from office, as was anyone known to have collaborated with communist power, especially with the secret police. These demands partook of a more broadly based movement for so-called transitional justice by which successor states to dictatorships of various kinds sought to address and overcome their repressive pasts. Applied to cases as varied as South Africa, Rwanda, Argentina, and Chile as well as the former Soviet sphere, transitional justice concerned such questions as how to exit from authoritarianism into democracy and the rule of law; how to bring the perpetrators of human rights violations to justice and compensate their victims; how to prevent supporters of the prior regime from corrupting or

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1   Andrei Şerbulescu (Belu Zilber), *Monarhia de drept dialectic* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1991).
2   This article is drawn from my book *Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of Romania's Secret Police* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014) and is included here by permission.

destabilizing the new order; how to reconcile warring parties; and how to come to terms with deeply troubling histories and rewrite national narratives.

In the former Soviet bloc, where these procedures were instituted, they relied heavily (even if very problematically) on the files of the secret police. Beginning with Czechoslovakia and Germany in 1990–1991, laws were passed requiring that aspirants to political office and certain other posts be vetted through the secret police archive, to prove that they had not served as collaborators. This practice, often known as "lustration" (from the Czech *lustrace*), spread throughout the region to varying degrees over the subsequent two decades.[3] With it emerged numerous disputes concerning the contents of the archives and their suitability for the purposes which they were being put to. The media in nearly every country of the region became saturated with informer scandals, debates over the truth value of the secret police files, arguments about whether transitional justice was being properly accomplished, etc. (see, for instance: Nalepa 2009; Sadurski 2005; Williams, Fowler and Szczerbiak 2005; for further discussions see Verdery 2012). Many citizens in Eastern Europe gained access to their files and experienced the shock of discovering that their best friends had informed on them. Accusations and denials followed.

In Hungary alone, a very partial reckoning gives us the Péter Medgyessy scandal, the István Szabó scandal, the Imre Mécs Commission, the libel suits against historian Krisztián Ungváry, the Kiss László affair, Péter Esterházy's painful reflections in *Javított Kiadás* (*Corrected Edition*) on his revered father's collaboration, and so on.[4] In 2010, the Orbán government proposed dismantling the secret police archive by simply letting everyone take their own file home. Hungarians' concern with secret police files was evident even in the U.S., where an article on the topic by celebrated historian Istvan Deak appeared in the *New York Review of Books* in 2006 and journalist Kati Marton published her *Enemies of the People*, based on her parents' Hungarian secret police files (Deak 2006; Marton 2009). Comparable lists could easily be drawn up for other East European countries.

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3   The literature on lustration is extensive. See the bibliography in Verdery (2012).
4   In 2002, it was revealed that Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy had collaborated with the secret police. Likewise, film director Szabó was discovered in 2006 to have written informer's reports between 1957–1961, a fact for which he gave changing explanations. The Mécs Commission, formed by the socialists to investigate the secret police connections of government officials, was accused by the opposition FIDESZ party of being overzealous and trampling on people's dignity. Another ardent accuser was historian Krisztián Ungváry, who decided to reveal the names of police collaborators, the most eminent of whom was archbishop László Paskai of Esztergom – Budapest, an elector in the papal conclave that selected Pope Benedict XVI. Some of Ungváry's targets subsequently sued him, one of whom was László Kiss, a judge in the Constitutional Court whom Ungváry accused of having written secret police reports when he was a university administrator. In 2000, novelist Péter Esterházy published *Celestial Harmonies*, his tribute to his ancestors and especially his father, only to learn soon thereafter that his father had been an active police informer between 1957–1980; Esterházy then published *Javított Kiadás* (*Corrected Edition*), seeking to account for his father's behaviour. For information on one or more of these scandals, see Deak (2006), Györffy (2002), Kiss (2006), Nadkarni (2011).

Romania, however, was slow to embark on lustration. Whereas Czechoslovakia and Germany were lustrating by 1990–1991, in Romania it was only in 1999 that legislation provided access to secret police files and a procedure for vetting public officials, and the process suffered numerous reversals. An organization, the National Council for Study of the Securitate Archives, known by its Romanian acronym CNSAS, was founded in 2000 to administer the archive and mediate public access to the files, which it took over from the various agencies (largely successor organizations to the Securitate) that had overseen them for the eleven years following Ceauşescu's overthrow.[5]

The procedures for taking over the archive were protracted and fraught, as the various agencies transferred their segments only piecemeal and in small numbers until after the elections of 2004, which brought a new political coalition to power. In 2005 over one million files were turned over, with more following thereafter, although the total corpus of the Securitate files is even now not fully under CNSAS control. Inadequate space and technology for managing the material, not to mention the purposeful "loss" of files, further hampered its transfer. As of 2013 the CNSAS archive consists of over 1,800,000 paper files in 2,300,000 volumes and a variety of other media; about 70% of the total archive is in paper files, 25% in microfilms, and 5% in audio and video material.[6] As for lustration itself, in 2006 the first of several lustration laws was passed and then rejected as unconstitutional, a sequence repeated several times thereafter. Despite these ups and downs of the lustration law, the CNSAS has continued to make files available to many persons who request them—including citizens of NATO countries like myself, who are permitted access to their files.[7]

The Securitate Archive and its files

The archive is divided into multiple collections, the principal ones being surveillance files of targets (the term I will use for people under surveillance); files of people who collaborated with the Securitate in one form or another; documentary files on particular problems such as religion, foreign researchers, art,

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5   The principal holders were the Romanian Intelligence Service (*Serviciul Român de Informaţii* – SRI), the Foreign Intelligence Service (*Serviciul de Informaţii Externe* – SIE), the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of National Defence, and the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs.

6   Source: "The European Network of Official Authorities in Charge of the Secret-Police Files: A Reader on their Legal Foundations, Structures and Activities," 2009, available on the CNSAS website at http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/reteaua%20EU/READER%20European%20Network.pdf (accessed May 30, 2013). The microfilms are important because they may include some paper files that were destroyed.

7   All present and former Romanian citizens can ask for their files, but not all Romanians have files and not all files are "found" for those who do.

etc.; files from the Foreign Intelligence Service (D.I.E., renamed S.I.E.); internal administrative documents and the personnel files of Securitate employees; and confiscated manuscripts. The CNSAS archive's total volume is approximately 24 km[8]—surprisingly small, when one considers that the Polish SB files occupy about 80 km and the Stasi files well over 100 km, for a smaller population.[9] At least part of the reason for the differences is that a sizable portion of the original Securitate documents were destroyed, both accidentally and intentionally[10]— either through normal administrative procedures during the communist period[11] or through events relating to the 1989 revolution, when buildings containing files caught fire and truckloads of documents were found burned and partially buried outside Bucharest.[12] More generally, however, it is impossible to say how large the archive was or is. At the time of the revolution it existed in various county offices around the country, sometimes with copies in the central archive in Bucharest but without precise collation. For someone like me to request a file could involve bringing volumes of papers not only from the depository on the city's outskirts to the CNSAS building in Bucharest but from several different county headquarters

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8   Initial estimates were 35 km, but according to personnel at the CNSAS in 2012, the total is 24 km. It is uncertain whether this reflects initial error or differences between what the CNSAS now has and the total Securitate archive at the time of the revolution.

9   The figure for Poland is from the Polish Institute for National Remembrance (courtesy of Saygun Gökarıksel). It includes court files, prison records, and military intelligence files as well. The figure for the Stasi is from Glaeser (personal communication).
Glaeser questions the possibility of comparing these figures across countries. There are complicated measurement issues: should the number in question include personnel files, those of the guard regiment, the passport control, the bodyguards, the ordinary administrative files (officers' health records and pay records, etc.), as well as enormous numbers of duplicates (e.g., one informant report of a group meeting would go into all case files of members involved, the file of the informant). Should it include background checks on the official apparatus, on the sportsmen and women allowed to travel, on the trade representatives of state owned corporations, etc., etc.? The figure of 111 km on the official document center website (http://www.bstu.bund. de/DE/Archive/UeberDieArchive/Ueberlieferungslage-Erschliessung/uberlieferungslage_node. html, accessed May 30, 2013) seems to include every kind of document the Stasi ever produced, so it overestimates the total surveillance effort, while simultaneously underestimating it, because other kinds of surveillance efforts are not included.

10   See Oprea (2004). Olaru and Herbstritt (2003, 199–200) report: "When the Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989, Securitate officers resident in Berlin were called back home to describe what was happening, and they told of the occupation of Stasi headquarters; rumors spread that planes were landing in Bucharest with documents from the Stasi archive." The gap of six weeks between the fall of the wall and the Romanian events of December 22 gave the Securitate ample time to begin preemptive destruction of their own archive.

11   Normal administrative practice was to destroy documents periodically, after the passage of set periods of time or after handwritten notes had been typed up and approved (the originals might then be burned).

12   For example, the Central University Library of the University of Bucharest suffered heavy fire damage during the December 1989 "revolution," and it was rumored that the attic of the building had contained Securitate documents. The most celebrated incident was reported in early 1990, when Securitate documents partially destroyed by fire were discovered loosely buried in the village of Berevoieşti.

as well. Each such request entailed that someone look through the material and withhold anything considered to be critical to national security; what was then transferred to CNSAS would thus be only a partial file. The endless politicking around lustration as well as other peculiarities of the process of file transfer mean that the archive now under CNSAS control—what is usually meant by the term "Securitate archive"—is a heavily politicized remnant, the result of several political churnings of the original (Poenaru 2012, 3).

Twenty-four or so km is still a large archive. What more can we say about it? Romanian researcher Florin Poenaru offers several observations, drawing upon Michel-Rolph Trouillot's work *Silencing the Past*, which sees an archive as the sum not only of recorded documents but of silences (Trouillot 1995). One peculiarity of the Securitate archive, suggests Poenaru, is that it has at least *two* levels of "silences:" the one Trouillot describes, having to do with the ontological gap between a historical event and its recording, which leaves room for selective retention and processes of power, and a second level relating to the fact that the Securitate archive was created by and against the silence of the population being monitored. As it were, the role of the Securitate archive was to record everything that was being kept silent by the population. The task of the historian, in this case, might not necessarily be that of navigating and making sense of the silences inherent in the archives [as Trouillot would have it], or to put it differently, to historicize its gaps and selections, but to understand and deal with its loquacity, not with its lack but with its excess, not with what is missing but with what is already present there (Poenaru 2012, 11).

His reference to the archive's "loquacity" reminds one of Stephen Kotkin's observation, following upon Lefort's comments about the loquaciousness of the Stalinist state: "Stalinism could not stop speaking about itself… The advent of Stalinism brought one of the greatest proliferations of documents the world has ever seen" (Kotkin 1995, 367; Lefort 1986, 297–302). It is to this habit that we owe the existence of this extensive archive.

Poenaru goes on to note another difference between a regular archive and the Securitate's. Unlike a standard archive, which includes some people and obscures the voices, experiences and even existence of others (women, black people in the triumphal histories of colonialism, etc.), who therefore have to find ways of resisting their erasure, the Securitate archive reverses the situation: "people included in it have always felt the need to justify themselves, to give an account of this inclusion (either as 'perpetrators,' or as 'victims'), or to erase their inclusion, to make it disappear" (Poenaru 2012, 11). In short, rather than resisting their exclusion, most people who find themselves in this archive would much rather not be there.

A final observation about the form of the archive concerns how the authority of its contents is expressed. Former Party member and political prisoner Belu Zilber writes:

Handwriting doesn't inspire too much confidence in the ordinary reader, even if it carries an illustrious signature. The same handwritten item, when typed, gains clarity and authority… Files contain almost entirely sheets written on a typewriter. Their authority proceeds from this…The process that led to the consolidation of state formations through the appearance of the printing press repeated itself at the finalization of the Stalinist state through the appearance of the typewriter. Only thanks to Remington's invention could we arrive at the principle: a person and a file having the authority of the state. It is not by chance that until recently, in Russia only state offices had typewriters (Şerbulescu [Belu Zilber] 1991, 144, 146).

In Securitate files, an officer's handwritten notes are generally replaced (or doubled) with typed versions. Handwriting persists, of course, in the marginal notes of people to whom a file circulates, and sometimes in the notes of someone reporting on a telephone conversation. Informers' reports often remain in the informer's hand, however, preserving traces of the pedagogical process by which they were generated (the officer and the informer together working out what should go in the report, as one of my own informers described it to me).[13] But informers and telephone operators are the lowliest of actors in this universe; anyone of importance will have his text typed. Indeed, in my own file and some others I have seen, the importance of the sender appears in the font: normal case reports are in a font resembling Times Roman 12 point, whereas documents coming from or directed to the top generals are in one resembling Tahoma 16 point.[14]

Unlike many administrative archives, such as the one described in Matthew Hull's fascinating *Government by Paper* about Pakistan's bureaucracy (Hull 2012), this one does not constitute primarily a record of administrative actions requested and taken, but a site at which knowledge about "reality" was concentrated through collecting endless amounts of information. This leads toward seeing the archive as a kind of ethnographic data base—not primarily concerning the lives of the people under surveillance, but concerning the inner workings of this branch of the Party-state. Literary scholar Cristina Vatulescu makes a similar point: "Sometimes wildly skewed records of historical fact, the files are at the same time priceless representations of the values, apprehensions, and fantasies entertained by the secret police. While a personal file can mislead about the particulars of a victim's fate, its close reading can be abundantly revealing about what the secret police understood by evidence, record, writing, human nature, and criminality" (Vatulescu 2010, 13). In the case of my own surveillance file,

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13   For more information on officer-informer pedagogy, see Gökarıksel, "Neither Immoral Opportunist," 11.

14   Alexei Yurchak (2011) describes several hoaxes in which people make a fraudulent claim by directing attention away from its intrinsic meaning and to the flawlessness of the documents supporting it. These hoaxes indicate that *how* something is presented outweighs *what* was presented, and they expose the hidden cultural principle that gives truth value to something because it is articulated in authoritative form.

my long-term goal is to treat its 2,780 pages as if they were someone's field notes, attempting to reconstruct from them the world view and practices of the officers and informers who produced them. What operation of power do these files reveal? What regime of truth or knowledge do they assume and attempt to serve, and how is it connected with power? What sort of knowledge-production enterprise do we see in them? How can we characterize what they are after? What common practices emerge from this body of evidence, and what categories and discursive frames? How do they define their object? What does the language of the files tell us about their makers' epistemology?

Conspirativity

Although I will not seek to answer these questions now through my file, let me briefly use it to illustrate the archive's potential for doing so. For example: my overall impression from reading my file—an opinion shared by others who have read theirs—is of an extraordinary expenditure of time, money, and effort.[15] The Securitate's work is very labor-intensive. Officers not only photograph or copy my field notes: they translate them into Romanian in painstaking error-filled drafts, then have those typed. Someone then reads the notes and underlines certain passages (occasionally with a gratifying 'Yes!' or other commentary indicating that I am right). Endless hours are devoted to translating correspondence and transcribing recorded conversations that sometimes lasted an entire evening. Agents charged with following me spend 14-, 16-, 18-hour days, much of the time waiting for me to leave one building and go into another.[16] Documents, accompanied by cover letters and marginal notations, are circulated up and back down the reporting hierarchy, where they are read and notated. Case officers meet with informers, then have to write their reports and (generally) have those typed. Having determined that my contact with villagers who were commuting to work in an armaments factory is a problem, they draw up a list of all people living in every nearby settlement who work there, so they can contact these people and warn them against me, as well as seeking to recruit informers among them. The list gives not only the people's names, but those of their parents, their places and dates of birth, and the specifics of

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15   See, e.g., Tănase (2002) for Romania; Marton (2009) for Hungary. Marton observes concerning her parents' file in Hungary: "Such utterly wasted human effort. … The hundreds of man-hours agents in two capitals devoted to assessing the best way to intercept my mother on her daily drive" (2009, 224). Radu Ioanid (2002) writing of his own file, says that the recordings of his telephone calls "indicates a tremendous waste of technical and human means, with embarrassing results for those who ordered it."

16   I wonder whether they *really did* wait — most Romanians of my acquaintance would have found a way to avoid doing that. Precisely this expectation on my part contributed to my not taking the Securitate's surveillance practices seriously enough.

their occupations (imagine how much time it took to get that for some 138 people); notations indicate those who already serve as informers.[17]

This was very time-consuming work; clearly I occupied enormous amounts of Securitate man-hours (see also Garton Ash 1997, 190; Glaeser, 2011). Moreover, the file betrays a remarkable duplication of effort. Similar texts provide similar information from different officers; wording is copied from one text to another and retyped. Sometimes it seems one department has no idea what others already know; they re-create the same discovery. As ex-informer Nicolae Corbeanu puts it in his memoir, *Recollections of a Coward*, "I always had the impression that in the Securitate, at least at the local level, the left hand didn't much know what the right hand was doing" (Corbeanu 1998, 290).

What can we make of all this seemingly wasteful duplication of effort? Was it just good sleuthing—data that are replicated are more credible? Does it betray a pedagogical practice: the point was not (just) to get specific information about a person, but to train many people in a process of producing it, through the repetition and circulation of a limited set of categories and techniques? Perhaps the point was not to produce information efficiently at all, but rather to demonstrate that the officers were working hard; therefore the idea of "wasteful effort" makes no sense. In a system that rewarded people according to the fulfillment of production plans (which included plans for recruiting informers), proof of completing planned activity was indeed very important.[18] But I think the most important cause of this duplicative effort is to be found in practices aimed both at specialization and at maintaining the secrecy of Securitate personnel—practices of what they called *conspirativitate*, or "conspirativity," an aspect of the compartmentalization of intelligence work that is common to all secret services.

Securitate actions were segmented into different branches—following people ("Service F"), censoring correspondence ("Service S"), intercepting telephone conversations ("Service T"), disinformation ("Service D"), and so on—as well as into different directorates specializing in internal information (Directorate I,) counterespionage (III), military counterespionage (IV), etc. Each of these had its corps of agents, divided by county and district. The principle of conspirativity dictated that agents from one branch not deal directly with agents from another, to reduce the possibility that someone's identity would be discovered.[19] According to

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17   ACNSAS, FI, DUI 195851/1, 183-192 (from 1974).

18   See, for example, Albu (2008) giving a document that mentions a recruitment plan of 10 informers of which only three have been obtained; another document mentions the inflation of the recruitment plan for the subsequent year.

19   Conspirativity underlay the necessity of recruiting both informers (since targets were not supposed to know their case officers) and other collaborators—such as from the postal service, because other postal workers were not supposed to know about means of censoring correspondence. "Directiva referitoare la cenzura secretă a corespondenței, 1954," in Anisescu et al., eds. (2007, 346, 347, 364).

Oprea, this kind of compartmentalization was a basic principle of the Securitate's work. It aimed to increase the secrecy surrounding its activity, known in its entirety only by the top leaders and those of the Interior Ministry. He writes, "Officers of one department could get data or information from another only by going through their chiefs. Any divulging of their own activity and its results to colleagues from other departments was drastically sanctioned, on the basis of violating conspirativity and the principle of 'compartmentalization of the work of the Securitate.' The levels of access to information concerning the activities of the Securitate were clearly delimited" (Oprea 2004, 52–53).

Conspirativity appears in multiple forms. One example comes from the Hungarian documentary film *Az Ügynök Élete* (*The Life of an Agent),* made from a top-secret collection of training films for secret police, which notes that after the projectionist started a film for the trainees, he had to leave the room in the interests of conspirativity. Another example from a case officer's report shows that the person who typed the report from the officer's notes was not given the names of the people about whom the report was written; she typed blank lines, onto which the officer would later fill in the names by hand. A third example comes from the instructions for relations between informers and their minders: If an informant on the way to meet his officer sees him on the street, he must cross the street and pretend he doesn't know him.[20]

Conspirativity had two aspects, relating to inside and outside the organization: 1. Compartmentalization of work in the unit in such a way that each person knows only as much as needed, and each busies himself with his own cases and problems—about which no one should know, except those invested with this right. 2. Preserving the secret of one's work outside the unit, of actions taken, of the means used (Bălan 1977). The first of these referred to hiding the work of the apparatus from itself by disguising the work of officers from each other, the second to hiding the work of informers, whose identities (like those of the targets being followed) were disguised with pseudonyms. A document containing instructions for operative surveillance gives some examples:

[People doing this work] wear only civil clothing and are registered at their domicile as workers in one or another institution/firm, carrying special documents to this effect… Undercover workers are not allowed to live in houses of Interior Ministry organs or come into contact with uncovered Securitate workers, to be

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20 See Ordinul Ministrului Afacerilor Interne al Republicii Populare Române nr. 85 şi Instrucţiunile privind supravegherea operativă organelor M.A.I., in Anisescu et al., eds. (2007, 411). Gail Kligman reminds me that the practice of crossing streets was mirrored in everyday life. When people thought they detected a *securist*, they would cross the street. Kligman recalls turning it into a game, especially in the late '80s when she was tailed all the time and street crossing became part of her ritual. She would pretend to window shop (even though the stores were empty); across the street, her "tail" would stop. Then she would cross the street, and he would do the same.

photographed in groups, to participate in political manifestations of Securitate workers, or to be used in official actions of Securitate organs… Visiting the Securitate headquarters or workplaces by undercover workers is permitted only in exceptional cases and each case must be approved by the leadership of that organ… They must preserve strict conspirativity. [If it is breached, the consequences include] transferring the worker to another city or his removal from the Securitate. Units of the apparatus of operative surveillance are located in special under-cover headquarters, each with its own cover… It is categorically forbidden for uncovered operative workers to visit the under-cover headquarters in their Securitate uniforms… It is not permitted… to have phone conversations from which it might be concluded that the telephone belongs to the Securitate, nor to communicate to any person, including Securitate workers having no connection with the activity of operative surveillance, the addresses of the under-cover headquarters (Anisescu et al., eds., 2007, 401–402).

The true identity of officers of the most highly secretized units was known only by their hierarchical superiors and the head of the central personnel division. After the defection of General Pacepa, a special unit 0544 was formed that was completely under cover; its officers were not known to other Securitate officers, and even the head of it did not participate in its meetings for analysis (Olaru and Herbstritt 2003).

Here is a specific example of how problems of conspirativity might appear in a person's file. Mine contains a photograph of a Securitate officer, facing me in 1988 in the one episode during my more than three years in Romania when I knowingly stood face to face with a Securist. He stands in front of an apartment building in which I was to meet an important Romanian writer; he has just asked me for my papers and informed me that if this visit is not part of my officially approved research program, I do not have permission to enter the building. In his handwriting on these photos is the note, "Moment of warning 'VERA'" (my code name). When I showed this photo to two researchers at CNSAS, both were astonished: an officer should *never* appear in a photo with his target, not even in a secret file. It is a breach of conspirativity. One of these two researchers speculated that the officer's superior had made the mistake of not properly directing my shadow (the person following me), but of course that would have revealed the officer to my shadow, breaching conspirativity: the shadower should not know who my case officer was. Instead, the officer should have remained inside the building, *invisible* to my shadow, and then accosted me when I entered, thereby avoiding the camera. By walking out, he had uncovered (*deconspirat*) himself. In any case, the photo shows that whoever was in charge had not done what was necessary to preserving the officer's anonymity. Particularly interesting, however, is that as the handwriting on the note makes clear, the officer himself had placed the photograph in my file. My second CNSAS interlocutor attributed that to "an

excess of zeal: he wanted his superiors to know he had carried out his mission of giving you a warning." Whatever the reason, having his photo means I now know who accosted me and can request his official "deconspiration."

The demands of conspirativity vastly complicated the Securitate's work, contributing to its inefficiencies and duplication of effort as well as to a considerable amount of organizational incoherence. For example, according to Troncotă, various units and compartments involved in counterinformation across the territory had their own systems of evidence and archives. Therefore, he suggests, if the Securitate was a hypercentralized institution, that was not true in the domain of the archives, where decentralization reigned owing to the principles of compartmentalization and secrecy (Troncotă 2003, 88). The workings of conspirativity as a practice, combined with my earlier comments about the factionalism within the organization and its complex relations with other branches of government, invites us to see the Securitate not as a monolith with a single overriding intention—the opinion of most Romanian citizens—but as a multicentric organization fragmented among many parts.

Properties of the Files

The segmentation of work practices is amply evident in the files themselves. My own consists of informers' reports, letters that have been copied and often translated, often-lengthy transcripts of telephone conversations or conversations secretly recorded in one or another public place (sometimes these are verbatim, sometimes just summaries), photographs—of me, of people I am with, of my research notes—, painstaking translations of these notes, detailed logs of the officers who followed me on my daily rounds, action plans for dealing with me, lengthy reports by officers synthesizing the situation revealed by all this, and the marginal notes of one or more superior officers who read them. In a word, a Securitate file is a heteroglossic body of documents, nearly all of it obtained in secret, produced by a variety of people using a range of linguistic conventions. It is polyphonic as well, not only because so many different services contribute to it, but because of the multiple notations in the margins by people who have read any given document; thus, any one page can contain the voices of several readers.

Let me dwell for a moment on the file's heteroglossia, in connection with Bakhtin's idea of heteroglossia in the novel (Bakhtin 1981). This is not a completely nonsensical move, for the files are replete with fantasy and invented characters, though not from conscious authorial intent. For Bakhtin, heteroglossia—the coexistence of multiple speech varieties or voices within a single text, utterance, or national language, reflecting multiple points of view—was the defining characteristic of the novel and the source of its power. That power, in turn, was used

to call into question authoritative discourse, a form that demands unconditional acceptance by the hearer and permits no alternative interpretation. The "officialese" of Communist Party enunciations is a typical instance of authoritative discourse. Securitate files contain multiple voices and viewpoints—the voice of the target, of the case officers and other operative workers, of superior officers in the hierarchy, of the informers (who sometimes parrot the voice of the Party as they understand it), and so on. But unlike a novel, the work of the file is to *decontextualize* those other voices and subject them to a single dominant interpretation, by attributing meanings to the target as viewed through the lenses of the various workers and by reinterpreting the target's own utterances and acts. If in Bakhtin's view the novel's effectiveness comes from the coexistence of and conflict among different types of utterance, with authors' intentions expressed only indirectly through the way they yoke different voices, the effectiveness of the file in its context lies in its goal of reducing the variety of meanings in the multiple voices it contains so as to leave only one interpretation: the target's identification as an enemy.

The organization of a surveillance file is not chronological but activity-based. As described by Troncotă (2003, 129–130), the first item is not the reports that caused a person to be followed, but a case officer's proposal to set up a surveillance file; after it come informational reports generally dated prior to that proposal and justifying it (the elapsed time indicates the period necessary to verify the information in them). Then comes the action plan (*plan de măsuri*), laying out the measures to be taken so as to verify the danger the target posed, and after that the periodic reports of the case officer and his superiors presenting conclusions to date and further measures to be taken.[21] A given file would usually group all these action plans together, likewise the analytic reports, even if they were separated in time by several months. After this group of documents came

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21 Not all these measures worked out as planned. For instance, a marginal note on one document from 1985 reported a lunch I had with a friend, commenting: "Because of poor quality microphones, the recording was bad, so we lost lots of data that could have clarified the preoccupations of these two people." In another case, despite a massive mobilization of forces, they apparently forgot to request permission to install microphones and lost the content of a crucial conversation. See ACNSAS, DUI 195847/4, 85–86. Concerning the latter example, writer George Ardeleanu, reporting on my visit to Nicolae Steinhardt in October 1988, provides the following piquant summary: "In the end, observing this episode in retrospect, we find a comic note as well. We have the image of a tremendous machinery being unleashed (The First and Third Directorates, the Bucharest Headquarters Inspectorate and the Cluj County Inspectorate, Military Unit 0800, the Special Unit T for intercepting conversations, the special services for following ("F"), correspondence ("S"), and "111," the heavies [generals] Gianu Bucurescu, Aurelian Mortoiu, col. Gheorghe Ardeleanu the commandant of the Special Unit for Antiterrorist Warfare, etc. etc.) for *what*? To record a simple meeting between two people in which the essential element—the conversation in Steinhardt's house—slipped through their fingers [for lack of microphones in Steinhardt's residence]. A striking contradiction between effort and its results, calling to mind Kant's famous definition of laughter: *an effect arising from the sudden transformation of a tension-filled expectation into nothing*" (Ardeleanu 2009, 276).

others resulting from the action plan, in chronological order but grouped by the service that produced them: all informers' notes together, all logs of shadowing the suspect, all censored correspondence, all overheard conversations, and so on. As a result, Troncotă notes, research into a file is very cumbersome since one cannot follow the thread of an action from beginning to end; the system was apparently useful, however, for the work of the operative who wanted to work with it and who wanted not to read the entire file but merely to look for a specific kind of information (informer's reports, correspondence, etc.), which he would find all together. The final page in the file would be a proposal to close the surveillance action, giving the reason for opening it, the measures taken, and the reason for closing it, along with the approval of superior officers. After this, the file went to the archivists, who would read the entire thing, remove extraneous items, perhaps underline important passages, ensure that the documents were in the specified order, collate and number the pages, and sew them into covers to create volumes of 300–400 pages each. Subsequent operations on the file might lead to removing items, crossing out page numbers and renumbering.

Secret police files belong to the genre of the criminal record, but in Vatulescu's opinion, the remarkable variety of sources shows how they depart from it: officers do not simply look for evidence of a particular crime, but rather examine a person's entire biography for suspect tendencies (Vatulescu 2010, 32). As Nicolae Steinhardt wrote, "You are not accused for what you have done, but for who you are" (Vatulescu 2010, 23)—specifically, for being a particular kind of person: an enemy. *What kind* of enemy might vary over time: if we read a file as autobiography, it shows how the Securitate was constantly changing its view of its subjects, rewriting them repeatedly. In my case, I go from being suspected of military spying to being seen as a Hungarian in disguise, fomenting unrest among Hungarians in Cluj, to being a spy for the dissident movement—though in each of these scenarios I remain a presumed CIA agent. Because officers did not want simply to "solve" a crime but to inspect a complete life history for tell-tale patterns, no detail was insignificant: they recorded as much as possible of the person's life and activity (Vatulescu 2010, 35)—much as an ethnographer would. (They themselves note this similarity in my file.)

Such a file is thus a product of collective authorship, engaging the efforts of many different operatives, including the archivist. As a type of writing, files have linguistic and narrative conventions peculiar to them, though like the wider corpus of Communist Party archives they are full of the characteristic "wooden language," with its ritualistic invocations (class struggle, liquidation of enemies of the people, unmasking, threat, etc.), its lack of the pronoun "I" and frequent use of passive verbs and depersonalizing constructions,[22] its military metaphors

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22 This is not a property only of Securitate files but appears in bureaucratic documents from many places. For example, Doyle (2007, 61) writes of the same feature in Guatemalan police

(the person under surveillance is referred to as an "obiectiv," in the sense of military objective or target), and so on. The subdivision of the file by types of action (correspondence, eavesdropping, informer reports), Vatulescu observes, produces abrupt shifts in narrative voice, juxtaposing the report by the target's close friend, for instance, with the mechanical account of her being followed. Because the narrative voice jumps around, we get a disjointed portrait of the subject (Vatulescu 2010, 37).

In this sense, the experience of reading one's own file is disorienting, for it lacks a single narrative thread organized as a biography (in my case, I felt compelled to rearrange the entire thing chronologically so that I could find myself and my experience in it). Better said, it *is* a biography, but not one its subject fully recognizes—and in this sense, it is fiction. Nonetheless, Vatulescu continues, the file's heteroglossia is tamed by rigid selection patterns, as the officers' reports reduce the portrait "to a cliché from an infamous stock of characters: the spy, the saboteur, the counter-revolutionary, the terrorist, and so on"—in a word, an enemy of the state (Vatulescu 2010, 38). Only with changes in surveillance technology, she observes, does the cacophony of the file diminish, since telephone wiretaps fixed a central viewpoint from a constant perspective. Although the new technology did not eliminate the need for informers, it helped to set a more impersonal tone that distinguishes files of the 1980s, say, from those of two decades earlier, while further reducing narrative coherence and progression (Vatulescu 2010, 46–49).

If a person's file has a fragmenting effect on his or her sense of identity, this is not only from the lack of a biographical narrative but from a proliferation of the file's subject, through the use of multiple code names. Each case officer assigns a code name to his target, and if a person is a target in more than one time or location, there may be code names for each. If the file is closed and later a new one is opened, it may use a new code name. Thus, I am "Folclorista" for my Hunedoara county case officers in the 1970s, "Vera" for my case officers in Cluj in the 1980s, "Katy" for the city of Iaşi in the late '70s and 1980s, "Vanesa" for the Foreign Intelligence Service. The different services also assign code names, particularly the shadowing service: I am "Kora" for the one in Cluj, "Viky" for Timişoara, "Venera" for Hunedoara, "Valy" and "Vadu" for the D.I.E.. Nine names, four of them with rich activity logs. "Disguises," indeed!

In talking of "my" file, I assume that somehow my own sense of being a constant presence across time gives unity to my piece of the archive—that is, I assume that its object unifies the file. But the object has many names and could thus be different people. Maybe I am not the same person in 1985 as in 1973; maybe the Securitate were postmodernists *avant la lettre*, recognizing that people have multiple identities. In Romanian, people refer to it as "dosarul meu," "my

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documents, in which an agent was chastised by his superior for *not* using the passive: "Never personify—the third person must always be used."

dossier/file," even when it contains multiple volumes from multiple years (as mine does). This takes the *ex post facto* view that a single unified human being or personality holds the whole thing together. But this is to project onto the file a unity that cannot be presumed as it is formed. When an officer is shadowing a target, he doesn't necessarily know "whom" he is following; likewise the person transcribing phone conversations or letters. Conspirativity—the segmentation of the Securitate labor process—thus segments the social world it appropriates.

The Files as Agents

So far I have been speaking of the Securitate and its officers as creators of the files. In this final section I will entertain the opposite question: to what extent are the files themselves social agents? Ever since the 1986 publication of Michel Callon's celebrated paper on scallop-fishing in France, which treated the scallops as actors on par with the fisherman and the conservation scientists he studied, and with the increasing popularity of actor-network theory and science studies, it has become possible to ask questions about the efficacy of objects in the world— objects such as surveillance files. What effects have these files had? I do not refer specifically to the effects of surveillance practices themselves, though they may enter into this discussion, but rather the effects of the existence of these files and the manner in which they are made, circulate, and act.

The theoretical perspective I draw upon now challenges referential theories of language. For example, Matthew Hull, who draws upon semiotic theory and science studies to analyze what he calls Pakistan's "Government of paper," observes of the writing he finds in Pakistani government files, "graphic artifacts are not simply the instruments of already existing social organizations. Instead, their specific discourses and material forms precipitate the formation of shifting networks and groups of official and unofficial people and things" (Hull 2012, 21). I confess that this is not a way of thinking in which I am fully at home; I am still basically a referential-theory kind of person and find it difficult to hoist myself out of the assumption that when we speak, our words refer to existing things in the world. But I have decided to accept the challenge posed by Hull and others to try on something different— because the whole matter of files is itself something in which I do not feel at home. I have a file; it contains words, which ought to refer to a reality in the world. But I find the reality those words purport to represent alien, since I am their object. So to try on a *modality of analysis* in which I am uncomfortable seems just the thing. In pursuing this line of thought, I am asking questions about sources, something that historians always ask about, but I pose them in a somewhat different form.

When people from the U.S. learn about my file, they tend to ask the same question: "did they get the truth or is it all made up, all lies?" This question points

to the fact that we (or my U.S. interlocutors, anyway) tend to take the file as an object for granted. We assume that it contains reports of various kinds, which are more or less true—that is, we posit a truth relation between the words in the file and the persons or behaviors described in them, through the agency of the officer and his paper. We posit, in other words, a referential theory of the file in relation to the reality of the person it is about, and we ask about the nature of that relation. Romanian readers of files share this assumption—as we gather, for example, from Poenaru's report of an episode witnessed one day in the CNSAS reading room. A man reading his own file "took out a pen and started to make his own annotations on the original, marking those things that were factually true and crossing out those that were false or incorrect—to the horror of the archive's guardians. This is perhaps the perfect metaphor, the extreme case, of how the files were generally read in post-communism: with an eye to their correspondence to reality, to their trueness in relation to facticity" (Poenaru 2013, 35). He goes on to argue that this reveals two different logics to the files: the logic under which they were composed—"as 'structural biographies,' as accounts of an overall social structure comprised of many levels and interlinked plots"—and the logic of the postsocialist reading, more autobiographical and concerned with truth (Poenaru 2013, 40).

Following Poenaru and Hull, it is apparent that the truth value of what is in the file may not be the most interesting question we can entertain about it. Although we can profitably ask by what techniques and assumptions the officers produce *what they consider* its truth, that is different from the more common preoccupation with whether files tell "what really happened." That preoccupation has the consequence of effacing the file itself, of reducing it to a paper form of the officer's relation to the person under surveillance. It is to avoid this that I ask about the agency of the file: what social effects does it have? What (to maintain the "fiction" of my essay title) does it fashion? These effects include aspects of the very physicality that have been overlooked, and to which I will briefly draw attention here.

One way to begin thinking about this is through performative theories of language, which a number of scholars have found particularly persuasive for analyzing socialist societies (e.g., Kligman and Verdery 2011; Nadkarni 2011; Oushakine 2001; Vatulescu 2010; Yurchak 2006). Here is former Romanian communist and political prisoner Belu Zilber, on how he came to think about Securitate files.

The first great socialist industry was that of the production of files… This new industry has an army of workers: the informers. It works with ultramodern electronic equipment (microphones, tape recorders, etc.), plus an army of typists with their typewriters. Without all this, socialism could not have survived… In the socialist bloc, people and things exist only through their files. All our existence is in the hands of him who possesses files and is constituted by him

who constructs them. Real people are but the reflection of their files… For the first time since the creation of the world demiurges have appeared on the earth. The masters of all the files are our masters, the silent fabricators of files—our creators (Şerbulescu 1991, 136, 137–138, 147).

This puts us in mind of Ian Hacking's felicitous notion of "making up people" (Hacking 2006), which, as I indicated above, was one of the Securitate's main tasks: their job was to produce the category of "enemy," including spies and various other types of enemies, and to populate it with real people. The files were a principal means of doing so, a repository containing the tracks of that process. The materiality of the file somehow guarantees the reality of the person produced through it.

Florin Poenaru offers a wonderful example of making up people in his description of how the Securitate made writer Dorin Tudoran into a dissident. Tudoran published parts of his file under the title *I, Their Son* (appropriately, for my purposes, opening it with the lines, "I didn't write this book—it wrote me" [Tudoran 2010, 9]). From it, Poenaru finds ample evidence for how a person who began by simply complaining about not being able to travel and not having the job he wanted is increasingly "discovered" to be a dissident: to have contacts in the West, to be writing "socio-political tracts" that are picked up by Radio Free Europe, and finally to be "at the center of a wide web of spies, French connections and illegal trade of manuscripts" (Poenaru 2013, 37–38). Finally, he is forced to emigrate (Romania's preferred way of dealing with dissidents). Poenaru (2013, 41) concludes, "Only by reading them as 'fiction,' as 'detective novels' from the Cold War do we get to the true political level of the files: that is, their performativity, their creation and recreation of reality." Reinforcing this message, Tudoran's file later served as the basis for Gianina Carbunariu's theatrical production "X mm of Y km," in which the actors keep changing roles and starting over so that "ultimately, the characters, their identities and social roles are effectively suspended and what seems to matter is only discourse, performatively creating the reality of the meeting. The content of the utterances becomes irrelevant, so does the actual identity of those doing the utterance: the text and the script prevails by virtue of its sheer repetition" (Poenaru 2013, 42). One is reminded, in this description, of the infamous show trials of the 1950s, which performatively turned loyal Party members into enemies of the state.

Belu Zilber's file makes him a traitor, Tudoran's makes him a dissident, mine makes me a CIA agent, and countless other people's files make them other kinds of enemies. Files can also make "informers" out of people who staunchly deny that they ever held this role. For example, the Czechoslovak StB created collaborator cards simply from making contact with someone, even if that person refused to collaborate with them. One might argue that in this kind of "making up people," the files are not fully agents but mere accomplices. Even as accomplices, however, files can act. For one thing, they can recruit people unwittingly into the service

of the organization. My own file recruits me into the Securitate, making me an integral part of it even while excluding me from the file's production, in ways I will suggest in my third chapter. So even as an American, I help to constitute the Securitate arm of the Romanian Party-state.

Let me take another approach to the agency of files by returning to the earlier discussion of conspirativity. As I indicated there, the compartmentalization of the labor process in the interests of maintaining the secrecy of officers' identities and work practices meant that in any one location, many members of the organization were unknown to each other; this had consequences for organizational cohesion, further undermined by factionalism and backbiting that made careers unstable. A very few senior officers—each county's Securitate chief; the head of the Inspectorate for Police, Securitate, and Penal Investigations; their deputies; and the organization's top generals in Bucharest to whom they reported—were in a position to know who the operatives were and what they were doing. As Poenaru writes: "Only the top echelon of the Securitate had access to the *entire* file: the rest of the employees just contributed pieces… Ultimately, the file is nothing other than a huge puzzle that only a handful of people could see in its entirety" (Poenaru 2013, 44). Understandably, the workload of such people likely exceeded their ability to keep track of everything.

Conspirativity made the Securitate a "virtual community" ahead of its time. If the operatives involved in shadowing, censoring letters, transcribing taped conversations, etc. were all disguised, the circulation of the material files was the principal instrument of their cohesion. Files traveled from the hands of the case officer up the hierarchy, accumulating marginal notes from various superiors on the way, and came back down with the superiors' observations and instructions, like this document with an informer's note and three levels of commentary—that of the informer's case officer, then of the officer's immediate superior, and of an even higher-level officer at the top of the page. Their trajectory materialized among various levels of the Securitate a conversation that would never or rarely happen in person. In this manner, Hull suggests, file circulation helps to produce collective agency and to distribute responsibility. These effects are also achieved by certain linguistic conventions that distribute authorship ambiguously (the use of passive and reflexive constructions, for example, and absence of the pronoun "I"—a common feature of ritual speech – Hull 2012, 181, 317). In brief, the process of their regular circulation made files complete and constituted the Securitate as an organization, a collective actor, rather than as a bunch of individuals writing reports. Is it going too far to say that only now, with the opening of the files, can we perceive that fully, as the gaze of file readers turns the Securitate and its archive into coherent, unified entities, which they were not before?

Even *without* the constraints of conspirativity one can make such an argument, as has Richard Harper in his ground-breaking study of the International Monetary

Fund (Harper 1998). Writing about staff reports, he states that their paramount function "is to act as instruments to cohere and control the organisation" (Harper 1998, 11-12). Every file has multiple authors as well as many readers; the organization tasked with setting world economic policy—or with ensuring the security of the Romanian state—uses this body of material to do so, and is itself made as a collective actor by the circulation of its files. An advantage of this line of thinking is that we do not have to accept the organization's own rationale or definition of itself in order to define it: we can look to its behavior. Such an approach helps us to *bound* the organization, by following what Harper refers to as "document careers." This is a useful reminder, given the fragmentation of the intelligence services: Where are the boundaries of the Securitate as an organization? They are indicated by the aggregate trajectories of files, which set the Securitate apart from other segments of the communist bureaucracy, into which these files rarely if ever circulated.[23]

In a fascinating discussion, Harper pushes these questions further by asking about the difference between paper and electronic files. He is not thinking only of the difference between paper that creates trajectories through its travels in the organization and people who turn on a computer to access a central data bank that everyone can visit. Rather, he draws on research about differences between these two media in the kinds of embodied reading practices they entail. This work indicates that paper documents affect how readers *impute relationships* among sections of a document, allowing them "to get to grips" with it in ways that are harder with hypertext (Harper 1998, 22). The stability of a printed text enables building a cognitive map of it more easily, and its linearity on the page facilitates building and inferring cohesion, by both author and readers. Because readers tend to make inferences based on adjacent text, hypertext can generate inferences, less likely with paper text, that the author did not intend (Harper 1998, 23). All these considerations underscore the vital significance of the files' materiality and give special meaning to the fact that despite the Securitate's endowment with powerful computers, most of its files remained in paper rather than electronic form until the regime's end.

In case this actor-network approach to the Securitate archive seems a bit far-fetched, I will end with one final aspect of the agency of files that is incontestable: their effects in post-1989 politics. Matthew Hull quotes a Pakistani bureaucrat who told him, "Files are always ready to talk, if not now while you are in your seat then later… Files are time bombs" (Hull 2012, 167). Almost every East European reader would surely agree with that image. These archives, unlike many

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23 There might be some sharing of documents between the Securitate and the Foreign Intelligence Service (as is clear from my own file), and documents might go to Party organs or the Ministry of Justice for penal cases, but for the most part, files produced by Securitate officers circulated only among them.

government archives in the world, were never imagined to have any readers other than the security apparatus. It is one thing to ask about the archive's efficacy in the context of its own norms, including the possible effects of circulating its files. But the events of 1989 have radically recontextualized these archives, lending them effects that were never anticipated by their makers. Since 1989, files have wrecked lives, destroyed family relationships and friendships, made and broken careers in politics and other domains, sought and failed to achieve "transitional justice" and "democratization," and otherwise produced boundless mayhem as well as tremendous opportunity. They have caused profound self-doubt on the part of persons who have read their own files—leading them to ask, as I have, for instance, whether they were unwitting spies after all, and why they were so trusting of friends, spouses, or kin who informed on them.[24] The files have become sources both for generating forms of political or moral capital (as people use them to "prove" that they were not collaborators or were victimized by those who were), and for *preventing* people from acquiring it (through exposing or threatening to expose their presence in the files) (Poenaru 2012, 6).

Files acquire this kind of "time bomb" agency mainly if they are seen as repositories of truth. But everything we know about how the files were put together diminishes their likely truth value. Informers reported under duress, out of malice, or inaccurately; case officers made tendentious interpretations that suited their ends; destruction of files left enormous lacunae in the corpus; agents opened files on people even when their "recruits" refused to cooperate; the demands of the planned economy set performance targets that compelled sloppy work; competition among officers and branches of the secret service aggravated that tendency; and so forth. Moreover, as Poenaru (2012, 6) has observed, the insistence on seeing the files as matters of truth has, in a dialectical reversal, "led to the proliferation of a widespread climate of suspicion, fear and denunciation, that is, precisely of what the former Securitate was mainly blamed for and the lustration mechanisms were hoping to eliminate from the public life of post-communism. By inscribing the Securitate archive as a site of truth about the past, post-communism simply prolonged its logic into the present."

With these observations, we come full circle to the concerns with which I opened this essay: the problematic use of files for postcommunist "justice". As I have written elsewhere (Verdery 2012), the political uses of these files for personal vendettas seem to be outstripping their possibilities for bringing closure through truth and reconciliation. This leaves us with the conclusion that the best uses of

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24   Timothy Garton Ash (1997, 65) in his ruminations on his Stasi file, comes to a similar conclusion. As his file forces him to ask himself what the differences are between being a spy and working sometimes secretively as a writer, he finds "disconcerting affinities between the two pursuits." If a newspaper's job is "to convey intelligence," then "I was a spy for 'intelligence'… I was a spy for the reader".

these files are to carry out ethnography of the secret police—how they conceived their task, how they understood their targets, and how they categorized the world in which they pursued those targets. In this essay I have begun to suggest what an ethnographic approach to these files might look like.

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Săteni. A Diffuse Household
in a Post-peasant Society
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To Frances Pine and her own *Sateni*

Abstract. An imagined "ideal type" village, *Sateni* portraits Romanian rural household changes after the fall of communism. The general frame of the story is based on a particular household I visited many times starting with the year 2000, dialogues and details being picked up from many other field researches in the Romanian countryside. The narrative is focused on household structure and relations, with fusions and fissions coping with societal changes, economic breakdown and new entrepreneurial opportunities as well as with work migration in the EU. The social history of the house itself, turned to a "pride house" by the elder generation and then to a "rustic house" by the younger one, depicts a general social trend of the post-socialist rural world seeking for "modernity" and of breaking up with the historical status of peasant.

The more theoretical frame is centred around the "diffuse household," an ambivalent locative and occupational social category of the communist "household-worker" (peasant-worker) that emerged during communism as a result of work migration of former peasants to surrounding cities, and which is still functioning as a main domestic adaptive strategy. Nevertheless, individualism seems to gain terrain reshaping households and household relations into an ambiguous "post-peasant" society.

Keywords: household, migration, credit, identity, post-peasant society.

The village of Sateni does not exist. It is a sort of Middletown I created, the name that I gave to an imagined village in order to speak about a real household I visited many times starting with the year 2000. However, the description of this household consists of many other (more or less) similar households where I have done fieldwork for the past 15 years. Rather than a pure Weberian "ideal type," the result is a dramatization of a kind of ideal pattern of *relations* in recent rural Romania.

The village

Sateni is a big village with a population of over 3,000 inhabitants. It is placed at about 30 kilometers away from the capital of the county, with no railway near it, but linked to the town through a national road. Recently, it has been declared a town, though without having suffered any notable changes in its infrastructure or demography.

In the village, there used to be a craftsmen cooperative shop employing several hundreds of women living there. Men used to work in the town's industrial facilities, at a power dam near the village, and in the woods. There is also a nearby famous monastery which attracted, besides religious people, a great number of tourists. In this respect there was also a union hotel, always filled with guests, as well as a "recreation house" for the employees of the power plant. At present, the cooperative is about to close its doors and cannot provide any more jobs for the women of the village. The union hotel is deserted, the monastery bought the recreation house and turned it into a hotel. Enterprises in the neighbouring town are not undergoing major restructuring operations or have closed up, so only about half of the active male population in the village was able to preserve their jobs. About 20% of its active population was or is currently away, working abroad.

There is also a Gypsy neighbourhood in the village, which is separated from the rest of the dwellings by a river, as in most of the Romanian villages. The neighborhood ("Gypsy quarter") consists of about 150 households with an average of 5 inhabitants per household. The great majority of the locals are daily workers on construction sites. The household we are referring to is right after one crosses the bridge, the first house of the "Gypsy quarter." On the maternal line, the Apetrei family has been living in the Gypsy quarter for at least three generations, while men married in the family came from other villages. Still, the origins and older history of this kin is shrouded in mystery, as none of the family members with whom I spoke would talk about it.

The Apetrei household

People know them as Apetrei, "of the Apetrei family." In fact, there are at least three families living under the same roof: Maria (who had died before my first visit there) and her husband Ion, also deceased in 2004 in a work accident, on the one hand, and their son (Marius) and daughter (Olga), both married with children, on the other hand. I said "at least" because the two separate houses of their old parents are across the road, one belonging to the mother, the other to Maria's grandmother. Now the two old women are living in the same house, the one near the road. When they have many tourists (Apetrei has joined the so-

called "agrotourism" network very early), they move in together, all of them or part of them, to live in the old houses.

V.M.: Officially, are you registered as one or more households?
Olga: What do you mean? As one household.
V.M.: But there are several families here!
Olga: There is one house. We are living here, the old women, there.
V.M.: So they form another household.
Olga: Yes. I mean they have two households: my grandmother's and my great-grandmother's.
V.M.: But don't they live together?
Olga: Yes, they do now, but they each had their house and this is how it stayed… There are two houses there.

The fact that the parents live with their married children and their grandchildren is not a typical issue. But Ion wanted to build a big house ever since the beginning.

Ion: We stayed in one room. There was a big room and father [in fact, his father-in-law] was also working there, mother was cooking sometimes… Ever since I was a child, I've wanted to have a bigger house… When I started to build this one, there was a lady here, a doctor. I used to say: 'My God, what a big house she has!' I envied her! (laughing). I wanted to build a house bigger than hers, but I didn't realize how much money would be needed for its maintenance and how much work was involved. But I did it. I was also the first one of the village to have an inside toilet. The lady doctor didn't have one, so this was a big incentive!
V.M.: How did you figure things out at that time, what was the deal?
Ion: The garage was down here, where we now have the cellar. This was the working shop… We weren't supposed to have any living space down there. And then I felt sorry. What was I to do with all that space? I could have easily turned it into a room… I made many changes. I still have the cellar. I haven't finished the attic.
V.M.: What was supposed to be there?
Ion: (laughs)
Olga: Grandchildren, great-grandchildren… (also laughs)
Ion: We have everything ready, but the entire woodwork burned down.
Olga: And Florin died, the carpenter who was supposed to do the attic.
V.M.: And now what do you want to build up there?
Ion: If I manage to find the money, I want to raise a light summer building. If these young girls come here (we were with some students), I'll get 20 of them there, to see the landscape.
Olga: We might build 6 upper rooms or 4 big ones, with a bathroom.

At present, the house has "6 rooms with wooden floors," five at the upper floor, where they all live, one on the ground floor—between the "good room" and the living room which is reserved for guests—with a near kitchen where they all eat. The garage and the workshop have been transformed into a closets and storing space. Recently, these were turned into a large modern kitchen, with a dining room for the clients. The bridge, decorated by a nice wooden gazebo is yet to be finished. There is a big yard with a small orchard where there are some beehives, and a garden spot in the back, towards the river. The cows are kept across the road, "at the old women's place," where a larger garage was built when Ion wanted to raise more cows. Right after 1990, next to the road, the family built a small building where they opened a convenience store and a bar next to it. In 2005, Olga and her husband Marcel started to build a new house on their grandmother's land, where they recently moved the convenience store.

In fact, we could talk about a single "domestic unit," even though it is distributed to several houses. Its covering five generations is a rather rare phenomenon. However, "the old women" are not seen by the rest of the family as part of the same household. The reason seems to be one in particular: one has to share at least some work in the household in order to take part in the (re)distribution of goods and have a full member status, and the two old ladies are no more involved in running the household. Household is not only about kinship…

One of the first things that caught my interest in these people was the functioning of their "household," more exactly what they meant by this. I first asked Mr. Ion if he saw himself as a "good householder," as people say.

V.M.: Would you tell me if you see yourself as a good master of the household? I for one see you as such.

Ion: Maybe I was… But now I'm alone, my wife is dead, you can not be a good householder alone, like this, just by yourself…

V.M.: How can you tell if someone is a good householder? Can you see someone in the street and say: "Look, there he is?" How do you recognize him?

Ion: He has a garden full of flowers and trees, a well-groomed garden, he has a cart, a chariot, horses… Well, he has everything a man needs… A shovel, a small tractor… Some land… What can I say? I bought another 3 hectares of land and this Sunday I just bought 4,000 square meters of land.

V.M.: Is the house important for a good manager of the household?

Ion: Oh, yes! Very important. And its comfort matters, however modest… There's no need to have a big house, and there are plenty of those who built themselves big houses, as I did with this one, and they are living in the old ones—as would be our old women's house—while they are saving the new house.

V.M.: But this is what you did too…

Ion (laughing): That's the rule here, one has to have a good looking house in order to be respected…

In a maybe more obvious way than in other cases, the Apetrei household was a continuing *process*, undergoing permanent changes, convergent projects and ongoing conflicts: "I don't know if we are to be separated, we'll see…" – Olga once told me.

The characters

Ion came to Sateni in 1971, from a village of the same county. He was a hydro mechanic and was performing maintenance works on the hydraulic pumps of the county. This is how he reached Sateni, where he met Maria. Shortly after this he married her and settled in the village. "Three years I did nothing. I didn't know what to start with," he says. In 1985, he started to work in Sateni as foreman at a small water power plant in the region. He has four more brothers, one in Craiova, one in Cluj, one who left for Germany and another one who stayed in their old parents' house.

Coming from a very poor family, Ion started from scratch. The house was his first and perhaps greatest ambition. Then he worked hard as a bee-keeper and even got a prize in Germany for his chestnut honey. This work brought him a fair amount of money during the communist years, and allowed him to round up his income as a worker. While working at the enterprise, he was permanently running his household, as most of the villagers. He also raised several cows and owned 20 or 30 sheep in the farming cooperative. Much to his help was the fact that he did surveillance work at the power plant. When he worked night shifts, he could sleep two or three hours and then have the entire day to work in the household. This was the reason why he never wanted to be promoted, as this would have meant more responsibilities, more work and therefore less time for his household.

After the fall of communism, he had initiated more projects than he could achieve. He was among the first who joined the "agro-tourism" network, while making a boarding house of the house built before 1989. Together with his wife, they built a small bar and a convenience store near the road. He turned back to his bee-keeping and, after a bad year when he lost most of his swarms, he started raising otters. They ate the animals and sold their furs. After this, he had some goats which he sold, then he bought more cows for whom he built a stable across the road, at "the old women's house" ("Cows are a safer investment," he concluded, arguing with Olga who wanted to invest in a pool for tourists). Ion made plans for a trout farm, and then wanted to install a heating central unit for heating a greenhouse and a sauna for tourists – and many more others. Each time I came to Sateni, he had other projects in mind. "This life is too short, too short to do all you have to," he used to moan, half-joking.

In 2003 he fell off the staircase while he was fixing something, and died.

There is very little I know about his wife *Maria*. She had already died when I first came to Sateni and no one of the family seemed to be willing to talk about her to a stranger. Still, I know that she was head of a section at the "Domestic Crafts" small enterprise of the village, a business which was going very well when it produced many textiles for export. She supervised 40 women and was working a lot at home, thus being able to take care of the household, as well. Together with her husband, she must have earned pretty well, as both had jobs that allowed them to take extensive care of their household too.

Olga, Ion and Maria's daughter, is a hyperactive woman. She quickly gave up her studies after 10 grades of elementary school. At the beginning of the '90s, she left for Austria, where she first worked at a pizza-shop, then in a greenhouse where there were other young people from her county. "The lady owner had many connections. It was like in Romania. She arranged our visas with the police, she was hiring us almost legally, but didn't pay any taxes. And she gave us smaller fees. It's true, she told us that if we wanted, she could pay us all the taxes, but there would be no salary for us. Who could have said yes?"

In 1994, she met a wealthy Austrian who did business with the lady she worked for and they lived together for a while. "The first thing about him was that I liked his car. Poor man, he thought I liked him, but I was more interested in his car" (laughing). She did not work any more, as "he took me away from my job, he said he would pay me my salary, only to stay home and take care of the cats. (…) You can't imagine his house! When I saw all that waste… I felt bad! This is one way to put it; in fact, I couldn't care less! (laughing) The cat food would cost more than ours." Then she came back to the country for the marriage papers. When she got back to Austria, three weeks later, she found her husband to be with a friend of hers. "I left for home. Why stay any longer? I was one too many."

When she got back, she spent all the money she had earned in Austria ("I spent it so quickly!"), then she worked at a bar in the capital of the county, where salaries were scarcely paid. "But when I saw how much I made out of the tips, I told myself it was all right. One time for Christmas, when the owner wanted to pay our salaries, we all refused, bought champagne with that money and drank it together." Here, someone from a neighbouring village introduced her to another Austrian. "He was pressing me to get the paperwork done. I said I would leave at once, I didn't care about his fortune. I would work and make money. He also had some advantages if he married me: he didn't have to pay certain bachelor taxes…" They were sort of married, but the Austrian would not let her free once Olga came back to Romania. This is why she couldn't marry another Austrian, "a very rich but older one, a refined special person," with whom she lived for a while.

I don't know how and why she decided to come back for good. "I had had enough." This is all she told me. Since then, she takes care of the convenience

store (for which she graduated "a one-day course, so that they could give me the license") and the bar. When tourists come, she takes care of them, too, and her sister-in-law helps her. She knows everything that moves in "the neighborhood" and she "comes to terms with everyone," as she says herself. As they keep tabs at the only bar of the "neighbourhood," it could not be otherwise.

When I first came to Sateni, *Marcel* was Olga's boyfriend. She was not officially married to the "Austrian" yet.

Marcel's grandmother had saved a lot of money during the Communist years: she had two cows and would sell their milk and cheese to the village hospital, she made doughnuts and toasted sunflower seeds which she sold at the high school near her house. She left all her money to Marcel's uncle. When Marcel asked him for money once, he told him that, if he wanted money, he had to work for them. He had a stable contract with Plafar, for gathering medical plants, so he sent Marcel to pick those plants up and paid him a little more than the official fee. Marcel got used to having money, so he quit high school and, right after his military service, he got married for a short while.

He had a connection that helped him leave for Germany. He worked for some time on the construction sites, as a woodwork assembler. This is how he met a man who was interested in doing business in Romania, in the wood field. Near Sateni there is plenty of wood ("Statistics say we can exploit wood here for another 80 years"), so they decided to open up a wood processing workshop in the village. "We had arranged to buy land here and to set up a stable working place for him to take orders only for Austria. When he didn't have any orders there, he would work for the domestic market.") The workshop would produce "doors and other home appliances," but it did not work out. "I wanted to have a big business, and he wanted to have fun. These don't go together. He thought that coming to Romania meant running away from duties at home." As Olga would put it: "They come here for a week or a month, they say they do business, but all they think about is having fun and then…"

Marcel takes care of everything, he is in charge of supplies at the shop and bar, he transports various things for people. Sometimes he does small businesses but, ever since I've known him, not one that might be big or enduring.

Marius is the other child of the Apetrei family, Olga's brother. In most of my visits there, he was gone, as he was trying to do business in Germany. He bought several cars, among which a VW van, but he got fooled and had to go back there for buying all sorts of spare parts, thus making many debts. His father, Ion, had to help him with a lot of money, which led to an unspoken conflict between father and son. Marius had other plans, but the results were scarce. Each time I spoke with Ion, he would mumble when talking about his son and say "he's more of an idler." I was not able to communicate much with Marius. Our first long discussion took place after his father's death, when Marius was suddenly forced

to take over the role of head of household. He was much more relaxed and was saying reasonable things. He had bought a wood mill and was installing it: "I took the land and closed it and I prepared it. I started to bring wood in collaboration with somebody else. It's fire wood and I can still choose some pieces for other purposes. Now I'm chasing some contracts – at first only for timber. I cannot do more." However, he had the ambition to produce "solid furniture with Romanian traditional motives." The next time I went to Sateni, Marcel had made some progress with his woodwork business and was speaking like a true businessman who knows what to do. Therefore, I was quite surprised when, during the winter of 2006, when I passed through Sateni, I saw that his wood mill business was dying away (it was proven that the seller had fooled him and sold him defective machinery, which had become almost unusable). Marius had decided thus to get a state job, as he suddenly wanted "to have a safer job, even though less well paid." In this sense, during the summer he tried to get a job as a fireman, with a fair salary and a working schedule that allowed him to work more in his household. The "bribe" he had to pay in order to get this job was much more than he had expected, so he had to abandon the plan. Now he was looking for something else, without having a precise idea about it.

Marcel's wife *Roxana* is "the daughter-in-law" of the household. A quiet and modest woman, she takes care of the children and of the current chores of the household. Practically, she does not play any role in the other members' various businesses or in their projects. She may keep Olga's place at the bar when she is away. Once, during the summer of 2000, while being exceeded by this passive role, she decided to have a life of her own and got a job in the city, without telling anyone anything. In the evening, when Marcel found out, he beat her up awfully. I happened to be there and I saw the whole scene from a distance. Since then, Roxana is even more quiet and I was able to exchange but a few words with her. The others speak very rarely about Roxana. As in a Zadruga, the last woman arrived inside someone's kin is everybody's servant…

The domestic economy of the Apetrei household

The Apetrei household is a typical *diffuse household* with its members working in and out, combining domestic and market resources according to opportunities and short term strategies. There were periods when this kinship network functioned on a dispersed basis in Sateni and Craiova (where one of Ion's brothers lived), in Germany and Austria, still keeping their close household relations. In fact, their different coping strategies keep something in common, a kind of *domestication of the market*, be it communist or capitalist. At present, Ion and "the old women" are dead and the relation with the uncle in Germany has been severed. But Olga,

Marius and their families are still living together and sharing the chores of the household, their resources, as well as calculating in common "their expenses, but not their income." "We are used to this, it's simple," they explain. "We are helping each other, even if we fight sometimes." However, there is at any time the possibility that this symbiosis ceases, a wish that both Olga and Marcel have expressed but never fulfilled.

a) *The social division of labor.* As Ion used to say, members of a household must work hard as oxen in the same yolk, drawing in the same direction. His children, Marcel and Olga, have chosen different directions. When they worked abroad, each of the children had their own plans, while the parents' household was more of a "safety net" to which they used to turn to whenever these plans would not succeed or whenever they failed. Generally, Olga contributed with a large amount of money to building the convenience store and improving the house (although she spent her money repeatedly), while Marcel brought a van with which he helps carry products for the store and go to the village (even though his father had to help him several times with money, in order to repair the car).

After finally (?) having settled in Sateni, they got married and settled in their parents' house. Then, the assignment of the household chores started to be more systematic: besides his job, Ion took care of the beehives, cows and other major chores. He was also the one to take the major decisions regarding the household strategies. Olga and her husband take care of the store and the bar; her husband is in charge of supplying them, while Olga takes care of potential tourists. Marius is driving the villagers wherever they need with his van and helps them set up contracts or negotiate. Moreover, he founded the wood mill business. His wife "tends to the house," prepares meals and takes care of both families' children. All members of the household take part in field works (vintage, mowing, harvesting). However, this flexible assignment depends upon momentary strategies and contexts. Thus, for instance, after Ion's death, the children were assigned the chore of grooming all eight cows, which they refused to do, and sold the cattle. Still, Marius decided to take up bee-keeping and fixed the hives left by Ion, thus providing honey for his children and tourists.

The two women of the household have completely different gender status. Olga is more of a modern businesswoman, as in many instances and occasions she is the modernizing factor of the household, much more than her brother or husband. On the contrary, Roxana is a typical example of a woman coming from a traditional patriarchal family. Still, this assignment seems to be working, and Roxana gave up any struggle a long time ago and is now happy with her obligations and rights inside the household. Marcel has also definitely changed his status in this association, from the moment his father died, as he is the one who has now the final word upon the household decisions. Finally, as long as they were alive, "the old women" had no decisional roles and were not asked to bring any contribution

to the household work, as they would not be the subject of any special affection or respect. They were "properly taken care of" and nothing more.

As for the household expenses, they were and still are "kept in common."

V.M.: How do you do it? Does each family mind its own business or do you share everything?

Olga: Well, we keep track of what each of us spent and then we split everything. At the end of the month we draw the line and do the calculations.

Marcel: We split the expenses, but not the income. Each knows what he earns, but expenses are shared.

Olga: We are sharing the same house, aren't we? (laughs)

Marcel: Of course we borrow money from each other when we need it…

V.M.: What do you do with "the old woman"?

Olga: She doesn't have any more money! We give her something from the store, we give her food or we take her eat with us, as is the case…

V.M.: As if you had everything in common…

Olga: Of course.

b) *Economic activities.* Opinion polls show that, when asked what they would choose between a poorly paid but secure job and a less secure but better paid one, three quarters of the Romanians still pick the first version. Ion gave the same answer when asked, although he had been a daring "entrepreneur" all his life. It seems that his son Marcel reached the same conclusion after failing at the wood mill business, and tried to get a "state job." For Roxana, such a job would simply mean being independent from her husband's family. However, she had to go back to her household chores. This hesitation tends to become typical, but the most common rule seems to be picking an easier job which may allow people work in their households, still the most secure belonging.

After having analyzed the Apetrei household for more than ten years, I cannot say I have identified any medium-term coherent and consistent strategy. All their economic activities were envisaged and were possibly achieved according to how they perceived certain opportunities in a local restraint space or in a large global one. Thus, for instance, woodwork business was a recurrent theme in the Apetrei household, influenced both by similar local initiatives, and due to certain tempting international offers. Still, the success or failure of one or other of these businesses would influence their decisions upon other businesses in the family. Therefore, in a profitable year regarding "agro-tourism," Olga and her husband closed the convenience store during the winter, as they thought "it was not worth the effort." With Romania's European integration, they wanted to turn the bar into a more profitable second-hand store but finally gave up and re-opened the bar.

Like in most of the villages of the region, the stores of Sateni grant a sort of informal credit. Only one grocery in the centre of the village, owned by a

businessman living in the city, officially refuses to sell on tab. However, saleswomen secretly sell on tab—using a short-term credit—in order not to lose their customers. Obviously, Olga and Marcel make no exception. Only their strategies differ to a certain extent, as they adapt to the particular conditions in which they develop their activities. Thus, prices are at the same level with those of the village, while the maximum credit line goes up to one million lei over three months at the most. Bread is a particular merchandise in this case and is often sold at its production price, no one is ever turned away, even if the respective person has surpassed the credit line or period or even if he does not pay his debts. Bread is still seen as a sort of Christian charity obligation and does not suffer the strict regime of being mere "merchandise."

During summertime, every Friday night, when daily workers come back from work, Olga and Marcel hire some fiddlers from the neighbouring village and take a grill out in the street. In such a good spot, right when one enters the neighbourhood, every man passes by the bar while going back home and few resist the temptation of entering and staying there for a while… Olga and Marcel are thus almost sure that they will recover the money spent by their families during the week. In certain cases, the family would rather recover its money in services, while their customers are working in their vineyard or doing other household chores, for goods purchased on credit. However, winter is a more difficult time of the year, as money is scarce, as most of the daily workers cannot find any work. Therefore, the couple prefers to sometimes close both the bar and store.

The other constant activity of the household is the "agro-tourism" business. Ion joined the official tourism network at the time of its foundation. At the beginning, there were about 40 households that joined the network, out of which 14 are now its current members. Only one is open on a full-time basis. Ion paid the necessary taxes and tried to take some money on credit from a bank, within certain agro-tourism development projects. The only time I saw him angry and heard him swear was when he told me about it. I did not quite understand what had happened, but it seems that setting up the credit file lasted for many months and implied many efforts. Finally, the interest proved to be much higher than the initial one. Therefore, the family had no results and has refused any idea of collaborating with a bank or other financial institution ever since. "I don't want to hear anything about banks any more. They're the biggest thieves of them all," Ion told me during our first interview.

A similar outcome occurred in their relations with the county branch of agro-tourism. The Apetrei family is dissatisfied for different reasons: on the one hand, the much too high commission cashed in by the agency for the tourists lodged and the much too small number of tourists who reach them through this network; on the other hand, the fact that they cannot control the quality of their tourists. "I don't want to see in my house whatever person they send," Marcel once said

to me, speaking on behalf of the entire family. Another time they told me that they had kicked some tourists out because they were making too much noise, while they told others at their departure not to come there any more: "They were pigs, this is what they were! They thought that, if they paid me, I was their slave and they could do whatever they wanted," Olga once explained to me. For them, tourists aren't just clients. They must be "likeable," "we must all feel well together." In fact, their agro-tourism business is in-between household and pension, commerce and hospitality.

As they would like to have mostly foreign tourists, the young members of the household have imagined various modern ways to improve their pension, starting with a bathroom with Jacuzzi for each room, and ending with a swimming pool. They started by arranging a dining room with a TV set, apart from the rest of the house, which they kept only for tourists. As a result, no foreign tourist would eat there, as they all preferred having lunch with the rest of the family, in their joint kitchen. Sometimes Marius takes these clients—whom he calls "friends"—in the woods, for a barbecue.

c) *The community*. Olga and Marcel know the problems of every family in the neighbourhood. In the morning, the bar is mostly filled with women who come for a coffee and chat with Olga. Also, they tell her about their troubles when they ask something for credit, when one bad thing or another just happens to them. Men come mostly at the end of the week and would rather talk to Marcel, to whom they tell where they have been, what they have found for work and whom they sometimes ask for favours. Therefore, our two people know rather well to whom and how much money they can lend without taking too great risks, due to their intertwining relationships. Also, even if she mumbles each time, Olga is in fact forced to reopen the store whenever someone has an emergency.

Marcel helps the daily masons of the "slums" with their papers and contracts, when they do not know anything about them. Many times, employers take advantage of this situation and fool them, and this is why they go to Marcel for advice or for him to read the contracts before signing them. "They are our means of living," he explains to me. "So we must help them, for they don't know anything. Then, if they have what they want, we have what we want too…" Other times, he or his brother-in-law takes the daily workers with the family van to the villages or towns where they are employed, and they negotiate the price as is the case.

In 2004, the entire family was involved in the local elections. They had a clear objective: to defeat the running mayor who did not want to give them a piece of land as compensation for a part of their garden, taken away by the state for building a local soccer stadium. Ion had ongoing trials with the Mayor's office for quite some time, but never obtained anything. After his death, his children pursued the matter in court and decided to defeat the mayor. When I visited them in 2005, they were very happy: they had made it. "I brought him at least 300 or

400 votes. That's no joke," bragged Olga, who seems to have been the head of the entire operation. There was a simple explanation: they told all the voters in the neighbourhood that, if they do not vote for their candidate, they could go and buy their things elsewhere.

In the winter of 2006 they were waiting to become the owners of the much expected land. For Olga, this meant above anything else a chance to "get out of the Gypsy quarter," which seemed to be her dearest dream, even though she did not speak about it at all. Only once, when one of my students said she was not sure she would leave for Italy with a scholarship, I heard her burst out: "Had I the chance to escape the curse of the Gypsy quarter!" The other members of the household seem rather at peace with life in this neighbourhood of Sateni.

Epilogue

In 2012 I paid the Apetrei family a short visit on my way to the capital of the county. A brand new house was built by Olga and her husband on the new plot of land: a "rustic" house, much smaller then Ion's "pride house," with many flowers and a wooden cradle facing a large veranda also in wood. The beehives, abandoned by her brother, were turned to ornamental garden furniture. "I wanted to do something nice," Olga explained to me, smiling happily. "Now I finally feel as myself," she concluded.

European Minorities or Postmodern "Euro-vision" – towards Critical Aspects in a Political Anthropological Frame[1]

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Abstract. Globalization and Europeanization resulted in significant integration mechanisms, but in the same time they also generated the disintegration of the national communities. Thus, in parallel with the self-assertive attitude of several minorities, the decomposition of the national identities also occurred. In this context the most important questions are: how minority status will be defined, which kind of narratives and representations concerning minorities will arise, how ethnic boundaries will be built up in a fluid world of flows, and how minorities will react on the external pressures from the globalization forces, e.g. cultural, linguistic clashes and changes in livelihoods. These are the questions discussed in this essay.

Keywords: Europeanization, integration challenge, narrative minority, national policy, EU-vision, political anthropology.

Instead of Introduction

In parallel with the European integration of the states, the disintegration of the national communities, the decomposition of the national identities, and the expansion of some minorities' self-assertion occurred (Appadurai 1996; Lendvai 1997; Kovács 2002). Thus, in the context of today's socio-political transition, the national character of the states and associated representations still exist (see Brubaker 2001; Giddens 2004; Kántor 2006).

Even a superficial look at current European integration processes may lead us to state with a reasonable scientific ease: it has become quite precarious nowadays to think in terms of "nations," "national minorities" or any forms of existence "local identities" take, other than the national frameworks. Not because, or not

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1   Preliminary study with the contribution of Andrea Varga.

merely because minority identities and forms of existence can only be formed with excess risks amidst current identity policies, but mainly because the Benchmark itself, the majority "framework" has become more friable than any of the constructions or structures made up of state-forming forces in history so far. "National identities"—as a phenomenon narrated by the essentialist point of view—are eroding ever more so, and ever more intensely.

In this short essay I am not able to describe each of the reasons of this dissolution; I am concentrating only on a short enumeration of the causes. In the course of this endeavour, I am aware that in parallel with the process of dissolution, policies of state establishment and nation forming fervours, identity-building movements, etc. are taking place; all these are manifesting themselves with great power, and it seems that they do not always give attention to micro-historical changes and they are propagating the idea that major geopolitical changes can still be shaped within the frameworks of macro-regions and nation states.

I must start my enumeration with the anti-nation, anti-national government and anti-national policy oriented phenomenon, i.e. globalization. Instead of making references to the exhaustive bibliography on globalization, I am referring to the following typical aspects through which globalization impacts national and minority identities. For instance, it is beyond any doubt that—whether we like it or not—we are living in a network society and, as a consequence, it becomes unrealistic to conceptualize national and minority identities within the framework of those traditional state forms, political integrations and micro-level social movements which were characteristic a century or even half or quarter of a century ago. World economy and manifestations of military, political, international, etc. relations are illustrative manifestations of globalizations, of the games, policies and solutions which are taking place beyond nations and even continents; the economy creates multiple linkages between nations, reshapes the order of the international relations, creates new priorities for development, redefines the place and importance of the actors and agents of development. In this context, it is irresponsible not to pay attention to the fact that borders and even isolated places are losing their importance, at least in the sense that even isolated events become rapidly externalized and globalized; a bird flu virus originated from Asia, a tribal conflict from Africa, an extremist political movement from the Middle East, or even a well developed computer virus—with no "nationality"—are able to reshape for months, years or for longer periods the life of nations, continents and to generate new types of international relations and security policy. In the era of globalization it is very risky not to pay attention to what occurs at a distance. The influences and connections are evident (Lévi 2006; Brubaker 2006).

We cannot overlook the fact that national politics has only a minor chance of remaining independent from the conflicts taking place beyond its borders

in other states of Europe, Africa, Asia or South-America. In the context of globalization, national development policies which are overlooking the forces and manifestations of globalization are irresponsible and invalid.

Minority or nation-policy disadvantage?

I will cut it short here; everyone is able to extend this consideration to the several domains of their respective field of knowledge, to their given set of devices of effects and interplays, constraints and dilemmas, challenges and solutions. I only mention all these, because in the past one and a half decades EU-(ro)phoria, with its delicate balances and collective constraints (Kovács ed. 2002), has successively become the existential experience of the nation states now slowly marching out of the bipolar global system (Giddens 2004; Kántor 2006). National states, I repeat—that is, power structures based on national policies, national past and national strategies—are facing this situation born out of constraint. Let we refer alone to the small circles of minorities, micro-minorities, differing identities and collective representations, which, in most cases, have gained their legitimacy and sought their legitimable forms of identity *against* the state level control, management, national policy or majority rule principle imposed upon them. Nowadays, this unity of local identity seems to be diminishing—a process which has been happening for some time, but has intensified recently, as I see it. This happens not only because this "unified" nature was mostly externally defined (or internally dreamt about, and hoped for); but also because this "society against the state" group-like mode of existence is eroding ever more spectacularly and rapidly, even from an insider's perspective. If the main supporting pillars of social cohesion are melting away, if all the traits of the spatial coexistence and economical functionality of the (joint) family and kinship are ceasing; if the entire system of economic and market relationships becomes supra-national, transcending all boundaries; then who is entitled to still keep on discussing the self-protective powers of small community identities? If the presumed or imaginary "unity" of the community and society—which was there long before, but had vanished by now—is only leading to further erosion from now on, is it still possible to be leisurely measuring the survival abilities, the autogenic world and autonomy-needs of small-scale collectives within the nation-policy dimensions? It is the locals themselves who know most about this, for in its numerous forms they are all living in minority conditions. If the state itself becomes eroded, how can we judge small communities' needs for autonomy? This aspects can be well illustrated not only in the case of Romania in terms of Romanian-Hungarian or Hungarian-Hungarian dimensions, but also throughout Europe: we are more often witnessing those phenomena in which

real linkages between several communities are articulated in terms of European–non-European, we–they, citizens–migrants, familiar–unfamiliar tandems. Other interests, other tales, European and not only European narratives have redrawn national identities, appropriated national historical conditions, and generated international, multi- or pluri-cultural identities, universal expatriations, etc. There emerged intercontinental movements, together with trans-continental identifications, which have been deliberately connected not to places or roots, but to changing flows. Since the nation states themselves were not perfectly united and homogenous, then how the situation of European minorities is going to be in the context of globalization? Should we expect more chances for minorities to articulate their identities and rights or, on the contrary, does this new context make the search for specific identities and avatars irrelevant? In any case, we must be aware of the fact that in the context of macro-policies and global flows, minority status, whether we are referring to Europe or to other continents, is not marketable. Thus, the extension of minority rights within a certain nation state, even against the will of the majority, could represent a useless joy. Autonomy can be reached (see the Faeroe islands, Catalans or even Kosovo), and global public opinion can be sensitized towards the solidarity with those repressed (see the case of Tibet, the case of international migrants from Africa, or even the case of the Roma population in Hungary), but all these are not enough to solve the minority politics occurring in the age after the nation state. Staying or becoming a minority in the process of transition gradually becomes a more characteristic experience than that of upholding the national colours against the symbols that represent other nation states of the EU or against other regions' national representations of the world. However, if everybody becomes a minority in the age of difffluent majorities, then it will rapidly turn out that there is no minority without an even more minor minority, without a nucleus, without some inherent group-aspirations, striving to independency even within the minority status… It will turn out—which is an open secret among minority researchers—that the main questions or the most important aspects of the minority problem in our age are not the minority groups discussed in terms of majority/minority, or the ones related on the basis of the "minority as a unity" principle. As they are hugely divided, even their group-like units contain decisive, dominant minority forces, and "drifters" are just as much to be found as the opposing members and the ones on the periphery. Which kind of minority narrative will be presented, and when, to the public or to the secret diplomatic vocabulary, thus, it might turn out, is merely a question of viewpoint or interpretation, hence it will be primarily determined by the international scientific argot, the language of the economical or interest-policy discourses, or the group-level narration of values attached to minorities.

Ruling principles, scripts, roles

During the course of Europeanization and the connected state policies, one of the most obvious phenomenon consists in the state's withdrawal from the national politics. This results in the fact that sub-national groups, the majority and the minorities, political parties and organizations, immigrants and other actors are not the dominant actors, i.e. protagonists of the events concerning the social and political transformations. They are just mute actors. This state theatre, though, claims to adhere to Euro-compatible norms. However, the processes of Europeanization, participatory democracy and the idea of equal opportunities frequently remain only at a discursive level.

The question of how the "theatre ruling strategy" of the state meets the practice of the actors might be a basic one. Summing it up, I would say, the political communities are bound to follow the EU-integrative norm in social integration, even having to familiarize themselves with the sense that what they are to integrate into, is itself a peculiarly disintegrating social state of affairs. In this "scenic space" the director's conception and the problem around which the script evolves are both counting on such professional actors, who, besides having the necessary routine in acting in front of an ever darkening background, are not only undertaking the narration of some well-known story, but they do love acting it out, as well. In the meantime, "spectators", e.g., minorities are watching with disillusion how the effective play of the actors remains much behind the EU-phoric expectations. In fact, the actors are playing an *ad hoc* game, and must continuously adapt their behaviours to international constraints and changing expectations from the part of the international institutions. In this strange modernist act, in fact, two fundamental structural elements are taking part. One of these is the *state dramaturgy*, while the other is represented by a cultural strategy composed of those pledges which can be assumed in the context of Europeanization. Such a play is the metaphor of reshaping democracy, and establishes the demarcation between ours and theirs, development and marginalization, etc. In this sense, we can refer to cases like the EU enlargement towards other states, to questions regarding states' capacities to meet the European norms, the development of new national legal norms concerning minorities, etc. Building these demarcations is a form of an identity-building mechanism which serves both the preservation of the existing state-level legislation and the introduction of new legislative norms in various fields of life. This is a cultural narrative of border-crossing between the West and the rest: the EU-phoric expectation of the West is coupled with the situation in which the East is not embraced by the former. Accessing countries are comparing themselves to the West, they accentuate those patterns which separate them from the East; this results in a double identity and places the states in front of a choice: us or them.

This zone of demarcation creates borders in the sense that in the course of regionalization there are emerging new lines of separation between specific spaces which are shaped by various ethnicities, interactions, habits, etc. In such context there are appearing new forms of group definitions (from the inside or from the outside, on ethnic or on economic grounds), which represent culture-dependent units with potential border-forming roles. History, the course of local events and external constraints (e.g., migration) are also important aspects of identity creation and have an important role in shaping the creation of cultural demarcation lines and borders. Ethnic and cultural groups are components of social stratification and are affected by various demographic, migration, etc. changes, whether we refer to ethnic groups situated in Transylvania, Dobrudja, Tirol, or in other parts of the first or third world.

The duality for us stems from the fact that, though we are far from admitting that the inner stratification and political conventions of Eastern societies would have any bearing upon our state of affairs, we suffer, at the same time, from the fact that the western type of Christianity can not be realized in its pure form. All these social and mass relations, geographical and historical dimensions in public policy and in public sentiment are not determined by the condition of being closed, but always by the *cultural contacts* and the *changes* of the given time.

Ethnic groups, religious or social subcultures are frequently only theoretical concepts; minoritiesm in terms of their status, effective rights and potentials for actions are pushed on the margin of the society. We must admit two aspects: on the one hand, there is an internal segmentation in the case of the East-European societies, and on the other hand such societies feel uncomfortable because they cannot truly adapt themselves to the West. In the meantime, keywords and issues like stigmatization, migration, ethnic economy, integration, exclusion, political stability, legitimacy, social conflicts, etc. are illustrative for the definition of identity along borders and ethnicity. The irony is that in the same time, due to the fluidization of effective borders, interactions, patterns of space and time-use not only influence the specific cultures, but allow the development of intercultural phenomena and spaces.

In concluding my thoughts, I would like to draw attention to the way ethnic group-relations are being dealt with externally and internally, as an inherent way of managing them. It is well-known, at least since Barth's introductory essay to the book dealing with the problem of ethnic boundaries, that in contrast to the structuralist-functionalist approach, minority individuals are not merely the "carriers" of a given culture's norms and values defined in various ways. Individuals, their perceptions and goal-oriented decision making capability, their self-definition and their relation to "external events" should rather be regarded as active social factors.

Ethnicity, minority status or marginal inequality are forms of a cultural state of life. The transactions along, inside and outside of the borders are continuously

rearranging the space as well as the cultural lifestyle of the communities. Communities and their actors are constructing and de-constructing the demarcation line between past and present, past and future. In the context of extended modernity there is no state or citizenship, membership and faith (see Appadurai 1996); everything is in motion and flow, both margins and centers are in continuous movements towards and through each other. In accordance with Barth, the flow of changes occurring between the dimensions of ebb and tide is in fact the history, and this history is composed of a reciprocal relationship between various horizons, cultural and geographical spaces. From the outside such a situation can still be defined in terms of ethnical and cultural groups, while from the inside it is perceived as a space in active transformation.

Thus, intercultural relations and programs of integration must pay attention to both the processes from inside and outside (see A. Gergely 2005: 226–229): the formers are important because they are composed of identity building mechanisms and narratives of cohesion and separation through which the individual level ethnicity can be defined and articulated, while the latter is composed of those influences which continuously reshape the internal narratives and actions of identification. Thus, in the course of the process of Europeanization there are emerging processes of self-definition which are generated both from the inside and the outside, and the narratives of identification presuppose various forms of representations (see for illustrations Lévi 2006; Sanbar 2006; Silberman 2006). (See A. Gergely 2005; Sanbar 2006; Silberman 2006; Brubaker 2006; Erős 1998.)

Minority self-definitions and the chances and conditions of intercultural contacts are thus not only questions of rights and benefits or rules, but are themselves necessities of clarification hidden in the definition of the External and the Internal, Ours and Theirs, etc.

The integration mechanisms of the European nations have become important projects in many countries of the region, but deep down within these processes the disintegration of communities is taking place and, simultaneously, there is an invisible expansion of the minority condition into the (state)nation forming majority, as well. Remaining or becoming a minority in the process of transition gradually becomes a more characteristic experience than that of upholding the national colours against the symbols that represent other nation-states of the EU or against other regions' national representations of the world. We might therefore ask: is being a minority a condition or a possibility for integration, or is it a choice born of necessity or insight? If in the near future everyone will have already become a minority, will there be a chance for the historical, cultural, linguistic or state-national minorities to sustain themselves in the way they have had the opportunity to do it until now? My essay leads to the question of crossing the borders and of integration plays on the European "stage," also touching on the narratives pertaining to nations and minorities.

Besides theoretical questions, I consider the crucial issue to be the inclusion of the West in the East and the acceptance of the East in the West, a process which will thoroughly reshape the postmodern EU-visions following the recent changes in the political-economical systems.

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Problems of Individualization in the Everyday Culture of Eastern Europe[1]

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Abstract. While the individualization of recent decades has proceeded in the eclectic world view of a society with an eclectic system of values, the system change often requires of individuals a total change in their system of values and world view: indeed, we can say it requires a change of culture in the sense used by cultural anthropology. The authors chose life situations in which the change of cultures or the relation of cultures to each other is striking from the point of view of individualization. Interviews were made with a group of intellectuals who had spent at least one year in the United States, and subsequently returned, so they twice confronted the differences of cultures, and a group of intellectuals who moved to Hungary from Transylvania and who have lived here for at least one year. Both meetings with an other culture having a higher degree of individualization produce similar reactions. The emergence of more individualistic attitudes is accompanied by ambivalent feelings, different adaptation forms and changes in the value system.

Keywords: cultural differences, East Europe, individualization, lifestyle, mentality, socialization, system change, value system.

The subject of our examination is what sort of life problems are caused by the East European changes from the point of view of individualization. The political, economic and institutional sides of the East European transformations have been analyzed by many and from many points of view; however, much less attention is directed at the individual side, i.e. how all these changes affect the everyday life and habits of individuals. From these points of view, we can talk about a slow process of individualization, which, after its beginning in the last century and its repeated, increasingly unambiguous impetuses after the turn of the century,

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has become a mass phenomenon in Hungary from the 1960s; about the change of the value system—shocking for many people, and very radical, measured on a historical scale—that accompanies the process of (political-social) system change; and about the individualization that is occurring on a world-scale with a rising tendency as we progress from the peripheries to the centres.

Individualization shows a close connection with modernization and with the development of bourgeois relations; it gained strength in East European state socialism when the state began to withdraw (gradually, leaving a scope to individual initiatives) from fields where it had previously been present in a dominant, directing way. It is well known that in Hungary, starting with the sixties, with the second economy gaining ground, the household plot, with a part of the intelligentsia becoming free-lance workers, increasingly wider groups were affected by one of the foundations of individualization: becoming independent (of course, until quite recently, independent only in a limited way) in an economic-existential sense.

This was related to the fact that the ideological offensive of politics also decreased, indeed, it increasingly made efforts to depolarize the society, as many observers have shown: it reached an agreement and made a compromise with the private sphere. The next important root of individualization was urbanization which destroyed the traditional society. Similarly, in that period radical changes occurred in the structure of the family: the nuclear family (also determining from the point of view of individualization) became typical. The cultural impacts also helped this tendency: cultural policy allowed Western culture to gain ground in a differentiating way (which communicated a more individualized system of values) and gave scope to the native (bourgeois) cultural traditions, representing similar values. These impacts strengthened each other as well.

This individualization, of course, was very contradictory, and lacked many of those things which characteristic for western societies (perhaps most strikingly the freedom of a self-organizing civil society). Because of this lack, the analysis made by Elemér Hankiss, originating from this period, makes direct use of the concept of negative modernization to characterize the shift of values in Hungary. The peculiarities of this process were, and the sense in which the above can also be regarded as typical ways of individualization, remain further questions, but perhaps it is indisputable that—in some sense—the last three decades in Hungary were characterized by a powerful individualization.

As these processes occurred slowly, over decades, it was only gradually that they became perceptible, and even then they were not perceptible in every field. The system change, however, made it obvious for all that from now on "everything is otherwise," and one important element of this "otherwise" is that in the field of values the "self-asserting" of the individual takes over the place of the "community" (this is so even if more emphasis is given—primarily by the governing parties—to the communality, although, of course, not in its abstract

socialist but in the traditional—national-religious—sense). What has changed spectacularly is the decrease in the paternalist functions of the state, and this suggests very dramatically for many people the view that: "You can only count on yourself." While the individualization of recent decades has proceeded in the eclectic world view of a society with an eclectic system of values, the system change often requires of individuals a total change in their system of values and world view: indeed, we can say it requires a change of culture in the sense used by cultural anthropology.

Since in the final analysis both of the two naturally inseparable processes are parts of the development of individualization within the world system, their most essential features—also within the individual countries—can be grasped when and where cultures with a different degree of individualization meet. When we chose the subject of our examination, we believed that we could most effectively examine individualization in the state of mind of individuals who experience directly and in a manifold way such a meeting with a culture of a different degree of individualization compared to their own experiences.

We chose life situations in which the change of cultures or the relation of cultures to each other is striking from the point of view of individualization. In Hungary, three particular groups appeared to be the best subjects for such an examination. 1. Intellectuals who had spent at least one year in the United States with a scholarship as temporary lecturers or as researchers, and subsequently returned, so they twice confronted the differences of cultures. 2. Intellectuals who moved to Hungary from Transylvania (that is, from the Romanian society that has not passed through the processes which occurred in Hungary in the sixties, moreover, which has very different traditions), and who have lived here for at least one year (so they have sufficient experience of the reality here, too). 3. Intellectuals who, leaving the nomenclature positions they held in the party apparatus, have become (involuntarily or voluntarily) economic entrepreneurs (since in their minds there has been an encounter and changing of two cultures that require very different degrees of individualization: the culture of the "state socialist" bureaucracy and the culture of the capitalist enterprise).

As for the method of examination, we conducted in-depth interviews (5-6 hours in length per person, which were arranged in 2-3 sessions). Thirty interviews of each type were made. Our questions were directed at the main differences between the cultures. Of course, we did not want to explore what the American or Hungarian society is like, but rather the differences which stand out in the minds of people who experienced the meeting of the cultures. What changes did they have to go through, what were their most striking, most unusual, most testing, or even most shocking experiences and observations?

The main fields touched on in the interviews were the following: work, the relation to work, working circumstances, methods of management, working

methods, working style; the customs of leisure time, travel, holidays, the time budget; the forms of human relations, the family, friendship, kinship, neighbourhood, relations at the work place; the customs of child-raising; the division of labour in the family, the peculiarities of the genders, sexual ideals, conflicts and ways of handling them; the home, the way of life, aspects of living, shopping habits, services; the media, TV, broadcasting, newspapers; what can be seen of the world "here" and "there," the segments of world view; politics, the relation to politics; society's degree of hierarchization and the way it is treated, the extent and forms of wealth and poverty, the ambitions, figures of fashion, successful people, the "models;" socialization (impacts at school and outside of it); the habits of conversation, topics of conversation, taboos, the way of communication, symbolic signs; the measure and forms of independence and dependence, people's individuality/uniformity, etc.

In the following, as the change from party bureaucrat to entrepreneur is a special form of culture change that differs in many respects from the experiences of the other two groups, allowing other sorts of conclusions, we select some cases from the experiences of the interviews which were made with the first two groups.

The life situation, which was the interviewees' common experience, has many determining peculiarities. The differences between the culture in which they grew up and the culture they recently got to know affect individuals to an amazing degree. The cultural shock produced by the differences, the globally alien environment often causes a state of depression, leading in turn to escape or slow adaptation. Several of the interviewees reported that the alienation caused in them an inability to create because they did not find anything in the alien conditions which could motivate them. Besides alienation, the mental state of the individual is determined by the absence of a net of connections: the individual feels like being in a void, in a vacuum situation.

All this results in the destruction of self-identity: the subjects of the interview talk about becoming nothing, about the annihilation of the individual, as under the new circumstances all their previous results, experiences, the connections they have built become invalid, void; they feel that they have to recreate the foundations of their lives, rebuild their personality itself.

Individuals can give various responses to these challenges. These solutions are placed on a scale between the extremes of resistance and surrender. On the one hand, we find overcompensation, the unconditional acceptance of the recipient culture, which is accompanied by undervaluing the self and overappreciating the recipient culture. In such cases people strive to ignore all critical elements in themselves, they downplay, in some cases exclude from their perception any impressions which are negative features of the recipient culture. On the other hand, there are techniques of exclusion: on the one side, overvaluing the individual's original culture (or undervaluing the recipient one), a kind

of strengthening cultural nationalism; on the other side, the defence of the sovereignty of the individual, an increase in personal self-awareness. Defences against the pressure of the absence of connections can also be placed on a scale between two extremes: on the one hand, there is the typical excessive toughness, on the basis of the principle "I can only count on myself;" on the other hand, the search, the protection of the ardour lacking in the new environment: the effort to quickly form possible connections and communities which ensure that defence. This can be ensured by special subcultures, by groups of the same origin finding each other, quick marriages between people in a similar situation, etc.

However, the positive outcome of the life situation examined is, in any case, being in the particular situation of the observer and the emergence of the capacities connected to this. They become aware of many phenomena which they would not otherwise perceive.

There are some other determining factors in perceiving the differences between cultures. I. People especially realize the differences (1) which are completely unusual phenomena in their own culture (different customs, norms, especially taboos) (the differences of "quiddity"); (2) which are strikingly different in standards or in measures (the differences of "quantity"); 3. which are the manifestations of the same things with totally different contents (differences of "quality"). II. In perceiving the differences, the heightened attention of the individual is directed mainly to the following areas: (a) the role and appreciation of the individual; (b) the peculiarities of the world of objects; (c) the forms of initiating and maintaining contacts; (d) what can be regarded as the key element which holds together the order of the world, the given culture; (e) divergences in the use of language, the systems of signs (namely those peculiarities which instantly draw the attention of the observer).

All this, thus, influences the perception and realization of the differences between the cultures. But what is ultimately observed by those who experience the meeting of the two examined cultures? First, we shall examine the common tendencies, i.e. those which generally accompany the move from a society with a lower degree of individualization to a more individualized one. Then we one by one examine those specificities which can be regarded as the peculiar and typical experiences of moving from the Hungarian society to the USA. (Naturally there are peculiarities of moving from Transylvania to Hungary, too, but the discussion of the questions related to them would be beyond the framework of this study; we would like to deal with these in a separate study).

General tendencies

1. The first great field where the differences can be registered is the observation of the peculiarities of social relations.

   1.1. It is natural to perceive the difference between living standards, and, generally, the differences in the importance of material goods. This relation can be viewed critically, emphasizing the disadvantages of wealth, or with an uncritical admiration. This also depends on the extent to which prosperity is regarded as a value in the sending society, or the strength of other values (possibly prevailing more weakly in the recipient society). The two examined groups differ from this point of view. In Hungary, for several decades the (partly officially enhanced) progress towards the values of material prosperity continued. This increases the positive predisposition towards the society of the USA. Among the Hungarians of Transylvania, communal values are stronger; this principle diminishes the unambiguously positive value attached to material prosperity: many report their amazement that in the recipient society "only money gives the value of man." In both groups, however, important modifying effects are at work. For the Transylvanians the extreme economy of shortage, immeasurably ruining human possibilities, has—necessarily—overvalued the non-prosperity-type values, but when they break away from their original environment, the abundance experienced affects them in an unambiguously positive, "paradise"-like manner. On the other hand, it is not an insignificant circumstance that they meet this in the "Motherland," in Hungary, and so the value of communal identification also strengthens the affirmation of the prosperity model. (They regard this as a Hungarian result which overvalues their domestic, Romanian social state). At the same time (not least due to the lack of communal identification of this sort), the compensatory effect often strengthens in Hungarians going to America: they search for the negative aspects of prosperity. Many people who went to the USA with a positive prejudice, overvalued the values of culture, solidarity, hence non-material values, during their stay there. After all, the balance in the judgement of prosperity, welfare advantages of the recipient societies is a positive one; and we must not forget here that the increased prosperity of the individual is the essential concomitant and condition of individualization: for societies which have stepped on the path of individualization this is always a positive value. Observers suggest the differences in prosperity primarily by stressing such phenomena as emphasizing the pleasantness of shopping, the recording of shopping as a separate ritual, the dizzying variety of goods, the comfort provided by the services, the recognition of the possibility of a quieter life, the propaganda, the priority given in the mass media to material goods and their acquisition, the greater possibilities for enterprise; the materialism, the rationality of the utility principle, which prevails in people's mentality.

1.2. The perception and interpretation of the differences (in prosperity) within the recipient society is connected to the above. These differences in the examined recipient societies are more extreme, more striking, than in the sending societies. This is recorded (with some astonishment) by almost everybody. The importance of that question is strengthened by the fact that at the beginning observers have a lower social status in the recipient societies than they had at home. In interpreting the social differences, in the final analysis, what divides the reactions into two types is whether the observer regards his/her stay here as temporary or he/she wants to adapt himself/herself permanently to this society. In the first case the perception of the extremes strengthens him/her in the decision to withdraw from the recipient society, and he/she criticizes it in what could be called the manner of a "class-struggle." In the second case his/her striving for adaptation makes him/her susceptible to the view that he/she also regards poverty (as the self-propaganda of the recipient society) as a deviancy, as the fault of the poor, and he/she places the emphasis on the charitable efforts of the recipient societies which are striving to reduce the social differences. (Taking note of the institutional protection of minorities, which is strengthened in the case of people who moved from Transylvania to Hungary in contrast with the experiences at home, and in the case of people going from Hungary to the USA by the experiences refuting the one-sidedness of the earlier counter-propaganda, also belong to this category.) The "critics," however, observe with scepticism the self-propaganda of the recipient society, the techniques by which these societies want to conceal the facts and injustices of social inequalities.

1.3. Many report how they observed a very subtle stratification in the recipient society (a) in the way residence, social status, and consumption habits, or other sorts of behaviour are connected to each other; (b) (in connection with individualization) in how wide and internally stratified the middle-class is; and (c) in how the recipient society forms some sort of subtle caste system. (The newcomers may necessarily be more sensitive to perception of those barriers in the path and therefore of the mobility of newcomers). At the same time many report that they are less able to notice (in the signs of dressing, of behaviour) the differences than they are at home, and they ascribe this to the greater degree of equality. There is no contradiction between the two observations: in the more individualized society the differences are greater, but also more gradual, more subtle, and they are less perceptible because of the more sophisticated character of the differences, and if we regard the "middle class" as one social group, then the process of the rise of more and more groups into the middle class with the parallel increase of individualization can also be seen (from the level of a society with a less differentiated middle strata) as a homogenization.

2. There is an equally emphasized difference in the divergence of values. The higher degree of individualization is directly perceptible in the divergence of the

value system, in the presence of the more individualistic order of the recipient society's values. Individuals, however, can least disregard such direct collisions of the value systems: the tendency that observers receive the phenomena of the recipient society with aversion is most observable in precisely these cases.

2.1. The members of both examined groups rank the recipient society as a colder one than their sending culture. The coldness in family relations is especially striking: the less bodily contact with children, less frequent expression of emotions, etc., the spread of the nuclear family (the disappearance of grandparents, of kinship relations), the "exaggerated rationalism," pragmatism of human relations.

2.2. While they report more civilized, more polite forms of contact in the recipient societies, they almost unambiguously state that these forms of contact are superficial, that they lack real, intimate conversations (the observers of American culture also add that the lack of both theoretical and personal topics in everyday conversations is striking) and intimate forms of communal life within which men "understand each other without words."

2.3. Some observers also mention that people have less endurance in the recipient societies than in their sending society. They are less able to adapt to difficulties. (In the Transylvanian-Hungarian relation it is also mentioned that "they live better than we do, and yet they complain more.") Here, their opinion is likely to be inseparably affected by the subjective judgement that they—who would be happy with the living standards of the recipient society—are less sensitive to the troubles of that society, and the objective fact that harder conditions of life necessarily make people tougher.

In both examined groups, all these differences of values originate directly from the fact that in the sending societies the communal dependence of the individual and, in connection with this, the emphasis on communal values is stronger than in the recipient society; and while in the case of differences in living standards the advantages of the higher living standards, in any case, are more unambiguous than the disadvantages, the indubitable advantages of the spreading individualistic value system are in fact accompanied by many losses, as a consequence of the retreat of communal values more characteristic to the less individualized societies.

3. On the other hand, the more individualized societies are emphasized unambiguously in the observations related to self-esteem. People emphasize the higher degree of independence of the people from recipient societies.

This is primarily observed in the process of its evolution, and both groups find that even the children are more sure of themselves, they communicate more easily, and their means of expression are also more developed. All this is explained by the prosperity, providing security (in the case of America, by letting the child stand on his own feet earlier) and not least by the techniques

of socialization which serve to strengthen the child in his/her individuality, to indicate to him/her that he/she is a value in himself.

The only negative judgement so far linked to the recipient society, perceived as unambiguously better in this respect, is that because of these contrast effects they, the outsiders, feel too little, dwarfed, compressed in this society of people who are sure of themselves.

Peculiarities: America

1. Several of the observed peculiarities of the more individualized society were mentioned only in the case of Hungary – USA. Most of these were related to the differences in "mentality."

These mentions paint a picture of the self-asserting mentality of the atomized individuals of a highly organized, enterprise-based society, the mentality of modern individualization. People judges as positive those things which carry them closer to this individualization.

1.1. The most determining feature of mentality observed is pragmatism. This pragmatism is observed when they talk about the fact that here everything can be bought at any time, when they emphasize the priority of the purposive rationality, from organizing the use of time, through the purposefulness applied in the forming of friendships, to the meticulous specialization of jobs; they note the speed of information processing and the fastness of the whole way of life, e.g., the spread of the disposable objects, McDonalds and similar chains, and other homogenizing mechanisms; etc. According to observers, all this means a mentality that indubitably ensures a much smoother and quieter life, but allows much less scope for sensitive creativity than the prevailing mentality of the sending society.

1.2. Another often mentioned characteristic feature of the mentality is the "keep smiling" attitude, which is related to the—also very often mentioned— very negative valuing of failures, and which expresses the attitude that you must not admit failure (far from recounting, complaining about it to others, which would show weakness), you must emphasize the success in everything, the individual must stand his/her own in a harsh, competitive situation, rely only on himself/herself (as the figure of the lonely western hero who is the model of this mentality). All this can positively affect the individual: the smile gives him energy, the feeling of "all right," the permanent emphasizing of successes gives self-assurance. At the same time, the price of the competitive harshness, the ability to win, according to the judgement of the observers, is a sort of mental dullness, the continuous pressure to prove how good you are, and the definitiveness of the failure of those who cannot stand up from defeat. (Here one

can not expect help, if somebody falls, everybody turns away from him/her, it is regarded as natural that he/she must struggle to his feet. The agelessness in connection with competition isalso observed by many: old-age is a sort of failure and so it should be hidden).

This is again the source of the successful preservation of physical condition and at the same time the psychological burdens of fear of failure. We must not leave out the observation that at the same time competition is not merely regarded as a struggle, as in Europe, but, so to say, as a parlour game, a challenge to the individual, and so the less help is balanced by the more general spirit of "fair play."

1.3. The concomitant of both, competition and pragmatism is hard work, accompanied by the necessary ability to manage, to sell oneself. The individual himself/herself must estimate his/her ability, and if his/her efforts are justified, he/she can count on recognition. Since success is the highest measure of values, its achievement as a reward is a very great mobilizing force, it can bring a strong pressure to perform. Here it should be noted that several observers perceive that despite there is an absence in the authority principle (for example, the teacher has no automatical rights in face of the students, but he/she must prove his/her right), the principle of authorityprevails. Thus, the fact is that authoritydoes not follow primarily from a certain role, but depends on the degree of successes achieved. In relation to this mentality, observers call attention to the great degree of productiveness and democratism it ensures; on the other hand, successfulness can become entirely independent from the real value of performance.

1.4. Another striking element of the mentality is also connected with the competitive view, the atomized state of society, the emphasis on "privacy." The point is not merely that the individual can count only on himself/herself, but that his/her "private sphere" is a value which must be ensured by as many means as possible (because of this, the school report is secret, it is the child's and his/her parents' business only; because of this, the result of the university exams is signalled only by a code number; because of this, it is important that the individual has a connection with his/her bank, drugstore, etc. by a channel as closed as possible). (The privacy ensured in most fields of life on the one hand increases the refinement in forms of contact; on the other hand, it excessively atomizes the individual, it not only protects, but also isolates him/her.

Thus, East Europeans, confronted with the American way of life, primarily value the practicality, the successfulness of this culture, and at the same time they record losses with respect to the ideal of humanity and cultural wealth.

2. There are more negative value judgements in the area of "cultural values," although an effort is often made to try to understand, from within, the peculiarities of American culture, so different from their sending culture.

2.1. The tastelessness of American culture—proclaimed by many—is almost a truism. However, many connect this with the other fundamental peculiarity

of this culture, the absence of the past. European culture and its norms of taste have been built up over centuries, in many fields, from human relations to the arts, and this cannot be compared with a "present time" culture (and that culture necessarily is a "present" one and two-generations-ago is already perceived as history). Moreover, the value judgement of European people has a great importance precisely from the point of view of individualization: the individualization of a culture may not be effective if it is not built on the antecedents of this culture. For this, the American model in its present form seems to be a much less attractive model for individualization for the European cultures.

2.2. The very high degree of technology—in the spirit of the prevailing pragmatism—can be made totally independent from the cultural expectations (a very good example of this is that children learn to write and read by computer, but the rate of functional illiteracy is rising steadily), the possession of (cultural) education in the European sense is not required, not even from intellectuals: apart from a narrow elite intelligentsia, only effective practice in the respective special field is required from the intellectual. (A part of the higher culture—for example, classical music is practically only attainable to a well-to-do middle-class, so it is not only a matter of culture, but also of financial welfare). The higher culture is less built into the structure of society: as remarked by an observer, while in Europe the cities settled around the universities, in America the campus left the cities, it withdrew into its own world.

2.3. However, a striking peculiarity—but one that logically follows from the above—is the cult of health which is general in this society. Here illness carries within itself the dangers of falling behind in competition, and where the costs of health service are so high, great importance is attached to body culture and sports.

Most of the cultural peculiarities—with the exception of the physical culture—are experienced by Europeans as an absence, they do not recognize them as a model of individualization for themselves.

3. The peculiarities of the forms of establishing and maintaining contacts follow from both the mentality and the cultural customs.

3.1. In interpersonal communication—in keeping with the general pragmatism—agreement or (business) information has a great role. The seemingly informal, purposeless conversations are preparations for important decisions; they touch the surface of different standpoints, and try to sketch out possible alliances. In American conversations, official or informal, the establishment of consensus has a very important value: much time and energy is spent on this, but this is an indispensable necessity in this—in many respects pluralist—society. However, Europeans require a fairly long period of learning to adapt to the fact that information in America serves an entirely different purpose and has a different meaning, and so it has a totally different construction than in the sending society.

3.2. The other often mentioned feature of human relations is the absence of their stability. This comes from the peculiarity of the pragmatic lifestyle, so the individual can change his place in the world without serious shocks, even surmounting great distances, depending on where he/she finds the most favourable conditions. These frequent moves, in turn, make the individual's long-lasting embedding impossible: it is a general phenomenon that the individual quickly establishes and also quickly terminates relationships. (Relations in the neighbourhood are very important for practical reasons, but due to the moves, naturally, these are also re-established.) Families are also fragile, there are many divorces, provisionality is one of the most important characteristics of contacts. An East European sometimes values this as easiness, but more often he/she qualifies it (based on his/her culture, emphasizing the more communal values) as superficiality, as the absence of roots.

After all, the forms of establishing contacts are not among the attractive components of the American model of individualization either; they cannot explain the impact, the appeal (for Europeans, too) of that model. 4.1. There is a striking difference in the spirit of primary schools. As it was pointed out by an observer, the European school constantly directs the attention of the child to what he/she does not know, while the American school points out what he/she already knows, this way suggesting that everybody is outstanding in something, thereby establishing a lasting self-esteem. This is also helped by the more direct contact and interaction between school and family (e.g., the initiation of the parents, the role of practical household tasks among the school aged). The requirements suddenly increase on the higher levels, but by then the child has already developed the ability to accept responsibility.

4.2. Socialization in the family is also directed towards this. Money has a very direct role which begins at birth: in the wide middle strata a bank account for the child is already opened at the time of his/her birth (to accumulate the costs of future education) and the child learns as early as possible to sell and to take a job, in order to be able to support himself/herself independently, away from his/her family by the time he/she becomes eighteen (it is generally a custom).

4.3. The best universities are places of elite education in more than one sense: the relations established here can be converted later into a political or business career, and the university years are schools of power, from the point of view that it is the student who – on the basis of high tuition – can make demands of the – providing – teacher (while, of course, very hard work is demanded of him, and he has to meet this).

Thus the East European recognizes in the field of socialization primarily those features which—contrary to his/her own bureaucratic-centralized model of society—prepare individuals for a life of competition.

5. The political model is viewed by observers as a factor which plays a totally different role in everyday life compared to the model to which they are accustomed, but they often mention with recognition the sober pragmatism which also prevails in this field.

5.1. They state that high politics or membership of a party are far less important in America from the point of view of the individual, but the local politics, where the decisions influencing people's lives are made, have a very great importance. (The strong appreciation of this pattern is expressed as something which is missing in the sending society, where civil society is undeveloped, etc.).

5.2. They stressed the integrating force, the ideology of the "land of opportunity" as the essence of the strong American patriotism, which is strengthened by continuous immigration; some talk about this with recognition, others with criticism of the hypocrisy which maintains this attitude. Many observers' attention is extremely sensitive to the question of "racial conflicts" (stressed by the counterpropaganda of recent decades). For some, the positive discrimination of the minorities is striking, but many emphasize that this is often largely formal (for example, they take good care to have coloured people among the positive heroes of movies, but it is at least as important that they remain in their own social medium, we do not very often meet mixed race couples in these movies).

5.3. The intensity of American mass information is also a truism among European observers. This obviously makes it more difficult for observers to identify with the recipient culture.

All these differences observed in American society are really peculiarities, specificities, but if we dismantle their formal contingency, we find the generally valid tendencies, too. The pragmatism, the success orientation, the isolation, as well as the fragmentation of the culture, emerging parallel with the development of mass culture, are phenomena which became characteristic in the individualized society..

At the same time, we must beware of overgeneralizations. Although from a certain point of view this trend of individualization exists among the individual cultures, most of the phenomena cannot be interpreted at all as a linear growth or impoverishment.

We can enumerate at length phenomena which in the Hungarian society are somewhere in between the USA and Transylvania from the point of view of individualization. are the most common, or on the contrary the most rare. Yet we can draw some cautious conclusions about the peculiarities of facing a society of a higher degree of individualization.

Some conclusions

Facing a society of a higher degree of individualization always produces mixed feelings. On the one hand, people are attracted by many features (greater opportunities ensured by prosperity, the strengthening of self-esteem, the higher degree of efficiency, the smoother organization of life), on the other hand, they dislike some peculiarities which they consider impoverishing (the increase of social differences, the coldness isolation, the competition threatening the safety of personality, the community, the culture). Value systems collide, and the individual feels that if he/she gives his/her previous value system up, he/she will win. In practice, he/she can lose, too.

What can be won by changing the value system is not quite unambiguous. It seems to be clear that the higher degree of individuality, of individual freedom, autonomy also means the enrichment of the individual. At the same time, the more individualized world seems to be more homogenized, the individual in it more endangered from many points of view. In addition to this, the collision of the value system in the case examined has two sides: the traditionalist values of the pre-capitalist East European traditions collide with the value system of the developed bourgeois world (indeed, it is more complex, since a Hungarian entering the American conditions can perceive the differences from his/her peculiarly European, particularly East-European, or just particularly Hungarian point of view), but this is coloured by another sort of collision between the value systems, too: the system of "collective" values, propagated in the state socialist system, which is mixed with the traditionalist values, but which is different from them in many respects, also collides with the same bourgeois world.

(Nevertheless, this confrontation can be better understood now than previously. While in the ideology of state socialism the features of the traditional value systems were declared to be more primitive, and the "socialist" features to be more "progressive" than bourgeois ones, today it is clear that the East European development, together with the market economy-type modernization, is moving towards increased individualization.)

The individual can react in many ways to meeting a culture with a higher degree of individualization than his/her own culture. Those responses which reject the model of individualization are irrelevant for our examination. But acceptance also takes many forms. a.) One response is when the individual gives up the different points of view of his/her sending culture and resolves the ambivalence in favour of total acceptance. b.) Another, perhaps the most common, type of adaptation is when he/she does not adopt the whole of the other culture, but strives to adapt, to incorporate into his/her own practice only some parts of it. In this case, of course, the most important question is which part of it should be incorporated. As reflected by the standpoints described above, in the case of American culture,

the cultural or political model acts as such an example at a lower degree, and many people try to adapt, to incorporate into their own previous relations the key elements of the mentality (pragmatism, success orientation, strong competition, or the model of childhood socialization).

It can perhaps be said that in the case of a cultural shift generally these (or these among others) are the key elements through which successful adaptation takes place.

Probably, cultural shift within a society, and hence individualization within the society (mentioned in the introduction), also primarily proceeds through this same process.

The adaptation can be regarded as effective from the moment when a transition occurs from one cultural model or value system to the other, when the key element of the worldview to be taken over is adopted. Finally, it must also be mentioned that the process of individualization presented here is not predetermined. A third ("c") type of adoption (or the solution of the ambivalence) is possible, in which the ultimate result is not the adoption of the other (in our case the more individualized) culture, but the creation of a new culture or value system, synthesized from the values of the sending culture (or value system) and those of the new culture (or value system). The analysis of the possibilities of such a synthesis would greatly exceed the framework of this study.

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Divergent Strategies of Living and the Ethnic Dimensions of Value Systems.
The Case of Tövishát[1]

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Abstract. The article focuses on the characteristics of cohabitation of Romanian and Hungarian communities in the area of Tövishát. In connection to the Hungarian and international literature on ethnicity it analyzes the process of setting up ethnic boundaries in terms of Romanian and Hungarian communities. In the article we argue that the almost three hundred years of cohabitation did not result in a loss of culture in neither of the parties, even though there are significant differences in terms of culture, language and ethnic-national identities. On the other hand, the article examines the problem of divergent strategies of life among the Hungarian and Romanian communities after the end of the socialist era, and the question of their parallelism with the ethnic dimensions of value systems.
The article uses the "familism" paradigm to analyze the strategy of Hungarians locking themselves up in the ethnic, religious and cultural traditions.

Keywords: practice of cohabitation, subsistence strategies, value system, "familism" paradigm.

Introduction

The current article is based on a research carried out in the Szilágyság (Dealurile Majei) historical region of Transylvania between 2009 and 2012. The aim of the cultural anthropological research was to analyze the long-term cohabitation of communities of mixed ethnic origin (Romanian and Hungarian).

By taking a look at the data on the ethnic ratio of the three villages in the Tövishát region situated in the Szilágyság, it becomes obvious that since the

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repopulation of the villages in the 18th century all three settlements have had a population of mixed ethnic origin (Romanian – Hungarian). Data on the exact ratio of ethnic groups in the villages have been available from the mid 19th century (Varga 2010). According to these data, the Romanian / Hungarian ratio of the villages in focus—Bősháza (Biuşa), Monó (Manău) and Völcsök (Ulciug)—has not changed significantly for 150 years (see Table 1, 2 and 3).

Table 1. *The ethnic groups in Bősháza between 1850–2002*

Year	Population	Romanian population	Hungarian population	Romanian population in %	Hungarian population in %
1850	461	221	238	47.9	51.6
1869	691	310	381	44.9	53.7
1880	629	285	316	46.9	51.8
1890	616	303	302	49.2	49.0
1900	683	292	390	42.8	57,1
1910	701	277	424	39.5	60.5
1920	708	319	372	45.1	52.5
1930	705	319	381	45.2	54.0
1941	709	297	411	41.9	58.0
1966	773	348	424	45.0	54.9
1977	746	315	431	42.2	57.8
1992	651	218	433	33.5	66.5
2002	592	196	396	33.1	66.9

Source: Varga (2010)

Table 2. *The ethnic groups in Monó between 1850–1992*

Year	Population	Romanian population	Hungarian population	Romanian population in %	Hungarian population in %
1850	827	379	441	45.8	55.2
1880	729	335	388	45.9	55.1
1890	865	402	463	46.5	53.5
1900	905	438	467	48.4	51.6
1910	1023	502	517	49.0	51.0
1920	930	473	434	50.1	49.9
1930	995	473	497	47.5	52.5
1941	1139	507	627	44.5	55.5
1966	1188	549	639	46.2	53.8
1977	1271	563	708	44.3	55.7
1992	1179	497	682	42.1	57.9

Source: Varga (2010)

Table 3. *The ethnic groups in Völcsök between 1850–2002*

Year	Population	Romanian population	Hungarian population	Romanian population in %	Hungarian population in %
1850	298	109	189	36.6	63.4
1869	618	205	413	33.2	66.8
1880	593	185	381	32.2	66.1
1890	654	202	431	30.9	65.9
1900	781	273	508	35.0	65.0
1910	851	299	552	35.1	64.9
1920	869	310	548	35.7	63.1
1930	867	300	563	34.6	64.9
1941	950	248	702	26.1	73.9
1966	1121	412	709	36.8	63.2
1977	1155	402	751	34.8	65.0
1992	1072	350	722	31.7	68.3
2002	1035	340	782	32.7	67.3

Source:Varga (2010)

The anthropological literature refers to this phenomenon as a situation of *ethnic balance* (Biczó 2008, 281–285). In the case of ethnic balance models, even if we take the currently growing number of mixed marriages into account, the associations between communities preserving their linguistic, cultural and religious traditions cannot be analyzed in the framework of assimilative and/or acculturation discourses (Biczó 2010, 105).

In my article, I examine the main characteristics of cohabitation of the different ethnic groups. By drawing on the Hungarian and international literature on ethnicity I analyze the process of creating ethnic boundaries in the given locality. I also point out the factors responsible for the fact that, even after 300 years of intensive cohabitation, these communities—being different in terms of religion, language, culture and ethnic-national identity—have not experienced the loss of culture. My paper also focuses on the possible correlation between the divergent strategies of living, observed during our fieldwork, and the ethnic dimensions of value systems (Andrásfalvy 1975, 105–113).

The concept of subsistence strategy is being applied primarily by Hungarian Roma research (Szuhay 1999, 139–163), studying first of all rural Roma communities. New research brings new dimensions into the Hungarian investigation of subsistence strategies by involving other ethnic groups in the survey living in a given community next to the Roma, and by extending the rural focus of previous analyses to ethnic groups in urban communities. As subsistence strategy is a concept much broader than income generation and economic strategy, I will use that term hereinafter. Subsistence strategy is a plan, a concept, some

action algorithm aimed at finding a way of ensuring the livelihood of a family under the given circumstances. Its elements include income generation activities same as plans for cost-rationalization, and transforming the consumption structure, re-structuring the family division of labour and reshuffling the basic values (Bánlaky and Kevy 1999, 32).

Description of the local model of cohabitation

The practice of cohabitation is influenced by several factors. According to our study, there are three main factors influencing cohabitation in Tövishát. First, we focus on the problem of minority – majority relation. It is of extreme importance that in all three researched communities the ratio of Romanians is significantly smaller than that of the other ethnic groups' taken together. We have to take a look into the exact ratio of Hungarians in the local mixed population. While their ratio takes up almost 70% in Völcsök and Bősháza, the Hungarians in Monó form a 60% majority.

It is also important to emphasize that spatial segregation, that was probably present at the beginning of their cohabitation, is not an issue anymore. As a result, everyday interactions between neighbours are quite common between the Hungarian and Romanian families. The third factor being of interest is that the religion is definitely parallel to one's ethnic origin. Romanians are Orthodox and Hungarians are Calvinists.

In the case of Neo-protestant denominations appearing after the regime change (Pentecostals, Jehovah's witnesses, Millenarians) the religious identities do not have an ethnic dimension. It is also true that in these cases the religious identity becomes a lot more important part of one's self-definition than the ethnic origin.

In the autochthon bipolar communities in focus, the ethnic balance situation is a statistically documented condition in which the proportion of different ethnic groups within the population does not extend a fluctuation of 15% for the last 150 years. The location of ethnic households is mixed, the lives of the families do not show significant differences, but the linguistic, religious and cultural boundaries remain unchanged (Biczó 2010, 106–107).

While the balance of cohabitation seems static for an outsider, it is obvious that the cohabitation of Romanians and Hungarians is based on constant and dynamic adaptations to the "others." Adaptation is carried out in accordance with local traditions, in accordance with ethnic identities (Biczó 2008, 281–286).

"You have to speak Romanian, have to respect Romanians, have to co-operate with them but you don't have to mix with them" – says one of our informants from Bősháza, summarizing the behavioural strategies of the local Hungarians.

Albeit the attitude toward the "other" ethnic culture is based on tolerance, the ethnic, religious and cultural boundaries between the two ethnic groups are quite

rigid. A good example of this is that mixed marriages were absolutely prohibited up to the time of the regime change in 1989. After the revolution, mixed marriages became more and more common but, for the time being, did not change the balance. In order to avoid "mingling" the two ethnic groups occupied completely different spaces in terms of work and entertainment in the past. Nowadays these "spaces" do not have ethnic characteristics.

When describing the practices of cohabitation in the Tövishát region it seems to be useful to refer to the deep analysis of the Romanian – Hungarian interethnic relations of Szeklerland, even though the nature of these relations is different (Gagyi 1996).

One of the most important theoretical-methodological findings by Zoltán Biró A. is that in the Szeklerland the Romanian-Hungarian, Romanian-Gypsy relations are characterized by legal/administrative asymmetry. Romanians have a higher status, while the minority ethnic group has a lower one (Biró 1996). According to Biró this should lead to a majority-minority relation characterized by constant conflicts. "On the level of everyday interactions between Romanians and Hungarians or Romanians and Gypsies the asymmetry originating in the majority's legal/administrative power simply cannot be observed or can only be observed occasionally. Moreover, in Szeklerland the asymmetry of Romanian-Hungarian relations is reversed. This reversed asymmetry is a mental/symbolic construction in which the Hungarians are 'up' and Romanians are 'down'" (Biró 1996, 246). The cohabitation practices in Tövishát are different from the ones in Szeklerland. As a result of centuries of living together, symmetry characterizes the relations between the Romanians and Hungarians in the settlements in focus. This symmetry influences the perception of the other ethnic groups together with each and every aspect of cohabitation.

According to Zoltán Biró A., when researching the Szeklerland region, we have to review the role of asymmetrical relations determined by administration/law. In his view, the asymmetry in power does exist in Romanian-Hungarian and Romanian-Gypsy relations, but this legal/administrative asymmetry does not play a role in interethnic relations as important as it would be assumable. He concludes that everyday relations are not shaped by the power asymmetry, but attain their social meaning through other relations (Biró 1996, 258). This conclusion can be applied to the cohabitation practices of the Tövishát region as well.

Nevertheless, Hungarians of the Tövishát region do not construct a mental/symbolic "up" position for themselves. In Szeklerland the mental/symbolic asymmetry favouring the Hungarian community helps Hungarians compensate the legal/administrative dependence on Romanians. As a result of the centuries of cohabitation, this phenomenon is completely unknown in the Tövishát region.

In Zoltán Biró A.'s view, the reason for the successful reversion of power relations based on mental/symbolic means is that the Szeklerland region has not

had irreversible modernization processes (Bíró 1996, 258). For that very reason, the ethnic race condition analyzed by several researchers did not arise in Szeklerland. Theories on the formation of ethnic conflicts refer to modernization as a process creating conflicts. Without strong modernization processes the legal/administrative asymmetry does not emerge, moreover, it turns around. The mental/symbolic process turning the legal/administrative asymmetry helps the given ethnic groups live through the situation and creates stable interethnic relations as well (Bíró 1996, 258) by defining the interactions (Bíró 1996, 274). In the case of the villages in the Tövishát region we find stable interethnic relations, but legal/administrative asymmetry or its turning into a mental/symbolic asymmetry cannot be observed.

According to Zoltán Bíró A., the structuring power of the mental/symbolic sphere lies in the fact that it helps to distinguish between ethnic groups, it helps the members keep away from the others, to occupy "their own space" (Bíró 1996, 274). The space of ethnic groups, local ethnic communities, ethnic families and households is markedly different (Barth 1969). Such differentiation usually has its own physical aspect. As we have already pointed out, spatial separation was probably present in the Tövishát region at the beginning of cohabitation, but today the ethnic groups do not occupy different spaces. We have to note though that, because of the mental/symbolic differences of the two ethnic groups, the boundaries are much stronger than the physical ones (Bíró 1996, 259). The practice of keeping mental/symbolic distance is elaborated, complex and successful in the Tövishát region, even if the members of the two ethnic groups live close to each other in the physical sense, which, due to the intensive Romanian-Hungarian neighbour relations, is quite common there.

Keeping ethnic distance is possible in the settlements in focus because an additional factor is given to the already existing mental/symbolic differentiation. Both ethnic groups realize their complementary role, their interdependence. Based on his research in Szeklerland, Bíró describes this phenomenon as follows: "The parties stand apart but recognize the existence of the other, mutually agree on the spaces and social functions of the other. In the 'up-down relation' the group of down position may (and usually does) experience mental/symbolic degradation but it is rare that it has to deal with closing out, with violence or annihilation, etc. In this still traditional and common practice the person coming from the different ethnic group is usually not part of one's own life, he/she is always the foreign, the different who can only occupy a space at the edge of one's life. Cooperation is possible, sometimes necessary, but the other cannot shape one's life, cannot be an integral part of it. Therefore, mixed marriages are rare" (Bíró 1996, 259–260).

As Zoltán Bíró A. points it out in his study, this cultural pattern does not generate conflicts in itself, because the "other," the "foreign"—that can cause conflicts—does not become part of one's life, does not enter one's circles. If it is possible, the separation is also physical, if not, the mental/symbolic tools of

separation are applied. In Szeklerland these tools tend to be successful, even nowadays, in the sense that everyday interactions are defined by this mental/symbolic asymmetry (Biró 1996, 259–260).

Similarly to Szeklerland, in the Tövishát region the restoration of ethnic boundaries following the regime change is part of a more complex, general process aiming to restore the family and/or local ways of life. It is an effort to return to a way of life that was characteristic in this region before the forced collective farming. The process includes factors like self-sustaining farming, community norms over family norms, peasant type norms of financing, learning and family life, etc. (Biró 1996, 261–262).

If we wish to focus on ethnic relations characteristic to a given region we shall move from the common process of creating ethnic boundaries and analyze not only differences. According to Eriksen, the mutual recognition ad strengthening of demarcation, the so called dichotomization is a crucial notion in interethnic relations (Eriksen 1993). Emphasizing differences is not possible if there is no mutual recognition. The parties not only show their differences but also accept them as bases of recognition. It means that by showing differences they emphasize derivations. At the same time, there are differences that are not emphasized. The parties regard these as facts and use them to recognize and "complement" the other. They have an implicit consensus on the occupation of fundamental territories which are created in a way that the actual territories of the groups do not overlap. This process does not mean that certain divisions of roles and labour or even cooperation do not exist there (Biró 1996, 275–276).

Several studies pointed out that the actual differences may vary according to the nature of the relations. Without doubt, it depends on the practical forms and rate of complementarity, on the rate and nature of the recognition of the "other" (Biró 1996, 276).

Interethnic relations are not characterized by conflicts in their nature. When researching a given interethnic relations, it is essential to analyze the actual levels and forms of complementarity. The levels and forms of implicit complementarity influence the chances of conflicts in an interethnic relation, and also signify the possibility of preventing or solving conflicts. In the settlements of the Tövishát region the actual levels and forms of complementarities are deeply rooted in the everyday practices (Biró 1996, 276).

The politics of mutual courtesies

The local cohabitation of different ethnic groups is based on mutual respect, acceptance and non-conflicting relations. The necessity of cohabitation created techniques of mutual acceptance and adaptation. Harald Eidheim uses the notion "dichotomization" when referring to the mutual distancing of different

ethnic groups (Eidheim 1969, 39–57). A different form of ethnic interactions is the so called complementarity. In this case differences are communicated within the ethnicity; the existence of differences is regarded as a fact and handled as advantages. While dichotomization is a process of "us" and "them," complementarity is a process in which "us" and "you" are present (Eidheim 1969, 39–57; Eriksen 2008, 46–48). As we have already pointed out, the local model of cohabitation falls into this category. Therefore there are no ethnic conflicts in the settlements of focus. The everyday interactions of the two ethnic groups do not reflect tensions on the base of ethnic origin.

The pragmatic and symbolic components of the politics of mutual courtesies observable in all aspects of interactions are effective. The interactions between the different ethnic groups are based on mutual acceptance and respect, showed through forms of greetings, neighbour relations and shared celebrations. The politics of courtesies is strengthened by the local religious leaders who have a leading role in its enforcement.

A very good example of interethnic solidarity is the example of Völcsök, where—in the case of unexpected loss or damage—the population of the village starts collecting donations for the family in loss or offers help in the form of labour, regardless of ethnic origin.

Divergent strategies of living

Besides the relative stability of ethnic proportions, the graphs showing the ethnic proportions of the villages reveal another characteristic. By focusing on the data from the last thirty years we can see that the Romanian population of the villages is slowly decreasing. We shall not conclude that it is a result of assimilation processes. The slow decrease of the Romanian population is due to migration. Migration became an important issue after the political changes in 1989, but the process itself has started at the late socialist times. Romanians tended to move from the local rural society and settle in cities more likely than their Hungarian neighbours.

The current strategies of living depend on the conditions determining the local economic and social relations, but also on global influences appearing after the revolution of 1989. Therefore, when analyzing divergent strategies of living, we have to take a look at the two aspects: the local and the global influences.

Life strategies in the villages of the Tövishát region

There are only a few families in the villages of focus with only one source of income. The families usually have two-three different sources of income. If we look at the primary source of income, we can form certain categories, as follows:

a) *Income from permanent employment.* Income primarily comes from employment. Commuting employees, family entrepreneurships and local employees fall into this category. Most of them are engaged in farming.

b) *Pension.* The base of living is coming from state or disability pension. With a few exceptions, pensioners practice farming on the level of the nuclear and extended family.

c) *Farming.* For 12 extended families in the three settlements the primary source of income comes from farming. The elderly members of the family also have state pensions, while the younger generation works in cultivation and/or stock farming exclusively.

d) *Employment abroad.* A growing number of the villagers work abroad.

István Kinda's findings are valid in terms of the farmers of the settlements in the Tövishát region: "The attachment of the locals to traditional values and life forms cannot be regarded as a conscious or romantic decision. More likely it is due to the fact that there are no other alternatives, that the locals are used to such strategies. The researched communities would gladly get rid of the 'old way' which is centered on surviving. They would accept very narrow possibilities, if only they could" (Kinda 2011).

The notion of "forced strategies" signifies the process of reorganization coming after 1989. After the urbanization and industrialization experienced during socialism, the rural Romanian population experienced a shift toward agriculture. The settlements in the Tövishát region, together with the rest of rural Romanian communities, were unprepared to get their land back, to re-privatization. Due to the mass layoffs and unfavourable macroeconomic processes, a large number of people chose to turn to the family based farming. Traditional farming techniques with out of date tools and equipments were barely enough to sustain the families. Yet hundreds of families were forced to make this decision in order to survive, to provide.

The opinion-shapers, the leading figures of the liquidation of collective farms were those farmers who were forced to give in their lands thirty years ago.

In some families we can observe the parallel existence of farmer and entrepreneur behaviours and attitudes. These families tend to take minimal risks and stick to old strategies and cheap equipments. Therefore they cannot be regarded as western-type entrepreneurs, more like farmer-entrepreneurs with some financial and crop capital.

In one third of the families in the settlements of focus, the primary source of income comes from state or disability pension. Usually, the elderly join the family in farming. Cultivation of the land is usually carried out by the extended family. Widows/widowers and elderly couples living without the support of their children rent their lands to local farmers in exchange for products. Selling the land is not an option; the ownership shall not be handed over.

The redistribution of lands started after the regime change in 1990, ending in 1991. The structure recreated the pre-collectivization status. Even though there was a possibility of concentrating lands in order to have a more effective farming system, the landowners did not agree on it. Everyone wanted their former land back (Peti 2004). By regaining the ownership rights the farmers not only got their lands back, but also their right to farming. As a result, "not only a strong mental-emotional re-compensation took place but it become possible to regain the status of a certain family based operation of the household" (Biró 2006, 11–12). Even though socialism strengthened the nostalgia toward individual, family based farms, as a result of which the farmers insisted on having their exact properties back, the now independent farmers did not have modern equipment to cultivate the lands, nor did they have the financial means to modernize. Therefore they hoped that their own labour force will somehow compensate them for the lack of the above mentioned aspects (Miklós 2009).

The farms, different in sizes and capacities, failed to exercise a significant market position. In consequence, the settlements of the Tövishát region could not integrate to the social division of labour. These small farms only have one positive effect on the Romanian society: these family based farms provide employment to the rural population that would otherwise be unemployed. We have to note that it is likely that as soon as the opportunity arises, these people, and even more so the younger generation would leave the land and the farms behind. Among the younger generation farming is not a desired way of life. In the case of unsuccessful attempts to try several other alternatives (employment in Hungary, employment in the private sector), they usually return to the family farms. They do not tend to stop seeking for other possibilities, but they only do it in a way that does not endanger the operation of the farm anymore.

In the time after the regime change, because of the closing down of plants and factories, several families had to face the fact that they are out of options. We cannot really talk about "returning to peasantry" but it is true that the families of the Tövishát region had to return to farming.

There are no significant differences between the economic model followed by Hungarians and Romanians in the Tövishát region. On the other hand, the divergences between strategies of living are there.

There are two main types of farms in the Tövishát region: 1. family based farms; being different in size, the common characteristic of these farms is that they are cultivated in the form of full-time employment; and 2. part-time farms where, beside the income coming from agriculture, the families have other, secondary income as well. The main reason for the existence of the farm is making life "cheaper."

For most people agriculture in the Tövishát region is not a real alternative for financial success. Most of the members of the local society follow traditional

farming suitable for self-sustenance. Market oriented behavior is not common. Even though they do not fail to work hard, it is mostly true that farmers do not have profit in these villages (Oláh 2004, 30).

Based on the interviews on economic strategies the economic practices of Romanians and Hungarians do not differ. Nevertheless, there are significant differences in terms of the equipments used. Romanian farmers do not use as much machinery, only a few Romanian families own tractors. Most of the Hungarian families have tractors and other equipment (plough, harrow, etc.). In Völcsök, for example, the 6 harvesters are all owned by Hungarians.

There are no significant differences in terms of structure of labour between the Romanian and the Hungarian households. The role of mutual help has decreased but it still has a very important role in cultivation. Even though the connections within the extended family loosened, the unit still works on the basis of mutual interactions, as a community with certain economic and social focus. Cole calls the form coordinating the benefits of urban and rural living in the socialist Romania an extended household unit (Cole 1981). It was an important relation correcting the inequality of politics. Through the member employed in the city the family had a higher status and the other members were able to benefit from it. At the same time, the parents who did not move from their rural homes were able to provide their urban children with goods not available in the cities. Beside the economic cooperation, the social cooperation was also important (Turai 2003). This practice was common in the Tövishát region as well. We have to note though that a higher number of Romanians moved to cities. The organization of labour is based on ethnicity. It is mainly organized within the family, and does not tend to cross over the ethnic boundaries.

The capitalist, profit-oriented attitude is not part of the Hungarians' mentality in the Tövishát region. The influence of modernization is not considerable, as a result of which traditional values are significant even today.

Since only a few families have a stable income from farming, and the employment opportunities in Szilágycseh, Zilah and Nagybánya were reduced after 1989, the importance of working abroad has increased.

The sociological literature in Romania (e.g., Bodó 1996; Csata and Kiss 2003; Gödri 2004; Horváth 2002; Horváth 2003; Sandu 2005, etc.) emphasizes that the migration of Hungarians from Romania shall only be interpreted in Romanian context. The reason for migration is the extreme economic difficulties experienced because of the slow process of transition in the country (Csata and Kiss 2003, 10).

The migration potential of the Hungarians in the Tövishát region cannot be interpreted outside the context of Romanian economy, neither outside the ethnic dimension of it (Csata and Kiss 2003, 11).

In the researched communities, the Romanians mostly choose Western European countries of employment, migrating mainly to Italy and Spain. Even

though many of them asked for their lands back, they did not create market-oriented farms. These farms are not well-equipped in terms of machines and have little products. On the other hand, Hungarians try to equip their farms with machinery and try to increase the productivity of their farms.

In our research we focused on the divergent strategies of living and the migration pattern of Bősháza in detail. In the following, I am going to focus on the characteristics common in all three settlements.

1. *Differences in terms of the nature and reason of migration.* The migration of Romanians was there even before the regime change. Several of them moved to nearby cities for employment. During socialism, Hungarians found employment in cities as well, but instead of moving from the village they became commuters. The difference between the migration pattern of Romanians and Hungarians after 1989 is that the migration of Romanians tends to be permanent. In the case of Romanians migration is followed by moving the whole family abroad. In the case of Hungarians employment in a different country is only temporary, lasting for a couple of years. There are differences in the reason for migration between the two ethnic groups. Romanians seek for employment abroad in order to establish their existence there, while Hungarians only want to collect some money to establish a life in Romania.

2. *Generational differences in migration.* There are significant differences between the two ethnic groups in terms of the age group willing to migrate. While middle-aged and/or elderly Romanians are willing to migrate with their whole families, Hungarians of the same age groups do not consider migration. It is a common practice in Romanian families that only the oldest members of the household remain in the village. In Hungarian families members who are less than thirty years old are most likely to seek employment abroad. After a few years they return to the village.

3. *Differences in terms of the experience of migration.* The fact that Hungarians from the Tövishát region mostly have negative migration experiences results in a decreasing willingness to migrate. On the other hand, most of the Romanians regard their migration as a success, which in turn strengthens the willingness to migrate.

4. *Differences in terms of the destination of migration.* From the early 1990s the Hungarians of the Tövishát region migrated to Hungary seeking for employment. It was followed by establishing common routes to Canada, France, Spain and Italy, mainly taken by Romanians (Csata and Kiss 2003, 23). Hungarian migration plans are not influenced by the Romanian community.

As we have seen, local Hungarians did have a tendency to seek for employment abroad in the decade following the collapse of the socialist regime. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the migration of Hungarians and Romanians. The conclusion of sociological research is true: ethnicity, as cultural

and symbolic capital, influences the intensity of migration and the destination of migration (Horváth 2002, 32).

The following components have an important role in creating divergent migration practices among the two ethnic groups. These components complement and strengthen each other.

1. *Differences in family structure, division of labour and use of income in Hungarian and Romanian families.* The formerly dominant three-generation households are still common among the Hungarians of the Tövishát region (Turai 2004). The three-generation household has a unique economic strategy: the elders work on the family farm, their children work in nearby cities (Zilah, Nagybánya, Szilágycseh). The two families live in separate houses but in one household. Agricultural work is carried out together. The families have separated spaces and the generations have different ways of life. Financial unity is partial, but agricultural products are utilized together. The incomes of the elders and their children are not perfectly separated.

We do not find similar symbiotic relationships in Romanian families and households. Labour and income are separated.

2. *Differences in social networks in the two ethnic communities.* The network capital of Hungarian families in the Tövishát region comes from kinship. Kinship serves as the base of the division of labour, of solidarity and of help. Most of the Hungarians remain in the local community; therefore they are attached to the local society, to the neighbouring Hungarian villages. Kinship, being present in the local Hungarian communities of the Tövishát region, is an important factor working against migration. The interpersonal network of Romanian families is much more extended and reaches over the boundaries of local communities. Therefore, their migration potential is also much higher.

3. *Differences in the relationships toward tradition and norms.* The differences in the level of attachment to traditions among Romanians and Hungarians are best described by taking a look at the different attitudes toward farming as the base of subsistence. Farming used to be the dominant form of living in the lives of both ethnic groups in the Tövishát region. By today this has changed. While the aspirations of Romanians are mostly driving them away from agriculture and farmer life, Hungarians are still bound by these traditions. In their attitudes and norms, at least among the elders, the traditional peasant type of life is still there. One of the direct reasons for low migration potential among the Hungarians of the Tövishát region is their strong attachment to norms transmitted by traditions. As we have already suggested, in the villages of the Tövishát region farming is done by elders. Not so among the Hungarians. In Hungarian families farming provides the primary source of food. The role of families did change, households are not as closely connected as they were before the Second World War, but they still function as economic units (Turai 2004).

The most important components responsible for the low migration potential among the Hungarians in the Tövishát region are the existence of farming, the attachment to religious traditions, and the responsibility for elderly parents.

The ethnic differences in migration potential suggest that there are radical differences in the relations toward tradition. These are the results of divergent value systems. We may conclude that general values are responsible for the differences between the willingness to remain home or migrate abroad (I only mention here some works out of the extensive literature: Kósa 1990; Szelényi 1992; Csite 1997; Fejős 1998; Niedermüller 2005; Niedermüller 2008), Romanians who have pragmatic-competitive values move abroad, while Hungarians with community oriented, tolerant, Catholic conservative values stay home (Csata and Kiss 2003, 17; Csata, Dobos 2001). To put it more simply: Hungarians in the villages of focus closet themselves in ethnic, religious and cultural traditions.

Theoretical reflections

In order to conceptualize the process of changes following the collapse of the regime, we have to find a consistent framework of notions by which we can describe the social processes and the long term local ethnic cohabitation models. It is important to explain the relation of existing theories to the interpretations used for analyzing peasant cultures (Kotics 2011).

In the following, I refer to some of the meta-narratives used by researchers to analyze rural societies after the collapse of socialism. There are several narratives in the scientific discourse, the weight of which differ. In our point of view the theories of gentrification and of elimination of peasantry are of importance. Besides, as an alternative interpretational framework, we can also turn to the theories of acculturation and re-peasantry. We have to note though that the notion of the latter is not elaborate enough. Some of the international literature on rural communities can also be applied (Csite 1998).

There are several theories focusing on being locked into local ethnic, religious and cultural traditions. Here I will only refer to some of the most important ones.

Among the meta-narratives applied for analyzing the changes of rural societies, the ones on gentrification and modernization are the most elaborate. The application of these seems to be questionable in our research, therefore we have to find another theory. Some theories argue that the phenomenon shall be described along the lines of social networks and social capital (Lengyel and Szántó 1988; Orbán and Szántó 2005). From the current research on social capital, the researches of Robert Putnam and Michael Woolcock are worth mentioning here. They differentiate three forms of social capital, bonding, linking and bridging (Putnam 2000; Woolcock 2001). Bonding capital is based on trust, reciprocity and solidarity, and it is relatively closed. Linking and bridging capitals work toward

social advancement and mobility. The different capitals have different functions. Bonding relations, in the family, among friends and neighbours, function as safety nets. The balance of the capitals is important in terms of a person's social network. The predominance of bonding capital may restrict the forming and/or maintenance of linking and bridging relations (Messing 2006, 37).

The network model describes the social structure as the network of junctions and ties. The application of Granovetter's now pragmatic model of strong and weak ties seems to be plausible (Granovetter 1991, 371–400). In some cases the strong ties are important: risks and uncertainty strengthens the importance of strong ties. Strong solidarity though makes it possible for the person to take risks. In the lack of additional sources, in times of economic crises the family is the safest harbour against the unfavourable outside conditions (Angelusz and Tardos 1998, 241). Some researchers argue that, in times of increasing unemployment, crises and economic difficulties following the collapse of the socialist regimes, the protecting ties (mainly family and kinship ties) had an extremely important role in the individuals' lives (Angelusz and Tardos 1998, 237).

The familism paradigm reappearing in the national and international discourses on post-socialist changes also emphasizes the central role of the family. The model was firstly used by Edward Banfield for describing a South Italian mountain community after the Second World War (Banfield 1958, quoted by Torsello 2004). Current research points out that familism is an ideology and a social status as well (Dupcsik and Tóth 2008, 309). The notion of familism can be applied for the description of societies that have a low level of general trust and in which, as a result, family ties are the only relations proved to be trustworthy (Dupcsik and Tóth 2008, 309). In this view, familism as social status does not originate from the immanent family ties and family friendly attitudes, but from the relative strength of these ties. Additional social relations are weak, rare and mostly forced, the participants experience constant distrust and the society faces the permanent risk of destabilization (Dupcsik and Tóth 2008, 309).

The post-socialist Romanian society inherited a unique system of traditions of less and less but still significant influence. Familism based on strong family ties is present together with the familism present because of the deficit in general social trust (Dupcsik and Tóth 2008, 435).

Several studies point out that in Central and Eastern Europe the general trust in institutions and in interpersonal relations is low (Torsello 2004, 103). This phenomenon is usually explained as the result of the changes in 1989: post-socialist transformation and general uncertainty (Utasi 2002). Scholars of post-socialist societies agree that the distrust toward institutions is balanced by the privilege of trust toward family, friends and relatives (Torsello 2004, 103). Nowadays the only sphere expressing personal trust is the family. Since the state lost its socialist character, the family became the only source of help, trust

and safety for the rural population (Torsello 2004, 111). Davide Torsello points out that several anthropological studies show that the collapse of the socialist regime resulted in cutting off solidarity and social cooperation and in decreased community interactions (Torsello 2004, 112). In a study of a mountain community in South Poland, Frances Pine points out that most of the villagers ensconced themselves in their houses after 1989. According to her understanding, this phenomenon is due to the collapse of socialist farming. In the past, the role of women as economic providers and reproductive players in the society was strong. Nowadays, with the household being the place for everyday struggle for survival, the role of family is stronger, solidarity and cooperation among the members of the family are more important (Torsello 2004, 112).

The theory of familism has changed: it regards the revaluation of family ties as a rational adaptation strategy applied in times of instability in the post-socialist countries. In my view, the notion of familism can successfully be applied when talking about divergent strategies of life, ethnicity and locking up in ethnic, religious and cultural traditions in the local Hungarian communities of the Tövishát region.

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Divided Sarajevo.
Representations and Sense of Belonging across the Boundary

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Abstract. This paper discusses the extent to which the territorial partition of Sarajevo affects people's spatial and social practices on a daily basis. Discussing the results of my interviews and ethnographic research I argue that the boundary crossing does not provide itself evidence of social bonds and exchange between the inhabitants of the two sides. On the contrary, what emerges from the contexts is a rooted division that does not manifest through open resentment towards the counterpart, but rather through indifference expressed by a separated, self-referred sense of belonging.
Spatial narratives and practices highlight that the symbolic relevance accorded to the boundary has been renegotiated throughout time; nevertheless, different and less visible dynamics intertwine in reproducing the division. Although crossing the boundary is not represented as a stressing emotional experience, that does not consequently imply the restoring of social interaction and exchange between the inhabitants of the two sides. On the contrary, the different spatialization of daily practices and the contrasting representations elaborated by the inhabitants reflect a parallel dynamic in which people from the two sides develop their own sense of belonging and cohesion simultaneously neglecting the counterpart. As such, Sarajevo and Istočno Sarajevo are represented and experienced as separated cities by inhabitants themselves.

Keywords: divided city, spatial practices, sense of belonging.

Introduction

The end of the war in Bosnia coincided with the peace agreement signed in Dayton, Ohio, USA, in November 1995 by the president of the three republics interested by the conflict: Alija Izetbegović for Bosnia, Slobodan Milošević for Serbia and Franjo Tuđman for Croatia.[1] The international accord ratified the Washington agreement signed in 1994 institutionalizing the internal line of division that Bosnian Serb

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1   For a detailed retracement of historical events see Pirjevec (2001).

nationalists had self-declared during the war and recognizing two different institutional entities within the state territory. With some spatial adjustments the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) divided the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Republika Srpska, two autonomous administrative entities provided with separated constitutions. The agreement also recognized the spatial unit of Brčko as an autonomous district directly put under the state sovereignty.

The boundary line peripherally crossed the area of Sarajevo so that the city was split into two autonomous local administrations; the old town center and several surrounding neighbourhoods became part of the Croat-Bosniak Federation while the area included within Republika Srpska's territory coincided with a suburban district and was renamed *Istočno Sarajevo* (Eastern Sarajevo).

After the IEBL was drawn some suburbs of the city controlled by Bosnian Serb troops during the war became part of the Federation. Within a short time Bosnian Serb inhabitants of those areas became the target of a double attack: while Bosniak gangs occasionally harassed them expressing their resentment, Bosnian Serb nationalists began to destroy their properties in the attempt to force them to abandon Sarajevo. Such attacks went in parallel with a massive Serb nationalist propaganda that pictured Sarajevo as an unsafe place for Bosnian Serbs and incisively promoted their resettlement within the new born Republika Srpska. Therefore Bosnian Serbs progressively left Sarajevo moving to the new city of Istočno Sarajevo and to surrounding municipalities (Sekulić 2002; Bollens 2007; Mazzucchelli 2010). At the same time people escaping from ethnically cleansed territories and seeking shelter in Sarajevo during the war rarely returned to their home villages, definitely settling in the city. Such processes led to a strong homogenization of the population in national terms so that nowadays Sarajevo is constituted for about 80% by Bosniaks and for 12% by Bosnian Serbs, while before the war the ratio was 50% and 30%; on the other hand, Istočno Sarajevo is mainly populated by Bosnian Serbs[2]. The boundary has a purely administrative nature, it is not marked by any physical element of separation and it is not militarized; as such, it can be freely crossed from both sides.

Within such context, this paper discusses daily practices of interaction and space use pointing out the generative power of division beside the lack of physical elements of separation. As many scholars have pointed out[3], the absence of physical barriers does not represent a sufficient element to foster cooperation, exchange and social encounter in post-conflict urban contexts.

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2   For an overview of post-war demographical changes in Sarajevo see Stefansson (2006) and Bollens (2007).

3   I particularly refer to the contributions provided by studies on borders and divided cities (Bollens 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2012; Newman and Paasi 1998; Pringle and Yiftachel 1999; Paasi 1999; Kliot and Mansfield 1999; Newman 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c; Kostovicova 2004; Kolossov 2005; Cella 2006; Anderson 2008; Calame and Charlesworth 2009).

As such, boundaries do not need concreteness to exert their influence; on the other hand, social practices and representations are equally able to affect spatial configurations and symbolical meanings attributed to them.

Within the spatially partitioned context of Sarajevo, this paper discusses the extent to which the territorial partition affects social interaction between inhabitants living across the boundary; on the other hand, it points out how social relations and daily spatial practices contribute to redefine the impact of the separation and renegotiate its divisive power.

As we will see, spatial and relational practices on a daily basis reflect the existence of two parallel and detached social contexts; as such, the divisive power is daily reproduced through practices and discourses of inhabitants from both sides.

Spatial practices and narratives

By looking at inhabitants' spatial practices, I discuss the extent to which the separation affects people's space use on a daily basis; moreover, I focus on representations and discourses concerning the partition in order to shed light on meanings attributed to the boundary.

During my fieldwork, narrations about boundary crossing often emerged both during interviews and unrecorded conversations. Considering the experiences and narratives related to the immediate post-war period as well as those referring to the present situation, it emerges that for many people the separation and its spatial demarcation have lost most of their former emotional burden.

After the Dayton agreement was signed, international forces (IFOR) took control over the new institutionalized line. Despite the end of the war, episodes of violence did not immediately stop, and from time to time news reported reciprocal offensive actions carried out by armed gangs still active in the area. Moreover, the Bosnian Serbs remained in Sarajevo became the target of a double harassment, since Bosniak groups openly addressed their resentment to them, while the most extreme supporters of Serb nationalism deliberately attacked them and their properties in order to force them to resettle in the new institutionalized territory of Republika Srpska (Dušan Sehovac, DISS, *Democratic Initiative of Sarajevo Serbs*, unrecorded conversation).

In such a strained atmosphere, the overwhelming emotional burden lasted in people's mind for long. While the war had come to an end, the distressed civilian population on both sides of the boundary had to deal with their reciprocal feelings of resentment.

"Honestly at the beginning, during the war, I hated them. I hated everyone during the war. At the beginning you could not see the other part; you could only

see what was happening to you. You can't see the other people and how they live. I knew only that we were being attacked, my mom died during the war, I had friends who died during the war… And from my perspective I could not see that the same things were happening to the other people as well. We were the good side and they were the bad side" (K., Istočno Sarajevo).

Episodes of violence slowly decreased, the situation progressively stabilized and civilians were enabled to cross the boundary in safety. Moreover, soon after the war the international community started several programs to foster the process of reconciliation, and in Sarajevo many NGOs began activities including inhabitants of both sides of the new boundary. Nevertheless, only few people could initially deal with the emotional stress caused by crossing that line. As many of my interlocutors told me, such an experience entailed a double source of strain: on the one hand, people going *to the other side* often perceived a general feeling of diffidence caused by their presence; on the other hand, they had to face the moral judgment of those blaming them for going to the former enemy's territory.

The experience of a Bosnian Serb interviewee who started working for an NGO in Sarajevo is particularly enlightening in this sense.

"So I started to work there [in Sarajevo] but I had problems on both sides when I started. With my people, because to go there you have to pass the street where the border is and people can see that you're crossing that street. So if you cross the street, everyone knows that you've crossed the border. So people hated me. And then, there they know that I'm not part of their people: you know, just by saying my name they know that I'm not Muslim, and that was the hardest part for me, maybe even harder than the war itself. At war, you know, you are on one side and you are with your people. But then, when the war ended, it was even harder. Some people spoke ill of me because I was going to work with them" (V., Istočno Sarajevo).

Feelings of mutual distrust and resentment had lasted long after the war, progressively vanishing but not disappearing. Even when individuals could move across the two sides of the boundary without any risk, for many of them the recognizable origin of their names and surnames continued to represent a serious deterrent. Most people were concerned about the likelihood of being recognized as members of the national counterpart by simply introducing themselves, especially Bosnian Serbs who used to live in Sarajevo (Field note, 17.10.2011).

Eighteen years after the war, the situation is rather different from the one recalled by my interlocutors. For many people of both sides the crossing experience has become a usual practice and the feeling of discomfort connected to being *on the other side* has progressively vanished since the post-war time.

To a different extent, people from both sides cross the boundary quite regularly, and the psychological strain described above seems to have vanished.

Both during interviews and unrecorded conversations my informants always minimized the emotional burden connected to the spatial division of Sarajevo; rather than awkwardness, the most widespread representation involves a general discourse of indifference. Both the people who experienced the war and those who did not emphasize how the boundary itself does not particularly affect them nowadays, pointing out that crossing it does not entail any kind of emotional stress. Some interlocutors highlighted the fact that they do not even realize when they pass the line as they never pay attention to the road sign. Of course, the discomfort in talking about sensitive topics during a recorded interview probably led interviewees to foster and exaggerate the attitude of indifference declared in their answers in the attempt to appear politically correct.

"I don't feel any problem and I would say that it's the same for people that I know. When you go to the airport, and I go there every day because of of my job, you have to cross the boundary and you are in Istočno Sarajevo, sometimes I stop to have a coffee there but it's nothing, if you ask me or any of my colleagues" (N., Sarajevo).

"I think it's invisible, it doesn't mean anything. If we had some kind of wall that separates us it would be different, but since there is not, I think it's not an issue" (O., Istočno Sarajevo).

"People may think there is a border between Sarajevo and Istočno Sarajevo, but for me there is just one sign on the road, it's just a sign" (V., Istočno Sarajevo).

In particular, narrations referring to different time periods further show the diminishing effect of the experience of going *to the other side*.

"The first time I went there I was 22, and I was going to Belgrade for the first time, so I had to catch the bus in Lukavica. Even if there were no walls you could feel the tension, there was no material division, but in fact there was, I have to say that I was scared, well, not scared, but I felt uncomfortable. […] It was strong because you could still see all the damaged buildings and the traces of the war, you could really feel what happened. […] Now I have to say that I don't see this separation anymore, I mean, the division is still there, but I don't pay attention to it anymore" (S., Sarajevo).

"I was here and I remember how it was soon after the war. Even if you could go to the other side, people felt uncomfortable and would not do so. I did not do it myself. Now it's different, and I would say that it doesn't affect me anymore, when I cross the boundary I almost don't see it, I don't know if it is because I got used to it or what, but it's just like that now" (V., Istočno Sarajevo).

People from both sides cross the boundary to different extents, some of them do it on a daily basis, others cross it only on rare occasions, others never do so. Beyond such different habits, the crossing experience has become a quite usual practice mainly related to utility reasons; as such, it has completely lost its emotional burden for people living on both sides, and daily spatial practices are much less conditioned by the separation.

In terms of daily spatial practices, for Sarajevo's inhabitants the main reason to go to the other side is the availability of cheaper products, but beside short visits to buy daily consumption goods, people go to the other side quite rarely. Moreover, this habit appears to be more common among residents of neighborhoods like Dobrinja and Alipasino Polje, located close to the boundary line, while for inhabitants living farther this practice appears less convenient. On the other hand, economical activities, NGOs as well as UN and EU agencies located in Sarajevo also provide job opportunities for residents of Istočno Sarajevo who come to the city on a daily basis. In addition, Sarajevo's cultural offer represents a further element of attraction for people living on the other side, especially for younger people. Nevertheless, spending leisure time in Sarajevo does not represent a usual custom but rather an exceptional practice related to special events, such as big concerts or the summer film festival (Field note, 16.10.2011).

The affluence of younger people from Istočno Sarajevo is further discouraged by some practical reasons. First, the absence of public transport connecting the two sides represents a crucial obstacle in this sense; considering that reaching the central area of Sarajevo takes approximately one hour, people rarely opt for this solution. Such inefficiency becomes even more effective considering that the possession of private means of transportation is not largely diffused among the younger generation. Finally, a factor that further prevents young people from regularly crossing the boundary is the existence of a university in Istočno Sarajevo; indeed, for several students the proximity of the services and the increasing provision of opportunities for leisure time activities contribute to reduce the interest towards Sarajevo (Field note, 15.05.2012).

According to Dušan Sehovac—a member of DISS, *Democratic Initiative of Sarajevo Serbs*—the post-war demographic alteration of Sarajevo still affects the social context, since very few people have maintained their social connections and friendships across the boundary: the majority of Bosnian Serbs who moved to Istočno Sarajevo after the war have built new relations progressively losing social bonds with their former home place; on the other hand, people in Sarajevo have almost no connection at all with their neighbours on the other side of the boundary (Field note, 28.11.2011).

Representations and interpretations provided by interlocutors on both sides of the boundary largely confirmed such a scenario. As such, the divisive power of the boundary is reproduced and fostered in more subtle but equally deep terms, preventing a real social encounter, fostering indifference towards the counterpart and reflecting the existence of two separated communities that have built a separated sense of belonging.

Therefore the changed spatial narratives and practices do not reflect a renovated social encounter and exchange, but rather a mutual attitude of indifference toward the counterpart. In this perspective the presence of the boundary does not prevent

people from going to the other side, but its divisive power manifests through the lack of interactions and social bonds between people living on the two sides.

The crossing experience has progressively lost its emotional burden for inhabitants of both sides, thus their spatial practices are scarcely affected by the territorial separation and are much more justified by practical utilities and advantages. Even if feelings of discomfort in going *to the other side* have vanished, they have been replaced by a general and reciprocal attitude of indifference; as such, the boundary is crossed to satisfy specific needs in the most convenient way, while social interaction remains scarce and superficial.

As I discuss below, the interesting aspect to highlight is the fact that the parallel sense of cohesion appears to be scarcely fostered by discourses on national and religious affiliation, but it is rather strengthened by the opposition between the urban and the rural world.

A different sense of belonging

Considering the post-conflict reconfiguration of space and the residential segregation occurred after Dayton, I aim to point out how people conceive the other side of the boundary by discussing their representations and narrations. Moreover, since Istočno Sarajevo has developed as an urban complex in the recent years, and considering that part of its residents have settled there only after the war, it appears to be particularly interesting to investigate their sense of belonging in spatial terms.

Identity can be expressed not only through discursive but also through spatial practices (Massey 1993), therefore the spatialization of everyday life assumes a crucial relevance in people's negotiation and production of symbolical and identitarian meanings. As I will discuss, such elements appear to be more relevant than national and religious affiliation in deepening the division between inhabitants of the two sides.

While in the first paragraph I specifically focused on the crossing experience, pointing out the changed symbolical meaning accorded to the boundary, here I discuss how spatial and relational practices carried out on a daily basis foster a reciprocal sense of extraneousness between inhabitants of the two sides. As discussed below, the way in which people experience space and negotiate a collective sense of belonging reflects a deep detachment towards *the other side*.

Sarajevo: refusing the rural

Interviews, unrecorded conversations and spare time spent with people during my fieldwork provided evidence for the fact that it is not so usual for inhabitants

of Sarajevo to go to the other side. For the majority of my interlocutors the place across the boundary represents nothing interesting, with very little to do. The discourse underlying this practice is common for all my interviewees: Istočno Sarajevo has nothing more to offer than Sarajevo. Both in occasional conversations and during interviews, people gave account of the place describing it as the countryside, a rural area, a village that constantly struggles to look like a city. The only reason for people to go there is the chance to buy cheaper goods in shopping malls and markets, but apart from that Sarajevans express a sense of extraneousness and unfamiliarity with the place across the boundary. People do not have a direct experience of the place, except for short moments, and they seem not to be curious.

Indeed, on several occasions the explanation of my research interests resulted in surprise and puzzled reactions among people in Sarajevo, as for them Istočno Sarajevo had nothing special to offer. Some of them could hardly get the point of investigating such division, as—many of them argued—the boundary was just the separation line between two cities (Field note, 03.06.2011; Field note, 22.09.2011; Field note, 04.10.2011). The frequency of such comments and reactions among my interlocutors confirms the lack of connection between Sarajevo's inhabitants and the area across the boundary; sometimes such a declared extraneousness was expressed in very explicit terms, highlighting how indifference slightly translates into resentment.

"Just to be clear, when I say 'Sarajevo' I mean this Sarajevo, this is Sarajevo for me, that is just a part of Dobrinja for me, it's not a city, it's nothing" (S., Sarajevo).

The other side is commonly conceived as the countryside, and the fact that it is not part of the city anymore is not an issue for inhabitants. Descriptions and representations of the other side provide a picture where Istočno Sarajevo is just a rural area that pretends to become a city and, in vain, struggles to build an artificial urban identity.

"Istocno was part of Sarajevo, it was actually a suburban area and nobody used to go there because there was nothing. People used to pass by on their way to Jahorina or other destinations for holiday or something like that. It wasn't really a place where you would go, it was a suburb or even a rural area, I would say, and even if now they say it's a city, for me it remains a village" (L., Sarajevo).

"I have to say that Istocno is not a city; Sarajevo is a city, but not Istočno, because it doesn't have what it takes to be *a city*. If you go there you will only see 20 years old buildings, there's no old town centre, there's nothing going on there, nothing" (S., Sarajevo).

"I cannot say that Istočno Sarajevo is a real city, because it's not. In the city you can do many things, and so many people come in Sarajevo because it's bigger and you really have something to do here, more than in Istočno Sarajevo" (N., Sarajevo).

"We also make some jokes about Istočno Sarajevo, because it is a place which is so close and so far away at the same time. Really, it's a different place […] and people here don't really have any need to go there. There was nothing there before, it was just a countryside, even in Lukavica there was nothing, it was just a small place. People used to go there just to spend the week-end outside the city" (B., Sarajevo).

"Istočno Sarajevo is much smaller than Sarajevo, I can't say that it is a town, I would rather say that it's a sort of village next to Sarajevo. It's always been like that, even when it was part of Sarajevo. Sarajevo is the capital city, everything is here, and that remains a small town" (M., Sarajevo).

Such discourses stress the use of urban-rural division as a tool of differentiation: the spatial separation becomes a social *limit* (Simmel 1989) through which inhabitants of Sarajevo distinguish themselves from the rural world. Sarajevo is constantly represented as the "real" city through discursive strategies that stress urbanity as a desirable value. On the other hand, Istočno Sarajevo is conceived as an anonymous and uninteresting place, striving to be perceived as a new city, but it still remains a village. In my interlocutors' narrations, the creation of parallel institutions is often interpreted as an attempt to show off such an artificial urban identity.

"Before the war Istočno wasn't even a city, but now more people live there, and they have built a lot of buildings. They have their institutions, their offices and also a new university. But for me, considering the number of population, I don't see the necessity of building a new university, we already have it here in Sarajevo. There are not that many students, so it doesn't make much sense, unless you want to show that you have your city with your services and things like that. They pretend to be a city, but it is still a village for me" (S., Sarajevo).

Such representations and discursive practices highlight the extent to which the divisive power of the boundary is constantly reinforced. Relational bonds with people living on the other side are almost inexistent, as Istočno Sarajevo is generally excluded from the *frame* (Goffman 1974) within which social and spatial practices take place. As such, the boundary exerts its sociological function of distinction (Cella 2006), and spatial separation becomes a tool of in-group recognition and out-group contraposition.

Istočno Sarajevo: reproducing the urban life-style

Spatial and relational practices carried out on a daily basis show the extent to which Istočno Sarajevo has been progressively redefined as the home place. This aspect appears particularly relevant, since a large portion of the inhabitants formerly lived in Sarajevo. As I will argue, for them the new settlement coincided with the rebuilding of a new sense of belonging and a progressive detachment from their birthplace.

Inhabitants' daily interaction and discursive practices contribute to provide the context with a strong identitarian connotation that fosters a new sense of belonging. As such, Istočno Sarajevo is represented and experienced by its inhabitants as a city, rather than the eastern side of a divided urban system; as I will show below, people produce and negotiate new meanings through the re-spatialization of daily practices typical of urban lifestyle.

In the last ten years, Istočno Sarajevo has been provided with a growing supply of services and structures, such as schools and a university, a hospital and a new sport centre currently under construction. Thus, the opportunity to enjoy proximity has limited the inhabitants' necessity to go to Sarajevo for basic needs or leisure time activities. Indeed, without giving the impression of a real city, but rather of a suburban area still developing, and without having any historical location that fosters the aesthetic value of the place, Istočno Sarajevo offers all the services and structures that individuals could need on a daily basis.

Despite the suburban feature of the environment and the absence of a proper old town centre, its central area offers bars and restaurants as well as clubs; their spatial proximity gives the impression of being in a quite populated place, and the place reproduces a sort of urban atmosphere, where people enjoy their leisure time meeting friends. People walking down the streets or sitting in bars and restaurants contribute to provide space with a specific meaning: through their daily social interaction inhabitants negotiate and elaborate a collective representation of that spatial context as the *centre* of a *city* (Field note, 14.05.2012).

Istočno Sarajevo is also provided with a university, and many students spend most of their time without ever going to Sarajevo. The central area is located only a few minutes' walk from the institution, so it is quite usual to join friends in some bar after classes. The university also offers a dormitory for students, providing further occasions to socialize and spend time together. In students' daily life Sarajevo does not represent a particularly attractive place.

"In Sarajevo I don't know anyone, and if I want to go out I don't know the places. Here my friends are always around, it is a small place but I like it, for example you can always meet someone from your university" (S., Istočno Sarajevo).

"We have pubs and clubs here, too. There is no point to go to Sarajevo. I never go. It's not because I don't want to go, but I have my friends here, so it is better" (L., Istočno Sarajevo).

Among adults, a representation of Istočno Sarajevo as the home place emerges as well. Even people who have jobs in Sarajevo and usually experience the city as their simple working place, and at the end of the day they *come home.* They rarely maintain relational connections, and social bonds are quite scarce across the boundary.

"Sarajevo is the capital city, it has cultural events, it is connected to all the other parts of the world […]. In Sarajevo you can go to cinema, theatre, to concerts. I

work there, and I go everyday, but then it's nice to come home in Istočno, because it is a quiet place and you have everything you need" (D., Istočno Sarajevo).

"I go to Sarajevo everyday during the week because of my work, but during my spare time I prefer to stay home. I don't have many friends there, because I only go for my job, so during the week-end I usually stay with my family and friends in Istočno" (V., Istočno Sarajevo).

The progressive provision of services and structures in Istočno Sarajevo has influenced the residents' experience of space, encouraging new spatial practices and fostering a lifestyle typical of urban environments rather than rural or suburban contexts. Through daily social interaction, inhabitants have rebuilt a new sense of belonging, simultaneously developing an emotional detachment from the other side of the boundary (Field note, 18.05.2012). Going to Sarajevo is usually conceived as a practice related to particular necessities, rather than a periodic occasion to spend leisure time. Istočno Sarajevo has progressively acquired a proper status of city for its inhabitants, therefore discourses of urban-rural division produced by residents of the other side appear radically contradicted.

"I don't like Sarajevo that much. It is too chaotic for me, so I never go, unless I really have to. Here you have everything you need, for you and your family: schools, sport centers, and so on" (J., Istočno Sarajevo).

The detachment expressed by people born in Sarajevo and resettled on the other side of the boundary further confirms this interpretation. Sarajevo is commonly represented and described as a place to go mainly for utility purposes, while the emotional bond to it is often minimized (Field note, 26.09.2011).

In this sense, discursive strategies of former inhabitants of Sarajevo highlight how the new context is represented and redefined as the new urban place. The emphasis involved in stressing a such new sense of belonging goes in parallel with a gradually developed emotional distance from Sarajevo, which is often represented in quite anonymous and detached terms.

"I was born in Sarajevo, but since I moved here I go there very rarely. My family lives here, my kids go to school here, I have my job. I like it here, I almost never go to Sarajevo […] I've never thought of moving back, it would not make sense for me" (M., Istočno Sarajevo).

"Sarajevo is ok, it has a lot to offer. But here it's ok as well. Ten years ago this place was not a town, but now it's developing more and more. Maybe it's not like Sarajevo, but it's becoming more efficient for people living here, and for me it's a nice place" (O., Istočno Sarajevo).

"I was born in Sarajevo, but I was pretty young when we moved, so I don't remember much. Sometimes I go with my friends if there is some special event, like a concert or something like that, but I don't go that often, so I don't have any favourite place" (S., Istočno Sarajevo).

As such representations show, Istočno Sarajevo is conceivable as an autonomous city not only in institutional and functional terms. The way in which people experience places and attach collective meanings to them contribute to fostering a new sense of belonging that makes Istočno Sarajevo a *city* for its inhabitants— including the ones who were born in Sarajevo—and reflect a progressive detachment from the other side of the boundary.

Urbanity is generally represented as a desirable value and a tool of distinction by inhabitants of both sides; on the other hand, people experience and perform their urban lifestyle in different spatial contexts, fostering a reciprocal sense of extraneousness and detachment.

Like Sarajevo, Istočno Sarajevo represents the new and separated *frame* (Goffman 1974) both in spatial and social terms, within which people negotiate and elaborate their representations and interpretation of reality.

Conclusions

The empirical findings discussed in this paper proved how the presence of the boundary has progressively lost its emotional burden for inhabitants of both sides. On the other hand, the fact that the crossing experience has become a much more common practice does not directly imply a renovated social exchange among individuals. Rather, the divisive power of the separation is now exerted through less visible but equally affective dynamics that foster a mutual feeling of extraneousness and detachment between residents of Sarajevo and Istočno Sarajevo.

The functional configuration of the two spatial contexts contributed to shape daily practices of space use in different ways. In addition to the boundary, which is commonly crossed without concern, the autonomous development of the two sides has also progressively fostered diverging spatial experiences. In particular, the growing provision of services in Istočno Sarajevo has allowed inhabitants to enjoy proximity, shifting the main reference from Sarajevo to the new spatial context. Furthermore, the presence of the boundary contributed to fostering different senses of belonging which are experienced in spatial terms.

The most significant element involved as a tool of self-definition and distinction is represented by discursive strategies and practices that stress the urban-rural division. Spatial practices and representations prove that urbanity is conceived as a desirable value by residents of both sides; nevertheless, the different spatializations of daily practices and the different productions of meanings elaborated by the inhabitants reflect a parallel dynamic in which people across the boundary develop their own sense of belonging and cohesion simultaneously neglecting the counterpart.

On the one hand, people in Sarajevo compare the other side to a rural village where they go very rarely and only for utility reasons. They do not have any

relational connections across the boundary, and the place is excluded from what they conceive as their city. On the other hand, Istočno Sarajevo reflects the creation *ex novo* of a new community, provided with a new spatial reference within which daily activities are carried out, social bonds are strengthened, and a new connection with home is fostered. People in Istočno Sarajevo experience and represent space as the home place, carrying out practices peculiar to an urban lifestyle and experiencing the context as a proper city. Interaction on a daily basis contributes to shape the spatial context and its public spaces in *urban* terms. Therefore, from a peripheral suburb Istočno Sarajevo is transformed into a proper city by the social and spatial practices of its inhabitants. While Istočno Sarajevo has functionally developed as a separated urban system, its inhabitants have progressively redefined and negotiated a new sense of belonging and cohesion. Sarajevo is then conceived as another city, and even the people who were born there have lost their emotional ties to it. On the other hand, people in Sarajevo have assisted to this process with indifference and detachment, employing the separation as a spatial reference to celebrate their urban identity in opposition to the counterpart's rural character.

As such, it is possible to argue that the territorial separation resulted in the creation of two cities, rather than in the existence of a divided one. Indeed, Sarajevo and Istočno Sarajevo represent two separated urban systems not only in institutional and functional terms, but primarily in people's representations. Moreover, the unproblematic circulation of people does not imply a renovated social exchange and encounter, as the divisive power still affects inhabitants in a less noticeable way. Indeed, the diminishing of mutual distrust and bitterness does not reflect the achievement of a definitive reconciliation and social mixture, but rather an indifferent acceptance of the status quo where the counterpart is neither openly refused, nor included, but rather ignored. Therefore, such a scenario entails a less visible but long-lasting and radical social division.

Within such a context, the risk of a new episode of violence or social and political strain is probably lower than in other divided cities; nevertheless, the worst implication of such a situation lies in the profound and probably definitive transformation of the context in a doubled and parallel social environment where people have progressively learnt to ignore each other even when sharing the same space. By looking at Sarajevo, the lesson we can learn is that the absence of the physical elements of separation is not sufficient to restore social encounters and exchange. In general terms territorial separation imposed as a solution to inter-group violence entails long-lasting consequences which are much harder to remove than physical barriers.

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Identity Spaces

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Abstract. Social space and identity are specifically connected. The formation of identity as a process of identification can be closely related to the space where it takes place. However, it leads to the creation of symbolic spaces instead of always adopting established ones. Identity spaces as well as the places for change or resistance are spaces creating alternate social orderings. In this essay, I intend to focus on continuities and departures related to the space involving the formation of identity. On the other hand, space identity and its community buildings, its organizational role and level will be presented through the examination of a youth subculture.

Keywords: identity, place, individualization, young people.

Introduction

Identity is not only achieved through identification with groups of individuals who share a common outlook, but also through recognizable performative repertoires that are expressive and embodied. Ritual processes, such as rites of passage pilgrimages, through which new identities are created, stress the importance of the spatiality of performance in the process of identity formation, and can be taken as a model for contemporary expressive identities. In the case of small-scale societies that much of the anthropological literature is originally set out to describe, rituals involving transgressions can take place without endangering the order of these societies, because the low level of social differentiation means that such transgressions, when organized through rites of passage in distinctly demarcated liminal zones, serve to reproduce the daily life of those societies, rather than endanger it. Such spaces, "heterotopia" as Foucault (1986) calls them, serve the purpose of providing a distinctive place in which social structures are challenged by the communities of intensely affective forms of sociality in order that the structure of rules, norms and accepted social identities may be renewed and reproduced.

The integration of identity is more than the identificatory performance of childhood. Identity is the increasing convincement about the evidence of the

individual's self-identity corresponding with the identity and continuity he suggests (Erikson 1997, 37). Thus the formation of identity can be considered as a long interiorizing process (Buda 1986, 140; Kelemen 1981, 106; Mérei 1989, 248). Through the interiorizing process, the personality is exposed to different conflicts and imbalance that should be interpreted and processed by the individual so that he/she can develop. Consequently, the development of individuals go through three important phases full of contradictions: the level of personalization, the level of socialization, respectively, the level of individualization (Kelemen 1981, 110). All three phases are vital in the age of adolescence when, besides the learning of gender roles and the realization of community expectations, inner control more and more prevails. The values of the individual are closely related to his/her orientation as well as the sphere of interests and the motivation system choosing role models and lifestyles in accordance with them. The process of self-identification is called the crisis of identity when through an experimental period the testing of different gender roles, behaviour types, ideologies and orientations are approved by the society (Atkinson 1995, 376).

Self-identity should be based on self-esteem that is formed and developed through a long learning process affected by expectations of parents, school and workplace as well as age groups (Mérei 1989, 228). The rewarding value of how to live up to the expectations influences the choice of the individual in case of conflicts, and young people tend to comply with the expectations of the age groups (McCandless 1976, 145–176). The values of age groups play an important role in the formation of the ideology of young people, truly reflected by their means of identification and cultural consumption (Vidra 2006, 29–30).

The role of the environment

The *Image of the City* (Lynch 1960) was a source of inspiration for behavioural geographers throughout the 1960s and 1970s. They picked up on the 'mental maps' which Lynch's researches had solicited from the residents of three North American cities. Although Lynch admitted that his interviewees were hardly representative, geographers were excited by the idea that the environment was acted on, not in terms of its physical reality, but in terms of the mental pictures that people had built up of that environment. People did not live in the city as such, but inside the mental picture that they had built up of the city. Lynch uses a wealth of information, derived essentially from anthropology and psychology to describe the tremendous adaptability of human beings to their environments, but also their ability to give meaning to those environments and to change them. Lynch describes also the ways in which different people survive in extremely hostile or disorientating environments (e.g., deserts, jungles, ice fields, etc.), and

even in such conditions they are able to shape these environments. The evidence demonstrates, he argues, that there is a two-way process between the observer and the observed in building 'the image' of the environment (Lynch 1960, 4–53).

While there is no direct link between any physical environment and the systems of thought that people used to get around and make use of (urban) space, Lynch suggests that there are common features: first, these systems of orientation are both emotional and practical, they make people feel safe and enable their survival; second, they are generalized, coherent and selective; and third, they relate to the body – not just in term of what is seen, heard and felt, but also in terms of body needs.

The development of social and personal identity can be considered as a much complex, multidimensional process. Place identity consists of a lot of emotions, cognitions and bonds of belonging connected to the place where the person lives. This cognitive structure allows the person to recognize the properties of environments, and helps the perception of environmental stability and environmental safety. People may describe and determine themselves on the basis of their belonging to different places, and this way it becomes a component of our personal identity (Casakin and Bernardo 2012, 36).

Identity means being able to identify a feature (i.e. identity means the object's difference from other objects), while structure means the object's spatial relationship or pattern in relation to others. Meanwhile, the object has meaning for the observer, whether this meaning is practical or emotional. Despite Lynch's avowed and repeated aim of building cities for enjoyment, he retreats from analyzing the meaning of the basic elements of the cityscape, concentrating instead on identity (difference) and structure (spatial relationships) (Pile 1996, 220).

Self, expressive identities

The cultural relativity of concepts of the self is by now widely recognized among sociologists. Beyond this, however, there are different theories about just what concept of personhood is indeed characteristic to different eras and/or cultures. And when we move to theories about precisely what the 'contemporary' or 'western' (or, alternatively, the 'modern' or 'postmodern') sense of self/identity essentially comprises, it starts getting highly controversial (Mackay 1993, 98). One such theory envisages non-western and non-industrial cultures as essentially holistic or collective, contrasting with the rational and individualistic concept of the self in the modern industrial West, a view enunciated by Mauss among many others. This has long been an influential model. It is, however, now under challenge. First, it is held to invoke outdated evolutionary and ethnocentric views of human history (a criticism I would strongly endorse). In addition, there

is the argument that some concept of individual personhood is in fact found very widely rather than confined to the West (Carrithers, Collins and Lukes 1985, Cohen 1994). An alternative, partly overlapping, theory has proposed that there is a particular sense of fragmentation of the self in western countries in the 1990s. The suggestion is that people are nowadays especially concerned to make and remake identities, which are more fleeting, fragile and perhaps illusory because of the fragmentation of contemporary ideas and institutions. Some theorists, notably Giddens (1991), develop this further. Giddens builds on his view of 'late modernity' as characterized by risk, uncertainty and rupture, to suggest that a parallel characteristic is the development of the self as a 'reflexive project' with revisable narratives of self-identity, as individuals negotiate their lifestyles among a diversity of individual options: a self-identity has to be created and more or less continually reordered against the backdrop of shifting experiences of day-to-day life and the fragmenting tendencies of modern institutions.

Expressive identities are not only associated with the formalistic issues of the minority rights of activists or others that they wish to represent, but with the idea of the Other as a symbol of identification around which their own identities are expressed. First nation peoples, oppressed minorities and ethnic groups, those which cannot have a voice—such as animals or parts of the natural world that are subject to the uncaring instrumentalist practices of industry, science and agri-business—are all a source of identification through which these identities are expressed (Hetherington 1998, 71).

Talking about "identity" is as common as it is ambiguous. Based on social theories, identity can be grouped under three categories: human, social, and personal. Human identity means the way people see themselves and others. Personal identity can be said to be the one particular view of people that differentiates one person from the in-group of another (Gudykunst and Kim 1997), while social identity refers to the common (shared) views about in-groups (Udrea and Corbu 2011, 67).

Nowadays, within the process of constant change and reconfiguration of the political, economic and socio-cultural surrounding, the search for national and transnational identity has intensified. People within the states of Europe are challenged by a growing need to legitimize and redefine their identity as well as their position. Therefore, the academic debate on identity (in general) and on European identity (in particular) have become a topical subject for researchers in different fields. Researchers consider identity as a process subject to change, constructed and renegotiated in interactions when individuals try to emphasize the various layers of their identity at a time, choosing and oscillating between their multiple identifications. The existence of the Other allows humanity to be divided into at least two groups: one that represents the norm, the rule, and whose identity is valued, and another, defined by its faults, discriminated and

devalued. Consequently, other-ness and we-ness are two inseparable sides of the same aspect. The Other only exists in relation to the Self, and vice versa (Udrea 2011, 1–2).

Identity and cultural transformation

Identity formation occurs within communities, but in the late twentieth century the factors that shape identities increasingly transcend the boundaries of locale. As researchers use the term, identity refers to a person's sense of inclusion in (or exclusion from) a range of social roles and ways of being, both 'real' (those derived from lived experience) and 'imagined' (those encountered in realms beyond the everyday: tales, religious epics, mass media, etc.). As a person's frame of reference expands beyond the boundaries of his/her own lived experience, via such avenues as education, travel and consumption of mass media, categories of being multiply into a plethora of 'possible lives' desirable and abhorrent, attainable and out of reach (Liechty 1995, 166). Rather than seeing identity as a 'thing' I prefer a model in which a person may have many identities encompassing many ways of being, within and between which there is no necessary consistency or logic. Identities may be claimed or ascribed and hence can change depending on the extent of an individual's authority in any given social context. Identities may be lived or imagined; while some identities are daily manifested in such things as labour and gender roles, other identities may never be actualized, yet exist in the imagination as potentialities or desired ways of being. Identity formations are never stable; they constantly change as people move through life cycles or through cultural landscapes in which they encounter (and must learn to function in) institutions and social relations based on a variety of social values and epistemic frames. Identity formation is a process and identity formations are always 'in the making' as subjects move through time and space (Pearce 1996, 7).

The self is a phenomenon of the human mind based on reflexive actions, stemming from a person's interactions with others. The self consists of two components: the "I" and the "me" (Mead 1934). The "I" (or subject) is the dynamic and spontaneous aspect of the self that constitutes the individual as knower and actor. The "me" (or object) is all the learned perspectives. Identities based on role relationships are the most central in the theories that stress internalization of identity meaning into the self-structure. Role-identity can be defined as a social position a person holds in a larger social structure. Identities can be based on perceived membership in a socially meaningful category (e.g., Arab or American) or on actual membership in a bounded, interconnected social group (Owens, Robinson, Smith-Lovin 2010, 479–480).

Individualization

The idea behind the hypothesis of individualization of lifestyles is that traditional socio-economic factors increasingly lose their significance in the choice of lifestyle: the choice becomes ever more personal. Fornas has attempted here as much as possible to base his discussion on lifestyles rather than on socio-economic factors, in order to give this hypothesis a chance. However, his analysis is limited by the fact that it covers a short period of time: the empirical material he has utilized extends from 1986 to 1991. In relation to the sorts of enormous changes addressed by the individualization thesis, this is doubtless unsatisfactory, but also difficult to do anything about. The analysis he offers can at least provide a certain amount of knowledge about the situation at present. Looking at the material from 1991, it is clear that the traditional structures live on. The probability that a young person from the working class will become a regular theatregoer is much lower than it is for someone from the cultural middle class. However, it should be recalled that the existing connections are not stronger than the fact that the differences within the respective classes are greater than the similarities. The various lifestyle orientations must be considered open: youth with similar orientations do not all come from the same backgrounds. The structures are in no way determining (Fornas and Bolin 1995, 138). If we add the material from 1986, one anticipates changes during this five-year period. Wholly in line with the individualization hypothesis, one expects the traditional socio-economic factors' significance in the choice of lifestyle to have weakened. However, the changes are not particularly great. The greatest difference is that the relationship to TV among the less and highly educated and among the working class and cultural middle class seems to be more similar. The distaste of the well-educated for more vulgar entertainment is no longer so total. These tendencies are not entirely clear; other studies have pointed in another direction. But the tendency does not in itself seem wholly unreasonable in the light of, among other things, changes in what TV has on offer. Thus, the hypothesis about augmented individualization during recent years is not strongly supported by the empirical material. The prerequisites for choosing lifestyles are still quite structured. If the possibilities for movements in social space and in the lifestyle field are increasing, then they are doing so relatively slowly. All this, of course, does not mean that the hypothesis is wrong, but Fornas' analysis suggests that it cannot be taken as read. Are there no changes in the lifestyle field? It may be so that young people still choose their lifestyles in accord with what other young people with corresponding positions in the social space do. But it is interesting that leisure seems increasingly heterogeneous. Young people have diverse leisure styles, and differences in style increase with age (Fornas and Bolin 1995, 138-139).

Young people tend to have more leisure time in all societies than adults, which is a key for the structuring of their later life course transitions. Many

researchers considered the expansion of youth leisure time activities as a positive development. Early studies connected different leisure activities to the social background, while others documented how young women occupy the space at home listening to music and reading, while males tend to spend more time away from home. Young people have occupied more and more of the public places by their leisure time activities, however, the number of young people choosing home-based free-time activities, such as watching TV or surfing Internet, is on the increase (Cieslik and Simpson 2013, 61–63).Media have held a considerable and growing place in the social environment of industrial society in recent decades (Arnett 1995; Dubow, Huessmann and Greenwood, 2006), creating a new world of social communications that transcends traditional boundaries of time and space, creating new paths for social relations, affecting lifestyles, socialization, and communication processes and the construction of identity itself.

The formation of the Self is a central part of the socialization process. Identity implies both resonance and difference; it is the result of a process which allows the individual to feel part of a social group and be recognized, and, at the same time, to understand themselves as someone unique.

Studies focus on identity formation in young people across multiple media contexts, in general, and on the influence of digital contexts on youth identity construction, in particular. These analyses explore the way in which the Internet is a place for youth and adolescents searching for their identity and the impact of interpersonal relationships and digital media use on adolescents' Self (Pattaro 2015, 308).

Youth and adolescents are engaged in complex processes of identity work to locate themselves in social worlds that are predominantly defined by school, family and peers. It is clear, however, that this process is not just about the experience in the sphere of everyday life, but also involves the interaction with new media.

## Group identities: the generation of the shopping malls

The identity forming, community organizing influence of local and public spaces is evident, especially amongst the youth. The peer group spaces definitely influence the adolescent identity formation during everyday life. In the context of our empirical research, the aim of the questionnaire survey was mainly to explore if in the life of those questioned the shopping mall appears as a leisure-recreational-social-cultural place, and if so, how they can be described. Furthermore, we wondered which factors of the background variables (family, leisure, media, pocket-money, friends, living space,, demographics, etc.) influence significantly the plaza-use assumed by us. We take the Budapest secondary school students

as the basic multitude for the sample; the total sample consisted of 289 persons. Our investigations show that the socializing, identification function of shopping centers—as places for leisure activities—is built on value-cores produced as a result of primary socialization playing a role in the socialization of youth as a secondary factor. In accordance with this correlation system, the "success" of primary socialization determines value, norm and model mediation of secondary socialization. The value world of plazas, being a manipulative and cherishing illusion, is only risky for youth if a stable value basis is not developed in them in the course of former socialization by means of which they can differentiate the reality from fiction and the true value from that which doesn't even exist. On the other hand, if the routes of former socialization "functioned" well, young people are "capable of creating reality in this dream-like world" and excellently enjoy themselves within it. Consequently, establishments contribute to the socialization of youth when using plazas "in this kind of way of rational character." These establishments have the most obvious socializing function in the process of becoming consumers. Youth can be socialized by plazas to spend the leisure time intelligently and fully, connecting with each other ("everything in one place" principle), which can be implemented in a safe, pleasant, cultural environment. We assume, that if the plaza-use is involved in the leisure culture of youth so consciously, its socializing role will continue to influence also the leaisure of the adulthood. On the other hand, centers have specified behaviour rules, shopping malls are not just places for coming together, but they are used and practiced in specific ways. Thus, youth are aware of the fact that spending leisure time in malls, is also one of the forms of social activities andits formal framework is determined by specific social behaviour models. Therefore, the dimension of socialization appears on the level of social skills. Youth can acquire social behaviour forms (courting, making contacts, etc), trying to play different roles (Vidra 2006).

According to our research, most adolescents enjoy listening to music (29 persons), playing on computers (17 persons), watching TV/DVDs (10 persons) or just "sitting in a café" (6 persons) in the company of friends as daily activities (Graph 1.).

About 48 persons out of the interviewees sit in a café at least once a week with friends, while 35 persons listen to music, 32 persons play computer games, and 28 persons watch movies. It is obvious that adolescents hardly ever attend classical music concerts or theatre plays, and other forms of consuming "deep culture" are less typical among them (museums/exhibitions/cinemas). Mall attendance is equally valued in the case of those visiting shopping centers once a week and in the case of those who are doing so more times a week. Leisure time activities performed once or twice per month reflected figures according to presumption/expectations. It is obvious, however, that activities related to shopping malls

are the most favoured ones (multiplex cinema: 35 persons; sitting in a café: 26 persons; doing the shopping: 26 persons), but the mere activity of "plaza-going" is also quite popular (22 persons).

Graph 1. *Time proportion of leisure time activities performed in the company of friends*

"The WestEnd is quite a good place to be, both in terms of its architecture and its appearance. It's modern and really nice. I think WestEnd fits in with its environment. I can't explain it. There is a wider space, a wider latitude and I can feel more free. After all, the sun can shine into the fourth floor, the inner space is bigger and you can walk longer there."

"I mostly go to Duna Plaza. It is the closest mall to go, anyway. I don't really like travelling, so it is the most comfortable for me to go there. That's why I chose it."

These figures are followed by the data on other free time activities: watching TV/DVDs (21 persons), going on trips (15 persons), listening to music (13 persons), and playing computer games (11 persons). As stated above, classical music concerts, cinemas, museums, or exhibitions are rarely visited by young people (Vidra 2006, 83).

Conclusion

Identity is also about spatiality. In part, this means that identity involves the identification with particular places, whether local or national. It also means that certain spaces act as sites for the performance of identity. I am interested in both of these. Through the creation of spaces as special, safe, comfortable, useful or violent environments, young people constructed, confirmed and changed aspects of their identity. These places simultaneously offered young people resources for constructing identities.

The socializing functions of the shopping malls can be perceived as *environmental factors* which strongly influence the staying of youth in shopping centers. The mall is a trendy place and has some environmental elements which are in accordance with the lifestyle of youth; on the other hand, it provides an excellent venue for socialization. Experiences of "I like being here" and "I like this place" arising in them considerably depend on the complex entirety of these factors. The main results of the research on the environmental factors of shopping centers were that they proved the emotional "excitement" and this then influenced positively the length of time spent there. People spend more time in shopping malls when they perceive this environment as a pleasant, interesting, exciting place (Wakefield and Baker 1998). For the youth it is important that the place to be spectacular, exciting, colourful; it should be rich in information and should allow the easy and fast information processing. Once they like this place, they will spend good and pleasant time there. Thus, one of the most important tasks of the managers of shopping centers is to initiate studies and surveys in order to identify those environmental factors which have an influence on experiencing this place pleasantly. As young people spend quite a lot of time in these centers, sellers have to take their active attendance into account. When planning establishments, the demand of this age-group should be taken into consideration, and their design should be done to be exciting and attractive for young people (Taylor and Cosenza 2002). "Place-theories" in the field of anthropology, communication studies and architecture are important viewpoints for connecting places to human activities. Such theories show that interactions, meanings, memories and identifications are formed during the course of place use. Although malls create an artificial world that often seems to be sterile, in the view of the youth they unambiguously become important places. They play a role in the formation and mediation of identity, and are functioning as sites for social interactions.

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Dilemmas in the Legal Treatment of the Status of People Living with Disabilities

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Abstract. The legal treatment of disability affairs carries in itself an inherent contradiction due to the nature of modern society and free-market economy. On the one hand, both the historically developed notions of essentialism and, on the other, the particular-functional definition of manhood drawing its roots from the established democratic order and market economics are present simultaneously. However, within the current order of things there is an unbridgeable divide between them. Nevertheless, with the progression of time there is a slow gradual shift discernible away from the functional definition with the parallel strengthening of the essentialist approach. This shift is further exaggerated by the more widespread acceptance of the rights of self-determination and the provision of opportunities for the disabled, the emergence of social self-determination in case of a population subgroup living under special conditions. For the proper interpretation of the currents in the evolution of legal treatment of disabled people it would be indispensable to institute a proper social-discourse analysis, which, however, exceeds in scope its narrowly defined task.

Keywords: disabilities, social dilemmas, legal questions, integration strategies.

Introduction

In the legal treatment of the condition of people living with disabilities we can find an inherent contradiction. As a result of social progress the individual is viewed as a distinct and unique being, however, its definition does not extend beyond a social-utilitarian approach. Therefore, the legal treatment of disabilities does not aim to support the realization of the fullness of life for all individuals, it merely delineates those segments that have direct relevance to the proper functioning of society. From a legal point of view the entire issue of disability affairs is characterized by the dichotomy between man as an individual for its own ends and self-realization and as a socially relevant and valuable building block of society.

The ontological basis of this duality is found in modern society and free-market economy which for Marx (1948, 43–159) meant the differentiation between the use-value and value of a commodity. Use-value is the actual utility of a thing, whereas value in itself is some kind of quantitative property, the amount of labour required for its reproduction, which only gains its true importance when put into actual use in the social organism. In brief, the commodity both as a quality and as a quantity is present. The same duality appears in Georg Simmel (1973; 2004, 108–154) as the contrast between hypothetical value and the individuality of objects. He arrives at the notion that money, as measure of value, terminates uniqueness. Thus, what has utility for the whole society in its uniqueness is valuable only to the particular individual. As long as quantity is socially important, quality tends to be irrelevant and only manifests any measure of importance if combined with quantity that is with value or social utility.

Certainly, it is not insinuated that prior to the advent of capitalism society did not extricate itself of those elements that had no utility or could not be integrated into its fabric (Foucault 2004). However, it was with the dawn of pluralistic democracy and modern-day capitalism that the now prevalent utilitarian approach to social organization and the concomitant social welfare and public health services, which ingrained in the daily discourse the categories of socially valuable and useless; the distinction between those worthy and unworthy to receive care. The entire conceptual understanding of disability affairs, its institutional system and necessarily its legal treatment is based on the division between valuable and redundant individuals, individuals fulfilling socially useful functions but sacrificing their independence, and the self-serving type, which nevertheless demonstrates a more multifaceted characteristics.

The examination of the legal treatment of people living with disabilities must exceed the mere enumeration of the pertaining laws and regulations. All the progress achieved in this area is the result of a continuous struggle and compromise among the groups involved, which often have rather diverse narrow interests. This determines conflicts, in the sense that in a particular situation what are assumed to be the most advantageous or at least acceptable requirements for social integration from the viewpoint of the disadvantaged group is not always applicable in practice. It is inescapable not to have a divergence between the attributes of people living with disabilities as human beings and the assumed criteria for social utility. Social discourse, i.e. Foucault's (1991) discourse theory settles the extent to which the disabled should be helped to either attain their full human potential or positively contribute to the fulfilment of actual social needs as a consequence of the support received. Therefore, in addition to the detailed listing of the attained rights, the analysis of the legal framework of the decision-making mechanism pertaining to disability affairs is also necessary, as it may shed light on the opportunities the disabled may have not only to be subjects of

but genuine contributors to the decisions directly affecting them. As part of the proposed study, there should be a discourse analysis examining the topics that the various involved parties employ during the various stages of the disability related legislative processes, e.g. the public parliamentary and media debate on the National Programme of Disability Affairs; however, the detailed treatment of this topic far exceeds the scope of the current paper.

The root problem of the legal treatment of disability affairs

In the legal treatment of the condition of people living with disabilities one primary problem needs to be overcome by every legislative body. On the one hand, in western civilization (Huntington 1998) the developing individualistic value system and the notion of equality emerging from the old system's feudal privileges, and the ideal of complete equally as enumerated in the Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen consider individuals strictly qualitatively, or view man in an *essentialist* model. On the other hand, the profit-oriented logic of capitalism favours a functionalist criterion, whereby the individual must serve as a productive member of society, meaning he/she should actively contribute to or at least not hinder the smooth functioning of the profit driven social-economic-political system; this is seen as the *utilitarian or functionalist* view of man. The area of disabilities may be one of the major flashpoints between the ideologically motivated and profit oriented philosophies; the disabled are entitled to the same rights as the non-disabled members of society, however, their integration into mainstream society due to their presumed "uselessness" requires the outlay of substantial social and material resources. The principle of equality demands that any society should attempt to remedy the outstanding disadvantages, but it does not necessarily mean that it attempts to transform disabled people into socially valuable members for its own benefit. As we lack any semblance of an eternal human essence, what should be applied to all members of society is the opportunity of self-realization, though personal aspirations may go far beyond what is considered as socially conducive in a particular society. Compensation for disadvantages suffered must come with the provision of opportunities to live a full life, which necessarily requires integration, in other words, in any age in any given society "useful" functions must be found for the disabled, though by doing so the essentialist model may be compromised.

The approach to equal treatment and equal opportunities must necessarily entail that in a viable social setting the peculiar conditions of the disabled are only remedied with a functional goal in mind, with results that are beneficial to the entire community. However, such an approach naturally sacrifices a measure of the ideals and expectations the disabled may have concerning what perfect human life may theoretically entail.

When examining the legal treatment of this area, it is apparent that only a general framework system is present, the wording of the particular laws and regulations is broad enough to be applicable to each individual case. Still, the logic behind such legislation is not simply its wide applicability, but also its usefulness as a tool for the realization of the profit-oriented philosophy of capitalism. The dreams, expectations, and desires, though can be viewed as social constructs, nevertheless constitute some form of human essence as a concrete historical totality, which often cannot fit into functionalist utilitarian benefit-oriented systems. There is a simultaneous need to provide accessibility to the disabled, as they are full-fledged human beings, but also to expend resources for such goals only when the attendant benefits are observable for the entire social organism. The primary goal of the legal treatment of disabilities is the simultaneous attainment of inherent human fullness and completeness, valuable for the capitalist system. Such duality necessarily leads to theoretical declarations of equality for the disabled, nevertheless, in practice a wide array of obstacles appears as soon as facing assumedly "worthless" cases or disabilities, which cannot be remedied through integration. In practice the target is not to help the disabled to achieve their inherent self-actualization, but only the attainment of a functionalist or integrated human existence. Human beings as self-defined measures of value, essentialism, and as socially valuable units, utilitarianism or functionalism, do not necessarily overlap; furthermore, due to the limited amount of available resources the latter becomes more dominant in normal practice. Any social endeavour beyond this narrow scope is viewed as untenable. The criteria for social "utility" are defined through a dialogue among the various actors involved. The four primary factors characterizing this discourse are: 1. basic human rights (core values); 2. the profit-driven nature of capitalism (the reinvestment of the highest possible share of profits); 3. the basic attitude of individuals toward the profit-driven lifestyle for possession and gain; and 4. "dysfunctional" values and demands which may appear during the operation of the system and considered to be a hindrance to its operation. Society handles the "utilitarian" value of disabilities by having various agents (individuals, groups, expert organizations etc.) arguing their case and engaging in a discourse according to their specific values and agendas.

The complexity of this duality is well-represented in Act XXVI of 1998 on the rights and safeguarding of equal opportunities of disabled persons, which in Article 4 defines a person living with disabilities for the purposes of this Act as someone who does not at all or only partially possess his/her sense organs, especially sight, hearing, motor skills, and mental abilities. Furthermore, he/she may be debilitated in his/her communication skills, which results in an *enduring disadvantage in his/ her social interactions and active participation in social life.*

The wording of the act insinuates that exclusion from social life, baring active participation is a disadvantage affecting the individual. Thus, the impression is made that people living with disabilities can make the decision whether the lack

of active participation is indeed disadvantageous for them and, if so, since when and to what measure it is disadvantageous. With the 2007 amendment of the act on disabilities, the valid criticism was made that the President of the Republic in the previously adopted legislation, while acknowledging its merits, considered the 2010 and subsequently the 2013 final deadline for the realization of the target of the act as too distant and the resources to be allocated for it inadequate, and proposed a shorter deadline and higher budget outlays. It seems that there is a persistent dichotomy between the listed goals and the available resources; however, it is also apparent that the definitions are adjusted to the actual possibilities and there is a discourse between the Parliament and the government on one pole, and the President of the Republic on the other. Unfortunately, the affected disabled people by and large seem to be excluded from the process. With the adoption of Act LXII of 2013 the pertinent article defines more clearly the rights of people living with disabilities, and the important terms employed are better enumerated as well.

Therefore, one of the central questions of every study should be the analysis of the interaction between the disabled and their representative advocacy groups and between such organizations and the public or state decision-making bodies. The major issue is to what measure the *disabled have the legal and institutional means and opportunities to realize their own goals*. It must be emphasized that the assumed self-interests are also social constructs, which are generated by society itself, which is both democratic and capitalistic, thus any aspirations also necessarily trace their roots to capitalism. There are two major possible points of contention between the self-interests and the publicly recognized legitimate expectations. First, when the public expense for remedying the special conditions of the disabled is deemed excessive; in the negotiation process concerning the price, the affected are completely left out or are involved in a limited fashion. Second, when the socially generated demands of the disabled run contrary to social utility. Regrettably, this latter conflict is impossible to resolve. The previously mentioned general human needs, from an analytical angle, can be actualized as the disabled's very own requirement; concurrently, the question of inquiry should be whether this own demand is able to articulate itself and, if so, with what chances of conversion into actual legislation or regulations.

Consequently, the legal treatment of disability affairs in Hungary has three main vantage points:

1. the opportunities the current treatment of disability affairs offers to the disabled to become "active members in social life," or the steps taken to offer equal opportunities with the non-disabled to become valuable members of society, which are the essential points of legal rights concerning disabilities;

2. the type of conflicts (advocacy groups, aims, and divergent values), which are clearly discernible in the current laws and regulations in place (these form the subject of a separate study, here a mere few essential points are mentioned);

3. the opportunities the disabled have for self-organization, and whether these bodies are able to—and to what extent they are able to—articulate and realize their own agendas; the level of involvement they demonstrate in decision-making or its delegation to other bodies, the system of demand articulation and its legal treatment.[1]

The legal treatment of disability rights. International treaties and conventions

Among international treaties, the primary legal foundation of disability affairs rests on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Optional Protocol,[2] which was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 December, 2006 in New York, and entered into Hungarian law as Act XCII of 2007.

The Convention solves with ingenious simplicity the contradiction between universal human rights (essentialism) and social usefulness (utilitarianism, functionalism) when it states in the Preamble that: "h) Recognizing also that discrimination against any person on the basis of disability is a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person." At the same place it is stated that "e) Recognizing that disability is an evolving concept and that disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others;" thus approaching disabilities from functionalist angle.

However, first it declares the following:

"a) Recalling the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations which recognize the inherent dignity and worth and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

b) Recognizing that the United Nations, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights has proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind," (…) which is an essentialist interpretation of human rights.

In the already mentioned Paragraph h) of the Preamble, disabilities are linked with the "inherent dignity and worth of the human person" while at the same time they are also seen as barriers that hinder full and effective participation in society. Unless the same opportunities are extended to the disabled for participation in the life of societies or the persisting disadvantages are not remedied, thus

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1   The study is based on legislation in force as of 30 September, 2012 (Komplex Jogtár).
2   Came into force on 3 May, 2008.

discrimination based on disabilities endangers the "inherent dignity and worth of the human person." The rectification of the condition stemming from disabilities therefore is to ensure human dignity and value. As a consequence, one's "inherent dignity and worth" acquires a functionalist meaning, which is realized with one's "full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others."

Achievements of European Community Law. Council Directive 2000/78/EC about equal treatment

Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 – establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. In its Preamble sets down the principles for the treatment of disabled people:

Paragraph 6 recognizes the importance of combating every form of discrimination, including the need to take appropriate action for the social and economic integration of elderly and disabled people.

Paragraphs 11-12 assess that discrimination based on "[…] disability […] may undermine the achievement of […] the attainment of a high level of employment and social protection, raising the standard of living and the quality of life, economic and social cohesion and solidarity, and the free movement of persons."

Paragraph 16 contends that "the provision of measures to accommodate the needs of disabled people […] plays an important role in combating discrimination on grounds of disability."

Paragraph 20: "[…] effective and practical measures to adapt the workplace to the disability, for example adapting premises and equipment, patterns of working time, the distribution of tasks or the provision of training or integration resources.

Paragraph 23 contends that in very limited circumstances, a difference of treatment may be justified where a characteristic related "to […] disability constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, when the objective is legitimate and requirement is proportionate."

According to Paragraph 26, the prohibition of discrimination should be without prejudice to the maintenance or adoption of measures intended to prevent or compensate for disadvantages suffered by a group of persons of […] a disability […] and such measures may permit organisations of persons of a […] disability […] where their main object is the promotion of special needs of those persons.

Paragraph 27 contends that in its Recommendation 86/379/EEK of 24 July, 1986 […] the Council established a guideline framework setting out examples of positive action to promote the employment and training of disabled people. In its Resolution of 17 June, 1999 affirmed the importance of giving specific attention *inter alia* to recruitment, retention, training and lifelong learning with regard to disabled persons.

Paragraph 29 sustains that persons who have been subject to discrimination based on […] disability […] should have adequate means of legal protection. To provide a more effective level of protection, associations or legal entities should also be empowered to engage in proceedings […].

Paragraph 31 proclaims that the burden of proof must shift back to the respondent when evidence of […] discrimination is found. The text aims to negate the effects of discrimination in employment to promote social and economic integration. Furthermore, it calls for a high level of social protection, the elevation of the standards of living, the improvement of the quality of life, economic and social cohesion and solidarity with exclusion to be averted even outside the workplace, as well as the provision of freedom of movement. Such wide array of complexity covers every facet of social life and is in complete accord with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Optional Protocol adopted by the General Assembly on 13 December, 2006 in New York which entered into Hungarian law as Act XCII of 2007, which defines discrimination based on disability as an offense against the "inherent dignity and worth of the human person."

Council Directive 2000/78/EC introduces the divergence between the terms *direct* and *indirect discrimination* in Article 2, Paragraph 2, sections a) and b), where it states that direct discrimination "shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation […]"; whereas indirect discrimination "shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral, provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a particular […] disability […] at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons."

Article 5 specifically mentions protection against unfair treatment of disabled people to "guarantee compliance with the principle of equal treatment in relation to persons with disabilities […] This means that employers shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or to undergo training, unless such measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer. This burden shall not be disproportionate when it is sufficiently remedied by measures existing within the framework of the disability policy of the Member State concerned." At first glance, the text seems reasonable as it requires from employers taking reasonable and appropriate measures, while simultaneously exempting them if such measures would impose a disproportionate burden on them. *The main point of contention is not the appropriate-disproportionate paradigm, rather the specific interests and bargaining positions of the various actors involved in its formulation.* Naturally, it is in the employers' interests to minimize their costs and burdens, while employees aim to maximize their remuneration and benefits. By stripping away the euphemistic formulas we are

left with the basic disagreement between labour and employers over profit-sharing or what portion of revenue above the overhead should be distributed among the employees. Obviously, the position of the employers in this intercourse is much stronger than that of labour. *The emphasis on appropriate measures merely serves to disguise the essential cleavage between labour and capital.* The reference to the disability policies of the concerned Member States rests on the tenet of the state's neutrality, whereby it appears in the dialogue process seemingly as an equal partner with the involved parties; however, the state's bargaining position far exceeds that of both labour's and capital's.

To somewhat offset this, Paragraph 26 of the Preamble declares that disabled people may organize themselves, thus fulfilling in theory the principle of equality. Nevertheless, it does not elaborate on the actual power relations from which it is prevented by the fear of nullifying the basic legal principles of modern societies based on free-market capitalism.

For settling disputes, the Directive mentions in Article 13 the process of the "dialogue between social partners." The text, by using the term "social," admits the existence of conflicting sides, but it fails to elaborate on what methods it deems fit to qualify to be applied during this "dialogue." In Paragraph 1 it mentions appropriate workplace practices including strike action while in Paragraph 2 it proposes the conclusion of agreements at the appropriate levels. In Paragraph 14 it emphasizes dialogue with appropriate non-governmental organizations, thereby including in the fight against discrimination such advocacy groups that have legitimate interests; naturally, the term legitimate is rather difficult to define.

In general, the Council Directive on equal treatment unequivocally fulfils the formal criteria for equality and recommends making actual decisions in the framework of social dialogues through the negotiation of all involved sides, while noting their uneven bargaining powers.

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Dr. Bubó and his Clients.[1] Drug Use and Policy in Hungary from the 1970s through the 1990s. Translating Health in Doctor-Patient Relationships

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Abstract. This paper is based on archive materials, newspaper articles and oral history interviews connected to drug using habits in Hungary during the socialist period. Drug use in the socialist era was treated as a police matter, and therefore they did not create establishments for prevention, cure and rehabilitation. In the socialist era the roots of the drug use phenomenon were considered to be in the 1968 movements, in the student riots and in the newly appearing hippy lifestyle. The drugs were not only absent in public and political discourse (except a few small reports which aimed to stigmatize specific groups or individuals), but also in the area of public politics—there was no public policy that would deal with this issue. The methods for drug rehabilitation were very similar to the alcoholics' rehabilitation where they tended to address the physical addiction before everything else. After the system change, the drug using habits totally changed.

Keywords: drug use habits, Hungary, socialist period, 1980s, oral history interviews with clients.

Introduction

This paper is set out to describe the translation and transfer of knowledge in medical cultures of prevention in Hungary during the 1970s and 1980s. The leader of this research project was József Rácz and the project concerned the history of drug using habits in Hungary during the socialist period. We collected archive materials, newspaper articles and we made oral history interviews with doctors and clients. The results of the research were published in 2014 (Bajzáth, Tóth and Rácz 2014).

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1   During the socialist period there was a very popular Hungarian cartoon: Doctor Bubo. One episode of this film was about drug use.

On the one hand, my cultural analysis is based on my oral history interviews, which were realized with doctors and drug user patients from the 1970s and 1980s. I have made interviews with doctors about medical treatment and the methodology of therapy. I aim to show the other side: I have interviewed patients and I will analyze their opinions and discourses about therapy.

Other sources of my analysis are archive materials and newspaper reports about drug using habits at that time. In order to understand health and prevention as travelling concepts, I will emphasize doctors' and patients' concepts about drugs in the socialist period.

The first archive report about drug users was written by dr. Ödön Kisszékelyi. He was a psychiatrist and worked in a hospital for policemen. In the middle of the 1970s, he brings the attention of the party leaders to the methods with which a group of young people from Budapest, consisting of about 70 members have been treated.

In Hungary the first death connected to drug use was reported in 1969. The victim was found with a plastic bag on his head, which made what had happened completely clear. We know from the archives that between 1970 and 1975 there were 75 drug related crime cases with 22 offenders. By the second half of the 1980s many people started drinking tea made out of poppy seed plants which had been brewed by young people at home from the plants that could be bought from florists. There was also the 'Polish heroin,' the so called 'compote.' The recipe originated from Polish tourists, and it could be learnt during a summer holiday at Lake Balaton.[2]

The methods for drug rehabilitation were very similar to the alcoholics' rehabilitation where they tended to address the physical addiction before everything else. (Barracks in the hospital on Róbert Károly Körút in Budapest). Drug rehabilitation usually took place in mental institutions and took 6 months at the longest. By the middle of the 1980s, in the counties of Csongrád and Baranya drug centres had been created where they provided day care and longer term hospital treatments as well. In those days underage drug users were looked after by local social advisers in milder cases and by mental institutions in more serious cases. In the case of poisoning they were taken to the toxicology ward, and in the case of disturbed behaviour to the psychiatric ward.[3]

The drugs were not only absent in the public and political discourse (except a few small reports which aimed to stigmatize specific groups or individuals), but also in the area of public politics—there was no public policy that would deal with this issue.

Drug use in the socialist era was treated as a police matter, therefore they did not create establishments for prevention, cure and rehabilitation. In the socialist

2   Interview with P. K. 9. Sept. 2012.
3   Interview with G.I. 12. Jan. 2012.

era, the roots of the drug use phenomenon were considered to be in the 1968 movements, in the student riots and in the newly appearing hippy lifestyle.

The National Anti-alcoholic Commission established its team against intoxication in 1974. Partly as a consequence of the earlier mentioned report, the National Youth Commission made an order with the title 'Information and measures about glue sniffing.' In the 1978 Penal Code amendment the government used the expression "pathological drug abuse." Ödön Kisszékelyi defended his PhD dissertation in 1979 in the topic. During the last few years of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, 1.6-4% of the high school students consumed alcohol combined with medication, or sniffed glue. According to the research of Dr. Krisztina Lénárt, in 1980 13, in 1981 31, in 1982 50, in 1983 32, in 19984 54, and in 1985 46 people were convicted for drug related crimes. Krisztina Lénárt quotes the 1985 results of the Sociology Department of the University of Economics from Budapest. According to those results, out of 498 students 6% sniffed glue and 9.6% consumed alcohol combined with medication in Budapest.[4]

From the research of József Rácz and his colleagues we know that in the socialist era classic drugs like heroin, hashish, marijuana, cocaine and LSD could not get in the country, therefore, during the end 1960s, drug sniffing became widespread (Nagy and Lovass 1985). They sniffed glue with a plastic bag on their heads in order to improve their mood or alter their state of consciousness. From the beginning of the 1970s, the most popular drug was the medication called 'Parkán' among young people who were trying to get high. They drank alcohol after taking the tablets. The medication was originally designed to cure patients with Parkinson's disease. The young people who had taken 'Parkán' reported that after 2-4 tablets their walking became unstable, they had the sensation as if their feet had sunk into the ground, and were walking on a wobbly pavement. They were seeing tiny bugs around them and their surroundings seemed to had become weird. "There was the Romanian and the Hungarian Parkán, and the cooler ones used the Romanian medicine because it needed to be smuggled in the country and that immediately added to the romanticism of it. It was freaking strong otherwise and completely unpredictable," as somebody recalled his/her memories in a spontaneous e-mail. Once there were stricter rules for prescribing Parkán from the beginning of the 1980s, they started combining alcohol with codeine derivatives, and from the mid 80s drinking poppy seed tea or injecting hydrocodine intravenously became popular.

People recalled how they could get hold of prescription drugs. "I learned it from Narkó-blues how to mix Coderit and Noxyron....this was the 'cocktail.' In our circles it was four rits with one noxi. It beat by far all the fantastic synthetic drugs of today. And there were some infamous chemists where they would hand out

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4   http://www.archivnet.hu/hetkoznapok/fiatalok_es_a_kabitoszer_az_1970es_evek_budapestjen.html

anything for even the most embarrassing potato print prescriptions. By the second half of the eighties you had to travel across the country to find such chemists. I still stick to my statement that the Aranybika chemist's mixtura pectoralis in Debrecen was like the Tokaji among wines in the sea of legal drugs in Hungary."

One of my people had an unprompted comment in which he emphasized that glue sniffing had been a common thing to do, and with the end of communism, as classic drugs appeared, it took a back seat, though sparsely it is still around. Drug sniffing and consuming alcohol with medications were supposed to be connected to the bum lifestyle and young panhandlers in the subways, according to the contemporary official discourse.

"The real lowlifes sniffed glue. I lived in Kőbánya, so I knew quite a few of them, but it was a different kind of world, and I only met them at concerts and festivals. The Gypsy guys would rather drink alcohol, spirits mostly, and we 'hippies' smoked weed and used medicines. The 'we' mostly meant high school students usually with the lifestyle of the lower middle class from apartments of the suburbs or smaller towns and boarding school students. The two or three years older guys from the city who were better off than us and had become alters and art punks would rather use medicines, but they would mostly choose to shoot themselves up with hydrocodaine or morphine," as recalled by somebody in an e-mail.

Another person emphasized that he had used drugs as escapism from the lower middle class lifestyle. He first used Parkán with apple cider, and in the 1980s he switched to poppy seed tea which was offered to him first by Polish students at Lake Balaton. He summarized his views in the following way: "I was revolted by the emptiness and hypocrisy of the philistine lifestyle. The fellow rolls out of bed in the morning, works hard for eight straight hours, has a drink, eats, mates and eventually the top of the coffin closes above him, and within a week nobody remembers him, that he was messing around in this vale of tears for 70-80 years."

Some of the drug users connect their drug experiences ideologically to the hippy movement. They talked about movies which had made a huge impression on them. A few of them mentioned the Milos Forman films, 'Hair' and 'Taking off.' "The examples came from films and books. I learned to smoke weed, which was not banned at the time and there was plenty around, mostly from the Forman film 'Taking off.' I remember when I first watched 'Hair.' It was a cult film for us. Sometimes on rainy days we watched it three times by the Lake Balaton. Somebody got hold of the West German version on VHS. It sounded horrific. We took loads of them to East Germany for the fellows. It was very welcome there, but in those days anywhere we went in Eastern Europe it was popular. As we saw it, we were the Eastern European hippy movement with our standard delay. Once at the east side of the Brandenburg Gate, where 15-20 of us were sitting around, a Soviet pioneer group came by. The teacher showed them the Gate, the Wall, the Reichstag, the whatever, and eventually she energetically pointed at us and said

'i eta hippi.' Another time, at the flower carnival in Debrecen about a hundred of us slept at the railway station."

Dr. Géza Szeles, the head of the Humanity Youth Protection Association, talked in a 'Magyar Narancs' interview in 1996 about the ways in which the habits of drug use and the drug using communities changed after the end of communism: "The drug users' society was a familiar, closed community. It was difficult to get into it or to get in trouble. They used opium, poppy seed tea, drank alcohol with Noxiron and medications, and there was a huge wave of popularity of taking Parkán. Drug users in those days looked after each other, which is something respectable. When somebody overdosed, the other person looked after him/her and called the doctor if it was necessary. There was a really close togetherness that also involved the dealers. It is different today. Drug dealing has become an industry. The drug dealer does not care if this is your first or one hundredth time. He will not explain to you how to use it and will not pay attention to what is going to happen to you. He is interested in one thing only. If you have a hundred thousand Forints and you want Ecstasy for it, then you are going to get it."

The big change in drug use was not at the end of communism but at the beginning of the 90s when the Albanian dealers appeared and started selling heroin and the Polish speed started coming into the country, then later first the Hungarian, then the Dutch speed. Physician Sándor Funk described the dramatic change in an interview. It was so quick that one week he was treating poppy seed tea patients, and the next week heroin users knocked on his door. The first substitution therapy attempts took place in 1989 in the Klapka street drug clinic (with Dr. István Cserne's supervision), where they used codeine and dehydrocodeine derivatives (hydrocodeine drops, 0,02g codeinum hydrochloricum tablets). From 1992, a steadily growing number of people asked for treatment against long standing heroin addiction, which meant such a huge number of patients that it was not possible to treat them in the few existing hospitals, clinics and rehabilitation treatments anymore. At the end of the 1990s long term methadone treatment was introduced and it resulted in a growing numbers of drug clinics and church community services.

Someone's memories from the mid 1980s (Sándor Bajzáth)

"My first encounter with drugs? In those days I used to go to Felszabadulás square, 'Felszab,' which is called Ferenciek square now. That's where hippies, punks and other rebellious blokes gathered then, and I was very attracted to these people. I wanted to belong among them because I had never really found where I belonged. I was always kind of an outsider and an insider at the same time. I knew them, but not really, and I went to the parties with them, but for me it was an empty experience…

After high school I met the girl who I really started to take drugs with. It was huge love at first sight. She was clean when we met, but she had been using drugs previously. I only found out about this later on. We had been together for weeks when she started it again. She disappeared for the whole weekend, and she did not tell me where she had gone. Next time she said that she had met her girlfriend and the girl's boyfriend. Then she told me how things really were, that she goes to Budakeszi where this girl and her boyfriend live, and they actually take drugs there. Next weekend I went with them, and that is when I first figured that some people use drugs intravenously. They shot themselves up straight in front of me, and I had to hold my girlfriend's arm while she was shooting up, and I felt like fainting. I did not try it out at the time because the fear was stronger in me. In my girlfriend, the whole madness started again. She got hold of some gear, but this time on her own. I tried it with her for the first time. My curiosity was stronger this time. Those days everybody used a medicine called 'Hydrocodaine' intravenously. In the 80s this was the most popular drug with opiate in it, and I had started on this one as well.

The first dose proved to be too big. She shot me up with as much as she used, but of course she had been using it for a while, and even though it started well, and the flash came, it was getting stronger and stronger. First it was good, but then I started to feel shitty, nearly fainted, my pulse went up, my blood pressure was in the sky, I saw yellow patches, I was scared of dying. I was throwing up all night, I had a terrible headache, my face was swollen up and I swore that I would never do it again. But next day, as I got better, my curiosity proved to be stronger, and I tried it again. This time my girlfriend shot me up with the optimal amount of Hydro (the nickname of Hydrocodaine at the time). And that DID IT!!! That intoxicatingly tingly feeling crawled up inside me as if I was being prodded with a million lustful needles, and afterwards that endless peace. As if I had been waiting for this feeling forever. The cog joined my imachinery that had been going wrong. Suddenly everything made sense. Even though I wouldn't be an addict in the physical sense for quite a while, psychologically I became the addict of the FEELING from that prod. Obviously, I thought I would only use it occasionally, when I WANT TO. Still, from that time on my fate was written. I was counting the days until I would allow myself to use it again, because I still thought that I would keep things under control… And the 15-year journey started."

This person was an active drug user for 15 years. His recovery (after many hospital rehabilitations, a 7-year methadone course and many police cases) is/ was based on rehabilitation and afterwards going to a 12-step self-help group on a regular basis. This 12-step group is the Narcotics Anonymous. Those who attend are anonym drug addicts who have been having meetings in Hungary from the 1990s, in Budapest and Pécs daily by now, following the philosophy of Alcoholic Anonymous. Those who accept the program of Narcotics Anonymous gather

regularly in self-help groups to give themselves a chance with regular meetings, helping each other, belonging to a group and sharing their experience to achieve long lasting (or even lifelong) recovery.

Conclusion

Drug use in the Socialist era was treated as a police matter, and therefore they did not create establishments for prevention, cure and rehabilitation. In the socialist era the roots of the drug use phenomenon were considered to be in the 1968 movements, in the student riots and in the newly appearing hippy lifestyle. The drugs were not only absent in the public and political discourse (except a few small reports which aimed to stigmatize specific groups or individuals), but also in the area of public politics—there was no public policy that would deal with this issue. The methods for drug rehabilitation were very similar to the alcoholics' rehabilitation where they tended to address the physical addiction before everything else. There was, for example, a ward in the hospital on Róbert Károly Körút for dealing with the problem. Ödön Kisszékelyi, using the Polish example, urged the use of new treatment methods, like organizing group activities for the addicts. There were 36 deaths in the first five months of 1985 in Budapest purely because of glue sniffing. The fight against drug abuse became a health policy issue with the 37th article of the 1972 Health Act. After the system change, the drug using habits totally changed.

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