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TARTALOMJEGYZÉK

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE WORD TYPES OF THE NEW HEADWAY COURSEBOOKS

MÁRIA CSERNOCH – ILDIKÓ KORPONAYNÉ-NAGY

Introduction

Surprisingly, until recently the selection of the vocabulary of a given coursebook received very little attention in teaching foreign languages. Earlier, neither the writers of these coursebooks nor the teachers using them attributed much importance to the vocabulary used. As a consequence, when selecting a coursebook testing of the vocabulary was either completely dismissed or, if looked at, it was a minor point as compared to the grammar, to the exercises and sometimes even to the pictures and colors used (Carter and McCarthy 1991; Grant 1994; Oxford and Scarcella 1994; Scurfield 2003).

Recently a number of criteria have emerged that could be used when planning the vocabulary of a coursebook. Here we would like to call the attention to two of these criteria, namely, the facts that a coursebook should include the most frequent and the most useful words (Cunningsworth 1995; Scurfield 2003). The list of the most frequent words can be accessed from several different sources, therefore the writers of nowadays coursebooks have the opportunity to use these frequency lists when planning their coursebook. The second criterion given above for the selection of the vocabulary, the most useful words, is not so easily comprehensible and not so easily tested as the frequency. The problem arises from the simple fact that usefulness has more of a subjective component than frequency. An additional criterion mentioned by Cunningsworth (1995) and by Yongqi (2003), too, that a coursebook should teach at least one thousand words, or as many as possible, during the course. While the given number seems to give a rather objective criterion, it can be very misleading since the „magical" one thousand words can not be completed at all levels and with all age groups. Further uncertainty comes from the term „teach as many words as possible". It is hardly justifiable to expect from students of a second language to know more words than that used by a native speaker.

Methods

In these studies the volumes of the *New Headway* series were analyzed. The reason for selecting this particular series was the comment found on the cover of these books stating that the *New Headway* series is the „most trusted English course" (Soars and Soars 2003), which gives a coursebook for every level of studies.

For the analyses the full material of each and every volume of the series – *beginner, elementary, pre-intermediate, intermediate, upper-intermediate,*

advanced – was digitized. The volumes were then analyzed individually and, after concatenating the volumes as they follow one another in the series, the complete long texts were also examined.

For the analyses the full digitized material was split into intervals containing one hundred words (blocks) and the texts in these small blocks were examined further in detail. The number of word types was counted in each and every block and then stored which, consequently, allowed us to explore the strategy used by the authors for the introduction of new word types. These results were then compared to literary works of approximately equal lengths to establish to what extent does the vocabulary and the tendency of the introduction of word types in a carefully planned (or should have planned) coursebook differ from the same parameters of a novel or a collection of short stories.

Results

Our results clearly demonstrated that the vocabulary of a coursebook as well as the introduction of the word types in these books greatly resemble the vocabulary of a collection of short stories (*Fig. 1*).

Figure 1.
The introduction of word types
in Kipling, *The Jungle Books* and in the *New Headway Intermediate* coursebook



We compared a collection of short stories, Kipling's *The Jungle Books*, with a coursebook of approximately equal length from the *New Headway* series. The data show that both the number of word types (Table 1) and their distribution (Fig. 1) are essentially identical in the two texts. In other words, there is no significant difference between the vocabulary in the two texts. This, furthermore, means that a literary work can just as efficiently used for the developing of the vocabulary, learning new words and repeating them, of a second language learner as a coursebook written for this particular purpose. Earlier studies (Yongqi 2003) have

also concluded that the reading of literary works can be a more efficient way of developing one's vocabulary then the studying of coursebooks which have, in most cases, independent and randomly selected themes (Oxford and Scarcella 1994).

Table 1.

The comparison of the vocabulary of Kipling's *The Jungle Books* and the *New Headway Intermediate* (lemma = block*100)

Title	Block	Type	Hapax legomena
The Jungle Books	516	4688	2064
Headway Intermediate	500	4803	2072

There is another clear result from counting the word types in the *New Headway* series. The number of word types by far exceeds the expected *one thousand types/volume* in each and every volume of the series (Tables 2 and 3). This observation is noteworthy even though we have not lemmatized our texts.

When a computer aided analysis of texts is carried out the question of lemmatization, whether the lemmatization is needed for the accurate evaluation, always reappears. The same is true for coursebooks, one should consider if lemmatization should precede the actual analysis. However, if we take into account that during the teaching/learning of a second language the different forms of the given word usually all appear in the students' vocabulary books, we can dismiss the lemmatization of the text and, probably, the result will be closer to real life and thus be more reliable. This is especially true for beginners who not only learn the lexical entry (lexeme) of a word but, due to the lack of knowledge of appropriate grammatical rules, the inflected forms as well. There are a number of examples when the student does not yet know the lexical term, but knows, from films, from the lyrics of a song, from readings, or uses in conversations other forms of the given word, e.g. *born*, *satisfied*, *data*. Taken all these into account lemmatization did not precede the actual analysis words were counted in the form they appeared in the text.

Table 2.

The number of words (lemma), word types and hapax legomena in the volumes of the *New Headway* series

Title	Block	Type	Hapax legomena
Beginner	163	1539	501
Elementary	239	2452	864
Pre-Intermediate	317	3309	1373
Intermediate	500	4803	2072
Upper-Intermediate	511	5646	2430
Advanced	513	6724	3274

The number of words in the given volume increased steadily until the volume *intermediate* while the last three volumes had approximately equal number of words. There is no clear reason for setting an upper limit for the number of words. A more reasonable approach would have been to increase the number of words in the oncoming volumes together with setting an upper limit on the number of word types. This would have increased the number of repetition of a given word and, consequently decreased the number of hapax legomena.

On the other hand, every volume considerably exceeds the one thousand words that are expected to be taught on a course, and there are cases when several thousand word types are found in a volume. It should also be stressed that the number of hapax legomena (Tables 2 and 3) and the number of words occurring less than ten times in the whole series is extremely high. This should be viewed in the light of a number of studies pointing out students fail to remember half of the words that they encounter only once or twice. A word should appear at least 7-8 times (extreme opinions require 5-16 occurrences) for students to remember them (Yongqi 2003; Scurfield 2003; Oxford and Scarcella 1994). By the end of the series the students encounter 224 500 words, 11 648 word types from which 4 636 occurs only once in the series. Both the number of word types and the number of hapax legomena are, in our opinion, too high. As a result, teachers using this series should be prepared that the series can only be used successfully from the point of vocabulary teaching if they use substantial amount of additional material which is systematically designed from the point of lexical content. This is in accordance with the opinion of Scurfield (2003) who, based on earlier studies (Oxford and Scarcella 1994; Schmitt 2000), suggested that most second language teachers, logically, assume that writers of these coursebooks have a general idea based on which they build up their books. Therefore, the vocabulary of the coursebooks should make a whole. Unfortunately, and unforgivably sometimes this is not the case.

Table 3.

The number of words in the concatenated volumes of the *New Headway* series

Title	Block	Type	Hapax legomena
Beginner	163	1539	501
Beginner→Elementary	402	2943	962
Beginner→Pre-Int.	719	4550	1628
Beginner→Intermediate	1220	6760	2607
Beginner→Upper-Int.	1731	8989	3456
Beginner→Advanced	2245	11648	4636

When writing a coursebook it is of vital importance to decide which words should, or must be included in the vocabulary. Although there are several aspects to the

question (Oxford and Scarcella 1994; Carter and McCarthy 1991; Scurfield 2003; Yongqi 2003), almost every work in the field agrees that the teaching of the most frequently used words should be the primary goal. Therefore, we used the frequency list of the *British National Corpus* (*BNC*) (Aston and Burnard 1998) (*http://www.itri.bton.ac.uk/~Adam.Kilgarriff/bnc-readme.html*) and the 1000 most frequently used words from the *Reading Teacher's Book of Lists* (Fry et al. 2000) (*http://www.duboislc.org/EducationWatch/First100Words.html*) to examine to what extent do the volumes of the *New Headway* series fulfill the requirement of teaching the most frequently used words.

In order to enable the comparison of the word list from *Headway* with the other frequency lists they first had to be formed to have the same structure. Since the structures of the frequency lists from the *Headway* and from the *Reading Teacher's Book of Lists* were almost identical, the list from *BNC* was altered to match the former two. To this end first the compounds and expressions were separated into individual words then the different meanings of the same word were counted. The final frequencies were obtained by adding the frequencies associated with the different meanings.

Figure 2.

Comparison of the frequency list from the *BNC* with the first three concatenated volumes of the *New Headway* series. The continuous lines in **A** and **B** show the ideal case, in which the two list would agree. In contrast, the number of words in the series which have different frequencies than in the *BNC*, is rather high. The graphs in **C** and **D** show how many of the first *n* words in the frequency list of the *BNC* (black trace) and of *the Reading Teacher's Book of Lists* (gray trace) are found in the *New Headway* series. As long as the ratio is 1, the two values are identical, if it is less than 1, then there are words which, albeit present in the lists of large corpora are not in the *New Headway* series.



Comparing the frequency list of the *New Headway* series to those of the two large corpora we found that there is no large difference between the frequencies of words from closed classes. In contrast, the coursebooks contain a number of words the knowledge of which is essential for solving the exercises in these books. These words have a much lower frequency in the *BNC* and are not in the first 1000 words of the list from the *Reading Teacher's Book of Lists*. This means that, even at the beginning of second language teaching words that students are taught words that

they use exclusively on language classes and, therefore, their practical value is negligible. Apart from technical terms associated with the exercises and the grammar, coursebooks tend to have larger frequency for words associated with eating, with working or with family relations. On the other hand, there is a large number of words that appear in the front of the frequency lists from large corpora but have a very low frequency in the *New Headway* series.

Summary

In our studies we found that the vocabulary and the way how word types are introduced in the analyzed coursebook series does not differ significantly from the same parameters of a collection of short stories. Furthermore, we found that the number of word types and the number of words that are mentioned only once in the whole series are too large. This observation, together with earlier studies suggests that the students will, most likely, not remember the words that have such low frequencies. The question thus arises how useful for students is and how effectively can a teacher use a coursebook with such parameters. The numbers show that the books provide an extensive, albeit not necessarily the most frequent and useful vocabulary, therefore, their efficient use in the classroom requires that the teachers prepare large additional material for the students.

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THE REMNANTS OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION IN THE „GOLDEN STATE", 6 YEARS AFTER PROPOSITION 227

SÁNDOR CZEGLÉDI

1. Introduction: Defining „Bilingual Education" in the U.S. context

Language policy conflicts in the United States have centered on three primary issues since the mid-1960s: education policy for language minority children; access to political and civil rights by non-English speakers; and the state/federal level attempts to establish English as the sole official language (Schmidt 2000: 11). The various accommodations that limited English proficient (LEP) minority children should receive have always been as much a political as a pedagogical flashpoint. Even the exact definition of the term, „bilingual education" (BE) has given rise to considerable controversy among experts and the general public alike. According to National Public Radio's Morning Edition Series on Bilingual Education, BE for educators means „a specific curriculum that teaches fluency in two distinct languages" (one of which, in the American context, is English), whereas many people use the term far more generically, to include „any special instruction for children with limited English skills" (Bilingual Education in the U.S.). A bit simplistic and restrictive as they might be, the definitions still highlight the fault lines that divide U.S. society on the issue.

Arguably, there is a basic distinction between education that (1) consciously promotes two languages (enrichment orientation), and (2) education for language minority children in general (Baker 2001: 192), with the hastening of language shift being the ultimate – whether overt or covert – objective (remedial orientation). The varieties of the former involve the „strong" (additive) forms of BE, where bilingualism and biliteracy are the desired outcomes: e.g. two-way (bilingual) immersion (TWI) (a.k.a. dual language education), and maintenance/developmental bilingual education (DBE). The „weak" (subtractive) forms of BE include e.g. transitional bilingual education (TBE), which uses native-language instruction but phases in English instruction as quickly as possible, and „structured/sheltered English immersion" (SEI), where language minority children are taught primarily through sheltered English techniques to increase the comprehensibility of input, with the native language used only for clarification.

Based on Ruíz's „orientations in language planning" (1984), Crawford outlines three paradigms that can be applied to describe the rationales for and the shifting attitudes towards BE in the U.S. language policy context (Crawford 2003):

Remedial Paradigm (language as problem): limited English proficiency is treated as a deficiency which calls for remedial attention;

Equal Opportunity Paradigm (language as right): focuses on equal educational opportunity for minority children by ensuring equal access to the curriculum;

Multiculturalist Paradigm (language as resource): bilingualism and maintenance / developmental BE are seen as worthy goals, or „English Plus" mentality.

According to Cummins, the debate on bilingual education in the U.S (i.e. the controversy over enrichment-oriented v. remedial-oriented programs) involves the collision of discourses between educational equity and xenophobia, even racism (Cummins 2000: 232). In broad terms, what is at odds is the pluralist v. assimilationist interpretation of the American past: the conflicting arguments about ethnic equality v. national unity (Schmidt 2000: 99). And the real (bilingual) education issue is to what extent (transformative) pedagogy can challenge the operation of coercive relations of power in school and society (Cummins 2000: 172).

2. Bilingual education as a political issue at Federal and California level

Latino immigration intensified after President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Hart-Cellar Act into law: the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 had far-reaching effects on the ethnic composition of the United States. The 1920s quota system was liberalized, and in 1968 it was finally abolished in favor of a first-come, first-served policy. Between 1930 and 1965, the top 3 contributors to U.S.-bound immigration had been Germany (940,000), Canada (900,000), and Mexico (610,000). As a direct consequence of the Hart-Cellar Act, the pattern underwent profound changes between 1965 and 2000, with Mexico heading the list (with 4.3 million documented, and about as many illegal immigrants), the Philippines coming next (1.4 million), and Korea in the third place (0.76 million people). A significant number of people had arrived from the Dominican Republic (0.75 m), India (0.74 m), Cuba (0.72 m), and from Vietnam (0.7 m) (*The Peopling of America*). The nation's school system began to feel the impact of the huge number of non-English-speaking children as early as the second half of the 1960s, prompting federal action to remedy the situation.

In order to reduce the high dropout rates among Latino students in the Southwest, Congress passed the first Bilingual Education Act (BEA) in 1968, which began a 34-year federal endorsement of (mostly transitional) bilingual education methods. In California, then Governor Ronald Reagan had signed a bill (SB 53) into law just one year before, which – for the first time since 1872 – made BE legal in the state's schools.

At federal level, the reauthorized BEA in 1974 saw the rationale for bilingual education in providing equal educational opportunity for LEP children, and declared that the native language was to be used „to the extent necessary to

allow a child to progress effectively through the educational system" (BEA, 1974, Sec. 703 [a][4][A][i]). Thus the Act recognized the right to use the minority language as a remedial tool.

The year 1974 witnessed other important – and mandatory – federal level developments in the field of educational rights. The *Lau v. Nichols* Supreme Court decision (414 U.S. 563) outlawed „sink-or-swim" as a legitimate „teaching method" for LEP children, although the court declined to mandate BE as a specific remedy. The federal level Equal Educational Opportunity Act of the same year required that educational agencies „take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by [their] students in [their] instructional programs" (Del Valle 2003: 243). However, „appropriate action" was not to be automatically equated with BE. The US Office of Education, on the other hand, interpreted the *Lau* decision as a mandate for BE, whenever a school district was found to be violating LEP civil rights (Crawford 2000: 93). This aggressive enforcement contributed to the rise of anti-BE attitudes, which developed into assimilationist political momentum from the end of the decade.

By relying on the EEOA to decide a bilingual education issue, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth a three-pronged test in the *Castañeda v. Pickard* case (1981) to determine the appropriateness of a particular school system's language remediation program. According to the *Castañeda standard*, a program serving LEP students – and receiving federal funds – had to be based on „a sound educational theory", implemented effectively, and evaluated as effective after a trial period (/5th Cir. 1981/ 648F.2d 989). Obviously, English-monolingual methods have also been qualified as „appropriate" ever since, given the loose interpretation of the term.

In 1976, the California legislature went further towards the implementation of a multiculturalists paradigm by adhering to a strong interpretation of the „language-as-right" language planning orientation: the Chacon-Moscone Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act declared (even the „maintenance" version of) BE as a right of LEP students, and required schools to offer this accommodation „whenever the language census indicates that any school of a school district has 10 or more pupils of limited English proficiency with the same primary language in the same grade level" (California Education Code, Sec. 52165 [a] [1]).

Yet, attitudes towards BE were beginning to change around the second half of the 1970s: economic decline, disillusionment in the wake of the Vietnam war, and the rise of Neoconservatism ushered in „melting pot"-type assimilationism with nativistic overtones, occasionally draped into English-only activism, which had resulted in the passage of „official English" legislation in 16 states by 1988.

At the federal level, various reports and studies began to question the effectiveness of bilingual education methods, and the unfolding backlash took its toll on the Bilingual Education Act as well. In 1978, L1-maintenance bilingual

education (a.k.a. „developmental bilingual education", DBE) was removed from the list of federally supported programs (although the restriction was somewhat eased in 1984). During Ronald Reagan's presidency, monolingual methods, such as structured (or „sheltered") English immersion (SEI) gained special recognition as „bilingual" programs under the generic name of Special Alternative Instructional Programs (SAIPs), eligible for up to 25 percent of annual BEA appropriations in 1988.

The early 1980s witnessed the strengthening of the Chacon-Moscone Act: the Bilingual Education Improvement and Reform Act of 1980 expanded the use of students' primary languages in classroom instruction (Witt 1998). The tide began to turn around 1986: California voters overwhelmingly adopted Proposition 63, which became the state's „official English" law, intending to „preserve, protect and strengthen the English language" (Proposition 63). Although it did not contain any explicit references to education *per se*, the timing and the result of the referendum appeared to legitimize Governor Deukmejian's decision to veto the extension of the Chacon-Moscone Act, which consequently „sunsetted" in 1987. The „general purposes" of the law remained active (but ceased to be mandatory), and school districts were allowed to continue offering the specialized services to their students, with financial support from the state (Biegel and Slayton 1997). For eleven years following the Act's sunset, the California State Legislature was unable to garner the necessary consensus for any subsequent legislation regarding bilingual education (Cos 1999: 16).

Even before the Governor's veto, hundreds of schools had been „out of compliance" with state law, due to critical shortages qualified bilingual teachers and the influx of ethnically diverse students. Between 1977 and 1987, K-12 LEP-population had risen from 233,000 to 613,000 in the state (Crawford 1991: 154). Criticism of bilingual programs – and of those that were just called bilingual – was intensified by the mid-1990s. The already crumbling stature of BE was further undermined by the 1993 release of a Little Hoover Commission report, titled „A Chance to Succeed: Providing English Learners with Supportive Education" The independent bipartisan state oversight agency condemned the State Department of Education's „single-minded pursuit of the method known as native-language instruction" and branded it „divisive, wasteful, and unproductive" (Little Hoover Commission). Almost one-fourth of English learners (ELs, formerly: LEP) were receiving no special assistance at all, which was illegal not only by California but also by federal standards (cf. *Lau v. Nichols* 1974). Student redesignation rate from EL to fluent English proficient status (FEP) was considered to be proceeding at an agonizingly slow pace. The Little Hoover Commission also criticized the State Department for not developing and implementing a valid assessment system to track student outcome. The Commission recommended the introduction of financial incentives for schools to help students attain English proficiency rapidly;

suggested increased local control and flexibility in creating programs to meet the needs of the EL population, with greater accountability for results rather than methods; and advised to strengthen teacher training with „language acquisition theory, cultural diversity and techniques to enhance learning ability" (ibid.).

The Commission's recommendations were realized only 18 years later – by the passage of a comprehensive elementary and secondary education bill – at the federal level. The „No Child Left Behind" Act (NCLB), signed by President G. W. Bush on January 8, 2002, is aimed at closing the achievement gap in America's public schools between disadvantaged students and their peers. The new law emphasizes the principles of strict accountability for results, increased local control and flexibility in using federal education funds and it calls for states to have highly qualified teachers in every public classroom.

For bilingual education, NCLB represents a marked departure from past federal policies. Barely eight years before, the reauthorized Bilingual Education Act Title VII of the „Improving America's Schools Act" (IASA) had recognized minority languages as a valuable resource, and declared that the education of LEP students should include the development of „bilingual skills and multicultural understanding" and „the native language skills of such children and youth" (BEA 1994, Sec.7102 [b] [2-3]). On the contrary, the „No Child Left Behind" Act treats minority languages as a minor irritant at best, a serious problem at worst. According to the official bill summary, it completely changes the focus of BE programs from teaching LEP children „primarily in their native languages" to „helping LEP children learn English" (United States House Education and the Workforce Committee). This interpretation of BE seems to reinforce the popular misbelief that BE is not meant to foster proficiency in English; rather, it is almost exclusively aimed at maintaining minority languages and ethnic cultures. From the actual text of the Act, all references to bilingual education have been expunged: the historic „Bilingual Education Act" has been transformed into the „English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and Academic Achievement Act", with the purpose of ensuring that LEP children „attain English proficiency" and „develop high levels of academic achievement in English, and meet the same challenging State academic content and student academic achievement standards as all children are expected to meet" (NCLB 2001, Sec. 3102 [1]). Educational agencies and schools are to be held accountable for „demonstrated improvements in the English proficiency of limited English proficient children each fiscal year" (NCLB, 2001, Sec. 3102 [8] [A]). Since even „ESL pullout" or English Language Development (ELD) can produce spectacular improvements in the short run – at least in basic interpersonal communicative skills (BICS) – as demonstrated by, for example, Thomas and Collier in 1996 (cited in Crawford 1997), schools may choose the weakest forms of „bilingual" education and will be pushed toward redesignating/mainstreaming their students prematurely in order to comply with the

requirements of the law. Yet, cognitive academic language proficiency (CALP), which, according to Cummins (2000: 58), supposedly enables immigrant students to approach grade norms in academic aspects of English, takes on average 5 to 7 years to develop. However, late-exit BE educational options have been strongly discouraged by federal level policies since 2002, and have explicitly been forbidden by California law since 1998.

Still, Title III of NCLB makes federal funding allowances for one genuinely bilingual „language instruction educational program" which „may include the participation of English proficient children if such course is designed to enable all participating children to become proficient in English and a second language" (NCLB, 2001, Sec. 3301 [8] [B]). No escape clause of this type can be found in the California regulations, although available data clearly show that in the state TWI programs are on the increase.

3. Bilingual education methods after Proposition 227

An eleven-year state level legislative gridlock was ended on June 2, 1998, when California voters decisively approved the „English for the Children" ballot initiative (Proposition 227), sponsored by software millionaire and former gubernatorial candidate Ron Unz. „Proposition 227" immediately became a part of the California Education Code, requiring that „all children in California public schools shall be taught in English as rapidly and effectively as possible" (Proposition 227). English learners „shall be taught English by being taught in English", which means education „through sheltered English immersion," in which „nearly all classroom instruction is in English," and this transition period is „not normally intended to exceed one year" (ibid.).

Leading BE experts criticized the theoretical underpinnings of the initiative from the onset. Stephen Krashen pointed out that the allegations about the ineffectiveness of BE were largely unfounded and exaggerated, the program label „sheltered immersion" was misleading, and the one-year transition period before mainstreaming was wholly unrealistic (Krashen 1997). In the highly overpoliticized atmosphere, bolstered by a professionally organized campaign, Proposition 227 passed nevertheless.

Exemption from the Draconian regulations of the new law can be granted through annually renewable parental waivers. Thus it is still possible to teach children through bilingual education techniques, although the process is fraught with bureaucratic obstacles; in addition, individual schools are only required to offer such classes when a minimum of 20 students of a given grade level receive a waiver.

The intent of the law was clearly to eliminate bilingual education from California's schools, and to deprive app. 1.5m ELs (or ELLs) from literacy instruction in their native language – a goal that has almost been realized. The total

share of ELs in California enrolled in bilingual education plummeted from 29% in 1997-98 to 12% next year, and by 2002-03 it had fallen to less than 9% (see below).

Official statistics are difficult to interpret, since the annual Language Census, which asks for the number of ELs enrolled in specific instructional settings, has traditionally used the following categorization (Dataquest Glossary):

English Language Development (ELD):

ELD is English language instruction appropriate for the student's identified level of language proficiency (=ESL instruction);

ELD and Specially Designed Academic Instruction in English (SDAIE):

EL students receive ELD and, at least two academic subjects taught through SDAIE to increase the comprehensibility of the academic courses. SDAIE is an approach used to teach academic courses to EL students in English, focusing on increasing the comprehensibility of the academic courses normally provided to FEP and native English-speaking students. Students are not receiving primary language support as described below. This method is close to „structured immersion" or „sheltered English immersion" (SEI), as it is defined by Rossell (2002: 6);

ELD and SDAIE with Primary Language Support:

EL students receive ELD and SDAIE with Primary Language Support (L1 support) in at least two academic subject areas. L1 support does not take the place of academic instruction through the primary language but may be used in order to clarify meaning;

ELD and Academic Subjects Through the Primary Language (L1):

EL students receive ELD and, at a minimum, two academic subjects through the primary language (=bilingual education, including TBE, DBE and TWI);

Instructional Services Other than Those Defined in previous columns:

EL students are provided with an instructional service specifically designed for EL students that does not correspond to one of the previous descriptions;

Not Receiving any English Learner Services:

EL students who are not provided with any specialized instructional service.

The passage of Proposition 227 has entailed the appearance of new categories on the Language Census form (now school districts are asked to fill out both sets of categories each spring):

Structured English Immersion (SEI, which is close to the „old" SDAIE category);

Alternative Course of Study (includes BE programs);

English Language Mainstream – Students Meeting Criteria:

Classes where ELs who have met local district criteria for having achieved „reasonable fluency" of English are enrolled and provided with additional and appropriate services;

English Language Mainstream – Parental Request:
Children originally placed in SEI transferred to an English Language Mainstream Classroom on parental request, where they are provided with additional and appropriate services;
Other Instructional Setting:
Other than the previous categories.

The following tables and graphs show the distribution of students in various programs between 1997-98 (1998-99) and 2002-03, according to the „old" and „new" California Language Census categories:

Table 1.

Number of ELs receiving instructional services since 1997-98 (before Proposition 227) to 2002-03, according to the „old" Language Census categorization (based on CDE's „Statewide Part II English Learner [EL] students" data):

	ELD (ESL)	**ELD+SDAIE** (SEI)	**ELD+SDAIE+ L1 Support**	**ELD+ Academic Subjects through L1** (Bilingual Education)	**Total number of ELs (100%)**
1997-98	159,617 (11.4%)	307,176 (21.8%)	305,764 (21.7%)	409,879 (29%)	1,406,166
1998-99	152,260 (10.6%)	410,681 (28.5%)	472,893 (32.8%)	169,440 (11.7%)	1,442,692
1999-00	151,518 (10.2%)	486,091 (32.8%)	427,720 (28.9%)	169,929 (11.5%)	1,480,527
2000-01	165,044 (10.9%)	539,942 (35.7%)	401,722 (26.6%)	167,163 (11%)	1,511,299
2001-02	173,145 (11.1%)	599,979 (38.5%)	389,904 (25%)	151,836 (9.7%)	1,559,244
2002-03	187,693 (11.7%)	694,425 (43.4%)	342,128 (21.4%)	141,428 (8.8%)	1,599,542

Graph 1.

Percentage of ELs receiving instructional services since before Proposition 227 to 2002-03, according to the „old" Language Census categorization:



Table 2.

Number of ELs receiving SEI and „Alternative Course of Study" since Proposition 227 to 2002-03, according to the „new" Language Census categorization (based on CDE's „Statewide Part II English Learner (EL) students" data):

	SEI	**Alternative Course of Study** (Bilingual Education)	**Total number of ELs (100%)**
1998-99	702,592 (48.7%)	179,334 (12.4%)	1,442,692
1999-00	691,212 (46.7%)	187,832 (12.7%)	1,480,527
2000-01	720,948 (47.7%)	181,455 (12%)	1,511,299
2001-02	754,558 (48.4%)	166,330 (10.7%)	1,559,244
2002-03	773,132 (48.3%)	153,029 (9.6%)	1,599,542

Graph 2.

Percentage of ELs receiving SEI and „Alternative Course of Study" since Proposition 227 to 2002-03, according to the „new" Language Census categorization:



Findings:

The percentage of ELs receiving ELD has remained constant at 10-11%;

Immediately after Proposition 227, bilingual education programs were mostly converted into „ELD+SDAIE+L1 Support" programs;

A comparison of EL percentages in the „old" and „new" categories reveals that SEI (with its steady 48% share according to Table 2) must have included numerous programs offering L1 support as well, which indicates a loose interpretation of the SEI category, taking advantage of the rather vague definition in Proposition 227, requiring that „nearly all classroom instruction [be] in English";

Since 1999-00, the L1 component of these programs has been declining steadily, suggesting gradually increasing compliance with the intent of state law (simultaneously, the tendency also reveals that the remnants of bilingual education – which might have been continued under the guise of „L1 support" – are being phased out);

The percentage of ELs participating in „ELD+SDAIE" has effectively doubled since 1997-98. The negative correlation with „ELD+SDAIE+L1 Support" points to the existence of a virtual „zero-sum" game within the SEI category, to the detriment of L1 support;

Genuinely bilingual programs suffered an enormous setback in 1998-99: the number of students participating in these programs had fallen from 409,879 to 169,440, amounting to a decline from 29% to 11.7% of the EL population. The

trend has continued to this day, although less spectacularly than immediately after Proposition 227.

4. TWI – a wave of the future?

The actual number of ELs served by TBE, DBE and TWI programs cannot be reliably verified, due to the nature of the California Language Census questions. Judy A. Lambert, Bilingual Education Consultant for the California Department of Education, estimates that the number of ELs in dual language education is currently about 13,300, i.e. less than 10% of the students who are in „ELD+Academic Subjects through L1" programs (E-mail communication, May 19, 2004).

TWI or dual language education is in many ways the strongest type of all maintenance programs. Wayne Thomas and Virginia Collier's latest longitudinal research findings („A National Study of School Effectiveness for Language Minority Students") indicate that by the end of the 5th grade, language minority students in „90-10 two-way bilingual immersion" significantly outperformed their comparison groups in 90-10 transitional bilingual education and 90-10 developmental bilingual education (Thomas and Collier 2002: 3). In a „90-10 two-way bilingual immersion" program, two language groups receive integrated instruction in English and a second language; 90% of instruction is initially delivered in the minority language, and 10% is in English, gradually evolving to 50-50 instruction over 5 years.

A strong dual language program can even „reverse the negative effects of socioeconomic status more than a well-implemented ESL Content program" (Thomas and Collier, 2002: 5), but only enrichment programs assist students to fully reach the 50th percentile in both L1 and L2 in all subjects (2002: 7).

According to the California Department of Education, there are presently 155 operational TWI programs in California, whereas Christian found only 57 of them in the state a decade ago (Christian 1994), and there had been none before 1980. Nowadays the target languages are Spanish (142), Korean (7), Cantonese (4), Mandarin (1), and Japanese (1) (California Two-Way Immersion Programs Directory). In broad outline, the distribution reflects the ethnic makeup of California's 1.6 million K-12 EL population, which constitute more than 25% of the total enrollment in the state's public schools (*Fact Book* 2004: 67). The top ten language groups in rank order are (1) Spanish, 84.3%; (2) Vietnamese, 2.3%; (3) Hmong, 1.6%; (4) Cantonese, 1.5%; (5) Pilipino (Filipino or Tagalog), 1.3%; (6) Korean, 1.1%; (7) Mandarin, 0.8%; (8) Armenian 0.7%; (9) Khmer (Cambodian) 0.7%; (10) Punjabi, 0.5% (ibid.). The two most conspicuous observations are the apparent overrepresentation of Korean programs and the nonexistence of similar accommodations for Vietnamese and Hmong students.

Nevertheless, the steady increase of TWI programs in California (utilizing

the parental waiver option) might give rise to some guarded optimism for those who favor maintenance bilingual education over assimilative methods.

Graph 3.

The number of new TWI programs in California established in a single year (1982-2003) (based on „California Two-Way Immersion Programs Directory" data):



Since CDE data are based mostly on self-identification, 100% accuracy cannot be expected from the program categorization. Thus any attempts to draw conclusions should be made with extreme caution. Rossell notes that it is only the Spanish speakers who receive authentic bilingual education in general (Rossell 2003: 47). Especially in the case of ideographic languages, the teaching of initial literacy in the native languages is mostly considered to be too difficult or confusing by teachers to be pursued seriously, regardless of the program label (ibid: 48).

What certain is that the number of two-way programs increased markedly after 1994, with 1998 and 2001 being the peak years. Both years witnessed fierce debates on educational reform: 1998 saw the virtual prohibition of BE in California, 2001 ushered in the largest-scale federal educational reform to date, the „No Child Left Behind" Act, with its limitations on BE. One would be tempted to see this TWI expansion as evidence for the viability of the method even in times of anti-bilingual backlash. Yet, there are important caveats:

1. As Graph 3 indicates, during the past two years, the expansive growth of these programs seems to be slowing down.
2. Not all programs on the CDE website meet the criteria for effective TWI programs.
3. Without significant popular – and political – support, the increase of TWI programs can hardly be regarded as a harbinger of a possible pro-enrichment countercurrent.

4.1 California TWI programs and the criteria for success

The CDE TWI Directory contains a few additional pieces of information about the

listed programs: e.g. the year of establishment, the grade levels served by the program, the number of participating students from both language groups, and also the model type („90-10", „50-50", etc.). However, a closer look at the available data reveals that (even without actually observing the classrooms in question) that up to cc. 40% of the programs listed there cannot possibly meet the relevant Lindholm criteria for effective TWI programs (cited in Crawford 1991: 167), e.g.:

(a) long-term treatment (4-6 years);

(b) balance of language groups (at least a 1/3-2/3 ratio between language-minority and language-majority children, 50-50% is the ideal);

(c) sufficient use of the minority language (a minimum of 50% of the time /to a maximum of 90% in the early grades/).

The compliance rate with criterion a) is 91/142 for the Spanish-target-language programs, 9/13 for the others. From among the remaining 100 programs, 85/91 and 7/13 can meet criterion b), respectively. The 92 programs that fulfill the first two criteria, all follow criterion c) as well.

Contrary to CDE, the Center for Applied Linguistics website lists only those programs that meet all three of the following criteria (Directory of Two-Way Bilingual Immersion Programs in the U.S.):

Integration: language-minority and language-majority students are integrated for at least 50% of instructional time at all grade levels;

Instruction: content and literacy instruction in both languages is provided to all students;

Population: within the program, there is a balance of language-minority and language-majority students, with each group making up between one-third and two-thirds of the total student population.

Consequently, CAL recognizes „only" 102 TWI programs in California in 2004, and 297 in the entire country (Two-Way Bilingual Immersion Tables), so the increase rate is still significant, even if not as rosy as the CDE data might suggest. The countrywide growth of TWI programs is also notable: fewer than 10 before 1981, 169 in 1993, 248 in 2000, and 297 in May 2004 (Howard and Sugarman 2001; Christian 1994; Directory of Two-Way Bilingual Immersion Programs in the U.S).

4.2 State level political support for TWI

The „English for the Children" campaign made bilingual education a salient political issue in California in 1998. Immediately after its passage, Proposition 227 was challenged in court by several Latino and civil rights organizations, yet no judicial decision has invalidated the measure to date.

The state legislature is effectively barred from repealing or weakening Proposition 227, since „it may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors" (*California*

Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 10 [c]). Consequently, no bill has been introduced in either house since 1998 that would have challenged the hegemony of SEI, which now seems to be firmly entrenched by the openly pro-structured-immersion stance of Governor Schwarzenegger himself, who may want to „bring California back," but definitely without BE (Arnold's Views: Join Arnold).

According to the results of the online „California Legislative Information" search, the state legislature has twice witnessed the introduction of bills concerning TWI or „dual language education" proper since 1998 (Official California Legislative Information). On February 21, 2001, Assembly Member Strom-Martin introduced AB 503, which would have established a K-12 Dual Language Education Grant Program to school districts offering TWI for eligible (waivered) pupils. Each program was to fulfill the selected minimum requirements of

a) at least 50% instruction time in the target language;
b) a duration of at least 6 consecutive years in order to reach academic proficiency in both L1 and L2;
c) a balance of native English speaking pupils and target language pupils at each grade level (AB 503)

It is clear that roughly half of today's California TWI programs could not meet these requirements – were the act in force. Unfortunately, the bill died in February 2002, after committee hearings.

A practically identical bill (AB 2698) was introduced on February 20, 2004, by Assembly Member Goldberg. It was amended in assembly on April 15, 2004, as a result of which several important provisions – e.g. the requirement that a program should last at least 6 consecutive years were dropped (AB 2698, amended). The bill is currently in committee stage, but its chances to become law are extremely limited.

Given the formidable obstacles before them, not even TWI advocates seem to be in a politically strong enough position to weaken the assimilationist nature of California EL-education regulations in the near future. The spirit of the law, however, seems to allow a rather flexible interpretation that leaves at least some room for L1 maintenance for waivered students especially when language majority Anglo parents also endorse the programs – within the framework of a method that has proved to be effective in the United States for more than four decades.

5. Conclusion

California, with approximately 40% of the nation's total EL population, has pioneered in reforming – and largely eliminating – its K-12 bilingual education for the recent years. A similar trend to put an end to BE by ballot initiative has continued in other states (e.g. Arizona and Massachusetts) as well, although in Colorado it suffered a setback in 2002, when the proposed „Amendment 31" failed to garner the necessary voter support. And in 2003, the Massachusetts legislature

actually managed to loosen the Unz-type English immersion law by overriding gubernatorial veto, thus granting exemption from the law for TWI programs (Lewis and Kurtz 2003).

Despite the proliferation of TWI programs in California, the overall decline of genuinely BE methods seems to be unstoppable in the short term. Tentative legislative steps at legitimizing TWI appear to be doomed in California at this stage, the rising enthusiasm for two-way programs is still insufficient to be translated into a political momentum that would carve out a legitimate „dual language education" niche in the seemingly monolithic wall of structured immersion. Pro-SEI advocates would consider such a niche a serious breach: e.g. Rossell recommends that Proposition 227 should actually be strengthened by making the waiver process stricter than it actually is at the moment (Rossell 2002: 109).

Bilingual education has always been regarded with suspicion by language majority Americans. Huddy and Sears (cited in Baker 2001: 256) suggested three theoretical explanations to this phenomenon: those in power tend to protect their self-interests („realistic interest" theory); the perception that minorities are undeserving of special treatment; and BE considered as a threat to national identity through its promotion of diversity rather than unity. Padilla argues that the most appropriate one-word description of BE in the United States is „ambivalence" – the mutually conflicting feelings or thoughts about an idea (Padilla 1998). This ambivalence has been observable at federal and state level alike: the successive reauthorizations of the BEA and the California legislative attempts to tackle language education issues illustrate it all too clearly. Federal and state level legislation tended to be more or less in sync until the second half of the 1970s, then bilingual-bicultural education was mandated in California, a policy that well exceeded and outlived similar federal level tendencies. Perhaps as a consequence, the backlash against BE was a lot harsher in 1998 than the federal NCLB in 2001. Another explanation to the more extreme swings in state level BE policies lies in the fact that education is predominantly a state and local responsibility in the United States. Not being listed among the enumerated constitutional powers delegated to the national government, educational issues by default belong to the (residual) powers reserved to the states or to the people. Therefore, overt federal level intervention into the curriculum is prohibited.

Padilla also makes a distinction between individual „bilinguality" (generally seen as a desirable goal) and „bilingualism" as a societal phenomenon, associated mainly with poor Latino immigrants (Padilla 1998). The gap between „bilinguality" and „bilingualism" has been widened considerably by Proposition 227. Closing it through TWI, with its integrationist and consensual appeal, could also mean the successful merger of the Equal Opportunity and the Multiculturalist Paradigms.

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THE EMPIRICISTS' TROUBLE WITH PRIVATE LANGUAGE[1]

TAMÁS DEMETER

I. Introduction

Private language does not appear as an articulate philosophical problem in British Empiricism. As a consequence of their theory of meaning, British Empiricists take it for granted that language is essentially private. This theory of meaning, of which Locke and Hume were advocates, and Berkeley was a fellow-traveller,[2] is responsible for a conflict arising between the empiricists' theory of cognition and the requirements of linguistic communication. The conflict is this: the process of cognition is to acquire and manipulate ideas. Due to their origin in subjective experience ideas are essentially private properties. Linguistic communication is an exchange of ideas by means of words whose meaning is determined exclusively by private ideas. Yet in order to be successful, this exchange requires the intersubjectivity of language. How is such an exchange possible when ideas are essentially private?

In this essay my purpose is not to discuss the possibility of a private language; nor is it to investigate or modify the arguments that lead to the inevitable acceptance of its possibility. Instead, I will try to figure out the response British Empiricists would give if faced with the above question. I will proceed as follows. First, as the meaning of „privacy" in British Empiricism is far from being unproblematic, I take a short detour in exploring some features of its meaning in Locke and Hume, and then in the second step I introduce how the problem sketched above arises in Locke. In the third step I sketch Locke's less sophisticated and unsatisfactory solution to it. In the fourth step I will argue that not in Locke but in Hume can we find better tools to solve the problem, though it takes some effort to reveal them. Finally, I will point out some aspects of the Humean solution that, I believe, make it less appealing than it initially might seem.

II. Privacy in Locke and Hume

Semantic privacy presupposes a substantial notion of privacy, and its applicability in Hume's case may seem problematic to some. To understand the worries that

[1] I'm indebted to Gergely Ambrus and Volker Munz for their scepticism about a substantive sense of privacy in Hume. I'm also indebted to Michael Bresalier for his stylistic proposals and corrections of my English. While writing this paper I enjoyed the support of the Hungarian State Eötvös Scholarship.

[2] Cf. Jonathan Bennett, *Locke, Berkeley, Hume. Central Themes*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1975, p. 1.

may appear here we should take a closer look at the less problematic case of Locke. For Locke there is a substantive self whose specific character consists in its sense of itself, i.e. its being self-conscious. Let me quote at length how he introduces his account of the self: „[It] is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive [...] [S]ince consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls *self*; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists *personal Identity, i.e.* the sameness of a rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that *Person*."[3]

Locke's picture of the self is based on the consideration that any act of perception is accompanied by another act that perceives this perception. This latter act tells us that ideas, which for Locke are the only objects of perception, belong to a specific self distinct from others. This provides grounds for the privacy of ideas, the very source of complications that bother us here.

One could argue, however, that the problems arising from privacy may be significant in Locke's case, but are far from being general in British Empiricism. Hume, for example, famously denied the existence of a self that could fulfil the role Locke assigns to it. As Hume himself puts it: „For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception."[4] Hume here explicitly denies what seem to be the very grounds of privacy in Locke, namely the perception of perceiving ideas. This amounts to the denial of a substantive self that is replaced by mere ideas that could serve as substances, without presupposing the existence of some other (thinking) substance to which they belong: „If [...] anyone shou'd [say] that the definition of a substance is *something which may exist by itself*; [...] I shou'd observe, that this definition agrees to every thing that can possibly be conceiv'd; and never will serve to distinguish substance from accident, or the soul from its perceptions. [...] [S]ince all our perceptions are different from each other, and from every thing else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be consider'd as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing else to support

[3] John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ed. by Peter Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon, 1975, 2.27.9.

[4] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by David Fate Norton – Mary J. Norton, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 1.4.6.3.

their existence. They are, therefore, substances, as far as this definition explains a substance."[5]

So, on the one hand it seems we cannot experience ourselves the way Locke claims, that is we cannot be self-conscious, as the objects of our perceptions are always ideas, and not something distinct from them. On the other hand we do not need to presuppose a substance with this property either, as ideas themselves can be thought of as substances – if one needs this terminology.

Is it then possible to talk about privacy in Hume's case? No, if one thinks that privacy presupposes some notion of a substantive self, which we cannot get from Hume. But for the argument of this essay I do not need to rely on any notion of a substantive self, I only need to establish that there is a relevant sense in Hume in which ideas are private. This follows from the project of tracking privacy in empiricist semantics: if privacy is possible without any notion of a substantive self then the claim that ideas are private will make sense. So here is the crucial passage from Hume that is instructive how to avoid the notion of a substantive self while keeping the privacy of ideas: „[T]he true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other. Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas, and these ideas in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chases another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expell'd in its turn. In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts. And as the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation."[6]

So privacy is still possible. It is true that from Hume we do not receive a picture of a substantive self that persists through time, something that remains the same through a variety of changes. The picture is more dynamic here: there is only a complex bundle of ideas, which are linked together by various idea-relations, most notably causation, and this compound we can call „self". A component of this bundle may be private precisely by virtue of its links to other ideas, most importantly to its causes and effects. There is then a temporal and causal chain of ideas that constitutes personal identity. For Hume, ideas are private by virtue of being part of this chain as opposed to some other.

[5] Ibid, 1.4.5.5ff.
[6] Ibid, 1.4.6.19.

III. The problems

From this background of privacy in Locke and Hume, let's turn to the semantic consequences of privacy. Private language is an inevitable consequence of empiricist semantics. For language to be meaningful we must be able to produce articulate sounds and to use these sounds as marks of ideas in our minds, thereby making them accessible to others.[7] Without constant conjunction between words and corresponding ideas there is no meaning, only insignificant noises.[8] Correspondingly, the Lockean model of communication goes like this: The speaker attaches ideas to his words, thereby fixing speaker meaning, and produces the corresponding signs (verbal or otherwise). The listener receives the signs, decodes them by translating them into his ideas, thereby fixing listener meaning. The meaning of words is therefore derived from ideas on both sides of conversation. To communicate is to convey ideas from one mind to another by means of signs. Locke puts it as follows: „Man, though he have great variety of Thoughts, and such, from which others, as well as himself, might receive Profit and Delight; yet they are all within his own Breast, invisible, and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made to appear. The Comfort and Advantage of Society, not being to be had without Communication of Thoughts, it was necessary, that Man should find out some external sensible Signs, whereby those invisible *Ideas*, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others [...] Thus we may conceive how *Words*, which were by Nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made use of by Men as *the Signs of* their *Ideas*."[9]

There are two kinds of problem with this picture. The first of these is the following: How come we attach the same ideas to our words that make understanding possible? Or to put it differently: How can speaker meaning and listener meaning be similar enough in significant respects so as to facilitate communication? This seems to be inevitable for successful communication. If we mean entirely different ideas by our words we could never communicate, as signs would invoke entirely different ideas on both sides. Therefore we need to attach identical or at least highly similar ideas to the same words. How is this possible? The most obvious way is to establish some kind of agreement within linguistic communities that fixes the link between ideas and words. Explicit agreement, however, seems to be impossible because it presupposes the use of language. We could agree to attach particular words to particular ideas if we had language, and in case of newly introduced words it is arguably a possible scenario. But with only this model at hand language simply cannot get off the ground.

This problem becomes even more problematic and mysterious given that

[7] Cf. John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, 3.1.1-2.
[8] Cf. ibid, 3.2.7.
[9] Ibid, 3.2.1.

Locke grants us total autonomy to accompany whatever ideas we want with whatever noises we make. As he puts it: „every Man has so inviolable a Liberty, to make Words stand for what *Ideas* he pleases, that no one hath the Power to make others have the same *Ideas* in their Minds, that he has, when they use the same Words, that he does."[10] Given this kind of semantic individualism, how can linguistic communities emerge at all?

The second kind of problem arises from the fact that the final origin of ideas is in subjective experience. Although a given word always means the same idea, this idea is different in each of us; therefore we are alone in our language. Even if all of us attach the same ideas to the same words, there is nothing that ensures the identity of the contents of ideas across different minds. This problem can be illustrated by reference to phenomenal qualities: Two people can have seemingly identical ideas of red – for instance, they can respond in the same way to red things – but they may nevertheless have different subjective experiences. Do they mean the same by „red"? No, if our semantics is based on ideas whose foundations rest on subjective experience. And it remains the case even if Locke himself tries to make this problem insignificant by pointing out that there are no pragmatic consequences to these differences that should bother us.[11]

A related problem is that we know our own ideas directly in an infallible way; therefore it is also transparent to us what we mean by our words. But it may never be transparent what others mean by their words, as the very signs of their meaning something by them are the words they use: it is therefore impossible to understand others without knowing their ideas, but this knowledge is impossible without language. We are getting circular here. The only way to get out of this circle is to admit that we always understand others imperfectly, and meaning is always indeterminate, as it is underdetermined by available evidence. And here again Locke could easily argue that this imperfection of understanding has no practical consequences whatsoever; still the problem persists: from here onwards it is only a matter of degree, of philosophical taste, whether we consider this as a fatal consequence for the possibility of communication.

IV. Locke's inadequate response

These two problems of Lockean semantics arise from its commitment to a private conception of language. The first problem arises from the denial that the origin of language is social; the second from the denial that a symbol-system for thought (that is, ideas) must also be a device for communication. Both suffice to make us sceptical about the possibility of language on Lockean grounds. Let's now take a

[10] Cf. ibid, 3.2.8.
[11] Cf. ibid, 2.32.15.

look at how Locke tries to avoid this consequence.

The general character of Locke's solution to these problems is pragmatic. For the first problem Locke does not have an explicit solution. A possible Lockean line of argument is that the point in using language is to communicate. Therefore, even if it is possible to use words in an arbitrary, entirely autonomous way, it makes no sense whatsoever, given the function of language. However, this is not a satisfactory answer. We would need some explanation of how a common language can come about given semantic individualism. Locke does not tell us how this might happen. With his model it is impossible to explain the emergence of a linguistic community from a set of individuals using their words autonomously to stand for their private ideas. As we shall see soon, it takes Hume to get a solution to this problem.

But for the second problem, Locke has an explicit solution that bears relevance on the first problem too. Let me quote him at length: „Neither would it carry any Imputation of *Falshood* to our simple *Ideas*, *if* by the different Structure of our Organs, it were so ordered, That *the same Object should produce in several Men's Minds different* Ideas at the same time; *v.g.* if the *Idea* that a *Violet* produced in one Man's Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a *Marigold* produced in another Man's, and *vice versâ*. For, since this could never be known: because one Man's Mind could not pass into another Man's Body, to perceive, what Appearances were produced by those Organs; neither the *Ideas* hereby, nor the Names, would be at all confounded, or any *Falshood* be in either. For all Things, that had the Texture of a *Violet*, producing constantly the *Idea*, which he called *Blue*; and those which had the Texture of a *Marigold*, producing constantly the *Idea*, which he as constantly called *Yellow*, whatever those Appearances were in his Mind; he would be able as regularly to distinguish Things for his Use by those Appearances, and understand, and signify those distinctions, marked by the Names *Blue* and *Yellow*, as if the Appearances, or *Ideas* in his Mind, received from those two Flowers, were exactly the same, with the *Ideas* in other Men's Minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the sensible *Ideas*, produced by any Object in different Men's Minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike. For which opinion, I think, there might be many Reasons offered: but that being besides my present Business, I shall not trouble my reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary Supposition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either for the Improvement of our Knowledge, or Conveniency of Life; and so we need not trouble our selves to examine it."[12]

Here we have got three considerations supporting the rejection of the second kind of problem that arises from the differences of ideas. 1) We could never know if they are different. 2) The ideas caused in us are indiscernibly alike. 3) The contrary presupposition is of no use for science and life. Once highlighted this way,

[12] Ibid, 2.32.15.

it is obvious that neither of these considerations will do for us, but let's see why, step by step.

1) Locke may be right in saying that we could never know the differences of ideas, and that such a problem is of no practical relevance. However, his semantics says that meaning arises from ideas, and if these ideas are different then meaning must be different as well. This entails private language on the one hand, and imperfect communication on the other – without any reference of practical relevance.

2) It is hard to accept that ideas are indiscernibly alike, mostly because we do not get an argument for it. Besides, even if this is true, it is contingently so, and it could easily be the other way round. Even if ideas happen to be indiscernible in all of us, this is certainly not a conceptual or metaphysical necessity, so private language prevails, and communication suffers.

3) The contrary presupposition may be of no use, but this is not a consideration that a philosopher should be worried about. It is certainly not our business to consider whether a position is useful or not: even if it is not useful, it may nevertheless be true.

To sum up: Locke provides us with three considerations, neither of which is backed by arguments. It is certainly not hasty to conclude that his proposals are unsatisfactory.

Let me add, however, that if Locke's picture was acceptable, it would partially solve the first problem too, and this may be a reason for not having an explicit Lockean solution for the first problem. If our ideas are indiscernible and language is to express these ideas, then private languages will be similar as well, and the only thing that is in need of explanation in this case is the uniformity of noises we make when expressing ideas.

V. A Humean solution

A much more promising solution to these problems can be read off Hume. The central notion of this solution is convention. Hume's theory of convention is developed in the context of his social philosophy, and more specifically as a component of his account of justice. One can find two alternative accounts in Hume. The one that I will call here the *robust* account appeals to the declaration of mutual interests that serves as basis for regularities of conduct. These regularities are what he calls convention: „This convention is not of the nature of a *promise*: For even promises themselves, as we shall see afterwards, arise from human conventions. It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, *provided* he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express'd, and is known to both, it

produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may properly enough be call'd a convention or agreement betwixt us, tho' without the interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are perform'd upon the supposition that something is to be performed on the other part."[13]

On the other hand, the *minimalist* Humean account does not require the declaration of interests. Convention can be formed in virtue of pure behavioural regularity among the parties to the convention – so it may serve as a basis for convention-based language. This lesson can be drawn from Hume's famous example of rowing, where two people behave as if they agreed on a rate of strokes without actually making an agreement, or even expressing preferences to synchronise the number of strokes.[14] On a weaker interpretation of the minimalist account, though mutual interests are not expressed explicitly, the parties to the convention nevertheless recognise them, and more importantly act in accordance with them. Thus conventions are built around the concept of interest. On a possible stronger interpretation, a sense of interest need not even be present as constitutive to the convention, though they can be imposed on similar situations at a somewhat abstract, descriptive level.

Both Humean accounts represent an alternative to an explicit, agreement based, or contract-like account of convention. This is fairly obvious in the minimalist case, but seems to be true in the robust case as well. The declaration and/or recognition of mutual interests does not entail that the agreement itself needs to be of explicit nature. It is not presupposed in either picture that a social contract must be made in order for the convention to come into force. Thus Humeanism is in opposition to social contract theories like that of Hobbes.[15] These two traditions conceive differently the process of convention formation. Humeans are inclined to accept an evolutionary view where conventions appear from behavioural regularities, combined and built upon each other, and thus become more and more complex as time goes by. An outcome of this process is an institutional structure. This process is predominantly tacit, or implicit, even if it may be based on mutual recognition of interests. For a Hobbesian the case is quite different. Institutions are formed through social contracts whose parties agree explicitly to create an institution for certain purposes.

Hobbesian and robust Humean theories of convention rely inherently on language: in the process of convention-formation we need language in order to achieve the equilibrium state as represented by the convention. Social contracts

[13] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 3.2.2.10.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Cf. ibid, 3.2.2.15.

cannot be agreed upon, and interests cannot be expressed without using language. As they presuppose language, these theories cannot provide the basis of a conventionalist account of language. Hobbesianism, of course, is stronger in this respect than robust Humeanism – as the acts of making contract and promising equally presupposes certain verbal features. Though David Lewis allows declaration of intention to be sufficient for reaching agreement without promises,[16] it is not plausible that any agreement can be reached without some sort of explicit commitment, that is, without something that is promise-like. Giving promises is constitutive in making contracts, as the parties must commit themselves to obey contracts.[17] One cannot make promises without using language, but for a Humean promises themselves arise from conventions,[18] thus they, and contracts along with them, are not eligible to provide the general basis of conventions, including linguistic conventions. Robust Humeanism, as we have seen above, requires only the explicitness of interests, and does not rely on language in general, and promises in particular, in the process of convention formation. Minimalist Humeanism, on the contrary, does not need any linguistic components in convention as it relies exclusively on behavioural regularities. Thus it becomes possible to treat language itself as an institution evolving gradually from convention. Lacking constitutive linguistic elements in a theory of conventions, this perspective can account not only for linguistic conventions but more generally, for any convention that is not dependent upon contract, or explicit mutual agreement.

As I pointed out above, Hume's theory of conventions is developed in the context of his social philosophy, and he does not specifically develop a theory for language on these grounds, but he gives us explicit permission to do so: „Thus two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention, for common interest, without any promise or contract: Thus gold and silver are made the measures of exchange; thus speech and words and language are fixed by human convention and agreement. Whatever is advantageous to two or more persons, if all perform their part; but what loses all advantage, if only one perform, can arise from no other principle. There would otherwise be no motive for any one of them to enter into that scheme of conduct."[19] Elsewhere, he is even more explicit with respect to the same point: „Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho' they have never given promises to each other. Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less deriv'd from human conventions,

[16] David Lewis, *Convention*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 34.

[17] John Searle (in his *The Construction of Social Reality*, New York: The Free Press, 1995, p. 35) adopts a similar position concerning this question.

[18] Cf. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 3.2.2.10.

[19] David Hume, *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. by Tom L. Beauchamp, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 172.

that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of inconveniencies of transgressing it. On the contrary, this experience assures us still more, that the sense of interest has become common to all our fellows, and gives us a confidence of the future regularity of their conduct: And 'tis only on the expectation of this that our moderation and abstinence are founded. In like manner are languages gradually establish'd by human conventions without any promise."[20]

Now given this general perspective, how is it possible to have language as a conventional device of communication? Meaning can be elucidated in terms of intending: to mean something by an utterance is to intend by this uttering to produce in hearers a certain result. If this intention is accompanied by another intention on the hearer's part, namely the intention to understand what the speaker meant by his utterance, then speaker and hearer share a common interest on which the necessary conventions can be based. This mutual interest need not be expressed explicitly, the parties to the convention may nevertheless recognise them, and act in accordance with them, as the above example of rowing shows.

For the empiricist, the problem of communication is a coordination problem, namely: How to reach a community-wide constant conjunction between ideas and words? Hume sees the solution clearly: If a given coordination problem has been solved successfully, it provides a precedent for future instances of the same problem. For a solution to become a precedent it must be, or must somehow become salient in some respect that ensures the extrapolation of a given solution to future instances of the same problem. This salience can arise from successful repetition: if a given word has been used successfully to represent a specific idea on several occasions then it may become a stable solution for the coordination problem of expressing this idea by this specific word. Thereby, Hume's account of language does not presuppose explicit agreement, and avoids the pitfalls of Locke's model in this respect.

Salience, precedence, and past conformity to a convention all induce common knowledge of the following: everyone has reason to conform to a regularity, thus everyone expects everyone to conform to it. Acquaintance with past examples of the same solution gives rise to expectations in the parties to the convention. These expectations can be first-order expectations, that is they can be about others' behaviour; or they can be higher-order expectations, that is expectations about others' expectations. Thus with an established solution an iterated system of concordant first and higher-order expectations appears in the linguistic community. Given these expectations it becomes possible to follow the Lockean model of communication. The speaker uses certain words to express ideas, and expects, on the basis of convention, that the hearer will associate the

[20] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 3.2.2.10.

same ideas to the words as the speaker himself does. And vice versa: the hearer expects the speaker to use words to express ideas according to the convention.

So it seems we have a solution to the first problem: convention fixes the relation of words and ideas. Does it suggest a solution to the second problem too? Possibly yes. A Humean can say that the idiosyncrasy of ideas is irrelevant to successful communication once language is fixed by convention, as it tells us which idea to attach to a word. However, this Humean response entails the modification of Locke's picture in at least two significant respects. First, we are forced to give up our autonomy, granted by Locke, to attach words to ideas in an arbitrary manner. If convention fixes the relation between words and ideas then our semantic autonomy may only be a philosophical fiction without real cognitive significance. Secondly, and more importantly, if language is dominated by convention then linguistic meaning is not exclusively a matter of private ideas, but also of public, conventional practice. It is primarily conventions, and not ideas, that constrain what can be expressed.

VI. A problem

It may seem that with Humean modifications, the Lockean picture of communication can survive, and perhaps the threat of private language can be avoided. Now I will try to show that this is not so. The reason why British Empiricists cannot avoid private language arises from the fact that they separate the realms of cognition and communication: ideas belong to the first realm, words belong to the second. Locke's proposal ties language to ideas very strongly: the privacy of ideas is inherited by language. Hume's proposal can be read as showing that the first realm of ideas can remain private, while the second, being public, seemingly avoids private language. But this proposal could not help the empiricist.

As Castañeda put it, the lesson of Wittgenstein's private language argument is that any symbol system for thought must be a means of communication too.[21] Hume's suggestion as presented here relies on the distinction between private ideas and public language, the first being the raw material for thought. But this distinction cannot be maintained for a well known reason: there is no way to find a criterion of identity to tell whether my idea of red *is* the same today as it was yesterday, or merely it *seems* to be so: „is identical" and „seems identical" cannot be distinguished. Or more precisely, they could be distinguished if their stability was ensured by a public language. But in this case ideas become

[21] Cf. Hector-Neri Castañeda, „Direct Reference, the Semantics of Thinking, and Guise Theory (Constructive Reflections on David Kaplan's Theory of Indexical Reference)" in Joseph Almog – John Perry – Howard Wettstein (eds.), *Themes from Kaplan*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 107.

language-dependent, and the realm of cognition and communication merges – a consequence intolerable to empiricists.

In conclusion, the lesson of the present story on the one hand is that British Empiricists can account for the possibility of a public language and communication, but they cannot do it by maintaining semantic individualism. On the other hand, British Empiricists cannot escape critiques of private language, as they inevitably reappear at the level of ideas.

WHO WERE THE SULṬĀNS OF THE ANATOLIAN SALJUQS?

MIHÁLY DOBROVITS

After the battle of Manzikert (Turkish: Malazgırt) on 26 August 1071 a new era in the history of Anatolia began, the era of Turkization and Islamization. Members of a Turkish speaking community professing Islam took over this land from the Byzantine Empire. A branch of the Great Seljuqs established themselves as rulers of the new country. They had been permanently evading the borders for thirty years before their final conquest took place.[1] Their first capital was Iznik (Nikaia, Nicea, 1075-1097), which was soon regained by the Byzantines (1097), but their empire flourished in Konya (Ikonion, Iconium) and later in Kayseri (Kaisaria, Ceasarea). The founder of the new empire was Rükneddīn I Süleymān şāh ibn Qutalmış (1075-1086), a nephew of Alp Arslan (1063-1072), the Conqueror of Anatolia. His father, Qutalmış ibn Arslan Yabğu, a grandson of Saljuq ibn Doqaq, tha legendary founder of the dynasty, was killed by Alp Arslan, when he tried to declare himself sulṭān after the death of Toğrul Beğ, the founder of the empire (1063). His brother Resūl tegin and his sons were imprisoned by the sulṭān. Their father, Arslan Yabğu (or Isrā'īl as his Muslim name was) was the first ruler of the Saljuqids, still in Cand (Central Asia) who died in a prison of Maḥmūd Ġaznawī, the famous ruler of what now we call Afghanistan. According to their non-Turkish names, Miḫā'īl, Isrā'īl and Mūsā originally must have been adherents of either Jewish or Nestorian tradition. According to the legend of their origin, the *Malik-nāme* Saljuq ibn Doqaq originally was in the service of a Khazarian prince, only later broke away and came to Cand, then under the influence of the newly Islamized Turkic dynasty of the Qarakhanids.[2] It is quite probable that all these events must have been closely connected with the fall of the once mighty Empire of the Jewish Khazars in 965.

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[1] Turan, O.: *Selçuklular zamanmda Türkiye tarihi*, İstanbul 1984, p. 36.

[2] Turan: *Selçuklular*, p. 45; Sümer, F.: *Oğuzlar (Türkmenler). Tarihleri – Boy teşkilatı – Destanları*, İstanbul 1999, p. 94-95; Агаджанов, С. Г.: *Очерки по истории огузов и туркмен* ; Cahen, C.: *Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A general survey of the material and spiritual culture and history, c. 1071-1330*, London 1968, p. 19-21.

The establishment of the Great Seljuq Empire

After the inprisonment of Arslan Yabğu (Isrā'īl) the two sons of Miḫā'īl, Çağrı beğ and Toğrıl (Toğrul) beğ became the chiefs of the family. They fled to Ḫʷārizm with their people, while the bulk of the men of Arslan Yabğu (Isrā'īl) remained in Ḫurāsān (i.e. the north-western borderland of Iran). These people brought Maḥmūd more trouble than help during his last years. In 1029 he had to drive them back. Evading him, they escaped across Iran to Azerbaijan. They were later followed by the people of Çağrı beğ and Toğrıl (Toğrul) beğ. They first established themselves as rulers of Marv and Nishapur (1028-1029) and in 1040 they defeated Masᶜūd, the son of Maḥmūd Ġaznawī at Dandānqān, north of Marv. Masᶜūd fled to India and the way to Iran opened to the Saljuks. In 1055 Toğrıl beğ entered Baghdad.[3] Proclaiming himself the Caliph's faithful client, Toğrıl beğ determined to restore to Baghdad the orthodoxy which the Būyid princes, the Shiite protectors of the Caliphate were compromising. Upon Toğrıl the Caliph conferred the title „King of the East and West" and he also gave him the title of *sulṭān*, granting of the fullest power, with the guarantee of the Caliph's sanction.[4]

Oğuz, Türkmen, Türk

Soon after coming to power Toğrıl beğ was faced with a coalition of the Shiites and the Arab princes of Iraq led by al-Basāsirī. At the same time a certain discontent appeared among the Türkmens. A Türkmen revolt broke out in Upper Mesopotamia and Iran led by Ibrahim Inal (the half-brother of the Sulṭān) and Qutalmış (1059). Indeed Claude Cahen was right, indicating that the Türkmen troops of Toğrıl beğ were exhausted and the princes of the Sulṭān's entourage, formerly regarding him merely as *primus inter pares*, were indignant to find him now assuming the style of an Irano-Muslim sovereign.[5] On the other hand, there was another, even harder problem with these Türkmen troops.

The main bulk of Toğrıl beğ's original retinue came out from the 24 Oğuz tribes of the lower Syr Darya. This is a classical territory of *excluded nomadism*. People living this way primarily rely on their own nomadic products, agriculture and urban markets are subordinated to the control of the nomadic élite. In interaction with their sedentary neighbours they follow what was called „the outer frontier strategy" by Barfield, who analysed the interaction between the Chinese and the Hsiung-nu.

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[3] Cahen: *Pre-Ottoman*, p. 21-23.

[4] Cahen: *Pre-Ottoman*, p. 24.

[5] Cahen: *Pre-Ottoman*, p. 25.

This strategy meant that the nomadic tribes or empires did not need to enter China, but they had to settle far from the Chinese and making use of their superiority in equestrian warfare, make them accept the exchange of goods or merely press them to give material support.[6]

The most authentic description of this strategy is, however, to be found on the famous Orkhon Inscriptions of Mongolia. Speaking about his connections with the Chinese, *Bilgä qaġan* (716-734), their ruler of the Second Turk Empire describes it as follows:

> „The place from which the tribes can be (best controlled) is the Ötükän [i.e. the Khangai] mountains. Having stayed in this place, I came to an amicable agreement with the Chinese people. They (i.e. the Chinese people) give (us) gold, silver and silk in abundance. The words of the Chinese people have always been sweet and the materials of the Chinese people have always been soft. Deceiving by means of (their) sweet words and soft materials, the Chinese are said to cause the remote peoples to come close in this manner. After such a people have settled close to them, (the Chinese) are said to plan to plan their ill will there. (The Chinese) do not let the real wise men and real brave men make progress. If a man makes an error, (the Chinese) do not give shelter to anybody (from his immediate family) to the families of his clan and tribe. Having been taken in by their sweet words and soft materials, you Turkish people, were killed in great numbers. O Turkish people, you will die! If you intend to settle at the *Čoyay* mountains and the *Tögültün* plain in the south, O Turkish people, you will die. There the ill-willed persons made harmful suggestions as folows: «If a people live afar (from them), they (i.e. the Chinese) give cheap materials (to them); but, if a people live close to them, then (the Chinese) give them valuable materials.» Apparently such harmful suggestions made the ill-willed persons. Having heard these words, you unwise people went close (to the Chinese) and were (consequently) killed in great numbers. If you go toward those places, O Turkish people, you will die. If you stay in the land of Ötükän, and send caravans from there, you will have no trouble. If you stay at the Ötükän mountains, you will live forever

[6] Barfield, Th. J.: *The Perilous Frontier. Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757*, Cambridge/Mass – Oxford/UK, p. 49-51, 70-71, 91, 139, 143, 148-149.

dominating the tribes."[7]

After the fall of the Empire of the Türks and even after the loss of their sacral center, the *Ötükän* (i.e. the Khangai mountains), the various Turkic tribes did not cease to make use of this „outer frontier strategy" The new target was the eastern border of the Caliphate.

When the Seljuqs entered the Middle East, they met another kind of nomadic economy, *enclosed nomadism*. In this system, them prestige of the nomads lower than that of the sedentary population, sedentary economy prevails and urban centres control the nomadic population. When, after Dandānqān, the Seljuqs left Mūsā to harass the frontiers of the Ġaznawīds, they continued the old way of their nomadic life.[8] But soon a new settlement came to exist. The Seljuqs accepted Sunnī orthodoxy and Iranian political tradition as the fundaments of their new-born state. The nomadic armies, without whom they would not have been able to carry out their conquest of the Middle East, turned out to be a dangerous mass, merely destabilizing the new political settlement. They had no way back, because their former pastures were now in the hands of various *Qıpçaq* tribes that forced them to the south. Only a small branch of them were able to remain in the zone of the great Eurasian steppes, they were the *Úz* of the Hungarian sources or the *torki* (торки) of the Russian sources. They were, however driven to the far western part of the steppe-zone by their various Qıpçaq neighbours. As to the main bulk of the former Oğuz confederation, usually called Türkmens at that time, they needed a new country to settle down and carry on their traditional „outer frontier strategy". So Byzantium had become the target of their raids for many years before the battle of Manzikert took place, and their original strategy had been transformed into *ġazā*, the fight for religion.[9]

The origin of the Anatolian Saljuqids

It was also a matter of fact, that Alp Arslan and his successor, Melik-şāh (1072-1092) did not intend to annex Anatolia to their Empire.[10] It was against their will and intention that the Empire of the Anatolian Seljuqs came to exist. After the revolt of 1063, Alp Arslan also planned to execute of the sons of Qutalmış. It was his famous vizier, Nizāmu l-mulk who advised him not to execute the members of the dynasty, but

[7] Translation of Talât Tekin, in Tekin, T.: *A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic,* Indiana University Publications, Uralic and Altaic Series 69, The Hague, p. 262.

[8] Cahen: *Pre-Ottoman*, p. 22.

[9] On these raids see Cahen: *Pre-Ottoman*, p. 66-72.

[10] Cahen: *Pre-Ottoman*, p. 72-73.

send them to the perilous borderlands instead.[11] It was only after the death of Alp Arslan, that Süleymān ibn Qutalmış succeeded to establish himself in Anatolia. Cahen even supposes, that the sons of Qutalmış were heterodox.[12] It happened first in 1078, that the Greek sources first made a mention of Süleymān-şāh as *sulṭān*. This title, however, was never conferred to him officially by the Caliph. It was the Byzantines themselves who encouraged the Turks to advance further than they would have done at once of their own accord. Süleymān-şāh himself was killed by Tutuş, the brother of Melik-şāh in a battle near Aleppo (Haleb).[13] It happened only after the death of Melik-şāh, that the son of Süleymān-şāh, ʿIzz ed-dīn Kılıc Arslan I (1097-1107) could establish himself in Anatolia. It was his vassal, Çaqa beğ, who entered into negotiations with the Pechenegs sweeping down from the Russian steppe.[14] (It seems that they were the pagan Turks the English in Byzantium fought against.)

The situation dramatically changed after the First Crusade. It drove the Turks back from the coast and enclosed them on the Anatolian Plateau. Nikaia was restored to the Byzantines, and the Anatolian Seljuqs became cut from the Arab world. They could maintain their contacts only with Iran.[15] After the death of Qılıç Arslan I, a rival dynasty, that of the Danişmends challenged their position. It was only during the time of ʿIzz ed-dīn Masʿūd II. (1116-1155) that, after 1143, the Saljuqid state really became re-established.[16]

Languages, cultures, symbols

The country was called *Bilād al-Rūm*, but it was much more linked to the neighbouring Iranian territories than to Byzantium. The administration and the literary culture of this new Muslim state of Turkish nomads was Persian. Turkish was first proclaimed as official language in 1277 by certain Qaramanlı Mehmed bey, who occupied Konya and tried to put up on the throne his candidate, ʿAlā ad-dīn Siyāvuş, the son of Keykāvus II. The central administration followed Persian patterns. Although many non-Muslims were still present, the Muslim urban population also followed this pattern. The double-headed eagle, a Sasanian symbol of imperial majesty, borrowed also by the Later Roman Empire was also in frequent use.

Together with these, we can find out an interesting claim for legitimation in

[11] Turan: *Selçuklular*, p. 45.

[12] Cahen: *Pre-Ottoman*, p. 74.

[13] Cahen: *Pre-Ottoman*, p. 75-79.

[14] Turan: *Selçuklular*, p. 84; Cahen: *Pre-Ottoman*, p. 81.

[15] Cahen: *Pre-Ottoman*, p. 85.

[16] Turan: *Selçuklular*, p. 158-177.

the names of the Sulṭāns. Together with Turkish and Islamic names, the Sulṭāns frequently used Persian names, e.g. Ġiyāṯ ed-dīn Keyḫüsrev I (1192-1196; 1205-1211), Ġiyāṯ ed-dīn Keyḫüsrev II (1237-1246) and Ġiyāṯ ed-dīn Keyḫüsrev III (1266-1284), ʿIzz ed-dīn Keykāvüs I (1200-1220) and ʿIzz ed-dīn Keykāvüs II (1246-1249), ʿAlā'ed-dīn Keyqubād I (1220-1237), ʿAlā'ed-dīn Keyqubād II (1249-1254), and ʿAlā'ed-dīn Keyqubād III (1298-1302). The frequently repeated element *key* is the New Persian form of the name of the Old Persian dynasty of the Akhaimenids. Using this element in their names, the Seljuqs of Anatolia not only pretended to be Muslim rulers of *Bilād al-Rūm*, but also emphasized a kind of continuation of the Akhaimenids.

According to the old Iranian tradition, a legitimate dynasty must be connected with the House of the *Dārā i Dārāyān*, i.e. the Akhaimenids. The Sasanids were the latest, who really proclaimed themselves the progeny of the Akhaimenids, and pretended that their rule was a restoration of the old Akhaimenid Empire. Although the Great Seljuqs of Iran were adhered to the old Iranian political tradition, they never tried to obtain such a legitimation. In Anatolia, the use of such throne-names had begun after the collapse of the Great Seljuq Empire, but continued till the last moment of the dynasty.

If they had not been their „Big Brothers", against whom the Saljuqs of Anatolia could have made use of such legitimation, we could imagine, that they had been the Byzantines. According to the Middle Persian tradition of the *Kārnāmag* it was *Iskandar i Hrōmāyig* (the Roman Alexander), who destroyed the Akhaimenid Empire.

> In the Kâr-Nâmak of Artakhshîr Pâpakân, it is so recorded that after the deadth of Alexander the Arûman there were two hundred and forty princes in the country of Persia. Ispahân, Pârs, and the adjoining country were under the sway of Prince Ardawân (Artabanus IV). Pâpak was the lord of the marches and governor of Pârs, and was a nominee of Ardavân. Ardavân had his capital in Istakhr (Persepolis). And Pâpak had no child to perpetuate his name. And Sâsân was a shepherd *in the service* of Pâpak, and always remained with his *flock of* sheep. He was a descendant of Dârâê, the son of Dârâ, and during the evil reign of Alexander had fled *from Persia* and lived in concealment and passed his time with Kurdish [*recte:* nomadic] shepherds. Pâpak did not know that Sâsân was descendant of Dârâê,

the son of Dârâ.[17]

Altough it is clear, that the tradition of the *Kārnāmag* was not known to the Saljuqids, but some other traditions preserved in the *Šāhname* and in Islamic historiography must celarly have been well-known for them. The *Šāhnāma* gives a detailed description of the *Mulūku t-ṭawā'if*, the feodal anarchy after the era of Alexander. It is clear, that the Byzantine Emperor (*βασιλεύς τῶν Ῥωμαίων*) was in the eyes of the Anatolian Seljuqids a successor of Iskandar-i Rūmī, who not only destroyed the Akhaimenid Empire but also took over Anatolia from the Persians. Stating, that they were successors of the Akhaimenids, they also demanded to be the legitimate rulers of Anatolia.

[17] *Kârnâmak-i Artakhshîr Pâpakân. The original Pahlavi text, with transliteration in Avesta characters, translations into English and Gujarati, and Selections from the Shâhnâmeh*, by Edalji Kersâspji Ântiâ, Bombay 1900, p. 1-2.

HUNGARIAN-ENGLISH LANGUAGE CONTACT IN AUSTRALIA – A CORPUS-DRIVEN STUDY FROM A PHONOLOGICAL ASPECT

ÉVA FORINTOS

1. Introduction

This paper is one aspect of a large-scale study that investigates how the written language (Hungarian) of a minority group (L1) functions outside its traditional setting in Central Europe, in an environment where another language (L2) is used (English in Australia). The aim of the study is to propose a phonological approach to the study of language contact in the light of the recent developments in corpus research. The focal point is to examine one version of the written language, with special regard to the patterns that emerge out of language contact situations and the motivation for such patterning, and basically to contribute to the ongoing search for a theoretical framework for the description and analysis of languages that it comes into contact with. Scholarly literature provides convincing evidence that in the field of language contact research spoken data have always been considered to be superior to written data, although examples of both spoken and written language mixing have been identified probably since the beginning of mankind (Sebba 1997, Thomason 2001, Winford 2003).

2. The corpus of the research

For my investigation, I agree with Kurtböke's (1998) criticism, according to which written sources have basically been neglected in language contact ever since this field of linguistics was introduced, and I have decided on studying and carrying out research on a written text. Engwall (1994) suggests with many others (cited by Kurtböke 1998) that newspaper texts provide as adequate a basis as do literary or specialised texts for a linguistic study of general language use focusing on vocabulary or grammar. If newspapers in general can offer a solid basis for linguistic studies, then community newspapers of minority groups of different countries are especially suitable for this. Since the language of Hungarian migrants in Australia, unlike that of their counterparts in the United States of America, as well as the language(s) of Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian Basin, has not been the subject of much research, this study employs the machine-readable corpus of written language samples taken from the only weekly published newspaper – entitled *Magyar Élet* (Hungarian Life) – of the Hungarian community in Australia. The corpus is made up of the advertisements found in the 98 issues of *Magyar Élet* published in 2000 and 2001. The number of words of advertisements found in the 98 issues of the chosen newspaper is 96,351 (100%), only 4 percentage of which is

written in English (3781 words). Obviously they have been excluded from the corpus. 7 per cent (6845 words) of the advertisements are translations of governmental advertisements, 26 per cent (25,272 words) of them were written in unmixed Hungarian, whereas 63 per cent (60,453 words) of them are instances where the two languages – Hungarian and English – come into direct contact. The corpus of the study is made up of the latter three, altogether 92,570 words. Although the dimension of the corpus is determined according to the types, „the abstract representations of tokens", which „are instances of a linguistic expression" (Sinclair 1991: 19), tokens are not without consideration; they are referred to in the coding scheme.

The coding scheme I created for the research includes the basic information in the following sequence:

2000/1/1/96 (6) =

2000 – the year of publication

1 – the issue number

1 – the page on which the advertisement was spotted for the first time

96 – the number of occurrence of the very same advertisement (token)

(6) the number of occurrence of the linguistic manifestation in other advertisement (token)

3. The research

The aim of this paper is to carry out a phonological research on the written data in order to examine how English words with Hungarian case suffixes are integrated into the Hungarian text. I would like to find out if the case suffixes are selected on the basis of the Hungarian letter-to-sound pronunciation rules or the English pronunciation rules to meet the requirements of the Hungarian vowel harmony rules (Kenesei et al. 1998: 425). Since the language of the examined newspaper is dominantly Hungarian, the most important hypothesis of my study is that the selection of the suffixes is governed by the Hungarian letter-to-sound pronunciation rules. In conducting the linguistic analysis of the corpus, a general purpose software application – a concordancing program, has been used.

3.1 The Hungarian and the English vowel system

Hungarian is a language in which orthography is dominantly based on pronunciation, so the spelling rules of morphemes are determined by the pronunciation used by speakers of standard/everyday Hungarian. Whereas in the case of English, there is a certain lack of correspondence between graphemes and phonemes, in other words morphemes sometimes have several phonetic forms, depending on the context in which they occur. The contrastive study of derivational blends of this language-contact (when Hungarian and English come into direct contact) has to consider this difference between the two languages. The

derivational blends studied here are blends that have an imported stem (English) and a native (Hungarian) affix in Hungarian context. Logically, they are basically approached and studied according to the rules of the Hungarian language. They are examined on the basis of the Hungarian letter-to-sound pronunciation rules and the English pronunciation rules. (Throughout this study the Hungarian language is described on the basis of the following book: I. Kenesei R. M. Vágó – A. Fenyvesi: *Hungarian – Descriptive Grammars*.)

A central aspect of Hungarian phonology is the process of vowel harmony, which places restrictions on the vowels of successive syllables. The term „vowel harmony" refers to a widespread, word level prohibition on the co-occurrence of back vowels and front vowels, affecting root vowels, affix vowels, and epenthetic vowels. Within the domain of a simplex word, the generalities of backness harmony dictate that back vowels and rounded front vowels do not mix. Unrounded front vowels are neutral in the sense that they may freely co-occur with either back vowels or rounded front vowels. Accordingly, the vowel system of Hungarian may be classified into the following three vowel harmony sets:

1. back harmonic vowels – *u ú o ó a á* (back vowels)
2. front harmonic vowels – *ü ű ö ő* (front rounded vowels)
3. neutral vowels – *i í e é* (front unrounded vowels)

The English vowel system contains the following vowels:

1. front – *i:, I, e, æ*
2. central – *ə, ə:, ʌ*
3. back – *u:, u, ɔ, ɔ:, ɑ:*.

3.2 The locative cases of Hungarian

Let us consider the locative cases of Hungarian. The locative cases are attached directly to the end of the word, and they form a system with respect to three parameters of motion: motion toward/to, no motion/at rest, motion away/from, and three parameters of space: interior, exterior, surface. The suffixes expressing the different locative cases have both front vowel and back vowel variants and the choice depends on the so called „vowel harmony rule"

The co-occurrence restrictions of vowel harmony are evident in lexical (root) morphemes and are reinforced for suffixes in the form of active vowel alternations: suffixes containing harmonic vowels have both front vowel and back vowel variants. The choice is governed by the harmonic constitution of the root.

(a) Back vowel roots

Back vowel roots contain back vowels exclusively and select back harmonic suffixes.

1. The inessive case (general English equivalent: in)
The inessive case *-ban/-ben* is used to express no motion in(side) a place. Let us examine it with regard to the Hungarian vowel harmony rule with the examples taken from the corpus. (Suffixes attached to the root with a hyphen are not discussed separately as this information is irrelevant to the aim of this research.)

In examples (1) – (11) the back vowel suffix *-ban* is used. The choice meets the requirements of the Hungarian vowel harmony rules from both the Hungarian and the English perspectives: on the one hand they contain only back Hungarian vowels (pronounced according to the Hungarian letter-to-sound rules), and on the other hand when pronouncing them there are only back or central English vowels in them (central vowels are considered to be back vowels because when they are articulated the body of the tongue is pulled back):
(1) A Magyar Élet kapható ***Warrawong-ban*** Warrawong Newsagency Shop 39-40m Westfield *(2000/18/2/2)*
(2) munkahelye az 1960-as években a victoriai vasútnál volt, majd azt követően ***Cuburgban*** élt *(2000/33/20/1)*
(3) 15-kor ***Hawthornban*** (egyházi ünnepek alkalmával a ráeső napon) *(2001/12/13/2) (2)*
(4) ***LOCKHARDTBAN***, Waggától 60 kilométerre 3 szobás, teljesen berendezett ház *(2001/21/24/2)*
(5) október 20-án, este 7 órakor ***Wollongongban*** látható *(2001/39/17/1)*
(6) 1 órakor kezdi próbáit a Sacred Heart Church ***Hall-ban*** *(2001/3/13/1) (12)*
(7) GÁBOR HENTES ***BURWOODBAN*** Magyarországról importált ételízesítők, savanyúság *(2000/1/20/6)*
(8) Operett előzetes a HAKOAH ***Clubban*** Töltsön egy estét Australia művészeivel *(2001/1/11/1) (11)*
(9) akivel együtt dolgozott az 5 ***Shop-ban*** 1968-tól 1970-ig Woodongában, az *(2000/36/24/1)*
(10) nyugdíjas megosztaná magánházát ***Dundas-ban***, 100 százalékosan korrekt, tiszta, egészséges *(2000/24/20/1)*
(11) a VMTSZ műsoros délutánján, a Magyar Házban, ***Punchbowlban*** kerül sor *(2001/41/12/1)(1)*

All the words ending in *a* or *e* lengthen the vowel to *á*, *é* respectively. *Examples (12) – (15)* prove that this Hungarian spelling rule is applied in the corpus. This phenomenon is called Low Vowel Lengthening:
(12) egyik egy hálószoba, sitting roomos első emeleten ***Parramattában***, a másik bedsittingroom *(2000/38/20/1)*
(13) akivel együtt dolgozott az 5 Shop-ban 1968-tól 1970-ig ***Woodongában*** *(2000/36/24/1)*
(14) VERONIKA JOHNS, kérem, hívja fel Magdát ***Wahroongában*** *(2000/15/20/2)*

(15) lenni egy barátságos, modern fogorvosi rendelőnek a kozmopolita ***Balaclavában*** *(2000/3/20/4) (5)*

The only counterexample *(example 16)* can be found in the following sentence:

(16) A Bondi Junction ***Plaza-ban*** két újságosnál is kapható a MAGYAR ÉLET *(2000/2/16/7)*

The locative cases may be attached to words already formed for the possessive *(example 17)*:

(17) ÉDES ANYANYELVÜNK irodalmi előadását a Magyar Központ Social ***Clubjában*** *(2001/17/11/) (7)*

According to the Hungarian vowel system *example (18)* can only take the back vowel suffix. When pronounced in English the first syllable includes a front vowel whereas in the final syllable there is a back vowel, which means that it could belong to the mixed vowel root but still it can only take the back vowel suffix:

(18) A Magyar Élet kapható ***CHATSWOODBAN*** (NSW) Westfield Shopping Town *(2001/47/11/2) (1)*

Examples (19) – (25) take the back vowel suffix. There can be two reasons for this, one of them, however, is more likely. The selection of the back vowel suffix must have been based on the English pronunciation, in other words the English vowel system. The other option is as follows: since they all include back and neutral Hungarian vowels, and the neutral vowel is in the final „syllable", they belong to the class of words with back harmonic mixed vowel roots. Consequently, as a possibility they can take the back vowel suffix, but this explanation is less likely, as mentioned above:

(19) a magyar piknik a Georges Rivernél ***Picnic Point-ban.*** Bejárat a Henry Lawson Drive-ról *(2001/6/11/1) (1)*

(20) ***LANE COVE-ban***, közel buszhoz és vonathoz, megosztanék 2 hálószobás, csendes lakást *(2001/34/20/2)*

(21) invitáljuk Önöket CSAK EGYSZER a ***Pearls of Europe-ban*** tartandó KOMÁR LÁSZLÓ *(2000/10/17/4)*

(22) keresünk 82 éves, jókedélyű magyar hölgy mellé privát házban ***Ivanhoe-ban*** *(2001/17/20/1)*

(23) BENTLAKÓ HÁZVEZETŐNŐT keres ***Vaucluse-ban*** élő család *(2000/2/20/8)*

(24) KERTÉSZ házaspárt keresünk sürgősen, hosszú távra, azonnali kezdéssel ***Newcastle-ban*** *(2000/48/24/3)*

(25) Gyászolják: férje Herbert, fia Herbert (Jelenleg a Talbot ***Nursing Homeban***, Kew) *(2001/6/8/1)*

(The words which have the neutral vowel *e* in the final „syllable" could also belong to the class with front harmonic vowel roots but then they would take the front vowel suffix.)

2. The illative case (general English equivalent: into)
The illative case *-ba/-be* is used to express motion to the interior of a place. *Examples (26) – (27)* take the back vowel suffix. The trigger must have been both the Hungarian and the English vowel system:
(26) buszkirándulás ***Gosfordba*** a Sara Lee süteménygyárba; december 10 *(2000/47/24/1)*

The locative case is attached to the word already formed for the possessive:
(27) akkor barátsággal várjuk önt is a Magyar Központ Social ***Clubjába*** *(2001/40/5/2)*

The proper name Toorak *(example 28)* must have taken the back vowel suffix on the basis of the Hungarian vowel system since it includes only back vowels. If it is pronounced in English, the first syllable contains a back vowel but the final syllable seems to include the front English sound *æ*. So it can belong to the group of words with mixed vowel roots and optionally it can also take the back vowel suffix:
(28) bejáró takarítónőt csütörtöki, illetve pénteki napokra Elsternwickbe, illetve ***Toorakba*** *(2000/40/20/1)*

Example (29) would take the front vowel suffix if it was formed according to the Hungarian vowel system since it contains a neutral vowel. But when it is pronounced in English, it has a back vowel sound in it, so that is the reason why it takes the back vowel suffix:
(29) TAKARÍTÓNŐT keresünk heti egy-két napra, ***Kew-ba*** *(2000/38/20/1)*

The explanation is the same as with the inessive case above *(example 30)*:
(30) TAKARÍTÓNŐT keresünk idős házaspárhoz heti 5 órára ***Chatswoodba*** *(2001/4/20/1) (4)*

3. The superessive case (general English equivalent: on, at)
The superessive case *-on/-en/-ön* is used to express a position on or at an exterior. In *examples (31) – (33)* there are only Hungarian back vowels or English back diphthongs so the selection of the back vowel suffix is justified from the perspectives of both the Hungarian and the English vowel system:
(31) évében a ***Gold Coaston*** elhunyt *(2001/6/8/1) (6)*
(32) A ***Great Ocean Road-on*** meglátogatjuk az útvonal nevezetességeit *(2000/13/11/1)*
(33) KIRÁNDULÁST rendez a ***Wandin East Sport and Recreation Ground-on*** *(2000/7/19/1) (1)*

According to the Hungarian vowel system, the word *shore* with a neutral vowel in the final „syllable" and a back one in the first one, would belong to the mixed vowel root group and as such it would require a long front vowel suffix because of Low Vowel Lengthening. If it is pronounced in English, it contains a

back English vowel; so that is why it takes the back vowel suffix *(example 34)*:
(34) ételeket és süteményeket teljes választékban házhoz szállítunk a ***North Shore-on*** *(2000/14/15/39) (5)*

4. The allative case (general English equivalent: toward)
The allative case *-hoz/-hez/-höz* expresses motion toward the vicinity of someone/something. The word *motors* takes the back vowel suffix, either because of the Hungarian vowel system or the English one *(example 35)*:
(35) Jöjjön a BALACLAVA ***MOTORS-hoz***, beszélje meg a gyakorlott, megbízható *(2001/5/13/10)*

The word *Homebush* contains a neutral Hungarian vowel with a back vowel in the final syllable, so it has a mixed vowel root which can take the back vowel suffix, but presumably it takes the back vowel suffix on the basis of the English pronunciation containing a back vowel diphthong and a back vowel *(example 36)*:
(36) szobát keres Sydneyben, ***Homebush-hoz***, vonathoz közel szeptember 16-tól 25-ig *(2000/29/20/1)*

5. The ablative case (general English equivalent: away from)
The ablative case *-tól/-től* expresses motion away from the vicinity of someone/something. *Example (37)* contains only back Hungarian vowels, and the English vowel system also makes it possible to select the back vowel suffix:
(37) LOCKHARDTBAN, ***Waggától*** 60 kilométerre 3 szobás, teljesen berendezett ház *(2001/21/24/2)*

The explanation is the same as with the inessive case above *(example 38)*:
(38) MÉRSÉKELT ÁRAK 30 percre a Citytől, 15 percre ***Chatswoodtól*** *(2000/41/11/8)*

Example (39) takes the back vowel suffix. The selection surely based on the English pronunciation, the English vowel system since it contains back English vowels. Another possibility can be that it takes the back vowel suffix because of the Hungarian vowel system since it includes back and neutral Hungarian vowels, and the neutral vowel is in the final „syllable" Because of these vowels it belongs to the class of words with back harmonic mixed vowel roots, so as a possibility it can take the back vowel suffix:
(39) farmunk ***Newcastle-tól*** 250 kilométerre, Cassiles (NSW) területén van *(2000/44/20/1)*

6. The delative case (general English equivalent: off, from, about)
The delative case *-ról/-ről* is used to express motion away from an exterior. *Drive* is a word which only contains neutral Hungarian vowels pronounced according to the Hungarian letter-to-sound rule so on the basis of the Hungarian vowel harmony

rule it should take the front vowel suffix *-ről*. Moreover the final *e* (short low front unrounded vowel) would be lengthened to *é* (long mid front unrounded vowel). The selection of the back vowel suffix is definitely based on the English pronunciation *(example 40)*:
(40) piknik a Georges Rivernél Picnic Point-ban Bejárat a Henry Lawson ***Drive-ról*** a River Rd *(2001/6/11/1) (1)*

When *example (41)* is pronounced in English, it only contains back vowels and that is why it takes the back vowel suffix. If we examine it in terms of the Hungarian vowel system, it belongs to the mixed vowel root group with a back vowel in the final syllable, which requires the back vowel suffix too:
(41) Bejárat az iskola parkoló helyére a templom és az iskola között a Victory ***Blvd-ról*** *(2001/4/5/1) (1)*

7. The adessive case (general English equivalent: near, at)
The adessive case *-nál/-nél* expresses a position near or in the vicinity of someone/something. *Example (42)* takes the back vowel suffix. Both the Hungarian and the English vowel system may have been the trigger:
(42) Willoughby a ***Clubnál*** kitűnő parkolási lehetőség *(2001/48/8/1)*

The word *Jones* is pronounced with a back diphthong in English that is why it takes the back vowel suffix. According to the Hungarian vowel system it could take the front vowel root because of the neutral *e* in the final syllable *(example 43)*:
(43) 15 hétre egy Magyarországról szakmai gyakorlatra (a ***David Jones-nál***) idelátogató *(2001/24/20/1)*

(b) Front vowel roots
Front vowel roots contain either front harmonic vowels only, or front harmonic vowels together with neutral vowels, in any order. Such roots govern front harmony in suffixes.

1. The inessive case
The words *church* and *suburb* contain only back Hungarian vowels according to the Hungarian letter-to-sound pronunciation, yet they do not take the back vowel suffix. When pronounced in English, the vowel articulated in the final syllable of the word *suburb* (*ə*) (or in the word *church* [ə:]) are central vowels, which are considered to be back vowels. (The two sounds are phonologically different but as they are phonetically identical, they are regarded as identical in this study.) The explanation for the selection can be that in the Hungarian language there is a front vowel sound *ö* (short mid front rounded), the articulation of which may seem to be similar to the pronunciation of the English sounds mentioned above, especially for a native speaker of Hungarian who acquired English as a foreign language.

(Although *ö* is a letter, for the sake of simplicity it is referred to as a sound on the basis of the Hungarian letter-to-sound pronunciation rule.) Without this misleading similarity the back vowel suffix would be produced. Consequently *examples (44) – (46)* must be the result of the process through which these central English sounds are regarded as front vowels; however, they should be articulated as back vowels:
(44) órakor ISTENTISZTELET az Unley ***Uniting Church-ben*** (Unley St.) *(2001/5/12/2) (72)*
(45) HÁZVEZETŐNŐT keres házaspár ***Eastern Suburb-ben***, pénteken 5 órai elfoglaltsággal *(2000/2/20/1) (3)*
(46) és az ***Eastern Suburbs-ben*** *(2000/14/15/39) (6)*

Examples (47) – (51) contain back Hungarian vowels together with neutral vowels in the final „syllable", which would make it possible to classify them into the group with mixed vowel roots. Words in this group can optionally take the front vowel suffix. The selection of the front vowel suffix, however, was definitely determined by the English vowel system:
(47) KÉRJÜK olvasónkat, aki ***Gladesville-ben*** június 20-án vásárolt Money Ordert küldött be *(2000/24/20/1)*
(48) ***MARRICKVILLE-ben*** szép szoba fürdőszobával kiadó nemdohányzó, nem iszákos *(2001/1/24/1) (2)*
(49) Keresem Németh Marikát (vezetékneve a volt férjéé), aki ***Fairfieldben*** lakik édesanyjával *(2001/48/20/1)*
(50) A SYDNEYI TRIANON TÁRSASÁG ezúton hívja meg a ***New South Wales-ben*** élő, *(2000/17/11/1)*
(51) SZAKÁCSOT, kiszolgálót és konyhai segítséget keres étterem ***Double Bayben*** *(2001/12/20/2) (4)*

2. The illative case
The word *bay* contains a back Hungarian vowel, so it could belong to the group with mixed vowel roots, but the selection of the front vowel suffix must have been determined by its English pronounciation *(example 52)*:
(52) BENTLAKÓ házvezetőnőt/mindenest keresek ***Double Bay-be*** *(2001/22/20/1)*

The detailed explanation of the choice of the front vowel suffix after the root *suburb(s)* was discussed under inessive case with front vowel roots (b/1) *(example 53-54)*:
(53) bentlakással társalkodó/gondozónak az ***Eastern Suburbs-be*** (Sydney) A délelőttök *(2000/6/20/1) (1)*
(54) KÉT GONDOZÓT keresünk idős házaspárnak ***Eastern Suburb-be*** *(2001/24/20/1) (5)*

3. The allative case
Regarding the English vowel system *examples (55) – (56)* are identical as they only

contain front English vowels, so it is obvious that they take the front vowel suffix. As for the Hungarian vowel system they are different. The word *beach* having a back Hungarian vowel in the final „syllable" could have the back vowel suffix. The word *business* having a mixed vowel root with a neutral Hungarian sound in the final „syllable" could take either:
(55) COOGEE-ban szoba kiadó közel a buszhoz és a ***beach-hez*** *(2000/26/20/1) (2)*
(56) Angolul jól beszélő, fiatal, csinos hölgyet keresünk North Sydney-i ***businesshez*** *(2001/4/20/1)*

4. The ablative case
The selection of the front vowel suffix in *example (57)* must have been determined by the same facts discussed above under the allative case (b./3):
(57) SZOBA KIADÓ egyedülálló személynek Coogee-ban, 5 percre a bevásárlóközponttól és ***beachtől*** *(2000/49/28/1)*

5. The adessive case
The front vowel suffix was selected on the basis of the Hungarian vowel system in the case of the word *brokers*. Having both a back and a neutral vowel in the word with the latter one in the final position it can take the front vowel suffix. If the word is pronounced in English, however, it contains a back diphthong and a central vowel, so it should take the back vowel suffix. One must remember that the central sound articulated here is very similar to the Hungarian front sound *ö*, so this similarity may also have been the trigger *(example 58)*:
(58) Hívja Andrew-t a „SURE " ***Finance Brokersnél*** 1300 301 411 *(2001/36/16/7)*
(The examination of the words *beach, business* and *broker* could have a different approach because by now they are part of the Hungarian language as new loanwords, and as such they would belong to the group of words with disharmonic roots. The reason why they are included in this section is that the bilingual speakers of Hungarian and English, by whom the corpus was produced, learnt them as English words not loanwords in the Hungarian language.)

(c) Mixed vowel roots
Mixed vowel roots contain back vowels and neutral vowels, in any order. If the last syllable contains a back vowel, then the root determines back harmony for suffixes.

1. The inessive case
Examples (59) – (69) include both back and neutral Hungarian vowels with the back vowels in the final syllable, and at the same time when pronounced in English they contain back vowels in the last syllable; that is the reason why the back vowel suffix is attached to them:
(59) KARALL GIZELLA, aki életének utolsó néhány évét ***Kyabramban*** (Victoria)

élte le *(2000/21/13/1)*
(60) kezdi próbáit a Sacred Heart Church Hall-ban, ***Prestonban*** *(2001/3/13/1) (2)*
(61) BÚTOROZOTT szoba kiadó konyhahasználattal kellemes környezetben ***Elwoodban*** *(2000/7/24/1) (1)*
(62) A Magyar Élet kapható ***Dandenong-ban*** Westend Newsagency 118 Hemmings St. *(2000/44/5/3)*
(63) magyarországi megszemélyesítője első ausztráliai fellépése ***Geelongban*** a Szent László *(2000/4/16/2) (2)*
(64) MAGYAR KOZMETIKA ***Paddingtonban*** *(2001/47/20/3) (1)*
(65) ELADÓ egy üres, 100 méter hosszan a főutcára néző telek ***Daylesfordban*** *(2001/31/20/4)*
(66) másik bedsittingroom, négy lépcsős földszintes ***Riverwoodban***, mind a kettő közeli *(2000/38/20/1)*
(67) IDŐS házaspár ***Bondi Junctionban*** ausztráliai gyakorlattal rendelkező, nemdohányzó *(2001/2/20/3) (1)*
(68) ANYÁK NAPI EBÉD a Melody ***Restaurantban*** (Warburton Highway, Woory Yallock) *(2000/16/16/2)*
(69) St. Patrick ***Cathedralban*** volt *(2001/4/13/1)*

The Hungarian spelling rule that words ending in *a* (short low back slightly – rounded vowel) lengthen the vowel to *á* (long low central unrounded) is applied in *examples (70) – (74)* too:
(70) A ***Wantirnában*** működő Árpád Otthon 30 önálló szobából és 11 villa unitból álló, magyar *(2000/10/9/1)*
(71) KÉTSZOBÁS unit ***Boroniában*** KIADÓ *(2001/24/20/2)*
(72) itt élt és dolgozott ***Bonegillában*** a Migrant Reception Centre-ben, hozza magával emlékeinek *(2001/2/5/1)*
(73) egy hálószobás lakás, garázs és dupla carport, kiadó ***Lurneában***, villannyal *(2001/38/20/1)*
(74) reggel 8.30-tól 12-30-ig, ***St. Kildában*** *(2000/19/20/2)*

It must be the English pronunciation that determined the selection of the back vowel suffix in *example (75)*. Though it is less likely, but if the Hungarian neutral *i* (short high front unrounded vowel) is considered in the final „syllable", then the word belongs to the class with back harmonic mixed vowel roots, so it could also take the back vowel suffix:
(75) 11 órakor Szabadtéri istentisztelet és piknik a Silvan ***Reservoirban*** *(2001/49/18/1)*

2. The illative case

Examples (76) – (82) below include both back and neutral Hungarian vowels with the back vowels in the final syllable, and at the same time when pronounced in English they contain back vowels in the last syllable, that is the reason why the

back vowel suffix is attached to them:
(76) Budapesten, 1958-ban érkezett ***Western Australiába***, Sydneyben a vasútnál dolgozott *(2000/8/20/1)*
(77) NAGY MAGYAR ZARÁNDOKLAT ***BERRIMÁBA*** 2001 *(2001/31/6/1) (1)*
(78) napokra ***East St. Kildába*** *(2000/4/20/1) (1)*
(79) MEGBÍZHATÓ takarítónőt keresek kéthetenként 4 órára ***Leichhardt-ba*** *(2001/16/20/3)*
(80) nemdohányzó, háztartásban gyakorlott házvezetőnőt keresünk ***Bondi Junctionba*** *(2001/12/20/4) (3)*
(81) HÁZASPÁRT keresünk ***NEWCASTLE-ba***, aki el tudja végezni a kerti munkát és segít *(2001/19/20/1) (1)*
(82) HÁZTARTÁSI alkalmazottat keresek heti egy vagy két napra ***Cremorne-ba*** *(2000/43/20/1)*

3. The elative case
The elative case *-ból/-ből* is used to express motion out from the interior of a place (general English equivalent: out of/out from). *Example (83)* contains both back and neutral Hungarian vowels with a back vowel in the final syllable, and if it is pronounced in English, there is a back vowel in the final syllable. The back vowel suffix is attached to it because of the above reasons. The final *a*, however, is not lengthened to *á* (at least not in the written version of the language):
(83) Régi barátja még ***Bonegillaból*** keresi Joseph Belepotoskit *(2000/33/20/1)*

4. The delative case
The word *avenue* is the only example in the corpus which takes both the front and the back vowel suffix. Because of the English vowel system (it has a back vowel in the final syllable) the first one takes the back vowel suffix. Whereas the second one is formed according to the Hungarian vowel system, according to which it can take the front vowel suffix since it has a neutral vowel in the final „syllable" *(examples 84-85)*:
(84) Cím: Magyar Központ 1-5 Breust Place, Punchbowl Bejárat a Highclare ***Avenue-ról*** *(2001/7/12/2) (1)*
(85) Cím: Magyar Központ 1-5 Breust Place, Punchbowl Bejárat a Highclare ***Avenue-ről*** *(2000/8/11/1)*

5. The ablative case
Although *example (86)* has the delative suffix attached to the root, it is included in the ablative case because the ablative suffix would be suitable in the Hungarian context. (This is one of the two examples in the corpus where the incorrect case suffix is used.) It includes both back and neutral Hungarian vowels with the back vowel in the final syllable, and at the same time when pronounced in English it

contains back vowels in the last syllable, therefore the back vowel suffix is attached to it:
(86) házzal, folyó melletti településen, víz, villany, telefon bevezetve, 25 percre ***Dandenongról*** *(2000/14/20/2)*

If the last syllable contains a neutral vowel, then three different harmonising patterns can be identified: back harmonic, front harmonic, and vacillating.

- Back harmonic mixed vowel roots take back vowel suffixes

1. The inessive case

Considering the Hungarian vowel system the last syllable of *examples (87) – (88)* contains a neutral vowel with a back vowel root so they can take the back vowel suffix. The same can be said about the English pronunciation:
(87) MAGYAR IDŐSEK OTTHONA Ferntree ***Gullyban*** DR. *(2000/49/25/16) (1)*
(88) az ***Armyban*** *(2000/36/24/1)*

The locative case is attached to *example (89)* already formed for the possessive:
(89) keresek egy komoly, 50-55 év közötti hölgyet feleségnek, aki itt élne velem kis ***unitomban*** *(2000/35/24/3)*

The following two proper names are quite interesting examples. They take the back vowel suffix because of both the Hungarian and the English vowel system (they are words with back harmonic mixed vowel roots). They could equally belong to the group of words with front harmonic mixed vowel roots because they contain an *e* in the final „syllable" In other words, they could also take the front vowel suffix on the basis of the Hungarian vowel system *(examples 90-91)*.
(90) ***COOGEE-ban*** igényes személyeknek lakrész kiadó *(2001/16/20/2) (3)*
(91) ***MOOREE-ban*** a Mária Hotel 20 éves! *(2001/3/11/2)*

2. The illative case

The back vowel suffix is attached to the roots in *examples (92) – (93)* because of both the Hungarian and the English vowel system. (With the English pronunciation the word „*Bondi*" can only have the back vowel suffix.)
(92) TAKARÍTÓNŐT keresünk kéthetente egy napra, 6-7 órás elfoglaltsággal vadonatúj ***unit-ba*** *(2001/2/20/1)*
(93) HÖLGY keres bentlakó segítséget ***BONDi-ba*** *(2001/4/20/1)*

According to the English vowel system *example (94)* contains two front vowels, so it should take the front vowel suffix. In terms of the Hungarian vowel system, the word has a back harmonic mixed vowel root with a neutral vowel in the final „syllable", that is why it takes the back vowel suffix *(example 94)*:
(94) autóbusz kirándulást rendez február 6-án, vasárnap ***Hunter Valley-ba*** a borkóstolóra *(2000/2/20/1)*

- Front harmonic mixed vowel roots take front vowel suffixes

They either contain an *e* in the final syllable, or they contain any neutral vowel in the penultimate syllable and *e* or *é* in the final syllable.

1. The inessive case

Example (95) contains the front English diphthong *ei* in the final syllable, and for this reason takes the front vowel suffix. As for the Hungarian vowel system – since there is an *e* in the final „syllable" of the word – the front vowel suffix is also a suitable choice:

(95) A Magyar Élet kapható ***Huntingdale-ben*** Huntingdale Newsagency 291 Huntingdale Rd. *(2000/8/9/4)*

2. The ablative case

The last syllables of *examples (96) – (97)* contain the front Hungarian *e* vowel, and so take the front vowel suffix. If the suffix was chosen on the basis of the English pronunciation, they would take the back vowel suffix because the last syllable is the central *ə* sound, which is considered to be a back vowel, and takes the back vowel suffix:

(96) ***Office of Fair Trading/Justice Department-től***, amiben értesítettek, hogy a jelenlegi *(2000/23/15/1)*

(97) ***BUNDABERGTŐL*** 45 kilométerre, betegség miatt sürgősen eladó csodálatos 25 acre *(2000/42/20/2)*

- Vacillating mixed vowel roots allow both back harmonic and front harmonic suffixes, which are in free variation

1. The inessive case

In terms of the Hungarian vowel system *examples (98) – (101)* can either take the front or the back vowel suffix, but here the front vowel suffix is preferred. If the English pronunciation is considered, the first two would take the back vowels suffix, whereas in the case of the last two either the front or the back vowel suffix could be taken:

(98) Április 14-én este a Club 28 ***Doncaster-ben*** tartózkodott. Kérem, jelentkezzék telefonon *(2001/15/20/1)*

(99) 2 órakor az Eastern Suburbs ***Memorial Gardens-ben***, Military Rd. *(2000/43/17/1)*

(100) 35 év körüli, hosszú fekete hajú, keresztneve Zsuzsa, ajkai születésű és ***Caulfieldben*** lakik *(2001/15/20/1)*

(101) Református istentisztelet minden vasárnap ***Strathfieldben*** 11 órakor *(2001/6/4/1) (26)*

Although the superessive case suffix is attached to the word *szupermarket* in *example (102)* it is included in this section because the inessive case suffix -

ban/-ben would be suitable in the Hungarian context. (The reason why the superessive case suffix was selected may be that both in English and Hungarian that is the case suffix which we use with the word *market.*) If the right case suffix is used it can be either the front or the back vowel suffix:
(102) Keresse az Eskal-t a ***szupermarketon*** és a deliben *(2000/2/5/8)*

2. The ablative case
Example (103) can either take the front or the back vowel suffix with regard to the Hungarian vowel system, but here the back vowel suffix is preferred. According to the English vowel system either one can be taken:
(103) -től, a Luna Parktól, az ***Esplanade-tól*** és a tengerparttól *(2000/41/3/1)*

(d) Neutral vowel roots
Neutral vowel roots contain only neutral vowels. In the great majority of the cases, suffixes are front harmonic, as expected (neutral vowels are front); exceptionally, some neutral vowel roots are back harmonic. They are known as antiharmonic words.

1. The inessive case
The use of the front vowel suffix *-ben* in *examples (104) – (106)* can be justified with the help of both the Hungarian vowel system (they only contain neutral vowels) and the English pronunciation:
(104) március 15-én ***Ipswichben*** elhunyt *(2000/10/13/1)*
(105) ***ENDEAVOUR HILLS-ben*** különbejáratú, komfortos, bútorozott *(2000/32/20/2)*
(106) egyedülálló hölgynek. Kényelmes, kertes házam van ***Bellevue Hill-ben*** *(2000/41/20/5)*

The word *centre* contains only neutral Hungarian vowels, therefore it takes the front vowel suffix. According to the English vowel system the second vowel is central, which is regarded a back vowel, so it should belong to the group with mixed vowel roots having a back vowel in the final position, which means that it should have the back vowel suffix *-ban (example 107)*:
(107) élt és dolgozott Bonegillában a ***Migrant Reception Centre-ben***, hozza magával emlékeinek *(2001/2/5/1) (6)*

The following proper name takes the front vowel suffix because it only has neutral Hungarian vowels in it, although it could also belong to the class of words with mixed vowel roots on the basis of the English pronunciation since its last syllable includes a neutral vowel with a central vowel in the last but one, which gives the option of the front vowel suffix attached to the end of the word *(example 108)*:
(108) ugyanazon tulajdonos alatt sikeresen működő ÉTTEREM ***Elsternwickben***

ELADÓ *(2001/35/20/3)*

The word ***height*** takes the front vowel suffix because it includes only Hungarian neutral vowels. If the English vowel system were the trigger, it would take the back vowel suffix because it is pronounced with a back diphthong *(example 109)*:

(109) 5 órától későig ***Dover Heights-ben*** *(2000/3/20/1)*

2. The illative case

The use of the front vowel suffix *-be* in *examples (110) – (112)* can be justified with the help of both the Hungarian vowel system and the English pronunciation:

(110) BENTLAKÓ, egyedülálló házvezetőnőt keresek ***Bellevue Hillsbe*** *(2001/15/20/2)*

(111) kirándulást rendez ***Bilpinbe***, az almaszüretre és a botanikus kertbe *(2001/22/20/1)*

(112) bejáró takarítónőt csütörtöki, illetve pénteki napokra ***Elsternwickbe***, illetve Toorakba *(2000/40/20/1)*

3. The superessive case

The word *beach* only contains front English vowels, so it is obvious that it takes the front vowel suffix. With respect to the Hungarian vowel system it could have the back vowel suffix because it has a back Hungarian vowel in the final „syllable" *(example 113)*:

(113) Élet kapható Bondi ***Beachen*** Newsagent, 134 Campbell Parade *(2001/1/21/20) (1)*

4. The ablative case

Example (114) contains only neutral vowels both in terms of the Hungarian and the English vowel system so it takes the front vowel suffix:

(114) kapható a ***South East Printingtől*** a Cooma, NSW 2630 címen, $ 20 *(2000/22/20/1)*

5. The delative case

The word *street* contains only neutral vowels both in the Hungarian and the English vowel system; so it takes the front vowel suffix *(example 115)*:

(115) Sydneyből a Castlereagh ***Streetről*** direkt buszjárat: 225-ös autóbusz *(2000/3/14/1) (1)*

6. The adessive case

The word *river* contains only neutral Hungarian vowels, and for that reason takes the front vowel suffix. If it is pronounced in English, the final syllable includes a central sound, which has already been characterised in connection with the word

church (example 116).
(116) Itt lesz a magyar piknik a Georges ***Rivernél*** Picnic Point-ban Bejárat a Henry Lawson *(2001/6/11/1) (1)*

(e) Disharmonic roots
In exceptional cases, mostly in unassimilated loanwords, back vowels and front rounded vowels are found tautomorphenically. Although these words do not follow the general patterns of root harmony, they are always regular with respect to suffix harmony in that it is the last harmonic vowel that determines the harmony of suffixes. No examples are considered in this group.

4. Summary
Altogether 116 (it is considered 100%) different derivational blends were examined, out of which 74 (63.5%) take the case suffix both on the basis of the Hungarian letter-to-sound pronunciation rules and the English pronunciation rules. This is due to the two languages „sharing" some of the vowels, so either one can be the trigger. In 31 cases (26.5%) the choice of the case suffix is governed by the English pronunciation and only 11 (10%) derivational blends take the case suffix on the basis of the Hungarian letter-to-sound pronunciation rules. In conclusion the following can be stated: the selection of the locative case suffix alternant is basically determined by the English pronunciation rules rather than the Hungarian letter-to-sound pronunciation rules, which means that our hypothesis cannot be justified.

The aim of a further study could be to carry out a morphophonological research to examine how the Hungarian assimilation rules are applied to English words (derivational blends).

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ENVIROMENT OF POLISH DEMOCRATISATION CHANGES

RAFAŁ MAJEWSKI

In 1989 a process of democratisation was started in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Democratisation means a change of the social system towards ideals and institutions well-rooted in the countries of Western Europe, the USA and Canada based, *inter alia*, on the principles of: 1. Sovereignty of nation; 2. Republican system of government; 3. Respect for the rules of the state of law; 4. Political representation; 5. Separation of powers and a system of checks-and-balances between them; 6. Political pluralism.[1] Political principles should be, to a great extent, linked to the economic rules. Democracy is said to be the support of market economy, i.e. the economy based on the rules of economic liberty manifested, to a major extent, in the freedom to establish and operate business units and equality before the law. Transition to democracy can be considered on two planes: that of law and institutions and that of the social one.

The political system of post-war Poland was provided for in the Petty Constitution of 19th February, 1947 and then in the Constitution of People's Republic of Poland of 22nd July, 1952, breaking off with the democratic institutions and traditions of the so-called March Constitution of 1921 and creating a political system close to the model of the Soviet Union and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. By April, 1989, 15 amendments were made to the Constitution, of various importance to the political system. A real breakthrough in Poland's post-war history was the debate of the Round Table (6th February – 5th April, 1989) resulting, among others, in changes leading towards democratisation of the country. Further amendments to the basic law were introduced, providing for changes in the electoral law, establishing the new office of the President of the Republic of Poland, stating the mode and principles of adopting a new constitution, etc. Of special importance was the Organic Act of 17th October, 1992 on the Relationships between the Legislative and Executive Powers of the Republic of Poland and on the System of Local Government. Foundations of the current political system are laid down, among others, in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997. Along with other normative acts being sources of the constitutional law it reflects solutions and ideas which are universally regarded as democratic ones.

Democratic political institutions of Poland's constitutional system, introduced within the last decade, among others, include: the model of government

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[1] *Konstytucjonalizacja zasad i instytucji ustrojowych*, red. P.Sarnecki, Warszawa 1997; G.Smitth: *Życie polityczne w Europie Zachodniej*, Warszawa 1992.

based on preponderance of the parliament to which the cabinet is responsible, vote of confidence/non-confidence, the ombudsman, the commissioner for protection of children's rights, the Constitutional Tribunal, the Tribunal of State and referendum, to name just some.[2]

The process of democratisation of political life, taking place now, is a sign of the civilisation changes taking place at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries.[3] It was in the middle of the last century that there came the wave of technical revolution. The changes in question are related to the development of mass media and other forms of communication; it is even said that a real revolution has taken place in information techniques. The latter have brought about major changes of social life, human behaviour, ways of thinking. The opportunity to immediately reach individual citizens using mass media has resulted in a new quality of political life. A change has also taken place as regards relations with political institutions. People lose trust in governmental institutions and show reluctance to participation in collective life. Ties with political parties come loose, attendance at the elections drops and constituencies keep fluctuating heavily.

The current rational social order gets replaced by emotional one. All kinds of integrism, fanatism, nationalism and populism come to life again. Extreme political groups grow in importance.

The intensity of political life keeps growing as well. Mass media (TV in particular) and IT networks increase the speed of transfer of information and its availability to the masses which, in turn, makes political élites pay more attention to their actions. Less and less themes are regarded as taboos, since various spheres of social life are made subject to the control exercised by mass media. The role of the media in modelling political and social life is often stressed. Control of the transfer of information exerts influence on public opinion and is translated into concrete examples of political behaviour. Poland's public TV enjoying almost 73% of social support, which is an important mechanism of shaping human behaviour. Control over public TV and radio becomes thus, oftentimes, a major goal of political struggle. Mass media use to be referred to as the „fourth power"

Diversification of behaviour characteristic of social life is manifested, on the one hand, in the creation of a global society, shaped to a great extent by mass media, and on the other hand in an ever growing activity of local structures.

Localism, consisting in local communities aiming at achievement of a high degree of autonomy and self-reliance is, to a major extent, a reaction to excessive centralisation, concentration and standardisation of the industrial society and

[2] Z. Witkowski – J. Galster – B. Gronowska – W. Szyszkowski: *Prawo konstytucyjne,* Toruń 1998, p. 55-75.

[3] A. Toffler – H. Toffler: *Creatinig a New Civilization. The Politics of the Third Wave,* 1995.

cultural homogeneity.[4] The citizen is not satisfied with the effectiveness of actions undertaken by the state mechanism. He is losing a feeling of influence for state affairs.

Tab. 1.

In your opinion, do people like to have an influence on public affairs of:	Yes	No	Difficult to say
	%		
State	16	82	2
Region in which you live	17	80	3
Municipal structure in which you live	31	67	2
City or village in which you live	43	54	3

www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2000/KOM008/KOM008.HTM

Localism is a sign of objection against overblown bureaucracy and the increasing distance between those governing and those governed. Being aware of the problem, Poland's political élites undertook an administrative reform of the country. Foundations of the reform, aimed at considerable decentralisation of the authority, proved to be a mere fiction. It is still the central government that remains the real centre of decision, a proof of that being found, among others, in distribution of financial resources or relatively strong position of the *wojewoda*, or governor, representing the central government in the field. The newly established administrative division of the country has made the latter composed of 16 provinces (Polish *województwo*), 308 counties (or *powiats*) and 2489 communes (Polish *gmina*), including 65 municipalities enjoying the powers of a county (*powiat*).

The traditional system of representative democracy raises objections, as its organisation favours the majority and puts it at an advantageous position.[5] A question is thus raised: does the government, established by a decision of Poland's *Sejm*, or Parliament, composed of 460 MPs, actually reflect opinions of Polish society and does it, consequently, have social title to take all those important decisions concerning individual parts of the country or groups that are unable to win a sufficient number of seats in the Parliament to express their needs and positions on individual issues? Does the president, appointed under a system of universal elections by a majority of 1 or 2% of votes, have the social title to exercise power? There are few legal solutions in Poland protecting minority

[4] E. Polak: *Przemiany cywilizacji współczesnej w sferze kultury materialnej,* Gdańsk 1996, p. 144.

[5] J. Naisbitt: *Megatrends,* New York 1984, p. 197-210.

interests. The only effective ways of mitigating many conflicts seem to be decentralisation of power, introducing rules of local government and forms of direct democracy.

Tab. 2.

ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRACY



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An ever increasing crisis of democratic institutions is taking place. The basic elements of the Polish democratic system are political parties competing for access to power, bicameral parliament elected for a period of 4 years, president appointed under a system of universal elections for 5 years, government bearing political responsibility to parliament, agencies of local government and local agencies of the central government. Two characteristic features of the political system, identical with those of many political systems existing in democratic countries of Europe and the world, should be noted in passing: the concept of the term of office and the concept of elections. The system, shaped to a great extent as early as in the 19th century, is now obsolete and does not actually suit the contemporary complicated realities.

Activity of the political parties is focused on elections. This is fostered by the electoral calendar, with elections to certain segments of government taking place almost every year (the presidential elections in 1995, parliamentary elections in 1997, municipal ones in 1998). Many a decision of parties belonging to the ruling coalition is aimed at winning friendly attitude of the voters. Political élites

are blamed for giving their own needs a priority before those of the state and society.[6] It is only in the period preceding the elections that constituencies are canvassed for votes. After winning them, the constituency is oftentimes ignored, promises made before the elections becoming forgotten and partisan interests being looked after. The concept of tenure of office also results in a kind of stagnation among politicians who are not interested in making long-term decisions, including many reforms with high social costs attached to them. Nor does it seldom happen that politicians abuse governmental positions to gain considerable financial resources. Highly controversial is the system of financing political parties, which parties – in return for financing their election campaigns – become dependent on certain pressure groups making them take the desired economic or political decisions. Issues of key importance to the country are similar in programmes of individual political parties, stress being put on secondary problems, like attitude to abortion. Those busy in election headquarters often focus on launching a so-called negative campaign, consisting in weak points of the opponents being identified and shown to the public, rather than present an election programme of their own, in which issues important to the country could be resolved.

The society loses trust in democratic mechanisms.[7] The fact is manifested in decreasing attendance at the elections. People become passive and sceptical about events of political life and do not identify themselves with processes taking place. Election of a candidate becomes dependent not on his/her knowledge, experience, skills, but much more on how his/her specialists can present him/her in the mass media or at the rallies, and how many posters have been placed in the streets, or on various deformations of the election system. It is even more frequently a small group of people who cannot actually make up their minds and settle the outcome of the election. They are people who make their final decision quite often at random, or guided by emotional factors, or yield themselves to the pressure of their environment, or base their decision on results of the polls which are published not without manipulation. The political élites selected in this way are oftentimes incompetent and compromise themselves with their behaviour, lack of adequate knowledge or just poor manners. The society is losing trust in politicians. The higher a politician's position in an authority society, the bigger his fall may be.

[6] S. P. Huntington: *Trzecia fala demokratyzacji,* Warszawa 1995, p. 168-279.
[7] A. Toffler: *Trzecia fala,* Warszawa 1997, p. 584-590.

Tab. 3.

Do you think, that there are people, who care about your affairs and needs:	Yes	No	Difficult to say
	%		
In the local authoritie's structure	47	41	12
In the regional government	33	47	20
In the parliament	32	55	13
In the government	31	57	12

www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2000/KOM008/KOM008.HTM

It was also the legal system under which political parties were institutionalised that had contributed to the evolving of the attitude to the political life in the mid-1990s. The required social support for a registration of a political party was merely limited to 15 persons. Easy legalisation of the parties brought about a situation in which the political stage of the country got crowded with a few hundreds of political groups, including so exotic ones like Polish Party of Friends of Beer, Congress of Polish Eskimos, or Party V (Party of Friends of VCRs). The situation has changed now, since aiming at legalisation of a political party one has attached to the application, among others, a list with a minimum of 1,000 of supporters. As a result of such changes there are some tens of political groups now, ephemeral ones or those arousing laughter and embarrassment among spectators of political life being eliminated.

It should be also noted that a major cause of civilisation conflicts are economic problems. Economic inequality of regions of the country, redistribution of income exercised by the central government, dependence of economic situation of individual regions on decisions taken at the central level, changes of ownership and management within the economy, poor quality of public services, low financial standing of municipalities and rural communes, lack of adequate infrastructure, unemployment, insufficient amount of real capital etc. are just some of the problems contemporary authorities have to cope with.[8] An important correlation can also be noticed between economic standing of households and acceptance of governmental structures. The loss of hope for better economic situation is connected with falling support for the government. Decreasing the standards of life and a growing sphere of poverty result in people losing trust in the governing circles and becoming alienated from political life of the country.

[8] R. Majewski: „Decentralizacja życia politycznego jako zjawisko cywilizacyjne", in *Tradycja i współczesne odmiany samorządu,* red. D. Walczak-Duraj (Zeszyty Naukowe, vol. 11), Płock 1999, p. 76-77.

Tab. 4.

Do you think that the politics of the government are good, give hopes for improvement and make the economic situation better:	IX	X	XI	XII	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
	1999					2000					
	%										
Yes	23	21	25	24	26	19	17	16	19	15	17
No	67	69	64	62	62	71	69	72	67	74	68
Difficult to say	10	10	11	14	12	10	14	12	14	11	15

www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2000/KOM109/KOM109.HTM

Obsolete and rather inefficient is also the structure of the government itself, based on branch ministries and vertical ties between them and the economy. Mechanisms co-ordinating operation of the ministries are inefficient, and as a result decisions taken on identical or similar issues by various centres of decision happen to be incoherent and misleading.

Tab. 5.

Opinion about government's politics	Czech	Hungary	Lithuania	Poland	Czech	Hungary	Lithuania	Poland
	VII 1999				I 2000			
	%							
Very good	1	4	-	1	1	4	2	1
Good	18	32	-	31	22	29	23	27
Bad	46	35	-	38	49	38	32	40
Very bad	16	16	-	16	12	18	9	18
Difficult to say	19	13	-	14	16	12	35	14

www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2000/KOM024/KOM024.HTM

One of the factors reducing efficiency of government is the expanding technosphere. Bureaucracy has become an element considerably slowing down decision-making processes in governmental agencies, international structures etc. Low level of competence, a long way of information transfer, „omnipotence" of public officials, licensing system limiting economic liberty are just some of the adverse phenomena appearing in that area. Other factors in question include extension of central agencies of the state. Under the guise of reforms aimed at decentralisation of the state new agencies are being created, also for the purpose of conducting the reforms, which agencies are not dissolved after the reform has been introduced but change their name instead, remaining a part of the central structure of the state.

In Poland, just like in other countries, amount of trust to the government is determined by civilisation processes. Politics, as a sphere of social activity, is tied to almost all aspects of life. Changes taking place in individual areas influence political behaviour and the shape of processes. A major role in the process is also played by Polish political culture. An important factor modelling the culture was adoption of Christianity in accordance with the Western patterns. The patterns have stamped themselves on the system of law and education. They did not mean a mere reflection of the Western system, though, but were adapted to Polish conditions and formed a specific system of standards and values.

Christianity has shaped Polish Catholicism, the features of which are expressed in such values, like: (1) respect to authorities; (2) socio-political hierarchy; (3) special mission and charisma; (4) great importance attached to symbols.[9]

In the world Poles are viewed as carriers of many romantic features. Stressed are, in particular, their (1) individualism; (2) readiness for making sacrifice; (3) high level of political involvement; (4) attaching great importance to the past; (5) pro-social activity, in particular as far as underground and liberating activities are concerned.

Another image present in the world is the cliché of the Pole as an anarchist. The picture includes megalomania, lack of perseverance, addiction to drinking, lack of discipline, but also hospitality, emotionality, flexibility, openness to the world.

Highly specific is Polish political culture. It is determined by elements like Polish Catholicism, Polish romanticism, Polish anarchism, Polish democratism, Polish apologetics of progress.[10]

Polish democratism has a special meaning. It is connected with the slogans of liberty, equality, fraternity. The perception of Polish democratism includes frequent changes in attitudes and opinions, rushing to get involved in social and political activities regarded as a single event. Meaningful is also the objection of Poles to strong executive power.

A marked feature of Polish culture is preponderance of politics over other aspects of life. Determined by politics are many aspects of life. It influences attitudes towards life and leads towards neglecting anything that is not politics.[11]

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[9] A. Chodubski: „O tożsamości cywilizacji zachodnioeuropejskiej", in *W kręgu cywilizacji Europejskiej,* red. A. Chodubski – A. W. Sobociński – W. Tłokiński, Toruń 1996, p. 30-32.

[10] A. Chodubski: „Kultura polityczna współczesnej emigracji polskiej", in *Kultura polityczna w Polsce. Przeszłość i teraźniejszość*, red. M.Kosman, Poznań 1996, p. 161-167.

[11] R. Majewski: „Korzenie kulturowe na drodze integracji Polski z Unią Europejską", in: *Edukacja Menedżerska a społeczne i prawne otoczenie biznesu,* red. B. Garbacik, Gdańsk 1998, p. 32-33.

„FACTS AND FICTION" ON THE CURRENT FUNDAMENTAL CRISIS IN HISTORY

OTTO GERHARD OEXLE

History as a discipline has been in crisis ever since its very beginnings around 1800 and it still finds itself in the same situation today. In the current crisis it is the „postmodern challenge" and „facts and fiction" which are at stake.

1.

The British historian Richard J. Evans became known by his book *Death in Hamburg* (1987) which focuses on civic society and politics during the cholera epidemics in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In his polemic *In Defence of History* (1997) which was recently translated into German,[1] he has taken up the fight against „postmodernism" in historiography and history, with such emotiveness that it seems to mask a deep sense of shock. According to Evans the „postmodern challenge" has to be met, since the „linguistic turn" that replaces historical „facts" and „causes" with mere „discourses" has driven the discipline into a fundamental „epistemological crisis" „History" says Evans, quoting three American historians Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt and Margaret Jacob and their book *Telling the Truth about History* from 1994[2] – „has been shaken right down to its scientific and cultural foundations."[3] Other British and American historians whose voices Evans quotes in his book have argued along similar lines:[4] the „postmodern challenge", as explained by the British social historian Lawrence Stone in 1991, has thrown the discipline „into a crisis of self-confidence about what it is doing and how it is doing it" And according to the American medievalist Gabrielle M. Spiegel the „dissolution" of history is imminent. There is even a threat of its „murder", as one Australian historian has claimed (Keith Windshuttle: *The Killing of History. How a Discipline is being Murdered by Literary Critics and Social Theorists,* 1994).

Richard Evans wants to put a stop to these shocking developments. Initially

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[1] Richard J. Evans: *In Defence of History*, London 1997. German translation: *Fakten und Fiktionen. Über die Grundlagen historischer Erkenntnis*, Frankfurt – New York 1998. All quotations are taken from the English original unless otherwise stated. – I would like to thank Gesa Stedman (Berlin) for her meticulous translation.

[2] Joyce Appleby – Lynn Hunt – Margaret Jacob: *Telling the Truth about History*, New York – London 1994.

[3] Evans, p. 4.

[4] Op. cit., p. 4.

quite in accordance with the postmodernists, he intends to awaken those historians who perhaps have not even become aware of the crisis from their complacency and self-satisfaction, in order to show them how to parry the postmodernists' attacks and finally overcome them. „It is time we historians took responsibility for explaining what we do, how we do it, and why it is worth doing"[5] – almost as if we were the first to have this idea. With this phrase he again quotes the three American historians who, for the same motive, announced „a new theory of objectivity" (1994), a new „practical realism".[6] However, this approach does not find Evans' favour since it rejects the notion „that the past can impose its reality on the historian through these [material] remains" [7] But it is exactly this role of the past, which Evans considers to be the most important and at the same time the most commonsensical view of history. For him, it is a „fact" that „the past" exists and that „the documents do have an integrity of their own, they do indeed „speak for themselves" „The constraints that past reality imposes through them on the historian are more than merely negative."[8] The historian, taught thus about the past by being instructed by the past, can „really" know history. In Evans' opinion, the question what historical facts actually are is easily answered. Facts are „objects" in the past. „A historical fact is something that happened in history and can be verified as such through the traces history has left behind. Whether or not a historian actually carried out the act of verification is irrelevant to its factuality: it really is there entirely independently of the historian."[9] At the end of his deliberations on the „postmodernist thinkers" Evans therefore remains „optimistic that objective historical knowledge is both desirable and attainable" And in the face of the „postmodernist challenge" he therefore looks „humbly at the past" and „despite" all these challenges the past „really happened, and we really can, if we are very scrupulous and careful and self-critical, find out how it happened and reach some tenable though always less than final conclusions about what it all meant" [10]

2.

On the basis of the statements I have just quoted one might think that the debate over „facts and fiction" is largely an American and British problem but it soon becomes clear that the quarrel has also gathered momentum in Germany.

In Germany, too, the belief in facts expressed by historians and historians

[5] Evans (as in note 1), p. 12. As a quotation in Appleby – Hunt – Jacob (as in note 2), p. 9.
[6] Appleby - Hunt – Jacob (as in note 2), p. 247ff.
[7] Evans (as in note 1), p. 115 and p. 131.
[8] Op. cit., p. 116.
[9] Op. cit., p. 76.
[10] Op. cit., p. 252 and p. 253.

of law has come under attack. The historian Michael Stolleis, a specialist in legal history, has recently written in his booklet entitled *Rechtsgeschichte als Kunstprodukt. Zur Entbehrlichkeit von „Begriff" und „Tatsache"* (1997) is „only [!] a learned variety of the species «poet/author», basing his work on older texts and signs"; and: behind the so-called „facts" „nothing more [!] [...] than linguistic messages are hidden, in which one generally believes for pragmatic reasons" [11]

On the opposite side, Germans also imploringly demand that „the facts be rescued" – states the medievalist Werner Paravicini in his treatise „Rettung aus dem Archiv?" (1998). Paravicini writes that „the fact" is „the pillar, the fundamental element of all history as an academic discipline"; but it is exactly the „fact" that has been dissolved by the „postmodernists" as in an acid bath. Modern historiography is therefore in danger of „succumbing to the creepers of theoretical confusion" [12] Paravicini, like Evans, fights against „postmodern arbitrariness" and against the „self-destruction of history" that allegedly follows from it. He therefore calls for „the rescue of history", which will occur through the „rescue of the fact" [13] There exists, he says, „an irreducible quality in facts, which is absolutely fundamental and which cannot be denied", and a „pragmatic evidence, which one should not be talked out of" Most of all, according to Paravicini, the „primary fact [...] must be reinvested with its dignity – as unbelievable as this may sound" Furthermore: „The fact will be saved because it has to be saved." And by „rediscovering the fact" one will also rediscover „the truth"

3.

This quarrel about „the past" allegedly takes the historian by the hand in order to show him the truth about the historical past, the quarrel about „irreducible" facts existing independently of the historian, about „primary facts" and their „dignity" – or about the mere fictional quality of „the" past and of the real is remarkable as soon as one judges it from the outside.

(1) It is remarkable, firstly, because of the assurance of the protagonists on both sides and because of their *lack of interest in the weaknesses and deficiencies of their own positions*. Where, for example, on the part of the fact-historians is the question concerning the conditions of the possibility of knowledge of pre-existing „facts", which are independent of the historian and moreover have long since passed, and their „truth" or indeed the possibility of knowledge of „*the* past" as

[11] Michael Stolleis: *Rechtsgeschichte als Kunstprodukt. Zur Entbehrlichkeit von „Begriff" und „Tatsache"*, Baden-Baden 1997, p. 16 and p. 27.

[12] Werner Paravicini: „Rettung aus dem Archiv? Eine Betrachtung aus Anlaß der 700-Jahrfeier der Lübecker Trese", in *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 78 (1998), pp. 11-46, p. 23.

[13] Op. cit., p. 31ff.

such? The question is not even posed, just as if it were unnecessary to discuss – and as if no discussion of it had ever taken place. On the opposing side, the insouciance of the „postmodernists" surprises, with which the challengers not only accept a reduction of epistemological complexity on their part, but give up, by cancelling the difference between fact and fiction, any regulating idea of „truth" And by cancelling the difference between historians and poets or writers they question the status of „history" as an academic discipline, thus abandoning and relinquishing it.[14] This explains the understandably violent reaction of the opponents. One may think it is an exaggeration that Richard Evans heavy-handedly plays the „Auschwitz"-card („Auschwitz was not a discourse"),[15] one may shake one's head when in the introduction to the German edition of his book and with regard to the „postmodernist theoreticians" he gives us a warning reminder of how German history subjected itself to the National Socialists and the East German SED-Regime,[16] almost as if Nazi-inspired or Marxist historians had been precursors of „postmodernity" But Evans' indignation becomes understandable when one considers the practical consequences of the postmodern attitude. The task in the 21st century, as the American philosopher Hilary Putnam recently stated, „is not to repeat the mistakes of the twentieth century. Thinking of reason as just a repressive notion is certainly not going to help us to do that. [...] [D]econstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility" [17] But is the belief in pre-existing facts, in the real existence of historical facts, in the reality of *the* past and the possibility that we may know it „wie es eigentlich gewesen" (as it really was) as a „reconstruction" of the real the only possible answer to the challenges posed by the „postmodernists"?

(2) Secondly, it is remarkable that the debate over „facts and fiction" is wholly related to the present, i.e. that it is conducted *without any regard whatsoever to the history of science.* But haven't all these positions been taken up long ago? The notion of „rescuing the facts" for instance? Wasn't that Leopold von Ranke's programme? „My basic idea is [...] to perceive, to penetrate and to represent the facts as they are. The truth lies in the perception of the facts" – wrote Leopold von Ranke to his brother Heinrich in a letter dated 21 November 1824. Ranke's famous „Zeigen, wie es eigentlich gewesen" (1824) requires no discussion

[14] See Ernst Hanisch: „Die linguistische Wende. Geschichtswissenschaft und Literatur", in Wolfgang Hardtwig – Hans-Ulrich Wehler (eds.): *Kulturgeschichte Heute*, Göttingen 1996, pp. 212-230.

[15] Evans (as in note 1), p. 124.

[16] Evans, Fakten und Fiktionen, p. 7ff.

[17] Hilary Putnam: *Renewing Philosophy*, Cambridge/Mass. – London 1992, p. 132f. – Cf. also Ernst Cassirer's criticism of Heidegger's philosophy (1945): Ernst Cassirer: *Der Mythus des Staates. Philosophische Grundlagen politischen Verhaltens*, Frankfurt 1985, p. 382ff.

since this statement is quoted often enough as legitimation in the relevant contexts. But no one ever pays attention to what the sole basis for the possibility of such a programme was, namely the assumption that knowledge of ideas is based on transcendence or metaphysics, a „religious belief in history" therefore,[18] as it existed with Leopold von Ranke as a personal conviction: the historian knows history „as it really was" because he recognises God's ideas as they are realised in history, e.g. in the peoples and nations (i.e. by participating in God's spirit). But how, after the rapidly occurring loss of religious certainties which had already set in before the 19th century, can the knowledge of facts in the sense of „as they really were" be constituted by an academic discipline? Certainly, the original context of the term „fact" in German is theological (as late as the second half of the 18th century): „facts" are the result of God's action; consequently, „facts" are won by experience and refer to the correspondence between the history of the world and the history of God's saving grace.[19] But this notion does indeed go back quite a long way. Even Friedrich Nietzsche could easily call Ranke „the born classic advocate of any causa fortior" and could mock him as the „brightest of all the bright «realists»" [20] And against the Rankeans and Neo-Rankeans of his time and their obsession with facts he calmly denounces these „facts" as „facta ficta" and, without claiming that no „history" had ever existed, he asserts the absolute fictitiousness of everything historians call „history" „A historian has to do, not with what actually happened, but only with events supposed to have happened: for only the latter have produced an effect. [...] His theme, the so-called world history, is opinions about supposed actions and their supposed motives, which in turn give rise to further opinions and actions, the reality of which is, however, at once vaporised again and produces an effect only as vapour – a continual generation and pregnancy of phantoms over the impenetrable mist of unfathomable reality. All historians speak of things which have never existed except in imagination."[21]

Of course, every historian may even today choose consciously or unconsciously – to defend, in Rankean terms, the possibility of knowing facts, which exist independently, and to defend the knowability of „the" past „as it really was" Or, following Nietzsche, he or she may consciously or unconsciously choose to argue for the fictional quality of historical „knowledge" But is not it a

[18] Wolfgang Hardtwig: „Geschichtsreligion – Wissenschaft als Arbeit – Objektivität. Der Historismus in neuer Sicht", in *Historische Zeitschrift* 252 (1991), p. 1-32.

[19] P. Simons, article on „fact" („Tatsache"), in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* 10 (1998), columns 910-916, column 910.

[20] Friedrich Nietzsche: *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (1887), in Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden, ed. by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, vol. 5, Munich 1980, p. 387.

[21] Friedrich Nietzsche: *Daybreak. Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, transl. by R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge 1997, No. 307 (1881), p. 156.

requirement of intellectual honesty to be aware of the historicity of these positions, and to be aware that these two contradictory positions taken up by Ranke and Nietzsche have long been the object of extended controversies and that different approaches have always existed and continue to do so?

(3) Thirdly, and this is also extraordinary, that *these different approaches, which were developed a long time ago, have obviously fallen into oblivion.*

Gustav Droysen, who in 1857 was the first to work out what he called „Historik", i.e. a theory of historical knowledge, already counted the debate over facts and fiction among the *„aporemata"*, that is among the catalogue of wrongly posed questions.[22] For Droysen both positions were inadequate. Knowledge of *„the* past" was impossible since, as Droysen had already explained in 1857, in so far as what has already occurred is „of an external nature it belongs to the past and in so far as it has not passed it does not pertain to history but to the present". And „in the archives [...] we do not find history but what lies there are the current states and administrative affairs in all their unpleasant extent, no more history than the many blobs of paint on a palette make up a painting" The fundamental question of „Historik" – according to Droysen – cannot lie in the aim of gathering „facts"; rather it has to direct itself towards the „transposition" with which „these affairs are turned into history, i.e. what occurred externally and according to other categories can be won for the processes of memory, of historical consciousness, of understanding" This attitude is modelled on a critical stance which follows Immanuel Kant. The intention, emphatically proclaimed by historical and contemporary historians alike „to simply let the facts speak" is, and I am still quoting Droysen, naive; since it overlooks the idea that „the facts do not speak at all" except through him or her who „has become aware of and understood them", thus by him or her who has understood „that facts per se do not exist" „Historical truth" can therefore never be an „absolute truth" What is „historically true" can only ever be „something relative", what is historically known is never a true „reproduction" „History is not the sum of everything that occurred, not the course of events but knowledge of what happened."

But this knowledge is not arbitrary, it is not simply „fiction". History is an empirical discipline, „the science of history" is „a result of empirical experience and research" [23] However, this empirical foundation does not refer to „history" but to the historical material, or, in Droysen's words from 1857. „What is given to historical experience and research is not the past – that has passed –, but what has

[22] Johann Gustav Droysen: *Historik. Rekonstruktion der ersten vollständigen Fassung der Vorlesungen (1857); Grundriß der Historik in der ersten handschriftlichen (1857/58) und in der letzten gedruckten Fassung (1882)*, edition by Peter Leyh, Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt 1977. This and the following quotations to be found on pp. 3f, 8, 11, 69, 218, 283, 397.

[23] Op. cit., p. 397.

remained of the past here and now." Historical material can be defined as such, that remains of „that present" which historians analyse or which has been handed down for memorial purposes. The findings and outcome of historical studies are therefore not reproductions of the past but „sign systems [...] – an imaginary world", as Droysen put it in 1878.[24] Neither do we deal with „reproductions" of a passed reality nor with „fiction" but rather with knowledge as „sign", „imagination" and „representation" We need to differentiate between what *already happened* (the „past") and what is *given* (the historical material as a basis for the historian's empirical work) and *history* – which is not a re-construction but a construction, an imaginary model – not an arbitrary one, of course, but one founded on empirical study.

4.

Droysen's „Historik" was never printed as a book by its creator but merely held as a series of lectures which were published as late as 1937. Droysen's „pioneering achievement in the theory of science and the teaching of history"[25] was therefore not destined to be noticed. And even in their own period Droysen's lectures on „Historik" (held seventeen times in all between 1857 and 1882/83) left his colleagues shaking their heads and found little echo with students.[26] Against the seeming plausibility of Ranke's „*Wie es eigentlich gewesen*", Droysen's „Historik"stood little chance, based as it was on a Kantian criticism, probably because this notion (and this is still the case today) goes against the everyday, „natural" view of science that scientific and academic knowledge is always a reflection, a reproduction of „external" reality.[27] In Ranke's opinion this corresponds with the idea that the most important condition for scientific and academic knowledge lies in „the dissolution of the self and letting only the objects and the powerful forces appear" [28] For Droysen on the other hand the maxim „only the thoughtless is objective" held true.[29]

The fact that Droysen's „Historik" was in a sense unavailable meant that the great theory debates since the 1880s had to reformulate a Kantian approach to

[24] Johann Gustav Droysen: „Philosophie der Geschichte", in *Jahresberichte der Geschichtswissenschaft* 1 (1878), pp. 626-635, p. 628. Cf. also Droysen: *Historik*, p. 421 (1882).
[25] Leyh (as in note 22), p. IX.
[26] Loc. cit.
[27] Ernst Cassirer: *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, vol. 1, 1911, reprint Darmstadt 1974, p. 1: „In a naive view perception represents itself as a process with which we reproduce an existing, ordered and structured reality in our minds", as an „act of repetition"
[28] Leopold von Ranke: *Englische Geschichte*, vol. 2, 1860, quoted from „Sämtliche Werke", 2nd complete edition, vol. 15, Leipzig 1877, p. 103.
[29] Droysen: *Historik*, p. 405.

these problems. Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Ernst Cassirer and Karl Mannheim moved along these lines. The debate was not only sparked off by the argument with Ranke and his followers but even more so by the probing questions posed by the new empirical natural sciences with regard to the status of historical knowledge and by Nietzsche's rejection of any claim to „objectivity" of historical knowledge.[30] Historical knowledge and its „objectivity" had to be redefined against Ranke and against Nietzsche and also with regard to the challenges posed by empirical natural sciences. What does it mean to speak of the „factuality" of historical knowledge? Which epistemological status does a historical „fact" have? What is „historical reality" as perceived „reality", i.e. as a „sign of something" (J. G. Droysen)? Does historical „objectivity" exist and how does it rank against the claim of objectivity made by the natural sciences? Those were the questions discussed around 1900. Historical knowledge, again based on Kantian criticism, was defined as knowledge gained empirically and based on the following hypotheses: it is knowledge constituted not by „reproducing" the „past" but by founding it on empirical approaches and problems. It is a „construction" but not an arbitrary one; it is a „cosmos of imagined contexts", an „imaginary order", as Max Weber explained it in his treatise on „Objectivity in social science and social policy" dating from 1904.[31] And only thus can it be a „science based on experience", a „science based on reality".[32] Knowledge of historical reality cannot be „a reproduction of «objective» facts with no preconditions" but only „the «construction» of contexts which appear to our imagination as sufficiently motivated and also as «objectively possible» [...]"; or, put differently: „It is not the «*factual*» connections between «*things*» but the *imagined* connections between *problems* that form the basis of the areas of work of the sciences" [33]

Perhaps it would be worthwhile to reread the key texts of this turn-of-the-century debate before we continue the current debate over „facts and fiction" which seems to be so unproductive: for instance Georg Simmel's „The problems of the philosophy of history" (1892 and 1905), Max Weber's essay on „objectivity" from 1904 or his „Critical studies in the field of logic in the Humanities" from 1906, Ernst Cassirer's book *Substance and Function* from 1910, Max Weber's lecture on „Science as a vocation" from 1917 or Ernst Troeltsch's essay on „The crisis of

[30] Otto Gerhard Oexle: „Naturwissenschaft und Geschichtswissenschaft. Momente einer Problemgeschichte", in id. (ed.), *Naturwissenschaft, Geisteswissenschaft, Kulturwissenschaft: Einheit – Gegensatz – Komplementarität?*, Göttingen 1998, pp. 99-151.

[31] Max Weber: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, 5th ed., Tübingen 1982, pp. 142-214, here p. 190 and p. 213.

[32] Op. cit., p. 192 and p. 170.

[33] Op. cit., p. 192 and p. 166.

historicism" from 1922[34] – or the early work by Karl Mannheim on these topics.[35] One could try and see whether, with regard to epistemological questions of historical knowledge, Weber's theory of an „objective possibility"[36] and Cassirer's theory of knowledge as a „sign" would not advance us more than the alternative between „facts and fiction", be it Ranke's and Nietzsche's version or today's.

Max Weber's argument with the professor of ancient history Eduard Meyer from 1906 or Troeltsch's crisis-essay published in 1922 would incidentally teach us something about the permanence of „crisis" in modern historiography whose dimensions, as much as they are obviously still present today, were constituted by the beginning of the modern period around 1800 and therefore – in an ever new „crises" of history – still make themselves felt: the problem of the historicity of historical knowledge itself and, following from this, the problem of objectivity in particular but also the question of the social conditioning of scientific knowledge and thus the question of its social relevance and meaning.[37] It was Troeltsch, incidentally, who, in this text as well as in his important book *Historicism and its Problems* (also published in 1922), sharply criticised history as a „business" and the tendencies on which it was based and which continuously fed it. He also showed that because of this „business-like" nature of history and its – admittedly not negligible successes the historians' „brotherhood" had not adequately conceived of the fundamental questions pertaining to historical knowledge and history as a discipline, and that as long as they continued to be satisfied with the interminable working of this business they would not be able to conceive of these questions.

5.

But let us return to our current debate over facts and fiction. The *facts-versus-fiction* debate is a „trap" because it precludes in advance that a third possibility, at least *one* third possibility exists. The force of the supposed dichotomy between „facts" and „fiction" lies in its apparent inevitability. But at the same time this is also the source of its weakness. Put differently: the dichotomy's apparent

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[34] Otto Gerhard Oexle: „Troeltschs Dilemma", in Friedrich Wilhelm Graf (ed.): *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* (= Troeltsch-Studien, vol. 11), in press.

[35] Reinhard Laube: „Mannheims «Kategorie der Bürgerlichkeit»: Bürgerlichkeit und Antibürgerlichkeit im Spiegel der Suche nach der «wirklichen» Wirklichkeit", in Martin Endress – Ilja Srubar (eds.): *Karl Mannheims Analysen der Moderne: Mannheims erste Frankfurter Vorlesung von 1930. Edition und Studien*, Opladen 2000, pp. 263-291.

[36] Barrelmeyer (as in note 39), p. 159ff., in part. p. 209ff.

[37] Otto Gerhard Oexle: *Geschichtswissenschaft im Zeichen des Historismus*, Göttingen 1996; id.: „Kulturelles Gedächtnis im Zeichen des Historismus", in Hans-Rudolf Meier – Marion Wohlleben (eds.): *Bauten und Orte als Träger von Erinnerung. Die Erinnerungsdebatte in der Denkmalpflege*, Zurich 2000, p. 59-75.

plausibility is based on the ignorance that a third possibility actually exists. One could also say that the two contradictory, mutually exclusive positions relating to „facts and fiction" are an „epistemological pair" in Gaston Bachelard's sense: we are dealing with contradictory positions which, in spite of all their differences, agree in one fundamental supposition, which one may or may not accept. In our case both positions claim to know the essence of the „whole" and of the conditions of knowing the „whole" and this is where the problem of both lies. How can one move forward in this discussion? I would like to suggest three conditions for such an advancement.

(1) A first condition for the way ahead lies in the acknowledgement of the *necessity that history itself needs to be historicised.* This historicising of history is fundamental. It is, as Droysen had already explained it in 1857/58, a fundamental prerequisite of modern historical research. „Historical research requires the insight that even the content of our self is a multiply refracted, a historical result" [38] Naturally, this insight also implies *historicising the debates over historical knowledge.* It is not sensible, even from a pragmatic point of view, to discuss problems which were intensively debated a hundred or a hundred and fifty years ago – and possibly in a more productive manner than they are discussed today – merely from a contemporary perspective. Final and „true" answers cannot be found but there are better or worse answers. But it can be debated whether criteria for their quality are based on scientific methods. Of course, it is always attractive to take the floor with a new theory instead of informing oneself about already existing ones whose numbers, incidentally, are not too great. And couldn't a new theory profit from knowledge of older ones? I don't have a pious and reverential remembrance of tradition in mind but rather the question whether during the transition period in modern epistemology in all disciplines, namely the period between 1880 and 1932, the fundamental questions of historical knowledge were not reflected in a more comprehensive manner and moreover in a more radical fashion than is the case today.

At least some young sociologists have recently rediscovered the stimulating force of these debates.[39] And it is the sociologists who have recently called for a careful rediscovery of that phase of debates on general principles which took place a century ago. They see the topicality of these debates in the similarities between the structural problems of the modern period around 1900 and those of the

[38] Droysen (as in note 22), p. 399.

[39] Uwe Barrelmeyer: *Geschichtliche Wirklichkeit als Problem. Untersuchungen zu geschichtstheoretischen Begründungen historischen Wissens bei Johann Gustav Droysen, George Simmel und Max Weber*, Münster 1997; Volker Kruse: *„Geschichts- und Sozialphilosophie" oder „Wirklichkeitswissenschaft"? Die deutsche historische Soziologie und die logischen Kategorien René Königs und Max Webers*, Frankfurt 1999.

new millennium of „2000". They consider historical phase to be the „real heyday" of modernity „under whose spell we still are and which uncovered precisely those problems with which we are still confronted today" [40] To say it again: it is not a reverential reading of this „classic" or the one I have in mind. Rather we should take into account a whole ensemble of „classics" and their definitions and analyses of problems. They were written in a period of crisis and rapid change and that is the reason for their relevance today. „We attribute meaning to the classics because they represent these periods of change and how to cope with them intellectually."[41] The point is not to return blindly to those opinions but to take up the questions again on which these opinions were based and at least to take the answers which were given to them seriously. If one follows this advice, perhaps many a wheel need not be reinvented.

(2) A second prerequisite for advancement is as follows: the debate over facts and fiction is, as we have seen, an international one. But is it really *one* debate? Do not we have much debate on one topic running parallel to another? In any case it is obvious that the individual positions are determined by the *historically mediated, culturally conditioned traditions of „national" thinking.* It is for instance evident that German historians continue to be fixated with Ranke, irrespective of whether „the rescue of the fact" is called for or whether, by contrast, a defiant fiction-stance is taken up against the tradition of *„Wie es eigentlich gewesen*" and against Ranke's „metaphysical, objective idealism" [42]

Equally evident is the British empiricist tradition on which Richard Evans' book is based. Since this tradition is mainly interested in facts one only has to debate whether facts imply an objective truth about the past, in Geoffry Elton's sense (*The Practice of History*, 1967), or whether facts are *also* dependent on the historians' personal opinions and convictions, in Edward Hallett Carr's sense (*What is History?*, 1961) and therefore history „is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past" [43] Richard Evans' book, published in 1997, is essentially an extended commentary on the differences between Carr and Elton. Evans argues entirely along Geoffrey Elton's lines and like him speaks of „things that happen", of „true facts", of „real" or „hard history" and conceives of the historian as an artisan who produces „things" [44] I ask myself whether this assurance in an

[40] Klaus Lichtblau: *Georg Simmel*, Frankfurt – New York 1997, p. 14.

[41] Otthein Rammstedt: „Umgang mit Klassikern", in *Soziologische Revue* 18 (1995), pp. 515-520, p. 520.

[42] Joachim Rückert: *Idealismus, Jurisprudenz und Politik bei Friedrich Carl von Savigny*, Ebelsbach 1984, p. 240.

[43] Evans (as in note 1), p. 1f., p. 75ff. and elsewhere. Quotation from Edward Hallett Carr: *What Is History?*, London 1962, p. 24.

[44] Cf. Quentin Skinner: „Sir Geoffrey Elton and the Practice of History", in *Transactions of*

empirical assertion of knowledge of facts and «the» past is not the reason for the vehemence of the postmodern challenge, in particular, of American historians, as well as the equally vehement reaction to it, as represented by Evans.

The „cultural" differences become more evident when one compares Evans' arguments against the „postmodern challenges" with a like-minded plea by the French historian Roger Chartier.[45] In his *book Au bord de la falaise. L'histoire entre certitudes et inquiétude* (On the Edge of the Cliff. History Between Certainties and Disquiet), published in 1998, Chartier, too, observes a crisis in historical knowledge, „la crise de l'intelligibilté historienne", which is further increased by the loss of trust in what was taken as a matter of course in the most recent phase of history as a discipline; since the certainties of quantifying history, of classic divisions of historical objects and familiar terms like „mentality" and „*culture populaire*" now lie in the past; to which the collapse of classic interpretations like Marxism and structuralism are added. That is why, according to Chartier, history currently finds itself „on the edge of the cliff" or even at the „abyss", at least „between certainty and disquiet" But Chartier's approach is not remotely related to a simple belief in the possibility of knowing „facts" or „the past" in Richard Evans' or Werner Paravicini's sense. He redefines history's course between narration and science („entre récit et connaissance"), by defining historical knowledge with Michel de Certeau (*L'écriture de l'histoire*, 1975) as a „construction" and a „composition", which is determined by the search for truth and which is „scientific" in so far as it is constituted by the „possibilité d'établir un ensemble de *règles* permettant de «contrôler» des *opérations* proportionnées à la *production* d'objets déterminés" [46] And further: „Abandonner cette intention de vérité, peut-être démesurée mais sûrement fondatrice, serait laisser le champ libre à toutes les falsifications, à tous les faussaires qui, parce qu'ils trahissent la connaissance, blessent la mémoire. Aux historiens, en faisant leur métier, d'être vigilants." But Chartier of course is not part of an empiricist tradition of philosophy. Historical knowledge is for him, as it was for Droysen or Max Weber, neither reproduction of „reality" nor fiction: it is a „*répresentation*" [47]

Cultural or „national" influences of this kind are already present in the usage of the term „science" Is history a „science"? In spite of all the differences with regard to the explanations and reasons given (Ranke, Droysen, Dilthey, Max Weber) in the German tradition „history" has always been understood and explained as a science. In Cambridge or in Stanford this would provoke a sceptical

the Royal Historical Society. Sixth Series 7 (1997), pp. 301-316.

[45] Roger Chartier: *Au bord de la falaise. L'histoire entre certitudes et inquiétude*, Paris 1998.

[46] Op. cit., p. 104f.; see p. 16.

[47] Op. cit., p. 105 and elsewhere.

smile[48] since here the term „science" is restricted to the natural sciences: physics is a science but „history" is not. What „history" is supposed to be is defined quite differently in different places and this is also a historically mediated fact. The nature of „history" is culturally relative and therefore requires a historical explanation. Perhaps historians should communicate more than is the case about this problem and perhaps they should do so in *comparative* fashion.

(3) And finally a third point. The extent, to which contemporary historians in their topical debates leave aside the *relation between history and the natural sciences,* is surprising. This is a fundamental difference between the current debates and those which were conducted from the mid-19th century onwards to the end of the 1920s, for instance in Germany,[49] and in particular by Droysen and Max Weber. History and all the disciplines connected with cultural studies should feel an urgent need to negotiate with natural sciences about their status and about the epistemological status of knowledge and its consequences. There are several reasons for this.

Firstly, the current positions in the debate over „facts and fiction" contain hidden suppositions with regard to the natural sciences. An example would be Hayden White,[50] one of the founding fathers and custodians of postmodernism against whom Richard Evans consequently fights hard.[51] Like Evans Hayden White (*Metahistory*, 1973) thinks that historians are confronted with what he calls „events *already constituted*" [52] But in contrast to Evans Hayden White is convinced that historians can in no way adequately grasp this reality. From this follows „the nonscientific or protoscientific nature of historical studies",[53] a view of historical studies, which itself is based on the comparison, White makes between history and the natural sciences: history today has not achieved the status of scientific explanation that physics had already had in the 17th century. According to Hayden White, since the 18th century modern historical thought has been unable to find a way „of chosing, on adequate theoretical grounds, among the different ways of viewing history", „the only grounds for preferring one over another are *moral* or *aesthetic* ones" [54] Hayden White's well-known literarisation of „history" is thus based on his notion of physics and it is explained in rather scientistic fashion. More

[48] Lorraine Daston: „Die Kultur der wissenschaftlichen Objektivität", in *Naturwissenschaft, Geisteswissenschaft, Kulturwissenschaft* (as in note 30), p. 9-39, p. 11f.
[49] Cf. Oexle (as in note 30), p. 111ff.
[50] Otto Gerhard Oexle: „Sehnsucht nach Klio. Hayden Whites «Metahistory» – und wie man darüber hinwegkommt", in *Rechtshistorisches Journal* 11 (1992), pp. 1-18.
[51] Evans (as in note 1), p. 66, 79ff., 124ff. and elsewhere.
[52] Hayden White: *Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Baltimore – London 1973, p. 6.
[53] Op. cit., p. 428.
[54] Op. cit., p. 432, p. 433.

than that: it is based on a notion of physical, scientific knowledge as it was prevalent in the 17th century. This is rather bizarre since the assumption that the opinions of physicists concerning their knowledge and its explanation have not changed since the days of Newton is rather strange. And furthermore didn't physics in the early 20th century, under the influence of Bohr's principle of complementarity and Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle, turn away from a notion of a „true", unambiguous, definite knowledge of natural reality? Hayden White does not seem to have noticed this. And: does not the „new physics" of the 1920s in its epistemological premises correspond exactly to the fundamental notions of scientific knowledge as knowledge based on empirically founded hypotheses as for instance Max Weber represented it?[55]

Clarifying one's position with regard to the differences and similarities between historical and scientific knowledge we will therefore clarify and define the assumptions historians hold with regard to historical knowledge.

A political factor also enters the arena since any discussion concerning the status of knowledge will have its consequences for the academic world and beyond. The current debate over „facts and fiction" as it is currently conducted is not very helpful here. The assertion that „true" knowledge of facts and of „the" past is possible will not impress epistemologically informed natural scientists, on the contrary.[56] And the notion that historical knowledge is nothing but poetry and the historian „only a species of the kind «poet/writer»" will please precisely those natural scientists who want to push cultural studies and history into the background or even argue for their abolition.

Historians have a lot to do. But naturally they have to *want* to do it and they must desire to achieve this on the highest possible intellectual level. I think the debate over „facts and fiction" has little to offer in this respect.

[55] Cf. Oexle: *Naturwissenschaft...* (as in note 30), p. 139ff.

[56] See for example Alfred Gierer: „Naturwissenschaft und Menschenbild", in *Naturwissenschaft, Geisteswissenschaft, Kulturwissenschaft* (as in note 30), p. 41-60; id.: *Im Spiegel der Natur erkennen wir uns selbst – Wissenschaft und Menschenbild*, Reinbek 1998.