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Contact: elpis.hu
elpis.periodika@gmail.com
www.facebook.com/elpis.folyoirat

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Preface

In March 2017, we dedicated a week of enthusiasm to Stoic philosophy by hosting the first Hungarian version of Stoic Week, inspired by the original idea of Stoicon. Our aim was to introduce Stoicism to a wider audience with no prior philosophical education but an interest in the modern renaissance of the movement on the one hand, and to generate in-depth scholarly discussions of classical texts and the afterlife of the Portico on the other. The week consisted of four separate events: firstly, we visited the Aquincum Museum, where the guided tour offered us a glimpse of Marcus Aurelius' life in Pannonia. Secondly, we had a public reading of selected texts from Seneca and Epictetus, which happened under the title "The unconquerable power of the soul". These were followed by an academic workshop in Hungarian on Plutarch's *On Stoic Self-Contradictions*, and the week culminated in a final two-day international event, The Stoic Tradition Conference. We had the pleasure of attending John Sellars' opening keynote speech and altogether eleven talks covering the reception of Stoicism by Cicero, Seneca, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, Irenaeus, Lactantius, Lipsius, Spinoza, Deleuze and Frankfurt. This volume contains selected and peer-reviewed papers of the conference.

We would like to thank the speakers, the chairs and the participants of the scholarly event for their effort and those who took part in the other programmes as well. We are especially thankful to the Philosophy Department of the Association of Hungarian PhD and DLA Students and Eötvös Loránd University, whose joint support made this project possible. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to the authors and reviewers of the current volume. We believe it takes us a step closer to an adequate understanding of the influence of Stoicism.

The organizers and editors,
Nikoletta Hendrik and Kosztasz Rosta

THE STOIC TRADITION

John Sellars

The Stoic Tradition

When we think about ancient philosophy we tend to think first and foremost of Plato and Aristotle, the two great Athenian philosophers, whose works have come down to us and that we can read today. In both cases the survival of their texts has been intertwined with commentary traditions, which could only come about because the texts were available but which also contributed to their survival for subsequent generations. The Neoplatonic practice of writing commentaries on the works of both Plato and Aristotle in late antiquity was central, laying the foundations for the subsequent philosophical traditions in Greek, Arabic, and Latin during the Middle Ages.[1]

The Stoics had no equivalent commentary tradition. The late Neoplatonist Simplicius wrote a commentary on the *Handbook* of Epictetus, but this co-opted Epictetus into the Neoplatonic curriculum rather than treating him on his own terms as a Stoic.[2] Earlier, in the first century BC, the Stoic Athenodorus wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, but this was a case of a Stoic contributing to the burgeoning Aristotelian commentary tradition, not starting a Stoic one.[3] Earlier still, Cleanthes in the third century BC wrote a commentary on Heraclitus, but again this was something quite different.[4] No one set about to write commentaries on, say, the works of Chrysippus in the way that they did on Plato or Aristotle. We cannot know the reasons why;[5] all we do know is that as a result of this textual neglect more or less all of Chrysippus' works are now lost, save for a few papyrus scraps recovered from Herculaneum. None of this bodes well for the idea of a Stoic tradition.

The early Byzantine and Arabic philosophical traditions were primarily shaped by the ancient Greek Neoplatonic commentary tradition; neither gained any significant familiarity with Stoicism. In the Latin tradition things were quite different. First and foremost readers had access to the philosophical works of Cicero, who remains now, as he was then, one of the most important sources for Hellenistic Stoicism. We know that some of these works featured prominently in the Carolingian Renaissance and were available in numerous centres across Europe.[6] But for many it was Seneca who came to embody Stoicism as a philosophy. His practical moral advice was often taken to be compatible – or at least not in direct conflict – with Christian teaching, and

1 For a substantial overview of the ancient commentary tradition see Sorabji 1990 and Sorabji 2016.
2 The text is edited in Hadot 1996.
3 On Stoic commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*, see Griffin 2015, 129–173.
4 See DL 7. 174.
5 I speculated about this in Sellars 2006/2014, 25–30.
6 See Reynolds 1983, 112–135.

this was helped by his supposed correspondence with St Paul and commendations by Church Fathers such as St Jerome. Throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance we find thinkers eulogizing Seneca as one of the greatest moral thinkers of antiquity.[7] The early Humanists read Seneca alongside their beloved Cicero with the consequence that Stoic ethical themes saturate their contributions to moral philosophy.

The impact of Stoicism started to change in the fifteenth century with the recovery of a wide range of Greek philosophical texts, not least Diogenes Laertius, but also Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, and others. Soon the ethical claims in Seneca and Cicero were increasingly relocated in the wider Stoic philosophical system. This greater familiarity with Stoic theoretical philosophy led some, such as Marsilio Ficino,[8] to question the extent to which Stoicism might be compatible with Christian teaching. The sixteenth century saw the beginnings of scholarship on the Athenian Stoa, not least in the work of Justus Lipsius,[9] as well as the recovery and printing of the works of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. By the seventeenth century Stoicism was everywhere.

By this point all the important sources for Stoicism were in circulation and scholarship was beginning to pay closer attention to differences between the early Athenian and later Roman Stoics, as well as the ideas of individual Stoics. A sense of the internal history of the ancient school was beginning to emerge. For those still committed to Christianity of one form or other, the basic incompatibilities between Stoic and Christian metaphysics were now abundantly clear, even if the ethics retained some attraction. For others, shaped by the ideas of the Enlightenment, Stoic materialism was naturally less of a problem, if not a positive virtue.

The narrative of the history of philosophy that dominated during the nineteenth century tended to prioritize Plato and Aristotle over the later ancient philosophical schools. Even so, Stoicism did not go away. The notebooks of Marcus Aurelius were to become a popular bestseller and interest in the practical life guidance that we find in the writings of the Roman Stoics continues today. In 2018 over 8000 people signed up to "live like a Stoic for a week", while books with titles like *The Daily Stoic* and *How To Be a Stoic* have found large audiences.

The impact of Stoicism on the history of philosophical problems has been no less great but often harder to pinpoint and discern. From at least Plotinus onwards, philosophers have silently responded to and borrowed from the Stoics, meaning that Stoic ideas in logic, metaphysics, and epistemology recur throughout the history of philosophy alongside the more explicit and widely attested impact of Stoic ethics.

7 Note, as just one example, the judgement of Giannozzo Manetti in Manetti 2003, 244–245.
8 See Ficino's criticisms of Stoic metaphysics in his *Theologia Platonica* 1. 2 and 3. 1.
9 See Lipsius' *Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam* and *Physiologia Stoicorum*, both first published in 1604.

The task of examining this Stoic tradition is far from complete. The first serious book to try to tell the story was Michel Spanneut's *Permanence du Stoïcisme, De Zénon à Malraux*.[10] To that we can add the collection of studies in *Stoizismus in der europäischen Philosophie, Literatur, Kunst und Politik*, edited by Barbara Neymeyr and others.[11] More recently, I edited *The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition*, the first volume in English to attempt to map the impact of Stoicism.[12] Naturally all these volumes only offer partial coverage, but they at least begin to map the territory. More work needs to be done, and the studies in this special issue make further welcome contributions. They examine topics ranging from late antiquity to the present and derive from a conference held in Budapest in March 2017. I had the great pleasure to attend and to speak at the conference and I am delighted that this special issue records some of the rich and varied papers presented at the event.[13]

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10 Spanneut 1973.

11 Neymeyr – Schmidt – Zimmermann 2008.

12 Sellars 2016. For a longer overview of the reception of Stoicism, with full references, see my introduction, 1–13.

13 I thank the organizers of the conference and the editors of this journal for their invitations, and first and foremost Nikoletta Hendrik.

Anna Aklan

Contradictions Around the Stoic Sage
Chapter Twenty of Plutarch's On Stoic Self-Contradictions

1. The contradictions

The study of Stoicism offers numerous contradictions to the inquiring mind. The history of the school spans over the course of half a millennium, from the 3rd century BCE to the 2nd century CE. During this period, the school itself changed as new concepts emerged and the emphasis shifted from one concept to another. Similarly to other philosophical traditions, the various representatives held differing views, which in itself led to some inconsistencies within the school. In addition to this synchronic and diachronic diversity, the fact that we only have fragments from the works of the founding figures such as Chrysippus[1] makes it even more difficult to understand the main concepts and the specific details of Stoic thought. Furthermore, a characteristic feature of Stoicism was that its proponents took pride in advancing views which seemed paradoxical and contradictory to common sense at first sight. According to Cicero, even Stoics themselves called these propositions paradoxes.[2]

Plutarch dedicated his treatise *On Stoic Self-Contradictions* to exposing the self-contradictory statements found in various places in the works of Stoic authors (mainly Chrysippus), thus suggesting a conclusion that their system as a whole is illogical and as such, untenable. The work is centered on the discrepancy between the lifestyles of the representatives of Stoicism and their teachings. Chapter 19 and 20[3] bring to light the contradictions about the Stoic sage as the Stoics themselves understand and explain the concept. Chapter 19 examines the concept of the perceptibility of good and evil in connection with the sage, and concludes with a question about the self-consciousness of the Stoic sage, as the Stoics held that the metamorphosis of an ordinary man into a full-fledged sage was instantaneous and he was not aware of this sudden transformation and his own novel state. Consequently, the sage would not notice that suddenly he was in possession of all the virtues. In the first phase of the Stoic tradition, the difference between a "good" and a "bad" person, a virtuous and a vicious man, was extremely

1 Numerous fragments from the works of Chrysippus and other Stoic philosophers survived verily due to Plutarch's bitter enmity with them, thus the Platonist author turned out to be one of those who transferred Stoic philosophy to posterity.

2 *Paradoxa Stoicorum ad M. Brutum* 4: "Quae quia sunt admirabilia contraque opinionem omnium ab ipsis [Stoicis] etiam παράδοξα appellantur." Because these are wondrous things and against the common sense, these are called paradoxes even by (the Stoics) themselves.

3 *St. Rep.* 1043B–1044B.

strict and clear-cut, as the former was the perfect sage possessing all virtues, while the latter was just the opposite, originally applied to everyone else. "All virtuous persons are equally virtuous and all non-virtuous persons are equally vicious."[4] "Sagacity is a state of psychic perfection and ... all other states are equally imperfect and vicious."[5]An intermediate state is also present between the perfectly wise and the utterly bad: that of the progressive man (*prokoptōn*), who is on his way to ethical perfection, but who has not attained it yet. In Plutarch's view, the instantaneous change from an ordinary or bad person into a sage, and especially the idea that the person is not conscious of this change is in direct contradiction to another Stoic doctrine, namely, that virtues and vices are perceptible. How is it possible that the sage fails to perceive his own virtues if everyone else is capable of doing so? (1042F–1043A). Plutarch is using the first Agrippan method called *diaphōnia*. Although nothing is known about Agrippa, who might have been Plutarch's contemporary, his Five Modes of argumentation, which became a traditional method of reasoning in the sceptical tradition, have been preserved in Sextus Empiricus' *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (*Pyrrhōneioi Hypotypōseis*).[6] The first among these, *diaphōnia*, demonstrates contradictions between ordinary life and philosophical teachings. The method is extended to examine the teachings of a given philosopher. Unfortunately, without an attempt of understanding the deeper coherence of the given system (just as here in the case of Stoic teachings), the presentation of superficial contradictions that do not affect the essence of the school's main tenets has questionable philosophical merit.

In this article I shall focus on the following chapter, Chapter 20, which continues the topic of the Stoic sage started in Chapter 19. It considers two main contradictions about the Stoic sage: his participation in or withdrawal from public affairs and his attitude towards wealth. In Chapter 20, Plutarch accuses Chrysippus that in his book *Objects of Choice Per Se*,[7] the Stoic philosopher states that the sage pursues a tranquil life far from public affairs, while in his book on *Ways of Living*, he writes that a sage either assumes kingship himself or accompanies kings as a counsellor (1043B–C). For a Greek citizen, these two ways of life are fundamentally contradictory, as the lifestyles of the *idiotēs* and the *politēs* are mutually exclusive. Plutarch continues castigating Chrysippus further. The motivation behind joining a king's court is profit, which is another source of contradiction. In his work on *Nature*, Chrysippus reckons that the sage needs only water and bread (grain) and does not care about wealth. In other places in the same work he lists the three ways of earning money that are appropriate for a sage: the first of these is the royal occupation as mentioned above; the second is through "friends," and the third is being a teacher. Plutarch is exceptionally upset about the third mode of

4 Holowchak 2008, 4.
5 Holowchak 2008, 27.
6 *PH* I. 164–177.
7 It is well known that Chrysippus' writings survived only in fragments, many of them in Plutarch's writings.

income and goes into detail about Chrysippus' prescriptions on how to collect tuition. What outrages Plutarch the most is the vast chasm between the idea of the tranquil sage far from affairs and content with bread and water on the one hand, and the caricature he creates on the basis of Chrysippus' writings about the eye-turning and profit-seeking meddlesome individual also called a sage on the other hand.

As a third element, the question of injustice joins these two considerations. In the ideal picture Chrysippus paints about the sage, the wise man cannot be deceived, and no injustice can cause him harm. Contrary to this, however, in another work of his Chrysippus elaborates on the different methods of collecting tuition, so that the sage would not be open to "fraudulent practices" (1044A).[8] Two different concepts appear here: *dikē* and *blabē*, 'justice' and 'harm' respectively. Plutarch is eager to prove that whoever suffers injustice also suffers harm, so if Chrysippus warns the sage against injustice, then at the same time he warns him against harm, too, so the self-contradiction becomes obvious: the sage cannot be open and not open to harm at the same time. This marks the end of the chapters concentrating on the Stoic sage and the contradictions around him. As typical of Plutarch, he does not infer any deep and sophisticated conclusions but only exposes the contradictions. He leaves it to his audience to draw the consequences.

Let us consider these accusations one by one. The first question is that of secluded life versus taking part in public affairs (1043A–B). Plutarch first paraphrases then directly quotes Chrysippus. There are slight differences between the two: in Plutarch's paraphrase the wise man (*sophos*) stays away from (public) matters (*apragmōn*), minds his own business (*idiopragmōn*), and takes care only of his own affairs (*ta hautou prattein*). In the direct quote, Chrysippus says that the prudent man (*phronimos*) stays away from (public) matters (*apragmōn*), has little business to attend to (*oligopragmōn*), and takes care only of his own affairs (*ta hautou prattein*), because having little business (*oligopragmosunē*) and caring only of his own affairs (*autopragia*) are characteristic of being *asteios*. This term is frequently used by Chrysippus, and while etymologically, the phrase means "urban" or "civilized", in Chrysippus' usage it frequently denotes the wise or virtuous person. Cherniss translates it as "decency",[9] Goodwin renders it as "civil persons",[10] and in the Hungarian translation we find the equivalent of "a delicate lifestyle".[11] Julia Annas, on the other hand, states that "in ancient philosophical discussions 'the sage' is used interchangeably with 'the good person' (*ho agathos*), and 'the virtuous person' (*ho spoudaios, ho asteios*)".[12] While it is extremely difficult to tell apart what exact words Chrysippus used in his original writings and what appellation was given by the later authors when they transmitted

8 All English translations of the *St. Rep.* are Cherniss', unless otherwise stated.
9 Cherniss 1973, 491.
10 Goodwin 1874
11 W. Salgo 1983, 350.
12 Annas 2008, 11.

Chrysippus' theories in their own words, it seems from the Chrysippan fragments that *spoudaios* is mainly used by later commentators when transmitting Chrysippus' thoughts in paraphrases, while *sophos, phronimos* and *asteios* were used by Chrysippus himself on the basis of the direct quotes that have been preserved. When Chrysippus uses the term *asteios*, it is frequently contrasted with *phaulos*, the simple, common person who lacks virtue and is consequently vicious. Regarding the differences of Plutarch's paraphrase and the direct quote from Chrysippus, Harold Cherniss, the translator and editor of the Loeb edition, signals them in a footnote and adds: "There is no more reason to change this [*idiopragmona*] to *oligopragmona* as Reiske did or *oligopragmona* in the direct quotation to *idiopragmona* as Pohlenz does than there is to change *sophon* in Plutarch's paraphrase to *phronimon* or the latter in the direct quotation to *sophon.*"[13]

Not only does Plutarch reprehend Chrysippus on the basis of the contradiction about whether the Stoic philosopher attributes a public or a secluded and private lifestyle to the sage, but he also rushes to remark poignantly that the life of tranquillity that Chrysippus advocates is a well-known tenet of a rival philosophical school, that of Epicureanism. Plutarch uses a juxtaposition to ridicule Chrysippus when, after quoting his sentence "not many realize this" (that tranquil life is secure), he adds that Epicurus certainly does (1043B), thus hinting at the possibility of equating the concept of a tranquil life in Epicureanism and in Stoicism, which seems absurd. Plutarch emphasizes this absurdity by adding that in Epicurus' system, staying away from (public, or in this case rather human) matters (*apragmosunē)* is achieved most perfectly by the gods, who consequently do not exercise divine providence (*pronoia*) over human beings (1043B). In Stoic cosmology, however, providence is the most fundamental governing principle. Consequently, the abstinence from actions is in contradiction with the cosmological principle – at least this is what Plutarch seems to suggest by his daring juxtaposition with Epicureanism.

Plutarch continues to find faults with Chrysippus quoting him that a wise man can assume kingship and is allowed to live with kings (1043C). Here, just as above, Plutarch uses the term *sophos*, but does not quote the term used by Chrysippus. Two main problems accompany this statement. The first is the motive for kingship, namely, gaining financial benefit. The second is that Chrysippus admits that wise men are allowed to join the courts of non-virtuous kings as well. Chrysippus uses the term *prokekophotos* (1043D), the perfect participle of *prokoptō*, the present participle (*prokoptōn*) of which is the standard term in Stoicism for the morally progressing person, one who is not a sage yet but is on his way to becoming one.[14] This compromise on

13 Cherniss 1976, 491fn. b.

14 It is the *communis opinio* of scholars that the concept of moral progress and the person who is progressive (*prokoptōn*) is a later development in Stoicism as an answer to the fervent criticism from adversaries about the too sharply cut division between the perfect and idealized sage and the non-virtuous person, who is basically everyone else, except for the sage with no intermediate state. To fill this gap, the concept of the morally pro-

Chrysippus' part could allow wise men to live together with and advise leaders who are morally questionable. This means another self-contradiction in Chrysippus' thought according to Plutarch: is the wise man to socialize with similar wise men, or is he to spend time with vicious people due to his greed for money? Here, Plutarch exaggerates again. Chrysippus uses the phrase "we admit" (1043C–D)[15] but Plutarch in his ironic paraphrase writes "Chrysippus thrusts the sage headlong into Panticapaeum".[16]

So far there has been one main contradiction with several corollaries, i.e. secluded life versus participating in public affairs. The following paradoxes arise from this central contradiction: 1. its similarity to the rival Epicurean school; 2. this moral tenet of a tranquil life involves a contradiction to Stoic cosmology, inasmuch as this consequently leads to the denial of divine providence (a far-fetched consequence one must admit, still Plutarch plays it down against Chrysippus); 3. assuming kingship as part of public affairs out of lust for money; 4. association with morally backward people. Plutarch elaborates on the kings one is supposed to be an adviser of. Chrysippus names two kings well-known for their moral stance and ethical behaviour as good examples of what kind of kings one should attend: Idyntharsus, the Scythian king and Leuco of Pontus. Later he adds that other kings might be joined, too, without giving names. Plutarch interprets this concession as if Chrysippus urged the wise man to "go riding with the

gressed person (*prokoptōn*) was created. He is one who acts according to virtues but has not attained sagehood yet. If the term really is a later development only, this participle here can be a precursor to it.

15 ἡμῶνδὲ καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἀπολειπόντων. My translation above. This complete direct quotation gives the impression that Chrysippus, too had certain reservations about associations with kings: "ὅτιγάρ᾽ φησὶ ‘καὶ στρατεύσεται μετὰ δυναστῶν καὶ βιώσεται, πάλιν ἐπισκεψώμεθα τούτων ἐχόμενοι, τινῶν μὲν οὐδὲ ταῦτ᾽ ὑπονοούντων διὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους ὑπολογισμούς, ἡμῶν δὲ καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἀπολειπόντων διὰ τοὺς παραπλησίους λόγους." For holding fast to these [what?], let us consider again that he [probably the wise man, but no appellation is present in the quote] would go campaigning and would live with the powerful, while on the one hand some do not even suspect these things due to similar considerations, and while on the other hand, we concede these things, too, due to nearly equal reasons. (1043C–D; my translation) The word "concede" (ἀπολείπω) signals that Chrysippus does not require the wise man to live with kings but simply allows him to do so. The subject of the sentence is not directly stated in Plutarch's quotation and we may only ponder whether Chrysippus used the word *sophos*, *phronimos*, or another term. The expression "some do not even suspect it may mean that others do not think that the sage can participate in public affairs, thus hinting at Epicureans. Although the verb ὑπονοέω is most probably used here in the simple meaning of "think", it is perhaps worth to remember that in the original meaning of the term the connotation of "suspect" is also present, which might bear the connotation that the object of the verb is something disdainful, so if "we", the Stoics allow it, we are aware that it is not a unanimously accepted and supported activity. It is unfortunate that we do not know what he means by "holding fast to these", which was probably expounded by him in the previous sentences. In summary, this direct quotation suggests that this concession about associating with kings was not the first option for a wise man, even for Chrysippus, but we can only guess what his reservations were. It is also possible that Plutarch interprets this correctly, and regarding financial gain, being a king yields more profit than being only associated with one, and this is the reason why it is only a second option, i.e. a compromise for Chrysippus. For the precise and correct interpretation of this passage, my sincere gratitude goes to Prof. Gabor Bolonyai.

16 1043D: ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος ἕνεκα χρηματισμοῦ τὸν σοφὸν ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ἐς Παντικάπαιον ὠθεῖ καὶ τὴν Σκυθῶν ἐρημίαν. Goodwin's translation.

Scythians and minding the business of tyrants in the Bosporus" (1043C). Here, as in other places, too, Plutarch selects freely from Chrysippus' writings, and the reader has difficulty reconstructing what the original intention of. Chrysippus might have been. It can be concluded from Plutarch's stylistic devices and his tone that he might consciously misinterpret some passages or exaggerates them to the extreme in order to create absurdity and inconsistency within the Stoic philosopher's system of thought. In contrast to this Chrysippan suggestion about associating with kings, Plutarch lists philosophers in relation to Alexander the Great, and concludes that the public opinion was that those philosophers are to be praised who denied Alexander's invitation, and the one who sought his favours is to be reprimanded. With this Plutarch indicates that it is not only his personal dislike of Chrysippus' suggestion, but the *communis opinio*, or else the common moral values that refrain from associating with tyrants.

In the second half of Chapter 20, Plutarch moves on to the question of the wise man and money-making as the second central contradiction. Being a king or an associate is already part of this, but now the question of money-making is in focus, again along with further contradictions following from the central topic. Plutarch repeats the three types of making money according to Chrysippus: by being a king, by having friends and by teaching not some specific knowledge but virtue in general. Plutarch examines this third type of earning advised by Chrysippus, *sophisteia*. While *philosophia* is a positive branch of knowledge and pastime, *sophisteia* is just the opposite, as it denotes the art and exhibition of false or deceiving knowledge. Even when used in a wider sense, just as here, to denote moral teaching, it still bears a pejorative connotation. Besides the central contradiction of whether the wise man despises money, or he does whatever he can to earn it, other questions also arise. First, the question of whether it is fitting to the wise person to teach virtue for money. The second problem is that according to Chrysippus, the wise man should ask for the tuition before he starts teaching. Plutarch also reprehends that the master does not promise to be effective in teaching, but only to do "whatever he can", which means he would ask for money even if his teaching was not effective (1044A).

Let us refer to the distinction between *sophos* and *phronimos* again. Which appellation does Chrysippus use in the context of *sophisteia*? Neither. He uses a third phrase: "those who have brains" or "who are at their senses" (*hoi noun ekhontes*)[17] when he explains that they will know when to collect tuition. This phrase gives the impression that he talks not so much about wise men, but about everyday intelligent people. It is true, however, that Stobaeus gives a list of occupations recommended for a sage, and these are the same as on Chrysippus' list (see below). It is also true that most early Stoic philosophers were teachers or held lectures. It is also true that Zeno regarded himself a sage, but from Chrysippus on, Stoic philosophers did not consider themselves sages

17 1044A: οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες.

but admitted that there was no living being who lived up to their concept of the ideal sage. Therefore, this historical fact cannot be used to prove whether Chrysippus really meant that the sage can be a sophist at the same time. Plutarch also sees a contradiction in Chrysippus' advice to draw a contract between the master and the student so that no harm could affect the master. This contradicts his other statement according to which the wise man cannot be subject to any kind of injustice. Plutarch concludes his chapters on the Stoic sage by exposing this contradiction between the written contract for money and the postulation that no harm that can afflict a wise man.

Plutarch addresses the question of injustice and harm and its self-contradiction in Chrysippus' writings in Chapter 16 of *De Stoicorum repugnantiis*. In 1041D, he quotes two different parts of *Demonstrations* by Chrysippus at length. In the first quote, Chrysippus asserts that whoever injures another man also does harm to himself. In the second, Chrysippus writes the following: "He who is injured by another injures himself and injures himself undeservedly. This, however, is to do injustice. Therefore, everyone who is done injustice by anyone at all does himself injustice." This second quote is so clearly in contradiction with the first one and also, it contradicts common sense so much that it presented a puzzle even to the most erudite commentators. Pohlenz takes it as an Academic[18] parody of Chrysippus, which Plutarch understands literally.[19] Later Stoics, such as Marcus Aurelius[20] can help us understand this seemingly senseless statement. Harm in the truest sense of the word can be done only to one's soul. When somebody does injustice to another person, he does harm to his belongings, his reputation or his body. All these are external possessions only. It is only the soul that can suffer real harm, and each soul is accessible solely to its possessor. Therefore, soul can suffer harm only from the person who possesses it, this is how one should understand that all harm is done to oneself.

Regardless of this contradiction, it is well-attested that the Stoics thought that the wise man cannot suffer injury or harm. The reasoning behind this statement goes as follows: real harm can be done only to the moral integrity of a person. Since the wise man is already perfect, he cannot suffer injury. Furthermore, Cherniss also adds that Chrysippus might have argued that injury occurs as a reaction to the victim's nature, and this is completely impossible in the case of the sage.[21] Consequently, as Plutarch rightly describes, there is an inner contradiction between the sage, who is free from injustice and the *sophistēs*, who writes a contract to ensure that he will stay free from injustice, which is a type of harm according to Plutarch.

18 The school of Plato's Academy, one of the main opponents of Stoicism.
19 Cherniss 1976, 480.
20 *Med.* 4. 39, 4. 49a, 5. 19, 7. 14, 7. 26, 7. 41, 8. 55, 8. 56, 9. 42.
21 Cherniss 1976, 480.

2. Attempting a consistent interpretation

Is it possible to reconcile these contradictions? Could the arbitrarily excerpted quotations make sense if the whole Chrysippan corpus was available? Albeit this question is unanswerable, it is still possible to examine the two central questions. One is the sage's selection between private or public way of life, and the other concerns his attitude towards money. Writings of later Stoic thinkers and other available testimonies of Stoic thought may shed light on these questions.

It seems that one way to resolve these contradictions lies in the idea and characteristics of the Stoic sage. Brouwer provides two different definitions for the concept of the sage in Stoicism. The first is the "knowledge of human and divine matters" and the second is "fitting expertise" which implies a stable disposition of the knower.[22] In both cases the sage is perfectly virtuous and perfectly knowledgeable. He knows that it is only virtue that has value. He understands the cosmic law (*logos*) and exists and acts in consistence with it (*sympatheia)*. Wisdom is a stable state of the soul that recognized the divine providence and the cosmic law and regards everything external indifferent to his well-being. Having reached this state, the sage continues to act in the world, albeit with an attitude of *apatheia*, emotional non-attachment, and a knowledge of real values and laws. Due to *oikeiōsis*, appropriation, the wise person is aware of what belongs to him (self, body, family, city, country, cosmos) and it is in accordance with nature to be beneficial to what belongs to one. This is the key to why the sage would be beneficial to others and promote virtue around him. This is why he can take part in public affairs. This is why he can be a teacher and act as an advisor to friends. It can be true that he also enjoys the life of tranquillity, but whenever it comes his way, he accepts the political role. Diogenes Laertius writes that Chrysippus states in the first book of his *Ways of Living* that the sage participates in public affairs "for they say that he will restrain vice and promote virtue."[23] This is consistent in all of the Stoic teachings. The question should be asked rather the other way round: how could Chrysippus extol a tranquil and secluded life? It seems that he simply said that the wise man would accept kingship if it came his way – which is not the same as directly ordering the sage to be a king or pursue this possibility, or any other of the three options. These possibilities plus the fourth, the tranquil and retired life, are only options out of which anything can be chosen, as none of them is better or worse than the others. These options represent mere possibilities and not injunctions in any hierarchical order.

Participating in politics in distant kingdoms is also coherent with the Stoic concept of the *cosmopolis*. According to the Stoic *cosmopolis* concept, a polis is a place where

22 Brouwer 2014, 7. DL 7. 121.
23 Brown 2006, 551.

human beings live and is put into order by law.[24] There is only one place which is put into order by law, i.e. right reason, and that is the cosmos as a whole. Brown accounts for Chrysippus' endorsement of the sage participating in foreign polities' affairs as a sign of benefaction to humanity as a whole, as a sign of true cosmopolitism, with the motto "Think globally! Act locally!"[25] Zeno's two students are historical examples of this advice given by Chrysippus. Diogenes Laertius in his book about Zeno tells the story of Persaeus of Citium (307/6 – 243).[26] Persaeus might have been sent to Zeno as a slave and secretary by king Antigonos II Gonatas of Macedonia. When later the same Antigonos invited Zeno to his court, the old philosopher sent his student Persaeus, who gained prominence in the king's court. He became the tutor of the heir to the throne, and after Antigonus captured Corinth, Persaeus was given control of the city. Another student of Zeno, Sphaerus of Borysthenes, joined the court of king Cleomenes III of Sparta and became his first advisor and a supporter of his reform programs.[27] These examples support the Chrysippan precept of staying in royal courts as advisors.[28] We must admit, however, that Plutarch is right when he states the following at the beginning of his essay (1033D): "Who, then, grew old in this scholastic life if not Chrysippus and Cleanthes and Diogenes and Zeno and Antipater?" All the principal founders of Stoicism, while theorizing about the sage's involvement in politics, stayed out of public affairs themselves. One can respond to this that with the exception of Zeno and Diogenes (who was not a Stoic but *the* Cynic philosopher), none of the above-mentioned thinkers regarded themselves as sages.

The key to the contradictions concerning financial matters is the concept of *proēgmena*, i.e. preferred indifferent.[29] There are external objects which are indifferent to virtue (*adiaphora*) and thus indifferent to happiness and wisdom but which are in accordance with nature (*phusis)* and the cosmic law, hence are to be chosen. Having attained wisdom, the wise man is free to select anything that is in accordance with virtue and nature while not being touched by any external possession or event. His wisdom is a psychological attitude, a stable disposition. Since wealth is in accordance with nature, it belongs to the category of preferred indifferent (*proēgmena*). As wealth is to be selected, it is completely appropriate for Chrysippus to write about the modes of gaining wealth and the precautions against financial loss.

24 *SVF* 3. 327; Brown 2006, 552.
25 Brown 2006, 554.
26 DL VII. 6. 9; Dorandi 2008, 39.
27 Dorandi 2008, 40.
28 Let us also refer to the most famous representative of Stoicism, who embodied the ideal of the politician-sage: Marcus Aurelius, the Roman emperor. His teacher, Seneca, was also a Stoic philosopher, politician, and teacher, thus giving an example to what Plutarch asks of the early Stoic thinkers: harmony of life and thought.
29 Inwood 1985, 204–5.

Stoic thinkers, including Chrysippus, regarded wealth as a preferred indifferent. Plutarch in the same work cites Chrysippus writing "the sage will speak in public and participate in government just as if he considered wealth to be a good and reputation and health likewise" (1034B).[30] As it results from the category of preferred indifferent, this is exactly what Chrysippus thought. Stobaeus writes that the sage alone is the master of both o*ikonomikē*, the "theoretical and practical state of mind in regard to the things advantageous to the household" and *khrēmatistikē*, "experience in the acquisition of money from the right sources".[31] Stobaeus gives a list of three modes of life[32] which is identical to Chrysippus' list of the sources of gaining wealth. Other Stoic philosophers, such as Ariston, Zenon and Sphaerus, are recorded to have written essays about wealth.[33] Antipater advises a young man to teach his wife about *oikonomikē*, so that he can be free to spend his time on philosophy and politics.[34] Regarding injustice and harm, the same reasoning can be used to resolve the contradiction. As acquiring wealth is a thing indifferent to virtue but is in accordance with nature and is consequently an object to be chosen, similarly its opposite, the loss of money is against nature, so it should be avoided. Even though it is not essential to one's being a sage, there is no problem with his efforts to prevent it. There is no contradiction in these tenets, as Chrysippus does not talk about harm to the sage, but only about injustice.

3. Plutarch's malevolence

It seems that Plutarch used mainly Chrysippus' writings and neglected other sources that could have been available to him. His logic probably was that once he refuted the tenets of the most prominent representatives and founding figures, he supplied enough evidence to prove that the system of whole school was fallacious.

Having inspected other sources and summarized the general tenets of Stoicism about the idea of the sage, it seems that Chrysippus' statements which Plutarch reprehended the most are truly in consistence with the canonical teachings of Stoicism. As for earning money through engagement either in politics (as a king, an advisor or through friends) or in lecturing – we have found that the professions Plutarch criticizes were all consistent with the widely accepted and repeated characteristics of the sage according to Stoicism. What is more interesting is that Plutarch himself led a life which

30 οὕτω ῥητορεύσειν καὶ πολιτεύσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ πλούτου ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας.
31 Stob. III. 623, quoted by Brunt 2013, 51.
32 Stob. II. 109. 10–24, quoted by Brunt, 2013, 51.
33 Brunt 2013, 50–51.
34 Stob. III. 256. 4ff., quoted by Brunt 2013, 52.

echoed these principles.[35] Thus, what is strange in the Stoic system is not the appraisal of public life but Chrysippus' exaltation of the tranquil lifestyle. Concerning the question of money, it is also clear that they listed wealth among the *proēgmenon*, and consequently, this is not such a fundamental contradiction, even if we accept that the sage does not need any external wealth. We have seen that Plutarch often exaggerates Chrysippus' statements and interprets them differently by shifting the emphasis in some passages or sentences. Finally, contrary to our more or less successful efforts to reconcile the different statements found in Chryssupus' oeuvre, it can be stated that the contradictions Plutarch finds in Chrysippus regarding the Stoic concept of the sage are most probably present. At the same time, however, these contradictions constitute the core of Stoic thought, which, albeit incomprehensible with an everyday common sense attitude, is consistent with their special philosophical system in which cosmology and ethics are closely interconnected.

35 Cf. Russell 1973, 5–7.

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Viktor Ilievski

Stoic Influences on Plotinus' Theodicy?

1.

The aim of this paper, as the interrogative form of its title indicates, is to critically examine the widespread opinion that in constructing his theodicy, Plotinus utilized quite a few building blocks of Stoic origin. Since his philosophical encounters and engagements with the Stoics in the *Enneads* are both obvious and well-recorded,[1] their influence on Plotinus' theodicy has also been taken as significant and unquestionable.[2] It should be noted, however, that I do not harbour the ambition to provide here an exposition and evaluation of either the Stoic or the Plotinian theodicy – such a task is clearly beyond the scope of a single paper. Instead, I shall limit my efforts to an attempt to isolate the Stoic answers to the problem of evil, try to see how they reflect on and to what degree they affect Plotinus' theodicy, and investigate whether they have a prior source, i.e. whether they can be called Stoic in the full sense of the word. My hope is to demonstrate that their influence on Plotinus' theodicy is mostly indirect, on account of the fact that the key Stoic theodicean strategies are borrowings or elaborations of the Platonic ones.

Unlike Plotinus', the Stoic attitude towards theodicy must have been ambivalent; on the one hand, it can be taken as almost redundant on account of Stoic determinism, identification of fate and providence, and their theory of indifferents (*adiaphora*),[3] while on the other, the necessity to present a theodicy may seem inherent to the Stoic system due to the fact that theology, as a division of physics, played an important role already for the early Stoics.[4] Now, the Stoic Deity is understood to be a "living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil [into him], taking providential care of the world and all that therein is".[5] These properties are so intrinsic to and inseparable from God, that they are included in the very preconception of the divine as formed in men: "therefore, we apprehend God as a living being, blessed and immortal, and beneficent towards men".[6] Thus, with these declarations of God's providential care and beneficence, the Stoics actually commit themselves to a notion of an actively benevolent Deity, and consequently

1 Karamanolis 2006, 216.
2 Armstrong 1967, 38; Bréhier 1924; Graeser 1972, xiii; Merlan 1967, 130.
3 DL VII. 104–107.
4 For an account of Stoic theology and further references, see Algra 2003, 153.
5 DL VII. 147 (tr. Hicks 1925).
6 *St. Rep.* 1051F (unless otherwise noted, the translations from Greek are mine).

to the task of defending and justifying his goodness in the face of omnipresent suffering and moral decadence.

2.

The aforementioned internal tension notwithstanding, the Stoics set out on a task of composing theodicy, which is in fact rather developed and detailed. Despite the unrecoverable loss of the early Stoics' writings, it can be reconstructed by turning to the preserved fragments of Cleanthes and Chrysippus, as well as to some works of the Stoics of the Imperial Period.

Plutarch noted in his *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*[7] that the existence of badness creates an incongruity within the Stoic monistic natural philosophy, according to which the entire cosmos is pervaded by the Divine and all of the events that take place within its framework are directed at the good of the whole and unfold in accordance with rational nature and providence. He even declared that the statements extolling the all-encompassing and beneficent providence stand in contradiction to the observable promulgation of vices and sufferings that infect the world of men and animals. How is it possible, asks Plutarch, for Chrysippus to witness a profusion of maladies, disasters, murders, rapes, and countless other evils daily, and nevertheless state that "everything comes to be in conformity with the universal nature and its reason, in uninterrupted succession",[8] as well as: "for none of the particulars, not even the smallest one, have come about otherwise than in conformity with the universal nature and in conformity with its law"?[9] Do not these proclamations come into a headlong clash with the innumerable instances of events and properties so obviously contrary to justice and providential care? In other words, if universal nature, i.e. God, brings itself or its parts into states and motions which include inauspicious, unwanted and bad things, then it is not fully rational and beneficent, while the so-called providence is nothing but blind fate.

The Stoics themselves might have not acknowledged similar accusations as a threat to their system but were nevertheless obliged to respond to the plaintiffs. They, at least starting with Cleanthes and Chrysippus, were trying to devise means to exculpate their God from responsibility for evil, and to simultaneously harmonize the latter's presence with providence's workings. Such efforts put together give rise to Stoic theodicy, which is comprised of at least ten different strategies.

a) *Sub specie dei*, not only the seemingly senseless suffering, but even the actions of vile and vicious people have their proper place in the overall scheme, and they, in

7 *St. Rep.* 1048F.
8 *St. Rep.* 1050C–D = *SVF* II. 937. 22–28.
9 *St. Rep.* 1050A = *SVF* II. 937. 10–12.

some way unknown to us, contribute to the goodness of the whole. Cleanthes, in his celebrated *Hymn to Zeus*, writes:

> Nay, but thou knowest to make crooked straight.
> Chaos to thee is order; in thine eyes
> The unloved is lovely, who did'st harmonize
> Things evil with things good, that there should be
> One Word through all things everlastingly.[10]

God, as the Reason pervading the entire cosmos, arranges all parts in such a way as to guarantee the supreme good of the whole. Evil cannot be its feature: *qua* something bad it is incongruent with global goodness. However, juxtaposed to the whole – in a form of a part gone bad – evil itself, paradoxically, turns into something good. Chrysippus provides the famous analogy of a comedy, where even jokes which may be basic or vulgar somehow contribute to its overall charm and beauty.[11] In a similar way, God's absolute wisdom and beneficence ennobles and harmonizes with the all-embracing good even such seemingly obvious evils as undeserved suffering and immoral behavior are.

b) A significant number of illnesses, injuries and other kinds of trouble that human beings suffer actually result from the abuse of divine benevolence. After all, numerous beneficiaries insolently waste away the inheritances they have received, but it would be absurd to blame this on the alleged deficiency of love and attention which should have been shown to them by their parents. In the same vein, God cannot be considered responsible for the damages that human beings inflict upon themselves and upon each other. It is true that everything that happens in heaven or on earth is part of God's plan; however, there is an exception: "save what the sinner's works infatuate", says Cleanthes.[12]

This is obviously an attempt to attach the blame for the evils done and experienced to the moral agent, which has been a staple strategy of theodicists up to the present day. It remains, however, highly controversial within the context of Stoic philosophy, on account of the apparent incongruence of their hard determinism on the one hand, and moral responsibility on the other.[13]

10 Cleanthes, *Hymn to Zeus* 18–21 (tr. Adam 1911, 107).

11 See Plutarch's *Comm. Not.* 1065D = *SVF* II. 1181. Unlike Plutarch, Marcus Aurelius (*Med.* VI. 42.) mentions Chrysippus' comedy analogy approvingly.

12 Cleanthes, *Hymn to Zeus,* 17 (tr. Adam 1911, 105): πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέραισιν ἀνοίαις. The same idea of the moral agent's personal responsibility is expressed in lines 21–25.

13 Of course, what seems incompatible and irreconcilable to us need not have seemed as such to the Stoics. The *locus classicus* on Stoic determinism and freedom remains (Bobzien 1998). See also: Brennan 2005, 235–305; D. Frede 2003; Salles 2005.

c) Badness must necessarily be present in the world, since it is connected with the good as a kind of "Heraclitean opposite". According to the testimony in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae*, Chrysippus stated explicitly that only the foolish could imagine good without evil; for, since good things are opposites of bad ones, it is necessary that they both subsist in a state of mutual interdependence. Chrysippus believed that goodness and badness are inseparably connected, both in the logico-epistemological and in the ontological sense. With regard to the former, he claims that the notions of justice, moderation, etc., cannot be understood without their correlative notions, i.e. their opposites (*quo enim pacto iustitiae sensus esse posset, nisi essent iniuriae?*).[14]

As for the latter, he falls back on Plato's short "Aesopian myth" of the *Phaedo* 60a–c, where pain and pleasure are depicted as Siamese twins joined at the crowns of their heads, so that when a person obtains one of them, the other inevitably follows. Chrysippus concludes that good and evil cannot exist apart from each other: if one is eliminated, the other will be eliminated as well (*situleris unum, abstuleris utrumque*).[15] Therefore, Chrysippus' philosophical opponents should not denounce the Stoic God on account of the existence of evil; for disposing of them would mean disposing of good things as well.

d) Many of the so-called evils are but unavoidable consequences of the purposeful acts aimed at some higher good. This approach is observable in Chrysippus' answer to the question "do even human diseases arise according to nature?", again preserved by Gellius.[16] Chrysippus claims that the primary intention of God was certainly not to create men as miserable animals susceptible to all kinds of maladies and injuries. However, while God was producing his magnificent work, certain unwanted properties came about together with the final product. These were also created in accordance with nature, but as certain necessary by-products, which Chrysippus denominates as *kata parakoluthēsin* (incidental, collateral concomitances). As an example of such phenomenon, he brings up the structure of the human skull, which is built out of thin and fragile bones, thus remaining liable to numerous injuries. However, such composition is indispensable for a creature meant to lead a life primarily characterized by the rule of reason; therefore, the good generated by its sensitivity greatly outweighs the evils, that is, the likelihood that any individual possessing such a skull may suffer pains, or even an untimely death.

14 *SVF* II. 1169. 38–39.

15 *SVF* II. 1164. 30–45, as well as *SVF* II. 1170. 26–28. Plutarch reports that Chrysippus goes so far as to say that even vice is not without use to the whole, because without it the good would not exist either (*Comm. Not.* 1065A–B).

16 *SVF* II. 1170. 7–25.

And if this does not sound Platonic enough, Plutarch also reports Chrysippus to have explicitly evoked the spirit of the *Timaeus* by explaining inauspiciousness in the world by the claim that "the admixture of necessity is also significant."[17]

e) A great many things imposing themselves on the unlearned as evils are in fact blessings in disguise. Bedbugs are useful because they wake us up, mice encourage us not to be untidy and lazy,[18] while leopards, bears and lions make it possible for us to receive training in courage.[19] What is more, in the sea, on land and in the air, there are many animal species and phenomena which – even if they do not leave such impression – are actually meant to benefit humanity. The only problem is that we have not as of yet discovered what their utility consists in; but with the passing of time and development of science, their value will be determined.[20] Finally, not only the seemingly trouble-giving living entities have their role in the improvement of men's moral and physical status, but even dreadful phenomena like wars ultimately have some useful purpose – they reduce the surplus population and thus make cities more pleasant places to live in.[21]

f) Possibly confronted with the apparently undeserved sufferings of the honest and virtuous, Chrysippus allowed for some instances of negligence to have sneaked within the all-encompassing plan of providence.[22] Perhaps a number of inexplicable states of affairs are due to certain oversights (*amelumenōn tinōn*), just like in every large household, a little flour or grain falls away and is wasted, even though the household as a whole is well managed (*tōn holōn eu oikonomumenōn*); or even:

g) Could those oversights actually be ascribable to the presence of evil spirits (*daimonia phaula*), who preside over such minute matters?[23] The last two suggestions, together with the proposal that God actually may not know everything,[24] significantly diverge from the overall spirit of Stoic physics and theology.

h) According to yet another Stoic strategy, the evils that humans experience are actually kind interventions of the Divinity, through which he puts them in order and trains them in virtue. Such imposition of disciplinary measures has a twofold manifestation. The first one is revealed through the sufferings of the wrongdoers, which are taken to be instances of just penalty. Chrysippus notes that by punishing the wicked, God cautions the others what might be their share if they fail to tread the path

17 *St. Rep.* 1051C = *SVF* II. 1078. 33: πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῖχθαι. See also Seneca's *Prov*. V. 9: "*Non potest artifex mutare materiam.*" (The craftsmen cannot alter his material).

18 *St. Rep.* 1044D = *SVF* II. 1163. 25–28.

19 *SVF* II. 1152. 26–30.

20 *SVF* II. 1172. 43–45. This testimony comes from Lactantius' *De Ira Dei*, and is presented as an example of a very inapt answer offered by the Stoics during their polemics with the Academicians.

21 *St. Rep.* 1049B.

22 *St. Rep.* 1051C = *SVF* II. 1178. 29–31.

23 *St. Rep.* 1051C = *SVF* II. 1178. 29–31.

24 See *SVF* II. 1183. 18f.

of rectitude.[25] The second becomes most conspicuous in Seneca's *De Providentia*. He goes a few steps further than Chrysippus and claims that the hardships and calamities *in themselves* have a beneficial effect when experienced by people of a worthy character. The virtuous are actually able to perceive their misfortunes as evidence of God's concern and love. For, just as caring parents raise their children by often employing harsh measures, so does God prevent the good man from wallowing in luxuries, and instead tests him, hardens him, breeds him for his own service.[26] Virtuous men actually welcome the so-called calamities, because they provide them with the opportunity to put their virtuous characters to trial, but also rescue them from idleness.[27] Thus, by embracing a viewpoint diametrically opposed to the common one, the Stoic philosopher is in a position to embrace all trouble as divine blessings and expressions of grace and affection.[28]

i) Furthermore, it is actually not right to say that anything bad happens to good men.[29] Although this idea had been formulated already by Chrysippus,[30] it gained great prominence with the theodicies of the late Stoics.[31] Thus, we hear that the virtuous remain happy, despite the severity of the surrounding external circumstances, knowing them to be utterly irrelevant.[32] Poverty does not bother such persons,[33] diseases come and go and are inseparably bound to the body, and even death is not a matter of grave concern: were it so, a wise man like Socrates would have found it disturbing, which he did not.[34]

j) Lastly, the solution to the problem of evil most congruent with Stoic ethics and theology was given by Epictetus. As a matter of fact, the goal of this strategy is not to explain evil or solve the problem, but to dissolve it, i.e. to demonstrate that, in every relevant sense, evil is non-existent. This position is visible throughout his *Enchiridion*, especially in sections 1–33, as well as in the *Discourses*.[35]Epictetus there keeps on trying to impress upon his readers the understanding that nothing external matters to them;

25 *St. Rep.* 1040C = *SVF* II. 1175. Besides, the suffering of the good and fearless also sometimes has a didactic function – it teaches those who aspire to virtue how to bear their own misfortunes with dignity. See Seneca *Prov.* VI. 3.

26 *Prov.* I. 6: *Bonum virum in deliciis non habet, experitur, indurat, sibi illum parat.* In addition, see especially II. 1–6, III, IV.

27 *Prov.* III. 1–4.

28 For more information on this and other theodicean strategies employed by Seneca, see Sellars 2018.

29 This solution seems quite close to the previous one, but also to the following. And, although they indeed share a common denominator – which is the triviality of suffering – I nevertheless decided to distinguish them on the following grounds: the solution h) seems to allows for the existence of evils (at least as conventions), but attributes positive value to them; i) denies that any evil can be associated with good men, while j) denies the reality of evil altogether.

30 *St. Rep.* 1038B.

31 As Seneca puts it in *Prov.* II. 1: "It is impossible that any evil can befall a good man." (*Nihil accidere bono viro mali potest*). See also VI. 1, and Epictetus *Diss*. III. 26, 28.

32 Cicero *Fin.* III. 42.

33 *Diss*. III. 17. 8. 1–9.

34 *Ench.* V.

35 E.g. *Diss*. I. 28, II. 16, III. 17, 24, 26.

in other words, such things that are not up to them are in no way related to their person, and are, therefore, neither good nor bad.[36] By managing to discern what is up to them and what is not, and by succeeding to turn a blind eye to the latter, people can practically become able to transcend the so-called evils. "The other will not hurt you, unless you want that; then you will become hurtable, when you accept to be hurt."[37] And this principle is applicable even to horrendous evils – like sacking and burning of cities, rape, and vicious murders of innocents.[38] The whole sense of the event of losing one's spouse and children to the sword of a bad man, can and should be encapsulated in a simple sentence – "I gave them back."[39] Thus, it turns out that the only bad thing is ignorance. Human beings are misled into blaming providence, or, significantly, men, for their own loses and sufferings.[40] This blame game, however, is unjustified and unsubstantial, and such understanding, aided by the act of forming the correct notion regarding the gods as supremely just and caring rulers, will help them to "never blame the gods nor accuse them of being neglectful."[41]

These are the main strategies applied by the Stoics in their defense of God's benevolence. They have been here, somewhat artificially, divided into ten types, although some of them are rather intertwined, and despite the fact that the Stoics themselves did not know such a taxonomy. This was done for reasons of clarity of exposition and precision, which will make the comparison with the Plotinian solutions much more straightforward.

3.

By the time Plotinus offered his contribution, serious thought had already been devoted to the concept of providence,[42] and a relative profusion of works entitled *Peri pronoias* / *De providentia* existed.[43] However, Plotinus' essay (divided by Porphyry into two treatises and named *On Providence* I and II) surpasses them all both in scope and manner of execution and stands as the most valuable monument of theodicy in Antiquity. His defense of the providential governance of the universe and of God's goodness is indeed comprehensive

36 *Ench*. I. 1. 1–2.1, *Ench.* XXXII. 1. 5, *Diss*. II. 16. 1–2.
37 *Ench*. XXX. 1. 8–9.
38 *Diss*. I. 28. 14–33.
39 *Ench*. XI.
40 This means that Epictetus actually to a significant degree abolishes even the moral aspect of the problem of evil – i.e. the evil that men do.
41 *Ench*. XXXI. 1.6 –2.1. Marcus Aurelius emphasizes the same point in *Med*. VI. 16. and 41. See also Seneca, *Prov*. V. 1–2.
42 Kalligas 2004, 441–45.
43 The most notable ones being Philo Judeaus' and Seneca's.

although sometimes repetitive, and in the spirit of Plotinus' general methodology, not systematically presented. He tackles, to a greater or lesser degree of success, all of the items in Leibniz' taxonomy of evil. However, as already mentioned, the aim of this paper is not to provide an account of Plotinus' theodicy. Instead, here I shall only try to examine those passages of Plotinus' *Peri pronoias* that bear resemblance to the Stoic solutions to the problem of evil outlined above, and briefly explore the cause of the resemblance.

Plotinus was a man of vast learning, well acquainted with the Aristotelian and Stoic ideas. Somewhat surprisingly, Porphyry even claims that "His writings, however, are full of concealed Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines".[44] I believe that this statement does not do full justice to Plotinus; his approach to Aristotle was complex, but he mostly took up a polemic stance,[45] and the same applies to the Stoics. He certainly held that his opponents were interesting and important enough to be discussed and refuted, but probably would not acquiesce to the charge that he was much indebted to them. Graeser summarizes Plotinus' stance on the Peripatetics and the Stoic as follows: "[P] lotinus' relation or attitude towards both of them can be characterized as open criticism of some doctrines and as tacit, though modified, acceptance of others".[46] The tacitness of Plotinus' acceptance, however, may also be understood as being due to his conviction that the ideas in question were actually borrowings or interpretations of certain Platonic teachings,[47] a claim which need not sound overly extravagant. This outlook concerning Plotinus' philosophy in general is more than applicable to his theodicy in particular, since the Stoics in that specific area relied heavily on Platonic (and Socratic) inspirations, as I shall attempt to demonstrate in what follows.

a) The first Stoic take on the problem of evil we identified above was the so-called Aesthetic solution. According to it, God succeeds in harmonizing each and every part of the creation – even those gone rogue – with the incomprehensible unity of the whole, and allows them to contribute to the overall beauty of the cosmic symphony, although some produce melodious, while others produce dissonant sounds. The part is, thus, not created first and foremost for its own benefit, but instead for the best interest of the whole. Indeed, both the Stoics and Plotinus make a copious use of this strategy, and especially of the artistic analogies related to it, which involve drama, painting and music.[48]

44 *Vita* 14. 5–6 (tr. Armstrong). A few lines later (10–15), we learn that, in order to stimulate debates at Plotinus' lectures, only some Platonic and Peripatetic texts, but no Stoic ones, were read.

45 Karamanolis 2006, 216–242.

46 Graeser 1972, 2.

47 Karamanolis 2006, 217; and Gerson 2007, 265, where it is stated that Plotinus' position was not syncretic, but instead influenced by the "[a]pplication of the principle that Aristotle's philosophy and, at least in psychological and ethical matters, Stoic philosophy, were in harmony with Platonism." As well as Gerson 2007, 274–275.

48 For the drama images, see Ariston of Chios (DL VII. 160), the already mentioned Chrysippus (*SVF* II. 1181), Aurelius (*Med.* III. 8, VI. 42–45, XII. 36), and Epictetus (*Ench.* 17, 31). In Plotinus, the Aesthetic solution represents one of the main motifs, so we have it in III. 2. 3, III. 2. 4. 9, III. 2. 5. 23–25,

However, the Aesthetic solution does not originate with the Stoics; its first formulation is to be found in Plato's *Laws*.[49] And although Plotinus in his work undoubtedly draws on the examples that the Stoics used, even most of those examples can be traced back to Plato's dialogues. Thus, the image of life as a sometimes tragic and sometimes comic stage comes from the *Philebus* 50b; the painter unwilling to use only bright colours because he knows that it is the contrast that makes the whole beautiful, is to be found in the *Republic* 420c4–d5; the dancing marionettes and actors are found in the *Laws* 644d6–8, 803c–804b.[50]

b) The second Stoic strategy identified above was Cleanthes' solution from personal responsibility. The tendency to place the blame, at least for some aspects of the evil we experience, on the fallible moral agents was amply exercised by Plotinus.[51] But again, the idea of personal responsibility was of great importance to Plato as well; it can be found in his myth of Er,[52] in the *Timaeus*, in the theodicy of the *Laws* X.

c) According to the third strategy proposed by Chrysippus, the good and the bad are mutually dependent. In other words, this solution makes evil as a logical and metaphysical counterpart of the good, a necessary requisite for the latter's very existence. In this regard, Graeser writes: "The argument employed by Plotinus for the necessity of the existence of evil […] is exactly that reported by Gellius […] to be held by Chrysippus".[53] This statement, however, is problematic in at least two ways. First, Chrysippus, to reiterate, drew on Heraclitus,[54] and on Plato's little *Phaedo* myth.[55] And in my opinion, he wrongly interpreted the myth; Plato's point is not that the good cannot exist without the bad, but that pain and pleasure are inevitably bound together in this world, in such a way that the sufferer of today is going to be the enjoyer of tomorrow, and *vice versa*, which is a claim much less forceful than Chrysippus'. Be that as it may, had Plotinus held the opinion ascribed to him here, he could have been interpreted to have fallen back on Plato (and

III. 2. 11 (together with the similes of painting and the imperative of including vulgar characters in a play), III. 2. 15. 22–60 (with plenty of dramatic stage and human puppets comparisons), III. 2. 16. 23–60 (with abundance of dance, drama, and musical similes), III. 2. 17. 10–90 (life is a play in which the good actor is promoted, the bad degraded, with more dance and music).

49 "The caretaker of the universe has arranged everything with an eye on the preservation and prosperity of the whole, where each individual part, according to its capacity, suffers and does what is befitting to it…" (*Laws* 903b4–c5).

50 For a brief comment on the passage as related to Plotinus' reuse, see Armstrong 1967, 90 fn. 2. For a more detailed elaboration of the world/living beings – stage/performers comparison, and for a historical overview of its application from Plato to Plotinus, see Dodds 1965, 8–10. Cf. Graeser 1972, 81.

51 Some of the passages where he underlies the guilt of the chooser are III. 2. 4. 34–41, III. 2. 5. 1–5, III. 2. 7. 15–22, III. 2. 8. 9–12, III. 2. 12. 10–13, III. 2. 17. 24–26, III. 2. 17. 50–54, III. 3. 3. 34–37, III. 3. 5. 33–40.

52 *Republic* 617e4–5.

53 Graeser 1972, 56.

54 Graeser 1972, 56, but also DK 22. B111: "Illness made health pleasant and good, hunger – satiety, fatigue – rest".

55 For a detailed elaboration of the Aesopian myth, see Betegh 2009.

Heraclites), and Chrysippus' mediation would have been superfluous. Secondly, I believe that Plotinus' passage in question, which evokes the concept of comparatives,[56] actually expresses a different idea. Plotinus there refers to his emanation theory, i.e. to the oft-repeated doctrinal facts that the descent from the One had to stop somewhere, and that the cosmos could have not existed if it were not worse than its paradigm, the world of Intellect. Thus, the third Stoic attempted solution to the problem of evil can be either traced back to Plato, or considered non-Platonic/Plotinian.[57]

d) The Chrysippian explanation of evil as a collateral concomitance of teleological act and his invocation of *anankē* are, of course, very prominent in Plotinus' theodicy.[58] There is, however, no need to argue that this is a genuinely Platonic take on the issue, considering both the Timaean example provided by Chrysippus,[59] and the overall Timaean spirit, even wording, of the solution. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that while Plotinus does not make any use of Chrysippus' propositional phrase *kata parakoluthēsin*, variants of the latter are rather conspicuous in Philo's *Peri pronoias*.[60] This phenomenon can be legitimately seen as a very strong indication of direct influence, unlike in the case of Plotinus.

e) Next comes the Stoic idea that some seemingly troublesome entities and events are in fact useful, while the utility of still others will be discovered in the future. Plotinus in this regard seems to follow Chrysippus closely. He even gives the same example of biting insects and sleeping men,[61] and states that the presently obscured benefits brought by some lower creatures will become evident with the passing of time.[62] As far as I can tell, this suggestion reveals no obvious Platonic correlations.

f) Plotinus does not consider Chrysippus' proposal that evil might be due to providence's negligence of smaller things, in the course of its diligently taking care of more significant matters. This view stands in blatant contradiction to Plato's carefully woven proof to the opposite, i.e. that even the minutest thing is not left unattended by the gods.[63]

g) The suggestion that evil is produced by the intrusion of evil spirits within the cosmic order does not figure in Plotinus' theodicy either.

h) The interpretation of the pains and miseries as God's intervention undertaken in order to cause moral improvement was embraced by Plotinus, and especially so in

56 III. 3. 7. 1–3.
57 For a more general criticism of the interdependent opposites argument, see Sandbach 1989, 105–106.
58 E.g. I. 8. 5–10, III. 2. 2. 32–42, III. 2. 5. 29–32, III. 2. 5. 7. 1–15, III. 2. 14. 7–10, III. 3. 7. 1–28.
59 *Timaeus* 75b–d.
60 2. 45 – ἐπακολουθεῖ, ἐπακολουθήματα; 2. 47 – ἐπακολουθήματα; 2. 48 – παρακολουθεῖ; 2. 49 – ἐπακολούθημα; 2. 53 – ἐπακολουθοῦντα; 2. 59 – κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν.
61 III. 2. 9. 34–35.
62 III. 2. 9. 35–37.
63 *Laws* 900b–902e.

its form of disciplinary measures. Plotinus conceived of the latter as meant to both rectify the wrongs done by the wicked, and provide an example of just punishment to those who are not such, and who would, on that account, refrain from possible future transgressions.[64] Yet, the motifs of character-forming powers of remedial punishment, its didactic application to the lives of the innocent and its overall beneficence are not genuinely Stoic, but once again Platonic. They are present already in the *Gorgias*, as well as in the *Republic*.[65] The punishment of the wicked as an expression of divine justice and victory of right over wrong is emphasized again in the *Laws*.[66]

i) Plotinus certainly follows the Stoics in asserting that nothing bad happens to the good.[67] This idea, however, also does not originate with the Stoics. It can be found fully explicated by Plato already in the *Apology* 41d1–2: "[t]hat nothing bad happens to a good man, neither in life nor after death."[68] As a matter of fact, Epictetus in the *Discourses* quotes this statement of Socrates almost verbatim: "[t]hat to a good man nothing bad happens neither in life, nor after perishing",[69] together with his assurance that God will never neglect such a person.

j) Epictetus' attempt to explain away evil completely is inapplicable to Plotinus' theodicy, because the latter has a very dissimilar ontological stance; namely, he holds that evil has its own principle, which is matter. This does not mean that Plotinus grants full reality to evil – he actually approximates something like Epictetus' position by stating that evil is nothing more that falling short of good,[70] and also through the many instances in which he relativizes pain, death and the like, reducing them to phantasmagorias, children's games and theatre plays.[71]Although not in the *Peri pronoias*, he also uses a comparison quite close to the one already employed by Epictetus, when writing that a man of virtue should endure the blows of destiny not as something dangerous, but as things that incite only children to fear.[72] Epictetus has: "for just as masks seem dangerous and fearful to children on account of their inexperience […]."[73] Plotinus' rationale for such statements is, however, different than Epictetus': he considers the external conditions insignificant,

64 III. 2. 24–25, III. 2. 4. 44, III. 2. 5. 17, III. 2. 5. 15, III. 2. 5. 23–25, III. 2. 8. 26–27. With regard to this *locus*, Graeser 1976, 84 remarks: "Plotinus believes that wicked men will be punished by being turned into wolves […]. This is exactly the opinion expressed by Epictetus, *Diss*. 4. 1. 27." However, the image of evil men turning into wolfs in this life, and suffering further punishment in the next, has its origins in Plato's *Republic* 566a.

65 *Gorgias* 478a–480b, 505b–c, 524e, 525d; *Republic* 380a–b, 615a–d, 619d.

66 *Laws* 904b3–6, 904b8–c4, 904e4–905b2.

67 III. 2. 5. 7, III. 2. 6. 1–4.

68 ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι. See also *Apology* 30c6–d1.

69 ὅτι ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ οὐδέν ἐστι κακὸν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτ' ἀποθανόντι, III. 26.28. 5–6.

70 III. 2. 5. 26.

71 E.g. III. 2. 15. 25–29 – death is likened to the changing of clothes; III. 2. 15. 35–37, 54–58 – wars, sufferings are like children's games

72 I. 4. 8. 27: οὐχ ὡς δεινά, ἀλλ' ὡς παισὶφοβερά.

73 *Diss.* II. 1. 15. 2–4: ὡς γὰρ τοῖς παιδίοις τὰ προσωπεῖα φαίνεται δεινὰ καὶ φοβερὰ δι' ἀπειρίαν.

because they do not affect the soul but only the shadowy body, while the latter's basic premise is the inevitability of destiny. Besides, Epictetus himself – in the aforementioned instance of banalizing the evil's impact by associating it with irrational fears of ignorant children – only illustrates his reference to Plato's Socrates.[74] The latter, in the *Phaedo* 77e–d, speaks of the fear of death as a childish fear of hobgoblins (*ta mormolukeia*), while in the *Crito* 46c, he calls penalties of fines, imprisonment and death as things that should not scare him like they frighten children.[75] Thus, it becomes obvious once again that Epictetus, much the same as the other Stoics, used to employ not only Platonic ideas, but also even direct quotations from Plato's dialogues. And this fact allows for a different understanding of the sources of most of the Plotinus' theodicean passages into which direct Stoic influences have been read. A modest proposal along those lines was presented throughout this section and will be summarized in what follows.

All in all, any attempt to deny the existence of Stoic ideas in Plotinus' *Enneads* would indeed be a futile one, and the same goes for his theodicy. To reiterate, the teachings of the Stoics were not at all unfamiliar to Plotinus, and he used to engage with them in many instances. Did he read the early Stoics? We do not know and probably never will,[76] but Plotinus seems to have been acquainted with some Chrysippean passages. Did he read the Roman Stoics? He most probably did.[77] Thus, his frequent encounters with the Stoics could not have but left some traces on his philosophizing. The same is applicable to the particular case of *Peri pronoias*, where he obviously makes use of several solutions integral to the Stoic theodicy, as well as of many examples and analogies employed by them. So, instead of the far-fetched denial of any Stoic influence, I propose that those influences are not genuinely Stoic. On closer inspection, most of the aforementioned solutions and illustrations turn out to be not only commonplaces shared by the Cynics, the Stoics and the Middle Platonists, but also easily traceable back to Plato's works. In other words, Plotinus might have taken up some of the Stoic *elaborations* of the Platonic solutions, but he, as well as they, was well aware that these have their origins in Plato. A significant exception is the idea of usefulness of troublesome animals and natural phenomena, which occurs in III.2.9.34–37. That one seems to be a direct borrowing from the Stoics, particularly from Chrysippus.

Taking the aforesaid into account, I would like to propose that, in the possible world where Stoicism never arose or where the Stoics never wrote on providence and theodicy, Plotinus would have nevertheless been able to compose a theodicy very similar to the present one, relying chiefly, if not exclusively, on Platonic sources and his own ideas.

74 II. 1. 15. 1–2: ταῦτα δ' ὁ Σωκράτης καλῶς ποιῶν μορμολύκεια ἐκάλει.

75 46c4–c5: ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται.

76 Graeser 1972, xiii–xiv.

77 As firmly asserted by Graeser 1972, 9. Gerson is also adamant: "Plotinus certainly had a knowledge of Epictetus' *Discourses.*" (Gerson 2007, 276 fn. 44).

Therefore, I take the claim that Plotinus' theodicy is strongly influenced by the Stoic one to be an exaggeration, unless subjected to significant qualification, which would underline the Platonic origins of Stoic theodicy itself.[78]

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Gábor Kendeffy

The Use of the Stoic Concept of *Phronēsis* by Irenaeus and Lactantius

In this work, I discuss the use of the Stoic concept of *phronēsis* by Irenaeus and Lactantius in four steps. In the first part, I outline the Stoic concept of practical wisdom (*phronēsis*). The second chapter is devoted to the Stoic teaching on the necessary conjunction of either advantages and disadvantages of moral good and bad, closely related to the concept of *phronēsis*. Next, I expound on how Irenaeus, the bishop of Lyons (130–202) appropriated this Stoic doctrine in his main anti-heretical work. The final chapter concerns Lactantius, the Latin apologist (c. 250 – c. 325), and points out that both the Stoic concept of practical wisdom and the teaching on the necessary conjunction of good and bad form the center of Lactantius' conception of divine providence in his *Divine Institutes* and in the *Anger of God.*

1. The concept of *phronēsis* in the early Stoa

For Zeno, *phronēsis* is the most fundamental virtue of all, and other virtues constitute different aspects thereof.[1] In one sense, *phronēsis* is defined by the Stoics as *the science of what should and should not be done and of neutral actions, or the science of things that are good and bad and neutral as applied to a creature whose nature is social.*[2] This means that practical wisdom is related to the moral value of an act. According to another testimony of Stobaeus, *phronēsis*, as related to appropriate acts (*kathēkonta*), is the ability to distinguish between things which are in accordance with nature and those which are contrary to it.[3] According to our sources, including Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus, the early Stoics established these fundamental claims:

1) Only what one's happiness depends on, can be regarded as worthy of the names *good* or *bad*.
2) Your happiness cannot depend on things which you can lose against your will.
3) Consequently, only what you cannot lose against your will is worthy of the names *good* and *bad*, all the rest do not deserve this, but are to be labelled as indifferent (*adiaphoron*).[4]

1 Kerferd 1978.
2 Stob. 2. 59.
3 Stob. 2. 60.
4 DL 7. 101–103; Stob. 2. 79; *Fin.* 3. 6. 21; 3. 15. 50; *Acad.* 1. 10. 35ff.

From these claims it follows that what is really worthy of the names *good* and *bad* are virtue and vice, that is to say, the capacity to choose correctly or incorrectly. To choose between what? Between *things* of course, let us say, situations labelled as indifferent. Upon what grounds? Whether an indifferent thing is conforming or contrary to nature. As for the acts, morally good or perfect acts (*katorthōmata*) are those stemming from virtue, morally wrong acts are those stemming from vice, whereas the so-called appropriate acts (*kathēkhonta*) are those directed at indifferent situations which conform with nature or conform more than the rest. Consequently, *phronēsis*, as put in relation to appropriate acts is to be understood not only as the capacity between opposite moral values (good and bad), but also the capacity to decide about the moral value of an act to be done.

This latter understanding of *phronēsis* is corroborated by a passage of Plutarch's *Dialogue on Common Conceptions.* According to this text, the prudent (here we can find the adverb *phronimōs*) selection and the acceptance of the primary things conforming to nature is the goal, whereas the things themselves, and the obtaining of them, are not the goal but are given as a kind of *material having selective value.*[5] The latter term intimates that the primary things conforming with nature serve as matter for the selection of practical wisdom. In my opinion, the two occurrences of the word "selection" indicate that not only things conforming with nature, but also things in contradiction with nature serve as a matter for this virtue. Being a matter for the selection might mean to be the object of selection for practical wisdom, and also to be an instrument for it to develop and be trained. Consequently, the primary things conforming with nature and, as it is implied in the text, those contrary to nature are the preconditions of the emergence and the functioning of practical wisdom. More explicit is in this respect a statement of Cicero in his *Dialogue on Moral Ends*: "But the primary objects of nature, whether they are in accordance with it or against, fall under the judgement of the wise person, and are as it were the subject and material of wisdom."[6]

From these texts, interpreted as I have suggested, we can conclude that for practical wisdom to expand and to exert itself both physical advantages and disadvantages are needed.

5 *Comm. Not.* 1071B.

6 *Fin.* 3. 18. 61: "Nam bonum illud et malum, quod saepe iam dictum est, postea consequitur, prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia sapientiae."

2. The necessary conjunction of good and bad

2.1 The necessary conjunction of physical advantages and disadvantages

Our next question concerns the way in which physical disadvantages can contribute to training practical wisdom. Seneca in his work, *On Providence,* expounds that the experience of ills (so-called evils) is necessary for someone to become virtuous. He particularly focuses on endurance (*hyponomē*), a component of courage, the latter being a particular aspect of practical wisdom.

> You are a great man, but how am I to know it, if fortune does not give you an opportunity of showing your virtue? [...] I may say to a good man, if no harder circumstance has given him the opportunity whereby alone he might show the strength of his mind, I judge you unfortunate because you have never been unfortunate; you have passed through life without an antagonist; no one will know what you can do, – not even yourself. For if a man is to know himself, he must be tested; no one finds out what he can do except by trying.[7]

From this the author draws a teleological conclusion:

> God, I say, is favouring those he wants to attain to the highest possible excellence whenever he provides them the ground to perform a brave and courageous action [*materiam praebet aliquid animose fortiterque faciendi*], and for this purpose they must encounter some difficulty in life. God hardens, reviews, and disciplines those whom he approves, whom he loves.[8]

The way of expression *materiam praebet aliquid animose fortiterque faciendi* (provides them the material to perform a brave and courageous action) can remind us of the vocabulary of Plutarch and Cicero, who consider, as we could see, the primary things conforming with nature, and, at least implicitly, also those contrary to nature as material for practical wisdom. Thus we can say that the selective character of *phronēsis,* understood as relating to appropriate acts consists in having practice in deciding which disadvantages to endure under which circumstances. The flaws afflicting the would-be wise have the function of training his virtue. The last idea and the use of the sport metaphor may bring to mind someone's many references to Scripture, especially by Pauline Epistles.

> For the Lord disciplines the one he loves, and chastises every son whom he receives.[9]

7 *Prov.* 4. 1–5.
8 *Prov.* 4. 8.
9 *Hebrews* 12:6. Translations are from the New English Bible.

> An athlete is not crowned unless he competes according to the rules.[10]

> Do you not know that in a race all the runners run, but only one receives the prize? So run that you may obtain it. Every athlete exercises self-control in all things. They do it to receive a perishable wreath, but we an imperishable.[11]

2.2 The necessary conjunction of vice and virtue

A well-known text about the necessary conjunction of good and evil is Chrysippus' answer to the problem of theodicy in his work *On Providence*.[12] The argumentation of the Stoic philosopher was quoted and introduced by Gellius in a part of his *Attic Nights,* which itself was preserved by Lactantius, the Christian Apologist. According to Chrysippus, good and bad mutually depend on each other, and this holds particularly true for the opposite moral values, vice and virtue. This *phronēsis,* which is implicitly claimed here to be trained by the comparison between vice and virtue, is practical wisdom as a capacity to decide about the moral value of an act to be done. Gellius introduces the argument as directed against those who declare that "nothing is less consistent with Providence than the existence of such a quantity of troubles and evils in a world which He is said to have made for the sake of man."[13] The argument goes as follows:

> There is absolutely nothing more foolish than those men who think that good could exist, if there were at the same time no evil. For since good is the opposite of evil, it necessarily follows that both must exist in opposition to each other, supported as it were by mutual adverse forces; since as a matter of fact no opposite is conceivable without something to oppose it. For how could there be an idea of justice if there were no acts of injustice? Or what else is justice than the absence of injustice? How too can courage be understood except by contrast with cowardice? Or temperance except by contrast with intemperance? How also could there be wisdom, if folly did not exist as its opposite? Therefore, said he, why do not the fools also wish that there may be truth, but no falsehood? For it is in the same way that good and evil exist, happiness and unhappiness, pain and pleasure. For, as Plato says, they are bound one to the other by their opposing extremes; if you take away one, you will have removed both.[14]

10 2 *Timothy* 2:5.
11 1 *Cor* 9. 24–25.
12 For the Stoic idea of interdependence of good and evil, see Long 1968.
13 Gellius 7. 1. 1.
14 Gellius 7. 1. 2–6.

The argument points to two kinds of interdependence or necessary conjunction. The first one is a logical interdependence, in the sense that none of these opposites *can be conceived* without comparison with the other. Let us label the second kind of interdependence pedagogical. This means that one cannot grasp the essence of one of these opposites without knowing something about the other. It is only through the understanding of vice that one comes to learn what virtue is. It is important to see that the necessary conjunction of moral good and evil works by the intermediary of physical disadvantages. That is to say, the intellectual progress leading to the learning of what virtue is goes through the disadvantages resulting from the vices of the other. This is clear both from Gellius' introduction to the quotation and from the following proposition: how could there be an idea of justice if there were no acts of injustice? This interdependence is a consequence of a third category of interdependence between acts of virtue and those of vice. This can be termed as metaphysical interdependence. Namely, nature can produce a kind of virtue only if it also produces the corresponding vice. Even the continuation of this text shows this, by setting forth the theory of necessary concomitances (*kata parakolouthesin*). But this third kind of interdependence is exposed more clearly in a passage of Plutarch's treatise *On Common Concepts*. The author quotes Chrysippus' treatise *On Nature*.

> Vice is distinguished from dreadful accidents, for in itself it does in a sense come about in accordance with the reason of nature and, if I may put it so, its genesis is not useless in relation to the universe as a whole […] While in a chorus, there is harmony if no member of it is out of tune and in a body health if no part of it is ill, for virtue, however, there is no coming to be without vice; but just as snake's venom or hyena's bile is a requisite for some medical prescriptions so the depravity of Meletus is in its way suited to the justice of Socrates and the vulgarity of Cleon to the nobility of Pericles.[15]

This interdependence of vice and virtue might be in the background of such propositions as that in Plutarch's other treatise on Stoic self-contradictions, where we can read that "both all states of the soul, including vices and disorders, and movements of the soul, vicious acts, come about in conformity with the reason of nature."[16]

3. Irenaeus

Now, before examining the appropriation of this Stoic material in Lactantius' works, I will follow the adaptation of the Stoic concept of *phronēsis* and the teaching on logical,

15 *Comm. Not.* 1065A–B.
16 *St. Rep.* 1050D.

epistemological and metaphysical interdependence of good and evil by Irenaeus. The context of the argumentation of the latter in book 4 of his *Against Heresies* is one polemic against Gnostics who deny that free will – the cause of the fall – can be the gift of a God who is good, just, prescient and omnipotent. They blame, as the bishop of Lyons puts it, the God of the Christians, asking why he could not create all the angels and men as being incapable to commit any sins. According to Irenaeus' account on their argumentation, the existence of a creature who is able to make a wrong choice by his will, contradicts the omnipotence of God. The exegetical starting point for the discussion is *Matthew*:[17] "How often would I have gathered your children together as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you were not willing!"[18]. That is to say: how could the Jews resist the will of the real God?

Irenaeus' response is as follows: "God has not coerced anybody, but he gave good council [*bonum consilium*/*gnómé agathé*] to everybody."[19] According to Irenaeus' argumentation, if man did not act from free decision, (a) there would be no merit, (b) Biblical commandments and injunctions would not make any sense, and finally, Man would neither appreciate his own being good nor would understand what is really good. [20] Why? First, because the good can be appreciated only if one has to struggle for it. The struggle [*agōn*] makes the real value and meaning of the good. 2) In the end the essence of good can be seized only by knowing what is evil. These two arguments are connected to each other. The struggle for the good implies to Irenaeus the awareness (or experience) of the evil to resist. Thus, both the appreciation and the understanding of the good – in its really moral sense – necessitates the experience of evil.[21] He develops the last point in the following way:

> Since, then, this power [i.e. the free will] has been conferred upon us, both the Lord has taught and the apostle has enjoined us the more to love God that we may reach this [prize] for ourselves by striving after it. For otherwise, no doubt, this our good would be unknown [*anoēton*], because not the result of trial [*agymnaston*]. The faculty of seeing would not appear to be so desirable, unless we had known what a loss it were to be devoid of sight; and health, too, is rendered all the more estimable by an acquaintance with disease; light, also, by contrasting it with darkness; and life with death. Just in the same way is the heavenly kingdom honourable to those who have known the earthly one. But in proportion as it is more honourable, so much the more do we prize it; and if we have prized it more, we shall be the more glorious in the presence of God.[22]

17 *Matthew* 23:37.
18 *Adv. Haer.* 4. 37. 1.
19 *Adv. Haer. 4.* 37. 1.
20 *Adv. Haer.* 4. 37. 6.
21 *Adv. Haer.* 4. 37. 7.
22 *Adv. Haer.* 4. 37. 7.

Irenaeus obviously points to the logical and the epistemological interdependence of virtue and vice, as we could read in Gellius' aforementioned text.[23] Virtue can be grasped only by comparison to vice. Without the *experience* of vice, the *good in us* is unknown, because it is not a result of training, namely, the training by evil. I cannot help remarking here that, in my view, at this point Irenaeus managed to seize something important, namely what the adjective "good" means in a truly moral sense. The moral goodness of an act does not only require accordance with a rule commonly accepted as moral, but it also necessarily implies the agent's striving for being capable to accomplish this act, rather than another which is wrong but seductive.

Now, let us turn back to the content of training by evil. Does it comprise to Irenaeus the temptation alone, or the sin itself? The continuation of the text seems to suggest the second answer by saying that in the process of formation (*paideia*) of man by God, both the apostasy of man and the long-suffering of God play an important role. To illustrate this idea, he quotes Jeremiah: "Your own apostasy shall correct you [*paideusei se hē apostasia sou*]."[24] Irenaeus puts the question into the mouth of his opponents: "What then? Could not God have exhibited man as perfect from beginning?"[25] God would have been capable of doing it – he replies – but man as a creation could not be perfect from the beginning. He must go through a process of growing up, the stages of which are childhood, adulthood – i.e. real human existence – and finally deification. Man thus had to come into existence as a child, who is still not a real man. He is bound to undergo a process of training in the course of which he is gradually made into God's image and after His likeness. Importantly, the church father adds that *the knowledge of good and evil* is a fundamental step in the process of man's growing up.[26] The vocabulary deserves attention. As we read, man has *received* this knowledge (*agnitione accepta boni et mali*). To Irenaeus, moral good and evil, the knowledge of which is possible only by the comparison between them are obedience and disobedience to God, a pair of opposite moral values. This is the inner experience of disobedience, which is indispensable for grasping the essence and seizing the value of moral good, i.e. obedience. Wisdom in its first sense is this understanding. But we must notice that according to Irenaeus, the first sin was not in itself necessary for the education of man, but only as followed by punishment. This means that the process of education also comprehends the comparison between the states of man before and after the Fall, that is to say, immortality and mortality. From this it follows that wisdom lies not only in the comparison between moral good and evil, but also in the comparison

23 See Osborn 2001, 57.
24 *Osborn 2001, 57.*
25 *Adv. Haer.* 4. 38. 1.
26 *Adv. Haer.* 4. 38. 3.

between physical good and evil. In both cases, experience *(exercitatio/peira)* of one of the opposites is needed for the knowledge of the other and vice versa.

By way of an intermediary conclusion, we can make the following claims:

(1) Irenaeus uses the Stoic idea that moral evil and good vice and virtue are epistemologically interdependent on each other.

(2) He conceives, to some extent, the biblical concept of wisdom (i.e. knowledge of good and evil) on the model of the Stoic concept of practical wisdom in two aspects: a) as the ability to distinguish between moral good and evil (see the first kind of Stoic *phronēsis* related to morally perfect acts); and b) as the ability to distinguish between convenient and inconvenient things (see the second kind of Stoic *phronēsis* related to appropriate acts).

4. Lactantius

As early as in the first, shorter version of Lactantius' chief work, the *Divine Institutes*, we can meet a moderately dualistic system, according to which the moral development of man is provoked by the stratagems of Satan, not so clear whether created or begotten by God. These stratagems of this Evil Spirit especially include tortures and seduction. Lactantius quotes Seneca's aforementioned passage from the *De Providentia* and expounds in a number of places that adversities are indispensable for the development of endurance, the latter being the highest virtue. Below I provide two examples from two different books of the *Divine Institutes*.

> The first steps in transgression do not thrust a man away from God and into punishment immediately: the purpose of evil is to test a man for virtue, because if his virtue is not stirred and strengthened by constant assault it cannot come to perfection; virtue is the brave and indomitable endurance of evils that have to be endured. Hence the fact that virtue cannot exist if it has no adversary.[27]

> Virtue either cannot be seen without the contrast of vice or is not perfected without the test of adversity. That is the gap that God wanted to have between good and bad, [or, following the manuscripts which contains the later, shorter version: Indeed, God wanted

27 *Div. Inst.* 3. 29. 6*:* "Idcirco enim in primordiis transgressionis non statim ad poenam detrusus a Deo est, ut hominem malitia sua exerceat ad virtutem: quae nisi agitetur, ni assidua vexatione roboretur, non potest esse perfecta; siquidem virtus est perferendorum malorum fortis ac invicta patientia." In other passages, this idea is connected with that of the imitation of Christ. As the apologist teaches, the incarnate Christ, exposed both to the same sufferings and passions, came to be the master of endurance for humankind. See *Div. Inst.*4. 19. 11; 4. 24. 18.

> good and bad to have that nature] so that we may know the quality of good from bad and likewise of bad from good: the nature of the one cannot be understood if the other is not there too. [When about to restore justice,] God did not exclude evil, in order that a reason for virtue could be constructed. How could endurance sustain its name and meaning if there were nothing we were forced to endure?[28]

In the latter quotation we can see that our theologian combines the idea that, by way of training, adversities are needed for the development of endurance with that of the pedagogical interdependence of vice and virtue. In a passage of the longer, revised version of the *Divine Institutes*, Lactantius associates, as Irenaeus did, the Stoic notion of practical wisdom with the Biblical concept of wisdom. Here the apologist claims that man has experienced evil as a result of the fall and that he is therefore given the task of choosing between good and evil. In this text, it is in wisdom (*sapientia*), and not in virtue, that the ability to make the right choice lies. Here, wisdom is judged not to be able to exert itself without the existence of evil. As Lactantius teaches here, the first sin has an educative function, for it is due to the sin that man *was given* the knowledge of good and evil, that is, the ability to distinguish them.

> Finally, knowledge of good and evil were given [*data est*] to the first man together. Once he had that knowledge [*qua percepta*], he was immediately banished from the holy place, where evil does not exist. He had been there in a context of good alone; he therefore did not know that it was good. Once he had received[29] [*accepit*] on the understanding of good and evil, however, it was wrong for him to remain in a place of bliss, and he was banished to this world we all share so that he could experience together the two things he had learnt together. It is thus plain that man was given [*datam esse*] wisdom in order to distinguish good from evil, benefit from disbenefit, and useful from useless, in order to exercise judgment and consideration of what he should beware and what he should seek, what to shun and what to pursue. Wisdom cannot therefore be established without evil. In the end, it may be said, man has to be both wise and blessed without any evil at all.[30]

28 *Div. Inst.* 5. 7. 4–6: "Virtutem aut cerni non posse, nisi habeat vitia contraria, aut non esse perfectam, nisi exerceatur adversis. Hanc enim Deus bonorum ac malorum voluit esse distantiam [in manuscripts which contains the later, longer version the latter word is replaced by *naturam*], ut qualitatem boni ex malo sciamus, item mali ex bono, nec alterius ratio intelligi sublato altero potest. Deus ergo [in the later version we can read inserted here *iutitiam reducturus*] non exclusit malum, ut ratio virtutis constare posset. Quomodo enim patientia vim suam nomenque retineret, si nihil esset, quod pati cogeremur?" Cf. *Div. Inst.* 5. 22. 11–19.

29 Here I modified the translation by A. Bowen and P. Garnsey, who put "had taken".

30 *Div. Inst.* 7. 5. 27. add. 10–12: "Denique boni malique scientia simul data est. qua percepta statim de loco sanctus pulsus est. in quo malum non est. Ubi cum esset in bono tantum id ipsum bonum esse ignorabat. Postquam vero accepit boni malique intelligentiam, iam nefas erat eum in beatitudinis loco morari, relegatusque est in hunc communem orbem, ut ea utraque simul experiretur, quorum naturam

Our author obviously follows Irenaeus at this point as well. He considers the knowledge of good and evil as a gift, and judges this gift to have transformed the potential, childish human creature into an actual, grown-up one. The innovation of the African theologist consists, as far as this theme is concerned, in adding the idea of divine deceit to all of this. According to the latter, God has made the use of the power of distinction between good and evil more difficult by mingling advantages of appearance with real disadvantages, and disadvantages of appearance with real advantages. So the deceptive conjunction of reality and appearance is claimed to be a fundamental characteristic of human existence on the earth.

> He put man midway between the two so that he should have license to pursue evil or good, but with the evil he mixed in some apparently good things, an assortment of attractive delights, that is, to draw man on by the temptations in them to the latent evil, and with the good he mixed in some apparent evils, pain, misery and toil, that is, whose harshness and unpleasantness might depress the spirit into shrinking from latent good. This is where the use of wisdom comes in: we need to see more with our minds than with our bodies, something very few can do, because virtue is hard and rare while pleasure is something many share.[31]

The idea of this divine deceit, a constitutive element of Lactantius' doctrine on the two ways, which I cannot elaborate here,[32] permeates the whole text of the *Divine Institutions*. Consequently, it is not only considered as the knowledge of good and evil, that is, the capacity to make a distinction between good and evil, but also as the capacity to make a distinction between real an apparent. In the *Epitome,* which is a kind of summary of the shorter, earlier version of the *Divine Institutes*, Lactantius puts the questions why God let demons provoke pagan religion and why he produced (*fecit*) their chief, Satan at all. He is, thus, concerned eminently about the providential role of vices and not about that of adversities. To answer these questions, he will quote the text of Gellius with the quotation from Chrysipppus, which we already met. Lactantius introduces Gellius' text as follows:

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pariter agnoverat. Apparet ergo idcirco datam esse homini sapientiam, ut bonum discernat a malo; ut ab incommodis commoda, ab inutilibus utilia distinguat, ut habeat iudicium, et considerantiam, quid cavere, quid appetere, quid fugere, quid sequi debeat. Sapientia igitur constare sine malo non potest, vixitque ille princeps generis humani, quamdiu in solo bono fuit, velut infans, boni ac mali nescius. At enim postea hominem necesse est et sapientem esse et sine ullo malo beatum."

31 *Div. Inst.* 7. 5. 27. add. 14–15: "Posuit itaque hominem inter utrumque medium, ut haberet licentiam vel mali vel boni sequendi. Sed malo admiscuit apparentia quaedam bona, id est varias et delectabiles suavitates, ut earum illecebris induceret hominem ad latens malum. Bono autem admiscuit apparentia quaedam mala, id est, aerumnas, et miserias, et labores, quorum asperitate ac molestia offensus animus refugeret a bono latenti. Hic ergo sapientiae officium desideratur, ut plus mente videamus, quam corpore."

32 For this topic, see especially Loi 1961–65; Rohrdorf 1972; Ingremeau 2006, 383–391; Kendeffy 2010.

> If vice is an evil on this account, because it opposes virtue, and virtue is on this account a good, because it overthrows [*affligit*] vice, it follows that virtue cannot exist without vice; and if you take away vice, the merits of virtue will be taken away. For there can be no victory without an enemy. Thus it comes to pass, that good cannot exist without an evil.[33]

It is worth noticing that according to this text, virtue can be regarded as a good owing to the fact that it *overthrows* (*affligit*) vice. From this it seems to follows that what is claimed here to be necessary to the agent's moral progress is the agent's own vice and not that of others. Lactantius thus deviates from the original meaning of the quoted text to teach, as Irenaeus did earlier, that the genuine moral sense of the good lies in the striving of the agent to be capable to accomplish this act rather than another one that is wrong but seducing. Here again, the apologist combines the idea of the necessary conjunction of good and evil with the idea of contest and closes both the quotation and his own reflection on this topic with a sentence which evokes Stoic propositions on practical wisdom as read in Seneca's Cicero's and Plutarch's texts.

> Therefore God acted with the greatest foresight in placing the subject-matter of virtue in evils which He made for this purpose, that He might establish for us a contest, in which He would crown the victorious with the reward of immortality.[34]

Lactantius in this text makes the connection between the concept of *phronēsis* and the idea of the necessary conjunction of good and evil more explicit than it was in the Stoic doctrine. This passage of the *Epitome* prepares the longer explanation of Satan's coming into being in the longer version of *Divine Institutes*. In the latter, Chrysippus' idea of the logical and epistemological interdependence of vice and virtue serves as the reason why God produced Evil. Here, the apologist is more faithful to the original content of the Stoic argument than in the *Epitome*: by saying "evil" he means the vice of the others, manifested in unjust deeds unambiguously.

> And when he was about to make man, whose rule for living was to be virtue through which he would achieve immortality, he made good and evil so that there could be virtue; if virtue were not beset with evils, it will either lose its potency or else not exist at

33 *Epitome* 24. 2–3: "Si vitium ex eo malum est, quia virtutem impugnat, et virtus ex eo bonum est, quia vitium affligit, ergo non potest virtus sine vitio consistere, et si vitium sustuleris, virtutis merita tollentur." *Div. Inst.* 2. 8. 6. add. 3: "Item facturus hominem, cui virtutem ad vivendum proponeret, per quam immortalitatem assequeretur, bonum et malum fecit, ut posset esse virtus; quae nisi malis agitetur, aut vim suam perdet aut omnino non erit." Cf. *Opif.* 19. 3.

34 *Epitome* 24. 11.

> all. It is the sharpness of need which makes wealth look good, it is the gloom of darkness which commends the grace of light, and the pleasures of health and strength are learnt from sickness and pain. Just so, good cannot exist without evil in this life, and though each is opposed to the other, yet they so stick together that if you remove one, you remove both. Good cannot be grasped and understood without the effort to escape from evil, and evil cannot be watched and overcome without the help of good duly grasped and understood. Evil therefore had to be created, so that there could be good.[35]

By way of conclusion, I would like to emphasize the following claims. The Stoic concept of practical wisdom and the Stoic idea of the necessary conjunction of good and evil, implicitly combined by Stoics themselves, can be found in the works of early Christian thinkers like Irenaeus and Lactantius. Both authors tried to reconcile the Stoic and the biblical concept of wisdom, and both located this hybrid concept in the history of salvation, although Irenaeus did this in a somewhat isolated section of his anti-heretic work. Both the bishop of Lyons and the African apologist associated to the Stoic concept of *phronēsis* the idea of the interdependence of good and bad, as it was done by the Stoic themselves. The core of Irenaeus' theology, to tell the truth, can be exposed relatively faithfully without mentioning this Stoic influence. As for Lactantius, one cannot say this. He took over the doctrine expounded by Seneca on the providential training of virtue by the adversaries and incorporated all these conceptions of Stoic origin into his theological system in a very substantial way. Namely, they make part of the explanation of the production of Satan by God and are integrated into Lactantius' idea of divine deception, which is at the heart of his doctrine of the two ways.

Summary

The Stoic concept of practical wisdom and the Stoic idea of the necessary conjunction of good and evil, implicitly combined by Stoics themselves, can be found in the works of early Christian thinkers like Irenaeus and Lactantius. Both authors tried to reconcile the Stoic and the biblical concepts of wisdom, and both located this hybrid concept in the history of salvation, although Irenaeus did this in a somewhat isolated section of

35 *Div. Inst.* 2. 8. 6. add. 3–6: "Item facturus hominem, cui virtutem ad vivendum proponeret, per quam immortalitatem assequeretur, bonum et malum fecit, ut posset esse virtus, quae nisi malis agitetur, aut vim suam perdet aut omnino non erit. Nam ut opulentia bonum videatur acerbitas egestatis fecit et gratiam lucis commendat obscuritas tenebrarum, valetudinis et sanitatis voluptas ex morbo ac dolore cognoscitur, ita bonum sine malo in hac vita esse non potest. Et utrumque licet contrarium sit, tamen ita cohaeret ut ut alterum si tollas, utrumque sustuleris. Nam neque bonum comprehendi ac percipi potest sine declinatione et fuga mali, nec malum caveri ac vinci sine auxilio comprehensi ac percepti boni. Necesse igitur fuerat et malum fieri, ut bonum fieret."

his anti-heretic work. Both the bishop of Lyons and the African apologist associated with the concept of *phronēsis*, the idea of the interdependence of good and bad, as it was done by the Stoics themselves. The core of Irenaeus' theology, to tell the truth, can be exposed relatively faithfully without mentioning this Stoic influence. As for Lactantius, this is not the case. The African apologist took over the doctrine expounded by Seneca on the providential training of virtue by the adversaries and incorporated all these conceptions of Stoic origin into his theological system in a very substantial way. Namely, they make part of the explanation of the production of Satan by God and are integrated into Lactantius' idea of divine deception, which is at the heart of his doctrine of the two ways.

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Ádám Smrcz

When the Stoic Chameleon Came Across the Cylinder
Stoicism and the Matter of Confessions

Introduction

Joseph Hall was a Calvinist bishop, who was also an early supporter of Stoicism in England. As a clergyman, he was an advocate of the theses accepted by the Synod of Dort rejecting the views of Arminians.[1] Armenians were famous for (1) their leaning towards Rome in ecclesiastical affairs, but even more importantly (2) for their endorsement of quasi-Pelagian attitudes concerning human salvation, and (3) for their libertarian position in metaphysics.[2] The latter two clearly contradicted some presuppositions which were crucial from a Calvinist point of view, including the doctrine of double predestination.

As a supporter of Stoicism, Hall wrote a treatise on the virtue of constancy (*Heaven Upon Earth*), for which reason he was even called the English Seneca by some of his contemporaries,[3] although he openly stated that without divine grace, philosophy was not sufficient to achieve human salvation: "[i]f Seneca could have had grace to his wit, what wonders would he have done in this kind!", as he said. As a consequence of his rather ambiguous stance towards the school, he compared the Stoics to dogs "swift of foot" (due to their philosophical apparatus) but not "exquisite in scent" (suggesting that their aims were wrongly established).[4]

However, it is also more than likely that Seneca was not the only Stoic influence Hall had ever had, since some parts of his treatise bear considerable similarity to the views of Justus Lipsius. Lipsius is most often referred to as the initiator of *Neostoicism*, a movement intending to harmonize Stoicism with Christianity. If this was really the case, Hall should have had many good reasons to respect Lipsius and his project.

However, this was not entirely the case. In his *Mundus Alter et Idem* (*Another World and yet the Same*), a Menippean satire written almost at the same time as his aforementioned Stoic treatise, Hall showed clear disregard to Lipsius. The satire gave a dystopian description of an imaginary land called *Fantasia*, which had four regions, each maintaining customs highly different from each other. *Moronia* was one such region, and her portrayal was intended to ridicule practices exercised mainly by Catholics. We could say it was Hall's own *Inferno* full of wicked customs with mendicant friars walking

1 Chew 1950, 1130–1145.
2 Colie 1957, 36–49.
3 Chew 1950, 1130–1145.
4 Hall 1808, 5.

barefoot only to kiss a piece of stone, while others converting metals into gold.[5] But Catholics had an even more annoying group (living in the province of *Variana*), where everything was constantly in motion and nothing ever stayed the same: the magistrates gave orders to vary the names of the cities, while the inhabitants, who were dressed into "colourful feathers", always changed the position of these feathers only to "fake a new fashion".[6] From my point of view, the most interesting episode here is the description of an archeological discovery.

> There was a circular coin with a middle-aged man in toga on one side: he was leaning on the head of some cute dog on the right, while holding a book half open on the left. On the other side [of the coin, there was] a colour changing chameleon, and the writing above: <CONST. LIP.>.[7]

It is not as if the metaphor of the chameleon needed any further explanation, but Hall still made sure that none of his readers should misunderstand his point by emphasizing the chameleon's colour-changing ability. Such a portrayal of Lipsius immediately raises two major questions. (I) Why Hall portrayed him this way, and (II) whether this negative representation was merely intended to be some kind of an *ad hominem* accusation, or it also entailed philosophical considerations.

(I) To the first question, the answer might simply lie in Lipsius' biography. He was the firstborn child of a Catholic family near the city of Louvain. He began his studies at the Jesuit college of Cologne, after which he returned to his hometown to study law. Between 1572 and 1574, he was a professor of history in the Lutheran city of Jena, but he spent the most important period of his life in the Calvinist city of Leiden between 1579 and 1591. It was here that he published two of his most important philosophical treatises (*De Constantia in Publicis Malis,* 1584; *Politica sive civilis doctrina*, 1587), but this was also the place of his conversion to Calvinism. However, after he left Leiden in 1591 only to return to his city of birth, he also abandoned Calvinism for the sake of Catholicism. His latter Stoic treatises (*Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam*, and *Physiologia Stoicorum,* both from 1604) were hence already written in a different intellectual milieu. Moreover, the reasons behind his sudden departure from Leiden, and behind his recatholicization are absolutely unclear, which is also shown by Jacqueline Lagrée's recent account of his life: "Lipsius was motivated to leave Leiden for a variety of reasons, including certain tensions in international politics, the ambiguity

5 Hall 1839, 49–50.
6 Hall 1839, 49–50.
7 Hall 1839 47–53.

of his religious position, his weak character, his desire for tranquility rather than glory, and the influence of his wife".[8]

(II) With such personal characteristics in mind, one is tempted to regard Hall's portrayal as an *ad hominem accusation,* and even as a fair one. However, the aim of this paper is to show that Lipsius' underlying reasons for such chameleon-like behaviour might have been mostly philosophical (and, hence Hall's accusations did not merely touch on his *person*, but on his *philosophy* as well). Therefore, in the first part of this paper (1) I intend to show that the definition of *Neostoicism* as a movement aiming at the reconciliation of Stoicism with Christianity is inaccurate and often misleading, since it entirely dismisses the importance of particular confessions. According to my claim, Lipsius never intended to harmonize Stoicism with Christianity *in general*, and his original ambition was the employment of Stoic philosophy in order to support Calvinism *in particular*. Beginning from the second part, (2) I intend to show how this project failed, and led him to the reconsideration of some of his original views. In (2.1) I will outline a crucial claim of Lipsian Stoicism, which was substance dualism (a position which remained unchallenged by him even in his later works). Here, we will see that (2.2) different laws applied to the physical and to the spiritual substance, while the question concerning their interaction was of crucial importance from the Lipsian point of view of theodicy and theory of responsibility. Hence, in (3) I will reconstruct Lipsius' early theory of causation (based on his account in the *De Constantia*), which might explain (4) why this account failed to meet the requirements posed by Calvinism. I will then come to Lipsius' latter theory (outlined in the *Physiologia Stoicorum*). (5.1) Although some scholars have recently argued that no significant difference can be found between the two accounts,[9] I will endorse a different claim. While in the *De Constantia* Lipsius had denied that the soul had causal effects on the body, in the *Physiologia*, he already seems to claim that human volitions can alter the physical world. As we shall see, this is clear both from his (5.2) novel definition of divine providence, and the way he interprets Chrysippus' parable of the cylinder. This shift is of importance, because it seems to accommodate his position on some libertarian requirements, first of all the counterfactual criterion of liberty.

1. *E philologia philosophiam feci*

Regarding their literary genre, all of Lipsius' philosophical treatises are compilations. They consist of quotations mainly by ancient and early Christian authors, and their goal is to unveil the outlines of Stoicism hidden by the fragmentary and often unreliable

8 Lagrée 2016.
9 Sellars 2014, 653–674.

nature of its sources. Lipsius hence did not intend to seem like a genuine thinker, but rather as a historian, a hard-working man of letters, who uncovers the system behind the fragments. However, he also realised later in his life that his project was not purely philological. The invention and the arrangement of the fragments (not to mention his commentaries) were all made by a philosopher rather than a historian with no presuppositions in mind. "I created philosophy from philology"[10], as he claimed in one of his letters.

Therefore, what Lipsius provided his readers with was evidently not *stoicism proper*, but stoicism from a Lipsian prism, drawing on particular presuppositions. But what kind of presuppositions? When Léontine Zanta created the umbrella term, *Néostoïcisme,* she suggested that the underlying presupposition was Christianity: "[Stoicism] had a contact point with Christianity, which was the notion of divine providence […]".[11] Zanta was obviously right when she observed an early modern attempt to identify the stoic *logos* with the Christian concept of *divine providence*, but she did not even try to articulate it further, even though this is where one of the greatest fault lines lay in post-Reformation Europe: the questions on the scope of divine providence (whether she related only to universals or to particulars as well), or whether she only foresaw the events to come or she was also the efficient cause of these events etc. were of crucial importance. Hence, Zanta's unqualified usage of the notion of divine providence, and the umbrella term constructed upon it is at least misleading.

It must be also due to Zanta's original definition of the term of *Neostoicism* that historiographers of the "movement" have been reluctant to admit the importance of confessional nuances ever since. On the other hand, according to Jonathan Israel's famous, and often contested claim, "before 1650 practically everyone disputed and wrote about confessional differences", [12] meaning that literary products of the period were motivated, even if implicitly, by confessional convictions and religious presuppositions.

According to my claim, the latter methodological aspect can highlight a more nuanced view of Lipsius' oeuvre. If we can discover a shift in his thinking concerning the nature of providence and fate before and after his recatholicization, then this would prove *a posteriori* that his philosophy was not intact from confessional matters right from the beginning. However, this claim is entirely unrelated to his piety and personal convictions (to which we have no access), and only presupposes that Lipsius always accommodated his views to the particular intellectual milieu he was staying in.

10 Lipsius 1607, 69.
11 Zanta 1914, 9.
12 Israel 2001, 4.

2. Stoic monism vs. Lipsian dualism

Although the principal aim of this paper is to show how Lipsius' later thought evolved from his earlier positions, there are some obvious questions concerning which he never changed his mind. One of these was *substance dualism*. This might sound surprising, since ancient Stoics generally held a monist position, regarding the universe as a systematic organisation of the *pneuma* or *spiritus*, and claiming that souls or bodies were constituted according to its tension (*tonos*).

2.1 Dualism: the foundation the Lipsian theory of theodicy and responsibility

However, Lipsius does not share the traditional Stoic view:

> It should not be overlooked, that men consist of two parts: of soul [*anima*] and body [*corpus*]. Since the former is more noble, it is akin to spirit and fire. The latter is inferior, since it is akin to earth.[13]

The reason why Lipsius had to distance himself from the Stoic tradition was his intention to construct a plausible theory of theodicy. As it is well-known, the *De Constantia* was intended to provide one with cures for the soul either elevated by false goods (*falsa bona*), or tormented by false evils (*falsa mala*).

> Two things in humans are besieging the bastion of constancy: false goods, and false evils. I call them so, since they are not within us, but around us, and they do not – properly speaking – help or harm the internal man or the soul.[14]

From the point of view of theodicy, the crucial question is where evils come from. According to Lipsius, these evils can be either private (like pain, poverty and death) or public ones (like war, pestilence and famine), but in both cases, their origin lies in our opinions, which are defined by him as movements of corporeal origin.

However, the connection between the substances is somewhat obscure, since, according to Lipsius, it is the "outermost layer of the soul" (*summa animorum cute*)[15] which is affected by such bodily movements, but it is also the realm of mental agency, since it is up to the soul whether to consent to attitudes evoked by these passions or not. "This is how the communion or forged society [works] between the soul [*animam*] and

13 Lipsius 1615, 7.
14 Lipsius 1615, 10.
15 Lipsius 1615, 6.

the body [*corpus*]"[16], as he said. Hence we should only look for the origin of evil in the physical world, and all turbulences of the soul are only due to the latter's connection with the body. But still, this theodicy would be implausible if one accepts the traditional thesis of the physical world's creation by God.

This is the point where the *Physiologia Stoicorum* has to pick up the thread and further elaborate on the subject. Lipsius still maintains his dualist claim here, although in a somewhat novel way: "two principles exist: *God* and matter".[17] Still, this novelty is only a seeming one, since the human soul is regarded by him as an emanation of divine spirit, (which possesses the human body as its vehicle [*receptaculum*]),[18] and hence, the new wording only emphasizes the close interconnectedness of the spiritual substance with God. What is surprising, is the way Lipsius is willing to defend his dualist position:

> In my view, the Stoics held that the principle of evil was not in God, but in matter (which is coeval with God and eternal – as they claimed). As a consequence, when God created humans together with other creatures, he made each and every one of them good, and prone to be good. However, there was some kind of repellent and malicious power [*repugnantem vim et malitiosam*] in matter, which attracted [men] elsewhere: internal and also external evils have existed thence".[19]

Lipsius expressly identifies his position with that of the 3rd-century Manicheist theologian, Hermogenes of Chartage,[20] but he claimed that "this was also the view of the ancient [church fathers]".[21] Lipsius hence clearly endorses a Manicheist position in order to break with the ancient Stoic view only to make a real distinction between the soul and the body.

2.2 Different substances, different laws

The underlying reason why Lipsius had to make such a surprising move was to be able to claim that different laws of causation applied to different substances. Such laws binding either the corporeal *or* the spiritual substance were called *fate* by Lipsius, but according to his account in the *De Constantia*, fate in the strict sense was confined to physical

16 Lipsius 1615, 8.
17 Lipsius 1610, 69.
18 Lipsius 1610, 159–160.
19 Lipsius 1610, 37.
20 Benett 2001, 38–68.
21 Lipsius 1610, 37.

events, while mental events were carried out freely. Hence, his whole distinction between two substances was aimed at providing the soul with freedom from physical causes.

Before turning to his own position, he also outlined some rival accounts of fate and ordered them into a fourfold historical taxonomy. He labelled the first group of views as (F.1.) *fatum mathematicum*, which was the alleged theory of the Pythagoreans and Hermetic thinkers. According to this view, heavenly bodies operated as *physical causes* as such, which necessarily determined all natural events. The second group was called (F.2.) *fatum naturale*, according to which causes always produce the same effects whenever they are not impeded on by another cause. This was in Lipsius' view the position of the Aristotelians. These two types did not seem plausible to him and he therefore dismissed them almost without any consideration.

The first such group of views on fate which was taken seriously by him, was (F.3.) *fatum violentum*, a system of claims attributed to the Stoics. The name *violent* was given to it, since it "refers to all things and actions, [the chain of which] is not broken by any kind of power."[22] Lipsius, however, did not endorse this allegedly Stoic doctrine of determinism due to four reasons: according to him it was unacceptable, that (O.1.) this implies the identification of God with fate, which was defined by him as "a firm and certain necessity between events" [*firma ac rata necessitas eventorum*];[23] (O.2.) that it implies an eternal chain of physical causes; (O.3.) that it implies the denial of any contingent events; (O.4.) and also implies the denial of free will in humans.

He hence provided a correction of this allegedly Stoic doctrine and introduced the concept of (F.4.) *verum fatum*, later to be endorsed by him. He first claimed, that (C.1.) God, or divine providence was not identical to fate, but fate was a *decree* of providence; (C.2.) the eternal chain of causes can be broken, according to him, but only by God himself: "God has often acted in the case of his marvels [*prodigii*] and miracles independently [*citra*], or even against nature".[24] As it is clear that these two objections and corrections were meant to guarantee the omnipotence of God over the physical world. However, as we shall see, the rest of his corrections were meant to provide freedom to the soul from physical determinism. According to his third correction added to the Stoic doctrine, (C.3.) there exist some contingent events produced by *secondary causes*: "when there exist such secondary causes, we allow some events to be contingent and fortuitous".[25] As it turns out from the somewhat obscure phrasing ("when there exist such secondary causes"), Lipsius identifies mental states with these secondary causes, as a consequence of which only a very small part of creatures (namely, humans) are endowed with them. But whoever is endowed with such secondary causes

22 Lipsius. 1584, 57.
23 Lipsius. 1584, 53.
24 Lipsius 1615, 65.
25 Lipsius 1615, 65.

(C.4.), must by definition be endowed with free will as well: "[y]our will is also among the secondary causes, and you should not think that it is agitated or drawn by God".[26]

3. The causal interaction between substances according to the *De Constantia*

What we have seen so far is that (p1) Lipsius was a dualist who claimed that (p2) the two substances were subject to different laws. While the physical substance or body was subordinated to such physical laws that otherwise could not be broken (or only by God's miracles), the spiritual substance or soul, preserved its freedom (and only its outermost layer could be affected by physical causes). Hence, (p3) whoever was endowed with a spiritual substance, was also endowed with free will. As a consequence, people were endowed with free will. The only remaining question will be the exact *scope* of this freedom. As we shall see, the spiritual substance could not produce effects in the physical world, but only on itself according to the account of the *De Constantia*.

3.1 Body-soul causation

As we have seen, Lipsius maintained that bodily movements or passions could affect the "outermost layer of the soul [*summa animorum cute*]".[27] The phrasing is partly obscure and partly obvious: obscure, since he never specifies what he means by "outermost layer," but obvious, as it is regarded as a part of the soul (instead of the body). As a consequence, Lipsius clearly seems to admit to the body's capacity to make causal effects on the soul.

3.2 Soul-soul causation

However, the same phrasing suggests that the soul is capable of producing effects on itself. This claim is (I) reinforced by the very goal of the treatise, according to which the movements transmitted through the body should be eliminated by *constancy* defined as the motionless firmness of the soul (*rectum et immotum animi robur*),[28] and (II) also by the previously seen Lipsian claim, according to which creatures with a spiritual substance were endowed with the capacity to operate as *secondary causes* and hence had free will. Moreover, if the soul was unable to hinder the activity of external, bodily movements, the project of the *De Constantia* would be entirely pointless.

26 Lipsius 1584, 65.
27 Lipsius 1615, 6.
28 Lipsius 1584, 10.

3.3 Soul-body causation

What we have seen so far is less than surprising. However, as it later turns out from the *De Constantia*, secondary causes are not capable of producing physical effects, and according to the first Lipsian theory, no soul-body causation exists at all.

> […] fate is like a master of ceremonies, which holds the strings during the dance in which the whole world takes part: but in a way, that our parts should be able to will and not will [certain things]. But we do not have more power [*vis efficiendi*] than this, since we were given only the opportunity, to be free, to be reluctant and to struggle against God [*reluctari et obniti*]; but power [*vis*] *was not given by which we could do that.*[29]

Hence according to this earlier account, it is only God or the supreme power (*vis supera)* only whom Lipsius endows with power. What the author offers here is a radical departure from the traditional notions of agency by drawing a distinction between will (*voluntas*) and power (*vis*). Since it is a necessary condition for anything to be endowed with power in order to be able to cause an effect on physical bodies, volitions are not capable of doing that.[30]

The difficulty is that all this entails God's efficient causation of evil, and even Lipsius has to admit this. However, he adds that by consenting to evils (or sins), the responsibility of humans is not taken away.

> [Y]ou err out of necessity. But you should also add, that through your will [*per tuam voluntatem*], since [God] foresaw that you will err the way he foresaw it, and he foresaw you erring freely: you err freely, hence, out of necessity.[31]

29 Lipsius 1584, 68.

30 Although the claim that Joseph Hall drew considerably on Lipsius has often been contested, he seems to repeat the Lipsian theory of the *De Constantia* in his *Heaven Upon Earth*. "Not that thou desirest shall come to pass; but that which God hath decreed. Neither thy fears, nor thy hopes, nor vows shall either foreslow or alter it. The unexperienced passenger, when he sees the vessel go amiss or too far, lays fast hold on the contrary part, or on the mast, for remedy, the pilot laughs at his folly; knowing, that, whatever he labours, the bark will go which way the wind and his stern directeth it. Thy goods are embarked now thou wishest a direct north-wind, to drive thee to the Straits; and then a west, to run in: and now, when thou hast emptied and laded again, thou callest as earnestly for the south and south-east, to return; and lovvrest, if all these answer thee not: as if heaven and earth had nothing else to do, but to wait upon thy pleasure; and served only, to be commanded service by thee. Another, that hath contrary occasion, asks for winds quite opposite to thine. He, that sits in lieaven, neither fits thy fancy nor his: but bids his winds spit sometimes in thy face; sometimes, to favour thee with a side blast; sometimes, to be boisterous; otherwhile, to be silent, at his own pleasure." (Hall 1808, 35.)

31 Lipsius 1584, 66.

3.4 The "synchronization" of substances

According to the previously seen Lipsian account, no causal relationship can be established between a mental state (e.g. my will to lift my hand), and a physical action (e.g. the movement of my hand). However, that the physical and mental events coincide is not entirely accidental, and it is due to divine providence that mental and physical events are in harmony with each other. God, due to his providence, has always foreknown that in a certain moment a volition to lift my hand will arise in my mind, and hence, he has ordained the physical world in a way that it would be in harmony with my volitions. Due to this act of "synchronization," physical events seem to be caused by my mental volitions even though no real causal relationship exists between the two.

4. Why did Lipsius fail to meet Calvinist demands?

Lipsius' previously outlined considerations were written and published during his Calvinist period in Leiden. His intention to redefine the concept of free will (as mere *voluntas* lacking *vis*), and hence his willingness to deprive humans of the capacity of agency (in the traditional sense), seems to be in harmony with Calvinist demands. However, Calvin, a former admirer of Seneca, famously did not sympathize with the Stoics, for which he might have had two major reasons: (I) their theory of emotions (prohibiting even the feeling of sympathy towards those in need), and (II) their "libertarianism." The latter objection is palpable in his *Institutio Christianae Religionis* as well.

> Those, who wish to invoke animosity against this doctrine [viz. against the doctrine of predestination], berate it as if it was the teaching of the stoics concerning fate […]. Although we do not usually debate over the usage of words, still we cannot accept the term fate […]. Since, as opposed to the Stoics we do not imagine any kind of necessity resulting from the invisible connection and concatenation of causes [*ex perpetuo causarum nexu et implicita quadam serie*], that might be containded *in nature*; but we make God the judge and governor [*arbitrum ac moderatorem*] of the world, who has – according to his wisdom – ordained from eternity whatever is to be done [*quod facturus esset*]; and now, based on his power [*potentia*], he executes whatever he has *decided* [*decrevit*]. Whence we claim, that his providence governs [*gubernari*] not only the heavens, the Earth and inanimate beings, but also the *decisions and volitions* [*consilia et voluntates*] of humans, in order that they should tend towards their destination [*destinatum scopum*].[32]

32 Calvin 1559, 64.

The indictment above enumerates three major concerns regarding the Stoic theory of fate, which also highlight Calvin's own views. The latter can be reconstructed as follows: (p1.) God possesses knowledge both concerning physical and mental events; (p2.) via his power [*potentia*], he instantiates all this knowledge; as a consequence of which events either physical or mental, originate from God. As we have already seen, while the account of the *De Constantia* endorses (p1.), it rejects (p2.). Although Lipsius admitted that God foresaw mental events as well, he denied that his providence caused them. As a result, Lipsius should have denied the consequence as well, according to which God would be the efficient cause of *all* events in the world.

5.1 The theory of causation according to *Physiologia Stoicorum*

According to my claim, it was the friction outlined above that prevented Lipsius from providing Calvinism with Stoic foundations (as a result of which he might have abandoned Calvinism for the sake of a more genuine kind of Stoicism). From a Calvinist point of view, it must have been unacceptable that he held a libertarian position regarding mental events, and confined his determinism merely to physical ones (by claiming that the soul had no power [*vis*] to affect the body). Moreover, as we shall see, he further extended his libertarianism to the realm of the physical world in his later works (already written in a Catholic milieu).

It has to be noted that Lipsius expressly denies any break with his earlier theory in the *Physiologia Stoicorum*. Mostly at least. However, when his interlocutor asks him about the origin of evil, he surprisingly admits to have (albeit only slightly) changed his mind: "[y]ou are stirring up old questions [*vetera moves*], which are alien to most people, and in cases [*alibi*] to me as well; or partly at least."[33]

Although he introduced his departure from his earlier position in a rather cautious way, its philosophical importance will be considerable. Lipsius' main concern here is to construct a theory of theodicy once again, but he choses a rather different path. He acknowledges, that there are three kinds of evil in the world: (1) natural evils (like monsters or venomous snakes), (2) internal (like sins) and (3) external ones (like punishments). The most pressing question is that of internal evils, since if God is the creator of the universe (which, in turn, operates according to deterministic laws also created by him), then this claim would render God guilty of any wicked action to be carried out by humans. As we have seen, Lipsius had to admit in the *De Constantia* that God was the efficient cause of sin (since the human soul was not endowed with power

33 Lipsius 1610, 52.

[*vis*] to act on the physical world), but still maintained that by willing to act sinfully, humans were also responsible for the wicked action.

In the *Physiologia*, he (1) maintains the soul's inability to have causal effects on bodies, but (2) denies God's role as the efficient cause of evil, (3) assigning this role to the human soul. But how is this possible? Although the *De Constantia* provided his readers with extensive raw material on ancient Stoicism, one remarkable fragment was missing from the early Lipsian compilation at least: Chrysippus' well-known parable of the cylinder, preserved in Cicero's *De Fato*. Due to his parable, Lipsius regards Chrysippus as a libertarian, claiming that (1) mental events were free of any determination, as a consequence of which (2) humans were to be held responsible for their actions instead of the gods.

> But it is clear even from Chrysippus' [claims], that such objections [regarding the responsibility of gods] are in vain, biased, and it is not an impartial judge, who speaks through them. [Cicero] clearly states, that [Chrysippus] is more similar to those, who hold that our souls are free from the necessity of being moved.[34]

And this is where the parable of the cylinder comes up, since this is where Lipsius bases his interpretation.

> According to Cicero's report, [Chrysippus] made a distinction between *perfect* or *primary causes*, and *auxiliary* or *proximal* ones. Thence, the principle of movement and action follows from these; but the quality of the particular motion depends on the proximal causes [*causis proximis*], that is to say, from our will [*á voluntate*]. As he says, <the principle of movement is transmitted [to the cylinder] by whoever has pushed it, but the volubility was not transmitted by him>.[35]

Lipsius, hence makes a distinction between the (1) principle of motion, and (2) its quality. What the reasoning intends to prove is that while the principle of motion is determined by the primary cause, its quality is contingent upon the auxiliary ones. However, this still does not prove that Lipsius intended to distance himself from his earlier position, since it is not clear whether auxiliary of proximal causes can alter the physical world, or they are simply identical to the *secondary causes* of the *De Constantia*. Furthermore, the well-known passage from the *De Fato* goes on with the discussion of *assensio*, or the soul's capacity to consent to bodily *passions*,[36] and this fact may easily suggest that the parable is unrelated to the physical world. But Lipsius interprets it in an entirely different way.

34 Lipsius 1610, 35.

35 Lipsius 1610, 35.

36 "The object seen imprints its species into the soul, but *assensio* will be up to us [*in nostra potestate*]: and for the remaining part, as it was said concerning the cylinder, it will move according to its own power

> What Cicero says concerning the thing seen […] does not necessarily seem to refer to the internal thing: [and] I believe he added to it much more, which parts have perished ever since.[37]

Lipsius therefore cautiously indicates here that the fragmentary text of the *De Fato* must have contained parts where the scope of proximal or auxiliary causes was not confined to the internal representation of objects but was extended to physics as well. This is also confirmed by his own commentary attached to the parable, where Lipsius first intends to narrow the scope of fate in order to extend that of the proximal or auxiliary causes to the physical world.

> Analyzing carefully the meaning of the word *energos* you will find that fate, according to Chrysippus, is constituted by the primary causes […].[38]

Here Lipsius clearly equates fate with Chrysippus' primary causes (which also implies that the *auxiliary* or *proximal* causes *do not constitute* a part of fate). However, this alone would still not necessarily exceed the claim formulated in the *De Constantia*, where secondary causes were also beyond the boundaries of fate. But Lipsius specifies his point further.

> It seems to me at least, that everything works according to nature (except for God, who is the primary cause), and each and every person is inclined to goodness or evil in a different way, since they were created differently; however [*sed tamen*], by their will [*voluntate*], they are capable of moderating [*temperari*] and deflecting [*flecti*] these primary and innate [*insitus*] causes a bit [*leviter*]; and we consider this will to be among the proximal and auxiliary causes[39].

Lipsius unsurprisingly regarded bodily dispositions (according to which "each and every person is inclined to goodness or evil") as determined by the primary cause, and this stance is consistent with the spirit of the *De Constantia* once again. However, his willingness to admit that humans could "moderate" or "deflect" these dispositions is entirely novel and even contradictory to the claims of his earlier work. By this, Lipsius approached a libertarian position, according to which an action can be regarded as freely carried out if and only if it could have been done otherwise.

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due to being pushed externally." (Lipsius 1610, 35.)

37 Lipsius 1610, 35.

38 Lipsius 1610, 36.

39 Lipsius 1610, 36.

5.2 Divine providence in the *Physiologia*

By endowing humans with the ability "to act otherwise" (and hence abandoning the thesis of the causal closedness of nature), Lipsius evidently had to reconsider his views on divine providence as well. As we have seen, divine providence had a fourfold role in the *De Constantia*: (1) foreknowledge and (2) causation of physical events; (3) foreknowledge of mental events; and (4) their "synchronization". In the *Physiologia*, however, Lipsius could not endorse (2), and had to at least modify it in order to provide a more or less consistent theory of causation. However, for such a libertarian approach, the earlier Stoic framework might have proved too narrow for Lipsius, as a result of which he started drawing on Platonic doctrines more considerably.

At a certain point he even criticized the Stoics for their negligence concerning distinctions, as a result of which they regarded God, divine providence and fate as identical to each other.[40] Although Lipsius repeatedly claimed that fate was closely connected (*cum ea nexum*) or even intertwined (*innexum*) with divine providence, he also maintained that the two were distinct.[41] Furthermore, he even extended this twofold distinction in order to make place for contingent events.

> It is fate, due to which the necessary thoughts [*inevitabiles cogitationes*] and initiations of God come to pass. […] The Platonists defined the first kind of divine providence [*primam providentiam*] <as the thought or will [*cogitatio sive voluntas*] of the highest God>. They further described the second kind as the providence of secondary Gods – dwelling continuously in the heavens – due to which [providence] all inferior and mortal things are arranged according to their species or genre>. The third kind [of providence] refers to daemons around the Earth, as judges [*arbitros*] and guards [*custodes*] of human actions.[42]

He comments Apuleius' previous words the following way.

> [The Platonists] distinguished [these kinds of providence], and deduced them to us so, that <the first kind of providence should contain fate, the second should be fate itself, while the third should be everything whatever part of fate is instantiated [*quod ex fato esset*].[43]

This novel threefold distinction signals some kind of departure from Lipsius' earlier position. While the "first kind of providence" seems to be identical to the concept of divine providence outlined in the *De Constantia*, the concept of fate (now called

40 Lipsius 1610, 28.
41 Lipsius 1610, 28.
42 Lipsius 1610, 28.
43 Lipsius 1610, 28.

as the "second kind of providence") is more strictly defined by its operation confined to the arrangement of phenomena "according to their species or genre." Fate, hence, is not related to particulars anymore, but only to universals. Particulars, in turn, constitute the territory of the "third kind of providence" or daemons, who do not force or necessitate, but only "judge" and "guard" events which are to be instantiated from among the physical laws. All this suggests that while the *specific* or *generic* characters of creatures are strictly determined by fate (or the second kind of providence), individual features are contingent on the "judgement" of the daemons (or the third kind).

There is, however, a crucial point which was left entirely without clarification by Lipsius, namely the relationship between this hypostatic theory of divine providence and the Chrysippean *auxiliary* or *proximal* causes. We have previously seen that according to the *Physiologia*, the human soul was still not endowed with power [*vis*] to act, but it could still alter the physical world. The question is how this hypostatic theory of divine providence can help explain this.

In my view, Lipsius came close to endorsing occasionalism (in a weak sense) by employing Apuleius' framework, even if he did not elaborate on it in detail: although agents were not endowed with power to act, still, their mental dispositions could serve as occasions for the "daemons" to materialize these dispositions. However, the scope of these daemons' activity must have been limited, since fate (or laws applied to universals) defined their framework. The major problem is that this new concept of providence and fate is made up of quotations from different authors and hence, is not even constructed from a coherent terminology. We could even say that it was not elaborated sufficiently. However, Lipsius' intention to distance himself from his earlier deterministic position is clear enough.

Our train of thought intended to highlight a certain shift in Justus Lipsius' considerations on divine providence, fate and free will. This shift can be regarded as a move from a compatibilist position to a libertarian stance, which also coincided with the author's recatholicization. However, the overall aim of this paper was to call attention to the importance of particular confessions in terms of "Neostoicism", as either by conviction or due to hypocrisy, authors related to this "movement" vary their positions in order to accommodate it to their circumstances. This however also bears philosophical consequences.

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László Bernáth

Stoicism and Frankfurtian Compatibilism*

Introduction

Although the free will debate of contemporary analytic philosophy lacks almost any kind of historical perspective, some scholars[1] have pointed out a striking similarity between Stoic approaches to free will and Frankfurt's well-known hierarchical theory.[2] However, the scholarly agreement is only apparent because they disagree about the kind of similarity between the Stoic and the Frankfurtian theories. The main thesis of my paper is that so far, commentators have missed the crucial difference between the Stoics' approach to free will and Frankfurt's, a difference that makes the former the superior approach.

I will make three main claims. In the first section, I shall argue that it is misleading and ultimately false to say that Frankfurt's and the Stoics' conception of free will are the same or notably similar to each other.[3] Frankfurt has a contrafactual analysis of free will that refers to a psychological ability which is specific to humans and exercised by most people in most cases. In contrast, the Stoic considers free will as an aim for everybody that is achieved only by the sage, who can choose the option that she regards as the best one every time.

In the second section, I shall show that there is indeed a relevant similarity between the two approaches. Both of them provide a semi-compatibilist reason- and reflectivity-based theory of moral responsibility. That is, both claim that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility regardless of whether free will is compatible, because the ultimate source of moral responsibility is not freedom of the will but reflective reason.

In the third section, I shall describe the difference that I take to be the most relevant between these theories regarding the problem of moral responsibility. In order to clarify how second-order desires can be the source of moral responsibility, Frankfurt claimed that agents form these second-order desires through *exercising* reflective reason. Therefore, Frankfurt held that exercising reflectivity is at the heart of moral responsibility. By contrast, the Stoics claimed that *having the ability of* reflective reasoning is the main source of bearing moral responsibility. I consider this difference as a crucial one, because a serious disadvantage of the Frankfurtian view follows from

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1 For instance Zimmerman 2000, Salles 2001, 2005.

2 Frankfurt 1969, 1971, 1988.

3 *Pace* Zimmerman 2000.

it. At the end of the day, if one commits to the Frankfurtian view, one cannot attribute moral responsibility to those agents who *have the ability to* exercise reflective reason but *do not exercise* it in a particular case. Since these cases are very common, this leads to the point that the Frankfurtian should take a revisionist position regarding our everyday moral practices. And this would be a failure of the theory, given that every compatibilists theory of moral responsibility aims to be as non-revisionist as possible with regard to everyday moral practices.

1. The difference between the Stoics' and Frankfurt's theory of free will

David Zimmermann is one of those scholars of Stoics and Frankfurt who believes that there is a striking similarity between their concepts of free will. He puts it as follows:

> I have this worry about Harry Frankfurt's theory of free will, autonomous agency and moral responsibility, for there is a very plausible argument to the effect that aspects of his view commit him to a version of the late Stoic thesis that acting freely is a matter of 'making do', that is, of bringing oneself to be motivated to act in accordance with the feasible, so that personal liberation can be achieved by resigning and adapting oneself to necessity.[4]

Later, because he found this worry to be grounded, he proposed a solution to Frankfurt. He claimed that Frankfurt should introduce some historical conditions, in order to evade the conclusion that one can and should liberate himself to acquire the freedom of the will in cases of coercion through accepting coercion calmly as something that is necessary.

There are two problems. One is that Frankfurt actually embraces a view that has an aspect which can be considered as historical. In his approach, a second-order desire can be formed only by exercising reason reflectively. So, by definition, the concept of second-order desire is historical in a sense, because second-order desires necessarily have a specific kind of history. But I will investigate this issue in more detail later.

The second is that Zimmerman does not separate the issue of autonomy, responsibility on the one hand, and the issue of free will on the other. Granted, in many contexts, this separation is not so crucial. For instance, most of contemporary moral philosophers seem to think that all of these concepts go hand in hand. However, both the Stoics and Frankfurt disagree with this. Or, at least, in agreement with contemporary semi-compatibilists, they claim that the problem of free will is relatively independent of (or should be independent of) the problem of moral responsibility.

4 Zimmermann 2000, 25.

Before I can start the analysis, I have to clarify a few terminological issues. The *contemporary* use of the term "free will" is ambiguous, and I believe that it is one of the reasons why many scholars misleadingly claimed that the Stoic and Frankfurtian concepts of free will are substantially similar to each other, whereas the truth is the contrary. Many contemporary philosophers consider the concept of "free will" as a term of art used to refer to the satisfaction of either all or some of the conditions of being morally responsible. For instance, Derk Pereboom defines the term "free will" in a way according to which any agent has free will if and only if she satisfies the control conditions of moral responsibility.[5] It is legitimate to define the term "free will" in this way, but one should bear in mind that many philosophers did not define "free will" by reference to the concept of moral responsibility. This fact is particularly relevant if one investigates the relation between Frankfurt's and the Stoics' concept of freedom of the will, given that neither of them used the term "free will" in this responsibility-related way.

Both Frankfurt and the Stoics, starting with Epictetus, refer to a psychological capacity by using the term "free will". However, from this point of view, it instantly seems to be evident that they call different psychological capacities "free will". Epictetus, who is the one that introduced this concept, explains freedom of the agent and her will in the following way.

> He is free who lives as he wishes to live; who is neither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force; whose movements to action are not impeded, whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would avoid. […] What then is that makes a man free from hindrance and makes him his own master? […] I have never been hindered in my will nor compelled when I did not will. And how is this possible? I have placed my movements toward action in obedience to God. […] [W]hatever God wills, man also shall will; and what God does not will, a man also shall not will. […] Diogenes was free. How was he free? – not because he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not possible […] to enslave him.[6]

In accordance with the above quote, Michael Frede sums up Epictetus' view on free will as follows:

> So here we have our first actual notion of a free will. It is a notion of a will such that there is no power or force in the world which could prevent it from making the choices one needs to make to live a good life or force it to make choices which would prevent us from living a good life. But it is a notion such that not all human beings in fact have

5 Pereboom 2014, 2.
6 *Diss*. 4. 1.

> a free will. They are all meant by nature to have a free will, that is, each human being is capable of having a free will. But human beings become compulsive about things and thus lose their freedom. Hence only the wise person has a free will.[7]

Both quotes are clear in this regard, but I would like to stress again that this Stoic notion of free will is very exclusivist. Only the sage, the wise person has such will that is perfectly unforced by external forces. This will is determined only by the wise person's reflective insights about which action serves the good in the most effective way in the given situation. Other agents' will is partly the result of the influence of external forces. because their will is a *slave* to different external objects. That is, the foolish person's will is influenced not only by the person's reflective view on the good but by other factors as well.

In contrast, Frankfurt's notion of free will is inclusive in the sense that most mentally healthy people have it in most cases.[8] Let us see Frankfurt's definition of free will:

> A person's will is free only if he is free to have the will he wants. This means that, with regard to any first order desires, he is free either to make that desire his will or to make some other first-order desire his will instead. Whatever this will, then, the will of the person whose will is free could have been otherwise; he could have done otherwise than to constitute his will as he did. […] In illustration, take a third kind of addict. Suppose that his addiction [is basically irresistible] but he is delighted with his condition. He is a willing addict, who would not have things any other way. If the grip of the addiction should somehow weaken, he would do whatever to reinstate it […]. The willing addict will is not free, for his desire to take the drug will be effective regardless of whether or not he wants this desire to constitute his will.[9]

Of course, if someone is not an addict, she will not take the drug if she does not want to act on the basis of the desire for the drug. So, it seems that most people have free will in most cases, because they can act on the basis of the desire they regard the most appropriate one. Unlike the Stoic notion of free will, Frankfurtian free will has nothing to do with the actual origin of the will. Rather, it is based on a contrafactual dependence between first-order will and the second-order desire of the agent. Insofar as an agent has free will, the content of the second-order desire of the agent will determine

7 Frede 2011, 77.

8 Frankfurt calls "wanton" those beings who can deliberate and decide but cannot have free will, because they do not have second-order desires and wants. However, according to Frankfurt, humans have free will in most cases since they are capable of acting in accordance with their second and first order desires. I am grateful for the anonyme reviewer who pointed out me the relevance of the notion of wanton with regard to free will.

9 Frankfurt 1971, 19.

the content of the first-order will, provided that the content of the second-order desire is different to the actual one.

In sum, the Stoic notion of free will is exclusivist and it concerns the object and the origin thereof, while the Frankfurtian concept of the freedom of the will is inclusivist and based on contrafactual dependence between first-order and second-order mental states. On the basis of Frankfurt's theory, one should say that most people exercise free will day by day. In contrast, a Stoic has to conclude that most people do not exercise free will during their lifetime, even if they were able to develop the ability of having free will. It seems that there are only two relevant similarities between the two concepts. Neither of them is a necessary condition of moral responsibility and neither implies that the agent could have done otherwise in the sense that would be incompatible with determinism.

2. Two theories of moral responsibility

Since both theories claim that free will is not a necessary condition of moral responsibility, both of them fall into the category of a semi-compatibilist theory in contemporary terms. Clearly, both theories are compatibilist as well, since they claim that free will and determinism are compatible. But the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism are explained by the fact that the causal efficiency of reflective reason is compatible with determinism, not by the fact that free will is compatible with determinism. Thus, Frankfurt and the standard Stoic theory of moral responsibility claim that the main source of moral responsibility is reflective reason. So, contrary to their theories of free will, their theories of moral responsibility have not only superficial but deep similarities.

This similarity is so striking that a recognized scholar of Stoic views of moral responsibility claimed that even if some minor dissimilarities can be found between Frankfurt's and the Chrysippean theory of responsibility, they are substantially the same. Ricardo Salles puts it as follows:

> Frankfurt and Chrysippus explain moral responsibility by appealing to factors that are substantially the same. In Frankfurt's theory, the responsibility for the action derives from the agent's decision to perform it, but also from that decision's being based on a previous all-things-considered practical reflection. Similarly, the responsibility for the action in Chrysippus derives from the agent's exercise of an impulse for it (or his assenting to the impression where the action is presented as valuable), but also, and crucially, from the impulse's being fully rational, which involves a reflection concerning the all-things-considered desirability or appropriateness of the action. […] [The Frankfurtian theory's

> focus] is a desire – whether or not one should have it. In the Chrysippean account, by contrast, the focus of the reflection is on action. […] This difference between the two authors, however, is only superficial. Under logical analysis, the two kinds of reflection emerge as mutually equivalent.[10]

I agree with Salles about the fact that, from the perspective of the issue of moral responsibility, it is not a crucial difference between the two approaches that Frankfurt focuses on desires instead of actions, as Chrysippus did. However, I claim that there is a relevant difference between the two approaches regarding the role of reflexivity.

In order to show this difference, firstly I shall sum up the standard Stoic view on moral responsibility. I regard the core of Chrysippus' theory of moral responsibility as the standard Stoic view, given that all Stoic theories of moral responsibility can be considered as a further elaboration or modification of it. Since my aim is not to give a novel approach to the interpretation of the Chrysippus' theory of moral responsibility but to merely summarize it, I will rely on recent accounts of this theory.[11]

To see why reflective reason is the main basis of moral responsibility, it is worth starting by summarizing the main difference between humans and animals in the view of Chrysippus. According to him, animals' behaviour is controlled by their impulsive impressions. Impulsive impressions such mental events with practically relevant content. If a cat is hungry and sees a basin full of milk, the perception of the basin will result in a representation of the basin that contains the proposition according to which the milk in the basin is desirable. This representation is an impulsive impression, given that it is rooted in some kind of perception and it has practical content. Furthermore, the cat is not able to override the propositional content of this impulsive impression, except for the case when she perceives another impulsive impression that represents the basin as avoidable in the given circumstances. By contrast, humans as rational agents have the capacity of reasoning and reflecting, because their souls are constituted by reason. Humans perceive impulsive impressions basically the same way as animals do, but they are able to give their assent or not give it to the propositional content of the impulsive impression in question. If the agent gives her assent to the propositional content, it means that the agent confirms the content of the impulsive impressions and she tries to act on the basis of this content. Insofar as she withholds her assent, she does not confirm the content and she will not act on the basis of the impulsive impressions in question.[12]

Since the reaction to the impulsive impression is not so automatic in the case of a human agent as is in the case of an animal, the agent who has the capacity of reason

10 Salles 2005, 66.
11 Especially Bobzien 1998, Salles 2005.
12 Bobzien 1998, 240.

has a chance to carefully *reflect* on whether the propositional content of the impression is valid all things considered. Granted, even a human agent who is thirsty and likes milk gets a vivid impulsive impression if she perceives a glass of milk, but she is able to reflect on whether the action of drinking a glass of milk is a good idea in light of every relevant considerations She is able to decide whether drinking milk is healthy, useful, etc. Humans are, in principle, able to withhold their assent until they consider all relevant aspects of the practical issue; moreover, they are able to act on the basis of the result of reflecting on what is best all things considered. So, whether the agent either withholds her assent or gives it, her innermost activity is an indispensable causal source of action, and therefore, she is morally responsible for it.

Note that every adult human being has, *in principle*, the *ability* to reflect on the rightness of the content of her impulsive impression. However, it does not mean either that every human exercises this ability of reflection in every case, or that everyone is *actually* and not only *in principle* able to reflect on such things. In cases of hasty action, although the agent would be able to reflect on the all-things-considered value of her act, she does not exercise this ability. A drunken person is in principle able to reflect on the general values of her action, but she is not able to do this, due to the fact that her rational capacities are impaired.

Now, one could argue that insofar as someone is not responsible for the fact that her character is such that it does not motivate reflectivity in many cases, the agent is not responsible for the fact that she does not recognize the wrongness of her acts on these occasions. Moreover, she is not responsible for the wrong act in question. However, Chrysippus has a famous argumentation that explains how an agent may be responsible for something, even if the whole sequence of events is set in motion by external factors. Gellius reports Chrysippus' train of thought in the following way:

> **(1)** Against this [the objection that Stoic "fate" is inconsistent with the condemnation of wrongdoing] Chrysippus has many subtle and acute arguments, but virtually all his writings on the issue make the following point. "Although it is true", he says, "that all things are enforced and linked through fate by a certain necessary and primary rationale, nevertheless our minds' own degree of regulation by fate depends on their peculiar quality. **(2)** For if our minds' initial natural make-up is a healthy and beneficial one, all that external force exerted upon them as a result of fate slides over them fairly smoothly and without obstruction. But if they are coarse, ignorant, inept, and unsupported by education, then even if they are under little or no pressure from fated disadvantages, they still, through their own ineptitude and voluntary impulse, plunge themselves into continual wrongdoings and transgressions. **(3)** And the very fact that it runs out this way is the product of that natural and necessary sequence of things called "fate". For it is in itself a virtually fated and sequential rule that bad minds should not be without

> wrongs and transgressions. **(4)** He then uses an illustration of this fact which is fairly appropriate and appealing. "Just as", he says, "if you push a stone cylinder on steeply sloping ground, you have produced the cause and beginning of its forward motion, but soon it rolls forward not because you are still making it do so, but because such are its form and smooth-rolling shape so too the order, rationale and necessity of fate sets in motion the actual types of causes and their beginnings, but the deliberative impulses of our minds and our actual actions are controlled by our own individual will and intellect. (5) In accordance with this he then says (and these are his actual words): "Hence the Pythagoreans are right to say: You will learn that men have chosen their own troubles", meaning that the harm they suffer lies in each individual's own hands, and that it is in accordance with their impulse and their own mentality and character that they go wrong.[13]

The point is that even if the whole course of events was necessary due to the chain of causes and the effects of external forces set in motion the whole sequence, the mind of the agent and its activity were the direct and main cause that the agent decided in the wrong way. As Susanne Bobzien[14] sums it up, even if one is not responsible for those character traits that prevent her from deciding to reflect on a particular situation, she is morally responsible for either the lack of reflection and the hasty action, because her soul with reason was the one which gave the assent of the impulsive impression to act without reflecting on the possible alternatives.

Epictetus complemented this reply in a remarkable way.[15] According to him, human agents are responsible for their actions, because they are not only in principle *able to* reflect on the overall value of their possible actions, but they *should* do it as well. This is because, as Chrysippus claimed, every genuine human action is produced by the reason of the agent. However, human agents' nature constituted by the fact that they have reason and the very nature of reason is that it is capable of reflecting on practical and theoretical issues. And, as Epictetus argues that everything *should* behave in accordance with its nature, it follows from this that agents who possess reason *should reflect* on those practical and theoretical issues that they face. As Epictetus puts in the *Discourses*.

> Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be eaten, another to serve agriculture, another to supply cheese, and another to some like use; for which purposes what need is there to understand appearances and to be able to distinguish them? But God has introduced man to be a spectator of God and his works; and not only a spectator of

13 Gellius 7.2.6–13 = *SVF* 2.1000, part; cited and translated in *LS* 61.
14 Bobzien 1998, 290–301.
15 Salles 2005, 97–101.

> them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to begin and to end where irrational animals do; but rather he ought to begin where they begin, and end where nature ends with us; and nature ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a way of life conformable to nature.[16]

Moreover, due to the fact that in the cases of beings with reason the main cause of the action is the way how the agent exercises her reason, it is up to the agent whose nature is defined by reason whether she does what she should or not. Therefore, the agents who have reflective reason are morally responsible for their acts because these acts are up to these agents.

Ultimately, this approach claims that moral responsibility is based on the fact that morally responsible agents cause their acts appropriately by their way of exercising reason. They are appropriate targets of moral appraisal or disdain, because they should exercise their reason in a reflective and proper way, even if they failed to do so.

If one investigates Frankfurt's theory of responsibility superficially, this approach seems to be radically different from this point of view. I stressed that the standard Stoic theory of responsibility claims that agents are morally responsible for their acts, because their reason is the source of their actions. But the well-spread view on Frankfurt's theory is that it does not consider the source of the action as a relevant issue with regards to moral responsibility. Frankfurt's hierarchical account is categorized as a non-historical theory of responsibility, because the relation between the action in question and the content of the agent's second-order desire is relevant, not because these second-order desires may be the sources of the action.

As in Franfkurt's well-known examples, both the willing addict and the unwilling addict are psychologically determined to take the drug by their first-order desires, but only the willing addict is morally responsible for taking the drug, because only his second-order desire fits the action. The willing addict is not only addicted, but he desires that his desire for the drug determines his action. In contrast, the unwilling addict desires that his desire for the drug disappears and does not determine his actions. This exempts him from being morally responsible although his action to take the drug was rooted in his first-order desire the same way as the willing addict's action was rooted in his first-order desire to take it. Thus, the second-order desires are causes of the agents' actions in neither case. So, even if second-order desires can be the sources and causes of action, this fact is not the most relevant regarding moral responsibility. If the content of the second-order desire and the action in question fit each other, it is irrelevant form the aspect of responsibility whether the second-order desire is the cause of the action or not.

16 *Diss.* 1. 16. 18.

However, if someone pays attention to Frankfurt's notion of second-order desires, it will be clear that there is a notable historical factor in his approach. This is because, according to Frankfurt, a desire can be a second-order desire only if it has been created in a particular way. Frankfurt characterizes second-order desires as follows:

> Now what leads people to form desires of higher orders is similar to what leads them to go over their arithmetic. Someone checks his calculations because he thinks he may have done them wrong. It may be that there is a conflict between the answer he has obtained and a different answer, which one reason or another, he believes may be correct; or perhaps he has merely a more generalized suspicion to the effect that he may have made some kind of error. Similarly, a person may be led to reflect on his own desires either because they conflict with each other or because a more general lack of confidence moves him to consider whether to be satisfied with his motives as they are.[17]

The historical aspect of this train of thought is that second-order desires have to be formed by reflecting on first-order desires. If it is formed in a different way, it is not a second-order desire after all. Given that without having second-order desires no one is able to be morally responsible for anything, it is not an exaggeration to say that reflecting on the person's desires and motivational background is a necessary historical condition of being morally responsible, according to Frankfurt. At the end of the day, reflective reason is the main source of moral responsibility in Frankfurt's approach as well as in the standard Stoic theory of moral responsibility.

I regard this similarity between the two theories as the most notable one. Both of them are reflectivity-based theories of moral responsibility. This similarity is the source of all of the other relevant similarities. For instance, both approaches are compatibilist with reference to moral responsibility, because they consider reflective reason as the main basis of moral responsibility and having and exercising reflective reason seems to be possible even in a deterministic world. And, neither Frankfurt, nor the Stoics claim that having free will is a necessary condition of moral responsibility because, in different ways, both of them consider free will as a highly effective form of exercising reflective reason. However, neither of them think that this great effectiveness could be a condition of moral responsibility, a very common phenomenon.

Nonetheless, the main difference between the two theories can be found at this point as well. Although both approaches tie moral responsibility to reflective reason, they do it in different ways. In the next section, I clarify this difference and why this difference has very remarkable consequences with regards to which theory can be considered to be more plausible than the other one.

17 Frankfurt 1998, 169.

3. The very source of moral responsibility – exercising reflectivity versus the capacity of reflection

According to Frankfurt, as the last quotation suggests, one reflects on the desires and different practical issues only if she is motivated in a proper way. For instance, if someone thinks that her calculation has to be perfect from every possible aspect, she will not reflect on whether her calculation was correct, because it would make no sense to do so from her perspective. Similarly, if one does not perceive a single reason to think that she should reflect on whether her desires have a good object, she will not reflect on this issue and will not form second-order desires with reference to them.

The Stoics agree. Before acting, in most cases, a hasty person does not reflect on whether the action which seems to be the best one at first glance is actually the best one, because her character traits, desires and beliefs do not motivate her to do so. In contrast, the sage will always reflect on what she *should* reflect on, because she is motivated by proper character traits, desires, beliefs and so on.

Nevertheless, the Stoics would not like it if the hasty person who does not exercise his ability to reflect on her possible options was off the hook. Partly this is why they claim that if reason has a causal role in producing the action, the agent is responsible for it regardless of whether she exercises reason in a reflective way. Thus, the hasty person is morally responsible for her hasty action because her reason was the one which gave assent to the impulsive impression according to which the aim of the action is a very desirable. Furthermore, the fact that she did not exercise her reason in a reflective way does not change that reflexivity is the very nature of reason; consequently, she should have exercised it in a reflective way.

The problem is that Frankfurt does not have a similarly detailed explanation of how agents who do not exercise their reflective capacity regarding a particular action can be morally responsible for the action in question. Insofar as the agent does not have a second-order desire, the action and the second-order desire cannot fit each other. However, this proper relation between second-order desire and action is the necessary condition of moral responsibility in the Frankfurtian approach.

Let us see a more detailed example which points toward this difficulty.

> Richard the boss
>
> Richard has a weird habit. If he sees a particularly beautiful flower, he rips one or a few petals off the plant. This action is based on a fairly strong desire because he acts in this way even if there are people around him. However, for many-many years, nobody criticized him openly for this, partly because Richard is a powerful man who is a boss of a great company. This and Richard's main characteristic traits explain that Richard has never reflected on his desire for ripping petals off flowers. But, one day, an old man saw when Richard ravaged a flower and openly blamed him for it, because he did not fear Richard at all.

The problem is that Richard seems to be morally responsible for his weird habit even though he does not have a second-order desire constituting his habit. One could say that there is no conflict between a second-order desire and the action in question either, and this is sufficient for it to be morally responsible. But Frankfurt has good reason to deny this. He thinks that the lack of second-order desires can explain why animals are not the typical objects of attributing responsibility.[18] Indeed, if the lack of conflict between second-order desires and the action would be sufficient for being morally responsible, it would be difficult to explain why dogs and other beings are not morally responsible for their actions within a Frankfurtian framework.

Note that the Stoic is able to explain why Richard is morally responsible and deserves blame for his weird habit. The Stoic could argue that Richard gave his assent to his impulsive impression without reflecting on whether doing this is a good idea or not; consequently, he caused his action in such a way that it was up to him as a person with reason whether he gave his assent or not. Moreover, he should reflect on this issue, considering that he as a person who has reason has a nature which should manifest by exercising reflective capacities.

One could say that the advantage of the Stoic view is only apparent because the Stoic answer relies on an implausible metaphysical assumption. Namely the fact that someone having a particular nature could be the very source of any kind of responsibility and obligation.

I think this argument fails for two reasons. The first is that if one theory has a solution to a problem on the basis of implausible metaphysical assumptions, and another theory has no solution to the same problem at all then the first one is better considering the problem in question. It can turn out either that the metaphysical assumption is not so implausible as it seemed at first glance, or that the cost of the metaphysical assumption is less than the price of having a relevant unsolved philosophical problem. The second reason is that, as I see it, the implausibility of the claim that having some kind of nature can be grounds for responsibility and obligations seems to be implausible to a contemporary reader, mainly because we do not prefer using the term "nature" in this ethical context. However, the Stoic view regarding responsibility and obligations could be rephrased without relying on the term "nature" or embracing the whole related metaphysics of the Stoics. Someone who embraces only the *ethical* views of the Stoics could say that having a capacity may be grounds for particular responsibilities and obligations. Furthermore, she could point out that having the capacity of reflective reason can plausibly provide the grounds for responsibilities and obligations because this capacity is the main condition of an agent being able to recognize and apply these practical ideas in particular situations.

18 Frankfurt 1971.

Another objection could be that the Stoic approach has a rather similar difficulty, insofar as they have to explain why people are not responsible in cases of serious psychological coercion. Frankfurt's example of the unwilling addict poses such a challenge to the Stoic view.

> [The unwilling addict] hates his addiction and always struggles desperately, although to no avail, against its thrust. He tries everything that he thinks might enable him to overcome his desires for the drug. But these desires are too powerful for him to withstand, and invariably, in the end, they conquer him. He is an unwilling addict, helplessly violated by his own desires.[19]

It is worth adding that one may stipulate, insofar as she considers it a relevant issue, that the unwilling addict is not responsible for being an addict. Now, the question is how the Stoic can stick to the plausible intuition according to which the unwilling addict is not morally responsible and blameworthy for taking the drug. Even though the question is interesting, there is an obvious solution for the Stoic. First, the Stoic could argue that she does not accept the assumption that the behavior of the unwilling addict is an action. According to the Stoic approach, the source of human action is always the activity of reason. At least, the person has to give assent to an impulsive impression in order to act in one way or another. It is reasonable to suppose that, in the case of the unwilling addict, the behavior is produced without giving assent to an impulsive impression, because the unwilling addict would not like to do that. Furthermore, it is very probable that the Stoic would also argue that, similarly to other cases of *akrasia*, the unwilling addict oscillates between the two alternatives without being aware of the oscillation, and due to the overwhelming impression coming from the pleasure of drugs, he goes for them.[20] However, insofar as the opponent of the Stoic claims that the unwilling addict gave assent to the impulsive impression according to which taking the drug is desirable, the Stoic is able to bite the bullet, because the original description of the example suggested the opposite, and the original intuition (which said that the protagonist was not responsible) was about the original formulation of the case.

If it is the case with the Stoic, why could not Frankfurt bite bullet and deny the intuition that Richard the boss is not morally responsible for ripping the petals off the plant? The reason is that one of the main motivations of compatibilists theories of moral responsibility is to be as non-revisionist regarding our responsibility practices as it is possible. But cases that are similar to the story of Richard are very common. People do not reflect on many of their desires and their actions are often based on such desires.

19 Frankfurt 1971, 12.

20 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer who pointed out this argumentative strategy.

Consequently, if Frankfurt claimed that agents are not responsible in all of these cases, it would result in a clearly revisionist theory of moral responsibility.

Conclusion

Even though I argued that the Frankfurtian and Stoic notions of free will are dissimilar to each other, I echoed the well-spread view that these approaches have alike views on moral responsibility. More specifically, I claimed that both approaches claim that the main source of moral responsibility is reflective reason, and this similarity explains why both of them are semi-compatibilists with regard to moral responsibility. Nevertheless, I pointed out that there is a relevant difference. On the one hand, the Stoic theory of moral responsibility claims that moral responsibility is rooted in the *capacity* of reflective reasoning. On the other hand, Frankfurt regards the *exercise* of reflective reason as the ultimate basis for being morally responsible. This difference is relevant indeed because Frankfurt, in contrast to the Stoics, is not able to explain why agents are responsible for their actions in cases that the agent acts on the basis of a first-order desire on which she has never reflected. Thus, the Frankfurtian theory results in a revisionist theory of moral responsibility that flies in the face of one of the main motivations of all compatibilist theories of moral responsibility. Consequently, if one believes that the main source of moral responsibility is reflective reason, I suggest that she embraces the idea according to which it is not the exercise but the capacity of reflectivity that is the ultimate ground for moral responsibility – as the Stoics did over a thousand years ago.

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Zülfükar Emir Özer

Chaosmos Against the Metaphysics of One, or a Defence Against Badiou's Criticism on Deleuze

Introduction

Deleuze's understanding of Stoicism has a crucial role in his project, *The Logic of Sense*.[1] He gives a privileged place to Stoicism and conceives it as embodying a new image of philosophy which overcomes the opposition between the Presocratics and Platonism. For Deleuze, Stoicism is linked to a new *logos* animated with paradox and new philosophical values, according to which all elements are contained in all things, i.e., in the *depth* of bodies everything is mixture, and there are incorporeals lying at the *surface*. In contrast to Platonism, there is no rule according to which one mixture rather than another might be considered bad and, in contrast to the Presocratics, there is no immanent thought capable of fixing the order in the depth of *phusis*.[2] The Stoics reinterpreted the Presocratics and Plato, and introduced a new philosophy, according to which there are local disorders in the world which can be reconciled in the Great mixture, so that it is a world of terror, and there is the autonomy of the surface independent of depth and height, so that the distinction no longer passes between the universal and the particular or between substance and accidents.[3] Beside these positive aspects of Stoicism, as John Sellars states, the Stoic understanding of incorporeals is vital for Deleuze in order to give an account of linguistic meaning or sense as a non-existing entity.[4] As Deleuze quotes Brèhier, for the Stoics, "there are two planes of being, something that no one had done before them: on the one hand, real profound being, force; on the other, the plane of facts, which frolic on the surface of being, and constitute and endless multiplicity of incorporeal beings."[5] Since these incorporeal events spread out along the border of corporeals, there is no simple ontological separation between these two planes. Deleuze claims that his reinterpretation of Stoic philosophy is thus a way to overcome or to reverse Platonism that is deeply rooted in Western metaphysics.

1 Deleuze1990.
2 Deleuze1990, 130.
3 Deleuze1990, 132.
4 Sellars 2006, 157.
5 Deleuze 2006, 5.

1. Badiou's criticism of Deleuze's philosophy as a metaphysics of One

Badiou, contrary to mainstream approaches, claims that Deleuze's philosophy is fundamentally based on his conception of Stoicism, is neither a doctrine of the heterogeneous multiplicity of desires, nor a conceptual critique of totalitarianism, nor a post-metaphysical modernity. Instead of being a philosophy that reverses Platonism, it is rather a philosophy that submits thinking to a renewed concept of the One.[6] Badiou criticizes Deleuze's notion of Being harshly by focusing on Deleuze's affiliation with Stoicism; for him, Deleuze follows Stoic doctrines throughout all his works, regarding his ontological pre-comprehension of Being as One. In this vein, I will first explicate Badiou's criticism of Deleuze's philosophy. And then, by addressing the points where Deleuze diverges from the Stoic model he depicts, I will endeavour to defend Deleuze's position regarding the relation of Deleuze's philosophy and Nietzsche's understanding, which Deleuze explicitly turns to when diverging from the Stoic doctrine of *cosmos*. Rather than the Stoic conception of *cosmos*, Deleuze introduces the notion of *chaos-cosmos* or *chaosmos*, which he inherits from James Joyce and links to the Nietzschean understanding of divergence and its affirmation.

Badiou claims that although Deleuze is the first one who is against the metaphysical couple of one/multiple, the occurrence and the qualitative rising up of the One in his philosophy entails the submission of multiplicity to this concept of the One.[7] By introducing the concept of disjunctive synthesis, Deleuze endeavours to ruin traditional metaphysical approaches, for instance the vulgar understanding of phenomenological intentionality, but "keeping with his supposition of the One, Deleuze cannot but approve of the fact that dissymmetrical couple composed of the reflexive subject and the object… is replaced by the unity of unveiling-veiling."[8] In detail, Badiou conceives Deleuze's idea of the univocity of Being as the sign of the contingent coherence of the One-All, so that beings which are multiple, different, engendered by a disjunctive synthesis, disjointed and divergent, are actually multiple forms of Being. From a similar perspective, Badiou puts forth that according to Deleuze's concept of the One, the differences in Deleuze's narration can be considered as named beings which can only be viewed under a species or a type. In this sense, beings are nothing but local degrees of intensity or, in the Deleuzian terminology, inflections of power that is another name of Being and beings which are only modalities of the One. Moreover, since all beings are bodies and incorporeals are not beings, the multiplicity of senses has no real status. Although it seems that there are unity of the power and quality and the multiplicity of

6 Badiou 1999, 10.
7 Badiou 1999, 10.
8 Badiou 1999, 22.

divergent simulacra or events, they denote exactly the same thing, i.e., the univocity of Being.

Badiou also emphasizes that in order to say that there is a single sense, two names are necessary.[9] He claims that Deleuze axiomatically introduces the One as the infinite power of life and its intensification as becomings, which are expressions of the One.[10] In this sense, a seemingly duality in Deleuze's works represents only two aspects of the same thing. For instance, the active aspect of things, which consists of singular differentiation or divergent simulacra of univocal Being, and the passive aspect, which is comprised of actual beings or numerically distinct states of affairs as equivocal significations, dissolve in and cause what Deleuze calls "extra-being".[11]

2. Deleuze's philosophy as a philosophy of death

Badiou furthers his criticism by examining the notion of the power of inorganic life operating in us, according to which we are traversed by an actualization of the One-All. "[I]n reality, we are ourselves chosen, far from being, as the philosophy of representation would have it, the center, or seat, of a decision."[12] Besides, for Badiou, the figure of automaton, which can be linked to the notion of the "machinery" that yields sense, represents a subjective ideal. According to this reading, the outside is an agency of active forces, i.e., the inorganic life, which selects the individual, and submits it to the choice of choosing. "It is in precisely the automaton, purified in this way, that thought seizes for the outside, as the unthinkable thought."[13] The conditions of thought are a matter of purification and exposure to the sovereignty of the power, i.e., the One, so that thinking is not conceived as the effusion of a personal capacity, it is rather pre-individual and non-personal. Therefore, thinking hereafter can only be conceived as an act which occurs according to a hierarchy that counts things and beings from the point of the view of power. Additionally, since everything, every individuality or every identity evaporates or dissipates in this inorganic power of life, Badiou claims that Deleuze holds a philosophy of death.

> For, if the event of thought is the ascetic power of letting myself be chosen (the Deleuzian form of destiny) and being borne, qua purified automaton, wherever hubris carries me; if, therefore, thought exists as the fracturing of my actuality and the dissipation of my

9 Badiou 1999, 27.
10 Badiou 2009.
11 Badiou 1999, 32–33 .
12 Badiou 1999, 11.
13 Badiou 1999, 11.

> limit; but if, at the same time, this actuality and this limit are, in their being, of the same "stuff" as that which fractures and transcends them (given that there is, definitively, only the One-All); and if, therefore, powerful inorganic life is the ground both of what arrays me in my limit and of what incites me, insofar as I have conquered the power to do so, to transcend this limit: then it follows that the metaphor for the event of thought is dying, understood as an immanent moment of life.[14]

For Badiou, Deleuze's notion of the event as the powerful inorganic life or as the eternal return of the identical is something composing life. The event is like a theme of the musical component that is organized by it. "The event is not what happens to a life, but that which is in that which happens, or that which happens in that which happens".[15] The Event is the undifferentiated power of the Same or powerful inorganic life which thus composes multiplicities as the One or which is the composition in different variations.

So far, Badiou's criticism on Deleuze's philosophy, which is based on two major points, is explicated. The first and general point of criticism is that Deleuze's understanding submits multiplicity to the One or the Being under the concept of the univocity of Being. Thus, Deleuze preserves the metaphysics of the One that is inherited from traditional Western philosophy, which Deleuze tries to overcome or reverse. Beings are nothing but local differentiations of the same Being. Moreover, Badiou reads the notion of the eternal return as something synonymous with Being and its emanative power regulates or organizes *chaos* or the *cosmos*. In this regard, Deleuze only affirms the subordinate status of multiplicity or simulacra. The second point, which is also associated with the first one is that by conceiving life as the inorganic flow of which everything is part of or in which every individuality is dissolved, entails that individuals or identities are only modalities of an infinite super-existence and the comprehension of death as the paradigm of all events as decomposition in the inorganic flow.

3. Deleuze's reinterpretation of Stoicism for a new philosophy

In response to the first criticism, Badiou's incessant efforts to pair up Deleuze's whole philosophy with Stoicism leads him to conceive Deleuze's understanding of the univocity of Being as a unity underlying multiplicity and/or multiplicity as the self-differentiation of the One.

14 Badiou 1999, 12.
15 Badiou 2009, 383.

> What radically explains the kinship of Deleuze and the Stoics … [is] that they also thought of Being directly as totality. One should not be misled by the use of the word "anarchy" to designate the nomadism of singularities, for Deleuze specifies "crowned anarchy".[16]

Deleuze's notion of the unification of all events is taken into consideration as the unity-totality of Being similar to the philosophy of "the Stoics, who referred their doctrine of the proposition to the contingent coherence of the One-All; Spinoza, obviously, for whom the unity of Substance barred the way to any and all ontological equivocity; Nietzsche, who was to "realize univocity in the form of repetition in the eternal return".[17] Thus, without ever mentioning differences between philosophies of Deleuze, the Stoics, Spinoza and Nietzsche in this context; Badiou groups them together and criticizes Deleuze according to the affiliation of his philosophy with these philosophies. The junction that brings all these philosophies together into one group is their understanding of *cosmos* which, Badiou insists, preserves a Stoic core. However, although Deleuze reinterprets Stoicism and considers it as an inspiration of a new philosophy, his philosophy diverges from Stoicism *vis-á-vis* their understanding of *cosmos*, as he depicts in *The Logic of Sense*.

As stated earlier, according to Deleuze, on one hand, Stoicism is a reinterpretation of the Presocratics, according to whom there is a world of terrors, i.e., there are local disorders. On the other hand, it is also a re-interpretation of Platonism from the perspective of autonomous surface on which there are incorporeal events.[18] In this sense, in Stoicism, there are causes referred in depth to a unity and effects maintaining another sort of relation at the surface. Destiny is described as the unity and chain between physical causes among themselves.[19] Incorporeal effects are either the effects of these causes or enter into another type of relation called quasi-causality, which is incorporeal and independent of any notion of necessity. Here, the Stoic paradox arises when we consider the destiny or necessity in relation to the notions of affirmation and denial. Following Deleuze, the Stoic sage is free in two manners despite the notions of destiny and necessity. First, one is free because one's soul can attain the interiority of perfect physical causes, i.e., conforming to destiny. Second, one's mind may enjoy very special relations established between the effects in a situation of pure exteriority, i.e., conforming to exterior effects and their relations. Deleuze calls these affects as events-effects. Here, we need to open a parenthesis about *lekta* (sayables), i.e., events-effects. They are incorporeal events produced when a physical body acts upon another one,[20] or in the relation between or within themselves. For instance, "the scalpel, a body, becomes the cause to the flesh, a body, of

16 Badiou 1999,12.
17 Badiou 1999, 24.
18 Deleuze 2009, 157–158.
19 Deleuze 2009, 198.
20 Deleuze 2009, 4–5.

the incorporeal predicate 'being cut'. And again, the fire, a body, becomes the cause to the wood, a body, of the incorporeal predicate 'being burnt'."[21] The relation between these incorporeal events or events-effects also produces another sort of events-effects. The relation between events forms the extrinsic relations of compatibility and incompatibility. In other words, events are not like concepts; events alleged to be contradictions result from their incompatibility. In this regard, as Deleuze states, events-effects are relations of expression between physical causes or between their ideational quasi-cause(s).

After the necessary explanation of events-effects, we are at the point where Deleuze interrogates the nature of these events-effects or expressive relations. As Deleuze imposes, since we are dealing with a relation of effects, we cannot claim that this relation is causal. And since the levels of destiny (the chain between bodies) and of events-effects are different, the same causal relation that applies on the level of bodies does not apply here. Following Deleuze, the relation that brings destiny on the level of events and the relation between events must not be brute causality, these are rather "aggregate of non-casual correspondences which form a system of echoes, of resumptions and resonances, a system of signs – in short, an expressive quasi-causality."[22] As in the example of butterflies, we see that the butterflies of one species are either grey and weak, or vigorous and black. On the level of events, there is only an incompatibility observed and then we assign a physical causality to this incompatibility. Thus, the relations of events among themselves, express primarily non-causal correspondence or compatibilities or incompatibilities and then physical causality is inscribed secondarily in the depth of the body.[23]

4. Deleuze's divergence from Stoicism and his reading of Nietzsche

The point where Deleuze diverges from the Stoics is the following. For Deleuze, the Stoics returned to the simple physical causality or to the logical contradiction, instead of a-logical compatibilities or incompatibilities. Although Deleuze does not provide textual proof of this, the Stoics ultimately determine the unique event as Zeus, a substantial, totalizing instance which creates a unity on both sides of the ontological divide, i.e., corporeal and incorporeal event-effects.

> On the one hand, then, evental quasi-causality was replaced by pure physical causality founded on Zeus as causa sui; and on the other hand, Zeus, as the "set of all sets" or "name of names", brought the ongoing determination of the event to an end by anchoring the "determinations of signification", and thereby also engendering a strong principle of

21 *Adv. Math.* 9. 211, quoted by Bowden 2011, 23.
22 Deleuze 1990, 170.
23 Deleuze 1990, 171.

> logical contradiction (at the expense of the much looser, experimental relations of evental compatibility and incompatibility). Deleuze must therefore look for a way of determining the event in its "ideal play" only, in accordance with the above stated problematic.[24]

As Deleuze states, "[events] are not like concepts; it is their alleged contradiction which results always from a process of a different nature."[25] This is the point where Deleuze turns to Leibniz.[26] For him, Leibniz is the first theoretician of a-logical incompatibilities and thus the first important theoretician of the event, for whom events cannot only be considered in terms of identity and contradiction. Leibniz, by offering the terms "compossibility" and "incompossibility" which are defined in an original and pre-individual manner and cannot be reduced to identity and contradiction, claims the anteriority and originality of the event in relation to the predicate. Following Deleuze, compossibility is the convergence of series which singularities of events form and incompossibility is the divergence of such series. In this sense, "convergence and divergence are entirely original relations which cover the rich domain of a-logical compatibilities and incompatibilities, and therefore form an essential component of the theory of sense."[27]

According Deleuze, Leibniz makes a negative use of disjunction as one of exclusions, and he accounts for this position by imposing the hypothesis of a God that grasps all events.[28] By distributing divergence into incompossibilities, divergence is excluded and by retaining maximum convergence as the criterion of the best possible world, the similar is preserved or the divergent is excluded in the name of a superior finality.[29] However, on the level of events, disjunction and divergence cease to be negative. The distance between events permits the measuring of contraries, or contrary events, so that the distance on the level of surface is a positive distance and through this difference two things or two determinations are affirmed. This notion, according to Deleuze, is very important, because it excludes depth and all elevations that restore the negative and the identity.[30] On this point, Deleuze gives Nietzsche's case as an example in which the affirmation of the positive distance between being sick and being healthy is accomplished. In this way, Nietzsche experiences a superior health even when he is sick.

For Deleuze, Nietzschean divergence is neither the connective synthesis (if… then), nor the conjunctive series (and), nor the disjunctive series (or). Rather than

24 Bowden 2011, 47.
25 Deleuze 1990, 170.
26 "[Pour] il ne s'agit ni de découvrir une tradition ni d'établir des influences, ni d'abandonner ni de réformer le stoïcisme, mais d'organiser un relais philosophique en spécifiant pour chaque auteur le passage de témoin conceptuel qui s'effectue." Cf. Bénatouïl 2003, 19.
27 Deleuze 1990, 172.
28 Deleuze 1990, 172.
29 Deleuze 1990, 260.
30 Deleuze 1990, 173.

those excluding relations, Nietzschean divergence can be observed in the "either… or" relation which is open to the infinite number of predicates, so that the centre, its identity as concept or self is lost.[31] It is important to note that the disjunctive synthesis negates neither the connective synthesis nor the conjunctive synthesis. It is *either* positive, unlimited, and inclusive, which affirms the divergence of the series in a world *or* it allows convergences to emerge.[32] Here, the communication of events replaces the exclusion of events. One can realize that s/he is a process or series of events.[33]

> [A]t the surface each event communicates with the other through the positive character of its distance and by the affirmative character of the disjunction. The self merges with the very disjunction which it liberates and places outside of itself the divergent series as so many impersonal and pre-individual singularities. Counter-actualization is already infinitive distance instead of infinite identity.[34]

5. Deleuze's notion of *chaosmos* beyond the "One-multiple" duality

Here there is a unity of divergent series, insofar as they are divergent or, infinitive distance means that there is *chaos*, the centre of which is perpetually thrown off. This *chaos*, which can only be conceived as the power of affirmation or the power to affirm all heterogeneous series, is an unformed one and "it 'complicates' within itself all the series"[35] – in other words, the differential or the difference itself is primarily affirmed. The constitution of *chaos* that Deleuze depicts is the divergence of *chaos*, decentring of circles. The divergence of these series without a centre constitutes a *chaosmos*, which complicates within itself. In this sense, the *chaos* cannot be considered as a unity that underlies multiplicity or a self-differentiation of the One. Here, Deleuze's notion of *chaosmos*, which is different from the notion of the Stoic *cosmos* as a coherent unity/entity, is beyond the one/multiple duality contrary to Badiou's criticism. Besides, Deleuze represents the univocal being as an extra-Being, "[a] position in the *void* of all events in one, an expression in the nonsense of all senses in one [italics added]."[36] Univocity is uniqueness at the level of sense on the surface of being, because it is not the identity of beings or what is (said to be); but a feature of being as sense.

31 Deleuze 1990, 174.
32 I would like to thank the referee for the clarification of this point.
33 Sellars 2006, 166.
34 Sellars 2006, 166.
35 Deleuze 1990, 260.
36 Deleuze 1990, 180.

In connection with this, the notion of difference in Deleuze's understanding is not an inscription of difference or a difference in the identity of a concept. As Nathan Widder shows in an example: Socrates and Plato are both human beings but they are distinguished by the irreducible "thisness" of each of them so that a difference makes an individual unique and prevents it from being subsumed under an identity; in this case the identity of its species and cannot be conceived by giving reference to or in connection with higher categories.[37] With the notion of the univocity of being, there is a possibility of a connection between diverging series and/or irreducible heterogeneous differences through these divergences and/or differences which are again incompatible with identity.

> [V]ariations, like degrees of whiteness, are individuating modalities of which the finite and the infinite constitute precisely singular intensities. From the point of view of its own neutrality, univocal being therefore does not only implicate distinct attributes or qualitative forms which are themselves univocal, it also relates these and itself to intensive factors or individuating degrees which vary the mode of these attributes or forms without modifying their essence in so far as this is being.[38]

In this sense, difference is no longer tied to transcendental One and without invoking an identity, difference establishes a common sense among heterogeneous beings and individual differentiations. For instance, one can put forth "God is wise" and "Socrates is wise". In other words, one can establish a common sense between heterogeneous beings without invoking any identity between God and Socrates, human comprehension and God's wisdom.[39]

6. Deleuze's eternal recurrence and Being beyond the duality of personal and impersonal

Deleuze endeavours to explicate the notion of the eternal return in order to show these differences which cannot be mediated. In contrast to Badiou's understanding of the eternal recurrence that regulates and organizes *chaos* as the informal law which can be considered to be subordinated to the Same,[40] the eternal return is a plastic principle which is differential in nature – i.e., the return of the difference itself.

37 Widder 2001, 441.
38 Deleuze 1994, 39–40.
39 Widder 2001, 444.
40 Badiou 1999, 69.

> The eternal return does not cause the same and the similar to return, but is itself derived from a world of pure difference. Each series returns, not only in the others which imply it, but for itself, since it is not implied by the others without being in turn fully restored as that which implies them. The eternal return has no other sense but this: the absence of any assignable origin – in other words, the assignation of difference as the origin, which then relates different to different in order to make it (or them) return as such. In this sense, the eternal return is indeed the consequence of a difference which is originary pure, synthetic and in-itself (which Nietzsche called will to power).[41]

In this context, with the doctrine of the eternal recurrence, as in Jon Roffe's conception, the thought and the production of the "absolute different", difference precedes the notion of the One.[42] Contrary to Badiou's understanding, according to which the eternal return is a principle that is the guarantor of difference and of chance, it is the affirmation of all chances in a single gesture.

> The eternal return is a force of affirmation, but it affirms everything of the multiple, everything of the different, everything of chance except what subordinates them to the One, to the Same, to necessity, everything except the One, the Same and the Necessary.[43]

In response to the second criticism according to which individuals, identities or finite existences, like death or being dead are decomposed in the inorganic and/impersonal flow, although Deleuze depicts life as an impersonal and singular life, it is not enclosed by the moment of death but it is an immanent life that carries with it the events or singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects so that a life is everywhere.[44] Here, Deleuze makes the difference between personal and impersonal or individual and pre-individual singularities transparent. In other words, death, rather than something related to finiteness, is a sign of our being composed of impersonal or pre-individual singularities. In this way, being is conceived as something beyond the duality of personal and impersonal, or more generally finite existence (as a modality) and an infinite super-existence (as the power of the One).

> The singularities and the events that constitute a life coexist with the accidents of the life that corresponds to it, but they are neither grouped nor divided in the same way.[45]

41 Deleuze 1994, 125.
42 Roffe 2012, 126.
43 Deleuze 1994, 151.
44 Deleuze 2001, 29.
45 Deleuze 2001, 29–30.

Conclusion

In conclusion, contrary to the claim that Deleuze submits multiplicities to the One, by focusing on concepts such as the positive difference, *chaosmos* and the eternal return, he distinguishes his understanding from the traditional philosophies and puts forth an understanding according to which phenomena find their ground in a constitutive difference which cannot be mediated. Resemblance and, as Badiou's conception, local multiplicities are the products of this internal difference that is related to the "same" excessiveness of all beings, so that they cannot be reduced to an identity and are always in relation to disjunction through which they can be linked. In this regard, the doctrine of eternal return of the "same" rather than a static principle that governs the universe or *cosmos*, is a nomadic, plastic doctrine, according to which *chaos* itself or the *chaosmos* substitutes something else entirely, its own *chaodyssey* (chao-errance), so that only divergent series can return.

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KRATER

Ágoston Guba

Desire in *Ennead* IV. 3–4

Introduction

Despite the fact that our first thought about Plotinus might not be that he was deeply interested in questions closely related to physiological issues, he dealt with several problems of the incarnated soul. In this paper I would like to discuss an example of this kind of problems, namely how Plotinus explains the desire which originates from the body. I will concentrate only on *Ennead* IV. 3–4 that represents Plotinus' view about this topic in his so-called middle period. My aim is twofold. On the one hand, I would like to show that Plotinus describes desire by the terms of sense-perception. Although this terminology has been observed and mentioned briefly by Emilsson,[1] I intend to offer a more elaborated account, which not only shows the well-known Plotinian duality between affection and judgement that Emilsson has observed but also expounds how an external object cause this affection in the proper part of the body. I am going to connect two texts in this treatise, namely *Ennead* IV. 3. 28 and IV. 4. 20, and interpret them in light of each other. I suppose the first one describes the external object's causal effect on the desiring part, while the other one tells us what judgement means in the case of desire. On the other hand, in the second part of my chapter I would like to present the crucial role that nature (*physis*) plays in Plotinus' analysis of desire.

To make my further points more understandable, it is worth giving a non-detailed overview of Plotinus' theory of sense-perception first. The account of sense-perception means a serious philosophical challenge for Plotinus due to his strong metaphysical convictions concerning the soul. Plotinus has to bridge the ontological gap between the immaterial soul and the sensible world in order that the incarnated soul become able to acquire knowledge about the sensible world. Moreover, what makes this issue more problematic is that the soul's immateriality also involves impassibility for Plotinus, in other words, the soul cannot be the subject of any affection or change in any way including sensory affection. In a nutshell, Plotinus' theory is that the sense organ occupies an ontologically intermediary position: as it is body, the sense organ is capable of being affected by external objects. This process, on the other hand, can be also regarded as the internalization of the form originated from the external object

1 Emilsson 1998, 344–45.

thanks to which the soul is able to know the sensible object.[2] Hence, Plotinus argues that two acts must be strictly distinguished in sense-perception, namely the sensory affection of the sense organ (*pathos*), and the judgment formed by the soul (*krisis*), which is based on this sensory affection.[3] The former is a physical change caused by the external object, while the latter is a propositional activity concerning the external object.[4] In addition, as opposed to mere affection, the judgment also has the essential character that it is conscious. Although the sense organ is continually affected by different external objects, we are conscious only of those about which the soul forms a judgment. Plotinus insists on that just the act of judgement or, at least, the combination of affection and judgment can be called sense perception, but not the bodily affection in itself.[5] After this short introduction, let us turn to the texts.

1. The analysis of the *Ennead* IV. 3. 28: affection in desire

The first chapter in the treatises *Ennead* IV. 3 – IV. 5 that mentions the incarnated soul's desire and anger are *Ennead* IV. 3. 28. This chapter belongs to a longer section (*Enn.* IV. 3. 25–31) in which Plotinus examines mainly the question what the subject of memory (*to mnēmoneuon*) is supposed to be. Therefore, Plotinus does not focus specifically on desire and anger here but rather their relationship with memory. In spite of this fact, as I will argue, this section will have importance in Plotinus' theory of desire if we analyse it carefully.[6]

The first option, which is provided by Plotinus for the original question, is that memory is not a unitary function of a power of the soul, but it must be given to every power and the different sorts of memories are individuated by the object of the given power (lines 1–3). However, Plotinus restricts his inquiry to the question about the memory of the desiring and spirited parts; and though the former seems to be the primary subject of his interest, the changes without any reflection in the discussion make it clear that the same explanatory model has to be applicable to the case of the latter as well. Plotinus, starting from the above hypothesis, argues for the memory of the desiring part as follows:

2 *Enn*. IV. 4. 23. See Emilsson 1988, 67–73.

3 That the judgement is formed on the basis of the sensory affection it should be understood that the judgment is not about the sensory affection but about the external object. See: Emilsson 1988, 75 fn. 28; Fleet 1995, 73–74 about this.

4 The most relevant text for this dichotomy: *Enn*. III. 6. 1. See also Emilsson 1988, 126–33.

5 For this, besides the first chapter of *Enn*. III. 6, see *Enn*. IV. 6. 1.

6 Besides Blumenthal's short analysis, to my knowledge, King offers the only extended interpretation about this chapter most of points of which I do not accept. See: Blumenthal 1971b, 86–87; King 2009, 165–169.

> For someone will say, there will not be one thing which enjoys [the desired objects] and another which remembers the object enjoyed by the first. On this assumption the desiring power is moved by what it enjoyed when desired object appears again, obviously by means of the memory. For why [otherwise] should it not be moved when something else is seen, or seen in a different way?[7]

Since the argumentation presented here is quite succinct, I think the explication of its premises helps us to understand Plotinus' point more clearly.

(1) The desiring power has enjoyed a kind of things earlier.
(2) Such a thing appears to the desiring power that belongs to this kind (*palin ophthentos tou epithymētou*).
(3) The earlier enjoyments excite the desire power (*hōn apelause toutois kineitai*) to desire the appearing thing.

According to these premises, Plotinus outlines a theory operating with *double causation* in desire. The actual object of desire in itself is not able to cause desire in the desiring power, but the earlier pleasurable experiences need to be supposed for this as well. Hence, a satisfying account is required for explaining how these earlier experiences and the actual object are related to each other. The most obvious solution of this problem, which is also the conclusion debated by Plotinus, is that this connection between experiences at different times comes about by the help of memory.

Conclusively, the earlier pleasurable experiences are clearly able to contribute to the actual desire by memory (*dēlonoti tē mnēnē*).[8]

This conclusion is supported by the further argument that if we do not refer to the earlier experiences in the case of desire, we are unable to answer why a certain thing possesses causal effect and not another, or the same in a different condition. Yet, this conclusion also compels us to accept the rather controversial consequence that whenever we desire a present thing, we have to be conscious of the present thing and the memory or memories of the earlier experiences at the same time. Although no doubt a state in which we are conscious of these two can happen often, supposing this common occurrence as necessary for an actual desire is more than superfluous: in

7 *Enn*. IV. 3. 28. 4–6: "Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ἀπολαύσει, φήσει τις, ἄλλο δὲ μνημονεύσει τῶν ἐκείνου. Τὸ γοῦν ἐπιθυμητικὸν ὧν ἀπέλαυσε τούτοις κινεῖται πάλιν ὀφθέντος τοῦ ἐπιθυμητοῦ δηλονότι τῇ μνήμῃ. Ἐπεὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἄλλου, ἢ οὐχ οὕτως."

8 Plato has already ascribed a role to memory in desire, as we can read in the *Philebus* 35a–d. In this passage, Socrates argues that the soul creates connection between the actual state and the desired opposite and clearly does this *by memory* that directs us towards the objects of desire. Therefore, as Socrates finally concludes, impulse and desire belong to the soul and it is not the body that has hunger or thirst. Plotinus, even though tacitly, absolutely does not want to follow his master in this line of thought.

my present desire for an apple, I do not need to be conscious of the fact that I enjoyed eating an apple yesterday.

First Plotinus expands the scope of the original presumption, which claims various memories attach to various powers of the soul: let us attribute every power to the other powers as well, but there is a dominant one in each of them, and this gives the name to them (lines 7–9). This an interesting intermediary step by Plotinus, since, on the one hand, it will not be accepted as his own view, but on the other hand, this idea opens the way for his own solution.[9]

> Now perception can be attributed to each power in a different way. Sight, for instance, sees, not the subject of desire, but the subject of desire is moved by a sort of transmission from the perception, not so that it can say what sort of perception it is, but so that it is unconsciously affected by it. And in the case of anger, [sight] sees the wrongdoer and the anger arises; it is like when the shepherd sees the wolf by the flock and the sheepdog is excited by the scent or the noise, though he has not himself seen the wolf with his eyes.[10]

What offers the key for understanding this elliptical passage is to elucidate what Plotinus means here by the expression of *aisthēsis*. Bearing in mind Plotinus' basic considerations I summarized in the introduction, in this text we read a surprisingly different approach to the *aisthēsis* of the desiring power. According to the present text, the desiring power does not tell what kind of perception it has, which comes through seeing, but the desiring power only becomes affected by it unconsciously (*aparakolouthētōs pathein*). By this differentiation, the above-mentioned fundamental dichotomy between affection and judgement appears again together with the characteristics of the two sides, i.e. the propositional character of the judgement and the affection which does not involve consciousness. What I called surprisingly different in this passage is that perception of the desiring part does not include judgement but only affection. In any case, if we notice these clues, we are able to point out an implicit change which has occurred in the course of Plotinus' inquiry. As the subject of affection can be exclusively a bodily being, when Plotinus mentions *to epithymoun* here, it is nearly impossible that he refers to the desiring power of the soul. Rather, it must denote that part of the body which is able to

9 To notice that here we have two different positions and only the latter one will be accepted is essential in order to understand the following. King misses distinguishing the two positions and their status, which influences his interpretation later as well. See King 2009, 166.

10 *Enn*. IV. 3. 28. 9–16: "Ἡ αἴσθησιν ἄλλως ἑκάστῳ· οἷον εἶδε μὲν ἡ ὅρασις, οὐ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, ἐκινήθη δὲ παρὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν οἷον διαδόσει, οὐχ ὥστε εἰπεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν οἵα, ἀλλ' ὥστε ἀπαρακολουθήτως παθεῖν. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ εἶδε τὸν ἀδικήσαντα, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς ἀνέστη, οἷον εἰ ποιμένος ἰδόντος ἐπὶ ποίμνῃ λύκον ὁ σκύλαξ τῇ ὀδμῇ ἢ τῷ κτύπῳ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἰδὼν ὄμμασιν ὀρίνοιτο."

participate in a given power of the soul, and this is the liver in the case of desire.[11] The text on the other hand tells us much less about how sight can cause an effect on this desiring part of the body. This question is closely related to another one, namely how the sense-perception of sight should be understood. In my opinion, we can distinguish two different approaches, and, although they can answer this question to some extent, they also pose problems.

The first option is that here, sight involves sensory affection and judgement: first I have to identify the external object by forming a basic proposition (e.g. "it is an apple") and only after that I become able to desire it. Accepting this interpretation, what causes the modification in the desiring part of the body is the representation of a thing. Nevertheless, by the acceptance of this position, we are supposed to reconstruct a theory that explains how a representation of the soul is able to cause a bodily modification, but we cannot find such a theory in *Enneads* even in a preliminary form.[12] Moreover, this interpretation must maintain that the representation, which is provided by sight, must not contain the proposition that "this thing is desirable", otherwise the affection of the desiring part is not unconscious anymore.

The second option is that the whole process in the text is interpreted as exclusively physical. This viewpoint is mostly supported by the expression of "sort of transmission" (*hoion diadosei*), which describes how the perception of seeing moves the desiring part. First of all, it should be mentioned that the word of *diadosis* does not have an innocent meaning in the *Enneads*. This expression occurs mostly in the kind of explanations Plotinus intends to refute. We can meet the most important occurrences in the passages of two early treatises,[13] where Plotinus criticizes a theory about the sensation of the soul. According to the transmission theory, the soul which is body can sense affection by transmitting it from one part to another one, up to the commanding-faculty. Another noteworthy occurrence is found in *Enn*. IV. 5.[14] Here Plotinus attacks a certain Peripatetic theory in that air as medium must be affected first by the sense-object and the eye is affected only by the medium having been affected. This whole process happens as if the medium transmitted (*hoion diadosei*) the form of the sense-object to the eye.[15] For our further inquiry, it will be unnecessary to show how Plotinus rejects these explanations; the relevant point is how he understands them. What unifies the different approaches is that the transmission signifies an entirely bodily process:

11 About connections of the soul's different powers with the given parts of the body, see: *Enn*. IV. 3. 23, on desire lines 35–42, on anger lines 43–45.

12 I think that the theory found in III. 6. 4 is not able to offer a solution to this question, because its aim is to explain those bodily affections which originate in the rational soul and here the case of desire that concerns Plotinus is caused by sensible objects.

13 *Enn*. IV. 7. 7; IV. 2. 2. 11–39.

14 *Enn*. IV. 5. 3. 3.

15 On *Enn*. IV. 5 see: Blumenthal 1971b, 77–78; Emilsson 1988, 36–62; Gurtler 2015.

the transmission-theory of sensation is rooted in the corporeal concept of the soul, and the air's affection by the sense object had to come about like an impression in the wax. Plotinus therefore does not think that these theories which operate with materialistic terms could provide satisfactory explanations for how the sensation of the soul occurs or how we acquire an adequate representation about the original object in seeing. Despite his hostile attitude towards these theories, we do not need to think that Plotinus would dismiss this physical transmission, as it is just that he looks on it as that which is unable to give an adequate explanation for a certain group of phenomena. Thus, taking into consideration these passages, it is already more plausible to think that the transmission mentioned here is also a bodily process, namely the transmission of the sense-organ's affection to the desiring part of the body, although Plotinus indeed leaves the details of this transmission obscure.

In any case, what definitely turns out in this text is that the perception of the desiring part is not an independent function *per se* but depends on sense-perception, due to which I will call the perception of the desiring part *secondary perception*, as contrasted to primary perceptions i.e. sense-perception. The secondary perception of the desiring part, even though presupposes sense-perception to be the primary one and thus a preceding sensory affection, cannot be simply reduced to these. Plotinus makes it clear in this passage that he uses sight just as an example (*hoion*)[16] of the indication that we can optionally substitute sight for other kinds of sense-perception, which are also able to move the desiring part in the body: the desiring part can be affected, for instance, by hearing or touching as well. Due to this fact, we should suppose that there is a specific sensible object of desire which is also perceived by primary perceptions but is not their primary object; and it has autonomy from sense-perceptions.

Supposing this secondary kind of perception, we are able to shed more light on the simile by which Plotinus intends to describe how to relate sense-perception and spirited part to the sense object. Despite the fact that the subject of the simile is not the desiring part but the spirited one, this change in the current examination does not involve a new approach. The previous solution is also applicable to the spirited part and the simile illustrates what was told about the desiring part. The shepherd and the sheepdog have the same object (the wolf), but they perceive it in a different way suitably to their own perception: while the shepherd sees, the sheepdog smells or hears the wolf. However, we also come to know something more specific about the affection of the spirited part. In the simile, the shepherd only sees the wolf (which is, by the way, not quite lifelike), while the sheepdog perceives it and because of its perception can be arisen against the

16 Plotinus apparently attributes a special position to sight in his explanation of sense-perception, which can be the reason why he uses sight as an example here. Moreover, elsewhere dealing with sense-perception he says that first we should establish "what happens in the case of the 'clearest sense'" and its results can be transferred to the other sense (*Enn*. IV. 6. 1. 11–14). See also Emilsson 1988, 63–64.

wolf. Nevertheless, we may not find that the simile would be able to cover every aspect of Plotinus' view. The simile illustrates the different kind of perception of the spirited part well, and, of course, the desiring part, but at the same time it misses the point that in each case a primary perception has to precede their perceptions. The perception of the shepherd and that of the sheepdog are completely independent of each other: the sheepdog is excited by its perception and not because the shepherd has seen the wolf, or, what is a rather possible situation, the sheepdog is excited by its perception, although the shepherd does not see the wolf.[17]

After all of this, Plotinus arrived at the final conclusion which, I assume, is the answer to the question about how earlier experiences influences desire.

> And the desiring part, certainly enjoyed and has a trace of what happened implanted in it, not like memory, but like a disposition or affection; but it is another power which has seen the enjoyment and of its own motion retain the memory what happened. It is evidence of this that the memory of the desiring part's experiences is often not pleasant, though it had been in it, it would have been.[18]

The desiring part does possess a "trace" in itself originated by an earlier experience, however, it is not like a memory-image, but a disposition or, in other words, affection. This way of expression once again confirms that this section discusses bodily and not psychic processes. Even though the "disposition" would allow that its subject could be the soul, the "affection" read as a further explication makes it improbable, because otherwise, we must suppose that the soul being an incorporeal entity is affected.[19] This distinction made by Plotinus between memory and disposition is remarkable: as we will be told later, in order to have a memory of a thing, we have to acquire a representation (*phantasia*) of it, which is the result of judgement in sense-perception.[20] In contrast, the desiring part does not need representation in order to be moved again and again

17 According to King, the point of the simile is that the dog, like desire, is excited, but it cannot say what perception it has heard; nevertheless, in his view, the simile is imperfect, because the dog actually perceives, see King 2009, 166–167. In contrast to King, I think it is more plausible that what Plotinus wants to emphasize pre-eminently with the simile is the different perceptions of seeing and the desiring / spirited part, but it is indeed imperfect, although in a different respect.

18 *Enn*. IV. 3. 28. 16–21: "Καὶ τοίνυν ἀπέλαυσε μὲν τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, καὶ ἔχει ἴχνος τοῦ γενομένου ἐντεθὲν οὐχ ὡς μνήμην, ἀλλ' ὡς διάθεσιν καὶ πάθος· ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἑωρακὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἔχον τὴν μνήμην τοῦ γεγενημένου. Τεκμήριον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἡδεῖαν εἶναι τὴν μνήμην πολλάκις ὂν μετέσχε τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, καίτοι, εἰ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἦν ἄν."

19 As for Plotinus' conclusion, King speaks about unconscious "modification of the desire" that I cannot see how we should understand. See King 2009, 167–169. In any case, what is quite clear from his interpretation is that King thinks that the disposition in the text is the disposition of *the soul*. King comes to this conclusion without taking into consideration the expressions in the text which are in connection with the affection or being affected.

20 *Enn*. IV. 3. 29. 22–27. See Emilsson 1988, 111–112.

by the same object of desire, since this process occurs automatically without involving a conscious state thanks to the disposition of the assigned part. So, Plotinus suggests a theory in which the desiring and spirited parts have causal connections with earlier experiences, but these are rooted not in memory but in a disposition of the body.

To sum up, although the first chapter in *Enn*. IV. 3–4 which deals with desire and anger is primarily related to the questions of memory, it does not simply reject the hypothesis according to which the desiring and the spirited power remember their object but, in quite an obscure way, offers an alternative theory as well. The passage is not about the desiring and spirited power of the soul but about bodily dispositions, otherwise we would be unable to reconcile this interpretation with Plotinus' theory of the soul's impassibility. However, even if all this is so, the question may arise why Plotinus does not pay attention to the fact that the subject of inquiry has been changed from the soul's powers to the bodily parts during the argumentation. I think the lack of explication can be explained by the fact that here Plotinus is interested chiefly in the questions of memory, which does not necessarily concern the distinction between the role of the soul and the body in desire and anger. Nevertheless, this distinction becomes of crucial importance when later in the treatise Plotinus analyses desire and anger in a detailed manner. Now let us turn to these passages.

2. The triadic model of desire in *Ennead* IV. 4. 18–21

In order to see in which theoretical framework Plotinus uses his analysis of desire in *Enn*. IV. 4. 20–21, we should summarize his earlier results. From the chapter 18 of *Enn*. IV. 4, Plotinus begins to examine a new topic: those activities of the incarnated soul in which the body is also involved. This new viewpoint demands the clarification about what it means that a body is a living body, in Plotinus' words, whether this kind of body has something of its own from the soul or what appears to be that is only the inferior soul, i.e. nature. Plotinus accepts the former position,[21] and argues that the living body possesses a trace[22] (*ikhnos*) as its own and this trace enables the body to be in such states in which the soulless bodies are unable to be, therefore it should be called so-qualified body (*to toionde sōma*). According to Plotinus, the body receives this trace from nature, or to be more precise, the trace is the second activity of nature, which means that the body is alive only when the soul is present. If the living body is affected, it will have an additional state the soulless body does not have. When a soulless body is cut, as Plotinus explains, what is affected in it is only its unity, but the living body being

21 On Plotinus' argument here, see Noble 2013, 252–56.

22 It should be noted that this trace cannot be the same as what was mentioned in the conclusion of *Enn*. IV. 3. 28.

cut also has a distress (*aganaktēsis*). The supposition of this special kind of body helps Plotinus to give an account for pain without giving up the impassibility of the soul.

Plotinus starts to analyse bodily desire with the help of this framework in chapter 22; his most relevant passage as follows.

> But just as in the case of pain it was from the pain that the knowledge came, and the soul, wishing to take the body away from that which produced the affection, brought about flight – and the part which was primarily affected taught it this by taking flight itself in a way by its contraction – so in this case too it is a sense-perception which acquires knowledge and the soul near, which we call nature, which gives the soul-trace to the body; nature makes the desire explicit which is the final stage of that which begins in the body and sense-perception forms the representation and the soul starts from the representation, and either provides what is desired – it is its function to do so – or resists and holds out and pays no attention either to what started the desire or to that which desired afterwards.[23]

First of all, I should make a short note about the Greek text. Against Henry and Schwyzer, Armstrong and most of the editors, it seems to me that *pathousa* cannot be the predicate along the second half of the sentence, but, in agreement with Theiler, I think that the text should be completed with such a verb which describes not a *knowing* act but a *producing* one.[24] The reason for this insertion is simply that without it, the philosophical content of the text becomes rather inconsistent. If nature just knows desire as explicit, we will not ascertain the reason why desire has become explicit (*tranēs*) and what the connection is between this condition and the earlier mentioned knowing act. As for sense-perception, accepting *mathousa* as the predicate, another and more serious problem emerges, namely what perception knows is the bodily affection; representation is the result of this knowing act and not its object. Thus, it offers a more plausible reading that, to paraphrase the text, nature makes the desire explicit and sense-perception forms representation by coming to know the affection of the so-qualified body.[25]

23 *Enn*. IV. 4. 20. 10–20: "Ὥσπερ δὲ ἐκεῖ ἐκ τῆς ὀδύνης ἐγίνετο ἡ γνῶσις, καὶ ἀπάγειν ἐκ τοῦ ποιοῦντος τὸ πάθος ἡ ψυχὴ βουλομένη ἐποίει τὴν φυγήν, καὶ τοῦ πρώτου παθόντος διδάσκοντος τοῦτο φεύγοντός πως καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ συστολῇ, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις μαθοῦσα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἐγγύς, ἣν δὴ φύσιν φαμὲν τὴν δοῦσαν τὸ ἴχνος, ἡ μὲν φύσις τὴν τρανὴν ἐπιθυμίαν <τελειοῖ > {add. Theiler} τέλος οὖσαν τῆς ἀρξαμένης ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τὴν φαντασίαν, ἀφ' ἧς ἤδη ἡ πορίζει ἡ ψυχή, ἧς τὸ πορίζειν, ἢ ἀντιτείνει καὶ καρτερεῖ καὶ οὐ προσέχει οὔτε τῷ ἄρξαντι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, οὔτε τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπιτεθυμηκότι."

24 Beutler – Theiler 1962, 518. The insistence on a certain solution would be unreasonable: as even Theiler's remark suggests, he regards his own insertion just as an option. Moreover, since Plotinus' extremely elliptical style allows it, also needless to suppose that any given word should have been present in the text.

25 I suppose, already Ficino was annoyed by this lack in the text when he completed his translation with the harmless verb of *reportat*: "Igitur naturam quidem concupiscentiam *reportat* iam adultam, velut finem concupiscentiae in tali corpore iam exorsae: sensus autem imaginationem […]"; see Plotinus 1580,

Following this interpretation of the passage, at first appearance, four different steps can be distinguished in desire: (1) the so-qualified body becomes affected so that I partly have already discussed; (2) nature makes the desire explicit which has begun in the body; (3) sense-perception forms representation about the affection; (4) starting from representation, the soul decides whether she pays attention to the origin of the desire and to what it has desired afterwards. Supposedly, the first one refers to the condition of the so-qualified body, while the second one to the state of nature. While (1) and (4) are quite unproblematic, (2) and (3) are rather obscure, therefore I am concentrating primarily on these two. Although I will examine them separately, I am going to argue that in fact these two steps are just two simultaneously occurring aspects of the same process that a bodily affection becomes conscious, and, in addition, they belong to the same entity, namely nature.[26]

As far as (3) is concerned, Plotinus makes his point clearer a little bit later in this chapter. However, before the analysis of this passage, we should mention something which is quite relevant to understand what the articulated desire means. According to Plotinus, the body being in flux always has different states, and, therefore, a selection needs to be supposed among affections. Examining the memory of the heavenly bodies, Plotinus explains that although the heavenly bodies are affected by the external object as everything else, their soul does not receive them into itself (*Enn*. IV. 4. 8. 8–16). What stands behind this idea is that the affection must reach a certain degree, which is already relevant from the angle of sustaining the relationship between the body and the soul in order that the soul has representation[27] – and this problem does not occur in the case of heavenly bodies. So, the articulation of desire which was mentioned as the last step of desire beginning in the body (*telos ousan tēs arxamenēs en ekeinō*) in the above quoted text, it should also refer to the point when affection becomes conscious and at the same time it means that not every affection of the body becomes articulated by nature.[28]

412–413. Another supposition of mine is that the parallel text Ficino based this insertion on might be *Enn*. IV. 4. 17. 11–14, although in this passage representation is that which reports and not that which is reported. Ficino's insertion, however, just shifts the above-mentioned problems to another level.

26 Although Emilsson also establishes these four steps, my distinction concerning what these four steps want to mean is absolutely different. Emilsson assumes that (2) describes the awareness of nature, while (3) is about the awareness of sense-perception, and this supposition forces him to deal with the question, I think unsuccessfully, how these two kinds of awareness can be explained. In my opinion, there are several problematic points in this approach. Emilsson takes it for granted that the main point in (2) is that nature has representation, although the text does not mention it. Moreover, Emilsson misses giving account for the impulses formed by nature which is, as I will argue, actually Plotinus' point in (2). See Emilsson 1998, 346–347.

27 Cf. *Enn*. IV. 4. 18. 25–36.

28 Cf. *Enn*. IV. 4. 21. 7–9.

Later in this chapter, after asking why two desires should be supposed (one of the so-qualified body and one of nature), Plotinus explains the difference between the two kinds of desire in the following way.

> [T]hen it is necessary that nature should not begin desire; but it must be the so-qualified body which is affected in particular way and feels pain in desiring the opposite of what it experiences, pleasure instead of suffering and sufficiency instead of want; but nature is like a mother, trying to make out the wishes of the sufferer, and the consummation of the desire passes from the body to nature. So one might say, perhaps, that desiring comes from the body itself – one might call it proto-desire and pro-desire – but that nature desires from and through something else, and it is another soul which provides what is desired or does not.[29]

In its metaphorical way, the passage spells out that the so-qualified body desires another state than what it actually has, and nature's desire has the very same aim, namely that the body acquires the other state. Yet, there are significant differences as well, and these differences answer the question about the two desires. First, the desire of nature has an active aspect the body misses: it articulates the starting impulse in the body by searching how it could satisfy the body's need. If the body is in lack of sweet, and this lack becomes conscious, it spontaneously involves not only that one would like to acquire something sweet, but also that this person begins searching the possible modes of accessing something sweet. Second, the desire of the so-qualified body only has general character: even if a concrete object caused the change in the bodily part (as we could see in the *Enn*. IV. 3. 28), the body does not have a relation with the given object but only with the desired opposite state. For instance, it intends to have sweet in general but not to have certain sweets. Nature is able to create the connection between the general desire of the body and a certain object outside which the body wanted to acquire. Thus, we need to suppose two desires, because the bodily change in itself is a necessary but not a sufficient cause of desire: in Plotinus' view, only state which is conscious and accompanied with an impulse (*orexis*) can be regarded as desire. And this is also the reason why Plotinus allows an alternative use of terminology concerning the bodily state: it is not desire (*epithymia*), but only a "proto-desire" (*proepithymia* or

29 *Enn*. IV. 4. 20. 25–36: "[...] ἀνάγκη μήτε ἄρχειν αὐτὴν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε σῶμα τὸ πεπονθὸς ταδὶ καὶ ἀλγυνόμενον τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει [*Phil.* 35a3–4] ἐφιέμενον, ἡδονῆς ἐκ τοῦ πονεῖν καὶ πληρώσεως ἐκ τῆς ἐνδείας· τὴν δὲ φύσιν ὡς μητέρα, ὥσπερ στοχαζομένην τῶν τοῦ πεπονθότος βουλημάτων, διορθοῦν τε πειρᾶσθαι καὶ ἐπανάγειν εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ζήτησιν τοῦ ἀκεσομένου ποιουμένην συνάψασθαι τῇ ζητήσει τῇ τοῦ πεπονθότος ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ τὴν περάτωσιν ἀπ' ἐκείνου πρὸς αὐτὴν ἥκειν. Ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐξ αὐτοῦ – εἴποι ἄν τις προεπιθυμίαν ἴσως καὶ προθυμίαν – τὴν δὲ ἐξ ἄλλου καὶ δι' ἄλλου ἐπιθυμεῖν, τὴν δὲ ποριζομένην ἢ μὴ ἄλλην εἶναι."

prothymia); the prefix of "pro-" in this expression signifies a temporal relationship, i.e. what is before desire.

Turning to the perception in the text, it requires more argumentation in order to prove that perception here should be regarded as the function of nature. In chapter 19, we read that the knowledge about the affection belongs to the perceptive soul in the neighbourhood[30] to complete the description, of the so-qualified body. Due to the soul-trace, the so-qualified body is able to be the subject of a special kind of affection, i.e. pain, but it is not clarified in this passage *why* the perceptive soul is in the neighbourhood. We saw earlier the similar expression of "the soul near" (*hē psychē hē engys*) which Plotinus identified with nature. Moreover, I think the reason for this name is that nature gives the soul-trace to the body, and so in a metaphysical sense, it is the closest to the so-qualified body, it is in the neighbourhood of the body.

Even if we accept that perception in the text belongs to nature, it might be regarded as a problem that representation must be attributed to nature. In other words, the vegetative power of the soul, although this objection can work only in case we allow that Plotinus uses a strict faculty-psychology. Examining the concept of nature in *Enneads*, we can find that one of nature's most general characteristic is that it comes immediately from the World Soul. Although Plotinus heavily argues that the human individual soul is independent of the World Soul, at the same time he presupposes that the inferior part of the human soul has a direct connection with the World Soul that he often also calls nature.[31] Moreover, Plotinus holds that nature is also a constituent of our self that relates generally to earthly life (e.g. *Enn*. IV. 3. 27. 7–10). This broader meaning turns up in the earlier section of the examination of memory that is quite relevant from the point of view of our present topic, namely the relationship between representation and the inferior soul. In *Enn*. IV. 3. 27, Plotinus asks whether memories belong to the divine soul (i.e. our rational individual soul) or to the other one which comes from the Whole (*tēs de allēs tēs para tou holou*), which description makes clear that this other soul should be identified with what is called nature in other passages. Plotinus keeps in mind the two kinds of soul along the whole examination and, attributing memory to the soul's representing power, he supposes that both types of the soul have representing power. The detailed reconstruction of Plotinus' theory of the double representing power would exceed the aim of the present paper,[32] but what appears clearly in the

30 The affection, then, is there, in the so-qualified body, but the knowledge belongs to the perceptive soul which perceives *in the neighbourhood* of the affection and reports to that in which the sense-perceptions terminate: "Εκεῖ [i.e. ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σώματι] μὲν οὖν τὸ πάθος, ἡ δὲ γνῶσις τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ γειτονίᾳ αἰσθανομένης καὶ ἀπαγγειλάσης τῷ εἰς ὃ λήγουσιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις." (*Enn*. IV. 4. 19. 4–7.)

31 On this, see especially *Enn*. IV. 3. 1–8. This interpretation about the relations among the different kinds of souls and the identification of nature with the soul originated from the World Soul was elaborated and proved first by Blumenthal 1971b.

32 On the theory of the double representation, see Blumenthal 1971a, 89–91.

text is that he wants to avoid the potential conclusion that the two representing powers could be defined by their objects, i.e. the superior soul' representations relate only to intelligible objects while the inferior soul's representations to sensible ones' reason for doing so is that otherwise, the living being would not be unitary, but we would have two living beings which do not have connection with each other (*Enn*. IV. 3. 31. 1–8). Thus, we can draw two conclusions from this examination of representing power: first, Plotinus assumes that nature *qua* part of the World Soul in a living being does have representations, and second, the superior and the inferior souls have common access to the representations of each other.

Returning to the *Enn*. IV. 4. 20. 10–20, the inferior soul's judgement about the affection involves representation, but I do not think that it would be Plotinus' main point here. Rather, he wants to describe how the rational soul comes into contact with the state of the body. As we have seen in the case of double representing powers, when nature, which is in primary connection with the body has a representation about the state of body the superior soul also will possess the same representation. However, unlike nature, the superior soul will become conscious of *two* states: the need of the body, on the one hand, and the impulse of nature, on the other. The most important difference between the superior soul and nature is that while nature *automatically* starts to desire something, the superior soul, which governs the human being, has in its power to take a decision whether consents nature's impulse or not.[33]

To conclude, although in *Enn*. IV. 4. 20. 10–20, which is the most important text, it seems to be four different steps made by four distinct entities, I tried to argue that Plotinus uses a triadic model consisting of three members, the so-qualified body, nature and individual soul. Following this scheme, we can claim that the four steps in the text do not indicate a simple temporal relationship: steps (2) and (3) in desire occur simultaneously, since they are just the different aspects of the same process, when the affection of the so-qualified body becomes conscious in nature.[34] What may be the most peculiar feature of this scheme is that nature has an essential intermediate position and, thanks to this position, it has also an intermediate function between the so-qualified body and the rational soul. So, in Plotinus' view about desire, we can find that not only the theory of the so-qualified body is a philosophical innovation, but this extended role of nature as well. Plotinus does not restrict the field of nature's function to the narrow traditional view of vegetative faculty, although his concept of

33 In Plotinus' view, nature, due to being the part of the World Soul, is subjected to the necessity in the world; as we are told later in this treatise, only those acts can be regarded as free which can be changed by the rational soul. For example, the Wise can become ill by magic, but cannot fall in love, because it must be preceded by the decision of the rational soul, see *Enn*. IV. 4. 43.

34 *Pace* Noble, who supposes that the desire in the so-qualified body and the desire of nature must be simultaneous, while forming a representation happens only after that, see Noble 2009, 116–119.

nature comprises also this function.[35] According to the examined texts, one of the most important differences between nature and the human rational soul is rooted in the possibility of being indeterminate. Thus, the *Enneads* outlines such a complex concept of nature on the level of the individual that exceeds the framework of an Aristotelian faculty-psychology or the earlier Stoic notion.

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35 Besides desire, Plotinus attributes representing power and, later, also anger to nature (*Enn*. IV. 4. 28).

İlker Kısa

Katharsis and *Phantasia* in Plotinus' Thought

Introduction

In this article, I will attempt to expose Plotinus' concept of *katharsis* in relation to *phantasia* (or *to phantastikon*) as the image-making, representative faculty of the soul in his system. I propose that Plotinian *katharsis*, as the true virtue, essentially targets the faculty of *phantasia* and regulates and transforms it until the soul reaches a purer cognitive state and busies itself with the content from *Nous*, the higher, divine intellect in his system. First, I will show the place of *phantasia* in Plotinus' depiction of the affective and desiderative processes in the body and soul, and examine his concept of a second, higher *phantasia*. Then, I will examine virtues in Plotinus' thought and the cathartic virtue, particularly in its relation to *phantasia*. We can see that *katharsis*, as the true virtue, aims at surmounting the desires by transforming the image-making faculty, so that this faculty is ready to be the locus of higher, intellectual content. The process of establishment of the higher powers of the soul in *phantasia* is a crucial aspect of *katharsis*, and by this process, *katharsis* is less about the removal of the lower content than about the dominance of the higher.

1. *Phantasia* and the affections

For Plotinus, *phantasia* is the faculty of the soul in which the activities happening both in the sensible and the intellectual/noetic realm appear in the form of images (or representations).[36] These appearances are the items via which we (as the rational part of the soul) actually became conscious of the things going on within or outside of ourselves. Correspondingly, consciousness and conscious apprehension (*antilēpsis*) is possible only when there appears an image in *phantastia*.[37] This is how an agent perceives a representation of the related object and this is actually how perception (*aisthēsis*) takes place. Sense-perception is a capacity of the soul which typically works

36 See *Enn*. IV. 3. 29. 24–25 and IV. 3. 30. 2–5. *Phantasia* is also the term which designates the imaginative content itself, and Plotinus sometimes prefers to use *to phantastikon* when he talks about the faculty which is responsible for the imaginative activity. However, since the term *phantasia* rather expresses a certain activity of the soul than a strict faculty of psychology, I prefer using it in this form.

37 Cf. *Enn*. IV. 3. 30. 13–16.

via an external object and the process terminates as a representation in *phantasia*.[38] Externality is emphasized by the philosopher due to the fact that what goes on even within the body or soul is external to the perceiving, conscious agent. *Dianoia*, the rational part of the soul on the other hand is the power which gives judgements about the images or appearances which are already the objects of perception.[39] Judgements or decisions concern image-items, deciding whether to pursue them or not. Evidently, this part of the soul, the rational mind, also happens to operate via images. Actually, this definite characteristic of the faculties of the soul, i.e. "working via images", is what makes the soul in its entirety an entity which is typically an "image oriented" one, as opposed to *Nous* which thinks *via* the unity of the subject and object, hence does not operate via representations.[40] The soul consists of a variety of power or faculties and these powers are characteristically operative through representative items.

Significantly for Plotinus, the powers of the soul are all active when they operate in the above-mentioned processes. The soul in itself is *apathēs*: impassible, unaffected.[41] Desires and passions (*pathē*) first start within the qualified-body, and *physis* (nature), which is the lowest phase of the soul, and which qualifies the body and gives life to it, joins this affection and desires with the body. The passage below is a compact text giving hints of Plotinus' understanding of the desiderative process and the position of several phases of the psychic realm within it.

> [I]t is sense-perception which acquires knowledge and the soul near by, which we call nature, which gives the trace of soul to the body; the nature knows the explicit desire which is the final stage of that which begins in the body, and sense-perception knows the image, and the soul starts from the image, and either provides what is desired – it is its function to do so – or resists and holds out and pays no attention either to what started the desire or to that which desired afterwards […].[42]

In the preceding chapter, Plotinus examines the origin of affections and the role played by the body and the soul within it. There he states that affections happen only in the qualified-body (*toionde sōma*) and the perceptive power of the soul merely acquires the

38 About perception's working merely with external objects even if the object is inside the body, see *Enn*. V. 3. 2. 2–5. For the relation of perception and *phantasia*, *Enn*. IV. 3. 29. 24–25.

39 *Enn*. IV. 4. 20. 16–20.

40 For *Nous*' special "identity in difference" with its thought, see: *Enn*. V. 1. 8. 26; V. 3. 15. 21–22; VI. 2. 15. 14–15.

41 For the impassibility of the soul: *Enn*. III. 6. 1–5; IV. 6. 2; IV. 4. 19.

42 *Enn*. IV. 4. 20. 14–20: ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις μαθοῦσα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἐγγύς, ἣν δὴ φύσιν φαμὲν τὴν δοῦσαν τὸ ἴχνος,ἡ μὲν φύσις τὴν τρανὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τέλος οὖσαν τῆς ἀρξαμένης ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τὴν φαντασίαν, ἀφ' ἧς ἤδη ἢ πορίζει ἡ ψυχή, ἧς τὸ πορίζειν, ἢ ἀντιτείνει καὶ καρτερεῖ καὶ οὐ προσέχει οὔτε τῷ ἄρξαντι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, οὔτε τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπιτεθυμηκότι. Greek texts of the *Enneads* are from Henry-Schwyitzer. Translations are from Armstrong, except where otherwise noted.

knowledge (*gnōsis*) of affection and transmits what it perceives to *phantasia*.[43] In chapter 20, where our text is found, Plotinus proceeds by examining the role played by the body and the soul in the desiderative process. In the text above, he repeats the same conviction and asserts that, just like the perceptive faculty, even the lowest phase of the psychic realm, *physis*, merely acquires information about the state of the qualified-body, and is not actually affected. When the related image of the desiderative state is produced in *phantasia*, what is left for the rational part of the soul is to make a judgement about the representative item and decide whether to follow or resist it. Regarding *physis*, the difference to be emphasized is that Plotinus, at the end of the quote, talks about it as the possessor of a secondary desire, following the initial desire of the body. In the following lines, *physis*' role as the maker of the qualified-body is emphasized and it is likened to a mother who is in a position to take care of the needs of her child.[44] *Physis* becomes compassionate, and desires get together with the desire of the body.[45] Another significant point about *physis* is made by Plotinus in the following chapter.[46] There Plotinus states that *physis* has its own mechanism of assent and dissent too, before the rational soul is in the position of making a judgement. Plotinus says that it is *physis*, nature, who knows best what is in accordance with to nature and what is not.[47]

It is critical to observe that the rational part's connection to the desiderative activities is possible only through images. As long as the rational soul (that is, *dianoia*) does not respond to the image, there is no pursuit and satisfaction of the related desire. *Physis* will go on ordering the bodily life and being compassionate with the needs of the body as long as necessary. Hence, it will ignite the production of the corresponding images in *phantasia*, for, as mentioned above, *physis* has its own working mechanisms, and, even has the capability of consent and dissent concerning the demands of the body. Accordingly, it can be argued that, the capability of the rational soul to lower and influence the basic operations of the qualified body is limited, due to the fact that *physis* there with its own rules and regulations. The question regarding the kind of relation between the rational soul and *physis* arises at this point. Below I will argue that the lower parts of the soul, including *physis*, get into a transformation as long as it is the case that the higher, rational part could gain supremacy and prevail in the

43 *Enn*. IV. 4. 19. 4–7: Ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν τὸ πάθος, ἡ δὲ γνῶσις τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ γειτονίᾳ αἰσθανομένης καὶ ἀπαγγειλάσης τῷ εἰς ὃ λήγουσιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις.

44 *Enn*. IV. 4. 20. 28ff.

45 Karfik puts it like this: "the desiring faculty is nature […] in so far as it 'desires from and through something else' viz. from and through bodily desires." (Karfik 2014, 122).

46 IV 4. 21. 11–14.

47 However, the capacity of *physis* concerning the judgement it can give about the desires of the body must be limited to the subjects related to the health and sustenance of the organic life of the body, excluding ethical decisions concerning what is good for the soul and what to follow in order to reach that good.

psychic realm. Furthermore, for this supremacy to be the case, the transformation of the faculty of *phantasia* should be provided first, given that the rational center's direct communication is with this faculty, as we have seen above.

A significant passage touching upon this point is found in *Ennead* III 6. 5. There Plotinus, after examining the impassible nature of the soul in general, starts chapter 5 by asking why we pursue making the soul free of affections if it is impossible to begin with.[48] Plotinus states that the image (*phantasma*) in the corresponding faculty produces what we might call the affection and disturbance (*tēn tarakhēn*), and reason (*ho logos*) sees this and tries to avoid the situation.[49] He goes on by stating that the soul is immune to affection when the cause of the appearing affection, i.e. "the seeing in the soul" (*peri autēn horamatos*), is absent.[50] Plotinus goes on by trying to give a new definition of purification of the soul, i.e. *katharsis*, in accordance with his examined views which propose the impassibility of the soul. He questions what meaning *katharsis* and the separation (*to khōrizein*) might have for the soul, if the soul is not stained at all. His answer is the following:

> The purification would be leaving it alone, and not with others, or not looking at something else or, again, having opinions which do not belong to it – whatever is the character of the opinions, or the affections, as has been said – and not seeing the images nor constructing affections out of them.[51]

Katharsis, purification, is still needed according to Plotinus, even if the soul is essentially pure. The important point is, as the text reveals, for Plotinus, that the soul's intermingled condition with the affections is basically caused by its pursuing of images (in *phantasia*). Thanks to IV. 4. 20, we already know that the affections have their origin in the bodily realm and *physis* desires along with the affections and desires of the qualified-body. This is how an image is produced in *phantasia*, corresponding to the relevant affection and desire. Plotinus, here in the text, rather takes the rational soul into consideration and questions how it gets into affective states. For Plotinus however, there is no actual involvement of the soul in affective

48 *Enn*. III. 6. 5. 1–2: Τί οὖν χρὴ ζητεῖν ἀπαθῆ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ποιεῖν μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν πάσχουσαν.

49 *Enn*. III 6. 5. 3ff.

50 *Enn*. III 6. 5. 8–9. Fleet reminds us that Plotinus uses ὅραμα as the vision of the one's eye and also that "thoughts are like what is seen." Fleet 1995, 136, cf. III 5. 3. 6–10 and III. 6. 2. 54.

51 *Enn*. III. 6. 5. 15–19: Ἡ ἡ μὲν κάθαρσις ἂν εἴη καταλιπεῖν μόνην καὶ μὴ μετ' ἄλλων ἢ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο βλέπουσαν μηδ' αὖ δόξας ἀλλοτρίας ἔχουσαν, ὅστις ὁ τρόπος τῶν δοξῶν, ἢ τῶν παθῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, μήτε ὁρᾶν τὰ εἴδωλα μήτε ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐργάζεσθαι πάθη.

states but rather, the soul merely falls into the trap of busying itself with the images produced in *phantasia*.[52]

Significantly, in the preceding chapters, Plotinus gives way to the possibility of affective states originated not in the body but in the rational part of the soul. Grief, anger, pleasure, fear, shame, etc. may all be reason-originated states (whereas, for Plotinus, while the origin is in the rational part, affections themselves take place in the body).[53] It is important however that even when the affective state comes into existence through the rational origin, it happens *via* an image again. Plotinus divides the images into two. First is the opinion (*doxa*), which belongs to the rational part, and the second is "that which derives from it", about which Plotinus says that it is "no longer an opinion, but an obscure quasi-opinion and an uncriticized mental picture".[54] The first quoted text should be read along these lines and it must be said that when Plotinus talks about the definition of *katharsis* and the separation as "not seeing the images nor constructing affections out of them", he includes the images caused by the opinions of the higher part of the soul as well.[55] However, this only supports the idea proposed in this article, namely that the cathartic work essentially concerns itself with the domain of *phantasia*, whether the contents of *phantasia* find their origins in the affections of the qualified-body or opinions of the rational soul.

What is crucial, according to Plotinus, is that *phantasia* is indeed a two-fold faculty, namely the higher and the lower *phantasia*, and each is the locus of representations coming from two different orders of reality, namely, *Nous* and the sense-world. However, the contents of the higher *phantasia* should not be confused with the above-mentioned opinions of the rational part of the soul which cause images in the lower *phantasia*. Rather, higher *phantasia* has a more special place in Plotinus' thought and it represents images of noetic content. This is crucial for the Plotinian *katharsis* due to the fact that, as long as the cathartic process proceeds and grows, the soul is more and more able to turn its attention from the images of the lower *phantasia* to those of the higher one. This is an important step of *katharsis*, after which the soul will be in touch with a realm even beyond the higher *phantasia*, i.e. *Nous*, in which representational thinking ceases and leaves its place for direct intuition.

52 Emilsson emphasizes that the soul is indeed involved in the affective states, but not by being affected and rather by giving consent to them or causing them by opinion (Emilsson 1998, 358). My usage of "involvement" should be understood in "affective" terms, that is, the soul is not involved in the sense that it is affected. Apart from this, the soul's contribution to the affections is accepted in this article as well.

53 *Enn*. III. 6. 3. 3–11.

54 *Enn*. III. 6. 4. 18–21: Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ φαντασία ἐν ψυχῇ, ἥ τε πρώτη, ἣν δὴ καλοῦμεν δόξαν, ἥ τε ἀπὸ ταύτης οὐκέτι δόξα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ κάτω ἀμυδρὰ οἷον δόξα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτος φαντασία.

55 See Emilsson 1998, 353.

2. Second *phantasia*

Plotinus talks about his second, higher *phantasia* in *Ennead* IV. 3. 31. He finishes the preceding chapter 30 by explaining that the unfolded noetic content is represented in *phantasia* in the form of *logos* (verbal expression) which accompanies the act of intellection.[56] The true intellectual activity (*noēsis*) is incessantly ongoing in the soul, too, but we apprehend it when it comes to be in *phantasia*.[57] The apprehension (*antilēpsis*), however, does not become the case most of the time because of the fact that *phantasia* also receives sense items beside the noetic content.[58] *Phantasia* is also responsible for memories and, without the image in this faculty, there can be no memory of noetic thoughts or of sense objects. Thus, there are two sources of memory: the noetic and the sensible world.

Earlier in the same book in chapter 27, Plotinus makes a separation of two kinds of soul in us, one is of a divine origin and the other coming from the Whole,[59] which is "nature" in us.[60] He gives the example of Heracles in Hades and makes a distinction of Heracles himself and his shade there in Hades.[61] What is important for our topic here is that Plotinus in chapter 31 questions that if both of the two souls have memory, then there will have to be two faculties of *phantasia*, too.[62] Plotinus says that if we do not want to posit two numerically different souls, there must be two kinds of memory, and hence two kinds of *phantasia* in one single soul. He then questions why we do not recognize the presence of these two image-making powers.[63] Plotinus replies this question by asserting that when the two mentioned souls (or phases of the soul) are in harmony, so that their faculties of *phantasia* are not separate, the better soul will be dominant and the representations of *phantasia* will be of a single origin, i.e. the higher soul. Plotinus here gives the example of smaller light merging into the greater one.[64] When there is disharmony on the other hand, the representations from the lower one

56 *Enn*. IV. 3. 30. 7–11.
57 *Enn*. IV. 3. 30. 12.
58 *Enn*. IV. 3. 30. 12.
59 The soul of the universe. See *Enn*. IV. 3. 1–8.
60 *Enn*. IV. 3. 27. 1–5.
61 *Enn*. IV. 3. 27. 8.
62 Enn. IV. 3. 31. 2.
63 Enn. IV. 3. 31. 9.
64 *Enn*. IV. 3. 31. 12–13. Elsewhere, in *Enn*. I. 4. 10. 6ff., Plotinus uses the example of a mirror. When the mirror is smooth, we have the images from the higher soul and *phantasia*, and when it is not, images from the lower phase of the soul dominate the mirror. However, we do not have the conceptualization of two different powers of representation here.

become manifest and then we are not even conscious of the other-higher *phantasia* or the existence of that higher phase of the soul.[65]

Significantly, Plotinus' division of the two phases of the soul in these passages relates to his previous discussions of nature (*physis*) and the rational soul (*dianoia*) in *Ennead* IV. 4. 20, which he took into consideration in the first quoted text in terms of desiderative processes. We saw there that desiderative processes are natural, that is they take their root from the qualified, living body. Moreover, nature, as the lowest phase of the soul, is compassionate with the qualified body and desires along with it and communicates this desire to the proper soul. I take it that we have a very similar division here within the psychic realm, too. In both places, the real tension is between the two phases of the psychic world, i.e. the rational soul and *physis*, the nature-soul.[66] Besides, the locus of the break between the higher and the lower phases of the psychic life is the faculty of *phantasia* in both places. The reason for this is that the items which the rational-center in the soul is in the position to decide about whether to pursue or renounce are images which perpetually appear in this faculty. In addition, this image-making faculty is two-fold and the rational-center's conviction regarding which of the two sources of the image-items to pursue is the decisive point for the soul's taking care of itself, which is an important component of the cathartic path.[67]

In order to get a clear view of the items from the higher *phantasia*, which are the unfolded expressions of the noetic contents, the lower *phantasia* should be clear and silent. Lower *phantasia*'s being clear and silent means that the soul is not busy with the representations of sense-objects or desires which *physis* transmits from the qualified-body. The more sense-perception and desire-related content are removed from *phantasia,* the more visible the content of the noetic activity in the higher *phantasia* becomes. Conversely, the more the higher *phantasia* is activated, the less visible the lower one becomes.[68] For the center which is in a position to be busy with both of them is one and the same, which is the rational soul.

65 *Enn*. IV. 3. 31. 9–15. For Warren, the crucial point is the identification and the focus of attention of the person. Respective activities of both *phantasia* will go on in their own right, but if the man's identification is with the conceptual imagination (in his words), that is the higher *phantasia*, he will just not be conscious of the items of the lower one anymore (Warren 1966, 282).

66 It is of course the fact that in the discussion at Enn. IV. 3. 30–31, Plotinus makes a distinction between noetic (purely intellectual) activity of the soul and the lower, sense-related cognitive activities. Still, *dianoia* in its given state at *Enn*. I. 2 (and Enn. IV. 4. 20) is the "judging" power, giving assent or dissent to the images in *phantasia*. Thus, it is representative of a higher, rational phase of the soul, albeit not purely noetic.

67 Dillon points out that the role given to *phantasia* by Plotinus is a significant broadening and upgrading of the concept in comparison to earlier ancient philosophical thought (Dillon 1986, 62).

68 *Enn*. IV. 3. 31. 12–13; I. 4. 10. 6ff.

3. Virtue and *katharsis*

In *Ennead* I. 2 (titled "On Virtues") Plotinus explains the twofold structure of the virtues. The first of them are civic-political virtues (*politikai*) and the second is true, cathartic virtue. The civic virtues, which are the traditional virtues of the classic Greek philosophical tradition (wisdom, self-control, courage and justice), moderate and regulate the desires and passions of the human being.[69] However, they are all context-based and externally oriented according to Plotinus.[70] He explains this characteristic of the lower, civic virtues by taking the universal soul (*hē kosmou psykhē*) into account and questioning if it needs them at all. Plotinus asserts that the universal soul's possession of all of the virtues is open to debate. For instance, being self-controlled (*sōphrōn*) or brave (*andreios*) would not be needed by the soul of the universe, since it has nothing to be afraid of.[71] The reason for this is that nothing is outside of, or external to it (*ouden gar exōthen*).[72] There is nothing that it does not possess in the corporeal realm and all belongs to it somehow. Nevertheless, it desires its higher principle (the divine, pure intellect, *Nous*) like we also desire it as individual human souls. Our order and virtue come from *Nous*, given the fact that the soul of the universe and individual souls share this higher, intellectual principle as their origin. Thus, the question to be answered now is if this highest intellectual principle of the Plotinian world, *Nous*, has or needs any virtue as we have and need virtues. Plotinus asks this question and plainly replies that it does not have the civic virtues (*politikai aretai*). According to him, each of the four cardinal virtues of the *Republic*,[73] which are practical wisdom (*phronēsis*), courage (*andreia*), self-control (*sōphrosynē*) and justice (*dikaiosynē*) are related to certain practical contexts and dimensions of our lives: to discursive reasoning, emotions, the harmony of passions and reason, and minding one's own business, respectively. These civic virtues merely bring order to the life of the individual by giving limits and measure to our desires and all affections.[74]

Since the aim of the article is not to present a thorough examination of the virtues in their entirety in Plotinus, it should be enough to mention that in the following paragraphs, Plotinus stresses the importance of the civic virtues mainly as the starting points in the ascent of the soul to *Nous*. On the other hand, he clearly asserts their non-presence in the noetic realm, where only their archetypes or paradigms reside.[75] The

69 *Enn*. I. 2. 2. 13–16.
70 Also, in *Enn*. VI. 8. 5. 20f. Plotinus says that civic virtues presuppose external evils and are therefore under compulsion and only the inner virtue is free.
71 *Enn*. I. 2. 1. 10.
72 *Enn*. I. 2. 1. 12.
73 *Republic* 427e–434d.
74 *Enn*. I. 2. 2. 13–16.
75 For the view that the paradigms are beyond virtue, see *Enn*. I. 2. 1. 28f; I. 2. 2. 3–4.

relationship between the archetype and the image is asymmetrical, i.e. the archetype does not share the qualities of the latter, which aims at being like the paradigm.[76] For Plotinus, these characteristics and relative deficiencies of the civic virtues give way to the need of another, higher kind of virtue, and this is where we first meet the concept of *katharsis*. According to him, Plato, when he speaks of likeness (*homoiōsis*) to the higher principle "as a flight to God" (*pros ton theon phygēn*), does not recognize the civic virtues as "virtue as such" but qualifies them as "civic".[77] In doing so, Plato requires the existence of a true kind of virtue and, according to Plotinus, explicates this elsewhere by the term "purifications" (*katarseis*).[78] In the following lines, Plotinus makes what he understands from *katharsis* explicit and converts the given four-fold classification of virtues to a new scheme in conformity with his fresh perspective.

> Since the soul is evil when it is thoroughly mixed with the body and shares its experiences and has all the same opinions, it will be good and possess virtue when it no longer has the same opinions but acts alone –this is intelligence and wisdom – and does not share the body's experiences – this is self-control – and is not afraid of departing from the body – this is courage – and is ruled by reason and intellect, without opposition – and this is justice.[79]

Plotinus here starts by depicting the soul as evil or vice (*kakē*), hence away from virtue, when it is kneaded together with the body. He immediately presents this condition as giving way for two states of the soul, i.e. its becoming sympathetic (*homopathēs*) with the experiences of the body and secondly, its opining in accordance with the qualified-body. This qualified body has its own needs and desires due to the fact that it grows, feeds and wants to sustain and survive. The soul, which accords its rational powers to the world of the living-body and the desires of which are presented in *phantasia* through the agency of *physis*, gets into a special kind of compassion and operates by following the passions of the body.[80] Here too, the rational soul's compassionate following of the body is depicted in terms of its producing corresponding opinions to the affections of the body.

76 *Enn*. I. 2. 2. 4–10. For the asymmetrical relation see Kalligas 2014, 138; Plass 1982, 242.
77 *Enn*. I, 2. 3. 5–10.
78 Cf. *Phaedo* 69b–c.
79 *Enn*. I. 2. 3. 11–19: Ἢ ἐπειδὴ κακὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ <συμπεφυρμένη> τῷ σώματι καὶ ὁμοπαθὴς γινομένη αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα συνδοξάζουσα, εἴη ἂν ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἀρετὴν ἔχουσα, εἰ μήτε συνδοξάζοι, ἀλλὰ μόνη ἐνεργοῖ – ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ φρονεῖν – μήτε ὁμοπαθὴς εἴη – ὅπερ ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν – μήτε φοβοῖτο ἀφισταμένη τοῦ σώματος – ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀνδρίζεσθαι – ἡγοῖτο δὲ λόγος καὶ νοῦς, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀντιτείνοι – δικαιοσύνη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦτο.
80 As also seen in *Enn*. III. 6. 5. 15–19.

In the text, by the new four-fold scheme of virtues by Plotinus, we witness a picture in which cathartic virtue already establishes itself and succeeds the soul's not busying itself with sensible and desiderative content. It is also possible to see that the new scheme upgrades the virtues to the level of *phantasia* from the level of the qualified-body. As seen in the texts from *Enn*. IV. 4 and III. 6, the fate of affection and desires are directly bound to the judgement of the rational center of the soul, through their representative images in *phantasia*. The new scheme above in the text shows us that, in this advanced state of the cathartic virtue, the soul does not produce positive judgement and opinion anymore regarding the images in *phantasia*, which have their origins in bodily affections and desires. This cathartic regulation happens in *phantasia*.

What is particularly important is that the new fourfold scheme of the cathartic virtue is not interested in ordering the desires of the qualified body any longer but rather aims at eliminating them and operating without them. This can be called the negative and purgative aspect of cathartic virtue in that it aims at a removal of the desires and passions, in order to leave the place for the higher capacities of the rational soul at the end. The regulative work of the civic virtues leaves its place to cathartic virtue, because the regulation does not put an end to the tiring relation between the soul and the qualified body.[81] Cathartic virtue initially tries to eliminate the pathos and later, by the help of this step, opens space to the higher, intellectual powers of the soul.[82] It must be said that establishment of the higher powers, which can be called the positive aspect of *katharsis*, is an important part of the cathartic process and the presence of these powers enables the soul to handle the desiderative processes better.[83]

The question of "How far down the cathartic virtue reaches in the stratified structure of psychic and bodily life?" becomes important in this context. Plotinus questions the extent of *katharsis* in *Enn.* I. 2. 5. This inquiry, according to him, will make it clear which level of identification we are supposed to strive for and "what god we are made like to and be identified with".[84] The subject of the whole chapter is about how far the separation (*to khōrizein*) is possible from the body-related desires and experiences. In accordance with his general and fundamental thesis concerning the soul, he says that

81 Dillon claims that Plotinus develops a theory of "grades of virtue", according to which the civic virtues are succeeded by the cathartic-purificatory ones. More importantly, he argues that Plotinus develops this theory because he saw an apparent conflict in the teaching of Plato, who in the *Republic* proposes a system of civic virtues and in the *Phaedo*, a system of purification (Dillon 1983, 96). Also cf. O'Meara 2003, 40.

82 Fleet puts it clearly by stating that purification and separation for the soul is "being active according to its essence" and only "by analogy" purification and separation of bodily things (Fleet 1995, 137–138).

83 Eichenlaub emphasizes the positive, active aspect of *katharsis*, too. However, in his article, finding its sources in Aristotle, he focuses on the positive, ethical value of all *pathemata* in Plotinus' conception of *katharsis* (Eichenlaub 1999, 64). See also Barnes 1942, 382.

84 *Enn*. I. 2. 5. 2.

the soul will be unaffected when it is on its own.[85] He goes on by saying that in the process of *katharsis*, the soul's relation to the pleasures will be based on necessity (*tas anankaias*), otherwise it will not even perceive them. Similarly to the passions (*thymos*), it gets rid of them as much as possible if it can (*ei dynaton*), but if not, it will not be compassionate to them.[86] Equally significant is the fact that Plotinus lets involuntary impulses (*to aproaipeton*) take place even at the advanced level of the cathartic process, provided that the related impulses never reach further than *phantasia* as an image.[87] After talking in the same vein about fears, Plotinus puts forth his thought that as soon as the rational part prevails, the tension will vanish from the picture.

> So there will be no conflict: the presence of reason will be enough; the worse part will so respect it that even this worse part itself will be upset if there is any movement at all, because it did not keep quite in the presence of its master, and will rebuke its own weakness.[88]

In this passage, Plotinus reveals a significant aspect of his cathartic ethics. The cathartic work reaches down to the level of the lower soul, which is to be understood as nature according to the previous work above, and causes a transformation there as well. However, it should be noted that the emphasis in the text, and in the preceding lines, is on *katharsis*' explicit reliance on the gradually increasing dominance of the rational soul. Whereas Plotinus mentions that the lower soul will behave as much as possible in accordance with the example of the higher part, the reason for this is not proposed as a perfect transformation in the lower part. Nor it is presented as the outcome of the rational part's deliberate effort in order to transform it. Rather, Plotinus emphasizes the activated capacities of the higher part of the soul and the very sufficiency of this for the lower parts' transformation.[89]

Actually, as mentioned by Plotinus in the preceding lines of the quoted text, the involuntary impulse (*to aproaipeton*) goes on taking place even at this level of the cathartic process, with the qualification that they stop at the level of *phantasia*.[90] The

85 For his thesis that the soul and all its activities are active and never passive, hence the soul is impassible, see *Enn*. III. 6. 5. 1–5; IV. 4. 18–21; IV. 4. 1; IV. 8. 8.

86 *Enn*. I. 2. 5. 11.

87 *Enn*. I. 2. 5. 14.

88 *Enn*. I. 2. 5. 27–31: Οὔκουν ἔσται μάχη· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ παρὼν ὁ λόγος, ὃν τὸ χεῖρον αἰδέσεται, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χεῖρον δυσχερᾶναι, ἐάν τι ὅλως κινηθῇ, ὅτι μὴ ἡσυχίαν ἦγε παρόντος τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ ἀσθένειαν αὑτῷ ἐπιτιμῆσαι.

89 Kalligas says that after possessing the higher virtues, the person will not governed by any deliberate intention of moderating the affections, but their moderation and elimination will come about as a concomitant of his conversion (Kalligas 2014, 148).

90 *Enn*. I. 2. 5. 14. In the following chapter of the same book however, Plotinus states that our aim must be to be God rather than be out of sin, hence signifies a further level (*Enn*. I. 2. 6. 1–3). He goes on by

pathos in the body still goes on, given that the body incessantly strives for better unity with the soul.[91] In addition, *physis* goes on transmitting the affections of the qualified-body to the whole soul, if not itself already revoked some of the demands of the body. However, the more the rational part grows in presence, the less turmoil takes place in *phantasia*, hence in the soul on the whole. The rational part has a growing awareness of the things going on in *phantasia* and does not use its cognitive capacities in the construction of images corresponding to affective states, nor give way to the fleeting images which could appear to further progress. Thus, *phantasia* now becomes a faculty more or less consisting of higher intellectual content, rather than being a locus of appearances which are body and sensation related. The "presence" (*parōn*) of reason which the philosopher points out is an extension of the rational capacities of the soul which make it possible that the higher and the lower parts of the soul are now in direct touch, hence neighbours.

Plotinus gives practical advice concerning the relation of *katharsis* and the faculty of *phantasia*. He states that in order to get to the awareness of the ongoing noetic activity in the soul, attention should be paid by turning (*epistrephein*) our apprehensive power inwards to the inner workings of the soul.[92] One must deliberately aspire to distinguish the lower, sensual contents in *phantasia* from the higher, intellectual ones.[93] Nevertheless, since even the contents of the higher *phantasia* are merely images (whereas they are images of genuine noetic content) the next step is to transcend from the images to the originals. Plotinus depicts this process as fitting or adopting (*epharmozō*) the images to the realities they represent.[94] The end of the cathartic process signifies the end of the representational processes as well. The soul's *katharsis* can only be needed as long as the soul descends from its pure state in *Nous* and by this way acquires capacities of memory, discursive thought and perception, all of which find their locus in *phantasia*.

saying that if there are still involuntary impulses at this stage, the person is like "a god or spirit who is double", but if not, the person is basically a god (*Enn*. I. 2. 6. 3ff.). Nevertheless, I think that this stage already signifies a level beyond any *phantasia*, the level of *Nous* or even beyond. Correspondingly, I take it that it does not affect the argument above proposing that the regulation of the lower parts of the soul is left behind after a while and concentration is put upon the higher powers. It must also be mentioned that in the following lines Plotinus starts explaining his view that beyond the level of soul, in *Nous*, there is no virtue anymore (hence no *katharsis*) but there is the immediate contact with the paradigms of the virtues (Enn. I. 2. 6. 13ff).

91 *Enn*. IV. 4. 20. 5–8: ἀλλὰ ὃ σῶμα μέν ἐστιν, ἐθέλει δὲ μὴ μόνον σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ κινήσεις ἐκτήσατο πλέον ἢ αὐτή, καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπίκτησιν ἠνάγκασται τρέπεσθαι·.

92 *Enn*. V. 1. 12. 12–20.

93 In this text, Plotinus, contrary to the passages of IV. 3. 30–31, prefers using the perceptive faculty (*aisthēsis*) instead of *phantasia*. However, together with Atkinson in his commentary, it can plausibly be taken to mean that Plotinus has the same faculty in mind (Atkinson 1983, 245). Atkinson adds that the use of *phantasia* in the latter treatises (instead of *aisthēsis*) marks a refinement in Plotinus' psychological thinking and vocabulary.

94 *Enn*. I. 2. 4. 24–25.

Conclusion

Plotinian psychology is designed around the faculty of *phantasia*, and *katharsis* is essentially based on reforming this psychology by clearing up *phantasia* and later on freeing the soul from this faculty altogether. This applies both to the desiderative, affective states and the cognitive, intellectual reactions to these states. *Katharsis* encompasses all and becomes a synonym for genuine virtue in general. Whereas the lower-civic virtues aim at controlling and regulating the affective and desiderative states, the higher/cathartic virtue aims at surmounting these states entirely, by a conversion of the soul to its image-making faculty, i.e. *phantasia,* and further, activating the higher intellectual capacities of the soul, which still takes place in the so-called higher *phantasia*. The goal, which is to reach an intellectual state beyond any representational and propositional activity, is what also provides the positive transformation of the lower components of the human soul and related organic activities.

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Summaries

Anna Aklan: Contradictions Around the Stoic Sage. Chapter Twenty of Plutarch's *On Stoic Self-Contradictions*

In Chapter nineteen of his *De Stoicorum repugnantiis,* Plutarch criticizes Chrysippus that the idea of the sage he presents is contradictory in parts of the Stoic philosopher's writings. Plutarch exposes the contradictions which center mainly around the mutually exclusive precepts of the private versus public life of the sage and secondly, around his money-earning occupations that both entail further contradictory corollaries. The first part of the article examines the Plutarchan passages, and in the second part an attempt is made at reconciling the contradictions using a wider range of Stoic literature. I suggest that the concepts of acting together with the cosmic law on the sage's part and his selection in accordance with nature to help whatever belongs to him can be the key elements to make a consistent interpretation of the selected Chrysippan passages. While it may be possible to make a consistent picture of the Stoic ideas regarding their concept of the wise person, we must remember that Stoicism did and does offer paradoxes both to ancient and modern inquirers.

László Bernáth: Stoicism and Frankfurtian Compatibilism

Although the free will debate of contemporary analytic philosophy lacks almost any kind of historical perspective, some scholars (for instance Zimmerman 2000; Salles 2001, 2005) have pointed out a striking similarity between Stoic approaches to free will and Frankfurt's well-known hierarchical theory (Frankfurt 1969, 1971, 1988). However, the scholarly agreement is only apparent because they disagree about the way of similarity between the Stoic and the Frankfurtian theories. The main thesis of my paper is that commentators have so far missed the crucial difference between the Stoics' approach to free will and Frankfurt's, a difference that renders the former as the superior theory. I make three main claims. In the first section, I argue that it is misleading and ultimately false to say that Frankfurt's and the Stoics' conception of free will are the same or notably similar to each other (*pace* Zimmerman 2000). Nevertheless, in the second section I show that there is indeed a relevant similarity between the two approaches. Both of them provide a semi-compatibilist reason- and reflectivity-based theory of moral responsibility. Finally, in the third section, I describe the difference that I take to be the most relevant between these theories regarding the problem of moral responsibility. I consider this difference as a crucial one because a serious disadvantage of the Frankfurtian view follows therefrom.

Ágoston Guba: Desire in *Ennead* IV. 3–4

In my paper I examine Plotinus' theory of desire in his middle period, which can be found in the most elaborated way in *Ennead* IV. 3–4 . Plotinus describes the desire by the terms of sense-perception: while physical affection (*pathos*) belongs only to the body, the propositional activity (*krisis*), which is based on the former, belongs to the soul. In the first part of my paper I will analyse IV. 3. 28, which deals with the connection between the memory and desire. Keeping in mind Plotinus' convictions about the impassibility of the soul, I will argue that here, instead of the disposition of the soul Plotinus speaks about that of the body which can be regarded as the part of affection in the process of desire. In the second chapter, I am going to examine IV. 4. 20-21 and demonstrate that Plotinus uses a triadic structure in the process of desire, parts of which are the so-qualified body, nature (*physis*) and the superior soul. In addition, I would also like to demonstrate that the Plotinian concept of nature goes beyond its original Aristotelian or Stoic framework.

Viktor Ilievski: Stoic Influences on Plotinus' Theodicy?

The aim of this paper is twofold: a) to identify the Stoic-attempted solutions to the problem of evil, allegedly appropriated by Plotinus and made use of in his main work on theodicy, which was divided by Porphyry into two treatises and published under the titles *On Providence* I. and II. (*Ennead* III. 2 and 3); and b) to demonstrate that the most significant theodicean strategies applied by the Stoics and later utilized by Plotinus are either of direct Platonic origin, or else might have been inspired by certain passages from Plato's dialogues. As a side issue, it will be shown that the Stoic answers to the problem of evil that do not concur with the Platonic approach – with a single exception – are not taken into consideration by Plotinus. This is not to say that the Stoics' contributions to the field of theodicy exerted no influence on Plotinus, but that in the counterfactual scenario where they never wrote on providence and theodicy, Plotinus would have nevertheless been able to compose a theodicy that is very similar to the present one, relying chiefly, if not exclusively, on Platonic sources and his own ideas.

Gábor Kendeffy: The Use of the Stoic Concept of *Phronēsis* by Irenaeus and Lactantius

The Stoic concept of practical wisdom and the stoic Idea of the necessary conjunction of good and evil implicitly combined by Stoics themselves can be found in the works of

early Christian thinkers like Irenaeus, the bishop of Lyons and Lactantius, the African apologist. Both authors tried to reconcile the Stoic and the biblical concepts of wisdom, and both located this hybrid concept in the history of salvation. Irenaeus did this in a somewhat isolated section of his anti-heretic work, *Against Heresies*. As for Lactantius, he combined them in the *Divine Institutes* and in the *Epitome*, with the doctrine expounded by Seneca on the providential training of virtue by the adversaries. These conceptions were incorporated by the African theologian into his dualistic theological system in a very substantial way, serving to give account for why Satan was produced and allowed to operate by God. These are integrated into Lactantius' idea of divine deception, which is inherent to his doctrine of the two ways.

İlker Kısa: *Katharsis* and *Phantasia* in Plotinus' Thought

The Plotinian virtue of *katharsis* is heavily integrated with his teaching on the concept of *phantasia*, which is the image-making faculty in his system. The processes of image-making and formation of mental representations are very intricate in the philosopher's thought, finding its start at the level of the organic, living body, which is alive thanks to the presence of the soul within. The last step into the other end of the spectrum is reason (*dianoia*), which has the role of judgement about the contents found in *phantasia*. In this article, I argue that the Plotinian cathartic virtue aims at the transformation of the relation of this faculty and reason. In this way, reason firstly stops busying itself with the lower content which takes place in *phantasia* and secondly, thanks to the first step, identifies more and more with the higher content, which also belongs to *phantasia* as a faculty of the soul which unfolds the content of the divine intellect, *Nous*. *Katharsis*' extended work upwards is also key for the transformation of the lower components of the human soul and reduction of the demands of bodily life to its natural minimum. Thus, intellectual philosophical work is what provides the necessary step thanks to which the desiderative and affective states change and upgrade.

Zülfükar Emir Özer: *Chaosmos* Against the Metaphysics of One, or a Defence Against Badiou's Criticism on Deleuze

Alain Badiou asserts that Deleuze's philosophy is a reintroduction of the metaphysics of One, although Deleuze tries to overcome it. He thinks that the univocity of Being in Deleuze's philosophy is a sign of the contingent and coherent cosmos that is the unity of all beings. For Badiou, the reason why Deleuze's understanding falls back to a metaphysical point is its strong affiliation with Stoic philosophy throughout all his

works. Indeed, for Deleuze, Stoicism promises a new understanding that overcomes the opposition between the Presocratics and Platonism. The Stoic concept of *lekta* – i.e. events-effects – is very prominent according to Deleuze as well. However, Deleuze's understanding diverges from Stoicism regarding their understanding of cosmos. Deleuze reintroduces the concepts of *chaosmos* and Nietzsche's eternal recurrence, by which he overcomes the alleged problems Badiou depicts.

Ádám Smrcz: When the Stoic Chameleon Came Across the Cylinder. Stoicism and the Matter of Confessions

This paper analyses the relationship between Justus Lipsius' earlier and later thought on causation, and it claims that a major shift did take place between the author's earlier stance (outlined in his *De Constantia and Politica sive Civilis Doctrina*) and his theories elaborated in later works (mainly in his *Physiologia Stoicorum*). While in his early works Lipsius endorsed a semi-compatibilist view (claiming that humans were not endowed with free will, but still, they could be held responsible for their actions), later in his life, he adopted a more libertarian stance. The paper does not only aim to challenge such theses of contemporary scholarship which claim that Lipsius held a mostly homogenous stance throughout his life, but it also intends to highlight the confessional importance of the shift between his earlier and later views: while his earlier works were written in a Calvinist milieu, his latter writings were authored after his recatholisation, and the two facts – according to this paper – are interrelated. Lipsian Neostoicism, hence, was not only intended to harmonize Stoicism with Christianity in general – as mainstream scholarship holds –, but with particular confessions as well.

Authors

Anna Aklan, Ph.D., Global Teaching Fellow (Eötvös Loránd University – Central European University)
Contact: Aklan_Anna@phd.ceu.edu
http://ceu.academia.edu/AklanAnnaKatalin

László Bernáth, Young Research Fellow (Hungarian Academy of Sciences), External Lecturer (Pázmány Péter University)
Contact: Bernath.Laszlo@btk.mta.hu
http://independent.academia.edu/LászlóBernáth

Ágoston Guba, Doctoral Candidate (Eötvös Loránd University)
Contact: gubaagoston@gmail.com

Viktor Ilievski, Postdoctoral Researcher (IRH-ICUB, University of Bucharest)
Contact: filotey@gmail.com
https://unibuc.academia.edu/ViktorIlievski

Gábor Kendeffy, Associate Professor (Károli Gáspár University)
Contact: kendeffy.gabor@kre.hu
http://kre.academia.edu/GáborKendeffy

İlker Kısa:, Doctoral Student (Eötvös Loránd University)
Contact: kisa.ilker@gmail.com

Zülfükar Emir Özer, Research Assistant (Université Lille 3 and Ankara University)
Contact: zozeremir@gmail.com
https://univ-lille3.academia.edu/EmirÖzer

John Sellars, Ph.D., Lecturer (Royal Holloway, University of London), Visiting Research Fellow (King's College London)
Contact: john.sellars@kcl.ac.uk

Ádám Smrcz, Research Assistant (Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Doctoral Student (Eötvös Loránd University)
Contact: smrczadam@gmail.com
http://elte.academia.edu/AdamSmrcz

List of Abbreviations

Acad.	Cicero: *On Academic Skepticism*
Adv. Haer.	Iraneus*: Against Heresies*
Adv. Math.	Sextus Empiricus: *Against the Mathematicians*
Comm. Not.	Plutarch: *Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions*
Diss.	Epictetus: *Discourses*
Div. Inst.	Lactantius: *Divine Institutes*
DK	Diels–Kranz: *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*
DL	Diogenes Laertius: *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*
Ench.	Epictetus: *Handbook*
Enn.	Plotinus: *Enneads*
Fin.	Cicero: *On Moral Ends*
LS	Long–Sedley: *The Hellenistic Philosophers*
Med.	Marcus Aurelius: *Meditations*
PH	Sextus Empiricus: *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*
Prov.	Seneca: *On Providence*
St. Rep.	Plutarch: *On Stoic Self-Contradictions*
Stob.	Stobaeus: *Anthology*
SVF	Arnim: *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*


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