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EXTRAORDINARY SITUATIONS, EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE REGENERATIVE PROJECTS OF THE HUNGARIAN RADICAL RIGHT

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Abstract:

This article provides an example in which the historical method is used as a tool to define and study the ideology of the radical right. It does this by using Hungary as a case-study and explores the questions of continuity, core ideas, and inner logic of radical right wing discourses. The vehicle is a diachronic comparison of regenerative planning in the interwar and contemporary period, concentrating on the main themes of ideological content. The article shows an interesting amount of commonalities between the thought patterns of the interwar and the contemporary radical right wing in Hungary.

Keywords: ideology, radical right, fascism, Jobbik, Arrowcross Party, Hungary

1. Introduction

The resurgence of the radical right in contemporary Hungary seems to echo a European trend of “renationalization” and Euro-skepticism. The question arises: what connection, if any, to similar past phenomena do these extreme manifestations of nationalism have? Does this continuity provide basis for a general definition of radical right wing parties? Hungary has been, in many ways, a fertile home for the development of radical right wing political phenomena. It may therefore be considered to be the perfect test-subject for political theorizing on the subject. The matured development of radical right wing politics may allow for a detailed study. The article shall attempt to draw the reader’s attention toward two issues: the continuity and consistency of certain core elements within the discourse of the Hungarian radical right, and an analysis of its contents, in order to reveal the successful parts. The vehicle for this analysis shall be a comparison of the two evolutionary poles of the radical right wing political planning: the regenerative plans concocted by ideologues in the interwar period, and today’s Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary. I attempt to succinctly unpack the message contained within these most basic of materials, directed at the voting masses. The article argues that the two periods touch upon the same basic issues, specifically the need of a certain part of the Hungarian voter for an alternate projection of the future.

The existing scholarship has approached the topic varying degrees of success. A considerable amount of research exists on the political history of both interwar, and

the post-1989 Hungarian radical right. Historians such as Karsai László,¹ and Romsics Ignác² have treated the subject of the interwar manifestations of the extreme right, while political scientists such as Andras Bozoki³, and anthropologists such as Laszlo Kurti have explored the topic for the 1990-2000 period. Their efforts are laudable, both for giving good accounts of the activities of these parties and movements, and also their style of politics. The phenomena of populist politics and political discourse has been well-explored and presented. Populism, however, may be adequately defined as a *style* of political argumentation, not an ideology *per se*. Very little has been written about the ideological content of the radical right wing movements, which would highlight their specificities or the reason for their success. Moreover, there are no academic attempts which would draw a diachronic comparison, or tackle the question of historic continuity.

This article is organized in three sections. The first section discusses the theoretical framework and presents the key concepts. The second section is the largest and includes the comparative analysis between the radical right in the past and in contemporary Hungary. The conclusions synthesize the findings of the article and discuss directions for further research.

2. Theoretical Framework

The studies concerning extreme right parties and movements of the last two decades have produced a plethora of theories on the nature of the extreme right. The number of scholars and the varied scientific and national contexts from which they hail has resulted in a multiplicity of means of studying the phenomena. The very terms of "extreme right" (Cas Mudde and Piero Ignazi⁴), "radical right" (Herbert Kitschelt⁵), "fascism" (Griffin, Eatwell), "neo-Fascism" have become at times rivals, and at times interchangeable, according to theoretical and methodological approaches, and political contexts.

1 László Karsai, *Ferenc Szálasi, chef du mouvement des Croix fléchées hongrois (1897-1946)*, in Traian Sandu (ed.), *Vers en profil convergent des fascismes? : "nouveau consensus" et religion politique en Europe centrale*, (Paris : L'Harmattan, 2010); Karsai László, *The radical right in Hungary*, in Sabrina Ramet, *The radical right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989* (University Park, Pa. : Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1999).

2 Ignác Romsics (ed.), *A magyar jobboldali hagyomány (The Hungarian right-wing tradition)* (Budapest: Osiris, 2009).

3 Andras Bozoki, *Modernisation and Nationalism*, in Leslie C. Eliason and Bogh Sorensen, *Fascism, liberalism, and social democracy in Central Europe : past and present* (Oxford: Aarhus University Press, 2002); Andras Bozoki, *An outline of three populisms: The United States, Argentina and Hungary*, (Budapest: CEU Press, 1994).

4 Piero Ignazi, *Extreme right parties in Western Europe* (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2003).

5 Herbert Kitschelt, *The radical right in Western Europe : a comparative analysis* (Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1995).

The traditional way of studying or defining radical right parties or movements was to define them through a single feature, identified as central to the parties' identities. Usually, this feature was an extreme apprehension of the national community, or some sort of variant of this: racism, ultra-nationalism, xenophobia, anti-immigration policies, and so forth. It was understood that this was the central element to the parties' policies and encapsulated the message which they wanted to transmit toward the voting public; or in another way, the feature with which they attempted to market themselves and set themselves apart from the rest on the political scene. Since this approach did not yield a good understanding of the dynamics of radical right parties and did not explain much, it was soon replaced by what can be termed the "checklist" method. This school, more refined than the first, operated on the correct assumption that the core of a party's beliefs or existence cannot be summarized by a single element, even if it be it central to their discourse.

Working within this checklist method scholars such as Hartmann⁶ proceeded to put together lists of elements, linked together in particular logic, which would best express the nature of the radical right. Elements such as nationalism, populism in socio-economic affairs and anti-democracy were identified by Macridis⁷ and Falter and Schumann⁸. The problem with this approach is that it is fairly vulnerable to criticism from the comparative school. These theories are highly dependent on the set of data and on the objects they study; for example, studies of Eastern and East-Central European radical right wing parties oftentimes cannot fit well into these checklists. There is also the question of what the exact minimum is for features necessary to define (even for heuristic use) a party as belonging to the radical right. If, for example, a party is pro law and order, nationalist, and socially conservative, but not opposed to democracy and immigration, can it be called radical right?

Mudde suggested a new approach, adapting the term "party families" for the radical right and creating the concept of the "extreme right party family". This placement of radical right wing parties within the larger space of "political families" allows for more attention to be given to specific national and spatial contexts within which the respective parties or movements actually exist. Moreover, the parties themselves do not have to strictly correspond to a number of requirements, or contain the rigorous list of ingredients which would suggest "extremism". Mudde's "extreme right party family" is centered around one ideological core, made up of a set of "consensual" elements: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and

6 Ulrich Hartmann, *Rechtsextremismus bei Jugendlichen. Anregungen, der wachsender Gefahr entgegenzuwirken*, (Munich, 1985).

7 Ray C. Macridis, *Contemporary Political Ideologies: Movements and Regimes* (Glennview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989).

8 Jürgen W. Falter and Siegfried Schumann, "Affinity towards right-wing extremism in Western Europe", *West European Politics*, no. 11:2, 1988, 96–110.

the strong state⁹. Mudde also added welfare chauvinism and a belief in law and order as further possible sub-elements¹⁰. The author distinguishes between two sub-groups within the “family” of radical right wing parties: the ethnic and the state nationalist Right. They are divided according to their ideological specificities, owing to historical proximity to the pre-1945 period. Mudde’s scheme represents a departure from the previous theoretical approaches to the topic of radical right wing parties, as he attempts to analyze them through their ideologies, and contends that while variable and corresponding to national contexts, they share a common ideological core.

However, his blueprint of the core of right-wing extremism does not accurately address the question of continuity, his studies concentrating, as they do, on what he has deemed “the third wave” of the phenomena. His blend of the ideological elements stated above, or at least some combination of a part of them, is rather loose. It does not explain the inner logic with which these elements are combined or what (perceived) socio-political needs the radical right wing seems to address. Both the continuity question and the matter of the inner logic can be dealt with by adapting Mudde’s conclusions (the existence of an ideological core, consisting of the combination of the above-mentioned parts) and supplementing them with a concept of fascism borrowed from the intellectual history of interwar political thought. Roger Eatwell’s thesis, built on the combination of rising political legitimacy of the extreme right and a growing personal efficacy and declining trust in the system,¹¹ put forward a meta-historical theorem which could be applied to past and present cases. It is especially this last part, declining trust in the power of the political-economic system to provide for the needs of the people, which is in common with the theory of another British historian, Roger Griffin. Griffin’s definition of fascism, as a form of palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism¹², contains the key to develop a scheme in which to address the issue of continuity and inner logic. The British historian explains the term of palingenesis as a total revolution of state, economics, and society, from the legislative through to the cultural level. He develops this idea further by adding to it the concept of liminoid society¹³. In this state, a part of society which supports the extreme right, perceives itself as being on the brink of great change.

This change may be positive or negative depending on political action; feelings of being besieged and threatened abound. It is my contention that these two concepts

9 Mudde, *The ideology of the extreme right* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 16.

10 *Ibid.*, 179.

11 Roger Eatwell, *Ten theories of the extreme right*, in Peter Merkl, Leonard Weinberg, *Right-wing extremism in the 21st century* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 64.

12 Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991).

13 Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

may provide a better heuristic guide for the study of the ideological core of radical right wing parties. They also address the meta-historical nature of the extreme right, providing a general theorem of what they are and were. I believe that both past and present manifestations of the extreme right contain these basic elements. The case-study of such past and present manifestations of the Hungarian radical right, scrutinized through the Griffinian lens, may provide interesting evidence in favor of the existence of a historical core of ideology. Within the scheme provided by Griffin, I have identified two implicit suggestions: the existence of a common understanding of history (the forces of change, evolution, and decay) and a shared bestiary (forces opposed to the interests of the national community). They are more or less common for the interwar and contemporary periods and exhibit a common logic. A diachronic comparative study, therefore, is the best means to showcase them.

The Key Concepts

The methodology of the proposed presentation shall be formed by a dual comparative nexus, both historical and contextual. I shall utilize the already mentioned theorem of generic fascism of Roger Griffin as a heuristic tool, and define the subject as populist ultra-nationalism bent on regenerating the national community¹⁴, thereby limiting the subject-matter. The supporters of radical right wing projects shall be defined as imagining society as *liminoid*, in Griffin's terms¹⁵ (on the verge of change or disaster). I argue that the Hungarian radical right (and the radical right, in general) feeds on a certain set of apprehensions, which it tries to seed and maximize. These perceptions, more specifically, have to do with how one perceives himself, his society and the large community he is part of. I argue that radical right wing thought fosters an understanding of the world in which the individual, in his/her present state, is threatened.

The threat can come at many levels, economic, social, identity, but typically all at once. Therefore, the reaction of the individual is pushed to respond to this growing danger by swift and radical means. Only this radical response shall elicit the awaited solution of the situation and the return to the desired state of ideal existence, or in the worst case, the resumption of normalcy. Societies in which the radical right is successful have a proclivity for perceiving the world in such a manner, and the radical right, once it has gained enough clout, may add to this feeling. The radical right achieves this result via its political strategies and its discursive products such as electoral programs.

14 Roger Griffin, *The nature of Fascism*.

15 Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism. The sense of a beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*, (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

3. The Radical Right over Time

Perusing Michael Freeden's methodology¹⁶, I attempt to broadly outline the discursive-conceptual world of the Hungarian extreme right. Freeden's scheme is as follows: political language is made up of a number of voluntarily-shared key concepts, which help to make sense of an individual's perception of reality, and help him to maintain a communicative relationship with his peers. Among these, in the modern period, we can identify broad concepts (those related to politics, understood as social life) such as the state, society, and more recently, the nation. The meaning of each of these concepts is not fixed and they are in a continuous flux. This happens due to the fact that they are exposed to continuous processes of mental processing and eventual re-definition by individuals and groups. Inside any polity, communication and relationships of power are mediated by linguistic competition. Groups and individuals acquire and lose influence over the rest of society and impose their apprehension of certain terms. A grouping of such concepts in a specific manner may be defined as an ideology, according to Freeden.

Within the inter-conceptual competition, radical right wing projections of the future emerge as victorious when they succeed in convincing the public (the practitioners of the same political *langue*) of their interpretation of certain key concepts (the state, the nation, society and their organization). The specific manner in which they achieve this domination over certain parts of the public is through the mechanism of description, which is a commonality within their present and past manifestations. This mechanism is a rhetorical device, which orders the regenerative schemes according to the following scheme: past, present and future. Each of these ordering concepts is linked to a certain tonality in the positive or negative field. In the plans and programs of the extreme right this manner of thinking about their respective contexts is so widespread that it can be described as one of the main components of their ideological imagination. This distinct model of historicist philosophy is one of the main sources of identity for the adherents of the extreme right. Due to this particularism, the regenerative plans chosen for study read a little like a doctor's investigation sheet: they contain past references to health, present symptoms, and prescriptions for the patient's improvement.

The discourse of the extreme right, as related to society, attempts to convince the target audience that it is in a state of ill-being, which urgently requires correction. As we shall see, the concept of "health" versus that of "disease" are common terms within the political language of the radical right. For the moment, however, the chronological concepts shall be utilized to frame the study. The key concepts of ideology, such as the state, society and the nation (as per Freeden) shall be

16 Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theories: a Conceptual Approach*. (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

described and analyzed according to the extreme right planners' apprehensions towards their past, present and future states.

The specific successful features of past and present regenerative national projects of the extreme right shall be presented, detailed and compared. The key concepts within these will also be analyzed utilizing the comparative method, and then contextualized, leading to a more exact definition of the extreme right today. A specific ideal-type (in Weberian terms) shall aid in the work of policy makers, providing tools for theoretical modeling and political strategy.

To this end, I briefly present three salient examples of regenerative planning from the interwar period, and compare their main features and understanding of base concepts to those of the most significant representative of the Hungarian radical right, the Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary. The sources for this comparative study are the works of Szalasi Ferenc¹⁷ (and a short work of Malnasi Odon and Berzy Jozsef, based on Szalasi's writing)¹⁸, Matolcsy Matyas¹⁹ and Rattkay Radich Kalman²⁰, who may be considered the most forthright and detailed programmatic writers of their age. They were the main political ideologues between the most significant political manifestation of interwar Hungarian fascism, the Arrowcross Party. The authors from the interwar period gained significant success in the late 1930's at the head of their political formation, winning approximately a third of the votes in 1939²¹. Their party was the most significant opposition party in the second half of the decade, in a political system which was dominated by conservative right-wing political formations. The political climate of the past, is therefore, somewhat similar to the political climate in which Jobbik gained support, in the present.

Similarly, I use the political and electoral programs of Jobbik from their emergence in 2006 until 2010.²² Jobbik is the most important representative of the Hungarian

17 Ferenc Szálasi, *A magyar állam felépítésének terve. (The plan for the construction of the Hungarian state)*, (Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1933); Ferenc Szálasi, *Út és cél. (Way and Goal)*, (Rioja (Argentina): Imprenta Mercur, 1954).

18 József Berzy, *A Hungarista Állam (The Hungarist state)*, foreword by Ödön Málnási. (Budapest: f.e., 1938)

19 Mátyás Matolcsy, *Az új földreform munkaterve (The plan for the new land reform)*, (Budapest: Révai, 1935); Mátyás Matolcsy, *Harcom a földért (My war for land)*, (Budapest: Magyarság útja, 1939); Mátyás Matolcsy, *Föld, Nép, Élet (Land, People, Life)* (Budapest: Centrum, 1941).

20 Kálmán R. Ráttkay, *Modern országépítés (Modern State Building)*, (Budapest: Hajdú Dénes/Centrum, 1933)

21 István Deák, *Hungary*, in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, *The European right : a historical profile*, (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1974).

22 Jobbik Movement For a Better Hungary: 2010 electoral program, [database online]; available at http://www.jobbik.hu/rovatok/egyeb/letoltheto_a_jobbik_ep_valasztasi_programja, accessed on 2011.03.05.

radical right at the present, commanding roughly 15 to 20 percent of the Hungarian vote²³. Jobbik is presently the third most significant political party in Hungary, and the second most important opposition party in the Hungarian Parliament (with 47 deputies). Their party program represent the best synthesis of the main points of Jobbik's ideology, articulates their political message, and expresses the logic behind their rhetoric. The article shall explore the possibility of a single model of reasoning behind past and present manifestations of Hungarian radical right wing ideology, as seen through these most basic forms of political communication.

The chosen texts constitute the sources for a short content analysis. The texts illustrate the possibility of conceptual and theoretical continuity between the political language of old and new, but shall also highlight discontinuities. The diachronic shifts in the political speech of the radical right might be attributed to new challenges, but also to the conceptual mutations and ruptures in the general political language and context. The continuities are due not only to the active use of the models from the past as a reference point, but also to the possible similarities between discourses across time. With historically-minded practitioners of political language, the key to the interpretation of reality, and of present-day challenges, is their association to past challenges. This model may provide a possible interpretative frame for the continuity question. Summing up, the following sections draw a comparison between the discourse of the contemporary Hungarian radical right and its historic predecessor. The findings are summarized in Table 1.

The Past

The main characteristic of the past is its positive nature, with a few important exceptions. All of the expositions start off with a description of a glorious heritage, forgotten by most. This is closely linked to the term of "golden past", which is a mainstay of all linear modern apprehensions of time. The ideal quality of the past is often so axiomatic that it is only described briefly and understood as implicit. It is the constant counterpart of the description regarding the present state of affairs. The other important characteristic of these descriptions are the existence of two details: factors of decay and points of rupture within the historic heritage.

The most quirky picture of a golden past painted by the chosen authors is provided by Rattkay Radich Kalman. His apprehension starts off with an organicist, almost naturalist apprehension of society and individuals. He starts from a description of a forest provided by Austro-Hungarian botanist Raoul Heinrich France. The forest, in the words of the author "is a mixture between life and death, one providing for the other" and a world in "which each organism is forced to adapt"²⁴. This quiet struggle

23 Sonda-Ipsos opinion poll for December 2011, [database on-line]; available at <http://www.ipsos.hu/site/graph?type=2>, accessed on 2011.12.25.

24 Ráttkay, *Modern országepítés*, p. 13.

forms “a harmonic life” which “sacrifices freedom in exchange for harmony”. This example of the forest can be akin to that of all life, the author claims, and can provide a model for society. Indeed, he concludes, that as the forest, society is a “living organism”. The laws governing it are those of “evolution”. Rattkay uses this concept in the key of social Darwinism. The axiom of similarity to living organisms is basically flawed, as he claims the example provided by nature shows to any empiric observation. Therefore, men are not all created equal, but the concept of “difference” is crucial.

This system might seem chaotic, but Rattkay provides an alternative: a biological dialectic of struggle. This “organic” struggle provided harmony for life, and its avatars: political systems, societies and the like. Within themselves, they might be integrated, without any conflicts, generating positive evolution. The common struggle also provided progress, through continual improvement of the qualities of the competitors, inherited by generations. This mechanism, however quirky, belies the true nature of the past, as understood by the author: quiet, harmonic, ordered. When contrasted to the chaotic state of the present, it gives credence to the argument of Rattkay. This is a simple but efficient rhetoric device.

Szalasi Ferenc takes a similar view of the past, and the mechanism through which history moves forward. He speaks of three “totalities of the past”²⁵, the military, the church and the capital. The “totalities” can be translated as regimes or modes of socio-political organization. He was also a supporter of the idea of harmony and unity, a harmony that was present in the past, but somehow lost through the generations. The fascist leader also spoke in his work about the force which developed national history, also interpreting it in a dialectical manner. Dubbing it “social nationalism”, he saw the force of community as responsible for the great moments of success in the past. The “military totality” (a sort of ideal communion between bellicose original Hungarians and their chieftains) was an overall positive occurrence, and can be a valuable lesson and parts of its value-system may still be rescued for the present, Szalasi argues. The perfect, ordered understanding, and unity of interests between the nation and its leader was the model to be followed in the future. Once central authority was weakened, certain elements and social institutions such as the church took a wrong turn. He distinguished between the political aspect of organized religion and its political undertakings, which he did not approve of. Society, he argued, should be ordered for a successful evolution, and each different individual, social category must strictly adhere to its position, not struggle with each other for power.

Table 1: Main components of Hungarian radical discourse

Party	Extreme nationalism	Biological Racism	Opposition toward supranational entities	Desire to regenerate society/bring about radical future change	Past and present seen as decadent	Opposition toward capitalism, liberalism, leftism	Stance on democracy	Support for strong state	Support for law and order
Interwar parties	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Negative	Yes	Yes
Jobbik	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Positive	Yes	Yes

In Matolcsy's works there is little direct reference to the golden age specifically. This, however, does not preclude the idea since it is present implicitly when he makes references to the eras following that age. In all of his works, a certain linear scheme of history is present. It starts with feudalism, identified with slavery to land, then continues with the fusion between feudalism and capitalism.²⁶ Matolcsy, building on the works of Hungarian historian Szekfu Gyula, identifies this supposed collusion of aristocratic elements and immigrant Jewry, which resulted in Hungary's backward capitalist development, in which the common Hungarian became a slave to credit and money²⁷.

The sources and periods of decay are common in the work of all three authors: the onset of capitalism and the waves of Jewish migration to the country. The concept of capitalism frames this idea of decay, which is understood as a combination of many other terms. The loss of social and political liberties, monopolized economic interests, the onset of individualism and greed, in favor of spirituality and community spirit, the de-nationalization of the country, leading to great disasters are all common elements within their narratives. The point of no return is represented by the Trianon peace treaty, the greatest trial of the nation. It is the main and almost total point of rupture with the past.

The vision of the past of Jobbik can best be gleaned from its short 2006 electoral program, and the Bethlen Gabor Program they launched a year later, in 2007. They identify the pre-World War II era as the "period of Legal Hungarian Statality", and 1944 as the moment when it was interrupted. Their continuous references to pre-Trianon Hungary and historic Hungary when speaking of issues such as the status of the Hungarian minorities abroad seem to signify their identification of that period as the ideal state of the Hungarian society and politics. Most important are the repeated references to the interwar period. The interwar period is seen as a time of great trials and tribulations, on the one hand; on the other hand, however, the Horthy era is seen as a moral highpoint, an ordered period, and a time when the interests of the community perfectly coincided with those of the leading elites. Society marched in an orderly manner toward the goals of social peace, harmony and the reunification of the community, crucified at Trianon.

The Bethlen Gabor program quotes 1930's culture minister Klebelsberg Khuno, and it asks for symbolic acknowledgment of right-wing figures from the same period by giving them statues: Horthy Miklos, Teleki Pal, Wass Albert and Prohaszka Ottokar. Their view of history can also be gleaned by their demand that an institute for history of ancient Hungarian history on the thesis of Hun-Avar-Hungarian continuity be founded. The programs interpret key moments in history such as 1918, 1945 and

26 Matolcsy, *Föld, Nép, Élet*, 5.

27 Matolcsy, *Harcum a földért*, 57-60.

1990 (which “did not bring the changes the regime change promised²⁸”) in the same negative manner, as episodes of the continuous decay of Hungarian society and authority. They also represent periodic points of rupture with tradition, signals of the radicalization of the status of society.

The Present

A quote from Jobbik’s eponymous program from 2007 illustrates the interpretation given by the thinkers of the party for the present situation of their country and society:

Bethlen Gabor, faced by a country broken into three parts, Turkish dependency, and a blood-soaked international scene, still managed to create a Transylvanian Principality, important on the political scene, flowering on the economic, social and cultural fields, significant Europe-wide...This is why we chose Bethlen Gabor as our heavenly guardian.²⁹

The present is identified as “the last twenty years”, forming a category in the party’s 2010 electoral program. This category is used as a rhetoric tool, as a frame of negative reference, the backdrop against the party made its recommendations. There are two corresponding concepts to present and to possible future: to the former, chaos, and the latter, order.

The state is seen as an impotent actor, not fulfilling many of its primary roles, which are primarily paternalistic: job creation, social security, social justice, combating corruption, responsibilities for the Hungarian minorities abroad. The concept of the state in the program is a body to be “active and strong³⁰”. The meaning of these terms is apparent, when the program refers to the sphere of economics. The role of the state is fostering and protective, in front of an European and international community bent on globalization, profit, and crushing the strongholds of the national economy. The concept of a strong state is pinned and only makes sense in a nexus of concepts. The other three members of this nexus of concepts are danger, security and self-identity of the community. The concept of danger is embodied by the international community, here in its menacing economic facet, but also by internal weakness, which is a cause of outside influence. The concept of security is

28 Jobbik Movement For a Better Hungary: 2006 electoral program, [database on-line]; available at http://www.jobbik.hu/rovatok/egyeb/a_jobbik_2006-os_rovid_programja, last accessed on April 21, 2012.

29 Jobbik, Bethlen Gabor Program, Foreword, [database on-line]; available at http://www.jobbik.hu/sites/jobbik.hu/down/File/Bethlen_Gabor_program.pdf, last accessed on April 21, 2012.

30 Jobbik 2010 program, 8-9, [database on-line]; available at <http://www.jobbik.hu/sites/jobbik.hu/down/Jobbik-program2010OGY.pdf>, last accessed on September 5, 2011.

personified by the projection of a strong state, protective of its society, and countering the nocent influences of the outside world. The community and its identity represent the assets that are the subject of protection by the state, in danger from the outsiders³¹. They form the object of competition, a competition which if lost, in Jobbik's interpretation, will mean the extinguishing of the community itself. This joining of concepts, in this particular interpretation, come together to form an image of community akin to a besieged castle. The terms come together as an allegory, and repeat themselves throughout the texts, no matter the actual subject.

The role of the state as the main agent and vector of action is seen in the particular interpretation of society of Jobbik. One of the main roles of the state is to regulate society. The mechanisms of this regulation are social reforms, social protection, community protection and restoring order. This can be seen in the lofty title of the 2010 program, called "Radical Change. Jobbik's parliamentary election program for national self-determination and social justice"³². The concept of self-determination I shall leave for the discussion about the international community. The concept of social justice is understood primarily as a restoration of normalcy. This normal situation is understood in two ways: as the elimination of elements of present chaos but also addition of elements to build on the new order. The addition of new elements shall be left to the discussion about the future. The elements causing disorder and their elimination, however, regard the apprehension of the present as such. The main concept associated with this is corruption³³. Corruption has, in Jobbik's vision, invaded all tiers of state and society, and their modes of interaction (i.e. politics). Therefore, in all its main points, the program mentions the problem of corruption, as the main obstacle in front of a "better future". This corruption causes society to be unequal, unjust and weak. The symptoms of this injustice are the disproportionate means of those in power vis-à-vis the have-nots. Unemployment, a lack of job security, and the exploitation of employed workers³⁴ are areas in which society must improve through a more active regulation of this sector via the state. The role of the state in creating jobs is important, but it must also to oblige all to work.

The concept of handouts and aids is associated with that of a weak society, and a welfare state, which Jobbik clearly opposes. This already refers to the other problem of society and the state, which causes corruption: a systemic unbalance. The problem is caused by the socio-economic organization of state and society. The modes of organization of these are identified by Jobbik through two concepts,

31 *Ibid.*, 6.

32 *Ibid.*

33 *Ibid.*, 66.

34 *Ibid.*, 5.

capitalism³⁵ and (neo)liberalism³⁶. The apprehension towards these two are that they are the manifestation of the same phenomena, the first of its economic aspect and the second its socio-political aspect. The two are identified as being based on the same basic principle: individualism and greed. Since they are such identified, they breed corruption into the system of state, laws, and the community as such. They are the disease³⁷ that must be eliminated. The lack of physical security they cause (corruption, crime³⁸ and “gypsy criminality”) are a clear indicator of this.

The interwar figures of the extreme right were thinking in very similar terms. In the works of all the three authors chosen for study we can find the same interpretation of the relationship between state, society, economics, culture and their problems. Most strikingly, the concepts employed for ascribing guilt and identifying the symptoms of the ailment besetting state and society are the same. They are the twin demons of capitalism and liberalism. To these, interwar political thinkers add another element, communism (sometimes referred to as Marxism). This last element is not present in the contemporary repository of menaces described by Jobbik, but it can be found in its attitude towards the legacy of the recent past, where numerous references are made to communism³⁹, and also its understanding of the present day left-wing liberals.

The apprehension towards the liberal and capitalist present was overtly negative. The core of criticism directed against both had to do with what was perceived as the nucleus of the two: the definition of human nature in materialistic and not “spiritual” terms⁴⁰. Marxism (or communism, the terms being interchangeable in the political language of the interwar extreme right) is blamed for the same reason. The extreme right of the 1930’s defined man through his role in the community he was born into, and defined this community on the basis of the concept of the nation. The state itself was understood as the expression of the political will of the nation, while the community was equated with the nation. Social categories, political institutions, economics were all supposed to be ordered to best serve the interests, the survival and the thriving of the national community. The liberal and capitalist present was therefore criticized not only for the lack of efficiency in doing so, but also because it was perceived as working consciously against these ends. One of the main reasons for not fulfilling the needs of the nation was the lack of care for the common man. Szalasi Ferenc, in his programmatic works, argues that “in the greatest period of overproduction, how could the greatest misery set in”, and follows up with: “the

35 *ibid.*, 8.

36 *ibid.*, 5.

37 *ibid.*, 48.

38 *ibid.*, 64.

39 *ibid.*, 46, 48, 78, 86.

40 *Nemzet Szava*, nr. 76, November 3, 1932, 2-3; paper owned by Mesko Zoltan, interwar fascist figure close to Rattkay and the others mentioned in the text.

level of maturity of the economic vision of the liberal and capitalist system... is not greater than that of an old peasant hoarding his hard-earned money⁴¹". Also, he says about the Hungarian state and administration that: "the system and composition of the present small Hungary cannot tackle oncoming problems,...because it is based on a number of tenets that have outgrown their leases of life...⁴²".

Rattkay R. Kalman is even more manifest in his repudiation of liberal capitalism, saying:

The ethics of the man of the now-concluding system of liberal individualism was an individualist ethic, its motto being: I owe responsibility only to my own conscience. The ethics of the man of the new society should be social ethics, with the following motto: I am responsible toward the community at my every step [*in life n.a.*].⁴³

The social exploitation of the disenfranchised classes and the lack of adequate protection is most present in Matolcsy Matyas' works. Practically all of his oeuvre is dedicated to detailing this problem, and proposing radical means to correct it. His 1935 book, entitled *The Plan for a New Land Reform*, includes:

in the past...there was very little obstacle in the economic activity of man. This was the system of economic capitalism⁴⁴.."

...there has been very little done in order to improve the living conditions of the agrarian work force...if we have the opportunity to lift the millions of have-nots into the status of valuable members of the nation, it must be done, even if we must sacrifice much...⁴⁵

today, we see that every man is not only an individual, but beyond the individual, he is the cell of the nation and the race. And we believe that outside his personal life, within the living organism of the nation, man has a set of greater responsibilities.⁴⁶

That was the direction toward which Matolcsy sought to steer his state and society, still under the grip of the vices of the recent past. The exploitation of the peasantry was his case-study for proving that the present society was dysfunctional. In the works of all of the authors above, we may observe the same allegoric duality: the present state of society, economics et cetera equaled disorder. This was due to the very nature of the organization, which was thought of as having structural problems,

41 Ferenc Szalasi, *A magyar állam felepitesenek terve*, 12.

42 Ferenc Szalasi, *Cel es kovetelesek* (Budapest: Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1935), 15.

43 Ráttkay, *Modern Orszagepites*, 14.

44 Matolcsy, *Az uj foldreform munkaterve*, 9.

45 *Ibid.*, 12.

46 *Ibid.*, 13.

being based on an incorrect definition of the nature and purposes of man, society and its avatars (the state, its institutions). The lack of order and logic are symptoms of this ailment, as is the bad treatment of those who form the backbone of society: the common individuals. These are all elements of political speech, organized in a particular logic, which are common to both present and past manifestations of the Hungarian extreme right ideology. Both share the same view of the present, expressed through a common rhetoric apparatus. The image projected is one comprised of lack of security for the common man (exposed to both physical dangers and exploitation), a chaotic and rapacious administration, and a lack of vision and direction from those in power.

The Geopolitical Context and the International Community

"In the case of a Jobbik success at the polls, the party will enact the withdrawal of the country from the European Union, through plebiscites" the 2006 party program reads. Since then, the Jobbik has become the third largest Hungarian party in the European Parliament, and has joined the Euro-skeptic group. As the national community represents the source of identity for the radical right in the past and in the present, similarly, the international community served and serves as one of the main points of negative reference. This is one of the important aspects of the contemporary *weltanschauung* of the Hungarian extreme right.

The localization of this community in the mental map of the radical right-wingers was and is primarily Europe. The negative apprehension of the European community was embodied in the interwar period by the Versailles system. Its association with the tragedy of the Hungarian national community was straightforward, and the duality of Hungary's reluctant participation to this system was not lost on the public, whose negative apprehension of this system was actively cultivated. The main characteristics of the international (mostly European) community were its opposition with national interest, its support of big business and financial interest that were seen to be crippling the Hungarians. Its association with conspiratorial elements was prevalent, and its links to anti-Semitic sentiment commonplace. An alternative vision of this community emerged in the late 1930's, as Hitler's New World Order began to gain strength. It pushed forward a diametrically opposed vision of Europe, based on national empowerment (only of certain nations, chosen for their leadership qualities), and German geopolitical interests, which most thinkers accepted. Szalasi however, was more bold in his schemes and imagined a racial buildup of the European order in which a "connationalist" organization would rule, and Hungary would be one of the leaders.

The place that the Versailles system and the League of Nations occupied in the past, is presently taken up by the European Union and NATO. While the relationship toward the latter is ambiguous, the opposition toward the EU is outspoken. A new

concept has also entered the political speech of the Jobbik, a term transferred from the west: globalization. Globalization is an umbrella-term connoting foreign financial interest, the fight against multi-national corporations of the nation, political interests foreign to domestic ones. The exploitation suffered by the populous internally, by banks and financial interests, is the counterpart of the exploitation of the country by international interests, which do not coincide with its own. One of Jobbik's declared goals is to decouple Hungary from the EU, or to transform Hungarian EU membership into a solely economics focussed membership and remove all governing political institutions, which are considered as subjugating national governments. The alternative vision of Jobbik is "the Europe of Nations", which would be based on "flexible cooperation between nations" and respect towards national sovereignty, the breaking of international political and financial trusts, all based on the concept of self-determination of all nations.

The Future

An important aspect of the vision of future projected by the extreme right is its duality. This is in close relation to the aforementioned concept of a liminoid status. The future is broken up into two, mutually exclusive, alternate avenues: glory and destruction. The two concepts exist in a symbiotic relationship within the respective works of the authors, and serve apolitical mobilization function. The glorious signifies and supports the positive aspect of a liminoid existence: future outcomes are already set in stone and must happen according to the "scientific" rules of progress outlined in the historical dialectic described when dealing with the past. According to these, the extreme right mode of existence shall prevail due to the needs of the people and their desires. This desire and will to act, however, is the deciding factor in the destruction concept, too. Contradicting the vision of the first, it is more implicit, and not outspoken. It circumvents the triumphal vision, and within the same historical mode of thinking, it does not support a linear path of progress but instead shows a possible loop backtowards the present. The present and the recent past serve as proof of where symptoms of degeneration may lead, and its unsavory details may furnish clues toward where it may be headed. The scheme is thus entirely contingent on immediate, radical and voluntary action. However irrational this model seems, its functionality is high, the proof being the popularity of the movements supporting it.

For this reason the changes have two basic tenets: they must be radical and swift. Rattkay Kalman writes in his book, *Modern State Building*:

in conclusion, all signs point toward the fact that the treatment of symptoms is not enough anymore and the cancer is eating away at the body and soul of the national organism. Therefore, the whole structure of the diseased body must be changed.

Szalasi's 1935 book, *The way and the goal*, reads:

The Party of National Will⁴⁷...believes that the only the realization of it's the work plan and the constitution it elaborated, and the swift, structured application of them into the day-to-day life of the state can secure the well-being, harmonic life and the survival of the Peoples of the Ancient Lands.⁴⁸

The alternate vision of the future can be found in his description of the present state of affairs in the capitalist economic field in his 1933 work, *The plan for rebuilding the Hungarian state*:

The end result of this sort of behavior can be only one: the loss of the battle. A humiliating defeat. Utter extermination.⁴⁹

Similarly, the key-words in Jobbik's programs for a better Hungary can be gleaned from the title of their 2010 electoral program, entitled *Radical Change*. On page 6, Jobbik politician Morvai Krisztina announces:

We Hungarian People want change here and now. Radical, efficient change. A better life, a better future. This... will come if we Hungarians demand it for ourselves...And we have now a historic chance to do so...The moment has come! We have to prepare for radical, drastic change. This spring we can make a fate-changing decision.

The program goes on to describe various issues, being structured on the aforementioned structure of comparison between the categories of "the last 20 years" and "the better future". This duality has an inbuilt meaning: the "better future" shall come about only if the voter chooses to opt for it. Morvai's statements help us to further elaborate the logic of these texts. The change which may come about is radical, and drastic, as she has stated. However, the change will come about only if voluntary action is taken toward achieving it. It is based on a *decision*, and can *change a fate*, something which one usually assumes is inherently set in stone. On the other hand, the opportunity is *historic*, so the decision may in part be regarded as coming about naturally, according to some pre-determined set of rules governing history. In the interwar period, Szalasi and Rattkay both described the era of liberalism and capitalism as "not being apt for the present conditions⁵⁰" and "belonging to an age that was coming to an end⁵¹". But at the same time, they agitated and laid out elaborate arguments for why their visions of the future were superior. The built-in duality, therefore, is another common trait.

47 The name of Szalasi Ferenc's first political party.

48 Szalasi, *Út és cél*, 5.

49 Szalasi, *A magyar állam felépítésének terve*, 12.

50 Szalasi, *Cél es követelések*, 15.

51 Ráttkay, *Modern Orszagepites*, 19.

In all three cases, the first chapter in the program is dedicated to the renovation of the state, which was seen as the primary agent of problem-solving. The nature of change to the superstructure of the state was to be swift and drastic and involving revolutionary changes. The state in the past, suggest all three works, was both an expression of the will of the people of which it is composed but also that of the nation. The concept of statality and that of the nation are inextricably bound together, in a classical 19th century construct, however the introduction of the state as an expression of popular will (though not in the democratic sense) was a new edition. The arguments for this ideal model were historical in nature and each of these works featured mostly the same historical dialectic. The high point of Hungarian power and its glorious achievements were associated with strong leaders, who all had a special affinity toward the people they were leading. The historic heroes such as the kings Arpad and Matyas were all shown directly leading their people, strictly controlling through though measures and reforms all aspects of life, and cutting out the middlemen such as bureaucrats or the aristocracy.

Against this backdrop, the radical planners projected an alternative vision. The main courses of action were inspired by Italy and Germany: the already-mentioned strengthening of central power, the bolstering of it through a corporatist parliament, and constitutional reform (in concord with the teachings of the Holy Crown). This strengthened state and its leader, the expressions of the will of the people and the nation, would enact swift and calculated reforms, which would renovate society through economics and politics. The idea of popular will is present, but also there is an underlying idea that the people are not wise enough to govern themselves (therefore, the leadership motif). Another idea buried between the lines is that of social justice enacted for the people, but not by them. The projections of harmony and concord, of national purity and sense of communal purpose are in stark contrast to the vision of the decomposing present shown beforehand.

With close analysis we can reveal the same directing ideas in the three Jobbik-programs of the last five years. Although the details of the programs are not congruent, we may observe a style of argumentation which is analogous. The argument also rests on a historicist basis; indeed, history being the main source for its legitimacy. Jobbik solutions for the perceived crisis also contain the same motifs as those of the interwar period: swiftness, preciseness, all under the agency of the state. The state is seen as the expression of the nation, and the idea of popular will, of grassroots activism is particularly strong in the case of the Movement for a Better Hungary, owing to its roots as a civil organization. For example, Jobbik also proposed a new constitutional order in its programs in 2006, 2010 and in its Bethlen-program. The details are hazy but they are not important for our analysis. The directing idea is that of re-establishment of order, by the state, mandated by the people. Jobbik proposed many of its measures to be adopted by plebiscite. The changes would affect all spheres of society from the economic (here the very strong

idea of social justice is present), to culture and the environment. The duality of choice between decay and rejuvenation is self-understood, and also the idea of a liminoid status ("The new power" slogan). The contrast between the glory of the past, the decay of the present and the possible semblance of glory of the future complete this triadic nexus.

The most significant feature and similarity of these texts, beyond their myriad differences, is the common mental logic which governs them. The structure of the exposition also shows continuity. Another common trait is their shared bestiary, the record of enemies which has changed very little over time. They identify the same problem-areas and prescribe similar treatments. Therefore, one may conclude they are the product of similar historic contexts, and analogous political-linguistic milieus. This familiarity may be one of the reasons of their success, in contexts where a segment of the public still responds well to embedded, familiar modes of political argumentation.

4. Conclusions

This article compared the discourse of the contemporary Hungarian radical right and its historic correspondents. It did so by identifying some of their main arguments. The parties have a common stance (as derived from their programs) on six of the eight larger themes that have been isolated in their discourse. This shows a clear pattern of continuity between them, and gives positive support to the thesis of an existing general theorem by which the radical right may be defined.

Moreover, the analysis illustrates that the themes are not only common, but have a similar logic in which they are combined. The discursive goals of the radical right in Hungary may be decanted to the following ideal-type construct: a radical understanding of the three concepts of past, present and future. The description of these concepts, as seen above, is fashioned to best serve the political interests of the radical right. The radical right discourse works by engendering a certain amount of fear (or capitalizing on already existing fear) within the individual members of society as towards their security and future. It attempts to push their identities and self-perceptions toward a liminoid status by enumerating the dangers of the existing situation, and offering a viable alternative. It achieves this not only by making reference to an ideal projection of the future but to a similarly-narrated past. It capitalizes (and attempts to further develop) on national-historical understandings of self and identity, which serve to buttress the linear logic of its argument. This ideal type construction, if identified in other countries and periods, may serve to explain some of the reasons of the success of radical right wing political discourses in certain European contexts.

The article proposes a different approach to the study of radical right wing ideologies. Namely, it draws on the diachronic method of historical studies. This comparative approach reveals important trends in radical right wing political thought, and moves toward establishing an ideal-type of it. The confines of this study have to do, of course, with its limitations to one case-study, that of Hungary in the interwar period and in the present. However, it may serve as an model for a larger comparative study, which could possibly compare cases not only in time, but in space as well. A collection of similar articles on a regional, or European level could perhaps check the validity of this study's findings.

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RECIPROCAL PERCEPTIONS BETWEEN WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES AND THE EU: NEWS COVERAGE ON THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS IN DAILY NEWSPAPERS

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Abstract

Against the background of increasing EU enlargement fatigue amongst EU countries, and with the official accession negotiation process with the Western Balkan countries currently underway, a comparative analysis of current reciprocal perceptions between both sides is carried out to identify potential conflict lines, and to trace how the EU is currently perceived from inside and from. In an exploratory media study three EU countries (Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom) and two Western Balkan countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina BiH and Serbia) are compared.¹ This paper shows that the reciprocal perceptions are not only shaped by assumed distance and difference, but also by proximity and similarities. However, the communicated boundaries and obstacles between EU and non-EU also show some indicate barriers for Western Balkan countries in the accession steps lying ahead. Furthermore, the media study suggests a broadening of the analytical spectrum to include thematic areas that go beyond political discourse.

Keywords: EU enlargement, Western Balkans, perceptions, media, news coverage

1. Introduction

As a number of political analyses and recent research studies have outlined, there is increasing Euroskepticism and fatigue among current EU member states as far as the further enlargement of the EU is concerned.² Some reasons for this growing

1 The media study was part of a collaborative project carried out between October 2010 and May 2011, financed in the framework of the Call for Research Cooperation and Networking between Austria and South Eastern Europe on "Changing Identities in South Eastern Europe", under the supervision of the Austrian Science and Research Liaison Office Ljubljana and the Center for Social Innovation Vienna (see http://www.aso.zsi.at/project_5_17_2010.html). The project partners were the Commission for Comparative Media and Communication Studies/Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna/Austria, the Mediacentar Sarajevo/BiH, the University of Belgrade/Serbia, and the University of Primorska in Koper/Slovenia. Additional contributions to the comparative media analysis came from Sanela Hodzic/Mediacentar Sarajevo, Isabella Purkart/Austrian Academy of Sciences, and Gazela Pudar and Prof. Gordana Djeric/University of Belgrade.

2 See: Helene Sjurjen, ed., *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006). Frank Schimmelfennig, "EU Political Accession

hesitation include the two latest accession rounds of 2004 and 2007, but also the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, or most recently the global economic crisis and its impacts on the European economy. This fatigue does not only apply to the political elites: Annual public opinion surveys show that the populations in many EU countries express a significant degree of skepticism with regard to a further EU enlargement: besides Turkey, the countries of the Western Balkan region (WBC³) thereby seem to have the hardest stance with regard to their membership endeavors. In the Eurobarometer Standard Survey 74 (Fall 2010), which included a specific survey section distinguishing different future EU member state candidates, when asked "Please tell me, whether you are for or against further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years," with regard to the countries of the Western Balkan region, an EU average of 45% of the population answered that they were against further enlargement to the region.

On the other hand, the populations in the WBC express considerable willingness to join the EU and have high expectations regarding this membership. At the same time, they are increasingly skeptical about how much they are appreciated and welcomed as new members by the population of the EU. In the Gallup Balkan Monitor Survey (2010) when asked, "Generally speaking, do you think that [your country's] membership in the EU would be a good thing?", in Serbia 44%, in BiH 69%, in Macedonia 60%, and in Kosovo even 87% of the interviewees said it would be a good thing. However, when asked "Do you think that the people in the EU want [your country] to join the EU?" in Serbia 36%, in Macedonia 28% in BiH 37%, and in Kosovo 14% assumed that most people in the EU would not want this. With the official accession negotiation process with WBC currently under way, this presents an unpredictable factor relating to whether or not and when those countries will actually become EU members, an exception here being Croatia as the only country of the region that has already signed the EU Accession Treaty, according to which the country will become the 28th Member State of the European Union on 1 July 2013.

Some studies suggest that growing Euroscepticism among EU citizens is determined by variables such as economic cost-benefit considerations, national political culture considerations, or (national) identity.⁴ However, a majority of those studies ignore

Conditionality after the 2004 Enlargement: Consistency and Effectiveness," *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, no. 6 (2008): 918–937. Deniz Devrim and Evelina Schulz, "Enlargement Fatigue in the European Union: From Enlargement to Many Unions," www.realinstitutoelcano.org (accessed September 16, 2011).

3 The political term is used by the EU and designates the countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.

4 See Erik Jones and Niels van der Bijl, "Public Opinion and Enlargement: a Gravity Approach," *European Union Politics* 5, no. 3 (2004): 331–351. Jelena Subotic, "Europe is a State of Mind: Identity and Europeanization in the Balkans," *International studies quarterly*

that the formation of public opinion depends to a great extent on media information, and that mass media may have the capability to determine differing levels of Euroscepticism or support for EU enlargement. Because of the lack of first-hand experience, citizens retrieve the vast majority of information and analysis from their national news media.⁵ At the same time we cannot, from population surveys alone, fully retrieve insights into the images and perceptions of the EU or the WBC when people are asked about their support for a future EU enlargement.⁶ The potential conflict between differing expectations and the skepticism that may result from positions stated in those surveys can only be described and interpreted on a very general and abstract level, while the attitudes towards the EU cannot be traced to underlying political, economic, cultural or social principles and practices.

The state of research on EU accession-related topics still lacks more profound analyses carried out with regard to the perception of the news coverage on the WBC in EU countries. Therefore, we still lack more profound media data that we could consult to relate it to the mentioned survey results. Furthermore, the differing public attitudes with regard to EU enlargements as well as the increasing EU skepticism on both the EU side and the WBC side indicate a potential conflict in the accession process ahead. However, the current state of research still lacks systematic comparative analysis of the current public opinion in WBC with the public opinion in EU member states.⁷

55, no. 2 (2011): 309–330. Sophie Lechelera and Claes H. de Vreese, "Framing Serbia: the Effects of News Framing on Public Support for EU Enlargement," *European Political Science Review* 2 (2010): 73–74. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?" *Political Science and Politics* 37, no. 3 (2004): 415–420.

5 Pippa Norris, *A virtuous circle. Political communications in postindustrial societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Claes de Vreese and Hajo G. Boomgaarden, "Media Effects on Public Opinion About the Enlargement of the European Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44, no. 2 (2006): 419–436.

6 Thomas Risse-Kappen, *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010), 34.

7 See, for instance: Katarina Ott, ed., *Croatian Accession to the European Union: The Challenges of Participation* (Zagreb: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006). Nebojša Blanuša, "Euroskepticizam: razine istraživanja i oblici iskazivanja," *Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva* 3 (1, 2007): 325–346. Vedran Dzihic, Silvia Nadjivan, and Hrvoje Paic, *Europaverflucht begehrt: Europavorstellungen in Bosnien-Herzegowina, Kroatien und Serbien* (Wien: Braumüller, 2006). Silke Adams, "Domestic Adaptations of Europe. A Comparative Study of the Debates on EU Enlargement and a Common Constitution in the German and French Quality Press," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 19 (4, 2007): 409–433. Cornelia Brantner, *Medien und EU: Europäisierung der österreichischen Öffentlichkeit?* (Saarbrücken: Südwestdeutscher, 2009). Juan Díez Medrano, *Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).

This article argues that mass media should be more strongly connected to public opinion, considering it a source of knowledge, especially when people's knowledge (of other countries or in the case of the EU of a transnational entity) cannot be developed solely from personal experience and networks, due to spatial distance or a high level of abstraction.⁸ At the same time, also the perspective of the EU out-group striving for membership should be included more systematically in the analysis of public opinion of EU enlargement, because for them this concept may be even more abstract and/or distorted. Also, taking the media into account here is crucial because aspiring member states may become subject to public approval by referendum during the accession process; just as the reciprocal knowledge in international relations forms an essential facet of public attitudes that leads us to a more detailed idea about what citizens and future citizens of the EU may conceptualize as a commonly shared collectivity.

To address some of the outlined gaps, this paper presents the results of an explorative media study. This study looked at the press coverage on the EU region in two WBC (Serbia and BiH) and the press coverage on the WB region in three EU member states (Austria, Germany, UK) for the year 2009. In a first step, the theoretical assumptions based on which the study was carried out will be outlined in more detail, and the methodological design will be described. Subsequently, some results of the media analysis will be presented and discussed. In a summary section, the news coverage will be related to the population surveys, and implications for further research will be derived.

2. Theoretical assumptions

Linking media content and public opinion can provide further insights into the way in which news coverage can affect support for a particular aspect of European integration. This expectation is based on the theoretical assumption that public support is of key importance for the legitimacy of any decision on the future enlargement of the EU, either because, indirectly, national governments can be held accountable (e.g., when the public may have an impact in European elections), or directly when possible referendums on the issue are carried out by national governments (e.g., on the Lisbon treaty).

It is assumed that mass media thereby frames certain topics to be transferred as relevant to the public with regard to the focus on the WBC in EU countries, and vice

8 See: Rens Vliegenthart, Andreas R. Schuck, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, and Claes H. de Vreese, "News Coverage and Support for European Integration 1990-2006," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 20, no. 4 (2009): 415–439. Niklas Luhmann, *The Reality of the Mass media* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000). Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

versa, and that those topics form the knowledge base for people's perception of the EU.⁹ Therefore, daily news coverage is considered to be a relevant contextual factor for people's perception of the world. Ordinary citizens usually do not have firsthand experience with either the EU or the WBC and, according to Eurobarometer surveys, EU citizens consistently identify newspapers and television as one of their most important sources of information about EU-related issues.¹⁰

In this context, the media does not merely serve as a channel of communication but can also assume the position of political actors themselves. They legitimately raise their own voice and thereby have an impact on political will formation or public opinion by assigning relevance to certain issues for public debate and by expressing their own positions on these issues or by considering the evaluation of actors involved in public debate.¹¹ In fulfilling these two functions – agenda setting and opinion leading – the media does not necessarily have to express beliefs identical with public opinion, but media opinion can and does reinforce and direct public opinion.¹²

A number of studies have shown that the mass media news coverage on the EU conditions public attitudes on EU topics such as EU integration or EU enlargement, and that the mass media's evaluation of EU enlargement as positive, negative, or mixed, that guides public opinion.¹³ Analyzing how the topic of EU accession is framed in news coverage can help to identify what aspects of the topic are emphasized, and what organizing principles may thus form the basis for a person's

9 Adopting the perspective of Robert M. Entman, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) and Maxwell E. McCombs, *Setting the Agenda. The Mass Media and Public Opinion* (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity Press; Blackwell, 2004).

10 See: Vliegthart et al., "News Coverage and Support for European Integration 1990-2006," 415. Jürgen Maier and Berthold Rittberger, "Shifting Europe's Boundaries: Mass Media, Public Opinion and the Enlargement of the EU," *European Union Politics* 9, no. 2 (2008): 243–267. Norris, *A virtuous circle*.

11 Pfetsch, "Agents of transnational debate across Europe," 22. But see also: Page et al., "What Moves Public Opinion?" 23–43. Michael Bruter, *Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Barbara Pfetsch and Silke Adam, eds., *Massenmedien als politische Akteure. Konzepte und Analysen* (Wiesbaden: VS, 2008).

12 See: Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, *News that Matters. Television and American Opinion* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

13 See: Andreas R. Schuck and Claes H. de Vreese, "Between Risk and Opportunity: News Framing and Its Effects on Public Support for EU Enlargement," *European Journal of Communication* 21 (1, 2006): 5–23. Maier and Rittberger, "Shifting Europe's Boundaries," 243-267. De Vreese and Boomgaarden, "Media Effects," 419-436.

understanding of and thinking about the EU enlargement process in the WB region.¹⁴

Framing theory offers an approach to analyzing those interrelations and how citizens make sense of politics through them, not simply by means of salience, but by defining frames as patterns of interpretation that are used to classify information and process it efficiently, stressing certain aspects of an issue over others. Frames offer citizens the possibility to choose from a spectrum of attributes, judgments, and decisions to make sense of EU related politics.¹⁵

A second theoretical assumption is that, for most European citizens, the EU still presents a rather abstract concept and social construction ("imagined community").¹⁶ Therefore, it does not pre-exist outside communication, but is created precisely when people speak to one another, be it in interpersonal settings or through certain media. Here mass media present an essential "communication arena" for the construction of the EU as a collective entity. Due to their widespread visibility and connectivity, mass media discourses are predisposed to the evolving and expansion of societal descriptions on unity.¹⁷

At the same time, the concept of the EU as a collective entity inevitably contains an in-group/out-group dimension: it relies on (real or constructed) boundaries between those who belong to the in-group and a conceptual out-group against

14 Claes H. deVreese, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, and Holli A. Semetko, "(In)direct Framing Effects: The Effects of News Media Framing on Public Support for Turkish Membership in the European Union," *Communication Research* 38, no. 2 (2011): 179–182.

15 Lechelera and de Vreese, "Framing Serbia," 76-78. See also Robert Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (1993): 51–58; Dielram A. Scheufele, "Agenda-setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects of Political Communication," *Mass Communication and Society* 3, no. 2 (2000): 297–316. Stuart N. Soroka, "Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy," *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 8 (1, 2003): 27–48.

16 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (Rev. London; New York: Verso, 2005), 14-15.

17 For theoretical discussion see especially: Christiane Eilders and Dennis Lichtenstein, "Diskursive Konstruktionen von Europa. Eine Integration von Öffentlichkeits- und Identitätsforschung," *Medien & Kommunikationswissenschaft* 58 (2, 2010): 199-201. Nancy Rivenburgh, "Social Identification and Media Coverage of Foreign Relations," in *News Media and Foreign Relations. A Multifaceted Perspective*, ed. Abbas Malek (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1997). 79-91. Gabriele Melischek and Josef Seethaler, "Media and International Relations: An Attributional Analysis of In-group and Out-group Perceptions in European Press Coverage of the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election," *American Journal of Media Psychology* 1 (2008): 103–124.

which one's own concept of belonging can be demarcated.¹⁸ This social categorization helps to provide a system of orientation for self-reference, enabling people to define their own place in the European context and in relation to other European countries. The future EU enlargement to the WB region presents not only a (re)definition of actual EU borders but may also trigger negotiations and (re)definitions of the concept of the EU as a collective entity. Therefore, it is assumed that one crucial parameter for the current perceptions and relations between EU and WBC is this in-group/out-group dualism (EU vs. WBC), as well as both sides' underlying conceptions of the EU as a collective entity.

A comparative analysis of how the EU is currently perceived (1) from inside (i.e. when EU countries perceive and define a potential out-group and thus define the boundaries of their own EU collectivity) and (2) from the outside (i.e. when those who are not part of the EU but are striving for membership perceive the EU) may also track possible gaps in the perceptions and definitions of this concept of unity, and based on that possible barriers for WBC in the accession steps lying ahead.

3. Design of the Comparative Media Study

3.1. Data Sample

Based on these assumptions, a comparative media study was carried out in three EU countries (Austria, Germany, and UK) and two WBC (BiH and Serbia). As an explorative study of limited scope and resources, the main aim of the research was to provide some insights into the structures and spectrum of the news coverage on the EU enlargement topic as well as the current reciprocal frames of perception between countries of the EU region and the Western Balkans. The country selection was guided by the consideration outlined below.

For the EU sample, three diverse country cases were chosen, to encompass some of the range of variation among EU member states with regard to public opinion towards the EU and especially further EU enlargement: Germany shows low rates of support for future membership of the different WBC in the EU, while Germany's own EU membership is evaluated rather positively.¹⁹ In the UK, public opinion is

18 Arguing with Social Identity Theory; see especially: Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse-Kappen and Marilyn B. Brewer, eds., *Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU* (Lanham, USA; Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, "Collective Identity: Group Membership and Self-conception," in *Self and social identity. Perspectives on Social Psychology*, eds. Marilyn B. Brewer and Miles Hewstone (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004). 147-181.

19 According to EB74 (QA20.1-7), the German rates of support regarding the future EU membership are 14% for Albania, 25% for BiH, 40% for Croatia, 17% for Kosovo, 24% for

traditionally rather skeptical toward the country's own EU affiliation.²⁰ At the same time, British governments have traditionally strongly supported further enlargement in general, an enthusiasm that does not reflect in public opinion surveys to the same degree.²¹ Here, the consulting of mass media discourse may provide new material to explain the survey data. Thirdly, in Austria public opinion in recent years shows strong skepticism towards the own EU membership, and also the lowest rates of support for a future WBC membership in the EU.²²

Additional factors that may shape the level of attention paid toward the region were also taken into account: the variety of old and newer member states (Germany is a founding member of the EU, the UK is a member since 1973, Austria is a relatively new member since 1995); population size (large countries Germany, UK vs. small country Austria); different degrees of proximity to the WB region (UK very distant, Germany relatively distant, Austria very close). Finally, due to the limited scale of the project capacities, EU countries were chosen that could be analyzed by the Austrian team (i.e. that where either German-speaking or English-speaking).

For the WB region, Serbia was chosen as it is the largest country of the WB region and because it is strongly divided over EU membership.²³ While political factions in Serbia are divided with regard to the EU, public opinion polls show that the Serbian population supports the own EU accession process, but at the same time has substantive reservations about the EU.²⁴ National sovereignty is put above the own

FYR Macedonia, 28% for Montenegro, and 21% for Serbia. At the same time, for 2009, the German support rate for the own EU-membership is 61% (EB71) and 60% (EB72).

20 According to EB74, for 2009, the British support rate for the own EU-membership is 28% (EB71) and 30% (EB72), while the UK rates of support are 23% for Albania, 25% for BiH, 31% for Croatia, 23% for Kosovo, 27% for FYR Macedonia, 26% for Montenegro, and 25% for Serbia.

21 Adele Brown and Michael Attenborough, "EU Enlargement: the Western Balkans," *Research Paper 07/27*, www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2007/rp07-027.pdf (accessed February 21, 2012). Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers, "Divergent Trends of Euroscepticism in Countries and Regions of the European Union," *European Journal of Political Research* 49, no. 6 (2010): 787–817.

22 According to EB74, for 2009, the Austrian support rate for the own EU-membership is 41% (EB71) and 42% (EB72), while the Austrian rates of support are 12% for Albania, 21% for BiH, 49% for Croatia, 12% for Kosovo, 17% for FYR Macedonia, 19% for Montenegro, and 18% for Serbia.

23 See Subotic, "Europe is a State of mind," 309–330.

24 For instance, Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections in 2008 led to a standoff between the pro-European and the anti-European forces. At the same time, according to the GBM 2010, the rates of support for the issue of whether or not Serbian membership in the EU would be a good thing declined from 61 to 44% between 2008 and 2010; also, in 2010 only 41% of the people surveyed thought that the people in the EU want Serbia to join the EU.

affiliation with the EU, especially with regard to issues such as the status of Kosovo, or the Serbian cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, both crucial preconditions for Serbia's EU accession.

BiH was chosen because the EU enjoyed a strong rise in support from the population in recent years. This stands in contrast to the status of the actual accession negotiation process, in which the country currently lags behind other WBC, mainly because of internal ethnic disputes and political conflicts. These struggles result to a large extent from the politically decentralized structure defined by the Dayton agreement that also increasingly manifests itself in the social division of the country in the two entities (the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska).

Focusing on the year 2009, two daily newspapers were chosen for each country that are nationally available, have the largest distribution rates, and are considered as *Leitmedien* (opinion-forming newspapers) in the respective country; they are leading the societal discourse, and are observed by other media, because their topics and interpretations are considered as relevant.²⁵

For Austria *Die Presse* and *Der Standard* were analyzed. The German sample included the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, the British sample included *The Times* and *The Guardian*, and the Serbian sample included *Danas* and *Politika*. For BiH, due to the ethno-political divisions in the country that also affect the circulation range and relevance of newspapers, the sample consisted of *Dnevni Avaz* as a newspaper read by the Bosniak population, *Nezavisne novine* for the Serbian population, and *Dnevni list* for the Croat population.

The stratified random sample included twelve publication days (5 January/3 February/4 March/9 April/8 May/13 June/6 July/4 August/9 September/8 October/6 November/12 December 2009), i.e. for each month choosing one issue of each newspaper, taken from the second week of the month, forming two artificial weeks from Monday to Saturday (Sundays were excluded since not all newspapers have regular Sunday editions). This way, the news coverage in all countries could also be observed beyond specific events, to gain a general overview over the average level of attention paid to the reciprocal Other in both the analyzed EU countries and the WBC.

25 Otfried Jarren and Martina Vogel, "Gesellschaftliche Selbstbeobachtung und Koorientierung. Die Leitmedien der modernen Gesellschaft", in *Leitmedien. Konzepte, Relevanz, Geschichte*, eds. Daniel Müller, Annemone Ligensa and Peter Gendolla (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009). 84-89. For rankings of newspaper circulations, see Hans-Bredow-Institut für Medienforschung, ed., *Internationales Handbuch Medien*, 28th ed. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009) and World Editors Forum / World Association of Newspapers, ed., *World Press Trends 2008* (Paris, 2009).

3.2. Analytical Steps

For each publication day and newspaper the entire newspaper edition was examined. In the three EU countries, all articles were selected that included references to the WB region, i.e. one or more of the countries Albania, BiH, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, or Serbia, to the transnational geopolitical categories [Southeastern Europe/the Balkans], [Western Balkans], or [Former Yugoslavia], or to actors or institutions from the region. This focus on the whole region was based on the assumption that all mentioned countries are currently in the process of EU accession, and that thus the accession process as such may also be referred to in the news coverage with regards to the whole region, and not just when individual countries are taken into view. In the two WBC, all articles were selected that included references to the EU region, i.e. to one or several of the 27 EU member states, to the [EU] as a geopolitical entity or to institutions from the EU region.

In a first analytical step, the geographical and the thematic spectrum of the reciprocal news coverage was identified. For that, the whole newspaper article was taken into account. For each article, all mentioned countries (in the EU region and the WB region) or the above mentioned transnational entity references were coded. Also, the thematic area in the context of which (1) in Austrian, German, and British newspapers the WB side, and (2) in Bosnian and Serbian newspapers the EU side was referred to, was identified. For each article, more than one thematic area could be coded. Subsequently, the identified geographical and thematic references were ranked based on a simple frequency analysis.

The identification of the geographical spectrum allows us to get an overview of what countries are perhaps more relevant in the context of the three EU member states, or whether the region may be perceived as a whole. Alternatively, the Bosnian and Serbian sample allows us to see whether an EU-related focus is dominating the news coverage or whether both countries also apply bi-national foci when countries of the EU region are taken into view. At the same time, including the whole newspaper edition and identifying the whole variety of thematic areas addressed when the reciprocal other is observed allows us to identify the whole spectrum of information provided for the readers of the specific country and on the respective other side (EU region, WB region), and to define how relevant the topic of EU-related issues and EU accession actually is.

In a second step, a qualitative content analysis of all articles focusing on the thematic area of politics was carried out, since the topic of the EU accession was predominantly addressed in that area. An inductive qualitative approach was chosen, meaning that the aim of this analytical step was to identify the way in which

the EU accession process of the WB region was framed in the news coverage. All given views and positions relating to the EU accession process or EU-related issues were identified in the articles that focused on political topics. Positions/views are defined as all statements about a topic that can be connected to speakers who hold or support a view in the respective article, either explicitly (direct or indirect quotations) or implicitly (when the medium expresses a view).²⁶

4. Reciprocal News Coverage between the EU Side and the Western Balkan Side

Overall the media study revealed that quantitative amount of the reciprocal news coverage of the EU countries and the WBC differs. In absolute terms, considering the whole newspaper edition, in the Bosnian (318 identified articles) and Serbian (317 articles) newspapers the focus on the EU region was significantly higher than the reciprocal focus on WBC in Austria (66 articles), Germany (73 articles), or the UK (69 articles).

4.1. Geographical and Thematic Spectrum of the Reciprocal News Coverage

In all three EU countries, the focus on the WB region was predominantly shaped by references made to individual countries. As shown in Figure 1 (all Figures in Appendix), most references were made towards Croatia and Serbia. In the Austrian newspapers, a significantly higher level of attention was paid to Kosovo, while in the German and the British sample, almost every fifth (Germany) or fourth (UK) article referred to BiH. The focus on other countries of the region (especially Montenegro) was only marginal.

In the Bosnian context, countries most often referred to here were the UK, Germany, Sweden, or Slovenia, while Serbian newspapers most frequently related to France, Germany, the UK, or Italy (see Figure 2).

All analyzed countries included a number of articles with references made to their own country when the reciprocal Other was under focus. Serbia and the UK stand out especially here with self-references in 85.8% of the analyzed Serbian articles and 76.8% of the British articles. Fewer national self-references were found in the Bosnian articles on the EU region (50.3%), or the Austrian (48.5%) and German newspaper articles (45.2%) looking at the WB region.

Furthermore, the newspapers of the three EU countries referred to the WB region using transnational categories infrequently (see Figure 3). While in the UK the only label significantly used was [Former Yugoslavia], in Austria and Germany the label

26 E.g., in opinion articles, but sometimes also when an article includes evaluations on a specific topic without any reference to an external source

most frequently applied was [Southeastern Europe/the Balkans], followed again by the categorization [Former Yugoslavia]. The category [Western Balkans] was only marginally applied.

In comparison, in Bosnian and Serbian newspapers the usage of transnational categories was much more frequent when the EU region was under focus, that is, when referring to the region as a geopolitical entity rather than as individual countries. Serbian newspapers more frequently applied the term [Europe], while in the Bosnian newspapers approximately every second article of our sample applied the term [European Union/EU].

Within this geographical spectrum, in all five countries we identified a similar range of thematic areas. What differed was the frequency with which those thematic areas came under focus (see Figure 4):

In Austria, BiH and Serbia the thematic area of politics was the main focus. Besides that, in Austrian newspapers the economy was a second thematic area frequently under focus, as well as articles relating to crime, catastrophes, or to migration issues. In Bosnian and Serbian newspapers sport formed a second relevant thematic frame of perception with regard to the EU region, followed by the economy as a third thematic area. Differing from this pattern, in British newspapers the central thematic area of perception was sport, followed by articles that focused on topics linked to the wars of the 1990s; the area of politics followed in third place. In the German sample the 1990s wars formed the central thematic area for the context in which the WB region came into focus, and politics followed. As in all other countries, apart from Austria, the thematic area of sport was a third important focus of the news coverage.

Altogether, the thematic ranking indicates that politics is not necessarily the first and foremost lens through which EU countries and WBC currently observe each other. However, it is in the context of those topics that most views and positions referring to issues at the European level and addressing the EU accession process of the region were found.

4.2. The News Coverage of the Western Balkan EU Accession Process in the Three EU Countries

In the Austrian newspapers articles with reference to the EU accession process of WBC frequently focused on the Croatian-Slovenian border dispute that has an impact on the Croatian accession negotiations, mainly because of Slovenia's blockades of these negotiations. Here, Slovenia was portrayed as seeing itself supported in its blockade position by the other EU member states, since some of

them also welcome a delay in Croatia's EU accession process.²⁷ Other identified statements reported that EU countries notice and appreciate the endeavors made by Croatia in the accession process.²⁸

Another focus identified in the Austrian newspapers were the political relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Here, the dispute was reported to block, or at least slow down, the EU accession process of both entities. The stated Serbian view was that Serbia still does not recognize Kosovo as an independent state, and that violent incidents between the two sides can be seen as an indicator of the instability and underdevelopment of Kosovo. The statements given by political actors of the EU side considered the EU accession of WBC as a chance for development and stabilization, especially with regard to Kosovo.²⁹

For BiH the internal political situation was specifically focused on as one obstacle to the accession process, especially the political disputes among the two entities as well as the necessary reforms of the political system (Dayton structure) and the role of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR).³⁰

In the German newspapers the EU accession process also formed a central political topic when the WB region came under focus. As in the Austrian sample, the EU positions were portrayed as two-sided: overall, the newspapers portrayed most EU countries as supportive of the integration of WBC.³¹ However, especially with regards to Serbia, it was reported that the Netherlands have objections to the countries' EU accession, citing cooperation with the ICTY as a crucial condition for Serbian EU membership.³²

German newspapers also frequently focused on the border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia, with quoted EU countries assuring their support in solving the conflict, but not explicitly taking sides with one of the two parties.³³ As in Austrian

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- 27 Thomas Roser, "Fatale Bruderzwiste auf dem Balkan," *Die Presse*, 5 January 2009, 5.
 28 Regina Pöll, "Schwedischer Vorsitz: Tür für Türkei offen," *Die Presse*, 13 June 2009, 5.
 29 Wieland Schneider, "Als Serbiens Macht im Kosovo zerfiel," *Die Presse*, 13 June 2009, 6.
 30 Manuela Tomic, "Das europäische Stiefkind auf dem Balkan," *Die Presse*, 9 September, 5, and N/A, "'Aus Bosnien ein ganz normales Land machen'," *Die Presse*, 9 September 2009, 5.
 31 E.g.: N/A, "Merkel: Kroatien schnell in die EU," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 April 2009, 4. N/A, "Proteste der britischen Konservativen gegen Cameron," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 November 2009, 7.
 32 Enver Robelli, "Ratko Mladic, wie er singt und lacht," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 13 June 2009, 9.
 33 E.g.: N/A, "Merkel: Kroatien schnell in die EU," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 April 2009, 4.

newspapers, the unsolved dispute over Kosovo's independent status was seen as a major obstacle for the progress of the EU accession process.³⁴ Lastly, with regards to BiH, also the German news coverage mentioned the Dayton structure as a major problem for the EU accession process, arguing that it blocks the political and economic development of BiH.³⁵

In contrast, in the two British newspapers we found no article focusing on EU-related political topics such as EU enlargement when political topics were covered.

4.3 The News Coverage of the Western Balkan EU Accession Process in the Two WBC

On the other side of the analytical constellation, the news coverage on the EU accession process in the two WBC revealed similar patterns. In the Bosnian newspapers, identified statements of both the EU side and the Bosnian side argued that BiH can expect help from the EU but has to solve its own problems and internal conflicts before it can become an EU member.³⁶

Quoted EU representatives emphasized that the internal political situation was still far below EU standards and that the progress towards reaching those standards was slow.³⁷ The major obstacle to the EU membership efforts of the country was the Dayton political structure, and Bosnian newspapers again pointed out BiH's self-responsibility for carrying out those reforms.³⁸ Especially the transformation of the OHR into the office of the European Union Special Representative was presented controversially – creating conflicts not only between the EU and the Bosnian sides, but also among the entities within BiH.³⁹

Despite the obstacles presented, the Bosnian perspective on its own EU accession process can be summarized as cautiously optimistic. Small steps towards the EU

34 Enver Robelli, "EU im Kosovo zum Einschreiten gezwungen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5 January 2009, 7.

35 Marieluise Beck, "Letzte Chance für Bosnien?," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 November 2009, 12.

36 Stevanović, "BiH bi mogla ispasti iz grupe za put ka EU," *Dnevni Avaz*, 3 February 2009, 4.

37 Škuletić, "BiH još nije izgubljen slučaj," *Dnevni Avaz*, 13 June 2009, 4.

38 SRNA, "Poziv BiH da izvrši promjene Ustava," *Nezavisne novine*, 8 October 2009, 5.

39 SRNA, "Poziv BiH da izvrši promjene Ustava," *Nezavisne novine*, 8 October 2009, 5. FENA, "Dodik protiv izaslanika SAD za BiH," *Dnevni Avaz*, 9 April 2009, 2. Sead Numanović, "EU izdala Incka," *Dnevni Avaz*, 13 June 2009, 1.

were emphasized, and the EU candidacy of BiH was portrayed as a realistic option.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that BiH still has to meet a number of conditions, especially when compared with other WBC.

In the Serbian newspapers, the question of Kosovo's independent status was of special relevance in the Serbian news coverage on the EU accession.⁴¹ In the context of this topic, the EU side and the Serbian side were presented as taking two opposing positions, with member states such as Germany approving further EU accession steps by Serbia only under the condition of recognition of Kosovo's independence, while Serbian political actors repeatedly emphasized that Serbia was willing to make compromises, but not with regard to Kosovo.⁴² A second frequent focus was on Serbian cooperation with the ICTY. Here, the Serbian newspapers acknowledged that some EU countries (Netherlands, Lithuania) block the accession negotiations because of the lack of full cooperation with the ICTY, especially with regard to the arrest of Ratko Mladić.⁴³ Other than in the Kosovo case, the Serbian side here was portrayed as being more willing to cooperate with the EU.⁴⁴

Despite those two obstacles, the Serbian EU accession perspectives were seen optimistically and Serbian newspapers frequently underlined the positive relations between the EU side and Serbia.⁴⁵ It was acknowledged, too, that the accession process has stabilized and will continue to stabilize the country.⁴⁶

4.4 Implications for Reciprocal Perceptions Between Both Sides

What implications for the reciprocal perceptions (the information and evaluation of the reciprocal Other in the context of the topic of EU accession) can thus be derived from the outlined exploratory study?

First of all, with exception of the UK, on the level of political topics, the analyzed reciprocal news coverage revealed a significant focus on the EU accession process in the WB region. This supports the assumption, noted at the beginning of this article,

40 E.g.: Goran Mrkić, "Bh. građani žrtve lažnih državljana," *Dnevni list*, 4 March 2009, 4. Škuletić, "BiH još nije izgubljen slučaj," *Dnevni Avaz*, 13 June 2009, 4. N/A, "UBBiH u EU bankarskoj federaciji," *Dnevni list*, 6 July 2009, 22.

41 Serbia does not recognize this independence; however full recognition presents a disputed point in Serbia's accession negotiations with the EU.

42 Snežana Čongradin, "Oli Ren ne može da ubedi Holandiju," *Danas*, 9 September 2009, 3.

43 Biljana Čpajak, "Brisel traži bolju regionalnu saradnju," *Politika*, 8 October 2009, 6.

44 N/A, "Pohvala za napredak u sprovođenju reformi," *Danas*, 3 February 2009, 2.

45 E.g.: Marković, "Kad nema odlikovanja, dobra I plaketa," *Danas*, 8 October 2009, 16. Preneto, "Moratinos u poseti Srbiji," *Danas*, 12 December 2009, 2.

46 N/A, "EU integracije sidro Srpske politike," *Danas*, 4 March 2009, 12.

that the political dimension of the EU accession process forms a crucial parameter in the current reciprocal perceptions between EU countries and the WB region. While the perspective on the WB region in the three EU countries was predominantly shaped by the perception of individual countries, from the perspective of the two non-EU countries, the news coverage on the EU region predominantly referred to a transnational level.

Secondly, in Austria and Germany the perspectives on the WB accession process reflected ambivalence. EU membership for the region was never fully rejected in the reported statements. However, it was indicated in many instances that the time for accession has not yet arrived and that some crucial preconditions have to be fulfilled. For Croatia this included the solving of the border dispute with Slovenia, for Serbia the recognition of Kosovo's independence, for BiH the solving of internal ethnic and political disputes, and for Serbia and Croatia the full cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague. In both these countries it was pointed out that the EU accession of the region was a chance for development and stabilization. Thus, the overall view that is communicated here is that EU accession is possible for the countries of the region but not yet, and only based on strict criteria that have to be met by each WBC. Political stability, the solving of bi-national and internal political conflicts, as well as a functioning democratic system can be derived as the crucial parameters for accession proposed here.

However, the outlined perceptions do not refer to *a//*WBC. Articles in the German and Austrian samples mainly focused on Croatia, Serbia and BiH, but not on the EU accession process of Montenegro, or Albania. Furthermore, in the British newspapers sample no articles included a focus on EU-related political topics and the EU enlargement process in particular. Therefore, no British view on the (potential) change of EU boundaries could be derived from the British news coverage, and thus no information about that topic was provided for the readers.

On the WB side, in the news coverage of both Serbia and BiH the perspectives on the own future EU membership were positive and ambitious. This is indicated by the emphasis on small steps towards the EU and by the portrayal of BiH's or Serbia's EU candidacy as realistic options.

From the Bosnian perspective, the perception of the EU that can be derived from the statements is that of a "savior" who should step in when Bosnian politicians cannot find agreement on internal political matters. The EU accession process was seen as a path to solving the internal problems of the country (for example, constitutional reform, transformation of OHR into EUSR) to make BiH a functioning state. At the same time, it was acknowledged that BiH has to solve its own problems before it can receive full EU membership. Bosnian newspapers clearly express a skeptical view on the underperformance of Bosnian political actors, and signal

doubt with regard to the fulfillment of all necessary EU accession criteria in the near future.

In comparison, Serbian newspapers provide a more skeptical view on the country's EU membership, especially with regards to the outlined accession criteria. Here national interests were clearly put above the EU membership. Nevertheless, the EU position on a future EU membership for Serbia was not portrayed as wholly negative and the newspapers signaled a general willingness on behalf of the country to cooperate with the EU in the outlined issues. Overall, the Serbian perspective appeared to be more self-confident than the Bosnian one.

However, the assumption that the focus on the possible change of EU boundaries may also trigger explicit references to EU collectivity conceptions was not supported since no explicit statements were identified in the five countries. Thus, underlying EU conceptions can only implicitly be derived from the analyzed news coverage. However, the focus on individual WBC in the three EU countries rather than on the region as a collective entity also reflects a rather nation-centric self-perception rather than taking an 'EU perspective'.

5. Conclusions

Coming back to the starting point for the outlined media study – the identification of media discourses on the Western Balkan EU accession process in EU countries and WBC as a context factor and platform for information and knowledge about the respective Other, and the relation of this reciprocal news coverage to the populations attitudes towards EU enlargement – we can make the following observations.

While in the two WBC the attitudes expressed in the survey resemble the perspectives presented in the newspapers, in the two EU countries the positions of surveys and media coverage are only partially congruent.⁴⁷ In Austria and in Germany, the higher rejection of a further EU enlargement towards the WB region among the surveyed populations can only be related to the news coverage on this question to a certain degree, at least when only political topics and the news coverage of the EU accession topic is consulted. For the UK, no direct relation is possible, since no news discourses on the question were found in the analytical

47 In the EB74, which included a specific survey section distinguishing different future EU member state candidates, when asked "Please tell me, whether you are for or against further enlargement in the EU to include other countries in future years," with regard to the BiH and Serbia, in Austria 74% (BiH) and 77% (Serbia), in Germany 65% and 70%, and in the UK 56% and 57% of the surveyed people were against this enlargement. For Serbia and BiH, see 1. Introduction.

sample. Thus, the news coverage in the analyzed EU countries, in particular, can be related to the survey results only to a limited extent.

Three explanations may be consulted here, that also outline the limits of the presented elaborative study, and that may form starting points for further studies:

One explanation is that the surveyed populations answer questions on EU-related issues based on their positions towards the EU, or towards their own country. Thus a lack of news coverage on EU-related aspects with regard to the WB region may be the result of a general disinterest in or distance towards EU-related matters. Therefore, context factors such as the own country's EU affiliation and the general news coverage on EU-related topics beyond EU enlargement should be taken into account in further studies.

A second explanation is that *Leitmedien* largely replicate the elite discourses on EU enlargement, as Thomas Risse-Kappen outlined for the previous Eastern enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007.⁴⁸ Thus, the news coverage on the EU enlargement in the media may only have limited impact on public opinion. This hypothesis should be tested in a subsequent study by including political discourses as context factors for media news coverage.

The media study's quantitative analytical step indicates a third explanation: as outlined in Figure 4, the question of EU accession was not the only lens through which EU countries and WBC currently perceive each other, especially when we broaden our analytical view to other thematic areas beyond politics. While in Austria, Germany and the UK the focus on the 1990s wars, economy, or on crime, catastrophes formed a crucial lens through which to view the WB Other; the two WBC but also the UK frequently observed the respective Other through the lens of sport. If mass media provide the knowledge frame based on which people may form their opinions about the world, we could assume that the news coverage *beyond* politics should be included in the outlined analytical design as well.

Thus, in a next analytical step, the non-political news coverage will be taken into view in order to identify the full spectrum of reciprocal perceptions as currently provided in the reciprocal news coverage between EU countries and WBC. If, for instance, in the Austrian news coverage we find a strong focus on criminal WB actors in Austria, this may also become relevant as a knowledge source based on which EU-related questions such as the EU membership for the depicted countries are supported or rejected among the Austrian population. At the same time, also the concept of an EU collectivity may address facets and degrees of unity *beyond* the political dimension. Those dimensions should be analyzed in more detail in

48 Risse-Kappen, *A Community of Europeans*.

future studies, here also by broadening the theoretical concepts (e.g., by including theoretical approaches on foreign news coverage, media and stereotypes)⁴⁹ with which those levels of news coverage could be approached and integrated in current political communication research on the question of EU enlargement and the definition of EU boundaries.

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49 See Stephen D. Reese, Oscar H. Gandy, and August E. Grant, eds., *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2001). Kai Hafez, *Die politische Dimension der Auslandsberichterstattung* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002). Jochen Müller, *Von Kampfmaschinen und Ballkünstlern: Fremdwahrnehmung und Sportberichterstattung im deutsch-französischen Kontext. Eine Presse- und Fernsehanalyse* (St. Ingbert: Röhrig, 2004).

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
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
Appendix

Figure 1: Frequency of References to Individual Western Balkan Countries in...




Note: Numbers refer to % of all newspaper articles per country sample in which country was referred to.

Figure 2: Frequency of References to Individual EU Countries in...




Note; Five most frequent numbers refer to % of all newspaper articles per country sample in which country was referred to.

Figure 3: Usage of Transnational Categories



Note: Numbers refer to % of all newspaper articles per country sample in which category was used.

Figure 4: Four Most Frequent Thematic Areas Referred



Note: Numbers refer to % of all newspaper articles per country sample in which thematic area was addressed.

ESCALATION OF SOCIAL CONFLICT DURING POPULAR UPHEAVALS: EVIDENCE FROM BAHRAIN

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Abstract

Bahrain experienced rapidly growing sectarian strife as a result of the "Day of Rage" uprising organized in February 2011. The aim of this article is to assess the sources of latent hostility as well as to explain why the social conflict manifested itself and why it took on a sectarian dimension. The appraisal is based on the elements of Hocker and Wilmot's conflict assessment model, which focuses on the adversaries' perceptions of the conflict. Through an in-depth examination of created stereotypes we evaluate miscommunication between adversaries and ultimately, rigidity of positions and polarization of society. We conclude that, following this pattern of development, the social conflict ultimately enters into a destructive phase, negatively impacting the prospects of conflict resolution. The social division engulfing Bahrain is representative of the power struggle and confessional tensions in the Gulf region.

Keywords: sectarianism, Sunni, Shia, revolution, Arab Spring, Bahrain.

1. Introduction

2011 was marked by series of uprisings in the Middle East commonly known as the Arab Spring. The development of these events was unexpected by the local population and international observers alike¹. Social mobilization led, in some cases, to deposition of long-term dictators; in other cases, open conflict whose outcomes are yet to be resolved. The case of Bahrain stands out among other Arab countries affected by the Arab Spring. The Bahraini "Day of Rage" received relatively little attention from international media compared with other protests. Moreover, after the violent clampdown on the opposition, foreign correspondents were gradually expelled from the country and Bahrain disappeared from the headlines of international newspapers. The authorities tried to preserve the image of the "island of golden smiles", as once Bahrain was known, by cutting out the flow of unfavorable and disapproving information abroad. It is only recently that foreign journalists were allowed to come back and that Bahraini authorities invited an international commission to assess the events.

1 Rosa Balfour, "The Arab Spring, the changing Mediterranean, and the EU: tools as a substitute for strategy?," *European Policy Center brief*, June 2011.

The side effect of the uprising is, however, hidden under the surface. Since February 2011 Bahraini society has been ripped apart by a bitter sectarian split that affected this country of roughly 1 million inhabitants. The upheaval led to a dangerous escalation of the social conflict that took the form of street violence, killing, vandalism and social ostracism. The polarization of society reached levels never seen before as the division between Sunnis and Shias divided neighborhoods, streets, businesses and mixed Sunni-Shia families who felt the split within their own households.² The questions that come to mind are why the sectarian split reached such alarming levels, why the violent clashes spilled out of control and finally, why Bahraini society remains divided. Solicited solutions did not bring results and despite containment at the end of 2011, the Bahraini "Day of Rage" continues.

The importance of this case study is twofold. To begin, it emphasizes development of socio-psychological barriers during conflict escalation which, in turn, lead to an increase of antagonism and set the conflict on a destructive course.³ Secondly, it constitutes a significant point of debate in the analysis of the durability and evolution of Arabian Gulf states.⁴ Bahrain, which underwent a transformation of its political system in 2002, was the only Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member deeply affected by the Arab Spring. The modern approach to building legitimacy that would go beyond the tribal and sectarian affiliations has not fully worked. In recent years, Islam's role in providing a common identity for Bahrainis diminished due to the growing sectarian split. In this context Vali Nasr's evaluation, stated by the title *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future*, acquires a new dimension in the case of Bahrain and beyond.

The framework used for the overview of escalation of the conflict comes from the Hocker-Wilmot conflict assessment model.⁵ After a brief literature review of the concept of social conflict and conflict assessment, the structure of the paper follows the steps of the Hocker-Wilmot framework. In order to understand the nature of the conflict, we shall explore its exogenous and endogenous causes and its triggering event. Furthermore, we concentrate on the conflict elements, namely, goals, attitudes and strategies. Ultimately, we present the attempted solutions. This

2 Suad Hamada, *Women struggle for unity in Bahrain* (Aljazeera, 24 April 2011) [database on-line]; available at <http://aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/04/2011422135237332438.html>, last accessed on April 4, 2012.

3 Daniel Bar-Tal and Eran Halperin, "Socio-psychological barriers to conflict resolution," in *Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: Social psychological perspective*, ed. Daniel Bar-Tal (New York: Psychology Press, 2011). 1-38. 204.

4 Michael Herb, *All in the family: Absolutism, revolution, and democratic prospects in the Middle Eastern monarchies* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999).

5 William W. Wilmot and Joyce L. Hocker, *Interpersonal Conflict, Seventh Edition* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 204-5.

research is ethnographic in nature. It is based on random observations among Bahraini citizens as well as on analysis of social media.

2. The concept of social conflict

Conflict is often defined as "an incompatibility of goals or values between two or more parties in a relationship, combined with attempts to control each other and antagonistic feelings toward each other."⁶ Social scientists agree that conflict is an inherent part of human interaction.⁷ Moreover, in any society conflict and tension are intrinsically interwoven with cooperation and peace. Universality of conflict in social relations calls for an explanation of its sources. For Dahrendorf power is "unequally divided, and therefore a lasting source of friction."⁸ In any society dichotomous division of power into those in power and the powerless leads to a conflict of group interests:

Power always implies non-power and therefore resistance. The dialectic of power and resistance is the motive force of history. From the interests of those in power at a given time we can infer the interests of the powerless and with them the direction of change.⁹

Similarly to Dahrendorf, Coser and Lipset, alike, see the source of conflict in an unequal distribution of resources.¹⁰ Coser defines conflict as:

a struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflicting groups are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals.¹¹

Given the fact that "the incompatibility or difference may exist in reality or may only be perceived by the parties involved,"¹² it is important to highlight the role of

6 Ron J. Fisher, *The social psychology of intergroup and international conflict resolution* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990).

7 With regard to social conflict see, among other studies listed below, Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977[1859]); Georg Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations* (New York: Free Press, 1955); Tatu Vanhanen, "Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: a Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (January 1999): 57-58; Randall Collins, *Conflict sociology* (New York: Academic Press, 1975).

8 Ralf Dahrendorf, *Essays in the Theory of Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 138.

9 Dahrendorf, *Essays in the Theory of Society*, 138.

10 Seymour M. Lipset, "Social structure and social change," in *Approaches to the Study of Social Structure*, ed. Peter M. Blau (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

11 Lewis Coser, *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1968), 232.

people's emotions in conflict situations. Indeed, it is not solely the pattern of distribution that creates conflict but also relative deprivation, the feeling of a gap or discrepancy between "what one considers one's rights, dues and expectations, and what one has actually attained."¹³ According to Gurr, a strong belief that access to certain goods is denied to ethnic or other groups in society leads to frustration and ultimately, is the source of aggression.¹⁴ Sobkowiak puts forward the idea that emotions are nonrational factors in the social conflict. Psychological tensions, stereotyping, fears and animosity increase the level of radicalism leading to polarization, which takes on the following forms: 1) idealization or glorification and degradation and dehumanization of the adversary by adopting a strongly polarized black-and-white perception of the conflict, 2) rejection of information which stands in opposition to one's convictions, 3) disappearance of criticism toward information combined with a belief in its veracity if received from a center of authority, 4) wishful thinking which leads to assessing the situation and planning ones actions based on desires and not on rational analysis, 5) inability to construct long-term realistic plans but only short-term goals, 6) willingness to suffer the negative consequences of the fight and 7) rejection of compromise, mediation and arbitration.¹⁵

Nonetheless, Coser and Dahrendorf argue that conflict fulfils important functions in society and can play a positive role.¹⁶ Deutsch, on the other hand, clearly differentiates between a constructive and a destructive conflict.¹⁷ A conflict is likely to take a constructive course "if it is viewed as a mutual problem" and induces "open, honest communication; friendliness and readiness to be helpful to one another; enhancement of the other's power and well-being; and mutual trust and trustworthiness." However, communication designed to deceive; hostility and obstructiveness directed toward the other; attempts to weaken the power of the other and to keep or place the other in an inferior position; mutual suspicion and

12 Ron D. Fisher, *Sources of Conflict and Methods of Conflict Resolution* (2000) [database on-line]; available at www.aupeace.org/files/Fisher_SourcesofConflictandMethodsofResolution.pdf, last accessed on April 4, 2012.

13 Earl Corteh-Morgan, *Collective Political Violence* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 304.

14 Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics* 20 (Jan. 1968): 245-78.

15 Leszek Sobkowiak, "Konflikt Polityczny – analiza pojęcia" (Political conflict – an analysis), in *Studia z Teorii Polityki* (Studies in Political Theory), ed. Andrzej J. Jabłoński and Leszek Sobkowiak (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1999), 117-131.

16 Evert-Jan Vledder, *Conflict in the Miracle Stories* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 101.

17 Morton Deutsch, *Destructive Conflict and Oppression*, Note prepared for the "Workshop on Humiliation and Violent Conflict," November 18-19, 2004, Columbia University, NY.

untrustworthiness set the conflict on a destructive path, which is damaging for all groups involved in the conflict.

Conflict is a complicated and a dynamic phenomenon; hence an appropriate framework for conflict assessment and conflict resolution should be helpful not only to dissect its elements but also to show their interplay in an interactive manner. Nonetheless, most approaches focus on conflict resolution and present a less thorough analysis of conflict elements.¹⁸ Out of the many frameworks that exist the works of Sandole, Wehr as well as Wilmot and Hocker seem to be best suited for the purpose. Sandole's comprehensive mapping of conflict and conflict resolution is a three pillar based approach, which focuses on understanding the conflict (first pillar), conflict causes and conditions (pillar two) and third party interventions (pillar three).¹⁹ Wehr's conflict mapping guide is intended to be a universal model covering "the full range of conflict types from interpersonal to international levels."²⁰ The guide requires a description of conflict history, context, parties, issues, dynamics, alternative routes to solutions as well as conflict regulation potential.

The Hocker-Wilmot conflict assessment guide builds on Wehr's conflict mapping guide. However, it is composed of a series of questions, which are useful for an in-depth analysis of specific aspects of the conflict or to find gaps in information about the conflict. The guide includes: the nature of the conflict and its triggering events; the attitudes each party holds toward the conflict and each other; goals, the distribution and use of power, tactics and attempted solutions. For the purpose of this text, elements from Hocker-Wilmot's framework were adopted. This framework is less extensive than Wehr's but more detailed than Sandole's. Most importantly, due to its interpersonal focus, it allows for an in-depth enquiry into the problems of communication as well as reality creation among the parties involved in the conflict. Hocker-Wilmot's question-based approach is useful and appropriate for ethnographic work.

3. Nature of the Conflict

In the Hocker-Wilmot's framework, an overview of the nature of the conflict is composed of analysis of the historical context of the conflict, including the ongoing relationships between the conflict groups and other external events, as well as "triggering events" that brought the conflict into mutual awareness. Although in this

18 Cathryn Q. Thurston, "Developing a Comprehensive Framework for Conflict Analysis: Sources, Situation, Attitudes, Group Maintenance, Escalation (SSAGE)," paper presentation, International Studies Association Annual Meeting, 2008, forthcoming, University of Michigan Press.

19 Dennis Sandole, "A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach," *Peace and Conflict Studies* 5 (1998).

20 Paul Wehr, *Conflict Regulation* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979).

particular framework conflict elements are included in the overview of the conflict, we decided to present them in a separate section for greater clarity.

3.1. Exogenous and Endogenous Causes of the Conflict

The Sunni and Shia split in Islam, although dating back to the death of the Prophet Muhammad, has acquired a new dimension in recent years due to changing geopolitics in the Middle East, namely the growing sphere of influence of Iranian Shia Islam. Apart from being a stronghold of Shi'ism, which largely sets it apart in the Middle East, Iran is characterized by a distinct culture and language. Iranians form a separate ethnic group, unlike their Arab counterparts, which provides them with individual sense of identity and with unique aspirations in the region. These ambitions were strengthened by the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and emergence of the first Shia-dominated Arab state²¹, Iran's involvement in sectarian developments in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and the Gaza Strip²² as well as the development of its nuclear program. Iranian influence is considered to be a major challenge for Arab countries in the Gulf region that have substantial Shia populations.

Together with Iran, these areas form what is called the "Shia crescent" where Iran's influence is believed to penetrate beyond its official borders. The changing geopolitics in the region led to a reaffirmation of Shia identity throughout the Middle East. Shias began a struggle for a greater share of power as well as intensified claims for their economic and religious rights. Within this context, it is commonly assumed that Shias, often treated as second class citizens, may be easily susceptible to Iranian influence, which poses questions about their loyalty to Sunni rulers. This phenomenon is especially worrisome for the Sunni rulers of Bahrain, where Shias are estimated to be 60-70% of the population. Persian occupation of Bahrain lasted from 1602 to 1783. The Al Khalifas managed to take control of Bahrain from the Persians at the end of the 18th century and consolidated their rule by series of treaties with Britain. Britain, which controlled Bahrain until 1971 when Bahrain declared independence, acted simultaneously as a protector to the Al Khalifas. Indeed, Iran was the most important contender to this area. In 1970 Shah Pahlavi unsuccessfully reasserted the Iranian claim to Bahrain.²³ In the absence of Britain, Al Khalifas strengthened ties with the USA. Bahrain became the headquarters of the US Navy's Fifth Fleet, which became another challenge in the eyes of Iran.

21 Vali Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 185.

22 Mehmet Ödütçü, "Turkey: A Major Regional Power to Engage or Confront Iran," *Insight Turkey* 9 (2007): 113-114.

23 Yitzhak Nakash, *Reaching for Power: The Shi'a in the Modern Arab World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 54.

The relations between Bahraini Sunnis and Bahraini Shias have been often branded in binarist terms of the conqueror and the conquered. Al Khalifas who arrived to Bahrain from the mainland were followed by Sunni families from the Nejd who settled subsequently in Bahrain. Since that time, the split between the Shia and Sunni population has been a reason for tensions. It has been noted that Arab Shia who are the indigenous inhabitants of the islands perpetuate the memory of the conquest and subsequent subservience.²⁴ Despite tensions, co-operation between Sunni and Shia populations existed in the 20th century as both sects pushed for political and economic reforms and jointly formed opposition movements during the British mandate.²⁵ After obtaining independence the stalled political reforms under Emir Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa (1961-1999) brought Shia and Sunni opposition even closer.²⁶ In 1973 the very first constitution of Bahrain stipulated that the legislative power would be vested in a unicameral parliament elected in general elections. The first elections to the parliament took place in 1973. However, two years after its establishment, the Bahraini Parliament was dissolved for almost 30 years. Lack of consent related to the issues of foreign policy, the US naval base presence in Bahrain as well as the State Security Law led to split between parliamentarians and the Emir Isa Bin Salman Bin Hamad Al Khalifa (1961-1999). Consequently, Bahrain was ruled singlehandedly by the Emir under the state of emergency law.

The end of 20th century marked a change in Bahraini politics with the ascension to throne of Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. In 2000 the new ruler initiated a plan to establish the National Action Charter. The document was submitted afterwards for approval in a national referendum and was overwhelmingly accepted by society with 98,4 % Bahrainis voting in its favor. The opposition was pleased with the announcement of reforms. Shia clerics called on their followers to stop skirmishes and remain calm.²⁷ On December 16, 2002 Bahrain became a kingdom. However the initial euphoria soon turned into disappointment. A parliament was re-established but as a bicameral body with solely the Council of Representatives, the lower house, elected by universal suffrage. In comparison to the Constitution of 1973, the role of the parliament was reduced. The upper house of the parliament, selected directly by the king, would approve bills proposed by the lower house before they are implemented. Moreover, ultimately the king would have the right to

24 Laurence Louër, *Transnational Shia Politics, Political and Religious Networks in the Gulf* (London, Hurst/New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 20.

25 Munira Fakhro, "The Uprising in Bahrain: an Assessment," in *The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security and Religion*, ed. Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997) 170.

26 Fakhro, "The Uprising in Bahrain: an Assessment," 174.

27 International Crisis Group. "Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge," *Middle East Report* 40 (May 2005).

veto all bills. In a show of discontent, Shia political associations boycotted the first parliamentary elections in 2002. This step allowed Sunni candidates to dominate the parliament. All in all, the controlled liberalization of the country ultimately led to a split within the society. Sunnis almost overwhelmingly backed the new reforms, while Shias called for further progressive amendments.

The elections in 2006 brought a change of strategy as Al Wefaq, the largest Shia opposition group, announced its participation. The elections were marked by disputes over distribution of electoral wards. Shia opposition denounced gerrymandering that would grant Sunnis advantage in the upcoming elections. Indeed, while Al Wefaq did not gain a majority of seats in the parliament it did become the largest party in the parliament with 17 seats out of 40. Moreover, participation in the parliament was not a particularly fruitful experience. For instance, in the years 2006-2007, 25 out of 27 bills proposed by the lower house of the parliament were rejected by the upper house.²⁸ In 2006 relations were further inflamed by a leaked report that allegedly implicated governmental officials in a planned naturalization of Sunni citizens to weaken the Shia majority.²⁹

Participation of the opposition in the current political system may have been a disappointment, which led to the formation of splinter groups that boycotted the existing political system.³⁰ In the years 2008-2010 protests organized by the opposition intensified and led to violent clashes with the police. Those cumulated tensions cast a shadow over the 2010 parliamentary elections. Al Wefaq used a parliamentary debate to push for further democratic reforms. On the other hand, opposition circles outside of the political system applied different strategies. Youth set burning tires on the roads as makeshift blockades. Rumors of a planned electoral sabotage by the opposition were circulated. The situation seemed to slip out of control of the governmental forces. Indeed, the legitimacy of the political system relied heavily on the elections. In September 2010 official sources announced foiling of a terrorist plot to topple Al Khalifa dynasty. Several members of the opposition were arrested.

3.2. Triggering Event

The successes of Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions provided the Bahraini opposition with an opportunity to at last bring international attention to Bahrain and gain sympathy for their cause. The organizers of the national "Day of Rage" scheduled on February 14, 2011 held a strong belief that a "domino effect" would occur in the

28 Mohammed Al A'ali, "MPs furious!," *Gulf Daily News*, 21 February 2007.

29 Mahjoob Zahid and Mohammed Zweiri, "The victory of al-Wefaq: The rise of Shiite politics in Bahrain" Research Institute for European and American Studies (April 2007).

30 Jane Kinninmont, "Bahrain: Assessing al-Wefaq's Parliamentary Experiment," *Arab Reform Bulletin (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)* 5 (2007).

Middle East and eventually bring changes in Bahrain. It is important, however, to stress the differences between the Bahraini "Day of Rage" and the other upheavals of the Arab Spring. To begin with, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya or Syria the popular uprisings came unexpectedly. Usually they were preceded by years or even decades of almost complete submission to the ruling circles. On the contrary, in Bahrain upheavals are not a novelty. As a matter of fact, since the country's independence, Bahrain was sporadically shaken by waves of unrest as Bahraini opposition became more vocal in their quest for rights in the 2000's. Thus, the 2011 uprising in Bahrain is part of a much longer and continuous pattern of unrest. Nonetheless, the Bahraini "Day of Rage" was inspired by the protest strategies applied in other Arab countries. Instead of direct confrontations with governmental forces, the organizers opted for a peaceful occupation of the centrally located Pearl Roundabout. Whole families with children moved to the area where they remained squatting in tents.

Furthermore, the Bahraini upheaval stands out since it was almost unavoidable not to analyze it in sectarian terms. Although the protestors strongly declined to identify the upheaval specifically as a Shia protest and the protest was supported by Sunni pro-reformers, the unfolding events led to a polarization of society that accentuated sectarian belongings. The violence that ensued during the crackdown of security forces as well as the deployment of GCC military troops, mostly from Saudi Arabia, to quell the upheaval, accentuated the sectarian dimension of the protest. Gradually all citizens were forced to take a stand by supporting or opposing the revolutionary movement, and their stand was based on religious affiliations.

The sectarian dimension of the Bahraini upheaval was accentuated on the international scene as Shia populations in the Middle East responded by condemning Al Khalifas, while Sunni governments supported the ruling dynasty. Iranian authorities observed the popular uprising in Bahrain closely and with an expressed sympathy for the movement. The crackdown that led to deaths of several protestors sparked an outrage in Iran. Criticism grew further after the deployment of GCC troops into Bahrain. On several occasions, Iranian governmental authorities warned against "foreign" interference in Bahrain. The row escalated with expulsion of Iranian diplomatic representatives from Bahrain and vice versa. Furthermore, Bahrain accused Iran of directly supporting the protestors in an attempt to overthrow the monarchy. The idea of an imminent Iranian intervention was reiterated in the Bahraini media, creating an atmosphere of suspicion. The events in Bahrain reverberated also among Shia populations in Iraq and Lebanon leading to criticism of Bahraini authorities by, among others, Nuri al-Maliki, Iraqi Shia PM, and by Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah. Demonstrations in support of the Bahraini opposition were staged by Shia populations in Iran, Lebanon, Iraq as well as in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

The developments on the international scene and within Bahrain led to a drastic increase of antagonism and to a dramatic radicalization of opinions. The sectarian dimension of the 2011 protests became paramount, while the divide within Bahraini society grew wider.

4. Conflict Elements

This section is essential to understand the escalation of the social conflict in the aftermath of the uprising of February 2011. The presentation of the perception of incompatible goals is followed by an overview of the evolution of attitudes as well as strategies employed by each group involved in the conflict.

4.1. Goals

Given the fact that goals are an essential part of a conflict, it is important to analyze the Bahraini "Day of Rage" from this point of view of incompatible goals perceived by groups involved in the conflict. Wilmot and Hocker differentiate three types of goals in human interaction, namely, content goals, relational goals and face-saving goals.³¹ Content goals are easily recognizable, concrete objectives that each party involved in the conflict holds. On the other hand, relational goals, which are often the real cause of the conflict, relate to hierarchy of parties involved. Relational goals usually underlie the content goals and include issues such as fairness, justice and equal treatment. The third type of goals is centered on protection of one's identity. The threat of losing important identities arouses fear. Due to this threat, damage to the other party becomes then a goal by itself. The content goals of the "Day of Rage" protestors were economic and political. However the relational goals were the real motor of the conflict.

The perceived discrimination of the majority has been a leitmotif of all the opposition demonstrations in the past decade. On the other hand, the "Day of Rage" created an identity threat among the government supporters. This face-saving goal, aimed at protection of the Sunni identity of the country, led to a spiraling violence among citizens. The violent attack of the governmental forces on the opposition aroused a similar threat among protestors, who acted in retaliation.

31 Wilmot and Hocker, *Interpersonal Conflict, Seventh Edition*, 63.

Table 1: Typology of goals in the conflict situation in Bahrain

Type	Subtype	Detailed description	
		Opposition	Government supporters
Content	Political	Change of the political system	Status quo
	Economic	Equal share of economic resources; greater access to economic opportunity	Status quo
Relational		Putting an end to perceived discrimination of the Shia population	Status quo
Face-saving		Continuation of the protests; inciting international pressure on the Bahraini governments	Preservation of the Sunni identity of the country

The following analysis presents an overview of the evolution of the goals of each side of the conflict alongside the development of the situation. The opposition put forward political and economic demands. Those content goals were in fact relational since they related to a perceived discrimination of the masses. Firstly, lack of genuine participation in power and decision-making prompted the February 2011 protestors to again put forward the demands for political reform. The opposition called for the abolition of the 2002 constitution; establishment of a genuine constitutional monarchy, where the parliament would have exclusive legislative rights as well as the formation of a new interim government. These demands were justified by a long struggle to obtain full political rights in the kingdom. The 2002 Constitution was considered by the opposition to be just a democratic facade. It satisfied the demands for democratization in the eyes of the Western allies but, in reality, it hardly allowed for any power-sharing.

However, as the negotiations prolonged, the most radical opposition groups insisted on abolishing the monarchy and installing a republic. Secondly, the Shia population had long complained about their economic hardships in the kingdom due to unemployment, low wages and a rising cost of living. Although reasons for this state of affairs are multiple, Bahrain and other GCC countries represent a peculiar case among rapidly developing countries. Growing labor migration to Bahrain profoundly changed the structure of the job market and indirectly affected the local population. Foreign employees almost entirely dominate the private sector. A gap between the public and private sector exists in terms of income and benefits. Low wages and hard working conditions deter Bahrainis from employment in the private sector. These factors were held responsible for structural unemployment among the local population. In 2001, unemployment reached, according to official statistics, a record level of 16% among Bahrainis and caused a

disenchantment of the population.³² Dissatisfaction was significant especially among the Bahraini Shia.³³ Even though labor market reforms initiated in 2006 managed to curb down unemployment to 3.5% in 2009³⁴, these measures did not entirely calm the situation. Shias continued to complain that low paid, unskilled jobs in private sector were offered primarily to them. On the contrary, governmental jobs that deliver higher wages and yield additional benefits were allegedly distributed according to sectarian preference.³⁵ Moreover, Shias pointed out discrimination in the army and police force, where employment was given to naturalized foreigners. Such posts are considered sensitive due to a strong belief in misplaced Shia loyalties. Overall, Shias believe themselves to be a socially disadvantaged group.

It is important to note that the calls for a popular uprising in Bahrain were not unanimous among Bahraini citizens. The occupation of the Pearl Roundabout on February 14, 2011 also mobilized a movement in support of the ruling family. For the pro-government camp, the opposition's quest for political rights was interpreted as a direct attack on the Sunni identity of the country. Not only it was understood in sectarian terms but also it was met with growing defensiveness. Greater leniency towards the opposition and rising Shia influence in politics would be considered a sign of weakness of the ruling family and a step towards imminent danger. Maintaining the status quo in Bahrain was far more important than political liberties. Religious belonging in Bahrain was an already-existing social cleavage and the suspicion of Shias acting as a "fifth column" to promote Iranian interests in Bahrain surfaced in the perception of the common people.³⁶

The suspicions about Shia loyalties are in part due to the Shia structure of religious leadership (*marja'iyya*). Bahraini Shia religious authorities look up to Shia authority figures abroad; specifically, these authorities include Ayatollah Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah in Lebanon, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Iraq, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Shirazi in Qom and Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrasi in Karbala. The belief that Bahrain's Shias take not only religious but also political orders from abroad is, in part, a result of this arrangement. Consequently, as the opposition demands hardened, the idea of a "Shia takeover" using Iran's help was commonly expressed as a real threat among Sunnis. At that time King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa had become a cherished symbol. His

32 Duraid AlBaik, "Bahrain takes steps to curb unemployment among its citizens," *Gulf News*, 1 October 2007.

33 Edward Burke, "Bahrain: Reaching a Threshold Project on Freedom of Association in the Middle East and North Africa," *FRIDE*, 2008.

34 Central Informatics Organization. *Statistics* (2009) [database on-line]; available at www.cio.gov.bh.

35 International Crisis Group, *Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge*, 12.

36 Laurence Louër, "The Political Impact of Labor Migration in Bahrain," *City & Society* 20 (2008): 32-53.

photographs were displayed on cars, windows and billboards, where he symbolized not only the current political system but also a Sunni Arab identity of the country. On the other hand, the banners of Hezbollah and Iran's Ayatollah Khamenei, carried sometimes during the protests, were for the Sunnis a confirmation of their worst fears. The real intents of the "Day of Rage" movement were further questioned due to comments by Shia religious leaders abroad. For instance, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati of Iran called Bahraini Shias on March 18, 2011 to keep up protests and resist "the enemy" until death.³⁷

The framing of the conflict played an important role in the further developments.

When we frame a conflict, we develop interpretations about what the conflict is about, why it is occurring, the motivations of the partners involved, and how the conflict should be settled.³⁸

The pro-government party framed the conflict in sectarian terms which was not the case for the protestors who emphasized the nonsectarian character of the uprising. Even though Sunnis also participated in the opposition movement; this element was ignored by the general Sunni public. Consequently, the adopted frame led to voices denigrating the Shia denomination of Islam as "deviant" and holding the religion responsible for the acts of the protestors rather than people who, implicitly, were manipulated by it. On the other hand, the opposition adopted a "diagnostic frame" by highlighting the unfairness of their current situation and by portraying themselves as a group suffering from unjust treatment by the pro-government party.

4.2. Evolution of Adversarial Attitudes

Researchers³⁹ stress that as the conflict develops psycho-sociological changes occur among the adversaries. Groups become highly polarized and boundaries between "us" and "them," are emphasized. Strengthening of boundaries between groups involved is usually followed by a reduction or a breakdown of communication. This, in turn, may lead to negative stereotyping, distortion of facts as the parties

37 "Iran cleric urges Bahraini Shiites to keep up protests," *YaLibnan*, 18 March 2011; available at <http://www.yalibnan.com/2011/03/18/iran-cleric-urges-bahraini-shiites-to-keep-up-protests>, last accessed on April 4, 2012.

38 Barbara Gray, "Framing of environmental disputes," in *Making sense of intractable environmental disputes: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Roy J. Lewicki, Barbara Gray and Michael Elliott (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2003). 11-34, 12.

39 For example: Elanor Kamans, Sabine Otten and Ernestine H. Gordijn, "Threat and power in intergroup conflict: How threat detremines emotional and behavioral reactions in powerless groups," *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 14 (2010): 293-310.; Barbara-Ann Mullin and Michael A. Hogg, "Dimensions of subjective uncertainty in social identification and minimal intergroup discrimination," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 37 (1998): 345-365.

"evaluate their own attributes more positively than those of the other group"⁴⁰ and derogatory rumors spread that escalate the conflict further. Finally, each group may dehumanize its opponents, which allows them to easily resort to coercion. This process "makes any moral norms against harming other human beings seem irrelevant. Those excluded from moral norms can be viewed simply as inferior or as evil, perverted, or criminal,"⁴¹ which is enough of a justification for harming or destroying the adversary.⁴² It is important to understand that resorting to coercion leads almost inescapably to retaliation, thus violence creates a spiral that produces more violence.

The presentation of "us" and "them", based on an analysis of Bahraini social media, clearly illustrates the polarization of the Bahraini society. Protestors and their opponents, construct a strong sense of belonging surrounding their cause. It is highlighted by the use of pronouns such as "we", "our" in opposition to "they" and "their". Both groups present themselves as victims and the killed on each side are called "martyrs". The Other is often described using labels. Those supporting the government are often referred to as "slaves" and "cowards". On the other hand, the opposition is branded as "terrorists" who place their loyalties with "Iran" and "Hezbollah". Thus protestors are accused of being "traitors" who secretly "gather weapons" to carry out instructions of foreign powers. Moreover, each of the groups presents itself as being under "attack", while the Other constitutes a "threat". The account of the events and the presentation of the events vary widely.

The adversaries and the developments are analyzed in black-and-white terms. Rumors, negative stereotyping and the distortion of facts to fit the perceived scenario are common techniques employed. Ultimately, they lead to dehumanization of the adversary who is perceived as a category and not as an individual. The pro-government camp accused the protestors of being selfish and inconsiderate in their quest for reforms. As the protest took place in a central area of Bahrain and later spread to the Salmaniya public hospital, government supporters claimed that the lives of common people were put into jeopardy. Apart from complaints about blocking main highways and limiting movement in the country, patients not involved in the protests were allegedly unable to receive medical treatment in the public hospital. The integrity of medical doctors was thought to be compromised as well, as Sunnis believed that preference in treatment was given to Shia protestors over other patients. These allegations have brought into scope the issue of human rights. The violations of human rights in Bahrain, such as lack of

40 Louis Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007) 32.

41 Michelle Maiese, *Destructive Escalation* (September 2003); available at <http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/escalation>.

42 Louis Kriesberg, "Identity Issues," *Peace Prints: South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding* 3 (Winter 2010): 2-11, 4.

transparency in the judicial system, torture of political prisoners, denial of free speech and discrimination, to quote just a few issues, have been widely denounced by the opposition.⁴³ Excessive use of violence against the protestors that led to several casualties led to the ultimate condemnation of the regime in the eyes of the opposition. It is interesting to note that the pro-government camp strongly believed that human rights were used as a pretext to cover up "criminal acts" committed by the revolutionary movement. Indeed, another point of discontent deals with the truthfulness of the portrayal of the events by the activists themselves and by the media. Both groups accuse each other of providing a one-sided version of the story, sometimes falsifying reality.

The protestors point out the brutality of the security forces that left a number of protestors injured or killed. They also underline aggression towards medical personnel and unarmed civilians including women and children. Uploaded videos and pictures serve as testimony to violence on both sides of the conflict. The pro-government sites present a completely different image. The protestors are shown provoking the security forces, carrying weapons and themselves involved in acts of brutality against the police and expatriates from South Asia. Some comments go as far to state that protestors used fake blood to present events as more dramatic and to manipulate the international opinion. Since these versions differ considerably, adversaries accuse each other of editing footages to serve their own purposes or even of fabricating the videos entirely. Moreover, both groups denounce the national or international media. The protestors claim the national media does not give them justice and "is lying." Their opponents criticize coverage of the events by some international media as completely biased.

Consequently, the issue of peacefulness is raised. Both sides present themselves as peace-loving people who seek protection of their just rights. The anti-government side seeks "freedom," while the pro-government side wants "peace." In addition, Facebook comments take a racial twist. Since the security forces involved include a large number of employees from South Asia and other Arab countries, they are branded by protestors as "mercenaries" who "would do anything to get a passport." The pro-government side presents them as "brave" people who perform their job, while risking their lives. This is shown in contrast to protestors themselves, who are ridiculed as having a "picnic" and engaging in immoral behavior at the Pearl Roundabout.

Even though in certain instances social media contributors underline that they make no generalization towards a specific religious or ethnic group since some of their members may be misjudged in this way, the emotional factor plays a further role in

43 Bahrain Centre for Human Rights documents the cases of human rights abuse; at this time the website of the Centre www.bahrainrights.org is blocked in Bahrain

splitting public opinion. Pictures and video clips taken at funerals of the "martyrs" on both sides of the conflict, often portraying grieving families, cause uneasy sensations among viewers and may easily stir up feelings of revenge and reinforcing the threat of backlash. It has been noted that "pain is likely to justify renewed struggle" and is unlikely to lead to compromise. Moreover, "justified struggles call for greater sacrifices, which absorb increased pain and strengthen determination."⁴⁴

4.3. Strategies

The tactics both groups employed in the conflict evolved over time. The strategy of peaceful occupation put in motion by the protestors was met with coercion. As the authorities cleared the Pearl Roundabout, protestors who tried to return to occupation of the spot were shot upon. At this point, the situation may have seemed contained by the authorities. However, studies suggest that in the presence of repression, protestors become polarized and even moderates are pushed to espouse radical ideas and resort to violence.⁴⁵ Moreover, as explained beforehand, instead of containment, violence leads to further sacrifice. It is not a coincidence that many members of the opposition started to wear flags with inscriptions "Ready to die for Bahrain". Throughout the uprising negative stereotyping that led to dehumanization of adversaries intensified and ultimately the country was plunged deeper into sectarian strife.

The tensions escalated and eventually led to violent sectarian clashes in the areas inhabited jointly by members of both sects. The district of Hamad Town was affected first on March 3, 2011. Tensions have existed there since 2008. The area was particularly vulnerable to instability because it is home to large numbers of naturalized Bahrainis. The naturalization of foreigners is a touchy subject for the Shia. The factors that contributed to the clashes were thus particularly salient. However, the unrest quickly spread to other districts. Subsequently, neighbors set up vigils and security checkpoints to prevent strangers from entering their districts. Meanwhile the unrest affected public schools jointly attended by Sunni and Shia students. The violence and devastation at the University of Bahrain led to the temporary closure of all schools and universities in the country. Several cases of attacks on foreign laborers of Asian origin, purportedly carried out by protestors, were reported in the media.

The interpretation of the events presented herein determined the behavior in the aftermath of the "Day of Rage." When allegations that Hezbollah had trained

44 I. William Zartman, "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments," *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1 (September 2001): 8-18.

45 Nicholas Sambanis and Annalisa Zinn, *From protest to violence: An analysis of conflict escalation with an Application to Self-Determination Movements*. Yale University, 2004, Manuscript.

Bahraini activists were voiced the pro-government camp saw the use of force as the only option to end the alleged terrorist plot. At this point, the pro-government camp was convinced of an alleged "Shia takeover"⁴⁶ and welcomed the arrival of GCC troops to restore order. For the protestors, their presence meant foreign interference and "occupation" of the country. It is interesting to note that, after the crackdown of March 17, 2011, rumors about a foiled Shia plot were circulated by word of mouth. One version claimed that Iran was due to send weapons by sea to Bahrain under cover of night. Another version spoke about a weapons arsenal containing swords and machine guns discovered somewhere in the Shia coastal village. This interpretation stands in sharp contrast to international analyses, which assessed that in actual fact the Iranian influence in Bahraini protests was rather limited.⁴⁷

5. Attempted Solution

The National Dialogue that was supposed to bring the opposition and the pro-government camps together proved to be a failure. Due to the dehumanization and de-individualization of the adversary, the idea of a dialogue with the opposition may not have been supported to begin with. A 50 year old Sunni man told me that he could not understand how the opposition asked to negotiate with the government whom they wanted to depose. He mentioned that it was ridiculous to just ask the royal family to leave. Consequently, after the crackdown at the Pearl Roundabout and the spread of the conflict into the Salmaniya Hospital, pro-government citizens did not deplore the use of violence and in general, did not express any pity for the injured and killed. On the contrary, a number of informants stated that, in their opinion, protestors should not have been even allowed to use the public healthcare facilities. Since they acted against the government, they should not take advantage of the government-sponsored healthcare system. Furthermore, the opinions became even more uncompromising.

The repressions began leading to imprisonment, suspension and dismissals of employees, withdrawal of study scholarships and the destruction of Shia mosques, which the authorities judged illegally constructed, but still the pro-government camp saw these actions as insufficient. The release of political prisoners and reinstatement of employees that followed the initial crackdown did not satisfy these demands. The protestors were branded as "traitors" who deserve punishment for their actions. In the common opinion of the pro-government camp, the government was overindulgent and it was high time to take firm action so as not to encourage

46 Rebecca Torr, "Masked thugs attack homes," *Gulf Daily News*, 16 March 2011.

47 Babak Rahimi, *Special Commentary: Iran and the Bahraini Uprising*, (The Jamestown Foundation, 2011) [database on-line]; available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37611, last accessed on April 4, 2012.

future revolutionary movements. As an old Sunni man explained "the government takes them [Shias] to prison; then there is amnesty and they are let out and then they start to do the same thing again."

Furthermore, throughout the protests, the attention of the Sunni public shifted towards the economic effect of the unrest in the country. A 60 year old Sunni taxi driver stated that, similarly to the protestors, he was not rich but he preferred to live in peace than to create chaos and ruin the country. The cancellation of the Formula 1 race in March 2011, which is a source of lucrative profit for many businesses, was a punch to Bahraini economy. A general feeling of discontent was expressed among the government supporters. Widely repeated rumors claimed that Shia businesses allegedly profited during the unrest, while purposely plunging the rest of the economy into crisis. The Jawad Business Group, among others, was accused of distributing free food on the Pearl Roundabout, while making additional profits by selling their products during the protests. Some respondents even believed that the "powerful" Shias paid the protestors to stay on the Pearl Roundabout and continue demonstrations. A call for a boycott of Shia-owned businesses was launched.⁴⁸ Throughout the unrest several outlets were attacked and vandalized in areas inhabited by Sunnis. On the other hand, the anti-government camp initiated a campaign to boycott the Formula 1 event in Bahrain in 2012. The protestors believe that staging of an international event in Bahrain would allow the government to promote its image, while international opinion would turn a blind eye to their hardships. At this point, the protest movement was seen by the pro-government camp as an obstacle to the country's economic development.

6. Conclusion

While it is too early to fully appreciate the outcomes of the Arab Spring, this case study provides an insight into the unanticipated consequences of the social upheavals of 2011 in the Middle East. Avoiding simplistic interpretations, this paper offers a comprehensive illustration of the mechanisms responsible for the widening Shia-Sunni divide in the Kingdom of Bahrain. Current Western analyses of the Bahraini upheaval fall into two categories, namely, description of the upheaval as a brutally crushed pro-democracy movement or as an Iranian-backed insurgency.⁴⁹

48 A petition is still available on-line at <http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/bjb1/>, last accessed on April 4, 2012.

49 Compare, for example, comments of Finian Cunningham, "Syria, Bahrain: A Tale of Two Uprisings... One Fabricated, the Other Forgotten," *Global Research*, March 19, 2012; available at <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=29854>, last accessed on April 4, 2012, and Mitchell A. Belfer, "The 'Arab Spring' as Winter Descends," *National Review Online*, January 18, 2012; available at www.nationalreview.com/articles/288392/arab-spring-winter-descends-mitchell-belfer, last accessed on April 4, 2012.

Nonetheless, both approaches, due to their narrow scope, fail to assess the importance of psychological factors in conflict situations. The Bahraini "Day of Rage" opposed not solely the opposition versus the authorities but led to a society-wide confrontation. This paper allows readers to fully understand the motivations of the groups involved in the conflict, their interpretation of events and subsequently, their actions. Consequently, it fulfils the need for a holistic overview of conflict situations. Holistic approaches to conflict resolution and peace building have been stressed as the most effective, yet still sporadically employed strategy.⁵⁰

It is clear that the "Day of Rage" escalated sectarian strife in Bahraini society. In this paper we presented an analysis of the social conflict using elements from Hocker and Wilmot's conflict assessment model. We concluded that Bahrainis interpreted recent developments depending on their sectarian affiliations. The real challenge lies in the fact that, as these interpretations reveal more and more conflicting perspectives, the gap between both sects widens. This polarization has already led to creation of mental barriers, judgments and prejudices that prevent co-operation and peaceful co-existence in society. Eventually, there exists a danger of radicalism, which has already surfaced in social media portals. The escalation of the social conflict in Bahrain induces, what Deutsch describes as a destructive, competitive process of conflict resolution. The following quote of a Bahraini "They [Shias] are not human they are criminals. [...] We never can get along with them" is a worrisome outcome of the "Day of Rage" upheaval tensions. This change in mentality marks a sharp contrast to past experiences of Sunni–Shia co-operation in Bahrain. As Sunnis and Shias look at the past events from different perspectives, the question is whether they can share a common future. The question is all the more important since socio-psychological barriers "serve as a catalyst for continuation of the conflict and in fact [operate] as part of the vicious circle in the intractable conflict."⁵¹ In fact, the dangers of the current situation include an inability to reach a common resolution, a state of continuous upheaval leading to a growing instability of the current political system, increasing militarization and resort to coercion. As the Bahraini uprising continues despite containment, it is vital to study further developments of the social conflict. Moreover, future studies are needed to assess the ability of the political system to evolve and create a stable basis for its legitimacy independent from sectarian divisions. As the system has been under a growing pressure from the opposition, the sectarian dimension of the conflict exacerbates its vulnerability given the fact that the crown is identified primarily with the Sunni part of the Bahraini society.

The limitations of this study stem from the adopted methods of ethnographic enquiry. Firstly, the scope of the study is limited in time. Given the continued

50 Catherine Barnes, *Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War & Building Peace* (The Hague: ECCP, 2006).

51 Bar-Tal and Halperin, "Socio-psychological barriers to conflict resolution," 232.

character of the social conflict in Bahrain and, possibly, changing patterns in group dynamics, the context of the research may be subject to change, thus the findings may need to be further evaluated. Secondly, the volatile situation in Bahrain, including but not limited to the months of February-June 2011, may have impacted equal access to informants from all backgrounds due to restrictions and monitoring of movement in the country. This article aims, however, at revealing the usually unknown or omitted aspect of the Bahraini uprising and at fostering further research. Future research directions may, for example, include measures of social polarization⁵²; analysis of development of civil society in Bahrain and its role in conflict resolution as well as possible limits to democratization of the regime.

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THE FALLACY OF *DE FACTO* INDEPENDENT CANDIDACY IN TANZANIA: A REJOINDER

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Abstract

The independent candidate question in Tanzania has, since 1992, remained a subject of debate among political parties, judiciary, parliament, executive, the attorney general's chamber, academics, civil societies, and election observers. The issue of this debate is whether or not independent candidates should be introduced in the electoral system. The ruling party and its government have been against the independent candidates on the ground that it would jeopardize the entire electoral system. The purpose of this article is twofold. First is to present my rejoinder to the issues raised by Frank Mateng'e's article "Protesting the Independent Candidacy in Tanzania's Elections: A Bona Fide Cause?" concerning one of my earlier works about the independent candidate issue in Tanzania. Second, I engage the contribution of Mateng'e to the independent candidate debates. This entails also interrogating his concept of "de facto independent candidacy".

Keywords: elections, de facto independent candidacy, Tanzania

1. Introduction

My 2011 article "'Join a Party or I cannot Elect You': The Independent Candidate Question in Tanzania"¹ had the independent candidate issue in Tanzania as central theme. I noted that since the introduction of multipartism in 1992, independent candidates are not allowed in Tanzania. This restriction has raised a debate that dominates multipartism and its efficacy in the country. There have been three major legal cases on independent candidates. In the first two cases, the High Court ruled in favor of independent candidate in 1994 and 2006. However, in the third case in 2010, the Court of Appeal, while subscribing to the need of independent candidates, nullified the previous judgments by the High Court on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to declare a constitutional provision to be unconstitutional; and that the independent candidate issue being political and not legal should be resolved by the parliament. Against this backdrop, I wrote an article based on two theses: 1) the Court of Appeal failed to exercise its mandate in administering justice and 2) such failure is attributed to the fear by the justices of the ruling party and its government.

1 The article was published in the *Central European University Political Science Journal*/Volume 6, No. 1, 111-137.

In recent years, scholars have developed interests to debate and publish on independent candidates. In his 2012 article², Frank Mateng'e raised issues critical of my publication which I am compelled to provide a clear direction. Thus, in this article, while I make a rejoinder to his responses, I proceed to examine his publication in line with the on-going debate on the independent candidate issue. The first section of this article covers my rejoinder and the second section re-examines Mateng'e's article in order to underline his contribution to the debate.

2. My Rejoinder

My article received three direct critiques: 1) a discrepancy between the title of my article and its content; 2) an absence of validity regarding the claims upon which the government/ruling party's reluctance to endorse independent candidacy is hinged and 3) the absence of explanations for how the judges are afraid of the ruling party and its government. All these issues are interrelated; however, addressing them separately allows me to elaborate on each of them.

2.1. *The Title of the Article and its Content*

The author of "De Facto Independent Candidacy" starts by saying that the title of my article was partially influenced by Justice Lugakingira's uneasiness with the contradictions in Article 20(4), 21(1) and 39(c) of the Tanzania's constitution. He continues that, in his ruling of the first petition on independent candidates in 1994, Lugakingira stated "you either belong to a political party or you have no right to participate" in the government.³ It is here where Mateng'e began to lose focus. For Lugakingira, "you either belong to a political party or you have no right to participate" was a mere restatement of the constitutional position. This could easily be seen by any layperson. If one reads my article in its entirety one will discover that the article took the concept of independent candidate and its development in Tanzania since 1961 when the country gained its independence. In my article I explicitly mentioned that independent candidates were constitutionally allowed until 1965 when the country became of one constitutional order. I proceeded to show that with the introduction of the Bill of Rights in the Tanzania's Constitution in 1984 and without deleting the old constitutional provision that required one to be a member of a political party in order to vie for a political office during elections, a new element stating that one can contest without necessarily being a member of a political party was adopted. Hence, this was the source of contradiction. On the eve of multipartism in 1992, Rev. Christopher Mtikila petitioned to the court praying for independent candidates in the Tanzania's electoral system as this was a

2 Frank Mateng'e, "Protesting the Independent Candidacy in Tanzania's Elections: A Bona Fide Cause?" *Journal of Politics and Law*, Volume 5, No.1 March 2012, 18-32.

3 Ibid., 22.

constitutional right. I also showed that there were three decided cases on independent candidates, two of which by the High Court in 1994 and 2006 and the third one by the Court of Appeal in 2010⁴. To rest my case, the title of my previous article was inspired by two things namely the constitutional development on the independent candidates since 1961 as well as the three landmark cases on the same matter. To add to my initial argument, the judgment of Lugakingira did not precede the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 but rather it was used as the sole document in reaching to his conclusion. It should be kept forth that the constitution is supreme.⁵ Hence, perceiving Lugakingira's position as a "catch-all" phenomenon – as Mateng'e does to the influence of my title - is a misinterpretation.

Having missed the point on the development of independent candidates in a broader context, Mateng'e was then out to sea by assessing that I defend the party-sponsored candidates against independent candidates. To let the author speak by himself, Mateng'e notes that "Makulilo's article implicitly suggests the electorate's preference for party-sponsored candidates to independent candidates".⁶ I would like to start by pointing out that not all that glitters is gold and a title is not always a synopsis of a scholarly work. My title being in quotation marks was a clear indication that something is artistically embedded in it. Therefore, to understand it required the reader to take into account the whole development of independent candidate in Tanzania. In the light of such a broader perspective, my simple interpretation was that it is the constitution which forces individuals to join a political party to qualify as candidates hence my title "Join a Party or I cannot Elect You". As can be noted, my title does not in any way indicate "electorate's preference for party-sponsored candidates to independent candidates" but rather the constitutional category of independent candidates.

It is here where Mateng'e failed to link the title of the article and its contents to my position to the independent candidate question. It is not clear as to why he subscribes to the position that my article favors party-sponsored candidates. Surprisingly, I am cited as one of the defenders of independent candidates.⁷ To a positive side, Mateng'e identifies the clear objective of my article which is to examine the validity of the verdict made by the Court of Appeal when stating "However, in the text the article entirely devotes its attention on examining the validity of the verdict made by the Court of Appeal in respect of independent candidacy".⁸ This objective does not go against the title, but substantiates it and

4 Makulilo, "Join a Party or I cannot Elect You", 118-126.

5 Shivji, Issa G. *Let the People Speak: Tanzania Down the Road to Neo-Liberalism*. Dakar: Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA), 2006.

6 Mateng'e, "Protesting the Independent Candidacy", 22.

7 *Ibid.*, 18.

8 *Ibid.*, 22.

approaches the issue quite likely from a different perspective than envisaged by my critique. Accordingly, the title is fully consistent with the content of my article.

2.2. *Shifting the Goalposts?*

In light of the previous argument, Mateng'e's claim that my article did not deal with "de facto independent candidate" is not supported by evidence. I am directly accused of making "no attempt to test the visibility of de facto independent candidacy in Tanzania. Against this drawback, the present paper employs data from the 2010 elections to demonstrate a scenario of *de facto* independent candidacy in Tanzania".⁹ Following the goal of my article, I did not use the hypothetical concept of "de facto independent candidate". Consequently, it cannot be a criticism since I have never promised to discuss it, leave alone mentioning it. In that respect, the goal of my study was misinterpreted. Since it is not possible to deal with everything in a single piece of work, any scholarly work is limited in terms of scope. Similarly, Mateng'e provides the scope of his work which excludes Zanzibar:

For analytical purposes Zanzibar is excluded because unlike Tanzania mainland, its voting pattern has, since 1992 when the multi-party system was reintroduced in Tanzania, been influenced by party orientation. The electoral outcomes of Zanzibar reflect partisan politics more than anything else. This is especially so due to the consistent correspondence of the electoral support accorded to the respective parties' candidates in both the parliamentary and presidential elections as well as those of the House of Representatives.¹⁰

From the quoted paragraph, I wonder whether the exclusion of Zanzibar is an asset while I was accused of committing a blunder by not discussing a "de facto independent candidate". Returning to the issue of case selection, Mateng'e superficially argues his scope analysis to mainland Tanzania. His premise for such exclusion is the partisanship as reflected in the electoral outcome. This raises a methodological question: how is partisanship defined and measured? To Mateng'e, it simply refers to electoral support for a political party. The same can therefore be measured by counting votes obtained by a political party and that partisanship is considered to prevail if and only if such votes correspond to different levels of political posts for the same political party. In the case of Zanzibar, the levels are the president, Member of Parliament, and the House of Representatives.

As noted elsewhere in this rejoinder, Mateng'e is dealing with the issue of "voting behavior" in which case such behavior precedes electoral outcome. If electoral outcome is to form the basis of partisanship as Mateng'e suggests, it is imperative to underscore issues such as party policy, ideology, membership and affiliation.

9 *Ibid.*, 22.

10 *Ibid.*, 18-19.

Mateng'e does not provide any evidence on how and the extent to which such correspondence in electoral outcome is a reflection of party policy, ideology, membership or affiliation. As such, his definition fails to distinguish between which votes were cast based on partisan and other non-partisan factors. As is well known, Zanzibar's politics is very complex and elections have most of the time led to political violence.

A rigorous analysis of Zanzibar's politics cannot afford to run away from examining critical factors like the polarization between Pemba and Unguja Islands, ethnicity, race, class, the Union between mainland Tanzania (then Tanganyika) and Zanzibar, and electoral irregularities. Yet, the issue of independent candidate falls under the 22 Union matters as stipulated in the URT Constitution, 1977. That is why despite the artificial exclusion of Zanzibar, Mateng'e continued throughout his text to make reference to data based on the Union. For example, he cites Sub-article 2(e) of Article 67 of the constitution which states that "no person shall be qualified to be elected to the office of President of the United Republic if he is not a member of, and a candidate proposed by, a political party"¹¹. Yet, Mateng'e makes reference to the total number of registered voters for the 2010 elections which was 20 million people for the entire United Republic.¹² To exclude Zanzibar arbitrarily as Mateng'e does is to suggest the existence of the president of "mainland Tanzania" in the context of the Union something which is not the case. Indeed, this is a clear acknowledgement by Mateng'e on his ignorance of the electoral system in Tanzania.

A further unsubstantiated claim is that "Makulilo does not treat the validity of the claims upon which the government/ruling party's reluctance to endorse independent candidacy is hinged".¹³ As Mateng'e himself noticed, the goal of my article was to examine the verdict by the Court of Appeal in Tanzania on the independent candidate question. Two specific theses were pursued: 1) "the Court of Appeal failed to exercise its mandate in administering justice"¹⁴ and 2) that "such failure is attributed to the fear by the justices from the ruling party and its government".¹⁵ Hence, my work cannot be accused of not discussing the claims of the ruling party and government on resisting the introduction of independent candidates. The best approach to assess a text is to consider its objectives. It is superficial to criticize authors for what they did not intend to cover. For a fair and accurate criticism, Mateng'e has to point to the weaknesses of my text along the two aims. These could refer to the theses, nature of arguments, structure, as well as the authenticity and appropriateness of evidence. Mateng'e did not dwell on such

11 Ibid., 21.

12 Ibid., 24.

13 Ibid., 22.

14 Makulilo, "Join a Party or I cannot Elect You", 111-112.

15 Ibid., 111-112.

aspects and he therefore decided to add a new goal to my work and lamented that I did not address it.

2.3. The Judge-Party Linkage

Moreover, I am accused of ignoring the reasons for which the judges feared the ruling party as he states “he does not explain further as to why the learned judges feared the ruling party”.¹⁶ Mateng’e missed my point on this issue. Let me start by admitting that instead of employing a simplistic list of explanations, I approached it broadly. To be sure, I noted that “state-party fusion” is the major source of such fears by the judges. The fusion undermines the whole notion of separation of powers and checks and balances thereby calling to question the independence of the judiciary. I furthered that this state of affairs stems from the legacy of the single party rule and the party supremacy.

Under the current multiparty system, the ruling party and its government still behave in a single-party fashion, hence at times undermining the independence of judiciary.¹⁷ In 1994, for example, the judgment of independent candidate was circumvented by the ruling party and its government by enacting a law that rendered the High Court’s ruling ineffective. This was contrary to the principles of democracy and good governance. Mateng’e acknowledges this fact on his article when stating “Given the current composition of the parliament predominantly tilting in favour of the ruling party and the fact that it was the very institution that unanimously approved the proscription of independent candidacy, changes against that effect are very unlikely.”¹⁸ I beg to slightly differ with Mateng’e that the ruling party is also a dynamic entity and hence it responds to the environment of the time accordingly. To be sure, in 1965 it was the parliament of the ruling party (then the Tanganyika African National Union) which unanimously approved for the introduction of the single party system. On the contrary, in 1992 the parliament of the ruling party CCM approved for the multiparty system.

Likewise, in Zanzibar, it was the CCM which was consistently against the inclusion of the main opposition party, the CUF into the government, hence regular conflicts and bloodshed after every general election. But in 2010, CCM finally consented to the government of national unity. What I am sure is that always the ruling party introduces some changes of which it has control. In other words, most of such changes are cosmetic. The 2010 ruling by the Court of Appeal affirmed the position that it is the Parliament of which Mateng’e admits to be dominated by members from the ruling party to have mandate of introducing the clause for independent

16 Mateng’e, “Protesting the Independent Candidacy”, 22.

17 Makulilo, “Join a Party or I cannot Elect You”, 133-135.

18 Mateng’e, “Protesting the Independent Candidacy”, 22.

candidates.¹⁹ Hence, I concluded that “the legacy of one party state which fused the ruling party to the state works as a hindrance towards the independence of the court particularly when the ruling party has vested interests in a given case.”²⁰ It seems quite clearly that Mateng’e did not follow my argument as to why the judges fear the ruling party and its government. Interestingly, he admits though, via speculation, that “if the court’s functioning depends on the pleasure of government/ruling party, there would obviously be serious implications for its impartiality.”²¹ This is what exactly I mean, but unlike Mateng’e I went a step further and noted that under the current multiparty system the ruling party and its government behave in a more or less fashion as they were during the single party era. Hence, whenever the interests of the party seem to be jeopardized, it will use every mechanism possible at its disposal including the use of state machinery to defend them.²² For that case, the behavior of the ruling party varies from case to case.

3. *De Facto* Independent Candidacy: Poor Theory and Literature

After clarifying the misinterpretation of my article, let us now turn to the faulty issues identified in Mateng’e’s work. This section examines the conceptual weaknesses of “de facto independent candidacy” as suggested by Mateng’e. While the author tries to provide a new direction by departing from the usual debate on the independent candidate issue, the concept is analytically fuzzy and its applicability is confusing. It seems that the concept is inconsistent with empirical evidence given as well as the nature of argument itself. In the final analysis, I note that “de facto independent candidacy” is not only a fiction, but also misleading.

3.1 *The Definitional Problem*

What is a “de facto independent candidate”? This is hardly defined analytically. In his article he uses only two sentences towards the end to provide a definition of de facto independent candidate. Mateng’e states:

The term de facto independent candidacy is used in this paper to simply describe an emerging pattern in Tanzanian politics where more emphasis is placed on electing candidates based on their personal qualities rather than voting on the basis of party lines. It is in this context that candidates are elected not necessarily because their respective political parties are organizationally stronger or weaker, but because of their personal appeals to the voters.²³

19 Ibid., 21.

20 Makulilo, “Join a Party or I cannot Elect You”...135.

21 Mateng’e, “Protesting the Independent Candidacy”, 22.

22 Makulilo, “Join a Party or I cannot Elect You”...134.

23 Mateng’e, “Protesting the Independent Candidacy”, 25.

This quote paragraph is quite telling. Mateng'e asserts that de facto independent candidacy is "an emerging pattern" in Tanzania's politics where more emphasis is put on "personality factor" rather than "party lines" during voting. Taking into account this conclusion, it seems to me that Mateng'e was doing a comparative analysis of the most influencing factors that inform voters, only to find that personality is more prominent. His analysis would have fallen into "voting behavior" as a distinctive field in political science. Under voting behavior, the interest of analysts is to investigate why voters vote the way they do. Yet, there is no place in his work where Mateng'e interrogates the voters either by the use of pre-opinion polls or post-opinion polls in order to ascertain voters' perspective with regard to the 2010 elections. Worse, as noted elsewhere in this rejoinder, Mateng'e did not even interview potential voters to argue this case. His data was essentially drawn from candidates, leaders of political parties, and election officials. Furthermore, Mateng'e did not examine the organizational strength of political parties in order to compare it with personality as can be deduced from his definition of de facto independent candidacy.

But what is "personality" in the context of Mateng'e's work? This simply means an individual's traits, behavior, qualities, or character that combine to create the credibility of a candidate to voters as a form of power that increases his/her chances of electability.²⁴ This definition which accords "voters" the power of assessing candidates alongside many factors, does not in any way exclude the candidates' membership from their respective political parties. In Tanzania, the constitution compels individuals to be members of political parties in order to qualify as candidates during elections. While no one can dispute the fact that the personality of candidates may contribute to one's victory, there is no empirical evidence to illustrate that in Tanzania this factor becomes prominent. Mateng'e simplistically approached the 2010 elections. He stated that he employed data gathered from the 2010 Tanzania general election results in 30 constituencies from the mainland Tanzania to argue that the discrepancies in electoral support between the parliamentary and presidential candidates of the same political parties presented a case for de facto independent candidates.

Accordingly, "de facto independent candidate" is attained if there are "discrepancies in electoral support between the parliamentary and presidential candidates of the same political parties presented".²⁵ His observation for the 2010 elections is problematic in four senses. First, he focused on the "discrepancies of votes between the parliamentary and presidential candidates" to explain voting behavior and decisions by voters. This is reductionism of analysis of complex

24 *ibid.*, 25.

25 *ibid.*, 18.

political phenomena. How did he control other factors such as party identification, corruption, religion, age, gender, education, rural-urban dichotomy, coercion, and ethnicity? It should be noted that the context and dynamics across constituencies vary and so do issues. Previous studies and opinion polls have shown that party identification scores the highest as a factor to explain the voting behavior.²⁶ As Mateng'e lacked data from "voters" themselves to examine such discrepancies, he ended up speculating the factors that might have informed voters to make their choice hence falling into what some might call arm-chair thinking. Second, how does he account for the situation in which candidates of other political parties get votes instead of candidates from the same party? Taking on board the limitations of the "de facto independent candidacy" to respond to this question, I would rather see Mateng'e as dealing more with electoral volatility.

Third, assuming that he got it right by using the "discrepancy factor" in examining the 30 constituencies, Mateng'e still fails to describe the variation in the personalities of candidates across such constituencies. Surprisingly, he simply describes the personality of one Member of Parliament (MP) from the Maswa East constituency. Since personalities of the cited candidates in the 30 constituencies cannot be the same, the author falls short by assuming the personality factor to be homogeneous. Indeed, there is no single factor that can explain why candidate "X" wins election "Y". For example, it was strongly argued during the 2005 elections that President Jakaya Kikwete was elected by 80.27% of popular votes because of his personality. Surprisingly, it was the same Jakaya Kikwete whose votes dropped to 61% in the 2010 elections. Assuming that personality was a prominent factor in 2010, it means that personality is dynamic and subject to contexts. In the case of Maswa, the author states that the MP Mr. Kasulumbayi had previously been the councilor for Ipililo ward for the past 17 years through different opposition political parties namely the CUF, CHADEMA, and Chama Cha Ustawi Tanzania (CHAUSTA).²⁷ Yet, the context of this constituency is sidestepped in explaining the success of Mr. Kasulumbayi. I suspect that the author does not understand well the Tanzania's political context. I expected him to subject the performance of opposition parties (in Table 1) in the broader context/dynamics such as grand corruption "*ufisadi*" phenomenon, failure of the ruling party to fulfill its 2005 promises of "better life for everyone"; elite fragmentation such as the concerns of trade unionists, the role of

26 Mgasa, Grace. *How Do Citizens Vote? The Experience Of Multipartyism in Tanzania* M.A Dissertation: University of Dar es Salaam, 2011; Ndumbo, Laurean. "Voter Choices and Electoral Decisions in the 2000 General Elections in Tanzania", *The African Review: A journal of African Politics*, 29, no. 1&2 (2002): 59-72; SYNOVATE (2010) *Matokeo ya Kura ya Maoni 10-10-2010*, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; TCIB (2010) *Matokeo ya Kura ya maoni Kuhusu Wagombea Uraisi 2010*, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; REDET (2010) *Maoni ya wananchi kuhusu Uchaguzi Mkuu wa oktoba 2000, namba 17*, Idara ya Sayansi ya Siasa na Utawala, University of Dar es Salaam.

27 Mateng'e, "Protesting the Independent Candidacy", 25.

the church; Muslims, students, factions within Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM); CCM primaries and others. To attribute the electoral performance of the cited candidates to personality factor alone is an underestimation of other relevant variables. This is also the result of a lack of empirical assessments and tests. Thus, equating independent candidate to personality in conceptualizing “de facto independent candidate” is a pitfall. Instead of examining deeply the issue of “de facto independent candidacy” Mateng’e spent almost eight pages explaining independent candidates. Fourth, in explaining his concept of “de facto independent candidacy” Mateng’e still accords the “political party’s ticket” the primacy in relation to the candidacy. He has chosen to situate his notion of de facto independent candidate inside the political party. In the party politics and electoral systems literature, independence usually refers to non-partisan affiliation. Moreover, if Mateng’e follows his conceptualization, he captures electoral volatility not independence.

3.2 *The Main Argument*

The author argues independent candidates leads to the splitting of the ruling political party.²⁸ For reference, he states “the real motive underlying the government’s reluctance to endorse independent candidacy stems from the ruling party’s fear of a split which is a possibility if the party loses its control over the dissenting members within the parliament and local government councils.”²⁹ The logic behind this relationship has two problems. First, why does this kind of relationship work only against the ruling party? If the fear is losing control over dissenting members, are opposition parties safe from the independent candidate question? In Tanzania, the rate of defection is higher in opposition parties compared to the ruling party. The typical cases of such defections are recorded in the National Convention for Reconstruction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi), Civic United Front (CUF), Tanzania Labour Party (TLP), and Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA). This is despite the fact that independent candidates are not allowed in the country. The ruling party CCM, on the other hand, has some relatively effective mechanisms and advantages to deal with such defections. Some of those who tried, experienced negative consequences and finally decided to return to the CCM. For example, Dr. Masumbuko Lamwai who was once an icon in the NCCR-Mageuzi in 1995 was expelled from teaching at the University of Dar es Salaam and his certificate to practice law (advocate) was frozen. Finally, in 2000 he returned to CCM (after he apologised before the CCM chairman and the former president of the United Republic, Mr. Benjamin Mkapa and thousands of CCM members at the Dar es Salaam National stadium). He was later nominated by the

28 *ibid.*, 18, 24.

29 *ibid.*, 18.

president as a member of parliament (MP) and he is currently a senior CCM legal advisor.

Yet, in some instances the party uses the “carrot”. It was said during the 2010 elections, for example, that Dr. Mohamed Bilal, who was one of the potential presidential candidates in Zanzibar, threatened to defect after he was not nominated by his party. Following such threats, he was nominated as the Vice-President for the United Republic. This helped to defuse the situation.³⁰ It is against that backdrop that the statement by Dr. Harrison Mwakyembe, a CCM MP for the Kyela constituency is evident to the consequences of defecting from CCM. He once said that if you want to live longer, do your business well and be listened, it is better to be in CCM than in the opposition parties where you will be voicing without adequate evidence.³¹ Moreover, Mateng’e fails to explain whether the ruling party fears about the “de facto independent candidate” or it is comfortable with it.

Second, independent candidates do not necessarily cause a split within the ruling party as the author argues. In Zambia,³² the USA,³³ Peru³⁴, Malawi³⁵ and Rwanda³⁶ independent candidates co-exist side by side with political parties yet there is no splitting of the ruling party. How can this lead to split of the ruling party in the context of Tanzania? In other words, what is so unique about Tanzania? The author has failed to demonstrate historically the issue of splits by the ruling party and in the 2010 elections in particular. Data provided does not in any way indicate any signs of neither the fear of splits by the ruling party nor the actual splits. Instead it shows how opposition parties are progressively gaining ground. It should be noted that

30 Mwananchi (2010) “Ni Bilal, Mgombea Mwenza wa Kikwete” <http://www.mwananchi.co.tz/sport/37-tanzania-top-news-story/3158-ni-dk-bilalmg-ombea-mwenza-wa-kikwete.html>, last accessed on March 15, 2012.

31 Translated as “*Ukitaka kufanya mambo yako vizuri, na unataka usikilizwe, uishi maisha marefu ni bora, ubaki CCM kuliko ukawa kwenye upinzani na kupayuka mambo bila ushahidi wa kutosha*” See Richard, Kilumbo “Dk. Mwakyembe awakatalia wapiga kura kuondoka CCM” Mwananchi 14 Januari 2009 <http://www.mwananchi.co.tz/> (accessed: 15.03.2012).

32 Alexander. B. Makulilo, *State-Party and Democracy: Tanzania and Zambia in Comparative Perspective*: PhD Thesis, Leipzig University, 2010; Zambia Weekly 24.02. 012 “Another PF MP enters parliament”, Week 8, Volume 3, Issue No.7.

33 Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, Phil Paolino, David W. Rohde “Third-Party and Independent Candidates in American Politics: Wallace, Anderson, and Perot”, *Political Science Quarterly*, 110, no. 3 (2005): 349-367.

34 Steven, Levitsky. “Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru”, *Journal of Democracy* 10, no.3 (1999): 78-92.

35 Nandini Patel “Malawi’s 2009 Elections: A Critical Evaluation”, A Paper for Presentation at the Conference on “Election processes, liberation movements and democratic change in Africa”, Maputo 8-11 April 2010, The Institute for Policy Interaction.

36 The Constitution of The Republic of Rwanda 2003

CHADEMA, for example, which the author makes reference to is the strongest opposition party in Tanzania. In 2005 it had only five elected members of parliament (MPs) but in the 2010 elections it returned 23 MPs. To my understanding, while the independent candidate issue provides a fertile ground for defections of members between political parties (something which is normal in politics) it does not in itself guarantee political party splits.

3.3 *The Nature of Evidence*

The empirical evidence to support his arguments is quite weak. First, the evidence is incomplete as the author provides election data for opposition parties only (see table 1).³⁷ In this way, he equates the issue of “de facto independent candidate” to the electoral success of opposition parties. One question arises here: is there a possibility to have “de facto independent candidates” from the ruling party? And, how is it that an independent candidate is found within a political party? How can the author explain the phenomenon of the CCM endorsing unopposed parliamentary candidates in the 2000, 2005 and 2010 general elections? In 2000 the number of unopposed candidates for the CCM was 25; in 2005 it dropped to 8; and in 2010 it increased again to 17.³⁸ In contrast, there has never been an unopposed candidate from an opposition party since the inception of multipartism in 1992. According to the author, can it be argued that the CCM’s unopposed candidates were “de facto independent candidates”? Also, can the criterion of personality as such be brought in to explain the unopposed candidates’ victory for CCM? These questions seem to challenge the personality issue. Had Mateng’e read works on voting behavior in Tanzania, he would not certainly arrive to his biased notion of de facto independent candidacy. To be sure, Ndumbaro, for example, while dealing extensively with the issue of personality, did not link it to the independent candidate issue. The work made use of opinion polls to ascertain the issue of voting behavior. He noted that during the single party era (1965-1992), the issue of personality was critical since competition was only limited to the same party policy. However, with multiparty system where alternative policies are sold, and campaigning issues vary, the voting pattern is such that party identification tops the variables that inform voting behavior. With regard to the 2000 elections, it was noted that most voters cast their ballot based on their party affiliation, as demonstrated in Table 1 below.

37 Mateng’e, “Protesting the Independent Candidacy”, 29-32.

38 NEC (2001) *The Report of the National Electoral Commission (Tanzania) on the 2000 Presidential, Parliamentary and Councillors’ Elections*, Dar es salaam, Tanzania; NEC (2006) *The Report of the National Electoral Commission (Tanzania) on the 2005 Presidential, Parliamentary and Councillors’ Elections*, Dar es salaam, Tanzania; NEC (2011) *The Report of the National Electoral Commission (Tanzania) on the 2010 Presidential, Parliamentary and Councillors’ Elections*, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Table 1: Respondents' Party Choice in the 2000 General Elections

Election	Candidate of my Party	Candidate of Other Party	DK/NA
Union President	81.5%	11.1%	7.8%
Parliamentary	75.9%	16.1%	8.0%

Source: Ndumbaro 2002: 69.

This trend was also evident in the 2010 elections. Opinion polls conducted by the Tanzania Citizens Information Bureau (TCIB) observed that 81% of CCM members/followers opined that they would vote for the CCM presidential candidate, while 2% of CCM members would vote for CHADEMA presidential candidate. Likewise, 90% of members of CHADEMA would likely vote for CHADEMA presidential candidate, while 2% of members of CHADEMA would likely vote for CCM presidential candidate.³⁹ Though I have some reservations with methodologies used by pollsters in Tanzania,⁴⁰ the TCIB's findings are close to what Ndumbaro found in the 2000 elections. Despite this evidence, Mateng'e, without any data, maintains that there is a "diminishing relevance and legitimacy of political parties" in Tanzania.⁴¹ Moreover, it is difficult to comprehend Mateng'e's conclusion in the context where political parties are the only avenues through which one can access a political post in the local government councils, the parliament, and presidency. Moreover, unlike Mateng'e, Ndumbaro employed data from all political parties, thereby escaping the charge of partisanship.

Second, Mateng'e claims to have conducted in-depth interviews with four parliamentary candidates, four council candidates, four district party leaders, and two election officials in the Maswa district between August and October 2010. He does not address key methodological issues such as: why and how was this sample size from only one constituency selected? To what extent was it adequate to supplement data drawn from 30 constituencies? Which specific questions were asked? Which political parties were involved in his sample? I have to say that there is no presentation of data in relation to these questions by Mateng'e. Yet, as can be noticed from this list of category of respondents, there is no claim by Mateng'e to having interviewed voters to get their opinion on which factors they considered important in deciding to vote in the 2010 elections. One wonders, then, how is it possible to sweepingly conclude that personality was the sole factor at least in the cited constituencies (in table 1) in the absence of data from those who voted? Yet,

39 TCIB (2010) *Matokeo ya Kura ya maoni Kuhusu Wagombea Uraisi 2010*, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

40 Alexander B. Makulilo, "Watching the watcher": An evaluation of local election observers in Tanzania," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 49 no. 2 (2011): 241-262; Alexander. B. Makulilo, *The Dark Side of Opinion Polls in Tanzania: (1992 - 2010)*, LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, Germany, 2011.

41 Mateng'e, "Protesting the Independent Candidacy", 26.

Mateng'e claims to have interviewed a government official⁴² something which is doubtful. Footnote 1 provides that Mateng'e interviewed many people including politicians, government officials, election officials, and ordinary citizens. This brings confusion to whom was exactly interviewed. What I find strange is that the responses of respondents are hardly found in his discussion. To be sure, there are only three interviews referenced in the entire article.

Third, the variation in votes by candidates at different levels of elections is a poor indicator for assessing voting behavior. Mateng'e used this criterion to establish the personality factor as a determinant of voting decisions by voters. Understandably, there are three levels of elections in Tanzania, namely the presidency, parliamentary, and councilor. A voter is not compelled to vote for one party at all these levels. The author ignores the fact that candidates of one political party are not the same for presidential, parliamentary and councilor elections. Hence variations are common not only for the 2010 elections, but also for all the previous election results. This explains why one party can lead in members of the parliament yet not win the presidential post. In the USA, for example, this is also the case. It can be noted that sometimes the Democrats have control of one of the houses of Congress while the Republicans control the other. Yet the President may still come from either of the two parties. So, the argument advanced by the author (in table 1) is not a new innovation at all. On the other hand, and as I have noted elsewhere in this rejoinder, there is a well established evidence in opinion polls and previous studies suggesting that Tanzanians vote more on party affiliation than on personality.⁴³ It is unclear how the author deals with this solid evidence and how his argument can be substantiated through supplementary evidence (the latter is not provided in the text).

3.5 Factual Errors and Omissions

There are three technical errors in Mateng'e's article. The first is related to the number of constituencies selected for his study. More precisely, he mentions 31 constituencies⁴⁴, then 30 constituencies⁴⁵ and again 31 constituencies in table 1.⁴⁶ Although this could be a minor problem it suggests that Mateng'e was not accurate in handpicking these constituencies. Second, Mateng'e cites the wrong literature to support his case. To be specific, he states, "Important to note, is that despite some

42 Ibid., 26.

43 See Ndumbaro, Laurean, (2002) "Voter Choices and Electoral Decisions"...2002; Mgasa, Grace, "How Do Citizens Vote?"...2011; Young Daniel, J. Support You Can Count On? Ethnicity, Partisanship, and Retrospective Voting in Africa, Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 115 (2009); SYNOVATE (2010); (REDET 2010) and TCIB (2010).

44 Mateng'e, "Protesting the Independent Candidacy", 24.

45 Ibid., 25.

46 Ibid., 29-32.

signs of growth, at least, in terms of the electoral seats recorded in the 2010 elections it is noted that, on the whole, opposition parties in Tanzania are still organizationally weak".⁴⁷ It is unclear how a manuscript from 2005 can reflect the situation in 2010. There is extensive literature that covers this area and a more careful review will definitely diminish this shortcoming. Third, there is a good number of works in the reference list which are not cited in the text. These include: Elms,⁴⁸ Mateng'e,⁴⁹ Ngailo, Kaswamila, and Senkoro;⁵⁰ Steven and Deering,⁵¹ TEMCO;⁵² and Wehmeier.⁵³

4. Conclusion

Mateng'e's article attempts to take further the debate on independent candidates in Tanzania. The author utilised a concept known as "de facto independent candidacy" to explain a situation where personality, rather than political party affiliation, matters to voters when casting ballots. To describe his concept, Mateng'e used 30 constituencies and observed the correspondence of electoral outcome between two political posts of the same political party namely the parliamentary and presidential one. He asserts that whenever the shares of electoral support in a specific election for the two posts are the same, it means that voters cast their ballot based on their party affiliation. In contrast, when there is a variation in the electoral support between those posts, the determining factor that informs voters to select a given candidate becomes to be personality. Mateng'e describes the latter state of affairs as "de facto independent candidacy." As can be discovered, Mateng'e is dealing with the issue of "voting behavior" as a distinctive field in political science, in which case such behavior precedes electoral outcome. However, Mateng'e's conceptualization shows the reverse. He begins to observe election results in order

47 See Chaligha, Amon. "The State of Political Parties in Tanzania" in Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) Democratic Transition in East Africa, 120-136, Dar es Salaam: E & D Limited, 2005.

48 Alan, C. Elms, *Personality in Politics* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1976).

49 Frank .J. Mateng'e, (Forthcoming). Parliamentary Supremacy in Tanzania: The Rhetoric and the Reality, *Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Dar es Salaam University College of Education.

50 Jerry A, Ngailo, Abiud L. Kaswamila and Catherine J. Senkoro, *Rice Production in the Maswa District, Tanzania and its Contribution to Poverty Alleviation, Research on Poverty Alleviation* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2007).

51 Smith, S. Steven and Christopher J. Deering, *Committees in Congress*. (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984).

52 The Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO). *The 1995 General Elections in Tanzania: Report of the TEMCO*, 1997.

53 Sally Wehmeier, *The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*, 6th Edition (Oxford: The Oxford University Press, 2000).

to ascertain factors that inform voters the way they vote. Indeed, this is akin to placing the cart before the horse.

If electoral outcomes form the basis of partisanship as Mateng'e suggests, it is imperative to underscore issues such as party policy, ideology, membership and affiliation. Mateng'e does not provide any evidence on how and the extent to which such correspondence in electoral outcome is a reflection of party policy, ideology, membership or affiliation. As such, his definition fails to distinguish which votes were cast based on partisanship and other non-partisan factors. Yet, by focusing on election data, one cannot appreciate the wider context within which elections take place such as ethnicity, culture, economy, religion, coercion, electoral irregularities, corruption etc. It is even difficult to control other factors in order to understand personality. Methodologically, Mateng'e falls short by selecting constituencies won by opposition parties only. This suggests a bias. Moreover, he does not state as to why and how his sample size was determined. And why he selected the Maswa constituency from the others? How was it adequate to supplement his secondary data? Or which specific questions were asked? Which political parties were involved in his sample?

A further weakness is that he did not interview voters to ascertain their opinion on their voting behavior. This forced him to speculate on the voting behavior by merely looking at the electoral outcome. Taking all these together, Mateng'e's article does not add anything new to the debate on independent candidates. His attempt to develop the concept of "de facto independent candidacy" has theoretical, methodological, and empirical flaws. What I could manage to see out of his article is a mere restatement of other peoples' works on the reluctance by the ruling party and its government to introduce independent candidates. Indeed, he was simply fascinated by the victory of opposition parties. I would rather describe his evidence to deal more with electoral volatility than anything else.

With regard to my article "Join a Party or I cannot Elect You", Mateng'e erred by misreading and misrepresenting its scope and analysis. He failed to comprehend the relationship between the title and its content; my objectives; as well as explanations as to why the judges in Tanzania fear the ruling party and its government. If he considered all of these one would have taken his article as providing a genuine critique and thereby expanding the debate on independent candidate issue. This is not the case though. It should be stated that despite the fact that political science can be approached from different angles, it is not a misguided field. Hence, for accuracy and fair criticisms, I would rather call upon Mateng'e to read the entire text and avoid being selective. It is in the interests of academics that the debate on independent candidate is not closed.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Joshua Cohen: *Rousseau: a Free Community of Equals* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)

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Joshua Cohen's book, *Rousseau: a Free Community of Equals* interprets Rousseauan political thought with the tools of analytical philosophy. It is part of a wider project of "translating" the works of early modern philosophers into contemporary academic speech. Moreover, together with Rawls's *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*, Cohen's book represents a radical turn in the interpretation of Rousseau's philosophy. Similarly to Rawls, Cohen's book seeks to challenge an older generation of Rousseau's exegetes. Cohen's central thesis is that Rousseau's philosophy does not represent the blueprint for a non-democratic oppressive society. For Cohen, Rousseau is the designer of a deliberative democracy composed of public-minded, free and equal citizens.

The book is composed of five chapters, dedicated to explaining the main lines of Rousseauan thought. The first three chapters represent the investigation of Rousseau's main political project: the society of the general will. In the first chapter, Cohen, like all interpreters of Rousseau departs from the fundamental problem: how can "each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before"? Cohen interprets this sentence as a description of the state of nature. The state of nature is composed of interdependent individuals who are interested in personal security and self-preservation and who possess a conception of the good. Since coordination is necessary, these individuals enter into civil society in order to satisfy their interests.

Cohen describes and defends the society of the general will in the second chapter. He illustrates this society by its four characteristics: 1) the particular interest condition, 2) the common good condition, 3) the priority condition, and 4) the reasonable confidence condition. These can be summarized as: (1) individuals with private interests in security and self-preservation (2) share a non-aggregative conception of the common good (3) which they place above their private reasons when taking political decisions and (4) which they reasonably believe is embodied by the society's institutions.

In the third chapter, Cohen discusses the sovereignty of the general will. He interprets Rousseau as an opponent of legal positivism. According to Cohen's rendition, Rousseau claims that a law (an expression of the general will) is just only if it advances the common good. Therefore, just laws cannot infringe on individual

liberties because individual rights are constitutive of the common good. Thus, Cohen attempts to show that Rousseau's rejection of the doctrine of natural rights does not undermine his commitment to individual liberties. The general will is formed by the deliberation of free and equal individuals who subordinate their private interests to the common good. Since the general will can only advance the common good, negative liberties cannot be infringed.

The fourth chapter presents Rousseau's psychological assumptions about human nature. Cohen describes and analyzes Rousseau's doctrine of "the natural goodness of humanity". If human beings are naturally good, then the society of general will is a feasible political project. Rousseau argues for the natural goodness of humanity by separating inclinations, which emerge out of instinct in the state of nature from beliefs, which are formed in society. If beliefs about one's proper place in society are misguided because of extant social inequalities, then natural motivations will be corrupted. Rousseau argues that existent unequal societies pervert people's natural inclinations and make them seek social positions of superiority. However, an institutional framework which allows people to recognize each other as equals will engender the appropriate conceptions of respect for fellow citizens.

Finally, the fifth chapter discusses Rousseau's institutional proposals. Cohen believes that, in Rousseau's broader conception, direct democracy is not necessary. Rather, he interprets the Rousseauian texts as requiring institutions that engender in citizens the proper ordering of reasons. Citizens should place reasons of the common good above reasons of personal interest. This requirement is best, but not exclusively, met by direct democracy in popular assemblies. Other institutional arrangements such as imperative mandates for representatives can achieve the same goal. Therefore, Cohen argues that Rousseau's ideas would be compatible with modern-day large societies.

Two innovative concepts are employed by Cohen in response to those who interpret Rousseau as an anti-democrat. Firstly, Cohen sets out to answer the charges of those like Allan Bloom and Ernst Cassirer who argue that Rousseau demands the social engineering of citizens. Those who support this interpretation maintain that in order for Rousseau's society to be feasible, all citizens must be indoctrinated to eliminate all personal wants and desires and to think only of the common good. Cohen replies by arguing for the distinction between "integration-through-unity" and "integration-through-ordering". The first represents the Platonic type of integration, in which citizens abandon private interests completely. However, Cohen views Rousseau as requiring only the second, which could be considered as a weaker version of integration. Citizens would thus maintain their private interests, but subordinate them to the common good when making political decisions.

The second main argument against Rousseau addressed by Cohen is related to a famous passage about the total alienation of rights to the sovereign. Rousseau's critics interpret this passage as the former's abandonment of natural rights and the complete subordination of the individual to the collective will. However, Cohen disagrees with this approach. He accepts that natural rights are abandoned when citizens enter civil society. However, he argues that individual rights will be preserved in the society of the general will. Rights will be conferred to the individual by the general will, and rights can only be claimed with reference to the content of the general will. Thus, the right to property will be protected, not because it is natural, but because the owner is the trustee of the general will. Cohen adds that, because of the particular interest condition, a considerable bundle of rights will be granted to the citizen.

A weakness of this argument derives from Cohen's underestimation of Rousseau's claim about the sovereignty of the general will. Rousseau maintains that individuals will alienate their rights to the community only insofar as necessary for the community's wellbeing. However, the sovereign community is the judge to what is necessary. Thus, Cohen fails to see that the complete subordination to the community can occur if a majority of citizens decides so.

Overall, Cohen's attempt to justify Rousseau's ideas, leads to innovative understandings of the *Social Contract* and other works. The language of analytical philosophy is well employed. Clear and precise, the book is addressed to not only experts on Rousseau but also to those interested in philosophy in general.

Jeffrey Stout, *Blessed Are the Organized. Grassroots Democracy in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010)

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Alongside theories of democracy and the evolution of its forms from the 5th century B.C. there is a rich tradition of political reflection. The latter aims to reveal the functioning of such a regime at the often ignored level of common citizens. In the political theory of democracy, researchers distinguish between normative and empirical approaches. However, the above mentioned tradition seems to be less characterised by a methodological approach (be it normative or empirical), theoretical-political in nature, and more anthropologically oriented. In this direction, the most meaningful example seems to be Alexis de Tocqueville's who, although seen as an outstanding theorist of democracy, may also be described as an "excursionist" in search of real, palpable democracy, of a democracy that is being

built every day, and whose main promoters are not politicians and government decision-makers but common people.

Jeffrey Stout's *Blessed Are the Organized: Grassroots Democracy in America* subscribes to this tradition of thought on democracy. The book focuses on the ways in which simple citizens build their own organizations, how they understand the relations of power within the social space, how they choose their leaders, treat their allies and opponents, and try and sometimes succeed in accomplishing their goals. Without pretending to configure a discourse able to perfectly cover all the aspects involved in the democratic practices of the contemporary societies, Stout claims that grassroots democracy is a democracy built in the context of daily reality. This process is enhanced by common people able to get organised based on a culture of association. Through these associations, they are most likely to become a force no longer ignored either by the governmental factors in a community or by the politicians who represent them formally in legislative structures. Such an approach starts precisely from the observation that democratic theory is too abstract to express the current realities threatening democratic organisation and that a credible alternative of explaining how democracy works supposes coming back to experience.

The excursion proposed by Stout into the world of "democratic experience" is neither normative nor empirical methodologically. More likely, it is a story of democracy told by its leading actors, the citizens. Nevertheless, the journey is special, as stressed in the title of the book, and here again we notice de Tocqueville's mark since it deals with grassroots democracy in America. The story develops "on the field" and extracts its elements from the testimonies of common people met on a road that begins in Katrina-stricken New Orleans, goes on to the Houston Astrodome, reaches the borders of Texas, moves to Arizona and California and ends in a synagogue in Marin County. Therefore, it is a story of democratic life in all these communities and, from this perspective, it is likely to be a magnet for readers who are the common citizens the book talks about as well as theorists of democracy, be they teachers, students or political decision-makers.

Stout's book recalls the anthropological journeys from the second half of the 19th century, but it remains perfectly grounded in the coordinates of current American society. The aspect that is particularly interesting is that Jeffrey Stout, the political "excursionist", included communities in crisis in his journey into grassroots democracy. Thus, the approach is contextualised and is perspectivist as the author himself reckons in the introductory part of the book (p. xvi). He is not interested in issuing a neutral theory complying with epistemological positivism's sense of objectivity but in observing, experiencing directly the reality of these communities, how common people manage to get organised under circumstances that represent real challenges. Of course, the elements of American associative culture have been

noticed since the early stages of democratic organisation in that country and explanations based on empirical measurements were provided by both democratic theorists and political scientists throughout the last century. But what Stout brings to our attention is that, beyond the measurable elements of that which, since Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, bears the name of "civic culture", there is a certain dimension of citizenship that needs to be rediscovered. And this dimension virtually points out to the initial signification of the term, which tells us that the citizen is the one who gets involved in the life of the community so that, along with others, they can pursue a common good.

Thus, the limited understanding of citizenship, the purely administrative one, is abandoned and the political meaning of the term is forged. Stout illustrates very well this reality when he explains, for instance, how a Hispanic immigrant can be a citizen politically by getting involved in solving and managing community issues and by becoming an authority acknowledged within it, all the while lacking the legal and administrative papers of a US citizen. Subsequently, it may be said that, to the extent to which it attempts to highlight the political role of active citizenship and to reveal the forms of democratic organisation at the level of small communities, the book achieves its goal. In the same context, I believe it is important to mention that this study puts back to good use the anthropological method, materialised in an interpretative formula of understanding the relationships within the community framework and of explaining how common people can impose, owing to their organised activism, the authorities' political accountability. The stress on this side of the approach becomes visible, for instance, when the author notes that "grassroots democracy is an evolving collection of practices intended to perfect the exercise of political responsibility by citizens in a republic that officially aspires to be democratic. As such, grassroots democracy is essentially social, as well as essentially embodied in action".

As the excursion proposed by the author is assumed, in the book's subtitle, as one focussing exclusively on American society, it is difficult to say to what extent his observations are extendable to the level of a generally applicable theory. Of course, Jeffrey Stout does not proclaim this goal as one of the book's objectives, his arguments in favour of democratic organisation focussing on the communities that, through the organisation of their citizens, are able to provide practical solutions to the issues of daily reality. Also highlighting the critical points of American society, the endeavour portrayed by the author in this study is an intellectually honest one and belongs to the line of research on the specific political culture of a given country, without aiming at configuring a comparative dimension. However, it can be a starting point for research that could eventually reveal the existence of various models of grassroots democracy belonging to different cultural spaces. Written in a dynamic style and insisting on the characters' profiles, Stout's book is a useful

supplement, with data specific to contemporary society, to the political anthropology studies whose main theme is how democratic communities function.

Richard Ned Lebow. *Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

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International relations, as a discipline, is concerned with the many and varied questions that arise through inter-state engagement. Some are trivial and fleeting, specific to a certain space and time and destined to only ever emerge as a sub-specialty, perhaps with a small group of committed yet marginalised scholars pursuing answers to questions that most in the field will only ever consider of secondary or tertiary appeal. Some questions, though, are central to what this social science is about, perhaps none more so than questions of war and peace in international politics. International politics, so said John Mearsheimer, is a ruthless and dangerous business and there is no sector of that business more ruthless or dangerous than war. As a result, understanding why states enter into wars that have, in the last century alone, led to the collapse of empires, the subjugation of great powers and the destruction of man and his environment is essential, if only to mitigate the ruthlessness and danger and not solve it. In this disciplinary and historical context, Richard Ned Lebow's *Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War* offers an argument that, if heeded, should teach theorists and practitioners of international affairs just how and why they continue to find themselves embroiled in conflict year after year.

Lebow's book is presented in seven chapters, including an introduction to his work and a thoughtful and reflective conclusion. The body of his work begins with an assessment of existing explanations for the occurrence of war (Chapter 2: Theories of War) followed by his key research findings on historical wars (Chapter 3: Theory and Propositions and Chapter 4: Data Set and Findings). Lebow follows his historical assessment of the causes of war with an assessment of the probable future causes and incidence of war in international politics. The fifth chapter (Interest and Security) clearly avoids specific prediction and instead engages in what Lebow terms "informed speculation" (p.132) about the likely continuation of the historical causal trends he has previously established, beginning with interest and security. The following chapter (Chapter 6: Standing and Revenge) considers the other two historical motives for war which between them are implicated in contributing to almost 70% of the wars in Lebow's data set. A conclusion follows, summarising the research but also carefully limiting the study and warning against social scientists giving too much weight to proximate causes when theorising war. The volume is

completed with the inclusion of Lebow's data set (pp.227-247) analysing 94 international wars across more than 350 years and a complete bibliography.

The significance of this study lies in Lebow establishing four primary motives for war in international politics. The first of these is interest, defined by Lebow as "a principal liberal motive...[that] refers to policies intended to maximise wealth" (p.107). Examples like the Gulf War of 1991 are offered but, reaching further back into international history, two of the Anglo-Dutch wars (1652 and 1665) and the Sino-Soviet conflict of 1929 are counted as wars motivated by interest. A second motive is standing, described as the "relative ranking among states" (p.108) and suggested by Lebow to be the most important cause of war. Indeed, Lebow would conclude that 58% of wars in the post-Westphalia period included standing as a motive (p.114) far outstripping interest (7%) and the two other motives he posits: revenge, "an expression of anger" (p.108), at 10% and security at 18%. Combined, then, Lebow contends that these four motives account for some 93% of all wars in the modern era, a finding that is challenging to both theoretical realists and liberals alike and is the key contribution of the book to the question of war and peace in international affairs.

Neorealists, for example, will appreciate Lebow's contention that standing and security are motives in three-quarters of all wars, yet their enthusiasm will be tempered by the significant proportion of wars motivated by revenge, which would likely fall under the classical realist's human nature explanation for international action. Liberals can find solace in Lebow's argument that war, as a political option to be exercised, is in decline; yet Lebow finds little of value in liberal arguments about the calming effects of institutions, the impacts of globalisation or within the democratic peace tradition that can be held to be playing a part in affecting the incidence of war (pp.203-210).

Indeed, this volume challenges the reader to conclude that there may be elements of classical realism, structural realism, liberalism and constructivism that can be helpful but that no one theoretical approach to international politics is wholly capable of explaining the incidence and frequency of the recourse to war by nation-states. Lebow's work and its focus on motives rather than goals forces the reader to re-assess their notions of why wars occur, leaving aside – if only temporarily – the geography of battlefields, the weighing of success and failure and returning instead to a Clausewitzian idea of a rational continuation of politics by other means. *Why Nations Fight* will be of interest to theorists of international politics, scholars of war and peace and international historians seeking a new perspective and typology of the wars that have plagued the international system since Münster and Osnabrück gifted to the world the modern nation-state.

John Fenwick and Janice McMillan (eds.), *Public Management in the Postmodern Era: Challenges and Prospects* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010)

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Applying “postmodern” and “public management” in one sentence, albeit one book title, is a challenge that editors John Fenwick and Janice McMillan acknowledge in their introduction (pp. 3-11) and concluding remarks (pp. 192-212) to this neat book which groups nine essays on public management by subject in the theory, application and resolution sections. The anthology collects essays by Wayne Parsons, Paul H.A. Frissen, Mark Evans, Andrew Massey, David Farnham, B. Guy Peters and Henrik P. Bang. Each author takes a distinctly different approach to solving the puzzle set out by the two editors of the book which belongs to the New Horizons in Public Policy series.

The book starts by examining the term “postmodernism”, its implications to public management and gives an overview of the 20th century discourse on managing public institutions (part 1). Then, it delves into the minutiae of particular policy application, interactions of the bureaucrat and his or her role in the current public administrative practice (part 2). In the third part, the authors examine a new mode of public governance and provide the ground for moving beyond the orthodoxy of the “foundationalist” theory and practice in public policy and management which they criticize.

The “postmodernist” edge that the editors and Wayne Parsons adopt is not a one-way direction to the dead end of nihilism. In their understanding, it is not enough to provide a descriptive account without offering a new constructive perspective; they charge the reader to be analytical and the theory to be inspirational. In Parsons’s words, a postmodern analysis of public policy can lead to “a more critical, thicker and richer understanding of what human beings can achieve when they combine rational analysis with their capacities for imagination, intuition, ingenuity [...]” (p. 34).

Each of the authors, in their own way, admits to a common shortcoming in current public policy being the “missing narrative” in current analyses of public policy. Most prominently, Henrik P. Bang in his essay makes an observation regarding Barack Obama’s electoral campaign which had managed to mobilize the young voter who political scientists thought were disinterested in politics. Bang explains that Obama’s campaign managed to engage the voter at the personal level in “micro-personal political activity” (p. 177). This, according to Bang, is an evidence that the political sphere can be a “lived experience” in a “reflexive political community” in which problems can be solved by participation (pp. 179-183). The practical lesson

for public management is, according to the editors, that activism, ethical values and sense-making of actors provides an effective solution to some of the paradoxes of determinist models of public policy theory in that the activism and creativity better interface with the constantly changing issues dealt with by the decentralised post-welfare states.

A narrative approach, praised by the editors, is based on tacit knowledge, understanding and actors' own experience. In this, they seem to diverge from the New Public Management (NPM) philosophy which relies on implementing market principles within the management of public institutions to increase institutional efficiency. In a sense, the editors seem to point to one obvious shortcoming of the NPM philosophy: one can hardly implement market principles in an area where there is no competition by default. That is, the states do not compete with their services to draw citizenry in as much as, in contrast, FMCG producers lure customers to buy a chocolate bar from one or the other. What works perfectly with chocolate (increased efficiency, price competition) cannot work for public services.

Instead, David Farnham notes that the performance of public administrators is increased by regular reviews, appraisals, monetary incentives, career development, promotion and other managerial tools. This new way of working is distinctly more individual than one under the traditional bureaucracy. B. Guy Peters goes further and claims that now the bureaucrats are faced with ambiguity and choices, previously unseen. This allows the public servant to reflect particular needs and policies and to provide nuanced responses. This however requires the public servant to attain new skills and engage in a "new governance". As Andrew Massey notes in his essay, the public servant must aspire to operate ethically, beyond the boundaries of race, ethnicity, religion, culture and politics and to respect individual human rights.

In theory, such an approach when taken to an extreme presupposes a system of governance without a centre, be it a power centre or even central and shared values. In his essay (pp. 39-63), Paul H.A. Frissen describes such a system which is far from the view of public administration as a "problem solving machine". Frissen argues for an "aesthetic view of politics" rather than a system with goals and means handed down from the political representation. Noting that knowledge in social science is often inadequate and always related to concrete social contexts, Frissen seems to claim that an effective public servant needs to adopt a form of moral relativism ("amoral" in Frissen's view) to be able to protect plurality and difference among the citizens. This finding is complemented by Mark Evans who examines policy transfers mainly in Anglo-Saxon countries. For him the key element is successful cross-cultural learning, cultural assimilation, simplicity and regard for indigenous practices which must be compatible, however, with the value system of the recipient organization and built on organizational strengths (p. 91).

The most challenging essay of the collection is Wayne Parsons' (pp. 12-38) since it sets the collection's theoretical tone. Parsons describes the current world as one in which

there is no such thing as objective truth and in which the role of the expert is fiercely contested, grand narratives are dismissed and in which we just bring and show each other our truth, rather than laying claims to anything called 'the truth' or 'the facts' (p. 33).

Parsons seeks a new link between knowledge arrived at by the social sciences and the natural sciences, and he maintains his trust in technology to give humanity the ability to gather knowledge about the world which is too complex to be intentionally directed, steered, planned or controlled.

The notion that holism in public policy is dangerously lacking in perspective permeates through the whole set of essays. This common theme, however, seems to neglect the distinction which Karl Popper made when he observed two kinds of holism in his *Poverty of Historicism*. Popper maintained (when citing Friedrich Hayek) that centralized power could not easily centralize the knowledge of individuals to make wise decisions. The incorrect belief that this can be done is only one kind of holism, and this kind of holism is referred to and rightfully criticized by Parsons, Fenwick and McMillan in the collection. Popper further argued that there was another kind of holism, one which sought to describe relations characteristic to a system made from particular agents; this view allows making prediction and managing some of the system's characteristics. Overtly, neither Parsons nor the rest of the authors seem to make such a distinction. But perhaps the common ambition of these essays is different: charting new waters and introducing challenging observations.

Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (eds.), *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*(New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010)

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Cultural diplomacy is usually limited spatially to the European and American areas and is mostly investigated for the period of the Cold War. What the two editors intend to do is extend both the geographical and temporal limits to African and Asian continents as well as back to the middle of the 19th century, as is the Japanese case. What Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried attempt in this work is to offer a comprehensive view of the term "cultural diplomacy" not only by looking at its multiple aspects, but also by offering throughout time and space various

examples of such a practice. As "cultural diplomacy" is not only a term, but also a valuable practice employed by both state and non-state actors.

The book is structured in four parts, comprising altogether 8 chapters and benefiting from a generous introduction by the two editors on this topic. It is in fact a collection of various articles and essays regarding what cultural diplomacy means in different areas and political regimes. For instance, two articles focus on Soviet cultural policy both at home and abroad, another one on Hungarian cultural diplomacy in the 1960's, a fourth one on the attempts performed by the German and Polish societies during the Cold War to find a channel of communication, involving religion and then culture, another two center on Syria, Lebanon and the Middle East and French and American cultural approaches there in the 1950's and 1960's and finally two essays draw on the Japanese case during the Meiji era and the first half of the 20th century.

The introduction specifies from the very beginning the intentions of the authors, the purpose of the book and its desired public. "Our goal is to find a usable definition for cultural diplomacy and, also, establish teleology for the term beyond the parameters of the Cold War. As such, this book is designed for academics, students, public officials and laymen interested in the field of cultural diplomacy" (p. 3). However, what remains of this goal in the final product is hardly the same.

Indeed, the editors set their minds to develop a definition of "cultural diplomacy", by looking into the examples provided by heterogeneous essays on the matter; up to a certain point they achieved laudable results. The two chapters of the introduction provide the reader with all the technical tools necessary to evaluate what cultural diplomacy is, how it can be differentiated from propaganda, its life-long adversary (as demonstrated in the essays concerning Soviet cultural policy and the French variant of cultural spreading in Syria and Lebanon). What is more, the editors clearly state what the characteristics of cultural diplomacy are and why it is called that. However, the editors refrain from drawing any conclusions from all the material they lay ahead of the reader. All the case studies are different and therefore, the perspectives are different also. Consequently, one would expect conclusion summing up all that has been presented throughout the book. Sadly, this does not happen and the entire skeleton put up together in the introduction is blown to dust in the end by the absence of such a conclusion. This would be a major drawback of the book: despite its highly academic documentation it appears unfinished to the naked eye.

A positive aspect of the endeavor of the two editors is the idea of gathering up studies concerning different spaces and times in which cultural diplomacy or any kind of cultural policy similar to it has been performed. Each of these studies is perfectly structured and stress out its purpose precisely, without useless details.

Another asset of this work, and this time the praises go to the editors, is that fact that nothing is repetitive, although the American, German and Japanese cases are mentioned several times. Even though the space is the same, new aspects are constantly brought into discussion without forcing the reader ponder for a minute whether he read it before or not. Moreover, each event, person or place benefits from its specific frame, which makes the work appreciable even to laymen. Endnotes are rich in detail and references are more than sufficient for those who seek further reading.

As far as drawbacks are concerned, only two are significant: the lack of an overall conclusion able to summarize the findings of the research and the fact that the intention specifically mentioned by the authors to go beyond the meanings of cultural diplomacy during the Cold War is not accomplished. All the studies refer either to the Cold War period or to pre-Cold War times (as is the case with Japanese cultural policy/diplomacy). Taking into account the conflicting nature of today's international community an overview of what cultural diplomacy means and how it manifests itself in the 21st century is highly recommended.

The articles of the book are all very well written; the lines of reasoning are fluid and are easily perceived. The tone is a neutral one: as the aim is to investigate and corroborate the information, the authors contributing to this volume refrained from becoming judgmental towards any of the practices and policies described. They all show an incredible knowledge on the topic discussed and, as a result, their handling of the topic is done in a most professional manner: the vocabulary is simple and well-chosen and the line of ideas presented at the beginning of each chapter is followed thoroughly.

Overall, this volume indulges the reader with a delightful analysis of the term of "cultural diplomacy" which has nowadays become quite a phenomenon. Apart from the drawbacks that will be easily overcome in future editions of the book, this work represents a considerable effort of all the academics involved to clarify this concept and present the way it has been used during the past centuries. For both academics and laymen, this is useful reading concerning the topic and highly recommended for all those looking forward not only to find basic information, but also, interpretation, analysis and references.

Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, *World in Transition: Evolving Governance across a Stressed Planet* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009)

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The need to develop sustainable and resilient governance mechanisms has plagued scholars, policy-makers and publics for several decades. Traditionally, such frameworks for coordinated decision-making have been associated with the problem of war. Yet in recent years both the recognition of and the proliferation of complex challenges emerging from the interconnectedness between local and transnational realities, between markets, migration, trafficking, and social movements, and between pandemics, a looming energy crisis, and climate change have tested the ability to comprehend and address convincingly their turbulence. Such risks have disturbed not only the assumption of a predictable model of world politics, but equally importantly they have also unsettled the accepted ways in which international affairs have been explained and understood. In this respect, the study of global governance seems to have been undergoing an intense and oftentimes troubled reflection on the validity and relevance of its theories, methods, and propositions. At the same time, the proliferation of a diverse set of new (or previously overlooked) issues on the political stage has urged such reconsiderations of the study of politics to promptly produce explanatory frameworks that can offer germane responses to the emerging challenges.

The complex reality of global life reveals sharp discontinuities to which modern, large-scale international actors (such as states and international organizations) are increasingly vulnerable. What appears to confound the imagination is the increase in uncertainty and randomness, which staggers decision-making rationality; in other words, it is “perennially vulnerable to failure” (p. 531). This is the context in which Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk want to make an intervention. Their book proffers an original reconsideration of established governance models and practices, by pioneering an evolutionary approach to governance, prioritizing the enhancement of adaptive and reflexive modes of decentralized policy-making. Premised on the nexus between biological and cultural development of human societies, Camilleri and Falk emphasize the increasing “complexification” of global life. This process draws attention to a series of phase-transitions that animate the evolutionary process. According to the book’s analysis, the underlying characteristic of these different stages is the ever deepening “psychological reflexivity,” whose contextual interactions “give shape and content to the sociality and governance in each of the main phases that have thus far characterized the human trajectory” (p. 65).

A central task of Camilleri and Falk’s endeavor is the development of resilient strategies that are able “to provide governance advice in the face of uncertainty” (p.

297). Such an effort reveals a marked departure from the traditional literature on global governance which tends to simplify the turbulence of global life for decision-making tractability. The contention is that more often than not mainstream approaches distort the reality of complex challenges in order to suggest predictable and controllable models for their solution. By offering an alternative reading of the global governance problematic, Camillieri and Falk demonstrate that the simplifying discourses on global governance remain analytically frozen, while the dynamics of global life are not. Their claim is that during the twentieth century – and in particular in the wake of World War II – a whole range of economic, political, social, and cultural processes were unleashed which gradually contributed to the erosion of the institutional efficacy of states. This does not mean that states are no longer important actors on the world stage, but their centrality was no longer accepted as a given.

Consequently, multilateral governance arrangements were consistently challenged by “the powerful pressures exerted by the market, and increasingly by civil society” (p. 144), which has led to the proliferation of ad-hoc arrangements, bottom-up approaches, and non-governmental agency in global life. The erudite account of Camillieri and Falk tackles directly this ever increasing complexity of global life. Thus, by developing an evolutionary perspective, their investigation is able to offer a meaningful engagement with the cognitive and policy multiplicity of global governance and its contexts. Their approach intimates governance mechanisms defined by the ability to cope with vulnerabilities, defy adversity, and construct new proficiency in response to the uncertainty, cognitive challenges, and complex risks emerging from the unpredictable alterations in global life. Moreover, Camillieri and Falk argue that the turbulence of current international patterns suggests the emergence of a “holoreflexive epoch” in human evolution. According to them, this new epoch reflects “a stage in human evolution that is for the first time distinctly possible, though by no means certain... [and which] characterizes and sustains several of the most significant normative, legal, and institutional shifts to have emerged during this period of transition” (p. 530).

The breadth and scope of the Camillieri and Falk’s exploration makes it a valuable reference resource for anyone interested in the study of governance under the conditions of an uncertain global life. As the authors indicate the question of “how to devise a pathway for continuing human adaptation” has, is, and will always remain the central concern of societies and communities around the world. Yet, the response will vary from one place and time to another owing to different circumstances and challenges. In this respect, Camillieri and Falk’s endeavor offers a valuable indication of the ways in which current generations can engage meaningfully in designing resilient and sustainable governance mechanisms. In this respect, their book is likely to enrich the endeavors of both students and scholars of political science, history, philosophy, and governance studies.

Eldar Sarajlić and Davor Marko (eds.), *State or Nation? The Challenges of Political Transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Sarajevo: University of Sarajevo, 2011)

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This edited volume brings together “the coming generation of Balkan social scientists” in an effort to open up discussion and shed light in various elements of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s troubled post-conflict transition processes. The book, like others focusing on the same subject, illustrates why Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) remains the most intriguing piece in the puzzle of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. In the most ethnically diverse republic of Yugoslavia, the particularly bloody conflict shocked the world that was watching in disbelief as international community scrambled to respond to the escalating crisis. The Dayton Peace Agreement put an end to the war but put into place a dysfunctional political system fashioned with consociational characteristics that resulted in ethnicization of politics, education and just about every other aspect of life in the country. Finally, the unprecedented international intervention that culminated in the institution of ‘international administration’, as embodied by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), made BiH the ‘perfect’ social experiment in the making. As an extreme or crucial case study, it attracted hordes of social scientists analyzing peace building, intervention, state building, nation-building and post-conflict reconstruction. With the international administration now in its sixteenth year of presence on the ground and with the political situation spiraling out of control to the point of talk among (nationalist) political elites of renewed conflict, it is not difficult to understand why the country is a mess that continues to fascinate.

Most scholarly accounts of the country, for reasons just presented, tend to get bogged down in the ‘diagnosing the problem’ stage, rarely offering policy recommendations or suggestions on how to break out of the stalemated status quo. However, these quests to assign the blame or pinpoint the ultimate cause of the troubled situation in the country or the reason behind international community’s inability to ‘administer’ the BiH’s post-conflict democratization processes often fall prey to circular reasoning. How does the volume by Sarajlić and Marko fare in this respect? Does the “new generation of Balkan social scientists” offer new information or fresh perspective on BiH’s troubled political transition? The introductory chapter by Sarajlić offers an excellent overview of cognitive, epistemic and methodological challenges in studying the BiH transition and correctly points out that conceptual boundaries (an example of which can be found in the civic versus ethnic nationalism dichotomy) stand in the way of political reform of the country. Sarajlić goes on to inflate readers’ expectations by pointing out that what is needed are “conceptual tools and political means to envisage Bosnia and Herzegovina beyond the mold of the nation-state” (p.18), as well as “a shift in

political thinking.” (p.19) However, he finishes the introductory chapter by setting a far more modest goal for the volume: “to open up certain questions, indicate certain problems” and offer opportunity to engage in discussion with the coming generation of Balkan social scientists. (p.20)

The book offers investigations in the spheres of state, society and culture. Sead Turčalo’s chapter summarizes some of the main literature in the field of statebuilding and its conclusion echoes Roland Paris’ that promoting empty forms does not lead to liberal democratic substance or norms within those institutions. As a review, this chapter offers a useful starting point to the discussion of external actor role in BiH post-conflict transition. Mateja Peter goes on to provide the analysis of international conceptions of state building by comparing different High Representatives’ priorities during their time in power. This chapter provides a useful narrative of different High Representatives’ goals and behavior while leading the OHR and illustrates well the shifting of the state building visions as well as the support and lack thereof from the side of the Peace Implementation Council. She concludes that, “Priorities and visions of the international community...greatly circumscribed the opportunities for the local subjects to translate their visions of state and nation into practice.” (p.60) However, some may disagree and point out that local political elites have fashioned the country into precisely the kind of state/nation they envisioned, despite the presence and interventions of the international administration.

Adnan Huskić is equally if not more pessimistic than Peter as he sets out to explain “the failure of state-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Pointing to the paradox of parallel state building and democratization processes, this chapter returns to the analysis of faults in the Dayton Peace Agreement and the mistake of premature post-conflict elections that legitimized and entrenched war-mongering nationalist parties in powerful positions. Even though well written, this chapter is a good example of an analysis bogged down in assigning blame and in critiquing Dayton and the 1996 elections – which few authors defend – it fails to offer new insights on the matter. Ivana Howard’s analysis of mistakes in supporting civil society development summarizes the main critiques of this endeavor, also offering local or recipients’ perspective on the flaws in this process. Her conclusion goes a step further and offers a set of recommendations. However, these recommendations (“donors must learn and be willing to change,” “they must learn to communicate,” “donors should learn how to respect their local partners,” p.118-119) lack operationalization. The final two chapters which focus on culture analyze the subjects that have not received as much attention as political elites, international administration and civil society in BiH: public holidays and the role of religious communities. Nataša Bošković’s chapter is well argued and demonstrates how through regulation of public holidays, political elites in BiH have institutionalized the precedence of ethnic identity instead of promoting individual citizens’ rights

and acknowledging the multiethnic composition of the country. The chapter by Tatjana Ljubić and Davor Marko provides an excellent illustration of religious communities' interference in both educational and electoral processes and how the 'synergy' between political and religious elites has hampered the democratization of the country. This final contribution is especially relevant taking into account the recent toxic backlash of religious figures against the government efforts to exclude religious teaching grade from students' overall GPA. (April-May 2011)

The overall impression of the book is that it reaches the goal that Sarajlić set initially: relevant issues were discussed, and some of the chapters provided original insights and added dimensions to existing analyses. However, as Sarajlić himself pointed out in the beginning, what is needed to further the discussion on BiH in an effort to break out of the political stalemate is a change of paradigm or a shift in our thinking about the local and international actors and their roles in the challenging BiH transition processes. As long as this conceptual shift is lacking, accounts of BiH and its problems will continue to leave readers frustrated, dissatisfied and wanting more.

Rajah Rasiah and Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt (eds.), *The New Political Economy of Southeast Asia*. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010)

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Southeast Asia has recently been dubbed as one of the world's fastest rising economic hubs. Although it has some countries that offer exemplary stories from the East Asian economic miracle, the region also has its share of middle-income and low-income countries beset with grave problems in their respective political economies such as endemic poverty, environmental challenges and economic governance issues. Notwithstanding that the region is indeed a fascinating focal point for the analysis of emerging political economies, there appears to be a vacuum in Asian studies scholarship on a comprehensively-written volume examining political-economic change of the countries from a distinctive regionalist perspective which justifiably abandons the country-by-country analytic approach. More particularly, this means that it considers the entirety of Southeast Asia as a focal unit of analytic-scholarly endeavor, rather than examining each country in the region – with the latter task usually ending up in a mere stockpiling of case studies.

Filling successfully such a gap, *The New Political Economy of Southeast Asia* aims to provide a compelling scholarly examination of the most crucial contemporary issues in region's political economy. By exhaustively and eloquently highlighting the weaknesses and limitations of previous analytical approaches (neo-classical; state-

capital; classical Marxist; neo-Marxist) in analyzing the rapid socio-economic transformations in the region, the volume advocates and utilizes an “interdisciplinary approach” (see pp. 20-27) that is intended to view regional political economy as a task for various disciplines to offer their own insightful perspectives in tackling exigent regional dilemmas such as “poverty, distribution, the environment and civil society” (p.23). Moreover, in methodological terms, the book’s over-arching proposition is the need to deem Southeast Asia in its holistic entirety through re-conceiving it as an investigative unit of inquiry; consequently considering its constitutive features and interconnectedness with the global political economy. In so doing, it attempts ambitiously to undercover the profundity of effects of the global political-economic variables on the individual Southeast Asian political economies.

Not including the introductory section written by the editors, the volume is composed of seven substantive chapters that include the following: industrialization policies in the second-tier newly-industrializing economies (Rasiah); recovery and reform policies in the post-1997 economic crisis (Dixon); distributional and equity issues of Southeast Asian economic growth (Chowdhury & Islam); the existence of feeble industrial relations and labour market conditions particularly on those national economies that are heavily dependent on transnational companies (Ofreneo & Wad); environmental costs of current urban and industrial development in key Southeast Asian countries (Sonnenfeld & Mol); role and impact of the civil society on conflicts over distributional, equity and resource-related issues (Schmidt); and lastly, an analysis of the creation of free-trade agreements in some key countries in the region (Das & Chongvilaivan).

Notably, this compendium of articles is likely to be of interest for students and scholars alike who are trying to comprehend the recent socio-political and economic changes that have occurred in the region. More particularly, it effectively responds to a critical demand in the Asian studies scholarship for a thorough yet theoretically-grounded primer on the most critical and timely issues of the region’s political economy. To a large extent, it succeeds with much remarkable perspicacity in being able to characterize the political-economic phenomena that spreads much across the region, and, consequently, to highlight the most probable underlying explanatory narratives that account for the region-wide patterns of political-economic change.

In addition, this particular volume’s notable strengths can be outlined as follows. First, it was able to persuasively argue for a need in adhering to a strong sense of interdisciplinarity in examining issues of political economy in the region. Such was the case while being able to point out the inherent analytical-methodological limitations of other approaches that parochially favor either an extremely strong disciplinary bias or a narrowly-defined ideologically-grounded framework of

understanding. The editors' seemingly ambitious goal of being able to offer a comprehensive volume on contemporary Southeast Asian political economy has been thoroughly matched by coming up with this scholarly compendium that is devoid of a parochial disciplinary bias in embarking upon an investigative inquiry of multifaceted issues such as poverty, industrialization, economic crises and environmental problems. Indubitably, these multifaceted problems require the analytic flexibility in that the volume's authors were able to successfully justify that an interdisciplinary approach was best, something that previous scholarly endeavors have failed to vigorously advocate and utilize. It goes without saying that such interdisciplinarity is not only reflected in the analyses unleashed in the volume, but also from the various disciplinary affiliations of the contributors themselves.

Second, the edited volume is also commendable for being able to characterize the underlying patterns and dynamics of political-economic changes with its topical approach, which is, selecting those timely and relevant regional issues such as poverty, industrialization and distributional issues pertaining to economic growth. Nonetheless, it may be keenly suggested that future editions of this volume should indispensably include a special chapter pertaining to China's growth and its profound impact to Southeast Asian political economy, both as a region and within its respective key national economies. Also, it is noted that one of the key notions upheld by the editors was to show the global linkages of the region's political economies, but a deeper and much more extensive discussion of global economic issues (e.g. the financial crisis in the U.S.; increased European integration; among many others) should have been consciously integrated in the analyses undertaken in each of the contributions.

Conclusively, *The New Political Economy of Southeast Asia* is a praiseworthy interdisciplinary scholarly survey of contemporary political economy of one of the most dynamic economic hubs of the world. It is a highly-recommended reading not only for advanced scholars of Asian studies who hope to build upon the theoretically-oriented and empirically-grounded analyses advocated in this volume, but also for students and interested individuals who are deeply interested in Southeast Asia, or more broadly, on the study of regional and national economies vis-à-vis their constitutive property of being globally embedded. Future scholarly endeavors in the social sciences dealing with the study of Southeast Asian political economy are strongly encouraged to build upon the findings uncovered in the volume's interdisciplinary-oriented analyses, as well as to be more conscious of uncovering the multi-dimensional linkages between the global and regional political economies.

Michael Urban, *Cultures of Power in Post-Communist Russia. An analysis of Elite Political Discourse* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's transformation has been an object of study by scholars of transition studies. The challenges of political, economic, and nation-building processes occurring in post-Soviet Russia have sparked numerous scholarly debates, and with the comeback of Russia in international politics, the interest of scholars in the societal and political developments of that country became even more pronounced. Michael's Urban recent book contributes to the body of existing scholarly literature on Russia's post-Soviet transformation and, due to its alternative conceptual framework, the book presents an interesting and thought-provoking study of the Russian society and politics.

The book centers on the political culture of the Russian political elite. In his approach to studying Russian political culture, the author proceeds as follows. In the first chapter (Introduction), the author starts off with an overview over the conceptual framework of his study, laying out the concepts of political culture and political discourse. He conceptualizes political culture as a discursive formation, in which political elites construct their realities (cultures of power) through communication. The investigation of these cultures of power is based on the analysis of narratives of the Russian political elite, with a particular focus on the language that Russian politicians use to describe the world of politics and their personal place therein. In analyzing the political discourse of the Russian political elite, the author focuses on four aspects of the political discourse, namely morality, community, approval (law), and competence. He applies a discourse analysis to thirty-four interviews with Russian politicians, revolving about their political careers, their influence on political events in the country, their principles of successfully realizing political goals, the personal qualities that they associate with success in politics, the role of moral principles, and their involvement in the events of August 1991 and the Belovezh Accords. The interview partners were governmental ministers, leaders of political parties, parliamentary deputies, and officials from the Presidential Administrations that served during the eras of Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin.

In the second chapter (Social Relations), the author develops a model of social relations in Russia, in which the political discourse that is to be investigated is embedded. The author contrasts the conventional model of civil society found in Western democracies to a specific Russian pattern of civil society as conceptualized in some academic works on Russia. The Western democratic model identifies civic associations as the dominant organizational form of the civil society, characterized by economic capital, weak ties among actors, specific focus of collective actions,

generalized social capital, and a strong rule of law. In contrast, the Russian civil society model constructed by the author is associated with different attributes: an informal network with social and cultural capital, strong ties among actors, a diffuse focus of the collective actions, particularized social capital, and a weak state.

In the subsequent three chapters (Community, Morality, and Competence), the author turns to exploring the discursive construction of the categories community, morality (and law), and competence, which appear in narratives of the Russian political elite within the Russian social relations framework as conceptualized by the author in the previous chapter. Here, the discourse of community is centered about the discussion of two distinct categories, state and society (people), the discourse of morality (and law) involves two different types of responders, moralists and pragmatists, and the discourse of competence (professionalism) is disaggregated in the discourse of professionals in politics and the discourse of professional politicians.

In the subsequent chapter (Revolution), the author analyzes the complexity of the above-discussed elements of the political discourse by focusing on the responders' recollections and assessments concerning the Russian anti-communist revolution (the failed Soviet *coup d'état* in 1991). Here, the elements of a political discourse (morality, community, approval (law), and competence) are examined simultaneously in order to show how the discourse elements in narratives on revolution are configured, and how certain elements express saliency and muteness. The discourse of the revolution is investigated through two notions: the emergence of the Russian state, and the socio-economic transformation that appears to be activated by the responders.

In his final chapter (Conclusion), the author presents a summary of his research on the political discourse in Russia. In his findings, he advocates for the idea that the elements of the political discourse (morality, community, approval, and competence) do not represent separate entities, but are intertwined in the political communication. The Russian model of civil society, as developed by the author in the second chapter, is to a large extent congruent with the narratives of the Russian politicians. In the understanding of the responders, the "law" signifies a formal general instruction from people in the office. Citizens, in their perception of "community", are marginalized and characterized by politicians as either a receiver of benefits or a degraded mass. "Loyalty" as a category of the morality discourse concerns the loyalty to those politicians with whom the relations of "clans" and "teams" were established. "Competence", in terms of professionalism, is seen either as knowledge that politicians bring to the government from their previous work places, or as the ability to achieve results in the world of politics. In this last part of his book, the author argues that his findings have two broad implications: for the

persistence of authoritarianism in Russia and for methodology in comparative politics.

Michael Urban's study is highly interesting due to his unconventional approach to investigating politics. By combining an innovative conceptual framework with a wealth of empirical material, the study is a strong contribution to a better understanding of the Russian society and politics. The author's direct quotations from interviews with Russian politicians in the book turn out to be an excellent writing strategy since they make the research findings visible and comprehensible. A significant part of the study's value is rooted in the original research based on interviews with Russian politicians. Scholars who deal with the exploration of Russian politics are certainly aware of the challenges that field work in Russia presents.

Furthermore, the book is a thought-provoking study for students of comparative politics. The study reveals challenges that scholars might face when dealing with the constructivist research paradigm. Since the constructivist approach is subjective and involves context-specific understanding of phenomena, it remains a challenge for scholars to combine the constructivist approach with normative positivist concepts in studies on democracy and authoritarianism. In this context, an average reader might find it difficult to follow how the author presents the concepts of political culture, language, discourse, and narrative in order to build a coherent theoretical framework of the study. Therefore, the book is recommendable for an academic audience rather than for the broad public.

Simon Teune (ed.) *The Transnational Condition: Protest dynamics in an entangled Europe* (New York and Oxford:: Berghahn Books, 2010)

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The Transnational Condition represents a valuable development of the academic literature on social movements and transnationalism. The objective of Simon Teune has been to "take protests in Europe as an example for the crosscutting relevance of transnational exchanges" (p. 2). Protest and activism act as a lens through which we are able to explore how local, national and global (or European) levels of social relations are shaped and integrated. Although the conceptualisation of 'transnationalism' as a set of "pluri-local relations of entanglement beyond national borders" (ibid.) initially seems somewhat vague and imprecise, the case studies that complete the edition clearly illustrate how a tighter definition of boundaries between these levels would fail to capture the fluid and dynamic nature of cross-border exchanges across them. In summary, the editor has brought together a range

of texts that successfully “expands the depth of academic focus with reference to political processes on the European continent” (p. 12), whilst also presenting academics of social movements, European integration and communication studies with new avenues for investigation. The result is a collection of studies that does not only inform about the topic at hand, but offers analytical tools for the future development of the field.

The book is structured into four sections that cover the different organisational levels of protest movements in Europe. The first approaches the micro-level of individual activists and organisations through case studies of participants in European Social Forums and Global Justice Movements, finding that in many circumstances national-level structures and cultural characteristics shape the composition of and interaction between groups on the European or global level. The second section takes transnational networks and public spheres as a meso-level of mobilisation. Christoph Haug argues soundly for a study of public spheres *within* social movements, in contrast to the elite-biased studies of European public spheres, in order to grasp the dynamic of Europeanisation “from below” in civil society across Europe and for political practitioners to avoid the reproduction of established power structures (p. 71). Nicole Doerr’s case study of the preparatory assemblies of the European Social Forum provides a particularly clear example of how these power structures contribute to inequalities between nationality groups within transnational social movements. The third section on the macro-level of protest and societal systems builds on this idea of tying civil society organisations and movements into studies of processes of European integration.

Donatella Della Porta offers an interpretation of ‘critical Europeanism’ and the development of a ‘Europe from below’ through democratic activism and protest, the technicalities and conceptual challenges of which are explored by Thomas Olesen in his subsequent chapter on porous publics (complementing Haug’s piece on public spheres in protest assemblies, see chapter 3). The final section confronts the reader with three chapters on theoretical and methodological questions arising from the study of transnational protest. Here it is the final chapter from Jackie Smith and Rachel Kutz-Flamenbaum that perhaps provides the greatest novelty by adopting a critical stance towards the protest research field, arguing that the routine application of theories in previous protest research is not only scientifically problematic but also fails to contribute to the political struggles that transnational movements are engaged in.

Central to the book’s appeal is its variety and diversity. There is a range of authors from established academics to PhD candidates and a balance is struck between chapters on theory, methodology and empirical case studies which renders the edition useful for academics, researchers and students of social movements. Also, similar to the border-defying nature of transnationalism, the academic relevance of

this book cuts across disciplinary boundaries. One topic which represents the cohesion between chapters as well as the wide-reaching academic relevance is that of 'Europe from below', covered in the meso- and macro-level analyses. The argument that democratic activism and protest are building 'Europe' from the perspective of civil society offers a new direction for academics of the integration of the European Union, going beyond the institutionalist and IR-realist dominated approaches that have previously ruled the topic. Here we find an alternative to the view that Europe is defined by bureaucrats, heads of nation-states and market-based interest groups in Brussels. We are shown instead how individuals, groups and networks organise around specific issues and a shared moral claim for justice. For Haug and Olesen, the process of Europeanisation from below does not consist simply of political institution building and market liberalisation, as does Europeanisation 'from above', but rather signifies the development of a transnational space of communication and information exchange.

Olesen further argues that for a public to be transnational – or European – it does not have to be uniform in content and form, but can instead be composed of national spheres that are sufficiently porous to enable the exchange of information across each other. In this way 'the transnational public sphere is not something constantly 'out there', it comes and goes because it always emerges on the back of specific issues that for one reason or the other acquire transnational resonance' (p. 142). Thus the project of a Europe from below is envisaged as a process of interconnecting local, national and transnational spheres of communication around specific issues. This vision of integration pushes us beyond the national-supranational dichotomy that has dogged the history of European studies. Furthermore, such a view vindicates Teune's original conceptualisation of transnationalism as entangled pluri-local spaces.

However, readers should also be aware of the limitations to the book. Despite being presented as a study of transnational protest, the focus is principally on European Social Forums and Global Justice activism in liberal democracies. This skew in the case selection is noted by Teune in the introduction, who justifies it by clarifying that the focus of the book is European, rather than global, protest. Yet the range of empirical cases is also lacking in local-level analyses, despite the fact that throughout the book the relationship between the local, the national and the global is presented as central to the nature of transnational protest. Indeed, the object of study in the chapters on the micro-level is not the local level of transnational protest, but rather the individual experience of large-scale macro-level protest movements. This area of study can benefit, on the one hand, from studies of migration and ethnic relations that have already attempted to confront the task of bringing grassroots organisations, networks and discourses into an understanding of wider political and social processes. On the other hand, the practice of cross-border activism by individuals, small groups and decentralised networks such as the French-

based *La Rage du Peuple* can provide case studies that permit greater exploration of the role of the local in the diffusion of global values, attitudes and perceptions, and vice versa, how a wider moral claim for global justice to is transposed onto specific issue claims in local situations.

In summary, Simon Teune has gathered a selection of studies that contribute positively to the study of protest and transnationalism in Europe. The conceptual and empirical analyses are thorough and will be appreciated by researchers, students and activists alike.

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