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# ERGÄNZUNGEN UND ANGABEN IN DER VALENZTHEORIE

## 1. Das Phänomen der Valenz

Die Wörter einer Sprache kommen im konkreten Redeakt nie isoliert vor, sondern sie verbinden sich mit bestimmten Partnern. Die Verbindungsmöglichkeiten der Wörter sind nicht beliebig, sie unterliegen bestimmten Gesetzmässigkeiten, mit deren Untersuchung sich die germanistische Linguistik in den letzten Jahrzehnten in vielfältiger Weise beschäftigt hat. Heute fasst man die grundlegenden Gesetzmässigkeiten der Verbindbarkeit bzw. Kombinierbarkeit sprachlicher Einheiten unter dem Begriff der Valenz zusammen.[1] Kennzeichnend für die Valenztheorie ist das Durchlaufen verschiedener Entwicklungsphasen, was sich daraus erklärt, dass im Zuge ihrer Formierung unterschiedliche Aspekte in das Blickfeld rückten. Die schrittweise Erarbeitung der Basis für die Valenzanalyse erfolgte in den verschiedenen Grammatiktheorien auf unterschiedlichen Wegen. Das Interesse wandte sich zunächst aus leicht verständlichen Gründen dem Verb als satzstrukturierende Dominante zu. Gleichzeitig wurde aber betont, dass die Valenz nicht ausschliesslich dem Verb zuzuerkennen sei, sondern auch anderen Wortarten und anderen Elementen des Sprachsystems. So wird der von Lucien Tesnicre geprägte Terminus „Valenz", der ursprünglich die Benennung einer strukturell-syntaktischen Eigenschaft des Verbs war, heute unterschiedlich verstanden. Der Begriff der Valenz wird als Bezeichnung für die unten angedeuteten Phänomene verwendet:

a) die Kombinationsfähigkeit aller gleichartigen sprachlichen Elemente auf allen Ebenen des Sprachsystems;

b) die Fähigkeit des Zeichens, obligatorische Beziehungen auf verschiedenen Ebenen des Sprachsystems zu realisieren, was sich in der Unterscheidung von syntaktischer, semantischer und pragmatischer Valenz niederschlägt;

c) die Kombinationsfähigkeit bestimmter Klassen von Wortzeichen, wobei die Funktion der Satzkonstituierung der Verbvalenz vorbehalten wird;

d) die Kombinationsfähigkeit der Wortklassen;

e) die Kombinationsfähigkeit ein und derselben Wortklassen in verschiedenen natürlichen Sprachen;

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[1] Stepanova, M.D. – Helbig, G.: *Wortarten und das Problem der Valenz in der deutschen Gegenwartssprache.* Leipzig 1981, S. 118.

f)  die Kombinationsfähigkeit, die nur dem Verb zukommt;
g)  die Ergänzungsbedürftigkeit des Verbs.

Die unterschiedlichen Interpretationen des Valenzbegriffes haben eine grosse Auswirkung auf die möglichen Wege der Lösung der Grundprobleme der Valenz, unter anderem auf die notwendige Grundentscheidung jeder Valenztheorie. Diese Grundentscheidung bezieht sich auf die Differenzierung zwischen Ergänzungen und Angaben. Wenn wir von den terminologischen Unterschieden in den verschiedenen Valenzdefinitionen absehen, lässt sich konstatieren, dass dem Phänomen der Valenz Universalität (Eigenschaft einer Systemkategorie) zugesprochen wird. „In der Linguistik steht der Ausdruck 'Valenz' nicht für eine natürliche Eigenschaft, sondern für eine konzeptuelle Eigenschaft des Zeichens - ganz im Unterschied zum Ausdruck 'Valenz', wie er in den Naturwissenschaften Verwendung findet, wo er sich auf Eigenschaften von Naturelementen bezieht."[2] Folglich kann unter Verzicht auf die Analyse konkreten Beispielmaterials a priori festgestellt werden, dass bei der Lösung der Grundprobleme der Valenztheorie mehrere Faktoren der Systemebene in Betracht gezogen werden müssen. Da von den verschiedenen Gruppen von Linguisten immer andere Faktoren als Prämissen in den Vordergrund der Untersuchung gerückt werden, finden wir in den modernen Grammatiktheorien unterschiedliche, manchmal sehr voneinander abweichende Lösungen der Grundprobleme der Valenztheorie.

## 2. Einige Grundbegriffe der Valenztheorie

Im folgenden werden Überlegungen zu einigen Grundproblemen und Grundbegriffen der Valenztheorie im Hinblick auf die Problematik der Abgrenzung von Ergänzungen und Angaben dargestellt.

Bei der Ermittlung der distinktiven Merkmale der Ergänzungen und Angaben tauchen immer wieder die Begriffe „obligatorisch" und „fakultativ" auf, die aber in den verschiedenen Grammatiken nicht immer eindeutig definiert sind. Die Interpretationsschwierigkeiten der genannten Begriffe ergeben sich in erster Linie daraus, dass sie im Zusammenhang mit solcher Erscheinungen wie Grammatikalität und Akzeptabilität bestimmt werden. Die Begriffe der Grammatikalität und Akzeptabilität wurden in die generative Grammatik eingeführt um die Grade und Arten der Regelabweichungen und Regelveränderungen zu beschreiben. Die generative Grammatik hat es nicht mit Gesetzen, sondern mit solchen Regeln zu tun, die entweder intersubjektiv (gemeinsam, nach dem Bewusstsein mehrerer Personen) oder subjektiv

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[2] Logaceva, E.P.: „Grundfragen der Valenztheorie", in *Deutsch als Fremdsprache* (2), Leipzig 1990, S. 70.

kontrollierbare Normen darstellen. Folglich liegen – nach dieser Auffassung – die Entscheidungen über Normhaftigkeit und teilweise auch über Grammatikalität im Bereich der Kompetenz. Es ist aber in vielen Fällen sehr schwer zu sagen, ob es um die Kompetenz des „ideal speaker" im Sinne der Chomskyschen Kompetenzauffassung, um eine Summe aus unterschiedlichen Individualkompetenzen oder um die Individualkompetenz irgendeines Sprechers der betreffenden Sprache handelt.

Die Frage nach der Unterscheidung von Ergänzungen und Angaben kann auf keinen Fall auf der Ebene der Individualkompetenz beantwortet werden. Die Begriffe „Ergänzung" und „Angabe" stellen Termini einer linguistischen Theorie, nämlich der Valenztheorie dar und als solche müssen sie auf der Basis linguistischer Fakten definiert werden. Auf der Ebene der Individualkompetenz können nur Entscheidungen getroffen werden, die sich auf das Ergebnis der operationellen Verfahren zur Unterscheidung von Ergänzungen und Angaben beziehen. Das sind aber Akzeptabilitätsurteile und nicht Grammatikalitätsurteile. Eines können wir also festhalten: wenn wir darüber entscheiden wollen, ob ein Satz grammatisch oder nicht grammatisch ist, muss der Terminus Grammatikalität (Grammatizität) definitorisch festgelegt werden. Um eine Definition der Grammatikalität festlegen zu können, müssen vorher die folgenden Fragen beantwortet werden:

a) Kann man auf der Basis seiner Sprachkompetenz über Grammatikalitätsfragen entscheiden?

b) Kann man aufgrund seiner Kentnisse der Grammatik darüber Entscheidungen treffen, ob ein Satz grammatisch oder nicht grammatisch ist?

c) Soll eine Person individuell oder sollen mehrere Personen gemeinsam Grammatikalitätsurteile fällen?

d) Kann jeder einzelne Sprecher intuitiv die Frage nach der Grammatikalität eines Satzes beantworten oder es müssen Linguisten und Grammatiker sein, die auf wissenschaftlicher Basis eine Antwort geben können?

Ohne die Antworten auf diese Probleme können die Begriffe „obligatorisch" und „fakultativ" nicht eindeutig festgelegt werden, da ihre Definitionen in den meisten Valenzkonzepten von der Interpretation des Grammatikalitätsbegriffes abhängig sind. Das kann man an folgenden Definitionen beobachten:

a) Ulrich Engel: „Wird ein Element als fakultativ gekennzeichnet, so bedeutet das lediglich, dass seine Aktualisierung (sein Vorhandensein) irrelevant für die Grammatizität des Satzes ist. Entsprechend ist die Aktualisierung eines obligatorischen Elements Voraussetzung für die Grammatizität des Satzes."[3]

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[3] „Zur Beschreibung der Struktur deutscher Sätze", in Engel, Ulrich – Grebe, Paul (Hg.): *Neue Beträge zur deutschen Grammatik*, Mannheim 1969, S. 45.

b) Ulrich Engel – Helmut Schumacher: „Elemente, die auf Grund grammatischer Regeln unabdingbar sind, nennen wir obligatorisch; ihre Elimination ergibt grammatisch unkorrekte (wenngleich eventuell kommunikativ brauchbare) Sätze. [...] Elemente, die auf Grund grammatischer Regeln nicht aktualisiert zu werden brauchen, deren Fehler also die Grammatizität des Satzes nicht berührt, nennen wir fakultativ."[4]

c) Gerhard Helbig – Wolfgang Schenkel: „Ein Glied ist ein obligatorischer Mitspieler, wenn es in der Obenflächenstruktur nicht eliminiert werden kann, ohne dass der Satz ungrammatisch wird."[5]

Bei der Analyse des Erklärungswerts der einzelnen Tests zur Unterscheidung von Ergänzungen und Angaben werden die Begriffe „obligatorisch" und „fakultativ" ebenfalls mit Hilfe des Grammatikalitätsbegriffes erläutert. Das sehen wir am Beispiel der Weglassprobe und des Eliminierungstests: „Wir eliminieren ein Satzglied und beobachten, ob der verbleibende Satzrest noch grammatisch oder bereits ungrammatisch ist. Ist er noch grammatisch, dann ist das eliminierte Satzglied syntaktisch nicht obligatorisch; ist er aber ungrammatisch, dann ist das eliminierte Satzglied syntaktisch für den Bestand des Satzes obligatorisch."[6]

Von dem Begriffspaar „obligatorisch/fakultativ" wird in vielen Valenztheorien das Begriffspaar „notwendig/weglassbar" abgeleitet. Die Differenzierung zwischen den beiden Merkmalpaaren liegt in einer intuitiven Unterscheidung zwischen syntaktischer und inhaltlicher Vollständigkeit des Satzes. Folglich beziehen sich die Termini „obligatorisch/fakultativ" auf Syntaktisches bzw. Morphosyntaktisches, und die Termini „notwendig/weglassbar" auf Semantosyntaktisches bzw. Kommunikatives. So entstanden die in den verschiedenen Valenztheorien gebräuchlichen Termini wie „grammatisch obligatorisch" und „kommunikativ notwendig" einerseits und „grammatisch fakultativ" und „kommunikativ weglassbar" andererseits. Aber eine Unterscheidung zwischen „grammatisch-vollständigen" und „kommunikativ-vollständigen" Sätzen ist nicht durchführbar, da der Begriff der „kommunikativen Vollständigkeit" den Begriff der „grammatischen Vollständigkeit" nicht ausschliesst und umgekehrt. Das spricht für die Annahme, dass jedes Merkmal des ersten Merkmalpaares mit jedem beliebigem Merkmal des zweiten Merkmalpaares kombiniert werden kann.

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[4] Engel, Ulrich – Schumacher, Helmut: *Kleines Valenzlexikon deutscher Verben*, Gunter Narr Verlag, Tübingen 1978, S. 28-29.

[5] Helbig, Gerhard – Schenkel, Wolfgang: *Wörterbuch zur Valenz und Distribution deutscher Verben*, VEB Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig 1980, S. 37.

[6] Helbig, Gerhard – Schenkel, Wolfgang, 1980, S. 33.

Die Kombinationsmöglichkeiten sind die folgenden (die Beispiele stammen aus der Arbeit von Angelika Ballweg-Schramm[7]):

a) Obligatorisch-notwendig:
   Thomas beansprucht Aufmerksamkeit.
b) Obligatorisch-weglassbar:
   Er hat. (Im Anschluss an den Satz „Hat der Boss was von dem Kraut?")
c) Fakultativ-notwendig:
   Pinkus pfeift ihn. (Im Anschluss an den Satz „Ich habe vergessen, wie der Kaiserwalzer geht.")
d) Fakultativ-weglassbar:
   Er isst. (Im Anschluss an den Satz „Isst der Boss was von dem Kraut?")

Wenn wir die oben dargestellten Kombinationsmöglichkeiten der Begriffe „obligatorisch/fakultativ" und „notwendig/weglassbar" für richtig halten, dann scheint es äusserst problematisch zu sein, sie bei der Unterscheidung von Ergänzungen und Angaben zu benutzen.

Die Tauglichkeit der Begriffe „obligatorisch/fakultativ" und „notwendig/weglassbar" bei der Charakterisierung von Ergänzungen und Angaben hängt natürlich von der Definition dieser Begriffpaare ab. In den meisten Valenztheorien heisst es: Ergänzungen sind obligatorisch oder fakultativ, Angaben immer fakultativ. Aufgrund dieser Definition kann aber keine Grenze zwischen den fakultativen Ergänzungen einerseits und Angaben andererseits gezogen werden. Hier kommt das andere Begriffspaar ins Spiel und besagt, dass die fakultativen Ergänzungen notwendige Glieder, die Angaben hingegen nicht notwendige Glieder sind. Auf der Basis der Logik können wir festhalten, dass zwei distinktive Merkmale (fakultativ = minus obligatorisch, weglassbar = minus notwendig) zur Unterscheidung von drei Kategorien genügen müssen:

|  | Ergänzungen I. | Ergänzungen II. | Angaben |
|---|---|---|---|
| +/-obligatorisch | + | - | - |
| +/-notwendig | + | + | - |

Zur Unterscheidung von vier Klassen von Elementen (Ergänzungen I. II., Angaben I. II.) reichen die genannten zwei Kriterien offensichtlich nicht. Deshalb vertreten viele Linguisten die Auffassung, dass die Unterscheidung zwischen Ergänzungen und Angaben nicht durch die Merkmalpaare „obligatorisch/fakultativ" und „notwendig/weglassbar" begründet werden kann. Demnach sind die Merkmale „obligatorisch/fakultativ" für Ergänzungen und

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[7] Ballweg-Schramm, Angelika: „Noch einmal: Grundbegriffe der Valenztheorie. Bemerkungen zu einem Papier von S. Pape", in Schumacher, Helmut (Hg.): *Untersuchungen zur Verbvalenz*, TBL Verlag Gunter Narr, Tübingen 1976, S.57.

Angaben keine typischen Unterscheidungsmerkmale. „Die Aufgabe der Merkmale ‚obligatorisch' und ‚fakultativ' bedeutet aber nicht die Aufgabe der Unterscheidung von Ergänzung und Angabe, wohl aber die Aufgabe von ‚obligatorischer' und ‚fakultativer' Ergänzung."[8] Aus dieser Sicht wäre aber die Einführung des Begriffes „obligatorische Angabe", die konsequenterweise nach dem Begriff „fakultative Ergänzung" eingeführt werden müßte, höchst problematisch.

Zusammenfassend können wir also festhalten, dass der Grammatikalitätsbegriff in vielen Valenztheorien nicht definitorisch eingeführt wird, obwohl er eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Unterscheidung zwischen den Merkmalen „obligatorisch/fakultativ" und „notwendig/weglassbar" spielt. Die Prämissen bei der Ermittlung der distinktiven Merkmale der Ergänzungen und Angaben können nicht ausschließlich auf den Merkmalpaaren „obligatorisch/fakultativ" und „notwendig/weglassbar" beruhen, sondern auch andere wichtige Merkmale müssen in die Untersuchungen miteinbezogen werden. Es wird also ein Bündel von distinktiven Merkmalen nötig sein um eine Differenzierung zwischen Ergänzungen und Angaben vornehmen zu können.

## 3. Kriterien zur Unterscheidung von Ergänzungen und Angaben

Ausgangspunkt meiner Überlegungen war die Beobachtung, dass es in der Valenztheorie unterschiedliche Ansätze und dementsprechend unterschiedliche Interpretationen der Grundbegriffe der Valenztheorie gibt. Die immer wieder diskutierte Grundunterscheidung der Valenztheorie zwischen Ergänzungen und Angaben bzw. zwischen obligatorischer und fakultativer Valenz wird auf unterschiedliche Weise behandelt. Dabei werden die wichtigsten Unterscheidungskriterien unterschiedlich festgelegt. Als Beispiel seien hier die grundlegenden Merkmale der Ergänzungen und Angaben angeführt, die einerseits zur Charakterisierung, andererseits zur Abgrenzung dieser beiden Kategorien dienen sollen (die Reihenfolge ist von der Bedeutung und dem Erklärungswert der einzelnen Merkmale unabhängig):

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[8] Pape, Sabine: „Bemerkungen zu einigen Grundbegriffen der Valenztheorie", in Schumacher, Helmut (Hg.): *Untersuchungen zur Verbvalenz*, TBL Verlag Gunter Narr, Tübingen 1976, S 36

| Ergänzungen | Angaben |
|---|---|
| nehmen an der Handlung teil | bestimmen die Umstände der Handlung |
| notwendig | nicht notwendig |
| obligatorisch oder fakultativ | fakultativ |
| konstitutiv | frei hinzufügbar |
| valenzgebunden (valenzbedingt) | nicht valenzgebunden (nicht valenzbedingt) |
| besetzen Leerstellen | besetzen keine Leerstellen |
| sind im Stellenplan des Verbs enthalten | sind im Stellenplan des Verbs nicht enthalten |
| verbspezifisch | nicht verbspezifisch |
| begründen Satzbaupläne | begründen keine Satzbaupläne |
| subklassenspezifisch (subkategorisieren die Valenzträger) | nicht subklassenspezifisch (subkategorisieren die Valenzträger nicht) |
| vom Verb regiert | nicht vom Verb regiert |
| morphosyntaktisch vom Verb abhängig | morphosyntaktisch vom Verb nicht abhängig |
| determinierte nichtverbale Elemente | determinierende nichtverbale Elemente |
| beruhen auf einem Paradigma | beruhen nicht auf einem Paradigma |
| lexikalisch-syntaktisch realisierte Argumente | nicht Spezifizierungen von Argumenten |
| können auf selbständige Sätze nicht zurückgeführt werden | können auf selbständige Sätze zurückgeführt werden |
| können aus dem Satz nicht herausgelöst werden, ihre Eliminierung verursacht Ungrammatikalität | können aus dem Satz herausgelöst werden, ihre Eliminierung verursacht keine Ungrammatikalität |

Keinesfalls kann das Faktum bezweifelt werden, dass die oben angedeuteten Merkmale für die Charakterisierung der Ergänzungen und Angaben eine gute Grundlage bieten. Folglich können die Ergänzungen und Angaben als Bündel dieser Merkmale angesehen werden. Es muss aber hinzugefügt werden, dass die einzelnen Merkmale eine unterschiedliche Rolle bei der Bestimmung der Ergänzungen und Angaben spielen und das kann wahrscheinlich die Ursache dafür sein, dass in den verschiedenen Valenztheorien einige Merkmale besonders

hervorgehoben sind, während die anderen nicht einmal berücksichtigt werden. In den letzten Jahren nehmen bei der Charakterisierung der Ergänzungen und Angaben die Merkmale „Notwendigkeit", „Subkategorisierung" bzw. „Subklassenspezifik" und „Determiniertheit" einen breiten Raum ein. Auf der Basis der Merkmale werden die Kriterien zur Unterscheidung von Ergänzungen und Angaben ermittelt. In Abhängigkeit davon, welche Merkmale in den verschiedenen Valenztheorien als wichtigste anerkannt sind, werden die Kriterien zur Abgrenzung von Ergänzungen und Angaben festgelegt. Die Verfasser älterer Valenzkonzepten gehen aus den Kriterien der „Notwendigkeit" und „Obligatorität" aus, wobei die Termini „notwendig", „weglassbar", „obligatorisch" und „fakultativ" auf unterschiedliche Weise und auf verschiedenen Ebenen des Sprachsystems interpretiert sind. In den neueren Valenztheorien treten diese Kriterien in den Hintergrund oder sie werden überhaupt nicht mehr berücksichtigt. Es wurde sogar erwogen, die Kriterien der „Obligatorität" und „Fakultativität" bei der Unterscheidung von Ergänzungen und Angaben ganz fallen zu lassen, weil sie stets zu unerwünschten Widersprüchen führen. Obwohl die Differenzierung unter einer kommunikativen, semantischen und morpho-syntaktischen Unabdingbarkeit einen Ausweg aus der Situation bietet, bevorzugen die modernen Valenztheorien andere Kriterien, nämlich die Unterscheidungskriterien der Subkategorisierung und Determiniertheit:

|  | Ergänzungen | Angaben |
|---|---|---|
| subklassenspezifisch | + | - |
| determiniert | + | - |

Es wurde schon darauf hingewiesen, dass in den meisten Valenztheorien ein Bündel von Merkmalen bzw. Kriterien zur Unterscheidung von Ergänzungen und Angaben verwendet wird. Aus diesem Grunde scheinen die Fälle, wo die Ergänzungen durch wechselnde entgegengesetzte Merkmale ermittelt werden, äusserst interessant zu sein. Sehen wir uns dazu die folgenden Beispiele an (die Beispiele stammen von Klaus M. Welke, der aufgrund von drei Kriterien, nämlich Sinnotwendigkeit, Subklassenspezifik und Determiniertheit den Status der Ergänzungen zu bestimmen versucht[9]):

1) Er benimmt sich gut.
2) Er isst Äpfel.

Im ersten Satz hat das Element „gut" die Merkmale „+sinnotwendig", „-subklassenspezifisch" und „-determiniert", und im zweiten Satz hat das Element „Äpfel" die Merkmale „-sinnotwendig", „+subklassenspezifisch" und

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[9] Welke, M. Klaus: *Einführung in die Valenz- und Kasustheorie.* Bibliografisches Institut, Leipzig 1988.

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„+determiniert". Der Status als Ergänzung wird einmal wegen der Sinnotwendigkeit, das andere Mal wegen der Subklassenspezifik und der Determiniertheit ermittelt.[10]

| | „gut" | „Äpfel" |
|---|---|---|
| sinnotwendig | + | - |
| subklassenspezifisch | - | + |
| determiniert | - | + |

Man kann natürlich darüber diskutieren, ob die obige Tabelle der Wirklichkeit entspricht oder nicht. Wer oder was entscheidet beispielsweise über die Sinnotwendigkeit der beiden Elemente? Ist z.B. „gut" in dem ersten Satz tatsächlich sinnotwendig oder kann der Satz „Er benimmt sich." in bestimmten kommunikativen Situationen auch als grammatisch richtig angesehen werden?

Wenn wir davon ausgehen, dass die Tabelle richtig ausgefüllt ist, kann „gut" als obligatorische Ergänzung, und „Äpfel" als fakultative Ergänzung klassifiziert werden. Wenn wir aber von fakultativen Ergänzungen sprechen, muss logischerweise auch der Bergriff der obligatorischen Angaben in die Valenzanalyse eingeführt werden. Wie können in diesem Falle die ermittelten Merkmale als Grundlage für die Charakterisierung und Unterscheidung von Ergänzungen und Angaben dienen? Muss man die ermittelten Merkmale und Kriterien hierarchisch anordnen und ein oberstes distinktives Merkmal bzw. Kriterium voraussetzen, wonach die Ergänzungen und Angaben eindeutig voneinander abgegrenzt werden können?

In der linguistischen Forschung am Ende der 80-er und Anfang der 90-er Jahre gibt es mehrere Versuche die Genesis dieser Fragen aufzuzeigen und verschiedene Lösungsmöglichkeiten vorzuschlagen. Eine dieser Lösungsmöglichkeiten ist das Konzept der dynamischen Valenz. Die Vertreter des Konzepts der dynamischer Valenz gehen davon aus, dass die Angaben nicht ausserhalb der Valenzbeziehungen stehen und deshalb in das Valenzkonzept integriert werden sollten. Es gibt nämlich „fliessende Übergänge" zwischen Ergänzungen und Angaben, weil einerseits Angaben in bestimmten Kontexten obligatorisch werden, und damit als Ergänzungen angesehen werden müssen, andererseits auch Ergänzungen zu Angaben werden können, wie z.B. der Subjektnominativ bei der Verwandlung ins Passiv.[11] Die Theorie der dynamischen

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[10] Welke, M.Klaus: „Kontroverses in der Valenztheorie. Eine Erwiderung auf Gerhard Helbig", in Deutsch als Fremdsprache, (3) 27.Jahrgang, 1990, S.153.

[11] Sadzinski, Roman: Statische und dynamische Valenz. Probleme einer kontrastiven Valenzgrammatik Deutsch-Polnisch, Helmut Buske Verlag, Hamburg 1989, S.143.

Valenz basiert auf der Prämisse, dass Ergänzungen und Angaben ineinander verwachsen bzw. überwechseln können und folglich nicht diametral verschieden sind. Es handelt sich also im Falle von Ergänzungen und Angaben nicht nur um die Pole oder Endpunkte einer Skala, sondern auch um eine dynamische Bewegung zwischen den Polen oder Endpunkten. Das Konzept der dynamischen Valenz enthält verschiedene interessante und aufschlussreiche Ansätze für die Lösung des Problems der Ergänzungen und Angaben, aber es hat auch seine schwachen Punkte. Es fragt sich, ob die Angaben, nur weil sie in bestimmten Fällen kommunikativ notwendig oder obligatorisch sind, zu Ergänzungen werden und dadurch ihren syntaktisch-semantischen Status verändern? Kann man ein sowohl morphosyntaktisch als auch semantisch determiniertes Phänomen des Sprachsystems wie die Valenz durch ausschliesslich kommunikative Faktoren bestimmen? Wie wir sehen, die Probleme lassen sich schwerpunktmässig je nach Gesichtspunkt anders formulieren; lösen lassen sie sich aber nicht immer. „Keine syntaktische Kategorie oder Relation kann eindeutig von jeder anderen abgegrenzt werden. Möglich ist eine scharfe Abgrenzung überhaupt nur dort, wo die Grammatik nicht eine gegebene Sprache beschreibt, sondern wo sie selbst eine Sprache 'definiert', wie das formale Grammatiken tun."[12]

Warum wird dann in allen Valenztheorien auf die Abgrenzungsfragen, u.a. auf die Abgrenzung von Ergänzungen und Angaben insistiert? Eine der möglichen Antworten verbirgt sich in der Natur der Menschen, in der Natur der Wissenschaft. Die Menschen und insbesondere die Wissenschaftler streben aus sehr verständlichen Gründen danach, dass alles eindeutig klassifiziert und definiert wird. Die Sprache lässt sich aber nicht immer den Bestrebungen der Menschen unterwerfen. Die Frage kann selbsverständlich auch anders beantwortet werden: die Unterscheidung zwischen Ergänzungen und Angaben ist für den DaF-Unterricht äusserst wichtig, in bestimmten Fällen sogar unentbehrlich. Auf jeden Fall kann man festhalten, dass die kontrastiven Untersuchungen der verschiedenen Auffassungen in bezug auf die Charakterisierung und Differenzierung zwischen Ergänzungen und Angaben zur Entwicklung der Valenztheorie im wesentlichen beitragen, weil gerade durch diese Untersuchungen die verschiedenen Aspekte des Phänomens viel genauer wahrgenommen werden.

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[12] Eisenberg, Peter, 1989, S. 292.

KRISZTINA SZŐKE*

# GENDER-SPECIFIC LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES

## Introduction

Sociolinguistics is concerned with investigating the relationships between language and society. Society is any group of people who are drown together for certain purposes, language is what the members of a particular society speak, however language in almost every society can take many different forms. Society and language are dependent on each other. There are varieties of language according to age, region, social background and sex.

The research of gender-specific differences became more intensive in the last decade. In many countries it is the focus of investigations, in Hungary this problem due to a different social structure has been neglected, no investigations have been done in this topic. This paper analyzes the language differences between the genders in different languages, the possible explanations of them and the tendency of changes.

## 1. Language Differences

### 1.1. Extreme Examples from Primitive Societies

The most famous example of linguistic differentation between the sexes is found in the Lesser Antilles of the West Indies among the Carib Indians. Male and female Caribs speak different languages as a result of a long-ago conquest in wich a group of invading Carib-speaking men killed the local Arawak-speaking men and mated with the Arawak women. Arawak is unrelated to Carib. The descendants have „different languages" for men and women, these languages are actually not completely „separate" , but rather one language with sex-based characteristics (Hudson 1993: 121, Wardhaugh 1995: 283-386).

The Dyrbal people of North Queensland, Australia have a special language which is sex-differentiated. The normal everyday language, Guwal, is used by both sexes, but if a man speaks and his mother-in-law is present, or a woman speaks and her father-in-law is present, they use Dyalnuy, a „mother-in-law"

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variety. This variety has the same phonology and almost the same grammar as Guwal, but its vocabulary is entirely different. However, both sexes have access to both varieties (Wardhaugh 1995: 283-286).

The Yana language of California contains special forms for use in speech either by or to women.

In a Siberian language, Chukchi, men, but not women, often drop [n] and [t] when these consonants occur between vowels e.g., female *nitvaqenat* and male *nitvaqaat.*

In Gros Ventre, an Amerindian language of the northeast United States, women have palatalized velar stops where men have palatalized dental stops, e.g., female *kjatsa* (bread) and male *djatsa.* When a female speaker of this tribe quotes a male, she attributes female pronunciations to him, and when a male quotes a female, he attributes male pronunciation to her.

In Koasati, an Amerindian language spoken in southwestern Louisiana men often pronounced an [s] at the end of verbs but women did not, e.g., male *lakáws* and female *lakáw.* Women teach their sons to use the male forms and men narrating stories in which women speak employ female forms in reporting their words.

In a northeast Asian language, Yukaghir, both women and children have [ts] and [dz] where men have [tj] and[dj].

In Bengali men often substitute [l] for initial [n], women, children , and the uneducated do not do this (Wardhaugh 1995: 284).

Taboo can cause the differnt varieties for men and women, one variety may be forbidden to one sex, but that sex is apparently nearly always the female sex. The taboos often have to do with certain kinship relationships or with hunting or with some religious practice and result the avoidance of certain words or even sounds in words. They derive from the social organisation of the group, from the fact that women were often treated in an inegalitarian way.


## 1.2. The Language-Use of Modern Societies

There are differences between the speech of women and men and these differences include a wide variety of linguistic behaviour, from intonation to conversation topics.

In most descriptions of sex-based differences women's speech is viewed as deviant or marginal, with men's speech regarded as the norm. The reason for this probably lies in our culture and society, as sex is one of the bases of social differentiation.

Many languages have *gender systems*, eg: the *he-she-it* „natural" gender system of English or the *le-la* or *der-die-das* „grammatical" gender systems of

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French and German. The possible connections between gender systems (masculine, feminine, neuter) and sex differences (male, female, neither) are various and often create problems in finding the right pronoun. The *he-she* distinctions can often be avoided, but sometimes only clumsily. The languages with gender distinctions are not „sexist", it is the people who use languages who are or who are not sexist.

*Phonological differences* between the speech of men and women have been noted in a variety of languages. Deep voice for men and high pitch for women are the features which show the greatest difference (Kiss 1995:102-103, Postl 1991: 39-45, Preston -Shuy 1979:283-287).

In American speech women's speech is associated with a greater intonational range than men's. This is said to reflect the female's more excitable, emotional nature.

Women use more questioning, polite and exclamatory intonations, because our culture socializes males against displays of emotion (Preston-Shuy 1979: 288, Wardhaugh 1995: 286).

In Montreal many more men than women do not pronounce the [l] in the pronouns and articles *il, elle, la* and *les*. Schoolgirls in Scotland apparently pronounce the [t] in words like *water* and *got* more often than schoolboys, who prefer the glottal stop (Wardhaugh 1995: 184).

There are also big differences in the *vocabulary*. Japanese women show they are women when they speak by the sentence-final particle *ne*. In Japanese a male speaker refers to himself as *wasi* or *ore* whereas a female uses *watasi* or *atasi* (Wardhaugh 1995: 286).

Adjectives like *divine, adorable, charming, lovely* and *sweet* are commonly used by women but only rarely by men. Color words like *mauve, beige, aquamarine, lavender* and *magnetta* characterize the female vocabulary. Women have their own vocabulary for emphasizing certain effects on them, words and expressions such as *so good, such fun, exquisite, precious, darling* and *fantastic* (Coates 1993:156, Preston-Shuy 1979:294, Wardhaugh 1995:284).

Differences in lexical domain may be expected to reflect the typical experiences of men and women in our society, so that we will not be surprised to find that women use the terminology of sewing and cooking and men that of sports and automechanics. Men talk to each other about money, business, politics, sports, amusements and other men, while women prefer such topics as clothing, decoration, and other women. Women adjust their conversational topics to the interest of their male companions. Females use significantly more words implying feeling, emotion, motivation and make more references to their own life, while men use more words implying time, space and quantity (Kiss 1995: 103-104, Preston – Shuy 1979: 294-295, Wardhaugh 1995: 283).

Kramer examined cartoons in 13 issues of The New Yorker in 1973. His

analysis showed that, when both sexes were represented in the cartoon, men spoke twice as much as women. Men and woman spoke on different topics, men were speaking about business, politics, legal matters, taxes, and sports, women about social life, books, food and drink, life's troubles and life-style. Women spoke less forcefully than man. There was also some evidence that the use of words like *nice* and *pretty* was sex-linked (Wardhaugh 1995: 288). These cartoons are not actual records of what happens in speech, however, they must be based on what people think happens if they are to be effective. This statement does not seem to be far from reality.

According to Coates and Preston-Shuy most people believe that women talk more than men and interrupt more. However, in conversations involving members of both sexes most researchers agree that men speak more than women do. When men talked to men, the content categories of such talks focused on competition and teasing, sports, aggression and doing things. When women talked to women, they used the equivalent categories, the self, the feelings, the home and the family. When the two sexes interacted, the man spoke less of aggression and competition, and the women reduced their amount of talk about family and home. Men tended to explain things to women, whereas women tended to apologize to men. In cross-sex conversations men frequently interrupt women. Researches found that in conversational interchange between men and women 96% of the interruptions were made by men interrupting women (Coates 1995: 19-25, Preston – Shuy 1979: 295). Interruption is used as a strategy of powerful participants in discourse to control the topic of conversation. Speakers who interrupt others infrigne others' right to speak and in effect demonstrate their power. Men challenge, dispute, and ignore more, try to control the topics, and tend to make categorical statements. There is also some evidence that women ask more questions than men, encourage others to speak, use more signals to encourage others to continue speaking, use more often *you* and *we*, and do not protest as much as men do when they are interrupted. In conversations that involve both men and women, men are dominant and women are subservient, they exhibit the normal „power" relationship that exist in society.

When the two sexes try to communicate with each other, the result may be miscommunication. The *mhmm* a woman uses quite frequently means only „I am listening"; whereas the *mhmm* a man uses, but much less frequently, tends to mean „I agree." Men often believe that women always agree with them, whereas women get upset with men who never seem to be listening. Women and men observe different rules in conversing. They have different views of what questioning is all about, women view questions as part of conversational maintenance and men as a request for information. They have different views of what is „aggressive" linguistic behaviour, women regard any sign of aggression as personally directed, and men as just one way of organizing a conversation. The

two sexes have different views of topic flow, topic shift and problem-sharing. Women tend to discuss, share, and seek reassurance, and men tend to look for solutions, and give advice to their audiences (Coates 1995:13-31, Kiss1995:109-111, Wardhaugh 1995: 288-289).

Women and men have different *paralinguistic systems* and move and gesture differently. Women lean forward, look at the other person in the face, men on the contrary, lean slightly back. These forms of behavior often require women to appear to be submissive to men (Kiss 1995:109-110, Wardhaugh 1995:287).

One sex-typed area of vocabulary is the use of obscenities. According to Kramer' s cartoon research men swore much more than women. Obscenities are a kind of taboo for women.(See:1.1) One study asked to rate obscene words according to their „strength", men and women agreed in their rankings. In another study researchers recorded all the obscenities they heard over a period of three weeks. Men used a significantly greather number of obsceneties (men: 64,8%, women: 35,2%). People were more likely to swear in single sex groups, but this was a stronger tendency for the men than for the women (Coates 1993: 127, Kiss 1995: 104-105, Preston – Shuy 1979: 294-295, Wardhaugh 1995: 286-287).

Among the stereotypes „polite speech" is attributed to females. In polite conversation a female speaker of Thai refers to herself as *dichan* whereas a man uses *phom*. In Thai, too, women emphasize a repeated action by repeating the verb, whereas men place a descriptive verb, *mak*, after the verb instead (Kiss 1995: 106, Wardhaugh 1995:286) (See: 1.1).

Women are often named, titled, and addressed differently from men. Women are more often addressed by their first names or by such terms as *lady, miss*, or *dear*, and even *babe* or *baby* (Kiss 1995: 105, Postl 1991: 101, Wardhaugh 1995: 287).

Women are more conservative in their linguistic behaviour, women are judged more often on appearence and what they say, in contrast with men, who are judged by what they do. For exemple as the pronunciation of „-ing" shows a conservative tendency for women, they try to be closer to the norms in pronunciation and grammar, and they use higher prestige forms. Men have more power and may be more assertive, women tend to be kept „in their place". Women therefore appear to be more conscious of uses of language which they associate with the „betters" in society. They therefore direct their speech in some cases even toward hypercorrection (Kiss 1995: 110-112, Wardhaugh 1995: 142-146, 290-292) (See 2.2).

## 2.1. Biological Explanation

Throughout history, women had fewer rights and lower social status than man. This situation was often justified as being the natural result of biological differences between the sexes. The sex of a person is biologically determined.

In many societies people believed women to be naturally more emotional and less decisive, less intelligent, less creative than men.

Various medical theories suggest that the female personality was determined by anatomy and women's reproductive functions. Woman differ physically from men, for example, in being, on average, smaller and less powerfully muscled.

According to modern brain researchers, men's and women's brains are anatomically different. A part of the corpus callosum, the fiber bundle connecting the two hemispheres of the brain is larger in women than in men. This would allow a fuller communication between the left and right brains. In human male fetuses the right cortex is thicker than the left, whereas in the female fetus, the two sides are of equal thickness.

Men and women may generate speech and hand movements from different parts of the brain.

Sex differences in brain are not only due to the structure of the brain but also the hormonal influences such as the androgenes and testosterone.

These biological differences can be one of the factors of the language differnces.

## 2.2. Sociological Explanation

Sociologists distinguish between sex and gender, they often treat the latter as an expression of the former, thereby giving biology a determining significance. The gender of a person is culturally and socially constructed, based on a biologically given sex.

## 2.2.1. The Role of Social Status

According to funcionalists gender differenes are useful for most societies especially in the field of jobs. It was recorded in the past that men were stronger, so they went hunting, while women were only capable of feeding and taking care of children . Reproduction forced women to spend most of their time with their children and their housework. In modern families we still need an adult with an „instrumental", material role and another with an „expressive", emotional role

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(Andorka 1997: 306).

Although women constitute the majority of the population in many countries, they are often treated like a minority group, assigned a definitive „place" in social order, denied access to careers and power in the public arena, and viewed as dependent, weak and submissive by „nature" (Chafe 1990: 258-270). On the other hand, unlike minority groups, women do not live together in a ghetto, are distributed through every region, class, and social group, and often share greater proximity and intimacy with their „opressors" than with each other.

In Western countries women have been fighting for sexual equality with men for much of the last and this century. The first women's movements arose largely in the industrial society. The industrial age brought about great economic and political changes. The first wave of women's movements concentrated on gaining voting rights for women. Machinery and limitation of family size gave women more opportunity to work and for longer periods, but women continued to face barriers in entering many occupations.

The second wave of women's movements emerged during the 1960s, and concentrated on greater equality for women in the family, in the workplace, and in political life. Their achievements have been considerable, on the one hand, sex discrimination is against the law, on the other hand, people still expect a large number of differences in everyday behaviour and domestic roles.

Even in progressive countries as Sweden, there is a big difference between men and women in job opportunities and in earnings. The majority of women's work opportunities still fell within a narrow range of occupations, such as teaching, nursing, and secretary work. Moreover, women are proportionally under-represented in higher-status occupations and in senior jobs within the feminized occupational order.

Britain was one of the first European countries to have a woman Prime Minister, however, in the nineties women formed only a tiny fraction of the total number of MPs (about 5%), only one out of five lawyers in Britain was a woman, less than one in ten accountants was a woman and there was only one female consultant brain surgeon in the country. In the US most professions were still controlled totally by men, professional women received only 73% of the salaries paid to professional men.

When women have a family they sometimes choose not to work or choose time off work while their children are young. Their attitudes to work are influenced by family roles. At work employers stereotype all women as being more likely than men to be absent from work or to interrupt their careers because of their family commitments. They became members of the secondary labour market, it provides low pay, unstable jobs and little career progression.

Former socialist countries granted women equal rights long before such rights were obtained by women in Western countries. Women had maternity leave,

government-funded child care, equal education, equal payment, and the right to hold any political office. There were no Western-style women movements. The „dubble burden" of employment and household responsibilities still falls heavily on women in these countries. Women's employment appears to have less effect on men's roles than in Western societies. Husbands rarely help with shopping, cooking, and other household tasks. In addition, labour-saving conveniences are scarcer in Eastern Europe. Sexism continues to exist in these countries as well.

## 2.2.2. The Role of Socialisation

Socialisation is the process whereby children are turned into fully competent members of their society. Speech is an important factor in socialisation, a good deal of culture is transmitted verbally (Hudson 1993: 99-103).

People appear to differ in the ways in which they use speech in socialisation. There is some evidence that parents make different uses of speech in socialising their children.

Children do not read the book of etiquette, but it seems that their parents and teachers have definite notions of how little boys and girls should talk (Kiss 1995: 86-90).

Most families still bring the boys up with more freedom and more rights than the girls. Girls are often encouraged to participate with mothers in non-competitive domestic activities in which language is very important, on the other hand, boys may be expected to be more competitive, to play outside more, and to be engaged in physical rather than social activity. They may also have less contact with their fathers than their sisters have with their mothers. They get different presents, for example boys get cars and toy-guns, while dolls are given as present to girls (Andorka 1997: 305, Kiss 1995: 106-107, Wardhaugh 1995: 293).

Researchers found in Reading, England, that lower-class boys use more nonstandard syntax than lower-class girls. The „tougher" the boy, the more nonstandard is his use of the -s ending of verbs in the present tense. Boys who were not regarded as tough produced a lesser incidence of such nonstandard use (Wardhaugh 1995: 179).

Education system reproduces gender differences and inequalities. Schools develop and reinforce sex segregations and stereotypes by socializing children into traditional male and female roles. School books depict girls helping mothers with domestic chores and boys helping fathers repair cars. Schools reinforce the expectations of the society with the hidden curriculum. Teachers believe that boys are more suited to technical and scientific subjects and girls to humanities, and instil these ideas in their pupils.

Teachers tend to give more time and attention to boys and the boys themselves tend to monopolize the physical and verbal space. Girls are self-disciplined, the teachers have to constantly try to keep boys' interest up so that they remain quiet. Not only they have to patiently tolerate the overall domination of boys in school, but more significantly, they learn from this that boys are more important since their interests are given piority.

Girls do better than boys until adolescence, but they do less well at advanced level and are less likely to attend university. The differences have often been explained by the sexual division of labour outside school. In a society where women's work is inferior to men's and takes second place to domestic commitments, girls are socialized with different expectations from boys. Teachers treat boys and girls differently, acting on the stereotype that girls should be submissive and passive (Swann – Graddol 1995: 135-149, Altani 1995: 149-160).

Girls and boys already occupy different positions in the social formation, to wich different activities and goals, and consequently, different interactional patterns are relevant.

One is never finished becoming a woman or a man. Each individual subject must constantly negotiate the norms, behaviours, discourses, that define masculinity and femininity for a particular community at a particular point in history.

## 2.2.3. Sex-Role Stereotypes

Stereotypes are one-sided and prejudical views of a group, and usually associated with racism and sexism.

People use the speech of others as a clue to non-linguistic information about them, such as their social background, personality and intelligence. People use information in stereotypes, „if characteristics $A$ and $B$ are tipically associated with each other, we assume the presence of $B$ whenever we observe the presence of $A$, or vice versa" (Hudson 1993: 202).

Sex-role standards exert real pressure on individuals to behave in prescribed ways and this is true of linguistic behaviour as well.

| | |
|---|---|
| essive | Very aggressive |
| pendent | Very independent |
| .l | Not at all emotional |
| emotions at all | Almost always hides emotions |
| ve | Very objective |
| fluenced | Not at all easy influenced |
| ive | Very dominant |
| and science very much | Likes math and science very much |
| e in a minor crisis | Not at all excitable in a minor crisis |
| | Very active |
| npetitive | Very competitve |
| l | Very logical |
| riented | Very worldly |
| lled in business | Very skilled in business |
| | Very direct |
| ow the way of the world | Knows the way of the world |
| ily hurt | Feelings not easily hurt |
| venturous | Very adventurous |
| in making decisions | Can make decisions easily |
| asily | Never cries |
| acts a leader | Almost always acts a leader |
| confident | Very self-confident |
| comfortable about being | Not at all uncomfortable about being aggressive |
| bitious | Very ambitious |
| parate feelings from ideas | Easily able to separate feelings from ideas |
| ent | Not at all indipendent |
| ed about appearance | Never conceited about appearance |
| en are always superior to | Thinks men are always superior to women |
| freely about sex with men | Talks freely about sex with men |
| harsh language at all | Uses harsh language |
| e | Not at all talktive |
| | Very blunt |
| | Very rough |
| feelings of others | Not at all aware of feelings of others |
| | Not at all religious |
| l in own appearance | Not at all interested in own appearence |

| | |
|---|---|
| Very neat in habits | Very sloppy in habits |
| Very quiet | Very loud |
| Very strong need for security | Very little need for security |
| Enjoys art and literature | Does not enjoy art and literature at all |
| Easily expresses tender feelings | Does not express tender feelings at all easily |

(Postl 1991: 31)

## 2.2.4. Language and Career

According to Coates gender-differentiated language plays a significant role in the marginalization of women in the professions, partycularly in career-progress and developement (Coates 1995: 13).

Parents raise their sons to be combative and girls to be nice, that means power is a difficult concept for women. Male speakers are socialized into a competitive style of discourse, while women are socialized into a more cooperative style of speech. The feminine orientation is focusing on the relationship, the masculine orientation is focusing on the self (Coates 1995: 16-43).

Male speakers are the dominant group in public life, they have established the norms. Till the 20th century women were firmly placed in the private world of home and family. As women start to enter the professions in greater numbers they adopt the linguistic norm of the pulic domain. Women are linguistically at a double disadvantage: they are less skilfull at using the adversial, information-focused style, and their more cooperative discourse styles are relatively valued in public life. Women are urged to adopt more assertive, more masculine style of discourse in the public sphere.

Women attempting to pursue careers in the public domain will continue to encounter problems. If they adopt a more adversial, more male-like style, they are in danger of being labelled „unfeminin". If they attempt to retain a more cooperative style of interaction, they risk being viewed as ineffectual.

## 2.2.5. The Role of the Media

The media is an instrument of cultural reproduction. In every society the communicative channels are under the control of a dominant group. Newspapers in general are basically oriented to male audiences.

According to Caldas-Coulthard men are represented speaking in their public or professional roles, while women, when they speak, are identified with the

private sphere (Caldas-Coulthard 1995: 226-239). Women are represented mostly speaking in their personal roles, they are the mothers, the daughters, the wives, and the widows (see Table 1). Male speakers are glossed by their professional designations or positions, for example Mr Bartell, the broker, Mr Paul Davie, economist. Women, on the other hand, are described differently: Hillary, President Clinton's wife, Richard's cousin, Anne. Women are characterised in terms of marital or family relations, especially in their relationship with a man. The private/public distinction is a very important feature of social organisation. Newspapers handle men and women in terms of different stereotypes. In the media, women are not only different, but unequal. Women are less heard than men, in the news women are in statistical terms underrepresented linguistically (see Table 2). Newspapers legitimate assumptions about their linguistic behaviour and social asymetries.

Most of the media is based not on women readers, it makes women magazines very popular among women. Women magazines are written especially for women and about women. They are targeted at a wide woman audience, their articles are addressed to a gender-marked population. Their topics repeat the stereotypes used about women (see: figures about the *Cosmopolitan* ). Magazines for men were not popular in Hungary, for example, the Hungarian issues of the *Playboy* were not successful and its publication stopped in a short time.

I examined the first 6 issues of *Cosmopolitan* (Hungarian edition 1997-1998) and compared them with the Hungarian *Kiskegyed. Cosmopolitan* is a new monthly quality paper for younger women, *Kiskegyed* is a popular weekly magazine since 1992.

My hypotheses were mostly based on the following stereotypes: women are very interested in their appearance, curious, gossipy, emotional and home oriented. This is the reason why magazines have so many horoscopes, gossip-, beauty- and fashion-columns. Most articles were written by woman writers (*Kiskegyed* 36%, *Cosmopolitan* 61%), but the anonimous articles (*Kiskegyed* 55%, *Cosmopolitan* 28%) according to their style probably were written also by women. Man writers prefer more neutral, not so typically woman topics like environment, celebrities, health, sex, and travelling. Most of the articles were about the celebrities (see Table 3, Table 4) (*Kiskegyed* 17%, *Cosmopolitan* 17%). On the second place were the articles about health (*Kiskegyed* 11%, *Cosmopolitan* 12,5%). On the third place we find beauty in *Cosmopolitan* (12%), but private life and men in *Kiskegyed* (10%), beauty was the fourth popular in *Kiskegyed* (8%).

Most advertisements were based on women's vanity (see Tale 5, Table 6). Most advertisements were cosmetics (*Kiskegyed* 20%, *Cosmopolitan* 36%). On the second place were telephone horoscopes in *Kiskegyed* (14%) and films in *Cosmopolitan* (9%). On the third place were housing equipments in *Kiskegyed*

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(8%), and fashion in *Cosmopolitan* (7%).

The style of the language was sentimental and trustful. The writers used the familiar second person singular forms. The magazines tried to influence emotions. The secret of their succes is the popular topics for women, the colloquial language and the easy to read style.

## 3. Changes

### 3.1. Language change

When traditions change in society, women begin to take a more assertive role in what goes on, young women often get in the forefront of the changes.

The inhabitants of Oberwart (Felsőőr), part of Austria since 1921, are shifting from a pattern of stable bilingualism in German and Hungarian to the use of only German. In the last thirty to forty years Oberwart, about 100 km south of Vienna, grew from a village of 600 to a town of over 5000 inhabitants, the bilingual population has decreased as a fraction to about a quarter of the total, and many of these are peasants. German has become the language of social opportunity and social status. The young women from the bilingual community have shown their willingness to participate in the social change. Hungarian is the symbol of peasant status, and most young people do not want to be peasants. Hungarian-speaking young peasant women prefer not to marry peasant men. They prefer non-peasant, German-speaking workers as spouses. The effect of this is to force the bilingual peasant men to marry German-speaking peasant women from the neighboring villages. The children of these mixed marriages do not learn to speak Hungarian, the offsprings of both kinds of marriage are German-speaking children. They reject to use Hungarian, for it is a clear indicator of peasant status in the community. It is the young women's desire to participate in the social change that is occuring in Oberwart and seek the higher status. Their use of German alone leads the traditionally bilingual population to a monolingual community (Kiss 1995: 111, Wardhaugh 1995: 180-181, 291).

### 3.2. Artificial Changes

If language tends to reflect social structure and social structure is changing, professions are just as likely to be held by women as man, changes might be necessary in the language.

*Man* and *mankind* are used as terms to describe the human race. Women holding certain positions are sometimes described in terms of men, e.g.,*lady*

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*doctor, female judge*, and *madam chairman*. There are professions with sex-based distinctions, e.g., *actor-actress, waiter-waitress*. Other pairs of words which reflect similar differentation are *boy-girl, man-woman, gentleman-lady, bachelor-spinster, widower-widow* and *master-mistress*. You can say „She is Tom's widow", but you cannot say „He is Mary's widower". Whereas Mary can be described as Tom's mistress, Tom cannot be described as Mary's master. There is a difference between „He is a professional" and „She is a professional" (She is a prostitute). Certain words, essentially pejorative, have no male equivalents, e.g., *effeminate, hen-pecked*, and even certain objects of an unpleasant kind are referred to as being feminine: *black widow spider, Black Maria, iron maiden, Venus fly trap* (lat. Dionea).

Textbook publishers have adopted guidelines to eleminate language that uses male forms to represent everyone. Many changes can be made quite easily: *early humans* from *early man, salesperson* from *salesman, ordinary people* from *common men, police officer* from *policeman, fire fighter* from *fireman, astronaut* from *spaceman, flight attendant* from *stewardess*, and *women* from the *fair sex*. Neutral words can be used in describing occupations e.g., *chairperson, letter carrier, salesclerk, actor* (She is an actor). Many of the suggestions for avoiding sexist language are admirable, but some are absurd e.g., changing *history* to *herstory. He* is used as the unmarked, general third person singular pronoun. *He* can be often avoided e.g., *Those coming late* from *He who comes late* (Kiss 1995: 112, Wardhaugh 1995:282-287).


## Conclusion

There are quantitative differences between male and female speakers in all languages.

The differences may be not only biological, but the results of different socialization practices. Men and women are usually brought up differently and in this way they have different roles in society. Man and women know this and react in different ways. We might expect changes in their language-use with the changes of society (feminism, equal rights, political correctness). It may also be possible that by means of language engineering sexisms can be avoided.

All these facts are very important for applied linguistics. This branch of linguistics can give useful information for the manpower management, for the professons mostly dominated by one sex. It helps mostly in cross-sex communication (from family life to board-meatings).

*Table 1: Frequency count of significant lexical terms*

|         | The Times | BBC World Service |
|---------|-----------|-------------------|
| she     | 5417      | 11103             |
| he      | 27255     | 97389             |
| woman   | 1523      | 2115              |
| man     | 1949      | 7555              |
| wife    | 634       | 1218              |
| husband | 337       | 581               |
| widow   | 89        | 250               |
| widower | 1         | 3                 |

*Table 2 : Frequency count of some reference items*

|             | The Times | BBC World Service |
|-------------|-----------|-------------------|
| Miss        | 1078      | 2271              |
| Mrs         | 2462      | 8505              |
| Ms          | 165       | 207               |
| Mr          | 15586     | 94951             |
| spokeswoman | 60        | 477               |
| spokesperson| 6         | 20                |
| spokesman   | 643       | 7747              |
| chairwoman  | 6         | 23                |
| chairperson | 2         | 5                 |
| chairman    | 1817      | 3255              |

*Table 3: Topics according to sex-relatedness in the magazine Kiskegyed*

|             | men | women | anonimous | total |
|-------------|-----|-------|-----------|-------|
| celebrities | 2   | 9     | 12        | 23    |
| health      | 1   | 7     | 7         | 15    |
| private life| 1   | 3     | 9         | 13    |
| men         | -   | 3     | 10        | 13    |
| beauty      | -   | 3     | 8         | 11    |
| fashion     | -   | 7     | 3         | 10    |
| sex         | -   | 4     | 6         | 10    |
| gossips     | -   | -     | 8         | 8     |
| food        | -   | 5     | 2         | 7     |
| environment | 4   | -     | -         | 4     |
| birth       | -   | 3     | -         | 6     |
|             |     |       |           |       |
| total:      | 11  | 47    | 71        | 129   |

*Table 4: Topics according to sex-relatedness in the magazine Cosmopolitan*

|                    | men | women | anonimous | total |
|--------------------|-----|-------|-----------|-------|
| celebrities        | 10  | 24    | 11        | 45    |
| beauty             | -   | 3     | 30        | 33    |
| health             | 2   | 25    | 6         | 33    |
| carrier            | -   | 27    | 4         | 31    |
| private life       | 1   | 20    | 5         | 26    |
| sex                | 4   | 11    | -         | 15    |
| men                | 4   | 7     | 1         | 12    |
| travelling         | 3   | 8     | -         | 11    |
| saving             | -   | 10    | 1         | 11    |
| cooking            | -   | 6     | 3         | 9     |
| fashion            | -   | 1     | 7         | 8     |
| sports             | -   | 6     | 2         | 8     |
| horoscope          | -   | 5     | 1         | 6     |
| mixed              | -   | 5     | -         | 5     |
| environment        | -   | -     | 4         | 4     |
| birth/ pregnancy   | -   | 3     | -         | 3     |
| marriage           | 1   | -     | -         | 1     |
|                    |     |       |           |       |
| total              | 25  | 161   | 75        | 261   |

*Table 5: Advertisements in the magazine Kiskegyed*

| # | | count |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | cosmetics | 22 |
| 2 | telephone horoscope | 16 |
| 3 | housekeeping | 10 |
| | selfadvertisement | 10 |
| 4 | beauty salons | 9 |
| | food | 9 |
| 5 | medical treatments | 8 |
| 6 | fortune-telling | 6 |
| 7 | things for children | 4 |
| | underwear | 4 |
| 8 | thread | 3 |
| | language courses | 3 |
| | travelling | 3 |
| 9 | breast enlargening | 2 |
| | diet | 2 |
| 10 | computers | 1 |
| | sport equipments | 1 |
| | wedding dress lending | 1 |
| | fashion products | 1 |
| | total: | 115 |

*Table 6: Advertisements in the magazine Cosmopolitan*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | cosmetics | 120 |
| 2 | films | 31 |
| 3 | fashion products | 22 |
| 4 | records | 19 |
| 5 | books | 17 |
| 6 | cigarettes | 13 |
| 7 | selfadvertisement | 12 |
| 8 | telephones | 11 |
| 9 | cars | 10 |
| 10 | housing equipments | 9 |
| 11 | cooking | 9 |
| 12 | bank cards | 8 |
| 13 | drinks | 6 |
| 14 | travelling | 5 |
| | sport equipments | 5 |
| 15 | sanitary pads | 4 |
| | underwear | 4 |
| | vitamins | 4 |
| 16 | coffee | 3 |
| | other women magazines | 3 |
| 17 | furniture | 2 |
| | beddings | 2 |
| | bathrooms | 2 |
| | glasses/contacts | 2 |
| 18 | diet | 1 |
| | jewelry | 1 |
| | birth controll | 1 |
| | festival | 1 |
| | | |
| | total | 327 |

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# ZITA KÁRAI[*]

## THE BASICS

*'We communicate -
not by what we are
but by what listeners understand*

*We communicate -
not by what we intend to say
but by what listeners see, hear, and are
willing to accept*

*We communicate -
not by what we say,
but what listeners hear'*

Waldo W. Braden (1971): 'Beyond the Campus Gate'

## Introduction

Language is the most precious gift to human beings; the most subtle way of expressing our ideas and thoughts. Human language is culturally transmitted and is the result of a long acquisition process. We owe it to our brain, more exactly the speech areas in the brain, that we are able to communicate and interact with other people in our surroundings.

Unfortunately there are a number of brain damaged people who, despite the efforts from specialists, as well as the persons themselves, will never acquire nor learn their mother tongue perfectly. Aphasia is a disorder of one or more components of speech production and comprehension and is caused by a breakdown in the two-way process mediating between thought and language. Specifically, it is due to local lesions of the hemispheres and damage to already developed and perfectly used speech, which is a system of signs (O. Sági 1986: 5). According to statistics, the number of people suffering from aphasia has been increasing, not only in Hungary but also in the rest of the world. In quite a

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number of cases the factors leading to aphasia are of cerebrovascular origin. As a result of these cerebrovascular diseases, the mortality rate was 8 percent in 1941 and has recently increased to 30-40 percent in Hungary (Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv 1980: 76; 1995: 53). There is a large number of people temporarily or permanently disabled who need to be rehabilitated. The cases of patients with aphasia need a complex medical, psychological supply with speech and physiotherapy.

As a junior I attended lectures in Applied Linguistics relating to Psycholinguistics and Neural Linguistics, which aroused my interest in speech production and comprehension, especially in the limitation of these. This paper is based on my own investigation and neural linguistic studies. The object of the present study is:

- to give a better insight into aphasia, which is a partial or total loss of ability to speak or understand spoken language, caused by damage to the brain,
- to describe where the speech areas are and their functions,
- to introduce the theoretical aspects of aphasia,
- to point out the main characteristics of aphasia based on my own practical experiments.

## 1. The Parts of the Brain and Their Associated Language Functions

It is not the purpose of the study to describe the brain in detail. The study is going to concentrate on that part of the brain that is involved in speech control.

'The human brain weighs about one and a half kilograms, it is mostly water and its consistency and colour resembles to vanilla custard.'(Purves, Orians and Heller 1992: 815) The brain is a part of the nervous system that receives information from sensors, such as eyes and ears, and communicates information to effectors, such as muscles and glands.

Some of the body actions are controlled by the brain consciously or voluntarily. Others, such as the functions of heart, lungs, etc., are controlled automatically. Both of these actions are going on simultaneously.

The brain and the spinal cord make up the central nervous system. Our nervous system processes and integrates information about events in the body and in the external environment. It controls organ systems and muscles of the body, orchestrates behaviour, and gives us the ability to learn and remember. 'Nerve impulses are the language of the nervous system. These electrical signals are generated and conducted throughout the body by the membranes of neurons. Ion pumps and ion channels in the membranes give neurons their electrical properties. Neurons are organized in complex, interconnected networks and circuits. They

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communicate with one another and with other cells mostly by means of neurotransmitters. (Purves, Orians and Heller 1992: 815)'

The medulla oblongata is continuous with the spinal cord, the pons Varolii is above it. These two organs control a number of basic physiological functions, such as breathing and circulation. The cerebellum and the cerebrum sit above the pons Varolii and the former orchestrates and refines behaviour patterns. These parts of the brain form an integrated whole by means of connective tissues (Purves, Orians and Heller 1992: 815, 820).

Language, logical and analytical operations, and higher mathematics are generally located in the left hemisphere, while, recognizing faces and emotions, and taking in the structures globally without analysis occur in the right hemisphere. This division of function and structure is called lateralization (Damasio and Damasio 1992: 63).

The *cortex* is concerned with the repetition and recognition of another's speech, as well as the formulation, initiation, and control of one's own.

*Subcortical structures* are concerned with the organization and relay of sensory and motor impulses travelling to and from the cortex.

*Cortical lobes* are important in language processes.

*Basal ganglia* are involved in the control of the muscles of the face, larynx, tongue, and pharynx. They receive input from Broca's and Wernicke's areas, then output them through the thalamus. In conjuction with the thalamus, it holds up the formulated information for monitoring and after it releases it. Damage to them may lead to lack of co-ordination in articulation, gesture and facial expression.

The *thalamus* organizes and relays sensory data on the way to the cortex. Its pathways perform semantic monitoring.

The *midbrain* contains relay stations concerned with sight and hearing.

The *medulla oblongata* contains motor nuclei for controlling basic body functions such as breathing.

The *cerebellum* is the control center for continuous muscular movements and co-ordination. Damage to it results in jerky, unco-ordinated speech.

*Broca's area* has two seperate systems: a language formulator and a motor programmer, in which phonological formulation and articulation respectively take place.

*Wernicke's area* is involved in the selection of appropriate words coded according to learned semantic and grammatical rules.

The *arcuate fasciculus* connects Broca's and Wernicke's areas, and is involved in phonological monitoring (see Figure 1.) (Bradshaw and Mattingley 1995: 43).

Figure 1. Parts of the Brain
(Biology 1992: 820)

## 2. Speech Control

Language is predominantly a left-hemisphere phenomenon, although right-hemisphere contribution is evident. There are six aspects to language, which are laterized to the two sides of the brain.

Phonology emphasizes the relationship between the positions adopted by the articulators and the resulting speech sound; the left-hemisphere is largely involved.

Morphology deals with the smallest individual meaningful units (words or word fragments) combined by rules from phonemes; largely under left-hemisphere control.

Syntax deals with morphemes which are combined into meaningful propositions according to grammatical rules; again largely under left-hemisphere control.

Semantics deals with the formal meaning of a string of morphemes, to which the left-hemisphere may contribute denotative meaning, while, the right-hemisphere may contribute connocative meaning or associations.

Prosodic aspects involve pitch, rhythm, stress, intonation, posture, and expression largely under right-hemisphere control.

Pragmatics deals with language used to express real intentions in particular

situations, to which the right-hemisphere contributes largely (Bradshaw and Mattingley 1995: 25-26).

## 2.1. Activities Supporting Speech Control

In order to talk, the speaker goes through a series of activities on at least four levels. Firstly, he must generate the concepts or thoughts about what he wishes to say. This process is called *ideation*. Damage to the activity at this level leads to mental-verbal dysfunction, which is characterized by itellectual impairment, or confusion. Secondly, according to the linguistic rules of the speaker's language the suitable words which convey the intended message are selected. This is called *symbolization*. Damage to this process leads to aphasia. The third step, which is called *translation*, involves the conversion of these linguistic units into neuromotor commands that initiate the orderly and sequential innervation of the motor nerves. Damage to this step leads to apraxia, when a speaker is not able to sequence or recall motor movements, however, he has intact verbal skills. Then, *execution* takes place at the fourth level. Damage to this step leads to impairments in actual motor pathways which innervate specific muscles of speech mechanism, such as tongue, lips, etc. As a result, the patient's speech sounds are slurred. This problem is called dysarthria (Meitus and Weinberg 1983: 225-230).

Formulated language travels from Broca's language formulator to Wernicke's area for semantic monitoring through the thalamus. If it is correct, the Basal ganglia and the thalamus release it back to the motor programmer in Broca's area for programming. If the formulated language is not correct, it is reformulated. After phonological formulation in Broca's motor programmer, the information travels via the arcuate fasciculus to Wernicke's area for phonological monitoring. If it is correct, it is released back through the Basal ganglia and the thalamus to Broca's area for articulation. During these processes, all these systems must work simultaneously for smoothly flowing speech (see Figure 2.) (Bradshaw and Mattingley 1995: 43).

Figure 2. Interconnections in Speech Control
(Clinical Neuropsychology 1995: 43)


## 3. The Role of the Right Hemisphere in Language

There is a difference between reduced verbal expression and preserved intonation which can help aphasics helplessness or can underlie the automatic production of songs and prayers. Speechless patients may utter *yes* or *no* or both indifferent tones. It is not a proposition but an interjection of a mere vehicle for variation of voice expressive of feeling.

It was also described that in many cases of motor aphasia, the faculty of singing words was conserved in spite of complete inability to speak a single word. In such cases, the patient probably sang by means of the right hemisphere. The right hemisphere has a role in prosodic comprehension and production. It is able to interpret words as symbols for verbal communication only to a limited extent, after the brain reaches maturity in its development. Prosody of emotional expressions, rhythm, melody and inflections that add emotion to speech are

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interpreted and modulated by the parasylvian zone of the right hemisphere. Damage to the right parasylvian zone or its subcortical connections results in perceptual disorder of prosodic decading independently of its linguistic or emotional function, and impairment in investing one's speech with emotional coloring.

In analogy with aphasia, one whose speech lacks emotional inflections has *expressive aprosody*. One who cannot differentiate the emotional inflections of language spoken by others has *receptive aprosody*, or may have *global aprosody*.

When attempting to detect expressive aprosody, the examiner listens for flat emotionless speech and asks the patient to say a test phrase while investing it with emotional inflections. Flat, expressionless speech can also occur with various neuropsychiatric disorders, such as depression, or diseases of the thalamus, such as Broca's aphasia.

When attempting to detect receptive aprosody, the examiner says a test phrase with different emotional inflections and asks the patient to interpret the emotion conveyed (DeMeyer 1993: 404; Plum 1986: 229-241).

## 4. Classification of Aphasia

Aphasia is a disorder of one or more components of speech production and comprehension and is caused by a damage to the two-way process mediating between thought and language. Specifically, it is due to local lesions of the hemispheres and damage to already developed and perfectly used speech, which is a system of signs. Language and speech depend on many brain regions, for there is a dynamic interplay between extended neural networks involving various cortical and subcortical regions.

The following are not qualified as aphasia:
- speech disorders due to a psychological or social condition,
- speech disorders due to lesions of articulatory and auditory organs or lesions of their controlling mechanisms,
- speech disorders due to mental disorders (e.g. autism),
- speech disorders due to gradual, extensive destruction of the cerebral cortex.

Mental disorders as a result of lesions of the cerebral cortex are confined not only to speech as an isolated form of behaviour, but also affect the patient's entire personality. As a result, aphasia is a disorder of communication with all its intrapsychic and social consequences. Symptoms of aphasias are varied and individual. Besides speech disorders, other kinds of symptoms can also associate with aphasia (e.g. disordes in writing, reading and motion). One type of aphasia

can transfer into another type caused by therapy or spontaneous improvement. Regions of lesions of the brain which cause aphasias represent an ample system of connections. Consequently, the border-lines between the aphasias are often blurred, and the occurance of a plain or clear type of aphasia is rare.

The question of systems or areas involved in speaking has been a matter of describing speech disorders in individual cases of brain damage. The centers of speech production and perception are located in some specific sites in the hemispheres. Not only did Broca and Wernicke reveal these centers, but also they described the pathological symptoms of aphasia the earliest of which were due to brain damage. The syndrome approach in aphasia has maintained existing typologies (see Figure 3.) (see Table 1.) (O. Sági 1986: 5).



Figure 3. Regions Involved in Aphasiogenic Lesions
(Clinical Neuropsychology 1995: 35, 40)

| | Fluency | Comprehension | Repetition |
|---|---|---|---|
| Broca | - | + | - |
| Wernicke | + | - | - |
| Conduction | + | + | - |
| Transcortical Motor | - | + | + |
| Transcortical Sensory | + | - | + |
| Anomic | + | + | + |
| Global | - | - | - |

Table 1. Major Types of Aphasia

### 4.1. Broca's Aphasia

Dax and Broca established in their early work that damage to parts of the left frontal lobe resulted in the limitation of speech production, however, comprehension of speech remained unimpaired. This type of aphasia ranges from complete muteness to slowed, deliberate speech constructed from very simple grammatical forms. It is nonfluent, telegraphic, effortful, dysarthric and agrammatic with abnormal prosody. It is characterized by reduced fluency, meaningful but shortened speech, which also occurs in writing, and impairment of repeating and initiating speech. Word order is aberrant, while articles, prepositions, grammatical inflections and other so called function words are often lacking; this is called agrammatism. In a way, the speech is similar to that of children at the telegraphic stage of speech production; it consists of few words or segments and is full of articulatory slips. The spontaneous verbal output is disordered, however, emotional and automatic speech and comprehension are retained to some degree. It has been discovered recently that speech comprehension of a patient with Broca's aphasia can also be affected. Broca's aphasia results not simply in a failure in muscle control of speech but also involves control and intention (O. Sági 1986: 9-10, 15-17; Kimura 1993: 42-43, 63-65; Crawford, Parker and McKinlay 1992: 183; DeMeyer 1993: 401-402; Iaccino 1993: 52-53; Plum 1986: 199-201, 208-211; Bradshaw and Mattingley1995: 37-38; Mosby's 1994).

In many cases of motor aphasia the patient's faculty of singing is conserved, while he is completely unable to utter a single word. In these cases the patient probably sings by means of the right hemisphere (Kimura 1992: 135).

qThere may be difficulties especially with syntax: *The apple that the boy is*

*eating is red.'* A patient with Broca's aphasia could understand the sentence expecially with regard to who is doing the eating. However the same patient could not figure out who was doing the looking when presented the sentence: *'The girl that the boy is looking at is tall.'* In the first case one can guess the meaning from knowing the vocabulary items *'apple'*, *'boy'* and *'eat'* and from knowing what happens in reality (boys eat apples). But in the second case guessing the meaning of the sentence from vocabulary is not so simple since boys look at girls and girls look at boys. Here, one must be able to analyse the syntactic relations (Hugdahl 1995: 45). Therefore, these patients with Broca's aphasia have an impairment of syntactic knowledge in both speech production and comprehension. Other examples are the reversible passives. *'The pie was eaten by the girl'* is problametic. But *'The girl was eaten by the pie'* is an unlikely statement. Even more problametic is the statement *'The boy was kissed by the girl'*, since either person could be the agent or the object, and it is the syntax that disambiguates it (Bradshaw and Mattingley 1995: 37).

Damage is located in the Broca-area (Broca 44-45.), which is located in the posterior-inferior region of the frontal lobe of the left hemisphere, its periphery and areas supplied by arteria cerebri media and arteria corotic interna. Broca's area occupies the articulatory syntactic fields of the language network and releases the utterance through the thalamus (O. Sági 1986: 10).

## 4.2. Wernicke's Aphasia

At the end of the last century Wernicke reported that posterior temporal lobe damage resulted in 'preserved' production of speech but clear comprehension difficulties. Consequently, the anatomical separation of production and comprehension seemed to be confirming. This type of aphasia is characterized by a comprehension deficit, without any loss of ability to conceptualize. Articulation is clear, speech is fluent and it often resembles empty, nonsense speech; it sounds right but is meaningless. The sentences are grammatically correct, however, these are full of semantic paraphasias (e.g. binoculars – spectacles), literal paraphasias (e.g. loiphant – elephant), sematic exchanges (e.g. table – stool), lexical paraphasias (e.g. cat – hat) and substitution of a word at a more general taxonomic level for the target word (e.g. people for women). These word finding problems are called anomia, and can occur during both confrontation and conversation. Paragrammatism is also another characteristic of Werniche's aphasia. It means that a person does not use the appropriate grammatical item or morpheme. There are only a few accompanying defects, e.g. at visual field. Reading and writing are also impaired, although the letters may be well formed. Social conventions, such as awaiting one's turn to speak or nodding the head at

the right moment are usually preserved (O. Sági 1986: 10-11, 18-19; Kimura 1993: 42-43, 63-65; Crawford, Parker and McKinlay 1992: 183; DeMeyer 1993: 402; Iaccino 1993: 53; Plum 1986: 203-211; Bradshaw and Mattingley 1993: 34-37; Mosby's 1994).

It results from damage to Wernicke-area, which is the auditory association area in the left temporal lobe, its periphery, gyrus temporalis superior caudalis. Wernicke-area processes speech sounds so as to map conceptual meanings onto words and vice versa. Comprehension occurs later as a consequence of the operation of the entire system. Wernicke's area monitors phonology. Then Broca's area will release the utterance through the thalamus (O.Sági 1986: 11).

## 4.3. Conduction Aphasia

It is a failure of connection between anterior and posterior systems. Speech is fluent in spite of the phonemic mistakes, frequent word searching, and phonemic paraphasia (e.g. cat-hat). Patients with conduction aphasia have a poor ability to repeat despite their relatively good comprehension, reading and conversation. Colloquialisms, stock phrases and automatisms may be preserved.

Conduction aphasia is a result of damage to the fasciculus arcuatus connecting Broca's and Werniche's areas (O.Sági 1986: 19-20, 62-63; Kimura 1993: 63-64; Crawfod, Parker and McKinley 1992: 183; Iaccino 1993: 54; Bradshaw and Mattingley 1995: 38-39; Mosby's 1994).

## 4.4. Transcortical Motor Aphasia

Speech is better than in Broca's aphasia, and it is a milder form of Broca's. It is characterised by nonfluent speech and repetition of wrongly articulated syllables and words. Verbal output is effortful, short, dysprosodic with the loss of grammatical function words. Spontaneous speech is hindered by impairment of initiating speech, which is not really an articulatory problem. These patients also try to fight against it by 'cueing in'. There is an impairment in naming, however, repetition and comprehension are relatively unimpaired. Moreover, patients with transcortical motor aphasia, or dynamic aphasia, are able to correct grammatically incorrect sentences. Their speech comprehension is suitable for everyday communication.

Damage is located in the frontal region of Broca's area, and in the anterior-fronto-medialis region of arteria cerebri (O.Sági 1986: 20-21; Kimura 1993: 63-64; Bradshaw and Mattingley 1995: 40; Mosby's 1994).

## 4.5. Transcortical Sensory Aphasia

The patient's spontaneous speech is fluent and often contains paraphasias and empty verbalisms. Their impaired speech comprehension is usually concealed by their abilities to repeat words perfectly, even though the meaning is not understood. Naming, reading and writing are also impaired. These patients also have a tendency to use semantic substitutions. Automatisms are retained while naming is impaired. These patients are only able to say a few empty sentences irrelevant to the objects.

This type of aphasia results from damage to the parietotemporal junction. Thus, Wernicke's area is diconnected from the rest of the parietal association area (O.Sági 1986: 21-21; Kimura 1993: 63-64; Bradshaw and Mattingley 1995: 39-40; Mosby's 1994).

## 4.6. Anomic Aphasia

It is characterised by the deficit of word finding, the use of parapharses, and semantic paraphasia. Language comprehension and repetition are relatively good, however naming is impaired which may also be a category-specific deficit (e.g. when the patient is unable to name items belonging to particular categories, such as furniture, vegetables or small animals).

It results from damage to the parietotemporal-zone (O.Sági 1986: 8, 22; Crawford, parker and McKinley 1992: 184; Bradshaw and Mattingley 1995: 41).

## 4.7. Global Aphasia

All aspects of language – comprehension, repetition, naming, output – are severely affected. Such patients are only able to produce a few nonsense syllables or speech sounds, however they demonstrate a little comprehension. There may also be preservation of nondeliberate automatisms, greetings, stereotypes and serial utterances (e.g. counting of days of the week) with normal prosody and inflections.

Global aphasia is presumably due to massive damage of numerous sites in the peri-Sylvian region, cortex, white matter and thalamus (O.Sági 1986: 23; Crawford, Parker and Mc Kinlay 1995: 184; DeMeyer 1993: 403; Mosby's 1994).

## 4.8. Amnesic Aphasia

It is characterized by the inability to remember spoken words or to use words for names of objects, or characteristics (O.Sági 1986: 22; Mosby's 1994).

## 4.9. Fluent Aphasia

In this form of aphasia the patient is able to say words easily although the words may be unintelligible or not be related to a particular stimulus. The impairments are found in the process of coordinating several units into connected speech rather than at articulatory single-syllable level. Patients with fluent aphasia have no problem with imitating single oral movements but they are impaired in copying multiple ones. They may use occassional pauses when specific words cannot be recalled, and they may use substitution or circumlocution. They may also frequently use general nondescriptive words like *'thing'*, *'stuff'*, *'it'*.

Fluent aphasia includes Wernicke's, conduction, transcortical sensory aphasias, and is due to posterior lesions (Kimura 1993: 64, 78; DeMeyer 1993: 401; Mosby's 1994).

## 4.10. Nonfluent Aphasia

Patients with nonfluent aphasia have difficulty reproducing both single and multiple oral movements. Their verbal output is decreased, it is usually fewer than 10 words per minute, with obvious effort, and altered prosody. Grimacing and articulatory struggle are likely to be visible. Nonfluent aphasia includes Broca's, transcortical motor and global aphasias (Kimura 1993: 64-64, 78; DeMeyer 1993: 401; Mosby's 1994).

## 4.11. Jargon Aphasia

In this form several words are combined into a single word in a jumbled manner. Incorrect accents or neologisms are used, and this speech is incomprehensible. However, it may be meaningful when it is analysed by a psychotherapist (Mosby's 1994).

### 4.12. Nominal Aphasia

Patients with this type of speech defect use incorrect names when identifying objects. It is also called amnestic aphasia (Mosby's 1884).

### 4.13. Syntactic Aphasia

Patients are unable to arrange words in a logical sequence resulting in incomprehensible speech (Mosby's 1994).

### 4.14. Visual aphasia

In this case, patients are not able to understand written language caused by a lesion in the left visual cortex and in connections between the right visual cortex and the left hemisphere (Mosby's 1994).

### 4.15. Childhood Aphasia

This results in the inability to process language due to a brain dysfunction during childhood (Mosby's 1994).

## 5. Linguistic Impairments

### 5.1. Impaired Comprehension

Patients with disturbance in the comprehension of speech hear the speaker but have difficulty understanding what is being said. As the length or complexity is increased, the level of comprehension is reduced. The ability to comprehend spoken language may depend on the general familiarity with the words used, in addition to the length, the complexity, the informational content, and the intellectual demands of the spoken message (O.Sági 1986: 7, 70-72; Meitus, Weinberg 1983: 237).

## 5.2. Impaired Fluency

Traditionally, patients are identified as being either fluent or nonfluent. In 1979, Benson gave a more complete description of these forms of aphasic language use. In this form of aphasia, the patient is able to say words easily although the words may be unintelligible or not be related to a particular stimulus. The impairements are in coordinating several units into connected speech rather than speech errors at an articulatory single-syllable level. Patients with fluent aphasia have no problem with imitating single oral movements but they are impaired in copying multiple ones. They may use occassional pauses when specific words cannot be recalled, in addition to substitution or circumlocution. They may also frequently use general nondescriptive words like *'thing'*, *'stuff'*, *'it'*. Fluent aphasia includes Wernicke's and conduction aphasias, and is due to posterior lesions (Kimura 1993: 64-64, 78; O.Sági 1986: 7, 84).

Patients with nonfluent aphasia have difficulty in reproducing both single and multiple oral movements, they produce decreased verbal output, usually fewer than 10 words per minute with obvious effort, and they have altered prosody. Grimacing and articulatory struggle are likely to be visible (Meitus, Weinberg 1983: 239).

## 5.3. Preservation

Many patients may continue a particular response long after it is appropriate or have difficulty shifting the response. In 1973, Eisenson observed that preservation tended to increase with any of the following conditions:
- the patient is confronted with difficult, or new cotext,
- the patient is fatigued,
- the situations change rapidly,
- the patient is anxious (Meitus, Weinberg 1983: 239).

## 5.4. Paraphasias

According to Eisenson, paraphasia is an error of commission modifying the individual word, or a word substitution.

Phonemic or literal paraphasia is characterized by producing inconsistent errors of some sounds of words. Patients might say *'lipe'* for *'life'*, while certain phonemic features, for example, vowels or the number of syllables of the target word are preserved, but it results in unintelligible words to the listener.

Verbal or semantic paraphasia is characterized by the substitution of a real

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word for the intended one. However, these words are somehow semantically related to each other, for example, *'knife'* for *'fork'*. These unintentional, unconscious errers cannot be recalled by the speaker.

Phonemic paraphasia is due to lesions in the planning period of sound forms of words. It reveals itself in many forms. Some patients perceive that they are only able to produce the target word after several tries while they get closer and closer to it. The following factors increase the possibility of making mistakes:
- nature of sounds,
- connection of sounds (accumulation of consonants),
- ability to be syllabified,
- which wordclass the word belongs to.

Aphasics often change or add sounds and syllables, while healthy people rarely make these mistakes. According to certain researchers, healthy people make mistakes only after the period of sound formation, while with aphasics, the lesion can be found at the level of sound formation or even before, at the planning stage (Meitus, Weinberg 1983: 237; Plum 1986: 199-201; O. Sági 1986: 55).

### 5.5. Anomia

It refers to word-finding difficultiy, that is, when a patient is not able to evoke, retrieve, or recall a particular word. Some patients, who are not able to evoke a word, substitute another word, or phrase, or might even use circumlocutions and gestures. The usual way of testing word finding difficulties is the naming test, during which the patient is instructed to name a series of pictures (Meitus, Weinberg 1983: 237).

### 5.5.1. Anomia of Word Production

There are two types of amonia of word production:

a. Disorder of articulatory initiation: selecting the phonological form is intact, however, articulatory execution is damaged. Patients are not able to name pictures alone, only with phonetic or contextual help, for example, open-ended sentences. It is characteristic of Broca's and transcortial motor aphasia.

b. Paraphasieic anomia: initiation is easy but the use of phonetic paraphasia is frequent. The number of syllables and inflections may remain. It is characteristic of Wernicke's aphasia (O.Sági 1986: 63-64).

## 5.5.2. Disorders of Word Choice

Speech comprehension and motoric execution remain, however, naming is disordered and paraphasias are used. Usually the pronounced word belongs to the target word's semantic group but they are not closely connected to each other (O.Sági 1986: 64).

## 5.5.3. Semantic Anomia

Naming is impaired and the patients are not able to choose the objects according to their names. It is characteristic of transcortical sensory and Wernicke's aphasias (O.Sági 1986: 64).

## 5.5.4. Disconnective Anomias

When it involves either the optic or the tactic sphere, it is *modality oriented*. When it involves certain categories, for example, colours, it is *category oriented*. If the patient cannot see the object which he is holding in his left hand and is also not able to name it, it is called *corpus callosum anomia*.

Patients with intact semantic processes are able to answer correctly with regard to pictures. When a patient is able to name pictures but cannot respond correctly to questions and repeats words similar to the target word, there is a disturbance in the phonological and lexical levels.

Usually, there are two procedures used in the exploration process of naming:
- *phonological prompting*: involving the first sound or syllable of the target word,
- *semantical prompting*: defining the target word.

Both phonological and semantical prompting may help naming tasks. If the phonological prompting was unsuccessful, the patient must lack access to the phonological representation of the word. However, if he is able to name the word knowing the first syllable, the disorder is in the activating process of the phonological form. Semantical prompting may be useful if the patient lacks adequate information in connection with the meaning of the target word. It may also result in the correct response, if the disorder is in the activating process of phonological or lexical representations (O.Sági 1986: 64).

These are two different forms of impairment in the use of grammar or syntax, which are established rules of the language.

*Agrammatism* is characterized by the omission of some function words during speech, such as prepositions, articles, pronouns, and conjunctions. Therefore the patient is telegrammatic, where only the key words are used.

*Paragrammatism* is characterized by the occassional use of inappropriate pronouns, inflections, conditional clauses, or prepositional clauses (Meitus, Weinberg 1983: 238; O.Sági 1986: 58-59).

## 6. Filled and Silent Pauses and Aphasia

Several studies have documented a complex link between anxiety and pauses, such as *ums, ers* and *uhs*. People assume that anxious speakers will litter their speech with pauses. However, it is also reported that some people will have no difference, while others will actually decrease the number of *ums* with an increase in the level of anxiety.

In 1968, Goldman and Eisler pointed out that these pauses are symptoms of the breakdown of the speech production apparatus. Specifically, when the next word or idea is especially hard to select, more time is needed and a filled or silent pause will occur. Thus, they concluded that manipulations that change the demands of the speaking task should change the rate of pauses.

In 1956, Mahl showed that anxiety interferes with all complicated ongoing behaviour. Talking is simply harder when one is anxious than when one is calm, and harder talking involves more pauses. He also suggested that anxiety increases almost every imaginable disfluency, except for the number of *ums* used. Thus, *ums* may not be the sign of breakdown and anxiety does something other than distract the speaker.

Levelt suggested that filled or silent pauses are symptoms of repairing processes. Detecting an error can make a speaker think about what he is saying. However, there are also other phenomena that can effect speech in the same way. Anything that increases deliberate control over speech production, manipulated evaluation apprehension, or manipulated self-counsciousness can dramatically increase the number of pauses.

People suffering from left hemisphere damage can display a variety of language deficits and these do overlap each other. Broca's aphasia is characterised by greatly simplified speech composed of, for example, infinitive forms of verbs, and singular nouns with few adjectives or adverbs. Speech is slow and deliberate in spite of being reduced. Speakers are aware of their trouble

articulating their meaning and they make conscious efforts to form their speech. Broca's aphasics are more like sober individuals. Their speech is better at conveying information, however, they produce lots of filled and silent pauses because they deliberate over it. They have to work on every word they utter and they are not able to let their speech production apparatus run automatically.

The speech of Wernicke's aphasics involves a great variety of words and forms but will make little sense and is often meaningless. It is neither slow nor deliberate. They do not realize that they are not communicating well and effectively and they do not or cannot control their flow of speech. They fall into the group of intoxicated individuals, who may not produce speech well but are also not concerned about it and therefore use few silent or filled pauses.

In conclusion, it is suggested that anxiety does not cause pauses itself, it is something accompanied by increased attention to the content of speech and this self-consciousness will lead to the use of more pauses. Alcohol, which makes speaking harder but also makes speakers care less about what they say, reduces pauses. Broca's aphasics, who produce simple speech but must deliberate over every word, produce lot of pauses. Meanwhile, Wernicke's aphasics may not talk very well, but they also do not mind and manage with few pauses. Pauses may provide information about moments when speech is not being produced automatically. They may indicate when the speaker changes mode and gives a deliberate attention to certain aspects of speech. Pauses are also found in tracking the developement of automatic speech in children and nonnative speakers (Christenfeld 1995: 171-186).

## 7. Case Study

In my experiment I would like to point out some main characteristics of aphasia by investigating the spontaneous speech and the results of the Boston Naming Test of three middle-aged aphasic patients with different kinds of aphasia. All of them earned a degree in higher education.

During my investigation I often met with difficulties: looking for an appropriate patient involves a lot of organizational problems. I had to get permissions from the patients themselves and from the treating institution. Then we had to get acquainted, and I had to make them work cooperatively and successfully, so that my patients did not feel embarrassed having a conversation with me and I could make a profile on their language. These results were due to a one-year-long common work, since disorders of the cerebral cortex are confined not only to speech as an isolated form of behaviour, but also affect the patient's entire personality, and this results in a disorder of communication with all its intrapsychic and social consequences.

It was pioneered by Goodglass and E. Kaplan in 1972. Since some of the pictures are culture specific O. Sági modified and adopted it to the Hungarian population. This test belongs to the group of practical tests since it examines only one aspect of speech, that is, naming. It consists of sixty heterogenious pictures, and pictures of scarce words appear followed by the thirtieth. The Boston Naming Test is an active procedure since the task is to name pictures.

In the task, the patient is simply instructed to name a series of pictures. If there is no correct response, there are two procedures used to help the patient:
-semantical prompting, when the examiner defines the target word, e.g. scissors-these are used to cut.
-phonological prompting, when the examiner helps by saying the first sound or syllable of the target word, e.g. flower- flo.
Four different codes are used in the evaluation of the naming test:

    3 - correct response without any help,
    2 - correct response with semantic help,
    1 - correct response with phonemic help,
    0 - non-valuable response.

## *7.2. Subjects*

Data from three different aphasics are analyzed in this study. These patients produced several impairments in spontaneous speech, naming and repetition.

Patient 1(H.A.) is a 50-year-old, right-handed, college-educated, retired architect who in 1997, at the age of 49, suffered a cerebrovascular lesion. He was initially diagnosed as a Broca patient who showed severe expressive difficulties characterised by agrammatic speech and anomia.

Patient 2(K.L.) is a 54-year-old, right-handed, college-educated automobile engenieer who in 1997, at the age of 53, suffered a cerebrovascular accident. His language impairement is best characterised as Wernicke's aphasia. He showed severe impairments of speech production and comprehension as a result of the loss of sensory control, which is a severe form of Wernicke's and global aphasia.

Patient 3(K.M.) is a 57-year-old, right-handed, college-educated, retired teacher who in 1997, at the age of 56, suffered a cerebrovascular accident. She was diagnosed as a mixed type senso-motoric aphasic patient.

Table 2.: Results of the Boston Naming Test based on the scale from 0 to 3:

| List of words | Patient 1 | Patient 2 | Patient 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ágy | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Fa | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Ceruza | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| Ház | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Síp | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| Olló | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| Fésű | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Virág | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| Fűrész | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Fogkefe | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Helikopter | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Seprű | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Kagyló | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Gomba | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Függöny | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Tolószék | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Teve | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Maszk/Állarc | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| Perec | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Pad | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Ütő | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| Csiga | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| Tűzhányó | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Tengericsikó/Csikóhal | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Hinta | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Kajak | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Földgömb | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Koszorú | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Hód | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Szájharmónika | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Orrszarvú | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Makk | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Bástya | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Gólyaláb | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Dominó | 1 | 0 | 3 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kaktusz | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Mozgólépcső | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Hárfa | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Függőágy | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Kopogtató/Reflexkalapács | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Pelikán | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| Sztetoszkóp | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Piramis | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Szájkosár | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sárkány | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Tölcsér | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| Harmónika | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Hordó | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Ananász | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Körző | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Retesz/Zár | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Állvány/Állás | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Jogar | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Cukorfogó/Cukorcsipesz | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Szfinx | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| Járom | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Lugas | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Paletta | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Szögmérő | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Akvárium | 1 | 0 | 3 |

### 7.3.1. General Aspects of Patient 1's Language

This patient, whose speech production is limited, is suffering from Broca's aphasia. However, his comprehension of speech remained unimpaired. This type of aphasia ranges from complete mutedness to slowed, deliberate speech constructed from simple grammatical forms. These stages have also been obsereved in his second acquisition of his mother tongue. Now, the patient's talk is moderate, he uses short sentences or phrases to describe fairly simple functions, actions, or relationships. He is also able to take part in some conversation and use clichés, e.g. *mindegy*, but his usage is characterised by some difficulty in expressing long or complex ideas. There are frequent occurances of word finding errors and jargon, scattered with instances of unintelligible words or phrases. It is nonfluent, in a way his speech is very similar to that of children at the telegrammatic stage, consisting of a few words or segments with articulatory
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slips, e.g. „Szereti a sok havat, amikor minden fehér? *El...elmegy, nem, nem, kicsi hó".* Word order is aberrant, while, articles, prepositions, inflections are often missing. This is called agrammatism. The spontaneous verbal output is impaired, however, emotional and automatic speech and comprehension are retained, e.g. „Hány éves? *Ötven lesz.* Hol volt építészmérnök? *Ungrobauban, Ongrobauban."*

There is also an impairment in repeating and initiating speech. The typical errors he made were that he repeated words without suffixes and another characteristic was that after giving phonemic help he produced only the rest of the word for the first time, then added syllables one by one backworth, e.g. „Függ...*Göny, függöny".*

Other errors found in his speech were almost all those of inflectional omission and phonemic paraphasias rather than lexical ones. These errors were not category specific, but were equal in all categories. The patient changed or added sounds and syllables in lots of cases – he used phonemic, e.g. *kombra* instead of „gomba", or lexical paraphasias, e.g. *fütyül* instead of „síp".

Many times he was not able to evoke words and to name pictures alone, only with the help of phonetic prompting, e.g. „Függ...*Göny, függöny".* In his case, selecting the phonological form is intact, however, articulatory execution is damaged. There was almost no need for semantic help since his disorder is not of semantic origin but of articulatory, e.g. before executing the name of an instrument he showed how to use that. This is called anomia (see Table 2.).

The patient was aware of his trouble and he made conscious effort to form his speech. He had to work on every word he uttered and was not able to let his speech production apparatus run automatically. His speech was better at conveying information than that of patients with Wernicke's aphasia, however, he produced lots of filled and silent pauses because he deliberated over it, e.g. „Most mit szokott csinálni? *Olv...Olvasni? Nem, nem, nem. Újság, tornázok, tornázok...öö...lo...logopédidus".*

This result was obtained due to the patients motivation, intensive learning and the family's and acquaintances' interest in his recovery.


### 7.3.2. General Aspects of Patient 2's Language

This patient is suffering from a severe form of Wernicke's aphasia and showed impairments in both speech production and comprehension as a result of the loss of sensory control. His speech is characterised as profound, his message is limited mostly to gestures, unintelligible attempts to speak, however, he was able to express needs and wishes in a defective manner, produce few simple, meaningful, everyday words to indicate something, e.g. *fésű,* or to ask for assistance, or to

name desired objects, e.g. „Nem kapott enni? *Nem"*. Szereti a telet? *„Szereti, szeretem."* His verbal output was sometimes fluent but consisted of empty, meaningless, nonsense speech.

Naming was also severely affected, and in the naming task there were lots of responses that could not be evaluated. These defects were not category specific, but were equal in all categories. Mostly phonetic prompting helped the patient, e.g. „Oll...*Ló*. Olló. *Olló*. Kak...*Ktusz, kaktusz"*. In one case, on hearing *biró* the patient associated with *vezető* (see Table 2.).

His comprehension is also severely impaired, however, he understood simple, direct instructions, e.g. „Kérem maradjon ülve és vegye fel a szemüvegét! He remained sitting and put on his glasses."

Unfortunately, this patient is very uncooperative due to the family's lack of interest in his rehabilitation.

### 7.3.3. General Aspects of Patient 3's Language

This patient is suffering from a mixed type of senso-motoric aphasia. Characteristics of both Broca's and Wernicke's aphasias can be found in her language.

This patient's speech can be best characterized as fluent and moderate. She conversed on many topics easily with word finding errors and difficulty in expressing her ideas, e.g. „És melyik tárgyat kedvelte a legjobban tanítani? *Öö...mit...mit...tudom...mert vagyok tani és tanár. E mi ezt csináltam ez és csináltam még mint tanító és csináltam tanár matematikát."* She used grammatical structures, such as possessives and prepositions correctly. Social conventions, such as nodding one's head at the right moment were preserved. Emotional and automatic speech was retained, e.g. „Mi a foglalkozása? *Tanító*. Szereti a gyerekeket? *Szeretem*." The patient 's comprehension of spoken language was remarkable in several respects. When she was engaged in normal social conversation with the examiner, there was no sign of difficulty in comprehension.

Her naming defect was not category specific, but was equal in all categories. There was more need for phonetic help than for semantic one in the naming task, e.g. „Kagy...*Kagyló"*, however, there were some non-evaluable responses, such as *papaletitatalinda* instead of hinta. There were impairments in articulatory execution and she used lexical paraphasias, e.g. *báscsa* instead of „bástya", *domitó* instead of „dominó", etc. In a case, when she could not articulate the target word she wrote it down correctly. The patient rarely used semantic paraphasias, e.g. *furulya* instead of „szájharmónika" (see Table 2.).

The patient was able to repeat all categories of verbal material well, e.g.

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*tolókocsi*, however, in some cases it was problametic, e.g. *helikopter*.

The patient was aware of her problem in speech, she used many filled pauses, but she has been working hard to acquire her mother tongue again. In a case, she also called the examiner's attention to it:

Patient: -*Báscsa*.
Examiner: -*Bástya*.
Patient: -*Hát azt mondtam. Nem azt mondtam? Jó hát jó hát nem tudtam semmit. Hát semmit nem tudtam. Azt sem tudtam, hogy hogy hívnak.*

## 8. Conclusion

In this overview the main aspects of aphasia are pointed out, however, the borderlines between the aphasias and other speech disorders, such as aparaxia and dysarthria, and also between the different types of aphasias are often blurred. These temporarily or permanently disabled people need to be rehabilitated, they need a complex medical and psychological supply with speech and physiotherapy.

Based on the results of my investigations on aphasics, I believe that motivation and repetition, but not empty repetition, are of the utmost importance in learning a language, either mother tongue for the second time after a brain damage or a second language. Children, students of a second language, and patients suffering from aphasia sometimes imitate speech what they hear. This may be a way to transfer an unanalyzed pattern to memory for some kind of future analysis, or may be a communication strategy where a response is learned which can later be applied to a similar context. Imitation may also give them a sense of participation in a conversation, however, we do not know to what extent imitated speech is analyzed by them.

These patients showed deficit in both speech production and comprehension, which was sensitive to message lenght, syntactic complexity, semantic anomaly and time. In general, the greater the number of syllables of an item, the higher the mean percentage of errors; and more errors were made on the naming task than in repeating. These characteristics can also be observed in the case of learners of a second language.

I would like to emphasize two aspects relating to mother tongue acquisition for the second time and second language acquisition: social factors and duration of classes which influence one's attention to a great extent. During my experiment on aphasics concentration and attention were of a high degree for approximately fifteen minutes, then, they became more and more tired and made more and more mistakes. The same process can be observed in the cases of language learners independently of age. Social factors help to shape patients' and learners' attitude which influence learning outcomes. There are some specific social factors which

influence the attitude to language learning, such as age and social background. Younger people as language learners are usually subject to social pressure from their peer group, while middle-aged people have less cohesive social values and are more influenced by the mainstream of societal values. In the case of older people, social preassure diminishes and these social networks also become narrow. People with greater knowledge and that of related to heuristics can learn single and string items quicker and put them into storage before they have time to analyze them structurally and semantically. Social class and social background also determine the level of choices, education and rehabilitation. In the case of one of my aphasic patients the lack of the family's interest in his rehabilitation hinders the patient's recovery, and as a result of this the patient is uncooperative. While, in other cases, suprising results may be obtained due to intesive learning and the family's and acquaintances' interest.

For trainees and teachers of a language speech and its disorders, namely, aphasia is worth studying because it provides a useful and deeper insight into the nature of speech, a better understanding of speech mechanisms, which help us to understand how people learn a second language and what kind of processes take place in one's brain during learning a second language and when concepts and thoughts are put into words. This way, it may be easier for us to help our students in their learning problems.

# Appendix 1.

The following examination was made on the 11th of February, 1998 in Miskolc.
Patient 1's sponteneous speech:

Examiner: *-Mit reggelizett ma?*
Patient: *-Öö... rá...öö...szalá...mit.*
Examiner: *-Szalámit?*
Patient: *-Szalámit.*
Examiner: *-Mivel?*
Patient: *-Kenyér, tart..tyart...*
Examiner: *-Kenyérrel?*
Patient: *-Sajttal.*
Examiner: *-Mit ivott hozzá?*
Patient: *-Öö...*
Examiner: *-Teát, kávét?*
Patient: *-Kávét...*
Examiner: *-Kávét vagy kakaót?*
Patient: *-Kakaót, kakaót.*
Examiner: *-Kakaó volt?*
Patient: *-Kakaó.*
Examiner: *-Szereti a telet?*
Patient: *-Szeret.*
Examiner: *-A hideget, a havat?*
Patient: *-Mindegy, mindegy.*
Examiner: *-Szereti a sok havat, amikor minden fehér?*
Patient: *-Hm...elmegy...nem...nem...kicsi hó...*
Examiner: *-Ha kis hó van azt szereti?*
Patient: *-Hm...*
Examiner: *-Hol lakik? Kertes házban?*
Patient: *-Öö...kertes...*
Examiner: *-Kertes házban?*
Patient: *-Kertes ház.*
Examiner: *-Hova szokott járni sétálni?*
Patient: *-Ház...öö...ház...*
Examiner: *-Ház körül? Az utcán, a környéken?*
Patient: *-Cán...cán...öö...kender.*
Examiner: *-Kenderföldön? Ilyenkor télen is?*
Patient: *-Télen, mindig.*
Examiner: *-Szeret sétálni?*
Patient: *-Jó az szeret.*

Examiner: -*Van hobbyja?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable) *Olajozok...*
Examiner: -*Rajzol?*
Patient: -*Épít.*
Examiner: -*Rajzolt régebben? Most mit szokott csinálni?*
Patient: -*Olv...*
Examiner: -*Olvasni?*
Patient: -*Nem, nem, nem, nem. Újság, tornázok, öö...lo...gopidédus...*
Examiner: -*Logopédushoz jár?*
Patient: -*Utcán.*
Examiner: -*Levegőzik, sétál?*
Patient: -*Igen.*
Examiner: -*Mit szokott nézni?*
Patient: -*Este...V...V...VT-t.*
Examiner: -*TV-t?*
Patient: -*TV-t.TV-tnéz.*
Examiner: -*Hány éves?*
Patient: -*Ötven lesz.*
Examiner: -*Mi volt a foglalkozása?*
Patient: -*Ungrobau...öö...*
Examiner: -*Hol volt építészmérnök?*
Patient: -*Ungrobauban...Ongrobauban.*
Examiner: -*Köszönöm szépen.*

*Boston Naming Test:*

Examiner: -*A következő részben képeket fogok mutatni és kérem nevezze meg, hogy mit lát a képen!*
Patient: -*Aha.*
Examiner: -*Ha nem megy, akkor segítek.*
Patient: -*Ágy, fa...*
Examiner: -*Nagyon jó.*
Patient: -*Cere...ceruza.*
Examiner: -*Nagyon jó.*
Patient: -*Ház.*
Examiner: -*Igen.*
Patient: -*Tü...fütyül...*
Examiner: -*Mivel fütyülnek?*
Patient: -*Sippal. Lo...olló, fésű.*
Examiner: -*Nagyon jó.*
Patient: -*Öö...fűrész...öö...virág...*
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Examiner: -Virág, nagyon jó.
Patient: -Mogosz...öö...
Examiner: -Ezzel mossuk a fogunkat.
Patient: -Öö...
Examiner: -Fog...
Patient: -Fogkefe.Öö...erbe...herbikopter.
Examiner: -Helikopter.
Patient: -Helikopter.
Examiner: -Nagyon jó, ez egy hosszú szó.
Patient: -Öö...
Examiner: -Ezzel takarítanak.
Patient: -Lo...
Examiner: -Sep...
Patient: -Rű, seprű.Öö...
Examiner: -Tengerekben, tavakban, folyókban élő élőlény.
Patient: -Csillag...öö...
Examiner: -Kagy...
Patient: -Kagyló, kombra, gomba.
Examiner: -Gomba, ez az. Ha világos van elhúzzuk az ablakon.
Patient: -Aha...
Examiner: -Függ...
Patient: -Göny, függöny.
Examiner: -Függöny, nagyon jó.
Patient: -Lop...kolo...csilo...kocsi.
Examiner: -Tolószék, tolókocsi.
Patient: -Tolókocsi, teve, álarc, perec.
Examiner: -Nagyon jó.
Patient: -Fa, pad.
Examiner: -Nagyon jó.
Patient: -Teniszütő, csiga.
Examiner: -Nagyon jó.
Patient: -Háá...öö...csi...ló...
Examiner: -Csikóhal vagy tengericsikó.
Patient: -Aha.
Examiner: -Melyikre gondolt?
Patient: -Csikóhal. Hinta, evez...
Examiner: -De milyen csónak ez? Ebben két oldalra evezünk. Ka...
Patient: -Kajak, kajak, ...öö...föld...gömb, földgömb, ...áá...
Examiner: -Virágokból fonják.
Patient: -Hm...
Examiner: -Koszo...

Patient: -*Rú, koszorú,...öö...*
Examiner: -*Vizparton élő emlős. Várat épít.*
Patient: -*Aha.*
Examiner: -*"h"-val kezdődik.*
Patient: -*Hód.*
Examiner: -*Hód, nagyon jó. Az az, jól mutatja. Száj...*
Patient: -*Szájharmónika.*
Examiner: -*Szájharmónika, nagyon jó.*
Patient: -*Etna...*
Examiner: -*Mi az?*
Patient: -*Jaj.*
Examiner: -*Tűz...*
Patient: -*Hányó, tűzhányó, öö...*
Examiner: -*Hosszú az orra, a szarva.*
Patient: -*Orrszarvú, makk, vár.*
Examiner: -*És ez?*
Patient: -*Vár...öö...*
Examiner: -*Bás...*
Patient: -*Tyáp...báspa...zásva...*
Examiner: -*Bástya.*
Patient: -*Bástya.*
Examiner: -*Az ember rááll és magasabb lesz.*
Patient: -*Ha...aha...öö...*
Examiner: -*Segítsek? Gó...*
Patient: -*Gólya, ...áá...*
Examiner: -*Mégegyszer!*
Patient: -*Gólyaláb.Hm...*
Examiner: -*Milyen játék ez?*
Patient: -*Játék.*
Examiner: -*Igen. Do...*
Patient: -*Bominó, dominó, szúr, szúr...*
Examiner: -*Ez szúr. Kak...*
Patient: -*Kaktusz, lépcső.*
Examiner: -*Milyen lépcső?*
Patient: -*Hm.*
Examiner: -*Moz...*
Patient: -*Mozgólépcső.*
Examiner: -*Mozgólépscső, nagyon jó.*
Patient: -*Öö...hárfa, hintázik.*
Examiner: -*Ez nem hinta. Ezen pihenni szoktunk. Függ...*
Patient: -*Göny. Függőágy.*
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Examiner: -az az, függőágy.
Patient: -Függőágy, hm...
Examiner: -Az orvosok ezzel vizsgálják a reflexet.
Patient: -Aha...öö...kalapács.
Examiner: -Reflexkalapács.
Patient: -Pelikán, orvos...
Examiner: -Orvosok használják ezt is. Szte...
Patient: -Fonedoszkóp, piramis.
Examiner: -Ez nehéz. Képzeljen el egy kutyát!
Patient: -Haa...
Examiner: -Száj, szájko...
Patient: -Kosár, szájkosár.
Examiner: -Igen. Töl...
Patient: -Csér, tölcsér, harmónika, öö...hordó...öö...
Examiner: -Gyümölcs, déligyümölcs. A...
Patient: -Ananász, rajz.
Examiner: -Igen rajzolnak vele.
Patient: -Igen, igen.
Examiner: -Kör...
Patient: -Körző, hát öö...zár.
Examiner: -Nagyon jó.
Patient: -Állás.
Examiner: -Mégegyszer!
Patient: -Állás.
Examiner: -Jó, attól függ, hogy ki hol nőtt föl. Egy királynak van koronája...
Patient: -Alma.
Examiner: -Almája is van.
Patient: -Öö...na...
Examiner: -Jo...
Patient: -Jogar.
Examiner: -Jogar, nagyon jó.
Patient: -Na...
Examiner: -Ezzel teszik a cukrot a kávéba.
Patient: -Aha.
Examiner: -Cukorfo...
Patient: -Gó, fogó.
Examiner: -Cukorfogó.
Patient: -Piramis, szinx, szfinx.
Examiner: -Mégegyszer!
Patient: -Szfinx, öö...
Examiner: -Ebbe fogják be a teheneket.

Patient: -*Aha.*
Examiner: -*Já...*
Patient: -*Árom, járom. Ó, jaj!*
Examiner: -*Lu...*
Patient: -*Lugas, lugas.*
Examiner: -*Lugas, nagyon jó.*
Patient: -*Öö...paletta, öö...*
Examiner: -*Szögmé...*
Patient: -*Rő, mérő, szögmérő.*
Examiner: -*Ak...*
Patient: -*Akvárium.*
Examiner: -*Akvárium, nagyon jó. Sár...*
Patient: -*Kány...ársár...sár...sárkány.*

# Appendix 2.

The following examination was made on the 11th. of February, 1998 in Miskolc. Patient 2's spontaneous speech:

Examiner: -*Mit reggelizett ma?*
Patient: -*Mit reggelik...*
Examiner: -*Tessék?*
Patient: -*Mi reggelizünk hm...*
Examiner: -*És mit ivott? Mit kapott reggelire inni?*
Patient: -*Enni hát nem...*
Examiner: -*Nem kapott enni?*
Patient: -*Nem.*
Examiner: -*Miért nem?*
Patient: -*Hát mert nem.*
Examiner: -*És ivott valamit? Teát?*
Patient: -*Nem.*
Examiner: -*Semmit?*
Patient: -*Semmit.*
Examiner: -*Holnap megy haza. Várja már hogy otthon legyen?*
Patient: -*Hm...azt nem tudom...*(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Mennyi időt volt itt a kórházban?*
Patient: -*Heten.*
Examiner: -*Mennyit?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*S otthon várja a felesége?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)

*Boston Naming Test:*

Examiner: -*Köszönöm. Kérem még maradjon ülve, és vegye fel a szemüvegét!* (He remained sitting and put on his glasses.) *A következő feladatban kérem nevezze meg a képeket! Mit lát a képen?*
Patient: -*Rajta...*(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Min alszik?*
Patient: -*Öö...*
Examiner: -*Ágy. Ágyon alszik.*
Patient: -*Ágy.*
Examiner: -*Ágy.*
Patient: -*Ágy.*
Examiner: -*Kérem mondja egy picit hangosabban, jó! Mit lát ezen a képen?*

Patient: -*Egy tába.*
Examiner: -*Micsoda?*
Patient: -*Nem.*
Examiner: -*Mi van sok az erdőben?*
Patient: -*Erdő,erdő.*
Examiner: -*Fa.*
Patient: -*Fa.*
Examiner: -*Ez egy fa.*
Patient: -*Fa.*
Examiner: -*Ez egy fa.*
Patient: -*Fa...*(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Mit lát ezen a képen?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Mivel írunk?*
Patient: -*Ír...*(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Ce...*
Patient: -*Uza, ceruza.*
Examiner: -*Mi van ezen a képen?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Hol lakunk?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Há...*
Patient: -*Há...*
Examiner: -*Ház.*
Patient: -*Ház. Hol van egy házan?*
Examiner: -*Mit lát itt?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Mit használ a bíró a mérkőzéseken?*
Patient: -*Vezető...*
Examiner: -*A játékvezető mit használ?*
Patient: -*Hm...*
Examiner: -*Mibe fütyül?*
Patient: -*Fütyül...*
Examiner: -*Sípba.*
Patient: -*Sípot.*
Examiner: -*Sípot használ, igen.*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Mivel vágunk?*
Patient: -*Hm...*
Examiner: -*Oll...*
Patient: -*Ló...*

Examiner: -*Olló.*
Patient: -*Olló.*
Examiner: -*Nagyon jó, ollóval vágunk.*
Patient: -*Fésű, egy...*
Examiner: -*Ezt használják a favágók.*
Patient: -*Fa...favágó, favágó.*
Examiner: -*Fü...*
Patient: -*Fűrész.*
Examiner: -*Mit lát itt?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Mi van a kertben sok, ha ültetnek?*
Patient: -*Hm...*
Examiner: -*Vi...*
Patient: -*Virág.*
Examiner: -*És ez?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Mivel mossuk a fogunkat?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Fog...*
Patient: -*A fogkrém.*
Examiner: -*Fogkrémmel és fogke...*
Patient: -*Fogkefe. Öö...*
Examiner: -*Ez egy heli...*
Patient: -*Heli...*(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Helikop...*
Patient: -*Koplolek.*
Examiner: -*Mondja utánam: helikopter.*
Patient: -*Helikomer.*
Examiner: -*Helikopter.*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Ezzel takarítunk. Mi ez?*
Patient: -*Hm...*
Examiner: -*Ez egy sep...*
Patient: -*Rű, seprű.*
Examiner: -*Mi ez?*
Patient: -*Hm...*
Examiner: -*Ez egy tengerekben, folyókban, tavakban élő élőlény.*
Patient: -*Hm...*
Examiner: -*Kagy...*
Patient: -*Kagyló. Hm...*
Examiner: -*Ez egy növény, amit enni is szoktunk.*

Patient: -(non-interpretable)

Examiner: -*Gom...*

Patient: -*Gomba. Hm...*

Examiner: -*Ezzel árnyékolunk, ha besüt a nap az ablakon.*

Patient: -*Hm...*

Examiner: -*Függ...*

Patient: -*Függöny...*(non-interpretable)

Examiner: -*Micsoda?*

Patient: -(non-interpretable)

Examiner: -*Ebben tolják a betegeket.*

Patient: -(non-interpretable)

Examiner: -*Toló...*

Patient: -*Toló...*

Examiner: -*Tolószék. Van két púpja is. Egy púp, két púp. Milyen állat ez?*

Patient: -(non-interpretable)

Examiner: -*Te...*

Patient: -*Ve.*

Examiner: -*Teve.*

Patient: -*Teve, púk.*

Examiner: -*Mit lát ezen a képen?*

Patient: -(non-interpretable)

Examiner: -*Színészek szokták felvenni.*

Patient: -(non-interpretable)

Examiner: -*Maszk.*

Patient: -*Maszk. Tizenhárom.* (He was looking at the 13. picture.)

Examiner: -*Mi ez? Finom, sós. Pe...*

Patient: -*Perót.*

Examiner: -*Perec.*

Patient: -*Perec.*

Examiner: -*Ezen ülünk kint a parkban.*

Patient: -(non-interpretable)

Examiner: -*Ez egy pad.*

Patient: -*Pad.* (non-interpretable)

Examiner: -*Ezzel ütjük a labdát.*

Patient: -*Buz.*

Examiner: -*Ez egy ütő.*

Patient: -*Ütő.* (non-interpretable)

Examiner: -*Milyen állat ez? Nagyon lassú. Csi...*

Patient: -*Csikiga.*

Examiner: -*Csiga.*

Patient: -*Csiga.* (non-interpretable)

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Examiner: -*Ez is egy állat, tengerben él. Csikó...*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Csikóhal.*
Patient: -*Csikóhal. Öö...*
Examiner: -*A gyerekek szeretnek ezen játszani. Hin...*
Patient: -*Öö...*
Examiner: -*Ez egy hinta.*
Patient: -*Hinta. Hát...*(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Milyen csónak ez? Ka...*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Kajak.*
Patient: -*Igen. Öö...*
Examiner: -*Mi ez a gömbölyű?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Föld...*
Patient: -*Földgo...*
Examiner: -*Földgömb.*
Patient: -*Földgömb. Öö...*
Examiner: -*Virágokból szokták fonni.*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Koszo...*
Patient: -*Koszorú.*
Examiner: -*Ez egy emlős állat, ami vízparton él.*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*És várat épít.*
Patient: -*Kéti...eszettüte...*
Examiner: -*Ez egy hód.*
Patient: -*Hód.* (non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Ez egy hangszer és fújni szokták.*
Patient: -*Hangszer, hangsze, hangsze...*
Examiner: -*Szájhar...*
Patient: -*Hangszer.*
Examiner: -*De milyen hangszer? Ez egy szájharmónika.*
Patient: -*Harmo...harmo...*
Examiner: -*És mit lát ezen a képen?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Tűzhá...*
Patient: -*Fekete.*
Examiner: -*Fekete tűzhányó.*
Patient: -*Tűzhányó.*
Examiner: -*Mit lát itt?*

Patient: -*Fü.*
Examiner: -*Sok fü és egy állat.*
Patent: -*Az na mi...*
Examiner: -*Hosszú a szarva. Orr...*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Orrszarvú.*
Patient: -*Orrszarvú.* (non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Ez kettő darab termés, a tölgy termése. M...*
Patient: -*M...Mi ez?*
Examiner: -*Makk.*
Patient: -*Makk.* (non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Mi található a várfalnál?*
Patient: -*Hen...tele...kert.*
Examiner: -*Bástya.*
Patient: -*Bástya.*
Examiner: -*Erre állnak föl az emberek, hogy magasabbak legyenek. Mi ez?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Ez egy gólya...*
Patient: -*Gólya.*
Examiner: -*Gólyaláb.*
Patient: -*Gólyaláb.*
Examiner: -*Milyen játék ez?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Dominó.*
Patient: -*Dominó.*
Examiner: -*Ez egy növény és szúr.*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -*Kak...*
Patient: -*Ktusz. Kaktusz.*
Examiner: -*Ez szállítja le az embereket a metróba.*
Patient: -*Metró.*
Examiner: -*Ez egy mozgólépcső.*
Patient: -*Lépcső.*
Examiner: -*Mondja: mozgólépcső.*
Patient: -*Mozgó.*
Examiner: -*Lépcső.*
Patient: -*Mozgólépű.*
Examiner: -*Milyen hangszer?*
Patient: -*Hárfa.*
Examiner: -*Hárfa, nagyon jó. Ni ez?*
Patient: -*Hárva.*
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Examiner: *-Két fa között függ és jót lehet rajta pihenni. Ez egy függő...*
Patient: *-Ágy. Függőágy.*
Examiner: *-Ezzel nézik, hogy jók-e a reflexei.*
Patient: *-Areke...*(non-interpretable)
Examiner: *-Ez egy reflexkalapács.*
Patient: *-Refrex.*
Examiner: *-Kalapács.*
Patient: *-Kalapács.*
Examiner: *-Milyen madár ez?*
Patient: *-Madár.* (non-interpretable)
Examiner: *-Jellegzetes a csőre, sok halat eszik.*
Patient: *-Hemprö...*
Examiner: *-Pelikán.*
Patient: *-Pelikán.*
Examiner: *-Az orvosok ezzel vizsgálják meg a tüdejét. Sztetoszkóp.*
Patient: *-Sztetoszkóp.*
Examiner: *-Egyiptomi fáraók építették. Pi...*
Patient: *-Piri...*
Examiner: *-Piramis.*
Patient: *-Piramis.* (non-interpretable)
Examiner: *-Mit rakunk a kutya szájára, hogy ne harapjon?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: *-Szájko...*
Patient: *-Szájkodott.*
Examiner: *-Szájkosár.*
Patient: *-Szájkosár.* (non-interpretable)
Examiner: *-Üvegbe ezen keresztül töltünk. Tö...*
Patient: *-Tölcsér.*
Examiner: *-Ez egy mesebeli figura.*
Patient: *-Sárkány.* (non-interpretable)
Examiner: *-Milyen hangszer?*
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: *-Harmó...*
Patient: *-Nika. Harmónika.* (non-interpretable)
Examiner: *-Miben tárolják a bort a pincében?*
Patient: *-Sör.*
Examiner: *-Hor...*
Patient: *-Hordó.* (non-interpretable)
Examiner: *-Ez egy déli gyümölcs. Ana...*
Patient: *-Rász.*
Examiner: *-Ananász.*

Patient: -Ananász...(non-interpretable)...kör...körész.
Examiner: -Körző.
Patient: -Körző.
Examiner: -Ezzel zárjuk az ajtót.
Patient: -Nyit.
Examiner: -Zár.
Patient: -Zár.
Examiner: -Erre állnak a festők.
Patient:(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -Állvány.
Patient: -Állvány.
Examiner: -Királyoknak van koronája és...
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -Jogar.
Patient: -Jogar.
Examiner: - Jó, jól mutatja. Cukorcsipesz
Patient: -Csipesz. (non-interpretable)
Examiner: -Szf...
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -Szfinx.
Patient: -Szfinx.
Examiner: -Ebbe fogják be a teheneket. Já...
Patient: -Játék.
Examiner: -Nem játék, járom.
Patient: -Járom.
Examiner: -Ives és szőlőből, virágokból készül. Lu...
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -Lugas.
Patient: -Lugas. (non-interpretable)
Examiner: -Régen a festők ezt használták, erre tették a festéket.
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -Paletta.
Patient: -Paletta.
Examiner: -Szöget mérnek vele.
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -Szögmé...
Patient: -(non-interpretable)
Examiner: -Szögmérő.
Patient: -Szögmérő.
Examiner: -Üvegből van, halak úszkálnak benne. Akvá...
Patient: -Akvá...
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Examiner: -*Akvárium.*
Patient: -*Akvárium.*
Examiner: -*Köszönöm szépen.*

# Appendix 3.

The following examination was made on the 11th of February, 1998 in Miskolc.
Patient 3's spontaneous speech:

Examiner: -*Mi a foglalkozása?*
Patient: -*Tanító.*
Examiner: -*Szereti a gyerekeket?*
Patient: -*Nagyon.*
Examiner: -*És melyik tárgyat kedvelte a legjobban tanítani?*
Patient: -*Öö...mit...mit...tudom...mert vagyok tani és tanár. Én mi ezt csináltam ez és csináltam még is mint tanító és csináltam tanár matematikát.*
Examiner: -*Matematikát?*
Patient: -*Igen.*
Examiner: -*És a gyerekeknek melyik volt a kedvenc tárgyuk?*
Patient: -*Hát nyil...*
Examiner: -*Az ön osztályában szerették a matematikát?*
Patient: -*Ah igen. Szerették a gyerekek. Igen, mert...öö...most...öö...a felsőkkel voltam már most. Mikor tizenhat éve...öö...hm...tanítok, igen, harmincat. Öö...jól mondtam? Harminchat, és az első a voltam taná..., nem tanító, és mostanában, há...de má a végén más felé voltam tanár.*
Examiner: -*És akkor matematika...*
Patient: -*Igen, igen, de ha azt mondta iskola...öö...gazg...most neked kell a gye...a...ar...na mi, a kicsik alsó, akkor az, most kell nekem oda, akkor én csináltam, igen. Nem hanem rendesen. Igen, persze, vagy ez, vagy az. De szeretem az, hogy öttől, nem hattól a...öö...mennyi az tízig. Őket nagyon szeretem.*
Examiner: -*És itt Miskolcon tanított?*
Patient: -*Is. Én miskolci vagyok...öö...de amikor öö...hm...öö...hm honnan hm...eljöttem tehát amikor a főikolá...mentem...öö...falura, és voltam..hm...öö...mi voltam? Mi voltam? Mi voltam? Mondjad mán, mi voltam? Hm...mi voltam? Nem tudják, hogy...dehogynem én tudom mi volt, ikola...nem, mi voltam? Hát a iskol...mi voltam?*
Examiner: -*Iskolai?*
Patient: -*És így...hm...hát olyasmi, nem voltam igazgó...ö...kisebb. És hozzám jött a...a...a...óvoda, nekem van...van osztály.*
Examiner: -*Az óvodások?*

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Patient: -*Itt is, igen, mert én voltam a...na mond mán mi voltam! Igen ez voltam, ez voltam.*

Examiner: -*Együtt volt az óvoda és...*

Patient: -*Ez voltam, után haza jöttem Miskolcra, itt voltak az anyukáim a...a... barátaim, vissza jöttem Miskolcra.*

Examiner: -*És mit reggelizett ma? Ez most egy másik kérdés.*

Patient: -*Ettem...öö...mit is? Azt mondja, hogy tea, mert én szoktam szokta...a...fösö...fö...Mit? Mindenfélet. Ki...ki...car...sutottam, nem, el nem, ilyet, ilyet, ilyet, ilyet tényleg. Ez az, mikor? Igen, és most öö...akkor volt láttad, nem ezt az egészet tudja, pedig ott volt, mert láttad, hanem na mi volt? Cserika? Csikoa? Csika? Csokolá...vagy pedig*

Examiner: -*Kakaós csiga?*

Patient: -*Igen, az volt. Igen, ez volt. Ezt szoktam megcsinálni.*


*Boston Naming Test:*


Examiner: -*Most mutatok pár darab képet. Kérem, hogy mondja meg, hogy mi van a képen! Jó?*

Patient: -*Jó. Ágy, öö...erdő vagy fa, öö...ceruza, ez egy, hát ez, ez nem tudom, ház, minden, öö...síp, olló, tű...öö...fésű, ez ez pedig azt mondja hogy...*

Examiner: -*Fát vágnak vele, darabokra.*

Patient: -*Az tudom, de ha tudnám, akkor...*

Examiner: - *'F'-el kezdődik.*

Patient: -*Fa...fűrész, azt tudom, ez virág, sárgs virág, ez öö...ez fogkefe, hm...ez pedig, ez, juj, nem ez nem repülő, nem olyan kop, na...*

Examiner: -*A vége az. He...*

Patient: -*Ha..., há nem jut eszembe*

Examiner: -*Heli...*

Patient: -*He...li...ko...per.*

Examiner: -*Helikopter.*

Patient: -*Igen. Hát az az. Jó, seprű, ez jó, hát ez mi lehet, ez a ződ? Mi ez az a ződ?*

Examiner: -*Tavakban, tengerekben, folyókban élő élőlény.*

Patient: -*Ja, igen. Cs...csiga, vagy így...*

Examiner: -*Puhatestű.*

Patient: -*Hanem akkor van rajta, a rajta van rajta, így levesszük, hm...sok van otthon mennyi van, hoztad, kaptad, te hoztad.*

Examiner: -*Ka...*

Patient: -*Kagyló. Csak azt hoztál. Ez l...ide teszem mondani...*

Examiner: -*Gom...*

Patient: -*Nem, le... mondtam.*

Examiner: -*Leírta: gomba.*

Patient: -*Igen, látod írni is, mondani is...(non-interpretable).*

Examiner: -*Gomba.*

Patient: -*Ez egy ablak...*

Examiner: -*Ablakon van.*

Patient: -*Igen, függöny. Jézus, Úristen, mi ez? Jaj, tudom, aki nem mer, fáj a keze, ö...kocsi, akinek fáj a lába. Dehát mit csinálnak azok?*

Examiner: -*Tolják. Milyen kocsi ez?*

Patient: -*Hogy mér viszik ezt.*

Examiner: -*To...*

Patient: -*Hm...*

Examiner: -*Tolókocsi.*

Patient: -*Tolókocsi, ez, hát ezt mondtam, hogy fáj a lába. Azér. Pupu, két pupu, igen.*

Examiner: -*Micsoda?*

Patient: -*Teve...(non-interpretable)...két pupu...,ez most lesz nem sokára az hm...a mit ez...*

Examiner: -*Igen, ezt farsangon használják.*

Patient: -*Úgy mondják, hogy...hát eszembe jut, hát nem jut a eszembe öö... nem jut a eszembe, nem tudom...*

Examiner: -*Ál...*

Patient: -*Lar...álarc...*

Examiner: -*Álarc, igen, vagy maszk.*

Patient: -*Igen, ez perrr...perec, eszembe jut, ez pedig ö...pad, ez öö..hát attól függ, hogy mit csinál, hogy lehet mondani kettőt is, hát lehet, de nem jut eszembe most, öö...la...na...t...*

Examiner: -*Ping-pong...*

Patient: -*Az is lehet vagy akkor igen na hát eszembe jut...*

Examiner: -*Ü...*

Patient: -*Üt, nem tudom, ütő.*

Examiner: -*Az az, ütő.*

Patient: -*Ütő. Hát a fiúk azok szokták csinálni. Csiga, ez pedig egy...Ez mi lehet? Ez van a ibe van ig van...*

Examiner: -*Tengeri élőlény. Egy állat, egy tengeri állat.*

Patient: -*Állat. Én tudom még ni lehet ez, hojhoj...eszembe jut eszembe...*

Examiner: -*Csikó...*

Patient: -*Nem tudom.*

Examiner: -*Csikóhal.*

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Patient: -*Nem tudom. Biztos, hogy van. Ez mi lehet? Jézus, Isten, mi ez, mi lehet ez? Mi lehet ez? De mi lehet ez?*

Examiner: -*Időközönként kitör.*

Patient: -*Vul...*

Examiner: -*Vulkán.*

Patient: -*Tudom. L...na, nézd má! Lapa..nem nézem e rá írsz rá, na, papaletitatalinda, pedig tudtam, ez pedig csónak.*

Examiner: -*Milyen csónak, amin két oldalra eveznek?*

Patient: -*Hogy mit csinál?*

Examiner: -*Két oldalon eveznek.*

Patient: -*Ke..ke...*

Examiner: -*Az az egyoldali. Ka...*

Patient: -*Kajak. Ez föld...gömb. Ez mi? Mi lehet? Jézus, Isten, mi lehet? Mi lehet ez?*

Examiner: -*Virágokból fonják.*

Patient: -*A virágból csinálják? De kicsoda?*

Examiner: -*Bárki, kislányok, mamák...*

Patient: -*Hát én én a az ilyen olyan mint egy ko...kor..., de hát ez nem egészen, mert az más ott, mi nem tetszik.*

Examiner: -*Koszorú.*

Patient: -*Nem tetszik. Nem. Ez öö Jézus Úristen, nagyon csúnya. Ez mikor él? Mikor?*

Examiner: -*Ez egy vízpart mellett élő emlős állat. Várat épít.*

Patient: -*Hm...a víz, vízhez van...Hód? Mondtam. Hát ez micsoda? Ezt se tudom mi ez.*

Examiner: -*Hangszer.*

Patient: -*Száj...fúj...furulya.*

Examiner: -*Szájharmónika.*

Patient: -*Hát én így tudom. Én úgy tudom. Ugyan az. Ez pedig mi lehet? Mi ez lehet? Hol lehet ez?*

Examiner: -*Ez egy hatalmas emlős állat.*

Patient: -*Óó mi ez? Milye volt ennek ez? Ilyen nagy...ilyen nagy, tessék?*

Examiner: -*Orr...*

Patient: -*Orr...orrszaj...én tudom orrfaj...nem jut ezsembe. Orr...örr...Nem, nem, nem jut eszembe, én tudom, de nem jut eszembe.*

Examiner: -*Orrszarvú.*

Patient: -*Igen. Az tudom, de nem tudom mondani. Ez makk, ez pedig vár.*

Examiner: -*És ez itt?*

Patient: -*Báscsa.*

Examiner: -Bástya.

Patient: -Hát azt mondtam. Nem azt mondtam? Jó hát jó hát nem tudtam semmit. Hát semmit nem tudtam. Azt sem tudtam, hogy hogy hívnak. Ez ezt nem tudom mit csinál például.

Examiner: -Erre állnak rá, hogy magasabbak legyenek.

Patient: -Ki veszi fel, aki fázik?

Examiner: -Gólya...

Patient: -Öö...ja úgy hogy hosszú lesz a lába, és akkor felveszi rá ez öö...lá...golyá...láb, ez pedig, na, hát ezt sem tudom, domitó.

Examiner: -Dominó.

Patient: -Jó, hát így tudtam mondani. Jó. Ez pedig azt mondja, hogy az egy kacus.

Examiner: -Kaktusz.

Patient: -Ez pedig, azt mondja, hogy felmegyek, ez pedig egy lépcső, nem ez ilyen...

Examiner: -És mi vezet a metróba le, milyen lépcső?

Patient: -Hát ezt én látom, látom, de hogyis mondjuk? M...na, mozló...mol, mozog, mozog...

Examiner: -Mozgó.

Patient: -Jó, hát akkor...Igen, ez mit csinál? Na ez mi? A ház föl, igen tudom. Ez amikor két föl rá tudtak feküdni a mit csinálnak öö...nem tudom mi ez.

Examiner: -Függőágy.

Patient: -Hát igen, ez épp az, igen, tudom. Hárfa. Ez micsoda? Húha! Igen. Mi lehet ez?

Examiner: -Orvosok ezzel vizsgálják a reflexét.

Patient: -Hát én ilyekkel én tudjam, hogy mit csinál a az itten az nagyon tudja, így ni. Ezek hogy milyen, hogy mennyi van neki. Tudom És az, hogy milyen? Az kell megnézni, azt, hogy mennyi a reflek.

Examiner: -Reflex.

Patient: -Igen.

Examiner: -Kalapács.

Patient: -Hát az nem érdekel. Ez pedig ez háp-háp, de milyen? De milyen?

Examiner: -Pel...

Patient: -Pelikán. Ez megint azt csinálja, meg a hallani, hogy mi van itt meg ide, de nem tudom mi megmondani.

Examiner: -Szte...

Patient: -Nem is fogom megmondani. Nem szeretem. Ismerem. Ez a az pedig öö...kidom, piramis, a hét egyik, jaj, hm..., na nem tudom, ez...

Examiner: -Kutyát képzeljen el!

Patient: -*Igen, ez nem szeret, ilyet nem szeret. Nem kell. Legyen ott kint, de neki nem kell ez a ráteszi, és azt mondják a felvenni a kötel...*

Examiner: -*Száj...*

Patient: -*Száj...szájk...öö..., rátesz, hát olyan van neki.*

Examiner: -*Szájko...*

Patient: -*Sár. De nem kell, nem szabad. Hú, ez micsoda? Az pedig az mi lehet?*

Examiner: -*Ez egy mesebeli figura.*

Patient: -*Jézus Úristen, én mi voltam? Ez nagyon sötét, nagyon szép, nem, nem, nem jó nekem, nem jó.*

Examiner: -*Sár...*

Patient: -*Sár..., azt mondja, hogy sárkány. Nem szeretem. Csúnya. Ez pedig ez öö..., beletesszük, szórjuk, ide beletesszük, tölcsér, harmónika, öö..., to... nem, nem, b, ebbe bor és ebbe van az, hogy... Há mennyi van nekünk, nyolc nekünk, ott vannak, pincébe van, a bor, bor, az ami benne van.*

Examiner: -*Hor...*

Patient: -*Dó, hordó. Igen, ez, öö.., ezt kettévágjuk és megisszuk, hm...*

Examiner: -*Ez egy déli gyümölcs.*

Patient: -*Azt látom. És így meg tudtuk inni és megisz...*

Examiner: -*Ezt nem isszák. Ezt eszik. Ana...*

Patient: -*Ata...ananász. Körző. Ez mi csoda? Tol, mi lehet? Toló. Hogy mi lehet?*

Examiner: -*Igen, azt toljuk, hogy bezárjuk az ajtót.*

Patient: -*Öö...riglizzni.*

Examiner: -*Rigli vagy zár.*

Patient: -*Ez az amikor csinálnak a...a...a egy állvány. Igen, ez mi ez? Hú, hát megint ez, mi lehet ez? Mibe lehet téve? Valami, öö...jogar. Hát ez meg, ez meg mi, mi lehet?*

Examiner: -*Cukrot fogjuk meg vele, és belerakjuk a kávéba.*

Patient: -*Jaj, tudom, hogy az a beletenni, így, össze, így és akkor kivesszük. Ismerem.*

Examiner: -*Cukorfogó.*

Patient: -*Hú, hát megint ez, öö..., na most mondtam az előbb, a piramis, és úgy hívják, hogy Ramszesznek, igen. Hm...hogy hívják ezt?*

Examiner: -*Szfi...*

Patient: -*Szfinx, igen. Amikor csinálják, tudom, tudom, látom, nem, ez pedig itt be ez a tehén, ez a a iga. De igen, ez iga. Ez biztos az. Ez itt a...*

Examiner: -*Járom.*

Patient: -*Igen, vagy á..., de ez vitte tovább. Az emberek. Én tudom. Ez mi lehet? Ez mi?*

Examiner: -*Szőlőből, virágból, fölfuttatják, ilyen íves alakban.*

Patient: -*Én nem tudom.*

Examiner: -Lu...

Patient: -Mi lehet az? Nekünk ilyen van. Igaz, igaz, de mit csinál az? Nem tudom.

Examiner: -Lu...

Patient: -Lugas. Na ezt tudtam, csak nem jutott a eszembe. Ezt festik, vagy azt is mondják, hogy pl..., hát ez festi, palté..., nem jut eszembe.

Examiner: -Pa...

Patient: -Pa...li..., nem tudom mondani.

Examiner: -Paletta.

Patient: -Paletta. Igen, ez t..., ez a, az az, na, harminchat...Mennyi is van? Szög, ez ez...

Examiner: -Szögmé...

Patient: -Szögmérő. De nem tudom mondani, csak ennyit. Ez pedig mi lehet? Ez pedig benne van ak...vá...ri...um.

Examiner: -Akvárium. Köszönöm szépen.

Patient: -Én is köszönöm.

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# SAROLTA SIMIGNÉ-FENYŐ[*]

## CONCRETIZATION OF THE LEXICAL MEANING OF THE VERB „TO GO" IN TRANSLATION FROM ENGLISH INTO HUNGARIAN

## Introduction

Concretization or differentiation of the lexical meaning of verbs is one of the techniques translators use in order to satisfy the expectations of the target language reader. Concretization with its corollary „generalization" means hyponymic/ hypernymic shifts in translation. The term was introduced into translation studies by Retsker and denotes one of the seven translation techniques used by translators when „there is no one-to-one equivalence and no readily definable contextual correspondence in the form of a collocation"(Retsker 1974:39, Fawcet 1997:29). In the case of concretization the translator departs from the wording of the original, and from among the dictionary offerings chooses a term narrower and more specific in meaning than the original. An all-exhaustive overview and a systematic study of the phenomenon was given by Klaudy, who, on the basis of Russian and Hungarian parallel texts investigated the translational possibilities of Russian reporting verbs when the target language was Hungarian (Klaudy 1986: 214-222).

The objective of the present study is to testify that it is not only the meaning of the verbs of saying that are narrowed in translation. Hyponymic shifts can be observed in the case of the Hungarian translation of the verb „to go". Concretization is only one of the strategies applied by translators.

## 1. Hyponymic Relations

Linguistic observation proves that verbs often come in a double layer. „The lower-level verb carries out the action of the superordinate in a particular way, **to limp** or **amble** is *to walk in a particular way*, **to munch** or **chew** is *to eat in a certain way*" (Aitchison 1994: 104). This kind of stratification can be observed

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both in English and in Hungarian. As a rule, this phenomenon is drawn on when we translate from English into Hungarian or the other way round.

It is a well-known fact that verbs can be classified on the basis of the semantic field they refer to. Some of them are central to a given field, while others are peripheral. English texts generally contain verbs occupying positions in the semantic centres thus being used in a very general sense. As a rule, translators often strive to find correspondents in the TL which are distant from the semantic centre. Such TL verbs have a more concrete sense and a more concrete meaning. In cases like this we can observe the relation of hyponymy between the original and the translated sentence, which reflects the way the translator interprets the original. Before analysing some examples taken from an original text and its authentic translation, let us introduce some basic considerations about the most frequent motion verbs.

## 2. The Role of Motion Verbs in Language

The verbs „to come" and „to go" focus on motion, a phenomenon playing an extremely important role in the way we conceptualize reality through the use of language. When perceiving an entity in motion we find that it has a starting point, a given trajectory and an end-point. Every language learner knows that the verb „to come" indicates movement towards the speaker, while the verb „to go" indicates movement away from the speaker, that is, both motion verbs incorporate the semantic feature of directionality. In addition linguists state that „come" inherently profiles the goal and „go" profiles the source of a given movement. Radden quotes Lakoff and Johnson stating that „our understanding of motion is based on an abstract image scheme which includes Source, Path, Goal and Direction as its structural element" (Radden 1994:68). The example sentences we are going to analyse show that „The mention of the Goal is essential but the mention of the Source is optional", an idea discussed by Ikegami, who emphasizes that the Goal is the dominant and the more natural element, while the Source is uncertain (Ikegami, 1987: 135).

## 3. Equivalents of the Verb „to go" in Translation

The semantic content of both verbs described above is very complex. Due to the various paradigmatic semes constituting the internal structure of the verb „to go" it has an extremely wide semantic range. It can express movement and position of a person or a thing, activity, state, and when combined with prepositions or adverbs it acquires a number of different meanings. Concretization of the lexical

meaning is due to this complexity and to the fact that the conjugated forms of the verb „to go" are used in English much more frequently than their Hungarian cognates. The example sentences that follow were taken from a paragraph of Stevenson's novel entitled „Will o' the Mill".

(1a) One evening he asked the miller where the river **went.**
(2a) „It **goes** down the valley," answered he, ...
(3a) „And then it **goes** out into the lowlands, ...
(4a) And it **goes** under bridges, ...
(5a) And then it **goes** on and on, ... (Stevenson 10)

(1b) Egyik este megkérdezte a molnártól, hová **megy** a folyó.
(2b) – **Végigfolyik** a völgyön – felelte a molnár, ...
(3b) Aztán **kilép** az alföldre, ...
(4b) Aztán hidak alá **bújik** ...
(5b) És aztán **hömpölyög** tovább, tovább ... (Udvarhelyi – Borbás 11)

This part of the novel describes the movement of the river from an unnamed location. In the source language it is made explicit by the frequent repetition of the same verb. The source of the motion is implied, while the end-point is unknown. Repeating the same dictionary equivalent of the English verb five times would have sounded too unusual and monotonous in Hungarian and it would not have satisfied the expectations of the Hungarian readers either. This fact must have been the reason why the translator created five different items corresponding to the English verb „to go" in this particular context.

In the case of (1a) and (1b) the event is shown as followed with attention by the boy, who observes the movement of the river as becoming more and more distant. The translational equivalent of the verb **went** is **megy**, which cannot be treated as an example of concretization. Since it is the first place in the passage where the verb „to go" occurs, the translator used a metaphrase. The past tense form of the English verb which is the result of a grammatical compulsion creates a distance for the reader in space and time. It has to be emphasized that the present tense form of the Hungarian verb brings the whole scene nearer the reader than the original.

In (2a) **go** is followed by the adverbial **down**, and besides expressing a change of place and indicating direction, the verbal structure **go down** describes the movement of the river as being in further progress and thus puts the emphasis on the action taking place along the given trajectory. Exactly the same characteristics of the movement of the river are described by the Hungarian prefixed verb **végigfolyik**. Both nouns **valley** and **völgy** refer to the spatial path of the process.

Although the direction of the river is not mentioned, we guess that it is determined by the geographical position of the valley.

In the context of **it goes out into the lowland** the verb refers to the Path of the movement, while through reaching a Goal, denoted by the noun **alföld** the Hungarian translation seems to make the final stage of the movement explicit.

In (4a) and (4b) the verb **goes** followed by **under bridges** profiles the Path of the movement again and so does the Hungarian translation. But we find that the translator uses a so-called goal-oriented static verb which creates the impression as if the movement has reached its end-point. When **goes** is equated with **hömpölyög** (5a) and (5b), both verbs emphasize the constant movement of the river again.

Later on the miller continues to describe the river like this:

(6a) Ay, it has a long trot before it as it **goes** singing over our weir, ... (Stevenson 12)

(6b) Bizony, hosszú út áll előtte, amikor dalolva **átlépi** gátunkat. (Udvarhelyi – Borbás 13)

In this case the source language verb together with the preposition **over** as well as the target language equivalent **átlépi** profile the end-point, that is, the Goal of the movement.

All the examples analysed show that the Hungarian translator narrowed the meaning of the verb „to go" in the sense that she chose target language equivalents which describe only a certain phase of the movement. The Hungarian sentences with the verbal predicates **végigfolyik, kilép, bújik, hömpölyög, átlépi** sound natural enough for the reader to believe that the novel he is reading is an original, and not a translation. Thus what the translator did was to satisfy the Hungarian readers' expectations. At the same time we can accuse the translator of distorting the original, since we can hardly imagine the miller, a kind but uneducated man using such sophisticated style.

## Conclusions

We have to admit that six examples are not enough to draw any conclusions about the nature of the translation process. For more details concerning concretization we refer the intended reader to Klaudy – Simigné-Fenyő (1996) and Klaudy(1994). The examples demonstrated above suggest that although English is rich in synonyms, both native speakers and writers favour verbs with very general meaning. Hungarian translators of English texts, in contrast, strive to recreate the original by means of finding more specific, that is, more concrete equivalents in Hungarian. This strategy contributes to satisfying the needs of the readers, but has to be applied with caution so that it should not distort the meaning and sense of the original.

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ÁGNES SALÁNKI[*]

# DIE ARTEN DER WERBUNG
## DEUTSCHE UND UNGARISCHE BEISPIELE AUS LINGUISTISCHER BZW. SEMIOTISCHER SICHT

Die einzelnen Autoren klassifizieren die Werbung nach verschiedenen Kriterien. Bei Tietz und Zentes hat jede Werbung „vier Hauptaufgaben, die im konkreten Falle mit unterschiedlichen Schwerpunkten realisiert sind:
- die Information,
- die Überzeugung,
- die Veranlassung,
- die Unterhaltung".
> (Tietz–Zentes 1980: 22)

Redlich (1935: 3) unterscheidet 3 Typen der Reklame:

„- mündliche (Reklamevortrag, Reklamerede, Ausruf)
- graphische (durch Schrift, Bild, Umrahmung)
- gegenständliche (die Ware selbst: Ausstellungen, Schaufenster, Modevorführung)".

Die meisten Wissenschaftler unterscheiden aber zwischen „informativer" und „emotionaler" Werbung (Suggestivwerbung). Wie Röper schreibt, hat „die Werbung [...] zwei Gesichter, die ganz unterschiedlich zu beurteilen sind: ein „gutes" Gesicht in Gestalt der „informativen" Werbung und ein „böses" Gesicht, das sich in der „suggestiven" Werbung zeigt" (Röper 1989: 46).

Die Anwendung des einen oder des anderen Typs hängt auch von dem beworbenen Produkt ab. Bei Konsumgütern langer Lebenszeit wird mehr Information geleistet, bei kurzlebigen Verbrauchsgütern entfällt das Bedürfnis zur Kundeninformation fast völlig. Die Menge der vermittelten Information hängt auch davon ab, wo die Anzeige erscheint. Am ausführlichsten wird über Produkte in den Fachzeitschriften berichtet (Hantsch 1972).

Echte Werbewirksamkeit kann aber erst erwartet werden, wenn informative und suggestive Elemente miteinander kombiniert werden.

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# 1. Die informative Werbung

Informative Werbung beschränkt sich darauf, zahlreiche Informationen über Qualität, Angebotsbedingungen, Preis usw. zu vermitteln. Sie knüpft sich an die sachlichen und funktionalen Eigenschaften des beworbenen Produktes an. Sie hat einen positiven Einfluss auf die kognitiven Wirkungsprozesse.

Die informative Werbung verschafft einen besseren Überblick über die Marktsituation und dient dadurch dem Verbraucher. Je stärker die Rechte der Konsumenten an den Entscheidungsprozessen sind, je grösser die Warenauswahl ist, desto mehr ist eine Gesellschaft auf Werbung angewiesen, desto intensiver muss der Verbraucher informiert werden. Die informative Werbung zeigt ihm die Alternativen, und sie macht Qualitätsunterschiede deutlich. Informative Werbung verschärft auch den Preiswettbewerb (Chamberlin 1933 zit. nach Röper 1989, vgl. Edler 1966, Tietz–Zentes 1980, Schürmann 1993).

Es ist die informative Werbung, die von den Wissenschaftlern als wertvoller bezeichnet wird. Sie enthält genaue, wahre Daten über das Produkt, um den Kaufentschluss zu fördern. Als informative Werbung können die folgenden Anzeigen betrachtet werden:

*„Brennessel-Kapsel gegen Arthrose*
*Als Durchbruch in der Arthrose-Therapie bezeichnen Experten die Entdeckung des neuen pflanzlichen Entzündungsherrers KOS. Dieser Bennessel-Wirkstoff in dem Medikament Rheuma-Hek lindert Gelenkschmerzen auf natürliche Weise.*
*Der KOS-Faktor in Rheuma-Hek blockiert die körpereigenen Botenstoffe, die Schmerzen in den Gelenken auslösen. So lindert Rheuma;hek die Arthrose und /verbessert die Beweglichkeit.*
*Das gut verträgliche Rheuma-Mittel ist auch für die Dauertherapie geeignet. Neue Hoffnung also für die 6 Millionen Arthrose-Patienten in Deutschland! Gegen ihre schmerzhaften Gelenkbeschwerden kann jetzt Rheuma-Hek (Apotheke) helfen*
*Der Gelenkschutz*
*Rheuma-Hek"*

Die folgende ungarische informative Werbung erläutert die Vorteile einer Zahnbürste ausführlich:

*„REACH ACCESS. A professzionális fogápolás.*
*A leghátsó fogakhoz is könnyen hozzáfér.*

*A Reach Access fogkefe tudományos kutatások eredményeként született. A fogkefe végén lévő hosszabb sörték a lerakódott lepedéket még a bölcsességfogakról is könnyedén eltávolítják. A többszintű sörterendszer a fog és az íny találkozásánál is rendkívül hatékonyan tisztít. Ugyanakkor a lekerekített sörtevégek kímélik a fogínyt és a fogzománcot. Az egyedülálló Reach Access fogkefe vékony, hajlított nyakának is köszönhetően könnyen hozzáfér a nehezen megközelíthető, hátsó fogakhoz is. Fogmosás közben, az ergonómiailag tervezett, gumírozott nyél első és hátsó oldalán a hüvelykujj és a mutatóujj számára speciálisan kialakított hely teszi még kényelmesebbé a fogást.*
*REACH. HOGY A FOG VALÓBAN JÖVŐ IDŐ LEGYEN."*

Die Aufgaben der informativen Werbung, die Aufklärung und die Belehrung kommen in den obigen Beispielen gut zum Vorschein. Das wichtigste Ziel ist hier, vom konkreten Produkt eine feste, korrekte Assoziation zu schaffen. Die Texte bedienen sich rationaler Apelle, Schlüsselwörter der Werbung wie *„neu"*, *„gut"*, *„natürlich"*, *„tudományos"*, *„egyedülálló"*, *„könnyedén"* *„kényelmes"*, usw. dienen hier der Überzeugung des Konsumenten, indem reale Tatsachen und logische Gründe aufgezählt werden, um seine richtige Wahl zu begründen. Der gefühlsmässig wirkende Slogan im ungarischen Beispiel mit dem Wortspiel, das auf dem Grund der Homonymie beruht (*„fog"* als das Substantiv *„Zahn"* und als Hilfsverb des Futurs) fördert das bessere Einprägen und enthält indirektes Versprechen.

## 2. Die emotionale Werbung

Immer häufiger ist in der Werbung das Zurücktreten der Information zu beobachten. Die emotionale Werbung vermittelt relativ unabhängig von funktionalen und sachlichen Produkteigenschaften emotionale Erlebnisse, die mit dem beworbenen Produkt verknüpft werden. Insbesondere auf gesättigten Märkten gewinnt die Vermittlung emotionaler Konsumerlebnisse an Relevanz. Dadurch kann nämlich eine Differenzierung von anderen Produkten erreicht werden. Die emotionale Werbung basiert vorwiegend auf Bildern, weil diese im allgemeinen über ein höheres Aktivierungspotential als Texte verfügen. Die Verwendung von speziellen Bildelementen (eine attraktive, verführerisch wirkende junge Frau oder das Foto des Produktes bei der Werbung von Genussmitteln) und Farben bringen eine deutliche Steigerung der Erinnerungsleistung (Edler 1966, Schenk–Donnerstag–Höflich 1990, Schürmann 1993).

Die Suggestivwerbung erstreckt sich im wesentlichen auf die Methoden der Einflussnahme. Die Warenästhetisierung scheint dabei eine bedeutende Rolle zu spielen. Das Produkt wird auf diese Weise aus dem rational Fassbaren herausgehoben. Diese Art der Werbung verschafft dem Werbenden ein Meinungs- oder Image-Monopol und wirkt so im Prinzip wettbewerbsverzerrend. Dadurch führt sie zu einer Verringerung der Wettbewerbsintensität, indem sie den Käufer bei seiner Kaufentscheidung behindert oder ihn sogar bezüglich der konkurrierenden Produkte täuscht. Die suggestive Werbung teilt dem Käufer kein neues Wissen mit, sondern manipuliert ihn (Chamberlin 1933, zit. nach Röper 1989, vgl. Röper 1972, Hantsch 1972).

Wie die zitierten Meinungen beweisen, schätzen die Forscher die Suggestivwerbung nicht zu hoch, sie betrachten sie sogar „täuschend" und „wettbewerbsverzerrend". Die meisten Beispiele zu meiner semiotisch-linguistisch gerichteten Untersuchung nehme ich doch von der Suggestivwerbung, weil sie meinen Forschungsabsichten mehr entsprechen. Suggestive Werbeelemente sind nämlich – nach den Eigenschaften der einzelnen Werbemedien – bestimmte „Blickfänger" wie Bildmotive, farbliche oder graphische Hervorhebung von Textstellen, unkonventionelle Textanordnung, die Plazierung, die Stimmlage oder die Sprechdynamik bei Hörfunkspots, Hintergrundmusik.

Unter den meist verwendeten emotionalen Konsumerlebnissen sind sowohl in der deutschen als auch in der ungarischen Werbung die Vermittlung von Frische, Freiheit, Genuss, Humor, Erfolg, Naturverbundenheit, Gesundheit, Exklusivität, Erotik, u.ä. zu finden, nicht selten kommen in der Suggestivwerbung auch Motive „Angst" und „Furcht" vor (Röper 1989, Meffert 1989, Esch 1994, vgl. Rákosi 1996, Trunkó 1996).

Das sollten die folgenden Bespiele beweisen:

- Beispiele für Genuss:

> „Der Moment, der Genuss, der Kaffee. Montana. Für den besonderen Moment."

> „ASTOR
> ... és élménnyé válik a pillanat"

In diesen Beispielen wird über die Produkte nichts Rationales mitgeteilt, es werden Eigenschaften der Waren betont, die den Lebensgenuss steigern können. „Der Moment" ist am wichtigsten, den man ergreifen und geniessen soll. Es wirkt

verführerisch, dass das mit dem Erwerb eines käuflichen Produktes so einfach verwirklicht werden kann.

- Beispiel für Erfolg:

*„Iroda 2000*
*Legyen irodája az Ön sikerének titka..."*

Diese Anzeige eines Möbelkaufhauses, die die schöne, geschmackvolle Einrichtung Ihres Büros verspricht, weist gleichzeitig mit verbalen Mitteln auch darauf hin, dass Ihr beruflicher Erfolg auch von der Beurteilung Ihrer Klienten oder Geschäftspartner abhängt. Dabei kann Ihnen das Möbelkaufhaus behilflich sein und Ihre Karriere fördern.

Der Phantasiename der Büroeinrichtung unterstreicht die Modernität, indem er sich schon höchstwahrscheinlich auf die Jahrhundertwende bezieht.

- Beispiele für Freiheit:

*„Helikon. A magam útját járom."*

*„Menjen világgá itthon!"*
*Tourinform*
*Kiránduljon, üdüljön Magyarországon! Itthon otthon van!"*

Vorwiegend in der Werbung für Genussmittel sind verbale Ausdrücke, die die Freiheit des Einzelnen betonen, zu beobachten. Das kommt aber natürlich auch solchen Dienstleistungen zugute wie Reisebüros sind. Die Sätze wie *„A magam útját járom."* und *„Menjen világgá itthon!"* befriedigen nach den psychologisierenden Analysen der Werbewirkung aufgrund der Motivforschung und der Tiefenpsychologie das Eskapismusverlangen des Menschen (Henatsch 1972).

Die idiomatischen Ausdrücke der Werbesprüche *(„a maga útját járja", „világgá megy")* bzw. der Satz *„Itthon otthon van!"* mit dem für die ungarische Werbung so sehr charakteristischen Wortspiel betont, dass man sich am besten im eigenen Land erholen kann, weil man sich hier zu Hause fühlt.

- Beispiele für Naturverbundenheit:

*„Ein zarter Ton für natürlichen Teint. NIVEA VISAGE. Natürlich schön bleiben."*

*„Oriflame – Természetes kozmetikumok Svédországból. Önbizalmat ad a sikerhez. "*

*„Aquafresh Whitening. Nincs szebb fehérség, mint amit a természet adott. "*

In jeder zitierten Anzeige ist ein auf explizite Weise ausgedrückter sprachlicher Hinweis auf die Natur, auf die Natürlichkeit zu finden. *„Natur"* und *„natürlich"* sind Schlüsselwörter der Werbung und entsprechen dem idealen Lebensstil des Menschen unserer Zeit.

- Beispiele für Gesundheit:

*„Vitamine in grossen Dosen.*
*An der frischen Luft hauen Vitamine ab. Darum gehören sie eingesperrt. Luft-und lichtdicht in einer Dose. So kriegen Sie Ihre Dosis Vitamine z.B. mit einem saftigen Pfirsich anstatt mit einer bitteren Pille. Weissblech. Voll gut. Leer gut. "*

*„PANTENE PRO-V*
*FÉNYES és ERŐS .... mert EGÉSZSÉGES*
*A haj vizesen a legsérülékenyebb. A Pantene B5 provitaminja behatol a hajgyökerekbe, és táplálja a hajat; így az egészségesen fénylő és erős lesz. Mert a fény és az erő az egészségben gyökerezik.*
*PANTENE PRO-V*
*AZ EGÉSZSÉGES HAJ TERMÉSZETES FÉNYE"*

„Gesund" und „Gesundheit" sind jene mystischen Wörter, die in unseren Tagen immer Werbewirksamkeit versprechen. Im Stress der Alltage wünscht sich ein jeder, seine Gesundheit bewahren zu können, egal ob es um die Gesundheit des Inneren oder um die des Aussehens geht. Wenn das leicht und angenehm zu erreichen ist, greift der Konsument mit grosser Wahrscheinlichkeit zur Ware.

- Beispiele für Erotik und Exklusivität:

*„UNWIDERSTEHLICH SINNLICH: MOSCHUS PERFUME OIL*
*Erleben Sie den verführerischen Duftzauber von Parfum in seiner reinsten Form: Perfume Oil. Ein paar Tropfen genügen, und Moschus Perfume Oil umhüllt Sie mit seiner geheimnisvollen Aura – angenehm intensiv und langanhaltend. "*

*„BLACK VELVET*
*A BÁRSONYOS ÍZ CSÁBÍTÁSA*
*Hűvös elegancia és csábító titokzatosság. A bársonyosan simogató ízben e*
*két érzés egyszerre ölt testet. Egy pillanatra csukja be a szemét és engedjen*
*az aranyló nedű csábításának!*
*Élvezze a pillanat varázsát..."*

Bei diesen Beispielen ist anzumerken, dass es unter ihnen relativ wenige gibt, die erotische Reize mit sprachlichen Mitteln ausdrücken. Die meisten lösen durch die Fotos (meist grosse Farbfotos mit dunklem Hintergrund und Pastellfarben ohne Worte nur mit dem Markennamen als Aufschrift) einen erotischen Effekt aus. In den zitierten Beispielen ist die Werbewirkung auch verbalen Mitteln, hauptsächlich Substantiven und Adjektiven zu verdanken.

- Beispiele für die graphische Hervorhebung von Textstellen:

*„schreIBMaschinen"*

Diese Anzeige ist extrem reduziert, besteht aus einem einzigen Wort. Die wichtigste Information, der Name der Herstellerfirma wird durch die Schreibweise ausgedrückt, die einem suggeriert, „wer an Schreibmaschinen denkt, sollte (muss) an IBM denken!" (zit. nach Röper 1989: 44, vgl. Forgács – Göndöcs 1997).

*„BILD dir deine Meinung!"*

Diese Werbung beruht auf der Homonymie, die der Titel der Zeitschrift und die Imperativform des Verbs „bilden" zulässt. Der treffende Slogan ist eine Anspielung dafür, dass man mithilfe dieser Zeitschrift viel besser informiert wird und auch seine eigene Einstellung klarer formulieren kann.

*„Holsten. Ha ÚJra szomjazik."*

Hier dient die Hervorhebung der Betonung der homonymen Form im Ungarischen: „újra" bedeutet einerseits „von neuem", „wieder", andererseits „auf etwas Neues". Mit dieser Flexionsform drückt der Slogan beides aus: „Wenn Sie wieder Durst haben." bzw. „Wenn Sie auf etwas Neues Durst haben". Die Qualität des Produktes wird auf diese Weise angepriesen.

*„EzR1 reklámötlet"*

Die Texthervorhebung mit dem Wortspiel in dieser ungarischen Werbung ist ein Aufruf zu einer Werbekampagne für die Zigarette R1. Das spielt darauf an, wie viele Ideen dem Einzelnen im Bezug auf die Marke einfallen könnten, die die Werbekampagne erfolgreicher gestalten liessen.

- Beispiele für die Plazierung der Anzeige:

Am Freiburger Bahnhof wurde für ein Genussmittel mit der folgenden Aufschrift geworben:

*„Das Leben in vollen Zügen geniessen."*

Die intendierte Plazierung basiert hier wieder auf der Homonymie: Züge, die vom Bahnhof abfahren oder dort ankommen, können voll von Reisenden sein, aber das Leben kann auch im Besitz des beworbenen Produktes vollkommen, d.h. „in vollen Zügen" genossen werden.

- Beispiele für Angstappelle:

*„Jobb (f)élni, mint megijedni?*
*A Generali életbiztosításai azoknak szólnak, akik nem akarnak sem megijedni, sem félni. Csak nyugodtan, biztonságban élni."*

*„Ma még szerencséje volt!*
*Autóját ott találta, ahol hagyta. Hogy ez mindig*
*így legyen, szereltessen autójába*
*sebességváltókar zárat!"*

„Angst" und „Furcht" werden den gefahrenbezogenen Emotionen und den Fluchtmotiven zugerechnet. Sie werden wegen ihrer aktivierenden Funktion und den daraus resultierenden Verhaltensweisen eingesetzt. Sie kommen vorwiegend in Anzeigen von Versicherungsanstalten oder von Herstellern von Sicherheitsanlagen vor.

Das erste Beispiel basiert auf einem Wortspiel der gleichlautenden Wörter „élni" und „félni" (auch graphisch unterstrichen!). Auf diese Weise drückt der Slogan sehr expressiv aus, dass es empfohlen wird, Angst zu haben und eventuell auftretenden Problemen vorzubeugen, um ruhig zu leben .

Das zweite Beispiel gilt viel mehr als eine Drohung. Es wird aber auch darin betont, dass sich Probleme leicht ergeben können, wenn man ihnen nicht vorbeugt.

Oben habe ich in meinem Schreiben versucht, durch deutsche und ungarische Beispiele die linguistischen und semiotischen Elemente der Werbung darzustellen. Ich hoffe, dass mein Artikel meinen Lesern und Kollegen in Zukunft bei der Interpretation der Reklame helfen wird.

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# A NOTE ON WORDSWORTH'S RELIGION

Wordsworth's autobiographical poem, *The Prelude* is unique in several aspects. One of them is the concept of Nature. The abundance of the descriptions of the landscape and the engagement in the appreciation of the environment surely goes back to more deeply rooted drives than mere overindulgence in the pleasure of sensory experience. Wordsworth himself does not feel reluctant to attribute a determining role of Nature in his spiritual development when in the subtitle to Book VIII of *The Prelude* he confesses that the „Love of Nature" leads to the „love of Man". Later he expounds it:

> „From Nature doth emotion come, and woods
> Of calmness equally are Nature's gift:
> This is her glory; these two attributes
> Are sister horns that constitute her strength.
> Hence Genius, born to thrive by interchange
> Of peace and excitation, finds in her
> His best and purest friend; from her receives
> That energy by which he seeks the truth,
> From her that happy stillness of the mind
> Which fits him to receive it when unsought."

(*The Prelude*, Book XIII, 1-10)

Here nature is presented as the source and drive of the noblest of all human activities and at the same time the source of utmost gratification. When reading Wordsworth's Preface to *The Excursion* we are likely to get a strong feeling that in Wordsworth's concept poetry, nature and religion are strongly interfused. This suspicion arises from the poet's likening the two poems (*The Prelude* and *The Recluse*) to an Ante-chapel and a Gothic Church. Even without paying particular attention to the poetic diction this feeling is reinforced by any passage of *The Prelude*.

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„Oh, there is *blessing* in this gentle breeze,
A visitant that while it fans my cheek
Doth seem half-conscious of *the joy it brings*
From the green fields, and from you azure sky
Whatever its *mission*, the soft breeze can come..."

(*The Prelude*, Book I. 1-5)

Or

„How shall I seek the origin? where find
*Faith* in the marvellous things which then I felt?
Oft in these moments such a *holy* calm
Would overspread my soul ...

(*The Prelude*, Book II. 346-349)

In a number of passages Wordsworth, himself categorically admits to his peculiarly ambivalent relationship with Nature.

„... I were long to tell
What spring and autumn, what the winter snows,
And what the summer shade, what day and night,
Evening and morning, sleep and waking thought,
From sources inexhaustible, poured forth
To feed the spirit of *religious love*
In which I walked with Nature."

(*The Prelude*, Book II. 350-357)

What is this infusion of religious vocabulary due to? M. H. Abrams' assumption is: that „the fact is that many of the most distinctive and recurrent elements in both the thought and literature of the age had their origin in theological concepts, images and plot patterns [...]".[1]

He concludes his investigation into the Christian heritage of the Romantic philosophy by pointing out that „characteristic concepts and patterns of Romantic philosophy and literature are a displaced and reconstituted theology".[2] He feels it necessary to stress that all the great minds of the age, whether on the continent or in England, considered the Bible „the grand store-house of enthusiastic and meditative Imagination" – as Wordsworth put it.[3] The great influence naturally takes different turns in the case of different authors: there is, for instance, Coleridge's case, who got involved in the new interpretations of the Bible (he

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[1] Abrams 1973 (*Natural Supernaturalism*) p. 65
[2] Ibid.
[3] W: Preface to *Poems of 1815*, in Abrams: 1973, p. 32

almost accepted an appointment to be a Unitarian pastor). Even Shelley, who was widely known as an agnostic and a radical opponent of the church, constantly studied the Bible – as Mary Shelley testifies to it.

All this interest we could put down to their education taking it for granted that the curriculum in those days would necessarily contain lessons on religion. Was it really so?

Finding justification for such a suspicion Emile Legouis's biography entitled *The Early Life of William Wordsworth*[4] and Christopher Wordsworth's memoirs[5] help us. Legouis points out that in the Grammar School at Hawkshead Wordsworth got his first religious training. Then when he showed no signs of aptitude to any profession or employment after leaving school his guardians (he lost his parents at an early age; he was eight when his mother died, and thirteen when his father passed away) decided that he must go to Cambridge to study until he shows some signs of choosing a career.

In Cambridge, however, arts and literature were not held in high esteem. As Legouis tells us the university was „the stronghold of Anglicanism and the nursery of the clergy... The supreme object(ive)[...] was to train for the Anglican priesthood men capable of meeting the enemies of the Church with concise and closely-marshalled arguments".[6]

Life at Cambridge, however, was not at every sphere as devout as one would think. The town people witnessed the hypocrisy of the theologians every night. Those who professed that their aim is „to protect the rising generation of clergy from dangerous influences, which in an age of threat of freedom and audacity of thought might reach them from every corner of Europe"[7] called for hostile reception and critical comments not only about their own conduct but also the ideas that they were to represent. This was due to their way of submerging in the worldly pleasures of drinking, loud entertainment and orgies.

The ambivalent feelings of college students towards orthodox religion may have been given further support by their natural reluctance to the strictly regular attendance enforced at morning and evening prayers in the college chapels. This discipline which could be felt at no other sphere of university life shed a light of hypocrisy over Christian ceremonies.

Thus the signs of radical criticism towards the religious doctrines did not come unexpectedly. One of these radical ideas were the spread of Unitarianism. In 1787 one of the Fellows, William Frend became a Unitarian and published „*An address to the Inhabitants of Cambridge and its neighborhood to turn from the*

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[4] Emile Legouis: *The Early Life of William Wordsworth*, London 1896
[5] Christopher Wordsworth: *Memoirs of William Wordsworth* (2 vols.), London 1851, Chapter IV.
[6] Legouis: op. cit., p. 72-74
[7] Ibid.

*False Worship of Three Persons to the Worship of the One True God.*"[8] We clearly know of Coleridge's involvement in this new trend and we can assume that Wordsworth also got acquainted with these ideas even though he left Cambridge before the publication of this pamphlet. This assumption finds reassurance in the episode that Abrams cites. A somewhat strange conversation happened between Wordsworth and his friend Henry Crabb Robinson. Wordsworth made a remark that he could not identify himself with the Unitarian thought. „Their religion allows no room for imagination, and satisfies none of the cravings of the soul. 'I can feel more sympathy with the orthodox believer who needs a Redeemer – said Wordsworth. But then he added „I have no need of a Redeemer".[9] – Why would he say that? Surely he was convinced that he had his own Redeemer, his own Mind. This is what he will declare in Book XIII., 188-90, of *The Prelude*:

„Here must thou be, O Man !
Strength to thyself; no Helper hast thou here;
Here keepest thou thy individual state:
No other can divide with thee this work,
No secondary hand can interven
To fashion this ability..."

Before coming to such a conclusion, however, Wordsworth passes through various stages of spiritual development. Moreover, clear as it may be, this glorification of the unaided intellect may not be his all eradicating tenet. Diminishing or eliminating the role of God, as it is seen at its extreme in the above passage quoted from *The Prelude* is echoed in the „Resolution and Independence".

„By our own spirits are we defined".

The very same inclination is manifest in his recognition of his radical approach to Christian orthodoxy, which is given vent to the following admission:

„...But let this
Be not forgotten, that I still retained
My first creative sensibility;
That by the regular action of the world

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[8] Legouis: op.cit., p. 73
[9] The episode is reported and commented upon by Abrams: in Abrams1973, p. 20

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My soul was unsubdued. A plastic power
Abode with me; a forming hand, at times
Rebellions, acting in a devious mood.

<div align="right">

*(The Prelude*, Book II. 358-365)

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The claim of the human to the throne with regard to his creative sensibility is manifest in the following lines, too:

„A local spirit of *his own*, at war
With general tendency, but, for the most,
Subservient strictly to external things
With which it communed."

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*(The Prelude*, Book II. 365-368)

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Note the first allusion to the self-begotten character of the creative power of the human intellect which will reappear in its full bloom and total power after the heart rendering experience of crossing the Alps described in Book XIII..

Wordsworth, however, is not the sole representative who shows signs of aversion to Christian orthodoxy. It is – I have to quote Abrams again – „a conspicuous Romantic tendency, after the rationalism and decorum of the enlightenment (to develop) a reversion to the stark drama and suprarational mysteries of the Christian story and doctrines.... Romantic writers revived these ancient matters with a difference: they undertook to save the overview of human history and destiny, the experiential paradigms and the cardinal values of their religious heritage, by reconstituting them in a way that would make them intellectually acceptable, as well as emotionally pertinent [...]"[10]

Harold Bloom's view on Wordsworth's relationship to God seems to be confronting this idea. He says that „Wordsworth is himself a poet in the Hebraic prophetic line. The visible body of Nature is more than an outer Testimony of the Spirit of God... Ordinary perception is.. a mode of salvation for Wordsworth, provided that we are awake fully to what we see.[11]

Bloom is clearly thinking in terms of the orthodox Christian paradigm, of the Holy Trinity whereas we from his friends testimony know that Wordsworth did not trouble himself about the issues of orthodoxy until he was incited to do so by Coleridge and others (Crabb e.g.). We must emphasize here that Wordsworth does not arrive overtly to such radical thoughts concerning the Holy Trinity as William Frend does (whether he had direct contact with Frend we do not know) but his ideas and religious views are certainly drifting away from the invincible

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[10] Abrams:1973 p. 66
[11] Bloom: *The Visionary Company*, 1961, p. 128

belief in the orthodox Christian God and towards what is often perceived pantheism, i.e. the doctrine, which identifies God with the universe and leads to a 'pagan', ritualistic adoration of Nature. Wordsworth, however, does not replace The Holy Trinity with Nature. His relationship with, radical as it may be, is more complicated than that. What he shares with his contemporaries is his freedom to break with the Christian doctrines.

# JUDIT HELL[*]

## ÖSTERREICHISCHE GEISTIGE WIRKUNGEN IN DER PHILOSOPHIE VON FRIGYES MEDVECZKY (FRIEDRICH VON BÄRENBACH) UND IHRE ERSCHEINUNGEN IN DER UNGARISCHEN PHILOSOPHISCHEN KULTUR[**]

Wenn wir die Geschichte der philosophischen Denkart Ungarns bzw. den einen oder anderen herausragenden Abschnitt zum Gegenstand einer Untersuchung machen, sehen wir uns praktisch unvermeidlich ebenso mit einem regelmässig wiederkehrenden metatheoretischen Problem konfrontiert. Im grossen und ganzen geht es dabei um folgende Fragen: existiert überhaupt eine ungarische Philosophie, und wenn ja, was haben wir dann darunter zu verstehen? Inwiefern sind deren Leistungen messbar und vergleichbar mit den Produkten der traditionell durch sie selbst als Vergleichszentrum gewählten europäischen (d.h. westlichen) Philosophie? Kann oder soll nun die seit dem 16.-17. Jahrhundert gewahrte dichotome Denkweise bezüglich hochentwickelter bürgerlicher Welt und dem sich nach Kultur sehnenden rückständigen Land überwunden werden? Wie sollten unsere, der ungarischen Philosophie gegenüber gestellten künftigen Erwartungen aussehen – sollten wir uns einfach mit den fortgeschrittenen Westen adaptierenden Bestrebungen zufriedengeben oder doch (sofern es sie überhaupt gibt) die rein ungarischen Erscheinungen und deren Untersuchung als Aufgabe der Analyse der heimischen Philosophie ansehen? Die Beurteilung von Status und Errungenschaften der ungarischen Philosophie, die Suche nach deren Selbstidentität, die Analyse von national-gesellschaftlicher identitätsfördernder und kulturschöpferischer Rolle ist tief verwurzelt in unserer Kultur-Historiographie.

Die Abhandlung erwähnten Themenbereiches zieht sich wie ein roter Faden vom Reformzeitalter mit der von Pál Almási-Balogh aufgeworfenen Fragestellung über den mit der Absicht einer Neufundamentierung der ungarischen Kultur Mitte des vergangenen Jahrhunderts auftretenden János Erdélyi bis hin ins letzte Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts, da sich wiederholt eine junge Generation (Alexander, Bánóczi, Medveczky, Pauer usw.) der Gründung einer neueren Kultur widmete. Diese auf geistiger Ebene erfolgende Suche nach Antworten weist klar ersichtliche Parallelen zu den mehrmals in Angriff genommenen, sämtliche Bereiche

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erfassenden ungarischen Modernisierungsbestrebungen des 19. Jahrhunderts auf. Hinsichtlich zuvor artikulierter metaphilosophischer Fragen hatten sich unterschiedliche Antworten herauskristallisiert. Einige sind geneigt, unsere oftmals unter ungünstigen Umständen geschaffenen Werte zu unterschätzen oder gar als nichtig anzusehen. Die das andere Extrem verkörpernde Strömung wird vom Geiste des Provinzialismus beseelt: ihre Verfechter weisen nach, dass das philosophische Denken in Ungarn von ebensolcher Bedeutung und Ursprünglichkeit war, wie in anderen europäischen Kulturen. Ich persönlich vertrete den dritten, einen gemässigten Standpunkt, denn ohne historisch erzielte Ergebnisse zu unter- bzw. überschätzen, wird doch die Existenz der ungarischen Philosophie und der philosophischen Kultur anerkannt. Wir müssen aber zur Kenntnis nehmen, dass es sich bei der Philosophie Ungarns (unter der bereits Alexander Bernát nicht eine Art Trikolore-Philosophie verstand) in erster Linie um eine von Befolgungscharakter handelt – ausgenommen selbstverständlich einige herausragende Persönlichkeiten. Über Jahrhunderte hinweg hat sie mit ausserordentlichen Assimilationsfähigkeiten immer wieder neue, aus dem Westen einströmende Lehren integriert.

Frigyes Medveczky, der selbst auch im Zusammenhang mit der János-Erdélyi-Monographie einen Überblick zur Geschichte der philosophischen Bestrebungen Ungarns bis ins 18. Jahrhundert zu geben wünscht, wirft zu Recht die Frage auf: „[...]ob in den langen, sozusagen ununterbrochenen Kämpfen um Existenz und Freiheit, in welchen die ganze Geschichte der Nation aufgeht, viele Factoren wirksam waren, die eine auch die abstracteste Denkarbeit fördernde geistige Atmosphäre erzeugen?" Unsere Antwort lautet offensichtlich: Nein. Es geht nämlich nicht darum, dass ungarische Denkweise und ungarische Mentalität sozusagen des Philosophierens unfähig wären.

Bedeutung und Wesen der historisch zustandegekommenen ungarischen Errungenschaften fasst Medveczky in den 80er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts wie folgt zusammen: „Weist doch die Verschiedenheit der Lebensbedingugen schon für sich darauf hin, dass auch Staaten und Völker nicht Alles in Allem leisten können. Genug, wenn sie sich der Culturarbeit auf verschiedenen Gebieten anzuschliessen, den Bewegungen derselben zu folgen und den Errungenschaften derselben ihr eigenes Geistesleben offen zu erhalten verstehen. Denn damit ist die Möglicheit geboten, die besten Früchte der Culturarbeit eine Zeitalters zu Bestandteilen der nationalen Cultur zu machen."[1]

Sowohl bei uns als auch ausserhalb der Landesgrenzen ist die Zahl jener gering, deren Forschungstätigkeit auf die Geschichte der ungarischen Philosophie ausgerichtet wäre. In deren Kreisen aber ist die von Péter Hanák formulierte These über die Renaissance der ungarischen Philosophie zum Beginn des

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[1] Medveczky: „Zur Geschichte der Philosophischen Bestrebungen in Ungarn I-II", *Ungarische Revue* 1886

Jahrhunderts ein schon allgemein anerkanntes Werturteil. Dabei richtete sich die Aufmerksamkeit überwiegend auf die „fortschrittlichen", d.h. grob ausgedrückt auf die in irgendeinem Sinne „linksgerichteten" oder jenen nahestehenden Denker, weniger hingegen widmen sich der philosophischen Tätigkeit vor der Jahrhundertwende.

Frigyes Medveczky verdient aus mehreren Gründen unsere Aufmerksamkeit, denn mittels seiner familiären und freundschaftlichen Bande, der österreichisch-deutschen Elemente seiner Bildung sowie aufgrund seiner jahrzehntelangen kulturschaffenden und vermittelnden Rolle zur Zeit des österreichisch-ungarischen Dualismus hat er persönlich die geistige Brücke zwischen den Regionen Trans- und Zisleithanien der Monarchie verkörpert. Seine Tätigkeit als Philosoph, Universitätsprofessor, sein kulturpolitisches und anderweitiges Wirken im öffentlichen Leben haben ihn von 1880 bis zu seinem Tode im Jahre 1914 an Ungarn gebunden. Mit seinem Schaffen hat er sich massgeblich an der geistigen Vorbereitung der Jahrhundertwende beteiligt mehr noch: wenn auch mit entgegengesetztem Vorzeichen so ist er doch aktiver Beteiligter der weltanschaulich-ideologischen Erneuerungskämpfe gewesen.

Frigyes Medveczky wurde im Jahre 1855 in Buda (Ofen) geboren. Sein Vater war der – einer oberungarischen lutheranischen Familie adligen Mittelstandes evangelischen Glaubens– entstammende Árpád Medveczky, welcher sein Diplom an der Universität Wien erwarb und später in der kaiserlich-königlichen Armee als Auditor-Oberleutnant diente. Gemeinsam mit seinem Bruder steht er im Freiheitskampf 1848/49 auf der Seite der ungarischen Honved-Armee, ist aber nach dessen Niederschlagung erneut Soldat in der kaiserlich-königlichen Armee. Sein Haus in Buda gestaltet sich zum beliebten Treffpunkt hochrangiger diplomatischer Persönlichkeiten. Medveczkys Mutter, Rosa von Pindtershofen, war die Tochter einer österreichischen Baronsfamilie. Die Mentalität der Medveczkys also ist eng verknüpft mit Wien und vor allem in der Periode des nationalen Erwachens, im Reformzeitalter, mit den königlichen Freistädten Oberungarns, so z.B. in erster Linie Eperies. Die Mittelschule besucht der junge deutschsprachige Medveczky am Wiener Theresianum. Seine Rechtsstudien nimmt er ebenfalls in Wien, die postgraduale Ausbildung hingegen in Strassburg vor. Unter den in Österreich durch die bürgerliche Entwicklung geschaffenen neuen historischen Bedingungen studiert er in der Zeit der Modernisierung des Hochschulwesens neben Juristik und Staatswissenschaften auch Philosophie, Rechtsphilosophie bzw. Politikwissenschaften sowie Nationalökonomie, Staatsbuchhaltung und Statistik. In Deutschland macht er sich mit den Lehren der sogenannten Kathedersozialisten und der neuesten deutschen historischen Schule (G. Schmoller, A. Wagner, E. Knapp, L. Brentano usw.) vertraut, ebenso wie mit den zeitgenössischen Lehren der vulgären Volkswirtschaft und der biologischen Soziologie. Über mehrere Semester hinweg ergänzt er in Leipzig, der Hochburg

des deutschen Positivismus (Fechner, Lotze, Wundt) sowie in Jena, der Stadt Haeckels, bzw. in Berlin seine Studien der Philosophie bzw. der damit in Verbindung stehenden Naturwissenschaften (Biologie, Anthropologie, Psychologie, Paläontologie). Ein Grossteil seiner Schriften wird in Deutschland veröffentlicht, und zwar unter dem Namen Friedrich von Bärenbach. Als er an der Universität Budapest zu seinem Rigorosum erscheint, ist sein Name hier bereits wohlbekannt. Die ersten Schritte auf dem steilen Wege der fachlichen Anerkennung liegen schon hinter ihm, als er – dem Rufe des Ministers Trefort folgend – nach langjährigem Auslandsaufenthalt heimkehrt. Dank der vielschichtigen christlich-liberalen Kulturpolitik seitens Eötvös und Trefort können die 70er und 80er Jahre des vergangenen Jahrhunderts als jene der Geburt eines modernen ungarischen Hochschulwesens angesehen werden. In Klausenburg öffnet die zweite Universität des Landes ihre Pforten, die Budapester Universität verfügt über neue Lehrstühle, die Gebäude der naturwissenschaftlichen und medizinischen Fakultät werden errichtet, dank des Wirkens schulemachender Professoren hebt sich das Bildungsniveau. Zu Beginn und Mitte der 80er Jahre erlebt die erste Hälfte des Dualismus ihre Blütezeit.

Medveczkys Sprachkenntnisse, sein gründliches, breitgefächertes und gleichzeitig zeitgemässes Fachwissen haben ihn für die heimische Verbreitung der modernen philosophischen Strömungen prädestiniert. Er habilitiert an der Budapester Universität in Anthropologie und Erkenntnislehre und führt als erster das philosophische Seminar ein. Seine Karriere macht schnelle Fortschritte, unter mehreren Berufskollegen ernennt man ihn zum Leiter des neu geschaffenen II. Lehrstuhles der Philosophie. Bereits als Dreissigjähriger ist er Professor. In den Vorlesungen des jungen und begeisterten Dreigestirns – Bernát Alexander, József Bánóczi, Medveczky - werden die Ideen der modernen Philosophie abgehandelt. Im Geiste der deutschen akademischen Philosophie verkünden sie auch bei uns das Programm „Zurück zu Kant". In der Thematik der Vorlesungen Medveczkys treten ab der zweiten Hälfte der 80er Jahre immer stärker die ethische und gesellschaftsphilosophische Problembereiche der in den Vordergrund. Im Auftrage Treforts tritt er derzeit eine Westeuropareise an, um das Wirken italienischer, französischer und deutscher Universitäten zu studieren und die Erfahrungen im Bereich der Bildungsorganisation in der Heimat zu verwerten. Er unterstützt unter anderem mit Ratschlägen die Gründung der Universitäten Pressburg und Debrecen. Zurückgekehrt vom anlässlich der Pariser Weltausstellung veranstalteten Kongress für Unterrichtswesen (1889), dem „Fest der Arbeit, des Friedens und der Zivilisation", legt er Zeugnis ab von der Repräsentation der höchsten Werte des ungarischen liberalen Bürgertums, er drängt auf eine Zusammenarbeit der Völker auf den Gebieten von Handel, Wirtschaft und vor allem der Kultur, er erhebt sein Wort gegenüber den Verfechtern nationalistischer Isolation und eines ebensolchen Partikularismus, im

Interesse der Öffnung der ungarischen Kultur gen Westen und der Rezeption der Errungenschaften der zivilisierten Welt. Den in Ungarn eine „nationale Wissenschaft" Fordernden gegenüber deklariert er: „Der Gelehrte hat eine Heimat, nicht aber die Wissenschaft".

In diesen Jahrzehnten leistet er als akademischer Gelehrter, Wissenschaftsorganisator und Universitätsprofessor gleichermassen Hervorragendes für Einbürgerung, Pflege und Popularisierung der philosophischen Kultur, für die Eingliederung der Nation in den europäischen Kulturkreis. Sein weitgefächertes theoretisches Schaffen umfasste nicht ausschliesslich sämtliche philosophischen Disziplinen. So sprechen seine um die Jahrhundertwende ausgebildeten Schüler – Ákos Pauler, Gyula Kornis, Samu Szemere, Béla Zalai - voller Anerkennung von allen seinen fundierten wissenschaftlichen Kenntnissen.

Gewiss hat hinsichtlich seiner Zurückgezogenheit für zwei Jahrzehnte und seines Schweigens Ende des Jahrhunderts die inhaltliche Leere des Ideenkreises des ungarischen Liberalismus eine bedeutende Rolle gespielt, ebenso, wie die christlich-nationale-konservative ideell-politische Wende der 90er. Er ist 53 Jahre alt, als erneut seine Schriften erscheinen. In den ersten Jahrzehnten des neuen Jahrhunderts ist Medveczky einer der bedeutendsten Ideologen des István Tisza-Establishments, ab 1907 dann Präsident der Ungarischen Philosophischen Gesellschaft. Bezüglich der Entwicklung seiner philosophischen Ansichten gelangt er vom einstigen Ideal des Faustschen Menschen zur Identifizierung mit dem christlichen Moralisten Pascal. Die Kollegen Medveczkys erachten ihn als eine der gebildetsten Persönlichkeiten Ungarns, gleichzeitig aber auch als einen Denker tragischen Schicksals. Geschichte und Ideenlehre des Dualismus und damit ebenso das Wirken Medveczkys werden im wesentlichen um die 90er Jahre durch eine starke Zäsur wie durch eine scharfe Trennlinie zweigeteilt. Im letzten Drittel des vergangenen Jahrhunderts hat der trotz jeden öffentlichen Erfolges und der grossartigen Karriere „Frühgeborene" und unverstandene Gelehrte in seiner Heimat das Schicksal eines eine allzu fortschrittliche Denkweise vorweisenden, nach der Jahrhundertwende jedoch mit dem Epochen- und Generationswandel nicht Schritthalten könnenden Philosophen erlitten.

Wie bereits erwähnt, beginnt seine wissenschaftliche Laufbahn im letzten Drittel des vergangenen Jahrhunderts im Ausland. Bei der Schöpfung seiner Ideen spielen die herausragenden Gestalten der deutschen klassischen Literatur (wie Herder und Goethe) eine bedeutende Rolle, ebenso wie die neuesten, das Weltbild radikal formenden Errungenschaften der Naturwissenschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts, die Produkte der neu ins Leben gerufenen Socialwissenschaften, die modernen Ideenströmungen des Jahrhunderts, d.h. Positivismus, Darwinismus, Spencerismus. Auch der Schauplatz der ideellen Aufnahme ist nicht nebensächlich, denn Wien mit dem derzeit praktisch beispiellos liberalen,

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gesellschaftlichen, politischen Flair, mit der auch der Modernisierung des Reiches dienenden fortschrittlichen Richtlinie der Wissenschaftspolitik, das barock-josephinische herbartiansche Traditionen auf interessante Weise miteinander verschmelzende Wien bot die Gegenwärtigkeit einer das Alltagsdenken und Lebensgefühl gleichermassen durchdringenden harmonischen Weltauffassung. Endre Kiss bezeichnet als wesentlichste Komponenten dieser „zweiten Aufklärung" das Prinzip des freien Denkens ohne Autorität, die Vorstellung vom Fortschritt, eine Art offiziellen Humanismus und ebensolche Menschenliebe, die Begünstigung zum Wohl der Allgemeinheit, die Geltendmachung der Vorherrschaft der Vernunft in der Lenkung gesellschaftlicher Prozesse, die Evidenzführung sozialer Probleme und die Bereitschaft zu deren Lösung, das in-den-Vordergrund-Treten des Erziehungsgedanken als Bestandteil des unmittelbaren Interesses am Menschen, den unerschütterlichen Glauben an einer historischen Effizienz der Ideen, das Bestreben nach der Ausführung von oben zu realisierender Reformen.[2]

Die Tätigkeit des jungen Medveczky wies darüber hinaus einen markanten Kant-Einfluss auf. Dies ist kein Zufall, denn nach 1850 wurde die Geschichte der deutschen akademischen Philosophie im Zeichen einer empirisch-sensualistisch-agnostizistischen Kant-Rezeption geschrieben. Laut Windelband hatte Deutschland derzeit noch keine Metaphysik nötig und der frühe Neukantianismus war jene Erscheinungsform, in welcher der Positivismus in einem über idealistische Traditionen verfügenden Land eine bestimmende Rolle zu spielen vermochte. Im Deutschland der 70er Jahre aber war nur für kurze Zeit jene geistige Atmosphäre charakteristisch, in welcher die jungen Denker der Monarchie aufwuchsen. Schon schnell verflog die Modernisierungseuphorie des nun einheitlichen Bismarckschen Reiches, die Epoche des dortigen gestärkten Liberalismus nahm ein Ende, im Kampf um Säkularisation unterblieben jene Anstrengungen, die auf eine philosophische Fundamentierung der wissenschaftlichen Souveränität und des freien Denkens ausgerichtet waren. Der Charakter der neukantianischen Philosophie machte einen grundlegenden Wandel durch: auf Kosten der emanzipativen und kritizistischen Tendenzen des Positivismus erfolgte im späten Abschnitt der Schule der Ausgleich mit der wilhelminischen Entwicklung.[3]

Obwohl eine der bedeutendsten Schriften Medveczkys, *Herder als Vorgänger Darwins und der modernen Naturphilosophie* noch das Produkt des österreichischen geistigen Reifeprozesses ist, reiht sich der Autor mit diesem Werk in die in Deutschland um den Darwinismus entbrannten ideologischen

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[2] Endre Kiss: *A k.u.k. világrend halála – Bécsben* (Das Ende der k.u.k. Weltordnung – in Wien), Budapest 1978
[3] K.C. Köhnke: *Die Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus. Die Universitätsphilosophie zwischen Idealismus und Positivismus*, Frankfurt 1986

Kämpfe ein. Im gegenwärtigen Zusammenhang ist das Werk deshalb von Bedeutung, weil es unter anderem entscheidende Elemente der später von Medveczky umrissenen Konzeption über den Menschen der anthropologischen Philosophie beinhaltet. Auf den Spuren Herders, Haeckels und Darwins erachtet er – im Gegensatz zur traditionellen biblischen Schöpfungsgeschichte und dem anthropozentrischen Weltbild - den Menschen als eine sich historisch ergebende spontane Schöpfung der Natur. Daher stammt auch die Ansicht, laut welcher die Voraussetzungen menschlicher Erkenntnis und Taten, ihre Gesetzmässigkeiten und Grenzen, letztendlich in ihrem natürlichen Ursprung verborgen liegen. Sowohl Philosophie als auch Ethik Medveczkys weisen also anthropologische Voraussetzungen auf.

Er ist noch nicht einmal 24 Jahre alt, als er den Systementwurf seiner Philosophie publiziert, die *Grundlegung der kritischen Philosophie. Prolegomena zu einer anthropologischen Philosophie* (Leipzig 1879). Im grossen und ganzen ist dies der Zeitpunkt der langwierigen Platz- und Aufgabensuche der Philosophie nach der Niederschlagung der 48er Revolutionen und des Zerfalls Hegelscher Traditionen. Wie uns bekannt ist, hat die Philosophie gemäss seines Programmes der Rückkehr zu Kant der Spekulativität zu entsagen und auch der Absicht der Errichtung eines metaphysischen „Luftschlosses". Im Zeichen der Kantschen Wissenschaftlichkeit und unter ihrer Obhut können sich die Wissenschaften (befreit vom kirchlichen Einfluss) frei entwickeln, während durch die Festlegung der Grenzen der Erkenntnis die unterschiedlichen materialistischen Strömungen „zur Metaphysik degradiert" werden.

Hinsichtlich der skizzierten Situation ist das philosophische Programm Medveczkys ein paradigmatisches. Wir können ihn sozusagen als kritischen Positivisten bezeichnen. Das bedeutet in seinem Falle den Versuch der Abstimmung der metaphysischen Kritik und des Kantschen Kritizismus mit den wissenschaftlichen Ergebnissen des 19. Jahrhunderts – die fachwissenschaftliche Ergänzung Kants. Der Denker versucht, eine „wissenschaftliche Philosophie", eine anthropologisch-kritische Philosophie zu schaffen. Sein System erachtet er insofern als eines von wissenschaftlichem Anspruch, dass er ihm ein immanentes, anthropologisches Fundament zu geben wünscht: die kritische Anthropologie gestaltet sich damit als philosophische Grundwissenschaft zu einer, die auf Subjekte von Erkenntnis und Handeln, auf die kritische Untersuchung der menschlichen Natur - d.h. Voraussetzungen, Gesetzmässigkeiten und Grenzen der theoretischen und praktischen Tätigkeit des Menschen eingeht. Denn allein aufgrund der Gesetze der menschlichen Natur sind Kenntnis und Handeln (moralisches Handeln) erklärbar. Auf diese Weise gestaltet sich Medveczkys (Kant ergänzende) Philosophie in erster Linie zur „Kenntnis des Wissens", mit anderen Worten zu einer Wissens- und Wissenschaftstheorie. Er wünscht, der Kantschen Erkenntnistheorie mittels der Wahrnehmungs-Psychologie eine

fachwissenschaftliche Basis zu verschaffen. Er ist überzeugt davon, dass wir keine absolute Philosophie schöpfen können, sondern nur eine menschliche. Mit anderen Worten: die psychologischen Gesetzmässigkeiten menschlicher Natur und Konstitution determinieren Qualität und Grenzen unserer Kenntnisse. „Es gäbe für unser Wissen – so schreibt er – keine andere reale Welt, als die empirisch wahrhaftige."

Nach einigen Jahrzehnten hingegen exemplifiziert Medveczky mit dem wiederum aktualisierten Pascal seine eigenen, sich nicht mit den praktischen Kenntnissen zufriedengebenden spekulativen Grübeleien über metaphysisches Allwissen, den aus der Skepsis zur Gewissheit des konfessionellen Glaubens führenden Weg. Die in extensivem und intensivem Sinne verstandene Ausweitung der modernen fachwissenschaftlichen Forschungen hat in der Geschichte der Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts zahlreiche Wenden mit sich gebracht. In den Mittelpunkt des Interesses traten derzeit in erster Linie die erkenntnistheoretisch-wissenschaftstheoretisch-logischen Probleme, weniger Aufmerksamkeit widmete man dem traditionelleren Problemkreis, den Fragen der Moralphilosophie. Gegenüber dieser als einseitig und ordnungswidrig angesehenen Entwicklung formulierte Medveczky die Notwendigkeit der Erarbeitung einer neuen, wissenschaftlichen Ethik. Dies ist seiner Meinung schon deshalb nötig, weil das wissenschaftliche Weltbild der modernen Epoche den Beweis für die Unhaltbarkeit zuvor konstruierter ethischer Systeme erbrachte. Die praktische Seite seines philosophischen Systems ist die sogenannte anthropologische Ethik, „deren Gegenstand die Prinzipien der Naturlehre vom menschlichen Willen und Handeln sind". Die anthropologische Philosophie also stellt in Medveczkys Programm eine Synthese der theoretischen und praktischen Seite dar, bei der es sich um eine den ganzen Menschen betreffende Wissenschaft handelt. Er schreibt: „Die Ethik sollte den *ganzen* Menchen berücksichtigen, ihn mit allen seinen tatsäschlichen Eigenschaften überprüfen, mit seinen realen Interessen und Zielen; so, wie wir ihn in der Gesellschaft, in kleineren oder grösseren Gemeinschaften mit anderen zusammenarbeiten sehen. Die natürlichen Bedingungen der organishcen und der socialen Entwicklung dürfen nicht ignoriert werden. Metaphysische Voraussetzungen und Postulate, welche den sicheren Tahtbeständen und Ergebniss der Biologie, wie insbesondere der Psychologie und der Sociologie widerstreiten, sind entschieden zurückzuweisen."[4]

In den Schriften Medveczkys handelt es sich bei der anthropologischen Ethik, der wissenschaftlichen und sozialen Ethik um Synonyme. Er hat zwar keine eigenständige Ethik ausgearbeitet, doch kann aufgrund seiner umfangreichen (als Manuskript vorliegenden) Metaethik eine ethische Konzeption auf immanenter, positivistisch empirischer Basis rekonstruiert werden, welche teilweise

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[4] Medveczky-Bärenbach: „Einige Gedanken über Ziele und Wege der Ethik", *Unsere Zeit* 1886

angelsächsisch angeregt, sozial empfindsam ist, welche sich auf die in der Entstehung begriffenen Gesellschaftswissenschaften stützt und die Anzeichen einer kritischen Attitüde in sich birgt. Darüber hinaus wünscht er auch weiterhin in zahlreichen Punkten auf Kantsche Lösungen zurückzugreifen (siehe Normativität, Deontologismus, Allgemeingültigkeit). Er ist überzeugt davon, dass es erforderlich und möglich ist, das sich herausbildende ethische Vakuum auszufüllen. Erforderlich, weil die Gesellschaft neben theoretischen Kenntnissen erfüllbare Normen von dieser Welt nötig hat, auch deshalb, weil seiner Auffassung nach die geistigen Wissenschaften tatsächlich eine praktische, kritische Funktion haben. Hier wird auf ethische Prinzipien verwiesen: neben dem Sein nämlich muss auch das Sollen aufgezeigt werden.

Auf das moralphilosophische Denken Medveczkys haben sowohl der Ideenkreis der zweiten Aufklärung der Monarchie, Kant, Comte, Spencer als auch die gesellschaftlich-ethnischen Bestrebungen der Kathedersozialisten bzw. die Kämpfe der deutschen Sozialdemokratie eine starke Wirkung ausgeübt. Gesellschaftliche Gerechtigkeit, Suche nach dem sowie Dienst am Allgemeinwohl, die gleichzeitige Gewährung von Ordnung und Fortschritt – das sind jene Schlüsselworte, mit denen wir die Wertordnung unseres Philosophen am ehesten charakterisieren könnten. Ebenso wie seine mutige geistige Parteinahme für den Darwinismus, weist auch die theoretische Konfrontation mit den die modernen Gesellschaften durch Erschütterungen bedrohenden sozialen Problemen auf ein korrektes Denkverhalten hin (vgl. in diesem Zusammenhang seine Rezension zum Buch 'Geschichte und Lehre der deutschen Sozialdemokratie' von Franz Mehring, mit welcher er der geistigen Etikette der deutschen Wissenschaftselite praktisch den Handschuh ins Gesicht warf)[5]. Die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung der modernen Staaten vermag er ausschliesslich als evolutive inhaltliche Prozesse ohne revolutionäre Transformation anzuerkennen. Getreu seiner positivistischen Überzeugung kann die Auflösung gesellschaftlicher Widersprüche mittels Anwendung eines sachlichen Leitfadens, d.h. wissenschaftlicher Errungenschaften erzielt werden. Zwecks Vollstreckung der von oben angeregten Reform wirtschaftlicher, gesellschaftlicher und politischer Verhältnisse drängt er auf eine wissenschaftliche Analyse erwähnter Sphären – und seiner Auffassung gemäss gab es erfolgende Kritiken sowie deren Überwindung aufgrund ethischer Ideale und Prinzipien. Ethische Forschungen erfolgen seinerseits immer im Einklang mit Nationalökonomie, Sozialökonomie, Politikwissenschaft, Sozialpolitik usw. Diese Disziplinen sieht er als normative Wissenschaften, als Bestandteil der Wissenschaft von der Moral an, deren Ideale sowie prognostischen Ziele letztendlich ethische sind. Die vom modernen Staat anzuregenden sozialpolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Reformmassnahmen erachtet er als

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[5] Bärenbach: „Die Sozialwissenschaften in der Gegenwart", *Unsere Zeit* 1869

Fürsorge hinsichtlich allgemeiner menschlicher Intersssen, als eine dem allgemeinen Fortschritt, dem Frieden und der kulturellen Entwicklung dienende moralische Pflichterfüllung, als Massnahme, welche Wohlstand und progressiven Fortschritt sowie die Freiheit der ganzen Gesellschaft, der Gesamtheit, zur Folge hat. Voller Überzeugung bekennt er: an die Stelle einer gewaltsamen Lösung gesellschaftlicher Probleme hat der moderne Staat mit friedlichen Mitteln zu greifen: mittels einer gerechteren Güterverteilung und sozialpolitischer Rechtssprechung muss gesellschaftlichen Revolutionen vorgebeugt werden (Hinweis auf das revolutionäre Programm von Marx und seiner Anhänger).

Im Schaffen Medveczkys mangelt es am Nachweis der auf modernen, wissenschaftlichen Fundamenten ruhenden These der normativen gesellschaftlichen Ethik vom „nicht nur Notwendigen sondern auch Möglichen". Er gelangte nur bis zur umfassenden Erörterung des methodisch-methodologischen Problems des „wie ist es möglich?". Ein Grund dafür ist, dass er erkennt: in seiner Epoche mangelt es noch an den die Exaktheit der Naturwissenschaften erreichenden Gesellschaftswissenschaften. Wie wir jedoch sahen, wünscht er sich bei der wissenschaftlichen Fundierung seiner Ethik auf eben jene zu stützen. Im gegenwärtigen Rahmen ist es unmöglich, die metaethischen Anschauungen Medveczkys in vollem Umfange aufzuzeigen. Für uns ist allein wesentlich, dass es sich bei der Ethik Medveczkys um eine „von der Absicht her" pflichtgemässe, kollektivistisch-altruistische Ethik handelt. Seine sozialethische Konzeption blieb ein Manuskript. Das von ihm gebotene progressive, wissenschaftlich anspruchsvolle und begründete, gesellschaftlich auf den Positivismus ausgerichtete sowie auch kritische Momente beinhaltende theoretische Modell (das mit seiner gesellschaftszentrischen Fragestellung der derzeitigen offiziellen ungarischen Philosophie vorauseilt) vermag bei uns nicht wirklich Fuss zu fassen. Die Epoche von Kálmán Tisza nämlich betrachten wir nicht allein als die der Festigung des Dualismus in Ungarn, sondern infolge der bestehenden politischen Realitäten auch als jene der Erstarrung des Systems. Die bedeutende Generation der Schöpfer von 1867 scheidet allmählich aus dem Leben oder zieht sich aus dem politischen Leben zurück. Zu dieser Zeit registrieren wir den Abschnitt des bedeutendsten Aufschwunges in der Geschichte der ungarischen Kapitalwirtschaft. Infolge der historischen Phasenverzögerung jedoch vertritt die offizielle Ideologie in Ungarn noch immer die „laissez faire"-Taktik des klassischen ökonomischen Liberalismus. Unter diesen Umständen ist die politische Impossibilität der Ethik Medveczkys offensichtlich. Ähnlich konnte in Ungarn die Verkündung der Notwendigkeit einer von Theologie und Metaphysik emanzipierten Moralphilosophie nicht populär sein. Eötvös, der programmgebende Politiker, verkündete die christliche Verbürgerlichung, darüber hinaus hat wohl die ethische Konzeption Medveczkys ganz gewiss die

konfessionell-moralische Überzeugung gemässigter Kreise der zeitgenössischen ungarischen Gesellschaft verletzt.

Das bei unserem Philosophen zu beobachtende positivistische Pathos, welches sich in dem in den Dienst des Fortschritts gestellten kritischen Verhalten, in der Hoffnung auf den vorwärtstreibenden sozialen Effekt der Gesellschaftswissenschaften und in einer säkularisierten Moralphilosophie manifestiert, macht sich erst Jahrzehnte später wieder im Lager der bürgerlichen radikalen Jugend bemerkbar. Bis dahin jedoch vergeht nahezu ein Vierteljahrhundert, und als dann zu Beginn des Jahrhunderts die junge Generation in Erscheinung tritt, finden ihre Bestrebungen wegen der grundlegend veränderten Anschauungen Medvedczkys schon keine Berührungspunkte mehr mit den seinen. Das Schicksal des Gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Vereins Anfang des Jahrhunderts liefert ein eklatantes Beispiel dafür, dass jene die Zukunft Ungarns betreffenden theoretischen Konzeptionen und die im Interesse ihrer Realisierung unternommenen konkreten politischen Schritte zur endgültigen Spaltung des ungarischen geistigen Lebens führen.

Diese ungarischen Krisenerscheinungen aus der Zeit um Jahrhundertwende-Beginn des Jahrhunderts, Fragen und Antworttypus der geistigen Sphäre jener Epoche ergaben sich nach und nach sowie unaufhaltsam teilweise aufgrund der Krise des westeuropäischen Liberalismus, entscheidend jedoch aus der 1867 hervorgerufenen historischen Situation. Auch ohne eine tiefgreifende Analyse des Problemkreises Ausgleich können wir konstatieren,· dass die ungarische Seite damit eine für lange Zeit nicht wiederkehrende Gelegenheit geboten bekam, im Interesse des Anschlusses an Europa umfassende Modernisierungsmassnahmen zu treffen. Neben den positiven Fakten der Entwicklung muss aber auch erwähnt werden, dass der ungarische liberale Adel mittels eines konservativen Kompromisses in den Besitz der Staatsmacht gelangte, und zwar hat man mit dem Absolutismus und der konservativen Aristokratie zu Lasten der emporstrebenden bürgerlichen demokratischen Kräfte und der Nationalitäten sein Abkommen getroffen. Der Ausgleich und damit der Fortbestand der Monarchie sowie später deren Beibehalt um jeden Preis waren für ihn praktisch in doppeltem Sinne von Lebenswichtigkeit. Einen grundlegenden Widerspruch barg jener Fakt in sich, dass in Ungarn solch intensive wirtschaftliche, demographische und gesellschaftliche Prozesse einsetzten, für welche ein äusserst eingeschränkter politischer Spielraum gewährleistet war. István Bibó konstatiert:"Ungarn erhielt zwar eine verantwortliche parlamentarische Regierung, jedoch mit der Bedingung, dass das Parlament jederzeit über eine solche Mehrheit verfüge, die den Ausgleich als für sich verbindlich anerkennt. In diesem Sinne also durften im Rahmen der Monarchie weder die eine umfangreichere oder absolute nationale

Unabhängigkeit, weder die eine gesellschaftliche Revolution noch die das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationalitäten Fordernden die Mehrheit erlangen."[6]

Dieses unsichtbare Statut des Ausgleichs (eigentlich das Oktoberdiplom) blieb für die nachfolgenden jungen Generationen eine rätselhafte Relation, deren Verfechter, wie z.B. den Kreis um István Tisza, man als verständnislos, störrisch und anachronistisch eingestuft hatte und denen man politisch nicht folgen konnte. Mit den liberalen Prinzipien der auf 1867 beruhenden Adelsführung also gingen friedlich Antidemokratismus, Nationalismus und sozialer Konservatismus einher. Die eigengesetzliche Entwicklung der beschleunigten Modernisierungsprozesse zur Zeit des Dualismus hat zum Beginn des Jahrhunderts die für eine konsequentere bürgerliche Entwicklung, die Schaffung eines Übergangs zur bürgerlichen Demokratie westeuropäischen Typs kämpfende junge Generation zu einer Konfrontation mit ungelösten Problemen gezwungen. Vollkommen zu Recht bezeichnet man sie als die zweite Reformgeneration. Bis 1910 erfolgt eine sich im wesentlichen als Kampf der Weltanschauungen präsentierende radikale Polarisation der gesellschaftlich-politischen Kräfte, weshalb nun endgültig die Gesamtheit der herrschenden Klassen des feudal-kapitalistischen „alten Ungarns" der demokratischen, sozialen Opposition der für ein „neues Ungarn" Kämpfenden gegenübersteht. Mit den Worten Oszkár Jászis gestaltet sich das Land zur Jahrhundertwende erstmals seit dem Ausgleich erneut zum Schauplatz tiefgreifender Kämpfe geistigen, weltanschaulichen und moralischen Charakters. István Tisza ist einer der bedeutendsten programmatischen Politiker und Ideologen des „alten Ungarn". Die markante Abweichung seines politischen Weltbildes und des allgemeinen geistigen Universums in Richtung Konservatismus verkörpert praktisch idealtypisch die geistige Strömung der sich um ihn scharenden, auf der 67er Basis beruhenden alten Liberalen Partei und der mit ihr sympathisierenden Angehörigen der Lateiner-Mittelklasse. Tisza wünscht in den sich zu Beginn des Jahrhunderts zuspitzenden weltanschaulichen Kämpfen auf die Mittel der geistigen Verteidigung zurückzugreifen. Er tritt sozusagen gegen jegliche Erscheinungsformen des modernen Geistes auf. Er steht den fortschrittlichen Kräften so gegenüber, wie der Traditionalismus dem Modernismus, so wie nationaler liberaler Kollektivismus versus Individualismus, Nationalisten und Kosmopoliten (sozusagen Antinationalisten), Glaubensmoral und Utilitarismus, Christentum und Atheismus, Wertabsolutismus und Relativismus, Weltanschauungsphilosophie und Positivismus, eine Art Westeuropäertum und Balkanismus.

Für die Reproduktion des ideologischen Programmes vom Grafen István Tisza mit Hilfe philosophischer Mittel sehen wir Beispiele in den späten Werken von Medveczky. Hier denke ich in erster Linie an die sogenannten Pascal-

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[6] István Bibó: *Válogatott tanulmányok* (Ausgewählte Aufsätze), Budapest 1986

Abhandlungen (1910) sowie die alljährlich von ihm als Präsidenten der Ungarischen Philosophischen Gesellschaft gehaltenen Eröffnungsreden. Letztere können praktisch als selbständige Studien aufgefasst werden.

Als Ziel und Zweck seiner Tätigkeit als Präsident und des Wirkens der Gesellschaft bezeichnet er das unverändert noch immer aktuelle Anliegen des Erweckens philosophischen Interesses, der Bildung des philosophischen Geistes sowie Hilfeleistung bei der Verbreitung der philosophischen Kultur. Ein ständig wiederkehrender Gedanke ist bei ihm das Ideal die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Philosophie, der Anspruch auf die sich gegenseitig befruchtende Zusammenarbeit von Philosophie und Fachwissenschaften. Als Beispiel erwähnt er Helmholtz, Fechner, Weber, Wundt, Mach und Ostwald. Seine nach 1910 formulierte Positivismuskritik entspricht vollkommen Rickerts Forderung nach der Befriedigung des Bedürfnisses einer philosophischen Weltanschauung. Seitens der auf „menschliche Probleme" eine Antwort suchenden, bei der Bestimmung von Zielen und Werten als Kompass dienenden Weltanschauungsphilosophie gerät er mit dem Standard der positivistischen Wissenschaftlichkeit in Konflikt. Laut Medveczky sind die philosophischen Fachwissenschaften dazu berufen, unsere theoretischen Ansprüche zu befriedigen, während die Philosophie als Weltanschauung metaphysischen Bedürfnissen dient. Jene neue Metaphysik, die er wie Kant als ein unaustilgbares Bedürfnis des menschlichen Verstandes bezeichnet, verweist er schon nicht mehr in den Zuständigkeitsbereich der Wissenschaft sondern des im allgemeinsten Sinne des Wortes aufgefassten Glaubens. Die Philosophie der Weltanschauung, sagt er, wird über den Kultus der hypothetischen Ideale hinaus auch weiteren ästhetischen, ethischen und konfessionellen Bedürfnissen gerecht: sie erfasst nicht nur die Welt der Fakten, sondern auch jene der Werte. In zahlreichen Präsidialansprachen Medveczkys kann die neukantianische Wertephilosophie und deren Wirkung nachgewiesen werden, für welche die Legitimation derzeit die Notwendigkeit der Versöhnung von Philosophie und Glauben bot. Ebenso zeugt seine Fakten und Werte voneinander trennende rechtsphilosophische Auffassung von derselben Wirkung (vgl. seinen Vortrag Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie). Seine Argumentation weist eindeutig nach, dass im ungarischen gesellschaftlich-politisch-geistigen Kontext nach 1910 die späten neukantianischen Bestrebungen objektiv antiprogressive Elemente in sich bargen.

Eines der hervorragendsten Beispiele seiner Modernitätskritik ist seine Eröffnungsrede als Präsident der Philosophischen Gesellschaft mit dem Titel „Unsere philosophischen Bedürfnisse und die ethische Renaissance", eben im Jahre 1910. Neben der Anerkennung der Bedeutung der Güter der Zivilisation diagnostiziert er darin die sogenannten „Gärungs- und Zerfallsprozesse" des geistigen Lebens der modernen Epoche: es ist die Rede vom an der Seelenkraft zehrenden beliebten Pessimismus, von der moralischen Dekadenz der modernen

Epoche, von einer modernen sophistischen Gedankenwelt, von der sich mit der Kenntnis der Fakten zufriedengebenden und moralischen Fragen gegenüber sich auf kenntnistheoretisch-logische Probleme konzentrierenden Bacon-Ära, vom die moderne Sophistik vorbereitenden Materialismus des 18.-19. Jahrhunderts, von der unwissenschaftlichen irrationalen Lebensphilosophie, vor allem jedoch vom zerstörerischen Genie Nietzsche. Es lohnt sich, an dieser Stelle daran zu erinnern, dass im grossen und ganzen zwischen 1910 und 1912 die Nietzsche-Rezeption in Ungarn zum Abschluss kam und das Verhältnis zu ihm, zum Individualismus, gleichzeitig einer der bedeutenden polarisierenden Faktoren der Konfrontation auf weltanschaulicher Ebene zum Beginn des Jahrhunderts ist. Mit seiner unbarmherzigen Attacke wünscht Medveczky vor allem, die das Absolutum relativisierenden Wirkungen der deutschen Denker auszugleichen. Damit wird er zum aktiven Beteiligten antiradikaler Gegenschläge der ungarischen Konservativen (Tisza–Herczeg–Prohászka–Hornyánszky). Er schreibt: „Haben wir den mittels des ethischen Subjektivisumus und Relativismus über den moralischen Skeptizismus in den Pfuhl des absoluten ethischen Nihilismus führenden, den mit dem Ideal des Übermenschen in Verbindung stehenden hemmungslosen Individualismus nötig oder eine Neuorientation zu Lebenstüchtigkeit und Anpassungsfähigkeit gegenüber den wohlproportionierten Akzeptanzauffassungen? Im Gegensatz zur die Welt des Altertums heraufbeschwörenden Renaissance verspüren wir die Notwendigkeit einer neuen ethischen Renaissance."[7] Diese neue ethische Renaissance wiederum vermag sich laut Medveczky aus der erhabenen Welt christlicher moralischer Ideale zu nähren, und zwar aufgrund des zur Bekämpfung egoistischer Veranlagungen Impulse gebenden Ideals, des Charitas-Ideals wegen. Er wünscht, den sich aus der Umwertung traditioneller Werte ergebenden ethischen Relativismus unter Berufung auf ein ursprünglich metaphysisches, universell gültiges, allgemein verbindliches moralisches Normensystem zu eliminieren.

Der bereits über Fünfzigjährige sucht erneut Antworten auf die ihn schon seit jüngsten Jahren beschäftigenden antropologischen Fragen: Was ist überhaupt der Mensch? Welcher Art und von welcher Reichweite sind seine Fähigkeiten? Wo ist sein Platz und welches sind seine Möglichkeiten in dieser Welt? Ist er fähig, seine ideellen Ziele aus eigener Kraft zu verwirklichen? Vermag er den ständigen Begleiter des menschlichen Seins, den Zweifel zu besiegen? Pascal zeigt mit seinen Gedanken die tragische Situation eines verlässliche Kenntnis und unerschütterlichen Glauben gleichermassen missenden Menschen auf, dessen sich daraus ergebende Skepsis und die Phasen des geistigen Kampfes zwecks Niederringung des Zweifels. Mit der aus vier Abschnitten bestehenden

[7] Medveczky: „Filozófiai szükségleteink és az etikai reneszánsz" (Philosophische Bedürfnisse und die ethische Renaissance, Eröffnungsrede 1910), *Magyar Filozófiai Társaság Közleményei* (Mitteilungen der Ungarischen Philosophischen Gesellschaft)

Studienreihe hat er ein Epochenbedürfnis befriedigt. Ein Zeichen dafür ist unter anderem, dass sein Buch zu Beginn des Jahrhunderts in Ungarn die Pascal-Renaissance einläutete.[8]

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[8] Zur Pascal-Renaissance zum Beginn des Jahrhunderts in Ungarn siehe Arbeiten von József Trikál, Gyula Kozáry, József Halasy-Nagy

# TAMÁS DEMETER*

## PRELIMINARIES OF A RESPONSE-DEPENDENT APPROACH FOR *PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS* 242

(*Abstract*: In this paper I intend to provide the preliminaries of an interpretation for one of Wittgenstein's most controversial paragraphs, namely section 242 in his *Philosophical Investigations*. The task will be accomplished by its response-dependent reading. I argue that the possession conditions of response-dependent concepts picks out the intertemporal and intersubjective basis on which our agreement required for communication can be built upon. Furthermore, I argue that response-dependence provides a suitable way for the demarcation of the judgements in which our agreement has to be granted and those in which we may differ. Thus I show how the response-dependent reading makes this vague paragraph available, and bridges the gap between collectivist and individualistic interpretations of Wittgenstein.)

This paper has a very restricted purpose. My aim is to achieve an understanding of section 242 in *Philosophical Investigations*. This attempt does not try to reconstruct its meaning in Wittgenstein's own terms, rather it tries to provide a conceptually clear and rigorous background to it, and argues that previous interpretations characteristically failed to provide substantial charcterization of the ideas involved in this paragraph. Although this attempt does not approach the paragraph in question with explicit contextual connections, regarding the whole work, in mind, the view it tries to advocate originates in certain Wittgensteinian ideas on the one hand, and (as I belive) certainly not foreign to Wittgenstein's spirit on the other.[1] The proposed view is not entirely new to the interpretations of Wittgenstein. Its components figures, to a greater or lesser degree, in various interpretations, but never in a full-blooded form.

Section 242 is clearly one of the most discussed paragraphs of the *Philosophical Investigations*. For my present purposes its relevant part goes like this: „If language is to be means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so." But, I ask to begin with, which judgements

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[1] The version of response-dependence I am to admit is very close to Philip Pettit's view; its development was inspired by the rule-following considerations and also has some other affiliations with Wittgenstein. Cf. Pettit (1990, 1991).

precisely? The thesis to be put forward in my paper is that there is a relatively simple reading of this and the related passages that presumably provides an opportunity for reaching a relaxed commonsense concerning the problems surrounding the paragraph's role, meaning and interpretation. My aim, in short, is to show how natural it is to read this passage with a response-dependent perspective in mind. Now, in order to render this thesis plausible, I shall develop my argument in three stages. First, I will construe the version of response-dependence which I myself subscribe to, but without going deeply into the details of the on-going debates concerning response-dependence; secondly, as for my main intention, I will give a response-dependent account of this passage; and thirdly, I will focus on how this picture presented here fits with one or another alternative pictures developed in the literature. Strictly speaking, my present aim is not primarily exegetical, thus my argument does not bear on extensive textual evidences, but, of course, I will illustrate, especially in the second section, my position with some quotes and references to Wittgenstein's texts. In this paper I intend to show that the problems addressed in this and some related paragraphs can be avoided, responded or solved by reference to response-dependence, or more precisely, there is absolutely nothing problematic in this paragraph, unless its notorious vagueness, because it merely points out a natural feature of our linguistic practice.

## I. Response-dependence

However novel a certain technical notion might be, it is a general experience that it usually has its own philosophical predecessor. This is the case with the notion of response-dependence too. Although the term itself was coined by Mark Johnston in 1989, the problem which it relates to was already manifested in Plato's dialogues. In *Euthypro* (10a) Socrates ask the question: Is something holy because the gods love it, or the other way round, the gods love it because it is holy? In some sense, as a consequence of the debate around response-dependence, our answer can be both, depending on our epistemic commitments – in spite of the fact that Socrates' voted for the latter one. In my understanding, the term 'response-dependent' characterizes those concepts which are biconditionally connected with how things appear to us, and this connection, as the theory holds, obtains there in an a priori and necessary manner.[2] How are we then to determine whether a concept, for example 'blue', is response-dependent? It must meet the following equation that

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[2] The status of the equation, namely its aprioricity and necessity (a question I shall not address here), is highly controversial. For example, cf. Johnston (1989, 1998), Menzies & Pettit (1993), Miscevic (1998).

$$(\forall x)(C \rightarrow (x \text{ is blue} \leftrightarrow (x \text{ looks blue to O}))$$

where „C" denotes the cognitively normal conditions, and „O" stands for a cognitively normal observer. Notice, that this equation requires mere normal conditions, and does not bear on ideal conditions; that is, it presupposes the lack of certain obstacles, but does not presuppose the existence of promoting circumstances. Its significance is obvious from the fact that it is very likely that we are practically never under ideal conditions, but at the same time it is also very likely that, given the reality of misrepresentation, we certainly must, at least sometimes, be under normal circumstances – although we may never be able to know when our conditions are normal anyway.[3]

According to the view I am advertising, response-dependent terms and the possession of the corresponding concepts are subject to certain psychological responses: the referents of those terms, say the properties picked out by them, evokes a disposition to belive that they are instances of a given property – at least under favourable cognitive conditions. Obviously, there is a possibility to formulate response-dependence in a strongly anthropocentric, or even subjectivist fashion: some qualities essentially involve reference to subjective responses without which they could not be intelligible; nothing can, for example, be nauseating or comfortable without connection to appropriate human responses. In this sense, in Johnston's sense, these qualities are „response-dispositional", and according to the orthodoxy they approximately correspond to what Locke called „secondary qualities," according to his dispositionalist interpretations (Johnston 1998).[4] Philip Pettit, agreeing with Johnston concerning the status of these secondary qualities, extends the range of reponse-dependence, and introduces the term „response-privileging" for picking out those concepts which represent a privileged mode of access, one which, under cognitively normal conditions, does not leave room for ignorance or error. This perspective excludes, by and large, the anthropocentric components, thus (in spite of the wider application of response-dependence) realism remains intact; as Pettit puts it: „people's responses do not shape certain things so that they fall under the concept of redness, they shape the concept of redness so that it falls upon those things" (Pettit 1991: pp. 622f).[5]

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[3] Fodor's explanation of misrepresentation (Fodor, 1990), i.e. his theory of asymmetric dependency exploits exactly this fact. My misrepresenting something is asymmetrically dependent upon previous correct representation: were there no correct representation under „normal conditions", misrepresentation would be impossible.

[4] Nevertheless, I beleive that there is a way of showing that some traditional secondary qualities are not response-dispositional. Color, for example, can be construed as a primary quality (cf. Jackson 1998), thus its response-dispositionalism can be challanged.

[5] There is a third view at issue in this respect. Crispin Wright argues for a specific „order of determination", i.e. he puts forward an anti-realist thesis according to which the biconditional should be read from right to left, thus: $(\forall x)(\forall w)$ (C → ((x looks blue to O) → x is blue), thus our judgements play an „extension determining" role. But I would not intend to compromise realism in this way; our judgements does not fix anything, not even determine their own extensions: if cognitively ideal observers under normal conditions judge that something is blue, then that is because its blue, and not the other way around. In Pettit's word I commit myself to „epistemic servility". Wright

Response-dependence, accordingly, can be formulated both in metaphysical and in epistemological manners. According to the first one, response-dependence would be a property of certain properties, while in the later case it would be associated primarily with concepts. Since response-dependence concerning properties has some uneasy corollaries (in case we are to apply it outside a very narrow category), I will develop my position with reponse-dependence as a property of concepts in mind. For example, if we took response-dependence as an inherent property of certain properties, realism's fading away would be inevitable. Properties taken to be response-dependent would manifest unseparable anthropocentric characteristics, thus our concepts would be filled in with anthropocentric content. For in this case the status of properties in the world could not be determined independently of us, we would have to accept that we are unable, in an epistemically relevant manner, to make any contact with how things really are. Nevertheless, if we construe response-dependence not for properties but for concepts it can have the merit of bypassing these difficulties. Concepts can be response-dependent insofar as they are response-dependently possessed and mastered, without any appeal to their content: what is crucial for response-dependent concepts is their possession conditions and not their conditions of application. Thus the process of getting acquinted with a property, the „geneology" of the corresponding concept should be kept in mind.[6] To put it in other words, and to summarize: response-dependence, as I appeal to it in this paper, is a thesis in epistemology and not in metaphysics.

As I mentioned above response-dependence of certain properties has a distinguished prehistory in philosophy, which doubtlessly deserves a short detour. Traditionally, Lockean secondary qualities, „which in truth are nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us by their primary Qualities" (Locke 1975: 2.8.10.), are usually said to be response-dependent in this sense.[7] Nevertheless, Locke has his own predecessors, namely Descartes and Galileo; they advocated a view of secondary qualities very similar to Locke's one. This tradition was taken up by Hume who developed a projectivist view for certain qualities whose category was somewhat broader than

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(1986) developed an interpretation of section 242 similar to mine, but his intentions are, of course, closer to his judgement-dependent standpoint than to the response-dependent one of mine.

[6] The two main representatives of this dichotomy between response-dependence construed for properties with anthropocentrism and for concepts without anthropocentrism are Mark Johnston (1989, 1998) and Philip Pettit (1991, 1998). In this reconstruction I followed their argument as well as I will mostly do in the same way in the remaining part of this paper. The distinction between application and possesion conditions is introduced by Peacocke (1992).

[7] Although Lockean secondary qualities are usually taken to involve subjects in a way primary qualities do not, perhaps it is possible to point out that even in Locke secondary qualities have a more complicated constitution than it is usually thought. (This is indicated by the phrase „by their primary qualities.") In this sense secondary qualities would be second-order, role properties; in a somehow close sense to Jackson (1998). The problem is for real, because e.g. Mark Johnston (1998: 6ff.) calls Locke's spirit without considering the relation and the possible strong connection between primary and secondary qualities. Anyway, this would be a project for another paper.

secondary qualities: „Vice and virtue [...] may be compared to sound, taste and color which, according to the modern philosophy, are not qualities in the object, but perceptions in the mind"; or, to give a more general formulation: „the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood: The latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects, as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: The other has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation."[8] However distinguished this history may be, my primary concerns are of concepts because response-dependence concerning properties cannot work outside a very restricted area,[9] and, in virtue of this peculiarity, response-dependence formulated for properties cannot serve my present purpose.

Now, how are we to get to master and possess a concept? The first step in learning is the reaction that, being exposed to instances of a given property, is evoked as a certain response in us which make the object's bearing that property saliently similar in my eyes, and this makes the property directly ostensible. Thus I get into the habit of responding, e.g. psychologically, in a certain way to the instances of the given property: „The examples make the property [...] salient and the concept is ostensively defined by reference to the examples" (Pettit 1991: p. 600). Then some restrictions are needed for the concept in order to be applicable in a variety of situations and to gain a relative stability: some corrections over the informations that sensations give have to take place in order to maintain the interpersonality and intertemporality of the concept. This process results in response-dependence as a global feature of semantically basic terms, that is those with which we get acquinted not in definitional but ostensive manner. Being all semantically basic terms response-dependent in the above characterized manner, it follows that all of our terms are either response-dependent, or, in the final definition, can be traced back to response-dependent terms – this thesis is called global response-dependence.

## II. Agreement as a Result of Response-dependence

Now my main intention is to make available section 242 by providing a background in a conceptually clear manner. The problem with our present paragraph can be condensed into the following three questions: How could we

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[8] Hume's quoted passages are of Hume 1978: p. 469; and 1962: Appendix 2: „Of Self-Love", p. 294. Johnston (1998) analyses Hume's projectivism and its preceeding tradition.
[9] Johnston in his recent article (1998) argues that manifest qualities cannot be response-dependent, thus he reduces its validity even within secondary qualities.

characterize these 'judgements'? What is the extension of this 'agreement'? How can logic remain untouched in this scenario? This last question can be understood as a subcase of the second one, nevertheless Wittgenstein considered it worthy for an independent remark, therefore I will also devote independent discussion to it.

II.1. These judgements are basic judgements in the sense that they are based on semantically basic terms, i.e. these judgements involves basic concepts which are, as we have seen, response-dependent: these judgements involves, in a sense, „the set of responses in which we agree" (Kripke 1982: p. 96). I belive response-dependence can provide a substantial characterization of these judgements: we agree in these judgements in virtue of the process of learning sketched above. The process consists of two components: of habits of responses and of practices of self-correction which certify that the (ostensively identified property and its corresponding) concept has characteristics common within the community. And, within this community, all that we can say about this property is pointing at its relevant examples (cf. also Z: 418 ff).

Of course, this seems to be a very minimalist program. As Duncan McFarland and Alexander Miller (1998) pointed out, this response-dependent account is not substantive in any relevant sense because it does not say anything about the differences between, e.g., colors. As the theory says:

(1) x is red if it causes normal perceivers in standard conditions to have experiences of redness.
(2) x is blue if it causes normal percievers in standard conditions to have experiences of blueness.
(3) x is yellow if it causes normal perceivers in standard conditions to have experiences of yellowness.

And so on. This is, of course, true. But from the present perspective it is a less defective feature of the picture. If we are to grasp a common component of those judgements by which our agreement is and has to be granted, then probably we would not be able to say anything deeper: for instance, the difference between two colors consists, on the one hand, in the dispositions evoked from which we find natural to extrapolate in different directions and, on the other, in the different corrections of the cues our sensations give. This account reveals the component which is crucial for the required agreement.

An objection could be raised whether these „basic judgements" are real judgements in the sense Wittgenstein intended. To support this objection, there should be a specified sense in which Wittgenstein used this notion. However, the task to identify the sense could hardly be accomplished, since he certainly did not used it as a term. In the *Philosophical Investigations* the word occurs only once again at the end of part XI, but in a very different context; he uses it more frequently in his *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (especially in part

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VI), but the context is predominantly logical and mathematical there. Furthermore, whether or not „basic judgements" correspond to the everyday use of „judgement" does not matter, because if one believed that it does not correspond to it, it is possible to reformulate my position in a manner in which basic judgements would be proto-judgements constituting higher-order judgements. These proto-judgements would thus not be judgements in the ordinary sense: they would not necessarily be in the form of a statement. This provides a possibility to avoid this terminological problem. To borrow David Chalmers's (1996: 174) definition, but not necessarily his corresponding theory: „We can think of a judgement as what is left of a belief after any associated phenomenal quality is subtracted." Of course, not just any belief, because we are talking about basic judgements. These beliefs must have a propostion as content which can be expressed by a recogniton statement involving basic concepts. In this sense judgements have propositional or quasi propositional form and relate to conscious experience: they are phenomenal judgements. A paradigmatic case is of colors; when I see something red, I am inclined to form the judgement: „This is red." Thus judgements can be seen as the primary vechiles of interpersonality and intertemporality: concepts with essential qualitative content are obviously private. The process of judgement formation as a collective act can be identified with the process of learning sketched at the end of the first part. This makes possible, to quote Wittgenstein, that e.g. „There is in general complete agreement in the judgements of colours made by those who have been diagnosed normal. This characterizes the concept of judgement of colour." (PI: II.xi, p. 227) Basic judgements are objective because they do not involve anthropocentric contents, thus the agreement in question can easily be attainible.

II.2. Our second, extension problem is derived from the fact that Wittgenstein in his famous remark did not qualify over the claim: „there must be agreement not only in definitions but also in judgements". If we take this sentence as a universal commitment, then we must conclude that there is no room for private opinion.[10] This alternative, however, is promptly excluded by the direct surroundings of section 242. Thus we have to look for a different reading, according to which we are able to specify the judgements in question. And since on the one hand there are judgements in which we have to agree in order to communicate, and on the other hand, there are other judgements in which we might not agree necessarily thus we need to provide criteria for the demarcation.

In a substantially similar paragraph, Wittgenstein himself makes it clear that he does not intend taking section 242 as a universal commitment: „[T]he

[10] J.C. Nyíri (1992) advocates this strange opinion. Comments based on thorough textual exegesis are provided in Neumer (1997).

phenomenon of language is based on regularity, on agreement in action. Here it is of the greatest importance that all the enormous majority of us agree in certain things. I can, for example, be quite sure that the colour of this object will be called 'green' by far the most of the human beings who see it. [...] We say that, in order to communicate, people must agree with one another about the meanings of words. But the criterion for this agreement is not just agreement with reference to definitions, e.g., ostensive definitions – but also an agreement in judgements. It is essential for communication that we agree in a large number of judgements." (RFM: VI 39) Besides requiring agreement in a restricted, however extended, set of judgements this passage shows the agreement's nature in connection with certain empirical facts, and the relevance of the empirical background is supported by the later part of section 242, where he points to the central role of the methods of measurement.

Obviously, agreement cannot be required in every particular empirical situation, from particle physics to brain research. According to our common experience, disagreement is usual in every discourse where there is some kind of substantive questions at issue. This provides the conclusion: the agreement is necessarily and also granted in questions which are non-substantive; „there are truths in every area of discourse whose acceptance or rejection is criterial for counting as a proper participant there: you must accept them – they are so obviously true – or you must reject them – they are so obviously false – if you are going to be held as someone who genuinely asserts and believes things in the discourse" (Pettit 1991: p. 593f). Basic judgements involving basic concepts are non-substantive; their response-priviledging character ensures that there is no room for ignorance or error about them. Basic judgements are, ceteris paribus, obviously true. They belong to the frame, consisting of ostensively defined and thus semantically basic terms to which our definitions are finally traced back.

The previous account makes available the fact that in this context the response-dependence of certain properties is useless. As we have seen, response-dependence is particular to all semantically basic terms. No version of response-dependence developed with regard to properties can be extended in the required sense: response-dependent properties cannot constitute the consensual basis for agreement bacause of their anthropocentric character. Only the process of learning, the fact that the corresponding concepts are possessed response-dependently, can ensure it. Directly about properties we are able to talk only in metaphysical manner; in order to specify the common background presupposed by communication we need a theory in epistemology. The theory of concepts which suggests that they supposed to be individuated by their possession conditions picks out response-dependent concepts, and explains why they are sufficient for a common interpersonal background of communication.

II.3. So, we have already characterized the extension of the required agreement, thus the answer to the third question is almost self-evident. Logic comes before judgements; as it is traditionally put: logic deals with form and has nothing to do with content, linguistic or mental. There is nothing in modus ponens which is based on anything semantical. Logical judgements are not basic in the sense that they do not involve semantically basic terms, and thus has nothing to do with their corresponding concepts. The agreement in judgements involving response-dependent terms arises from the character of such concepts, the fact that in their case there is no room for ignorance and error. It is senseless to require such prompt agreement concerning logical judgements because e.g. there certainly are people who do not, at the first sight, recognize that modus ponens is a valid form of reasoning.

A final question should be addressed to the response-dependent account of paragraph 242. Why can response-dependence be taken for granted as genuine consensual basis in the required sense for these judgements? A short answer would be that because response-dependence is a necessary fact about our semantically basic terms. But the fact that they are necesary for the theorist, one could object, does not guarantee that they are the same for the layman. Of course it does not. In fact, the biconditional describes and not prescribes the state of affairs and the theorist, fixing on the common habits and practices, concludes: the biconditional is a priori and necessary for us. Of course, there is a deeper explanation, which refers to the substantive/non-substantive distinction mentioned above. There should be a way, other than intuitive, in which it is possible to discriminate non-substantive and substantive judgements. Recognizing the reponse-dependence of some of our concepts provides a sufficient basis for this distinction. And at this time this is the only game in town.

To sum up: agreement is a corollary of response-dependence. Thus Wittgenstein's claim is not normative, but descriptive: given the reality of communication, we must agree in a large number of empirical judgements called basic judgements because they involve concepts formed via ostensive exemplification in virtue of natural psychological responses and collective habits of self-corrections, i.e. they are formed response-dependently. The process of learning guarantees the objectivity, i.e. interpersonality and intertemporality, of our judgements, and this serves as a stable basis for communication. Logic, on this account, remains untouched because logical judgements do not belong to the realm of reponse-dependence.

## III. Fitting with Other Interpretations

As I mentioned above, the response-dependent approach I developed on the previous pages is not exclusively new in the sense that its various components have already figured in previous interpretations. The following section is devoted to a short survey.

A celebrated interpretator of the section and its surroundings is Saul Kripke. As I see him, his interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations focuses almost exclusively on one side of the process of learning, namely on the role of community. As I tried to show, the process of getting to possess and master a concept is a twofold one; it consists of our individual responses and some self-corrections for the sake of objectivity. This second step can be seen as community-bound, but the first one is strictly individual. Kripke sees correctly that the substantive/non-substantive distinction is to be drawn with regard to the language game (or discourse as I called above). In every particular language game there are non-substantive judgements in which everyone who inteends to participate in the discourse has to agree: „One who is an incorrigible deviant in enough respects simply cannot participate in the life of the community and in communication." (Kripke, 1982: p. 92) However, he seems to disolve the first individual component in the second, possibly comunitarian one by connecting our responses to our form of life: „The set of responses in which we agree, and the way they interweave with our activities, is our *form of life*." (Kripke, 1982: p. 96) But the responses originate not in a sociological but in a more fundamental level. When I am presented something red and later again I do not need any criterion for deciding if it is the same, I just react the same way. (Cf. RFM: VII 40, and PI: 28) On this level there is no role for the community. Kripke's picture is predominantly community-centered: he sees community where there is no place for it. This is the point where Boghossian and McGinn attacked Kripke's interpretation: „if I can be taken in by a deceptively horsey looking cow on a dark night, what is to prevent 17.000 people just like me from being taken in" (Boghossian, 1989: p. 536).[11] Our immediate responses do not fall under the influence of community.

Patricia Werhane is trapped in a similar scenario, but her picture is strictly individualistic – a counterpart of Kripke's account. In her account, our agreement lies in „the prior similarity of response to certain stimuli. What is implied is that because there is a basic similarity in our reactions, one understands the expressions and movements of others, and hence means of communication in the form of language can develop." (Werhane, 1992: p. 182) This picture

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[11] As McGinn argues, community can serve such explanatory purposes only in case the members of community react in the sufficient way. (McGinn 1984: p. 184f.)

presupposes that there is a basic similarity, almost identity in our responses, thus our concepts are substantially interchangeable. According to the picture I was to drawn above, interpersonality is a result of our general practice of self-correction, and at this level community can play a significant role. But it seems to be unjustified to presuppose that our responses are basically (e.g. biologically) similar. An obvious counter evidence is the case of red-blindness or color-blindness. A red-blind person certainly has very different responses to the property of redness, but in virtue of certain self-corrections she can develop some access to the general concept of redness. As Wittgenstein put it: „What determines our judgement, our concepts and reactions, is not what ONE man is doing NOW, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action. [...] Seeing life as a weave, this pattern [...] is not always complete and is varied in a multiplicity of ways. But we, in our conceptual world, keep on seeing the same, recurring with variations. That is how our concepts take it. For concepts are not for use on a single occasion." (Z: 567f) These paragraphs, on the one hand, summarizes my position; and, on the other, points out the common mistake of individualistic and collectivist interpretations. Individualists do not care about the fact that the possession conditions of a given concept involves social factors; collectivists leave another fact unnoticed, namely that there are a „multiplicity of ways" in which we respond to the weave of life. The response-dependent background provides a plausible compromise.[12]

[*Abbreviations of Wittgenstein's Works:*
PI – Philosophical Inestigations, Oxford: Blackwell 1967
RFM – Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Oxford: Blackwell 1978.
Z – Zettel, Oxford: Blackwell 1967]

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[12] David Bloor in his recent book (1997: p. 152 n2) divides the participants of the on-going rule-following debate in two groups according to their methodological commitments. Thus there are a group for individualists and collectivists, and he is inclined to put Philip Pettit in the first group. Pettit (1990) argues for a response-dependent account of rule following, and does not intend to interpret Wittgenstein. But as I tried to show in this paper it is false to interpret response-dependence as an individualistic approach. Thus Bloor's categorization seems to be unjust.

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GÁBOR FORRAI[*]

# NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES[**]

(*Abstract*: The notion of a conceptual scheme is often used when trying to explain why certain ways of thought strike us as odd. However, it has been repeatedly criticized, for it is alleged to rest on various philosophical errors. The purpose of this paper is to defend it. Section I reviews the recent history of the notion, focusing on the developments which have led to its demise. In Section II a new way of understanding the notion is suggested. The core idea is that conceptual schemes are not inherent properties of systems of language use, but presuppose the juxtaposition of different systems. Section III puts some constraints on what is worth calling a conceptual scheme. In Section IV it is shown that the revised notion is free of the shortcomings of its predecessor and that it gives no support to the sort of cultural relativism which is often associated with the notion of a conceptual scheme.)

The notion of a conceptual scheme can be used in many different contexts and for many different purposes. The sort of use which will be examined here can perhaps be called the „hermeneutic use". In this use the context is the interpretation of an alien way of thinking, and the purpose is the explanation of radical congnitive differences. The typical examples could be Malinowski trying to understand the Trobriand islanders, Whorf grappling with the intricacies of the Hopi tense system, or Kuhn studying some long forgotten scientific text. Suppose that the student of an alien culture finds that the people he studies seem to hold beliefs which are not just false, but also extremely odd, or even crazy. He may then either conclude that his subjects are somehow liable to gross mistakes or decide that the oddity is perhaps more apparent than real. In the latter case the appearance of oddity calls for an explanation. If the subjects are quite sensible, how come their ways seem so weird? It is at this point that the notion of a conceptual scheme can be invoked: the subjects' conceptual scheme is different from that of the interpreter. The concepts expressed by the aliens' words differ from those of the interpreter, and the apparent oddity is due to the fact that this was not realized initially. Once the aliens' conceptual scheme is explored in depth and the first tentative interpretation is revised in accordance with the findings, the weirdness evaporates. Of course,

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weirdness evaporates. Of course, this does not mean that the interpreter is bound to end up in full agreement with the people he interprets. Weirdness is one thing, falsehood is another. The interpreter may come to attribute his subjects beliefs which are false but not weird.[1]

What is it about the notion of a conceptual scheme that makes it look suitable for this explanatory role? To answer this question we have to see what the noton involves. First of all, the notion implies a distinction between the conceptual scheme and its content. The content is something neutral, something which is not affected by the human cognitive process. It is usually identified either with the physical environment human beings have to cope with or with the sensory input to the cognitive processes, the 'stimuli'. The task of the conceptual scheme is to structure the content by provididng a system of individuation and classification. It supplies criteria for answering questions like „Is this the same as that?" or „Are these of the same kind?". The scheme is not a fully-fledged description. It is more like a vocabulary, in terms which various descriptions can be couched. People sharing a conceptual scheme may disagree about matters of fact. Therefore, the conceptual scheme should also be distinguished from the fully-fledged descriptions, which I shall call „theories".

Given this rough characterization of the idea of a conceptual scheme, it is easy to understand why the idea can be employed to account for the apparent oddity of certain ways of thinking. The set of concepts which are readily available to the interpreter does not match the concepts used by his subjects. In the beginning the interpreter may not realize this. As a result, he identifies the alien concepts with those concepts of his own which are the most similar to them. Consequently, some of the aliens' claims come out as weird. Suppose, for example, that the people under interpretation have a concept A, the interpreter has no exact counterpart of this, and the most similar concept he has is B, which is narrower than A. If the interpreter is not aware of this difference, he will find that the people he studies are somehow liable to false generalizations. Once the conceptual difference is identified, we get an explanation of why the people under study seemed initially hasty in their generalizations, and it also becomes clear that they are, in fact, not that hasty.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the notion of a conceptual is clear and coherent enough to be put to this sort of hermeneutic use. Section I reviews the process which led to the demise of the logical positivists' notion. Section II, the core of the paper, suggests a revised notion. Section III adds some minor details. Section IV shows that the revised notion is free of the

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[1] This shows that the hermeneutic use of the notion of conceptual scheme, as it was described, is by no means committed to cultural relativism.

difficulties that plagued the logical positivists' notion and that it is not committed to the sort of cultural relativism which is often associated with the notion.

# I

The most sophisticated account of conceptual schemes in our century are due to the logical positivists, especially to Carnap (1950). They did not wish to put the notion to hermeneutic use. Their purpose was epistemological, the rational reconstruction of knowledge, especially of scientific theories. Their reconstructions were intended to lay bare the structure of knowledge and its evidential basis. They noticed that the same body of knowledge can be reconstructed in different ways. One may choose which terms to treat as primitive and which ones as defined terms, which system of logic to use, one may also choose between a phenomenalistic and a physicalistic language, etc. The idea of multiple reconstructibility lead to the idea of a plurality of conceptual schemes or „linguistic frameworks" (Carnap 1950). The conceptual scheme is the basic conceptual apparatus of the reconstruction. It is distinct both from content and theories. The same content, i. e. the same body of observations can be captured by different conceptual resources, and the same conceptual resources can be used for the reconstruction of conflicting theories.

They considered scientific knowledge as a two-level structure. The lower level is that of observation, the upper level is that of theory. Observations – or rather possible observations – are what theories are about: they constitute the content of scientific descriptions. They are completely independent of theories and, therefore, neutral between them. Consequently, they can serve as arbiters between rival knowledge-claims. The language of science has certain expressions which stand for observations: the observational terms. However, it is impossible to express our knowledge solely in these terms. Purely observational descriptions would be immensely complicated and would have little explanatory and predictive power. So we need theoretical terms as well. These are to be introduced by „coordinative definitions" or „correspondence rules", which link them to the observational vocabulary. These rules are linguistic conventions. They tell us how the theoretical terms are to be used. Consequently, they are analytic. If two theories employ the same theoretical terms, they belong to the same conceptual scheme. So a conceptual is a set of theoretical terms. Since theoretical terms are introduced by correspondence rules, this point may also be expressed by as follows: a conceptual scheme is a set of linguistic conventions, i. e. a set of analytic sentences. What distinguishes between the theories employing the same scheme is that they contain different synthetic sentences – i. e. they use the theoretical vocabulary for making different, or even incompatible claims. The

content of the scheme is the set of observations in terms of which the theoretical terms are introduced.

So the logical positivists' epistemological ideas provided solid foundations for the threefold distinction bwtween scheme, theory and content. The observational – theoretical distinction served to set apart pure content. The analytic – synthetic or conventional – factual distinction distinguished between scheme and theory.

However, this notion did not reign long. It began to disintegrate even before it was explicitly formulated. By the time Carnap coined the term „linguistic framework" he was already aware that certain correspondence rules, namely the conditional definitions called „reduction sentences" cannot all be analytic (1936-37). But the first major blow was delivered by Quine's critique of the analytic – synthetic distinction (1951). Quine agrees with the logical positivists in holding that knowledge includes both factual and conventional elements, but maintains that the two cannot be neatly separated. There are no sentences which are exclusively conventional, i. e. whose only function is to assign meaning to certain terms. All sentences are both conventional and factual, so there is no distinction between analytic and synthetic. With the fall of the distinction it has become impossible to distinguish between scheme and theory. There cannot be different or rival theories utilizing the same conceptual scheme. Rather, each theory has its own scheme. Let me illustrate this with the case of change in knowledge. The logical positivists had no trouble to decide whether a change is conceptual or merely theoretical. If one replaces some analytic sentences, i. e. some linguistic conventions, this results in a new conceptual scheme. If the replaced sentences are synthetic, that amounts to change in theory. Once the analytic – synthetic distinction is renounced, the distinction between conceptual and theoretical change collapses. Each sentence both contributes to the meaning of terms and expresses something factual. So the replacement of sentences changes both the conceptual apparatus and the theory.

The second major blow came from Kuhn (1962), Hanson (1958), Feyerabend (1962) et al., who challenged the observational – theoretical distinction. They claimed that mental representation does not have a basic level which contains nothing more than information from the senses. In experiencing we are both active and passive. Passive in the sense that we receive something from outside, and active because we mold and shape this input through concepts. What the critics of pure observation and raw experience claimed is that these two aspects cannot be separated in an epistemologically interesting way. The most basic level we can have access to is already conceptualized. There may be deeper layers, way bellow the reach of consciousness, but these are epistemologically

inert, i. e. they cannot be cited as evidence.[2] If there is no raw experience, there is no pure content. Hence, the distinction between content and scheme collapses too. Instead of being neatly separated, content, scheme and theory have now come together into an amorphous whole. Different schemes cannot share one and the same content: each of them has its own.

These developments leave us with two options. One is Rorty's program of „loosing the world" (1972), which goes as follows. Both everyday thinking and the philosophical tradition is permeated with the idea that there is a distinction between the world and our representations of it. The representations are true if they are faithful to the world. Once we abandon naive realism, the view that we have some sort of direct access to the world, the scheme – content distinction becomes a promising way of elaborating on this idea: even though we cannot have knowledge except through representations, there is a level of representation – the observational level – which is directly controlled by the world. Rorty suggests that whole idea of representing the world should be discarded. The truth value of representations is not decided by confronting them with the world. Rather, we should start from the fact that we have theories and methods for adjudicating between them. The world is simply what our best theories say. In Rorty's view what we should conclude from the history of the notion of conceptual scheme is that the notion is just as bankrupt as the representational picture of which it is a part. It does not have to be revised. It must be forgotten.

The other option is to retain the representational picture and put up with the recent developments. Scheme and content cannot be sorted out, the representation cannot be distinguished from the represented. A change in our picture of the world is, therefore, a change in the world. People committed to different schemes are dealing with different worlds. So when Kuhn says that „after the revolution scientists are reacting to a different world" (1970, 111) or that „the scientist afterward works in a different world" (ibid. 121), he is not just using bad metaphors. Rather, as an adherent of the idea of conceptual schemes who has rejected the distinctions upon which the idea was based, he is compelled to say this – even though in the final analysis, he does not want these sentences to be taken literally. Goodman, however, does not shy away from this conclusion: „I am afraid that my remarks about conflicting truths and multiple actual worlds may be passed over as purely rhetorical. They are not." (1978, 110)

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[2] There were other criticisms as well. Sellars (1963) accepts sense-data only as theoretical concepts and insists that they cannot play the epistemological role of providing foundations for knowledge. Quine (1960) also has something which may be regarded as the physicalistic counterpart of sense-data, „retinal irradiations" or „surface irritations", but he denies that these can serve as foundations. He maintains that language has no primitive layer to describe these.

## II

I suggest that the notion can be preserved without paying this intolerable ontological price. In order to do that we must give up an idea which was taken for granted throughout the history of the notion, the idea that the conceptual scheme is an inherent feature of a system of language use. According to this idea the distinctions which support the threefold distinction between scheme, content and theory are simply there in the system and do not presuppose anything outside that. The sentences of the system just belong to the categories observational vs. theoretical and conventional vs. factual, and their membership in these categories does not depend on anything else apart from the speakers' linguistic behavior. In contrast with this, I shall argue that a conceptual scheme is a relational property of a system of language use. Conceptual schemes presuppose the juxtaposition of different systems. A system of language use does not simply „embody" a conceptual scheme. It does so only in relation to another system of language use. The notion of conceptual scheme makes sense only if we look at the system of language use from an external perspective, the perspective of an interpreter, whose linguistic habits are different from those of the people he tries to understand.

I shall use a toy example by Putnam (1987, 17-21) to explain the idea. Let us assume that the universe is a small and boring place, but Bill and Sue have different stories to tell about it.

Bill's story: There are three objects, one is red, the other is blue, the third is green.

Sue's story: There are seven objects, which are respectively red, blue, green,                                                                                     red and blue, red and green, blue and green, and red and blue and green.

Suppose they meet each other. Initially they will be puzzled, but very soon they will be able to explain the apparent disagreement with the help of the notion of conceptual scheme. Bill realizes that Sue's first three objects correspond to his, and her other four objects are just the various composites formed out of these three objects. He summarizes this as follows:

(SB)    By „object" Sue means objects and their composites.

Thus he discovers that Sue's use of the word 'object' follows a convention that differs from his own. However, he would deny that there is factual disagreement between them. Then along comes Mary, who tells yet another story:

Mary's story: There are three objects: a red one, a blue one, and a red and blue one.

Suspecting that Mary might not have seen the green object yet, Bill can make sense of Mary's story in the same way as he did in Sue's case. However, he adds that Mary's story is not absolutely correct, since she is ignorant of an object („four objects" – in her own idiom). So he construes her story as differing from his own both conceptually and factually, and agreeing with Sue's story conceptually, but not factually.

In this situation the threefold distinction between content, scheme and theory makes perfect sense. Sue and Mary have the same conceptual scheme but have different theories, i. e. they disagree about the facts. Bill does not share their conceptual scheme, but the content he is trying to capture is the same. But what we have here is a contrast between different ways of thought. Sue's conceptual scheme emerges only as a result of Bill's attempt to interpret what she says. This becomes clear if we have a closer look at (SB), in terms of which Bill describes Sue's conceptual scheme. (SB) is not a sentence in Sue's language: it is formulated in Bill's language, which serves as the metalanguage for the description of Sue's language. What makes it possible for Bill to sort out the conventional elements of Sue's story is that his language is different from hers. This is quite natural. Conventions are usually identified only when they are contrasted with other conventions. Of course, Sue knows very well that her language is conventional in the sense that her words are not „natural signs" in the sense in which smoke is a natural sign of fire. But knowing that there are conventions is much less than knowing what the conventions are. It is this latter kind of knowledge which Sue lacks. When asked what conventions her use of the word 'object' follows, she can only reply „By 'object' I mean objects". This is not informative at all, since when asked about his own language use, Bill would utter the very same words. Perhaps Sue could improve her reply by pointing at some of the things she calls 'objects'. In this way she could convey more about her use of the word. Yet, this would rather be an illustration of the convention, not an explicit statement of it. The point is that to be able to single out the conventions, one has to notice differences. But there are no differences within a single system of language use. So one has to look from outside.[3]

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[3] This is an oversimplification. Our language is not homogeneous and may well consist of different, relatively self-contained subsystems. If it is so, one may occasionally analyze the conceptual scheme of a particular subsystem by contrasting it with another subsystem. Consider these examples: the explanation of 'grue' and other bent predicates in terms of our normal predicates, the explanation of the ontology of enduring substances in terms of the ontology of temporal parts, the various reductions of arithmetics to set theory. What are contrasted in these cases are not complete languages, but parts of the same language. However, if the notion of a conceptual scheme were applied in such cases that would not really be hermeneutic use, for it would not be meant as an account of apparent oddity.

It follows from the relational conception of conceptual schemes that the same conceptual scheme can be described differently by different interpreters. To see this, let us consider Joe, who would describe the world in this way.

Joe's story: There are three eternal, indestructible objects: Red, Blue, and Green, each of which has destructible spatio-temporal parts. As it happens, we only know of one part of each of the objects.

So Joe's 'objects' are qualities, and what he calls 'spatio-temporal parts' are instances of these qualities, i. e. objects. Now if Joe were to interpret Sue's story, he would attribute her the following conceptual scheme:

(SJ)     By 'object' Sue means spatio-temporal parts and their combinations.

Of course, (SJ) is verbally different from (SB). But what else can we say? We cannot say that Sue has two different conceptual schemes. First, because (SB) and (SJ) are formulated in different languages – in Bill's and Joe's --, so their verbal difference does not necessarily signal disagreement. Second, because there is indeed no disagreement here. To understand this, imagine that Bill meets Joe prior to meeting Sue. After learning how to communicate with each other, Joe tells Bill about a woman whose language is different form theirs, and describes her language use by (SJ). Given the translation rules from Joe's language to Bill's, Bill is able to describe the mysterious woman's language in his own idiom, and what he comes up with is exactly (SB). So when he meets Sue, he will find that she talks the same way as the woman Joe told him about. Since Bill's direct interpretation of Sue agrees with his indirect interpretation through Joe's interpretation, we cannot say that Joe and Bill attribute Sue different conceptual schemes.

In light of this it may be tempting to say that what the two descriptions describe is one and the same conceptual scheme. So someone's conceptual scheme would be analogous to a person's (exact) height.[4] Height is an inherent property, which, however, can only be expressed in relational terms. When we say of someone that he is 6 feet tall, we relate his height to a standard unit. When we say that he is 183 cm tall, we use another standard unit. But one cannot conclude from this that height is a relational property. Similarly, one might be tempted to say that conceptual schemes are inherent, even though they can only be described in relational terms, i. e. by expressing their relations to other linguistic systems. I suggest, however, that we should resist the temptation to view things in this way. I believe conceptual schemes are truly relational just as 'taller than' is. Of course,

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[4] I say 'exact' to rule out descriptions like 'tall' or 'short', which would spoil the example.

relational descriptions like „Joe is taller than Bill" are true or false in virtue of the inherent properties the two people have, namely their height, but this does not make 'taller than' into an inherent property. In a similar way, a description of someone's conceptual scheme in the language of another person is a relational description. This relational property too is grounded in inherent properties: the two people's linguistic behavior. By 'linguistic behavior' I mean the utterances and the conditions under which they are produced.[5] Descriptions of linguistic behavior are relational, because they presuppose a metalanguage. Consider „When she saw the rabbit, she said 'Gavagai'" or „Wenn er den Hase sah, sagte er 'Gavagai'". The descriptions are relational, because they link a particular linguistic behavior to different systems of language use, English and German. But the fact they capture, the fact about linguistic behavior, is not relational. But just as being grounded in inherent properties does not make 'taller than' non-relational, being grounded in linguistic behavior does not make conceptual schemes non-relational.

This was just the exposition of the relational view, not an argument for it. I have not explained yet why 'taller than' is the correct analogy for conceptual schemes rather than 'height'. To see this we have to consider first the following question. How can we determine the nature of the difference between two theories? How can we decide whether the difference is conventional, factual or both? The answer is implicit in the earlier discussion, and it has also been discussed thoroughly by Davidson. The crucial idea is charity: we should presuppose that we are in fundamental agreement with the person whose linguistic behavior we are interpreting. We should presuppose that most of her beliefs are true, most of the things she desires are indeed desirable, most of her inferences are valid, she acts mostly in accordance with her beliefs and desires, etc. Davidson's argument for charity is that without it there would be no constraint on interpretation, since the attribution of propositional attitudes and the assignment of meanings could be adjusted to each other in indefinitely many ways. For example, if a Quinean jungle-dweller says „Gavagai" when a rabbit appears, there would be nothing to prevent us from attributing her the belief that there is a tiger and construing her sentence as meaning that there is a tiger.

However, charity is not a strict enough constraint to eliminate all but one interpretations: it leaves us with several possible interpretations. There are two reasons for this. First, charity is not a single principle but a set of different principles. Sometimes the different principles conflict. Suppose that the interpretation is already well under way, i. e. we already know much about the alien's propositional attitudes and we have deciphered much of her language. Then the alien draws a conclusion which is unacceptable. Suppose further that we

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[5] Roughly those things which a Davidsonian radical interpreter would have access to.

are fairly confident that we did not misunderstand the conclusion. In this case we may do two things. We either assign such meanings to the premises that they come out false and regard the argument as valid, or construe the premises as true and accuse the alien of logical error. Either way, we have to suspend a principle of charity, the principle of believing the truth or the principle of obeying the laws of logic. Or, to consider another case, suppose the alien does something odd. We may explain this in at least three ways. One, the alien has been led by desires we find unacceptable. Two, the alien's action was based on false beliefs about the circumstances. Three, she failed to act in accordance with her beliefs and desires, because she was carried away by momentary passions. Again, one principle of charity must be suspended. Of course, it may turn out later that one option is much better than the others. However, there is no guarantee that all dilemmas of this sort will be eventually resolved by empirical evidence.

The second reason why the principles of charity cannot select a single acceptable interpretation is that we have some choice as to how charitable we want to be. Although without charity interpretation cannot get off the ground, the better we understand the alien, the less mandatory charity becomes. Minimizing the disagreement may clash with keeping the interpretation as simple as possible. We will have to strike a balance, but we have choices in doing that.

Now, why do these considerations about charity lend support to the relational notion of conceptual schemes? Why do they count against the view that although conceptual schemes admit only relational descriptions, they are inherent? The reason is this. Some of the issues in interpretation which the principles of charity cannot resolve concern exactly the nature of the differences between theories. When the interpreter has to decide whether a particular difference between his theory and that of the alien is conceptual or factual, he is guided by the principles of charity. In so far as the principles of charity underdetermine the interpretation, this sort of decisions are also underdetermined. So in certain cases one may either construe a difference as conceptual or as factual, and our construal of the alien's conceptual scheme depends exactly on these decisions.

If this is right, the following situation is possible. C is interpreted by B, who, in turn, is interpreted by A, which leads – as in the Bill, Joe, Sue case – to an indirect interpretation of C. If then A interprets C directly, it may turn out that his direct and indirect interpretations do not coincide. Moreover, this may happen even when neither interpreter makes mistakes. This possibility is a natural consequence of the fact that charity does not determine a single good interpretation. In a case like this A ends up with two different construals of C's conceptual scheme. If conceptual schemes were inherent, A would have to choose, since, presumably, C cannot have two different conceptual schemes. But given that each interpretation satisfies all the constraints, there is no way to choose. Perhaps one may object that only one of the interpretations is adequate, but we
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cannot decide which one. This, however, leads to skepticism about conceptual schemes, for why should we say that either the direct or the indirect interpretation is right? They may both be wrong! The only possibility to escape this is to regard conceptual schemes as relational. The conceptual scheme resulting from the direct interpretation is different from the one resulting from the indirect interpretation simply because they exist in different relations.[6]

## III

It should be clear from what has been said so far that talk of conceptual schemes is talk of meanings. A conceptual scheme is a system of meanings assigned to someone's words on the basis of his linguistic behavior. However, not all systems of meanings deserve to be called conceptual schemes. Consider, for example, the fictitious language called Engrave. Engrave is what we get from English if we systematically reassign the meanings of English words to the words following them in the dictionary. The language is called so because 'engrave' is the word following 'English' in the dictionary. Although Engrave words differ in meaning from the like sounding English words, it is clear that we would not credit it with a conceptual scheme different from that of English. The systems of meanings in the two languages are completely isomorphic. The two languages differ only verbally, not conceptually.

This raises the following question. What are the exact criteria which distinguish conceptual difference from purely verbal difference? The precise and pedantic answer would be that anything less than complete isomorphism marks conceptual difference.[7] But the question then becomes this. What conceptual differences license the attribution of a conceptual scheme? Surely, a few unrelated conceptual differences are not enough. English, for example, distinguishes between hares and rabbits, whereas German has a single word for these animals. This is certainly a conceptual difference, but a few conceptual differences like these are not sufficient for the attribution of a conceptual scheme. If they were sufficient, the notion of a conceptual scheme would become rather uninteresting,

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[6] Those with verificationist inclinations may appreciate the same argument with a slightly different ending. Accept, as before that (1) no possible empirical evidence can select a unique good interpretation and that, therefore, (2) no possible empirical evidence can select a single conceptual scheme. Given (2), the idea of „the one and real" conceptual scheme is senseless, since no verification procedure can determine which of the candidates is „the one and real" conceptual scheme. However, the view that conceptual schemes are inherent implies exactly this senseless idea, since the the same body of language use cannot embody different conceptual schemes. To escape the senseless idea, we must hold that conceptual schemes are relational.

[7] This does not clash with what I said about the multiple interpretability of linguistic behavior and the interpretation-relative character of conceptual schemes. I assume here that we already have an interpretation and what we are trying to decide is whether this interpretation licenses the attribution of a conceptual scheme.

since it should be invoked practically anywhere. Most probably, no two people have exactly the same set of concepts, and not even a single person has the same set of concepts at different times. So the criteria of what counts as a conceptual scheme must be strengthened. We should demand that there be many conceptual differences.

Of course, 'many' is a vague term, so it makes the notion of a conceptual scheme vague. However, vagueness is a virtue here, not a problem. It often depends on the interests of the interpreter whether the notion of a conceptual scheme is worth introducing. Imagine that people in a rural area classify plants in a way that differs from the standard scientific taxonomy. Suppose that the government wants to help the local population by distributing special sorts of seeds which promise greater yield, and commission a specialist to explain the people the benefits of the new seeds. The specialist needs some understanding of the local taxonomy in order to communicate with the people. But her understanding does not have to be very deep. She needs to register some of the conceptual differences, but she might not have to invoke the notion of a conceptual scheme. Compare her attitude with that of an anthropologist studying folk taxonomy. The antropologist needs more than basic understanding. He wants to explore the local taxonomy in depth, and he will be more likely to talk of a conceptual scheme. If we leave the notion vague and, therefore, flexible, both the specialist's and the anthropologist's procedure can be justified.

There is a second way in which the criteria of what counts as a conceptual scheme may be strenghtened. Most advocates of the notion maintain that conceptual schemes are essentially holistic. It is important to be clear what holism means here. The process of interpretation is always holistic in the sense that each tentative translation is always subject to revision in light of further evidence, and there is no way of specifying the range of relevant evidence beforehand: in principle, each bit of linguistic behavior may prove relevant for the translation of a particular utterance. This is not what holism means here: the process of interpretation is holistic even if in the end we decide that there is no point in attributing the other a conceptual scheme. Holism should be understood here as a characteristic of the result of interpretation, the set of translation rules. The interpretation is holistic if certain expressions are translated together in the sense that the translation of an expression involves reference to the translations of the other expressions. To put it differently, holism means that the translations of the expressions form a structure so tightly integrated that changes in the translations of a few expressions are bound to affect the translations of other expressions as well. In such cases the translation rules look rather like commentaries. Holism, of course, is a matter of degree. But, as I have already argued, it is better to keep the notion of conceptual scheme vague and flexible. So,

to sum up, I suggest that we should talk of a conceptual scheme if the interpretation reveals many interrelated conceptual differences.

There are two more things to be done. First, to show that the notion developed here is not committed to the dichotomies whose collapse led to the demise of the notion reconstructed in Part I. Second, to inquire whether the notion involves commitment to cultural relativism.

The logical positivist notion used the observational – theoretical distinction to distinguish the content and the scheme which organizes it. The content is the set of possible observations, which can be described in a purely observational language; the scheme is the set of theoretical concepts which organize them. The present account makes no use of the distinction. The notion of a conceptual scheme is introduced on the basis of certain sorts of differences between our linguistic behavior and that of an alien. We assume that there is common content, since the facts the alien seeks to describe are more or less the same facts we try to describe. But I did not assume that the content consists purely of observational facts. Nor did I assume that it can be described in a purely observational language. Rather, we specify the content in our own language – the metalanguage in which the translation rules are formulated -, and our language may be fairly theoretical.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the logical positivists' conception contains a grain of truth. As we have seen, in order to interpret the alien's linguistic behavior, we have to presume that we agree on many things. (That's Davidson's point about charity.) Now the area in which we can most easily find the desired agreement is that of observation, even if not in the logical positivist's contrived sense of 'observation'. This is so because our perceptual skills are fairly similar, due to the fact that they result rather from nature than nurture or individual creativity. Unfortunately, this pedestrian fact, which is part of the normal practice of interpretation, was transformed by the logical positivists into an artificial and untenable dichotomy.

The analytic – synthetic distinction was used by the logical positivists to distinguish between the conceptual scheme and the theories belonging to it. The observational language and the theoretical language were supposed to be connected by correspondence rules, analytic sentences whose function is to introduce the theoretical terms on the basis of the observational vocabulary. Differences in correspondence rules were regarded as conceptual differences, whereas differences in the synthetic sentences were regarded as merely theoretical differences. Instead of correspondence rules, my account relies on translation rules, which link two languages, rather than theory and observation. The translation rules are certainly not analytic: they are discovered during interpretation, which is an empirical inquiry. There is a weak similarity though between the logical positivists' correspondence rules and my translation rules.

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The correspondence rules were supposed to be the conventions which govern the use of theoretical terms. The translation rules describe the conventions which the alien's language use follows. However, the mere fact that the alien's language follows conventions different from those of our language is not sufficient to establish conceptual differences, let alone the presence of a different conceptual scheme.

Finally, a brief remark about cultural relativism. Cultural relativism has many forms, most of which has nothing to do with the notion of a conceptual scheme. What is relevant here is the version of cultural relativism which holds that different communities may have different conceptual schemes, which cannot be translated into each other. Since there is no common framework within which the ideas of such different communities could be compared and evaluated, truth is inescapably relative to conceptual schemes. The fact that I relied so heavily on Davidson's ideas about charity should make it clear that the notion developed here cannot be invoked in making this sort of relativistic claim. Conceptual schemes, as explained, emerge in the process of interpretation. So the relativist, who denies the possibility of interpretation, cannot make use of this notion. So this sort of cultural relativism and the present account of conceptual schemes are inconsistent. To put the same point differently, what I propose is the converse of Davison's procedure (1974). Davidson has shown that the notion of a conceptual scheme which is committed to the version of cultural relativism just described is incoherent. I made Davidson's ideas part of the notion of a conceptual scheme and have shown that the revised notion is incompatible with cultural relativism.

The notion of conceptual scheme has been used under different names by generations of anthropologists and historians for the exposition of alien ways of thought. If the present account is tenable, the notion is free of philosophical errors and can be used without fear.

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# FERENC L. LENDVAI*

# ON THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSCENDENTAL MATERIALISM

The purpose of this address is to argue for the following theses:
(1) the concept of transcendentality can be associated not only with idealism but also with materialism;
(2) such a connection was made possible by Karl Marx's theory;
(3) in the development of Marxism up to now, theory was tied to a political movement, which is an error of principle, for what survives of it is a kind of social ethics which should more appropriately be called Marxianism.

(1) The concept of transcendentality, as we know, was introduced by Immanuel Kant in Section VII of his Introduction to his *chef d'oeuvre: Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, where he said that cognition is transcendental when it is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects. He subsequently examined the possibility of surpassing mere immanence without arriving in the sphere of an abstract transcendence. Kant's idealism is therefore neither immanent (subjective) nor transcendent (objective) – it is a transcendental idealism that seeks the potential and the limitations of cognition. This concept of transcendentality, although with certain modifications, remains unchanged in the subsequent development of German idealism, having in general preserved the formula 'transcendental idealism'. That this combination is not necessary is exemplified by Arthur C. Danto's words in his work *Analytical Philosophy of History*, saying that the primary task of philosophy is to draw the borderlines of our knowledge. This he performs with respect to the philosophies of history which he calls substantive or analytical – and this is fully analogous to drawing the borderline between transcendent and immanent philosophical knowledge.

It is a commonplace that Marx's theory is a continuation of the German classical philosophy – Hegel's in the first place. He, however, wanted to turn the 'upside down' idealist dialectics the right way up, as he said, and put it on a materialist basis. In doing so he followed not so much Feuerbach's example as the materialism of the English and French Enlightenment with which he had already been well acquainted, as is clear from his work *Die heilige Familie*. Feuerbach instead inspired Marx to preserve the humanistic pathos, which was present in the Prometheus cult in his doctoral dissertation, also on materialistic grounds, instead

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of the 'sunshine idealism' he praised in the recommendation. Only an 'anthropologic' materialism could naturally serve such purposes – the mature Marx, too, always categorically distanced himself from the metaphysical and natural scientific materialism. He also distanced himself from Feuerbach's unhistorically anthropological materialism. His materialism can only be termed anthropological if anthropology is understood as a historical anthropology (as Marx himself said in his work *Das Elend der Philosophie*, history is none other than the constant transformation of human nature), thus 'historical' materialism at the same time. We may call it 'dialectic' materialism in the usual way, insofar as Marx too employed the dialectic apparatus Hegel had mobilised; and he described its essence in the Introduction to *Das Kaptial* as a *critical* view, consequently this materialism can be also described as 'critical' materialism

The basis of this critical materialism was, for Marx, science – and it really meant the base, rather than the superstructure itself. This is evident in that Marx expounded his theory as a critique of *political economics* on one hand, and as a *critique* of political economics on the other. (In the title versions of his main work, *Das Kapital*, and of its antecedents, the word 'critique' occurs more than once.) In the course of that critical treatment Marx distinguished the general features of production – in fact, man's material life – from its specific forms, in the first place from the developed system of the production of goods, the capitalist mode of production. Production in general is characterised by the fact that the productive subject, man, as the creator of his own world, enters into contact with the world of objects; more precisely, he creates them *as* objects (not in the metaphysical sense, that is) – a machine is a machine because it is used; a house is a house because it is inhabited, and things of nature are things of nature because they are learnt to be as such (see primarily the Introduction to *Grundrisse*). For Marx, the Kantian unknowable 'things in themselves' did not exist. He averred that a difference existed only between the 'already known' (already learnt) and the 'as yet unknown' (yet unlearnt) things. In that he is a follower of Fichte and Hegel: being in its entire abstract sense is in fact identical to not-being (see Hegel: *Enzyklopädie*, Vol. I, Par. 67), and things come into becoming (are created) only in the process of becoming something (*Werden*) – from the aspect of production, 'use values'. There is no metaphysical transcendence – the transcendental becomes continually immanent. At the same time, values do exist; man himself, his activity, can bestow things with values in this or that sense. There is value not only in economics but also in logic, aesthetics, ethics, even in religion. Marx's atheism is atheism not because he denies religious values but because he does not even predicate them to begin with.

Transcendence and immanence are, therefore, notions of relationship. Common exchange value too is transcendental when regarded from the physical aspect of things; as Marx ironically puts it in the chapter on fetishism of

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commodities in *Das Kapital*, no chemist has as yet discovered the exchange value in diamonds. Values therefore exist 'sensually above the senses' (*sinnlich übersinnlich*), he says. Similarly, the aesthetic value of a painting is not identical with the material of the canvas and the oils on it, although it cannot exist without them, just as the exchange value of diamond cannot exist without the physical and chemical reality of the diamond. A piece of cloth with stars and stripes on it is not normally used for dusting; on the contrary, such a use could well be described as sacrilegious. In a similar way, two pieces of wood fixed in the shape of a cross may have sacramental value. This is no fetishism in the Marxian sense, at least not necessarily so. Marx spoke about fetishism only in case we forget that in the last analysis we ourselves are the creators of our world and in it the world of values. Not as individuals, certainly, nor as members of a community, but as representatives of mankind, in the Kantian sense of necessary and general transcendentality (see *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Introduction II and VII), i.e as human beings to whose existence some anthropological and ontological specifics *a priori* belong. Man, Marx says in his Introduction to a critique of Hegel's philosophy of law, tears off the imaginary flowers that adorn (and thus conceal) the chains because he wants to wear the chains themselves but because he wants to pick living flowers without chains. Persons who do not recognize values that are transcendent compared to the merely natural immanence or, to put it in another way, for whom nothing is sacred, are in fact not human. It is not only the transcendent that turns immanent, but also the immanent turns transcendent – in the above sense, therefore, Marx's philosophy may even be described as „transcendental' materialsm.

(2) How could Marx have spoken about the immorality of capitalism without presupposing all this, and how could he have moralised at length in *Das Kapital* about small children, for instance, from whose blood silk was woven or about working mothers who were unnaturally alienated from their own children? How could he have brought value judgment on capitalism, how could he have described it as an empire of total alienation – the world of 'sinfulness at the fullest' (*vollendete Sündhaftigkeit*)? Marx distinguished three fundamental forms of human existence. First was the immanent form of natural human existence, in which man in general is distinguished from the animal by his general anthropomorphic features (namely that man continuously produces his own world, while the animal does not) – but these qualities have not as yet developed according to man's own standards. The second is the genuine development of these most important human anthropological qualities, namely liberty and conscious being, in the course of which he rids himself of the primitive ties and unenlightened ignorance and becomes a free and conscious creator of his world – at the cost, however, that over and above nature which he seeks to dominate, he

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creates a second nature, the world of alienated social laws (in which these laws eventually lead to catastrophe much in the way of a house collapsing in an earthquake), and in which the subject and repository of the entire development is a ruling elite which uses the great masses as unwitting means or objects of this development, whether in good or bad circumstances. And Marx posits the existence of a third form, which is transcendent as compared to the second, and in which the genuine qualities of human life gradually return at the cost of going through the second form and without the naiveté of the first form, and this time in a way that they directly belong to man (and are not embodied in an alienated economy, the state or ideology). This is a materialised version of the Hegelian triple formula of 'being in itself', 'being other' and 'being for itself' or, as Marx himself referred to it, the famous formula of the negation of negation.

All this can only be found sporadically and coverty, „thorugh a glass, darkly" (I. Cor. 13:12): in his scientific analysis and directly Marx actually examined the capitalist mode of production, even though he described its antecedents and development as he saw them. In this he naturally employed hypotheses of a philosophical nature. After all we know full well that all sciences have paradigms, presuppositions and axioms that are assumed without proof and that can no longer be reduced to something else. (In case of rivalling scientific systems that confront or exist side by side, these exist separately in each system.) Such a presupposition is, for Marx, that capitalism is indeed technically the culmination and morally the nadir of human history, and that these two statements are closely interconnected. And if this period forms the centre of history, then it is possible that, to put it in terms of Teilhard de Chardin's famous evolution theory, logically there can be, and empirically there are gradations between this centre, the alpha point and the omega point, which the last grade attained does regard as steps leading to itself – this then could make for 'evolution', as the Introduction to *Grundrisse* puts it somewhat ironically. This is how Marx's periods of pre-capitalism and a post-capitalist perspective were born – and it is not difficult to point out that all this happened under the direct influence of Hegel's periods. In case it appears as a series of preconceived logical forms, this is in general a necessary consequence of taking up an arbitrary point, which no evolution theory could do without. And without an evolution concept we can only attain various versions of cyclical and eternal recurrence theories which the facts of history refute after all.

At the beginning of the so-called economic social formation (or of its various forms), therefore, we find the *life world*, to use a modern phrase, of the patriarchal industry of a family economy. The disintegration of this constitutes the first great period – with the societies of patriarchalism and the Antiquity, with a growing production and a system of private ownership, yet the dominance of natural economy and vestiges of communal ownership. Then, in Vico's words, the
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Christian-Germanic period of 'barbarism returned' did give the necessary momentum to this society to shed its final rigidity and to evolve the modern bourgeois society with the dominance of the production of goods, industrialism and free private ownership. Both great periods are based on coercive, i.e. slave labour, which in the first period is formal slavery and in the second a salaried slavery. There is nothing special about the production and appropriation of added value, for labour always creates more value than is necessary for its own reproduction, even in the case of an independent private labourer. The basis of all kinds of accumulation carried out by man is the fact, as Hegel revealed, that labour is an indirect desire and goal (see *Die Wissenschaft der Logik*, Vol. 3, Section 2, Chapter 3: Teleology): if we want to accumulate something, we obviously consume less than we are able to produce. However, since industrial production, as Marx expounded in *Das Kapital*, necessarily consumes its own basis, destroying the natural environment and reproduction of human life, it immediately is contanied, once it is unable to extend these processes – the processes of external and internal colonisation, to refer to theories by Rosa Luxemburg and Jürgen Habermas – without obstacles. That is why Marx posits a third great period, predominantly post-industrial in character, in the development of economic social formations, in which economisation with time, social planning and collective control of ownership necessarily increase. To postulate such a post-historical transcendent period is, at least in itself, scientific in nature. In fact, it turns to utopia theroetically, and in practice it has led to the emergence of eschatological movements.

(3) This unfavourable turn has had to do with the essential features and the peculiar historical circumstances of the birth of Marx's theory. It was, as we said, a continuation of the heritage of classical German philosophy, which in turn was the inheritor of the Christian, more precisely Protestant, religious tradition. Hegel emphasised in his *History of Philosophy* (Vol. 1, Introduction, B, 2.b.) that philosophy and religion only differ in form, not in content. Thus Marxism as theory necessarily took over and continued this heritage as well – certainly in a reversed form, as it were, and if Kant, Fichte and Hegel accomplished the secularisation of the Christian religion, Feuerbach and Marx certainly concluded its materialisation. The main point in this respect was to take over the eschatological views of Christianity, as a consequence of which an early salvation theory of some sorts, a secularisation of Christian *parousia* was to be felt in a cautious or less cautious way in the thought of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, as well as of Feuerbach and Marx. The proclamation of God's country on Earth was, for Kant, the universal society of the citizens of the world and the world state of eternal peace; for Fichte, the community of saints and the justification of mankind; for Hegel, genuine monarchy of the estates and the bourgeoisie and the

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state of reconciliation; for Feuerbach, the general rule of love; and for Marx, the realisation of communism. With some cautious reservations, primarily with Kant and Marx, who emphasized it was a process and declared that the final perfect status would never come true, this idea has nevertheless been present everywhere, and was to turn to an adulatory type, as with Fichte in the wake of Kant, or with several of Marx's followers, among them Bloch and Lukács, in the wake of Marx. All this is central conclusion of all such antecedents, namely that philosophers up till then merely explained the world, but the real task is to change it – obviously conforming to the demands of philosophy (classical philosophy).

The realisation of such demands would have entailed that, as the young Marx put it, all those circumstances which philosophy deemed as unworthy of man ought to have been eradicated and such social circumstances to be created instead as stimulate men to adopt an aesthetic and ethical way of life, rather than the attitude of 'spiritual animal world' (*geistige Tierwelt*). Consequently, the alienated economic relations of society are to be abolished, the alienated state machinery and the equally alienated ideological forms, philosophy itself should be abolished, insofar as they should be realised in reality itself – in general, the rift between the bourgeois and citoyen side of human existence, or even more generally, between civilisation and culture, should be abolished. This idea was the continuation of old Utopian dreams of the Golden Age, the Coming and Return of the Messiah; in earlier times, in the Antiquity, it went back to the Jewish prophets and the Esseneans, and in later ages with Joachim of Fiore and Thomas More as mediators. This idea resurfaced again in the Reformation and the English and French Revolutions in religious or quasi-religious form with the Anabaptists, Levellers and Jacobins. In the wake of the English industrial revolution and the French social revolution, in the course of a major transformation of Europa when the relationships of modern bourgeois society emerged, these ideas were organised and reached a peak in theory and in practice in the systems of Utopian socialism and the socialist workers' movements. However, due precisely to its Utopian character, Utopian socialism was indaequate to become the ideology of the socialist workers' movements which were mainly concerned with the sphere of financial interests. Therefore it was possible for the Marxist 'scientific' socialism to take this place. Thus, as the young Marx again put it, one indeed found the weapons in the other – to what avail is another question.

The outcome, as soon as it appeared, was a series of catastrophes. Can the catastrophic consequences of this development be eliminated at least theoretically? We must realise that such consequences followed not from the idea itself, nor from the attempt at realising it, but from the form of the attempt at realising it – namely, from the *movement* character of this attempt. Though Marx himself is also responsible for this launching of the form as a movement, yet this feature does not necessarily follow from the theory. That ideas strain to be

realised is natural – for what kind of a philosophy would it be if it were restricted to mere useless speculation. However, political movements and revolutions belong in the historical empire of necessities, rather than in free ethical action. The socialist movement obviously has a future for itself, but that is not necessarily contingent on Marxism and vice versa. Marxism as such has failed, for it forgot about Hegel's admonition that revolution was not possible without reformation and that renewal of the external was impossible without the renewal of the internal. To change the world – according to its inner standards – is out task indeed; realising this, however, can be a categorical imperative only from the aspect of our individual activity. The ethical (social ethical) thought that departs from Marx's theory and rids itself from the character of a political movement could be called in the following Marxianism, after the example of Kantianism and Hegelianism, rather than Marxism.

The eminent historian and philosopher of religion, Mircea Eliade, shows in his work *The Saint and the Profane* how the lifestyle of modern, formally non-religious man is full of magical, mythological and religious elements, without positing transcendence in the classical sense of the word. Modern man himself creates the 'spiritual' values that lift him above the mere immanent material existence, and which in fact make him a man. Thus the world of values emerges from and is tied to the world of immanence, although it also supersedes it – much in the way of the Kantian idea of knowledge which always begins with apperception but then surpasses it theoretically. The assumption of at least a prevailing, if not existing, transcendence – in neo-Kantian terms: *gelten-existieren* – which emerges from the sphere of immanence and supersedes it, using that sphere as a basis, should be the essence of a transcendental materialism. And if Marx's thought is cleansed from the debris which the political movement has deposited on it, that is, if it takes shape as Marxianism, then from this approach Marxianism, owing to and undertaking the philosophical and cultural heritage it takes as its point of departure, may consider itself as a radical Protestant view, even a version of 'God is dead' theologies. Because, as the Czech Marxian philosopher Vitézslav Gardavsky said, God is not entirely dead.

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[1] Journal of Physics [...]
and Son, 1926), p. [...]
[2] Born, M., „Physical [...]
lecture held at 29 August, [...] on the [...] of [...] Atomic [...]
in Born, M., Physics in my [...]
[3] Institut International [...]
[4] The details of the Soviet [...] on quantum mechanics [...] the Marxists [...]
P., Methodological Problems of Quantum Mechanics in the Soviet Philosophy, [...] (in Russian:
Nauka, 1987)
[5] Nikolski, K. V., „Principles of Quantum Mechanics [...]

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# COLD WAR AND INTERPRETATIONS IN QUANTUM MECHANICS

*(Summary*: After 1927 the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics was dominant for more than two decades. However in this period some changes were developing which finally have created a whole series of different interpretations. If we want to look for the reason of these trials, then we have to take into account the following conditions: 1) circumstances arising from actual theoretical researches of physics, 2) the evidently more critical attitude of new physicist generations to the orthodox interpretations, 3) that some of the great authorities of physics (first of all Einstein) were holding on their earlier disloyal views and this influenced the young physicists, 4) there were ideological reasons, as well. A part of young physicists was politically left sided and the Marxism (dialectical materialism) influenced them. In this paper we present the development of statistical interpretation in Soviet Union and its effect to the non-Soviet interpretations in the age of the Cold War.)

The possibility of an interpretation of quantum mechanics based on statistical ensembles early appeared in the mind of physicists (see de Broglie[1], Born[2], and Einstein[3]). Behind this interpretation there are totally contradictory philosophical standpoints. Our aim is to present the first sophisticated statistical interpretation which was born in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet scientists worked since the earliest times professionally and successfully in quantum mechanics originally arosen mainly in German speaking territories. Concerning the problems of interpretation the well-known discussions in the Soviet Union were colored by the fact that in the twenties they were fitting into a general philosophical debate[4]. It was demonstrated for example by Nikolskij's appearance in 1936, who in his paper[5] sentenced complementarity as

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[1] *Journal de Physique*, 8 (1927): 225. Reprinted in de Broglie and Brillouin, *Wave Mechanics*, (London: Blackie and Son, 1928), p. 113.
[2] Born, M., „Physical Aspects of Quantum Mechanics", *Nature*, 119 (1927): 354-357; enlarged version of the lecture held at 10 August, 1926 for the A (Mathematics and Physics) Section of the British Association. Reprinted in Born, M., *Physics in My Generation*, (London: Pergamon Press, 1956), p. 6-13.
[3] Institut International de Physique Solvay, *Rapport et discussions du 5e Conseil*, (Paris, 1928).
[4] The details of the Soviet discussions on quantum mechanics in the twenties and thirties see e.g. in Dielokarov, K. H., *Methodological Problems of Quantum Mechanics in the Soviet Philosophical Science*, (in Russian Moscow: Nauka, 1982).
[5] Nikolskij, K. V., „Principles of Quantum Mechanics 1." *Uspekhi Fiz. Nauk*, 16 (1936): 537-565 (in Russian).

idealist misunderstanding of physical data and suggested a new objective interpretation namely the statistical reformulating of quantum mechanics in which Heisenberg's uncertainty relations became statistical correlations of dispersions. Although he remained almost alone with his viewpoint, perhaps the appearance of Einstein's papers made it possible for him, to publish his interpretation in a book entitled *Quantum Processes* (Moscow, 1940).

His follower Dimitrij Blokhintzev[6] was studying physics in the period of emergence of quantum mechanics and with the help from his teachers – for instance Tamm[7] – he made himself master of this new science. His researches in theoretical solid state physics show the high level of his knowledge in quantum theory[8]. He taught this branch at the University, he wrote its textbook, and gave it a new interpretation – the latter is our main subject.

Blokhintzev besides quantum mechanics discussed general methodological and philosophical problems of physics, as well[9]. He also took part in political life and was admitted to the Soviet Communist (Bolshevik) Party in 1943; later he repeatedly was a member of the city party committee in Moscow.

Coming back to his works on quantum mechanics we continue there that Blokhintzev just began to investigate the quantum and classical ensembles[10], the quantum and classical behavior of physical systems and the corresponding mathematical apparatus[11], when Nikolskij's book was published. This time Blokhintzev rejected the statistical conception, because by his opinion the quantum mechanics concerned the individual properties of atomic systems (plus

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[6] He was born in Moscow, in 1908. In his childhood he read Tziolkovskij's works, they changed some letters, and Blokhintzev made experiments with rocket engines. This connection with the pioneer of the space research played a determining role on his career, on his world view. After the industrial-economical secondary school originally he wanted to go to a military college, but Rutherford's experiments on the transformations of nucleus impressed him so much that he began to study physics on the Moscow University. In that time the Faculty of Physics went through a great development. Among the professors there was Vavilov, S. I., who founded researches in optics and luminescence. The Nobel-prize winners Cherenkov, P. A. and Frank, I. M. were his former students. In 1932 Vavilov became the director of the State Institute of Optics in Leningrad, he was followed in the chair of the Moscow department by Levshin, V. L.. The head of the Department of Theoretical Physics was Mandelstam, L. I., who was followed in 1931 by the Nobel-prize winner Tamm, I. E.

[7] Tamm, Ig. und Blohincev, D., „Über die Austrittarbeit der Elektronen aus Metallen", *Zeitschrift für Physik*, 77 (1932): 774.·

[8] Blochincew, D., „The spectra of fluorescence and absorption of complex molecules", *Journal of Physics USSR* 1 (1939): 117.

[9] See e.g. his papers written in the thirties together with Galperin, F., *Pod znameniem Marksisma* (1934) 2: 97; 6: 147; (1936) 5: 102; *Antireligioznik* (1936) 3: 10; *Front Nauki i Tekhniki* (1936) 6: 49.

[10] Blokhintzev, D. I., „The Gibbs Quantum Ensemble and Its Connection with the Classical Ensemble", *Journal of Physics* 2 (1940): 71 and Blokhintzev, D. and Nemirovsky, P., „Connection of the Quantum Ensemble with the Gibbs Classical Ensemble II.", *ibid.*, 3 (1940): 191.

[11] Blokhintzev & Dashevskij, Ja. B., „On the Dividing of Systems into Parts – Quantum and Classical", *JETP*, 11 (1941): 222 (in Russian); Blokhintzev, „On the Force of Reaction", *ibid.*, 12 (1942) 29 (in Russian); Blokhintzev & Briskina, Ts. M., „Relation of the Mathematical Apparatus of Quantum Mechanics with the Apparatus of Classical Mechanics", *Vestnik Moskovskovo Universiteta*, (1943) 10: 115 (in Russian)

measuring devices), as well[12]. Essentially preferred the interpretation of Copenhagen School, but he declared its materialistic and dialectical nature. In 1944 his *Introduction to Quantum Mechanics* (the first comprehensive university textbook in Russian) was written in the spirit of Heisenberg's interpretation. Its second edition was published in 1949 with the title *Fundamentals of Quantum Mechanics*[13]. For the book Blokhintzev in 1951 was honored with the first class Stalin-prize.

The second edition from our point of view is rather different then the first one. Beyond the usual corrections and completition the main point of the change was that Blokhintzev rejected Bohr-Heisenberg interpretation and adopted the statistical one. Accounting the circumstances of this change we must recall not only his earlier works, Einstein's authority and Nikolskij's book which evidently influenced the Soviet physicist, but the surrounding social and scientific life, too. After the World War Stalin made up his mind to pass the results of foreign science in the nearest future. In 1947 the secretary of the Central Committee of the party, Zhdanov – in his lecture on a book in history of philosophy – actualized it to the requirement of elimination of bourgeois (ideological) influence from the Soviet science. On this base occurred a year later the so called Lisenko affair with the contribution of the Central Committee. In 1948 Molotov (Zhdanov has been died already) demanded similar course for all the sciences. The philosopher Maksimov[14] who had criticized the Copenhagen School already in the previous decade, tried to meet these claims. In 1947-48 his controversy with particle physicist Markov[15] was pregnant with aftermath's. The attack of Maksimov and his followers[16] personally concerned the main part of leading physicists. This didn't prevent for instance Frenkel or Ivanenko to be honored with Stalin-prize for their works in physics, but hard critics on books[17] and debates with ideological edges[18] were often published in this period. Such debates were stopped only after

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[12] Blokhintzev, D., „Where the Fundamental Characteristics of Quantum Mechanics Lie?", *Sovietskaia Nauka* (1938) 4: 17. (in Russian)

[13] *Osnovy kvantovoi mekhaniki*, (Moscow: GITTL, 1949; third edition: Vysshaia shkola, 1961; fifth: Nauka, 1976; in German: Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1953, corrected: 1958; fourth, translated from the third Russian, 1963; in English: Dordrecht: Reidel, 1964; Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1964; in French: Paris: Masson, 1969; 1981)

[14] Maksimov, A. A., „Marxist Philosophical Materialism and Modern Physics", *Voprosy Filosofii*, (1948) 3 (in Russian).

[15] *ibid.*, (1947) 2 (in Russian).

[16] Lvov, V., „Against Idealism in Physics", *Zvezda*, (1949) 1.

[17] On the book *Mechanics* by Hajkin, S. B., because of its Machism in *Uspekhi Fiz. Nauk* 40 (1950): 476; on the physics textbook for medical students by Artzybishev, S. A., *ibid.*, 46 (1952): 287; the Scientific Council of the Lebediev Institute on the philosophical mistakes in the works of academician Mandelstam, L. I., because of his spontaneous (and not dialectical) materialism *ibid.*, 51 (1953); on the book *Fundamental Problems of Modern Physics* by Joffe, A. F., *ibid.*, 45 (1951): 113-140 (The book was taken up this time by the *Voprosy Filosofii*, as well.)

[18] On the philosophical concept and relations of mass and energy with the participation of physicists (e.g. Fock) and philosophers (e.g. Maksimov) *ibid.*, 48 (1952): 147; *ibid.*, 49 (1953) (exchange of letters among

Stalin's dead in 1953-54. In this situation Blokhintzev not only had written a good textbook and founded an important interpretation, but practically also preserved for posteriority quantum mechanics and its teaching in Soviet Union. He did it such a manner that criticizing the vulnerable points of orthodox interpretation he only positively referred to Soviet physicists and this was rather exceptional in that era[19].

Blokhintzev's works had other important consequences. Following his footsteps some physicists began to think about the possible interpretations. This process lead into the great but politically less dangerous discussions at the end of the fifties, when three main orientations were developed in Soviet Union: Fock's special Copenhagen interpretation (where the wave function represents the „potential possibilities"), Blokhintzev's quantum ensemble theory, and Terletskij's hidden parameter model.

Blokhintzev's influence wasn't limited to his country. Among the main unorthodox interpretations in the international literature developing from the fifties the most sophisticated variant of the statistical interpretation namely the theory of quantum ensembles was his work[20], and partly due to him raised the wide class of hidden parameter theories. It was initiated by the American theoretician David Bohm[21]. To understand quantum mechanics at the end of the forties Bohm wrote and introductory book to quantum mechanics which was first published in February 1951[22]. Its general philosophical basis followed Bohr's and Oppenheimer's conceptions but in spite of this Einstein also liked it perhaps because the book was radically unusual as Bohm started with a non-mathematical, conceptual, really physical introduction on the first 170 pages. He wrote about the hidden variables „... the general conceptual framework of the quantum theory cannot be made consistent with the assumption of hidden

philosophers); *ibid.*, 50 (1953) (exchange of letters between a physicist and a philosopher). On the philosophical concept of matter *ibid.*, 44 (1951): 485; *ibid.*, 48 (1952): 623; *ibid.*, 49 (1953): 125. A discussion on the theory of relativity was initiated by Naan, G. I., in *Voprosy Filosofii* (1951) 2; Blokhintzev added his remarks in the paper „To the Leninist concept of Motion", *ibid.*, (1952) 1: 181-183. The other (sharper) part of this debate was continued between Maksimov and Fock in *Krasnyj Flot* (13. June 1952) and in *Voprosy Filosofii* (1954) 4.

[19] Blokhintzev, D., „Criticism of the Philosophical Views of the SoÄcalled 'Copenhagen School' in Physics". In *Philosophical Problems of Modern Physics*, (Moscow: Academy of Science URSS, 1952) p. 358 (in Russian); in German: *Sowjetwissenschaft /Naturwissenschaftliche Abteilung/* 6 (1953): 545; in French: in *Questions Scientifiques*, (Paris: Nouvelle Critique, 1952) p. 95.

[20] The zenith of the 'career' of Blokhintzev's theory in Soviet Union was, when in 1949 he was commissioned to write the entries „quantum mechanics" and „quantum electrodynamics" for the second edition of *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (in Russian).

[21] Bohm was born in 1917 in Pennsylvania and studied physics at the State University of Pennsylvania and in 1943 obtained a Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. At Oppenheimer's lectures on quantum mechanics he began to interest for the foundations of quantum mechanics. He tried to understand the basic concepts of quantum mechanics and their philosophical consequences for the notion of movement and Zeno paradoxes. He got a job in Lawrence's Radiation Laboratory. In 1946 as a known plasmaphysicist he got a job in Princeton with the help from Oppenheimer.

[22] Bohm, D., *Quantum Theory*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, February 1951; January; September 1952; etc.). We refer here to the 3rd printing (New York: September 1952). Russian edition: Moscow: 1961.

variables that actually determine all physically significant events. In other words, no completely deterministic mechanism that could explain the observed wave-particle duality of the properties of matter is even conceivable. ... At present, however, it seems extremely unlikely that we shall ever be able to obtain a totally deterministic description in terms of hidden variables."[23] The last part of the book was again a principal one on the process of measurement involving a dozen of pages about the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. Bohm concluded that „no theory of mechanically determined hidden variables can lead to *all* of the results of the quantum theory.".

In that time, after the attack of the House Committee on Un-American Activity, Bohm was suspended from his job, and this fact gave him the occasion to meditate on fundamental questions of quantum mechanics. Knowing Blokhintzev's criticism and partly due to the discussions with Einstein, he changed his mind. Concerning this change it is important to mention that Bohm belonged to the circle of Oppenheimer's students in Berkeley at a time, when the leftism and the sympathy for Soviet Union were fairly popular there. So either the Committee investigations or Bohm's familiarity with the Soviet scientific literature are no mere chances. Bohm's leftism played and important role in the Oppenheimer affair. The only charge against Oppenheimer which worsened during the hearings was just the Bohm-connection. The scientific leader of the Manhattan-project had a contact with Bohm. Oppenheimer helped him to get a job, wanted to invite him to Los Alamos (security service ruled it out), and he didn't break off the relations with Bohm after the War, even after the Bohm hearing. The Bohm hearing was in the spring of 1949, when invoking the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, he refused the answer to the question on his connections with a communist party member (Steve Nelson was accused with spying). Earlier Bohm told Oppenheimer that he hadn't been the member of the party, and this membership wasn't proved during the Oppenheimer hearing[24]. By July of 1951 Bohm worked out a deterministic hidden parameter interpretation of quantum mechanics. In 1952 he published a long article[25] (The Physical Review let the paper through only after a special vetting) making an offer of concrete, deterministic hidden variable theory for conventional quantum mechanics. The essence of his theory that the quantum mechanical state function – as it was

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[23] *ibid.*, p. 115.

[24] The Bohm-Oppenheimer relation can be followed in the wide literature on the Oppenheimer affair. See e.g. In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board and Texts of Principal Documents and Letters, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971); Stern, Ph. M., /and Green, H. P./ The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial, (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Major, J., The Oppenheimer Hearing, (London: Batsford, 1971); Davis, N. Ph., Lawrence and Oppenheimer, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968.); Michelmore, P., The Swift Years. The Robert Oppenheimer Story, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1969)

[25] Bohm, D., „A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of 'Hidden Variables'. Part I., *Phys. Rev.* 85 (1952): 166-179; and Part II. 180-193.

supposed by Einstein and others – is not a complete description of the reality, but it refers only to the average of the precise positions and velocities of individual particles which quantities are „hidden" for the usual measuring devices. As we have seen, Bohm had an inner propensity for the conceptual problems, Einstein encouraged him as well, and at last Bohm was in sympathy with Blokhintzev's and Terletskij's less concrete critical ideas based on materialist philosophy. Perhaps these were the reasons why the American physicist seriously attacked the orthodox interpretation. The reception of his theory was so characteristic for the functioning of the physicists' society that the sociology of science has made it subject of investigation. The physicists generally rejected the hidden parameter interpretation; they criticized it from technical and ideological point of views. For instance Pauli considered it outdated, metaphysical and causelessly asymmetrical. Rosenfeld attacked its deterministic fundamentals. It has positive reception only from certain French and English Marxist circles (and for instance from Mario Bunge[26]), but the Soviet Vladimir Fock attacked it several times. However the criticisms refused to consider logical coherence and empirical adequacy of the interpretation that is none of them refuted the theory in the usual (or rather required) manner. Against Bohm it was used von Neumann's no hidden parameter theorem, although Bohm's hidden parameters lie beyond reach of von Neumann's considerations. The attack of the élite of quantum mechanics on Bohm constituted the defense of positivism, arithmetic ideal of physics and the defense of the established authority structures[27].

In the meantime already before the coming out of his fundamental paper, in the fall of 1951 Bohm left the United States, because after the House hearing he had been dismissed from his job and didn't get another one. In Princeton his farewell party was organized by Eugene Wigner. By the help of Oppenheimer and with Einstein's recommendatory letter in his pocket he went to Brazil, where he worked at the University of Sao Paulo.[28] After a few weeks he was called in the American Consulate and his passport was taken away to prevent his journeys to other countries, albeit Brazil in that time was a rather isolated place from professional point of view. So he was forced to apply Brazil citizenship. During his stay in Brazil Bohm worked on the problem of spin in his theory together with

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[26] See e.g. Bunge, M., „Strife about Complementarity" I-II., *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 6 (1955): 1-12.; 141-154. or any of his papers from the fifties on this subject. A collection of these: Bunge, M., *Metascientific Queries*, (Springfield: Thomas, 1959).

[27] Whitley, „Changes in the Social and Intellectual Organization of the Sciences: Professionalism and the Arithmetic Ideal". In *Sociology of the Sciences. Yearbook 1977. The Social Production of Scientific Knowledge*, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), p. 157.

[28] That time the leader of the school of theoretical physics at Sao Paulo University was Mario Schönberg. He was a communist and a guest at Princeton for several month a number of years earlier. He has been imprisoned at Sao Paulo for a short time without any formal accusation or legal process in 1948. In his papers in the volumes of *Nuovo Cimento* 11 (1954): 674-682; 12 (1954): 103-133; 300-303; 649-667 Schönberg used the same model for the non-linear generalization of the Schrödinger and Dirac equations as Bohm.

Tiomno and Schiller[29]. From 1955 he worked at the University of Haifa, Israel. In 1959 he moved to England where first he worked at the H. H. Wills Laboratory of Bristol University, then from 1961 until his death he was professor of theoretical physics at Birbeck College, London. In that year he got a favorable offer from the Brandeis University (Massachusetts), but finally this plan wasn't realized because of political reasons. In his emigration he continuously worked on interpretational problems of quantum mechanics[30].

Summarizing this two interrelating stories we can say that the ideological debates of the Cold War (and possibly other ideological collisions) positively influenced the development of unorthodox interpretations in quantum mechanics. If we accept Paul Feyerabend's opinion on proliferation in sciences, we should have to like these interpretations, but of course we have other good reasons (no physical ones) do not like Cold War.

[29] D. Bohm, R. Schiller and J. Tiomno, „A Causal Interpretation of the Pauli Equation" A-B, *Supplemento del Nuovo Cimento* 1 (1955): 48-66; 67-91.
[30] On the further development of his philosophical ideas see e.g. Hiley, B. J. and Peat, F. D., „General introduction: The development of David Bohm's ideas from plasma to the implicate order". In Hiley, B. J. and Peat, F. D., *Quantum Implications. Essays in honour of David Bohm*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), pp. 1-32.

# CSABA FAZEKAS[*]

## DATA TO THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF HUNGARIAN CATHOLIC POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE HORTHY ERA

We know a lot about the social structure and voters of the in interwar Hungarian Christian political movements, mainly the most important Christian Economic and Social Party [Keresztény Gazdasági és Szociális Párt – KGSzP, 1925-1937] in general. But in the Hungarian historiography there are no detailed studies of the social structures of the different Christian party members in the interwar period. In this article we should like to summarise the main points of the social structure of the Christian political leadership and MPs. But first we have elaborated the membership-applications of Christian National Party [Keresztény Nemzeti Párt, KNP], the first Christian party formation in the post World War I Hungary.[1]

Based on a number of contemporary reports, we have been able to analyse the remained declarations made by those who joined the Christian National Party. (See Tab. 1.)[2] This party was formed on 8 August 1919 after the Hungarian Soviet Republic and the very beginning of the formation of the Horthy regime. The party was founded by Pál Teleki and István Friedrich, who declared: „We can only save our homeland of one thousand years from its final destruction if every Hungarian Christian joins together into one political party." The need for a unified and universal party proved to be a fiction even at that moment. Nevertheless, this party above all emphasised the that „the Christian world view and the national goals" must be prevail at all costs.

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[1] First I would like to thank Peter and Gabriella Schimert for their help in the translation of this study into English. This article was made in connection with my other work: Fazekas, Csaba: „With or without the power: Political catholicism and Christian Political organisations in Hungary, 1918-1945", in Kaiser, Wolfram (ed.): *Political Catholicism in 20th c. Europe*, Vienna 1999, (under press). In the footnotes I disregarded the detailed quotation of the literature. The best works on this subject used by me very much: Adriányi, Gabriel: *Fünfzig Jahre ungarischer Kirchengeschichte, 1895-1945*, Mainz 1974 (Studia Hungarica 6.); Gergely, Jenő: *A katolikus egyház története Magyarországon, 1919–1945*, [The History of the Catholic Church in Hungary, 1919–1945], Budapest 1997,; Gergely, Jenő: *A politikai katolicizmus Magyarországon (1890-1950)*, [The political Catholicism in Hungary, 1890-1950], Budapest 1977; Gergely, Jenő: *A keresztényszocializmus Magyarországon, 1903-1923*, [The Christian Socialism in Hungary, 1903-1923.], Budapest 1977; Gergely, Jenő: „Keresztény pártok, 1919-1944, hatalom és egyház között", [The Christian Parties, 1919-1944, between the Church and the Power] in *Társadalmi Szemle* (1991) No. 8-9. pp. 132-141 etc.

[2] The source was found: National Archives of Hungary. R 316. Records of the Christian National Party. (Magyar Országos Levéltár; R 316. Kornai János-hagyaték. 2. cs. 13. t. A Keresztény Nemzeti Párt iratai.)

*Tab. 1.*
**Composition of Christian National Party's Membership**
**(August – September 1919)**

| According to religion (%) | | According to age (%) | | According to job (%) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Roman Catholic | 76,2 | Under 30 | 28,5 | Official, staff | 37,9 |
| Greek Catholic | 1,2 | 30-39 | 35,7 | Teacher, schoolmistress | 15,5 |
| Orthodox | 1,2 | 40-49 | 14,2 | Physician, pharmacist | 13,7 |
| Calvinist | 7,6 | Over 50 | 21,4 | Lawyer, jurist | 5,1 |
| Lutheran | 13,8 | Total | 100,0 | Student | 5,1 |
| Total | 100,0 | N | 28 | Engineer | 3,4 |
| N | 80 | | | Actress | 1,7 |
| | | | | Member of Parliament | 1,7 |
| | | According to sex (%) | | Officer | 1,7 |
| | | Man | 68,8 | Peasant | 3,4 |
| | | Woman | 31,2 | Family member (sy's wife) | 10,3 |
| | | Total | 100,0 | Total | 100,0 |
| | | N | 80 | N | 58 |

This table were made only on the remained applications of membership, nevertheless it seems to be a very good illustration. The first dozens of party members of Christian National Party represented the social groups of later Christian political parties. The most active members of the party were most often officials, teachers, members of the petit bourgeoisie, and the so-called „Christian intellectuals". More than half of them was official or school teacher, we could not find any workers or tradesmen etc. Most were between thirty and forty years of age, but this composition seems to be very balanced. A relatively large number were women, it is characteristic feature on the traditional sympathisers of the Christian policy. Most of the party members were Catholics, although the party's officially declared goal remained „the unification of all Christians into one party".

The later Christian parties openly were organised for the defence of Catholicism, and thus were rejected by the Protestants. The anti-Semitism of the Christian parties excluded not only the petite bourgeois Jews but also the wealthier Jewish citizens, who enjoyed certain social connections to various groups of aristocrats. In a typical example, when the Budapest lawyer Ferenc Rósa asked to be admitted into the Christian Nationalist Party, he was reject with the simple comment: „Formerly Jewish!" The rejection came despite Rósa's fervent Catholicism; and only after a long debate would the party accept his baptism of twenty years earlier.

In somewhat simplified form voting in interwar Hungary reflected three separate patterns: Budapest, the other larger cities, and the villages. Generally the biggest difference between the cities and the villages was that in the urban areas the presence of the organised industrial workers and Jews increased opposition against the Horthy system. At the same time the urban intellectuals and officials generally supported it. The rural peasants strongly backed the government and the Christian parties. This support was only reduced during the 1930s with the rise of the reorganised Independent Smallholders Party [Független Kisgazdapárt, FKGP] and the rural organisation of the social democrats.

The consolidation of Hungarian political life after the World War I was made by Prime Minister, István Bethlen (1921-1931). He made a very powerful government party from the first Smallholders Party [Kisgazdapárt]. The biggest Christian party (KGSzP) was made from the unification of Christian National Unity Party [Keresztény Nemzeti Egyesülés Pártja, it was a reorganisation of the mentioned KNP], a smaller group of Christian socialists and others. In the 1920s the KGSzP was a part of the governing coalition, which severely limited the party's ability to manoeuvre.

Due to the enthusiastic backing of the prelates and the network of parishes the KGSzP enjoyed a nation-wide organisation. Only in Budapest did it fail to establish any significant local organisation [Christian Community Party – Keresztény Községi Párt, KKP]. This was due to the fact that the Christian politicians in the capital who supported Bethlen without reservation had their own political party. The leaders of the KKP observed, after World War I roughly one fourth of Hungary's population came to be concentrated in Budapest; and the cosmopolitan capital that had suddenly swelled so enormously embodied entirely different political and social problems than the countryside. The KKP belonged to the KGSzP's right wing. In parliament its representatives formed an alliance with the KGSZP, but not in local Budapest politics they did not. Instead, the KKP in local matters pursued a considerably more radical Christian national policy. It independently organised Budapest's local government; and the KKP could mobilise the capital's non-Jewish population including Protestants. Between 1920

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and 1939 the KKP proved to be an effective rival of the social democrats and the liberals; and with the help of the national government it steadily maintained control of Budapest's municipal government. Largely due to the activities of the KKP, Budapest, where the largest number of workers were concentrated, was not only the citadel of social democracy but also became „Christian Budapest". (See Tab. 2.)[3]

*Tab. 2.*
Distribution of Votes (%) on Parliament and Municipal Elections in Budapest, 1935.

| Parliament elections | | Municipal elections | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Christian Community Party | 25,8 | Christian Community Party | 27,1 |
| Party of National Unity | 26,0 | Party of National Unity | 25,5 |
| Social Democratic Party | 22,5 | Social Democratic Party | 22,3 |
| Liberal and Democratic Opposition Party | 18,9 | Unified Bourgeois Party | 19,6 |
| Christian Opposition – Legitimist People's Party | 1,7 | Christian Opposition | 2,7 |
| Free Bourgeois Party | 1,0 | others | 2,8 |
| Hungarian Nationalist Socialist Party | 0,6 | Total | 100,0 |
| others | 3,5 | | |
| Total | 100,0 | Number of valid votes | 218262 |
| Number of valid votes | 249155 | Participation on elections (%) | 76,9 |
| Participation on elections (%) | 79,8 | | |

Remark:
a) In a municipal general assembly only the one-third part of seats was filled by direct elections.

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[3] Illyefalvi, I. Lajos (szerk.): Budapest Székesföváros Statisztikai és Közigazgatási Évkönyve [Statistic and Administration Yearbook of Capitol Budapest] (XXIV., Budapest 1936)

From the countryside patterns we have chosen Miskolc in north-eastern Hungary, a typical example of a larger provincial town. Unlike Budapest, Miskolc lacked a liberal civic opposition, and in practice the inhabitants of the town divided into two camps. The worker colonies of the large government owned companies and industrial plants and the Jewish petite bourgeoisie turned Miskolc into a citadel of social democracy. These fought constant battles with the adherents of the governing party, who included „Christian intellectuals" such as teachers, officials and employees, as well as refugees from the north-eastern territories lost under the terms of the Treaty of Trianon, the non-Jewish petite bourgeoisie, and the anti-Semiticly inclined „Lumpenproletariate." The Christian nationalist forces attracted attention through constant demonstrations and increased activism. The sharp political and social cleavages were revealed in 1925 when some desired to separate the professional organisations into „national" and „non-national," or Jewish parts. In the local policy the voters actually voted according to local and not national parties' interests. (See Tab. 3.)[4]

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[4] Political life of interwar Miskolc and Szabolcs county, see: Bozsikné-Mengyel, Katalin: „Miskolc polgárságának gazdasági és politikai viszonyai 1920-1930 között", in [Economic and social relations of Miskolc Citizens between 1920 and 1930], *A Miskolci Egyetem Közleményei*, Miskolc, 1994. pp. 17-32.; Vinnai, Győző: „Választások és önkormányzatok Szabolcsban 1919-1939 között", in *Tanulmányok választásokról és önkormányzatokról Szabolcsban (1848-1948)*, [Elections and Self-Governments in Szabolcs County between 1919 and 1939.] Nyíregyháza 1994, pp. 61-98. For the Tab. 3. we have used: Választási eredmények, in: *Reggeli Hírlap* (Miskolc), December 14. 1934. p. 8. [Electoral Results.]; Tóth, Gábor, A parasztság politikai hangulata Hajdú megyében az 1931-es országgyűlési választások tükrében, in: Acta Universitatis Debreceniensis. Tom. XII. Debrecen 1966. pp 73-84. [The Political Atmosphere of Peasantry in Hajdú County in the Mirror of 1931 Parliament Elections.]; Vonyó, József: „Meskó pártja Zalában. Adatok a nyilasok Zala megyei szerepéről és társadalmi bázisáról", in *Zalai történeti tanulmányok*, [Zoltán Meskó's Party in Zala. Data to the Role and Social Basis of Radical Right-wings in Zala.] Zalaegerszeg 1994, pp. 27-304.

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*Tab. 3.*

**Examples for Elections in Countryside in the 1930s**

**1.) In a big town with majority of workers and middle-class citizens (Miskolc, municipal elections, 1934)**

| | Distribution of votes | Number of elected seats in municipal assembly |
|---|---|---|
| Alliance of Opposition Citizens and Workers (Coalition of Liberals and Social Democrats) | 50,2 | 14 |
| National Front (Coalition of the government party, the „Christian Democrats" and Christian Socialists) | 49,8 | 10 |
| Number of valid votes | 72020 | |

**2.) In rural counties with majority of peasants and smallholders**

| In place with Catholic majority | | In place with Protestant majority | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zala County, municipal elections distribution of elected seats (1934) | | Hajdú County, parliament elections distribution of votes (1931) | |
| Unity Party | 58,0 | Unity Party | 64,6 |
| Christian Economic and Social Party | 25,0 | Independent Smallholders Party | 22,4 |
| Hungarian National Socialist Party | 13,6 | Social Democratic Party | 13,0 |
| Independent Smallholders Party | 3,4 | Total | 100,0 |
| Total | 100,0 | Number of valid votes | 30546 |
| N | 88 | Participation on elections (%) | 70,1 |

Among the villagers the governing party and the Christian party held overwhelming sway. In Szabolcs county in the north-east many did not go to vote because in a number of districts only the government party ran candidates. In the

rural areas the limited suffrage was further curtailed by the practice of public voting and the forceful backing of the governing party by the police. The basic workings of the Horthy system made any thought of organising an opposition based on the support of the peasantry entirely illusory. Protestants actually voted for government party and disliked the Christian parties. For Protestants in the 1930s only the Independent Smallholders Party meant an opposition but conservative alternative. In counties with a Protestant majority the FKGP received a lot of votes, but was quite unsuccessful in Catholic territories.

Within the ideology of Christian nationalism the Christian political parties usually revealed a clearly defined social composition. It is indicative that beginning in the second half of the 1920s most of the divisions within the party resulted from disagreements between the Christian socialists and the so-called Christian democrats. The latter were organised around agrarian interests, which included not only wealthy aristocrats but also peasants. During the era the Christian socialists on the other hand remained an urban based group, albeit their intellectual worker bases declined.

Even if we know little about the membership of the parties, we do have some sources on the leadership of the Christian political movement. The confessional composition of interwar Hungarian parliament properly was parallel with the whole population. But it is remarkable that the Protestants were more represented and the almost lack of the Jews. (See Tab. 4.)[5]

*Tab. 4.*
**Examples for the Religious and Social Composition of the Interwar Hungarian Parliament**

1.) According to religion

|  | members of parliament | | Hungary's total |
|---|---|---|---|
|  | number | % | population (1930) |
| Roman Catholic | 174 | 59,0 | 64,9 |
| Greek Catholic | 10 | 3,4 | 2,3 |
| Orthodox | 1 | 0,3 | 0,5 |
| Calvinist | 81 | 27,4 | 20,9 |
| Lutheran | 27 | 9,1 | 6,1 |

[5] Rudai, Rezső: *A politikai ideológia, pártszerkezet, hivatás és életkor szerepe a magyar képviselőház és a pártok életében, 1861-1935,* [The Role of the Political Ideology, Party Structure, Employment and Age in the Life of the Hungarian Parliament and the Parties, 1861-1935] Budapest 1936; Haeffler, István: *Országgyűlési almanach az 1939-44. évi országgyűlésről,* [Parliament Almanac from the 1939-44 Parliament] Budapest 1940, The population is from the 1930 national census: Balogh, Margit – Gergely, Jenő: *Egyházak az újkori Magyarországon,* 1790-1992. [Churches in Modern Hungary, 1790-1992. Statistics] II. Adattár, Budapest 1996

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unitarian | 1 | 0,3 | 0,1 | |
| Israelite | 1 | 0,3 | 5,1 | |
| Total | 295 | 100,00 | 100,00 | |

Remarks: The number of seats after the territorial changes and by-elections of 1938-1941.

## 2.) According to job

| | KNEP<br><br>(1920) | All Christian parties<br>(1922) | All Christian parties<br>(1931) | government party | All MPs<br><br>(1939) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landowner | 34,1 | 22,9 | 17,6 | 23,7 | 20,0 |
| Lawyer, jurist | 9,3 | 5,7 | 2,9 | 19,8 | 13,8 |
| Engineer | - | - | - | - | 4,0 |
| Writer, journalist, teacher | 14,7 | 17,1 | 17,6 | 7,2 | 9,8 |
| State official | 6,7 | 14,3 | 14,7 | 15,1 | 12,8 |
| Municipal official | 6,0 | 2,9 | 2,9 | 15,8 | 5,7 |
| Private official | 3,3 | 5,8 | 2,9 | 0,7 | 3,3 |
| Clergyman | 13,3 | 20,0 | 17,6 | 1,3 | 6,4 |
| Artisan, manufacturer, tradesman | 7,3 | 5,7 | 11,8 | 9,2 | 3,7 |
| Physician, officer | 5,3 | 5,7 | 11,8 | 5,9 | 11,1 |
| Smallholder, peasant | - | - | - | - | 7,4 |
| Worker | - | - | - | - | 1,0 |
| Total | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 |
| N | 74 | 35 | 34 | 158 | 295 |

Remark:
a) We quoted data from different periods, but the social composition of the parliament (including Christian parties) did not change during the interwar period.

The leading bodies, those that included the representatives in parliament developed along the lines of „Christian democrats" and „Christian socialists." The latter included a number of landowners, while the former typically came from the

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ranks of the traditional Catholic intellectuals such as teachers and lower ranking officials. In every Christian organisation we can find among the leaders a number of clergy. This would appear to indicate that these groups were not social organisations that arose spontaneously but came about as a result of church sponsored political activity. Other interesting and illustrative example the National Christian Socialist Party's leadership. The 68 % of them belonged to intellectuals (clergymen, lawyer, teacher, party functionary etc.), the role of other social groups is negligible. (See Tab. 5.)[6]

*Tab. 5.*
**Employment Composition of the National Christian Socialist Party's Leadership (1926)**

| Employment | % |
|---|---|
| Clergyman | 10,0 |
| Official | 18,1 |
| Teacher | 16,3 |
| Lawyer, jurist | 14,5 |
| Physician, pharmacist | 7,2 |
| Writer, editor, journalist | 4,5 |
| Smallholder | 4,5 |
| Artisan, manufacturer | 6,3 |
| Party or trade union functionary | 18,1 |
| Total | 100,0 |
| N | 110 |

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[6] Gergely, Jenő: „A politikai katolicizmus átrendeződése a bethleni konszolidáció első felében", (1920-1926), in *Századok* (1990) No. 5-6. pp. 670-707. [Transforming of the Political Catholicism in the First Half of the Bethlen Consolidation.]

# KATALIN BOZSIKNÉ-MENGYEL[*]

## EXPROPRIATION AND ANNIHILATION
## OF THE JEWISH CITIZENS IN MISKOLC

### Preliminaries

In the interwar period the number of the Jewish population living in Miskolc was extremely great in comparison with those in other provincial towns. After Budapest and Nagyvárad it was in Miskolc that their number was the greatest (in 1920 11.300 people). *In the 1930s the proportion of the Jewish population was as follows: in Budapest 23,2%, in Miskolc 19,8%, in Debrecen 9,8%, inPécs 9,0%, in Szeged 5,8%, in Kecskemét 2,3% and in Hódmezővásárhely 2,0%.*[1] Their mass immigration goes back to the 18th century when the Jews dealt with trade, worked in industry and different professions, but 80% of the landowners and lease-holders having more than 57 hectares of land was also Jewish. Besides industial and commercial activities they played a determining role in the formation of the intellectual life of the town. 60% of the landowners and 71,2% of the medical doctors in Miskolc were of Jewish origin.[2] Another, more independent layer of the intellectuals emerging from among the Jews also left an essential mark on the aspect of the town. The busiest parts of the town were occupied by lawyers, doctors and merchants and it were they who gave the town what we can call mission, excitement, life and activity. „The cityscape was mainly formed by them too, the illuminated shops and some of the more than one storey buildings being more showy than necessary also emphasized the property of an independent group represented by the bourgeoisie." This is what Zoltán Szabó said about Miskolc in his book entitled „Cifra nyomorúság" (Poverty disguised under a superficial show of wealth).[3] *The great majority of the Jews in Miskolc were progressive minded, strongly assimilated and neologian, they declared themselves to be native speakers of Hungarian and in the interwar period hardly any of them stuck to strict orthodox, religious rules.*

They had denominational educational institutions but lacked the so-called Zionistic political organizations based on nationalistic ideas. They joined the Hungarian political trends. Although in 1927 a Zionistic organization began to be

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[1] Schneller K. : *Nagy-Miskolc népessége* [The population of Greater Miskolc], 1930, p. 30
[2] ibid.
[3] Szabó Zoltán: *Cifra nyomorúság* [Poverty disguised under a superficial show of wealth], Akadémia - Kossuth - Magvető 1986, p. 272

established under the influence of the attacks by the strengthening political right-wing, the majority of the Miskolc Jews did not agree with it, so the organization could not have a resounding effect.[4]

The Jewish population in Miskolc *was stratified*. The richest and topmost layer was constituted by bankers and financiers, wheat and wine traders. The greatest tax-payers of the town also emerged from among them. The well-to-do *middle-class bourgeoisie* dealt with industrial, commercial or intellectual activity. The poorer middle class was represented by market-men, the owners of grocery shops and the craftsmen employing one or two helpers.

In the 1920s there were *three* basic political trends in Miskolc. *One of them was the Christian Socialist and the Christian National trend.* Thanks to its trade unions the Christian Socialist trend first of all attracted railwaymen, labourers and representatives of the religiuos middle class. The Christian-National trend was stronger, more important and first of all more militant than the Christian Socialist one. Due to its agressive anti-Semitic attitude this organization kept the Christian Socialists at a distance. Their supporters came from the so-called „Christian middle classes": the civil servants of the town and county, lawyers, teachers, leading personatities of administrative offices, who escaped from the disannexed territories, but this trend found followers among the lower middle classes and labourers influenced by the religious, mainly irredentist ideology. Greatly exposed to the governmental policy and shocked by the war, revolutions, the loss of the country and disillusioned with its existence the layer of office workers saw the source of every trouble in the anarchy and Trianon. When making a new start and re-distributing new posts, authority and material potentials this layer looked upon the political rightists as the defender of their interests and rejected not only the socialistic leftist ideas but also the civil liberal thoughts. Amid the heavy economic conditions of the 1920s one of the characteristic features of this trend was *to find a political scapegoat*. The country was divided according to the following categories: „national" and „anti-national", „Christian national and civil liberal, cosmopolitan", that is „Jew" and „non-Jew". This division meant that it was *anti-Semitism* that became the determining feature of this political trend.

*The other strong political trend in Miskolc was that of social democracy.* However, between 1922 and 1939, in spite of the revolutions and the defeat of the left-wing one of the town's MPs in Parliament was Ferenc Reisinger, a social democrat. The basis for this movement was provided by the several thousand labourers working in the Diósgyőr and Miskolc factories. While seeking protection in the anti-Semitic campaigns renewing gain it was the Miskolc lower

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[4] Borsod -Abaúj - Zemplén megyei levéltár /BAZ County Archives/; Miskolc városi levéltár /The Archives of the city of Miskolc/: Miskolc főispán elnöki jel. /presidential report by the Lord Lieutenant/ 1927/106. (Later: BAZ mlt, Mvlt)

middle-class, especially its members of Jewish origin that sympathized with this party.

*The third political force* manoeuvring between these two main political trends was *the civil-liberal opposition*, which represented the views of the leaders of former office-holders, the rich upper middle-class, the wealthy Jews and part of members of the liberal professions. This trend had a decisive impact on the town policy for a long time and played a role in electing the mayor.

In the 1920s the so-called „Christian line" divided the citizens of Miskolc in various (in the majority of cases successful) ways. The local rightist press conducted a series of anti-communist, anti-socialist and anti-Semitic campaigns for fun. After the elections of 1922 it was the achievement of the right-wing that the middle-class dealing with crafts and business had no representatives in the municipal board. As part of the comprehensive attack the craftsmen's association in Miskolc became divided. It was their intention to set up one separate organisation for „the national craftsmen" and another one for the „non-national", that is, Jewish craftsmen. These disruptive tendencies were only partly crowned with success. In the summer of 1925, following the national craftsmen's association that existed only for a short time, the middle-class in Miskolc established a unified association of craftsmen consisting of 500 persons. It demonstrated the citizens' disagreement with their discrimination, their wish not to deal with politics and their action against hatred and disruption.[5]

The anti-Semitic attitude of the 1920s and 1930s *did not undermine the positions of the Miskolc Jews to a large extent* in the economic life of the town, but at the same time *it caused a lot of psychological damage* and misleading masses of people, it paved the way for further tragic events.

Following the Anschluss, on the Eve of World War II, the shadow of the Hitlerist Germany bacame more and more threatening for Hungary. The existence of the Jewish population in Miskolc was deeply affected by *passing the first and second anti-Jewish law*. The laws in 1938 and 1939 essentially displaced the Jews from intellectual and office jobs and limited their political rights. The necessary proportion of Jewish tradesmen and merchants was determined by administrative organizations. Several Jews with a low standard of living got into a dangerous position. In July 1940 the Miskolc association of the small retailers and craftsmen asked the mayor to permit trading at least to families of Jewish confectioners as well as traders in fancy goods shops, the head of which did labour service. The mayor refused to permit it.[6] Jews working in intellectual jobs, for the press and at the theatre also remained without a job.

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[5] *Miskolci Napló* /Journal of Miskolc/ 14. 07. 1925.
[6] BAZ mlt, IV. 1906, 26588/1940.

*The third anti-Jewish law in 1941* was passed in the spirit of the German Nürnberg „racial laws". It was followed by the introduction of compulsory medical examination before marriage, the prohibition of marriages between Jews and non-Jews, if they had a sexual intercourse it was qualified as a racial slur.

Local authorities had to make arrangements against the Jewish population which limited their basic conditions of life. The competent authorities were ordered by the sub-prefect to make statements about whether there were still any Jews working in the public sevices, how many enterprises ceased to exist as a result of earlier anti-Jewish laws, how many of the Jews did still have the right to vote, and if there were any Jewish members in the municipal board.[7] The Jews had to hand in their radio sets and they were only allowed to listen to the Budapest I. broadcast. The organisations safeguarding their interests were limited, the authorities found every pretext to do so. In 1942 the headquarters of the Miskolc retailers and smallholders were closed due to unlawful management of property and having radio sets for listening to foreign broadcasts.[8]

*Labour service* meant a serious ordeal for Jewish men in the years of the war. It was military service at the front-line without fighting. In the beginning of the war inmates of the labour camps were made to work on constructions at the airport, then, together with the Miskolc VII army corps they were taken to the Don where as a result of mistreatment, cold, hardship and the defeats on the battle fields most of them lost their lives.

The opinion of the society on the anti-Jewish laws and the reason for diminishing their feelings of danger were summarized by István Bibó as follows:

„By this kind of 'solution' to the Jewish question most of the people meant the following simplistic and childish idea: it has to be „ordered" by some laws and regulations, without changing the whole economic and social structure, that Jews should earn less money than non-Jews. The anti-Jewish mass feeling set free and stirred up as a result of equalizing certain unequalities in income distribution as well as the distinction on the basis of origin paving the way for this distinction could easily change into persecution and the killing of the Jews. This historic experience was deeply printed only into the nerves of the Jews in the 30s, but for other people it had no convincing force, which is not surprising at all."[9]

## Annihilation of the Jewish Population in Miskolc

The German occupation in 1944 meant that the fate of the Hungarian Jews was decided. It was obvious that the fascist repressive organisations would gather and

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[7] BAZ mlt, IV. B. 810/b, 19010/1944.
[8] BAZ mlt, report by the Miskolc Lord Lieutenant 1942-44
[9] Bibó I.: *Válogatott tanulmányok* /Selected Essays/ II. 1945-49 Magvető 1986, p. 632

deport the Jewish population in the same way as it was done in other countries under German occupation. On 31 March 1944 the Hungarian authorities passed a decree stating that Jews had to wear *a yellow patch* as a distinctive sign and *abolishing* the Jews' *public services and duties*, and their *membership in lawyers' offices, media, theatrical and cinematic chambers* and other limitations.[10]

The „affairs of Jews" were dealt with by the XXI. Department of the Ministry of the Interior under the quidance of László Endre under-secretary of state. This department was directed and advised „from above", by the German Erickman and his team members charged with special tasks, but *it was the Hungarian police and gendarmerie, some corps of the home-defence and the local administrative organisations that gathered and deported the Jews.*

On 7th April 1944 *a secret decree was issued* by the Ministry of the Interior about *setting up ghettos* and the methods of separation. The document was signed by under-secretary of state László Baky. In the order of the appointed territories, lord lieutenants, deputy-lieutenants and commanding officers of the competent police and gendarmerie were called together to be informed about the tasks to be done.[11]

The necessary steps were taken in Miskolc too, in accordance with the governmental regulation. Ordered by the deputy-lieutenant, the mayor signed the decree stating that it was i compulsory for the Jews to report to the police their permanent place of residence.[12]

On 9th May 1944 the mayor ordered the Jews to wear a yellow patch with the diameter of 10 cm so that it could be visible.[13] As a result of the mayor's command it was prohibited in schools and institutions of education to teach and read any written work by Jewish authors.[14]

The Mayor's Office started *to survey the lands of the Jews* and, as stated in contemporary documents, started to find new owners for the lands „offered". Out of 181 applicants 179 were given land. (61 office-holders in town, 34 state employees, 28 agricultural workers, 31 craftsmen and tradesmen,18 factory workers and 10 persons representing other categories.)[15] The distribution of the land „offered" first of all improved the property status of the Christian middle-class in town. *As the next step*, the registration of the Jews was followed by their separation is *ghettos*. It was the task of the town's administration to mark out the suitable and separated territory, which could be locked and guarded perfectly, to

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[10] Budapesti Közlöny /Budapest Bulletin/ 31. 03. 1944 [73]
[11] *A Baky – Endre–Jaross per* /The trial of Endre - Baky - Jaross/ Cserépfalvi 1994, p. 62
[12] BAZ mlt, 1944 - 18002, 9236/a. /18002, 9236/a: decree by the Mayor of Miskolc/; 1944. /decree by the subprefect; BAZ mlt IV. B. 1910/b. 9236
[13] ibid.
[14] BAZ mlt, IV.1906/b. 21402/1944.
[15] BAZ mlt, XXI. 503/a. 1009/1944.

make the necessary technical changes, to ensure the basic living conditions and catering. Before transporting the Jews and sending them to concentration camps the Germans insisted on the Jews being segregated so that they might not get in touch with the population and thus might not escape. However, due to war transports, for the transportation of the thousands of people the Germans did not have the necessary number of trains at their disposal either. On the other hand, the purpose of gradation was to hinder the the potential resistance of the huge crowd. The self-respect and will-power of the Jewish population was destroyed step by step on the way to the death factories.

It was the MÁV estate that the Mayor's Office first suggested being converted into a ghetto. Their intention was to make use of the temporary lodgings. This plan was rejected on the grounds that this territory was not closed enough and it was exposed to the danger of air-raids and the authorities considered that railwaymen would also have been endangered by the Jews living in the vicinity.[16] In the end the territory of the ghetto was marked out as being in the area bordered by *Szemere, Margit, Zrínyi, Petőfi* and *Gilányi streets* as well as in *Arany* and *Vörösmarty streets*. There had been 120 Jewish families living in this territory earlier, it was mainly their flats where about 10.000 people were crammed.

In Budapest as well as in some provincial towns, among them in Miskolc the German and Hungarian authorities founded the *Jewish Council* to represent the Jewish population gathered and at the same time inform the Jews about the decisions of the authorities. Mór Feldman, president of the Municipal Jewish Council, the former initiator of the Zionist movement became leader of the Miskolc religious community. On 1st May 1944 Szlávy, the mayor saw the representatives of the Jewish community. The president asked for fair treatment and pleaded for mercy for the Jews of Miskolc. „Your excellency! The fates of 10.000 Jews, among them so many helpless, old and sick, so many innocent souls, are in your hands. We hope that your decisions will be guided with humanity", said the president of the Jewish Council.[17] On 28th June 1944, when the Jews were transported from Miskolc, in the Mayor's Office it was written on the document: „The present request cannot be fulfilled. There is no need for further measures."

On 11th May 1944 at 8 o'clock a.m. directing the Jews to transit camps began with police interference. It was the last stage before deportation. Besides the clothes they were wearing, the Jews were allowed to take 1 pair of shoes, 1 change of clothing, 2 changes of underwear, some bedclothes and food for three days. On the way to the ghettos the march was led by carts carrying the

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[16] BAZ mlt, IV.B. 1906 20579/1944.
[17] BAZ mlt, IV. B. 1906. 19493/1944.

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belongings permitted, they were followed by the people marching two by two with police and gendarmerie escort on the sides and at the end. After reaching their destination nobody was allowed to leave the territory of the ghetto. Lodgings were distributed by the members of the Jewish Council as well as the representatives of the authorities.

A lot of Miskolc Jews tried to find excuses and save themselves and members of their families. Those who had been given honours in the Great World War and the citizens having lived in Miskolc for several generations applied to the Mayor's Office for *exemption*. However, as determined by laws and regulations relating to the subject these persons also had to go to the ghetto until clarifying their legitimacy. It was hardly possible for people deprived of their homes, personal belongings, financial means, values and documents to prove their identities in a convincing way and arrange their affairs.

As ordered by the government, *a strict and detailed inventory* of the personal property „left" by the Jews had to be made. Orders were given on the basis of enacting clauses to survey and lock the properties. These orders determined the way the sub-prefect of Borsod County gave to make inventories of shops, workshops, flats, etc. which had been of Jewish property. Inspections by experts and „sealing" of various properties were also determined by the spirit mentioned above. Only the treasurer was entitled to sell securities, precious metals, paintings, fur coats, etc.[18] *On 7th July 1944 shops being previously the property of those deported were closed.*[19] The people crammed in the ghettos waited for their fates to be changed with fear and defencelessness. Permanent raids by police and gendarmerie, infamous brutality caused by the Jews' hiding some valuables also increased the suffering of the hopeless.

It was at that time that the population of Miskolc faced with *the deprivation of civil rights of masses*, the blackening of their fellow-citizens they had lived and worked together with for decades. As a result of mixed marriages many of the non-Jews were also deeply concerned with these ordeals.

In spite of the serious punishments promised and the political demagogy proclaimed day by day there were people who tried to help and rejected mutual cooperation with the executive organs. Many of them hid refugees from the ghetto or labour service, took food or false documents to the ghettos. (We have to mention the 18 year old Erzsébet Jorkó, resident of Miskolc, who was interned because of helping a woman to escape from the ghetto.)[20] There was a striking

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[18] BAZ mlt, IX.202. 14036/1944.
[19] A BAZ megyei és a miskolci zsidóság története /The history of the Jews in BAZ County and in Miskolc/ (manuscript); BAZ mlt.
[20] Beránné-Nemes É.: „Miskolc politikai élete a német megszállás hónapjaiban", *Borsodi Történelmi Évkönyv* /The political life in Miskolc in the months of the German occupation, The year-book of the history of Borsod County/ III p. 15

number of office holders in the Mayor's Office who reported illness and medical treatment so that they should not have to work during these critical weeks. The office holders who were entrusted to become administrators of Jewish property resigned one after the other, because there were serious problems and scandals in connection with managing the properties and many of them were unable to reconcile it with their conscience.[21] However, the Mayor's Office was strict with the negligents and found various regulations for those who disagreed and the office could prove it.[22] At the same time we must not forget that intimidation and military drill made the fulfillment of individual duties extremely difficult. Those who wanted to help the „blackened" risked not only their own lives, but also those of their families'. *The official propaganda* also had its effects. It suggested that the results of the Christian-national policy had ripened and after pressing the Jews out of economic and political life the Christian-national middle class would get its deserved position at last. It was followed by the moral decline of the whole society which took place according to the terrible logic of making scapegoats who condemn the Jews. It was a false situation for the middle class suggesting the possibility to create advantageous positions without any individual effort and with the help of the state. Instead of real social „reforms" the whole political leadership counted on the people's most wicked emotions and by means of this wanted a redistribution of material goods and social positions.

One of the means of intimidation was included in the statement of the Miskolc Police in June 1944. It was the revival of the change of ritual murder against the Jews. It said: „We warn the Hungarian Christian community that certain persons have put poisoned lumps of sugar near the gates of the houses and thus they intend to endanger the life and health of Hungarian Christian children."[23]

The local rightist press intended to supress people's elementary feelings of solidarity by starting a big teasing campaign about the hidden properties and the kilos of gold piled up. The population was made to nurse hopes that the allocation of the 2200 vacant flats would put an end to the housing shortage in Miskolc. The Hungarian daily *Magyar Élet* regularly published articles offering anyone interested abandoned surgeries, lawyer's offices and shops.[24] Announcements of this kind always had their effects: several people applied for pharmacies, surgeries, furniture for newly weds, etc.[25] Christian tradesmen and craftsmen, especially the ones whose shops and workshops were attacked by bombs were in the position of applying to the Mayor's Office and asking for a shop or a warehouse, a one-time Jewish property to be opened for them. The bureaucratic

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[21] ibid.
[22] BAZ mlt, IV. 196. 160/1944.
[23] Braham, R. L: *A magyar Holocaust* /The Hungarian Holocaust/, Gondolat 1988, p. 36
[24] *Magyar Élet* 1944, 26, 27 April, 7, 9, 13 May, 15 July
[25] *Magyar Élet* 1944, 30 April, 11 May, 4, 8 June, 6, 13, 15 July

language of the resolutions passed mentioned „abandoned" Jewish property and owners „being away", whose properties were given to new owners according to inventories, „the charge for use being fixed later".[26]

The possibility of acquiring property quickly made the deviant layers of the town wild and unmanagable. The atmosphere of this period was described by a contemporary like this: „Horthy and his men, and later the Hungarian Nazis were clever enough to blacken part of the population as a result of the anti-Semitism they incited. I remember June 1944, when the Jews were deported and robbed, the authorities siezed and took the greater part of the properties, and the flats belonging to the Jews earlier were thrown open to those who were inclined to take part in a robbery like this. I myself witnessed events like this in Miskolc. It was terrible. Possibly as a result of some organizing activity a crowd consisting of several hundred people gathered in the High street (Fő utca). The people went into the shops, flats and shameful events followed. On the balcony of a flat, formerly a Jewish property, marauders started fighting for getting eider-downs. Then they tore one and the contents, that is, feathers poured out. Then I saw a tramp run away with a box of gloves and witnessed when he discovered that all the gloves were for left hands."[27]

According to the Cabinet decision the transportation of the Jews from Miskolc and Székesfehérvár had to be started on 6th June 1944. It was the definite wish of the Germans that the Jews were transported from the operational areas and the nearby territories to the concentration camps so that they might not form a „fifth" column and collaborate with the enemy. As confirmed later by Endre Baky, under-secretary of state responsible for the deportations in an evidence at the people's tribunal, the Hungarian Jews living in the provinces were transported in the following order: first from the Transcarpathian territory, then from Transylvania, the southern regions and the ghettos in Miskolc and Székesfehérvár, then from the district of Debrecen and Szeged, and in the end from the surroundings of Pécs, Szombathely and Pest.[28] In the beginning of June 1944 there were no military operations in the area surrounding Miskolc, but according to the evidence given by Jaross, Minister of the Interior later, the Germans demanded the earliest possible transportation of the Jews gathered.[29] The Germans even praised the competent under-secretaries of state László Endre and László Baky for „arranging matters" in Hungary quicker than in Poland, which was due to the better work of the gendarmerie.[30]

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[26] BAZ mlt, IX. 201. 12701/1944., 12699/1944.
[27] Pelle, J.: „Konstruált vérvád" /A charge of ritual murder/, Valóság 1995/1, p. 57
[28] A Baky - Endre - Jaross per, p. 920
[29] ibid. p. 179
[30] ibid. p. 319

On 5th June 1944 the commanding officer of the gendarmerie responsible for the deportations from Miskolc ordered the inhabitants of the ghetto to line up. Then they were driven to the premises of *the brick-works in Tatár street*.[31] It was a well-known practice all over the country to take the Jews to brick factories before the deportations because of a practical reason: it was the easiest way of making the deported build temporary lodgings and lavatories for themselves from the building material piled up in the open drying rooms. There were railway lines in the brick factories where it was possible to shift in railway carriages and solve the problem of „loading" the trains with several thousands of people comparatively separately.

The Miskolc Jews were deported some days later, *on 12th, 14th and 15th of June*.[32] There were 80-100 persons crammed into one carriage and their destination was Auswitz-Birkenau. The trains went to *Auswitz through Kassa* (Košice). It was impossible to travel through Lemberg (Lvov) because of the military transports, since it was a military area then.

According to the data available in the County Archives *the number of those deported was as follows: on 12th June 1944 8.667 persons, on 14th and 15th June 6.797 persons. It totals 15.464 persons*.[33] We have no unambiguous data about the exact number. As stated by Andor Jaross, Minister of the Interior, there were 13.000 Jews in the Miskolc ghetto.[34] On the monument of 1947 14.000 victims are remembered.

The members of the death march were allowed to take the following quantity of food: 1 kg flour, 3,5 kg bread, 40 dkg dehydrated vegetables, 15 dkg oil or margarine. After spending some weeks in the ghetto hardly any people had this supply, so it was obvious that their sufferings were increased by hunger, too. It was the duty of the Mayor's Office to ensure the supply of drinking water and bread as well as a suitable lock for the carriages.[35] The carriages were covered by lead, so the people inside could have hardly any air through the small vent-holes. So the miserable creatures travelled, deprived of their belongings and their money for days. They received some bread and two buckets „for the journey", one bucket full of water and the other for their sanitary needs. This is how they set out for their unknown destiny: women, men, babies, seriously ill and old people, said the president of the Jewish Council in a letter to Jaross, the Minister of the Interior on 22nd June 1944.[36] The train was accompanied as far as the borders by the gendarmerie, but when they reached their destinations, it was the Germans who

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[31] *Magyar Élet* 07. 06. 1944.

[32] In her study Beránné-N. É. Nemes refers to the departure of the trains as taking place between 6-10 June, 1944.

[33] A BAZ megyei és a miskolci zsidóság története (manuscript) BAZ mlt.

[34] *Baky - Endre - Jaross per*, p. 516

[35] ibid. p. 527

[36] ibid. p. 527

„unloaded" them, confessed László Ferenczy, colonel of the gendarmerie in the trial of the Endre–Baky–Jaross case.[37]

*Out of the 13-14.000 people*, who had been displaced from Miskolc and the ones who returned from labour service *only 3.000 survived.*[38] On 28th June 1944 *the sub-prefect in Borsod Couny dissolved all the Jewish associations and civil organisations*, since at that time there were practically no Jewish inhabitants in Miskolc at all. This was the first destruction of the middle class in the modernized and industrialized Miskolc in the course of the dictatorships of the 20th century and we have to emphasize, that it took place with the active participation of the Hungarian authorities and with the silent assistance of the deceived, intimidated population.

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[37] ibid. pp. 605-606
[38] ibid. p. 218

# SÁNDOR KOVÁCS*

# THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE INTEGRATIVE MODEL
# OF THE TRADITIONAL SOCIETY

Traditional society is one of the forms of society unfolding in a discrete way and obtaining specific properties in the historic process of *genus humanum,* that is to say, it is the product of history developing at a definite degree of civilization (as a result of objective necessity), has a specific (exceeding its function) trajectory of evolution and in time gives way to a newer form of society. Thus traditional society represents a category of history.

Approached from the theory of systems as a product of *species* the traditional society can be classified as a functional system formulated as a negation of segmental systems. That is, all the functional systems form a unit intervened extensively and having a hierarchical structure, an uneven distribution of potential and topological dynamics. This unit is based on the interaction of its parts relatively separated from but mutually conditioned upon and built on each other and working in accordance with one another. The structural elements of this specific system are functors, components with functional ties, they constitute an integral whole which can be interpreted as an organic system. In qualitative respect the system exceeds the mechanistic sum of its parts.

At the same time it is advisable to distinguish the traditional society as such from the modern functional systems free from singularity. That is, traditional society for the most part is characterised by singularity, the potential absorbing conic point of which originally is hypostasized by the unique concentrated form of the suprasegmental components developing and forming a specific cluster in the process when the segmental systems reach complexity. The centre or the cone of the system qualified as traditional gets constituted and personified as a result of the specific transformation of the suprasegmental components ('specialized ' for the most part in fulfilling the task of the substantial functions) and as the representative of the system possesses qualities exceeding those of the parts. It is how the functional system elementary from historic point of view, being unbalanced as a result of its singularity, organised lineally, guided from above and having a low degree of freedom comes into being in which the twin process of centralization and concentration predominates. In this sense the cone producing

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hypertrophic development is nothing else but the concentrate of the potential accumulated in the centre.

As is well known, in a traditional society it is the centre and its cone that traditionally form the main, that is the principal organising, guiding and integrating power in society. So within this social system a dual contradiction comes into being in which the integration of the relatively discrete elements into a whole is performed by the part in an extreme and unique way.

The roots of this dual contradiction go back to the geminated and superponed structure of this type of society since the movement in the system transmitted by its own counterpart leads to the fact that the system accomplishes its own substantiality outside itself, in one auctor. That is why and how the greatest paradox in the history of human society comes into being: a contradiction between the accidental character of the substance (the whole system) and the substantive character of the accident (a part of the whole), which necessarily leads to newer contradictions and provides a basis for a system of awkward and absurd relations. The elimination of this contradiction from historic point-of-view means taking back the redoubling of the system and at the same time it is the lawful process of getting free from the mere arbitrariness and sheer accident.

Being a primitive functional system, the traditional society constitutes an indeterministic cosmos of fragmentary structure, which personifies the alienated and different form of existence of the deterministic chaos having a fractal structure. Since the most important property of the functional systems concentrates in a single element of the former but extends to all the elements of the latter we can conclude that at the same time they are diametrical opposites of each other. On the basis of all that has been said it is evident that the attractor of the trajectory of the functional systems resembles a Cantor-set, that is, a regular fractal.

The conclusion we intend to draw can be summarised in the following corollary: the unique that has become general in the traditional society appears traditionally as a single, and as a result of a movement while constituting and manifesting itself it generates more and more serious contradictions and necessarily proceeds towards the negation of itself.


Quod erat demonstrandum.

# LÁSZLÓ KÜRTI[*]

## CAMERAS AND OTHER GADGETS: REFLECTIONS ON FIELDWORK EXPERIENCES IN SOCIALIST AND POSTSOCIALIST HUNGARIAN COMMUNITIES[1]

My purpose in this paper is to provide a retrospective analysis of anthropological fieldwork in Hungarian communities in Hungary and Romania. In the retrospective aspect I will deal with how fieldwork possibilities have changed in these two countries; my concluding discussion will suggest some of the important research and theoretical questions facing former communist (East Bloc) cultures to which we, as anthropologists and fieldworkers, should pay closer attention as we embark upon constructing them both in reality and into texts (Atkinson 1990; Wolcott 1995). By establishing the similarities and differences of conducting fieldwork in socialist and postsocialist Hungarian communities I argue that socio-cultural context of the transition in East-Central Europe needs to be problematized differently than it has been earlier; more open systems call now for a renewed ethnographic concerns than previously practiced. I wish to suggest here that earlier theories and fieldwork methods under state socialism are no longer adequate for studying the postsocialist period of the 1990s (Buchowski 1996; Kürti 1996, and Kürti and Langman 1997; Sampson 1996; Verdery 1996). One of the most serious questions to answer is whether earlier anthropological practices can now be accepted without serious critical revision of their foundations and backdrops. In order to specifically clarify why, I will provide – from a particular „native anthropologist" perspective – a comparative retrospective analysis of my own fieldwork before and after socialism in Csepel, a famed working-class district of Budapest, and in Transylvanian Hungarian communities in Romania.

The title of my essay will surely ring a bell to students of anthropology: on the one hand, I express my homage to Evans-Pritchard, who used „Cameras and Other Gadgets" as a subtitle in his essay (1973:241), and on the other, to Paul Rabinow

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whose *Reflections* (1977) I have learned from so much while I was in graduate school. Among other important texts, from these we anthropologists learn much about the necessity of fieldwork, its nature and structure, and the way in which data gained from first-hand experiences must coexist with theoretical concerns. As Evans-Pritchard noted in his short essay on fieldwork in the Sudan in the 1920s, it is still a paramount tenet of our discipline „that we record what were the material, physical circumstances in which the fieldworker of the past conducted his research, because these circumstances surely have to be taken into account in evaluating its results and assessing their significance" (1973, p. 235). [2] In fact, what Edmund Leach has suggested concerning fieldwork is even more true when it comes down to the realities of anthropological circumstances under communism. Leach writes: „the essential core of social anthropology is fieldwork – the understanding of the way of life of a single particular people" (1971, p. 1). He then goes on to emphasize that „This fieldwork is an extremely personal traumatic kind of experience and the personal involvement of the anthropologist in his work is reflected in what he produces" (1971, p. 1). This „traumatic experience is even more punctuated when we take into consideration what Kirsten Hastrup has pointed out so correctly: „Fieldwork is situated between autobiography and anthropology. It connects an important personal experience with a general field of knowledge" (1992, p. 117). One, however, looks in vain for the disclosure of these experiences in the anthropology of eastern Europe, a reason why I wish to stress them in this article.

I want to argue, then, that theory and fieldwork practice are oxymoronic terms, especially when we discuss them in relation to personal experiences in the former Soviet bloc countries. Very little has been published concerning fieldwork experiences of western anthropologists in the east. Therefore, the personal experiences of anthropologists who have conducted fieldwork in the Soviet bloc and its successor states – the far-away field 'Out There' as Raymond Williams has suggested it (1983, pp. 87-93) – sadly demonstrate the truth in the premonitions. While research conducted on eastern Europe has had the potential to offer excellent glimpses into societies both planned and unplanned, these studies are far from being widely known to anthropologists. Such experiences, when written and elaborated upon adequately, may provide anthropological accounts which replicate neither those written about Third or Fourth World backgrounds nor those describing western states. For the accounts of what went on in existing socialist countries, how they have been transformed and how anthropologists have been able to record and analyze theme belong to the very core of the discipline's epistemological make up. For one example, anthropologists studying the socialist societies were placed, whether they wished it or not, at the center of anthropology's leftist legacy. This mission, either to support or

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[2] In fact, there are very few publications I know about fieldwork experiences in the former east bloc. For the few exceptions see Sampson and Kideckel (1989) and Hann (1987, 1994).

critically re-think the role of marxism in anthropology, however, has not, we must sadly admit, been fulfilled. Thus, the anthropology of eastern Europe – or to use Chris Hann's term, the anthropology of socialism – has been unable to contribute to the debate which raged through anthropology between the marxist/materialists (political economy) and the symbolic/structuralists or the later postmodernist debates. Another reason for this is the fact that the anthropology of Europe in general, and the anthropology of eastern Europe in specific, despite some brave and recent attempts (Hann, 1993; Watson, 1994), has remained marginal in mainstream anthropological debates and discussion.[3]

One wonders why this has been the case but my conviction is that both theory of fieldwork and fieldwork practice in eastern Europe were at odds with ruling – colonialist, western and capitalist – anthropological paradigms of the 1970s and 1980s. Anthropology of east Europe, which was quite parochial and specific at worst, and rather eccentric at best, wished to study the specifics of otherness of the East, yet most monographs of the time seemed to agree with state ideology in general and carefully avoided the problems of the communist experiences on the local level.[4] For instance, anthropologists conducting research in Third and Fourth World cultures have been the champions of human and minority rights and ecological and local developmental dilemmas and, by so doing, they have provided their expertise through various possibilities by acting as go-betweens for their communities and the state or international organizations. Such attempts have been simply unknown with regard to the anthropology of „socialist" eastern Europe. I suggest that this odd situation was created in part because some anthropologists who had (latent or manifest) leftist leanings were intent upon studying the socialist experiments and simply were not critical enough of the states, governments, and institutions of their studies. While human and minority rights were all over the media and in the *samizdat* (do we still remember this word?) publications of the east, western anthropologists were either accepting the bafflement of the east European bureaucrats concerning such problems or, since they took the marxist-leninist project for granted (Remember: „The working-men have no country" etc.), they could not indulge themselves in studying such a „non-legitimate" subject matter.[5]

The nature of fieldwork practice and an obvious ideological divide are surely what

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[3] I have dealt with some of the specific problems of east European anthropology, its nature and content, in another paper (Kürti 1996).
[4] The parochial or eccentric nature of east European anthropology is easily discernible if we realize that the view from the village was, and it seems to continue to remain an obsession for most anthropologists. As a natural consequence, then, large segments of society, as well as important aspects of societal processes, were left out of anthropological inquiry. Eccentricities, while including a good dosage of sensible research and interpretation, never made more than a good afternoon reading for those who wanted to take their minds off daily problems. From Dracula's castles to blood-feud, from ritual mid-winter dances to Gypsy traders the list is long; yet some of these analyses, their seriousness and importance notwithstanding, helped the anthropology of the east to be even more marginalized (see for example, Boehm 1987; Bringa 1995).
[5] Chris Hann makes an apt point concerning this when he discusses American anthropologists studying Romanian society in the 1980s (Hann 1994, p. 241).

is also at the heart of separating so sharply the „foreign anthropologist" from the „native scholar," concepts which have been interrogated recently by various scholars (Kürti 1996, 1997; Hastrup 1993, 1996; Kristmundsdóttir 1996). In his early article „Anthropologists and native ethnographers in Central European villages" (Hofer 1968), a Hungarian ethnographer proposes, perhaps too naively and simplistically, sharp differences in personality, interests, and specialization between North American anthropologists and European „native" ethnographers. Opposing such traditional ethnographic point of view, and writing in another context while reflecting back on his own fieldwork, Renato Rosaldo questions the anthropological category „native point of view" when he writes: „Surprisingly, discussions of the „native point of view" tend not to consider that so-called natives are more than reference points for cultural conceptions. They often disagree, talk back, assert themselves politically, and generally say things „we" might rather not hear" (1993, p. 245). This conflict, which was missed by both „native" ethnographers kind and his western counterparts, must be address before progressing any further (cf. also Pálsson 1995). I too had to learn that the fact that I was born as a Hungarian did not automatically provide me with a carte blanche to know local communities. These distinctions – the kinds of questions asked, tools and methods utilized, and areas of knowledge emphasized – presuppose genuine interest in, and thorough identification and engagement with, the „others" who are purported subjects of study, even if they are supposed to be one's fellow citizens. This I will elaborate below.

In a sense, this duality between the „native" ethnographer (although in Anglo-American anthropological practice „indigeneous anthropology" is preferred) and the „foreign anthropologist" means that since the anthropologist feels that she/he has a „real home" as opposed to the far-away fieldwork site – the dialogic anathema of Williams's 'Here' as opposed to 'Out There' (1983) – she/he may choose any set of identities, various degrees of engagement with those studied, and might claim a degree of detachment from them in accordance with the current direction of theoretical concerns. Thus, the anthropologist acquires and even assumes the „liberty" (or power) to decide just how „native" she/he wishes to be; moreover, she/he holds a powerful and advantegeous position to select informants and topics at will. Yet, such a positioning of the anthropologist may be extremely problematical if not outright Eurocentric, classist and egocentric. As Lévi-Strauss aptly pointed out awhile ago in *Tristes Tropiques;* „Never can [the anthropologist] feel himself 'at home' anywhere: he will always be, psychologically speaking, an amputated man" (1961, p. 58). Such gender bias notwithstanding, we can add that amputated women too (Callaway, 1992; Kulick and Willson 1995). Even if such an „amputated" anthropologist has the freedom to „go native," what measure of freedom has the native-born ethnographer who, having departed, returns to that native community in the guise of a foreign anthropologist? [6]

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[6] The British anthropologist Hann analyzes some of these points in greater detail (1987, pp. 1139-153). See also Balzer

To answer this dilemma, and to provide the backdrop for the above reflections, I will utilize my multiple fieldwork experiences in Hungarian communities in the past decade.[7] By so doing, I hope to share my ideas, neither as an amputated nor as a „halfie" (Abu-Lughod 1991, p. 139), but simply as a professional anthropologist (even though somewhat uneasy about self-identification at this postcolonial/postcommunist/postmodernist moment) traversing various boundaries (cf. also Holy, 1996), the „third timespace" as Lavie and Swedenburg would have it (1996:165). Lavie and Swedenburg, combine the notion of „third space", as suggested by Homi Bhaba (1990) as a possibility of anti-modernist theoretical exploration, and Trin Minh-ha's „third space/time gride (1991) to suggest the third timespace for the politics of location in the examination of the everydayness (Lavie and Swedenburg 1996:174).

## Fieldwork in Socialist Csepel

„Social anthropology is packed with frustrations," Edmund Leach notes (1971:3), and, surely, no research can take place without frustrations, trial-and-error procedures, and grave mistakes. This is a proper motto for the anthropology of Hungary, a subfield which is a minuscule part of the anthropology of eastern Europe, a region sandwiched between the prestigious anthropology of the Mediterranean and western Europe (Goddard, Llobera, and Shore, 1994; Herzfeld 1997; Macdonald, 1993; Wilson and Smith 1993). Since it inception, anthropological fieldwork in Hungary has been centered on the study of villagers. In fact, all practicioners from the American David Bell to Eva Huseby-Darvas, Susan Gal, Michael Sozan, and Martha Lampland to the British Chris Hann, and Ildiko Vasary conducted fieldwork in small-scale peasant-worker communities in Hungary. Their 1970s and 1980s locale of research and the foci of anthropological interests emphasized collectivization, the peasant-worker, and other aspects of life that differentiated Hungarian socialist peasants either from other peasants or from their predecessors in Hungary. In this endeavor many attempted to replicate Third World peasant studies or, better, searched for the cultural specificities of the socialist experiments in eastern Europe (see also the contributions to this volume). But nowhere do we find a systematic explanation whether the state socialist societies' differences 'Out There' came from just that (i.e. the fact of being under the ideological strains Marxism-Leninism), or from the theoretical/ideological disposition of the anthropologist/fieldworker.

When I arrived in Hungary in 1985, with the aid of an International Research and

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(1995) for useful insights on this issue with reference to the former Soviet Union.
[7] Although „fieldwork" has long been a hallmark of anthropological endeavor, as post-modern cross-disciplinary fertilization took place throughout the 1980s, practitioners from other disciplines appropriated the term to signify other concepts and practices (Atkinson 1990; Fox 1991). For the defense of traditional fieldwork practices see Moran (1995).

Exchanges Board (IREX) doctoral dissertation grant, I felt modestly self-assured, although slightly intimidated by most of the political science-influenced anthropological literature on the „cold" realities of the Soviet bloc and what I, as a child and a teenager, remembered. As I pondered a potential fieldwork site outside the mainstream village studies, I observed that no one could tell me what I wished to hear: that is to say, that an ideal factory town bursting with the appropriate organizations, heritage, and working-class life-styles awaited my research project. Still more frustrating were the complaints of Hungarian sociologists and political scientists about the current economic situation in Hungary, the impossibility of conducting surveys, and the presumably valueless effort of carrying out fieldwork and participant observation among workers. The more I tried to comprehend this, the more I clung to my „otherness", my „difference" from them; after all, I was educated to believe that I was an American, and an anthropologist. At such times I wanted to be an outsider; I wanted „them" to see me as somebody who took the leading role of the working-class in society for granted. As Paul Rabinow has written, being an outsider „is incessantly apparent" and „the cloud of official approval always hung over me" (1977, p. 79). I, too, felt that native scholars and officials should treat me with respect and distinction. However, this distinction was accorded to me in a different style; in many instances, I was made to feel a „halfie", someone neither from 'Here" nor from „Out There".

One sure sign of being placed into the third timespace zone had to do official seals of approvals. Many of us who conducted fieldwork in the former Soviet Bloc know all too well that official permissions, ministerial and collegial approvals were of primary importance. One could not do much without them even if they were absurd and ridiculous. Once I had to obtain permission to enter the „Closed Section" at the National Library in Budapest. The stamped letter simply stated that I am an anthropologist who needs to look at historical records. With that paper all doors opened up for me. Only if things would have been always so simple!

For a number of reasons, the native ethnographers of the Hofer's kind did little to improve my outlook, or so I felt at that time. Ensconced in museum offices, among dusty nineteenth-century objects, or seated at desks in the ethnographic institute atop Buda Hill, surrounded by western tourists and relentless traffic, most remained insulated from my concerns. Those chairing departments of traditional ethnography and folkloristics did not fare any better. For many, working-class culture, translated through the „dreaded" words of „workers' culture" and „workers' folklore" (munkáskultúra or munkásfolklór) inherited from the Stalinist 1950s, seemed meaningful only if grounded in nineteenth-century traditions and related to the hallmark of their science, the chimeric Hungarian „proper peasants." When I discussed my plan to conduct fieldwork and participant observation in Csepel, with specific reference to workers at the Csepel Works, a few were non-committal, some supported my idea, and others found ways to discourage me. They argued, for example, that the site was too large, ill-suited for an in-depth study, and no longer a functioning

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community, and the subject matter out of favor. Despite this discouragement, I adhered to my original idea and was able to secure permission to enter the Csepel Works, which I was told was of military significance.

As I learned, Csepel has attracted the fascination of writers and travelers beyond the borders of Hungary. To evoke its impact, I quote here two sources, both western, that bear testimony to Csepel's enduring power, at once both real and symbolic. The German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger describes it as follows in *Europe, Europe*:

Today the ironworks of Csepel is one of the dinosaurs of the socialist planned economy. Red Csepel is also a symbolic place for the economic reformers. For them this state-owned concern is not the engine of the economy but a brake block, an unprofitable, immovable relic of Stalinism. The machinery still dates, in part, from the forties; the fittings and infrastructure are obsolete. In truth, Hungary's crisis can be read quite literally from the dust in the passageways, from the resignation in the faces, from the rust in the factory halls (1989, pp. 104-105).

And another observer/traveler in the early 1990s, when the state enterprise was slowly being dismantled as the result of the 1989-1990 transformation, saw it thus:

According to a 1990 map, the short little „Grass-street" in Csepel ends at a square where the statue of V. I. Lenin stands. However, one looks in vain for Vladimir Ilich Lenin: instead we find a few, beaten up containers, dog droppings, and patches of grass here and there. The bronze statue of the leader of the revolution was removed in March 1990. Where? No one knows. One thing is sure: it is gone now. To rework the past is not what people think of these days. The market economy is at the doorstep of the country requiring the full energy of all; clearly new times are coming to Csepel (Zanetti, 1992, p. 14).

Seeing the Csepel Works for the first time in the mid-1980s, I, too, was struck by its behemoth size, ear-splitting din, and lively atmosphere, and the contradictory images it projected. People moved in and out of the factory, and at the gates, through which only those with identification badges could pass, banners, signs and packed stores signaled a strong life force. Outside the main gate single-family workers' houses, with their small vegetable gardens, reminded the visitor of the remnants of the inter-war working-class culture; the main square, with its central location for a catholic church, police station, city hall, the MSzMP (The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party), KISz (Communist Youth Association), trade union, stores, and bus stations, exuded a sense of importance and centralized power. Farther away, huge ten-story apartment complexes dominated the city's landscape, results of the „glorious victory" of Stalinism and state socialism over bourgeois capitalistic individualism, terms so freely mentioned even during the mid-1980s.

Like other academics, anthropologists select fieldwork sites according to criteria ranging, among others, from availability of funding and pressures from advisors to offers of help from those-to-be-studied and personal, intrapsychic motivations. The above impressions contributed to my selection of Csepel in the first place. After the

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initial trips, I read what I could about its history, working class movements, and workers' life stories and was fortunate to find excellent, well-documented studies on Csepel, its past, and later developments. As a source of data, these texts provided intriguing insights into the town's struggle to maintain its identity and preserve its population. I was able to obtain much of this information, especially concerning the struggle of the communist underground in the inter-war Horthy era, from the parents of my informants, some of whom found their way into my studies.[8]

No sooner had I begun my regular daily visits to Csepel and its young workers than I realized that I could not conduct interviews with them alone. I had to become, in the words of Rosaldo, the „positioned" and constantly „repositioned subject" (1993, p. 7). Instead of sticking to my youthful informants, I had to proceed hierarchically, from the top down. In fact, my first informants were company managers, party and communist youth organization secretaries, and trade union stewards who were genuinely eager to learn what „this American" wanted to do in Csepel. By satisfying their curiosity, I also learned that many of my initial hypotheses concerning reproduction, socialism, and factory work were outdated if not simply wrong. Fieldwork does, and should for that matter, challenge prevailing notions of theoreties. When I reached middle-level management and, finally, the workers themselves, I was quite familiar with the hierarchical set-up, organization, power distribution, and the most important company statistics. Feeling like a heretic, I became more and more convinced that state socialism and Marxist-Leninist ur-texts presented a world that were to be found nowhere; neither in Csepel's reality nor in Hungary. It was to be found, literally, in the world of 'Out There', a space of neither here nor there but simply somewhere out there.

As I listened to Csepelers' complaints of rigid industrial hierarchy, excruciatingly slow advancement processes, and hectic work-tempo, I could not help remembering how, as an eighteen-year-old semi-skilled mechanic, I, too, had felt the same things. As we serviced railroad cars dripping with oil, we were aware that our work was filthy; when we picked up our monthly checks, we knew we were grossly underpaid; and when we requested concessions, we were dismissed out of hand. What was to be done? To whom could we turn? There was, to be sure, a trade union, but we were not included among its higher ranks. There were, to be sure, social organizations – the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSzMP) and the Communist Youth League (KISz) – political organs of which we knew very little and whose power we only vaguely sensed, whose leaders descended unannounced on the shops like demigods from time to time. In the course of such reveries, though, I was brought squarely back to my anthropological fieldwork reality by explanations of how differently shopfloors were organized and how decisions were made in Csepel. These were frustrations „in

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[8] In fact, upon my return several of them requested copies of my publications. Knowing English somewhat they immediately began arguing with me, pointing out some of the issues which, to their mind, were not discussed in full detail.

the field" occasioned by the transference of frustrations from „out of the field," in a different time and place.

From the approximately one hundred individuals with whom I came into contact throughout the years between 1985-1986, I selected a manageable group for in-depth inquiry based on availability, on willingness to contribute to this study, and on the personal chemistry required between fieldworkers and their informants. I followed these workers through their factory life; I learned of their involvements in various political and cultural organizations, of their relationships to other workers and to management, and discovered how – and on what – they worked. Their world of labor was equally fascinating and, in a sense, complex, almost chaotic. In fact, the absurd images of Ridley Scott's *Bladerunner* seemed to be superimposed to the world of George Orwell's *1984.*

Added to this hodgepodge of ideological superstructure and the base of the everyday life, was the conflict between my interests in them and their life and their immediate concerns for privacy and intimacy. Although the camera was not a novelty to them – many were in fact avid amateur photographers – they shied away when I raised my camera ready to shoot. It was not as if they did not want to be preserved; on the contrary, many enjoyed enormously when I showed up a few months later with color pictures and gave them copies of our times together. What I found out was that most simply complied with the written/unwritten rule about the „western anthropologist" and being photographed. Such a rule was clearly elaborated for me when I was told by factory management that I could not take any pictures inside the factory gates. No people, no machines, not even seemingly innocent bystanders in an alley-way were considered proper subjects by my guides. The sign „No camera" simply signalled „No natives here!" Machine industry was considered, after all, a minor military installation (in fact most industries in state socialist societies were considered as such); the workers themselves were simply cogs in the wheel. What I had to distill for myself from this experience was that the foreign anthropologist's technological violation of the workplace added a considerable distance between natives (them) and outsiders (me).

As more and more time went by, and I was able to collect more materials, I came to the conclusion that accomplishing a single, descriptive factory ethnography would be impossible, for the industrial complex was composed of many factories, vast and complex organisms requiring many different vital connections in order to maintain themselves. From socialist brigades to factory rituals, from vocational training to club events, I came to see the connections among the various „body parts" forcing me to connect workers' factory existence to their non-factory life. This took me on a separate, but not wholly independent, mission, opening yet another new world before me. The blue overalls, noisy shop-floors, and strict institutional frameworks had disappeared, to be replaced by many individuals, different clothing, new frameworks, and new ideas. It was as if the world of labor was non-existent for these young people.

They expressed different ideas and values, they behaved otherwise from what I had seen in the work place, and what I had expected of them. Most frequented discos (not punk concerts), and smoked and drank incessantly (not French cognac, but beer and *pálinka*, home-brewed plum-brandy); some visited churches (not museums); many read science fiction (not Gogol), attended soccer games (not classical concerts), and watched crime movies as well as the evening bed-time folktales on television.

However, as I spent more time with them, in their favored *kocsma* (pub), hang-out, or weekend hide-out, I came to a realization that the two worlds – the world of labor and that of private life – were neither distinct nor wholly isolated in their minds. When they spoke of their ideas and aspirations to better working conditions and higher salaries, or when they analyzed the latest soccer game, these aspects formed parts of the same process in their discourse. They were startled when I pointed out that in many interviews they criticized political, bureaucratic structures and complained of factory conditions while continuing to talk about „bosses," „work to be performed," or „the next political gathering" during their leisure activities. „Oh, you don't understand anything," argued one youth. „Complaining is not only a favored Hungarian past-time, but also part of being young." Flippant as this may sound, the disinterested nature of young workers toward the state ideology was one of the main causes of the collapse of the state socialist system during the time of the Velvet Revolution.

## Postsocialist Experiences I: The Workers of Csepel

In 1992-1995 I was able to continue my comparative anthropological analysis of the changes that had taken place since 1989 and, in particular, what happened to the workers I knew in Csepel. Because of 1989 and 1990 – the Springtime of the Peoples as many western observers referred to it – much had changed in Hungary, just like elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc countries. Most countries became free from Soviet domination as the Soviet Union itself collapsed, and single-party rule was abandoned in favor of multiparty representation. Hungary had its first free elections in more than forty years; it elected a president and, with the aid of a new constitution, it legitimized a parliamentary representative system. In 1990, a new law went into effect which made illegal the presence of political parties in workplaces and allowed the dismantling of former state enterprises. This effected all state factories, including the Csepel Works.

Csepel suddenly became a non-communist city: in 1990, the MSzMP was voted out of office, and mostly non-communist leaders filled the seats of the district's council and mayoral office. I was, naturally, interested to return and to find out what had happened to my youthful informants. More than that, I wanted to learn what had taken place inside the factories and the fate of all the bureaucrats who served the communist party and its youthful alter ego, the KISz.

Trying to catch up with my former informants was no easy feat. Many worked outside the district, as the result of large-scale dismissal of workers from privatized companies. I had to realize that, although I was supposed to conduct fieldwork and participant observation, Paul Rabinow was correct when he suggested that „one cannot engage in questioning and redefining twenty-four hours a day"(1977, p. 38). Many people were also working in two or three jobs; their time, which had been regulated by the party, trade union, or the communist youth league earlier, was now under the constraints of the market and money. Monitored by the stock exchange, multinational corporations, and transnational trade agreements, the Hungarian economy was slowly transformed. For the anthropologist this make-over meant several heretofore unexperienced realities. There was no possibility of conducting interviews on factory premises, as I had been able to do in 1985. Outside, if they went to the local bar or restaurants, time seemed very short and our conversations abrupt. To be fair to their situation, I must admit that factory officials, now called managers, did not dismiss my research; they simply did not find ample justification to validate my presence inside the factory.

Many signs of the old system had been demolished and removed both inside and outside the factory gates. The large Lenin statue, at the entrance to the factory, was removed from its pedestal and shipped to a warehouse. As a friend admitted, it was not the anti-communists who took it down but, contrarily to popular opinion, members of the communist party and its youth brigade who had decided that, rather than wait for a large-scale riot, which would have been embarrassing to them, it was better to take it down by themselves. Similarly, street names had also been changed, a practice which was widespread in Hungary in 1989 and 1990. All the old communist names were exchanged either for their pre-war names or for new ones. As I found out from my friends, this time, too, the communist party and the KISz were the „culprits." These statues, plaques, and signs may be seen now in the local historical society's little museum.

Despite these „revolutionary changes," however, as one of my former informants told me, a lot had not been transformed by the dismantling of the party-state. For example, I still had to apply for a special entrance document permitting me to visit the various shops and offices. The changing times notwithstanding, there were still some company documents which I was not able to see or, better, photocopy. Cameras were still off limits, and taking fieldnotes on factory premises was almost impossible. I was happy to find that most of the old guard and former KISz leaders were still working in the factory and, not surprisingly, in fairly good positions. One of the KISz secretaries had been „promoted" to a management position involved with hiring new workers; another made it to shop-floor foreman; and a woman secretary, who had managed to get an engineering diploma, made it into the white-collar ranks, a position she had not been interested in even during the mid-1980s when I interviewed her the first time.

The most fundamental change, however, was the nature of the newly hired

workforce. This time they were younger, better educated, more aggressive workers, and, interestingly, since no party official told them who I was and what I wanted to do and, especially, why they should help me, many simply refused to be interviewed. This is the real amputation of the anthropologist. Although I recognize the validity in the statement of Margery Wolf, who writes that „The construction of a partial and incomplete version of a reality observed by the anthropologist begins with the writing of fieldnotes" (1992, p. 87), I had to realize that for me to get there first I had to leave my own anthropological reality (i.e., that I am a a professional fieldworker) and, while trying to still maintain my professional identity, to make a new one.[9] In essence, I had to construct a reality scenario for all my potential youthful informants. This involved a great deal of explanation on my part, convincing them that what I had to do was not in vain and, moreover, that I was genuinely interested in their life-styles. With the KISz youth in 1985-86 it was much easier: the KISz secretary's approval gave me a green light to the membership. Now that there was no more youth organization, getting to people meant a one-to-one reality construction as well as „selling" myself to them.

Also adding to the frustrations was that some of the hard-core party and KISz members whom I interviewed at length in the mid-1980s were suspicious. This had two components: first, they were suspicious because they wanted to know what I had done with my previously collected materials; and, second, because I knew their past, a past which had been ridiculed and delegitimized in the early 1990s, they were wary as to what they should and should not tell me. This knowledge, that I had known their former lives in the „movement," made them feel uneasy and closed. Thus, to my surprise, I had to realize that previous fieldwork experiences, and an extensive knowledge of locals, would not guarantee an immediate entry into the lives of my „new," or even my former informants. Even more, that previous immersion in the local culture might even hamper anthropological inquiry. Clearly, for many I knew the „truth", i.e. their involvement in the communist movement. Knowing little of and in the field is ridiculous knowing too much may be frustrating, if not outright suicidal. Some people who were openly anti-communist did not feel sympathetic to my questioning; others, on the contrary, felt that they did not know any details worthy of my attention and turned away. This new attitudes on the part of my informants forced me to rearrange my interviewing techniques as well as my networks. This I did not have to do in my research among Hungarians in Romania.

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[9] The nature of writing fieldnotes, what they mean and how they provide meaning to ethnographic accounts while taking on their own lives, has been a fashionable topic recently (Sanjek 1990; Emerson Fretz and Shaw 1995; and Pálsson 1995).

Transylvanian Hungarians had been on my mind since I had read the anthropological debate in *Current Anthropology* about the fate of Hungarian minorities under Ceausescu's rule.[10] Although I was able to visit Romania several times while I resided in Budapest in 1985-1986, none of these trips was I able to consider as „official." I felt that since I did enter Romania on a tourist visa, paying all the exorbitant fees and charges as every other western tourist were forced to do, I was not accorded the special anthropologists' treatment.[11] Entering the field, one immediately realizes that the ever-watchful eyes of the state. Requlations forbidding foreigners to stay overnight with families at villages notwithstanding, I traveled extensively in Transylvania, residing with Hungarian families who never turned me away. Playing that kind of hide-and-seek game with the authorities – sleeping in barns and hay-stacks, running ahead of the Romanian police, and lying to the border guards when leaving the country about where I stayed and what I carried with me – had its own sense of romanticism.[12] Although not able to stay in Romania as an „official anthropologist," I decided to conduct miniature research projects in Hungarian villages anyway. Eventually these experiences made their way into publications (Kürti 1987, 1990a), even though I felt uneasy that until I had conducted funded i.e., legitimate fieldwork, I would not be able to express these experiences in an open forum. Yet, these clandestine semi-fieldwork trips assited me in developing an ethnically-based and nationally reliable network. Hungarian priests, teachers, students and writers, as well as ordinary villagers, all came to my aid – just like all „good" informants are supposed to do – to provide data and connections to far-away settlements. These connections proved invaluable for me in the coming years.

In the wake of the changing times in Romania, I applied for a grant, and, thus, received „official recognition. In my working hypothesis I argued that by analyzing the renewed comparable ethnopolitical movements in both Hungary and Romania – their similarities as well as differences – we may witness how the now official language and political actions, however inadvertently, nonetheless continue to perpetuate and even exacerbate former resentments and stereotypes of the „other" while claiming to

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[10] This refers to the article by the Hungarian emigré anthropologist Michael Sozan which was rebutted by the Romanian Research Group's essay also published in *Current Anthropology*. I have analyzed this debate more fully in Kürti (1990b) and Kürti (1995).

[11] Americans had to pay $30 for a visa of thirty-days and $10 for each day staying in Romania. In addition, gasoline tickets had to be purchased with dollars and, as the law required, foreigners had to be housed at a hotel which charged separate prices for foreigners and native guests. However, times are changing in a strange way: in the Summer of 1995 when I left Romania, I was forced to pay a gasoline tax, a spurious amount of money the validity of which I was not able to check in any official documents. My Hungarian friends, however, assured me (even as recently as the end of 1997) that it is a regular custom's procedure a the Romanian border. Others, however, resorted to an old adage: borders have no laws.

[12] Film and notebooks were taken away from me on numerous occassions, just as I had to pay fines for embroideries and potteries considered by Romanian border guards to be invaluable „*art objects*" of the national treasury which had to stay in Romania.

contradict them. In an earlier paper, for example, I had argued that the exacerbation of the conflict between Hungary and Romania was historical and, in part, because of the failure of state socialism, specifically that of Kádárism and Ceausescuism, to cope with the problems of ethnicity and majority-minority relations (Kürti, 1990b). However, as I began to research the current situation of antagonism between the two states concerning their ethnic minorities, I increasingly came to the conclusion that these conflicts are not simply survivals of old, historic debates although history is contantly manipulated and contested by all the sides. During my many meetings with scholars and cultural workers in both Hungary and Romania, I had to realize that the 1990s have provided a different setting from the 1970s and 1980s for rekindling nationalist arguments (Verdery, 1994). Most of these earlier decades were almost free from nationalistic hatred and tension, or so it seemed from the major publications available.

With these troubling thoughts, I arrived in the Transylvanian city of Cluj in January 1993. My official contact was the local Romanian Academy of Sciences office, an outpost of the Bucharest headquarters. Being a „foreign scholar" (they did not grasp what anthropology really was), I had a constant struggle to make my points and to get along with them. I had a much more friendly and collegial relationship with the head of the Sociology department at the Babes-Bolyai University, the late Professor Ion Aluas. He was a key person in obtaining for me a letter which gave me all kinds of freedom.[13] This affiliation proved extremely valuable for meeting both Hungarians and Romanians, while it also allowed me to show this letter whenever I had to deal with local bureaucracy.[14] Interestingly, the passage of eight years notwithstanding, what was strikingly similar between my Csepel research and my Transylvanian research was the necessity of obtaining an official permit – even if it is in the guise of a collegial endorsement – for a foreign anthropologist to conduct research.

Mobility and exchange of information with Romanian and Hungarian colleagues in Cluj was not without its difficulties and funny moments. For example, bureaucrats at the Romanian Academy of Sciences office wanted to know my movements and contacts. I nevertheless pleaded with them and tried to cite what I believe to be the

[13] Professor Aluas – a younger colleague of Henri H. Stahl (1901-1991) – was a kind and extremely knowledgeable man. He was of the old rural sociology school, following in the footsteps of D. Gusti (1880-1955), who wanted to understand the Hungarian-Romanian conflict. Aluas was instrumental in bringing Hungarians to the department of sociology at Cluj, one of the most important being perhaps József Venczel (1913-1972), a Hungarian scholar from the D. Gusti school who spent years in jail on trumped up charges (Venczel 1993). Ioan Aluas was an important figure who was key in reforming sociology at the university of Cluj, including bringing cultural anthropology into the curriculum and developing a center for studying inter-ethnic conflict in Transylvania (Aluas and Rotariu 1992).
[14] I treasure this letter very much. It is written, of course, in Romanian; it has three official signatures and stamps on it. It also „allowed" me to mover freely in parts of Romania. Aluas asked me one morning: „And where would you like to travel? „ „Mostly in Transylvania," I answered with bafflement. „No," he said, „I mean *where* in Romania?" So he ended up writing Transylvania *as well as* Moldavia as the main research site of my fieldwork! After all, a Hungarian-American anthropologist could not just conduct fieldwork in Transylvania about Romanian-Hungarian interethnic relations; not in 1993, not yet.

profession's Fifth Amendment right: thinking that I have the right to remain silent about certain informants, their names, and subjects discussed. In return, my official hosts cited their own rights and responsibilities: if I wanted to be paid for my travels, I had to tell them exactly where I went; if I wanted to be paid for the rent I paid to my village host, I had to tell them where I stayed, with whom and for how many days. So things started to be more and more uncomfortable and I did not feel that I had the upper-hand. Yet, anthropologists must be willing to compromise and find other ways to handle such sensitive and embarassing issues. So I willingly complied with the wishes of my official hosts and revealed all the names and addresses of locals who gave me permission to do so (there were not many). Other names were never mentioned (this was the majority). However, my village hosts smiled when I told them about this verbal hide-and-seek game, rebutting that the Romanian secret police know everything anyway. One thing is sure: fears die hard in the field and „secrecy", whether of the anthropologist' or the informants', is one of the most neglected issues in the debates concerning the fieldwork and the whole of the anthropological enterprise (Mitchell 1993).

In the county seat Cluj, I experienced the renewed and curious conflicts between members of the Hungarian minority and the Romanian majority. By focusing on various cultural and political institutions as well as on elements of everyday culture – such as the politics and the question of native language education – I came to the realization that the conflict between Hungarians and Romanians had become open and vicious, a result of the mismanaged policies of the Iliescu government. In daily life, cooperation between the two groups were not easy to discern. What came as a surprise to me was that while aggression and hatred were minimal and mostly avoided in the open, that was not because of democratic thinking on the part of the population at large, but largely because of the insistence on separate spheres of existence by the two groups. In cultural and religious life, for instance, Hungarians and Romanians continue to live in two separate „realities" supported by the churches' religious world views. In eveyday culture, Hungarians visit their own cultural institutions (theaters, clubs), but less so cinemas, which play only Romanian and western films either synchronized or subtitled. Hungarians, to give another example, frequent the Hungarian theater, but rarely the Romanian National theater. Also at the market-square in Cluj, Hungarians often select those sellers who commute from nearby villages and are themselves of Hungarian ethnic background. Yet this too, seemed to be the case with Romanian city-dwellers. After a little chat, a closeness is established between sellers and buyers, and trust develops allowing the transaction to take place. Needless to say, some of the native producers were bilingual – for I was able to ascertain they spoke both languages fluently – and, thus, some of the city residents may be fooled by them.

These markets were extremely lively locations for observing the interaction of the various nationalities: for example, Gypsies utilized their language skills to

communicate fluently with Hungarians and Romanians alike; and, furthermore, some of them were extremely skillful how to beg for money from foreign tourists. The Cluj market was also a place for testing the level of liberalization and democracy in Romania. Street-signs and Hungarian name plate had almost disappeared, some smeared with paint others knocked down. Cameras and videos were still looked at with distrust and trepidation. I was told to stop filming as well as to put away my camera. At one point a man even decided to make his point in a forceful way by shoving the camera away from my face. Clearly, the past decades of totalitarian terror and state indoctrination were so successful that Transylvanians still felt uneasy about being filmed.[15] While in Csepel my laptop computer elicited awe in my youthful informants, on the Romanian border it caused a minor havoc in 1994; the camera, however, continued to remain in the eyes of the state bureaucrats a weapon for authenticating reality.

The logistics of such actions have for a long time been that recording anything that the state and the police deemed sensitive, including the nationality situation in Romania, was out of the question. By the mid-1990s, however, it seemed to me rather odd that there would be such misgivings about using a recording device. Yet, as it was, even in 1996 – after the signing of the bilateral treaty between the Hungarian and the Romanian governments in September 1996 – issues relating to the situation of the Hungarian minority were still too sensitive to be recorded, especially by a „foreigner". In Romania, a foreigner is even more dangerous if he/she comes from Hungary, or drives a car with Hungarian lincence plates. Such people are doubly burdened by identitities both of their own and those foisted upon them. Clearly, crossing such state and national borders and having to deal with several ascribed and assumed identities places the anthropologist in a special category being in the shifting configurations of the timespace dimension, the actual third timespace mentioned earlier.

Such minor incidences aside, it became clear to me that language has been used as the most important cultural marker to identify and, especially, divide the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority. Book and newspaper reading and church visiting (all language based) are also institutions which separate the two groups. At the main square of Cluj there are separate newspaper stands which cater strictly to Romanians and do not carry any Hungarian language newspapers; vica versa, the few Hungarian sellers only sell their „own" publications. This is not only because of the recent politicization of national identities which follows in the wake of the resurgence of transnational and diaspora identities discernible all over Europe.[16] There is a

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[15] Having a lap-top computer when crossing into Romania was no easy adventure either. Twice I was asked to fill out papers declaring it, together with the video camera, and both serial numbers made it on my visa papers. I guess much of this is simply following the law and trying to counter the illegal transporting of these high-priced products. Yet, knowing the area and the country's totalitarian past somewhat, one cannot but wonder how far the state can go in keeping both citizens and travelers alike in a state of constant fear as well as under surveillance by limiting their access to technology.

[16] See, for example, the recent works by McDonald (1993, 1996), Wilson and Smith (1993), Kideckel (1995), and Kürti and Langman (1997).

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continuing tradition of separateness and distance between these nationality groups. My friends often told me the stories they could only hear from their elders (for reading about them was not possible). These focused on the period which they conveniently termed the „Hungarian world/time." Since in Hungarian these ideas two are expressed by one world (*világ*), to them it was natural to reminiscence that during the time of the Hungarian occupation of Transylvania, between 1941 and 1944, their whole world was transformed. Equally true was the follow-up period, when the Romanian communist party did everything in its power to diminish ethnic and national identities other than the majority Romanian. Listening to their memories I had to realize that their everyday actions or inactions, when it came to the lack of correspondence between the two groups, were rationalized through the real or perceived facts of what it was to be a member of a minority group living under extreme conditions and suffering from the side-effects of state supported nationalism.

In addition to my fieldwork in Cluj, I worked and lived in a Hungarian village (pop. circa 500) about 35 kilometers from the city, where I learned about local-level differences as well as similarities in Hungarian nationalistic perceptions. Also I felt, under the pressure of previous monographs on eastern Europe, that „real" anthropological fieldwork must be conducted in a village setting, with a small number of families, fairly isolated from the hub of city traffic and in a place where I could perform traditional „participant observation," a phase which has been referred to by Crapanzano as „meaningless" (1992, p. 139), but a phrase which may hold different meanings for different anthropologists. What was important, however, was the personal experience of being there and being able to learn through my own trial-and-error living with them. Very soon I had to realize that while I was able to talk to many people, only a few families were able (or willing) to sit for hours and answer my questions. For this reason, I decided to monitor questionnaires – administered to one-third of the village's population – to establish the relevance and reproduction of nationalistic stereotypes concerning the majority Romanians.

The results, which added to my understanding of familiar behavior that I could only observe momentarily and with a few families, had revealed how implications of ethnic stereotyping and nationalistic, ethnocentric rhetoric were embedded in popular consciousness. In questions about stereotyping Romanians, Hungarian villagers expressed disdain and their wish to remain separate from them. Most Hungarians expressed their overt desires that they did not want to live together with Romanians. In specific, I asked for acceptance of Romanians' proximity to Hungarians: „Would you mind if Romanians buy land in your village?" About fifty-percent of Hungarians answered a resounding „No" (more men asnwered in the affirmative though) However, when asked whether they had misgivings about Romanians moving in and buying a house next to them, most of the Hungarians (95 percent) answered that they did not wish this to happen. My survey's initial finding shows a comparable intolerance on the part of Hungarians toward Gypsies as well.

After living in Transylvania, it became clear to me that in present-day Romania there are very few institutions which are designed to bring the majority and minority groups closer to each other. A few individual and artistic (elite) circles, however, do exist; yet, as I was able to observe, even at the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj, Hungarian students form their separate cultural, political, and artistic clubs and circles. This was even more acute as a problem since from the beginning of 1997 the separation of the university into a Romanian and a Hungarian halves was voiced by many. The Hungarian party in Romania, with the able leadership of B. Markó and L. Tőkés, has been intent upon pressuring the Romanian government to make concessions: specifically, some ethnic Hungarians want acceptance of the full autonomous status of the Hungarians in Romania (Biró 1995, Kürti 1995).

These ideas, which to the Romanian leadership are tantamount to full scale separatism even after the thaw resulting from the new government in office since the beginning of 1997, have been expressed to me by my informants on a daily basis. Aside from the elite, they do not use jargon; „separatism" or „autonomy" are not to be found in their vocabulary. Yet, for many, these have been translated to simple acts of cultural preservation, heritage and frictionless co-existence with the majority Romanians. My landlady in the village where I lived for six months, recounted a story to me which she asked me not to tell anyone. But by telling me, and knowing full well what I was doing in her village, I know she meant the opposite: that I could to tell it. While this story concerns her solely, it is extremely important, for it reveals the continuation of some of the hidden tensions between the two nationality groups. In late Fall 1996, she needed medical care and was sent to the local county hospital for a check-up. At the hospital a young doctor inquired about her condition, and the elderly lady tried to explain to the best of her knowledge what she felt. Not finding adequate words in Romanian to describe her condition, she resorted to Hungarian words. The doctor replied sarcastically that she should learn Romanian well enough to communicate with doctors, for after all it is the state language, and otherwise she might not be treated by (Romanian) doctors.

This little story also made me aware why Hungarian villagers prefer to travel forty or fifty miles to another town (or in special cases, even to neighboring Hungary) where they can rely on the care of doctors who are Hungarians and never go back to the county hospital ever again. With such stories behind me, I had to realize that these new times force Hungarians and Romanians to cope with their everyday realities and shape their conceptions accordingly. Naturally, this has also meant a redefinition and repoliticization of identities and inter-ethnic relations. The tension and the distance between the two populations in Romania has been, unfortunately, continuing ever since, and, despite recent governmental changes, both my village and city informants' statements about the different spheres of existence are sadly but truly a continuous reality in present day Romania (Kürti 1995, Kürti 1997). To learn all this has given me a feeling of success which I was not able to receive from anthropological works

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written in the west, save for some notable non-anthropological exceptions (Gallagher 1995). My committed involvement with my friends and colleagues as well as my own national identity, allowed me to gain sensitive information which would have been unthinkable a decade earlier or not necessarily available to a western scholar.

## Conclusions: A New Anthropology of the New East?

Writing about these past experiences naturally brings up the question: what does all this entail both to anthropology and the communities in question? For one, with the fall of the wall way behind us and the former communist countries begging for NATO and EU membership, we now may begin to create a new ethnographic practice which will be fitting for the new cultural tapestry of Europe in general (McDonald 1996; Kokot and Dracklé 1996; and O'Dowd and Wilson 1996) and eastern and central Europe in specific (Danforth 1995; Brumen and Smitek 1995; Giordano 1997; Kirin and Povrzanovic 1996; Kürti and Langman 1997; Schwartz 1996; Tishkov 1997). At this postsocialist moment, and in the changing political, economic, and cultural landscapes, we can never just simply return to our earlier fieldwork sites, areas of existence which were not only transormed but often erased in the tumultuous years after 1989 and 1990. While returning always enables us to reflect back on the changing times, how things were and how much they have changed, the earlier visits cannot and for that matter should not be reproduced.[17] But as anthropologists we should also be aware of using earlier material uncritically to suit our fancy. We need to develop a new vocabulary and a timely theoretical apparatus to deal with the societies which have undergone such tremendous transformations.

Yet for anthropologists working in eastern Europe there are even more burning questions. What are we to make of those communities and institutions we once termed „state socialist" or „communist party" institutions which are no more although our informants once connected to them are still around us? How are we supposed to justify the lack of Marxist-Leninist ur-texts, making these societies work and reproduce according to a master plan; or how, moreover, are we supposed to feel about our past work pigeonholing millions into peripheral and technologically backward existing state socialist societies? Or, can we make a flippant statement that, yes, once these communities were state socialist, but now, with the availability of recent technological gadgetry, they are truly European, Internet-user democracies ready for NATO and EU memberships. Returning to my earlier point in the beginning, about whether anthropological fieldwork really is concerned with gaining first-hand and personal experiences of the peoples' lives we study, one serious question remains: if it was not

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[17] For an insightful account of return visits and changing perspectives on fieldwork among the same populations, see Kenna (1992) and Pálsson (1995).

state socialism, as many scholars and laymen alike now claim in eastern Europe and the West, what did we as anthropologists understand and participate in for all those years? If state socialism can collapse in a few months, how could it have lasted for so long? With whose support? The people's? The anthropologists'? And, finally, how could anthropologists not notice that it would not last very long if they truly understood the intimate and everyday lives of the people they studied?

Aside from these rather (unkind) questions, we might begin also to rethink several of our earlier notions concerning both European anthropology and eastern Europe per se. Conducting fieldwork under the watchful eyes of state and local bureaucrats, with special permits needed to participate and observe, and writing under the constraints of what state socialism really was or (to some) ought to be, cannot be dismissed lightly. For these cut at the very heart of the anthropological enterprise: what we do and why, and how much we care about the societies we study.

Thinking about our fieldwork locale in the 1980s and telling those (almost folkloristic) stories may elicit a few intellectual whimpers, but back then most of us took the power of the party, the police, and the informers a bit too seriously. Even the anti-government and the policemen jokes seemed funny and dangerous at the same time. Yet, in retrospect, I hesitate to add, that we were a little too naïve, often making fools of ourselves, and several of our monographs now attest to that. Critical reflections are clearly the number one order of the day now. By not taking this seriously we are endangering the idea that we take anthropology seriously.

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# ANNA URBÁN*

## THE IDEA OF A UNITED EUROPE BEFORE 1949

It was Victor Hugo who introduced the idea of the United States of Europe, this way comparing it with that of the federal formation of the American contintent. Ortega y Gasset, the philosopher also regarded the lack of pan-European institutions as the barriers of development. The Austro-Hungarian count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in his book entitled *Europe Must Unite* initiated the so called Paneuropa Movement in the 1920s.

In October 1926 the first Paneuropa Congresss was held in Vienna, attended by more than two thousand Pan-Europeans from twenty-four European countries. Von Lukács was the head of the Hungarian delegation.

A few months after the first congress the Central Council of the Pan-European Union met in Paris and offered the Honorary Presidency of the Union to Aristide Briand, the Foreign Minister of France. So in 1929 it was the first occasion on which the idea of a federal Europe was suggested.

There are many parallels between the Briand Plan and the developments after 1945. The Briand Plan was based on Franco-German cooperation, securing French hegemony with British assistance on the continent, excluding only the Soviet Union. At the same time a European 'federation' would break down barriers to trade in Europe and help the continent stand up to American economic competition. However, the British showed little enthusiasm for the plan, for several reasons. On the economic side as Robert Boyce argued, they were opposed to regional trading blocs, preferring a liberal trade policy. They also wished to preserve special commercial links to the Commonwealth, and they did not wish to argue with the Americans, who seemed likely to oppose a European trading bloc because it would restrict US exports.[1]

On the second Paneuropa Congress in Berlin participants discussed the „great difficulties of bringing into harmony the various attitudes adopted regarding European rapproachment.... The most striking feature was the reserve displayed by Great Britain, which was at the time preparing its economic rapprochement with the Dominions and was not willing to be hampered by continental ties during this period of construction. Great Britain's attitude, supported by the bureucracy

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[1] Young, J.: *Britain and the European Unity 1945-1992*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1993, p. 4

of Geneva, which saw in European union a dangerous rival to the Leauge of Nations, contributed in no small degree to the failure of Briand's initiative".[2]

Some in Britain did show interest in European cooperation, however. Earnest Bevin, a trade union leader, after visiting the US in 1927 believed that a large, single market in Europe would improve trade and employment levels. He showed interest in European unity until the 1930s. In 1940 he advocated a rather different idea of an Anglo-French imperial customs union.[3]

There were also a number of influential British figures who believed in 1938-9 that, given the failure of the League of Nations to maintain peace, states should surrender some of their sovereignty to a federal world government. Among the supporters of the 'Federal Union' movement there were Archbishop William Temple and the Ambassador to Washington, Lord Lothian. They were inspired by *Union Now!* a book by an American journalist, C.K. Streit, published in 1938. Streit however believed that a federation was only possible among the liberal democracies, so his scheme could not have avoided war with the agressor states. Still, the ideas developed by the British Federal Union movement had an important impact on the wartime development of federalist ideas in Europe among Resistance movements determined that there would be no more destructive European wars.[4]

It is notable that just before the Fall of France to the Nazis in June 1940, Britain offered her ally an 'indissoluble union', including common citizenship, Imperial unity and a single cabinet. This proposal was drawn up by officials from both countries, most notably France's Jean Monnet. The 'indissoluble union' appealed to Britain's new Prime Minister, Churchill, and France's Under-Secretary of War, Charles de Gaulle, mainly as a way of keeping the French Empire in the war. This proposal was turned down by the French Cabinet, who feared a British attempt to take over the French Empire and were convinced of Germany's ultimate victory.[5]

## The Idea of a Western Bloc

The inter-war years represent a period when Britain had already ceased to be strong enough to justify it playing the role of the dominant world power, but, because of the withdrawal of the United States from participation in the international system, and because of the defeat of Germany, there was no barrier to Britain continuing to play the role.

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[2] Coudenhove-Kalergi, R.: *Europe Must Unite*, Paneuropa, Glarus 1939, p. 63
[3] Young, p. 5
[4] ibid.
[5] ibid.

During the Second World War the representatives of the governments in exile in London (Belgian, Holland, Norwegian) regarded Great Britain as the future leading power after the war, and in the Foreign Office they had the belief that the formation of a Western bloc would be able not only to control Germany but to help Great Britain to maintain its position of dominance. Britain had always held a special place in ordering the affairs of the world, and, despite its reduced position its statesmen continued to play this role.

It is ironical enough, but the idea of a British-led 'Western bloc' was first put forward by Stalin himself, in talks with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in December 1941. Stalin saw British military bases in Western Europe as a way to hold down Germany after the war, and as a compensation for Britiain for Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe.[6]

As Churchill was aware of the fact that Britain lacked the resources to build up Western Europe into a strong military alliance, any attempt to achieve a Western bloc before the end of the war was rejected by him. At best he hoped for a loose 'Council of Europe' as a part of a number of regional organisations under the UN.[7]

The Foreign Office was perfectly aware that Britain was incapable of resisting the strength of the United States, or the Soviet Union once it had recovered from the war. In order to counteract the influence of the USSR the Foreign Office saw it essential to keep the United States as a significant actor in the international system. Preventing a further withdrawal of the United States into isolation became a major preoccupation of British foreign policy after the war.

It was probably for this reason that Winston Churchill made the special relationship with the United States the first of the three spheres of influence for Britain that he identified in a famous analysis of the country's position in the world. The other two spheres were the Commonwealth and, definitely in third place, Europe. Churchill presented this analysis when he was the leader of the opposition, but there is little doubt that it represented the concensus view of the Conservative and Labour leaderships, and of the Foreign Office.[8]

The idea of a special relationship was based on the belief that the Americans, as another English-speaking nation, would need guidance of Britain in how to conduct themselves in international affairs. When successive US Administrations supported the movements for West European unity, the British saw it as a mistake which simply proved that the Americans needed British guidance. Suggestions from Washington that Britain might join the European Communities that were being shaped were seen in the same light. Despite the support of the United States for British participation in the European Communities, the belief in a special

[6] Young, p. 6
[7] ibid.
[8] George, S.: *An Awkward Partner*, Oxford University Press 1994, p. 14

Atlantic relationship acted as a psychological barrier to Britain's policy-makers seeing the need for such participation.[9]

The Commonwealth had considerable economic and political importance for Britain, but it became a real barrier to cooperate with the six states that eventually came together to form the European Communities. The Commonwealth as a perceived sphere of influence deterred British policy-makers from seeing any need to be a part of a 'narrow' European grouping. Popular sentiment could easily be mobilised in favour of 'kith and kin' in the Commonwealth and against 'foreigners' in Europe.[10]

The war had drained the country of financial reserves, harmed its overseas trade and its merchant navy. Peace added to problems: apart from the need to end wartime controls, the British people opted for costly social reforms and nationalisation by voting Labour in the July election. Economic and financial problems, Imperial crises and Cold War tensions faced the new government with challenges and looking for new directions in foreign policy. Foreign Office Secretary Bevin's meeting with the Foreign Office about Western Europe, on 13 August 1945, was clearly more than an isolated example of interest in continental cooperation. By emphasizing the need for economic cooperation Bevin went beyond the Foreign Office, which had put the accent on military and political links.[11] The negative view of the Treasury and the Board of Trade had been made clear at an inter-departmental meeting in July when their representatives argued that Britain must preserve its economic independence, its world trading role and its ties to the Commonwealth, and believed that America would oppose a European trade bloc.[12]

Another reason for the delays to the Western bloc was poor British relations with France. The only real progress in Franco-British relations was made in September 1946 by the formation of an Economic Committee, accompanied by a settlement of financial debts. Economic Committees were created with many other West European countries to discuss mutual problems. Bevin's interest in economic cooperation went beyond bilateral agreements. In September he pressed the British government to study a customs union with Western Europe.[13]

The year 1947 began with successful talks on a Franco-British treaty. This change of French attitude came because of a short-lived Socialist government in France, whose leader was a leading anglophile, Leon Blum. British Ambassador Duff Cooper, who was seen as an early advocate of European unity,[14] encouraged

[9] ibid., p. 15
[10] ibid., p. 16
[11] Young, p. 8
[12] ibid.
[13] ibid., p. 12
[14] Charmley, J.: Duff Cooper, 1986

him to sign a treaty, which was finally signed in March 1947, at Dunkirk. Bevin began talks with the Belgians about a possible treaty, based on the Dunkirk model. This was consistent with Bevin's declared aims in August 1945. On 7 May Bevin told a Foreign Office meeting, that with the Americans predominant in the western hemisphere and with the Soviets dominant in Eastern Europe, Britain must organise the Western bloc.[15] However, Bevin's talks on Belgian treaty had not progressed because on 5 June American Secretary of State George Marshall offered to assist a European economic recovery programme.

The Marshall Plan had few details when it was launched. It forced Western European states to work together to draw up a joint recovery programme, but it can be shown what resistance there was to US attempts to shape Europe in its own image into a large, single marketplace. Each European country was keen to protect its own interests, not least the British, who were determined to preserve imperial trade preference and their special financial position in the Sterling Area. Bevin refused to be treated as 'just another European country'[16], though it would be wrong to conclude that Britain was opposed to European cooperation. The Foreign Office had always wanted Western European cooperation as a way to improve Britain's international standing, a way to match the power of America and Russia, but not as a way to the loss of independence.

An indication of division between France and England over the future of Europe emerged in 1947 when the British and French took the initiative in convening a conference of all European states interested in receiving aid from the United States under the plan and a Council for European Economic Co-operation was created.. The formation of a customs union had been proposed by the French, but the British had declined to be involved in such a project.[17] Jean Monnet, the head of the Economic Planning Commission charged with organizing France's economic recovery recognized that France was too small an economy to be able to compete effectively in international terms, and that a wider domestic market was necessary if European companies were to be fostered which would match the Americans in size and scale. But the British representatives argued that the problems of Europe were global problems, and that an exclusive trading block would be no solution.

The idea of a 'third force' appealed to some elements of the Labour Party after the war, but it was abandoned by them following the Hague Congress of April 1948, designed to further the cause of European unity at which 'Labour observers noted that the attendance was overwhelmingly representative of

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[15] ibid., p. 13.

[16] Hogan, J.: *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe* (Cambridge 1987), p. 48-51

[17] Barker, E.: *Britain in a Divided Europe*, London 1971 pp. 78-79

Conservative and capitalist groups.'[18]The star speaker there was Winston Churchill, which was a sure reason for Labour members to be suspicious of the unity movement. But before the Hague Congress Foreign Office put down its views in a memorandum. A Cabinet paper, 'The First Aim of British Policy, circulated in January 1948, talked of 'a Western Union among European states, with the backing (and not the participation) of America.'[19] When Bevin on 22 January made a speech to the House of Commons where he stated 'Britain cannot stand outside Europe', his announcement was welcomed by the Conservative opposition, whose foreign affairs spokesman Anthony Eden was an advocate of a Western bloc.[20]

There was a difference between the 'third forcism' of British Labour Party members and that of the French politicians'. French conservative Foreign Minister Georges Bidault in 1946 proposed and Anglo-French treaty around which Western Europe could unite independently of the United States and the Soviet Union. Labour members had the ideological motivation to find a middle way between the capitalism of the United States and the communism of the USSR, whereas for many French politicians the motivation was national pride.[21]

For Britain the security of Western Europe had to be based on the unchallenged leadership of the United States owing to its historical and cultural sympathy for the United States and its conviction that it could enjoy special relationship with the new dominant power. For France the key to remain independent of the US was to build up Western European unity under French leadership. Britain suspicious of the 'third forcism' inherent in this French proposal, rejected the project. It can be noted that the Western alliance had many internal differences, and for numerous reasons British policy began to differ radically from its continental allies. Bevin saw the prime aim of a European cooperation as being to strengthen Britain's role in the world, and he was not prepared to agree to the loss of British power to any centralised European institutions.

Outside government circles even the idea of a European-Commonwealth union persisted for some time. It was drawn up in a so-called 'Strasbourg Plan' in the Council of Europe in late 1949, and was supported by Churchill's Conservative delegation.[22] In a pamphlet 'What do you think about the Western Union' circulated by the British Conservative Party in 1949 Robert Boothby, MP for East Aberdeenshire wrote that 'the new phase should be the development of regional groups of Colonial territories of Europe, in Africa and Asia. And the

[18] Morgan, K.: Labour in Power 1945-1951, Oxford 1984, pp. 391-392
[19] CAB 129/23, CP (48) 8.
[20] House of Commons debates, Hansard (H.C. Deb. 5s), vol. 446, cols. 387-409 (Bevin) and 418-28 (Eden)
[21] George, p. 19
[22] Young, p. 24

ultimate goal should be the welding of the whole into a new democratic United Nations Organisation, which will have the advantage of being genuinely united for the realisation of a common purpose.'[23]

Given the fact that Britain lacked material resources, Bevin saw it impossible to realise a customs union, Euro-African links and a strong French alliance. However, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949, the Foreign Office found it very attractive that an alternative to European Unity was formed.[24]

[23] British Conservative Party, *Leaflets and Pamphlets*, CPA 1949/28 p. 10
[24] Young, p. 25.

# Notes for Contributors
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