


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par

M. EMERIC LUKINICH



**BUDAPEST
HONGRIE**

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Országos Széchényi Könyvtár



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FR. IULIANI ILLUSTRANTES.

Prooemium.

Iulianus, fr. Prov. Hungariae Ord. Praed. anno D. 1235 profectus est ad visendos consanguineos Hungaros, quos trans flumen Tanain (hodie: Don) in quadam parte confinii Europae et Asiae incolere compertum est.

Iulianus, cum duo comites revertissent, tertius autem in itinere mortuus esset, periculis perfunctus, id quod sibi proposuerat, gloriose peregit. Peragravit horrida et inculta Alaniae, vasta et deserta Kergis-terrae, saltus silvosos montis Ural et immensa plana Russiae.

Iuliani iter nobis Hungaris maxime memorabile est. In hoc enim itinere Asiae Hungaros reperit in Magna Hungaria, de qua adhuc nihil constabat. Hungaria Maior vel H. Antiqua 2000 chiliometra meridiem versus ad lacum Caspium sita erat. Haec est illa terra, cuius in bulla Ioannis XXII, papae Avoniensis mentio fit.¹

Tum Iulianus primus nuntium, quem ipse acceperat, Tartaros irruptionem parare, in Europam pertulit.

Deinde Iulianus fuit primus Europaeorum exploratorum, qui ex Asia certas et testatas res adtulit demonstravitque ibi quoque homines et non portenta commenticia habitare, id quod iis temporibus vulgo creditum et in academiis traditum est.

Idem explorator geographicus tantum terrarum occidentali-

¹ Vide, *Raynaldus*: *Annales Ecclesiastici* XV. ad a. 1329. nr. 96. — *G. Golubovich* O. F. M.: *Biblioteca Bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell'oriente francescano*, 1215—1300. Tom. III. pag. 354—357 etc. — *Bendefy*: *Az ázsiai magyarok megtérése, Jeretány országa*. *Theologia* IV. (1936), 4., pp. 1—16. Budapest.

bus notum fecit, quanta est tota Australia, ut breviter dicam: Iulianus est Columbus Orientis.

Sed his rebus confectis anno 1237 se denuo ad Asiae Hungaros rediturum statuit, licet non esset nescius ferocissimos Mongo- los tamquam procellam brevi in plana Russiae se effusuros esse, non territus est feroci gente Tartarorum, nec pavescebat exercitus eorum citato cursu advolantes.

Iuliani iter non tantum in geographicis est memorabile. Cum enim ab eo incipit aetas geographicarum indagacionum tum aperuit viam missionibus catholicis Orientis ulterioris. Nisi Iulianus exstisset, non Ioh. Piano de Carpini, non Will. de Rubruk, non Marcus Polo itinera sua suscepissent. Nisi Iulianus viam praeisset, Asia interior multis tantum saeculis post investigari potuisset.

His de causis fortissimi viri iter per totum orbem terrarum fama pervulgatum dignum duximus, cuius memoria sollemniter celebraretur.

Eventus indagacionum mearum biographicarum, geographico- historicarum, earumque diuturnarum et accuratissimarum duobus voluminibus separatim eduntur.² Hoc autem volumine itineris Iuliani codices manu scriptos nova via et ratione summa cum fide ordinatos et concinnatos publicavi. Exempla codicum excepta editione Hormayriana, nonnisi ope methodi infrarubrae confecta sub prelum misi. (Codices in hunc modum transcripti multo facilius leguntur, quam autographa ipsa et correctionum vestigia continuo apparent).

Editionem hanc duae res ratam faciunt: una, quod codicum autographa non facile adiri possunt, altera, quod in editionibus, quae adhuc prodierunt, complura locorum geographicorum et personarum nomina varie et vitiose scripta sunt, quae errorum et falsarum interpretationum multitudini locum dederunt itaque factum est, ut etiam ipse Iulianus impugnaretur. Secundum investigationes meas Iulianiani itineris sex codices novimus, quorum tres fortissimi monachi prius, tres vero alterum iter enarrant.

Codicum ope photographiarum autographarum cum professore Georgio Balanyi diligenter se comparatos prorsus inter se congruere cognovimus.

Facere non possum, quin hoc loco professori Balanyi pro

² *Bendefy*: Az ismeretlen Juliánusz. Az első magyar ázsia kutató élet- rajza és kritikai méltatása. Bp., 1936. (1—1920. 8 térképpel és 46 képpel.) Stephaneum.

opere et cura laboris plena, quam mihi promptam officiosamque praebuit, omnium primum gratias agam atque habeam summas.

Gratias maximas ago professori Emerico V á r a d y, quod libenter requisivit a me expetitos codices Vaticanos et eos phototypice exscribendos curavit. Eidemque debemus novam accuratamque codicum descriptionem.

Rogatu meo eadem opera perfuncti sunt director Musei Nationalis Hungarici Cantabrigiae, et Florentiae Ordo Dominicanorum, pro qua eis hoc loco gratias ago.

Iuliani itineris codices manu scripti.

Monachi Iuliani itineris primum in Magnam Hungariam facti descriptio protocollo Richardi servata est. Adhuc hanc descriptionem memorabilem solum uno voluminum „Libri censuum”, qui in tabulario Vaticano est, contineri credebamus. Cum Iuliani itineris anno septingentesimo circumacto vitae eius et duobus itineribus operam navarem, viam itineris mihi designanti maxima inde exorta est difficultas, quod in libris impressis nomina locorum variant atque discrepant inter se.¹

Contuli igitur textus editionum Desericzkyanae, Theinerianae et Fejérpatakyanae Latinos ex codicibus exscriptos publici iuris factos. Collatis codicibus statui textus prioris et duarum posteriorum editionum graves et sententiae integritati repugnantes discrepantias plures esse quam triginta omnesque discrepantias supra ducentas esse. Ex quo conieci complura narrationis exemplaria superesse et in manus diversorum editorum protocolli varia exemplaria venisse.

Scrutanti mihi contigit varia Richardiani protocolli exemplaria invenire. Haec sunt:

¹ Editiones descriptionis fr. Richardi sunt sequentes: *Jos. Inn. Desericzky (Desericzky)*: De initiis ac maioribus Hung. commentarii. Budae, 1748. — *Pray*: Annales veteres Hunorum, Avarum et Hungarorum. 1761. — *Bél András*: Solemnia Magistrorum philosophiae et artium creandorum in diem Jovis h. e. D. III. martii indicit atque ad ea concelebranda invitat ord. phil. Decanus Car. Andr. Bel. Lipsiae, 1763. — *Fejér György*: Codex diplomaticus Hungariae. IV. 1. 50—57. — *Endlicher*: Rerum Hung. Mon. Arpadiana, Sangalli, 1849. — *Theiner A.*: Vetera Mon. Hist. Hung. Tom. I. Romae, 1859. — *Szabó Károly*: Magyarország. tört. forrásai. Bpest, 1861. II. füz. — *Fejérpataky L.* (Fraknoi összehasonlítása): A magy. honf. kútfői. Bpest, 1900. Harum editionum tantum Desericzkyana, Theineriana et Fejérpatakyana habent codices manu scriptos pro fundamento, ceterae ex aliqua harum editionum depromptae sunt.

1. Descriptio codicis „Liber censuum Romanae ecclesiae” in scripti et nota „Miscell. Arm. XV t. 1.” insigniti, qui in Castello Angeli tabularii Vaticani asservatur. Hunc primus Petrus Köppen geographus Russicus reperit rogatus a Georgio Fejér ut primae Desericzkyanae editionis textum cum eius autographo compareret. Köppen hoc mandatum Desericzkyum, cum protocollum ederet, textu „Libri censuum” usum esse existimans perfecit. (Köppen titulum recogniti codicis: „Liber censuum” notum fecit.) Theiner cum hoc rescivisset iam Richardianum „Libri censuum” edidit. Textus, quem edidit, est tam accurate descriptus, ut Fejérpataky, qui eodem textu uteretur, vix quidquam relictus est, ad corrigendum Theinerianum textum.

In usum eius Guilielmus Fraknoi textum ad prelum praeparatum cum codice „Libri censuum” a. 1898—99 comparavit.

„Liber censuum” Richardiani protocolli vetustissimum fortasse eiusdem aetatis videtur continere exemplum. Codex pulcherrimus ab initio usque ad finem eadem manu scriptus, quia in narratione itineris nullum apparet correctionum vestigium, vix primitus scriptus, sed transcriptus putandus est. „Libri censuum” textus, ut antiquissimus tamdiu pro indagacionum nostrarum fundamento habendus est, donec protocollum primitus scriptum aut probabiliter antiquissimum comparet.

2. In tabulario Vaticano Richardiani protocolli alius codex custoditur, quem Desericzky a. 1745 invenit. Tametsi Desericzky codicis numerum (965) in opusculo suo commemoravit. Köppen non invenit contulitque — ut supra memoravimus — cum textu „Libri censuum”.

Neque quisquam mirabatur, Dudik codicem in opere „Iter Romanum” in scripto enarravisse eiusque titulo in medium prolato („Diversa ad historiam pertinentia”) ostendisse codicem exempla scriptorum diversorum tabularii Vaticani in usum Iohannis II (1350—1364) confecta continere. Singule scripta textumque paginarum 200—207, qui „De facto Ungariae magnae a fr. Ricardo ord. praedicatorum invento tempore Gregorii IX.” in scriptus est, copiose tractavit.²

3. Richardiani protocolli adhuc omnino ignotum atque posterioribus (XIV—XV) saeculis scriptum exemplum meis communicationibus usus in collectione Florentinae Bibliothecae Riccardianae invenit Emericus Várady. Codex narrationem itineris continens, est

² Dudik B. Fr.: *Iter Romanum*. Wien, 1855. I. p. 287, 327.

exemplum „Libri censuum”. Eundemque titulum habet, notam vero hanc: „Riccardianus 228”.

Collatione exemplorum multae textus partes accurate diiudicari possunt, velut confirmari potest in textu Theineriano pro: „in civitatem Bundaz” recte positum esse: „in civitatem Bundam”. Ex discrepantiis in exemplum subiicimus hanc: Saracenorum quaedam provincia Uela (Vela) in „Libro censuum” Uela, in codice numeri 965. Ueda appellatur. Mirum est, quod in „Libro censuum” appellatio „ord. praedicatorum” a nomine Ricardi abest.

Iulianus alterum iter ipse epistola narrat, cuius tres textus circumferuntur, ut:

1. Exemplum Hormayrianum.³ Huius autographum hodie ignoramus. I. Fr. Böhmer in quodam tabulario Germaniae vel Austriae invenisse videtur. Exemplum, quod confecerat, ita Hormayro edendum tradidit, ut locum, ubi epistola custoditur, non indicaret.

2. Exemplum epistolae Dudik-ianum⁴ Pal. Lat. 443. n. codex Castelli Angeli continet.

3. Exemplum Fraknoianum⁵ codex parvus Castelli Angeli nota Vat. Lat. 4161 insignitus asservatur.

In codice Castelli Angeli epistolae eiusdem aetatis esse videntur. Nomina personarum in utroque vitiose, contra in editione Hormayriana mirum quam recte scripta sunt. Ex quo cum colligere possumus Böhmerum epistolae autographum invenisse, tum suspicari, aliud quoddam exemplum in quo librarius nomina aetatis suae scripturae convenienter correxisset, reperisse.

Conditio et natura omnium trium litterarum eadem est, sed quaeque earum habet variantes partes velut exempli Fraknoniani pars haec: „... tartari prius habitabant Romam”, in textu Dudikiano sic scribitur: „... tartari habitabant terram, quam nunc Cumani inhabitant”. Scriptor codicis in priore exemplo pro vocabulo *terram* „Romam” scripsit, sententiam autem secundariam, quae insequitur, omisit. In classe discrepantiarum altera nimis longa additamenta inveniuntur. Editionis Hormayrianae additamento narratur, in quorum manibus fuerit exemplum epistolae Iulianianae per Böhmerum repertum. Hoc additamentum veri-

³ *Br. Hormayr-Hortenburg J.:* Die goldene Chronik von Hohenschwangau. München, 1842. II. 67—69.

⁴ L. c.

⁵ Solum hoc exempl. habet titulum: Epistola de vita Tartarorum. Vide: *Lukcsics Pál,* Levélt. Közl. II. 162—163. Bp., 1924.

simile est, ut ab archiepiscopo Aquileiensi scriptum sit. Additamento exempli Frakoniani accurate de numero exercitus Tartarorum redditur ratio. Exemplum epistolae per Dudik inventum ideo in rem est, quod Iulianus solum hoc res gestas narrat quatuor monachorum Hungaricorum ord. praedicatorum, qui dum ipse, ut de itinere priore papae Gregorio IX. referret, Romae moratur, in Magnam Hungariam missi sunt.

Una cum Iulianiani itineris descriptione edimus epistolam fr. Iohancae, hoc litterarum monumentum cognitu dignissimum vitae Bascardiensis continet narrationem anni 1320. Epistolae verba facilia sunt intellectu, nisi quod haec Bascardia non eadem est atque terra fluvio Ethyl adiacens, quam Iulianus perlustravit, ubi gentes Hungaricae incolebant, sed inde ad Orientem vergens usque ad iugum montis Ural porrigebatur.

Sibur vel Sybur, cuius in epistola mentio fit, non hodiernam Sibiriam significat, sed pristinam in hodierna regione Tjumen sitam provinciam, cuius capiti nomen Sibir vel Sibur inditum erat. Huius prisci oppidi parietinae locis oppido Tobolsk vicinis ad confluentem fluminum Irtis et Tobol nostra quoque aetate conspiciuntur.

Codicem, quo haec memorabilis et magni momenti epistola continetur, et qui in Bibliotheca Academiae Cantabrigiensis nota „D. II. 3. 7” insignitus asservatur, A. C. Moule invenit, qui eius primam descriptionem in Arch. Francisc. (series XVII. ann. 1924) exhibuit. Ibidem edidit duas alias descriptiones eiusdem codicis, quae ad missiones orientales Franciscanorum pertinent.

Codicum bibliographica descriptio.

I. Codex Vaticanus, „Miscell. Arm. XV. t. 1.” insignitus et „Liber censuum Romane ecclesie” inscriptus est in indice. (fol. 1r, moderna numeri nota). Auctor codicis est: Cencius camerarius, qui post nomine III. Innocentii papa factus est. Codex chartaceus Romae in Tabulario Castelli S. Angeli custoditur. Foliorum ambitus 27.5×35.5 cmetra efficiunt, spatii litteris conscripti $(9.0 + 9.0) \times 27.0$ cmetra. Litterae circiter 3—4 mm. alta, intervalla linearum 6—8 mm. lata sunt. Codex nitidissimus ab initio usque ad finem eadem manu scriptus est. Textus nec litteris initialibus, nec aliis ornamentis insignes sunt, solum inscriptio, quae in principio textus invenitur, est litteris rubris scripta.

Folia perperam erant numeris notata, nam folium 209. sub-

secutum est 301, quare totus codex novis numeris insignitus est et cum olim textus protocolli Richardiani 445^r—446^v foliis continebatur, secundum novam numerationem foliis 364^r—365^v continetur.

In foliis novae numerationis documenta anni 1232—33 Hungariam spectantia inveniuntur. In foliis 364^r—365^v insequitur iter Iuliani per fr. Richardum enarratum, quod inscribitur: De facto Ungarie Magne.

II. Codex Florentinus nota „Riccardianus 228" insignitus, qui idem „Liber Censuum Romanae Ecclesiae" inscribitur. Auctor eius ignotus est. Codex chartaceus in Bibliotheca Riccardiana (Florentia) custoditur. (Haec bibliotheca occlusa per directorium Bibl. Laurentianae administratur.)

Foliorum ambitus 16.5×21.5 cm., spatii textus 10.3×14.0 cm. efficiunt. Litterae 1.5 mm. altae, intervalla linearum 3.3 mm. lata sunt. Textus totus una eademque manu exaratus est.

Textus narrationis, quae item „De facto Ungarie Magne" inscribitur, foliis 328^r—329^v continetur. Codicis argumentum idem est ac supra descripti. Textus paucissimis adhibitis abbreviationibus facillime omnium legitur et paucissima obscura habet. Compluribus locis lucem nobis adfert, ubi ceteri codices obscuri sunt.

In linea, quae sexto folii 328^r versui respondet, hanc legimus marginalem adnotationem: „Ungnaria (sic!) maior & minor". Textus nihil habet ornamentorum, tantum littera I quattuor lineas alta est exornata.

III. Codex Vaticanus nota „Pal. Lat. 965" signatus inscribitur: „Diversa ad historiam pertinentia". Librarius codicis saec. XIV. chartacei ignotus est. Hic codex Romae in Tab. Cast. S. Angeli asservatur. Foliorum ambitus 24.0×33.6 cm., spatii textus forma duarum columnarum 22.2×(7.0+7.0) cm. efficiunt. Litterae 3.0 mm. altae, intervalla linearum 7.2 mm. lata sunt.

Codex iussu Ioannis II. regis Francogallorum in ipsius proprium usum est totus ornatissime confectus. Ab initio usque ad finem est eadem manu scriptus. Folium 1^r—^v habet indicem particulatim dispositum. In versu extremo folii 1^r, id est in primo versu folii 1^v legitur Richardianae narrationis titulus est: „De facto Ungariae magnae invente per fratrem Richardum ordinis fratrum praedicatorum tempore domini Gregorii papae IX. 200."

Itaque iam in hoc magnopere errat codex, quod contra atque ceteri codices Richardum dominicanum (fr. ord. praed.) esse facit et Magnam Hungariam repertam ei ascribit. In titulo codicis libra-

rius hunc errorem correxit quidem, sed appellatio Ord. Praed. mansit: „... fr. Richardo ord. frat. pred...”

Textus codicis incipit sic: „In ista secunda parte cronicarum continetur: Origo regum Franciae usque ad regem Ioannem praesentem: Franci origine fuere Troiani etc. (fol. 2—89). — Comites Tholosani (fol. 97). — De tempore celebrationis Conciliorum. De officio Missae etc. (fol. 97—200). De facto Ungarie Magne a fr. Richardo ord. praed. invento tempore Gregorii IX (fol. 200—207). Hymbertus de Romanis, de his quae tractanda videbantur in concilio Lugdunensi 1274 in Kalend. Maii (fol. 208—209). Descriptio Galliarum (fol. —238). Descriptio Italiae (fol. —240). Descriptio Historiae, descriptio Foroiulii (fol. —242). De peccato originali etc. M S ultimus: „De octo translationibus bibliae”.

Textus incipit in columna sinistra fol. 201r, explicitque in fol. 203v. Haec est nota moderna, antiqua enim textum fol. 200r—202v habebant.

IV. Unum exemplar Iulianianae epistolae primus invenit Fredericus Böhmer, ut videtur, in quodam archivo Austriae vel Germaniae et descripsit. Hunc descriptum codicem br. Iosepho Hormayr—Hortenburg publicandum tradidit non indicato fonte. Hunc codicem hodie quoque ignoramus.

V. Codex Vaticanus nota „Pal. Lat. 443” insignitus, qui „Ioannes Leodiensis, Sermones per annum” inscribitur, continet alterum exemplar Iulianianae epistolae. Foliorum ambitus 23.5×32.8 cm., conscripti textus spatii in folio 105r 7.9×15.5 cm., folio 105v 20.5×29.0 cm. efficiunt. Litterae sunt circa 1.0—1.2 mm. altae, linearum intervalla 5—6 mm. lata. Codex a compluribus librariis exaratus est. Iulianiana epistola pulcherrime et singulari cura descriptus est. Scripturae color est niger, qui in fuscum abiit. Textus codicis incipit: „Mag. Iohannis Leodiensis sermones totius anni (fol. 2—97) — „Attributiones, ordine litterarum digestae (fol. 98—105). Postea insequitur *epistola fr. Iuliani ad episcopum Perutinum* de vita, secta et origine Tartarorum (fol. 105r—v), „Danieli sermones” (fol. 106) etc.

VI. Codex Vaticanus „Vat. Lat. 4161” insignitus sic inscribitur: „Petri Alphonsi disciplina”. Hic codex habet Iulianianae epistolae tertium et notum exemplar. Librarium eius ignoramus. Codex hic chartaceus forma minima item in Tab. Cast. S. Angeli asservatur. Foliorum ambitus 12.8×17.5 cm., textus spatii 7.5×10.5 cm. efficiunt. Litterae circiter 2.3 mm. altae, linearum intervalla 4.8 mm. lata sunt. Codicis argumentum et titulus concordant. Textus est totus nigris litteris exaratus, titulus (epistola de vita tar-

tarorum) et verba ultima tantum (Explicit epistola . . . etc.) sunt rubris litteris scripta, id quod epistolam Iuliani iam tum magni aestimatam fuisse declarat.

Argumentum esse varium fol. 43r duae marginales adnotationes ostendunt.

De itineribus fr. Iuliani.

In hac parte operis breviter complecti volumus omnes explanationes, quas in opere nostro, quod inscriptum est: *Az ismeretlen Juliánusz accurate enarravimus. Definienda est nobis regio prioris et alterius itineris, item definienda sunt nobis itinerum tempora, hae quaestiones enim nondum solutae sunt.*

Quia descriptio fr. Richardi admodum brevis est, explanatio rerum et utilis et necessaria videtur. Huius partis est descriptionis errores corrigere, res et facta praetentorum temporum ordinate exposita repraesentare.

Inventis codicibus adhuc prorsus ignotis nova via aperienda est ad singulas partes in ordinem redigendas. Unus adhuc conatus ad descriptionem Iulianiani itineris ordinandam et reficiendam ipsiusque itineris repraesentationem captus est, sed frustra (Ö. R. Passuth et H. Marczali). De itineris tempore variae opiniones erant vulgatae. His de causis infra complectimur omnes itineris partes atque particulatim explicabimus.

1. De peregrinatione fr. Ottonis.

Praecursor fr. Iuliani fr. Otto erat. Nam cum fratres O. P. Hungari in chronicis codicibusque legissent Hungaros in Orientis partibus, in confinio Asiae et Europae Hungaros incolere, quattuor fratres circiter annis 1231—1232 ad eos investigandos ubicumque habitarent, missi sunt. Tres autem horum fratrum laboribus ingentibus exantlatis morbo absumpti sunt, quartus vero, nomine Otto ut mercator advenit in quamdam terram ultimam, ubi aliquot viros, Hungarica lingua loquentes invenit, cum quibus collocutus quidem est, sed in patriam eorum morbo implicitus non perrexit, sed celerrime in Hungariam revertit (1234—1235) „pro fratribus pluribus assumendis, qui cum ipso redeuntes fidem illis catholicam praedicarent”.

„Sed multis fractus laboribus post octavum reditus sui diem, *cum omnem viam illos quaerendi exposuisset*, migravit ad Christum.”

Nescimus, quae loca fr. Otto sociique peragraverint, sed cer-

tum est eos ad terras in chronicis nominatas missos esse. Quia de itinere Ottonis nullam descriptionem habemus, nonnisi coniunctura assequimur fratrem, quem supra memoravimus, flumen Volgam attigisse. Fr. Otto deserta Kergisiana Volgae adiacentia cognovisse putandus est. Otto enim narraverat quaedam fratribus Hungaricis de terra Ungarorum, qui iuxta flumen magnum Ethyl incolebant. Sic enim intelligere possumus, cur fr. Iulianus sociique eius per deserta infinita provinciam Saracenorum versus Uelam nominatam peregrinati sint. Hi nisi instructi essent ad hoc iter, fame cruciati, pannosi, periculis obiecti rebus incertis pedibus iter assiduo ad Orientem tendentes non fecissent.

Fr. Otto, sociique eius exploratores primi et fortissimi Ungarorum Asiaticorum omnes mortui sunt. Solum mente cogitare possumus, quos labores quasque aerumnas illi viri perpessi sint.

2. De regione itineris Iuliani.

Iulianus et socii ex quo monasterio egressi se itineri commiserint, certo liquidoque decerni nequit quidem, verisimile tamen est eos ex monasterio vel Pestiensi vel Budensi, Albaregiensi, Strigoniensi profectos esse. Ex quoquoque monasterio egressi sunt, certum est Buda relicta per Albam Regiam, Quinqueecclesias, Belgradum, Nissam (Nis), Serdicam (Sophia), Philippopolin atque Adrianopolin transeuntes ad moenia Constantinopolis pervenisse.

Hac trita notaque nationum via perrexerunt iam anno 1096 Godofredi Bouillon, a. 1146 Conradi III et Ludovici VII., anno 1190 Frederici I. crucigeri exercitus.

Haec itineris regio prorsus convenit fr. Richardi descriptioni, re vera enim haec via per Bulgariam principis Assani et Thraciam, quae tum temporis Romania vocabatur, duxit. Recte vero fr. Richardus ait quattuor monachos Hungaros, cum princeps Assan regis Belae IV. socer esset, atque ita monachi ab eo tutelam et auxilium sperarent, iter fecisse. Sed eum hoc recte affirmasse iam inde apparet, quod tum duae Bulgariae erant: una earum fuit regnum Assani, altera Magna Bulgaria vel Bileria ad Volgam sita.

Romania, quae hic commemoratur est hodie pars Turciae Europaeae, tum ad imperium Byzantinum pertinuit. Haec terra, planities fluvii Maricae a Turcis nostra quoque aetate Rumili appellatur. Sed hoc non ad rem.

Constantinopoli navi porro vecti sunt Sichiam versus. Tempestates maris vehementes effugituri oram Asiae Minoris praetervecti 33 dies consumpserant, dum Matricam pervenerunt.

Sichia vel Zichia provincia, quae a scriptoribus Byzantinis saepe hoc nomine memoratur, ad oram orientem spectantem ponti Euxini sita est. Terra eius fere tota montibus Caucasiis tecta erat. Populus „Zich" vel, ut in relationibus Iuliani legitur, „Sich" est idem ac Circassiorum. Circassi ipsorum lingua adighe, Georgiensium et Ossetorum: Kazakh, olim clivos ad occidentem vergentes incolebant, sed eorum erant loca plana fluvii Kuban atque etiam magna pars Cabardiae. A scriptoribus Byzantinis nomine Zichi Circassii et affines eorum Abasgi appellantur, qui sine dubio Bulgaris ad Meotim degentibus, Casaris et Hungaris vicini erant, cum quibus sanguinis et rerum gestarum vinculo coniuncti erant, cuius rei vestigia in nostra quoque lingua comparent.¹

Circassii iam antiquissimis temporibus Christianae religioni accesserant ut videtur — regina Thamare Georgiensium, sed saeculo XVII magnam partem Mohametani facti sunt. Gens bellicosa, libertatis studiosissima, eximia statura inclitae Cosacorum legionis decus.

Matrica, oppidum medii aevi, loco hodierni Taman, in lingua arenosa 62 chm. longa et 20—30 chm. lata, quae alluvione fluvii Kuban efficitur. Hac lingua arenosa et e regione sita paeninsula Kercsi (Gazaria medii aevi) mare Asovicum a ponto Euxino dirimitur. Antiquis temporibus erat Graecorum opulentissima colonia. Phanagoria appellata quae saeculis X—XI in possessionem Circassiorum venit, colonisque expulsis Matrica appellabatur.

In tabulis geographicis Italorum medii aevi Matrica vel Matarcha appellata invenitur. Rubruk Matricam et Matrigam — Edrisi Matracham vel Matrikam vocat. „To Tamatarcha" Constantini Porphyrogeneti idem est ac hoc oppidum. In ore populi nomen prolixum brevius factum formam „ta Matarcha" accepit.

In Russicis fontibus Matrica nomine Tumutorokan appellatur. Hoc nomen originem ab oppidi Kazarico procuratore traxisse et ex vocabulis Taman-Tarkan compositum esse ducitur. Haec forma composita ad singulas litteras cum forma vera et prima, quae a Constantino Porphyrogeneto adfertur. Taman vel tamyán est vocabulum Turcorum priscum, significatque dignitatem et honorem nobilem. Tarkan est nomen personae.

Monachi relicta Matrica iter secundum flumen Kuban perrexerunt ad oppidum hodiernum Ladowskaja, ubi flumen rectangulo facto flectitur. Nunc iterum recta via ad colles Ergeni con-

¹ *Munkácsi B.*: Magyar műveltségi szók kaukázusi nyelvekben. (Nyelvtud. Közl. 1893. XXIII. 119 p.) Bp.

tendebant, quo sine ulla difficultate pervenerunt. In Richardi protocollo de hac levi et expedita parte itineris nulla fit mentio, nec enim memorabilem duxit.

Si ea, quae postea facta sunt, respicimus, intelligimus Richardum narratione non omnia complexum esse, utpote quae non sit commentarius itinerarius, sed protocollum duobus annis post projectionem scriptum. Atqui duorum annorum laboribus, rebus adversis, incommodis memoria temporum tranquillorum oblitteratur qua nisi itineris memorabilia et adversa, non retinentur.

Relictis collibus Ergeni in partem occidentalem per flumen Volgam diremptorum Kirgiz (Kherkiensium) desertorum venerunt. Tredecim dies in desertis laboribus fatigabantur nullis hominum, domuum, stirpium ac herbarum usquam vestigiis repertis, cum tandem iterum in terras cultas et habitabiles pervenerunt Alaniae.

Alania, Alanorum terra iis temporibus ad lacum Caspium in media parte, quam fluvii Terek, Kuma et Jajk circumfluunt, porrecta iacebat. Alani, gen Sarmaticae' gentis, migrationibus nationum magnam adepti sunt auctoritatem. Alania iam anno a. Ch. natum a scriptoribus rerum Sinensium nomine an-cai, vel potius a-la-na appellantur.

Arabes eos *ossi*, Russi *jassi*, finitimaeque Caucasiarum gentes *ossi* vel *osset* nominant. Ammianus Marcellinus quoque, scriptor rerum Romanarum, sicut Iulianus inter se semper discordare dicit regibus carere, esse sub compluribus indicibus. Res Alanicas XII. saeculi Iulianus epistola verissima accurata depinxit. Monachi Hungari, cum hiems ingruisset sex menses in Alania commorari coacti, in magnum quoddam oppidum, quod dicitur Itil vel Torgikan, hodie Astrachan, se receperunt, ubi „unus fratrum, sacerdos, coclearia et quaedam alia praeparavit, pro quibus aliquando parum de milio receperunt“.

Verum in tantas angustias inciderunt, ut duos sociorum sub corona vendituri essent, ut pretio venditorum mancipiorum duo alteri iter pergere possent. Res cum ad irritum cecidisset, duo socii redibant in Hungariam. Quia in narratione in itinere periisse non dicuntur, in regnum Belae regis incolumes pervenisse eos statuendum est.

Quaesiverit aliquis, certumne sit monachos revera in Torgikan hibernum tempus peregrisse? Certum esse dicamus oportet, cum haec opinio sola in narrationem quadrat. Legimus enim incolas loci agris colendis operam navasse, in silvas lignatum isse venaliciariam exercuisse. Quae cum ita sint, sequitur, ut quattuor viri, minutis bilibusque rebus vendendis vitam sustentare potuerint.

Ex duabus rebus, quas supra memoravimus, apparet eos in quodam magno oppido commoratos esse. Iis temporibus mercatus mancipiorum in Torgikan fuisse, quo mercatores populorum septentrionalium Turcorum et Bulgarorum commearent, testes sunt scriptores antiqui. Plana fluviorum Volgae et Aktubae loca agris silvisque abundabant.

Verisimile est mercatu verno fr. Juliano et Gerardo cum quibusdam septentrionalibus, fortasse Bulgaris mercatoribus domum redituris familiaritatem intercessisse. Isti erant „comites pagani”, qui auditione fortasse accepissent ad fluvium Ethyl Hungaros incolere.

Tandem Iulianus et Gerardus, postquam in Astrahan, — ubi frigus interdum ad -35 C° descendit! sex menses hibernati sunt, in viam se dederunt, ut per vastam kirgiz-desertorum interiorum orientalem partem transeuntes propius proposito accederent. Post 37 dierum laboriosum iter in oppidum Bunda provinciae Uelae in terram cuiusdam muhametanae religionis (saracенаe) et Turcicae stirpis populi.

In opusculo meo, quod supra memoravi, exquisite et accurate demonstravi terram Uelam in locis fluvio Uil adiacentibus sitam fuisse nomenque a fluvio accepisse. Fluvius Uil medius est inter fluvios Ural et Emba. Est autem proprius desertorum fluvius. Oritur ab origine fontium fluvii Kobda meridiem et occidentem versus ex duabus partibus et aqua eius, postcursum aliquot centum chilometrorum minoribus maioribusve lacubus salsis absumitur postquam maximam aquae partem bibula desertorum arena absorbit.

De oppido Bunda nihil certi constat. Scriptores Russici incolas Bundae eosdem ac Burtas esse volebant. Sed hanc opinionem putidam et ineptam duco, cuius causa inde orta est, quod vocabulum „Bundam” perperam legerant (Bundaz). Si in nomina agrorum ibidem loci inquiretur, solutio quaestionis sperari poterit.

De incolis Uelae et de principetu Ogotaj-i annalibus Sinensibus Jüan-csao-pi-si edocemur. Iam demonstravi populi in fonte laudato *ubadzsigi* appellati nomine incolas Uelae atque totum populum *Oguz* significari. Oguz-i (= gaga uz, albi uz, albi Cumanii) sunt affines Cumanorum proximi. Itaque facile eorum commercium habuit.^{1a}

Gerardus in terra Saracenorum mortuus ibidemque sepultus

^{1a} *Bendefy*: Egykorú kínai kútfők a mongolok 1237—42. évi hadjárataról. Bp., 1937.

est. Posthac Iulianus sacerdotis cuiusdam Mohametani servus factus est, ut iter continuare posset. Atque pervenit cum sacerdote in quoddam Bulgariae magnum oppidum, quod ut loco laudato demonstravi, in locis hodierno oppido Orenburg vicinis situm erat.

Hic obviam factus est mulieri cuidam Hungaricae, quae ex terra Hungarorum in Bileriam nuptum data est, id quod documento est Hungaros cum Bulgaris sanguinis vinculo coniunctos fuisse. Mulier haec monachum edocuit ad locum sibi propositum prope accessisse. „Itinere“, inquit mulier, „bidui facto invenies gentes Hungaricas ad magnum flumen Ethyl“. Hoc bidui iter equestre fuisse ponendum est, siquidem mulier ex gente equestri locorum intervalla hoc modo aestimabat. Sic iter 140—160 chilometrorum, quod Iuliano conficiendum erat, non repugnant mulieris verbis.

Invenit igitur monachus gentes Hungaricas quaesitas „iuxta fl. magnum Ethyl“. Hoc flumen non Volga, sed Bjelaja fuit, quem admodum Basciri Bjelajam etiam saec. XIX. Ak Idel appellabant.²

Iulianus terram, quam Hungari incolebant „magnam Hungariam“ vocavit. Prof. Iulius Németh demonstravit scriptores aevi orientales Hungaros tum „magyar“ (modžger, možerjan) tum „baskir“ (bašdžird, bašdžirt, bašgird, bašgirt, baškirt...) immo etiam „ungar“ (hunkar) nominum formis appellavisse. Atque idem fontibus penitus perscrutatis *baskir et magyar eadem gentis nomina esse atque iis unum eundemque populum designari*. Inter argumenta, quae adfert, primo loco ponenda sunt duo gentis nomina baskirea, quibus memoria germanorum quondam Hungarorum servatur. Haec sunt ea nomina: *Ienej* (= Jenő) et *Iurmaty*, alia forma *Surmaty* (= Gyarmat).³

Scrutanti mihi novissime in manus incidit fr. Henrici relatio (ex codice Musei Britannici „Nero A IX“ signato), in qua textus in appendice adlatus invenitur.⁴ Hic leguntur verba haec: „Sed iam de proximo baptisatus est per fr. Henricum Alemanum filius cuiusdam magni millenarii vocatus *Tharmagar*“. Inquisitionibus Iulii Németh gravissimis innixis pro certo affirmare licet nominis

² *Pauler Gy.*: Budai Szemle CIII. 342. p. — *Bendefy* l. c. p. 58.

³ *Németh Gyula*: A honfoglaló magyarság kialakulása. Bp., 1930. Cap. VI. pp. 299—309.

⁴ Vide p. 49, n. 4.

veram formam Tarchan Magar fuisse,⁵ quae ad verbum expressa *magyar alkirály* id est viceregem Hungaricum significat. Sic prorsus intelligitur haec sententia: „Item Estokis dominus totius Baschardie”. His verbis luculente probantur, quae prof. Iulius Németh demonstravit atque etiam docemur circa annos 1320—30 Baskir-Hungaros, qui sub dicione et imperio essent, suae stirpis viceregem habuisse et tantum hunc supereminuisse alienigenam procuratorem, qui toti Baschardie praeesset.

Unde Hungari Iulianiani ad haec loca devenerunt? Ex inquisitionibus et investigationibus historicis diligentissimis cognovimus gentes Finno-Ugricas priscis temporibus loca inter Volgam, Kamam et Bjelajam sita incoluisse indeque circiter saeculo a. Ch. n. primo tempore procedente adultam et coalescentem gentem „Praehungaricam” (Előmagyar) ad clivos montis Ural ad orientem spectantes transmigrasse atque ibidem cum Onogur-Turcis artissimo vinculo coniunctam esse. Horum commercio humanitas cultusque crevit adolevitque et saec. V. Hungari corroborati et expoliti in loca inter Pontum Euxinum et Lacum Caspium media migraverunt.

Hic cum in vicinitatem Bulgarorum venissent, gentes finitima loca incolentes cum Bulgaris etiam coniunctione sanguinis copulati sunt. Haec erat causa, quod quaedam particula gentium Hungaricarum Bulgaris, cum hi initio saeculi VII. in Bileriam iuxta Volgam redissent, se adiunxit et loca fluvium Ethyl circumiacentia et Bulgarorum terrae vicina consedit.⁶

Hungari terrae circum fluvium Ethyl sitae sciebant quidem esse alios Hungaros, tamen, ubi habitarent, ignorabant. Contra Hungari christiani regis Belae tantum ex chronicis suspicabantur iuxta Maeotim alicubi in confinio Europae et Asiae aliam Hungariam esse, sed Hungaros iuxta fluvium Ethyl non noverant. Iuliano est laus tribuenda hos investigavisse et horum nuntium adtulisse.

Id, quod Iulianus de religione Hungarorum paganorum memoriae tradidit, veritatis modum excedit. Etiamsi verum sit Hungaros hos paganos fuisse, tamen deos, immo etiam auctoribus Arabicis scriptoribus, divas quasdam et strigas daemonas esse credebant et id quod summum est, Deum omnipotentissimum co-

⁵ L. c. 255—261. pp.

⁶ Vide: *Hóman* (—*Szekfü*), *Magyar történet*. I. Bp., 1928 & 1936. — *Gombocz*: *Az őshaza és a nemzeti hagyomány*. II. (Nyelvtud. Közl. 1923. p. 1—33.) Budapest.

lebant. Priscorum temporum sunt vocabula: „Hadúr” (dominus exercituum et tribuum) et „magyarok Istene” (Deus Hungarorum). Nec dubitari potest, quin Hungari monachi Iuliani, propter conjunctiones cum Byzantinis, religionis christianae gnari fuerint. Fr. Iohancae epistola confirmatur christianos in eadem terra ita diffusos fuisse, ut christicularum numerus Mohametanorum exaequaret.

In Richardi narratione scriptum legimus Hungaros paganos lac equinum et sanguinem potavisse. Lac equinum sine dubio lac equae fermentatum erat, quod nomine „kumisz” innotuit. Hanc potionem indigenae Russiae meridionalis et Asiae Interioris in deliciis habent et in itinere utribus pelliciis secum portant.

In editione Georgii Fejér pro „lac equinum” „lac et vinum” manifesto errore scriptum invenimus. Vinum Hungaris loca ad fluvium Ethyl incolentibus notum esse non poterat, vel si noverant, vulgo eo non utebantur, in eo enim tractu vitis non gignitur.

Atque vix credi potest animalium sanguinem potavisse; multo verisimilius est, ut eum coctum comederint.

Iulianus ineunte fere Iunio a. 1236 ad ripam fluvii Ethyl advenit et 3—4 hebdomadibus inter suos Hungaros consumptis, domum redire statuit. Cur autem, cum necesse esset, ut corpus reficeret, tantam adhibuerit festinationem, Richardi narratione satis probatur.

Domum rediens non ea via perrexit, qua venerat, sed auctoribus Hungaris paganis viam per Nisnijnovgorod—Vladimir—Rjesan—Černigov—Kiow—Halič—Budam ferentem ingressus est. Qua re confirmatur hos Hungaros commercio mercatorum Kiowensium coniunctos prisca via usos esse, quae iam inde ab aetate aenea inter Velemszentvid—Moskwa et Jekaterinburg frequentabatur.

Iulianus a rege Bela IV. brevi post reditum Romam missus est, ut de rebus gestis et eventibus itineris ad papam Gregorium IX ipse praesens referret. Relatione verbis facta a Richardo publice perscriptum est protocollum.

3. De Iuliani itinere altero.

Dum Iulianus Romae commorabatur, auctore rege Bela quattuor dominicani monachi, ut Magnam Hungariam iterum quaerent et de Tartarorum consiliis certiores fierint, iter susceperunt, sed a principe Magnae Laudameriae (Vladimir) capti iter vertere coacti sunt. Cum de his nihil allatum esset, rex Bela Iulianum

SIBIR 32

42 CSERDYN

25 WEDIN

SUSDAL 18 47 16 BOLGARI
MAGNA LAUDAMERIA 19 NISZIJNOVGOROD
MOSCOW 20 21 ORJASAN 15 ORENBURG

26 MOXEL 14 BUNDA (?)

27 VORONEZ
Orgenhuara (?)

22 CERNIGOV
23 KIOW

28 SURAI

24 HALIC

29 ORNACH

43 ITIL TORGICAN
AsTrachan

BUDA 2
ALBA REGIA 3
St. Iohannes Bekhwar

1 PEST

30 CHERSON

42 MAGYAR
Magyar, Madjar

44 VENEZIA 4
QUINQUE ECCL
Quinque

SOLDAJA 31 41 MATRICA
ABCHASIA 40

39 MALCHAITAE
34 TIFLIS

5 ALBA GRAECA
Handaricidvar - Beograd

NISSA 6

38 ROMA

7 SERDICA

33 ERSERUM

PHILIPPOL 8 9
ADRIANOPOLIS 10 CONSTANTINOPOLIS

35 TEBRIS
TEHERAN 36

ANTIOCHIA 43

37 TRIPOLIS



Itinera fratris Iuliani
 anno Domini
 1235—36. et 1237—38.

iterum ablegavit, qui cum tribus sociis ordinis nunc breviori via, qua domum redux venerat, propere Magnam Hungariam versus contenderunt.

Transeuntes per Halič, Poloniam et Russiam, tandem ad ultimos fines Russiae venerunt, ubi iam fugientibus Hungaris occurrerunt. Res innumerabiles, quas Iulianus de Tartarorum expeditione tribus epistolis memoriae prodidit, inter pretiosissimos fontes numerantur.

„Dux Gurguta I" nemo alius est, quam Dsingis kan (1203—1227). At Iulianus iam accepit Gurgutam mortem obiisse et ei succedentem filium Chayn (ver. Chaym) regnare. Hoc vocabulum hic Ogotaj kan significat, sed non eius nomen, sed titulum indicat (Chayn = chain > chanus = princeps, dux Tartarorum). „Chayn" vero, qui regi Belae bellum denuntiavit, certo est Batu kan, dux summus exercitus occidentalis. Iulianus et socii opperiebantur, dum exercitus Tartarorum Vladimir in speciem soleae ferreae circumvenirent. Quo facto, fugam petiverunt. His rebus coacti sunt per exercitus Mongolicos pervadentes per terram Cumaniae domum contendere. Anno 1238 vere in monasterium redierunt.

4. De temporibus itinerum Iuliani.

Iam titulo Richardianae narrationis tempus Iulianiani itineris, cum regnante papa Gregorio IX factum esse ait (1227—1241). Item scriptum legimus Belam, *nunc* regem monachorum iter adiuvisse. Hic vocabulum *nunc* singulare quiddam habet significans itinere suscepto primo Belam nondum Hungariae legitimum regem fuisse. Cum vero rex Andreas II. anno 1235 mense Septembri mortuus esset, Iulianus et socii necessario ante Septembrem anni 1235 se itineri commiserunt.

Priusquam tempus prioris itineris definire persequeremur, alterius itineris tempus definiendum esse putamus, quod facile erit, cum sciamus civitatem Bolgara a Tartaris a. 1237 autumno deletam esse, cum oppidum Susdal, quod tempore alterius peregrinationis Iuliani integrum esset, vere a. 1238 a saevientibus Tartaris excisum esset.⁷ Quae cum ita sint, Iulianum hieme a. 1237—1238 in Russia peregrinatum esse statuendum est.

Nunc redeamus ad prioris itineris tempus definiendum. Ex narratione duo tempora novimus. Constat autem die 21 Iunii a

⁷ *Hammer-Purgstall: Geschichte d. Goldenen Horde*, p. 104—105.

Hungaris eum revertisse („Incipit autem frater redire tribus diebus ante festum nativitatis beati Iohannis baptistae”) atque sci- mus die 27 Decembris montes Carpathios et fauces Vereckienses transgressum esse („... secundo die post nativitatem domini Un- garie portas intravit”).

Die 27 Decembris tantum ad annum 1236 referri potest, unde sequitur, ut etiam dies 21 Iunii ad hunc annum pertineat.

In libro meo iam laudato rationem itineris Iuliani prioris chro- nologicam composui atque eam ibidem argumentis copiose explicavi. Iulianus sociique eius circiter primis diebus mensis Mai profecti iter 1500 chilometrorum comitantibus regis Belae satellitibus equo vecti usque ad Constantinopolim uno fere mense confecerunt. Iter marinum triginta trium dierum erat. Matricam ergo circa 2. Iulii advenerunt, quo in oppido 50 dies eis morandum fuit, dum auxi- lium primae uxoris principis impetrarent, ergo circa diem 21 Augusti iter perrexerunt.

Matrica a Torgikan 800 chilometris separatur. Huius inter- valli pars 260 chilometra longa per deserta extenditur, quam eos 13 dies confecisse narratione docemur.

Si fingimus eos singulis diebus ex 540 chilometris 30 chilo- metra — expedito itinere — confecisse, colligitur eos a. 1235 exe- unte Septembre in Torgikan advenisse.

Hic propter frigora hiberna sex menses morantes nonnisi circa 20 diem Martii a. 1236 iter continuare poterant. Narratione docemur die 37. post profectionem ex Torgikan in terram Uela venisse atque extremo Aprili in oppido Bunda fuisse. Fr. Gerar- dus 7. die Mai in terra mortuus est, cum Iulianus iam circa diem 20. Mai ad loca circum hodiernum Orenburg venit, ubi aliquot dies frustra quaeritans in mulierem, quae rectam viam monstra- ret, incidit.

Ex his efficitur, ut ultimis Mai vel primis Iunii diebus in ripa fluvii Ethyl Iulianus primos Hungaros offenderit.

Diem reditus diem 21 Iunii 1236 fuisse certo nobis constat. Adversis fluminibus Bjelaja et Kama navigio vehenti expeditum iter fuit. Primo Iulii die pervenit ad locum, ubi Kama in Volgam influit, post exeunte mense ad fines terrae Morduanorum se con- tulit. Quindecim diebus adverso fluvio vectus fines Mordvae traie- cit. Uno alterove die transacto medio Augusto in oppidum Nisnij- novgorod venit.

Verisimile videtur ut Augusto exeunte ex oppido Vladimir equo profectus sit. In itinere tantum quietis sumens, ne equus

veloci cūrsu enecaretur, circa 15. diem Septembris in Rjezan, die 22 Octobris in Csernigov, die 5 Novembris in Kiow, medio Decembri in Halics venit. Die 27. Decembris montes Carpathios transcendit. Circa diem 8. Ianuarii a. 1237 videtur in monasterium Budense rediisse, ut regi Belae de rebus gestis referret. Ex narratione suspicamur Iulianum Romae circiter vere anni 1237 fuisse atque inde, vel cum tardissime, mense Iunio domum revertisse.

OSZK

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

TEXTUS MANUSCRIPTORUM.

I.

Descriptio itineris prioris fr. Iuliani a fr. Richardo.

Exempl. Cod. Tabularii Castellii S. Angeli sg.: „Miscell. Arm. XV. t. 1.“
fol. 364^{r-v}, 365^{r-v}. Inventum a *Petro Köppen* et iterum ab *Augustino Theiner*. (Vide tab. I—IV.)

[f. 364 r, dextr.] <i>De facto Ungarie Magne a fratre Ri-</i>	35
<i>cardo invento tempore Domini Gregorii pape noni.</i>	36
Inventum fuit in Gestis Un- garorum ¹ christianorum,	37
quod esset alia Ungaria maior, de qua septem duces cum	38, 39
po- pulis suis egressi fuerant, ut ha- [f. 364 r, sinistr.] bitandi	40
quererent sibi locum, eo quod terra ipsorum multitudinem	1
inhabitantium sustinere non posset; qui cum multa regna per-	2, 3
transissent et destruxissent, tandem venerunt in terram, que	4
nunc Ungaria dicitur, tunc vero dicebatur pascua Romano-	5
rum, quam ad inhabitandum pre terris ceteris elegerunt,	6
subiectis sibi populis, qui tunc habitabant ibidem. ² Ubi tan-	7, 8
dem per sanctum Stephanum primum ipsorum regem ad	9
fidem catholicam sunt reversi, prioribus Ungaris, a quibus	10
isti descenderant, in infidelitate permanentibus, sicut et	11
hodie sunt pagani. Fratres igitur predicatorum, hiis in gestis	12, 13
Un- garorum inventis, compassi Ungaris, a quibus se de-	14
scendisse noverunt, quod adhuc in erro- re infidelitatis ma-	15
nerent, miserunt IIII-or de fratribus ad illos querendum,	16, 17
ubicumque eos possent, iuvante domino, invenire. Sciebant	18
per scripta antiquorum, quod ad orientem essent; ubi essent,	19
penitus ignorabant. Predicti vero fratres, qui missi fuerant,	20
multis se exponen- tes laboribus, per mare, per terras eos	21, 22
usque post annum tertium quesiverunt; nec tamen propter	23
mul- ta viarum pericula poterant invenire; uno ipsorum	24
excepto sacerdote, nomine Otto, qui tantum sub mercato-	25
ris nomine processit, qui in quodam regno paganorum quos-	26
dam de lingua illa invenit, ³ per quos certus efficiebatur, ad	27

¹ In chronicis Hungaricis et originis Occidentalis.

² Idem textus invenitur etiam in narratione Anonymi, notarii Belae regis. (Anonymus: *Gesta Ungarorum*. Vide: *A magyar honfoglalás kút-fői*, Bp., 1900.)

³ Scil. Ungaros, quos quaerebat.

28,29 quas partes | manerent; set illorum provinciam non intra-
30 vit; | ymmo in Ungariam est reversus pro fratribus pluribus |
31 assumendis, qui cum ipso redeuntes fidem | illis catholicam
32 predicarent. Set multis fra- | ctis⁴ laboribus post octavum
33,34 reditus sui di- | em, cum omnem viam illos querendi expo- |
35 suisset, migravit ad Christum. Fratres vero | predicatorum
36 infidelium conversionem deside- | rantes, quatuor fratres ad
37,38 querendam gentem | predictam iterato miserunt; qui ac-
39 cepta | fratrum suorum benedictione, habitu regulari in se-
40 cula- | rem mutato, barbis et capillis ad modum | [f. 364 v,
1 dextr.] paganorum nutritis, per Bulgariam Assani⁵ | et per
2 Romaniam⁶ cum ducatu et expensis | domini Bele nunc regis
3,4 Ungarie usque Con- | stantinopolim pervenerunt; ubi intran-
5 tes | in mare per triginta et tres dies venerunt | in terram,
6 que vocatur Sychia,⁷ in civitate, que | Matrica⁸ nuncupatur;
7,8 quorum dux | et populi se christianos dicunt, habentes lite-
9 ras | et sacerdotes Grecos. Princeps centum dicitur | habere
10 uxores; omnes viri capud omnino | radunt et barbas nutriunt
11,12 delicate, no- | bilibus exceptis, qui in signum nobilitatis |
13 super auriculam sinistram paucos relin- | quunt capillos, ce-
14 tera parte capitis tota ra- | sa. Ubi propter societatis spem,
15,16 quam expecta- | bant, quinquaginta diebus moram fecerunt. |
17 Deus autem dedit ipsis gratiam in conspectu domine, | que
18 super centum uxores regis maior erat, | ita ut mirabili eos
19,20 amplexaretur affectu, | et in omnibus eis necessariis provide-
21 bat. In- | de progressi consilio et adiutorio dicte domine |
22 per desertum, ubi nec domos, nec homines in- | venerunt,
23 diebus tresdecim transiverunt; | ibique venerunt in terram,
24,25 que Alania⁹ dicitur, | ubi christiani et pagani mixtum ma-
26 nent; quot | sunt ville, tot sunt duces, quorum nullus | ad
27 alium habet subiectionis respectum. Ibi conti- | nua est guerra
28 ducis contra ducem, ville contra | villam. Tempore arandi
29,30 omnes unius ville | homines armati simul ad Campum va-
31 dunt, | simul omnes metunt, et contiguo terre spatio | hec
32 exercent, et quicquid extra villas sive in | lignis acquirendis
33,34 sive in aliis operis | habent, vadunt omnes pariter et armati;
35 nec | postea¹⁰ ullo modo pauci per totam septimanam | de
36 villis suis quacumque de causa egredi abs- | que periculo
37 personarum, excepta sola die dominica | a mane usque ad
38 vesperam, que in tanta devo- | tione apud illos habetur, quod
39,40 tunc quilibet, | quantumcumque mali fecerit, vel quocumque
1 habeat | [f. 364 v, sinistr.] adversarios, securus potest sive
2 nudus, | sive armatus, etiam inter illos, quorum | parentes

⁴ Recte: fractus...

⁵ Per Bulgariam iuxta fl. Danubium.

⁶ Thracia, pars Imp. Byzantini. Vide p. 10.

⁷ Vide p. 11.

⁸ Vide p. 11.

⁹ Vide p. 12.

¹⁰ Recte: possunt...

occidit, vel quibus alia mala | intulit, ambulare. Illi qui 3
 christiano ibi | censentur nomine, hoc observant, quod de | 4, 5
 vase illo nec bibunt, nec comedunt, | in quo murem mori con- 6
 tingit, vel de | quo canis comedit, nisi prius a suo | presbitero 7, 8
 fuerit benedictum; et qui aliter facit, | a christianitate effici- 9
 tur alienus; et si | quis eorum quocumque casu hominem oc- 10, 11
 ci- | dit, pro eo nec penitentiam nec benedictionem | accipit; 12
 ymo apud eos homicidium | pro nichilo reputatur. Crucem 13
 in tanta ha- | bent reverentia, quod pauperes sive indige- | ne 14, 15
 sive advene, qui multitudinem secum | habere non possunt, 16
 si crucem qualemcumque | super astam cum vexillo posue- 17
 rint, et eleva- | tam portaverint, tam inter christianos, | quam 18, 19
 inter paganos, omni tempore secure incedunt. | De loco illo 20
 fratres societatem habere non po- | terant procedendi, prop- 21
 ter timorem Tarta- | rorum, qui dicebantur esse vicini; prop- 22, 23
 ter quod | duobus ex ipsis revertentibus, reliquis | duobus 24
 perseverantibus in eadem terra, in | penuria maxima sex 25
 mensibus sunt mora- | ti, infra quos nec panem, nec potum | 26, 27
 preter aquam habebant; set unus fratrum, sacerdos, | coclea- 28
 ria et quedam alia preparavit, pro | quibus aliquando parum 29
 de milio recepe- | runt, de quo nonnisi tenuerit, nimis | po- 30, 31
 terant sustentari, unde decreverunt | duos ex se vendere, 32
 quorum pretio alii cep- | tum iter perficerent; sed non inve- 33, 34
 nerunt | emptores, quia arare vel molere nescive- | runt. Unde 35
 necessitate coacti duo | ex eis de illis partibus versus Unga- 36, 37
 riam | redierunt, alii vero remanserunt ibidem, | volentes¹¹ 38
 desistere ab itinere inchoato. | Tandem ipsi habita quorum- 39, 40
 dam paganorum | [f. 365 r, dextr.] societate, iter arripientes 1
 per deserti | solitudinem triginta septem diebus | continue 2
 iverunt; infra quos vigin- | ti duobus panibus subcinericiis 3, 4
 usi | sunt, adeo parvis, quod in quinque diebus | potuissent 5
 et non ad satietatem totali- | ter comedisse. Unde frater, qui 6, 7
 sanus | quidem set sine viribus fuit, cum maximo | labore 8
 et dolore, libenter tamen de deser- | to eduxit. Infirmus 9
 autem frater plus sa- | no quam sibi compatiens illi frequen- 10, 11
 ter | dicebat, quod ipsum in deserto relinqueret | tanquam 12
 mortuum et truncum inutilem, | ne per occupationem ipsius 13
 negligenter¹² opus | dei; qui nequaquam consensit, set usque | 14, 15
 ad mortem ipsius secum in itinere labora- | vit. Pagani co- 16
 mites vie ipsorum, creden- | tes ipsos habere pecuniam, fere 17, 18
 eos oc- | ciderant perquirendo. Transito autem | deserto sine 19
 omni via et semita, tricesi- | mo septimo die venerunt in 20, 21
 terram Sar- | racenorum, que vocatur Uela,¹³ in civita- | tem 22
 Bundam;¹⁴ ubi nullo modo apud | aliquem poterant hospitium 23
 obtinere, sed in | campo manere oportuit, in pluvia | et fri- 24, 25

¹¹ Recte: nolentes ...

¹² Sic! — Recte: negligeret ...

¹³ Vide p. 13.

¹⁴ Ibid.

26 gore. Diebus¹⁵ vero frater, qui sanus | fuit, sibi et infirmo
 27, 28 fratri helemosinam | per civitatem querebat, et tam in potu |
 29 quam in aliis potuit invenire, precipue | a principe civitatis,
 30, 31 qui eum christianum | esse intelligens, libenter ei helemosi- |
 32 nas porrigebat, quia tam princeps quam | populus illius re-
 33, 34 gionis publice dicunt, | quod cito fieri debebant christiani
 35 et ecclesie | Romane subesse. Inde ad aliam civi- | tatem
 36 processerunt, ubi predictus frater | infirmus, Gerardus no-
 37, 38 mine sacerdos, in do- | mo Sarraceni, qui eos propter Deum
 39 rece- | pit, in domino obdormivit, et est sepultus | ibidem.
 40 Postmodum frater Iulianus, qui | [f. 365 r, sinistr.] solus re-
 1 manserat, nesciens qualiter pos- | set habere processum, fac-
 2, 3 tus est serviens unius | sarraceni sacerdotis et uxoris ipsius,
 4 qui | fuit in magnam bulgariam¹⁶ profecturus, | quo et pariter
 5, 6 pervenerunt. Est vero mag- | na Bulgaria regnum magnum
 7 et potens, | apolentas habens civitates; set omnes sunt | pa-
 8 gani. In regno illo publicus est sermo, | quod cito debeant
 9, 10 fieri christiani, et Romane | ecclesie subiugari; set diem as-
 11 serunt se | nescire, sicut enim a suis sapientibus audi- | verunt.
 12, 13 In una magna eiusdem provin- | cie civitate, de qua dicuntur
 14 egredi quin- | quaginta milia pugnatorum, frater unam | Un-
 15 garicam mulierem invenit, que de | terra, quam querebat, ad
 16, 17 partes illas tradi- | ta fuit viro. Illa docuit fratrem vias, per |
 18 quas esset iturus, asserens quod ad duas die- | tas ipsos pos-
 19 set Ungaros, quos querebat, | procul dubio invenire; quod et
 20, 21 factum est. Inve- | nit enim eos iuxta flumen magnum ethyl;¹⁷ |
 22 qui eo viso, et quod esset Ungarus christianus, | intellecto,
 23, 24 in adventu ipsius non modicum | sunt gavisi, circumducentes
 25 eum per domos | et villas, et de rege et regno Ungaro- | rum
 26 christianorum fratrum ipsorum fideliter perqui- | rentes, et
 27 quecumque volebat, tam de fide, | quam de aliis eis propo-
 28, 29 nere, diligentissime | audiebant, quia omnino habent Un-
 30 garicum ydi- | oma, et intelligebant eum, et ipse eos. Pa- | gani
 31 sunt, nullam Dei habentes notitiam; | set nec ydola vene-
 32 rantur; set sicut bestie vi- | vunt; terras non colunt, carnes
 33, 34 equinas, lu- | pinas et huiusmodi comedunt; lac equi- | num
 35 et sanguinem bibunt. In equis et ar- | mis habundant, et stre-
 36, 37 nuissimi sunt in | bellis. Sciunt enim per relationes antiquo-
 38 rum, | quod isti Ungari ab ipsis descenderant; set | ubi es-
 39 sent ignorabant.¹⁸ Gens tartarorum | vicina est illis, set hii-
 40 dem tartari commi- | [f. 365 v, dextr.] ittentes cum eis, non
 1, 2 poterant eos in bello | devincere; ymo in primo prelio de-
 3 victi sunt | per eos. Unde ipsos sibi amicos et socios | ele-
 4 gerunt, ita quod simul iuncti quindecim | regna vastaverunt
 5, 6 omnino. In hac Un- | garorum terra dictus frater invenit
 7 thartaros | et nuntium ducis Tartarorum, qui sciebat Un- |

¹⁵ Recte: dictus.

¹⁶ Magna Bulgaria = Bileria, regnum Bulgarorum iuxta fl. Volga.

¹⁷ Fl. Ethyl id est Bjelaja; vide p. 14.

¹⁸ Scripta de Ungaris Magnae Ungariae vide pp. 14—16.

ricum, Ruthenicum, Cumanicum, Theo- | tonicum, Sarrace- 8
 nicum¹⁹ et Tartaricum; qui | dixit, quod exercitus Thartaro- 9
 rum, qui tunc ibi- | dem ad quinque dietas vicinus erat, 10, 11
 contra | Alemaniam vellet ire; set alium exercitum, | quem 12
 ad destructionem Persarum miserant, expec- | tabant. Dixit 13
 etiam idem, quod ultra terram th- | artarorum esse gens 14
 multa nimis, omnibus | hominibus altior et maior, cum capi- 15, 16
 tibus adeo | magnis, quod nullo modo videntur suis corpo- 17
 ribus | convenire, et quod eadem gens de terra sua exi- | 18
 re proponit, pugnaturi cum omnibus, qui eis resistere | vo- 19
 luerint, et vastaturi omnia regna quecumque | poterunt sub- 20
 iugare. Frater, hiis omnibus intellec- | tis, licet ab Ungaris 21
 invitaretur, ut maner- | et, donec decrevit, duplici ratione, 22
 una, quia | si regna paganorum et terra Ruthinorum, | que 23, 24
 sunt media inter Ungaros christianos | et illos, audirent, quod 25
 illi ad fidem catho- | licam invitarentur, dolerent, et vias 26, 27
 omnes | forsitan de cetero observarent, timentes, quod | si 28
 illos istis contingeret christianitate con- | iungi, omnia regna 29
 intermedia subiuga- | rent; alia ratione, quoniam cogitabat, 30, 31
 quod si eum | in brevi mori aut infirmari contingeret, | frustra 32
 tus esset labor suus, eo quod nec ipse | profecisset in illis, 33
 nec fratres Ungarie, ubi esset | genus eadem, scire possint. 34
 Cum igitur vellet | reverti, docuerunt eum hiidem Ungari 35, 36
 viam | aliquam, per quam posset citius pervenire. In- | cepit 37
 autem frater redire tribus diebus ante | festum nativitatis 38
 beati Johannis baptiste,²⁰ | et paucis diebus in via quiescens, 39, 40
 tam per | [f. 365 v, sinistr.] aquas quam per terras, secundo 1
 die post nativita- | tatem²¹ domini²² Ungarie portas intra- | 2
 vit; et tamen per Ruciam et per poloniam | eques venit. In 3
 redeundo de pre- | dicta Ungaria transivit in | fluvio regnum 4, 5
 Morduanorum quindecim | diebus, qui sunt pagani, et adeo 6
 homines | crudeles, qui pro²³ nichilo reputatur | homo ille, 7, 8
 qui multos homines non occi- | dit; et cum aliquis in via 9
 procedit, omnium | hominum capita, quos occidit, coram | 10, 11
 ipso portantur, et quanto plura coram uno | quoque portan- 12
 tur capita, tanto melior | reputatur; de capitibus vero homi- 13, 14
 num civos | faciunt, et libentius inde bibunt. | Uxorem ducere 15
 non permittitur, qui homi- | nem non occidit. Isti a prophetis 16, 17
 suis acci- | pientes, quod esse debeant christiani, miserunt | 18
 ad ducem Magne Laudamerie,²⁴ que | est terra Ruthenorum 19
 illis vicina, quod eis | mitteret sacerdotem, qui ipsis baptis- | 20, 21
 mum conferret; qui respondit, non meum | hoc est facere, set 22
 pape Romani: prope enim est tempus, | quod omnes fidem 23
 ecclesie Romane debe- | mus suscipere et eius obedientie 24, 25
 sub- | iugari. 26

¹⁹ Scil. Bulgarum.

²⁰ 21. Iunii a. 1236.

²¹ Recte: nativitatem...

²² 27. Decembris a. 1236.

²³ Recte: quod pro...

²⁴ Magna Laudameria id est Vladimir.

II.

Descriptio itineris prioris fr. Iuliani a fr. Richardo.

Exempl. Cod. Bibl. Riccardiana Florentina sg.: „Riccardianus 228.“
fol. 328^r-v, 329^r-v. Inventum ab *Emerico Várady*. (Vide tab. V—VIII.)

[f. 323 r] *De facto Ungarie Magne a fratre Riccardo*
1 *invento, tempore domini Gregorii pape noni.*

Inventum fuit in gestis Ungarorum christianorum, quod
2 esset alia Hungaria Maior, de qua septem | duces cum popu-
3 lis suis egressi fuerant, ut habitandi quererent sibi locum;
4 eo quod terra ipsorum | multitudinem inhabitantium susti-
5 nere non posset; qui cum multa regna pertransissent, et
6 destruxis- | sent, tandem venerunt in terram, que nunc Hungaria
7 dicitur; tunc vero dicebatur pascua roma- | maior et
8 norum; quam ad inhabitandum pre terris Ungnaria
9 ceteris elegerunt; subiectis sibi populis qui minor.
10 tunc habitabant | ibidem. Ubi tandem per
11 sanctum Stephanum primum ipsorum re-
12 gem ad fidem catholicam sunt reversi; priori- | bus Ungaris a
13 quibus isti descenderant, in infidelitate permanentibus; sicut
14 et hodie sunt pagani. | Fratres igitur predicatorum, hiis in
15 gestis Ungarorum inventis, compassi Ungaris a quibus se
16 descen- | disse noverunt; quod adhuc in errore infidelitatis
17 manerent; miserunt quattuor de fratribus ad il- | los que-
18 rendum, ubicumque eos possent iuvante domino invenire.
19 Sciebant enim per scripta antiquorum | quod ad orientem
20 essent; ubi essent penitus ignorabant. Predicti vero fratres
21 qui missi fuerant, multis | se exponentes laboribus per mare
22 per terras eos usque post annum tertium quesiverunt; nec
23 tamen propter | multa viarum pericula poterant invenire;
24 uno ipsorum excepto sacerdote nomine Octo, qui tantum |
25 sub mercatoris nomine processit, qui in quodam Regno paga-
26 norum quosdam de lingua illa inve- | nit; per quos certus
27 efficiebatur, ad quas partes manerent; set illorum provin-
28 ciam non intravit; in- | mo in Ungariam est reversus; pro
29 fratribus pluribus assumendis; qui cum ipso redeuntes fidem
30 illis | catholicam predicarent. Set multis fractus laboribus
31 post octavum redditus sui diem, cum | omnem viam illos
32 querendi exposuisset, migravit ad Christum. Fratres vero
33 predicatorum in- | fidelium conversionem desiderantes, quat-
34 tuor fratres ad querendam gentem predictam iterato mi- |
35 serunt; qui accepta fratrum suorum benedictione, habitu re-
36 gulari in secularem mutato, barbibus et | capillis ad modum
37 paganorum nutritis, per Bulgariam Assani, et per Romaniam
38 cum ducatu et | expensis domini Bele nunc Regis Ungarie,
39 usque Constantinopolim pervenerunt; ubi intrantes in ma- |
40 re per triginta et tres dies venerunt in terram que vocatur
41 Sychia; in civitate que Matri- | ca nuncupatur; quorum Dux
42 et populi se christianos dicunt; habentes litteras et sacer-

dotes | Grecos. Princeps centum dicitur habere uxores; om- 26
nes viri caput omnino radunt et barbas | nutriunt delicate;
nobilibus exceptis, qui in signum nobilitatis super auriculam 27
sinistram | paucos relinquunt capillos; cetera parte capitis 28
tota rasa. Ubi propter societatis spem, quam expec- | ta-
bant, quinquaginta diebus moram fecerunt. Deus autem de- 29
dit ipsis gratiam in conspectu domine, que | super centum
uxores regis maior erat, ita ut mirabili eos amplexaretur 30
affectu, et in omnibus | eis necessariis providebat. Inde pro-
gressi consilio et adiutorio dicte domine per desertum ubi 31
nec do- | mos nec homines invenerunt, diebus tredecim
transiverunt; ibique venerunt in terram, que Ala- | nia dicitur;
ubi christiani et pagani mixtim manent; quot sunt ville, 33
tot sunt duces, quorum | nullus ad alium habet subiectionis
respectum; ibi continua est guerra ducis contra du- | cem;
ville contra villam. Tempore arandi omnes unius ville homi- 35
nes armati simul ad Campum | vadunt; simul omnes metunt,
et contiguo terre spatio hec exercent; et quicquid extra vil- 36
las | [f. 328 v] sive in lignis acquirendis, sive in aliis operis 1
habent, vadunt omnes pariter et armati; nec possunt | ullo
modo pauci per totam septimanam de villis suis quacumque 2
de causa egredi absque periculo | personarum; excepta sola
die dominica; a mane usque ad vesperam que in tanta de- 3
votione aput illos | habetur, quod tunc quilibet, quantum-
cumque mali fecerit, vel quotcumque habeat adversarios, se- 4
curus | potest sive nudus sive armatus, etiam inter illos quo-
rum parentes occidit, vel quibus alia mala | intulit ambulare. 5
Illi qui christiano ibi censentur nomine, hoc observant, quod 6
de vase illo nec bi- | bunt nec comedunt, in quo murem mori
contingit, vel de quo canis comedit, nisi prius | a suo presbi- 7
tero fuerit benedictum; et qui aliter facit, a christianitate 8
efficitur alienus; et si quis eorum | quocumque casu hominem
occidit, pro eo neq penitentiam nec benedictionem accipit; 9
inmo aput | eos homicidium pro nichilo reputatur; crucem 10
in tanta habent reverentia, quod pauperes sive indige- | ne
sive advene, qui multitudinem secum habere non possunt, si 11
crucem qualemcumque super hastam | cum vexillo posuerint,
et elevatam portaverint, tam inter christianos quam inter 12
paganos, omni tempore se- | cure incedunt. De loco illo
fratres societatem habere non poterant procedendi, propter 13
timorem tar- | tarorum, qui dicebantur esse vicini; propter
quod duobus ex ipsis revertentibus, reliquis duobus per- 14
seve- | rantibus in eadem terra, in penuria maxima 15
sex mensibus sunt morati; infra quos nec panem, | nec
potum preter aquam habebant, set unus fratrum sacer- 16
dos coclearia et quedam alia prepara- | vit; pro quibus ali-
quando parum de milio receperunt; de quo non nisi tenuerit 17
nimis poterant | sustentari; unde decreverunt duos ex se 18
vendere quorum pretio alii ceptum iter perficerent; | set non
invenerunt emptores, quia arare et molere nesciverunt. Unde 19

19 necessitate coacti | duo ex eis de illis partibus versus Un-
 20 gariam redierunt; alii vero remanserunt ibidem, nolentes |
 21 desistere ab itinere inchoato. Tandem ipsi habita quorum-
 22 dam paganorum societate, iter arripien- | tes, per deserti
 23 solitudinem triginta septem diebus continue iverunt. Infra
 24 quos viginti duobus | panibus subcinericiis usi sunt; adeo
 25 parvis, quod in quinque diebus potuissent, et non ad satiet-
 26 tatem | totaliter comedisse. Unde frater, qui sanus quidem
 27 set sine viribus fuit, cum maximo labo- | re et dolore, liben-
 28 ter tamen de deserto eduxit. Infirmus autem frater plus
 29 sano quam sibi com- | patiens illi frequenter dicebat, quod
 30 ipsum in deserto relinqueret tamquam mortuum et truncum
 31 inuti- | lem, ne per occupationem ipsius negligenter¹ opus
 32 Dei; qui nequaquam consensit, set usque ad mortem | ipsius
 33 secum in itinere laboravit. Pagani comites vie ipsorum cre-
 34 dentes ipsos habere pecuniam | fere eos occiderant perqui-
 35 rendo. Transito autem deserto sine omni via et semita tri-
 36 cesimo septi- | mo die venerunt in terram sarracenorum, que
 37 vocatur Veda, in civitatem Bundaz; ubi nullo modo | apud
 38 aliquem poterant hospitium obtinere, set in campo manere
 39 oportuit; in pluvia et frigore. | Diebus² vero frater, qui sanus
 40 fuit sibi et infirmo fratri helemosynam per civitatem quere-
 41 bat, et tam in | potu quam in aliis potuit invenire; precipue
 42 a principe civitatis, qui eum christianum esse intelli- | gens
 43 libenter ei helemosynas porrigebat, quia tam princeps quam
 44 populus illius regionis pu- | blice dicunt, quod cito fieri de-
 45 bebant christiani et ecclesie Romane subesse. Inde ad aliam
 46 civitatem | processerunt, ubi predictus frater infirmus Ge-
 47 rardus nomine sacerdos in domo sarraceni, qui eos propter |
 48 Deum recepit, in domino obdormivit, et est sepultus ibidem.
 49 Postmodum frater Iulianus qui so- | lus remanserat, nesciens
 50 qualiter posset habere processum, factus est serviens unius
 51 sarraceni, | sacerdotis et uxoris ipsius, qui fuit in magnam
 52 bulgariam profecturus, quo et pariter pervenerunt. | Est vero
 53 magna Bulgaria regnum magnum et potens apulentas habens
 54 civitates, set omnes sunt | [f. 329 r] pagani. In regno illo
 55 1 publicus est sermo, quod cito debeant fieri christiani, et Ro-
 56 mane ecclesie sub- | iugari, set diem asserunt se nescire,
 57 2 sicut enim a suis sapientibus audiverunt. In una | magna
 58 3 eiusdem provincie civitate, de qua dicuntur egredi quinquag-
 59 4 inta milia pugnatorum, | frater unam Ungaricam mulierem
 60 5 invenit, que de terra quam querebat, ad partes illas tra- |
 61 dita fuit viro. Illa docuit fratrem vias, per quas esset iturus,
 62 6 asserens quod ad duas dietas ipsos | posset Ungaros, quos
 63 7 querebat procul dubio invenire, quod et factum est. Invenit
 64 8 enim eos iuxta | flumen magnum ethyl, qui eo viso et quod
 65 9 esset Ungarus christianus, intellecto, in adventu ipsius | non
 66 10 modicum sunt gavisi; circumducentes eum per domos et vil-

¹ Recte: negligeret...

² Recte: Dictus...

las, et de Rege et regno Ungarum christianorum fratrum
 ipsorum fideliter perquirentes; et quecumque volebat, tam 9
 de fide, quam de aliis eis proponere, diligentissime audie- 10
 bant; quia omnino habent Ungaricum ydioma, et intellige-
 bant eum et ipse eos; pagani sunt; nullam Dei habentes 11
 notitiam; set, nec ydola venerantur; set sicut bestie vivunt; 12
 terras non colunt; carnes equinas, lupinas et huiusmodi
 comedunt; lac equinum et sanguinem bibunt. In equis et 13
 armis habundant; et strenuissimi sunt in bellis. Sciunt enim 14
 per relationes antiquorum, quod isti Ungari ab ipsis descen-
 derant, set ubi essent, ignorabant. Gens thartarorum vicina 15
 est illis, set hii- dem thartari committentes cum eis non 16
 poterant eos in bello devincere; inmo in primo pre-lio
 devicti sunt per eos. Unde ipsos sibi amicos et socios elege- 17
 runt, ita quod simul iuncti, quin- decim regna vastaverunt
 omnino. In hac Ungarorum terra dictus frater invenit thar- 18
 taros et nuntium ducis thartarorum, qui sciebat Ungaricum, 19
 Ruthenicum, Cumanicum, Theoticum, Sarracenicum, et
 Thartaricum; qui dixit quod exercitus thartarorum, qui tunc 20
 ibidem ad quinque dietas vicinus erat, contra alemaniam 21
 vellet ire; set alium exercitum quem ad destructionem per-
 sarum miserant expectabant. Dixit etiam idem, quod ultra 22
 terram thartarorum esse gens multa nimis, omnibus ho-
 minibus altior et maior cum capitibus adeo magnis, quod 23
 nullo modo videntur suis corporibus convenire; et quod 24
 eadem gens de terra sua exire proponit, pugnaturi cum om-
 nibus qui eis resistere voluerint, et vastaturi omnia regna 25
 quecumque poterant subiugare. Frater hiis omnibus intel-
 lectis licet ab Ungaris invitaretur, ut maneret, donec decre- 26
 vit; duplici ratione. Una, quia si Regna paganorum et 27
 terra Ruthinorum que sunt media inter Ungaros christia-
 nos et illos, audirent, quod illi ad fidem catholicam invita- 28
 rentur, dolerent, et vias omnes forsitan de cetero obser- 29
 varent, timentes quod si illos istis contingeret, christianitate
 coniungi, omnia regna inter media subiugarent. Alia ratione, 30
 quoniam cogitabat, quod si eum in brevi mori aut infirmari
 contingeret, frustratus esset labor suus; eo quod nec ipse 31
 profecisset in illis, nec fratres Ungarie ubi esset gens eadem 32
 scire possint. Cum igitur vellet reverti do- cuerunt eum
 hiidem Ungari viam aliam per quam posset citius pervenire. 33
 Incepit autem frater redire tribus diebus ante festum nati- 34
 vitatis beati Iohannis baptiste; et paucis diebus in via
 quiescens, tam per aquas, quam per terras, secundo die post 35
 nativitatem domini Ungarie portas intravit; et tamen per
 Ruciam et per Poloniam eques venit. In redeundo de pre- 36
 dicta Ungaria transivit in fluvio Regnum Morduanorum 37
 quindecim diebus qui sunt pagani; et adeo homines cru-
 deles, qui³ pro nichilo reputatur homo ille, qui multos homi- 38

³ Recte: quod pro...

38 nes non occidit; et cum aliquis in | via procedit omnium
 39 hominum capita quos occidit, coram ipso portantur, et quanto
 plura | coram unoquoque portantur capita, tanto melior re-
 40 putatur; de capitibus vero hominum civos | [f. 329 v] faciunt,
 1 et libentius inde bibunt. Uxorem ducere non permittitur, qui
 hominem non occidit. | Isti a prophetis suis accipientes, quod
 2 esse debeant christiani; miserunt ad ducem magne Laudame-
 me- | rie, que est terra Ruthenorum illis vicina, quod eis
 3 mitteret sacerdotem, qui ipsis baptismum | conferret; qui
 4 respondit, non meum hoc est facere, set pape Romani, prope
 enim est tempus, quod | omnes fidem ecclesie Romane de-
 5 bemus suscipere, et eius obedientie subiugari. |

III.

Descriptio itineris prioris fr. Iuliani a fr. Richardo.

Exempl. Cod. „Pal. Lat. 965.“ fol 201r—v, 202r—v, 203r—v. Inventum a Jos. In. Desericzky et iterum a Ladislao Bendefy. (Vide tab, IX—XIV.)

1 [f. 201 r, sinistr.] *De facto Ungarie Magne, | a fratre*
 2 *Ricardo ordinis fratrum pre- | dicatorum invento tempore*
 3 *domini Gregorii noni. |*
 4,5,6 Inventum fuit | in gestis Unga- | rorum christianorum,
 7,8,9 quod | esset alia Unga- | ria maior, de | qua septem duces |
 10,11 cum populis suis egressi fuerant | Ut habitandi quererent
 12 sibi locum, | eo quod terra ipsorum multitudinem inha- | bi-
 13,14 tantium sustinere non posset. Qui | cum multa regna pertran-
 15 sissent et | destruxissent, tandem venerunt in | terram que
 16,17 nunc Ungaria dicitur, tunc | vero dicebatur pascua Roma-
 18 norum, | quam inhabitandam pre terris ceteris ele- | gerunt,
 19,20 subiectis sibi populis, qui | tunc habitabant ibidem. Ubi tan-
 21 dem | per sanctum Stephanum primum ipsorum | Regem ad
 22,23 fidem catholicam sunt | reversi, prioribus Ungaris a qui- |
 24,25 bus isti descenderant, in infidelita- | te permanentibus sicut
 26 et hodie sunt | pagani. Fratres igitur predicatorum, | hiis in
 27,28 gestis Ungarorum inventis, | compassi Ungaris a quibus se
 29,30 de- | scendisse noverunt, quod adhuc in | errore infidelitatis
 1 manerent, | [f. 201 v, dextr.] miserunt quatuor de fratribus
 2 ad | illos querendum, ubicumque possent eos | iuvante do-
 3,4 mino invenire. Sciebant | enim per scripta antiquorum, quod
 5 ad orientem | essent. Ubi essent, penitus ignora- | bant. Pre-
 6,7 dicti vero fratres, qui missi | fuerant, multis se exponentes |
 8 laboribus, per mare, per terras eos | usque post annum ter-
 9,10 tium quesiverunt, | nec tamen propter multa viarum peri- |
 11 cula poterant invenire. Uno eorum | excepto sacerdote, no-
 12,13 mine Otto, qui | tantum sub mercatoris nomine pro- | cessit,
 14,15 qui in quodam Regno paga- | norum quosdam de lingua illa
 16 in- | venit, per quos certus efficiebatur, | ad quas partes

manerent, sed illo- | rum provinciam non intravit; ymmo in | 17, 18
 Ungariam est reversus pro fratri- | bus pluribus assumendis, | 19, 20
 qui | cum ipso redeunte fidem illis ca- | tholicam predica- | 21
 rent. Sed mul- | tis fractus laboribus post octa- | vum reditus | 22, 23
 sui diem, cum omnem | viam illos querendi exposuisset, | 24, 25
 migravit ad Christum. Fratres vero | predicatorum infidelium | 26
 conversionem de- | siderantes, quatuor fratres ad queren- | 27, 28
 dum gentem predictam iterato miserunt. | Qui accepta frat- | 29, 30
 rum suorum be- | [f. 201 v, sinistr.] nedictione, habitu regu- | 1
 lari in | secularem mutato, barbibus et ca- | pillis ad modum | 2
 paganorum nu- | tritis, per Bulgariam Assani, et | per Roma- | 3, 4
 niam cum ducatu et ex- | pensis domini Bele, nunc Regis | 5, 6
 Un- | garie, usque Constantinopolim pervene- | runt. Ibi | 7
 intrantes in mare, per | XXXIII. dies venerunt in terram, | 8, 9
 que vocatur Sichia, in civitate, que | Matrica nuncupatur; | 10
 quorum dux et | populi se christianos dicunt; habentes | lit- | 11, 12
 teras et sacerdotes grecos. Prin- | ceps centum dicitur ha- | 13
 bere uxores; omnes | viri caput omnino radunt; et barbas | 14, 15
 nutriunt delicate, nobilibus exceptis, | qui in signum nobili- | 16
 tatis, super auri- | culam sinistram, paucos relinquunt | ca- | 17, 18
 pillos; cetera parte capitis tota ra- | sa. Ubi propter socie- | 19
 tatis spem, quam | expectabant, quinquaginta diebus mo- | 20, 21
 ram fecerunt. Deus autem dedit ipsis | gratiam in conspectu | 22
 domine, que super | centum uxores Regis maior erat; | ita | 23, 24
 ut mirabili eos amplexaretur | affectu, et in omnibus eis | 25, 26
 necessariis | providebat. Inde progressi consilio | et adiuto- | 27
 rio predictae domine per deser- | tum, ubi nec homines, nec | 28, 29
 domos | invenerunt, diebus XIII. transiverunt. | [f. 202 r, | 30
 dextr.] Ibique venerunt in terram, que Ala- | nia dicitur, | 1
 ubi christiani et pagani | mixtim manent. Quot sunt ville, | 2, 3
 tot sunt duces, quorum nullus ad | alium habet subiectionis | 4, 5
 respectum. Ibi | continue est guerra ducis contra | ducem, | 6
 ville contra villam. Tempore | arandi omnes unius ville ho- | 7, 8
 mines | armati simul ad campum vadunt, | simul et omnes | 9
 metunt et conti- | guo terre spacio hec exercent, et quid- | 10, 11
 quid extra villam sive in lignis | acquirendis sive in aliis | 12, 13
 operis ha- | bent, vadunt omnes pariter et arma- | ti(;) nec | 14
 possunt ullo modo pauci per | totam septimanam de villis | 15, 16
 suis qua- | cumque de causa egredi absque periculo | perso- | 17
 narum, excepta sola die domenica, | a mane usque ad vespe- | 18, 19
 ram, que in | tanta devocione apud eos habe- | tur, quod | 20
 tunc quilibet, quantumcumque ma- | li fecerit, vel quocum- | 21, 22
 que habeat ad- | versarios, securus potest sive nu- | dus, sive | 23
 armatus, etiam inter il- | los quorum parentes occidit, vel | 24, 25
 qui- | bus alia mala intulit ambula- | re. Illi qui christiano | 26
 ibi censentur nomine | hoc observant, quod de vase illo nec | 27, 28
 bibunt nec comedunt, in quo murem | mori continget, vel de | 29, 30
 quo canis | [f. 202 r, sinistr.] comedit, nisi prius fuit a suo | 1
 presbitero benedictum; et qui aliter facit, | a christianitate | 2
 efficitur alienus. Et si | quis eorum quocumque casu homi- | 3, 4

5 nem | occidit, pro eo nec penitentiam¹ nec bene- | dictionem
6, 7 accipit; ymmo apud eos ho- | micidium pro nichilo reputa-
8 tur. Cru- | cem in tanta habent reverentia, quod | pauperes
9, 10 sive indigene sive ad- | vene, qui multitudinem secum ha-
11 bere | non possunt, si crucem qualemcumque super | hastam
12, 13 cum vexillo posuerint, et | elevatam portaverint, tam inter |
14 christianos, quam inter paganos, omni tem- | pore secure
15, 16 incedunt. De loco illo | fratres societatem habere non pote- |
17 rant procedendi, propter timorem tarta- | rorum qui dice-
18, 19 bantur esse vicini, propter | quod duobus ex ipsis reverten-
20 tibus, | reliquis duobus perseverantibus in | eadem terra, in
21, 22 penuria maxima | sex mensibus sunt morati, infra | quos nec
23, 24 panem nec potum preter | aquam habebant. Set unus frater |
25 sacerdos coclearia et quedam alia | preparavit, pro quibus
26, 27 aliquando parum | de milio receperunt,² de quo | non nisi
28, 29 tenuiter nimis pote- | rant sustentari. Unde decreverunt |
30 duos ex se vendere, quorum pretio alii | [f. 202 v, dextr.]
1, 2 ceptum iter³ perficerent; sed non | invenerunt emptores, quia
3 arare | et molere nesciverunt. Unde necessi- | tate coacti,
4, 5 duo ex eis de illis | partibus versus Ungariam redierunt, |
6, 7 alii vero remanserunt ibidem nolen- | tes desistere ab itinere
8 inchoato. Tan- | dem ipsi habita quorundam pagano- | rum
9, 10 societatem, iter arripientes per | deserti solitudinem XXXVII.
11 diebus | continuo iverunt, infra quos XXII. | panibus subci-
12, 13 nericiis usi sunt | adeo parvis, quod in quinque diebus | po-
14, 15 tuissent, et non ad satietatem | totaliter comedissee. Unde
16 frater, | qui sanus quidem sed sine viribus | fuit cum maximo
17, 18 labore et dolo- | re, libenter tamen de deserto eduxit. | In-
19, 20 firmus autem frater plus sano, quam | sibi compaciens illi
21 frequenter dice- | bat, quod ipsum in deserto relinqueret |
22, 23 tamquam mortuum, et truncum in- | utilem; ne propter occu-
24 pationem ipsius | negligeret opus dei; qui nequa- | quam
25, 26 consensit, sed usque ad mortem | ipsius secum in itinere
27 laboravit. | Pagani comites vie ipsorum, cre- | dentes ipsos
28, 29 habere pecuniam, | fere eos occiderant perquirendo. | Trans-
30 ito autem deserto sine omni | [f. 202 v, sinistr.] via et semita,
1, 2 XXXVII.^o die vene- | runt in terram Sarracenorum, que |
3, 4 vocatur Ueda in civitate Bun- | dam; ubi nullo modo apud
5 ali- | quem poterant hospicium obtinere, | sed in campo ma-
6, 7 nere oportuit | in pluvia et frigore. Diebus⁴ vero | frater qui
8, 9 sanus fuit, sibi et | infirmo fratri elemosinam per civi- | tatem
10, 11 querebat, et tam in potu, quam | in aliis potuit invenire,
12 precipue | a principe civitatis qui eum christia- | num esse
13, 14 intelligens, libenter ei elemo- | sinas porrigebat, quia tam
15 Prin- | cipes⁵ quam populus illius regionis publice | dicunt,

¹ In ms.: pniam.

² Hic scriptum et tersum est: pro quo, ...

³ Hic scriptum et tersum est: s

⁴ Recte: Dictus ...

⁵ Sic!

quod cito fieri debeant christiani, | et ecclesie Romane sub- 16, 17
 esse. Inde | ad aliam civitatem processerunt, ubi | predictus 18
 frater infirmus, Gerardus | nomine sacerdos in domo Sarra- 19, 20
 ce- | ni, qui eos propter Deum recepit in | domo⁶ obdormivit, 21
 et est sepultus | ibidem. Postmodum frater Iu- | lianus, qui 22, 23
 solus remanserat, | nesciens qualiter posset habere | reces- 24, 25
 sum,⁷ factus est serviens unius | Sarraceni Sacerdotis et 26, 27
 uxoris | eius, qui in magnam Bulgariam | profecturus, quo 28
 et pariter pervenerunt. | Est vero magna Bulgaria | [f. 203 r, 29, 30
 dextr.] Regnum magnum et potens opulen- | tas habens civi- 1
 tates, sed omnes sunt | pagani. In regno illo publicus | est 2, 3
 sermo, quod cito fieri debeant christi- | ani et Romane eccle- 4, 5
 sie subiugari; | sed diem asserunt se nescire, sic | enim a 6
 suis sapientibus audierunt. | In una magna eiusdem provin- 7, 8
 cie | civitate, de qua dicuntur egre- | di quinquaginta milia 9, 10
 pugnatorum, | frater unam mulierem Ungaricam | invenit, 11
 que de terra quam haberet,⁸ | ad partes illas tradita fuit 12, 13
 viro. | Illa docuit fratrem vias per quas | esset iturus asse- 14
 rens, quod ad duas | dietas ipsos posset Ungaros, quos | 15, 16
 querebat, procul dubio invenire, | quod et factum est. Invenit 17, 18
 enim | eos iuxta flumen magnum | Ethil. Qui eo viso, et 19, 20
 quod esset | Ungarus intellecto, in adventu ipsius | non mo- 21
 dicum sunt gavis; circumducen- | tes eum per domos et 22, 23
 villas, et de | Rege et Regno christianorum fratrum | ipso- 24
 rum fideliter perquirentes. Et que- | cumque volebat tam 25, 26
 de fide, quam de | aliis eis proponere, diligentissime au- | die- 27
 bant, quia omnino habent Ungaricum | ydioma; et intelligebant 28, 29
 eum et ipse | eos. Pagani sunt, nullam dei habentes | [f. 30
 203 r, sinistr.] noticiam, sed nec ydola venerantur; | sed 1
 sicut bestie vivunt; terras non | colunt; carnes equinas, lupi- 2, 3
 nas | et huiusmodi comedunt; lac equinum | et sanguinem 4
 bibunt. In equis | et armis habundant, et strenu- | issimi sunt 5, 6
 in bellis. Sciunt | enim per revelationes antiquorum, quod | 7, 8
 isti Ungari ab ipsis descende- | rant, sed ubi essent ignora- 9, 10
 bant. | Gens Tartarorum vicina est eis. | Sed iidem Tartari, 11, 12
 committentes | cum eis non poterant in bello eos | devincere, 13
 ymmo in primo prelio de- | victi sunt per eos. Unde ipsos 14, 15
 sibi | amicos et socios elegerunt; | ita quod simul iuncti XV. 16, 17
 Regna | vastaverunt omnino. In hac | Ungarorum terra, dic- 18, 19
 tus frater inve- | nit Tartaros, et nuncium ducis | Tartaro- 20
 rum, qui sciebat Ungari- | cum, Ruthenicum, Cumanicum, | 21, 22
 Theoticum, Sarracenicum, et | Tartaricum, qui dixit quod 23, 24
 exercitus | Tartarorum, qui tunc ibidem ad quin- | que dietas 25
 vicinus erat, contra Alaman- | niam vellet ire. Sed alium⁹ 26, 27
 quem | ad destructionem persarum miserat¹⁰ | expectabant. 28

⁶ Recte: in domino...

⁷ Recte: processum...

⁸ Recte: querebat...

⁹ Recte: alium exercitum...

¹⁰ Recte: miserant...

29, 30 Dixit etiam idem, quod | ultra terram Tartarorum esset
 1 gens | [f. 203 v, dextr.] multa nimis, omnibus hominibus |
 2, 3 altior et maior, cum capitibus ade- | o magnis, quod nullo
 4 modo viden- | tur corporibus suis convenire. Et | quod eadem
 5, 6 gens de terra sua exire | proponit, pugnaturi cum omnibus
 7, 8 illis | qui eis resistere voluerint; et vasta- | turi omnia Regna
 9 quecumque¹¹ | poterunt subiugare. Frater hiis | omnibus intel-
 10, 11 lectis, licet ab Ungaris | invitaretur ut maneret, non¹² decre-
 12, 13 vit | duplici ratione. Una, quia si Reg- | na paganorum et
 14 terra Ruthenorum | que sunt media inter Ungaros | chrispi-
 15 nos¹³ et illos, audirent quod illi | ad fidem catholicam invi-
 16, 17 tarentur, | dolerent, et vias omnes de cetero | observarent,
 18, 19 timentes quod si illos | istis contingeret chrispianitate con- |
 20, 21 iungi, omnia Regna intermedia | subiugarent. Alia ratione,
 22 quoniam | cogitabat quod si eum in brevi mo- | ri aut infir-
 23, 24 mari contingeret, fru- | stratus esset labor suus, eo quod
 25, 26 nec | ipse profecisset in illis, nec fratres | Ungarie ubi esset
 27 gens eadem sci- | re possit.¹⁴ Cum igitur vellet rever- | ti,
 28, 29 docuerunt eum iidem Ungari vi- | am aliam per quam posset
 30 citius | pervenire. Incepit autem frater redi- | [f. 203 v, si-
 1 nistr.] re tribus diebus ante festum nativi- | tatis beati Iohan-
 2, 3 nis baptiste, et pau- | cis diebus in via quiescens, tam per
 4 aquas, | quam per terras secundo die post nativitatem | Do-
 5, 6 mini Ungarie portas intravit, et | tamen per Ruthiam et
 7 Poloniam eques | venit. In redeundo de predicta Unga- | ria,
 8, 9 transivit in fluvio Regnum | Morduanorum XV. diebus qui
 10, 11 sunt | pagani, et adeo homines crudeles | quod pro nichilo
 12 reputatur homo ille | qui multos homines non occidit; | et
 13, 14 cum aliquis in via procedit, omnium | hominum capita quos
 15 occidit coram | ipso portantur; et quanto plura coram uno |
 16, 17 quoque portantur capita tanto melior | reputatur. De capiti-
 18 bus vero hominum | ciphos¹⁵ faciunt, et libentius inde | bibunt.
 19, 20 Uxorem ducere non permittitur | qui hominem non occidit.
 21 Isti a prophe- | tis suis accipientes, quod esse debeant |
 22, 23 christiani, miserunt ad Ducem magne | Landemerie¹⁶ que est
 24 terra Ruthenorum | illis vicina, quod eis mitteret sacer- |
 25, 26 dotem qui ipsis baptismum confer- | ret. Qui respondit, non
 27 meum est hoc | facere, sed pape Romani. Prope | enim est
 28, 29 tempus, quod omnes fidem ecclesie | Romane debemus susci-
 30 pere et eius obe- | diencie subiugari. |

¹¹ Hic scriptum et tersum est: potan.

¹² Recte: donec...

¹³ Sic!

¹⁴ Recte: possint.

¹⁵ In MS. correctio posterioris temporis (*s*) videtur, sic: *sciphos*.

¹⁶ Correctio posterioris temporis pro L: S; sic textus correctus:

Sandemerie...

IV.

Epistola fr. Iuliani de bello Mongolorum.

Editio Hormayriana — in op. „Die goldene Chronik von Hohenschwangau, München, 1842. Bd. II. S. 66—69.” — Inventum a Ioh. Fred. Böhmer. MS. autographum ignotum.

Venerabili in christo patri, dei gracia episcopo perutino apostolice sedis legato, frater Iulianus fratrum ordinis Predicatorum in Ungaria servus, reverentiam tam debitam quam devotam. Cum secundum mihi iniunctam obedienciam ire deberem ad magnam Ungariam cum fratribus mihi adjunctis, iniunctum nobis iter perficere cupientes, cum ad ultimos fines Bruscie¹ devenissemus rei subscripte veritatem didicimus. Oy res miseranda et omnibus stupenda! Ungari pagani et Bulgari et regna plurima a Tartaris sunt destructa. Quod autem sint Tartari cusjusve² secte, sicut petistis discrete, vobis tenore presentium enarrabo. Relatum est enim a pluribus, quod Tartari, qui prius inhabitabant terram quam Cumani nunc inhabitabant, dicuntur in veritate filii ysmahel, inde ysmahelite, volunt nunc Tartari appellari. Terra autem de qua prius sunt egressi Gothia³ vocatur, quam Ruben Gothiani vocavit. Primum autem bellum Tartarorum taliter est inchoatum. Dux erat in terra Gotia, Gurgutha nomine, qui sororem habebat virginem, parentibus defunctis sue familie presidentem et honore virili se gerentem, ut dicitur. Expugnavit enim ducem quandam sibi vicinum et eundem bonis suis spoliavit. Elapsis autem quibusdam temporibus cum iterum eundem ducem predictum Tartarorum natio expugnare sicut consueverat niteretur, ille sibi precavens commisso bello cum predicata puella convaluit in pugnando, et eam quam prius habuit adversariam, captivavit conversoque in fugam suo exercitu ipsam in captivitate positam violavit, et in signum majoris vindicte defloratam turpiter decollavit. Quo audito frater puelle memorate Gurgutha supra dictus dux nuncio ad virum prefatum legato tale fertur mandatum transmisisse: „Intellexi quod sororem meam defloratam decollasti. Noveris te opus mihi contrarium exegisse. Si soror mea forsitan fuit tibi in quieta, dampnificans te mobilibus, ad me accedere poteras ab ea equum iudicem petiturus, vel si manibus propriis volebas te vindicare debellatam captam defloratam poteras in uxorem acceperisse. Si autem occidendi propositum habuisti nullatenus debueras deflorare. Immo vero in duobus dampnificans, et virginali pudicitie turpitudinem intulisti et capitali morte eam miserabiliter condempnasti. Propter quod in vindictam necis puelle prefate scias me tecum totis viribus congressurum.” Hoc audiens dux necis perpetrator et videns se non posse resistere fugit cum suis ad Soldanum de Hornach⁴ terra primo derelicta. His itaque peractis

¹ Recte: Russiae...

² Recte: cunjusve...

³ Scil. Kathaj.

⁴ Hornach (var. Ornach), P. da Carpino: Ornas (Ornac, Orna); Bene-

erat dux quidam in terra Cumanorum nomine Witoph, cujus divitiae tam preclare predicabantur, quod etiam pecora sua in aureis canalibus in campis pascebantur. Quem dux alius de flumine Buchs⁵ nomine Urech propter divitias expugnavit et devicit. Qui devictus cum duobus filiis suis et paucis quibusdam, qui de belli periculo evaserunt, ad dictum soldanum de Hornach transfugit. Soldanus vero injurie, quam sibi forte quondam intulerat reminiscens quia vicinus fuerat, receptum in porta suspendit et populum suum dominio suo subiugavit. Duo filii Witoph fugam protinus arripuerunt. Et quia refugium alias non habuerunt ad prefatum Urech, qui patrem ipsorum et ipsos jam antea spoliaverat, sunt reversi. Qui ferali concitatus rabie cum equis majorem rapiens interfecit. Minor autem fugiens ivit ad Gurgutham regem Tartarorum, rogans eum obnixius, ut de his, qui patrem ejus et fratrem interfecerunt, vindictam exerceret, dicens, quod isti duci videlicet Gurguthe honor remaneret si sibi pro nece patris et spolio fratris retributio fieret et vindicta. Quod et factum est ac habita victoria rogavit iterum Gurgutham ducem juvenis prenomatus ut de soldane de Hornach vindictam acciperet pro miserabili patris nece, dicens quod et populus relictus a patre, qui ibi quasi captivus tenebatur, esset sibi presidio sui exercitus in progressu. Ille de victoria jam duplici debachatus sedulo concessit quod juvenis supplicavit. Et egressus contra soldanum victoriam habuit sibi glorificatam et honestam. Igitur quasi undique victoria fretus laudabili, Gurgutha supradictus dux Tartarorum cum toto impetu belli progressum fecit contra Persas propter quasdam guerras, quas primitus habuerat ad invicem. Ubi victoriam obtinuit perhonestam et regnum Persarum sibi penitus subiugavit. Ex his audacior effectus et fortiozem se reputans omnibus, progressum cepit facere contra regna totum mundum sibi subiugare proponens. Unde ad terram Cumanorum accedens, ipsos Cumanos superavit terram sibi subiugans eorum. Inde reversi ad magnam Ungariam de qua nostri Ungari originem habuerunt, et expugnaverunt eos quattuordecim annis et in quintodecimo anno obtinuerunt eos, sicut ipsi pagani Ungari viva voce retulerunt. Illis obtentis reversi versus occidentem spacio unius anni vel parum amplius quinque regna paganorum maxima obtinuerunt Faschiam,⁶ Merowiam, regnum expugnarunt Bulgarum, quod quadraginta castra munitissima continebat tam populosa, quod de uno poterant exire quinquaginta milia armatorum. Ceterum et Wedint⁷ regnum expugnabant, cujus duo principes erant, et unus principum cum toto populo et familia Tartarorum⁸ dominio se subiecit, alter vero loca munitissima ad tuendum se petit cum paucis populis, si valeret.

dictus Pol.: Ornarum civitas; Albericus Mon.: Ornacia, Oruntia; in Annalibus Russicis: Arnače, Ornače id est civitas Tana, seu Tanais iuxta fl. Don.

⁵ Recte: Bug.

⁶ *Faschiam*, recte: *Basciriam*, aut *Bascardiam* et non id est civ. seu prov. Saksyn, sicut in op. cit. Gombocz scripsit.

⁷ Recte: Wedin.

⁸ Recte: Tartarorum.

Nunc autem cum in finibus Ruscie⁹ maneremus prope rei sensimus veritatem, quod totus exercitus ad partes veniens Occidentis in quatuor partibus esset divisus. Una pars a fluvio Ethil in finibus Ruscie¹⁰ a plaga orientali ad Sudal¹¹ applicuit. Altera uero pars versus meridiem jam fines Risennie qui est alius ducatus Ruthenorum regnum expugnabat. Tercia autem pars contra fluvium Denh¹² prope castrum Orgenusin¹³ qui est alius ducatus Ruthenorum, resistebant. Hoc tamen expectantes sicut ipsi Rutheni, Hungari, Bulgari, qui ante fugerant nobis viva voce ferebant, quod terra fluviis et paludibus in proxima hieme congelatis totam Rusciam toti multitudini sic facile est depredari sicut totam terram Ruthenorum.

Sic tamen hec omnia intelligatis, quod dux ille primus Gurgutha nomine qui hoc bellum inchoavit, est defunctus. Nunc autem filius ejus Chayn¹⁴ regnat pro eodem et residet in civitate magna Hornah, cujus regnum obtinuit pater ejus prima fronte. Residet autem tali modo: palatium habet ita magnum, quod mille equites intrant per unum hostium et eidem inclinantes equites exeunt nichilominus insidentes. Dux autem ille prefatus paravit sibi lectum pergrandem et altum columpnis aureis, lectum inquam aureum et precise coopertum, in quo sedet gloriosus et glorificatus, preciosis circumdatus indumentis. Hostia autem ipsius palatii per totum aurea sunt, per que transeunt sui equites incolomes et inunes. Alii vero nuncii si pedites transeunt per ostia vel equites et si pedibus limen hostii tangunt ibidem gladio feriuntur.^{14a} Sed cum summa reverentia oportet quemlibet alienum pertransire. In tali vero pompa residens misit exercitus per diversas terras videlicet ultra mare et quanta ibi fecerit, forte vos audivistis. Alium autem exercitum copiosum misit juxta mare super omnes Cumanos, qui ad partes Hungariorum transfugerunt. Tercius autem exercitus obsidet Rusciam sicut dixi.

Verum ut de bello vobis significarem, dicitur, quod¹⁵ longius jaciunt, quam alie consueverint nationes. In prima congressione belli, ut dicitur, non sagittant, sed quasi pluere sagittas videntur. Gladiis et lanceis minus apti dicuntur ad bellum. Taliter autem cuneum suum ordinant, quod decem hominibus unus Tartar preest, iterum centum hominibus unus centurio. Hoc ideo tali astutia factum est ne exploratores supervenientes possint inter eos aliquatenus latere. Et si forte contingeret numerum eorundem diminui per bellum, posset restitui sine mora, et populus collectus ex diversis infidelitatem aliquam non possit facere. Quemlibet denarium ex linguis diversis collegerunt. Omnium regnorum que obtinent reges et duces ac magnates, de quibus est spes quod ali-

⁹—¹⁰ Recte: Russie.

¹¹ Recte: Susdal.

¹² Recte: Don.

¹³ Scil. Woronež. (Vide Gombocz, op. cit.)

¹⁴ Recte: Chan = Khan, kán = dux, nomine Ogotai.

^{14a} Recte: ... feriuntur.

¹⁵ Recte: quod sagittas longius...

quando possint facere aliquam resistentiam, interficiunt sine mora. Milites autem fortes et rusticos ad prelium ante se mittunt armatos ad preliandum sive¹⁶ sponte. Alios vero rusticos ad preliandum minus aptos relinquunt ad colendam terram, et omnium tam ad prelium compulsorum quam occisorum uxores, filias et cognatas dividunt ad singulos viros terre cultui relictos, cuilibet decem, vel plures assignantes et imponunt eisdem, ut de cetero Tartari nuncupentur. Milites vero, qui ad prelium compelluntur, etsi¹⁷ bene pugnant et vincunt, parva gratia eis. Si vero in prelio moriuntur nulla cura eis. Si autem in prelio retrocedunt sine misericordia a Tartaris occiduntur. Ideoque preliantes appetunt potius mori in prelio quam gladiis feriri Tartarorum. Pugnant ergo fortius, ut in posterum non vivant, sed ut citius moriantur. Castra munita non expugnant, sed prius devastant terram et populum depredantur et ejusdem terre populum congregatum compellunt ad pugnam ad expugnandum ipsum castrum. De multitudine autem ipsius exercitus vobis aliquid non scribo nisi quod omnium regnorum, que obtinent, milites ad pugnam aptos compellunt ante se preliari. Fertur a pluribus re certa et dux de Sudal mandavit per me regi Hungariorum¹⁸ viva voce quod nocte dieque consilium habent Tartari, qualiter vincant et obtineant regnum Hungariorum christianorum. Propositum enim habent, ut veniant et expugnent Romam et ultra Romam. Misit ergo legatos ad regem Hungariorum, qui venientes per terram ducis de Sudal et literas regi Hungariorum missas dux ille recepit ab eis et legatos ipsos cum sociis mihi deputatis etiam vidi. Predictas literas a Noe duce de Sudal mihi datas ad regem Hungariorum deportavi. Litere autem scripte sunt literis paganis et lingua tartarica. Unde rex qui eas possint legere multos invenit, sed intelligentes non invenit. Nos autem cum transiremus per Cumaniam, paganum quendam invenimus, qui nobis eas est interpretatus. Hec sunt autem que litere continent: „Ego Chayn nuncius regis celesti cui dedit potentiam super terram subicientes mihi se exaltare et deprimere¹⁹ adversantes. Miror de te Hungarorum regule, quod, cum ad te miserim tricesima vice legatos, quare ad me nullum remittis ex eisdem, sed nec nuntios tuos nec literas mihi mittis. Scio quod rex es dives et potens et multos habes sub te milites solusque gubernas²⁰ magnum regnum. Ideoque te mihi difficulter subicis sponte tua. Melius tamen tibi esset et salubrius, si te subiceres mihi sponte. Intellexi insuper, quod Cumanos servos nostros sub tua protectione suscepisti, unde mando tibi, quod eos de cetero apud te non teneas et me adversarium non habeas propter ipsos. Facilius enim est Cumanis evadere quam tibi, quia illi sine domibus cum tentoriis ambulantes possunt forsitan evadere. Tu autem in domibus habitans habes castra et civitates, quomodo effugies manus meas?”

¹⁶ Recte: sine . . .

¹⁷ Recte: et si . . .

¹⁸ Recte: Hungarorum . . .

¹⁹ In orig.: dreprimere . . .

²⁰ In orig.: gubernus . . .

Notum sit omnibus christi fidelibus, quod hoc scriptum Rex Hungarie delegavit patriarche aquilegiensi et patriarcha transmisit episcopo brixinensi et comiti tyrolensi, ut de ipsi universis christi fidelibus transmittant admonendo eos, ut deum pro ecclesia exorare studeant. Preterea scire desideramus omnes, ad quos presens scriptum pervenerit, quod lator presentium justus et veredicus sit.²¹

V.

Epistola fr. Iuliani de bello Mongolorum.

Exempl. Cod. „Pal. Lat. 443.“ fol. 105^r et 105^v. Inventum a *Beda Dudik*.
(Vide tab. XV—XVI.)

[f. 105 r] Viro venerabili in Christo Patri Dei Gratia 1
Perusino Episcopo, Apostolice Sedis Legato, frater Iulia- 2
nus | Fratrum Ordinis Predicatorum in Ungaria, Servus 2
Vestre Sanctitatis, Reverentiam tam de- | bitam, quam de- 3
votam. Cum secundum iniunctam mihi Obedientiam ire de- 3
berem ad mag- | nam Ungariam cum fratribus mihi adiunc- 4
tis, iniunctum nobis iter arripere cupientes, | cum ad ultimos 4
fines Brussie devenissemus, rei dedimus veritatem, quod 5
omnes | thartari,¹ qui etiam Ungari pagani vocantur, et Bul- 6
gari, et Regna quam plurima | a Thartaris penitus sunt de- 7
vastata. Quid autem sint Thartari, cuiusve secte sint, | prout 7
melius potuimus directe Vobis tenore presentium enarrabi- 8
mus. Relatum est | mihi a quibusdam, quod Thartari inhabi- 9
tabant terram prius, quam nunc Cumani inha- | bitant, et 9
dicuntur in veritate filii ysmahelis, unde et Ysmahelite vo- 10
lunt nunc | thartari nuncupari. Terra autem, de qua prius 11
sunt egressi, Gotta vocatur, quam | Ruben Gottam vocavit. 12
Primum autem bellum Thartarorum sic est inchoatum: | Do- 13
minus erat in terra Gotta, Gurgatam nomine, qui sororem 13
habebat virginem, paren- | tibus defunctis sue familie presi- 14
dentem, et more virili, ut dicitur, se gerentem. | Expugnabat 14
quendam ducem vicinum, et eundem suis spoliabat. Elapsis | 15
autem quibusdam diebus, cum Ducem iterum predictum 16
Thartarorum natione, sicut consueverat, | expugnare nitere- 16
tur; ille sibi precavens, comisso bello cum puella supradicta | 17
prevaluit in pugna, et eam, quam prius habuit adversariam, 18
captivavit, conversoque | in fugam suo exercitu, ipsam in 19
captivitate positam violavit, et in signum | maioris vindicte, 20
defloratam iam turpiter decollavit. Quo audito frater | Puelle 21
memorate Gargatam supradictus Dux, nuntio ad prefatum 21
virum | delegato, tale fertur mandatum transmississe: „Intel- 22
lexi, quod sororem meam | captam et defloratam decollasti; 23
noveris, quod opus mihi contrarium exegisti: Si | soror mea

²¹ Vide p. 5—6. — ¹ Verisimiliter recte: bascardi, qui etiam...

24 tibi forsitan fuit inquieta, dampnificans te in rebus mobili-
 25 bus, | poteras ad me accedere, equum de ea iudicium peti-
 26 turus; vel, si volens te | propriis manibus vindicare, debella-
 tam captivasti et deflorasti, ducere eam po- | teras in
 27 uxorem. Si autem eam occidendi propositum² habuisti, nulla-
 28 tenus de- | bueras eam deflorare. Nunc vero in duobus dam-
 nificans, et virginali | [f. 105 v] pudicicie turpitudinem in-
 tulisti, et capitali eam mortem miserabiliter condempnasti.
 1 Propter quod in vindictam necis puelle nominate scias, me
 tecum totis viribus congressum." Hoc audiens Dux necis
 perpetrator, et videns, | se non posse resistere, fugit cum
 suis ad Soldanum de Ornach, terra propria derelicta. Hiis
 2 itaque gestis erat dux quidam in terra Cumanorum, nomine
 Vithut, cuius divitie tam preclare predicantur, quod etiam
 pecora in campis in aureis | canalibus adaquantur. Quem dux
 alius Cumanorum de flumine Buc, nomine Gureg, expugna-
 3 vit propter divitias, et devicit. Qui devictus cum duobus fi-
 liis et quibusdam paucis, qui de belli periculo evaserant, ad
 iam dictum soldanum | de Ornach transfugerunt. Soldanus
 vero memor iniurie, quam sibi quondam forte intulerat, quia
 4 vicinus extiterat, receptum in porta ipsum suspendit, et po-
 pulum suo dominio subiugavit. Duo vero filii eius ad Euthet
 fugam protinus | arripuerunt; et quia refugium alias non
 habebant, ad prefatum Euthet, qui patrem eorum et eosdem
 5 ante spoliaverat, sunt reversi. Qui ferali attritus rabie cum
 equis cupiens maiorem interficere; minor autem cupiens fu-
 gere, venit ad Gur- | gatam Ducem Thartarorum iam ante
 nominatum, rogans eum obnixius, ut de Euthet, qui patrem
 6 spoliavit, et fratrem interficit, vindictam exerceret, dicens,
 quod ista duo, videlicet quod Gurgatam honor remaneret, et
 sibi pro nece fratris, | et patris spolio, retributio fieret et
 7 vindicta. Quod ita factum est. Hac habita victoria rogavit
 alterum ducem Gurgatam iuvenis prefatus, ut de soldano de
 Ornach vindictam acciperet pro miserabili | nece patris; di-
 cens, quod etiam populus relictus a patre, qui ibi quasi cap-
 8 tivus tenebatur, esset in presidio sui exercitus in progressu.
 Ille iam de victoria duplici corde et animo debachatus, se-
 dulo concessit, quod iuvenis pos- | tulavit, et egressus contra
 9 soldanum, victoriam habuit sibi glorificam et honestam. Igi-
 tur quasi undique victoria fretus laudabili Gurgatam, supra-
 dictus dux thartarorum; cum toto impetu belli progressum
 fecit | contra Persas, pro quibusdam Guerris, quas primitus
 10 habebant ad invicem; ubi victoriam habuit perhonestam, et
 Regnum Persie sibi totaliter subiugavit. Ex hiis audacior
 effectus, et fortiozem se reputans | omnibus super terram,
 11 cepit facere contra regna, totum mundum sibi subiugare
 proponens. Unde primum ad terram Cumanorum accedens,
 ipsos Cumanos superavit, terram sibi subiugans eorumdem.

² Recte: propositam . . .

Inde reversi | ad magnam Ungariam, a quibus nostri Ungari
 originem habuerunt, expugnaverunt eos XIII. annis, et in 12
 XV^o optinuerunt eos, sicut nobis ipsi pagani Ungari retule-
 runt viva voce. Illis optentis | reversi versus occidentem spa-
 tium unius anni vel parum amplius, V. regna maxima pagano- 13
 rum obtinuerunt, Sasciam, Fulgariam;^{3a} etiam LX.^{ta} castra
 munitissima capiebant tam populosa, quod de uno | eorum
 poterant exire L.^{ta} milia militum armatorum. Ceterum quo-
 que et Wedin, et Merowiam, Poydowiam, Mordanorum reg- 14
 num expugnabant. Cuius duo principes fuerunt. Et unus
 princeps cum toto populo | et familia thartarorum dominio
 se subiecerat. Alter vero munitissima loca ad tuendum se 15
 petiit cum paucis populis, si valeret. Nunc autem cum nos
 in finibus Ruscie maneremus, prope rei scimus veri- | tatem,
 quod totus exercitus thartarorum veniens ad partes occiden- 16
 tis, in IIII^{or} partes est divisus. Una pars ad fluvium ethil in
 finibus Ruscie a plaga orientali ad sudal applicuit. Altera |
 vero pars versus meridiem iam fines Recennie, quod est
 alius ducatus Rutenorum, quam nunquam expugnabat. Ter- 17
 tia autem pars contra fluvium Den³ prope castrum Ovche-
 ruch, qui est alius Ducatus Ruthenorum, residebat. Hi tamen |
 expectantes, quod sicut et ipsi Rutheni, Ungari, et Bulgari,
 qui ante eos fugerant, viva voce nobis referebant: quod terra 18
 fluviis et paludibus in proxima hieme congelatis totam Ru-
 ziam toti multi- | tudini sic facile est eis depredari,⁴ totam
 terram Ruthenorum. Sic tamen intelligatis hec omnia, quod 19
 ille Gurgatam Dux, primitus qui bellum inchoavit, est de-
 functus. Nunc autem filius eius chaym regnat pro eodem, |
 et residet in civitate magna Ornach, cuius regnum obtinuit
 pater eius prima fronte. Residet autem tali modo: Palatium 20
 habet tam magnum, quod mille equites intrant per unum
 hostium et eidem⁵ inclinantes | equites exeunt nichilominus
 insidentes. Dux autem prefatus paravit sibi lectum grandem 21
 et altum, columpnis aureis inixum. Lectum inquam aureum
 et preciosissime coopertum, in quo sedet quasi gloriosus, |
 et circumdatus gloriosissimus indumentis. Hostia autem ip-
 sius palatii per totum aurea sunt, per que equites sui trans- 22
 eunt inclinantes et incolomes et immunes. Alieni sui nuntii,
 si equites transeunt per | hostia, vel pedites, si pedibus limen
 hostii tangunt, ibidem gladio feriuntur. Sed cum summa re-
 verentia oportet alienum quemlibet transire. In tali ergo 23
 pompa residens misit exercitus suos per diversas terras,
 videlicet | ultra mare, sicut credimus, et quanta ibi fecerit
 etiam vos audivistis. Alium autem exercitum copiosum mi- 24
 sit iuxta mare super omnes Cumanos, qui ad partes ungarie
 transfugerunt. Tertius autem exercitus obsidet totam | Rus-

³ Recte: Don...

^{3a} Recte: Bulgariam...

⁴ Recte: depredari, *sicut* totam...

⁵ Recte: iidem...

ciam sicut dixi; verum ut de bello vobis significem, dicitur,
 25 quod longius iaciunt sagittis, quam cetera consueverint na-
 tiones; et in prima congressione belli, sicut dicitur, non sa-
 gittare, sed quasi pluere sagitte videntur. | Gladiis et lanceis
 26 dicuntur minus apti ad bellum. Taliter enim suum cuneum
 ordinant: quod X. hominibus unus thartar preest. Item C
 hominibus unus centurio preest; hoc in tali astutia faciunt,
 ne exploratores | supervenientes possint aliquatenus latere
 27 inter eos. Et si forte contingeret eorum aliquem diminui
 propter bellum, possit restitui sine mora; et populus collec-
 tus ex diversis infidelitatem aliquam facere non possit, |
 quem ex diversis linquis et nationibus collegerunt. Omnium
 28 regnorum, que obtinent duces et magnates, de quibus est
 spes, quod aliquando possint facere resistantiam, interficiunt
 sine mora. Milites autem et rusticos | fortes ad prelium ante
 se mittunt armatos, ad preliandum sine sponte. Alios autem
 29 rusticos ad preliandum minus aptos relinquunt ad excolen-
 dam terram, et omnium⁶ occisorum, quam ad prelium misso-
 rum, uxores et filias et | cognatas dividunt ad singulos viros
 30 cultui terre relictos, cuilibet XII. vel plures assignantes, et
 imponunt eisdem, ut thartari de cetero nuncupentur. Milites
 vero, qui ad preliandum compelluntur; si bene pugnant | et
 vincunt, parva⁷ gratia. Si vero in prelio moriuntur, nulla cura.
 31 Si vero in prelio retrocedunt, sine mora a thartaris occidun-
 tur. Ideoque preliantes appetunt occidi potius in prelio,
 quam gladiis thartarorum fe- | riri. Pugnant ergo fortius ut
 non vivant in posterum, sed ut citius moriantur. Castra mu-
 32 nita non expugnant, sed prius terram devastant, et populum
 depredantur, et eisdem terre populum simul congregant et
 compellunt ad pugnam, | ad expugnandum ipsum suum
 castrum. De multitudine omnium exercitus sui non rescribo
 33 aliquid, nisi etiam quod omnium regnorum, que obtinuit, mi-
 lites ad pugnam aptos ante se compellit preliari. Fertur a
 pluribus re certa, | et dux de Sudal mandavit per me regi
 34 ungarie viva voce, quod die noctuque consilium habent thar-
 tari, qualiter veniant et obtineant regnum ungarie christia-
 num. Propositum enim habere dicuntur, quod veniant | et
 expugnent Romam et ultra Romam. Unde legatos misit regi
 35 ungarie, qui venientes per terram Sudal captivati sunt a
 duce Sudal, et litteras regi missas dux ille recepit ab eis;
 et legatos ipsos cum | sociis mihi deputatis etiam vidi; pre-
 36 dictas litteras a duce sudal mihi datas ad regem Ungarie
 deportavi. Littere autem scripte sunt litteris paganis, sed
 lingua thartarica. Unde rex eas, qui possint legere, multos |
 invenit, sed intelligentes nullos invenit. Nos autem cum trans-
 37 iremus per Carmaniam,^{7a} civitatem magnam paganam, quen-

⁶ Recte: omnium tam...

⁷ Recte: parva eis gratia...

^{7a} Recte: Cumaniam...

dam invenimus, qui eas nobis est interpretatus. Est autem hec interpretatio: |

„Ego chaym nuncius regis celestis, cui dedit potentiam super terram subicientes in se exaltari et deprimere adversantes. Miror de te, rex ungarie, quod cum miserim ad te iam tricesima vice legatos, quare ad me nullum remittis ex eisdem; sed nec nuntios tuos vel litteras mihi remittis. Scio, quod rex dives es et potens, et multos sub te habes milites, solusque gubernas magnum regnum. Ideoque difficile sponte te mihi subicis, melius tibi tamen esset et salubrius, si te subiceres sponte mihi. Intellexi insuper, quod Cumanos, servos meos, sub tua protectione detineas. Unde mando tibi, ne eos de cetero apud te non teneas, et me adversarium tibi non habeas propter ipsos; facilius est enim eis evadere, quam tibi; quia illi sine domibus cum tenoriis ambulantes, possunt forsitan evadere, tu autem in domibus habitans, habens castra et civitates, qualiter effugies manus meas.” Sed hec non pretermittam. Iterum dum ego remansi in curia Romana, precesserunt me ad magnam Ungariam IIII-^{or} fratres mei, qui pertransientes per terram sudal, in finibus regni eius occurrerunt quibusdam ungaris paganis fugientibus a facie thartarorum, qui libenter fidem catholicam recepissent. Et dum versus ungariam christianam venissent, audiens dux predictus de sudal indignatus, fratribus predictis revocatis, inhibuit, ne legem Romanam predicarent Ungaris memoratis, et propter hoc expluit fratres predictos de terra sua; tamen absque molestia, qui nolentes redire, et viam factam facile dimittere, declinaverunt ad civitatem Recessue, si viam haberent, ut in magnam Ungariam, vel ad Morducanos, vel ad ipsos thartaros pertransirent. Duobus autem fratribus ibi relictis, ex ipsis, conductis interpretibus, in festo Apostolorum Petri et Pauli proximo transacto, venerunt ad Ducem Morducanorum alterum, qui eodem die egressus quo isti venerant, cum toto populo et familia, sicut superius diximus, thartaris se subiecit. De cetero, quid de duobus fratribus illis factum sit, utrum mortui sint, vel a Duce iam dicto ad thartaros deducti, penitus ignoratur. Duo fratres relictis, ammirantes de mora eorumdem, circa festum Michaelis proximo celebratum miserunt quemdam interpretem, de eorum vita cupientes certificari; quem etiam morducani invadentes occiderunt. Ego autem et socii mei videntes terram a thartaris occupatam, et regiones munitas conspicientes etiam nullum fructum fructificandi, reversi sumus ad Ungariam; et licet per multos exercitus et latrones transivimus, Sancte tamen Ecclesie orationibus et meritis suffragantibus, pervenimus ad fratres nostros et claustrum incolumes et immunes. Ceterum cum tale Dei flagellum adveniat et adproximet ad filios ecclesie sponse Christi, quid fratribus his agendum, quidque faciendum sit, Vestre Sanctitatis discretio dignetur sollicitate providere. Pre-

terea, ut nihil ex his maneat pretermis- | nitati
 Vestre significo, quod cum quidam clericus Ruthenorum no-
 52 bis aliqua rescriberet de historia libri Iudicum, dicebat, quod
 thartari sint madyanite, qui cum Cethym⁸ pariter contra fi-
 lios | Israel expugnantes, devicti sunt a Gedeone, sicut in
 53 librum Iudicum continetur. Unde fugientes dicti Madianite,
 habitaverunt iuxta fluvium quemdam nomine thartar, unde
 et thartari sunt vocati.

VI.

„Epistola de vita Tartarorum“ a fr. Iuliano.

Exempl. Cod. „Vat. lat. 4161.“ fol. 41r—44r.

Inventum a *Willelmo de Fraknoi*. (Vide tab. XVII—XXIII.)

1 [f. 41 r] Venerabili viro **epistola de vita tartarorum**, |
 2 in Christo patri, Perillustrissimo episcopo, Frater Iuli- | anus
 3 Fratrum ordinis predicatorum, servus vestre | Sanctitatis.
 4, 5 Cum secundum iniunctam michi obedi- | ciam ire deberem
 6 ad magnam hungariam cum fratri- | bus mihi adiunctis, in-
 7 iunctum nobis iter perficere | cupientes. cum ad ultimos
 8 fines Prucye¹ | devenissemus, rei dedimus veritatem: quod
 9, 10 omnes | hungarii pagani, et regna quam plurima, | a tartaris
 11 sunt penitus devastata. Quid autem | sint illi tartari, cuiusve
 12 secte; vobis te- | nore presentium enarrabo. Relatum est |
 13, 14 autem michi a quibusdam, quod tartari: prius | inhabitabant
 15 romam.² Dicitur hi veritate: | filii hismaelis. Unde hismaelite
 16 nunc tartari | volunt vocari. Terra autem, de qua prius sunt |
 17, 18 egressi: gotha vocabatur, quam Ruben | gotham vocavit. Pri-
 19 mum autem bellum | tartarorum est taliter inchoatum. Dux
 20, 21 e- | rat in illa terra gotha: Gurguta nomine, | qui sororem
 22 habuit virginem. Eius parentibus | defunctis sue familie pre-
 23 sidentem et more | virili, ut dicitur, se gerentem; expugnavit |
 24 quemdam ducem vicinum, et eundem suis bonis | [f. 41 v]
 1, 2 et requisitis spoliavit. Elapsis autem quibusdam | temporibus
 3 cum iterum predictum ducem sicut consueve- | rat expugnare
 4 niteretur; ille sibi preca- | vens comisso bello cum puella
 5 supradicta; pre- | valuit in pugnando, et eam quam prius
 6, 7 adver- | sariam habuit, captivavit. Conversoque in | fugam
 8 suo exercitu, ipsam in captivitate | positam violavit; et in
 9 signum maioris vin- | dicte defloratam, turpiter decollavit. |
 10, 11 Quo audito frater memorate puelle Gur- | guta supradictus

⁸ Cethym (var. Kittim, Vulgata: C., Cethyum; vide: Macc. 8, 5 Cetei) incolae insulae Cypri antiqui, qui nomen ab oppido aut provincia a Graecis *Kittion* nominata acceperunt. A quibusdam scriptoribus Japhetitae, oppidum vero ipsorum colonia Phoenicum fuisse, in Macc. 8,5 C. incolas Macedoniae esse narrantur. (Conf.: F. Schmidke, Die Japhetiten der bibl. Völkertafel (1926) 75 ff. Dict. Bible Suppl. II. 19/23.)

¹ Recte: Russiae

² Vide exempl. Hormayr et — Dudik p. 35. et p. 39.

dux nuntio ad ipsum vi- | rum delegato, tale fertur manda- 12
 tum trans- | misisse. Intellexi quod sororem meam cap- | tam 13
 et defloratam decollasti. Noveris te opus | mihi contrarium 14, 15
 exegisse. Si soror mea forsi- | tan tam inquieta fuit dampni- 16
 ficans te re- | bus mobilibus, poteras ad me accedere 17
 e- | quum de ea, petiturus iudicium. Vel si | volens debella- 18, 19
 tam quam propriis manibus cap- | tivasti et deflorasti, pote- 20
 ras ducere in uxo- | rem. Si autem propositum occidendi 21
 eam habuisti, | nullo modo debuisti eam deflorare. Nunc 22
 vero | [f. 42 r] eam dampnificans in duobus et virginali tur- | 1
 pitudinem intulisti pudicie, et carnali | eam morte misera- 2, 3
 biliter condempnasti. Propter | quod in vindictam necis 4
 puelle nominate, scias | me tecum totis viribus congressurum. 5
 Hec ve- | ro audiens dux necis perpetrator et videns | se 6
 non posse resistere, fugit cum suis ad solda- | num de Or- 7, 8
 nach, terra propria derelicta. Hiis | itaque gestis, erat qui- 9
 dam dux in terra Chana- | neorum^{2a} nomine Wroccus cuius 10
 divicie tam precla- | re predicantur, quod et pecora in aureis 11
 can- | nalibus adaquabantur. Quem dux alius de flumi- | ne 12
 de Bux nomine Gauex propter divicias ex- | pugnavit, et 13, 14
 devicit. Qui devictus cum | duobus filiis suis et quibusdam 15
 paucis qui de belli | periculo effugerunt, ad dictum soldanum 16
 de Or- | nach fugerunt. Soldanus vero memor memor³ | in- 17
 iurie quam ei quondam intulerat, quia vicinus | eius extiterat 18, 19
 recepit eum et in porta suspendit, | et populum dominio suo 20
 subiugavit. Duo | autem filii eius protinus fugam arripuerunt. 21
 Et quia re- | fugium alias non habebant, ad prefatum Gruex 22
 qui | [f. 42 v] patrem eorum et eosdem iam antea spolia- 1
 verat, | sunt reversi. Qui ferali concitatus rabie, ma- | iorem 2, 3
 cum equis interficit. Minor vero fugiens | ad Gurgutam du- 4
 cem tartarorum iam antea nomi- | natum, rogans obnixius 5
 ut de Gruex qui | patrem suum spoliaverat et fratrem occi- 6
 derat, vin- | dictam exerceret. Dicens quod Gurgute, honor | 7
 remaneret, et sibi pro nece fratris et spolio | patris retri- 8, 9
 bucio fieret et vindicta. Quod factum | est. Ac habita victo- 10
 ria, rogavit iterum Gur- | gutam ut de soldano de Ornach 11
 vindictam | reciperet. Et egressus contra soldanum victo- | 12
 riam optinuit. Igitur quasi undique fre- | tus victoria lauda- 13, 14
 bili, Gurguta pre- | dictus dux tartarorum cum toto impetu 15
 bel- | li cepit progressum facere, contra persas pro | quibus- 16, 17
 dam guerris quas ibi primitus habuit, et | regnum persarum, 18
 totaliter subiugavit. | Ex hiis audacior effectus, et fortio- 19
 se reputans omnibus super terram, progressum cepit | facere 20
 contra regna totum mundum debellare | proponens et ad 21, 22
 terram romanorum^{3a} accedens, eam | sibi subiugavit. Inde re- 23
 versus ad magnam | Hungariam a quibus nostri hungarii ori- 24
 ginem | habuerunt, expugnavit eam XIII. annis sicut | [f. 25

^{2a} Recte: Cumanorum . . .

³ Sic! — ^{3a} Recte: . . . Cumanorum . . .

1, 2 43 r] ipsi hungarii pagani, nobis retulerunt. | Reversus inde
 3 versus occidentem spatio unius | anni vel parum amplius,
 4 quinque regna pagano- | rum maxima obtinuit. Que LX.
 5 castra | fortissima habebant, tam populosa, quod de uno |
 6, 7 eorum exire poterant L. milia militum arma- | torum. Scien-
 8 tes quod Gurguta dux ille primus | qui hoc bellum inchoavit,
 9 est defunctus. Nunc | autem filius eius Chayn, regnat pro
 10 eodem, et re- | sidet in civitate magna, Ornach. Residet |
 11 autem tali modo. Palacium habet tam
 12 magnum quod. Mille | milites intrant Nota de nobili pa- |
 13 per unum ostium, et eidem inclinan- | latio ipsius ducis.
 14 tes, exeunt nichilominus residentes. Dux
 15, 16 autem | prefatus paravit sibi tectum pergrande et altum |
 17 aureis columpnis inmixtum; lectum aureum, | et precisiosis-
 18 sime coopertum; in quo sedet, quasi gloriosus, | et circum-
 19 datus preciosis indumentis. Ostia vero
 20 ipsius | palacii per totum, aurea sunt. Nota de ostiis au- |
 21 Misit autem exerci- | tus per diversas reis et de potes- |
 22 terras. Videlicet ultra mare imum.⁴ | tate ipsius.
 23 Alium copiosum exercitum, misit iuxta
 24 mare super | omnes Comanos qui ad partes Ungarie fuge-
 25 runt. | Tertius vero exercitus obsidet totam Hungariam et |
 26 Ruziam. Longius quoque iaciunt sagittas, quam | [f. 43 v]
 1, 2 cetere nationes. Et prima congressione belli non | sagittare
 3 dicuntur, sed quasi sagittas pulve- | rizare videntur. Et tali-
 4 ter autem suum cuneum | ordinant, quasi X. hominibus unus⁵
 5 preest. Centum | vero unus centurio. Hoc quoque tali astucia
 6, 7 faci- | unt, ne exploratores supervenientes, possint | latere
 8 aliquatenus inter eos. Et si contigerit | eundem numerum
 9 diminui; propter bellum resti- | tuitur sine mora. Et ut po-
 10 pulus collectus | de diversis infidelitatem aliquam facere
 11, 12 non pos- | sint, quemlibet denarium numerum ex di- | versis
 13 nationibus et linguis, collegerunt. Omnium | regnorum reges,
 14 magnates, duces de quibus | spes est quod possint facere
 15 resistentiam, interficiunt | sine mora. Quid super hiis con-
 16 sulendum, quidve | faciendum sit, vestre Sanctitatis discretio
 17 dignetur | sollicite providere. Preterea ut nil ex hiis | re-
 18, 19 maneat pretermisum, Paternitati Vestre sig- | nifico, quod
 20 quidam clericus Ruthenorum dixit, quod | Tartari sunt ma-
 21 dianite. Qui cum Cetheis pa- | riter pugnantes contra filios
 22 Israel, devicti | sunt a Gedeone, sic in libro Iudicum con-
 23 tinetur. | Unde fugientes dicti madianite, habitaverunt | [f.
 1, 2 44 r] iuxta quemdam fluvium nomine Tartar, | et inde Tar-
 3 tari sunt vocati. Tantam | quoque asserunt Tartari se bella-
 4 torum habere | multitudinem, quod in XL. partes dividi pos-
 5, 6 sit ita, quod nulla potestas inveniatur | super terram, que
 7 uni parti eorum valeat | resistere. Item dicitur, quod habent
 8 in exercitu suo | secum servos CCLX^a milia, qui non sunt |

⁴ Mare imum id est Mare Thyrraenum.

⁵ Recte: ... unus Thartar preest.

de lege sua et CXXXV milia de lege sua | probatissimorum 9, 10
 in acie. Item dicitur, quod mu- | lieres eorum, sicut et ipsi, 11
 bellicose sunt, et | iaciunt sagittas et insident equis et iu- | 12
 mentis, sicut et viri, et animosiores sunt | viris in conflictu 13, 14
 belli. Quia viris ali- | quando terga vertentibus, ille nulla- 15
 tenus | fugam arripiunt, sed omni discrimini se expo- | nunt. 16
Explicit epistola de vita, secta et | origine Tartarorum. 17, 18

VII.

Documentum novum rerum Magnae Hungariae A. D. 1320.

Epistola fratris Iohancae Hungari O. F. M. ad Ministrum
 generalem, Fr. Michaellem Caesenatem.

In codice Bibliothecae Academiae Cantabrigiensis; sg.: „D. II. 3. 7.“
 fol. 149^r—v. Inventum ab A. C. Moule. (Vide tab. XXIV—XXV.)

Litera missa generali ministro.

[f. 149 r] In xristo reuerendo patri fratri Michaeli ordi- 5
 nis minorum, | fratrum, frater Iohanca hungarus, ceterique 5
 fratres minores pro deo peregrinantes honoris & animarum 6
 zelo in latissimo | aquilonari Tartarorum imperio reueren- 6
 ciam humilem cum oracionum instanciis in domino ihesu 7
 xristo. 7

Nouerit pia pater- | nitas vestra quod pro nomine xristi
 laborare volentibus, castra Tartarorum sequendo, fructus est 8
 maximum animarum, ita | quod baptizando & confirmando, 8
 predicando & informando, confessando & confortando quasi 9
 continue vacamus, crebrius | & comuniter vsque ad profun- 9
 dam noctem, quoniam in aliquibus partibus populus xristia- 10
 nus in tantum multiplicatur, quod vix modo, iudicio | nostro, 10
 parum vltra medietatem de infidelibus extant. Nam diuersas 11
 nationes sibi potencia prelii de populis xristianis Tar- | tari 11
 subiecerunt, quos permanere sinunt in sue legis & fidei ob- 12
 seruanciis, non curantes vel modicum quis | quam sectam 12
 tenuerit: sic vt in temporalibus seruiciis, tributis & vectiga- 13
 libus ac sequelis bellicis suis faciant | dominis, ad que obli- 13
 gantur secundum edictam legis. Quinimo in tanta libertate 14
 eosdem conseruant xristianos, quod multi du- | centes vxores 14
 et familiam mangnam tenentes, efficiuntur quandoque 15
 suis dominis diciores, et non audent domini | illi de rebus 15
 contingere seruorum, quin et eos appellant socios & non ser- 16
 uos, set cum domini ad prelia vadunt, | ipsos armati sequuntur, 16
 fideliter seruendo contra Saracenos cum eis pugnando, 17
 pacti fidem conseruando. 17

Sa- | raceni autem iuxta discurrentes eos infestant & 18
 conuersos de Tartaris ac alios nituntur subuertere, ac | quan- 18
 doque peruertunt a fide, non habentes qui eos doceat legem

19 xristianam. Saraceni autem qui propriam legem makometi
 20 habent, sectam quamdam | habent religiosam reputatam, cuius
 21 fratres falsarios¹ vocant, gladios in promptu ferentes, vt statim
 22 interminant contra legem | loquentes. Sinunt tamen pa-
 23 cienter xristianos legem nostram & xristum & mariam ac
 24 sanctos commendare, sic quod makometum non contemp-
 25 nant. | In lege sua multa tenent de ewangelio Luce, & ma-
 26 riam virginem asserunt & xristum in ea conceptum flatum
 27 diuino. Set xristum | deum esse negant; venerantur tamen
 28 eum sepcies in die, inmediate post makometum, ad tube
 29 mangne sonitum in quadam | turri vel campanili, eumque
 30 maiorem prophetarum dicunt post makometum, & 7^{os} sic
 31 secundum legem mecanica² dimitunt, oracioni- | que incum-
 32 bunt & veneracioni, & hec eos seruare in ciuitatibus Apulie,
 33 Hyspanie cotidie vident xristiani inter quos ibi degunt. |

34 Fratres autem nostri qui in Tartaria iuxta eos morantur
 35 in claustris vel locis mansiuis, fructum faciunt multum predi-
 36 cando, | & ministrando conuersis & aliis ecclesiastica sacra-
 37 menta, plurimosque captiuos redimunt pauperes de elemosi-
 38 nis sibi datis. | Set est multo maior fructus castra sequi vo-
 39 lentibus, sicut experientia cercio[r] docet cum labore; vnde
 40 licet fratres in ciuitatibus | conmorantes loca deserere non
 41 possunt absque perdicione quam plurimarum animarum, con-
 42 uenit vestri paternitati et prudencie | prouidere, quo cicius
 43 valueritis, pro provinciis Tartarorum & exercitibus variis, de
 44 diuersis rengnis & multis, fratres ydoneos | prouidere ad hoc
 45 inspiratos & ibidem destinare, de Anglicis, Hungaris & Teu-
 46 tonicis precipue, qui leuius linguam scient; | scientes quod
 47 qui in hoc conpacientur infidelium animabus xristi sanguine
 48 redemptis [et] in adiutorium nostrum venerint, deo lucrifa-
 49 ciant | multa milia earum. Si quos vero retraheret victus par-
 50 citas & penuria, suam buccellam tingat in aceto et | felle,
 51 que xristus in cruce gustauit: si quos vero labor, fessitudinis
 52 recordentur & laborum xristi, & sic leuia fient cuncta | eis,
 53 cuius iugum suaue est & honus leue.

54 Certa quedam referam que cunctos mouere habent. Cum
 55 enim ego frater Iohanca | cum duobus fratribus hungaris &
 56 uno anglico ascendissemus vsque in Baschardiam,³ nacionem
 57 mangnam Tartaris subiectam, | duobus fratribus Hungaris
 58 pro fidei negociis a nobis recedentibus, ego cum dicto an-
 59 glico, nomine Willelmo per 6 annos con- | tinue conmorati
 60 sumus. Et ibi erant Tartari iudices Baschardorum, qui licet
 61 baptizati non essent, heresi tamen nestoria- | norum inbuti,
 62 cum eis fidem nostram predicaremus, cum gaudio suscepe-
 63 runt; set principem tocius Bacardie cum maiori parte | fa-

¹ I. e. asseclas, quos more ac nomine suo auctor nuncupat. Pro falsarios lege *falcharios*, *falcherios*, quod Turcis = *fakir*.

² Scil. opera.

³ *Baschardia* id est *Bascardia* (Iohanca), *Bascart*, *Baschart*, *Bosartos* (de Carpini), *Bascardia* (Benedictus Pol.), *Pascata*, *Pascatir*, *Paschata*, *Pascatur* (Rubruquis), *Magna Hungaria* (Iulianus).

milie inuenimus errore Saracenorum totaliter infectum.⁴ Qui- 40
 bus cum predicarem, dixerunt: si vos vtique primum ve-
 nissetis, | suscepissemus vtique fidem istam, set turpe est
 principibus cum vnam legem susceperint, ab illa leuiter dis- 41
 cedere ad aliam | transseundo. Frequentantibus autem nobis
 fidei doctrinam, & cum totam peritis Saracenorum probauim- 42
 us omnibus modis nobis possibilibus, | scripturis, singnis, ra-
 tionibus et exemplis, eorum legem friuolam & prophanam, que 43
 nulla ratione nec euidentia miraculi fulta, sicut est lex | xri-
 stianorum, cuius in partibus illis, vt cito referam, patuerunt 44
 miracula clara, ac ostendimus iam legem esse diabolicam & ab
 eo | cautelose bonis et malis esse admixtam, vt suspicio tol- 45
 leretur & sic magis simplices deciperet, ipsi in furorem
 uersi | interficere nos querebant. Nobis autem captis & atro- 46
 citer incarceratis, ferris onustis & fame cruciatis ac | carceris
 sualore,⁵ vermium horrore & mortali fetore, mortem cum 47
 gaudio prestolantibus, ipsi Tartarorum timore | attoniti, pre-
 sumere non audebant.⁶ Xristianos enim Tartari diligunt & 48
 illos odiunt atque persequuntur.

Cum autem adhuc | essemus in Bascardia, venit quidam
 nuncius de terra Sibur,⁷ que cingitur mari 7trionali, & est 49
 terra fertilis in victualibus, | set hyemem habet grauissimam,
 in tantum quod pre nimia niuium magnitudine vix tunc ali- 50
 qua animalia ambulare | possunt, preter canes istius terre;
 quatuor enim canes magni trahunt vnum uehiculum, in quo 51
 potest vnus homo sedere cum | necessario victu & vestitu.
 Ista autem gens de capite hominis mortui cutem cum crini- 52
 bus abstract, quam pro deo suo ad- | orat, pellem vero faciei
 excoriatam in domibus suis tenent & pro domestico deo ve- 53
 nerantur. Dicunt tamen deum | xristianorum omnibus diis
 aliis esse forciolem; cum enim quandoque aliqua necessitate 54
 perurgentur, deum xristianorum invocant, et sepe | [f. 149 v]
 optinent quod petunt. Nam cum semel super eos⁸ exercitus 1
 debuit transsire super glaciem valde magnam, ipsi timore
 perterriti | deum xristianorum inuocare ceperunt cum magno 2
 rugiti & clamore, ac ei sacrificia optulerunt, moxque dei
 gracia, | ceteris patrie partibus remanentibus induratis, ista 3
 per quam exercitus transsiret mox tota resoluitur et multis |
 periclitantibus, vt in mari rubro exercitus Pharaonis, alii 4
 vacui [et] frustrati ad propria redierunt. Item cum semel |
 eis pestilencia accidisset, eorum phitones dixerunt: omnes 5

⁴ In fol. 101 r. codicis Musaei Britannici „Nero A. IX.” sg. inuenitur textus, qui a quodam fratre anonymo O. F. M. est scriptus: „Sed iam de proximo baptizatus est per fratrem *Henricum Alemanum* filius cuiusdam magni millenarii vocatus *Tharmagar*. Item *Estokis* dominus totius *Baschardie*, cum uxore et filiis et familia multa”. (Vide p. 14.)

⁵ Recte: squalore...

⁶ Adde: nos interficere.

⁷ Vide p. 6.

⁸ I. e. contra eos.

morte peribitis, nisi efficiamini xristiani. Quod audientes, |
 6 multi eorum baptizati sunt a quodam clerico Rutheno scis-
 matico. Est enim regnum Ruthenorum scismaticum ab eccle-
 7 sia | romana, sicut regnum Grecorum, propter precipue dic-
 tum de spiritus sancti emanacione non a filio, quod reuocare
 volunt. | Et eciam aliter quam nos baptizant, dicentes: bap-
 8 tizetur seruus xristi et cet., sicut recitat magister sententiarum.
 Quia | tamen dictus Ruthenus neque sciuit, neque
 9 audebat eos debite instruere, tam baptizati quam nos⁹ bap-
 tizati in pristino er- | rore permanserunt. Ex hiis satis liquet,
 10 quod illa gens cito conuerteretur, si haberent qui eos doce-
 rent fidem xristi; | quod et ipsi fatentur.

11 Hoc eciam patet ex quodam quod negligi non debet.
 Nam predictus nuncius qui venerat de Sybur, | legacionem
 12 attulit a quodam tartarico iudice populi supradicti ad
 nostrum xristianum iudicem Bascardorum in | hec verba
 13 certa: Audiui quod tu, germane mi, habes tecum 4^{or} sacer-
 dotes latinos xristianos, rogo ut duos ex | ipsis ad nos mit-
 14 tere velis, qui possint & debeant nostrum populum bap-
 tizare; et si voluerint in ciuita- | tibus morari, nos eis eccle-
 15 sias & domos edificabimus in quocunque loco voluerint de
 Sybur; si vero | voluerint castra nostra sequi, omnia neces-
 16 saria eis ministrabimus; si vero nobiscum stare noluerint,
 eos vsque ad vos | super capita nostra conducemus,¹⁰ tan-
 17 tum nos baptizent et doceant fidem suam; si autem ad nos
 venire noluerint, | deus eorum animas omnium quas saluare
 18 possent, de manibus eorum requirat. Noster autem xristianus
 iudex, audita le- | gacione, misit ad nos, rogans quod ad
 19 gentem istam transsiremus. Nos vero habentes maximam
 voluntatem, set in- | firmitate ex dicto carcere sumpta vehe-
 20 mentissima prepediti, nullo modo potuimus, coacti ad fratres
 redire | vel remanere.

21 Post hec vero prefati domini Bascardorum, venientes
 ad curiam inperatoris, fratres cum instancia | petiuerunt; set
 22 propter paucitatem, nullum eis dare potuimus, sine eorum
 perdicione inter quos eramus; pauci | enim sumus pro locis
 23 seruandis et aliqua dimisimus, set xristus vobis, pater, inspi-
 ret & ecclesie romane de re- | medio tanti defectus; & ad-
 24 uertant hec fratres verissima, & quid pro xristo attemptent
 illi precipue, qui quanto sunt ex- | cellencioris sciencie, qua
 25 in suis prouinciis quasi parum curantur, maioris ibi essent
 vtilitatis & eminencie, qui | magis eximie scilicet sunt intel-
 26 ligencie: ideo videant quid facto opus sit, ne eorum literalis
 sapiencia, tot laboribus | vigiliisque conquisita, domi rectis-
 27 sime¹¹ quasi sit sepulta, cum ibi, scilicet apud nos, foret
 velud ardens lucerna. | Data in castris Tartarorum iuxta
 28 Bascardiam anno domini 1320. |

⁹ Recte: non ...

¹⁰ I. e.: reportabimus.

¹¹ Pro — uti remur — saepissime ...

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tum concilium approbavit. et etiam
 asapientissimo et beato iohanne damas-
 co. qui in g'alia multa sic dicit. spi-
 ritum filium dicimus. et filio aut non
 dicimus. sed quod ad plurimam in-
 firmo extensus est. in hoc et monem
 signamus. Receperunt omnes tironi-
 tones aplos tam scriptas quam non
 scriptas. venerunt autem scriptas et
 g'alia concilia. et quos illa recep-
 unt receperunt. quos vero repba-
 uerunt repbamus. et ritus et
 eos qui tunc tenebant sequimur. et hac
 tenus obfirmamus. sicut a sanctis ap-
 tolos p' uniuersum mundum cruciatu
 tironi fuerunt. ac sicut regali pur-
 pura utouti aiam fide orthodoxa.
 clari stabimus ante tribunal xpi.
 et per eam regni xpi erimus. incedere
 immaculata diuina dei genitricis
 et semp' uirgine maria cum omnibus
 sanctis. qui pro fide et ueritate etiam en-
 dulcissimum pro quo meruerunt coronam
 in martirium et gloriam sempiternam.
 fiat hoc per omnipotens genitricem
 unigenitum filium tuum. et puolens spe-
 ritu sancto. amen. in. am. **C**onsular
 sume dei ecclesie constantino polatino
 aulino presentem libellum nre con-
 fessionis et fidei precepto scilicet p'iar-
 charum tam g'ralis quam theopoleos
 magne antiochie p'suatione etiam
 sa concilio sub scripto.

De facto ungenite magne a fide ri-
 cardo in uento epie d'ni Greg' ap.

Ingentium fuit ig'entium un noui-
 garum xpiarum quod est alia ungeni-
 arum de qua septem duces cum po-
 pulis suis egressi fuerunt ut ha-

bitandi quererent s' locum. eo quod tunc ipse
 multitudinem ibi tantum sustinere non
 posset. quod cum multa regna pertransissent
 et testatissent tandem uenerunt in terram
 que nunc ungenia dicitur. tunc uero dicebatur
 pascua romanorum. quod ad inhabitandum pre-
 teritis temporibus elegerunt subiectis sibi ipse
 qui tunc habitabant ibidem. ubi tandem per
 sanctum stephanum primum ipse regem ad fidei
 catholicam sunt reuerti. prioribus ungenis
 a quibus ista descenderant infidelitate
 permanerunt. sicut et hodie sunt pagani.
 Fratres igitur predicatoribus huius ungenis un-
 garum iuentis compassi ungenis adbe-
 se descendisse nouerunt. quod adhuc in erro-
 re infidelitatis manerent. miserunt. uis-
 tes tribus ad illos querendum. ubi etiam ex-
 possent uiuante et non inuenire. sciebant
 precepta antiquorum quod ad orientem essent.
 ubi esset penitus igno:abant. predicti
 uero fratres qui nulli fuerant in his se erponere
 laboribus permanere p'prie eos usque post
 annum tertium quesierunt. nec tamen ipse mil-
 ta uia pericula potant inuenire. uno ipse
 excepto sacelote nomine octo qui tantum
 subincatoris nomine precessit qui in quodam
 regno paganorum quodam de lingua illa
 inuenit. pro quod certo efficebat. ad quod p'prie
 manerent. s' illorum punitam non inuenit.
 inuenit in ungenia est reuerti. pro fide plures
 assumendis. qui cum ipso redierunt fidem
 illis catholicam predicarent. Sed multum fra-
 tris laboribus post octiduum relictis sui di-
 em. cum omnes uiam illos querendi crepo
 fuisset inuenit ad xpm. fratres uero
 predicatores infidelium conuersione deside-
 rantes quatuor fratres ad quendam gentem
 p'prie ueritate miserunt. qui accepta
 fratrum suorum benedictione bitu regiam istam
 rem inuato barbibus et capillis admodum

paganorum nutritis p̄ Bulgariā aſſim
 et promaniā cū diu cati et expenſis
 dñi Bele nūc regis vngarie uſq̄ con
 ſtantiā pol' puenērūt ubi iactantes
 in arte p̄tingitū et tres dies uenerūt
 inſtam que uocāt̄ archia. i ciuitate q̄
 matrica uocatur nūcupat̄ quorū dur
 et ppli ſe r̄pianos dicunt. Inſtes hīs
 et ſacerdotes grecos. p̄ncps centū vi
 halere uoces. oīs uim caput oīno
 trōūt et barbās nutriūt delicate no
 bilibus exceptis q̄ in ſignū nobilitatis
 ſup̄ auriculā ſiniſtram paucos relin
 quūt capillos. cetera p̄te capitis tota ti
 ſa. vbi ipſi ſacerdotes ſpem q̄ expecta
 bant quinquaginta diebus morā fecerūt.
 dñs at̄ dedit ipſis gr̄m in cōſpectu dñe
 que ſup̄ centū uoces regis maior erit
 ita ut auribus eos amplectat̄ affectū.
 et in oībo eis neceſſariis p̄uidebat. in
 te p̄greſſi cōſilio et adiutorio dñe dñe
 p̄teritū ubi nec tomos nec hoies in
 uenerūt diebus tredecim tranſiuerunt
 ibiq̄ uenerūt in ſtam que alama d̄r.
 ubi r̄piani et pagani uirtū manēt. q̄
 ſūt v̄tē tot ſunt duces. quorū nulls
 ad aliū h̄t ſubiectōis reſpectū. ibi cōti
 nua ē guerra duras. ſonātin. uille q̄
 uillam. t̄p̄e arandi omīs unius uille
 hoies armati ſunt ad Campū uadūt
 ſunt omīs in cōtū. et cōtiguō t̄r ſpatio
 h̄t erent. et q̄c̄q̄ certis uillas ſiue i
 lignis acquirendis ſiue lalus opis
 h̄t uadūt omīs p̄t̄ et armati. nec
 poſt ullo modo paucis p̄toci ſeptimanā
 de uillis ſuis quacūq̄ t̄cā egredi abſ
 q̄ p̄iculo p̄ſonarū. excepta ſola die d̄ca.
 manent uſq̄ ad ueſp̄an q̄ inſtanti duo
 cōt apud illos h̄etur q̄ tunc quilibz
 q̄ r̄miciq̄ mali fecit. uſ quocūq̄ h̄t

ad ſarros ſecuro pot̄ ſiue nudus
 ſiue armatus. etia: inſ illos quor
 p̄ntes occidit. uſ quibz aliamala
 i t̄t̄t̄ ambulat. Illi qui r̄piano ibi
 cenſent̄ noie hoc obſuant. q̄ de
 uale uo nec bibūt ſi comedunt
 i quo murem morā cōtingit. uſ de
 quo canis comedit. niſi p̄us alio
 p̄b̄o ſiut b̄ndictū. et qui alit̄ fac
 ar̄p̄iamate effiat̄ alienus. a ſi
 quis cor quocūq̄ can̄ h̄oian occi
 dit p̄ conce p̄iūm nec b̄ndictōe
 accipit. ſmo ap̄d eos h̄oia d̄um
 p̄uicho reputat̄. quē in tanta ba
 lent reuētia q̄ paupes ſi indige
 ne ſiue aduene qui in ſaci die ſeci
 h̄e no poſſit ſi c̄t̄t̄e qualecūq̄
 ſup̄ aſtā cū uerillo poſuerit. et eleua
 tam portauerit. tam inſ r̄pianos
 q̄ inſ paganos oī t̄p̄e ſecur̄ i c̄t̄t̄.
 de loco illo ſit̄ ſacra t̄t̄ h̄e non po
 t̄nt p̄cedendi ipſi timorē tanta
 tor q̄ dicebant̄ eſſe uiam. ipſi q̄
 duobz er ipſi reuētiabz. reſquis
 duobz p̄ſeuiantibz i eadem t̄t̄a in
 penuria maria ſer inſ ſilo ſi mora
 ti. inſta quos nec p̄m̄e nec potuz
 p̄ter aq̄ h̄ebant. ſi un̄s ſim̄ ſa c̄t̄t̄e
 c̄t̄t̄e a q̄dam alia ſp̄arant. p̄
 q̄bo aliquōto p̄tū t̄e inſo recepe
 rūt. de quo nō niſi tenuent uim̄s
 pot̄ant ſiſtētiam. unde t̄e acūnt
 duos et ſe uentē quor p̄no aln̄ c̄p
 tū iter p̄ficerent. ſi nō inuenerunt
 c̄ptores q̄ arant uſ uolere uel ſiue
 runt. vñ neceſſitate d̄acti duo
 er̄tis de illis p̄t̄bo inſus ungariaz
 redierūt. alii uo remanſerūt. ibid.
 uolentes reſiſt̄e ab̄itūe in c̄t̄t̄o.
 Tante: ipſi h̄iti quor a am paganos

facerent iter ampicentes p̄deserti
 solutivici triginta septem diebus
 continue uerunt. infra quos vigi
 ti duobus pambis subtanentis usi
 sūt. ateo paruis q̄ in q̄q̄ diebus
 potuissent a nō. ad sacertate totali
 ter comedisse. vnde frat̄ q̄ sanus
 quidē ser sine uirbo fuit. cū maris
 labore et dolore. libent̄ tam̄ de deser
 to eduxit. infirmus at̄ fr̄ plus sa
 no q̄ sibi. et pariens illi frequenter
 dicebat. q̄ ip̄m in deserto relinqueret
 tamq̄ mortuū et trunca in uallem.
 ne p̄ occuparet ip̄s negligent̄ op̄
 det. qui nequa q̄. consensit ser usq̄
 ad mortē ip̄ius sc̄m̄ mitine labora
 uit. pagani comites uer̄ for̄ crede
 rentes ip̄os h̄c pecunia fecit eos et
 accerant p̄quirendo. Transito. iūc
 deserto sine om̄i uia et seruita tricesi
 mo septimo die uenerūt in d̄tam sy
 racenozū q̄ uocatur. Dela i ciuita
 tem v̄ndax. ubi nullo modo. apud
 aliq̄ potant hospitiū obtinē. s̄ in
 campo manere opo: tuit. i pluuia
 et frigore. Diebo uero frat̄ qui san̄
 fuit sibi et infirmo fr̄i belemosina
 pauitate querebat. et tam̄ i potu
 q̄ malis potant i uenire. papue
 ap̄i cape ciuitatis. qui cū xp̄ianū
 et intelligens libent̄ a belemosi
 nas porrigebat. q̄ tam̄ p̄nc̄ps q̄
 ppl̄e illi⁹ regionis publice dicit̄
 q̄ cito fieri debebat xp̄iani et eodē
 romane subē. In te. ad aliam ciui
 tate. p̄cesserunt ubi p̄dictus frat̄
 infirmus Gemelus noie lactos i do
 mo lactem qui eos ip̄c̄ teū teū
 p̄i d̄no obdormiuit et ē sepulta
 ibidē. postmodū fr̄ iulianus q̄

solus remanserat nescies qualibet por
 ter h̄c p̄cessum factis ē fueno unius
 lactem lactos et uero ip̄ius. q̄
 fuit in magna bulgana. p̄fecturus.
 quo et parit̄ puenit. Est uo mag
 na bulgana regnū magnū et potent̄
 apolentas h̄ns ciuitates. s̄ om̄s sūt
 pagani. In regno illo publicis ē sermo
 q̄ cito debeat fieri xp̄iani. et rom̄e
 ec̄c̄e subiugari. s̄ diem asserunt se
 nescire. sicut ei alius sapientib⁹ audi
 uerunt. In una magna ciuitate. p̄m
 cie ciuitate de qua dicitur egre cū q̄
 quaginta milia pugnatorū fr̄ una
 vngarici mulierē inuenit. que de
 tra qua querebat ad p̄ced̄ illas terri
 ta fuit uiro. Illa occurrit fr̄m̄ uas p̄
 q̄d̄ c̄t̄ iturus. assens q̄ ad duas die
 tas ip̄s poss̄. vngaros quos quereb̄t
 p̄t̄ dubio iucire. q̄d̄ et san̄ est. Inue
 nit et eos uir flumen magnū et h̄v
 q̄ co uisō et c̄t̄ vngarus xp̄ianus
 i tellecto i aduentu ip̄is nō modicū
 sūt gaudi. arāducentes eū p̄ domo
 et uillas et de rege et regno vngaro
 rum xp̄ianoz̄. fr̄m̄ ip̄oz̄ fidelit̄ p̄qui
 rentes. et quecūq̄ uolebat tam̄ de fr̄o
 q̄ de aliis eis p̄pone diligētissime
 audiebant. q̄ oio h̄nt vngarici rōi
 oma. et intelligebant eū et ip̄s eos. pa
 gani sūt. nullam dei h̄ntes uociam.
 s̄ nec uola uenerant. s̄ sicut bestie ui
 uūt. fr̄is nō colūt. carnes equinas lu
 pinas et h̄m̄m̄ comēdūt. lac equi
 nū et sanguinē bibūt. In equis et ar
 mis h̄nt. et strenuissimi sūt in
 bellis. et ciunt ei p̄ relatores antiq̄oz̄
 q̄ isti vngari ab ip̄is descendit. let
 ubi c̄nt̄ ignoz̄. abant. Gens tartaroz̄
 uicina ē illis ser h̄ydem tartari comi



intentes cū eis nō potūnt eos itello
 deum ē. vno m̄ pmo plio deūcti sūt
 p eos. vnt ip̄s sibi amicos & socios
 elegerunt. ita q̄ siml̄ unca quidecū
 regna uastauerūt oīno. In hac vnga
 rorū t̄a dicitur fiat in uicē thartaros
 & nūtiū dicitur t̄a t̄a q̄ facbat vnga
 riam. Rutheniā. Cumaniā. Sleo
 toniā. Sarraceniā. et Tartariā. q̄
 dicitur q̄ c̄atus thartarorū q̄ t̄a ibi
 dem ad q̄nq; dicitur uicibus erat. S
 alexandria. uellet ite. s̄c̄ abū et atum
 q̄ ad destrūcōem plarū miserant c̄p̄
 tabant. dicitur etiā iteni q̄ ultra t̄am th
 artarorū ē gens multa nimis. oibus
 hoībo altior & maior t̄a capibus adeo
 magni s̄ q̄ nullo modo uidentur suis corp̄
 cōuenire. et q̄ eadem gens de t̄a sua en
 re p̄p̄t. pugnatūti cū oībo q̄ eis resistē
 uoluerit & uastatūti oīa regna q̄cūq;
 poterit s̄b iugare. fiat bus oīto itelle
 ctis licet ab vngaris iuitatē urman
 et t̄onec d̄cūt. Duplia ratē vnt q̄
 si regna paganoꝝ & t̄a ruthenoꝝ un
 q̄ sunt media int̄ vngaros xpianoe
 et illos. audient q̄ illi ad fidem catho
 licam s̄uicentē. tolerēt et uas oīs
 for̄sitan deceto obriaret. timētes q̄
 si illos ista contingeret xpianitate cō
 ungi. oīa regna int̄ media s̄bi uga
 rent. Alia rōne. qm̄ cogitabat q̄ si cur
 ibreū mori aut infirmari cōtingeret
 frustratus c̄t labor suus. eo q̄ nec ip̄e
 p̄feciss̄ illis. nec t̄es vngarie ū esset
 genus eadem scire possint. Cū q̄ uelli
 reūti docuerunt h̄ytem vngari uia
 aliq̄ p̄ quam possēt c̄tus p̄uenire. In
 cepit ad fr̄it̄ redire tribus dieb̄. ante
 festum natiuitatis b̄i iobis bapti st̄.
 et paucis dieb̄ i una descens. iam p̄

a q̄s & p̄t̄as. sc̄d̄o die p̄natiuita
 tatem d̄ni vngarie portas intrā
 uit. et t̄m p̄uicam et p̄poloniar
 eques uenit. In uelcūto de p̄e
 dicta vngaria transiuit et t̄m in
 fluuio regū quorduanorū quidecū
 diebus q̄ sunt pagani & adco boīes
 cruceles qui p̄ nichilo reputatur
 homo ille q̄ in altos boīes nō occi
 dit. et cū aliquis suua p̄dit. oīu
 hoīnū capita quos occidit coram
 ip̄o portant. et q̄nco pla coram uno
 quoeq; portant capita t̄a to melior
 reputat. decapitabo ūo hoīnū c̄f̄s
 faciunt. et libentis uite bibunt.
 vrozem ducē nō p̄mittit qui boī
 nem nō occidit. isti app̄bis suis acci
 pientes q̄ c̄tebeant xpianit̄. misit
 ad ducem magne lauclamerie que
 est t̄a ruthenoꝝ illis mana. q̄ c̄
 mittet sacerdotem qui ip̄is bapti
 s̄m cōf̄teret. q̄ r̄ndit. nō man
 hoc ē face si ip̄e romani. ip̄e c̄i t̄p̄o
 q̄d omnes fidem eēt romane dete
 mus suscipere. et eis obediente sub
 iugari.

Gregorius ep̄s suus fuorū ter
 dilecto filio aragrio vngario
 de securito. p̄p̄to c̄t̄e uasilien̄ sa
 lūt̄ & aplicam b̄n̄ dicit̄. Cū uisū
 icama uis̄ immorāto diutius offi
 cia gessens laudabilē & prudentē
 & fidele. nob̄ ac plenam. s̄ uis̄ n̄m
 b̄n̄ placū reddidens rōnem. uolē
 tes animi tui p̄uicē q̄cū teoibo que
 usq; ad p̄sentem diem gullisti seu
 recepisti & exp̄ndidisti. p̄cūia te
 penitus absoluumus et quitam us.
 Ita q̄ ad aliam rōnem reddendam.

preliminarem litterarum vice confessionis et hinc precepto dicitur pascendi cum generalis quoniam in
 pascis magne amiche pascione cum et monchi subterph.

De facto vngarie magne a fite Ricardo inuenio tpe dñi Greg. pp. noni.

Inuentum fuit ingessu vngarie xpianoy q' et alia vngaria quoniam de qua septem
 duces cum populo suo egressi fuerunt ut habitandi querebant sibi locum. eo q' terra ipoy
 multitudinem inhabitantium sustinere no' poterat. qui ad multa regna pascensisset et destruxit
 sine ratione conuertunt in terram que nunc vngaria dicitur. tunc vero dicitur pascia roma
 nay. que ad inhabitandum per tres annos elegerunt. subiectis sibi populo qui tunc habitabat
 ibidem. Vbi tamen p' sibi septem primis ipoy regem ad fidem catholicam sunt reuersi. Priori
 b; vngarie aequi sibi defendentes in infidelitate pascensibus. sunt et hodie sunt pagani.
 fides igitur predicatores hinc in gentes vngarie inuenias compassi vngarie aequi se desce
 dere nouerunt. q' ad hinc in errore infidelitatis manserunt. miserunt quatuor de sibi: ad il
 los quatuor. ubi ipoy eos pascia inuenit dno inuenit. dicitur cui p' scripta antiquoy
 q' ad orientem sunt. ubi esse gentes ignorabant. Preterea vero sibi qui missi fuerunt multos
 se exponentes laborib; p' mare p' terra eos ubi post totam terram quaesierunt. nec tamen ip
 multa illay pacila pascia inuenit. uno ipoy quoy sacerdote noie dno qui unum
 sub martirio noie pascia qui in quodam regno pagano quodam de lingua illa inue
 nit. p' quoy certus efficitur ad quoy pascia manserunt. de illay pascia no inuenit. in
 me in vngaria est reuersus. p' sibi pascia; aliamencho. qui cum ipoy micascoz sic illis
 catholicam predicant. deo multos factos laborib; post octidni micascoz sui diem. cum
 omnia uiam illos querendi cepissent regressi ad xpm. factus vero predicatores in
 fidem conuisione adlocantes quatuor sibi ad querendam gentem predicam uento in
 ferunt. qui accepta sibi suay benedictione habitam regulam in sicut micascoz barba et
 capillis ad modum pagano; natis p' bulgari aliam et p' romanu cum dicitur eo
 cepit dno dele tunc regis vngarie ubi constantinopol pascunt. ubi inuenias in ma
 re p' triginta et octo dies uenerunt in terram que uocatur sydia. in ciuitate que quoniam
 ciuitas dicitur. quoy dno et popli se xpianos dicit. habitans laico et sacerdotes
 greges. Principe conu dicitur habere uxore. omne uen caput ostius radunt et barbas
 nutriunt delicate. nobilib; acceptis qui insignium nobilitatis sup auream sicutam
 pascia relinquit capillos. cetera parte caput sua ubi. ubi ipoy factus sibi qui ipoy
 tabant quingenta dieb; moa fuerunt. deo aut dicit ipoy glem in conspectu dno que
 sup conu uxor regis manu erat ea ut mirabili eos amplexatur affectu. et in omib;
 eis necessariis pascit. inde ipoy consilio 7. aduocato dno dno p' octidni ubi nec do
 mos nec homines inueniunt dieb; pascia; manserunt. ubi uenerunt in terram que al
 na dicitur. ubi xpiani et pagani mixti morant. quot sunt uille: tot sunt duces. quoy
 nullus ad alium habet subiectionis respectum. ubi continua est guerra duces conu di
 con. uille contra uillam. ipoy acandi omne unius uille homines armati simul ad campum
 uadit. simul omne metat. et conuagis sibi sicuti hoc gerunt. et quatuor contra uillas

siue in lignis acquirendis siue in alijs opib; hinc: uadunt om̄s par̄t̄ et armati. nec possunt
 ullo modo pauca p̄ totam septimanā de villis suis quorūmq; de causa egredi abib; p̄cilio
 p̄sonarū. excepta sola die d̄nica. amane usq; ad uesp̄am que in tanta deuotione apud illos
 habetur q̄ tunc quilibet quātūcumq; mali fecerit. ul̄ quotūq; habeat aduersarios sc̄rimo
 potest siue nudus siue armatus etiā int̄ illos quorū partem occidit ul̄ quib; alia mala
 inuult ambulare. Illi qui xp̄iano ibi censentur noīe hęc obseruant. q̄ de uase illo nec bi
 bunt nec comedunt in quo muran̄ mori contingit. ul̄ de quo canis comedit. nisi prius
 a suo p̄bro fuerit benedictū. et qualit̄ fact̄ xp̄ianitate efficiatur alienis. et si quis eorū
 quocūq; casu hōinem occidit. p̄ eo nec penitentiam nec benedictionē accipit. immo apud
 eos homicidii p̄ nichilo reputatur. crucem intanta habent reuerentia q̄ sanguis suus indige
 ne siue aduene qui multitudinē sc̄ā habere nō possunt si crucē qualēcumq; sup̄ hastā
 cum uocello posuerit. ⁊ eleuatā portauerint. tam int̄ xp̄ianos quā int̄ paganos om̄i mō se
 cure incedunt. de loco illo s̄c̄o societate habere nō poterunt procedendi. pp̄t̄ tamen car
 tarorū qui dicebantur ēē uicini. p̄ q̄d duob; ex ip̄is reuertentib;. reliquis duob; p̄sue
 rentib; in eadem sc̄a in serua maxima sex mensib; sunt mortui. infra quos nec panē
 nec potum p̄t̄ aquam habebant. sed unus s̄c̄m sacerdos cocleina ⁊ quēdā alia prepara
 uit. p̄ quib; aliquando parum de malo recipiunt. de quo nō nisi tenuiter nom̄s potest
 sustentari. unde decreuerūt duos ex se uendere quorū p̄t̄o alij cepum t̄ p̄ficiunt.
 sed nō inueniunt emptores quia arce ⁊ molere nesciuerunt. Unde necessitate acta
 duo ex eis de illis partib; uersus uinganā redierūt. alij uero remanserūt ibidem. nolentes
 desistere ab itinere inchoato. Tandem ip̄i habita quorūdam paganorū societate t̄ arripē
 tes p̄ deserti solitudinē ingressi septem dieb; continue uenerūt. Infra quos viginti duob; dieb;
 subueniens illi sunt. adeo paruis q̄ in quinq; dieb; potuissent et nō ad societatem
 totalit̄ comedisse. Unde stat̄ qui sanus quidem sed sine uirib; fuit. cum maximo labo
 re ⁊ dolore. libent̄ tamen de deserto educat. Infirmus aut̄ stat̄ plus sano quam sibi com
 patiens illi frequēt̄ dicebat. q̄ ip̄m in deserto relinqueret̄ tāquā mortuū ⁊ inuicem inuicem
 lem. ne p̄ occupationē ip̄ius negligēt̄ opus d̄i. qui nequiq; consensit̄ sed usq; ad mortē
 ip̄ius sc̄am intrinsec̄ laborauit. Pagani comites uis ip̄orū credentes ip̄o habere p̄uicē
 fer̄ eos occiderant p̄quirendo. Transito aut̄ deserto sine om̄i uia et semita maximo septi
 mo die uenerūt in sc̄am Saracenorū que uocatur uedi in ciuitate dimidat. ubi nullo mō
 apud aliquē potest̄ hospitii obtinere. sed in campo manere oportuit. in pluuia ⁊ frigore.
 dieb; uero stat̄ qui sanus fuit sibi et infirmo s̄c̄i heliosyni p̄uicē querēbat et tam in
 potu quā in alijs potuit inuenire. p̄cipue apud principē ciuitatis. qui cum xp̄iani ēē uicini
 gēns libent̄ a heliosynis p̄tingebat. quia tam princeps quam pop̄s illius regionis pu
 blice dicunt q̄ ato fieri debebant xp̄iani et eccl̄ie romane subē. Inde ad aliam ciuitatē
 p̄cesserunt ubi predictus stat̄ infirmus Gerardus noīe sacerdos in domo Saraceni qui eos p̄
 cam recipit in d̄no obdormiuit ⁊ est sepultus ibidem. Postmodum stat̄ julianus qui so
 lus remanserat nefarius qualē potest̄ habere p̄cessum factus est seruus unius Saraceni.
 sacerdos et uir ip̄ius. qui fuit in magnā uulgari p̄fecturus. quo et parē p̄ueniunt.
 Est uero magna Bulgaria regnū magnū et potens apulentiā habens ciuitates. sed om̄s s̄c̄i

pagani. In regno illo publicus est sermo q̄ eis debent fieri xp̄iani. et romane ecclesie sub
 vngar. sed etiam affirmant se nefare. sicut enim a suis sapientib; audierunt. In una
 magna eiusdem p̄uincie ciuitate de qua dicitur egredi quinquaginta milia pugnatorū
 facta etiam vngarica mulierem inuenit. que de ha quam querebat ad partes illas na
 dita fuit uirō. Illa docuit s̄m̄ uias p̄ quas eēt murus. assertis q̄ ad duas dietas ip̄os
 posset vngaros quos querebat p̄culombio inuenire. q̄ et faciam ē. Inuenit enī eos uix
 flumen magnū ethyl qui eo uis et q̄ eēt vngarus xp̄ianus intellecto inaduertit ip̄ius
 nō motū sunt gauisi. circūducentes eum p̄ domos et uillas et de rege et regno vngar
 roy xp̄ianoy factū ip̄oy fidei p̄quirentes. et quēsiq; uolebat tam de fide quā de
 aliis eis p̄ponere. diligentissime audiebant. quia om̄ino habent vngaricū ydionia.
 et intelligebant eum et ip̄e eos. pagani sunt. nullam dei habentes notitiam. s̄ nec
 ydola uenerant. sed sicut bestie uiuūt. carnes nō colunt. carnes equinas lupinas et
 huiusmodi comedunt. lac equinū et sanguinē bibūt. In equis et armis abundante.
 et strenuissimi sunt in bellis. Scunt enim p̄ relationes antiquoy q̄ isti vngari ab
 ip̄is descendunt. sed ubi eēt ignotabant. Om̄is thartaroy uicina est illis sed hi
 dem thartan admittentes cū eis nō poterant eos in bello deuincere. immo in primo p̄
 lo dante sunt p̄ eos. unde ip̄os sibi amicos et socios elegerunt. na q̄ sunt uicini q̄
 tam regna uastauerūt om̄ino. In hac vngaroy ita dicitur facta inuenit thartaros et
 nuntia duas thartaroy qui fuerat vngaricū Ruthenicū Comanicū Theconanicū
 Sa. taceuicū. et thartanai. qui dicit q̄ exercitus thartaroy qui tunc ibidem ad quinque
 dietas uicinus eēt. contra alemanū uellet ut. sed alium exercitū quē ad destructionē
 p̄ se miserat expectabant. Dixit etiā idem q̄ ultra hanc thartaroy eēt ḡns multa in
 mis. om̄ib; hōib; alioz et maior cum capitib; adeo magnis q̄ nullo modo uident
 suis corpib; conuenire. et q̄ eadem gens de ha sua erit p̄ponit. pugnaturi cum oib;
 qui eis resistere uoluerūt et uastaturi om̄ia regna quēsiq; poterūt subuigare. facta
 hīs om̄ib; intellectis licet ab vngaris inuideretur ut maneret donec decederet. dupl
 a ratione. ma. quia si Regna paganoy et ita Ruthinoy que sunt media int̄ vnga
 ros xp̄ianos et illos. auderent q̄ illi ad fidem catholicam inuertantur. dolerent. et
 uias om̄is forsitan decetero obseruarent. timentes q̄ si illos istis contingeret xp̄ianitate
 conuerti om̄ia regna int̄ media subuigant. Alia ratione. qm̄ cogitatur q̄ si eum in
 breui mori aut infirmam contingeret. frustratus eēt labor suus. eo q̄ nec ip̄e p̄ferat;
 in illis. nec s̄b vngaricū ubi eēt gens eadem fore possint. Cum igitur uellet reuerti do
 cuerunt eum huiusmodi vngari uiam aliam p̄ quam p̄sser atus puenire. Incepit autem
 facta redire trib; dieb; ante festum natiuitatis beati ioh̄is baptiste. et paucis dieb; ui
 uia quiescens. tam p̄ aquas quā p̄ fens. sexto die post natiuitatē dñi vngaricū p̄tias in
 trauit. et tam p̄ Ruam et p̄ Polomiam equos uenit. In redeundo de predicta vngaria cū
 fuit in fluuio regnum gerduanoy quindē dieb; qui sunt pagani. et adeo hoies ma
 deles qui p̄ nichilo reputatur homo ille qui multos hoies nō occidit. et cum aliquis in
 uia p̄cedit. om̄ia hōinum capita quos occidit coram ip̄o portantur. et quanto plura
 coram uis quoq; portantur capita tanto melior reputatur. de capitib; uero hōinum capto

faciunt. et libentius inde bibunt. vxorem ducere nō p̄mittunt qui hōnem nō occidit.
 Isti ap̄p̄tis suis accipientes q̄ et dēbant xp̄iani. miserūt ad ducem magne laudame-
 ne que est n̄a Ruthenoy illis uicina. q̄ eis miseret sacerdotem. qui ip̄is baptisimū
 conferret. qui r̄ndit. nō meū ius est facere. sed pape romani. et cum est ip̄e. quod
 oīs fidem ecclie romane debemus suscipere. et eius obedientie subiugari.

OSZK

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

De facto vngarie magne

et ritus ecclesiasticos qui tunc tenebantur sequimur / et hactenus observamus / sicut a sanctis apostolis ecclesie per universum mundum evangelizata tradita fuerunt / ac sicut regali purpura induci animam fide orthodoxa claris stabimus ante tribunal christi / et per eam Regnum christi erimus mercedem immaculatam deam matrem dei genitricem et semper virginem virginem cunctis sanctis qui per fidem certaverunt certamen dulcissimum pro quo meruerunt coronam imperisibilem et gloriam sempiternam. fiat hoc pater omnipotens genitor vngarum filij tui et puellens spiritus tui. Amen. Amen.

Cartophilax summe dei ecclesie Constantinopolitane iulius principem libellum meum confessionis et fidei precepto sanctorum patriarcharum tam generalis quam theodosios magne inchoche persuasione etiam sancti gregory sub scripsi.

De facto vngarie magne

a fratre Ricardus ordo finis predicatores in eo die domini Gregorius regis.

Auentum fuit in gestis vngarorum vngarorum quod esset alia vngaria maior de qua septem duces cum populis suis egressi fuerant ut habitandi querebant sibi locum quod terra ipsorum multitudine inhabitantium sustinere non posset. Quia cum multa regna preuisissent et destruxissent tandem venerunt in terram que nunc vngaria dicitur. Tunc vero dicebant pastua Romanorum quam inhabitanda per tres annos elegerunt subiectis sibi populis qui tunc habitabant ibidem. Vbi tandem per sanctum Stephanum primum regem ad fidem catholicam sunt reuersi / postquam vngarie a quibus isti descendunt in infidelitate permanebant sicut et hodie sunt pagani. fratres igitur predicatores huius in gestis vngarorum inuentas compassi vngarie a quibus se descendisse nouerunt quod adhuc in errore infidelitatis manerent

De facto

miserunt quatuor & fratres ad
 illos gentium dicitur: possit eos
 iuuante domino inuenire. Sciebant
 enim per septem annorum quod ad orientem
 essent. Vbi autem penitus ignora-
 bat. Vnde dicitur de fratribus qui missi
 fuerunt multis se exponentes
 laboribus per mare per terras eos
 septem annorum tenuerunt
 nec tamen propter multa diuina pi-
 cula poterant inuenire. Vno autem
 excepto fratre nomine Octo qui
 tantum sub mercatoris nomine per-
 cepit qui in quodam Regno paga-
 norum quosdam de lingua illa in-
 uenit per quos certus effractus
 ad quas partes manent sed illo-
 rum iuuantia non inuenit. Vno in
 Ungaria est reuersus per fractu-
 bus pluribus assumendis qui
 cum non rediit fides illis ca-
 ritatem predicauerunt. Sed mul-
 tos fractus laboribus post octa-
 uum reditus sui diem cum octo
 diuina illos gentium exposuisset
 inuenit ad christum. Frater de
 predicatore in illius questione de
 siderantes quatuor fratres ad que-
 rentem gentem peruenit. Vnde miserunt
 Qui accepta fratri suo de

ne ditione / habitu regulari in
 scilicet mutato barbis & ca-
 pillis ad modum paganorum nu-
 titus per Bulgariam Asiam et
 per Romaniam cum ducatu & ex-
 pensis domini Celestini Regis in
 gane deperit Constantinopoli puen-
 rit. Vbi inuenit in mare per-
 xxxij. dies uenerunt in terram
 que dicitur Sicia in amicitia que
 maritima nuncupatur / quorum dux et
 populi se christianos ducunt / habent
 literas et sacerdotes grecos. Vni-
 cepto cenam de habent ditione / sed
 dux caput omnino radit / & barbas
 inuenit delicias nobilibus exceptas
 qui in signum nobilitatis sunt auri-
 cula similia / paucos relinquunt
 capillos / cetera per capras tota ra-
 ra. Vbi propter societatis spem quam
 expectabant / quinquaginta diebus mo-
 ram fecerunt. Deus autem dedit ipse
 gratiam in conspectu domine / que si-
 cenam ditione Regis maior erat /
 ita de mirabili eos amplexaretur
 affert / & in omnibus eis necessarius
 prouidetur. Inde progressi consilio
 et adiutorio per ditione per deser-
 tum. Vbi nec homines nec domos
 inueniunt / debus .xij. inueniunt

Vngarie magne.

Ibiq; venerūt in terram que dicitur
 ma dicit. Vbi xpiani et pagani
 mixtam manēt. Quos sūt dille
 tot sūt Duces quoz nulls ad
 aliū hē subiectionis respectū. Ibi
 omne ē guerra duas contra
 Ducem dille cont' dillā. Tempe
 arandi omēs unus dille hoīes
 armati simul ad campū vadūt
 simul et omēs metūt et cōti
 quo tē spacio hēt cecant et qd
 quid extra dillam sive in lignis
 accendit sive in alijs opēris ha
 bent vadūt omēs parit et arma
 ta nec possūt illo modō pauca per
 totā septimana de villis suis q̄
 cūq; de causa egerit absq; p̄iulo
 p̄sonaz excepta sola die dūca
 a mane usq; ad vesperā que in
 tanta deuotione apud eos habe
 tur q; tūc quilibz q̄ntūq; ma
 li fecerit vel quocūq; habeat ad
 uersarios securū potest sive nu
 dus sive armato etiam int' il
 los quoz parentes occidit vel q̄
 bus alia mala inculit ambula
 re. Illi qui tūto ibi censeūt nō
 hoc obpauant q; de vase illo nec
 bibūt nec comedūt in quo mure
 mori conuiget. Vel de quo caus

comedit nisi prius fiat a suo
 p̄bro bndictū. Et qui aliter facit
 a iustitate efficit alienus. Et si
 quis eoz quocūq; cau' domine
 occidit p̄ eo nec p̄nam nec b̄n
 dictione accipit. Vno ap̄ eos ho
 micidū p̄ nichilo reputat. Cru
 cem in tanta b̄n reuerentia q;
 paupes sive indigane sive ad
 uene qui multitudinē secū habe
 nō p̄nt si crucem qualescūq; s̄
 hastam cum deo illo posuerit et
 eleuatam portauerit tam int'
 ianos q; int' paganos omi tem
 pore securū incedūt. De loco illo
 fratres societate habe nō pore
 rant p̄cedēdi p̄ timore turca
 roz qui dicebant et viam p̄
 quod duobz eoz nōs reuerentibz
 reliquis duobz p̄stuerant in
 eadem terra in terra maxima
 sex mensibz sunt morati inf^m
 quos nec panē nec potū p̄ci
 aqua habebant. S; vno frater
 sacēdos coelestia et quedā alia
 p̄uuit p̄ quibz aliquando panū
 et milio receperūt p̄ quo de q̄
 non nisi tenuiter minus pote
 runt sustentari. Vna denūc
 duos ex se dēdit q; p̄tio alij

De facto

cepit iter s̄ p̄ficere. sed non
 inuenit emptores quia anare
 ⁊ molere nescuerūt. Unde nati-
 tate coacti duo ex eis de illis
 partibz verso in garia redierūt
 Alij dō remanserūt ibidē/nolen-
 tes desiste ab ioue inchoato. Tan-
 dem n̄i habita quorūdam p̄gano-
 nū societate/iter arripientes p̄
 defora solitudine. xxxv. diebus
 otinuo ierūt infra quos. xxiij.
 annibz subaenatis vs̄ sunt
 adeo purus q̄ in quibz diebus
 vocauerūt ⁊ nō ad s̄dactatem
 totalit̄ comedisse. Unde frater
 qui sanus quidē sed sine vmbis
 fuit cū maximo labore et dolo-
 re libent̄ tamē a defeto eduxit
 Infans at̄ frater plus sano q̄
 sibi opaciens illi frequent̄ dicit
 q̄ ip̄m in defeto reliquet
 tamq̄ mortuū/et truuā in-
 uitalem. ne p̄ occupatē n̄i
 negligeret opus d̄i. qui neq̄
 q̄ offensis sed vsq̄ ad mortem
 n̄i secum in itinē laborauit
 Partim comites die n̄d̄sar-
 dentes n̄os habere pecuniam
 fere eos occiderant p̄ueniēdo.
 Transito at̄ defeto sine om̄i

dia et semita. xxxv. die bene-
 rūt in ciuitate Sarrazenoz que
 vocatur. Beda in ciuitate Bun-
 dam ibi nullo modo apud ali-
 quem poterant hospitiū obtine-
 sed in campo manere oportuit
 in pluuia ⁊ frigore. diebz vero
 frater qui sanus fuit/sibi et
 infans fratri elemosina p̄ ciui-
 tatem querebat ⁊ tam in potu q̄
 in alijs potuit diuine p̄cipue
 a p̄cipue ciuitatis qui eū xp̄ia-
 nū eū intelligēs libent̄ a elemo-
 sinas porrigebat quia tā q̄ n̄
 apes q̄ ip̄s illa regionis p̄-
 dicit q̄ cito fieri debeat ram
 et ecclie Romane subesse. Unde
 ad aliam ciuitatē p̄cesserūt ibi
 p̄cipue frat̄ infans Gerardus
 nōre sacerdos in domo Sarra-
 m qui eos p̄ter dei rapit in
 domo obdormiuit ⁊ e sepultus
 ibidem. Postmodū frater Ju-
 lianus qui solus remanserāt
 nesciens qualit̄ posset habere
 necessū factus ē fruens d̄no
 Sarrazenū sac̄dotis ⁊ d̄onis
 eius/qui in magna Bulgaria
 p̄fecturus quo et ip̄e p̄uenit.
 Est vero magna Bulgaria

Ungarie magne

Regnū magnū et potius opulen-
tas hñs ciuitates sed om̄e sūt
Magari. In regno illo publica
ē sermo q̄ cito fieri debeat xp̄i
am et Romane ecclie subingai
sed diem asserūt se nestare sic
em̄ a suis capūabz audierunt
In vna magna eiusdem p̄uicæ
ciuitate / de qua dicitur egre
di quiquaginta milia pugnatorū
frater vna muliere vngari ad
inuenit / que de tra quā habere
ad p̄ter illas tradita fuit dno
Illa docuit fr̄em vias per quas
ē iturus asserens q̄ ad duas
dictas n̄d̄ posset vngaris q̄
quereret p̄cul subio inuenit.
quod et factū ē. Inuenit em̄
eos iuxta flumen magnum
Ethi. Dum eo h̄sp̄ et q̄ esset
vngari mtellō. in aduētū n̄i
nō modicū sunt gaudi. Ecūduā
eos cū p̄domos et villas. et de
Rege et Regno xp̄ianoz fratru
n̄oz f̄ideliter p̄quirentes. Et q̄
cūq̄ volebat tam de fide q̄ de
alijs eis p̄one diligētissime au-
dibat. quia om̄o h̄nt vngariā
p̄dōma. et mtelligebat eū et n̄
eos / pagani sūt. nulla dei h̄nt

noticia. sed nec ydola venerant.
sed sicut bestie viuūt. Has nō
colūt. carnes eq̄n̄ et lupinas
et h̄m̄ comedūt / lac equinū
et sanguine bibūt. In equis
et armis habudant. et s̄uū
affirm̄ sūt in bellis. Sciunt
em̄ p̄ reuelationes antiq̄z q̄
isti vngari ab ip̄s desce-
runt. sed vbi eēt ignorabāt.
Gens Tartaroz diuina ē eis.
Sed ydem Tartari om̄netes
cū eis non potant in bello eos
deuincē / ymo in p̄mo pl̄o de
uicti sūt p̄ eos. Tandē ip̄s sibi
amicos et socios elegerūt.
ita q̄ simul l̄cti. x̄b. Regna
vastauerūt om̄ino. In hac
vngaroz fra / d̄cūs fr̄at̄ iue-
nit Tartaroz / et m̄cū d̄cūs
Tartaroz / qui sciebat vngari-
cum / Puthenā / Cumaniā /
Theotomā / Sarraceniā / et
Tartariā / qui dixit q̄ c̄ato
Tartaroz qui tūc h̄nt ad q̄
q̄ dictas diuina erat cōf̄ Alama-
niā vellet ire. Sed aliū quem
ad destructionē p̄fari miserit
expectabat. Dixit etiā idē q̄
vltra h̄am Tartaroz eēt gēs

De facto Ungarie magne

multa minus omnibz hominibz
altior et maior tū capitibz ad
o magnis/ qz nullo modo vidu
tur corpibz suis concire et
qz eadem gens de tra sua erit
prouit/pugnatur cū oibz illis
qui eis resistit soluerit/ et dicitur
cur nā Regna quęcūqz potant
poterūt subungari. Sicut hęc
oibz intellectas licet ab Ungari
inuitent de manet non daret
duplia racione. Una quia si Reg
na paganorū et tra Ruthenorū
que sūt media inter Ungaros
xpianos et illos/ audiet qz illi
ad fidem catholicā inuitent
diderit et diab omnes de celo
obseruet timentes qz si illos
istis conuiget xpianitate con
uiget/ omnia Regna intermedia
subungaret. Alia racione qm
arguatur qz si cū in breui mo
ri aut infirmas conuiget fru
stratōr cō labor suis/ eo qz nec
ipē ppasser in illis/ nec frēs
Ungarie ubi cū gens eadem pa
re possit. Cū igit deller reuer
ti/ daret ut cū nō Ungari bi
am aliā p quā possit tutius
puenit. Inapit at frāt redi

re tribz diebz ante festū natiui
tatis beati Johannis bap̄ et pau
cis diebz in via questens/ tā p aqs
qz p rias sō die post natiuitatem
dñi Ungarie portas intrat et
tame p Ruthiā et poloniā que
dicitur. In rediuidō de p̄tā Ungra
na transiuit in flumē Regni
Norduanorū. x. diebz qui sūt
pagani et adō hoies crudelis
qz p nichilo reputat homo ille
qui multos homines nō occidit
et tū aliquis in via pcedit om̄
bonū capita quos occidit corā
ipō portat et q̄to plura corā duo
quoqz portat capita tāto mellor
reputat. De capitibz dō bonū
sciphos facit et libentio mē
bibunt. Exorē duā nō p̄mittit
qui hoimē nō occidit. Isti a p̄p̄
tis suis accipietes qz cū debeant
xam miserit ad Duam magne
Sanāmerie que ē tra Ruthenorū
illis diama qz eis miserit sacro
dotem qui nōs baptisimū conf
ret. Qui rūd. Nō meū ē hoc
facē sed pp̄ Romanū. Prope
enī ē tempus qz omnes fidem eorū
Romane debent suscipere et eis obe
dencie subungari. am. . .

luc 7 oblia qd pedia ^{velte iac}
 gminare fac. ^{capit} ^{dotit}
 pta jugi.
 lex Cornu.
 amunis. Cruta.
 il. godelta. Metriola
 (clausa)
 it. flagit 2 erudit
 flexibit. floret i sumo
 Claru
 agle. pta fugit abe
 uolitant. duab alit vna
 ut. Corpis liniamta
 cep. Obitu corpis sic
 (mans)
 mollic. Natatit
 adiu gnat. Studiū nel
 ret
 ite. Durissima pelle
 al. belnis. orelle delcat.
 rucle nale. ling form
 t. putat. foditur. (arur)
 al. pft. frond. Floret.
 itapital ad eol. tūteat.
 t. calore solis recipiat.
 a. In hyeme nllim ligū
 nitij.
 uelari eliquat. Inebat
 eat. Ingeniū acunt. A
 ulol enecat.
 a. Dolosa. Inesibilis. J
 dura. (foued man.)
 omū dnm. Dhicur
 (Jueatit iuct.)
 tne dr.
 ut. Lreia sequit ut
 libent gdnat.

lac scriptura. hasta iusticia in pphit 7 adultis. Gla
 dius spc q e ubu dr. Clipeus. Albu
 Casula. Manipul^o stola.
 Calta. dilecta. fecunda. Obediens.

Viro veni in rpo par dei gra pafino epo. 4p. s. legam. fr Julia
 fru odis pccator. In hungaria seruu ure caratis. reuienta tam de
 bora qm deuotay. Cu sedm inuicta m obediay ure debem ad mag
 na hungariam e tribz m adiunctas. iunctu nob it arripit cupiatur.
 e ad ultimos fines Bapussie deuenissent. rex didiciu uicaco q os
 thartari q ena vngari pagani vocant. 7 Bulgarij. 7 regna gplima
 a thartari pntit se deualata. Qd au sunt thartari. e ue secte sunt
 p ut meli potum directe uob renore pferent enarra bunt. Delat z
 m a qdida qd thartari inhabitabant tram p. q ne Cumary inha
 bitant. 7 dnt i carate filij ysrahel. Sen 7 ysrahelice uol uunc
 thartari nuncupari. Terra au de q p sut eglli Gotta uocat qm
 Buben Gotta uocau. Primu au bella thartaroy sic e inchoata.
 Vus erat in tra Gotta Burgata noie. q sorore habebat uigine. per
 tibi defuncta lue familie pudente. 7 more uirili ut dr se gunt.
 Ex pugnatat quenda dnoc uicinu. 7 eund suis spoliabat. Claphil
 au quibda dieb. e duce um pdem thartaroy naroe sic gfuert
 ex pugnare nrae. ille s pccent qmillo bello e puella supdicta.
 pualuit i pugna. 7 ea q p hnt adulara captiuauit. gulo q
 i fuga luo gderit ipam i captiuitate pona violauit. 7 i lignu
 maioril vndoe deflorata ia turpic decollauit. Quidam te
 puella memorare. Burgata supdca dur. nuntio ad pferu uiuu
 delegato. tale fert mandatu rnsmississe. Incellet qd sorore mea
 captam 7 deflorata decollati. nouis qd op m gnu eregula. di
 soror mea e fersicu fuit ingera dampnificans te in rebz nobilib.
 uocat ad me accede. equu de ea iudiciu perant. ut si uolent to
 ppil manz iudicare. deflorata captiuata 7 deflorata. duce en po
 tental in uroie. Si au ea occiderit. postaru habuist. nllaten de
 bueris eam deflorare. It e u i duobz dampnificans. 7 ggnale

Stabili viro epla de uita tartaroy
 in xpo pu. Perulimo epō. Si Iudi
 anuū fratru ordiū pdicatorū: Ierū urē
 scātal. Quē scdm iunctā michi obediē-
 ctiā ire deberē ad magnā hūgarā c̄ frī-
 bz in aduētū iunctū nobis iter pfice:
 cupentes cū ad ultimos fines pruce
 deuenissent: rei didiscimū uitatē. q̄ oēs
 hūgarū pagani. ⁊ regna q̄m plima:
 a tartari sūt penit̄ deuastata. Quē ā
 sūt illi tartari cui ue secte: uob te-
 noxe p̄sentū: enarrabo. Relatū est
 aut̄ michi a quibz dā qd̄ tartari: pri
 iher̄tabant roma. Dicitur i ueritate:
 filij h̄smael. Vn̄ h̄smaelice n̄ tartari:
 uolūt uocari. Terra ā de q̄ pul sunt
 egressi: gotha uocabat̄. quam Rubē
 gotham uocauit. Prīmū ā bellum
 tartaroy: est tātē mehoatū. Dux e-
 rat i illa t̄ra gotha: Gurguta noie
 q̄ soror hūc uginē. Qui penobul
 defūctū sue fāmilie p̄sidētē ⁊ mox
 uirū ut dr̄ se gerētē: expugnauit
 quēdā ducē uicini. ⁊ eūde suis bonis

Requirit spoliavit. Glaphic autē q̄zdam
 temporibz cū tū p̄dca ducē sūt q̄fuerū
 ac expugnare nitetur: ille sibi p̄ca
 uet q̄ in illo bello cū puella sup̄dca p̄
 ualuit ī pugnando. ⁊ eā qm̄ p̄ul adū
 lartā h̄tū: captiuauc. Conuersoq; ī
 fugā suo ex̄tū: ip̄am ī captiuitate
 positā uolauit. ⁊ ī signū maioris uī
 dē defloratā: turpiter decollauit.

Q̄o audito fr̄ memorare puella ḡ
 guta sup̄dca dux nūcio ad ip̄m uī
 rū delegato: tale fert̄ mādacū t̄ul
 misisse. Intellexi qd̄ sorore meā cap
 tā ⁊ defloratā decollasti. Nō uis te ep̄
 m̄ fr̄ uī: exregisse. Si soror mea forsi
 tan t̄ īqueta fuit dāpnificā te re
 bol mobilibz: potal ad me accede e
 quū de ea. p̄ctū uidicū. Vel si
 uolens debellatā qm̄ p̄ul nianibz cap
 tuasti ⁊ deflorasti: potal ducē ī uo
 rē. Si autē p̄positū occidendi eā h̄tū:
 nullo m̄ debuisti eā deflorare. Quē uī

eā dampnificā i duobz z uiguali e—
 pudiciā utulisti pudiciae: z carnali
 eā morte miserabiliter gdepnasti. Propt̄
 qđ i uidecā necal puelle notate: t̄cas
 me teā total uiribz ggluū. Hec ue-
 ro audier̄ dux necal pepectoz z uideul
 se n̄ p̄te r̄eliste: fugit cū suis ad solda-
 nū de ornach: t̄ra p̄pa derelicta. Hūc
 itaqz gestul: erat qđā dux i t̄ra chana-
 neoz noie uirca cui diuicie tā p̄da-
 re p̄dicāu: qđ z pecoza i aures can-
 nalibz adaq̄bant. Quē dux alī de flumi-
 ne de uuz noie sauez p̄t diuicias ex-
 pugnauit z deuicta. Oī deuicti cum
 duobz filiis suis z q̄bzda pauca q de belli
 p̄iculo estuguit: ad dcm soldanū de or-
 nach t̄ugūt. Soldanū u memor memor
 t̄uile qm ei qđā t̄ulerat: qz uicinus
 el̄ ex̄tat̄ recepit eū z i porta suspedit:
 z populū dominiū suo subiugauit. Duo
 ā filiū ei p̄tū fugā arripuerūt. Et qz re-
 fugiū alias n̄ habebat: ad p̄fatū sauez q

prem eoy ⁊ eoldē iāntea spoliauat:
 sut reūli. O^r ferali gcutat rabie: ma-
 iorem cū eq̄i infecto. quoz ū fugiet
 ad Gurguta ducē tartaroy iā aña noi-
 natū: rogāt obui^r ut de Gruz q̄
 prem suū spoliauat ⁊ frēm occidat: ū-
 dcām exercec. dicēs qd Gurgute. honoz
 remaneret. ⁊ sibi p nece frū ⁊ spolio
 p̄rū: retribucio fieret ⁊ iudcā. O^r fām
 est. Ac hūa uictoria: rogauit utū Gur-
 guta ut de soldano de ornach iudcām
 reciperec. Et egitū q̄ soldanū uicto-
 riam optinuit. Ergitur quali undiq̄ fir-
 tut uictoria laudabū: Gurguta prē-
 dictul dux tartaroy cū toto ip̄ecu bel-
 li cepit p̄ḡssim face: q̄ perlat p
 q̄bz dā guerris qual ibi p̄ntā hūa. Et
 regnū play: totalit subuigauit.
 Ex hūa audacior effectul: ⁊ fortiorē
 se reputā oibz li: terrā: p̄gressū cepit
 face q̄ regna totū iudian debellare
 p̄ponēt ⁊ ad terrā romanoy accedēt: eā
 sibi subuigauit. Inde reūli ad magnā
 hūgarā a quibz nr̄i hūgarū originem
 hūerūt: expugnauit eā. x. iiii. Anl sicut

ipi hūgarū pagani: nob reculerunt.
 Reuersus inde ulus occidūte spacio unū
 āni uel parū amplū: quibz regna pagano-
 rū maxima: obtinuit. Que. lx. castra
 fortissima habebāt tā populosa: qd de uno
 eoz. exire potant. l. milia multū arma-
 toz. Sciunt qd Cinguta dux ille p̄m
 q hoc bellū inchoauit: est defūctus. Sicut
 aut filius ei chajm: regnat p eodē. ⁊ re-
 sidet ī ciuitate magna. omāch. Residet
 ā tali m. Palaciū h̄c tā maguū qd. mille
 milites int̄it p unū ostiū. ⁊ eidē iclūā-
 tel: exiūt nichilominū residēt. Dux ā
 p̄fāt parauit sibi tectū p̄gnde ⁊ altū
 aureis colūpnis im̄tū. lectū aureū.
 ⁊ p̄ciosissime coop̄tū. ī q̄ sedet. q̄i p̄fuit.
 ⁊ cūdat p̄ciosis indumētis. Ostia ū ip̄
 palaciū per totū: aurea sūt. q̄slic ā p̄m
 cul p̄ diuisal etal. videlicet ulē mare unū.
 Aliū copiosū eritū: multū ūy mare si
 oēs comanos qui ad p̄ces ūngarie fugiūt.
 Verū ū p̄fuit: obsidet totā hūgarū ⁊
 ruziam. Longū q̄ iaciūt sagittas: q̄

Nota de nobilitate
 latro ip̄ ducit.

Nota de ostiū au-
 reū ⁊ de p̄fuit
 tate ip̄fuit.

cete nationes. Et p̄ma q̄ ḡtioe belli non
 sagittare dū. s̄ q̄ sagittas pulue-
 rizare uident. Et talit̄ an̄ suū cuneū
 ordinat: quasi .x. hoīb; un̄ pest. Cent̄
 ū: un̄ centurio. Hoc q̄ tali astuta faci-
 ut: ne exploratores supueniē eos: p̄sūt
 latere aliquatēd̄ iter eos. Et si yctiḡte
 eundem num̄ d̄minui p̄p̄ bellū: resti-
 tuūt sine mora. Et ut populus collectus
 de diuisis infidelitate aliq̄m face n̄ pos-
 sūt: quēlib; denariū numerū ex di-
 uis̄ nationib; 7 linguis: collegūt. Oīū
 regnoꝝ reges. magnates. duces de qb; 7
 spes 7 qd̄ p̄t̄ face resistētia: m̄ficiunt
 sine mora. Qd̄ sup̄ hūc q̄sulendū qd̄ ue-
 facitōū sit: ur̄e iēctatōū dilectio dignū
 sollicit̄ p̄uidere. Preterea ut nil ex hūc
 remaneat p̄missum: p̄mitta ur̄e sig-
 nifico qd̄ q̄dam etiā ruthenoy dixit qd̄
 tartari sūt madianice. Q̄ cū cecheil pa-
 rit̄ pugnat̄ q̄ filios israel: deuicti
 sūt a gedone sic ī lib̄ iudicū ḡnētur:
 Vade fugietes d̄i madianice: h̄rauit̄

iuxta quēdam fluvium noīe tartar:
 ⁊ inde tartari sūt uocati. Tantam
 q̄s allerūt tartari se bellatorū habere
 multitudinē: qd̄ ī .xl. p̄tes diuidi p̄-
 sit. ita qd̄ nulla potestas inueniatur
 sup̄ terrā: que uni parti eorū ualeat
 resistere. Item d̄r qd̄ h̄nt ī exercitu suo
 secū seruos. cc. h̄. milia qui non sūt
 de lege sua. ⁊ c. xxx. q̄. de lege sua
 p̄batissimorū in acie. Item d̄r qd̄ mu-
 lieres eorū sūt ⁊ ip̄i: bellicose sūt. et
 iaciūt sagittas ⁊ insident equis ⁊ in-
 mental. sicut ⁊ uirī. ⁊ adiosos sūt
 uirī: ī cōflictu belli. Quia uirī ali-
 quādo tergā uertētibz: ille nullatenū
 fugā arripuit. s̄ oī discrimine exp̄-
 nit. Explicit eplā de uita. secta. cc
 origine tartarorū. || — || — || — || — ||



DOCUMENTUM NOVUM RERUM MAGNAE
HUNGARIAE.

Epistola fr. Johanae Hungari O. F. M.
In Cod. Bibl, Univ. Cantabrigiensis, sg. „D. li. 3. 7.”

Fol. 149 r. in tab. XXIV. Text. vide in pag. 47—49.
Fol. 149 v. in tab. XXV. Text. vide in pag. 49—50.

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár



GREAT BRITAIN AND KOSSUTH.

I.

Kossuth influenced by Count Széchenyi's literary propaganda for British institutions. — Kossuth's progress in English during his imprisonment in Buda. — His advocacy of Bentham's humanitarian theories. — His endeavours to create industrial enterprises, credit, free trade and a free press. — Blackwell's plan to increase Hungarian agricultural exports. — Kossuth opposes Blackwell's plan.

Britain always attracted Continental Europe, where feudalism still prevailed. Her splendid principles of government were indeed deeply rooted. After much bloodshed, at the end of the seventeenth century Britain could boast of equality of rights and a constitution, having reached the zenith of a development which served the welfare of her own people as well as those of Continental Europe.*

France was the first to follow Britain's lead, the France

* SOURCES AND ABBREVIATIONS.

I. Official Records.

- | | |
|---|----------------------------|
| Public Record Office, London | P. R. O. London |
| Foreign Office Records | F. O. |
| Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris | A. d. M. A. E. Paris |
| L'Angleterre, Rapports, Dépêches | |
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1855. Provinces Slaves | |
| Preussisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem | P. G. St. A. Berlin-Dahlem |
| Bunsen's Immediatberichte aus London | |
| Geheime Präsidialregistratur d. kgl. Polizei-
Präsidiums, Berlin | |

where the abuses of feudalism had by this time deprived her people of political, social and moral sense. The ideals of the French revolution spread rapidly all over the Continent; nevertheless, it was only very slowly that they penetrated into Hungary, where, until 1848, feudalism prevailed. This is easily accounted for. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Napoleon's campaigns had engaged the nation's attention, and the repercussions of the French revolution awoke no echo in Hungary. France had no constitution, but feudal Hungary enjoyed a very ancient one similar to that of old feudal Britain. Consequently, this ancient constitution only needed to be reformed, like that of Britain, and not, as in France, to be created a fresh. There is no doubt that the British example seemed the proper one to follow

Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Wien Archiv d. k. u. k. Ministeriums des Äussern Kabinettsarchiv, Nachlass Schwarzenberg Actes de Haute Police	H. H. St. A. Wien
R. Archivio di Stato, Torino Lettere ministri, Gran Bretagna Lettere ministri, Porta Ottomana	A. St. Torino
M. kir. Országos Levéltár (Public Record Office), Budapest Ministry for Foreign Affairs Ministry of Finance Committee on National Defence	P. R. O. Bpest M. F. A. M. F. C. N. D.

II. Private Letters and Collections.

1. In Public Record Office, Budapest:

Kossuth Papers. Kossuth's literary legacy. Official and Private Correspondence	Ko. Pp.
Vörös Papers. Official and Private Correspondence collected by Kossuth's secretary Anthony Vörös	Vö. Pp.
Miscellaneous Papers ex 1848/49. Collection of papers dealing with history of the struggle for independence. (Purchases and Donations)	Miscell. Pp.
Tanárky's MSS. Diary (the manager of Pulszky's real estate)	

2. National Museum, Budapest Manuscript Department, Private Letters	N. M. Bpest. MSS Dpt.
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in the judgment of those who advocated a reformed constitution in Hungary.

A young rich and spirited member of the Hungarian aristocracy, Count Stephen Széchenyi made great propaganda at home in support of this conviction. Between 1815 and 1830 he spent much time in Britain and brought back to his own country an unbounded admiration for British constitutional liberty.¹ During his first visit, on November 1, 1815, he wrote to his father: "... Even the humblest servant here has the same right and claim to prosperity as the richest people have. This equality, the like of which I never dreamed of, but which now I see exists, is a tremendous boon for this country. The peculiar relationship between squire and servant, on which every man's rights are based, is not to be found in any other country. The island, the character of its people, and many other circumstances facilitate their existence..."²

Széchenyi seized upon every idea that was likely to lift Hungary out of her state of backwardness. In order to awaken national consciousness he began to write. He searched for means to improve the situation of his country. All his efforts were concentrated on the hope that Hungary, once awakened, would force the chauvinist absolutistic government of Vienna to revise on the ancient Hungarian constitution on liberal lines. Hungary at that time was an agricultural country, as Britain had been in the eighteenth century. Britain's example should go to prove that, even in an agricultural country, all classes of society could become prosperous by the application of a system of intensive production coupled with manufacturing industries, an organized credit-system and free trade, all of which were the motive power behind the prosperity of the human race. Deeply imbued with these principles of national economy, he first published in 1828 a pamphlet on "Horses", which was followed in 1830 by his work on "Credit"³ which created a great sensation all over the country.

In conservative circles he was sneered at as an Anglomaniac. But this had no effect, for his popularity was growing rapidly and

¹ Angyal Dávid, *Gróf Széchenyi István történeti eszméi* (Count Stephen Széchenyi's historical ideas). Bpest, 1923 p. 75.

² Vizsota, Julius, *Gróf Széchenyi István írói és hírlapi vitája Kossuth Lajossal* (Polemics between Count Stephen Széchenyi and Lewis Kossuth in Letters and in the Press). Bpest, 1927, vol. I, p. IV.

³ Iványi-Grünwald, Adalbert, *Gróf Széchenyi István, Hitel* (Count Stephen Széchenyi, "Credit").

he became the centre of interest during the reform-session of the Hungarian Diet, which was held in Pressburg from 1832 to 1836.

As against the criticism he had to face, however, he gained much satisfaction from the enthusiasm of his admirers. Among the latter was a young lawyer, Lewis Kossuth, who was living at that time in the county of Zemplén and who, after reading Széchenyi's "Credit" with eager interest, believed that he recognized in British institutions the lines along which the Hungarian constitution ought to be reformed. Kossuth also attended the reform-session of the Lower House (1832—36) as the deputy of the absent Baron Samuel Vécsey, and he insistently demanded a free press, in order to inform the public of what was going on in Pressburg. When the Vienna Government vetoed his intention to print a report of the debates, he had handwritten copies of his manuscripts prepared by friends, and these were distributed among the magistrates of the counties. As a result of this defiance he was arrested in 1837 and charged with high treason.

Kossuth presumably began his English studies during the session of the Diet.⁴ He had plenty of time in prison to acquire a fair knowledge of the language. He spent his time in reading. His interest was particularly concentrated on the works of British economists, which he read partly in English, and partly in French or in German translations. He made precise notes from Mc Culloch and Whateley and studied very carefully the books of Jeremiah Bentham.⁵ He followed with eager enthusiasm the polemics initiated by the German economist Frederik List against the theories of Mc Culloch and Whateley. Contrary to List's opinions, Kossuth took the side of the British economists and pleaded for free trade, from which he hoped for the prosperity created by the reconciliation of the interests of British agriculture and manufacturing industry. Strongly advocating Bentham's theory⁶ of the duty of society to make as many people as possible happy, he decided, once he was free, to leave no stone unturned in his efforts to create a reformed Hungary.

⁴ Cf. his letter from prison to his mother "...Should I receive French books, would you please let me have a dictionary. During the last three years I have been reading much English. It is possible that I am out of practice in French..." Buda, Dec. 24, 1837, Vö. Pp. no. 233. Public Record Office, Budapest.

⁵ Cf. Kossuth's fragmentary notes. Vö. Pp. no. 234. P. R. O. Bpest.

⁶ Cf. Angyal's op. cit. concerning Bentham's influence on Széchenyi p. 103.

But apart from this specialized interest in national economy, he also studied very carefully the causes of British industrial prosperity, as well as British social and educational institutions. Even before his imprisonment he made propaganda for British Kindergartens and in his solitude translated Wilderspin's work dealing with the system into Hungarian⁷ thus making the Hungarian public acquainted with the benefits of that British institution.

But in addition all this he also found time to educate himself in history and literature. He read Thomas Moore, Gibbon, Hume, Ferguson, Washington Irving, Cooper and Bulwer⁸ and the entire works of Shakespeare.⁹ His metrical translation of Macbeth is a masterly piece of work, but was never finished, because while still in prison he heard that it had been translated and published by another.¹⁰

On May 13, 1841, he was set free under an amnesty. He then displayed a quite extraordinary activity, which showed the influence of the British economists. Chance permitted him to spread his ideas through the medium of the press and the public was stirred up in favour of the reforms to come. The owner of the daily paper "Pesti Hírlap"¹¹ offered him an editorship, and from that time on he wrote a series of fiery editorials full of quotations from British authors. The headings alone were enough to interest the public. "Want of Money", "Banking", "The Whip for ever"¹² were parallels to Bentham's theories.¹³

The "Pesti Hírlap" rapidly became the most popular paper in Hungary. The following advertisement, printed in the issue of June 16, 1841, is undoubtedly without parallel in the history of the press: "The numbers of the first half-year are out of print; the second edition has already been issued". In consequence of

⁷ Cf. his letter to his mother, Buda, Nov. 3, 1837. Vö. Pp. no. 233. P. R. O. Bpest.

⁸ Cf. his letter to his mother, Buda, Dec. 24, 1837. Vö. Pp. no. 233. P. R. O. Bpest.

⁹ Vizsota op. cit. contains a list of the books he was allowed to read during his imprisonment, pp. 685—689.

¹⁰ Kossuth's own remarks on his MSS fragment of Macbeth. Vö. Pp. no. 234. P. R. O. Bpest. — Further, Hegyaljai Kiss Géza, *Kossuth L. Macbeth fordítása* (The Translation of Macbeth by L. K.). Bpest Review, 1934.

¹¹ Pester Gazette.

¹² I. e. for serfdom.

¹³ Cf. his *Book of Fallacies* and the *Théorie des peines et des récompenses* which Kossuth read in a French translation.

the great demand for Kossuth's editorials a newspaper had to be reprinted in order to satisfy the public's interest!¹⁴

Since British wealth was based on industry he launched a campaign to establish industrial concerns in Hungary. His slogan became a struggle to achieve industrial independence from Austria by building up a scheme of national autarchy.

He organized a society for the protection of home industries whose branches formed a network all over the country. When the manufacturing industry had grown in strength, the time would come for free trade. It would be the task of the newly established Hungarian Commercial Association to offer credit. His efforts were successful, and the first industrial exhibition was opened in Pest in 1842, and proved that spirit of enterprise was not lacking.

He did not overlook the needs of agriculture. The production was old-fashioned, did not pay and was in a state of overproduction being able to place only small proportion in the markets of Austria. New openings for export seemed to be the first corollary of any improvement in this situation. It was discussed by the Pester Club, founded by Count Széchenyi on British lines.

Kossuth was prevented from being elected to the Club by the jealousy of Széchenyi, who was anxious to check his growing influence and his efforts to carry out progressive reforms; compared to these, his own ideas seemed entirely out of date. Nevertheless, Kossuth was in permanent contact with many influential members of the Club and through this channel he was always well informed of their activities.

Blackwell, the Pest correspondent of the British Legation in Vienna sent a memorandum to the members of the Club, advising them to organize the export of Hungarian agricultural products to Britain. At the world market prices it did not seem impossible to sell Hungarian corn in London on more reasonable terms than in Vienna, in spite of the prohibitive British tariffs, which greatly handicapped the import of continental products. For that purpose Blackwell proposed the establishment of a Hungarian commercial agency in London, and with the Club's support went to Britain to make the necessary preliminary arrangements.¹⁵

Kossuth was deeply interested in Blackwell's enterprise, though his reports gave little hope of rapid success. The export

¹⁴ Hegedüs, Roland, *Lewis Kossuth*, p. 58.

¹⁵ Cf. his report *Aux Messieurs Souscripteurs du Casino*, London, July 25, 1842, Vö. Pp. no. 56. P. R. O. Bpest.

should be organized at home — he wrote to the Club¹⁶ — before he could make positive offers to British commercial enterprises. Hungarian agriculture should consider first and foremost every aspect of a planned export, particularly how the products could be transported to a seaport, thus enabling British merchants to calculate their offers.

But Hungary had only one seaport, Fiume, which in Blackwell's opinion was far more distant from London than New York, as far as the transit-time was concerned. Blackwell therefore suggested that the Club should select either Hamburg or Rotterdam for the export rather than Fiume. The transport to the former could be arranged through the waterways of the Danube and the Elbe, to the latter only via the Danube and the Rhine. Anyway, British capital might well be interested in Hungarian mines, in road-building and organizing river navigation. All these fields for capital investment were preliminaries to inducing British capitalists to import Hungarian cereals.

Kossuth did not share Blackwell's opinion. In spite of the latter's arguments he insisted on making Fiume the centre of export to Britain. In the press, he popularised the opening of a new rail route between Pest and Fiume and the creation of a national merchant fleet. Hungarian ocean-going ships were to carry grain direct to London where, the prohibitive British tariffs were suspended, they might have a chance of selling profitably.

In spite of Széchenyi's resolution to follow Blackwell's advice, Kossuth persevered in his propaganda for that 'new deal' in foreign commerce which he regarded as a most essential object.¹⁷ What was more, he commissioned Kreuter, a Bavarian engineer, to make plans and surveys for the projected railway line between Fiume and Vukovár, as being the first section of the route from Pest to the only seaport of the country.¹⁸ Nevertheless, Kossuth's endeavours were without success. The government approved Széchenyi's conception and gave preference to roads and waterways over the "imaginative usefulness" of rail and sea navigation, taking account of the lack of capital available in the country, which would first have to be imported for investment in the building-up of commercial routes.

¹⁶ Cf ut supra.

¹⁷ Pulszky, Francis, *Életem és korom* (My Life and Times). Bpest, vol I, p. 196.

¹⁸ Cf. Kreuter's letters to Kossuth. Vienna, January 18, 20, 23, 1848. Vö. Pp. nos. 1142, 1143, 1144. P. R. O. Bpest.

The revolution of 1848 breaks out. — Parliamentary system introduced in Hungary. — The cabinet council informs Britain of the constitutional reform in view. — Reforms prevented by nationalist movements in Servia and Wallachia. — Integrity of the Hapsburgh Monarchy endangered by the Pan-Slav Movement in Prague. — Hungary requests British mediation. — Belgrade's plan to separate Croatia and the southern territories from Hungary. — Vienna refuses to allow British consulate in Pest. — Hungary buys British arms for maintenance of the status quo. — Austria's expected entrance into the German Bund. — Kossuth's plan for alliance with Germany in case of the dissolution of the Austrian Empire. — Hungary's diplomatic agents in Frankfort, Paris and London. — The Agent Szalay refused by Palmerston and Eddisbury.

In February 1848 the rumours of a revolution in Paris brought all commercial projects to a standstill. Kossuth as the leader of the opposition and representative of the county of Pest now concentrated all his efforts in the Diet on behalf of the parliamentary system instead of the feudal constitution. But it seemed as if he could not foresee the consequences of his propaganda and overpowering oratory which fascinated all his followers in the opposition ranks.

In March the revolt broke out in Pest. The King formed the first responsible cabinet, whose premier was Count Lewis Batthyány with Kossuth as Minister of Finance. Events moved rapidly. While the Cabinet was busy preparing reform-bills for Parliament it did not omit to inform the Western Powers of the great constitutional changes which were taking place in the Danube Basin.¹⁹

The cabinet wanted to send a message to the British government. The Hapsburgh Monarchy was traditionally regarded by the latter as a natural ally of Britain against Russia, therefore the Hungarian cabinet laid particular stress on proving that the reform-bills were devoid of any revolutionary character. If carried

¹⁹ Cabinet Council, Pest, April 12, 1848, Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs no. 2. P. R. O. Bpest.

out, they would not weaken the Monarchy nor lessen the intrinsic value of Austria as an ally of Britain.

Besides this, there was another fact which could not be kept a secret from Downing Street. If the rumours of nationalist movements on the Lower Danube, in the Servian and Wallachian Principalities — then under Turkish rule — proved to be true, their moral effect upon the Croats, Servians and Wallachians of Hungary might be incalculable. Anyway, this movement might check the execution of the reforms and result in the dissolution of Austria, and troubles in Turkey; it might even lead to a European war. The cabinet therefore implored Palmerston to use his influence for the reestablishment of order in the Servian and Wallachian Principalities.

Prince Esterházy, the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was authorized by the cabinet to inform Viscount Ponsonby, the British Minister in Vienna of this anxiety. The latter expressed his appreciation of the cabinet's endeavours to keep the peace with all its southern and eastern neighbours and spoke very favourably of the commercial intercourse which might possibly follow the adoption of the reformed constitution.²⁰ As to the movements in the Principalities, Ponsonby felt embarrassed as to what advice should he give his government. He could not conceal his doubts as to the propriety of Britain exerting her influence in interest of order and peace during the disturbances.²¹

Unfortunately the anxiety of the Hungarian Cabinet was only too well founded. The Pan-Slav Congress convoked in Prague for May 31, 1848, had undoubtedly for its object the disruption of Austria. As soon as the aims of this Congress were known to the Hungarian Cabinet, Kossuth, together with Szemere, the Minister of the Interior, asked for Esterházy's intervention with the Austrian Cabinet in order to comply with the wishes of the discontented party in Galicia. Everything must be sacrificed for peace, declared the Hungarian Cabinet, for the integrity of the Monarchy must be saved from Panslavism.²²

The reason why the Cabinet of Batthyány stood so firmly

²⁰ Esterházy—Batthyány, Vienna, April 20, 1848. M. F. A. no. 2. P. R. O. Bpest.

²¹ Esterházy—Batthyány, Vienna, May 13, 1848. Committee on National Defence, no. 238/e ex 1848. P. R. O. Bpest.

²² Batthyány—Esterházy, Pest, May 16, 1848, C. N. D. no. 2/e, P. R. O. Bpest.

for order and peace, was its uneasiness as to the future of Austria. No one could foresee whether she could enforce her authority in the German Bund as well as in Lombardo-Venetia. The Pan-Slav Congress in Prague indicated in definite terms the future of Austria. In fact, the Slavonic elements of the Monarchy raised loud objections to her entering into the German Bund. If she did so, they felt themselves cheated of their hopes of taking over the rule of Empire on the grounds of their majority. In a future confederacy of races under the Monarchy they demanded priority.

In the event of a separation of the Slavonic races from Austria for the purpose of constituting an independent Slavonic block, the situation of Hungary would have been regarded as desperate by the Hungarian Cabinet. In its opinion the dissolution of Austria would finally result in the entrance of her remaining German territories into the Bund. Consequently, Hungary would necessarily find herself in an abyss between the German and Slavonic blocks, with a tendency to constrain her to enter the sphere of interest of one or the other.

This conception impelled the Cabinet to continue its policy of carrying on the constitutional reforms already sanctioned by Emperor Ferdinand, extending them to all branches of the administration. Even the national defence was to be included under this scheme. It was already rumoured that the Servians' and Croats' decision to separate from Hungary, owing to their attitude in their National Assembly held in Karlović, on May 13, 1848 plainly expressed this resolution as a common desire of the Southern Slavs of Hungary.

The resolution of the Karlović Assembly was corroborated by General Hrabowski, the commander in chief of the fortress of Pétervárad, who added to his report that Belgrade was considered as the centre of these separatist movements, whence the strong instigation began. The Servian Principality wanted to set up a Yougoslav kingdom, in which Southern Hungary would be included.²³

On receipt of Hrabowski's report, the Hungarian Cabinet acted immediately. It requested the Sovereign to allow the raising of a national guard of ten thousand men until Hungarian regiments stationed abroad in Galizia and Lombardy could be ordered back.

²³ Hrabowski—Archduke Stephen, Peterwardein, May 13, 1848. Präs. 454. C. N. D. 191/e. P. R. O. Bpest.

But for an armed resistance to the Southern Slav movement the Cabinet needed military equipment, which could not be produced at home on account of the lack of suitable factories. This they hoped to obtain from Britain, whose diplomatic representative had recently communicated to Esterházy Palmerston's satisfaction at the peaceful reforms mentioned before.²⁴

This announcement of Ponsonby's gave the Cabinet a welcome opportunity again to urge him to establish a British consulate in Pest, already promised by Palmerston but until then frustrated by the Cabinet in Vienna, which was always jealous of Hungary's relations with British commerce.²⁵

Kossuth in particular was quite confident in Britain's resolute policy over the maintenance of the status quo of the Austrian Empire. This would possibly have meant Palmerston's readiness to support Hungary's resistance to the Southern Slav separatist tendencies. But Batthyány's Cabinet had absolutely no time for consideration. Without waiting for Palmerston's answer about the consulate or for his assent in the matter of military equipment, the Cabinet sent Lieutenant Samuel Sztankay to London to purchase arms.

In any case, these military preparations were not directed by disloyalty towards the Emperor, although Vienna and Prague looked askance at them. Kossuth supported the maintenance of the Monarchy by every means in his power, and stood firm for his Sovereign in spite of being thoroughly entangled with the equipment business, which he had to finance in his capacity as a member of the Cabinet. "We want to transfer the centre of gravity of the Monarchy to Hungary" — he wrote on June 17th, to Pázmándy, the Commissioner of the Cabinet at the German Bund in Frankfort. — "The King is expected to come here this month and he will stay with us with God's help. We have to direct the Austrian diplomacy. Premier Batthyány was requested by the Cabinet to go to the Court in Innsbruck."²⁶ On the same day he wrote to his intimate friend Pulszky, Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Vienna: "Please, discuss that matter with the diplomatic representatives. They

²⁴ Esterházy—Batthyány, Vienna, May 13, 1848, no. 389. — C. N. D. Pest, May 16, 1848, no. 191/e. P. R. O. Bpest.

²⁵ Klauzál Gabriel, Minister of Commerce—Esterházy, Pest, April 26, 1848, no. 61. P. R. O. Bpest.

²⁶ Kossuth's own draft. Vö. Pp. no. 1051. P. R. O. Bpest.

should be carefully prepared. When the King arrives, they should also come here."²⁷

In this chaotic state of things Kossuth planned to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the German Bund for counterbalancing the accumulated tendencies of the Slav elements. Kossuth's plan was founded on the Bund's interest in preventing the establishment of an enlarged independent Czech state supported by Russia. Nevertheless, he was afraid of this plan being misconstrued in Paris and London. He called Pázmándy's attention to this possibility, which would have to be considered in Frankfort if the preliminary negotiations were to begin. He considered through what channels France's and Britain's support could be secured for a guarantee of Hungary's integrity in the event of her being in danger from the Slavonic forces of disruption.²⁸

No doubt, ideas might sometimes coincide. In fact, Pázmándy and his deputy, Szalay²⁹ were of the same conviction. Szalay urged the Premier to send agents immediately to Paris and London in order to inform the respective governments of the aims of the Hungarian Cabinet, and to request their support in any form they were willing to offer. There was no hope of help from Austrian diplomatists residing at that time in Britain and France on account of the hostile attitude shown by Vienna and Prague towards Hungary's preparations, which were directed towards building up her independent administrative and military equipment.

It is characteristic of the unsettled administration of the period that the Hungarian agents in Frankfort reported alternatively to Batthyány or Kossuth or even to Szemere. The instructions were usually given by Kossuth together with Szemere who acted on behalf of Premier Batthyány. Now, Szalay was called upon by these ministers to hasten to London³⁰ and to report to Palmerston on the events in Hungary. Upon his return he was to visit Paris and speak with Lamartine in the same sense as with

²⁷ His own draft. Pest, June 7, 1848. Vö. Pp. no. 1050. P. R. O. Bpest.

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ Cf. Flegler, Alexander, *Erinnerungen an Ladislaus Szalay*. Leipzig, 1866, pp. 14—19; Angyal, David, *Szalay László emlékezete* (Recollections of Ladislaus Szalay). Commemorative address delivered at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Bpest, 1914, vol. XVI, no. 11; Károlyi, Árpád, *Gróf Batthyány Lajos főbenjáró pöre* (Capital charge against Count Lewis Batthyány). Bpest, 1932, vol. I, chapt. XIV.

³⁰ Károlyi, op. cit. vol. I, p. 323.

Palmerston. These statesmen were to be convinced of the consequences which might result from the overthrow of the Monarchy which was threatened by the Slavonic nationals. And they were also to be remained that any political rearrangement in the Danube Basin would undoubtedly run counter to the interests of the Western Powers.

Szalay went first to Paris, where the revolution of June 1848 culminated. Unfortunately he had no chance to meet Lamartine or Bastide³¹ and consequently returned to Frankfort without continuing his voyage to Britain.

But Kossuth attached great importance to Britain's expected assistance. He tried to get in touch with Palmerston through his personal agent, the evangelical pastor, Theodore Wimmer, and hoped by this intermediary to negotiate a loan.³²

Kossuth's speech in the House of Commons on July 11th, 1848, shows his unbounded expectations from Palmerston's assistance. His imaginative character is well expressed by his utterances, which depicted Palmerston's mere courteous message to the Hungarian Cabinet as a great diplomatic success, although it lacked any political significance.³³

Premier Batthyány disapproved of Kossuth's individual actions in diplomatic and in military matters. Again, Kossuth regarded Batthyány's administrative aims as too conservative. Kossuth was the man of rapid action. As a result of his impulsive character he also gave orders to Pastor Wimmer for the purchase of arms in London, though he was cognizant of Batthyány's instructions to Lieutenant Sztankay, as well as of his request to the British Government to permit the manufacture of the recently-discovered rocket of Congreve in Hungary. Batthyány was glad to have a British officer in Pest who might have been able to undertake the instruction in the handling of the rockets.³⁴

The overlapping orders of Batthyány and Kossuth greatly

³¹ Szalay—Eötvös, Minister of Education, Paris, June 26, 1848, cf. Szalay, Baron Gabriel, *Szalay László levelei* (Letters of Ladislaus Szalay). Bpest, 1913, pp. 125—126.

³² Cf. his letter to Wimmer. Kossuth's draft. Pest, Aug. 15, 1848. Vö. Pp. no. 1066. P. R. O. Bpest.

³³ Cf. Kossuth's speech in Janotyckh v. Adlerstein, *Archiv des ungarischen Ministeriums*, Altenburg, 1851, vol. II, p. 58.

³⁴ Batthyány—Pulszky, Pest, Aug. 8, 1848. — C. N. D. no. 481/. P. R. O. Bpest.

embarrassed the London firm Fry, Cotton and Trueman, who were charged by both ministers with the delivery of military equipment. The firm did not conceal its opinion of the employment of two agents, which would greatly increase the price of goods to be delivered to Hungary.³⁵

But it was in vain that Batthyány protested against Kossuth's arbitrary behaviour, and Kossuth consequently acted without the assent of the Cabinet. Kossuth's attitude necessarily led to growing antagonism between the two statesmen, which finally resulted in their mutual estrangement.

Wimmer was in fact unsuccessful in business matters and we doubt whether he had the chance to see Palmerston at all. Fry, Cotton, Trueman and Co. were brokers but not manufacturers. They only dealt in useless arms and could not even guarantee their delivery to Hungary although the latter was the most important point of the business. The Banus of Croatia, Jellašić was already on the march with his troops towards Pest and the Hungarian national guard needed arms very rapidly. The campaign with the Southern Slavs was a sharp one.

If it is admitted that Kossuth deserve censure for his arbitrary conduct in business matters, the same is not true of him in politics, although he had a particular inclination to political romanticism, as he actually showed in all his dealings during the last months of his public service.

We cannot wonder at his misconstrued hopes as to Palmerston's attitude towards Hungary. Count Ladislaus Teleki and Ladislaus Szalay, the Agents of Hungary in Paris and Frankfort, entertained a similar false opinion in that matter. This attitude seems to be a common mistake usually made by revolutionary governments as well as by their diplomatists. They have a firm belief in the accomplishment of what they aim at. Otherwise they would lack moral force to fight for their principles with short-sighted optimism.

According to this political psychology, Szalay applied to Kossuth, who became the head of the Committee for National Defence, organized by decision of Parliament. Premier Batthyány resigned and Kossuth took over the administration in his stead. Szalay requested Kossuth³⁶ to be commissioned with the agency

³⁵ Cf. the firm's letter to Wimmer, London, Aug. 29, 1848. Prince Schwarzenberg Papers, Fasz. VIII. H. H. St. A. Wien.

³⁶ Cf. Szalay—Kossuth, Lüttich, Oct. 17, 1848, Schwarzenberg Pp. Fasz. VIII. H. H. St. A. Wien.

in London. Kossuth agreed. But knowing Britain's practical sense, he imagined to secure Palmerston's mediation in the matter of promising preferences in commercial intercourse.³⁷ Nothing could better characterize Kossuth's misconstrued judgment of the situation than his hope that Hungary's independence would be recognized by Britain. But Palmerston refrained from receiving Szalay, still less was he willing to negotiate with him. His neutral attitude — that seemed to be ironical to Szalay — was properly expressed by his Under-Secretary, Eddisbury, who advised Szalay to apply to Baron Koller, the Austrian Minister in London. "The British Government has no knowledge of Hungary" — wrote Eddisbury — "except as one of the component parts of the Austrian Empire."³⁸

But Szalay did not give in easily. He got in touch with Bunsen, the Prussian Minister in London, who was on intimate terms with Palmerston. Then he asked for the recommendation of Prince Leiningen, the Premier of the Central Government in Germany, who was a half-brother of Queen Victoria. He sent another memorandum to Palmerston, in which he explained the psychological background of recent events. The fight arose for the maintenance of the constitution. It could not be stamped as a mere revolution. Besides, he could not apply to Koller for Austria was at war with Hungary — as he wrote in that memorandum.

Eddisbury's answer was strictly negative; it discouraged Szalay and induced him to give up his endeavours. "Hungary has to pay for the Cabinet's carelessness in having failed to inform the foreign press systematically of the true state of things in Hungary" — he wrote bitterly to Teleki.³⁹ No doubt, the British press informed the public about events in remote parts of the Globe better than about the struggle that raged in the Danube Basin. It was an unusual event when the *London Times* published, on the New Year's Eve of 1849, a long letter about the situation in Hungary. Upon reading it the Austrian chargé d'affaires was much

³⁷ Instructions for Szalay, Bpest, Nov. 12, 1848. Correspondence relative to the Affairs of Hungary. Presented to both Houses of Parliament. 1847—49. London, pp. 106—107; Sproxton, Charles, *Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution*. Cambridge, 1919, pp. 44—45.

³⁸ Correspondence, p. 107; Koller—Schwarzenberg, Rapport no. 1. A—B. London, Jan. 2, 1849; Rapp. no. 6. D. Jan. 14, 1849. H. H. St. A. Wien.

³⁹ London, Dec. 21, 1848, cf. Horváth Michael, *Magyarország függetlenségi harcának története* (History of the Hungarian struggle for independence). 1848—49. Bpest, 1865, vol. II, p. 47.

annoyed and anxiously reported the fact to the Vienna Government.⁴⁰ Otherwise he was thoroughly satisfied with Eddisbury's attitude and wished to hear of the same treatment from the French Government for Teleki.⁴¹

III.

Szalay's successor, Francis Pulszky, diplomatic agent in London. — The war in full swing in Hungary against the South Slavs and the Austrians. — Rumours of the impending Russian intervention. — Lord Eddisbury's relative, Capt. F. W. Brown in service of the Hungarians. — Pulszky's efforts to gain over public opinion through the press. — His collaborators, D. J. Vipan, M. J. Kemble, Ll. W. Birkbeck, Toulmin Smith, Ch. F. Henningsen, F. W. Newman. — Unfavourable impressions in London and Paris caused by the dethronement of the Hapsburgs by the Hungarian Government. — Kossuth, Governor of Hungary. — The Russian intervention. — Cobden's agitation against Russia.

Upon receiving intelligence of Szalay's failure, Teleki became embittered and his moods varied between gloomy pessimism and bright optimism. When Pulszky visited him on his way to London, he made great efforts to dissuade him from his purpose.⁴² Again, when it rumoured in Paris that Palmerston had decided to send a note of protest to the Russian Cabinet on account of the sudden and violent invasion of Wallachia by Russian troops, he became full of optimism. Although he was well aware of Palmerston's axiom of regarding Austria's integrity as the greatest guarantee against German and Russian expansion,⁴³ he still thought that Palmerston, indignant at the Russian advance, would necessarily take the side of Hungary. His correspondents sent him good news from London. Lady Palmerston seemed to be in favour of the Hungarian cause, giving utterance to her opinion "que les Hongrois sont dans leur bons droits".⁴⁴ Teleki regarded her influence upon

⁴⁰ Bericht no. 85/A. London, Dec. 31, 1848. H. H. St. A. Wien.

⁴¹ Bericht no. 1. A—B. Jan. 2, 1849. H. H. St. A. Wien.

⁴² Pulszky, op. cit. vol. II, p. 436.

⁴³ Pulszky—Kossuth, Paris, Febr. 26, 1859, Vö. Pp. no. 1351. P. R. O.

Bpest.

⁴⁴ Teleki—Kossuth, Paris, March 7, 1849, Vö. Pp. no. 1419. P. R. O.

Bpest.

the attitude of London society as of considerable importance. If so, Pulszky's chances might still become promising. He was duly supported in his judgement by Capt. Fred. W. Brown, a near relative of Palmerston's Under-Secretary, Lord Eddisbury. Brown spoke very firmly about the anti-Russian feelings of the British public.

Besides this, Brown offered his services to Kossuth on behalf of the Hungarian cause. Teleki gladly nominated him to the rank of Major in the Hungarian Army and sent him direct to Kossuth through the Austrian lines. "You have never met a more faithful person" — he wrote to Kossuth⁴⁵ — "Brown is a real antique character. You will never find a more enthusiastic Hungarian than this Englishman. I am ready to answer for his loyalty." In fact, Brown crossed the Austrian lines by a gallant ride and handed Teleki's reports safely to Kossuth, who sent him to Constantinople to negotiate with the Porte. Kossuth thought that Brown would succeed in gaining the Porte's support for Hungary.

Meanwhile Pulszky reached London by entering the island with a false passport, and started work immediately. Taught by Szalay's experience, he concentrated all his efforts on informing the British public of Kossuth's rôle, as well as of the aims of the Hungarian struggle. He endeavoured to make Britain acquainted with the Hungarian point of view and wished to show the background of the movement in a fair manner which had never been done by the Austrian press, whose information was usually translated by the British press. The Viennese news spoke only of Hungarian revolt which must be suppressed for the sake of law and order. These reports only referred to victories over the Hungarians in revolt.

To counteract the false impression inspired by the Austrian Government, Pulszky incessantly stressed the fact that Kossuth was only fighting for constitutional reforms, for the parliamentary system sanctioned by the Sovereign. He was faithful to the Hapsburgs, and supported them in spite of the intrigues stirred up by court circles, who did not cease to egg on the Servians and Croats against Hungary. This was indeed true. The court camarilla was doing all it could to counteract the constitutional reforms. It was cognizant of the fact that if these reforms were once carried through, a similar process could not be avoided in Austria where absolutism

⁴⁵ Vide ut supra.

still prevailed. In this case, court circles must resign the power and influence they exerted hitherto.

In order to understand "the opposite views" Pulszky wanted to promulgate his own ideas in the press. First of all he tried to gain the confidence of those who did not regard him as a political agent in his new capacity, but only saw his fidelity to his studies. Since his early youth he had devoted himself to archeological studies, and now he was seeking to renew his former relations with D. J. Vipan, the archeologist.

Before this time of turmoils Mrs. Pulszky had been on friendly terms with the daughter of Lord Landsdowne, the President of the Council. Through this channel he received invitations to Landsdowne's family and became acquainted by his help with Sir Charles Lyell, a geologist of high reputation. By friendly recommendations he got in touch with the young historian, Mitchell John Kemble who again introduced him to Lloyd William Birkbeck and Toulmin Smith, barristers-at-law.

Informed by Pulszky of the present state of things, this small circle of well-wishers and friends became highly interested in the Hungarian cause and with their firmness and perseverance, so characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon, promoted Pulszky's attempted approach to the press. Even Vipan, Kemble, Birkbeck, T. Smith, as well as C. H. Henningsen, a reporter on the *Daily News*, and Francis W. Newman, brother of the subsequent Cardinal Newman, offered him their services to write articles about Hungary and place them in the papers. But apart from this generous help of friends, Pulszky's success with the press was due to the commencement of the military operations in Hungary. Henceforth the British public showed a growing interest in news from the Lower Danube, and the papers gladly accepted articles about the situation. Particularly the *Daily News*, the organ of Cobden's party, was very attentive to Pulszky and published his article, entitled "Fallacies", in which he endeavoured to refute the falsehoods spread by the Vienna press. Besides this, Palmerston's organ, the *Globe*, the radical *Sun* and Cobden's *Express*, also published pro-Hungarian articles. Again the *Examiner*, *Spectator*, *Observer* and Douglas' *Herald* printed many articles on the same lines in their Sunday issues. Among the monthly magazines the Tory *Blackwood* and *Frazer*, and the Quarterly Whig *Edinburgh Review* accepted articles from Pulszky and his friends.

This Hungarian News Centre proved with much tact and success the fact of Hungary's having been forced into the struggle

by the court party around the Emperor, and the weakness of the latter who had been influenced to tolerate General Jellačić's insurrection against the Hungarian administration. When the struggle for national defence began, Pulszky wrote impressive articles about the movements of the Hungarian army, expounded the rôle of the foreign legions, and familiarized the public with bibliographies of leading personages of the army and administration.

But he had to face the difficulty of being shut off from the permanent news service from home. He could not compete with the daily service of the Vienna press, nor could he send reports to Kossuth about the changing public opinion. Again, Kossuth sorely missed the necessity of contact with him. The only route by which they could have communicated led through Constantinople or via the island of Candia. There is no doubt that these reports or instructions were always out of date when they reached the addressees. The only channel open to Pulszky led him to Paris, where a few of his compatriots lived and endeavoured more or less successfully to keep up contact with friends at home. This means that he was entirely dependent on his own inventive faculty.⁴⁶

Left alone, he received with great consternation the news of the dethronement of the Imperial House, decreed by Parliament in a session in Debrecen on April 14, 1849. It seemed unlikely to him that Kossuth would be elected Governor of Hungary. No doubt, this news created an unfavourable impression in Britain, where the public adhered to the monarchical system and general opinion tended to the hope that even in France the President of the Republic would very soon become Emperor.⁴⁷

Pulszky himself was convinced that republican principles could not take root on the Continent, consequently the republican tendencies in Hungary seemed to be devoid of any prospect of practical utility. Pulszky did not identify himself with this republican spirit. Nevertheless, he worked for his government and continued his press campaign without intermission, for he considered himself as a representative of his county's interest and not of its present supreme authority.

⁴⁶ It is characteristic of the want of reliable communication between Kossuth and his agents abroad that his instruction, sent to Paris on December 24, 1848, for Count Teleki, reached the addressee only on March 14, 1849. Cf. the letter of Fred. Szarvady, secretary to Teleki, addressed to Kossuth, Paris, March 15, 1849. Vö. Pp. no. 1379. P. R. O. Bpest.

⁴⁷ Pulszky, op. cit. vol. II, p. 452.

The Russian intervention was known in Britain at an earlier date than it was to Kossuth and his administration. As soon as it proved to be true, Cobden became one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the pro-Hungarian movement, though formerly he always took the part of Russia, which he never excluded from his scheme for free trade. His generous character was indignant at realizing the expansive and violent means used by Russian politics. He was in favour of fair play and mutual respect, even in politics. Having been informed of the Russian plan of negotiating a considerable loan in Britain, Cobden was convinced of Russia's decision to spend that money on military equipment and not for railway building, as was avowed when putting out feelers in Britain's financial circles. He agitated against Russia and warned the financial market against promoting her expansionist policy.⁴⁸

IV.

Britain's advice: Hungary should come to terms with Austria. — Prince Czartorisky, the Head of the Polish Emigration, suggests agreement with the South Slavs. — His mediation between Croatia, Servia and Hungary through Count Bystrzonowski. — Beöthy commissioned by Kossuth to conclude a commercial treaty with Britain. — Bikkessy's mission to London. — Kossuth requests Britain's help to prevent Russian intervention. — Pulszky's unfounded hope of recognition of independent Hungary. — Palmerston does not want to encourage the independence of Hungary and Poland.

Meanwhile Kossuth, surrounded by the attacking troops of Austrians, Croats and Servians preached a crusade for preserving Hungary's integrity. The only hope he had in the Western Powers' mediation proved to be vain. Teleki wrote him from Paris about the opinion of British statesmen, who suggested Kossuth should come to terms with Austria. Their idea was that the necessary atmosphere for such terms might be created by an overwhelming victory which the Hungarians must gain over the combined forces of their opponents. Again, Teleki added to this counsel that it would be wise to be reconciled with the Servians.⁴⁹

But Teleki's letter reached him too late. After the dethronement and the Russian intervention there was no chance of Austria's

⁴⁸ Pulszky, vol. II, p. 456.

⁴⁹ Paris, March 7, 1849. Vö. Pp. no. 1419. P. R. O. Bpest.

willingness to enter into any negotiation whatsoever. Hungary had to give in herself unconditionally. As to the Servians, he also considered it advisable to negotiate with them, and instructed Count Casimir Batthyány, his Minister for Foreign Affairs for the purpose. But there was little hope of a genuine accord, because Count Bystrzonowski, a secret agent of Prince Czartorisky sent by Bastide to Belgrade, Zagreb and Pest for preliminary mediation between the contestating parties, promised arbitrary and far-reaching territorial concessions to the Servian Government, which Kossuth could not accept without agreeing to Hungary's dismemberment.⁵⁰

Then again Kossuth turned to Britain. The only free route from Hungary led through the Wallachian Principality. He therefore instructed Edmund Beöthy, his Consul-General in Bucarest, to get in contact with the British Vice-Consul there and to request his mediation for commercial negotiations for a treaty between their respective countries.⁵¹

He then sent Lieutenant-Colonel Alois Bikkessy to London with instructions to inform Palmerston personally about the dethronement of the Hapsburghs and his elections to the governorship.⁵² Bikkessy was also commissioned to initiate commercial negotiations, but Pulszky refused to support Bikkessy's mission, for he was warned by British friends that such beginnings would presumably be followed by Palmerston's declining to hold any further intercourse with him. Besides, the translation of the voluminous documents into English required much time, and he succeeded only at the end of July in receiving permission for Bikkessy to be introduced to Palmerston. The Secretary of State in his private mansion listened with interest to Bikkessy's representations without expressing any sort of opinion about them.⁵³

During this time Pulszky received voluminous instructions,

⁵⁰ Cf. Bastide to Bystrzonowski, Paris, Sept. 30, 1848, *Turquie, Mémoires et documents 1838—55*, vol. 60. *Provinces Slaves*, A. d. M. A. E. Paris: cf. further Fabre's and Limperani's the French consuls' despatches, Belgrade, Jan. 19, 1849, no. 40; Febr. 27, 1849, no. 43, June 29, 1849, no. 6, vol. III, 1848—49. Belgrade, *Turquie*. Ut supra.

⁵¹ C. D. N. no. 5877, April 20, 1849. P. R. O. Bpest.

⁵² Bikkessy—Kossuth, Herrmannstadt, May 1, 1849. — Cf. C. N. D. no. 6864/k. P. R. O. Bpest.

⁵³ Cf. Bikkessy—Palmerston, London, July 19, 1849. *Corresp.* pp. 255—265; Pulszky, vol. II, p. 453.

which he submitted to Downing Street.⁵⁴ From their contents he realized the full extent and consequences of the Russian intervention. Also he learnt his government's points which he had to explain to Palmerston. Kossuth requested an explicit statement from Palmerston to Russia and Austria on behalf of the principle of non-intervention. As a diplomatic formality to announce his attitude, Kossuth suggested that Palmerston should send a resolute protest to the Absolute Powers against their intervention.

Count Batthyány called Palmerston's attention to the intended expansion of Russia upon the Lower Danube, the Principalities and Turkey, with the purpose of shutting off their markets from Britain.⁵⁵ If Hungary succeeded, Britain would find in her a very promising market. In that case she would be freed from Austria's economic encirclement which she had now to endure for the sake of being exploited by Austrian manufactories. If Hungary fell, Russia would find the way open through her and through the Balkans to acquire the commerce of the Near East, which would be detrimental to British interests. Besides, was it not a peculiar fact that Austria, Britain's ally, had always charged British goods with high import duties? What of the federal value of Austria, who did not respect her ally's interests?⁵⁶

It was very wise of Pulszky that he never presented this note at Downing Street. Its trend of thought and the reiterated request for commercial intercourse was indeed contrary to the principle of neutrality explained in his introduction, where that the Hungarian Government thanked Palmerston in advance. For this reason he confined himself to the interpretation of his instructions by occasionally presenting the credentials he received after nearly a year's stay in London.⁵⁷ The documents did not help the Hungarian cause but were still useful in showing the high hopes Kossuth's Government entertained in regard to Britain's attitude and influence.

In spite of Pulszky's representations, Palmerston of course persisted in the point of view he had taken since the beginning of

⁵⁴ Pulszky's instructions dated from Debrecen, May 15, 1849, F. O. 7/375. P. R. O. London. — See appendix no. 1.

⁵⁵ Debrecen, May 19, 1849. Miscell. Pp. no. 1848/49. P. R. O. Bpest.

⁵⁶ In fact the British textile industry found illegal access to Lombardy and Venetia. Prague and Brünn were roused by this keen competition and urged the Vienna Government to remove it. Compare the minute of the Cabinet Council no. 3146 ex 1848, cited by Károlyi, vol. II, p. 352.

⁵⁷ Debrecen, May 15, 1849. Both in original in P. R. O. London.

the conflict between Austria and Hungary. He could not consider independent Hungary as of the same political weight as was represented by the Austrian Empire. In case of the latter's dissolution a smaller Austria, dismembered from her Slavonic provinces, could not be foreseen as a balance to Hungary. Again, he did not want to promote Austria's incorporation into the German Bund nor did want the latter's degradation to a vassal of Russia. Consequently, Austria as a balance to an independent Hungary, which formed together the traditional wall against Russian expansion, seemed to become an unforeseen factor in continental politics, particularly in those of the Danube Basin. On the other hand he did not want to encourage the creation of an independent Poland, intended to keep the balance instead of Austria with an independent Hungary. He considered that such an extensive re-arrangement of Eastern Europe could not be made without provoking a European conflagration.⁵⁸

Pulszky reported to his government very thoroughly on the principles expressed to him by Palmerston. Nevertheless, he was glad to write the steps he understood Palmerston to be making against Russian intervention. In his unbounded optimism he attributed to Downing Street's politics the idea that Kossuth still had free access to the East through the Wallachian Principality. Even the friendly attitude of the Sublime Porte he ascribed to British influence. It can hardly be understood how Pulszky was induced to that unfounded optimism. "I have every reason to believe" — he wrote to Kossuth and Batthyány — "that London will recognize our de facto government very soon... A considerable success against the Russians, the taking of the port Fiume or in case of military misfortune at least brave endurance would create a great impression upon the Western Powers. I suppose Russia wants to have the port of Cattaro from Austria as an equivalent for her intervention. I wish I could find out the secret which seems to be hidden behind the screen. Anyway, I am convinced, Britain will take a hand in the war. Besides, I have been always received with particular kindness by Palmerston; he is our best friend in the cabinet."⁵⁹

Pulszky's reports must have necessarily increased Kossuth's unfounded optimism. It was only too true that Palmerston detested

⁵⁸ Pulszky—Batthyány, Paris, June 16, 1849. Miscell. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

⁵⁹ Pulszky's second letter from Paris of the same date. Miscell. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

Prince Schwarzenberg for his violent political methods, but this fact did not make him feel himself constrained to protest against Schwarzenberg's attitude in invoking Russian aid.

Having been informed of the first Russian invasion of Transylvania in January 1849 and of Sir Stratford Canning's statements in Constantinople, he took note of them without giving utterance to his opinion in any way. On February 9th he received Count Nesselrode's note concerning the invasion of Transylvania by Russian troops, under the pretext of humanity "by protecting two cities against spoliation and the massacre of the Hungarians".⁶⁰ Again, Palmerston had nothing to say.

On May 1849 when the Russian intervention followed, he wrote to Buchanan, the British Minister in St. Petersburg: "Much as Her Majesty's Government regret this interference of Russia the causes which have led to it and the effect it may produce, they nevertheless have not considered the occasion to be that which at present calls for any formal expression of the opinion of Great Britain on the matter..."⁶¹ And when he discussed this matter with the Russian Minister in London, he remarked: "Make an end to it very quickly". No wonder that Brunnow at once reported this significant statement to Nesselrode.⁶²

Palmerston was strongly backed in this opinion by the anti-Magyar propaganda widely favoured by large conservative circles in London society. This movement was headed by Princess Metternich, the wife of the former Austrian chancellor, who took refuge in Britain in the spring of 1848. Then again Countess Colloredo the wife of the Austrian Minister in London and Lady Jersey, the mother-in-law of Prince Esterházy, former Minister for Foreign Affairs in the first Hungarian Cabinet, distinguished themselves by their activities. One heard further of the strong anti-Magyar attitude of Leopold, the Belgian King, whose opinion was much respected at the British Court. Pulszky was cognizant of these facts, which caused him much uneasiness.⁶³

⁶⁰ Irányi—Chassin, *Histoire politique de la révolution de Hongrie. 1847—1849.* pp. 471—472.

⁶¹ Correspondence etc. London, May 7, 1849.

⁶² London, May 18, 1849. H. H. St. A. Wien.

⁶³ Cf. his letter to Batthyány ut supra.

V.

Activities of Bernal Osborne, Lord Brougham, J. Hume, Monckton Milnes, Roebuck, Thompson and J. Mc. Gregor on behalf of Hungary. — Lord Claude Hamilton's arguments with B. Osborne and M. Milnes on the Hungarian constitution. — Palmerston's great neutral speech. — Hundred members of Parliament pay homage to him in procession. — A Parliamentary Relief Committee formed under Lord Nugent for Hungarian refugees. — Speeches of Cobden, Osborne and Dudley Stuart at the Hungarian meeting in London. — The meeting demands recognition of Kossuth's de facto government. — The resolution before the House of Lords. Lord Brougham against Cobden. — Second meeting in Marylebone presided over by Dudley Stuart. — Pulszky's unchanged optimism. Kossuth's efforts for recognition of his government. — Palmerston under pressure of Parliament and public opinion. His endeavours to intervene on behalf of Hungary.

No one could have denied the European importance of the Russian intervention; even the British Parliament could not have passed it over. The first move was made in the matter by R. Bernal Osborne⁶⁴ on May 11th in the House of Commons. He asked Palmerston whether there was any treaty that bound Britain to tolerate the entrance of the Russian troops into Hungary. Was the Government willing to mediate between Austria and Hungary in order to come to a reasonable compromise, or was it to allow the Russian advance in silence?⁶⁵

This speech was followed by laughter. A great many of the members had no clear conception of what had happened on the Danube. Palmerston gave an immediate answer. Russia interfered at Austria's request, therefore he did not see how he could intervene in the matter because Austria did not show any signs of needing British mediation. There was no treaty however that would oblige Britain to guarantee Hungarian integrity.⁶⁶

A few days after, on May 15th, Lord Brougham asked the Government in the House of Lords whether it had received reliable intelligence of the entrance of the Russian troops into a "province"

⁶⁴ Middlesex.

⁶⁵ Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 105, p. 326.

⁶⁶ Kropf, Lewis, *Anglia és a magyar forradalom* (England and the Hungarian Revolution). Bpesti Szemle (Bpest Review) 1904, pp. 10—11.

of Austria. The Marquess of Lansdowne answered in the affirmative but the Government had not considered it proper to be anxious if one European power needed another's help for restoring order in one of its provinces.

The House of Commons dealt with the matter again on July 6th., on the motion of J. Hume⁶⁷ but Lord Russell assured the members that Russia had no intention of occupying Hungary.⁶⁸

With this statement by the Premier the Hungarian question was not passed over finally. On July 21st, B. Osborne explained that the Hungarian struggle had no relation whatever with the French socialist revolution. Kossuth was a representative of religious and civil liberty, just as Washington was. He was fighting for principles which had always been traditionally popular in British public opinion. That was why liberal society was dissatisfied with Palmerston's policy as looking with indifference upon the struggle in Hungary.⁶⁹ He explained with distinct ability the political relations between Austria and Hungary by particularly stressing the independent political structure of Hungary during the whole time she had been linked with Austria, since the year 1526. Her constitution had been laid down only seven years after the British constitution.

Osborne was backed by his political friends. M. Milnes⁷⁰ later Lord Houghton stressed the European significance of the Russian step, Roebuck⁷¹ urged the Government to condemn the intervention. Or would they wait until Russian expansion reached Constantinople and through Turkey even endangered British interests in Egypt or India? Colonel Thompson⁷² protested against Russian despotism, which desired to play a considerable rôle in European policy. "What would have become of Britain in the year of 1688" — he said — "if our grandfathers had been crushed by foreign troops just as has happened now in Hungary?" J. Mc Gregor⁷³ emphatically agreed with the statements of his friends.

But these pleas for Hungary could not be made without contradiction. Lord Claude Hamilton started a keen debate with Osborne as to the social value of the Hungarian constitution. He

⁶⁷ Montrose, Scotland.

⁶⁸ Hansard, vol. 106, p. 1397.

⁶⁹ Hansard, vol. 107, pp. 785, 786.

⁷⁰ Pontrefact.

⁷¹ Cf. Roebuck, John Arthur, *Life and Letters of* —. London, 1897, p. 231.

⁷² Bradford.

⁷³ Glasgow.

ridiculed Milnes' speech and considered that the poet but not the politician supported Hungary. He denied the "infame" Kossuth's liberal sense; on the contrary he branded the latter as the representative of a feudal nobility which did not pay taxes, nor maintain human relations with the peasantry. Hamilton concluded that he did not care a nap for such a constitution.

He was apparently not aware of the nobility's contribution, which had already been a fact in many instances during the last fifteen years. Nor did he seem to have any knowledge of Kossuth's reform-plans for the constitution, for general tax-paying, for the abolition of all privileges of the nobility and finally for the liberation of the peasantry.

Osborne had no opportunity to refute Hamilton's statements, Palmerston began to speak.⁷⁴ It would be an endless discussion — he said — whether Austria is still to be regarded as an ally to Britain or not. But all arguments were of no use if they were directed against a state with which Britain considers herself to be on friendly terms. With a left-handed compliment he ascertained the fact that Austria was compelled to break her alliance with Britain. The cause of it was the irresistible pressure of her needs and — not her fault. The matter of her alliance therefore stood like that.

The political situation in Middle Europe, was very serious. If Hungary succeeded, Austria could not keep the position for which Britain needed her. If Hungary fell, Austria would lose her right arm. Every man who fell in the ranks of the Hungarians must be regarded as an Austrian soldier "deducted from the defensive forces of the Empire". Britain wanted peace and would be glad to see any chance of a mutual agreement between the contesting parties. He was constrained to cite the warnings of Stratford Canning, who said that those who want to impede reforms only because they represent innovations, will sooner or later be compelled to accept innovations when they have ceased to be reforms.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, Britain was always ready for mediation but her readiness could not be construed into armed intervention.

Palmerston's speech met with general approval. Especially

⁷⁴ Cf. George, Henry Francis, *Opinion and Policy of the Right Honourable Viscount Palmerston*. London, 1852, pp. 483—90; Granville, Stapleton Augustus, *Intervention and non Intervention or the foreign policy of Great Britain from 1790 to 1865*. London, 1866, p. 116.

⁷⁵ Cf. Pauli, Reinold, *Geschichte Englands seit der Friedensschlüssen von 1814 und 1815*. 1875, vol. III, p. 389.

the left wing of the Liberals and the Radical Party became quite enthusiastic. Nearly a hundred members paid homage to him in a great procession. At the same time a Parliamentary Relief Committee was formed to meet the needs of the Hungarian refugees. In this Committee Lord Nugent took the chair.⁷⁶

Upon receiving intelligence of this debate, Pulszky endeavoured to arrange a meeting in London. But it was difficult to get someone in public authority to take the chair. Finally he succeeded in getting Salomon David, an alderman of the City. The meeting was held at the Old London Tavern in Bishopsgate-street, where Cobden reiterated his former campaign against granting credit to Russia and demanded from the city bankers the same reservedness towards Austria. He made up for his absence from the debate of July 21st when he was invited by the Lord Mayor. Osborne called for cheers for Kossuth. Dudley Stuart presented a resolution for the recognition of Kossuth's de facto government. Then he proposed the meeting should petition the House of Lords for intervention with the Austrian Government. He said that political honesty and mutual commercial interest require the adoption of this resolution.⁷⁷

Lord Beaumont willingly undertook its presentation to the House of Lords but he did not find a reception for it. The Tory Lord Brougham keenly criticised Cobden's speech demanding the refusal of credits.⁷⁸ Cobden's campaign was a got-up affair, he said. There is no doubt, if God and devil were anxious to negotiate a loan and the City could close with devil on more reasonable terms, the devil would get the loan.⁷⁹

With these words Lord Beaumont succeeded in turning the House's interest from the meeting's resolution. It was therefore resolved without debate to lay it on the table of the House.⁸⁰ The reason for this resolution was properly indicated by Palmerston's

⁷⁶ Members of the committee were: Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart, Charles Lushington, Francis Mowatt., William Scholefield, William Ewart, Monckton Milnes, Ralph Bernard Osborne, Duncombe, Moffart, Marshall. The first collection brought in L 308 ls 4d. Cf. Daily News, July 21, 1849.

⁷⁷ Kropf, p. 218; Daily News no. 986. July 24, 1849.

⁷⁸ Hansard, vol. 107, p. 962.

⁷⁹ Pulszky, p. 456.

⁸⁰ Collorado—Schwarzenberg, Bericht no. 32. London, July 26, 1849. H. H. St. A. Wien.

former speech which he delivered in the House of Commons, clearly explaining the Government's attitude.

Besides, there was another meeting for the working classes, held in Marylebone, where Dudley Stuart presided and Hume, Milnes, Col. Thompson and Wyld, all members of Parliament, addressed the public. The meeting adopted the same resolution as had been proposed in London for the recognition of Kossuth's de facto government.

These two meetings were followed by many others held in Westminster, Kensington, and, on August 7th, in Edinburgh with the assistance of the city-councils. An inducement to these manifestations was given by the *Daily News*, which published in extenso the declaration of independence.⁸¹

As soon as these Hungarian moves became known in Paris, Teleki hastened to the British capital in order to assist Pulszky in his campaign in the press and by meetings for the Hungarian cause. They were also invited to the dinner given by the Lord Mayor to the members of the Parliamentary and Financial Reform Association. Addressing the guests, Pulszky spoke about the possible exchange of British manufactured goods for the agricultural products of Hungary, and Teleki explained the similitude of the British and Hungarian constitutions.⁸²

After the dinner both were full of confidence. "Palmerston is still our good friend" — wrote Pulszky to Kossuth — "he detests the Austrian Government and he did not hide his opinion from me... Cobden, the Head of the Peace Party, is a faithful ally of ours; he is even interested in military matters. No one was so useful as he to Hungary though Russia and Austria particularly calculated on his help."⁸³ "Do'nt worry, the recognition is sure to come... the public took our part more enthusiastically than that of the Poles, Greeks or Italians..." "If we could hold out until the coming winter, the public will force the Government, which wants to avoid war by all possible means..."⁸⁴

These letters, entrusted to Henningsen, were only delivered to Kossuth in Widdin, Turkey, after the defeat in Hungary. Kos-

⁸¹ July 27, 1849, no. 989.

⁸² *Daily News*: July 26, 1849, no. 988.

⁸³ London, Aug. 7, 1849. Miscell. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

⁸⁴ London, July 27, 1849. Miscell. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

suth himself hoped for Britain's support until the beginning of August. Even at the end of June he instructed Francis Duschek, his Minister of Finance, to make preliminary arrangements for a commercial treaty with Britain.⁸⁵ Then about the middle of July he urged Pulszky to arrange for the recognition of the government. In that desperate state of things he was ready to offer Hungary's crown to a person chosen by the British Government. Kossuth thought of one of the descendants of the Coburg-Koháry family.⁸⁶ In case of a British refusal he was even prepared to accept a member of the dethroned House of Hapsburgh, with the exception of Francis Joseph. Further he expressed his readiness to enter into a federation with Turkey in order to restore the balance of power in Eastern Europe by that means instead of the dissolution of Austria. This overhasty change of political combinations indicates his presentiment of the collapse, which had actually drawn very near.⁸⁷

But all his endeavours were in vain. Though Palmerston decided in August under pressure of public opinion to mediate in Vienna⁸⁸ Schwarzenberg was not willing to read his notes. He went to Warsaw and requested the Tsar to send more troops to Hungary, for he wanted to obtain her capitulation by force of arms. In the meantime Palmerston endeavoured to induce Prussia and France to assist him in his mediation, but neither Schleinitz nor Tocqueville were ready to join in his action⁸⁹.

On August 13th Stephen Görgey, commander in chief of the Hungarian army, laid down his arms before Prince Paskievich, the Russian Generalissimo. So Palmerston's mediation came too late. Even Schwarzenberg's journey to Warsaw became superfluous: Tocqueville and Schleinitz had rightly estimated the course of events.

⁸⁵ Pest, June 24, 1849. M. F. no. 696. P. R. O. Bpest.

⁸⁶ Cf. his ideas on this plan in a letter addressed to the Polish general Bem, former commander of the Hungarian forces in Transylvania. Tergova, Aug. 14, 1849. Published by Horváth Michael, vol. III, pp. 517—18.

⁸⁷ Batthyány—Pulszky, Szeged, July 14, 1849; Pulszky, vol. I, p. 503; Sproxton, pp. 74—75.

⁸⁸ Károlyi, vol. I, p. 547.

⁸⁹ Schleinitz to Bunsen, the Prussian Minister in London, *Varia de Prussie*, Berlin, Aug. 20, 1849; Bericht no. 94, Paris, Aug. 11, 1849. H. H. St. A. Wien.

VI.

Impression in London on Görgey's surrender. — Kossuth's flight to Turkey with the assistance of the British consul in Belgrade. — Chaos in Constantinople. — Russian and Austrian démarche to the Porte for extradition of Polish and Hungarian refugees. — Rumours of the Porte's advice to Kossuth and his compatriots to become Mussulmen. — Kossuth's resistance. Makes his will. Ready to die. — Stratford Canning against religious pressure by the Porte. — Kossuth implores Canning's and Aupick's, his French colleague's, assistance.

The intelligence of Görgey's surrender first reached London on August 21st and created a great sensation, for its reasons were not immediately clear. Plenty of rumours of doubtful authenticity went round. One heard much of the Polish troops which were alleged to have caused the collapse. Though they did not have a large share in the national defence, yet their presence might well have contributed to the Russian intervention. The *Globe* openly expressed its disappointment at the turn of affairs and said, if Austria abused her victory — which in fact Russia had gained — British sympathy for Hungary would not cease.⁹⁰

Among the London diplomatists the Hungarian question had also been discussed. When questioned Baron Brunnow, the Russian Minister apologized for Russia's attitude. Shortly before the surrender of Görgey, Brunnow was authorized by Nesselrode to declare that Russia would not help Austria to abolish Hungarian independence. The intervention purported only to save the internal régime in Russia, which seemed to be seriously endangered by the Hungarian rising.⁹¹

The sympathy was general in Britain, with the exception of the conservatives. Sixteen members of Parliament headed by Lord Fitzwilliam sent a memorandum to Russell and Palmerston requesting their intervention.⁹² The sympathy-meeting arranged by

⁹⁰ D'Isola, Sardinian chargé d'affaires—D'Azeglio, Minister for Foreign Affairs, London, Aug. 29, 1849. *Lettere ministri*. Gran Bretagna, no. 41. Archivio di Stato, Torino.

⁹¹ E. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Minister in London—Tocqueville. Report no. 40. London, Aug. 15, 1849. *Angleterre*, vol. 674. A. d. M. A. E. Paris.

⁹² *Daily News*: Aug. 29, 1849, no. 1017.

Dudley Stuart and Cobden⁹³ adopted resolutions in the same sense. As soon as the executions of Hungarian generals and the violent administrative methods started by Austria became known to the public, Cobden addressed an open letter to Bach, the Austrian Minister of the Interior condemning his system indignantly.⁹⁴

The Hungarian army, faced with superior Russian and Austrian troops could not but retreat on all fronts. In the meantime Kossuth's Government took refuge in Arad but it felt uneasy at being under Görgey's influence. In consequence of this situation Görgey demanded from Kossuth to be given full power to carry on all military and civil affairs, supposing that he would thus have the means of holding out to the end. Kossuth agreed. He thought of death and felt that if Hungary fell he must himself sacrifice his own life.

But some time later his vitality prevailed. He thought that he would be more useful alive to his country, even in disaster. Again it was in Britain that he thought of taking refuge. He wanted to fly. Lenoir-Zwierkowski, the Polish agent of Prince Czartorisky, procured a passport given by Fonblanque, the British Consul General in Belgrade. Under the fictitious name of "James Bloomfield" he crossed the Hungarian frontier.⁹⁵ But before he decided to risk the flight he raised the question at the Porte, whether he might consider himself free on Turkish territory. Omer Pasha, the commander in chief of the Turkish troops in the Wallachian Principality, assured him of the Porte's protection. There is no reason to believe — he answered — that the Porte would extradite him to the Vienna Government.⁹⁶

In fact he continued his journey as far as Viddin without any hindrance, but he was told there by Zia Pasha that he must await the Porte's new decision. Kossuth had misgivings. He therefore asked Sir Stratford Canning and General Aupick, the British and French Ministers in Constantinople, to intervene on behalf of his freedom.⁹⁷

⁹³ Hammersmith, cf. Daily News, Aug. 31; Norwich, *ibidem*, Sept. 12. London Tavern, *ibidem*, Oct. 9; Bristol, *ibidem*, Oct. 11.

⁹⁴ Daily News: Nov. 20, 1849, no. 1088. See appendix, no. 3.

⁹⁵ Lenoir—Count Zamoyski, Zamoyski Papers, Belgrade, Aug. 17, 1849 — cited by Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 451, 452.

⁹⁶ Kossuth—Omer Pasha, Kalafat, Aug. 22, 1849 — Hajnal, vol. I, p. 453.

⁹⁷ Kossuth—Canning, Viddin, Aug. 22, 1849 — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 455—458.

There was real anarchy in Constantinople. The most contradictory news was eagerly received by the public. Neither Count Julius Andrassy, the former agent of Kossuth at the Porte, who replaced the gallant Major Brown, nor Czajkowski, the agent of Prince Czartorisky could see clearly in this chaos of politics. Both turned to Canning and both understood Canning's information in a different manner. Czajkowski was glad to learn that Vienna already accepted Palmerston's mediation and that Ponsonby was en route to Warsaw following Schwarzenberg. But Russia did not accept the mediation and the Tsar ordered Paskievich to force the total destruction of the Hungarian armies.⁹⁸ According to Andrassy's information, Canning did not know anything about mediation. He was pleased to write Kossuth of the Porte's decision to take him under its protection. He thought he was to be confined for a while on the island of Candia until he could continue his voyage to Britain. This time would come when the Porte had settled the matter of the refugees with Russia and Austria.

Events moved rapidly. The Tsar sent Prince Radzivil to the Sultan with an autograph letter demanding the extradition of the Polish refugees. As to the Hungarians, he explained that their departure from Viddin would be considered as a *casus belli*.

None of the Turkish statesmen was prepared for this *dé-marche*. There was great consternation among the members of the Great Council, who demanded from the Government in a violent session the extradition of all the refugees. Opinions among the ministers were divided, but the majority voted against extradition.

Andrassy at once reported this bad news to Kossuth. Only his conversion to Islam, together with that of his fellows-refugees, could save them from extradition in case of the Porte being unable to avoid the united Russo-Austrian demands. This was the advice that some of the ministers forwarded to Kossuth.⁹⁹

Upon receiving Andrassy's letter Kossuth was much depressed. He invoked the immediate support of Palmerston,¹⁰⁰ for he only relied upon Britain, "in that great and glorious nation the natural supporter of justice and humanity in the world".

⁹⁸ Czajkowski—Count Zamoyski, Constantinople, Aug. 27, 1849 — Hajnal, vol. I, p. 457.

⁹⁹ Andrassy—Kossuth, Constantinople, Sept. 11, 1849 — Hajnal, vol. I, p. 472.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Korn, Philipp, *Neueste Kronik der Magyaren*. Hamburg, 1851, pp. 99 et seq.

"Though I have finished my political career" — he wrote — "still I have before me the duties of honour. Once governor of a generous country, I leave no heritage to my children. They shall have at least my unsullied name. I am ready to die. The will of God may be fulfilled..."¹⁰¹

These words were no mere phrases: they truly expressed his absolute depression. He made a will in favour of his family and entrusted it to his fellow-refugee, the Count Richard Guyon, who was of Polish origin but a British subject, whose release seemed to be certain by British diplomatic intervention.¹⁰²

But it was difficult to find a reliable courier to forward his letter to Palmerston. By chance he was relieved of these cares by Roger Casement, a former officer of the British army, who accepted the task and handed Kossuth's letter over to Palmerston in ten days from his departure from Viddin.¹⁰³ He then wrote to Reschid Pasha¹⁰⁴ the Grand Vizier and to the ministers Canning¹⁰⁵ and Aupick¹⁰⁶ in the sense of his letter to Palmerston.

The situation was indeed grave. Austria was as impatient as Russia in demanding extradition.¹⁰⁷ It happened in February 1849 when Count Stürmer, the Austrian Internuncio in Constantinople,

¹⁰¹ Viddin, Sept. 20, 1849. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁰² Kossuth—Guyon, Viddin, Oct. 8, 1849. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁰³ Roger Casement, an Irishman stationed in the East Indies but resigned his commission and returned to Britain where he attended a meeting held in London on behalf of the Hungarian cause. At the request of Dudley Stuart who presided at the meeting he undertook to deliver to Kossuth the address of the meeting, but reached Hungary only after the surrender of Világos. He therefore continued his journey to Turkey and happened to be in Viddin when Kossuth was looking for a courier to Palmerston. — Kossuth met Casement once again in Hatford, Conn. USA. during his trip in the New England States on April 13, 1852, but he disappeared before Kossuth could recognize him. His son was Sir Roger Casement (1864—1916). Cf. *Kossuth in New England: a full account of the Hungarian governor's visit to Massachusetts*. Boston, 1852. Edited by Robert Carter, pp. 20—22; see further Kropf, *Roger Casement* in the *Bpesti Szemle* (Bpest Review), May, 1905, pp. 268—275; Kossuth, Lewis, *Irataim* (Writings), vol. III, chapt. IV; United Irishman, *Kossuth's Irish Courier*, February 25, 1905.

¹⁰⁴ Shoumla, Nov. 26, 1849. — Tecco—D'Azeglio. Enclosure to Rapp. no. 744, Constantinople, January 15, 1850, Legatione di Porta Ottomana, A. St. Turin.

¹⁰⁵ Hajnal, vol. I, p. 474.

¹⁰⁶ Viddin, Oct. 16, 1849, Turquie, vol. 302. A. d. M. A. E. Paris.

¹⁰⁷ Temperley, Harold, *The Crimea*. London, 1936, pp. 261 et seq.

raised the question with Aali Pasha,¹⁰⁸ the Foreign Minister as to the attitude of the Porte in case of the Hungarian leaders taking refuge within the Turkish dominions. Stürmer then acted upon instruction received from Prince Windischgrätz, the Austrian Generalissimo. The question was based on a treaty made between the two powers in 1739. It contained the mutual obligation to deny refuge to rebels and to punish them in the event of their capture on their respective territories.

Stürmer must have understood that the extradition of Hungarian refugees according to that treaty could be demanded, all the more because the Austrian Government had a few years ago refused to extradite the Bosnian and Herzegovinian insurgents who took refuge on Austrian territory.

Then Stürmer sought for another solution. In conformity with the peace of Belgrade made in 1739, the diplomatic representatives of Austria were authorized to exercise jurisdiction over Austrian subjects living in Turkish territory. Now, if the Porte were willing to help the Austrians on this basis to capture the refugees, Austria would have attained the aim she was striving for.

Without a mutual agreement as to the interpretation of the treaty having been reached, the collapse came and Stürmer now formulated his previous demand for the actual extradition of Kossuth and his comrades. But the Sultan made it clear that he could not comply with his demand. He promised Stürmer to guard the refugees in Viddin as long as they might endanger the restoration of order in the Austrian Empire.¹⁰⁹

On the other hand, Russia had in fact a good right to claim the extradition of the Polish refugees. In conformity with the stipulations of the treaty of 1774, both powers agreed to remove or to extradite mutually their respective subjects if they took refuge on the contracting party's territory and committed any crime or treason.

Canning was informed by the Porte of all particulars of the negotiations. He was sure the Turkish Ministers would never take any decisive step without asking his opinion. In this diplomatic contest he again took a prominent rôle. The Porte raised the questions to him and to the French Minister: 1. Are the refugees

¹⁰⁸ Rosen, G., *Geschichte der Türkei von dem Siege der Reform im Jahre 1826 bis zum Pariser Tractat vom Jahre 1856*. Leipzig, 1867, vol. II, pp. 126—131; *Stellung der Pforte z. d. ungar. Aufstände. Die Flüchtlingsfrage*.

¹⁰⁹ Rapport no. 37 litt. C — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 722—724.

to be considered as political emigrants? 2. May the Porte rely upon Britain's and France's support in case of the present strained relations being followed by war? Both questions were answered by the ministers positively in the affirmative.¹¹⁰

With the existing intimate relations, it now happened for the first time in many years that the Porte did not ask Canning's opinion as to the advice given to the refugees to become converts to Islam. Canning felt deeply offended in his religious sense when he learned this fact from Kosuth's imploring letter. He did not like to joke or to make politics about religious questions. In fact, Aali alluded to that in a conversation with him, a few weeks before. He then protested in very "pointed terms" that Kossuth should have "the eventual alternative of death by the hand of the executioner or escape by means of conversion to Islam."¹¹¹

Upon receiving Kossuth's letter he protested again and succeeded. Reschid explained that the Porte's advice concerning conversion would only be regarded as an "error" committed against the refugees. Again he accepted Canning's proposal to move Kossuth from Viddin to Shoumla as soon as the diplomatic coolness with Russia and Austria had abated.¹¹²

Canning had already succeeded some weeks before in encouraging the Porte's resistance upon the receipt of the Tsar's letter, as well as of the *démarches* presented by Titov, the Russian Minister, and Stürmer. It required much firmness from the Porte to be courageous enough to take neutral attitude. The Porte then answered the Russian and Austrian representatives: the Sultan cannot say yes, on the other hand he cannot say no. But he protests already in advance if anyone assumes his answer to be negative.¹¹³

After long hesitation the Porte decided not to hand over the refugees, but it wanted time to gain the support of Britain and France. And this was exclusively Canning's merit. He was himself convinced of it and did not fail to express it plainly to Palmerston "If I would have ceased even for a moment to support the Porte" — he wrote to Palmerston — "I am sure, it would have yielded

¹¹⁰ Andrassy—Kossuth, Sept. 24, 1849. — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 489—492.

¹¹¹ Canning—Palmerston, Oct. 5, 1849, no. 298. F. O. 78/780, P. R. O. London.

¹¹² Ut supra.

¹¹³ Rapport no. 38. litt. G. — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 736—737.

to the *démarches*.¹¹⁴ But the refugees had of course not the least idea that their lives were saved by Canning's firmness.

VII.

Canning calls for British Mediterranean Squadron. —

diplomacy in St. Petersburg and Vienna. — Uneasiness of Russian and Austrian Ministers in London. — Difficulties arising from the entrance of the Squadron into the Dardanelles. — Impression made upon St. Petersburg and Vienna. — The demand of extradition given up by the Absolute Powers. — The Porte's agreement with Nesselrode on the detention of the Polish refugees. — Aali encouraged by Canning to resist Austrian demands. — Rumours started by Stürmer of Kossuth's liberation by the British Consul in Varna. — Stürmer wants to hide the attempt to murder Kossuth. — Canning's intervention comes in time. — The Porte's agreement with Austria concerning detention. — Canning alleviates the refugees' voyage to Asia Minor.

Canning maintained his courageous attitude all the time during the diplomatic campaign. The British Blue Book shows that he solicited Admiral Parker — upon his own responsibility — to send the Squadron to be put at the disposal of the Embassy.¹¹⁵ Palmerston was also indignant at the demand of the Absolute Powers and resolved immediately to support Turkey in maintaining her sovereignty. Russell, Lansdowne and Grey shared his opinion as far as the Turkish sovereignty was concerned, though they were far from being as enthusiastic for the refugees as Palmerston. What is more, Russell did not refrain from qualifying the Hungarian refugees as rebels.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless upon Palmerston's explanation the Cabinet agreed to Canning's measures and requested the First Lord of the Admiralty to give orders to the Mediterranean Squadron.

¹¹⁴ Therapia, Sept. 17, 1849; Ashley, Evelyn, *The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston*. 1876, vol. II, p. 150; Alter, Wilhelm, *Die auswärtige Politik der ungar. Revolution*. Berlin, 1912, p. 228.

¹¹⁵ Correspondence no. 14. Enclosure. Therapia: Sept. 17, 1849.

¹¹⁶ Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Minister in London to Tocqueville. Rapp. no. 65, London, Sept. 29, 1849, Angleterre, vol. 674. A. d. M. A. E. Paris.

Of course the importance of this measure would have been much greater if France had shown willingness to cooperate. Callimachi, the Turkish Minister in Paris had already called — by order of the Porte — for the French Cabinet's moral and material support.¹¹⁷ Tocqueville sent him an encouraging letter. Palmerston, being aware of the grave situation, acted immediately. By his order Normanby, the British Minister in Paris, redoubled his efforts to gain over Napoleon for a joint demonstration. The French Cabinet hesitated. General Changarnier opposed the British call. After the bloody fighting in the near past he wanted to have peace at any price. Peace seemed to be in jeopardy if France brought on dissension in the Oriental question by sending her Squadron to partake in a demonstration. Finally Napoleon's will prevailed and on October 10th the Cabinet voted for cooperation with Britain.¹¹⁸ As to the period of this demonstration, the French President suggested to Normanby that discretionary power should be given to Canning and Aupick for the return of the fleets from the Dardanelles.¹¹⁹

Palmerston and Canning did not let slip the opportunity to express their dislike of Schwarzenberg in order to be revenged for the latter's brusque refusal of British mediation. Even at the time when Kossuth took refuge in Turkey, Palmerston wrote to Canning in an indignant manner about Austrian policy, which would treat the emigrant Hungarians like "thieves and brigands".¹²⁰ Even in diplomatic circles Palmerston did not conceal his opinion, which was commented on with regret by Count Colloredo, the Austrian Minister in London. He urgently requested Schwarzenberg to relieve him of his office, which had become "a mere sine-cure", for he could not maintain his relations with Downing Street any longer.

Palmerston behaved very skillfully towards Colloredo. Upon

¹¹⁷ Callimach—Tocqueville, Paris, Oct. 5, 1849. Copy. F. O. 27/848. P. R. O. London.

¹¹⁸ Another brilliant officer, Capt. Townley undertook to deliver Palmerston's despatch concerning France's assistance to Canning. Cf. Sir Ward, A. W. and Gooch, J. P., *The Cambridge history of British Foreign Policy. 1783—1919*. Cambridge, 1922—23, vol. II: *Hungary and Kossuth*, pp. 309—321.

¹¹⁹ Normanby—Palmerston, no. 535, Paris, Nov. 13, 1849. F. O. 27/848. P. R. O. London.

¹²⁰ Correspondence, London, Sept. 24, 1849.

the question raised by the latter, why he supported Turkey, he answered that he acted only upon the request of the Porte. Again Fuad Effendi, the Sultan's extraordinary envoy to the Tsar, who had the task of giving a detailed account to the latter of the causes which led the Sultan to a negative answer, reported in an entirely different manner about Palmerston. He said, Palmerston supported the Porte of his own accord. Contrary to Fuad Effendi's words, Aali had good reason to deny that support to Stürmer. He did not want to give evidence of the Porte's helplessness and strove anxiously to hide the apparent weakness of her sovereignty.

The truth was that Palmerston acted upon Aali's request when he tried to induce the Russian and Austrian Cabinets to show more inclination to give way over the extradition. It was a thankless task for the British diplomatic representatives to make this attitude understood in Vienna and in St. Petersburg, but all the same more easy to carry into effect than to announce the united action of the British and French Squadron in the Bosphorus. Ponsonby particularly had to solve the problem of the manner in which to convey to Schwarzenberg Palmerston's advice. The British Foreign Secretary thought that it would be profitable for Austria to support Turkey against Russia. Austria was on the way to commit the greatest faux pas — he said — for she wanted to unite Britain and France in her own attitude.

He then wrote to Bloomfield, the British Minister in St. Petersburg, asking him to express his peaceful intentions to Nesselrode. The appearance of the Squadrons in the Bosphorus did not signify inimical feelings towards Russia.¹²¹ Again in London he said to Brunnow, the Russian Minister, he should not attach particular importance to the Squadron's appearance. It was only a bottle of smelling-salts put under a frightened woman's nose . . .¹²²

Brunnow understood the joke, still he felt that men of war are "peculiar messengers" of peace. But diplomatic circles did not find anything new in Palmerston's habit of joking with affairs which annoyed Colloredo so much.¹²³ And when the London press printed sensational reports about the entrance of the Squadrons into the Straits, Baron Koller, the Austrian chargé d'affaires, again asked the Foreign Secretary for acceptable reasons for it. Again

¹²¹ Correspondence, no. 62.

¹²² Ashley, vol. II, p. 163. — Correspondence, no. 52.

¹²³ Cf. Colloredo—Schwarzenberg, Oct. 22, 1849, Private letter. England, Varia, H. H. St. A. Wien.

Palmerston answered in an evasive manner. He spoke of the inclemency of weather which induced Admiral Parker, whose Squadron was staying only *accidentally* in the Beshika Bay, to request the Turkish authorities to grant him harbourage within the fortresses of the Straits.¹²⁴

Palmerston had no doubt a peculiar sense of humour. Still he noticed himself that his answer to Koller might lead to ineffectual discussions. The treaty of 1841 between the five Powers interested in the Straits did not render it possible that a man of war should anchor in peace-time within the outer fortresses of the Straits. In fact it was not Palmerston's intention that Squadrons should anchor within the fortified Straits. He did not fail to express his displeasure to Canning. His plans were frustrated by the Squadron's entrance within the fortified zone due to the inclement weather. But if by chance it happened he left it to Canning's judgment to appoint the time of its withdrawal.¹²⁵ General Aupick received similar instruction as to the French Squadron's return.

The arrival and entrance of the Squadrons in the Straits created great excitement in the Russian and Austrian diplomatic missions. After having suspended diplomatic relations with the Porte, both representatives felt themselves in very delicate position, for they had no chance to ask Aali for an explanation personally.

Even in St. Petersburg and Vienna the news of the Squadrons made a deep impression. Neither of the Absolute Powers had any interest in piling up diplomatic defeats and helping by their continuous resistance the establishment of durable relations between Britain and France which would strengthen the influence of both powers at the Golden Gate. Therefore they decided to give up their demand for extradition and sought new ways for mutual understanding.

But the negotiations failed to make headway. They had to be conducted in writing because of the interrupted diplomatic relations. Schwarzenberg pressed the Porte to undertake the detention of the refugees and further to maintain it until internal order and peace were established in Hungary. Schwarzenberg wished to

¹²⁴ Report no. 52. litt. A—B. England. H. H. St. A. Wien. — Hajnal, vol. II, p. 819.

¹²⁵ Correspondence no. 75, 76.

reserve the right to determine when this could be considered as done.

At the beginning of these negotiations the difficulties were almost insurmountable. Persuaded by Beaumont, the French Minister in Vienna, Mussurus, the Turkish Minister, was ready to accept the demand of Schwarzenberg on behalf of his Government, yet this agreement was disavowed by Aali, who acted with Palmerston's encouragement.¹²⁶

The British Foreign Secretary would have preferred it if the Porte had made an agreement similar to that already made between Nesselrode and Fuad as to the fate of the Polish refugees. If this were done, the Porte would be enabled to expel all the refugees from its territory excepting a few leading politicians, among them of course Kossuth, whose detention could have been negotiated separately.

Aali was in a stronger position than Schwarzenberg. Upon the agreement with Nesselrode he resumed diplomatic intercourse with Titov, and consequently Stürmer became isolated. The latter urged Aali in vain to accept the preparatory agreement between Schwarzenberg and Mussurus. Canning stood firm behind Aali and pressed him to resist. Aali, he said, must not be the tool of Austria's vengeance.¹²⁷ Canning quarrelled a great deal with Aali, who understood only to a limited degree "where firmness is safer than concession".¹²⁸ He now urgently recommended Aali to refuse any Austrian control over the refugees if they were removed from the Balkans and presumably detained somewhere in Asia Minor.

Supported by Canning, Aali was now ready to undertake the detention of the refugees. As to its duration, he thought he had plenty of time to negotiate. Stürmer showed himself very anxious to supervise their transportation to the Near East. He requested Aali to exercise the greatest caution. He brought him news about the British Consul's alleged attempt in Varna to liberate Kossuth and Bem, the famous Polish general, while under way between Shoumla and Varna.¹²⁹

No doubt Aali heard this "news" with ironical amusement.

¹²⁶ Rapport no. 1, C. Constantinople, Jan. 2, 1850, Turkey, H. H. St. A. Wien.

¹²⁷ Rapport no. 1, c. Jan. 2, 1850. Turkey, H. H. St. A. Wien.

¹²⁸ Canning—Palmerston, Therapia: Dec. 24, 1849, no. 384. F. O. 78/783. P. R. O. London. See appendix, no. 5.

¹²⁹ Rapport no. 5, C. Jan. 16, 1850. H. H. St. A. Wien.

He was already well informed about the ineffective attempt to murder Kossuth. Jazmagy, the Dragoman of the Austrian Inter-nuncio, engaged some Croats to commit the crime. Their plan was to induce Kossuth to attempt escape and then to murder him en route between Shoumla and Varna.

Canning was previously informed of this plot by Baron Tecco, his Sardinian colleague. Though he suspected its authenticity, he immediately informed Aali and Colonel Eduard Neal, the British Consul in Varna, in order that they might take precautionary measures. This was the truth of Neal's attempt to assist Kossuth's escape, so Stürmer informed the Porte.¹³⁰

Apart from this "unsuccessful anxiety" of Stürmer, he used every opportunity to slander Kossuth. He called Aali's attention to Kossuth's alleged conspiracy with the emigrants living in the Western States. He charged him with setting up a particular tribunal in the camp at Shoumla whose activity was contradictory to Turkish and Austrian jurisdiction as exerted by the consular service on Ottoman territory. But Aali paid no attention to this. Nor had he any inclination to discuss Stürmer's recent demand for the prolongation of the refugees' confinement for five years.¹³¹

It was personal animosity which induced Stürmer to assume this attitude. He was instructed by Schwarzenberg to propose to Aali a period of less than five years for Kossuth's detention, yet he persevered. Aali would have been open to an agreement for one or two years but Canning positively reminded that "it would be the best to consult his own dignity and interest by adhering to his last proposition involved in question of months and not years".¹³²

Aali became a "hard nut" for Canning and Stürmer. But the Turkish Minister preferred peace with both as far as it was attainable. He sent a circular note to the Turkish missions abroad informing them of the Porte's decision to oppose any entrance of men-of-war in the Straits. Of course this note was forwarded at a time when the British and French Squadrons had already

¹³⁰ Canning—Palmerston, *Therapia*: Dec. 26, 1849, no. 387; Private letter from Dec. 28, 1849. F. O. 78/783, P. R. O. London.

¹³¹ Cf. Lane-Poole Stanley, *Life of Sir Stratford Canning*. London, vol. II, pp. 203—205; Greer, Donald, *L'Angleterre, la France et la révolution de 1848*. Paris, p. 315.

¹³² Canning—Palmerston, February 16, 1850, no. 50. F. O. 78/871. P. R. O. London.

left.¹³³ Aali wished with this note to outstrip the probable Russian and Austrian *démarches*. Yet with the object of expressing his gratitude for Palmerston's help, the note declared with oriental elasticity that the Squadron's entrance within the fortified zone of the Straits could not be considered as a breach of existing treaties: it only resulted from a *vis major* that could not have been avoided.

As to the details of the detention, the Cabinet Council resolved to conclude a preliminary agreement with Schwarzenberg as to its duration. Yet it wanted to take Canning's advice that the detention could not be prolonged for more than one year.¹³⁴ Reserving this point of view, Aali suggested to Stürmer that they should leave this contested point open in order at least to make the detention effective.¹³⁵

This was the position when the order was given by the Porte to transport Kossuth and some of his compatriots, nominated by Stürmer, to Kutahia, in Asia Minor. They left Varna on February 20, 1850, by boat for Gemlek and then continued their voyage in carriages or on horseback. Canning requested Aali to postpone the long and tiring journey from Gemlek to Kutahia until the bad weather was over.¹³⁶ Aali agreed, and the party spent a month in a small port of Gemlek and arrived only on April 12th in Kutahia, where they had to stay for more than a year and a half.¹³⁷

VIII.

Kossuth hopes for his early release and journey to Britain. — Projects in Viddin for the establishment of a refugee colony. — Kossuth annoyed with Canning's attitude in agreeing to his detention. — Plans for the recommencement of the struggle in Hungary. — Kossuth's memorandum to the Porte as to the presumable issue of her conflict with Russia. — His presentiment of war over the Oriental Question. — Henningen's mission to

¹³³ Corresp. no. 119, 131; Rapp. No. 11, Constantinople, Febr. 6, 1850. H. H. St. A. Wien.

¹³⁴ Rapp. no. 13, B, Constantinople, Febr. 13, 1850. H. H. St. A. Wien.

¹³⁵ Rapp. no. 15, A—C, Constantinople, Febr. 20, 1850. H. H. St. A. Wien.

¹³⁶ Canning—Palmerston, Constantinople, March 15, 1850, F. O. 78/818. P. R. O. London; see further Canning—Kossuth, Constantinople, May 30, 1850. Ko. Pp. Bpest. Appendix no. 6.

¹³⁷ László's Diary, pp. 36—38.

London to procure a loan and military equipment. — Instructions for Pulszky to urge his release. — Palmerston's sympathy for Kossuth is dictated by humanity and not by political considerations. — Argument between the Times and the Daily News over the Hungarian Question. — Pro-Austrian attitude of the Morning Chronicle, the Herald and The Morning Post. — Motion of Lord Dudley Stuart in the House of Commons.

Kossuth had no exact knowledge of what had happened behind the scenes. Though Andrassy kept him informed of the results of the negotiations, the details were often unknown to him. For this reason Kossuth could not properly estimate the importance of the facts. This circumstance, as well as his impressionable character, often led him to a conclusion which was far beyond any reasonable deduction. He was susceptible to extreme sentiments. Now unbounded optimism overpowered him.

As soon as the dangers of conversion and extradition were over he was convinced that he would be able to leave Turkey for Britain. Impressed by Pulszky's letters, he considered British public opinion as still favourable to his cause. He did not imagine that Palmerston or Canning could not or would not bring about his immediate release. "In a few weeks I shall reach Britain" — he wrote to his wife — "and hope to save my country. But I am afraid to write about my projects and prospects for I do not want to reveal them to my country's executioners . . ." ¹³⁸

Henningsen was also responsible to a considerable extent for this optimistic view, because he spoke in persuasive terms of the bright prospects which he were ahead. Henningsen led him to believe that he was in close contact with Palmerston. On account of this Kossuth trusted him to intervene on his behalf with the Secretary of State. ¹³⁹

Apart from his impatience while awaiting his release, he positively insisted on his compatriots' remaining in Turkey. He wanted to see them gathered in a colony where all of them could find proper conditions for living and were free of the fear of being separated. His idea was to organize them with military

¹³⁸ Viddin, Nov. 1, 1849. Vö. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest. — Cf. Hajnal, vol. I, p. 525.

¹³⁹ Fonblanque—Palmerston, Belgrade, March 18, 1850. F. O. 78/826. P. R. O. London. Fonblanque asked Palmerston whether he was on intimate terms with Henningsen. Palmerston's answer was definitely negative. Compare his draft to Fonblanque, London, April 10, 1850. F. O. 78/826. Ibidem.

discipline in order to have them at his disposal as soon as the new insurrection broke out.

The Porte of course did not sympathize with Kossuth's project because its carrying into effect was considered as a permanent object of diplomatic *démarches*. Canning also shared this opinion and was not willing to support his aims.¹⁴⁰

The beginning of November brought him the alarming news of his coming detention by the Porte in Asia Minor.¹⁴¹ He wrote to Palmerston in an imploring tone and felt hurt by Canning's apparent indifference. He complained of Canning's attitude in considering him as a disturber of the peace and assisting in his removal from Europe. "It is a question of deportation and not internment" — he wrote to Henningsen — "that Canning has in view in collaboration with the Porte." . . . „But, please, do not tell anybody that I am discontented with Canning's attitude . . .”¹⁴²

In spite of this discouraging situation he did not cease to urge Pulszky to raise a subscription or to negotiate a loan — at least ten thousand Pounds — for preliminary preparations of war in Hungary. According to the usual emigrant's psychology, Kossuth was always full of visions of undoing what was already done. Then he wanted to use every means to return home. He decided to prepare an insurrection or an invasion if European politics would not enable him to liberate Hungary from the Austrian rule.

All these dreams and combinations depended upon Turkey's and Britain's tacit consent. It was clear to him that military invasion or the preparation of an insurrection could only be carried out from Turkish territory. On the other hand British sympathies seemed to him useful for influencing European public opinion in favour of violent methods.

As matters stood in Europe, Kossuth was convinced that the antagonism that existed between Russia and Turkey must necessarily lead to war. He deplored the failure of the Porte to use the question of the refugees as a pretext for war. Of course, the Porte was not prepared for that, yet Britain and France would have helped her in their own interests. His idea was that, in case of war, even the refugees themselves and the Slavonic provinces of the Ottoman Empire could have given considerable support to

¹⁴⁰ Kossuth—Canning, Viddin, Nov. 2, 1849. — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 526—527.

¹⁴¹ Andrassy—Kossuth, Constantinople, Nov. 1, 1849. — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 541—542.

¹⁴² Shoumla, Dec. 7, 1849. — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 559—562.

the Porte. By missing this exceptional chance the Porte itself helped to strengthen Russia's faith in her ability to expand. If the huge roller of Pan Slavism started to move, the fate of European Turkey was definitively sealed.

Kossuth put his ideas in the form of a memorandum and hastened to communicate them to the Porte. He forwarded a copy to Henningsen and urged him to send at least ten thousand rifles to the British Consul in Varna. "I am convinced" — he wrote — "the war will break out next spring: it has to break out. I see the signs . . ." ¹⁴³

But when the internment was carried into effect, all these plans had to be abandoned. He complained bitterly of the change in the Porte's friendly feelings, but it had not cared for his incessant protests during the diplomatic campaign. Its dissatisfaction with Kossuth's attitude dated from his letter to Palmerston. General Aupick also shared the Porte's opinion and refrained from offering Kossuth further support because of his accusing manner towards the Porte. ¹⁴⁴

The Polish refugees also turned away from him. Czajkowski, the agent of Prince Czartoriski in Constantinople, wrote to Zamoyski, the former aide-de-camp of General Bem, that France could only consider the Hungarians in the same light as the Poles. ¹⁴⁵

After recuperating from the fatigues of a long and weary journey to Kutahia, Kossuth again started his efforts for release. He incessantly implored Canning for aid, but the latter could do nothing but advise him to persevere. ¹⁴⁶ Finding no success with the British Minister, he instructed Pulszky to present his views to Palmerston personally. If Downing Street was ready to provoke Russia on behalf of Greece, why did it not show a more resolute attitude on behalf of the Hungarian emigrants? "If the profession of diplomacy consists in creating general dissatisfaction which would practically mean that no one should be saved and no one

¹⁴³ Kossuth—Henningsen, Shoumla, January 5, 1850. — Hajnal, vol. I, p. 632.

¹⁴⁴ Aupick—De la Hitte, Therapia: Dec. 5, 1849, Turquie, vol. 302. A. d. M. A. E. Paris.

¹⁴⁵ Constantinople, Jan. 11, 1850. — Cf. Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 643—45.

¹⁴⁶ Canning—Kossuth, Constantinople, May 6, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

should be damned but all should burn in purgatory, — then the British Cabinet shows itself expert in the matter. There is no doubt" — wrote Kossuth in his violent letter — "that Palmerston regards the Hungarian question as a negligible affair. Anyway, the honourable Lord must know that no names cause more sleepless nights in Vienna than his and mine . . ."¹⁴⁷

Pulszky did not fail to express Kossuth's views in a more diplomatic form, but Palmerston said that the Sultan himself had pledged his word to the Emperor of Austria. For that reason he could not prevent the detention because he could not disown the Sultan. But it would not last very long, for the Porte had bound itself to a term of one year.

Further, Pulszky gave Kossuth to understand that his political plans were impracticable if he thought that Britain would support Turkey against Russia with armed force. Downing Street desired the victory of liberal principles against absolutism, but actually did nothing to assist them. Britain represented a separate part of the Globe with all her colonies, whose immense territories were greater than the European continent. Since her manufactured products were shut off from European countries excepting Portugal and Turkey, she isolated herself from the continent and took no interest in such small problems as that of the refugees. If Palmerston still showed interest in the Hungarian question, it was only due to his human feelings and not to political considerations. "C'est tout! In vain! Palmerston is an old man of sixty-six, Lord Landsdowne, the President of the Council, is seventy-two; the Whig party is already stricken in years! . . ." — he wrote in a tone of resignation to Kossuth.¹⁴⁸

The only promise Palmerston would give Pulszky was his readiness to instruct Canning to use his influence for the alleviation of the lot of refugees. This the latter had already done, without instructions. When Kossuth's children were permitted to leave by the Austrian Empire to join their parents, Canning saw to it that they travelled in safety. He did his utmost for their welfare. Klezl was indignant on learning of Lady Canning's walks with them in the streets of Stambul.¹⁴⁹ Sandison, the British Consul in Brussa, also consoled Kossuth and advised him to plan his escape un-

¹⁴⁷ Kossuth—Pulszky, Kutahia, May 17, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁴⁸ London, July 30, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁴⁹ Klezl—Schwarzenberg, Rapp. no. 6, A—D, June 15, 1850. H. H. St.

aided.¹⁵⁰ Though this letter was intercepted and never reached the addressee, it fully proves the writer's sympathy for him.

At the beginning of September 1850, Palmerston ordered the British Minister in Vienna to call Schwarzenberg's attention to the fact that the term of one year's detention was already up. Palmerston took the most favourable view on behalf of the refugees by reckoning the time as from their reaching Turkish territory. In view of the fact that the American Government had offered the Porte a free passage for the refugees to the United States, Palmerston now asked Schwarzenberg if he would be willing to advise the Porte to accept the American offer. Schwarzenberg naturally received the British message with displeasure and immediately ordered Klezl to counteract Canning's steps in this direction at the Porte by all possible means.¹⁵¹

There was still one circumstance which influenced Palmerston in his humanitarian feelings for the refugees. These were the pro-Magyar sympathies of the public which had been aroused chiefly by the Whig press in London.

The support of *The Daily News*, tendered to Pulszky during the struggle, was not withheld afterwards from the emigrants. It systematically refuted the anti-Magyar articles of *The Morning Chronicle* and *The Times* and attacked the former constantly, even from the beginning of the war. Since the summer of 1849 it had opposed *The Times*.

The pro-Austrian articles of the conservative press, particularly of *The Herald* and *The Morning Post*, arose from the sympathy they felt for conservative Austria. It was in a spirit of fair play that *The Daily News* did not enter into any dispute with the conservative press. It only rectified their errors concerning the struggle in Hungary. But the changing attitude of the leading liberal organs, particularly the utilitarianism of *The Times*, spurred on *The Daily News* to controversy. Since the beginning of September 1849 there had been a series of open letters, published under the heading "Austrian misrepresentations of the Hungarian cause", in which all the distorted items of *The Times* were thoroughly analyzed and refuted.¹⁵² On October 3rd Cobden's

¹⁵⁰ Sulejman Bey, the Turkish commander in Kutahia opened this letter and forwarded it to the Austrian authorities. Compare Rapp. no. 33—C, Sept. 18, 1850. H. H. St. A. Wien.

¹⁵¹ Wien, Sept. 10, 1850. Türkei. H. H. St. A. Wien.

¹⁵² See numbers 1026 et sqq. of the *Daily News*, Sept. 2, 1849.

organ printed the news of the arrival of Lackenbacher, a member of the Austrian police, whose task was to supply *The Times* with news material, among other items with a long list of Hungarians executed by Kossuth's government on account of their adherence to Austria. The Government of Vienna had list prepared for its own defence. It wanted to prove that the execution of Hungarian generals in Arad, Hungary, was only a justifiable act of retaliation for the executions by the Hungarian Government.

The *Daily News* became the official press for Kossuth and his fellow emigrants. It published all the news it received from Turkey about their doings. Since Henningsen returned from Viddin, he thoroughly refuted in this paper *The Times'* calumnies against Kossuth.

Again Charles Pridham reiterated Cobden's call to the public to refuse any attempt originating from Austria to negotiate a loan.¹⁵³ Pulszky was also a diligent collaborator with *The Daily News* and argued for a long time with Lord Claude Hamilton, charging him with insufficient knowledge of Central-European history.

Apart from the press even Parliament did not fail to hear of the Hungarian cause. At the beginning of November, eighty-three members belonging mostly to the Liberal party, presented a memorandum to Russell and Palmerston, requesting them to offer their services to the Austrian Government on behalf of a settlement of the affairs still in dispute between the two parts of the Empire. Fully convinced that a fair settlement would greatly help to promote peace in Central Europe, they considered it as a necessity that such a settlement should be arrived at as soon as possible. Otherwise the existing antagonism must necessarily lead to a permanent estrangement which might be followed by incalculable consequences. The paramount interests at stake must undoubtedly induce the British Government again to offer Vienna its good offices, even if Austria did not ask for them.¹⁵⁴

On February 7th, 1850, Lord Dudley Stuart delivered a speech in the House of Commons explaining the causes of the collapse on the authority of a pamphlet on Hungary prepared by Mrs. Pulszky.¹⁵⁵ He asked Palmerston to obtain the Queen's permission

¹⁵³ Febr. 11, 1850, no. 1159.

¹⁵⁴ *Times*, Dec. 5, 1850. — See appendix no. 4.

¹⁵⁵ Hansard, vol. 108.

to publish the diplomatic correspondence which might prove to the House the Government's attitude on the question.

Claude Hamilton contradicted Dudley Stuart and objected the latter's outbursts against Austria. Only Disraeli supported Hamilton. There was no other member among the Peel party willing to defend Austrian absolutism.

Palmerston was rather unwilling to adopt Dudley Stuart's motion. Referring to this attitude *The Daily News* did not refrain from expressing an ironical opinion. It said that the Secretary of State seemed to prefer a "marriage de raison" with Russia and Austria.¹⁵⁶

IX.

Kossuth complains of Palmerston's and Canning's refusal to intervene for his release. — Plans for "The North Eastern Federative States" consisting of Poland, integral Hungary and possibly of Turkey. — He hopes to find Palmerston's agreement that this would constitute an equivalent block in the event of the dissolution of Austria. — Wants to offer liberal selfgovernment to Servians and Wallachians of Hungary but not to offer them territorial sovereignty. — The Czech Palacky's manifesto published in London about the federation of nationalities within the boundaries of the Austrian Empire. — Austrians (Germans) and Magyars should resign their hegemony. — Hungarian emigrants in Paris think that Kossuth's federative plans cannot stop the union of Servians and Wallachians living in Hungary and Turkey. — Kossuth retains his plans for integral Hungary. — Wants to gain Cobden's support for the principle of "intervention for non-intervention".

Upon receiving Pulszky's intelligence about Palmerston's speech, Kossuth again showered complaints on Canning on account of his long detention; yet the latter refused to intervene. He told Kossuth "he had played high and lost. The consequences must be borne with resignation: he must abstain from further political activities".¹⁵⁷

Kossuth was unable to take Canning's advice, which was indeed opposed to the psychology of the emigrants whose aims

¹⁵⁶ Febr. 9, 1850, no. 1157.

¹⁵⁷ Kossuth—Pulszky, Kutahia, Nov. 5, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

were involuntarily concentrated on risking everything for the sake of getting home. Kossuth was also annoyed by Palmerston's failing to send instructions to Canning similar to those presented by the British Minister to Schwarzenberg for ending the emigrants' detention. He became persuaded that Palmerston had failed to send such instructions to Stambul, for he knew that the Porte would have deferred to it, knowing very well that Schwarzenberg would never have accepted. Consequently when Palmerston sent this note to Vienna, he did not intend to do anything but bow to public opinion. "Besides, the Grand Vizier has positively expressed to Baron Tecco his readiness to end the detention as soon as Canning supports my request. I sent a message in this sense to Canning, but he refrained from doing anything" — he wrote excitedly to Pulszky.¹⁵⁸

The latter was also dejected. "The greater the sympathy of the public, the more inconvenient you become to the governments" — he answered Kossuth. — "If General Haynau, who hanged Hungarian generals, had not been so fiercely attacked by the workmen at Barclay and Perkins Brewery, Palmerston would have done much for you, I am sure. But then he saw how powerful you were even here in London. So he is waiting for the public sympathy to cease..."¹⁵⁹

After this experience Kossuth lost all hope, excepting in the offer of the American Government to convey him and his associates to the New World.¹⁶⁰ But the matter was still in a preliminary stage between the respective governments, and its end and issue could no be foreseen. So he spent his time in weary waiting and worked out a scheme of political organization to use as a guide in negotiations for settling the problem of the cooperation of the nations.¹⁶¹

Even in Viddin he dreamt of solutions which seemed capable of producing an honest settlement of the aspirations of the nations.

¹⁵⁸ Ut supra.

¹⁵⁹ Nov. 21, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Tecco—D'Azeglio, Constantinople, March 15, 1850. Rapp. no. 754. A. St. Torino.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Hóman—Szekfű, *Magyar Történet* (History of Hungary). Bpest, vol. VII, p. 282 — also *Kossuth, six chapters by a Hungarian*. London, 1854, chapt. II; see the problem in its development by Wertheimer Eduard, *Kossuth's Projekt einer Donaukonföderation: Österr. Rundschau, LXIII* (1920), Heft 5.

In the long controversy which arose over the problem and shattered Hungary during the war, there were some points of view which he held to be basic. He regarded it as a fundamental that the Austrian Empire's fate was definitely sealed. She could not survive, for she had proved to be incapable of governing her provinces in a constitutional spirit. On the other hand he believed firmly in Turkey's revival if reasonable reforms were introduced, which would enable her to assume the rôle allotted to her in European politics. A powerful Turkey together with a great North Eastern Confederacy of States, consisting of integral Hungary and Poland, would constitute a remarkable political unit, and would replace very effectively the Austrian Empire. Its existence would demonstrate the real success of Palmerston's Eastern-European policy. The huge wall of defence running from the North to the South could successfully resist Russia's expansion towards the Adriatic Sea, which was to be anticipated from the Austrian Empire, since she had sold her independent position by invoking Russian aid. On the other hand, if Russia succeeded in persuading the Slavonic peoples of the Austrian Empire to adopt the spirit of Panslavism, no power on earth could stop her influence reaching the Adriatic Sea. In this case Russia's exclusion from the Dardanelles would become merely nominal because the Dardanelles would lose their importance in the Oriental Question.

As to the problem of the North Eastern Confederacy, he adhered firmly to the principle of Hungary's integrity. It was his sense of political honesty towards Turkey which induced him not to separate her Servian and Wallachian provinces. He stood for the principle of historical state rights, and did not favour the principle of nationality. He was convinced that a common cultural development, a common tradition of living together for many centuries, and common economic interests had a stronger amalgating power than the theory of races alone as fundamental for building up a state.¹⁶² In the United States of America he found striking example of the correctness of his conviction.

As soon as he had established himself in Kutahia he studied the problem of state confederacy very carefully. He persisted in his original plan that he had worked out in Viddin and did not desire to weaken the Turkish Empire by creating new national

¹⁶² Cf. the memorandum of Count Zamoyski, Viddin, Nov. 10, 1849. — Hajnal, vol. I, pp. 529—539.

states out of the Danubian Principalities.¹⁶³ Even the acceptance of Turkish sovereignty over Hungary was not unfamiliar to him, for he considered this possibility as a means for creating closer political contact among the Servians and Wallachians living on both sides of the Turkish-Hungarian boundaries, without changing the historical structure of these ancient states.

In the meantime there was a sensation among the emigrants in London, created by a manifesto issued by František Palacky, a well-known Czech historian of his age.¹⁶⁴ He regarded the federative problems of Middle-Europe from an opposite point of view to that expounded by Kossuth. Palacky preached the maintenance of the Austrian Empire. Yet he contested the assertion that the Austrian-¹⁶⁵Magyar hegemony could not be maintained in a polyglot Monarchy. He suggested reshaping her into a state confederacy instead of creating independent federative states. Provision was made in his scheme for seven separate ministries (1. German, 2. Czechoslovak, 3. Polish-Russian, 4. Magyar, 5. Ruthenian, 6. South-Slav, 7. Italian) by accepting Vienna as a federative capital for the Monarchy.

In opposition to Teleki, the Wallachian emigrants in Paris were fighting for the establishment of an independent national state. They wanted to unite the Wallachian territories of Hungary and Turkey by separating them from their ancient political units.

Upon receiving intelligence of the Czech and Wallachian national schemes the Hungarians headed by Andrassy and Teleki held a conference in London and discussed the possibilities of satisfying their national aspirations in the event of Hungary's succeeding in gaining her independence.¹⁶⁶ They finally expressed their hopes of finding means for the maintenance of the Magyar supremacy by offering a wide measure of autonomy to all nationalities. But Szarvady, the secretary of Teleki, was dismayed on realizing the resolute attitude of the nationalities. He wrote to Kossuth¹⁶⁷ calling his attention to the spirit of opposition which became so strong among the Slavonic races that their union with their brethren living beyond the boundaries of Hungary could hardly be

¹⁶³ Kossuth's remarks to Teleki's letter. Kutahia, June 15, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁶⁴ Daily News: January 2, 1850, no. 1126.

¹⁶⁵ I. e. German.

¹⁶⁶ MSS. Diary of Julius Tanárky, London, January 10, 1850. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁶⁷ Paris, Jan. 27, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

avoided. It was the same with the Wallachians, he found. Consequently Kossuth's federative scheme, based on the exclusion of the Servians and Wallachians living outside Hungary, had no chance of being realized, for their national and racial spirit seemed to prevail over traditions and the *raison d'état* which culminated in the opinion that the maintenance of the Austrian Empire or at least of historical Hungary would offer them the advantages of a great, settled economic unit. This they could hardly find by creating numerous smaller independent states whose overwhelming national spirit would deprive them for generation of the advantages of a reasonable political and economic cooperation.

Again, Count Teleki, under Prince Czartorisky's influence,¹⁶⁸ showed willingness to offer independent provincial unity with autonomy to the nationalities, for he was convinced they would not feel satisfied until they reached this final objective. As to the acceptance of Turkish sovereignty over Hungary, which Kossuth had already in theory admitted, Teleki together with all the other emigrants was decisively against it. He felt supported in his resistance by Palmerston's, Cobden's and many other parliamentary members opinion that Britain could never concur in such a far-reaching extension of Turkish sovereignty.¹⁶⁹

Contrary to Teleki's opinion, Sabbas Vukovich, the former Hungarian Minister of Justice, was in principle against any plan of federation. He thought it would be a great misfortune for Hungary because it would necessarily lead to the loss of the independence for which she had fought in the past. He wished to call Kossuth's attention to the probability that Hungary, in a confederation with newly-created Slavonic states, would undoubtedly be overpowered by them. Should Hungary's nucleus, the Magyar Land together with her territories where Servians and Wallachians lived, constitute a confederacy of states, the latter would constantly impose their will upon the Magyars, who must necessarily find themselves permanently in minority. Was it worth while to sacrifice Hungary's future to such chimeras as would make her fate more intolerable than under Hapsburgh's rule? — he asked in his letter to Kossuth.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Russjan, Lucjan, *Polacy i sprawa polska na węgrych w roku 1848—49* (The Poles and the Polish Question in Hungary, 1848—49). Warszawa, 1934, p. 287; further Handelsman Marcellus, Czartoriski, *Nicolas Ier et la Question du Proche Orient*. Paris, 1934, p. 114.

¹⁶⁹ Teleki—Kossuth, Paris, after June 15, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁷⁰ Montmorency, Aug. 14, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

No doubt, Kossuth only wanted confederacy in order to replace by this means the Austrian Empire's rôle as allotted to her by British diplomacy. But apart from this point of issue, he was practically ready to offer the Servians and Wallachians extensive local and national self-government, stopping short only of provincial independence and national sovereignty.

It was not only the consideration that the Magyars would presumably be overshadowed by other nationalities in the event of their sharing their sovereignty with them. The reason for his negative attitude was based on a conviction that the territories claimed by the Servians and Wallachians were much mixed up with nationalities where Magyars were in minority, yet constituted a majority when combined with the Germans as against the Servians and Wallachians. Was there any sign of self-determination if this German-Magyar majority were to be delivered up to Servian or Wallachian minorities? — he wrote to Teleki.

Of course the whole theory would have an entirely different meaning if regarded from the national point of view of Servians and Wallachians. As already explained, they wanted to be united with their brethren living on Turkish territory. No doubt, in this united Hungarian-Turkish territory they constituted majority as against the German-Magyar minority. The latter's majority existed only as long as the newly-created political units were confined to historical Hungary.

In answering Teleki's plan of offering autonomous provinces to Servians and Wallachians, he wrote: "The carrying out of your ideas would result in an incessant turmoil among the races of Hungary. As a consequence of the geographical and gravitational relations, your ideas would neither help the federative scheme nor the southern counties would adhere to Servia, the eastern ones to Roumania, the Slovaks of the North to the Czechs, the Germans of the western counties to German-Austria and the Magyars — to death!" "I do not want to see a federalized Hungary. I wish to maintain one sovereign territory and federalize only this with other states like Poland or Turkey..."¹⁷¹

During these long and abortive arguments which went on intermittently — due to the considerable distance, — the emigrants in Paris realized the fact that the nationalities were not inclined to enter into any negotiations without the preliminary of their

¹⁷¹ Kossuth—Teleki, Kutahia, Aug. 22, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

national sovereignty being admitted. Ex-minister Vukovics and Szarvady were right in their presentiments. Consequently, the emigrants became convinced of the inexpediency of publishing Kossuth's scheme. They decided to discontinue their vain attempts at reconciliation.

Kossuth also realized the necessity of occupying himself with other problems, which seemed to bring him better results than that of Hungary's political reconstruction. Since the time he escaped he had always been seeking means to interpose another Russian intervention if Hungary happened to start a new fight for her independence.

Seeing clearly Britain's overwhelming influence upon European politics, and the dependency of her government upon public opinion, he charged Teleki to induce Cobden to cooperate with him.

As it was the aim of Cobden and of his Peace Party to agitate for the maintenance of World Peace, why could he not induce the government to support this principle officially which would — no doubt — re-echo all round the world? Why could the government not adopt the principle of non-intervention as a practical means of enforcing peace?

But such a declaration could only be regarded as a first step towards raise interest in the civilized world. If Britain refrained from meddling in the domestic affairs of other states, this very honourable attitude did not imply that other states would also be willing to respect her avowed principle of non-intervention. On the contrary, Britain's reservedness might even instigate the despots of Europe to use their "charter of freedom" to oppress their people. Therefore Britain should declare that — while she would not interfere in the domestic affairs of the other states — she would not tolerate the intervention of other states in a third state's internal affairs. Kossuth called his principle „*the intervention for non-intervention*” which signified at least diplomatic activity as against diplomatic reservedness towards the mere adoption of this declaration, without entailing its practical assertion.¹⁷²

¹⁷² Cf. Pivány, Eugène, *Mann Dudley Ambrus küldetése* (Mission of Ambrose Dudley Mann): Századok ("Centuries", Historical Periodical), Bpest, 1910, pp. 353—356. — Pivány thinks that Daniel Webster's speech delivered on January 19, 1824, in the House of Representatives of the American Congress might have had some influence upon Kossuth's theory of intervention. Webster in his speech assailed the intervention of foreign powers in the struggle of

Teleki must convince Cobden — wrote Kossuth the former¹⁷³ that the Peace Party would not promote peace with a passive challenge to non-intervention. The Party must win over the British public, and through the public the government, to adopt this active interpretation of the former principle. If so, world-peace will no longer be a mere phantom, and the people themselves will govern their own affairs. Monarchs will think twice before oppressing their people, for they will no longer be able to rely upon foreign assistance.

If Cobden were willing to propagate this principle as firmly as he was resolute in the Anti-Corn-Law affair, and would represent it in Parliament against the passive non-intervention preached by the Tory Graham, Russian expansion might be checked in a very effective manner and in this way Hungary would receive the greatest service she could hope from abroad. "Being thoroughly convinced of this principle's importance" — he wrote — "I regard it as my most important task to agitate for this as soon as I am set free. I shall do the same in America. By carrying this into effect, Hungary will be free and independent very soon."¹⁷⁴

Teleki was ready to comply with his instructions.¹⁷⁵ He agreed with Kossuth's opinion that Palmerston could only be constrained by public opinion to tender more active support to the Hungarian cause. To begin with, he placed many articles in London and Paris to raise general interest.

As to Cobden, it was a difficult task to induce him to undertake such propaganda, because his conception of peace absolutely excluded any active interference in the internal affairs of foreign states. His negative attitude can best be characterized by the opinion he expressed several times to Edmund Beöthy, the former Consul General of Hungary in Bucarest. His generous and human feelings led him to offer shelter to this sick and aged man in his own residence. In spite of his expressed sympathy for the Hungarian cause, he repeatedly said to Beöthy that Kossuth was positively wrong in taking up arms to defend Hungary's constitutional rights. "He had had only right to use *vis inertiae* against Austria and the Croatian insurgents . . ."¹⁷⁶ Of course it can hardly

Greece for independence, and condemned the declaration of the Troppau Congress upholding intervention.

¹⁷³ Cf. his cited letter, Kutahia, Aug. 22, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁷⁴ Ut supra.

¹⁷⁵ Montmorency, Sept. 17, 1850, no. 5. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁷⁶ Tanárky's MSS. Diary, London, July 23, 1850. P. R. O. Bpest.

be said that Hungary was wrong in taking up arms. It is quite clear by the light of historical data that she was constrained to apply force on account of the treachery and intrigues of the court circles. But Cobden did not seem to accept this ultima ratio.

It was as a result of Cobden's political psychology that Te-leki's efforts were totally ineffective. Only Kossuth succeeded in gaining his cooperation during his tour in England.

X.

Urquhart's visit to Kossuth. — Urquhart and Kossuth against Palmerston. — Their agreement in the Oriental Question. — Kossuth wants to convince the British public of the inappropriate policy pursued in the Near East by Palmerston. — Urquhart warns Kossuth against becoming entangled in Mazzini's Russian politics. — Algernon Massingberd's offer to finance a Hungarian colony in Asia Minor. — Kossuth depressed by Turkish ambiguity. — Pulszky's despairing letters from London. — Reservedness of British Conservatives towards Kossuth's democratic principles. — Palmerston presents his correspondence respecting the refugees to Parliament. — Pulszky's disappointment. — Urquhart's action in favour of Kossuth's release. — Palmerston's evasive utterances. — His attitude towards Turkey and the British public: ready to support refugees in Stambul but does not reveal his humanitarian feelings in public. — Canning agrees with Palmerston.

Kossuth was deeply depressed by the feeling of permanent uncertainty and soon almost worn out by this quixotic insistence on principles. In a few months he grew old and very irritable. During the monotonous days of his detention he only felt better when foreign visitors came to see him. There were two British travellers accompanied by Henningsen who presented themselves in the autumn of 1850. One was David Urquhart, member of Parliament, and the other Algernon Massingberd, a young officer in the Blues who wanted to make his acquaintance while staying in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷⁷

Urquhart had spent several years in this country¹⁷⁸ in the capacity of a secretary attached to the British Embassy. When

¹⁷⁷ Cf. László's Diary, vol. I, p. 47.

¹⁷⁸ Temperley, pp. 407—408.

Russia blockaded Circassia he encouraged Bell, a British merchant, to run the blockade with his boat in order to transport salt to the Circassians who were under the Sultan's protection. It was an arbitrary act, contrary to the attitude of Ponsonby, then British Minister to the Porte. Bell's boat was captured by the Russians. He applied to Parliament for indemnification but was refused. Following this act Urquhart was dismissed by Palmerston.

Urquhart considered himself as victimized by Palmerston, whom he assailed incessantly in pamphlets. He asserted in public that Palmerston had sacrificed British interests by dismissing him.

Palmerston was always ready to recognize the extraordinary services he rendered in Turkey to British interests. It was Urquhart's personal task to make the first commercial treaty between Britain and Turkey, which recognized the latter's particular importance for British foreign trade. Again, Urquhart was the first to proclaim that British interests required the support of the Porte, a point of view which was duly appreciated by the Secretary of State.¹⁷⁹

At this time Urquhart was occupied with problems of ownership respecting Turkish Mosques and the Porte gratefully accepted his advice.¹⁸⁰ Now in Kutahia Kossuth met in him the firm friend of Turkey, who entertained the same distrust of Palmerston as he did. Both agreed too in their unconquerable hatred of Russia, which made them fast friends.

They discussed by day and night all the probabilities of the Near East and this resulted in a common policy to be pursued in time to come. Above all, the British public must be convinced that British interests in the Near East required Turkey's reconstruction. Further, Russia's anti-British tendency could not be too strongly stressed¹⁸¹ which the London Press seemed to neglect. As to the Hungarian question, which constituted the background of the former main issues, it should be left in obedience.

Kossuth wanted to inform Pulszky immediately about the results of their discussions, but unfortunately gave the latter contradictory instructions. He urged him to refrain from interfering with British internal politics. "In spite of Palmerston's anti-Magyar attitude" — wrote Kossuth — "we do not know when we have to

¹⁷⁹ *Thirty years of foreign policy*. London, 1855. pp. 216 et sqq.

¹⁸⁰ Klezl—Schwarzenberg, Rapp. no. 21 C. Constantinople, Aug. 7, 1850. H. H. St. A. Wien.

¹⁸¹ Cf. László's Diary, vol. I, p. 78 concerning Urquhart's anti-Russian propaganda.

apply to the government or to those are likely to come in."¹⁸² On the other hand he urged Pulszky to make propaganda in the press to the effect that Britain was not using her influence at the Porte properly to promote her own interests, but on behalf of those of Russia. Was it not curious that Turkish corn — thanks to the interference of the British Minister — was liable to a duty of twelve per cent in transport from one Turkish port to another, while Russian corn could enter Turkish territory free of duty. As a result of this two-thirds of Stambul's population consumed Russian corn. After this, was there any sense in saying that Britain's influence was exerted properly in Stambul?¹⁸³

In the meantime Urquhart returned to Constantinople and used all his efforts with the Porte to promote Kossuth's political aims, which tended to gain the Porte's assistance in the plans of confederacy as well as the new insurrection in Hungary. In undertaking this mission of Kossuth's he made conditions with the Hungarian leader. Urquhart was dissatisfied with Kossuth's attitude of making common cause with Poles and Italians who already asked him for cooperation.

Urquhart was of the opinion that the political outlook of these emigrants differed widely from that of the Hungarians, and this keeping together might possibly ruin the chances open to Kossuth. Particularly he warned him against any closer contact with Giuseppe Mazzini, the head of the Italian emigrants whose relations with Russia he regarded as beyond dispute.¹⁸⁴ Mazzini, a born revolutionary, fought only for the creation of "Italia Unita". Any means were good to attain this aim. "In case of failure to obtain support from Britain" — wrote Urquhart — "Mazzini may apply with success to the Russian cabinet." Urquhart was perfectly convinced that his information was only too true.

This possible approach of Mazzini to Russia was opposed to his and Kossuth's decided anti-Russian principles. But since he realized Kossuth's readiness to cooperate with Mazzini, he pledged his word to keep away from the Italian revolutionary. Now, should Kossuth decide on any change from their common platform, he was to inform Urquhart immediately.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² Kutahia, Nov. 5, 1850, Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁸³ Ut supra.

¹⁸⁴ Urquhart—Kossuth, June 20, 1851, *The Free Press*, Sheffield, March 8, 1856.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. the common call of Mazzini, Arnold Ruge, Ledru Rollin and Albert Darász, members of the board of the "Comité central démocratique

Kossuth could not conceal his doubts to Urquhart as to the usefulness of basing the Hungarian question upon the Porte's support alone, because of its changing attitude which made it unreliable to negotiate with. "I must confess" — he wrote to Urquhart — "I fear politics at Constantinople to be so much envenomed by the habit of intrigues. The underminers of Turkey have insured their pernicious influence so well that even your energy, forced to waste precious time in the laborious task of persuading individuals at second, third, or fourth hand, will alas! prove too slow to attain a clear decision against the intrigues which of course you cannot fail to meet."¹⁸⁶

During the time that Urquhart discussed with Reschid the re-establishment of Turkey's independence and the counteracting of Palmerston's present influence, Kossuth turned for a while from European politics in order to face every day problems that awaited immediate solution.

It was while still in Viddin he realized the necessity of making efforts to save his fellow emigrants from dispersion all over the world. But not only this point of view induced him to seek a solution of this problem. He wanted to have them living together in a military colony in organized legions ready to cross the Hungarian frontiers at any time. His project of the military colony could not have been realized in 1849 on account of the Porte's and Canning's resistance.¹⁸⁷

From that time he worked continuously to bring this project to a satisfactory issue. When he heard of the Porte's decision to offer a large estate to Lamartine, as a token of the esteem of the Ottoman Empire, he urged Teleki to persuade the famous French writer and statesman to allow him a part of this estate for Hungarian colonization.

On the visit of Algernon Massingberd, this project was unexpectedly realized. Knowing Kossuth's ideas, he expressed his readiness to purchase a suitable estate in Asia Minor and was himself planning to undertake the military training of emigrants who were to settle in this colony. He offered Kossuth five hundred

européen". London, Aug. 7, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest. Published by Kastner Eugenio, *Mazzini e Kossuth*. Firenze, 1929, pp. 3—4.

¹⁸⁶ Kutahia, December 17, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Kossuth—Canning, Viddin, Nov. 2, 1849. — Hajnal, vol I, pp. 526—527.

rifles and wanted to organize a guard composed of thirty British subjects, properly trained in military service, to assist him in the management of the colony.¹⁸⁸

Massingberd instructed Henningsen on the spot to procure the colony's technical equipment in London. Again Kossuth called upon Joseph Prick, the head of the Hungarian emigrants in Constantinople, to urge them to take part in the colonization.

But these high hopes failed on account of Prick's intractability; he made considerable propaganda for the colony and called his fellow refugees by posters to present themselves. As soon as the Russian and Austrian diplomatic representatives learnt of these posters, they protested at the Porte, which dutifully suppressed Prick's propaganda.¹⁸⁹

The beginning of the year 1851 did not offer any prospects for the refugees. The Porte repeatedly gave evidence of its proverbial weakness. Although asserting that it would not keep Kossuth and his associates in detention for more than a year, beyond this it did not show the least firmness. No one could say from what date this one year's term was to be reckoned. If the Porte were willing to calculate it as from the date of their entering Turkish territory, the term had already elapsed a long time ago. Even if the one year were reckoned from the date of their detention, it was already at an end.

Knowing this, Kossuth came to the conclusion that he stood before a locked door. He could not remember one gesture of the Porte which could prove its reliability. When he crossed the frontier, the privileges of hospitality were promised him, yet he, together with his fellow refugees, was deprived of every advantage attained by their escape. Again in Shoumla it was the Porte which let the Austrian hirelings escape after their failure to murder him. Only ambiguity or a peculiarly slack attitude, always open to opposing influences, was the lot of the refugees. Through Canning's courtesy Kossuth learnt the peculiar instructions given by the Porte to Sulejman Bey, the Turkish commander in Kutahia: "... You must allow them¹⁹⁰ more latitude within their walls, ob-

¹⁸⁸ Kossuth's personal notes without date; cf. further the original statutes of the colony. Kutahia, Dec. 1, 1850. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁸⁹ László's Diary, vol. I, p. 59.

¹⁹⁰ The refugees.

serving in the meantime the necessary precautions but endeavouring to prevent their being aware of it . . ."¹⁹¹

He wrote long letters about this "humiliating" order to the Government of the United States of America and implored its help for his release. But of course it was a matter of doubt whether the American Government would renew the offer made last year to the Porte for his conveyance to the New World. The more he felt discouraged his "prison", the more he realized the truth of Urquhart's opinion that he could only rely upon the Porte, whose ambiguity had already extinguished his last faint hope.

The intelligence he received from London was similarly hopeless, which again proved that Urquhart was right. In the opening session of Parliament the question of the emigrants was mentioned in the speech from the throne, but Palmerston's answer created general uneasiness among the refugees.¹⁹² Nevertheless Pulszky was busy arranging meetings in Sheffield and Manchester. The petitions adopted on various occasions were usually presented to Palmerston, but Cobden doubted whether they were likely to effect Kossuth's release. At the beginning of 1851 Palmerston's position again became very strong and even the *Daily News* refrained from criticizing his foreign policy.

With the emigrants thus depressed Pulszky was inclined to overestimate the influence which the least sign of sympathy might exert over their future. "Your popularity did not cease" — he wrote to Kossuth¹⁹³ — "I must even confess I am afraid your popularity is greater than is desirable for you. The ministers would not like your coming here, because the people would prepare you a reception not even equalled by a King's visit to this country. Trust God, help yourself, for nobody else will help you. I have done my utmost, I cannot do any more . . ."

Pulszky's letter became even more pessimistic when he wrote about official Britain. In Parliament the aristocracy occupied the right wings of the Tory and Whig parties and had authority over their party friends. They had no fear of despotism, for they knew

¹⁹¹ Kossuth's draft to the Government of the USA, May 30, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁹² Vukovich and Teleki to Kossuth. Paris, March 6, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁹³ London, January 30, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

that no power on earth could enforce it in Britain, where constitutional liberty prevailed. But they disapproved of the democratic movements on the Continent whose success in Britain would — no doubt — be followed by the end of their influence. Therefore the aristocratic factions were more anxious than anybody else that the wheel of victorious democracy would turn against the Conservative Powers on the Continent. Was it any wonder if they did not sympathize with Kossuth's democratic utterances? Influenced by their personal interests, they wanted to retain peace and order at any price. This common opinion of the aristocracy was challenged by the Whig Macaulay, who explained in his works that "it might be necessary to *sacrifice even liberty, in order to save civilization...*"¹⁹⁴ Cobden and his radicals avowed the same principle as the conservative aristocrats among the Tories and the Whigs. The radicals also preached peace at any price in order to promote free trade on the Continent.

Russell and Palmerston looked upon the helplessness of the Porte with indifference. Pulszky was terrified on hearing in Downing Street that the Porte had entered into new negotiations with Vienna concerning the prolongation of Kossuth's detention to five years.¹⁹⁵ When he read the diplomatic correspondence¹⁹⁶ which on Dudley Stuart's motion Palmerston presented to Parliament, he learned with resignation that he was indeed well informed upon Britain's foreign policy. He read between the lines that Palmerston never intended to exert an active influence upon the diplomatic contest between the Absolute Powers and the Porte. This supposition seemed to be proved by Palmerston's answer to the complaints of Pulszky: "... Il faut qu'il¹⁹⁷ fasse le mort; c'est le seul moyen de faire cesser sa situation pénible..."¹⁹⁸

Meanwhile Urquhart arrived in London and, true to his promises to Kossuth, immediately moved in Parliament on behalf of

¹⁹⁴ Pulszky—Kossuth, London, March, 2, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁹⁵ Pulszky—Kossuth, London, Febr. 23, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

¹⁹⁶ Correspondence resp. Refugees from Hungary within the Turkish Dominions. Presented to both Houses of Parliament on February 28, 1851; Imrefi, *Die ungarischen Flüchtlinge in der Türkei*. Leipzig, 1851, p. 239.

¹⁹⁷ Kossuth.

¹⁹⁸ Pulszky—Kossuth. London, March 9, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

his release.¹⁹⁹ Palmerston's answer seemed to support Pulszky's opinion that he was not interested in the question. He said that Austria and Turkey already agreed on the details of the detention. Turkey could release seventy-six of the refugees immediately. The remaining sixteen — among them Kossuth — were to be detained provisionally. It was desired by the British Government that even these sixteen should be set free very soon.²⁰⁰

After three weeks, on May 9th, Urquhart asked repeated questions, but did not receive any definite answer about Kossuth's detention from Palmerston.²⁰¹ In June he made a new attempt, and raised the question whether it was a fact that Kossuth and his fellow-refugees would not be permitted to return to Turkey if once set free. This was a delicate question, for Urquhart entertained the hope that Kossuth might settle in Constantinople and keep in contact with the Turkish Ministers after his release.

Palmerston's answer was in fact absolutely evasive, but still admitted that Kossuth would be handicaped in taking up his permanent residence in Stambul.²⁰² The Porte reserved itself the right — he said — to release Kossuth under this condition for it wanted to have peace at home and with its neighbours as well.

No one could deny that Palmerston's utterances in public led people to the conclusion that he wanted to maintain entire aloofness in the matter. It was his admirable political sense which induced him to screen his real attitude in question. There were reasons for him to do so. In view of the normal diplomatic relations he entertained with Austria, he could not have acted otherwise. Further the court's reservedness and the anti-Kossuth attitude of the Tory and Whig aristocrats constrained him to defer to their opinions.

But in his diplomatic correspondence with Canning we recognize an entirely different statesman from the one of his speeches. His instructions and letters are guided by indomitable hatred of Vienna as well as by most generous and human feelings for the refugees. This attitude cannot be realized from the documents published in the Blue Book because he withheld those documents which would have proved his very active influence in the question ,originating from his individuality and his aversion to

¹⁹⁹ On March 14, 1851.

²⁰⁰ Hansard, vol. 114, pp. 1317 et sqq.

²⁰¹ Hansard, vol. 116, pp. 769—770.

²⁰² Hansard, vol. 117, pp. 782—783.

unnecessary suffering.²⁰³ But of course, this sympathy never went beyond British interests, being the "suprema lex" of all his actions. The Hungarian question was in fact a matter of subordinate importance in his Oriental politics; still he used every opportunity to annoy Vienna and encourage Stambul at the same time strengthening his influence with the Porte.

Palmerston was informed by Canning's report of April 25th that the Sultan had definitely resolved to free Kossuth and his associates on September 1st, yet he remained silent when Urquhart put a question in June. Palmerston even went so far as to offer the Porte a steamer to convey the refugees to Malta, in case they could not avail themselves of the frigate promised for that purpose by the U. S. Government.²⁰⁴ Then he pondered over the propriety of ordering the Mediterranean Squadron in the Archipelago again to strengthen the Porte on behalf of Kossuth's liberation.²⁰⁵

Canning acted in exactly the same way as Palmerston. While he counselled Kossuth to be patient, he exerted all his influence with the Porte to secure tolerable conditions for the refugees. The Porte had not treated them well. Even the generals were accommodated in Kutahia two in a room and the treatment of the others was almost inhuman.²⁰⁶ Canning was indefatigable in his efforts to alleviate their lot, although General Aupick regarded their prospects as very discouraging.²⁰⁷ But Canning continued to tell Aali that the Porte had already fulfilled its obligations. The one year's term was over and internal order in Hungary undoubtedly restored. The Porte must not accept Vienna's idea that the Austrian Emperor was right in regarding the release of the refugees as a personal insult from the Porte — even if the one year's term was actually over. The attempt of Austria to create disorder in the Turkish provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria in order to take vengeance for the stand taken by Turkey who was already weary of showing indulgence towards Austrian demands, — was decidedly contrary to international law.

Owing to Canning's motives and firmness the Sultan decided

²⁰³ See unpublished material in the Foreign Office Records, Turkey F. O. 78/779 et sequ. P. R. O. London.

²⁰⁴ Draft no. 130. F. O. 78/849 — cf. Further Correspondence, no. 39.

²⁰⁵ Palmerston—Canning, Aug. 11, 1851, Draft no. 210. F. O. 78/850. P. R. O. London. See appendix no. 9.

²⁰⁶ Further corresp. no. 1, 2.

²⁰⁷ Canning—Palmerston, April 17, 1851. F. O. 78/854. Confidential. His observations on the Iradé as to the release of the refugees.

on resistance, and fixed September 1st for the refugees's release. "I find in the express engagement now contracted by his Majesty" — reported Canning to Palmerston — "a sufficient compensation for the four summer months during which the detention of the refugees is still to be continued . . ." ²⁰⁸ With this act the diplomatic contest was practically over.

XI.

Kossuth's depression. — Pulszky's unsuccessful attempt to help Kossuth's escape. — Henningsen's unreliability. — Kossuth decides to cooperate with Mazzini. — Arrival of Adriano Lemmi, Mazzini's confidential agent, in Kutahia. — His influence upon Kossuth. — Urquhart tries to get Batthyány to keep Kossuth away from Mazzini. — Urquhart's counsels to Kossuth. — How things were going on in Constantinople, as seen by Urquhart. — Cobden and Urquhart wish to use Kossuth to show up Palmerston's incomprehensible policy. — Kossuth's hesitation. — Urquhart tries to dissuade Kossuth from indiscrete publication of his negotiations with the Porte in the British press. — Pulszky reveals Canning as the author of the publication. — Urquhart despairs of succeeding in the establishment of political relations between the Porte and Kossuth. — Kossuth urges Canning and Marsh, the American Minister in Constantinople to assist his release.

All that happened behind the scenes in diplomacy remained unknown to the European public. And if Britain formed a wrong opinion about Palmerston's and Canning's policy, is there any wonder if Kossuth — impressed by Pulszky's exaggerated letters — was incapable of separating facts from sentiments? His solitude also contributed to his seeing the dark side, and solitude is a bad counsellor.

Kossuth accepted Pulszky's advice. He did not want to go on waiting inactively for things to develop, as Canning asked him to, but took the point of view that, however risky it was, he must help himself. He could not keep his pledged word to Urquhart because he had lost his faith in Turkey.

But again he had bad luck. Pulszky's letter brought him the distressing news of the unreliability of Henningsen, to whom he entrusted all his secret plans.

²⁰⁸ Constantinople, April 25, 1851, no. 135. F. O. 78/854. P. R. O. London.

At the beginning of 1850 Pulszky was informed by Kossuth of his plan to escape from Turkey. For that purpose the former started a subscription in London and the truest friends of the Hungarian cause, Dudley Stuart, Cobden, Gilpin, the Alderman of the City Council contributed to it. The money exceeded sixteen hundred Pounds to which was added the sum of forty thousand Francs given by Count Branicki, a rich Polish refugee, who was living at that time in Paris. Pulszky entrusted this considerable sum to Henningsen, who could neither help Kossuth to escape nor render any account to his trustees.²⁰⁹

Kossuth learnt of Henningsen's unreliability only after he had charged him in Kutahia with various delicate missions which all ended unsuccessfully. E. g. his instruction for negotiating with the Grand Vizier as to the term of his detention or the technical equipment of the colony planned in Asia Minor, for which purpose Massingberd gave him considerable sums.

Nevertheless his cup was not yet full. But when Jazmagy, the notorious dragoman of the Austrian Internuncio who attempted to murder Kossuth in Shoumla, was furnished by the Porte with a passport in order to watch him in Kutahia, he lost finally faith in the Porte and refused help from Urquhart and Canning, although the latter was glad to tell him of his release in September.²¹⁰

In this desperate state of mind he decided to cooperate with Mazzini.²¹¹ The latter had been plotting Italy's unity since 1849 and already possessed a revolutionary fund of several million Lire. In spite of his promise to Urquhart he accepted the invitation of the Central European Democratic Committee in London to go on its board; the open and avowed aim was to destroy the monarchies.²¹²

According to this decision Mazzini ordered his confidential collaborator, Adriano Lemmi, to Kutahia in order to establish direct contact between himself and Kossuth. Lemmi formerly represented Mazzini's interests in Constantinople and now entered on

²⁰⁹ Pulszky—Kossuth, April 5, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

²¹⁰ Canning—Kossuth, Constantinople, April 30, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest. — See appendix no. 7.

²¹¹ Baron Tecco had knowledge of Kossuth's planned contact with Mazzini but he was informed that Mazzini's approach did not lead to cooperation. Cf. Tecco—D'Azeglio, Constantinople, May 5, 1851, no. 826. A. St. Torino.

²¹² Menghini Mario, *Luigi Kossuth nel suo carteggio con Giuseppe Mazzini*. Aquila, 1921, pp. 18 et sequ.

his new position with Kossuth in April 1851.²¹³ In a very short time he had gained decisive influence over Mrs. Kossuth and through her Kossuth himself. He also succeeded in isolating Kossuth from his fellow-refugees, particularly from Count Casimir Batthyány, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lazarus Mészáros, former Minister of War, and General Perczel. The aim of this isolation was to keep any influence away from Kossuth excepting that of Mazzini. In fact, since that time Kossuth's activities were concentrated exclusively on the revolutionary organization in Hungary in accordance with Mazzini's similar preparations in Italy.²¹⁴

Without any knowledge of this turn of events Urquhart was waiting in vain for Kossuth's letters. When he left Kutahia in October last he already suspected Kossuth of accepting Mazzini's offer of a common revolutionary platform. His suspicion gained ground as he perceived in Constantinople the lack of caution shown by Kossuth in choosing his confidential collaborators, who were not worthy of such services. So he wrote to Batthyány and requested him to withhold Kossuth from communications which, in his opinion, could not promote their common plans. "You too, are necessary for Hungary" — he wrote. — "One without the other²¹⁵ is useless. You can do absolutely nothing without him. Without you he may struggle and agitate but not succeed. It requires then between you a union of powers, confidence and affection. The bar is on *his side*, not yours and the bar is his misplaced confidence. He estimates your talents, but not your character and so you cannot give him your confidence entirely nor he derive from you the strength you would otherwise afford him..."²¹⁶

Urquhart was perfectly right, but instead of giving counsel to Batthyány he should rather have done so to Kossuth, who had already become estranged from the former owing to Lemmi's influence.

With no sign of life from Kossuth, he regularly sent his letters after he arrived in London in March 1851. He again requested him to refrain from politics and gave him to understand that he would

²¹³ Cf. Batthyány—Urquhart, Paris, Oct. 29, 1851. The Free Press, Sheffield, March 8, 1856.

²¹⁴ Cf. Geheime Präsidialregistratur des königlichen Polizei-Präsidiums, Berlin. Tit. 94. Litt. U., no. 40. G. P. ST. A. Berlin-Dahlem.

²¹⁵ Kossuth.

²¹⁶ Constantinople, Jan. 13, 1851: The Free Press, Sheffield, March 8, 1856.

only remain a considerable factor in European politics as long as he was detained on Ottoman territory. At the moment he was set free, he would become a "negligeable quantity", which could in no way be counteracted by popular demonstrations in Britain. Urquhart's opinion derived partly from his own conviction, partly from the "news", grown almost to "legends", about Kossuth's person.

In well-informed circles of the Porte great scepticism prevailed as to the probable issue of the negotiations. One entertained the opinion that Canning, while urging Kossuth's release, was endeavouring to bury his political significance. He was acting in accordance with Metternich's counsels, which were revealed by the Paris press. Metternich considered it wise to disarm all nationalities living in Hungary, even those who fought for Austria, then to arrest all turbulent individuals and to banish them to America, where they could make happy themselves according to their own principles.

As to whether this counsel was accepted by Austria or not it does not matter. Yet Schwarzenberg acted in this sense and expelled a large number of individuals who had fought for Hungary. They were regularly furnished with passports, only good for America, under condition of being forbidden to return to the Austrian Empire.

This procedure was often discussed at the Porte along with the prospect that Palmerston might regard it as very reasonable on account of European peace, and even himself be willing to promote Kossuth's deportation to America or to Australia.

It was rumoured in Constantinople that these were the reasons why Canning urged the release of Kossuth. He would not hesitate to help Kossuth's escape. Again the sensitiveness of the Porte was touched by Canning's behaviour, which gave the impression that he would govern the Ottoman Empire himself. This very idea induced the Porte to discontinue Kossuth's detention, although his person was a strong card in Turkey's hands against the Powers interested in the question.²¹⁷

However things might stand, this procrastination gave rise to various speculations. Urquhart believed the Turkish version. His conviction was confirmed by Palmerston's attitude in the question of the refugees. Urquhart's opinion was not alone among the ra-

²¹⁷ Ladik Effendi—Urquhart, Constantinople, April 15, 1851: *The Free Press*, March 15, 1856.

dical members of Parliament. Cobden also shared his impression. "If there is any chance of that man²¹⁸ being unmasked" — he said to Urquhart — "it is Kossuth that will do it for he has more than any other man at this moment the ear of the European public and nothing will intimidate him once he has made up his mind..."²¹⁹ Urquhart decided to use all his efforts to induce Kossuth to write an open letter and reveal Palmerston's diplomacy in Stambul to the British public.

But before his letter reached Kossuth an unforeseen event made him almost hostile towards the Hungarian leader. He read in the London papers the protest of Kossuth addressed to Reschid, in which he referred plaintively to the long term of his detention.²²⁰ In this very letter Urquhart's name was mentioned several times.

Kossuth outlined Urquhart's opinion as being in favour of the maintenance of the Austrian Empire, and agreeing with Palmerston's principle as to her political mission in Middle-Europe. But being properly informed in Kutahia, he made up his mind and became convinced that the reestablishment of an independent Hungary was absolutely necessary "for the security not only of the future glory but of the existence of the Turkish Empire". Thus, his attachment to Turkey made him a friend of Hungary.²²¹

What Kossuth said about Urquhart was absolutely true; nevertheless Urquhart did not like to see the summary of his discussions in print. He felt deeply compromised by this publication and complained of Kossuth's attitude in breaking his word. But of course he did not know that it was against Kossuth's intention to have his protest to the Porte published by the British press.

After long inquiries Pulszky was successful in finding out the person who caused this indiscretion. Yet he could not change Urquhart's ill-humour. Namely, Kossuth's protest was usually shown by Reschid or Aali to Canning, who felt in this case particularly glad to forward a copy to the British press. With this act he wanted to give Urquhart a disagreeable surprise for the incessant trouble he caused Palmerston in his Near East policy.

Deeply mortified by this indiscreet publication, Urquhart's

²¹⁸ Palmerston.

²¹⁹ Urquhart—Kossuth, House of Commons, June 27, 1851: The Free Press. Ut supra.

²²⁰ Pulszky—Kossuth, London, May 26, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

²²¹ Kossuth's letter to Reschid. Kutahia, Febr. 15, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

estrangement towards Kossuth began, and took further nourishment from news received from Pulszky about a letter addressed by Kossuth to Marsh, the American Minister in Stambul.²²² In this letter he accused the Porte and the Turkish policy of causing his hopeless situation in terms which led one to conclude that he renounced any intention of a rapprochement with Turkey.

Urquhart was further informed by his Turkish friends that Kossuth had indeed entered into close relations with Mazzini. In a terse letter he asked Kossuth for an explanation²²³ and made up his mind to discontinue his contact with Kossuth if rumours proved his changed attitude. The Turkophile Urquhart could not make common policy with a man who "fell in the net of the Russo-philé Mazzini".

Urquhart never received an answer to his letters. Kossuth's time was full with preparations for the insurrection planned for the spring of the coming year 1852. Besides, it was an open question whether he had ever received Urquhart's letters or at least some of them. None of them were preserved by Kossuth.

But apart from his busy correspondence with Mazzini he raised innumerable questions to Canning and Marsh. He wanted to know whether he would actually be released on September 1st. If so he would be glad to receive permission to break his voyage in Gibraltar, for he wished to spend a few days in Britain in order to arrange pressing matters there. These were his plans, made with Mazzini whom he wanted to talk with concerning the particulars of their common cause before he had to sail to the United States.

Meanwhile Lemmi was sent by Kossuth to Constantinople to forward his letters to the ministers. But being afraid that Kossuth's letters would do more harm than good, Lemmi retained them arbitrarily and tried to calm Kossuth by persuasive words: "Please, be quiet" — he wrote — "Brown who is in place of Marsh, entertains friendly feelings towards you, but he has to follow instructions received from Washington. No provision has been made for the break in your voyage, therefore he can give you no hope of realizing your plans."²²⁴

²²² Urquhart—Kossuth, July 3, 1851: *The Free Press*. Ut supra.

²²³ London, June 20, 1851: *The Free Press*. Ut supra. — See appendix no. 8.

²²⁴ Lemmi—Kossuth, Constantinople, Aug. 11, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

XII.

Lawrence, the American Minister in London reveals to Pulszky the secret aims of the Absolute Powers concerning Kossuth. — Uneasiness of Austrian diplomatists in London. — Prince Paul Esterházy invited to Palmerston's reception. — He reassures Buol, the Austrian Minister about the importance of the Kossuth affair. — "Revolutions would have less importance, he said, if Continental Governments would redress their peoples' grievances." — Schwarzenberg's endeavours to have accepted his interpretations of the agreement with the Porte. — He threatens the Porte with recall of the Austrian Internuncio. — Schwarzenberg unsuccessful negotiations with Mussurus, the Turkish Minister in Vienna. — Klezl, the Austrian chargé d'affaires writes from Stambul: Aali is the most respectable liar in Turkey. — Schwarzenberg answers: he does not even deserve this honourable title.

In London Pulszky was just as desperate as Kossuth. He was convinced like Kossuth that the Porte would not keep its word about the release of the refugees. When he called upon Lawrence, the American Minister in London, to receive promising news, he learnt only dishartening facts. Lawrence informed him of the secret intention of the Absolute Powers to settle the Kossuth affair finally. They wanted to avoid his presence in Europe in the crisis to come. The general opinion was that he would attempt his escape from Asia Minor. In order to keep him quiet they let his wife escape and sent his children to him. Even the American Government was solicited by the Absolute Powers to make its proposal to the Porte. "It is already the end of June and you are still detained" — wrote Pulszky to Kossuth. — "They want you to keep there as long as they can and then to convey you to America. If you come to Britain they want to overwhelm you with distinction till May next . . ." ²²⁵

Lawrence judged the situation fairly well, though he was wrong in asserting that the American Government was persuaded by European Powers to convey Kossuth to America. It was the motion of Senator Foote of Mississippi which induced the American Government to act on feelings of humanity. Besides, in a considerable part of Congress the opinion prevailed that America had to interence on behalf of those who fought gallantly for democracy but fell in the conflict against European absolutism.

²²⁵ London, June 24, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

A great many London diplomatists shared Lawrence's opinion and did not attach any particular importance to the Kossuth affair from the point of view of the European politics. Only the Austrian Legation lived in a state of permanent excitement in view of Kossuth's coming release. Baron Koller was rather perplexed by the contradictory news he received in Downing Street. Once Canning reported that Kossuth would travel directly to America. Another time he wrote of Kossuth's changed decision to go to London in order to meet fellow emigrants of the continental states.

The Austrian Legation did its utmost to counterbalance his presumable activities during his stay in Britain. Yet Koller's measures were greatly dependent upon the attitude of Palmerston whose intrinsic politics were not disclosed to the Austrian diplomatists. Count Buol, the successor to Baron Koller, was painfully surprised to meet Prince Paul Esterházy, the former Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Palmerston's residence²²⁶ and to learn that Lawrence made no secret of his relations with the refugees.

When he asked Palmerston to explain the reasons of the invitation which Prince Esterházy was honoured with, he considered Palmerston's answer more evasive than friendly. Palmerston only said, his residence was neutral territory where the representatives of the most opposite principles might meet. Of course he regretted all that had happened in the past but he could not assume any responsibility as to whether such scenes might be repeated or not.

Almost every day brought some discouraging news for Buol. The answer given by Palmerston to the motion of Dudley Stuart was clear enough, that the Hungarian refugees were to be released on September 15th.²²⁷ Buol was seeking the opportunity to receive from Palmerston personally more particulars about the pending affair, but the Secretary of State spent the summer season out of town; so he was prevented from seeing him until the end of September.

In a long discussion he had in Broadlands, in Palmerston's country residence, he realized the desire of the Secretary of State to avoid diplomatic controversies. Palmerston assured Buol that the demonstrations in prospect during Kossuth's stay in Britain

²²⁶ Buol—Schwarzenberg, London, June 24, 1851. Rapp. no. 2, A—D. Angleterre, H. H. St. A. Wien.

²²⁷ Aug. 5. Hansard, vol. 118, pp. 888—9.

would neither exert any influence upon the government nor on the public. He decidedly refuted the reproach that he had anything to do with supporting continental refugees. Those, who entertain such an opinion" — he said — "apparently ignore that Parliament does not give legal power to the government to proceed against foreigners who did not come in conflict with the Alien Act. There is no reason to believe that Parliament would consent to any change in that matter proposed by the government. The only measures the government could make upon its own responsibility might be an explanation given to the refugees to avoid any collision with the law, in their own interest. "Believe me" — concluded Palmerston — "that revolutionary movements could be lowered to their real importance if foreign powers would not attach to them exaggerate significance and would rather redress their peoples' grievances""²²⁸

After this discussion Buol considered that he had Palmerston's open approval that his "mauvais conseils" prevailed in Turkey. Buol was aware of the delicate point of the whole controversy, which consisted in the Porte's refusal to keep its promise concerning the stipulations of Schwarzenberg's *previous* agreement as to the release of the refugees. And Buol suspected Palmerston of having influenced the Porte to change its views.

Of course, the Porte had its own point of view. Namely, Schwarzenberg reserved himself the right to determine the period when he was willing to admit that the order in Hungary was properly restored. But the Porte had good reason to believe that this stipulation was only to prolong the detention ad infinitum. Already two and a quarter years had elapsed since the refugees came into the Ottoman Empire, and Schwarzenberg was not yet willing to give his consent to their release. Again, the Porte as well as the Western Powers considered this period long enough for the pacification of Hungary, even if Schwarzenberg were not willing to share their opinion.

Since diplomatic relations were interrupted between the respective powers, Baron Stürmer left his office in Stambul and in spite of the "official" reconciliation which took place some time later, Schwarzenberg did not send another diplomatic representative to the Sultan instead of Stürmer. Schwarzenberg wanted to use this opportunity to impose his will upon the Porte. For this

²²⁸ Buol—Schwarzenberg, London, Sept. 23, 1851. Rapp. no. 14. H. H. St. A. Wien.

purpose, Count Leonhard Rechberg-Rothenlöwen, the successor of Stürmer, was instructed to leave his position immediately if the Porte were not be willing to change its decision concerning the release of the refugees.²²⁹

In spite of this attempted intimidation, it became evident shortly that the Porte did not want to change its attitude. Being informed of Rechberg's unsuccessful steps, Schwarzenberg sent for Mussurus, the Turkish Minister in Vienna, and explained to him without reserve what he thought about the weakness of the Porte.²³⁰ "Events prove clearly" — he said — "that the Porte takes heed of Britain's counsels concerning an affair which belongs exclusively to the Austrian and Turkish Governments. Mussurus should report to Stambul that Rechberg is not allowed to enter his office as a reprisal for the Porte's tenacity. After all, there is no use in sending a diplomatic representative to the Porte because Turkey's brain is substituted by Britain and Austria is represented properly in London. Schwarzenberg will find means to settle affairs concerning Turkey directly with Palmerston . . ."

But Austria failed again. Klezl, the Austrian chargé d'affaires could not but accept the present state of things and began to apologize for Aali, "the most respectable liar in Turkey". The arrival of the American steamer *Mississippi*, sent for Kossuth by the U. S. A. Government, was reported by him in an ironical manner. And he did not conceal the amusing news of that boat's being stranded in the Bay of Smyrna where she was released from her dangerous position by the assistance of three steamers of the Austrian Lloyd!

With pretended good humour he wrote about the keen competition that existed between the British and French diplomatists for the conveyance of the refugees.²³¹ Canning offered the steamer "Growler", Da la Valette, the new French Minister, the "Ajaccio". Kossuth might have chosen among the powers with whose assistance he was "to start his political propaganda".

This ironical manner only served to veil Austrian weakness. Schwarzenberg had to make the best of the unavoidable events. Nevertheless his fury against the Turkish Ministers did not cease for months. "Aali does not even deserve to be called a "respectable

²²⁹ Despatch, Vienna, June 10, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.

²³⁰ Despatch, Vienna, July 8, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.

²³¹ Rapp. no. 71, A—D. Sept. 3, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.

liar", he answered Klezl²³² and turned his attention to the West where Kossuth became the centre of interest.

XIII.

Kossuth's departure from Kutahia. — Controversies in Spezia with Capt. Long, of the Steam Frigate "Mississippi" and Comodore Morgan of the American Mediterranean Squadron. — Kossuth wants to break his passage to America in Marseilles. — Refusal of the French Government to permit his crossing France. — Kossuth's Marseilles Letter. — The pro-Magyar British Press divided and partly disillusioned by the Marseilles Letter. — Diplomacy stirred up by Kossuth's appearance. — Ralph Abercromby's damning criticism of Kossuth's behaviour. — Reproaches of Baroche, the French Minister of the Interior on account of the imposing preparations at Southampton for Kossuth's reception. — Reservedness in St. Petersburg. — Schwarzenberg's planned reprisals towards British travellers. — Palmerston's conciliatory despatches to Paris, Vienna and St. Petersburg. — Buol's departure from Britain for the period of the Kossuth demonstrations.

The good news reached Kossuth as early as August 22nd that he was to make preparations for departure.²³³ He left Kutahia with his fellow-refugees on September 1st. Thence they were transported by a Turkish steamer to the Dardanelles, the place of anchorage of the Steam Frigate Mississippi which had been ordered there by the American Government to convey them to the United States.²³⁴

Kossuth did not conceal his dissatisfaction when he was informed by Capt. Long of the orders of the American Navy Department to convey him directly to the New World.²³⁵ When the Frigate anchored in Spezia to coal he explained the reasons for

²³² Despatch, Vienna, Dec. 16, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.

²³³ László's Diary, vol. I, p. 81.

²³⁴ Cf. Baron Tecco—D'Azeglio, Rap. no. 843. Constantinople, Sept. 15, 1851. A. St. Torino.

²³⁵ Official correspondence published by 32nd Congress, 1st Session. House of Representatives. Executive documents no. 78. — See also *Kossuth and the voyage of the Mississippi* with comments in the *Evening Post Weekly*, New York, Nov. 13, 1851; *Official Documents. M. Kossuth and the Mississippi*. The National Intelligencer, Washington, Febr. 21, 1852.

his complaint to Commodore Morgan²³⁶ commander in chief of the American Mediterranean Squadron. He spoke to Morgan about the confusing and misleading tone of the Austrian press which culminated in the assertion that his release and conveyance to America had been stipulated by Austria. He said he must refute these false assertions. For that purpose he resolved to go directly to Britain where he expected to spend a few weeks and then to continue his voyage to America. By this act Kossuth desired to demonstrate his free will in accepting America's invitation, and also to give evidence that his voyage had no relationship whatever to Austrian stipulations.

He further spoke with Morgan of the discouraging news of Austria's planned entrance into the German Bund. Austria intended to amalgamate Hungary, Croatia, Lombardy and Venice with this Confederation. The matter had already been discussed at the Dresden Conference. Britain and France made representations, but they were refused by the Frankfort Parliament. The latter was resolved not to tolerate foreign interference in the "domestic" affairs of the Bund. The attitude of Frankfort was very soon re-echoed in Austria by the suspension of the constitution. Now, no legal bars exist — said Kossuth — to prevent Hungary's forced entrance into the Bund.

He had to protest in any case against this brutal policy. But he could not do it on American territory without infringing its traditional political principles as laid down in Washington's farewell address. These are still in force in the great Republic. It would be an act of ingratitude towards his American hosts. That is why he had to go to Britain and give utterance to his firm protests.

Morgan was in fact confused by Kossuth's explanations. He could not understand why he wanted to be mixed up in politics. When President Fillmore approved the joint resolution of Congress on March 3rd 1851 and the Mississippi was ordered to Asia Minor to convey the refugees to the United States, it was supposed that they wanted to emigrate and settle in the New World.²³⁷ Kossuth however did not set forth his views on this point of the resolution, but incessantly requested facilities for his journey. This

²³⁶ Wertheimer, Eduard, *Ludwig Kossuth in Amerika*: Preussische Jahrbücher, 1925, pp. 253—57.

²³⁷ Curti, Merle Eugene, *Austria and the United States 1848—1852*. Smith College Studies in History. Northampton Mass. 1926, vol. XI, no. 3, pp. 172—73.

attitude was taken as an unconditional acceptance of Congress' offer.

But apart from all this Morgan thought that he could not constrain the guest of the American people to continue his voyage against his will. He therefore complied with Kossuth's request to convey him to Marseilles, supposing that the French Government would permit him to cross France to London. In case of a French refusal, he instructed Capt. Long to convey Kossuth to Gibraltar²³⁸ and to await his return from Britain. In this case Kossuth had to choose the route and await himself of the regular Packet Boat that ran once a week between Gibraltar and Southampton.

As was to be expected, the French Government refused to permit Kossuth to travel through France. It had every reason for its attitude, because it wanted to avoid demonstrations with which the left wing elements would have honoured him.²³⁹

Kossuth objected to the government's order, which was sent to Suleau, the prefect of Bouche du Rhône. "I know the French people are not responsible for it and not identified with this act of the government" — he wrote in his manifesto. "I know that neither Louis Napoléon Bonaparte nor Faucher are considered to be identified with the French nation itself. Although the executive power is delegated to them, yet the honour of France is not in their keeping." Then he entrusted this fiery article to the *Peuple de Marseille*, a progressive daily paper which published it; but the issue was immediately confiscated.

After this unsuccessful experience, the Mississippi continued her voyage to Gibraltar, where a large correspondence was forwarded to Kossuth, containing the latest news from Britain about the plans for his reception. Kossuth eagerly read Pulszky's letter from Southampton. "There will be arrangements" — wrote Pulszky. — "Addresses are sent from every part. All the mayors of South Britain are expected to come... Still I am afraid the

²³⁸ As to the controversy which arose between Kossuth and Capt. Long in the Mediterranean ports see Kropf, Lewis, *Kossuth Lajos és Long kapitány* (Lewis Kossuth and Capt. Long): Budapesti Szemle (Budapest Review) 1903, pp. 318 et sequ.; — Marsh, the American Minister in Constantinople took Long's part. See his letter to H. J. Raymond, the Editor of the New York Times, Marsh, Caroline Crane, *Life and Letters of George Perkins Marsh*. New York, 1888, pp. 251—52.

²³⁹ Moore, J. B., *Kossuth the Revolutionist*: Political Science Quarterly, New York, 1895, pp. 270 et sequ.

enthusiasm will abate; the people are growing tired with waiting so long . . ."²⁴⁰

There was no exaggeration in Pulszky's jubilation. Buol, the Austrian Minister, was compelled to report to Schwarzenberg that nearly every organ of the British press wrote with open or concealed sympathy of the Hungarian refugees, with the exception of *The Times*.²⁴¹ Only Kossuth's manifesto from Marseilles created discord in this harmony of sympathies, and divided the press. Some of the papers took offence at the inconsiderate tone of the manifesto, and doubted its authenticity. "Kossuth must have signed a manifesto" — they wrote — "whose effect he did not consider." Others again, decided to withdraw their sympathy from him should he speak in a similar manner in Britain. *The Times* accused him openly of being a conspirator like Mazzini or Louis Blanc. Again, *The Globe* wrote in a friendly tone in spite of the Marseilles incident.

Kossuth's appearance in the Mediterranean created great excitement among the diplomatists. Britain's representatives reported all details of his voyage very fully. Ralph Abercromby, the Minister at the Sardinian court, wrote a very disillusioned letter about him. His information was based on the intelligence received from Mc Kinney, his American colleague in Turin.²⁴²

Again, in Paris Baroche, Minister of the Interior, gave utterance to his consternation by speaking about the inconsiderate attitude of the prefect of Bouche du Rhône, who permitted Kossuth to land in Marseilles and thus caused demonstrations which resulted in grave popular disturbances. He complained further to Normanby, the British Minister in Paris, that the preparations in progress in Southampton for Kossuth's reception would no doubt encourage revolutionary elements all over the Continent.²⁴³ But having learnt of the disapproval of the Marseilles manifesto expressed by a considerable section of the British press, Baroche became somewhat easier in his mind as to the consequences of Kossuth's British trip.²⁴⁴

Nesselrode was also greatly interested in matter and was glad

²⁴⁰ Southampton, Oct. 6, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

²⁴¹ Rapp. no. 18, A—E. London, Oct. 11, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.

²⁴² Report no. 123. Turin, Sept. 28, 1851. Sardinia. F. O. vol. 179. P. R. O. London. — See appendix no. 10.

²⁴³ Normanby—Palmerston, Paris, Oct. 6, 1851. Report no. 279. F. O. 27/903. P. R. O. London.

to be informed by Lord Seymour, the British Minister in St. Petersburg, of what was going to happen as regards Kossuth. On Seymour replying that Kossuth would probably be met with the greatest cordiality, he did not express any further opinion...²⁴⁵

Magenis, the British Minister in Vienna, reported Schwarzenberg's plan of refusing British travellers' requests to enter Hungary. The reason of this government order was to apply reprisals for Palmerston's pro-Magyar attitude.²⁴⁶

The Secretary of State was aware of Schwarzenberg's annoyance and gave Magenis an ironical answer.²⁴⁷ Still he did not regard Schwarzenberg's threats as worthy of diplomatic steps in Vienna.

To Normanby he wrote that the British Government only acted at request of the towns and counties in intervening at the Porte. After all it seemed only proper, if the British people was willing to arrange festivals in honour of Kossuth. But in the event of Kossuth's speeches, as he intended, being moderate and restrained, it was not likely that they would encourage European revolutionaries.²⁴⁸ Mr. Baroche would have very little cause for anxiety.

On the other hand, if his speeches were of revolutionary character, the British people would no doubt, lose interest in him. Besides, there would be no one of any importance who would be willing to attend such festivals or dinners.²⁴⁹

He also tried to calm Nesselrode, and let him know via Seymour that in his opinion even the most turbulent emigrant would fail to create troubles in a country where tranquillity prevailed.²⁵⁰ He thought the governments must be empowered to eliminate any apparent reasons for domestic dissatisfaction.

Anyway, Continental Powers must learn the impropriety of extraditing political refugees who lived quietly in Britain. How

²⁴⁴ Normanby—Palmerston, Paris, Oct. 10, 1851. F. O. 27/903. no. 283. P. R. O. London.

²⁴⁵ Seymour—Palmerston. Report no. 42. Confidential. St. Petersburg. Russia. vol. 395. P. R. O. London. — See appendix no. 14.

²⁴⁶ Vienna, Sept. 30, 1851. F. O. 7/388. no. 182. P. R. O. London.

²⁴⁷ London, Oct. 14, 1851. Draft no. 285. Austria. F. O. 7/388. P. R. O. London. — See appendix no. 13.

²⁴⁸ Palmerston—Normanby, London, Oct. 17, 1851. no. 485. F. O. 27/896. P. R. O. London. — See appendix no. 17.

²⁴⁹ Palmerston spoke in the same sense to Buol. Cf. the latter's report no. 20. A—C. London, Oct. 20, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.

²⁵⁰ Palmerston—Seymour, London, Oct. 28, 1851. no. 53. Russia. vol. 930. P. R. O. London.

could it be otherwise? Britain could not undertake the duty of acting as judge between governments demanding the extradition of political refugees. Should Britain comply with their demands, she must be sure which one of the contesting parties was in the right, which was, practically, outside her province.

Besides this the Ministers of Austria, Russia and Prussia in London decided to present a common *démarche* to Palmerston. They had complained several times already of his liberal point of view in interpreting the British Aliens Act. They said that Britain's cooperative task should give support to Continental Powers which had to exert their utmost energies in the race of subversive activities. It might be admitted that Britain was not endangered by Continental revolutionary movements on account of her geographical situation. Still, it was in her own interest to help to keep the peace.²⁵¹

In Palmerston's opinion the ministers took too serious a view of the rôle of the political refugees. He ridiculed them and said that all the refugees in Britain were not a match for a few thousand Pounds. Most of them were living in great poverty, striving for their daily bread. As to Kossuth, he was convinced that no one could find a Court in Britain which would be ready to banish him or forbid his return to Britain simply on account of statements charging him with revolutionary tendencies. Kossuth had no means of obtaining military or naval equipment. Besides, it was every government's task to defend its own territory against disturbances arising either at home or abroad.

Buol found that these statements were rather discouraging for continental diplomatists. He decided therefore to leave London while Kossuth was in Britain.²⁵² Otherwise he would have to face a very awkward situation as an involuntary eye-witness of demonstrations arranged in favour of Kossuth.

Schwarzenberg agreed with Buol's decision, for he wanted to avoid the appearance of having Buol interrupted his diplomatic activities. Of course, the public was informed of Buol's intention of leaving London "in order to meet his wife in Brussels and to go with her to Paris on private affairs" — which literally meant the date of Kossuth's departure for America.

²⁵¹ Bunsen's political papers. *Immediatbericht* no. 119. London, Oct. 15, 1851. P. G. St. A. Berlin-Dahlem.

²⁵² Buol—Schwarzenberg. *Rapp.* no. 19. A—C. Oct. 15, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien. — See appendix no. 15.

XIV.

Kossuth's arrival in Southampton. — Palmerston invites Kossuth to Broadlands. — Mazzini and Ledru Rollin want to counteract this invitation. — Cobden's and Urquhart's counsels to Kossuth as to his political attitude in Britain. — Cobden refrains from forwarding Palmerston's invitation. — Kossuth declines Palmerston's and the socialist workers' invitation. — Favourable impression of his moderate speech in Southampton. — Kossuth festival in Winchester. — Cobden enchanted by his personality. — Cobden's readiness to give moral support to Kossuth. — Crosskey, the American Consul in Southampton forecasts Anglo-American Alliance against Continental Despotism. — The Central Democratic Committee prepares Kossuth for the impending democratic revolution in France. — Kossuth's political platform and cooperation with the Radical Party. — Henningsen's revelations in the Times. — T. Smith's and F. W. Newman's literary propaganda for Kossuth. — His great speech at the public dinner in Southampton. — Walker, the Ex-Secretary of the American Treasury explains Crosskey's prediction: the Anglo-American Democratic Alliance will be ready for an armed intervention on behalf of oppressed liberty in Europe.

Kossuth bade farewell to the Mississippi in Gibraltar, then he changed boat and arrived on October 23rd in Southampton, where all Hungarian refugees of rank were gathered to take part in his festal reception. The thrilling scenes of their reunion overpowered the multitude, which eagerly occupied every vantage-point and following the example of the refugees shouted Hungarian "Éljen" with unbounded enthusiasm.²⁵³ Andrews, the Mayor of Southampton, Dudley Stuart, Crosskey, the American Consul, and Pulszky were the first to greet him on board.

Pulszky wished to be the first to go on board, for he knew of Palmerston's invitation to Kossuth, which Dudley Stuart handed to the Hungarian leader. Palmerston wanted to see him at Broadlands, his country residence not far from Southampton.

Mazzini and Ledru Rollin also knew of this invitation. It was regarded by them as a misleading action by the aristocracy in order to compromise him in the eyes of democracy. If Kossuth accepted this invitation, they decided to turn against him and to discontinue their common action. Mazzini clearly explained this

²⁵³ Headley, *Life of Lewis Kossuth*. Auburn, 1852, p. 233.

point of view to Kossuth in a letter delivered by Pulszky, and warned him against losing the interest of the aristocracy, which in fact never really sympathized with his cause.²⁵⁴

Pulszky had further to convey Cobden's advice as to his attitude when invited to public demonstrations or dinners in Britain. Cobden, who gave him assurance of the support of the Radical Party²⁵⁵ warned him against speaking at a public gathering if his political opponents were speaking at the same time. Otherwise he was in danger of being identified with partisan political tendencies which would spoil his chances in this country.²⁵⁶

It was really difficult for him to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of the sympathies of those who represented opposite political principles. It was just as difficult to find his way in the varying suggestions he received in his large correspondence. One of the most peculiar suggestions was made by Urquhart who warned him against speaking to anybody before he could see him personally.²⁵⁷

Kossuth highly appreciated the advice of his British friends of the Radical Party. Mazzini's letter also made a great impression on him. In accordance with information received he decided to refuse Palmerston's kind invitation. He explained to Dudley Stuart his intention of informing the British public first of all of his political principles and of his country's true situation. If Palmerston were willing to receive him when he had made his public speeches, he would regard it as the greatest honour that could be conferred upon him.²⁵⁸

Of course this was clear enough for Dudley Stuart to understand Kossuth's aims. If Palmerston showed readiness to receive him after his public speeches, it would actually mean the Secretary of State's decision to endorse the political principles for which Kossuth was fighting.

Dudley Stuart was somewhat irritated by Kossuth's opinion, but he did not resign because of his lack of success, and requested Cobden to mediate. The latter was not willing to assume this

²⁵⁴ Pulszky, vol. II, pp. 66—67.

²⁵⁵ Cobden—Pulszky, Midhurst, Sep. 22, 1851. N. M. MSSDpt. Bpest. — See appendix no. 11.

²⁵⁶ Cobden—Pulszky, Midhurst, Oct. 4, 1851. N. M. MSSDpt. Bpest. — See appendix no. 12.

²⁵⁷ Kossuth—Urquhart, Oct. 24, 1851: The Free Press. Sheffield, March 8, 1856.

²⁵⁸ Pulszky, vol. II, p. 67.

rôle, for he did not belong to the followers of Palmerston. "You may depend upon it" — he answered Dudley Stuart — "Kossuth knows a great deal more about Lord Palmerston than you do . . ." ²⁵⁹

Somehow or other this invitation was made public in the press. Through this channel Kübeck, the Austrian chargé d'affaires, also got to know of it, but he was sceptical of its authenticity. In fact, he knew of Palmerston's alleged promise to Buol that he would not receive Kossuth. ²⁶⁰ But Kübeck was in error. Palmerston promised only that he would not have an "official" meeting with Kossuth.

Anyway, it was not only the invitation of Palmerston which Kossuth refused. He showed a similar attitude towards the socialist workers, who wanted to honour him with a banquet in Southampton. Upon receiving his negative answer they returned to London very discontented. ²⁶¹

Besides this, Kossuth's charming manner fascinated all who came in contact with him. The progress he made in English since the surrender at Világos was a remarkable tribute to his genius. Even in Viddin he drafted his letters to Canning in French and only began in 1850 during his detention in Kutahia, to correspond regularly in English.

It created a great sensation in Southampton when his oratorical talents became known. ²⁶² He first addressed the crowd from the balcony of the mayor's house. There was a sudden hush when he began to speak in a clear, mellow voice: "Seven weeks ago" — he said — "I was a prisoner in Kutahia. Now I am a free man because glorious England choose it, that England which the genius of mankind selected for a monument of its greatness and the spirit of freedom took to be its happy home . . ." ²⁶³

With these opening words a man of profound feelings and gratitude was introduced to the crowd. On he same evening he

²⁵⁹ Bright John and Rogers James E. Thorold, *Speeches on questions of public policy of Richard Cobden*. 1903. See his speech in Manchester in 1857 on behalf of Bright's re-election to Parliament.

²⁶⁰ Cf. Rapp. no. 24. London, Oct. 29, 1851. H. H. St. A. Wien.

²⁶¹ Bunsen's *Immediatbericht* no. 93. London, Oct. 25, 1851. G. P. St. A. Berlin-Dahlem.

²⁶² Cf. a description of Kossuth's powers as an orator by Mc Carthy Justin, *A history of our own times*. London, 1897, vol. II, pp. 139—141; By the same author, *Reminiscences*. New York—London, 1900, vol. I, p. 108; Hóman—Szekfű, *Magyar Történet* (History of Hungary). Bpest, vol. VII, p. 281.

²⁶³ Headley, *Life*, p. 234.

fascinated his audience with similar flattering words. With his extraordinary tact he praised Queen Victoria's high personal qualities and with oratorical force said: It is a glorious sight to behold a Queen, representing popular liberty.²⁶⁴

With these words he at once gained the enthusiasm of his audience. Then he spoke about the British constitution and compared it with that of France, whose weakness he found in its centralization. He praised British self-government, which always offered effective protection against revolutionary tendencies. It was like Hungary, where the municipal institutions preserved the spirit of public life and constitutional liberty "against the open violence and secret intrigues of the House of Austria."²⁶⁵

Kossuth's great speech, which took more than an hour, was duly reported by the London press, which unanimously praised his moderate tone and the extraordinary modesty with which he deprecated all personal merit. He said that any special attention shown to his person could only be accepted by him as a token of sympathy for Hungarian liberty. Even in diplomatic circles the opinion prevailed that he had succeeded in changing the unfavourable impression which was created by the Marseilles incident.²⁶⁶

His first success had greatly contributed to his growing popularity. The City Council adopted the motion of Alderman Gilpin to make arrangements for his formal reception. But some time was needed for preparations. Kossuth was therefore requested to stay in Southampton for two days, which time was used by Mayor Andrews of Southampton to invite him to his country house at Winchester.

Cobden first met Kossuth in Winchester and discussed with him the political outlook being at that time very discouraging on account of the latent revolutionary movements which made all political combinations uncertain on the Continent. He warned Kossuth against Palmerston and renewed his advice to keep out of British internal politics.

²⁶⁴ *Kossuth in England, His progress and his speeches.* London, 1851.

²⁶⁵ At the end of the meeting Kossuth was honoured by a Hungarian national flag sent to the Hungarian Government by the Magyars living in New York. But the flag was retained by the British Customs on account of the late payment of duties. When this affair was settled, the collapse came in Hungary and the British post-office was unable to forward it to the Hungarian Government; Headley, p. 240.

²⁶⁶ Bunsen—Manteuffel, London, Oct. 25, 1851. *Immediatbericht* no. 93. G. P. St. A. Berlin-Dahlem.

Speaking about international law, he agreed with Kossuth that secret diplomacy and the principle of non-intervention were pressing problems. If the governments showed willingness to accept the principle of non-intervention, the reform of secret diplomacy could be avoided.²⁶⁷

Cobden was deeply impressed by Kossuth's personality. "Amiability, earnestness and disinterestedness were the most speaking characteristics of the man" — he wrote to Bright.²⁶⁸ "Speaking phrenologically, I should say, he wants firmness. The head is very small in the animal organs behind the ear. Altogether he did not impress me with a sense of his power to the extent I looked for, yet he must possess it for otherwise he could not have acquired an ascendancy over the aristocratic party of his country when judging by the specimens I have seen amongst the refugees, he was brought into competition with men of no ordinary stamp. The secret of his influence lies, I suspect, in his eloquence. His speech at Winchester delivered within forty-eight hours of his arrival in England in a language with which he would have but little practical acquaintance, was the most extraordinary exploit I ever witnessed..."²⁶⁹

So it was. Yet he talked over his improvised speech with

²⁶⁷ Cobden—Bright, Nov. 4, 6, 1851. Morley John, *The Life of Richard Cobden*. 1896, vol. II, pp. 101—102.

²⁶⁸ Oct. 29, 1851. Ut supra, p. 100.

²⁶⁹ In the same enthusiastic manner he wrote a few days later to Sir Joshua Walmsley: "...I got your letter at the moment I was starting for Southampton to pay my respects to Kossuth. Otherwise I should have them answered earlier. I found the Hungarian leader at Winchester, in Andrew's house, where I passed part of a couple of days with him. He is very much what I pictured him: mild, pensive, earnest. In his features he is not unlike the lithographs, which however have given a romantic touch to the expression of his face and a depth of colour to his blue eye which does not quite fairly represent the original. He is a slight and delicate person; and if I must confess it, I should add, that his tout ensemble does not impress me with the idea of that power which he must undoubtedly have possessed to have been able to rise to the foremost place in a revolution, and to sway such human materials surrounded him in the Diet and the camp. I suspect that his eloquence and moral qualities were the main source of his strength. He is undoubtedly a genius both as an orator and a writer. His speech in English, at Andrew's dinner, for more than an hour, was delivered with scarcely a mistake. Under all circumstances it was one of the most marvellous performances I ever listened to. There was little attempt at oratorical display, but it was a masterly good English..." Walmsley, Joshua, *The life of Sir Joshua Walmsely*. By his son. London, 1879. Chapt. XXI, pp. 241—42. The letter dated from Nov. 10, 1851.

Cobden before he addressed the banquet's guests. He made his audience acquainted with the constitution, with the self-government of the counties which in Hungary became the strongholds of constitutional liberty. These counties played a prominent part in Hungarian history, because the reign of the eleven Hapsburgs who rose to royal dignity was "but an incessant series of violations against the constitution".

As to his own person, he said, all his life he had fought for practical self-government in which he was incessantly handicapped by the Court. In 1848 the Hungarian Government wanted to carry out reforms, only by constitutional means, in civil and military administration. He went to Vienna in order to get the consent of the Court. Everything was promised him there if he could only save Vienna from the impending revolution.

Within forty-eight hours there was order again. "This was one of the moments" — he said — "in which I, in my humble person, was a strange example of the various changes of human life. Myself, a humble unpretending son of modest Hungary, was in the condition that I had the existence of the House of Hapsburgs and all its crowns here in my hand . . ."²⁷⁰

He ended his speech by saying that he always remained attached to the House of Hapsburgh until Russian intervention destroyed any hope of reconciliation. These last words were scarcely spoken when he was overcome by tears.

Cobden, in his subsequent speech, followed the thread of Kossuth's. "The fate of Hungary proves" — he said — "that among the nations the principle of non-intervention has to prevail. Nevertheless, it would be of no use, if only Britain would be willing to proclaim it alone; she has also to exert her influence to restrain other powers from accidental interventions."

Kossuth was exceedingly glad to have induced Cobden to make a public statement on behalf of the active interpretation of the principle of non-intervention. Then followed Crosskey, the American Consul in Southampton, who drew a rough sketch of the international politics he foresaw for the future. "The United States with their increasing power and dazzling future a new and different policy have to pursue by the necessities of their condition." As an ally of England they will be able to prevent the

²⁷⁰ Headley, p. 339.

Absolute Powers' intention of reviving the tragedy of the Hungarian war of independence.²⁷¹

These two speakers said exactly what Kossuth considered as the nucleus of his political platform which he was ready to proclaim in Britain and, later, on his trip in the United States.

He always regarded constitutional liberty as the greatest sign of a well-balanced state machinery, which is the most effective guarantee of individual liberty. Britain and the United States being two paramount strongholds of constitutional liberty could not remain indifferent to the issue of a contest in Europe between the state systems of absolutism and constitutionalism. They must exert their full influence on behalf of the principle of constitutionalism.

As to the methods to be employed, Kossuth thought that the British and American public must influence their own governments to refrain from meddling in the domestic affairs of other states. This was but the first measure to help to gain the principle of constitutionalism. Beyond this, the Anglo-Saxon democracies must with all their moral and physical power constrain the other states to respect the principle of non-intervention. Now, having been successful in carrying into effect this second phase of democratic policy, no doubt constitutional liberty would gain ground everywhere over continental absolutism.

Kossuth's political theories were in accordance with the policy of the Radical Party. But Cobden requested him to refrain from making any comparison in his public speeches, although he took upon himself to proclaim Kossuth's principle of intervention for non-intervention, with the proviso that he confined himself within the limits of *passive* intervention. No doubt, the acceptance of Kossuth's principle by Britain and the United States would necessarily have signified the risk of *armed* intervention, supposing their inability to prevent the Absolute Powers from interference in the domestic affairs of other states.

Cobden could not give his consent to the application of force which he had so positively condemned at the Peace Convention in Frankfort. Nevertheless he was ready to endorse it, at least theoretically, by giving considerable moral support to Kossuth. "You are afraid" — he wrote to Bright — "that others will push our doctrines to the point of physical force. Even if they do that is no reason why we should cease to give moral power to Kossuth's

²⁷¹ *Kossuth in England, etc.* 1851.

only chance by boldly proclaiming the right and justice of the Hungarians to settle their own domestic affairs...²⁷²

But apart from Cobden and his Radicals there was a small but enthusiastic group of literary men who helped the Hungarian cause from the very time Pulszky arrived in Britain. Unfortunately his most active collaborators, J. D. Vipan and T. C. Banfield had already died when Kossuth visited Britain. But the others were constantly eager to promote his principles. Joshua Toulmin Smith, lawyer and recorder of Parliament, who published as early as 1849 the pamphlet "Parallels between the constitutional liberty of England and Hungary", advised Kossuth to stress the constitutional background of the late struggle in Hungary on every occasion. Charles F. Henningsen published also a pamphlet in which he attacked the editorials of *The Times*.²⁷³ In informing the public of the misleading sources used by that organ, he charged the editor with the intention of creating a feeling adverse to Kossuth. This pamphlet was edited by Alderman Charles Gilpin, who was responsible for the resolution passed by the City Council on October 2nd concerning the official reception of Kossuth, and he himself published a leaflet about Hungary which was apparently printed for distribution during Kossuth's visit in Britain.²⁷⁴

Thadeus Delane, the editor-in-chief, was made uneasy by Henningsen's revelations concerning the 'inspired' news-service of *The Times*, but still he maintained his pro-Austrian attitude.²⁷⁵

Like Toulmin Smith and Henningsen, Francis W. Newman, the intimate friend of Pulszky, gave practical advice to Kossuth as to the manner of preparing his speeches.²⁷⁶

²⁷² Midhurst, Nov. 6, 1851. — Morley, vol. II, p. 103.

²⁷³ Oct. 9 and 17, 1851.

²⁷⁴ *The sixth of October. In memory of the defenders of constitutional liberty in Hungary.* London, 1851. — Concerning the activity of Henningsen see the *Proceedings in the Times*, Oct. 3, 1851. — Henningsen, *Kossuth and the Times, By the author of the Revelations of Russia containing curious information respecting "Our own correspondents" of "The Times"*. London, 1851.

²⁷⁵ Cf. Delane's letters to Dasent, Vienna, Oct. 27—Nov. 3, 1851, in Dasent, Arthur Irwin's work: *John Thadeus Delane, editor of the Times. His Life and Correspondence.* 1908, vol. I, p. 114.

²⁷⁶ Cf. his Mss.: Considerations to be surmounted before England can render any public aid to Hungary, respectfully addressed to the illustrious

With a critical eye on Kossuth's political expositions, he declared that speeches dealing with the history of national defence in Hungary or with the similarities of the British and Hungarian constitutions might keep up the public interest, but did not result in any practical benefit to the Hungarian cause. Kossuth must tell the British public the truth about the failures of British foreign policy which consisted in omitting the occasions to support Hungary.

Newman expected the same attitude from Kossuth as did Cobden or Urquhart: a severe criticism of Palmerston's policy. What could Kossuth have done in the existing circumstances? At one time he was warned not to interfere in British domestic politics and at another called upon to assail Palmerston's foreign policy. By chance he was prevented from pondering over all the contradictory advice he received, for his time was entirely taken up with social contacts and banquets. He adhered to the political programme he began in Southampton and Winchester.

Before he left Southampton there was a dinner on October 28th given in his honour by the Town Council. It was attended by several members of the Radical Party, among them Henry Charles Fitzroy, Dudley Stuart, B. M. Wilcox, E. A. J. Harris, J. Wyld who had spoken several times in Parliament since the war of independence in Hungary. C. T. B. Lawrence, the American Minister, whose absence was said to be due to ill health, was represented by his son, Capt. Lawrence, attaché at the Legation. Charles Gilpin was also present on behalf of the City Council of London. Further J. R. Walker, the late Secretary of the American Treasury, joined the party; he had come over from the United States to attend the Crystal Palace Exhibition.

When Mayor Andrews read Lawrence's letter of apology, unbounded enthusiasm arose. "I watched his career" — wrote Lawrence — "during his brilliant administration of affairs in Hungary and I have seen what he has done since; and I am now persuaded that he is eminently deserving the admiration of all lovers of constitutional government and freedom... He is now free through the joint efforts of the United States and Britain, two nations animated with the common desire to see it enjoyed by all civilized nations and now has the opportunity to see on the

shores of England the workings of a constitutional government and the happiness of a free people."²⁷⁷

On hearing this letter read, Kossuth was deeply moved and kissed Andrew's hand to express his everlasting gratitude.²⁷⁸ Then Kossuth spoke with his marvellous, somewhat Oriental rhetoric. But all he said was more or less retrospective and lacked any invective. As a compliment to Cobden he explained the relations between free trade and constitutional liberty. Then, speaking about the attitude of European reaction towards the Anglo-American democracy, he called the attention of the audience to the existing barriers set up by reactionary governments, which threatened Anglo-American commercial interests.

After Kossuth, Walker spoke in the same sense as Crosskey at Winchester. His remarks were considered by a large section of the Whig press as of political importance. Walker was no political novice, for he had spent a long time working in the American Treasury. *The Daily News* said he had dealt all his life in realities; so his assertions could not be construed as visionary inventions.

Kossuth's liberation from Asia Minor — he said — was the first joint intervention of England and America in favour of freedom... But Anglo-Saxon Powers do not need to march up with cannons in order to save liberty. Their united moral power is strong enough to face European reaction successfully.²⁷⁹

Britain had a great problem to solve: she had to maintain liberty on the Continent. Should she need auxiliary forces from the United States in her efforts, the American People and Government would stand as one man behind Britain to help her to victory.

All that Kossuth heard in these days inspired him with unbounded optimism as to the political consequences of his trip. It was further increased by Mazzini's confidential communication that Ledru Rollin and Louis Blanc had already completed their imposing preparations for the coming French revolution. Napoléon's

²⁷⁷ London, Oct. 28, 1851. — Cf. *Daily News*: Oct. 29, 1851.

²⁷⁸ *Daily News*: Oct. 30, 1851.

²⁷⁹ *Speech of Hon. Robert J. Walker ... at the Banquet given by Mayor Andrews etc. ... to Lewis Kossuth. Oct. 28th, 1851.* London, Waterloo and Sons, 1851. — See further the editorial from the *Daily News*: Oct. 30, 1851; *Illustrated London News*: Nov. 1, 1851; *The National Intelligencer* (Washington): Dec. 17, 1851.

coup d'état was supposed to be imminent. In case of its breaking out, the democratic revolution would carry the day.²⁸⁰

Like the leaders of the national emigrants in London, he expected to stay for a while in Britain, for he thought he might be of assistance to French democracy by gaining over public opinion in Britain with his extraordinary oratory. Should French democracy be successful, the way would be open for the renewal of the struggle in Hungary. In this hope he went to London to receive the honours of the City-Council which were to be conferred upon him.

XV.

Kossuth's speech before the City Council. — Disillusionment of the Chartists and the working classes at his lionisation by civic elements. — Solidarity of the French democratic press with the British working classes in attacking him for refusing their public dinner. — Kossuth's aversion to the Chartist Leader Feargus O'Connor. — Accepts the worker's invitation to receive their addresses in Copenhagen House. — Attacked by the British conservative press for having accepted the workers' invitation. — The Times against Cobden. — Kossuth demonstrations in Southwark, Westminster, his fêting by the Parliamentary Reform Association. — Walter Savage Landor's enthusiasm. — Kossuth's reception and speeches in Birmingham and Manchester.

Kossuth's route from Eaton Place in London, where Algernon Massingberd offered him his residence, to the Guildhall was a triumphal procession.²⁸¹

Accompanied by Aldermen Gilpin and Wire in a coach drawn by four greys he arrived at the place of the festival.²⁸² An immense

²⁸⁰ Pulszky, vol. II, p. 68.

²⁸¹ Cf. E. O. S., *Hungary and its revolutions, with a memoir of Lewis Kossuth*. 1854, p. 515. — Massingberd of the Blues sold his commission in the British Guards in order to put himself at the disposal of Kossuth for the approaching Hungarian insurrection. He also accompanied Kossuth to America and travelled with him as far as Pittsburg. Before Kossuth's arrival in Britain M. published a leaflet "Letter on Kossuth and the Hungarian Question, 1851." in which he reviewed the causes of the war. — Cf. *Illustrated London News*: Oct. 11, 1851, p. 442; *The Economist*: Oct. 4, 1851, p. 1161.

²⁸² D'Isola—D'Azeglio, London, Oct. 31, 1851. Rapp. no. 396. A. St. Torino.

multitude lined the streets and burned several copies of the Times. The people's trial was accompanied by loud groans.²⁸³

The speech he delivered before the City Council was again a rhetorical display, but contained almost the same principles as he had already proclaimed. But before closing his speech he directed to the bankers of the City the followings words: "If London is the regulator of public credit of the world" — he said — "and if a very considerable quantity of the loan shares of every government in the world are concentrated here, let me ask, where is the security of these loans? Is the security in the victory of the absolutist principle or is it in the victory of the principle of freedom? . . . The absolute governments need the money for immense costly armies and not less costly diplomatic intrigues. But every new loan, in whatever unproductive manner applied, diminishes the resources out of which it should be paid. The prospect is inevitable bankruptcy!" Finally he asked the bankers to refuse the loan of eight million Pounds which Austria was asking for.

Of course, since Walker's political augury became his programme, he could not refrain from reiterating it: "I will again and again repeat to you these words" — he said — "I will repeat them with the faith of those martyrs of old which had moved the hills and the mountains. I will concentrate all the fire of my sentiments, all the blood of my heart, all the energy of my mind to raise these words high and loud, deep and solemn, till the almighty echo of the public opinion in repeating it becomes like a thundering trumpet before the sound of which the "Jericho" of human oppression falls . . ." ²⁸⁴

All who believe in the soberness and self-control so characteristic of the Anglo-Saxons, would have been rather puzzled by seeing the indescribable enthusiasm and hearing the tremendous cheering with which Kossuth was honoured. The festive session was closed by passing a resolution that Kossuth's speech, printed and framed, should be hung up in the Guildhall.²⁸⁵

As soon as the leaders of the Chartists and the working classes heard of this they were greatly disappointed. They wanted

²⁸³ Daily News: Oct. 31, 1851.

²⁸⁴ Headley, p. 360.

²⁸⁵ *Kossuth in England*, p. 42.

to use his popularity for their own ends and now they felt outstripped by the enthusiasm of the middle classes.

Kossuth must have taken into consideration that their disappointment would be followed by serious consequences. Already in Southampton, when Kossuth refused the invitation of Thornton Hunt, the representative of the London workers, to a public dinner, this refusal was immediately reechoed by the Red Press in Paris. The solidarity among the left-wing press went so far that even democratic papers like the "*National*" considered it their duty to refuse every article favourable to the Hungarian cause. Irányi, the former collaborator of Count Teleki during the war of independence, anxiously wrote about this turn of the French press' attitude to Kossuth, asking him to reconsider his refusal to Thornton Hunt.²⁸⁶

Kossuth could not but yield to the pressure of the press, although he did not share Irányi's opinion of the presumable support of the masses. He never wanted to risk the sympathy of the bourgeoisie which retained the power of governing against all attempts of the working classes. Particularly in Britain, there was not the least prospect of a socialist-workers' government.

Yet he felt induced by Irányi's arguments to accept Thornton Hunt's offer to honour him with a public demonstration. Provision had been made for that purpose in Copenhagen House, where the workers' delegates intended to hand him their addresses of welcome. However, he asked Thornton Hunt to exclude the leader of the Chartists from the demonstration. He first met him in Southampton, where the ostentatious enthusiasm of Feargus O'Connor for the Hungarian leader, caused him great embarrassment,²⁸⁷ Now, being properly informed of the aversion entertained by a large majority of the British public towards O'Connor's person, he did not want to compromise the cause he represented by the latter's participation.

Thornton Hunt did not keep his word. Instead of a gathering of a limited number of delegates he arranged an imposing demonstration. *The Globe* writes about a multitude of fifty thousand demonstrators who started their procession in Russell Square. In Copenhagen Fields where they assembled, their number was estimated at two hundred thousand. It was an embarrassing

²⁸⁶ Paris, Oct. 29, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

²⁸⁷ Gammage, R. G., *The History of the Chartist Movement*. London, 1864, vol. I, p. 403.

situation. Moreover, Kossuth felt provoked at seeing nearly all the Chartist leaders among the members of the committee for the arrangements. Bronterre O'Brien and Reynolds were present. Even O'Connor took his place among them. Only Jones was absent, for he did not wish to be excluded from among the speakers, as was intended.

No wonder that Kossuth was attacked again by the conservative press, whose condemnatory criticism was stronger than a few weeks ago when his Marseilles Letter caused so much comment.

Of course *The Times* found a new motive to make fun of him and lost no time in assailing Cobden and the Radicals. "What an absurd position we are in" — wrote Cobden about *The Times* — "so completely dictated to and domineered over by one newspaper that it requires a periodical revolt of the whole people to keep the despot in tolerable order..."²⁸⁸ In fact, *The Times* sneered at the armed-intervention principle of Kossuth, and published a very sarcastic editorial on Cobden, who supported Kossuth in spite of his well-known anti-armament principles.²⁸⁹

The address of the workers was a peculiar one. "We have to state" — said their speaker — "that had the wishes of the working classes governmental aid, the intervention of Russia would not have been met alone by protests upon paper, but upon the field of action by the force of British arms."²⁹⁰

Though Kossuth was flattered by these words he did not overestimate their practical value. They might have been regarded as faithful expressions of the workers's sentiments but they lacked all political significance considering the imponderability of their representatives in Parliament. With his usual caution he read a properly prepared speech before the audience. He spoke about the abolition of class-privileges and of free trade as being a fundamental condition of the workers' acceptable standard of living. The attractive idea of these principles quite won over his audience. It would undoubtedly have had the same result with the Radicals if they had happened to be among the workers' delegates.

These demonstrations in Southampton, in the London Guild-hall and in Copenhagen Fields were warmly re-echoed from the

²⁸⁸ Nov. 4, 1851. — Morley, vol. II, p. 101.

²⁸⁹ *Times*: Nov. 4, 1851.

²⁹⁰ *Kossuth in England*, p. 49.

country. He received many invitations from Wales, Scotland and Ireland requesting him to lecture about Central-European problems. It was a delicate task to decline these invitations. But their acceptance would have involved months that he could not spend in Britain, for he had to leave very soon for the United States. The American Minister urged him emphatically to continue his voyage. Otherwise he must be prepared to lose American sympathy, if people heard of the fêting with which he was honoured in Britain.²⁹¹ Then he was suffering severely from a cold since his arrival in Britain. It hindered him greatly in speaking. Besides, he had privilege of receiving the visit of James Clarke, the Queen's physician, who offered him his services as soon as he learnt of his illness.²⁹²

When he was en route from Asia Minor the boroughs of Southwark and Westminster had arranged meetings in his honour.²⁹³ The Parliamentary Reform Association, presided over by Sir Joshua Walmesley, praised his merits and prepared an address of welcome for him.²⁹⁴ Then he had to thank Edinburgh for having urged Palmerston in a most decisive manner to intervene on behalf of Hungary²⁹⁵ and now the city invited him to deliver a lecture.²⁹⁶ He entertained the same feelings of gratitude towards Glasgow and Leeds. Bristol presented him an address with three thousand signatures.²⁹⁷ The aged poet, Walter Savage Landor welcomed Kossuth with an open letter when he learnt of his presidency and urged him to flight persistently against oppression.²⁹⁸ Now he organized a reception committee in Bath and awaited for his visit. But Kossuth, being compelled to decline the hearty invitation, received from the aged poet the following answer: "The chief glory of my life is that I was the first in subscribing for the assistance of the Hungarians at the commencement of their struggle. The next is that I have received the approbation of their illustrious leader. I, who have held the hand of Kosciusko, now

²⁹¹ Bunsen-Manteuffel, London, Nov. 4, 1851. Immediatbericht no. 97. Berlin-Dahlem.

²⁹² Cf. Berzeviczy, Adalbert, *Az abszolútizmus kora Magyarországon* (The Epoch of Absolutism in Hungary.) Bpest, 1922. vol. I, p. 382.

²⁹³ Naily News: Oct. 18, 1851.

²⁹⁴ Daily News: Oct. 17, 1851. — See appendix no. 16.

²⁹⁵ The Edinburgh News: Aug. 11, 1849.

²⁹⁶ Ibidem: Oct. 30, 1851.

²⁹⁷ Cf. a box full of addresses. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

²⁹⁸ Published on May 19, 1849 in the Examiner. — See Appendix no. 2.

kiss with veneration the signature of Kossuth. No other man alive could confer an honour I would accept . . ."299

Again, there were the invitations he received from Birmingham and Manchester, the strongholds of the Radicals, which he could not decline on account of his relations with Cobden and his friends. In Manchester he wanted to pay his respects to the home of the Peace Society and the cradle of freedom. Besides, feelings of emotion induced him to accept the invitation of Birmingham. This important centre of British industry was one of the first towns in Britain where a meeting had been held on behalf of Hungary.³⁰⁰

In Manchester an extraordinary meeting was called by sixteen members of the Town Council to make suitable arrangements for Kossuth's reception. But Mayor John Potter opposed any measure proposed by the Council. He was uneasy that the Council might thus exceed its powers as enacted in by-laws of the Town. The Council had to deal with administrative problems, he said, but not with foreign politics, which must necessarily result from the intended Kossuth demonstrations.³⁰¹

Informed of the Mayor's attitude, Bright, Heyworth, Kershaw, Henry Marshall, Milligan and Pilkington, Members of Parliament, formed spontaneously reception committee. Due to their activities, within forty eight hours four hundred citizens presented themselves to undertake the arrangements.³⁰² There was a general feeling of displeasure at the Mayor's attitude "for he did not manifest the same amount of squeamishness in other questions equally foreign to Manchester". They sent a declaration to *The Examiner* and *The Times* giving utterance to their disapproval.³⁰³ Under these conditions Alexander Henry, M. P. of South Lancaster assumed the rôle of host and invited Kossuth to stay in his country house in Woodlands for the time of the festivals.³⁰⁴

Kossuth's lecture was to be delivered in the Free Trade Hall, but it proved to be too small to accommodate the multitude which

²⁹⁹ Bath, Oct. 28, 1851. — Wheeler, Stephen, *Letters and other unpublished writings of Walter Savage Landor*. London, 1897, p. 147.

³⁰⁰ On May 23, 1849 in the Odd Fellows Hall. Cf. Landford, John Alfred, *Modern Birmingham: a Chronicle of local events from 1841—1871*. London, 1873—77, vol. I, pp. 105—107.

³⁰¹ The letter of the sixteen councillors and the answer of Mayor Potter, Manchester, Nov. 1, 1851. *The Times*: Nov. 4, 1851.

³⁰² *Daily News*: Nov. 5, 1851.

³⁰³ *Daily News*: Nov. 6, 1851.

³⁰⁴ *Daily News*: Nov. 7, 1851.

asked for admittance. Besides Manchester, Liverpool, Bradford, Asthon, Oldham, Rochdale, Bolton, and Burnley announced that they would send representatives to the festivals.

In Birmingham, where similar enthusiasm prevailed³⁰⁵ the Town Council seemed to take the same reserved attitude as the municipality of Manchester by expressing its disinclination to take an active part in the arrangements. As a protest against this attitude the citizens themselves collected five thousand signatures, and invited Kossuth on their own behalf.³⁰⁶ Cheltenham, Kidderminster, Derby, Coventry, Walsall, Wolvenhampton, Athelstone, Grantham and the whole Midland county also resolved to take part in Kossuth's reception.

When Kossuth, en route to Manchester, broke his journey in Birmingham "the capital of the small masters" received him with imposing demonstrations. Only the great workers' procession in 1832 on behalf of the Reform Bill could have equalled them. Geach, Scholefield and Muntz, Radical Members of Parliament, were his hosts and took him round in an open barouche drawn by four greys with postillions in scarlet jackets. On every side the gay banners of the various associated trades fluttered in the air. One could recognize on the banners the sentences taken from Kossuth's speeches. Five bands played Hungarian airs, the bells of the churches rang cheerful peals and the streets were filled with an immense crowd. To describe the programme would be to describe one continual ovation, as the Daily News reported of this great demonstration.³⁰⁷

The same scenes were repeated in Manchester. Here Bright and Dudley Stuart introduced Kossuth to the audience which filled the Free Trade Hall completely. He was also addressed by Dr. Vaughan, the President of the Lancashire Independent College, who had written many articles about Hungary since 1849 in the *British Quarterly Review*.³⁰⁸

Kossuth only reiterated the principles he had propounded in his former speeches, but understood well — due to his oratorical sense — how to put what he wanted to say in a new form. His speech delivered in a small circle at Henry's residence found a

³⁰⁵ Cf. Kossuth's thanksgiving letter to the five thousand citizens who signed an address of greetings and personal esteem for him. *Daily News*: Nov. 10, 1851.

³⁰⁶ Vide ut supra.

³⁰⁷ Nov. 12, 1851.

³⁰⁸ Hilson, John, *Kossuth in Exile*. Manchester, 1856.

greater reception. He spoke of France which in sixty years failed three times to obtain results from political revolutions. Now France sought her salvation in a social spirit which must prevail everywhere in order to avoid a general revolution on the Continent. But if this great turmoil ensued, no one could foresee the consequences. In his explanations he assailed Communism and Socialism, which he declared as one and the same movement as far as results are concerned. Both were stigmatized by him as destructive of social order and personal property.

Next evening a public dinner was given him in Birmingham, attended by eight hundred guests. The most impressive scene of the evening was Walter Savage Landor's poem "On Kossuth's voyage to America" which was set to music and sung by the Birmingham choir.³⁰⁹

With this Birmingham festival the series of public demonstrations ended. On his return to London he attended only the Polish-Hungarian Ball held in the Guildhall and a meeting of the various charitable societies arranged in the Hanover Square Rooms. The time remaining to him until his embarkation he used in giving instructions to his confidential agents whose task was to organize the insurrection in Hungary.

He could not have foreseen the time he was about to spend in America. Anyway he was prepared to return very soon, possibly in January next. Being uncertain about coming events in Europe, he left on November 20th for New York where he was the object of unparalleled demonstrations, fêting in his person the martyr of democracy.

³⁰⁹ W. S. Landor wrote many poems dealing with Hungary. „To General Kossuth” appeared in the *Examiner* on May 19, 1849 p. 307; „Poem on Kossuth” on Dec. 15, 1849, *Ibidem* p. 789; „Hymn to America” and „Kossuth's voyage to America”, Nov. 15, 1851, pp. 723, 730; „To the City of New York on its reception of Kossuth”, Dec. 27, 1851, p. 822; „Ingratitude”, Nov. 27, 1852. p. 756. — See also his unbounded admiration for Kossuth as manifested in his „Last Fruit of an Old Tree”, „Dry Sticks Fagoted”, „Hellenics Enlarged”. Cf. Foster, John, *W. S. Landor, a biography*. London, 1869; Wheeler, Stephen, *Letters of W. S. Landor*. London, 1897; also in Stedman, Edmund Clarence, *Victorian Poets*. Boston, 1876, p. 63. — Again, Thomas Carlyle strongly opposed Kossuth's principles. In a letter dated from Chelsea, Oct. 11, 1851 he writes of Kossuth as follows: "To me he is hitherto nothing but a bag of mutinous playacton wind, very doubtful whether he is anything more to anybody; and I mean to keep well clear of him for the present..." Cf. Carlyle Alexander, *New Letters of Th. Carlyle*. London, 1904, no. 226.

XVI.

Summary of Kossuth's trip in Britain. — Impartial attitude of the Press with the exception of the Times, the Morning Chronicle and Cullen's Tablet. — Austria and British Aristocracy behind the Times. — Bureaucracy under the influence of the Aristocracy. — Industrial, commercial circles and the working classes of London in favour of Kossuth. — Middle and working classes of the industrial and rural districts praise him more openly than the Londoners. — Disraeli and Gladstone against Kossuth. — Cobden and Urquhart become reserved. — Official Britain's attitude. — Prince Albert and Baron Stockmar against Palmerston. — Differences between the Queen and Palmerston. — Russell assails Palmerston for his intention of meeting Kossuth. — Palmerston and the deputations of Finsbury and Islington. — Cabinet Council will not condemn Palmerston's attitude. — Kossuth's unsuccessful endeavours in the United States to promote Anglo-American Alliance. — He returns to London.

In any retrospective judgment of Kossuth's visit to Britain one must realize the impartial attitude of the press. It appreciated and understood the principles he was fighting for as well as his extraordinary ability in public speaking, which fascinated all who came in contact with him. Only his speech delivered in Copenhagen House and another made in Woodlands at Henry's, when he identified the consequences of Socialism with that of Communism, created some dissatisfaction and provoked criticism whose seriousness cannot be doubted. There is no other country — writes *The Globe* — where Socialism would represent such a living reality in public's mind as in Britain.

The Tory papers, *The Standard* and *The Morning Herald*, wrote in favour of Hungary though they sometimes criticized Kossuth's activities very keenly. But their criticism was never malicious towards the oppressed Hungarians: it was impartial from a British national point of view. Even *Punch*, under its satiric garb, gave evidence of human feelings and displayed more taste than to sneer at the "Kossuth Humbug".

Amongst the Periodicals *The Illustrated London News* showed much interest in Kossuth and presented him with a copy printed on silk with a welcoming article and pictures of his arrival in Britain.³¹⁰ On the contrary, Dicken's *Household Narrative and*

³¹⁰ Nov. 1, 1851. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

Current Events reported his visit with impartial calmness, without being successful in hiding its inclination to disdainful irony.³¹¹

The Examiner and *The Leader* were in favour of Kossuth. The great Whig papers, *The Globe* and *The Daily News*, appointed special reporters to accompany him on his trip. They published daily sketches of his activities and editorials which dealt with the political aspects of his principles. *The Times* also provided a special reporter. Russel, who accompanied Kossuth by appointment of his paper, sent very accurate articles in which he never omitted to report *The Times'* being carried round and hanged on gallows by the infuriated multitude.³¹² Besides, only *The Times*, *The Morning Chronicle* and Cullen's paper, *The Tablet* permanently opposed to Kossuth and the Hungarian cause.

At the beginning of the war *The Times* and *The Morning Chronicle* reported very impartially but when Russian intervention ensued they took the side of the stronger of the contending parties.³¹³ *The Times* especially attacked Kossuth with unvarying perseverance. It did not shrink from being inconsequent if it could only discredit him. Kossuth was once declared to be a red republican, another time an ossified aristocrat. Again, he was blamed for his unfriendly attitude towards the Court of the Hapsburgs. Then he was censured as a supporter of the Hapsburgs who placed Hungarian regiments at the disposal of the Vienna Cabinet in order to defeat the Italians fighting for their national independence.

The incessant attacks in *The Times* created a deep impression. And these assaults became more violent as Kossuth's speeches became more passionate as compared with his early moderate speeches delivered in Southampton.³¹⁴ It was generally suspected of being on intimate terms with the Austrian Government, which was supposed to have financed the campaign against Kossuth. This supposition seemed to have some foundation when John Thadeus Delane, the editor of *The Times*, happened to be in Vienna, exactly at the time of Kossuth's journeys in Britain, and had a conference with Schwarzenberg.³¹⁵ In his absence, the

³¹¹ Cf. „The three kingdoms” in the Household Narrative of Oct. 29—Nov. 29, 1851.

³¹² Pulszky, vol. II, p. 70.

³¹³ *Daily News*: July 3, 1849, no. 968.

³¹⁴ Letter of Count Corti, London, Nov. 14, 1851 ad no. 99. 231/3. A. St. Torino.

³¹⁵ Dasent, Arthur, Irwin, *John Thadeus Delane, His Life and Correspondence*. 1908, vol. I, p. 114.

management of *The Times* was left in the hands of Henry Reeve, while Delane endeavoured to collect evidence against Kossuth's private and political life, with the assistance of that paper's Vienna correspondent, Bird. It was proposed to accuse Kossuth of being a common thief, with reference to the execution of Count Eugene Zichy, whose diamonds were stolen by Caesar Bolliak, the head of the intended Wallachian Legion in Hungary.³¹⁶ Justifying himself, Kossuth wrote to Canning from Kutahia, and informed him that the jewels he had handed over to Bolliak were supposed to be a token for Omer Pasha, the Turkish commander in chief in Wallachia. It was in conformity with Oriental customs. But the jewels never reached the Pasha. Kossuth admitted having been informed by Bolliak in Shoumla of the loss of the diamonds, but he never believed these assertions.³¹⁷

But all proof was lacking of *The Times'* alleged business with the Vienna Cabinet, excepting the fact it entertained close relations with the Austrian Legation in London. Count Széchen was sent there by Schwarzenberg with express orders to give the information needed by the editor for the anti-Kossuth articles. With the same purpose there were sent to London Felsenthal and Lauterbach, members of the staff of the Austrian Secret Police, to counteract the pro-Magyar propaganda launched by Pulszky and his British friends. Jazziuzzi, belonging to the same staff, was also correspondent of *The Times* during his stay in London where he published his work "The Voices from the Danube".

Besides, *The Times* always had in view its political independ-

³¹⁶ Bolliak offered his services to Kossuth together with Bălcescu to form a Wallachian Legion for the support of the Hungarian cause. Cf. Refik, A., *Mühtedzsiler*, Stambul, 1926, pp. 17—18. Kossuth was in fact slandered by the Times. Upon the request of Count Edmund Zichy, the brother of the executed Count, Bolliak was examined by the Turkish authorities as to the whereabouts of the jewels. He stated that he had taken them over from Francis Duschek, former Hungarian Minister of Finance, by order of Kossuth, but he lost all of them excepting the golden spurs of the late Count Zichy, which he handed over to Kossuth at the Hungarian frontier when the latter escaped from Hungary. He declared further his readiness to deposit the equivalent value of the lost jewels i. e. two thousand Ducats, for the brother of the executed Count. Upon this he was set free by the Turkish authorities. But instead of depositing the sum mentioned he left Constantinople in Sept. 1850 for France with a false British passport made out in the name of „Timotheon Paléologue". Cf. die Zirkularnote of Schwarzenberg about the Zichy jewels. Nov. 8, 1851. Haute Police, Interna, H. H. St. A. Wien.

³¹⁷ Kossuth-Canning, Kutahia, May 12, 1850. enclosed to Rapp. no. 183. Constantinople, June 5, 1850. F. O. 78/820 P. R. O. London.

ence. It never failed to call the public's attention to its news service as supplied by its own correspondents. Apart from Bird, the permanent Vienna correspondent, Charles Pridham³¹⁸ and Patou were also on its staff in Austria. Pridham was soon dissatisfied with the editorial way of changing the essential parts of his articles. And when he realized *The Times'* attitude, opposing the principles so brilliantly represented by Kossuth, he revealed in his work "Kossuth and the Magyar Land" the methods used by that paper. He also published his own experiences and collected data from Hungary.

In spite of these facts *The Times'* point of view requires to be understood correctly. They were indeed some weak points in the theory of non-intervention proclaimed by Kossuth. Through these weaknesses the whole theory might have been attacked with reasonable arguments. If Kossuth's theory had been of standard value — as he tried to convince his audience — then Lafayette and Rochambeau would never have hurried to help the Americans with the express sanction of Lewis XV., the constitutions of Spain and Portugal would never have come into existence and no doubt the Christian subjects of the Porte would never have been granted the rights of existence without Russian intervention.

The Times fought for the existing order and European peace when it assailed Kossuth and the Hungarian cause. This point of view was particularly welcome to those who considered it more reasonable to keep European peace at any price than to repair great injustices committed against small nations by other states, supposing that such injustices could only be redressed by a European war.

This idea prevailed generally among the British Aristocracy, which highly appreciated the principles pursued by that paper, especially when it began to criticise Palmerston's attitude very keenly on account of his sympathies with the Hungarian cause, although it risked its popularity among the political friends of the Secretary of State.³¹⁹

³¹⁸ Cf. his letter to Palmerston, Oxford, June 19, 1849. F. O. 7/375. Domestic-Variou. P. R. O. London.

³¹⁹ Cf. Dasent, p. 121. — See further Lord Clarendon's letter to Reeve, Nov. 22, 1851. "... I have had a long conversation with Count Nugent who is an intelligent old gentleman. He certainly defends the government. He serves con amore and can find no speck in Austrian policy. He was delighted that no respectable person had figured in the Kossuth ovations and very grateful for the service which the Times has rendered to the cause of order

This feeling of satisfaction expressed by the Aristocracy did not mean of course that the upper classes of British Society would have given their consent to the political methods traditionally practised by Austria and Russia. Even the House of Lords could not have been regarded as reactionary; on the contrary, a great many of its members showed a strong liberal sense, although their liberalism never exceeded the limit of political reasonableness imposed by Britain's continental interests.

This attitude of the upper classes had a strong influence upon bureaucracy; the industrial and commercial circles of the middle classes were more independent in forming their opinion. The latter fêted Kossuth in the Guildhall of London, and their enthusiasm was only surpassed by the working classes on the occasion of their great demonstration to Copenhagen Fields.

The middle classes of the country did not refrain from showing their feelings of sympathy. Public opinion in the industrial and rural districts was opposed continental absolutism, and, regardless of Britain's alleged political prestige abroad, demonstrated via Kossuth's person in favour of the Hungarian cause. A similar attitude was shown by the working classes of London as well as of the country, but owing to their individual sense, they manifested the same principles in more pointed manner than the middle classes. Nothing could have proved more clearly the general pro-Hungarian feeling than the forty thousand signatures collected in few days by the committees of reception only in cities which Kossuth actually visited.

Contrary to this respectable public opinion, Official Britain was ostentatiously reserved towards him for various reasons. By chance, Kossuth's visit coincided with the recess of Parliament, whose six hundred and ninety-five members were dispersed in all directions. Yet Kossuth happened to meet about twenty five of them, belonging almost exclusively to the Radicals of the Whig Party.

Thanks to the conservative sense of the aristocracy³²⁰ the House of Lords almost wholly refrained from the Kossuth de-

abroad and common sense at home. It must have been a difficult task to stem the tide of ignorant enthusiasm; but it was done with tact and the Times will be all the more powerful for risking momentary unpopularity and showing that it knew what public opinion ought and in fact what it has turned out to be..." Knox, John, *Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of Henry Reeve*. London, 1898, p. 240.

³²⁰ D'Azeglio—M. E.—D'Azeglio, London, Nov. 11, 1851. A. St. Torino.

monstrations. Palmerston himself was very pleased to be able to state that not one of the members took part in the meetings, with the exception of John Abel Smith.³²¹

Summarizing the attitude of the political parties, it can be said that neither the Tories nor the Whigs or the Peelites sympathized with Kossuth's cause, excepting the left-wing Radicals headed by Cobden. But even the latter withdrew from Kossuth's public receptions on account of the attacks of *The Times*. His party friend Urquhart stood by him all the time and complained incessantly of Kossuth's unwillingness to "expose" Palmerston.

As to the prominent politicians, Disraeli was decidedly against him; Gladstone also shared his opinion. "You need not be afraid, I think, of Mazzinism from me" — he told Lord Aberdeen — "still less Kossuthism which means the other plus imposture Palmerston and his nationalities . . ."³²²

Indeed, Palmerston is considered as an exceptional case among the political leaders of his time in showing sympathy for Kossuth. But his warm interest led him to controversies with the Queen and Premier Russell, which ended finally in his withdrawal from the Cabinet.

The Court has always disliked his attitude towards the refugees. It was regarded as incompatible with the correct relations which the Court wished to maintain with Austria and Russia. Prince Albert definitely condemned Palmerston's policy in Constantinople. It was in 1849 when Palmerston was determined to press the Sultan to refuse extradition. According to this, he prepared instructions for Canning in which he wished to authorize his minister to declare that the Porte's refusal was due to Britain's protest. Being informed of Palmerston's determination, Prince Albert immediately intervened. The Secretary of State had to change his instructions, expressing only the simple advice of the British Cabinet that the Porte might possibly refuse extradition.³²³

The differences of opinion in diplomatic matters between the Court and Palmerston were repeated from day to day and caused much anxiety to Russell. In the affair of Schleswig-Holstein,

³²¹ Cf. his letter to his brother, the British Minister at Naples, Bocket, Nov. 6, 1851; Ashley Evelyn, *The Life of Henry Temple, Viscount Palmerston, 1846—1865*. London, 1876, chapt. VI, pp. 263—264.

³²² On Dec. 1, 1851. Cf. Morley, John, *Life of William Ewart Gladstone*. London, vol. I, p. 402.

³²³ Walpole Spencer, *The Life of Lord John Russell*, 1891, vol. II, p. 50.

Palmerston took the part of Denmark. Prince Albert was greatly annoyed by this policy and in time became directly inimical to Palmerston. The Prince Consort was backed by Baron Stockmar, his physician and sometime intimate counsellor in foreign affairs. The latter represented the warm sympathies shown by the Belgian Court towards Austria and the condemnatory feelings towards Palmerston for his pro-Hungarian attitude. Stockmar's strong personality had a great influence upon the Prince Consort and through the latter possibly upon the Queen. This circumstance might have also contributed to their decided reserve concerning the Hungarian question and augmented their aversion for Palmerston. "I think, the man has been for sometime insane" wrote Stockmar about the Secretary of State.³²⁴

Palmerston must have had knowledge of Stockmar's influence, by which he felt drawn into differences of opinion with the Queen³²⁵ and now he was strengthened in his decision to adhere to his opinion of Kossuth.

As soon as the Queen was informed of Kossuth's arrival in Southampton, she ordered Russell to stop Palmerston receiving the Hungarian leader. She had some anxiety for its objectionable consequences to Britain's relations with the Absolute Powers.

Russell held the opposite view to the Queen. He did not object if Palmerston received Kossuth immediately after his arrival, for he did not want to prevent the Hungarian leader from expressing his deep gratitude to the Queen and Palmerston.

Being convinced of the propriety of such a visit by Palmerston, Russell informed the Queen of his inability to dictate to Palmerston whether he should receive Kossuth or not. Nevertheless, he thought of reminding the Secretary of State that their discussion should be restricted to Kossuth's thanks, and Palmerston should not enter into questions dealing with actual politics.³²⁶ But having read Kossuth's first speeches, delivered in Southampton, in which he definitely attacked the Emperors of Austria and Russia,

³²⁴ Stockmar, Baron E. von, *Memoirs of Baron Stockmar*. London, 1873, vol. II. p. 459.

³²⁵ Cf. Newman F. W., *Reminiscences of the two Exiles*. London, 1888, pp. 29—31.

³²⁶ Russell—Victoria, Windsor Castle, Oct. 24, 1851, cf. Benson, Arthur Christopher, Lord Esher, *Königin Victorias Briefwechsel und Tagebuchblätter*. 1908, vol. II, p. 91; Pembroke Lodge, Oct. 30, 1851; Walpole, vol. II, pp. 132—133.

Russell changed his opinion and considered it impracticable for Palmerston to receive Kossuth — after these speeches.

But he failed to convince Palmerston. "Even if he is mad, as you say" — wrote Palmerston to Russell — "and which is not unlikely, I am not afraid of his biting me..."³²⁷ The Secretary of State persisted in his opinion that he did not want to receive Kossuth in his capacity as British Minister of Foreign Affairs, but as one private individual who wished to meet another in his country home, in Broadlands. In this case, of course, he did not feel any obligation towards the Cabinet. "There are limits to all things" — he wrote firmly to Russell — "I do not choose to be dictated as to whom I may or may not receive in my own home... I shall use my own discretion... You will, of course, use yours as to the composition of your government..."³²⁸

Russell was indignant at Palmerston's answer. To his mind, the Foreign Secretary could not regard himself at one time as a private individual and at another as a Member of the Cabinet. He was angry at rumours of the Austrian Minister's intention to demand his dismissal if Palmerston actually met Kossuth. But being aware of Palmerston's obstinacy he decided to discuss the controversy with the Members of the Cabinet and requested the Queen to order to Palmerston not to meet Kossuth.³²⁹

The Queen was somewhat disconcerted by Russell's request. She could hardly be exposed — she wrote to Russell — to the possibility of one of her ministers refusing to obey her orders. But after having sent this letter she changed her mind. She realized that Britain's political interests were at stake if Palmerston's meeting with Kossuth actually ensued. She therefore summoned Palmerston and told him he must comply.³³⁰

But even Russell changed his mind under the impression he received on learning the Queen's reasons for being unable to meet his request. When Russell received the Queen's first letter he immediately answered that she should not send any order to Palmerston until the Cabinet had considered the affair.³³¹

But the Queen had already sent her letter, with orders to

³²⁷ Oct. 21, 1851. Cf. Gooch, G. P., *The later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, 1840—1878*. 1925, vol. II, p. 8.

³²⁸ Panshanger, Oct. 30, 1851; Walpole, vol. II, p. 133.

³²⁹ Pembroke Lodge, Oct. 31, 1851; Benson, vol. II, pp. 91—92.

³³⁰ The Queen's letter to Russell and Palmerston, Windsor Castle, Oct. 31, 1851. Cf. Benson, vol. II, p. 92.

³³¹ Pembroke Lodge, Oct. 31, 1851; *Ibidem*, p. 93.

Palmerston, before she received Russell's second letter. Nevertheless, she did not regret her action. On account of the week-end, the Cabinet could only hold its Council on the Monday, November 3rd; consequently, Palmerston had plenty of time to see Kossuth, unless he had been prevented in time by the Queen's order.³³²

Russell in the Cabinet Council detailed the attitude the government had taken concerning the Hungarian refugees. Then he spoke about the correspondence he had had lately with Palmerston. He wanted to learn the reaction of his colleagues without asking them to pass a resolution, for he wished to avoid differences of opinion which might paralyze the Council's activities. Britain in these days needed a strong and united government. The political aspects abroad were particularly critical. No one could have foreseen whether Socialism or Absolutism would prevail in France. Therefore Britain's interests required her to keep order at home and to display a neutral attitude abroad.

Palmerston burst into laughter when he heard of Russell's anxiety. To his mind the Cabinet underestimated the British character in agreeing with the point of view that Austria, Russia or any other state may dictate to the British Secretary of State his attitude in tendering shelter or showing courtesy to anyone if it is his intention.

Russell was glad to have heard Palmerston's explanations within the privacy of the Council instead of in Parliament. It was done with consummate skill. Had he had the chance to make this apology before Parliament, no doubt, his speech would have attracted members, and this might have been followed by unpredictable consequences.

But the Council considered it with more calmness than Parliament would have done, though some of the ministers shared Palmerston's opinion. Again Lord Broughton threw light on the question from the opposite standpoint. "Would it not be curious" — he said — "if Kossuth could defeat the British Cabinet when he had not succeeded against the Austrian Cabinet?"

At this remark all members of the Cabinet burst into laughter. In this enlightened atmosphere the majority voted for a note to be sent to Kossuth, that he should not request an audience from Palmerston. The resolution was silently accepted by the Secretary

³³² Victoria—Russell, Windsor Castle, Oct. 31, 1851; *Ibidem*, p. 93.

of State. He only desired to keep opposing views within the Cabinet.³³³

The Queen was immediately informed of the details. She became reassured of the dangerousness of the affair, which now seemed to be finally settled. Yet she did not cease to reprove the Cabinet for its reserved attitude which — in her opinion — greatly encouraged the Kossuth ovations.³³⁴

As to Palmerston personally, her antipathy remained unchanged. "I have the worst opinion of him" — she said to Lady Russell. — "If he took the part of the revolutionists in some countries, he ought in all and that while he pretended great compassion for the oppressed Hungarians and Italians, he would not care if the Schleswig-Holsteiners were all drowned..."³³⁵

From this it seemed as if the Prince Consort or Baron Stockmar had expressed the opinion they had of Palmerston, who became irrevocably disgraced at Court.

In few days new controversies arose again between himself and his colleagues. On November 19th the borough of Finsbury and the parish of Islington³³⁶ sent deputations to him to convey their congratulations "for his patriotic and human conduct towards Kossuth", and presented their addresses, condemning the Emperors of Austria and Russia as "odious and detestable assassins".

Giving answer to these fiery addresses, Palmerston failed to correct their strong language and remarked with irony that "during the pending struggle a good deal of judicious bottleholding was obliged to be brought into the play".³³⁷

No wonder, *The Times* promptly attacked him in scathing editorials.³³⁸ The Queen felt offended again and said to Russell he might well dismiss the Secretary of State. The cup was full.

³³³ Lady Dorchester, Lord Broughtin, *Recollections of a long Life*, London, 1911, vol. VI, pp. 286—288.

³³⁴ Walewski Alexius — to Minister of Foreign Affairs, London, Nov. 1, 1851, Angleterre vol. 684. A. d. M. A. E. Paris.

³³⁵ Cf. Mc. Carthy Desmond and Russell Agatha, *Lady John Russell, a Memoir*. London, 1916, p. 116; *Lady Russell's diary*, Windsor Castle, Nov. 13. 1851.

³³⁶ Cf. the enthusiasm of Th. H. Duncombe, MP. of Finsbury for Kossuth, *The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Hingsbury Duncombe*. London, 1868, vol. I, pp. 128—132.

³³⁷ *Times*: Nov. 19, 1851.

³³⁸ Nov. 21, 26, 1851.

No one could have convinced the Queen that Palmerston had complied with her orders and did not see Kossuth after all.³³⁹

Russell again convoked the Council for December 4th and explained that — at present — any change in the position of the Secretary of State was too alarming. If the Cabinet decided to comply with the Queen's desire, the government would be shaken. Russell stated further that he had already informed the Queen of his anxiety. Upon hearing this the Queen gave up her demand for Palmerston's dismissal, but she insisted on the affair being discussed in the Cabinet.

Opening the discussion, Russell asked Palmerston to explain his answers to the delegates. Palmerston indignantly declared the comments of the papers to be most exaggerated. "That sort of literature can only derive from penny-a-liners but not from reliable reporters." Yet he admitted having failed by ignoring the necessity of excluding the reporters before his speech. He also admitted he did not read the addresses before hand. But all that he said he repeatedly expressed in other words before Parliament.

Lord Grey condemned Palmerston unreservedly. He said the Cabinet should express his disapproval to Palmerston and should inform the Queen of this resolution. Nevertheless the majority of the members, headed by Lord Lansdowne, did not want to initiate any steps against Palmerston and authorized Russell to convey their opinion to the Queen in a manner suitable to this particular case.³⁴⁰

Informed of these discussions, the Queen thought she was right in her aversion to Palmerston. Also she let her disfavour to Lady Palmerston be known and received her very coldly when she presented in Windsor — among other ladies — the Portugese Minister's wife. The Queen invited them to stay but she let Lady Palmerston return to London alone.³⁴¹

The Cabinet crisis still continued when Kossuth sailed for the United States in order to carry his political plans into effect. He was received in New York with great enthusiasm, unsurpassed in his times. The greatest honour was bestowed upon him by being

³³⁹ Queen-Russell, Windsor Castle, Nov. 21, 1851; Benson, vol. II, pp. 94—95.

³⁴⁰ Lord Broughton, vol. VI, pp. 289—290.

³⁴¹ Cf. Malmesbury, Earl of, G. C. B., *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*. London, 1884, vol. I, p. 297.

introduced to both Houses of Congress, which no foreigner with the exception of Lafayette had enjoyed before. He thrilled the masses of the East, Middle-West and the South with his brilliant eloquence on his trip around the States. Yet he did not succeed in realizing the plans suggested by Walker and Crosskey and adopted by him as his programme.

The auguries for a rapprochement between Great Britain and the United States were at that time not very promising. Britain's growing influence in Nicaragua and the Sandwich Isles was anxiously watched by American commerce, which felt its own interests endangered; therefore, no other political watch-word could have been more unpopular than the launching of an understanding with Britain.³⁴²

In July 1852 he returned again to London, where he took up his permanent residence. After the successful coup d'état of Louis Napoléon, all dreams of the progress of democracy were in vain. The reaction spread over Continental Europe and the last faint sparks of hope for the new struggle in Hungary dwindled.

Kossuth had to experience the transient character of human enthusiasm which Greville had foretold during his visit in Britain. "We are great hero worshippers" — he wrote to Reeve, then editorial-writer of *The Times* — "and there is something romantic and imposing in the Hungarian war... However like other things of this kind, the fever soon subsides and Kossuth a week after his departure will be forgotten..."³⁴³ Though Greville was inclined to underestimate the term of the Kossuth fever yet he was not very much mistaken.

In the course of years which Kossuth has spent in Britain he excelled himself in lecturing about actual problems as well as with writing editorials, particularly after the War in the Crimea. Otherwise, he had for many years to share the lot of the other emigrants who lived in London remote from publicity under the protective shelter of British liberal sense.

³⁴² From the author, *Kossuth politikai tervei az Amerikai Egyesült Államokban* (Kossuth's political plans in the U. S.): Napkelet (Magazine) Bpest, 1928, pp. 450 et sequ.

³⁴³ Livermere, Sunday, Nov. 1851, no. 136. Cf. Johnson A. H., *The letters of Charles Greville and Henry Reeve*. London, 1924, p. 203.

APPENDIX.

I.

Debrecen (Hungary) May 15, 1849.

Instructions to Francis Pulszky, Hungarian Diplomatic Agent in London.

MSS. F. O. Turkey vol. 375 P. R. O. London.

Monsieur, Il ne peut vous être inconnu, ni à vous ni au gouvernement de l'Angleterre, que depuis quelque temps de nombreuses dislocations et envois de troupes, ainsi que d'autres préparatifs de guerre se font dans l'empire russe. Une armée russe a déjà une fois rompu le principe de non-intervention et blessé le droit des peuples à notre égard en s'ingérant de main armée dans nos affaires intérieures en Transylvanie, et malgré les protestations faites à cet égard tant par les consuls, que les cabinets même des puissances occidentales de l'Europe, malgré la réclamation formelle faite par le cabinet de Londres contre l'occupation même des principautés du bas Danube par lesdites troupes qui demeurent constamment dans ces contrées. Mais ce corps qu'il nous fût facile de vaincre, bien qu'uni avec une armée autrichienne, et des nombreuses hordes de Valaques séditeux, ne fait qu'une petite partie des troupes que le gouvernement russe a dernièrement porté jusqu'aux limites les plus proches des provinces autrichiennes qui nous entourent vers le nord-est.

Des rapports qui ne manquent point de crédibilité portent le chiffre de cette dernière armée au-delà de 100.00 hommes, qui sont effectivement échelonnés sur la frontière de la Galicie et de Cracovie. — Il n'y a de là, que très peu d'étapes pour arriver au seuil même de nos frontières.

Ceci joint aux bruits qui courent dans tous les journaux des avis nombreux que nous recevons sur l'intention prononcée du gouvernement russe de faire entrer ses troupes en quatre colonnes dans la Hongrie, mais plus encore les dispositions assez connues du cabinet de Russie et de l'autocrate lui-même, pas moins le triste exemple que nous avons déjà eu devant nos yeux, jusqu'à quels moyens le cabinet d'Autriche a eu recours pour continuer sa guerre injuste contre la Hongrie, ne peuvent qu'inspirer les plus vives inquiétudes sur les in-

tentions de ces puissances vis à vis de la nation hongroise, au gouvernement de celle-ci chargée de veiller sur la sûreté en dedans et en dehors.

C'est donc au nom de celui-ci que je vous engage Mr. le chargé d'affaires, de ne pas tarder un moment à faire des démarches sérieuses près du gouvernement de l'Angleterre.

Vous lui représenterez d'abord, que ces mouvements des troupes russes, qu'on cherche peut-être de sa part à masquer autant que possible aux yeux de l'Europe, mais dont nous avons connaissance certaine, ne sont justifiés par aucun motif apparent, ni par aucune déclaration de guerre émise par le gouvernement de Russie entre aucune nation de l'Europe, ou lancée contre elle de quelque part que ce soit.

Il ne reste donc d'autre but à deviner, que celui d'une intervention, soit dans les affaires de l'Autriche même, soit dans la guerre, que la Dynastie déchue, bien que vaincue pour le moment, semble vouloir renouveler contre nous. Il est clair qu'une occupation militaire des provinces de l'Autriche même, ne serait autre chose dans les circonstances présentes, qu'une intervention déguisée et indirecte dans la guerre entre la Dynastie de Habsbourg-Lorraine et de la nation Hongroise.

Outre que ce serait un attentat aux droits des nations les plus saints, vous représenterez au cabinet de l'Angleterre que ce ne serait pas une moindre injure et un manque d'égard sans pareil au gouvernement de l'Angleterre même.

La Russie aurait-elle des prérogatifs dont d'autres nations s'abstiennent par respect, non seulement du droit des nations et de l'humanité, mais encore en vertu des déclarations, pactes et traités, concertés et stipulés dans les congrès des différentes nations, tous prononçant également le droit de non intervention dans les affaires intérieures d'un pays à l'autre, comme la base et le principe fondamental du droit international. Tels sont p. e. la déclaration faite par l'Angleterre au congrès de Vérone, où ce principe est ouvertement prononcé.

Plus tard le même principe ne fût pas moins reconnu, non seulement de l'Angleterre, mais aussi de la France, lorsque l'Espagne fût la scène de guerres civiles.

Mais plus récemment encore c'est vis-à-vis de la France même, que le principe de non intervention fut généralement énoncé à deux reprises même par l'Autriche et la Russie même. Les affaires de Sicile fournirent de nouveau l'occasion à la déclaration positive de l'Angleterre, qui ne rencontra point de contradiction d'aucune autre puissance, qu'elle ne regardait point les Siciliens comme rebelles, mais comme une nation qui défendait ses droits naturels.

Sans que j'entre plus amplement en cette matière, vous représenterez au ministre de l'Angleterre que la nation Hongroise n'a pas moins prouvé que celle de la Sicile sous des circonstances bien plus défavo-

rables, qu'elle contient en elle, assez de forces pour maintenir sa liberté, attaquée qu'elle fut de tout côté sur son territoire même, déchirée d'une guerre civile dans son intérieur, guerre suscitée par un tissu de machinations les plus infernales, artificiellement animée dans toutes ses ressources, elle sortit en vainqueur de ce combat inégal. Elle offre donc pour l'avenir bien plus de garantie pour l'équilibre de l'Europe, — dont celui-ci est pris en considération, — que l'état délabré et décrépité de l'Autriche.

Ceci prouvé dans l'affaire de Transylvanie, elle le prouve nouvellement par les préparatifs d'invasion de la Russie, qui se font en tout cas de son accord, qu'elle est trop faible pour se maintenir seule jusque dans son intérieur.

Les obligations qu'elle contracterait envers la Russie, si par son aide elle réussissait même à rétablir son pouvoir en Hongrie, — pouvoir qui ne sera jamais d'aucune durée — tellement notre nation est décidée, unanime, et prête à se consolider dans son intérieur, — ces obligations dis-je, la feraient déjà descendre de son état de puissance de premier rang à celle d'une puissance débonnaire et tributaire de la Russie, — et ainsi le colosse aurait enfin atteint le plus grand de ses dessins si longtemps nourris, objet de tant d'intrigues politiques. Il n'y aurait plus qu'une voix décisive de la mer du Nord jusqu'aux Dardanelles.

La politique timide ou fausse du cabinet autrichien ne lui a cédé déjà que trop de terrain. La Hongrie est capable de mettre sur pied une armée de 200.000 hommes, qui font honneur à son ancienne réputation de bravoure, et un matériel de guerre analogue, sans compter une nombreuse garde nationale, de mieux en mieux aguerrie dans ces derniers troubles sanglants. Puis, l'enthousiasme de la liberté, l'amour de la nationalité et la haine de l'opresseur ne sont point à ne compter pour rien.

S'il y a donc une barrière pour l'Europe centrale contre l'acroissement démesuré du nord, ce n'est qu'une Hongrie autonome, forte, puissante, que tous les intérêts et penchants portent naturellement à la plus étroite alliance aux puissances civilisées de l'Europe.

Du reste, vous représenterez au gouvernement de l'Angleterre et à celui de la Hongrie qu'en recevant avec reconnaissance tout appui de la part de l'Angleterre, ne fût-ce même que l'expression de sa sympathie, la Hongrie ne demande ni secours ni protection; — laissée seule aux prises avec la Dynastie de Habsbourg-Lorraine, la Hongrie ne craint point le résultat.

Elle ne demande que le moyen de pouvoir communiquer librement et sans entraves avec les puissances de l'Europe, afin de pouvoir leur exposer ses griefs, qui blessent le droit général des nations, tel que l'irruption projetée de la Russie en Hongrie.

Elle demande que les puissances de l'Europe usent de la même

politique envers la nation Hongroise comme envers d'autres nations qui se trouvent dans une situation pareille.

Elle demande que les gouvernements des premières puissances de l'Europe déclarent formellement à l'Autriche et à la Russie, — comme ils ont fait en d'autres occasions, qu'ils protestent contre toute intervention armée dans les affaires intérieures de l'Autriche et de la Hongrie, de la part de la Russie; — qu'ils somment celle-ci à expliquer les motifs de ses préparatifs de guerre sur les frontières de l'Autriche et de la Hongrie, et qu'ils énoncent décidément, que l'occupation militaire de quelques unes des provinces autrichiennes par les Russes sera considérée comme une intervention indirecte entre le suprême pouvoir et les nations qui lui sont soumises, et que le premier pas qu'un soldat russe fera sur le territoire de la Hongrie, ne sera autre chose qu'un casus belli de ces puissances envers la Russie.

En vous priant de soumettre ces vues au gouvernement de l'Angleterre et d'en solliciter la prise en considération, je reste avec estime,

le ministre des affaires étrangères de la Hongrie
Comte Casimir Batthyány m. p.

II.

Undated.

Extract from Walter Savage Landor's open letter to Kossuth.

The Examiner, London, May 19, 1851.

General! There are few who have the privilege to address you, but I am of the number; for before you were born I was an advocate, however feeble, of the sacred cause which you are now the foremost in defending. Imminent was the peril of fine and imprisonment, and certain the loss of friend and fortune: I disregarded and defied the worst. Do not trample on this paper for being written by an Englishman. We are not all of us jugglers and dupes, though we are most of us the legitimate children of those who crowded to see a conjuror leap into a quart-bottle. If we have had our Wilkeses and Burdetts, our Wilsons and Broughams, we have also had our Romilies and our Benthames. In one house we have still a Clarendon, in the other a Molesworth. Be amused but never indignant at the spectacle of our public men; at restlessness without activity, at strides without progress pelted from below by petulance without wit. A wider and fairer scene is lying now before you, a scene of your own creation, under the guidance and influence of Almighty God. Merciful and just by nature, and enlightened, as the powerful of intellect always are, by the continous lamps delivered in succession from past and passing ages you will find them shine clearer by contraction of space and adaptation to circumstances.

You have swept away the rotten house of Hapsburg. It would be an idle trick to pursue the vermin that nestled and prowled among its dark recesses, behind its moth eaten tapestries and throughout its noisome sewers. But there is no idleness in following the guidance of the most strenuous and most provident conquerors. Sulla, Julius, and Augustus Caesar distributed the forfeited estates of their enemies among the defenders of their cause. The justice of their cause was questionable, the justice of yours is not. In our country, William of Normandy broke up the estates of the vanquished and rendered them powerless for revolt. Elisabeth and Cromwell and William of Nassau, our three greatest sovereigns pursued the same policy with the same success. In Hungary there are immense tracts of lands imperfectly cultivated and forfeited by the defection and treason of the rich and indolent proprietors. Surely no time should be lost in the distribution of this national property among the nation's defenders. Larger and smaller allotments should be holden forth as the incentives and the rewards of valour. This was promised in France by the revolutionists of that country; but what promise was ever kept by France, under any of her governments to any nation? Least of all perhaps to her own. The Hungarians are morally the antipodes of the French; the Hungarians are calmly brave, consistently free, strictly veracious, immutably just, unostentatiously honourable.

(Then speaking about French foreign politics he continues:)

Behold the promises of a nation which declared its readiness to aid unreservedly in the deliverance of the oppressed. Behold the first public act, beyond the boundaries, of its President! . . .

Sir, in your hands are deposited the sword and the scales of justice: hold them firmly and if any price calls to the stranger, bid your lictors bind him, and perform the rest of their duty forth with. In the exercise of this righteous authority may God preserve you for His glory, for the benefit of the present age and for the example of every age to come.

III.

London, October 20, 1849.

Cobden's open letter to Alexander Bach, Austrian Minister of the Interior protesting against the execution of the Hungarian generals.

The Daily News, London, Nov. 20, 1849.

Sir, These lines are not addressed to you in your character as a member of the Austrian government; they are addressed to you personally as a gentleman whose liberal and enlightened views left a lasting impression on my mind when I had the pleasure to make your acquaintance in Vienna. An excuse for this step you will find in the principles of humanity and civilization which at that time were equally

cherished by us both. Mindful then of the opinion which recommended me to your friendly attention in the year 1847. I cannot suppose that you are now less favourable inclined towards them than you were then. Public opinion is in my country horror-struck at the cold-blooded cruelties which have been exercised on the fallen leaders of the Hungarians. The feeling is not confined to one class or to one particular party for there is not a man in England who has defended either in writing or by word the acts of Austria. The opinion of the civilized states of the Continent will have reached you while that of America will very soon be known in Vienna. You are too enlightened not to be aware that the unanimous verdict of contemporaries must also be the judgment of history. But have you considered that history will not deal with brutal soldiery, the creatures of cruelty, but with the ministers who are responsible for their crimes. I should not like to appeal to less important motives than those of an honourable ambition. But have you well considered the dangers which threaten you in your present course? You, who are so well-read in English history that, four years afters Jeffries "bloody assizes" not only he himself but his royal master was a miserable fugitive before the avenging hand of justice. Or, do we live in a time when public conscience can be treated with contempt without fear of the punishment that followed in the seventeenth century. Is it not, on the contrary, the peculiar characteristic of our time, that deeds of violence whether committed by governments or by people are followed by reaction with astonishing celerity? But I am taking too great a liberty in offering to defend your reputation or in permitting myself to be interested for your personal safety. I appeal to you in the name of humanity, to make an end to this renewed terror, which, not content with butchering its victims, must also put to the rack all the better feelings of humanity, for the world has advanced too far in its civilization long to permit upon its stages heroes like Alva or Haynau. I conjure you publicly to protest against the judicial butchering of prisoners of war, against the still more disgraceful whipping of females, and, finally, against the practice of kidnapping, in order that you may be acquitted of all participation in the responsibility for acts which must brand with shame their authors.

I remain etc.

IV.

Memorandum of eighty-tree Members of Parliament to Russell and Palmerston on behalf of Hungary.

The Times, London, December 5, 1849.

We, the undersigned, desire to express to your Lordships, and, through your Lordships, to the rest of her Majesty's confidential servants, the deep interest which we have taken in the contest which has been recently carried on between the Hungarian nation and the

Emperor of Austria. Not less deep is the interest which we now take in the final settlement of the question at issue between them, and in the permanent pacification of that great country. Sincerely attached to the liberties of our own country, the final establishment of which is due to the successful termination of struggles analogous to those which have been made from time to time in Hungary — with equal sincerity desirous of maintaining the peace of Europe, we are fully sensible of the great importance that the settlement of the questions at issue should be effected in a manner, and upon terms, satisfactory to the Hungarian nation, not only for the sake of Hungary herself, but because we apprehend that a settlement unsatisfactory to the country will sow the seed of renewed discontent, may lead to fresh local disturbances, and by the local disturbance of so large an element of the European system, may endanger the tranquillity of the whole.

The objects of the undersigned are internal liberty, national independence, European peace. For the attainment of these objects we trust the Court of Vienna will bear in mind that the satisfaction and contentment of Hungary will afford the greatest security. Considering, however, the means by which the authority of the House of Hapsburg has been re-established, the undersigned are of opinion that the occasion permits, even if it does not call for, the intervention of Great-Britain, in counselling the Austrian government respecting the exercise of its restored executive power. With respect to the mode and opportunity of interfering, the undersigned offer no specific opinion, but we hope that her Majesty's Government will not shrink from suggesting to that of Austria that, since republican France has abolished capital punishments for political offences, it will not be wise to allow a contrast to be drawn unfavourable to the clemency of monarchical governments.

Fitzwilliam
Northampton
Zetland

Beaumont
Hatherton
Conyngham
Gosford

Montford
Ducie

Radnor

R. M. Milnes

T. Townshend

Robert Price

Harry Verney

Thomas S. Duncombe

T. P. Thompson

Thomas Wakley

John Saldeir

Pierce S. Butler

Wm. Scholefield

John Fergus

Robert A. Slaney

Thos. E. Headlam

John Reynolds

E. K. Tenison

Michael Sullivan

T. Chisholm Anstey

James Heywood

F. Mowatt

Geo. Thompson

John O'Brien

James Kershaw

Henry Salwey

Joseph Locke

Wm. Collins
 Wm. Fagan
 Francis P. Dunne
 Nicholas M. Power
 Torrens M'Cullagh
 J. G. Marshall
 D. Jephson Norreys
 J. Dawson Rawdon
 James Wyld
 Savile C. H. Ogle
 Charles Pearson
 Lawr. Heyworth
 James Clay
 H. A. Aglionby
 The O'Gorman Mahon
 B. M. Willcox
 William Pinney
 A. E. Cockburn
 Richard M. Fox
 W. S. Crawford
 Alex. Hastie
 W. T. Fox
 J. Twizell Wawn
 J. Pilkington

Pryse Loveden
 William Hutt
 William Evans
 Thomas Sidney
 B. Hall
 P. T. Locke King
 T. MacGregor
 W. Marshall
 T. Twisden Hodges
 John Williams
 T. A. Mitchell
 Charles Cowan
 Edw. N. Buxton
 Dudley C. Stuart
 De Lacy Evans
 Maurice Power
 William Ewart
 R. Perfect
 M. Forster
 E. H. Bunbury
 William Clay
 G. W. Fitzwilliam
 W. Lockyer Freestun
 T. Milner Gibson.

V.

Therapia, December 24, 1849.

*Canning to Palmerston respecting the present state of the
 Refugee Question.*

Despatch no. 384. F. O. Turkey vol. 783. P. R. O. London.

My Lord, I know not whether it be owing to the nature of the questions themselves to the overbearing temper of one party, to the vacillating character of another, or what is most probable to a mixture of these causes, but the difficulty, be it how it may, of bringing the Porte's differences with Russia and Austria to a satisfactory settlement appears to be nearly interminable. Their approach towards a conclusion might be imagined to proceed on the principle of those mathematical lines which, though continually approximating, never meet.

It is already well known to your Lordship that the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, after relinquishing the demand of extradition, put forward proposals, not warranted by Treaty, unbecoming and discreditable for the Porte to accept, and, if accepted threatening to produce much future altercation and embarrassment. The firm, but

temperate objections which the Sultan's ministers, with my concurrence and that of General Aupick, opposed to such overweening pretensions, were fairly appreciated by the Russian government and repelled for the most part by that of Austria. Yet Russia was not satisfied without requiring a new and unnecessary concession, in appearance a formality but even in that character showing mistrust of the Porte and lying open to the suspicion of ulterior views.

This state of things is the most perplexing because it inverts the rule of Turkish policy, making Austria an object of estrangement and Russia for a time at least the most complying neighbour of the two.

My advice to the Porte has uniformly been of that tenour which your Lordship's instruction of the 30th ultimo so pointedly incalculates. I have never ceased to recommend a faithful execution of Treaties, a willing fulfilment of the duties of good neighbourhood and a steady, unobtrusive maintenance of the Sultan's honour, dignity and independence. These principles would justify the Porte if it were worth while, in declining, the Russian demand of a Protocol. They engage the Porte to persiste in repelling those Austrian conditions which would interfere with the free exercise of her sovereignty. But although the right and duty are alike acknowledged by the Sultan's principal ministers, various motives of a less rigid character incline them to give way after a decent show of resistance and would in all likelihood hurry them to an inconsiderate and unworthy conclusion, if they had not also to consult the public opinion of Europe, and to preserve the good will of England and France.

Of these important considerations, they seemed however, a few days ago, to have so much lost sight, that I was obliged to enter into a warm expostulation with the Grand Vizier, who finally expressed his readiness to abide by my counsels, directed as they were to the permanent welfare of this Empire and agreeing as they do, in the present instance with those of my French colleague.

The advice which I tendered in consequence to Aali Pasha who does not always perceive where firmness is safer than concession was anything but repulsive or exaggerated. In substance, with respect to Russia, I recommended that the Protocol should be signed with M. de Titov if the measure could not be avoided without a fresh period of delay, but in that simplest possible form which would give it rather the character of a Procès-Verbal than that of a Convention, taking care to have it understood that the renewal of diplomatic relations should follow at once. With respect to Austria I approved the Porte's intention as well to preclude any Austrian inspection over the Refugees, when detained in Asia Minor, as to accept the Internuntio's amended proposal of keeping open the list for two months. As to the main requisition of making the eventual liberation of the refugees dependent on Austria's consent, I suggested terms of agreement which bordered

so closely on Prince Schwarzenberg's demand as barely to reserve the Sultan's right.

To make this more clear I beg to refer to Your Lordship to the accompanying memorandum which exhibits the very term of my suggestion and to the copies, inclosed herewith of two instructions addressed by me to the first interpreter of Her Majesty's Embassy. An extract of Mr. Pisani's intermediate report and a project submitted to Aali Pasha by Count Stürmer are also inclosed for Your Lordship's additional information.

The actual state of the whole affair as resulting from these communications may be thus described. A meeting is to take place to-morrow, at the Grand Vizier's house between that minister, Aali Pasha and M. de Titov. A Protocol will, no doubt, be signed and probably in the form inclosed herewith which is based on my suggestion and contains no addition which I think it worth while to resist; but it is by no means impossible that the Russian Envoy may require and carry amendments less admissible and withhold the renewal of his diplomatic relations with the Porte until Count Stürmer is also satisfied.

As to the Austrian part of the difficulty supposing the statement of M. Mussurus to be correct and the language of Count Stürmer sincere, there is little prospect of an immediate accommodation with the consequent renewal of diplomatic relations, except by means of an unqualified submission to the most objectionable of Prince Schwarzenberg's demands.

However regrettable the continuance of this disagreement may be, I confess that, whether I look to Your Lordship's instructions, or to my own personal conviction, I hold that inconvenience to be a less evil than the surrender of the Porte's independence and dignity to a requisition grounded on no Treaty right and likely to be productive hereafter of much vexations intermeddling and unnecessary suffering.

This manifest at the same time that I should travel out of my province if I ventured on this occasion to control the free judgment of the Porte. The two leading ministers are fully acquainted with my opinions and with those of the French representative. I despair of striking out any fresh expedient for reconciling the pretensions of Austria with the fair and rightful objections of the Porte. The only sort of menace I could by possibility employ would be the immediate withdrawal of Her Majesty's Squadron from the neighbourhood of Turkey and the application of such a lever would be almost equally objectionable, whether it succeeded or whether it failed.

So much during the protracted struggle has been accomplished in favour of Turkish independence and consequently of that pacific system which in the East so intimately connected with its progressive establishment, that it is impossible not to watch with a deep and

anxious interest over the terms of final accomodation. But, deeply as the Porte would compromise its essential interests by any unnecessary weakness or inconsistency in the closing act of these negotiations, and much as the powers friendly to this Empire would have to deplore such ill-timed compliance, the most useful and best intentioned interference has its limits. Ours, I conceive, has reached them under the present circumstances.

I have the honour etc.

VI.

Constantinople, May 6, 1850.

Canning to Kossuth concerning his endeavours on behalf of the Refugees.

Pte. MSS. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

Monsieur, Les deux lettres que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser de Kutahia exigent quelques mots de réponse. Je m'en suis servi pour faire parvenir vos plaintes aux yeux des ministres de la Porte, et en ce qui regarde votre bien-aise personnel et celui de vos compagnons d'infortune, mes représentations ne sont pas restées sans résultat. Le Grand Vizir a consenti à donner de nombreux ordres à Suleiman Bey. Son Altesse m'assure que sa lettre est déjà partie pour Kutahia, et la traduction ci-jointe de cette lettre vous fera savoir mieux que je ne le pourrais dire, sur quoi vous pouvez compter.

Pour ce qui regarde le terme de votre détention dans ce pays et le changement du lieu où elle doit s'écouler, je ne peux pas me flatter d'avoir fait toute l'impression que vous désirez sur l'esprit du ministre ottoman. Il est permis néanmoins d'espérer que le temps amènera une manière de voir plus favorable à vos vœux, et je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire qu'il me sera fort agréable de vous marquer les premiers indices d'un tel changement.

En attendant, Monsieur, je suis persuadé que le courage de soutenir un grand malheur avec fermeté ne vous désespèrera pas, et je profite volontiers de cette occasion pour vous renouveler l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

VII.

Constantinople, April 30, 1851.

Canning to Kossuth concerning the liberation of the Refugees.

Pte. MSS. Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

Monsieur, I hope you will forgive my long silence. I wished to send you good news and deferred writing in acknowledgment of your letter until I could have the pleasure of satisfying my wish in that respect. It is at length in my power to announce a decision, — not

indeed such a decision as I desired and at times expected — but one which has at least the merit of certainty. The Sultan has pledged the word of his government of your liberation on the 1st of September next, and His Majesty has had the consideration to adopt new style on this occasion.

The delay of four months will probably occasion disappointment to you and your friends. Fortunately it is confined to the best season of the year, and it may console you to know that every exertion consistent with my position was made to obtain an immediate or at least an earlier termination of your detention. I may add in confidence that a decision worse by two months than the present one was taken at first, and that it cost me no slight effort to gain the amendment.

In order to save the post I must obtain from entering upon any other topic at present. I cannot, however, conclude without thanking you for the kind welcome which you gave to the box of books I sent you in the winter; and begging that you will accept the renewed assurance of my sympathy and consideration,

I have the honour etc.

VIII.

London, June 20, 1851.

Urquhart to Kossuth, asking to be informed of any change in Kossuth's political attitude.

The Free Press, Sheffield, March 8, 1856.

You will recollect that I ventured to ask for a pledge and that you gave it me. I required that you should bind yourself to inform me of any change in your opinions and while you declared they would not change, you gave me your word of honour that, in case they did, I should be informed thereof before you acted in consequence of that change. I recalled this contract because I have had some suspicion awakened in my mind of your being in or tending towards communication with a party, with which, had you been anyway connected in October last, I never could so much as you have seen — and the chief of which you know to be a Russian agent. The requiring such a pledge could only proceed from alarm respecting the fixedness of your purposes, which has never ceased and renders almost painful every thought of which you are the object. If, then, at present my suspicions are happily without foundation, you must attribute them to the morbid irritation thus ungendered. I never write to you without thinking that the letter I write may be the last, nor receive one from you without the same damping reflection. In the case of my worst fears being realized and your having had, or (which is the same thing) thought of having communication with Mazzini, I expect you will let me know the fact yourself. In any case, I am relieved and either deceptive hopes,

or unfounded alarms will be put an end to. In the one case I return to my solitary toil, where I was before we met, in the order I shall be relieved from doubts, which are wholly incompatible with concert, even for objects of low degree.

IX.

London, Foreign Office August 11, 1851.

Palmerston to Canning concerning the demonstration by the Mediterranean Squadron in the Dardanelles.

Draft. No. 210. Turkey, volume 850. P. R. O. London.

Sir,

With reference to my Despatch No. 204 of the 4th instant I have to acquaint Your Excellency that I have stated to the Lord's Commander of the Admiralty that I am of opinion, with a view to the question of the proposed liberation of Mr. Kossuth and the other Hungarian Refugees detained at Kutahia, it would be useful if Sir William Parker's Squadron after reaching Alexandria were to show itself in the Archipelago.

P[almerston].

X.

Turin, Sept. 28, 1851.

Ralph Abercromby to Palmerston respecting Kossuth's behaviour on the „Mississippi“.

MSS. No. 123. F. O. Sardinia vol. 179. P. R. O. London.

My Lord, Mr. Kinney, my American colleague, to whom I applied for information with respect to the ultimate destination of the Ex-President Kossuth has given me the following details connected with the conduct and language of the Exile, while on board the United-States Steam Frigate Mississippi which I hasten to transmit to your Lordship as being of sufficient importance to merit the attention of Her Majesty's Government.

From Mr. Kinney's description it appears that Kossuth is a visionary of an impracticable and dangerous character — that he professes to have received a mission from Heaven to deliver Europe from thralldom and in pursuit of the accomplishment of this plan his intention on quitting the Turkish territory was not to proceed direct to America and there accept the hospitable home he had been generously offered.

On being informed that the United States Frigate had been sent for the purpose of conveying him to America, he protested against being taken there and declared his intention of going first to Naples, then embarking for Genova and possibly proceeding to Marseilles,

landing at each Port in order that the people might hail their deliverer; and he proposed to use the United States Frigate as his means of transport on his propagandist errand.

The captain of the Mississippi however, as your Lordship may suppose, peremptorily refused his concurrence in such a plan; and on the Mississippi's arrival at Spezia, Kossuth declared his intention to land here, but, the instructions which there met the captain of the Mississippi from Mr. Kinley forbidding him to allow Kossuth to land, at once put a stop to this project. The language of the Ex-President seems to have been most violent and indecorous and he declared that he had only changed gaolers, the Turk for the American.

Mr. Kinley informs me that he, under the difficulties of the situation, Kossuth having positively declared that nothing but force should take him to America, has directed that the Ex-President should be taken to Gibraltar and there landed, previous warning being given to His Excellency the Governor, Sir Robert Gardiner of the intentions and character of his guest.

I regret that Mr. Kinley did not communicate with me on this subject before the departure of the Mississippi, as I should in that case have taken upon myself to write to Sir Robert Gardiner, requesting him to take particular care that Kossuth did not find the means of returning to this part of the continent of Europe but, I trust that the description he will receive from the captain of the Mississippi of the political fanaticism of Kossuth will be sufficient to impress him with the necessity of taking proper precautions on this point.

The Ex-President intends, it appears, to proceed from Gibraltar to England and I therefore hasten to warn your Lordship of his arrival, in order that you may take such steps as you may consider necessary under the circumstances.

The American Commodore Morgan, commanding the United States Squadron in the Mediterranean who had hastened to La Spezia from Lucca, describes in a letter the captain and the principal officers of the Mississippi as being worn out and harassed by the conduct of Kossuth on board, *as it was found necessary to watch him day and night, to prevent him from tampering with the ship's company.*

It is only charitable to suppose that former excitement and subsequent misfortunes have so disordered the Ex-President's mind as to render him incapable of adopting a reasonable and moderate course of action; for it is hardly to be imagined if the details above given are correct, which I cannot doubt from the source from which I have received them, that he should deliberately avow his determination to commence so wicked and reckless a system of revolutionary propagandism.

I have the honour (etc.)

XI.

Midhurst, Sept. 22, 1851.

Cobden to Pulszky regarding Kossuth's reception in Britain.

N. M. MSS. Dept. Bpest.

My dear Sir, I merely take advantage of the opportunity of my wife writing to Mrs. Pulszky to add a line to you. You are I suppose without any fresh news from Turkey. I observe a report in the Manchester paper that Kossuth is on board the U. S. Steamer Mississippi on his way to America. Is this true? I should not be surprised to find that the yankee commander pleaded the latter of his instructions and refused to take him to any other place than Washington. The Americans are fond of lions and besides they make „political capital” of them. — Apart from any inconvenience it may occasion him in his family arrangements and the disappointment you and his countrymen in England may feel, I do not think it will be to be regretted if he should alight for the first time after his liberation upon American soil. You are all interested in the preservation of his moral power and that will be greatly increased by the glorious reception he will meet with, from men of all ranks and parties, from the president to the daily labourer. If he were to take up his abode here he would be welcomed by the Radical Party. But the Aristocracy both Whig and Tory would generally stand aloof; and the conservative politicians would of course have nothing to say in his favour. The government would, I suppose, plead etiquette and ignore him at least publicly. If he returned hereafter being fêted in America by such statesmen as Webster and Clay, it may shame some of our Whig politicians into some art of recognition. Besides, the American government may give him a township or land which although not convertible into European wealth, is worth having and would be an honourable tribute at least. But should Kossuth after all, land in England, I should advise him to be cautious, how he accepts any offers of a public demonstration. Let him received complimentary address of a public meeting, or of the mayor of the town, or show himself to the masses who may surround his lodging-but let him be cautious of accepting any invitation to a public dinner or a public demonstration of any kind. He might find himself surrounded by persons who would be representatives of their own vanity then of the British public. Verborum satis est. I say this for your own ear only.

XII.

Midhurst, October 4, 1851.

Cobden to Pulszky regarding Kossuth's attitude in Britain.

N. M. MSS. Dept. Bpest.

My dear Sir, I shall be in London on the exhibition business on Wednesday for a week and shall not fail to pay my respect to Kossuth either there or in Southampton. — I presume he will come to town soon after his arrival in England. He will have many occasions for speaking to the people in answer to addresses presented to him from the London Corporation and all kinds of bodies. But I am still of the same opinion as ever that he would do wisely not to attend any banquet *where other peoples will make speeches*. I gave this opinion to Teleki when Kossuth was expected in 1848. — The more public addresses he receives from corporations or bodies of men, the better the more the crowd besiege him with cheers the better; but there is this risk if he enters a room to attend a public dinner or meeting where speeches are made that he has no control over the speakers and still to a great extent he is identified with the orators and their oratory, whatever its character may be. — For instance, supposing that at Southampton one of the speakers were to claim for Lord Palmerston the merit of his release, or suppose he were to attack Lord Palmerston for not having done enough, — in either case it would be embarrassing to Kossuth to be a silent auditor. However, all these I say for your private ear. I wrote before I heard that the people of Southampton intended to offer him a public dinner. That however does not effect the question at all.

I have no objection to his having the offer of a dinner. The more the better. It does not follow that he should of necessity accept them. I have not heard from Beöthy. My wife joins me in kind remembrance to Mrs. Pulszky and yourself and believe me faithfully yours.

XIII.

London, Oct. 14, 1851.

Palmerston to Magenis respecting the refuse of permission by the Vienna Government for British travellers to proceed to Hungary.

MSS. no. 285. F. O. Austria vol. 388. P. R. O. London.

Sir,

I have received your despatch No. 182 of the 30th ultimo reporting that the Austrian government had refused permission to English travellers to proceed to Hungary.

These measures and some other things of alike kind are no doubt the results of irritation at some parts of the policy pursued by Great-

Britain, but however His Majesty's government may lament that the government of a great country should have recourse to such small ways of testifying its displeasure, the measure now in question is not one against which it would be worth while formally to remonstrate.

XIV.

St. Petersburg, Oct. 15, 1851.

Seymour to Palmerston respecting Nesselrode's opinion of Kossuth's liberation.

MSS. no. 42. F. O. Russia vol. 395. P. R. O. London.

My Lord,

In speaking to me of the liberations of Kossuth and his companions, the Russian chancellor took an opportunity of expressing his regret that they should have been yet free, not only without the consent of the Austrian government but against her wishes.

The chancellor seemed anxious to know what reception the Hungarian exiles would meet with in England.

I stated my conviction that they would be received with the greatest cordiality and at the same time expressed my conviction of the inexpediency of foreign governments making any observations either with regard to the exit of the Hungarians from Turkey, or upon the manner in which they might be welcomed upon English ground.

How far Count Nesselrode coincided in the correctness of this opinion I am unable to state, he only said that up to the present time no representation upon the subject of the liberation of Kossuth and his companions had been addressed to the Russian government by that of Austria.

It is then to be inferred that such a presentation founded upon an alleged violation of the engagements of the Porte towards Austria, is to be expected.

I have the honour (etc.)

XV.

London, Oct. 15, 1851.

Buol to Schwarzenberg respecting his absence from London during Kossuth's trip in Britain.

MSS. Report no. 29 A—C. Angleterre. H. H. St. A. Wien.

Mon Prince!

La faculté que Votre Altesse a bien voulu m'accorder par la lettre qu'Elle m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 9 courant, de ne pas être témoin des scènes nauséabondes et ridicules auxquelles l'arrivée de Kossuth donnera sans doute lieu, m'a paru être un avis que je n'ai pas cru devoir négliger dans l'intérêt du service. Seulement

la considération que Madame de Buol devait précisément quitter Mannheim le même jour où ces directions me sont parvenues et que, ma famille une fois rendue ici, mon départ aurait nécessairement eu plus d'éclat; m'a embarrassé un moment sur la manière la plus convenable de remplir Vos intentions. Je me suis, en conséquence, décidé à adresser sur le champ, une lettre à Madame de Buol pour l'engager à m'attendre à Bruxelles et à dire ici à mes connaissances que j'allais à la rencontre de ma famille. Venant de recevoir une invitation pour me rendre demain à Windsor et y passer la journée d'après-demain, je compte donc immédiatement après mon retour, m'embarquer pour Bruxelles et me rendre de là à Paris pour y attendre le dénouement des folies qui se préparent.

Je n'aurais pour différentes raisons pas jugé à propos de dénoncer ici le véritable motif de mon départ. On n'est pas fort ici sur les questions de délicatesse, et beaucoup de personnes se disant et se croyant bien pensantes, n'auraient pas compris que je dusse attacher tant d'importance à un mauvais jeu dont ils ne veulent pas eux-mêmes comprendre la portée; d'autres m'auraient accusé de l'intention de vouloir ou causer un embarras au Gouvernement, ou forcer la main à Lord Palmerston de se prononcer contre ses convictions, ce dont avec la malignité de son esprit il n'aurait pas manqué de tirer parti dans son intérêt, et certes, je ne me sens pas appelé à lui rendre ce service. Ne voulant aussi exclure de mes prévisions aucune des chances possibles, j'ai dû même admettre la possibilité que Kossuth eût l'intention de se dispenser tout à fait de sa course en Amérique et de rester en permanence en Angleterre. Or, dans ce cas, j'aurais pu, en faisant sonner trop haut le motif de mon départ, me rendre le retour plus difficile que Votre Altesse même ne l'eût désiré. Les bruits qui déjà circulent généralement que cet intrigant s'est brouillé avec le capitaine du Mississippi et que celui-ci après l'avoir déposé à Gibraltar se rendrait directement en Amérique avec les autres réfugiés en abandonnant leur chef à sa destinée, sembleraient même donner quelque poids à cette dernière supposition.

Je serai de cette manière, dans tous les cas, absent lors de la réception de Kossuth à Londres, qu'on tâchera de rendre aussi bruyante que possible; je prolongerai mon absence tant que l'attitude de cet individu me paraîtra peu conciliable avec la présence du représentant de l'Autriche, et si enfin, son séjour devait indéfiniment se prolonger, ou que le Gouvernement dût, ce que je ne crois pas d'ailleurs, se rendre complice de l'accueil que l'on prépare au chef de l'insurrection hongroise, j'attendrai les directions ultérieures que Votre Altesse voudra bien me donner.

Malgré toutes les indignes machinations du parti radical anglais et des coryphés des révolutionnaires réfugiés, pour tenir éveillées les sympathies pour la cause soit-disant hongroise, malgré la peine qu'on

se donne de les faire mousser en faveur du chef de l'insurrection, et de représenter sa mise en liberté comme un triomphe éclatant remporté par la politique de la Grande-Bretagne, il est incontestable cependant qu'il y a quelque chose de très factice dans les préparatifs de sa réception. Toutes ces adresses, ces députations, ces souscriptions ne sont que l'oeuvre d'une classe qui ne jouit pas ici de la considération qu'on lui suppose sur le continent, ces démonstrations ne sont soutenues que par le ramas de toutes les populations de l'Europe et stigmatisées par le dégoût de tous les honnêtes gens. Il est constant également que la jactance avec laquelle Kossuth s'est énoncé dans son adresse à Marseille et dans la lettre qu'il a adressée depuis au Maire de Southampton a donné un change très remarquable à l'opinion qu'on s'est formée ici sur le compte de ce dangereux aventurier; les retards qu'éprouve son arrivée ont aussi en quelque sorte déjà ralenti le zèle de ses amis. Toutes ces circonstances me portent à croire que si Kossuth était assez mal avisé pour vouloir à son arrivée se poser comme chef du grand parti du désordre en Europe, il tomberait bientôt dans un ridicule qui le refoulera dans la catégorie des Mazzini et des Louis Blanc, et qu'il serait même honni par un grand nombre de ceux qui, à présent, en font l'idole de leur croyance. Toutefois, son séjour prolongé en Angleterre me semblerait être une infraction flagrante à l'entente au moins tacite, qui semble avoir motivé son élargissement de Kiutahia et si le Gouvernement Britannique pouvait même seulement passivement encourager ce projet, il ajouterait un nouveau tort à tous ceux dont nous avons droit de lui tenir compte dans la part qu'il a prise dans toute cette transaction. Il est certain aussi que malgré le mépris qui l'entourerait, cet homme formerait toujours un point de ralliement fort dangereux pour les intrigues qui s'ourdissent ici contre le repos du Continent. Ce serait donc à la sagesse du Gouvernement Impérial de peser l'importance qu'il croirait devoir attacher à cette nouvelle infraction de bonne foi dont le Ministère de Lord Palmerston nous a déjà fourni tant de preuves, et de juger de la nature des réclamations qui pourraient être présentées au Gouvernement Britannique et sur lesquelles je ne me permettrai pas d'anticiper par un retour trop précipité.

Si, par les raisons que j'ai eu l'honneur de développer plus haut, j'ai cru plus convenable de n'assigner qu'un motif tout à fait personnel à mon départ, je n'userai pas cependant de la même réticence vis à vis de Lord Palmerston, si, comme je le pense, je trouve encore moyen de le voir. Informé de son arrivée en ville, je lui ai adressé avant-hier un billet pour le prévenir que je comptais comme demain, (n'ayant pas alors encore reçu l'invitation pour Windsor) me rendre à la rencontre de Madame de Buol et que je serais charmé s'il pouvait encore avant m'accorder un moment pour pouvoir l'entretenir de différentes communications dont je me trouvais chargé. Je n'ai pas reçu de réponse probablement parce que Monsieur le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat s'est

rendu immédiatement après le Conseil des Ministres d'hier à Windsor, où, au reste, je m'attends à le trouver encore. Je croirais en ce cas ne pas devoir lui dissimuler que j'ai dû avec empressement saisir une occasion pour me soustraire à la réception scandaleuse qu'on prépare à un traître et à un rebelle dans un pays qui cependant affecte de vouloir être en bons rapports avec l'Autriche. Je lui ferai sentir que j'ai cru de la dignité de ma cour de m'absenter et que je craindrais assumer une trop lourde responsabilité en assistant à des orgies politiques que le Gouvernement semblait ne pas pouvoir réprimer, et dont à juger d'un exemple récent de triste notoriété publique, il ne pourrait même pas avoir la puissance de réprimer les excès.

J'ai l'honneur de joindre ici plusieurs coupons de journaux dont l'ensemble donne une idée assez juste des différentes opinions qui tâchent de se faire jour dans l'affaire Kossuth.

Agréez, (etc.)

XVI.

London, October 15, 1851.

Address from the Parliamentary Reform Association to Kossuth.

The Daily News, London, Oct. 17, 1851.

Your Excellency: The Council of the Parliamentary Reform Association offer you their sincere and cordial congratulations on your safe arrival in this country. We esteem our nation honoured by your presence. Britain has often sheltered those whom tyranny has proscribed for their virtues, but in our apprehension, has never received a more illustrious or welcome visitor. Whilst you remain upon our shores you will be the People's Guest. And when you leave them for that land where a great and generous nation wait to echo the shout of welcome that now ascends from the millions of these islands, you will be followed by our heartfelt aspirations for your happiness amongst our honoured brethren of the Western World.

We, and the multitudes of British reformers whom we represent, have watched your career with the liveliest interest. We have rejoiced in your success, we have lamented your disasters; but all, we admired the integrity, the wisdom and the fortitude you have undeviatingly displayed through a long and perilous struggle for your country's rights. In unison with every friend of justice and civilisation, we have been indignant at the cruelty and vindictiveness of the influences which enforced the detention of your person, when the conflict was for the time decided. But this detention while it has rendered infamous those at whose instance it was prolonged, has added to the glory of Kossuth, by demonstrating that he knew how to endure as well as to contend for the noblest cause in which man can either combat or suffer.

Enjoying ourselves a large measure of freedom we sympathize with all who labour to achieve their just political rights. What our ancestors did, you have nobly striven to do. We venerate their memory, and regard you and you brave compatriots as their kindred. The inheritance which those ancestors bequeathed to us is precious and we are endeavouring to show ourselves worthy of it by pressing on to the full realization of the liberty, of which they proclaimed and laid deep the foundation.

In thus acting, our only motive is an earnest desire for human well-being; embracing first our fellow-countrymen, but not confined within the narrow boundary of our own land.

Would you learn the object which as an association we have in view, is to give a full scope and authoritative expression of the popular feeling and opinion, that our government may rest upon the intelligence and will of the people.

In this righteous object we have a firm belief that we shall succeed. When this peaceful triumph shall have been gained, the time will have arrived when the sympathy with which the masses of our people already share the hopes, the fears, the gladness, and the sorrow of their brethren throughout the world, will no longer be suppressed in the legislature or misrepresented by official diplomacy, but will make itself heard in tones, that shall neither be misinterpreted nor disregarded.

At whatever time, or by whatever means, it shall please Providence to raise your country from its temporary prostration to the possession of freedom and nationality, we feel confident that a people's gratitude will be yours.

We feel also confident that your future fame is sure and that mankind touching the results of our consels, your exertions, and your sufferings, will consecrate the name of Kossuth, and transmit it to the latest posterity as that of the liberator of Hungary.

On behalf the Council of the Association,

Joshua Walmsley, President.

XVII.

London, Oct. 17, 1851.

Palmerston to Normanby regarding the memorials of the cities in support of Kossuth's liberation.

MSS. no. 485. F. O. France vol. 896. P. R. O. London.

My Lord,

I have received your Excellency's despatch No. 279 of the 6th instant stating the M. Baroche has expressed to you his regret at hearing of the preparations which are being made for receiving Louis Kossuth on his arrival in England.

Your Excellency is aware that a strong interest has been excited in this country in favour of Kossuth. The interest has been expressed not only in the House of Commons but by memorials which I have received from public meetings held in the various cities and towns including the cities of London and Edinburgh and the towns of Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow, Leeds and Newcastle all praying Her Majesty's Government to use their influence at Constantinople to obtain the release of Kossuth and of his companions in confinement.

But this interest was founded upon the belief that Kossuth is a man who placed himself at the head of a nation resisting an unjust and illegal attempt to deprive them of their ancient constitutional rights and that he was kept in confinement in Turkey against the law of nations and to gratify the resentment of the Austrian Government.

It is natural, therefore, that, when Kossuth arrives in England owing his release very much to the efforts made by Her Majesty's Government in accordance with the general wishes of the British nation; it is natural that, when he so arrives, he should be invited to public dinners; and this will probably be the case, not only at Southampton, but at many other places.

If at these dinners the language of Kossuth is moderate and becoming, those dinners will not lead to give encouragement to the Revolutionary Party in Europe; but if at those dinners his language should be violent and revolutionary, public opinion in this country in regard to him will greatly and speedily change and dinners given to him will cause, or will no longer be attended by any persons of consideration and respectability.

XVIII.

Undated.

Considerations of the difficulties to be surmounted before England can render any official assistance to Hungary.

MSS. of Francis W. Newman, Ko. Pp. P. R. O. Bpest.

The first difficulty is obviously *ignorance of fact*. This will be rapidly dispelled by the public speeches of our noble guest. It is therefore here only needful to remark, that no Englishman feels able to goad an unwilling government into foreign action, until he believes himself to have mastered the *whole* of the case. Thus, it is not enough to know that the Austrian cabinet is grossly and tyrannically violated law and right and mercy against Hungary. Much as we may grieve over this, we shall be publicly passive, if we imagine that Hungary is likely to oppress the Croats, Slovaks and Wallachians, unless herself oppressed by Austria, so long as we are conscious that we imperfectly understand the relations and conduct of the Magyars towards these subordinate races, detestation of the House of Hapsburg will not urge us into any practical aid to the Magyars.

For these reasons, the outline of the past behaviour of the Hungarian Diet towards Croatia and the intrigues of the Austrian cabinet with Jellašić and the Servians, are the most essential complement for our due sympathy with the Hungarian cause. It may be added, that the wickedness of Austria in the matter of the Servians and of Jellašić seems incredible to a vast number of the English *because of its extravagant atrocity*. It is therefore peculiarly needed to fortify this part of the case with the most cogent and undeniable proof; and its analogue, the Austrian massacres in Galicia, — equally disbelieved by us, — equally needs to be insisted on.

A second and greater difficulty remains behind, which nevertheless it will perhaps be in the power of Lewis Kossuth, if of any one, to remove, should by distinctly address himself to the task: — it is, the difficulty felt by every Englishman of setting *any limit* to the national effort incurred by quarelling with any first rate European power. Our past history warns us, how subject we are to an unreasoning warlike fanaticism, when once implicated in hostilities. A saying of the Duke of Wellington's has become current, — "A great country cannot have little war"; and the public imagines, that, whatever the cause or circumstances of a quarrel, any or every English ministry is certain to act as in the past century; when we entered war after war as *secondaries*, but conducted ourselves as *principals*, and, for objects of no interest whatever to the nation, incurred flagitious expenses and debts which still threaten the ultimate welfare of England. The public fears, that the very name of War would become an adequate excuse for total neglect of internal reforms, for *unlimited* prodigality and irresponsibility of ministers, with the prostration of all Parliamentary opposition. In consequence, new warlike loans are regarded as inevitable, which, when peace and sobriety return, may endanger Repudiation of an intolerable Debt, with possible convulsion that will end in civil war.

Thousands of us have not exactly shaped to themselves the forms of terror, which nevertheless, flitting across their hearts, impress their judgments: but all thoughtful men among us feel, that our first duty is to uphold the welfare of our own people, and that the justest indignation and compassion for oppressed foreigners ought not to issue in action which will involve our own people in consequences *which cannot be computed*. This desire of "counting the cost" of a generous deed before we undertake it, pervades all English life. The man who will give twenty pounds to aid a refugee into permanent independence (as by establishing him in America) will possibly grudge to give him a single pound for passing necessities, if he foresees that this first act of charity will probably lead to a series of new demands, harder and harder to refuse, yet propagating themselves — he knows not how far. If the English Parliament were quite sure, that to vote a free gift of

one million, of two million, or of three million sterling, would suffice to establish freedom and order in Hungary or Italy, their vote to this effect would (I believe) be joyfully approved in every part of the United Kingdom; but the gift of a single thousand pounds would be contemplated with diffidence and anxiety, if it seemed to be the precursor of indefinite liabilities.

Thus while we look at the Russian intervention with indignation and disgust, few of us know how to answer the questions with which the Times presses us: "Are you prepared to answer for the consequences of a war with Russia? You are generous and chivalrous: no doubt, all wars are popular in the beginning. But if once you plunge into war and several great powers get implicated in it, are you sure that you will not begin to repent of your generosity? What will you, who cry out for Financial Reform, say, when the war-minister whom you have lifted into power, demands new taxes and new loans? will you then cry out for Peace, and ingloriously abandon the object for which you made War? Or, if you are quite resolved not to go to war, are you so silly as to think that Russia or Austria (knowing this too surely) will care for your words?"

Our people will be deluded by this painful struggle of the judgment, until some powerful voice can reach their ears, proclaiming the solution of the riddle which embarrasses them. To do this by *abstract argument*, might seem impossible; but happily *precedent*, to which Englishmen bow, may here be used presuasively. The part which we took in the siege of Antwerp, in 1832, is a practical reply to the sophisms of the Times, and the fears of Financial Reformers. It is not true, that a great nation cannot have a little war. To imagine this, is to throw into confusion all international morality. It is not true, that *all* Hostilities necessarily reach to that *universal* and *unlimited* hostility, which is designated by the illomened and hateful name, War. During the siege of Antwerp, Dutch ships were unmolested by us on the seas and in the very ports of England. Dutch citizens moved as freely as ever on English soil. No attack on the country of the Dutch was dreamed of by us, or feared by them. Our contest was concerning the city of Antwerp *alone*; and while we *there* cooperated with ships against the Dutch forces, everywhere else we preserved unbroken amity.

Now if it be asked what enabled us so to limit our hostility, the reply is obvious: — "If *we* were willing so to limit it, the Dutch were certain to be glad. With their inferior navy, they could not wish to force England into a naval war: therefore, so long as we proclaimed peace and safety to their ships and people, they gladly imitated us". Nothing but the violence and iniquity of powerful states has hindered the general establishment of similar principles. The powerful have been accustomed to take to themselves unlimited license of retaliation for injuries confessedly limited; so that every petty quarrel is liable to

explode into widespread war: but, as this is a vice which has risen out of the abuse of power, so it is one from which a powerful state, if well principled, can break away, — as we and the French practically showed in the siege of Antwerp.

In the Hungarian struggle, more than in any other great cause, England had remarkable facility for giving efficient aid to the right, while strictly declining to take part as a *principal*, and *limiting at her own will* the amount of effort which she thought it prudent to use. The obvious explanation of this remark lies in the fact, that Russia and Austria are helpless against England in a maritime war; and whatever might be their rage against her, it is certain that they would not have been so mad as to attack her merchantships and her subjects, while she proclaimed peace to theirs. Strictly therefore, we had in our hands full power to keep peace with both states, every where that we chose, with whatever exceptions we might choose. Thus, we might have announced, "We are at war with you in Hungary, but no where else: we shall supply arms, money, troops, generals, to the Hungarians, at our own pleasure; your ships are safe; and our commerce, as far as we are concerned, shall be conducted as though no Hungary existed". Or again: we might have announced both *Hungary* and *Lombardy* as our sphere of war, and have thus distracted the Austrian armies. And what could the despots have done? Suppose them so mad as to attack us on the seas. Our existing fleet far more than suffices to close the Baltic and Black Seas, and to sweep away the little navy of Austria. No addition whatever would be needed to our public forces, in the worst case; and it would be in our own power to limit the succour given to Hungary. We might have either presented it with half a million muskets, or we might have sold them for Kossuth-notes, if too poor to be generous.

These topics are probably familiar to the thoughts of the eminent person for whose eye they are intended. The writer's object in penning them is, *to suggest to him the side on which the English mind is weak*. We not only distrust the discretion of war-ministers (an inevitable thing, after our past history), but we are ignorant of the vast results which a prudent English minister could effect without endangering any new burdens on the nation. It is of great importance to point out to our people the critical opportunities which might have been used for Hungarian freedom in the few last years, *without incurring unlimited liabilities*, and also, what lies in our power for the future.

In the past, I presume, we may enumerate:

1st when the collusion of Latour with Jellašić became a public fact, we might have angrily remonstrated, pointing to the peace of Szatmár at which our ambassador assisted, and to the debt incurred by us for Maria Theresa, on which we are still paying enormous interest: and if remonstrance availed nothing, our minister might have published a

manifesto to Europe, complaining that Constitutional Royalty was being brought into odium, by the malversation of an Austrian Cabinet. The mere publication of such a manifesto might have driven out Schwarzenberg and Bach from the ministry.

2nd when Ferdinand had abdicated, and (since he is still capable of becoming father to a lineal heir of the Hungarian throne) the throne was left necessarily vacant, — Hungary became *ipso facto* for the time independent of Austria. We might then at once have sent an ambassador to the Diet, and angrily protested against the Russian troops in the Danubian principalities, which were preparing to enter Transylvania. Had we done so, the Sultan would probably have commanded them to withdraw, and Windischgrätz might never have received orders to invade Hungary.

3rd when the Austrians invited Russian aid, we might have commanded them to reject it, by the threat of raising Lombardy against them, or of seeking to effect an alliance of Hungary and Turkey.

4th by acknowledging the Roman Republic, we might have effected an important diversion.

Statesman probably know many other possibilities; but the English nation desponds of its own power to do anything at all, except by a prodigious war; and it has seen, with so much disgust, the result of English interference in Spain, Portugal, Naples, Sicily, Greece, Syria, — that we dread *all* foreign intermeddling. If therefore any one desires our nation to aid an oppressed foreign nationality, be ought to be prepared to point out how we can do it, *without losing the government of our own fortune course.*

I must not venture to suggest in this matter what is the right reply: I desire rather to be one of those who hear it. For myself, I distinctly believe that an English minister, backed by the zeal of the nation, and resolving to be unfettered by the Treaty of Vienna which Austria and Russia have repeatedly broken, would be able, without any addition to our existing burdens, to reestablish Hungary and to free Italy; although the latter question is (perhaps only for a little while) greatly embarrassed by the French forces in Rome. But when one considers how the despots are hated in Poland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, — that in all these great countries they have no internal support, but stand by the brute force of armies, — and that half the soldiers would desert if they dared, — one must believe that there are many ways, if our ministry had but an earnest will, to aid Europe into freedom with extremely little active effort on the part of an insular free state which is mistress of the seas. If our people can be made to understand that the procedure used by us in the siege of Antwerp against the Dutch may with equal ease and propriety be used against Russia and Austria, public aid from this country to Hungary will no longer be a thing to be despaired of.

M I S C E L L A N E A.

Le baron P. de Bourgoing et l'intervention russe de 1849.

C'est en étudiant la mission française du comte Ladislas de Teleki que nous sommes tombés pour la première fois sur le nom du baron Paul de Bourgoing. En effet, le représentant du gouvernement national hongrois fait allusion à ce personnage, disant dans l'opuscule intitulé *De l'Intervention Russe* (p. 37), que cet auteur „trompé dans toutes ses prévisions et démenti dans toutes ses assertions par les événements eux-mêmes, a droit à l'indulgence de son prochain”.

Ces paroles d'ironie, sans être injustes, répondent surtout aux exigences de la polémique. Car, il faut en convenir, Bourgoing se montre dans ses écrits bien intelligent et habile, assez bien informé aussi. Il a les avantages d'une illustre naissance, fils d'un ambassadeur, issu d'une famille nivernaise, il compte parmi ses aïeux des gens de robe et des soldats, le principal rédacteur du *Coutume du Bourbonnais* (1534) et un général de la Congrégation de l'Oratoire. Il a parcouru une carrière brillante sous la Restauration: secrétaire de légation à Munich et à Copenhague, il passa en 1828 à Saint Pétersbourg où, en l'absence du Duc de Mortemart, il devint chargé d'affaires. C'est à la suite du tzar Nicolas qu'il fit la campagne de la Turquie et l'influence personnelle qu'il gagna sur l'esprit de l'empereur était pour une bonne part dans la reconnaissance de la monarchie de Juillet par l'autocrate.

Après la chute de Louis Philippe M. de Bourgoing n'avait plus d'envie de servir une République aussi. Il prend congé. Diplomate émérité, il passe ses loisirs à écrire des brochures concernant les questions du jour. Aux débuts de 1849 le problème le plus ardu est celui de l'Europe centre-orientale; c'est donc à lui que notre auteur va consacrer ses talents peu contemptibles. Par la suite il deviendra un adversaire dangereux de la cause hongroise.

Devons-nous l'accuser à priori — après ces prémisses biographiques — de partialité? ou citer d'un article du *Blackwood Magazine* le passage suivant (1849, juin, p. 710, ss.): „From the tendencies of M. Bourgoing's writings which occasionally peep out somewhat thinly clothed, through they are generally well wrapped up, we should infer that the „ancien ministre de France en Russie” does not consider his

connexion with the court of St. Petersbourg as finally terminated."

Peut-être la vérité est-elle plus nuancée. Sous l'influence d'un passé vécu dans une atmosphère russe ou plutôt panslave, et songeant à ses intérêts à l'avenir (ce gouvernement de février peut-il durer? — à 58 ans on ne considère pas sa vie comme terminée!) M. de Bourgoing doit sympathiser avec la cause embrassée par les Souverains, en même temps qu'il essaiera de rendre justice à celle des Hongrois. Jadis il avait même apprécié cette nation. Dans ses *Souvenirs d'Histoire Contemporaine* (Paris, 1864) il rapporte une conversation qu'il a eue avec l'empereur Nicolas à propos des troubles en Pologne (p. 563): „Que V. Majesté” — dit il — „prenne pour exemple la Maison d'Autriche dans sa manière d'agir contre la Hongrie. A cette époque” — ajoute-t-il il en s'excusant — „il m'était permis de citer les Hongrois pour leur dévouement absolu. Je pensais aux nobles élans des sujets de Marie Thérèse, aussi bien qu'aux légions hongroises que j'avais apprises à estimer dans les guerres de l'Empire; les événements de 1848 n'avaient pas eu lieu."

Et pas même ceux de 1849! Les faits d'armes éclatants des 'honorés', leur victoire finale paraissant possible, les sentiments et l'admiration de l'Europe, donnent le signal de ralliement aux forces réactionnaires. Dans le mois de mars si critique, M. de Bourgoing fait paraître chez l'éditeur Dentu un in-8 de 120 pages: *Les guerres d'idiome et de nationalité, tableaux, esquisses et souvenirs d'histoire contemporaine*. La couverture porte un motto tiré de la Genèse, en caractères hébreux — pour servir de gage envers le trône et l'autel.

Dès le début l'auteur annonce, que „le principe de la répartition des nationalités par idiomes est la pensée politique dominante de notre époque. Je dirai même” — poursuit-il — „que l'extension excessive et absolue d'une règle si difficilement applicable est l'une des folies politiques du jour!... Il appartenait à 1848 de voir surgir tout à coup entre les nations européennes une cause imprévue et bizarre de ruine, d'incendie et de carnage... Toutes les nations en effet qui se combattent en Danemark ou en Lombardie, au bord du Danube ou au pied de l'Étna ne se sont guère avisées que depuis dix ans à peu près de regarder la différence du langage comme une cause légitime d'implacable inimitié..."

„Seule la France resta étrangère à cette confusion, et ce désintéressement permet à elle de juger sainement l'état présent de l'Europe." Les questions qui peuvent solliciter son attention, — L'Alsace, la Lorraine, puis les frontières du Rhin — n'ont plus qu'un intérêt historique — (suivent quelques anecdotes et indiscretions curieuses) — et ne deviendront pas actuelles tant que dureront les indécisions de l'Allemagne, ses luttes prolongées entre l'unitarisme et le particularisme. — La France peut donc rester calme, la coalition de 1813 n'existe plus, grâce à Dieu!..." Toutefois de cette satisfaction que doit nous

inspirer la ruine d'une coalition si persistante, il y a loin à une joie coupable, à des souhaits inhumains qui auraient appelé la désorganisation dans les derniers débris de cette gigantesque alliance." (ch. V.; grattez le patriote, il redevient russe!). „La France qui n'a aucune haine, parce qu'elle n'a aucune crainte, n'aurait pu voir qu'avec un sincère regret la subversion de cette antique monarchie autrichienne, dont la ruine eût ébranlé l'Europe entière et porté un coup mortel au commerce, aux finances plus ou moins solidaires de tous les pays civilisés. Ce qui doit nous suffire... c'est que du chaos ou se débattent les nationalités italienne, allemande, hongroise et slave, il sorte des états reconstitués, régénérés peut-être, mais à coup sur, séparés d'intérêts et d'affections." Impossible de proclamer plus franchement le ‚divide et impera'!

Les chapitres qui suivent donnent une sorte d'ordre de bataille des armées combattant en Hongrie. „Dans notre pays de France le courage malheureux a droit à tous les égards, à tous les respects; laissons donc connaître tout d'abord combien ce vaillant peuple (hongrois) est numériquement inférieur aux ennemis qui l'attaquent de toutes parts." — En général c'est la nationalité de chacun des régiments de l'armée impériale qui les a déterminés à embrasser l'un ou l'autre des deux partis. Pourtant quelques-uns des corps slaves ont été sincèrement dévoués à la cause magyare, „ainsi les régiments d'infanterie qui portent le nom de l'Empereur Alexandre et celui du Prince de Wasa; composés, le premier entièrement, le second en partie de Slovaques, se sont, sans hésiter, battus contre l'armée de Jellachich." Par contre on a cité une fraction d'un régiment d'artillerie bohème qui a marché avec Kossuth et dont les soldats cherchaient sans cesse de rejoindre le drapeau contre lequel on les faisait combattre. „De nombreuses désertions ont eu lieu dans ce corps, on a raconté que les cannoniers bohèmes ont parfois a dessein dirigé leurs pièces de manière à faire le moins de mal possible à la ligne sur laquelle on ordonnait de faire feu... on a même dans les dernières affaires dû placer un hussard hongrois auprès de chaque pièce pour s'assurer si ces cannoniers slaves pointeraient avec plus de justesse." ... Un régiment italien tout entier (Zanini) et une partie de celui de Ceccopieri ont fait cause commune avec l'insurrection.

Mais le gros de l'armée est formé de milices. Une belle gravure nous montre leur organisateur: Kossuth Lajos, a honvédelmi bizottmány elnöke (sic! en hongrois). Celui-ci „n'est point Magyar de naissance, mais d'une famille noble Slovaque, ses traits sont le véritable type de cette race... On assure qu'à la première vue tout habitant de la Hongrie reconnaît que Kossuth appartient à ce type de l'une des plus belles races slaves. Il a été élevé dans la partie magyare de la Hongrie. Il existait depuis longtemps parmi la noblesse magyare le principe et l'habitude d'envoyer ses enfants aux collèges situés dans

une contrée slave de la Haute-Hongrie. On plaçait réciproquement les jeunes slaves dans les écoles foncièrement magyares... les familles hongroises et slaves y trouvaient l'avantage de faire apprendre à leurs enfants indépendamment du latin les deux idiomes les plus indispensables pour la vie usuelle. Ce qui explique pourquoi un certain nombre de jeunes slaves élevés dans les collèges magyars ont embrassé, ainsi que Kossuth, la cause de cette nationalité."

Celui-là est avant tout un orateur, non pas un soldat. „C'est le général Moga, valaque de naissance" (évidemment, mais que de Slaves dans le camp hongrois!) „et portant le même nom roumain que l'évêque de Fogaras dans la partie valaque de la Transylvanie, qui a le plus fréquemment dirigé toutes les opérations militaires."

Quel héros au contraire le chef du parti slave Joseph Jellasich, présenté au lecteur sur une gravure. „Il est signalé comme un des hommes les plus éminents de notre époque." C'est un poète. En langue allemande, „celle qu'il parle de préférence, il a publié quelques ballades, odes et chansons." C'est aussi un grand stratège et si l'auteur „fidèle au rôle de narrateur impartial qu'il a adopté, doit dire que les relations hongroises présentent la bataille de Pákozd sous un tout autre aspect", il ne nous épargne néanmoins pas la description de cette victoire fameuse, qui devint connue sous le nom de „Rückwärtsconcentrierung". Il nous fait connaître aussi „l'une des innovations militaires les plus dignes d'attention. C'est l'emploi des célèbres fusées incendiaires autrichiennes. Ces fusées très habilement dirigées ont été mises en usage non seulement contre les villes mais encore heureusement contre les corps de troupes. — Après un résumé de la situation stratégique des partis („mais j'écris en présence d'événements qui changent d'un jour à l'autre et je dois en conséquence m'abstenir de prévisions trop positives en ce qui concerne l'issue prochaine de cette guerre") M. de Bourgoing aborde — après un préambule qui aujourd'hui nous paraît peu convaincant — la question de l'intervention russe.

„Les guerres politiques et de religion ont eu le même caractère d'entraînement universel, mais on peut affirmer que les guerres et révolutions qui pourraient encore surgir seront forcément et naturellement circonscrites aux nationalités qu'elles frappent directement..."

„Ainsi les Russes — Slaves pourtant — s'ils participent après s'être longtemps abstenus à ces combats livrés si près de leurs frontières, ont marché en Transylvanie comme auxiliaires des Valaques et des Saxons, mais seulement à dernière extrémité et appelés par un intérêt pressant et *local*, par la nécessité de protéger des contrées en proie à l'incendie, à la dévastation..."

Quant à vouloir profiter de l'état de l'Europe pour réaliser d'anciens plans d'agrandissement en Orient, tous ceux qui connaissent l'Empereur Nicolas, un des grands caractères de notre époque, peuvent affirmer, que ces projets sont pour le moins ajournés. Sur ce point

spécial j'aurai de nombreux contradicteurs, mais je ne serai que plus péremptoire dans mon affirmation; je parle ici d'une chose que je sais par moi même et de science certaine."

Après cette déclaration „ex cathedra”, l'auteur conclut, que l'intérêt de la France et celle de la paix demandent qu'on ne s'oppose pas aux projets des gouvernements impériaux.

„Quel que soit le résultat ultérieur de tous ces mouvements, le nouveau ferment de discorde internationale, l'idiome, n'a fait que rendre à la France un service essentiel et inespéré: puissant dissolvant il a détruit l'union des peuples de races distinctes, naguère encore coalisés contre elle... Si par impossible, les grandes puissances entraient dans l'arène, on se battrait en Europe entière... La guerre extérieure au lieu de calmer à Paris, à Vienne, à Berlin les mauvaises passions, ne ferait que les enhardir... Les gouvernements sont en présence de cette alternative: Courir follement les chances d'une guerre, c'est à dire, déchaîner dans le monde toutes les passions démagogiques, toutes les aberrations des masses qui les conduiraient à la ruine, ou bien s'entendre entre elles... Affranchis de toute appréhension extérieure, ne songeons plus qu'à lutter autour de nous contre les doctrines perverses, à ramener à nous tous nos compatriotes qui ne sont qu'égarés et sont accessibles au langage de la raison pratique et à celui d'une fraternelle conciliation."

Ainsi se termine cette étude. Très ingénieuse, elle n'a pas réussi pourtant de rassurer l'Europe. L'opinion publique en France est assez prononcée. Les romantiques se rappelaient les vers fatidiques d'Espronceda:

Hurra, cosacos del desierto! Hurra!
La Europa os brinda espléndido botín;

et voyaient déjà les coursiers de la steppe s'abreuver des ondes de la Seine. Les disciples d'Auguste Comte ou plutôt les adhérents de la Religion Positiviste jugeaient que les ambitions de Nicolas I cadraient mal avec le fameux „plan méditerranéen" développé jadis dans les colonnes du Globe. Les parties de gauche comprennent et disent franchement dans leurs journaux — *Le Peuple, La Vraie République, La Réforme, La Révolution*, publications plus ou moins éphémères — que les Hongrois combattent pour la liberté du monde, que leur cause est celle des autres peuples:

Mais un nouveau peuple a surgi
Des flancs de la liberté mère;
La jeune Hongrie a rugi
D'un rugissement de tonnerre.
.....
A la voix de Kossuth le fer
Jaillit en nouvelle phalange
Combien d'autres, Görgey, Percel,

En qui l'amour du droit milite
Tiennent le sublime cartel:
Hourra! Les morts vont vite.

.....
Robert Blum et Messenhauser
Bem avec Dembinsky vous venge!

écrit un certain Pierre Dupont (*Le Peuple*, 13 juin 1849). On annonce de temps en temps pour encourager les lecteurs que la délivrance de Vienne est imminente; le gouvernement autrichien aux abois a offert le commandement des troupes au maréchal Marmont, à l'homme haï, à celui même qui a „ragusé” en 1814. D'ailleurs un publiciste du juste milieu, le comte Aldebert de Chambrun n'espère-t-il pas lui aussi (*De la Politique de la France en Allemagne*. Paris, 1848) que „les Madgyars iront à Vienne continuer l'oeuvre si dignement commencée par les braves habitants de cette antique cité!”

Une brochure anonyme, *Question Austro-Hongroise et Intervention Russe* (Paris, 1849, chez Amyot) — dont l'auteur est peut-être ce même Chambrun — va plus loin et propose des mesures énergiques contre l'agresseur: „S'il est vrai que les entreprises de la Russie sont un danger pour l'Allemagne, la Turquie, l'Angleterre même, est-il donc impossible que ces puissances s'unissent pour déclarer avec nous, qu'il y a cas de guerre si les Russes, appelé ou non, franchissent les Karpathes!”

Mais, c'est un patriote polonais, le comte Stanislas Worcell, qui apporte une solution pratique du problème. Dans ses articles parus au *Demokrata Polski*,* dont il fut aussi le rédacteur, il préconise la fédération de la Hongrie, de la Pologne et de la Valachie. „Voilà le grand avenir de l'Europe!... Le sang slave et magyar coulant ensemble” — dit-il — „lavera toutes les taches, toutes les offenses réciproques... et dans la patrie républicaine, vaste et libérée, trois grandes fleuves et trois grandes mers chanteront de nouveau, comme autrefois, l'hymne de gloire!” Il répond avec une belle force aux sophismes concernant la question des nationalités: „Groupez ensemble un Magyar de la Theiss, un Ruthène de la Kraina, un Slovaque de l'Árva, un Roumain de Transylvanie et un Ráce de Buda et vous constaterez que ce sont les fils d'une même race!... Demandez à chacun d'eux ce qu'il est et il vous répondra: Uher sem! (je suis Hongrois!).

La voix de l'Angleterre résonne tout autant de nette. Le *Blackwood*, dans l'article déjà cité, se sert d'expressions qui nous étonnent de la part d'une revue si modérée pour l'ordinaire: „If Austria uses the power of Russia to enforce injustice and with that view is prepared to sacrifice her own independence, we should refuse to identify

* Quelques-uns de ces articles furent republiés dans *La Pologne et la Hongrie*. Varsovie, 1920.

the cause of monarchy and order, the cause of constitutional liberty, morality and public faith with the dishonest conduct of Austria or with the national antipathies and dangerous aspirations of Russia."

De même, l'*Edinburgh Review*, toujours libéral, supportant la politique de Palmerston, attaque les points de vue austro-russes. Elle fait allusion (1849, p. 230 et ss.), pour la détruire, à la thèse de M. de Bourgoing, peut-être aussi à sa personne: „There is another error which Austria has encouraged — that of regarding the present war as a war of races. Through mistake or interest the continental journalists have generally assisted in misleading the public on this part of the Hungarian question... But neither the venal scribe nor the volunteer ethnologist can abide the test of facts: ... In the first place many of the non Magyar races adhere to the Magyar party and the adherents of the Magyars form numerically the majority and comprise the most civilised portion of the nationalities. In the next place what has been ascribed to a difference of race is really attributable to very different causes. For if we look into the details of each particular raising of the various races, we shall find that either Greek priests or officers of the Austrian army have been the real instigators of the provincial revolts."

Et sonnant le tocsin: „If through Russian aid Austria will be victorious the last barrier is swept away from Constantinople. Austria herself will from that time forward need the bayonets of the czar to keep down her discontented subjects and must sink to the level of a secondary power." Et prophétiquement sa péroraison constate: „The constitutional vitality of Hungary would be equally effective against either extreme: A Cossack ascendancy or a Red Republic!"

La discussion, on la voit, s'envenime. Pendant ce temps la Hongrie résiste, elle seule, aux armées envahisseuses. Le baron de Bourgoing continue sa propagande. Ne chuchote-t-on pas dans certains milieux influents d'un mémoire de haute importance présenté à l'Empereur Nicolas quelques mois après la révolution de février? Il s'agit maintenant de le commenter et de tamiser dans la mesure du possible les effets équivoques qu'il a exercé. En avril 1849 paraît donc un nouveau pamphlet: *Politique et Moyens d'Action de la Russie Impartialement Appréciés*; par P. de B.

Paraître, c'est beaucoup dire: Ce cahier de XXVII pages n'est tiré qu'à douze exemplaires. „J'ai pensé" — dit l'auteur — „qu'il y aurait plus de convenance et d'utilité à ne communiquer ce document qu'à un très petit nombre des principaux régulateurs de notre politique."

Et continuant: „Le mémoire dont je vais donner quelques extraits est l'ouvrage d'un des employés les plus habiles et les plus instruits de cette chancellerie russe où se sont formés sous la direction du Cte. de Nesselrode tant de diplomates distingués... il avait été envoyé

vers le mois d'octobre dernier avec l'assentiment tacite du gouvernement impérial dans l'une des capitales de l'Allemagne pour y être imprimé sur le champ... on l'a vu circuler dans la haute société et parmi plusieurs des hommes politiques les plus influents... il est sur le point d'être livré au grand jour... dans cet état de choses et muni, non pas d'une autorisation formelle, mais d'un assentiment indirect" — (M. de Bourgoing connaît son dictionnaire) — „je ne vois aucun inconvénient à faire partiellement connaître ce document... Voici les premières phrases:

„Pour comprendre de quoi il s'agit dans la crise extrême où l'Europe vient d'entrer, voici ce qu'il faudrait se dire: Depuis longtemps il n'y a plus en Europe que deux puissances réelles: la Révolution et la Russie. Ces deux puissances sont maintenant en présence et demain peut-être elles seront aux prises; entre l'une et l'autre il n'y a ni traité, ni transaction possibles. La vie de l'une est la mort de l'autre; de l'issue de la lutte engagée entre elles, la plus grande des luttes dont le monde ait été témoin, dépend pour des siècles tout l'avenir politique et religieux de l'humanité.”

Le document attaque les idées de 89, se tourne brutalement contre l'Allemagne et „cette Pologne, factieusement catholique, séide fanatique de l'Occident et toujours traître vis à vis des siens" (les Slaves) et à la fin se décharge en haine contre la Hongrie:

„Ce sont toujours les ennemis de la Russie les plus acharnés qui ont travaillé avec le plus de succès au développement de sa grandeur. Cette loi providentielle vient de lui en susciter un qui certainement jouera un grand rôle dans les destinées de son avenir et qui ne contribuera pas médiocrement à en hâter l'accomplissement. Cet ennemi c'est la Hongrie, j'entends la Hongrie magyare. De tous les ennemis de la Russie c'est peut-être celui qui la hait de la haine la plus furieuse... Tous les peuples qui l'entourent, Serbes, Croates, Slovaques, Transylvains, sont les anneaux d'une chaîne qu'il croyait à tout jamais brisée. Et maintenant il sent au dessus de lui une main qui pourra, quand il lui plaira, rejoindre les anneaux et resserrer la chaîne à volonté. De là sa haine instinctive contre la Russie.”

„D'autre part sur la foi du journalisme étranger les meneurs actuels du parti se sont sérieusement persuadés que le peuple magyar avait une grande mission à remplir dans l'Orient orthodoxe, que c'était à lui en un mot, à tenir en échec les destinées de la Russie.”

Même à M. de Bourgoing — qui d'ailleurs distingue soigneusement entre le courant panslave d'une part, l'Empereur conseillé de ses ministres de l'autre — elle paraît un peu féroce cette philippique dirigée contre „la nation hongroise, qui dans toutes les dernières guerres, dans toutes les grandes batailles occupait au milieu de nos adversaires une place si considérable... pense-t-on qu'après la guerre cruelle qui se perpétue elle en revienne jamais au sentiment d'obéis-

sance qui conduisait à Marengo et à Leipzig ses vaillantes cohortes et ses brillants escadrons?" — Rappeler aux Français l'ancienne inimitié des deux peuples, ou plutôt de deux dynasties, — cet éloge s'entend d'une manière douteuse! Mais l'auteur rend aussitôt la parole au document russe:

„Quelle ne serait pas l'horrible confusion où tomberaient ces pays d'Occident aux prises avec la révolution, si le légitime souverain, si l'Empereur orthodoxe d'Orient tardait encore longtemps à apparaître!"

„Non, c'est impossible! ... les pressentiments de mille ans ne trompent point! La Russie, pays de foi, ne manquera pas de foi dans le moment suprême. Elle ne s'effrayera pas de la grandeur de ses destinées et ne reculera pas devant sa mission..."

„L'Occident s'en va; tout croule, tout s'abîme dans une conflagration générale; L'Europe de Charlemagne aussi bien que l'Europe des traités de 1815; la Papauté de Rome et toutes les papautés de l'Occident; le catholicisme et le protestantisme; la foi depuis longtemps perdue et la raison réduite à l'absurde; l'ordre désormais impossible, la liberté désormais impossible et sur toutes ces ruines amoncelées par elle la civilisation se suicidant de ses propres mains... Et lorsqu'au dessus de cet immense naufrage nous voyons, comme une arche sainte, surnager cet Empire plus immense encore, qui donc pourrait douter de sa mission?"

Après cette tirade provocante n'est-elle pas bien paradoxale l'affirmation de M. de Bourgoing, que la Russie ne s'abandonnera à aucune des tendances ambitieuses qu'on lui prête et qu'elle se montrera disposée à seconder de tout son pouvoir les intentions pacifiques des autres cours?

La fin du drame nous est connue: Aux débuts du mois de mai la Russie envahit le sol hongrois. Et dans ses *Aperçus Nouveaux de Politique Internationale* paraissant en 1852 — deux ans avant la guerre de Crimée — dans cette brochure qui est une apologie du Prince Louis Napoleon, dont l'étoile monte, — M. de Bourgoing croit pouvoir poser l'épithète de la Hongrie (p. 36): „L'apparition des Russes a été regardée comme un bienfait pour l'Europe, justement alarmée de la périlleuse perturbation qui se prolongeait dans les contrées danubiennes. Tous ceux qui comprenaient que sans cette intervention le principe de révolte triomphant sur ce point se serait étendu à tout le continent, ont rendu grâce à l'Empereur de Russie, dont tous les actes sont dictées par sa conscience et par l'intérêt de l'Humanité."

Le baron de Bourgoing se doutait-il de l'épilogue? A-t-il prévu l'année 1914, la Monarchie des Romanov détruite, les frontières de l'U. R. S. S. poussées jusqu'aux bords du Danube?

Sándor Baumgarten.

Le maître des médailles de Constantin Brâncoveanu.

Comme pendant la longue durée de la domination turque il était défendu aux voïvodes de Moldavie et de Valachie de faire frapper des monnaies à leur propre coin, les rares pièces numismatiques qui nous sont parvenues de ces provinces et qui sont dues à des circonstances exceptionnelles, méritent une attention spéciale. Un groupe de pièces de cette catégorie est formé par les médailles, connues en plusieurs variantes, de Constantin Brâncoveanu, qui du reste expia terriblement sa témérité d'avoir enfreint l'interdiction de la Sublime Porte. Les médailles de Brâncoveanu ont déjà été plus d'une fois discutées à plusieurs points de vue. Par la suite nous ne nous attacherons qu'à un seul problème, celui d'établir exactement la personne du maître qui a fait ces médailles, puisque les recherches y relatives n'ont pas encore abouti à des résultats satisfaisant sous tous les rapports.

Du reste ces médailles accusent deux types. L'un porte sur l'avvers le buste de profil du voïvode, tandis que sur le revers on voit sur un écusson rond entouré de cartouches ses armes surmontées de la couronne. L'avvers de l'autre médaille montre l'effigie de face du voïvode, tandis que sur le revers les figures de l'armoirie se tiennent dégagées, surmontées aussi de la couronne. Le premier de ces types se rencontre en or et en argent (des dimensions d'un écu ou d'un demi-écu), au poids divers et en trois variantes. Du second, on n'en connaît que deux variantes, en argent, ayant les dimensions d'un demi-écu.

En ce qui concerne l'histoire de ces médailles, les premiers renseignements en sont fournis par le contemporain de l' *del Chiaro*,¹ qui a visité la Valachie aussi. Selon lui, Brâncoveanu fit frapper en Transylvanie plusieurs monnaies d'or et d'argent, sous forme de médailles commémoratives, d'une valeur allant de 2 à 10 pièces d'or de Hongrie. Un exemplaire de ces médailles fut même envoyé à Constantinople pour convaincre le sultan de leur authenticité. Quant au motif de la frappe, *del Chiaro* mentionne que ces médailles devaient être distribuées en 1714, le jour de la fête de la Ste Vierge (le 26 août) au cours des festivités projetées pour célébrer le 70^e anniversaire de la naissance et le 26^e anniversaire du règne du voïvode. Mais les renseignements de *del Chiaro* ne sont pas tout à fait exacts. Ils ont été rectifiés par

¹ Antonmaria del Chiaro, *Istoria delle moderne rivoluzioni*. Venezia, 1718, p. 175.

Moisil dans un article consacré aux médailles de Brâncoveanu.² Moisil a démontré qu'étant datées de l'année 1713 ces médailles doivent être rattachées aux événements de cette année. Il considère donc comme occasion directe de la frappe le 25^e anniversaire du règne du voïvode. Les médailles publiées par del Chiaro ne portant pas de date, il ne connaissait manifestement pas l'année de la frappe. Il est possible que — comme le pense Moisil — pour une raison quelconque le voïvode n'eût en effet l'intention de distribuer ces médailles frappées en 1713 qu'en 1714, mais cette distribution n'eut jamais lieu. Les ennemis du voïvode mirent tout en oeuvre pour le perdre et formulèrent toutes sortes de plaintes contre lui. Parmi les nombreux chefs d'accusation figurait aussi le fait qu'il avait fait frapper des monnaies à son nom et à ses armes, monnaies dont une pièce en or était aussi jointe à l'acte d'accusation. Aussi la cour de Constantinople convoitant les trésors du voïvode décida-t-elle sa mort et le fit arrêter et conduire à Constantinople, lui et sa famille, par le pacha Rapoudji. Là, il fut décapité en même temps que ses quatre fils et son ministre des finances le 17 août 1714, presque le jour même des solennités projetées.³

Déjà selon la notice de del Chiaro, les pièces en question n'étaient pas des pièces de monnaie, mais des médailles commémoratives que le voïvode fit frapper conformément à la mode générale de l'époque. Gebhard qui est aussi de cet avis, en parle en ces termes: „Diese Münzen waren erst kürzlich in Siebenbürgen mit einigen in Holland Sauber geschnittenen Stempeln geprägt und hielten 2, 5 und 10 hungarische Dukaten in Golde und einzelne Thaler und Gulden in Silber; da sie aber nicht völlig das Gewicht der Ausgebemünzen hatten, so schien es, dass sie, wie damals das Gerücht gieng, vom Fürsten bestimmt worden waren, als Schaumünzen . . .” etc. Moisil leur donne aussi le nom de médailles commémoratives en se basant sur leur exécution soignée et sur les différences de poids des exemplaires connus, étant donné que des monnaies courantes ne pourraient tout de même pas accuser des écarts de poids si considérables. Dernièrement I. Ţabrea a soutenu la thèse contraire, mais sans produire des arguments particulièrement convaincants, de sorte

² Const. Moisil, *Medaliile lui Constantin-Vodă Brâncoveanu*: Buletinul Soc. Num. Române XI (1914), p. 9—18.

³ Ludewig Albrecht Gebhardi, *Geschichte des Reichs Hungarn und der damit verbundenen Staaten*. Leipzig, 1782, vol. IV, p. 455.

qu'il faut continuer à considérer ces pièces comme des médailles commémoratives.⁴

Reste à savoir où ces médailles ont été frappées et qui a gravé les coins-matrices. Outre les renseignements écrits, on n'a qu'un seul appui fixe pour élucider ce problème, c'est la signature dont on rencontre même deux variantes sur les médailles du premier type: C. I. H. et C. H. Del Chiaro et d'après lui Gebhard affirment que le voïvode fit faire ces médailles en Transylvanie, opinion admise par Moisil et par Țabrea aussi. Mais selon Gebhard, comme il ressort de la phrase citée plus haut, les coins-matrices auraient été faits en Hollande. Joachim trouve l'exécution des médailles si soignée et l'effigie si artistique qu'il en conclut que les coins devaient être gravés en Allemagne.⁵ En revanche d'après Engel l'artiste aurait été le médailleur suisse Carl Johann Hedlinger.⁶ En cherchant la source de cette identification, j'ai constaté qu'il avait puisé se renseignement chez Schönvisner, qui, après avoir décrit la médaille, désigne Hedlinger comme son auteur.⁷ Cette information d'Engel a été reprise par Moisil aussi qui attribue la médaille également à Hedlinger. Comme on voit, l'origine de ces pièces est assez incertaine, une seule chose semble acquise, c'est qu'ellen furent frappées en Transylvanie.

On constate du reste de notables contradictions entre toutes ces hypothèses. Si les coins-matrices ont été gravés en Hollande, ils ne peuvent pas être l'oeuvre du Suisse Hedlinger et vice versa. Mais si l'on examine les détails de la biographie de Hedlinger, on est obligé d'admettre que rien n'est moins assuré que l'attribution des pièces en question à ce médailleur. Johann Carl Hedlinger, qui joue un si grand rôle dans l'art de la médaille au XVIII^e siècle, naquit le 18 mars 1691 à Schwyz, chef-lieu du canton suisse du même nom. En 1700 il alla avec ses parents en Allemagne, à Bollenz im Pleniethale, où son père obtint une place d'inspecteur des mines. C'est là qu'il fit ses études et qu'il com-

⁴ Ilie Țabrea, *Originea și evoluția talerilor: Cronica Num. și Arheol.* București, 1934. N^o 100, p. 92—93.

⁵Johann Friedrich Joachim, *Das neu eröffnete Münzkabinet.* Nürnberg, 1761, p. 51—56, planche V, N^o 3.

⁶ Johann Christian Engel, *Geschichte des Ungrischen Reichs und seiner Nebenländer*, vol. IV, I. partie: *Geschichte der Moldau und Walachei.* Halle, 1804, p. 73.

⁷ Stephanus Schönvisner, *Notitia Hungaricae rei numariae etc.* Budae, 1801, p. 569: „Infra C. I. H. nomina Incisoris Caroli Johannis Hedlinger”.

mença à dessiner. En 1708 la famille retourna à Schwyz où le jeune Hedlinger fit ses premiers pas dans l'art de la gravure. En 1709 il se rendit à Sitten dans le canton du Valais chez Wilhelm Crauer, médailleur et inspecteur de la Monnaie épiscopale, qui lui inculqua les premiers éléments de l'art qu'il allait illustrer. En 1712 il participa comme volontaire dans le corps de Lucerne à la campagne de Villmergen, puis resta encore trois années à Lucerne. Depuis 1713 il travailla aussi pour l'Hôtel Municipal des Monnaies, mais sa première médaille commémorative connue, qu'il offrit au canton de Lucerne, ne date que de 1714.⁸ De toutes ces données biographiques détaillées il ressort que Hedlinger, qui allait acquérir plus tard une renommée internationale, n'était en 1713 qu'au début de sa carrière de médailleur et qu'aucune médaille commémorative n'était encore sortie de ses mains. On ne peut donc nullement supposer que pour le voïvode de la lointaine Valachie un jeune homme inconnu ait gravé ces médailles. Du reste aucune de ses biographies ne lui connaît ces oeuvres. On comprend l'erreur de Schönvisner, qui n'a pris en considération que la signature et sachant que Hedlinger dans ses oeuvres ultérieures se servait des initiales *I. C. H.*, l'a identifié avec le maître des médailles de Brâncoveanu, sans soumettre à un examen critique la possibilité d'un rapport de ces médailles avec l'artiste suisse.

Il faut donc chercher une autre piste pour arriver à la personne du maître médailleur. Comme il a été mentionné plus haut, les sources anciennes et modernes sont d'accord pour constater que le voïvode a fait frapper ces pièces en Transylvanie. Il est superflu d'insister sur les rapports étroits qui existaient entre la Transylvanie et le voïvodat surtout dans le domaine de l'art et de la monnaie. Pour ne mentionner que les faits les plus saillants, les pièces d'orfèvrerie transylvaines étaient objets d'une importation ininterrompue sur le territoire des voïvodats et l'infiltration des pièces de monnaie peut aussi être considérée comme constante. Les médailles connues de Michel, voïvode de Moldavie, émanent aussi sans aucun doute d'un atelier monétaire transylvain et plus tard le despote Héraclidès avait dans sa cour un

⁸ *Lebensabriss des berühmten Medailleurs Ritter Johann Carl Hedlinger von Schwyz*: Num. Zeitung, Blätter für Münz-, Wappen- und Siegel-Kunde. Weissensee i. Th., 1862, p. 73; L. Forrer, *Biographical Dictionary of Medallists*, vol. II, 1904, p. 455; Chrétien de Mechel, *Oeuvre du Chevalier Hedlinger ou recueil des médailles de ce célèbre artiste* etc. Basle, 1786.

maitre-monnayeur saxon de Transylvanie, nommé Wolf.⁹ On peut mentionner comme exemple plus rapproché le fait relaté par Gebhard¹⁰ que voulant munir l'acte d'accusation rédigé contre Brâncoveanu des signatures et sceaux contrefaits des boïards de marque, on fit graver les faux cachets et Transylvanie. Donc, abstraction faite des sources écrites, on peut constater que rien ne s'opposait à ce que le voïvode fit faire ses médailles en Transylvanie.

En 1713 un seul atelier monétaire transylvain était en exploitation, celui de Gyulafehérvár (auj. Alba-Iulia). Les monnaies de Joseph I^{er} (1705—11) avaient encore été frappées à Szeben (auj. Sibiiu), mais après sa mort, peut-être dès 1712, mais en tous cas dès 1713, l'atelier fut transféré à Gyulafehérvár, où en 1713 il travaille déjà sous la direction de Franzl Leopold Kropf.¹¹ On connaît non seulement le nom du maître-monnayeur, mais celui du graveur de coins aussi, c'était, d'après les données recueillis au Hofkammer-Archiv de Vienne, Charles Joseph Hofmann: „Karl Josef Hofmann, Eisenschneider im Münz-amte zu Carlsburg 1713—1738. 1713 H. wird zum Münzeisenschneider zu Carlsburg mit 200 fl. Gehalt ernannt.”¹² Dans les années qui suivent, il est plusieurs fois mentionné et nous savons qu'il était un médailleur fécond, qui, outre les matrices des monnaies courantes, fit toute une série de médailles commémoratives relatives à la Transylvanie et souvent signées par lui. On connaît jusqu'à présent 11 types de médailles, en partie pourvues de sa signature et en partie anonymes, mais attribuées à lui; ce sont¹³

1714	la fondation de la forteresse de Gyulafehérvár	signé	C. H.
1715	„	„	C. I. H.
1716	la victoire de Temesvár	„	H.
1716	la naissance de l'archiduc Léopold	„	C. H.
1717	la prise de Belgrade	„	H.
1717	le rétablissement de la Dacie		anon.

⁹ E. Fischer, *Beitrag zur Münzkunde des Fürstenthumes Moldau*. Czernowitz, 1901, p. 13.

¹⁰ *Ou. c. p.* 454.

¹¹ Pour les monnaies v. A. Resch, *Siebenbürgische Münzen und Medaillen*. Hermannstadt, 1901.

¹² *Katalog der Münzen- und Medaillen-Stempel-Sammlung des k. k. Hauptmünzamt in Wien*. Wien, vol. IV, 1906, p. 1269.

¹³ Pour la description détaillée des médailles v. Huszár—Procopius, *Medaillen- und Plakettenkunst in Ungarn*. Budapest, 1933, p. 73—5, N^o 214—27.

1721 le comte Hugo de Virmond	"
1722 la pragmatique sanction	" H.
1734 Etienne Wesselényi	anon.
s. d. le général de Steinville	" C. HOFF.
„ „ médaille de St. Georges	" C. I. H.

On voit d'après cette liste que la signature le plus fréquemment employée par Hofmann correspond aux initiales qu'on trouve sur les médailles de Brâncoveanu et que les lettres *C. I. H.* et *C. H.* se rencontrent souvent sur ses oeuvres. En revanche aucune des signatures de Hedlinger — c'est-à-dire, selon *F o r r e r* : *I. C. H.*, *I. C. H. F.* ou *H.* — ne s'accorde avec les initiales qu'on voit sur les médailles du voïvode. Nous ne connaissons même pas un autre maître de cette époque qui aurait signé ses médailles de cette façon. La réouverture de l'atelier monétaire de Gyulafehérvár est peut-être en rapport avec la fondation de la forteresse. C'est alors que s'y installa comme médailleur Charles Joseph Hofmann, qui, par conséquent, aurait gravé en Transylvanie ses premières médailles commémoratives à l'ordre du voïvode de Valachie. Puis suivent en série ininterrompue ses autres médailles connues. On ne peut décider la question de savoir, s'il a fait les médailles de Brâncoveanu en 1713 ou en 1714, car il est vrai que les pièces mêmes portent la date de 1713, mais d'autre part, selon del Chiaro, elles n'allaient être distribuées qu'en 1714. En tous cas l'attribution à Hofmann est bien plus plausible que l'hypothèse Hedlinger. En outre, sachant que les médailles ont été frappées en Transylvanie, il est bien plus naturel de chercher le médailleur dans ce pays plutôt que dans de lointaines contrées de l'Europe.

En dehors des arguments chorologiques et historiques, les analogies de style plaident aussi en faveur de l'hypothèse Hofmann. Non seulement les caractères généraux des deux groupes de médailles en question sont identiques, mais même leurs menus détails accusent des traits communs surprenants. On peut surtout constater l'identité de type des lettres, la disposition particulière de la légende, de même que son exécution qui rappelle les ouvrages en relief. On peut aussi mentionner la bordure composée de cercles concentriques, trait caractéristique qui se retrouve sur les autres médailles de ce maître. C'est surtout l'autre médaille des premières années de Gyulafehérvár qui se prête aux rapprochements, celle qui est relative à la fondation de la forteresse (v. fig. N^o 4 sur la planche). Elle fournit des preuves abondantes pour

tout ce que nous venons d'avancer. Nous pouvons aussi mentionner la médaille à l'effigie du général de Steinville (planche, fig. N° 5) où Hofmann s'avère bon portraitiste, ce qui corrobore notre hypothèse de lui attribuer les médailles de Brâncoveanu. Enfin le revers décoré d'armoiries de la médaille du comte de Virmond (planche, fig. N° 6) fournit aussi des éléments de comparaison.

Il est possible que le type non signé des médailles de Brâncoveanu ne fût qu'un essai, comme le pense Moisil. La rareté de ces pièces par rapport à celles de l'autre type semble appuyer cette hypothèse. Quoi qu'on pense de cette partie du problème, il semble acquis que le maître des médailles de Brâncoveanu, frappées en Transylvanie selon le témoignage des contemporains, ne peut être que Charles Joseph Hofmann, graveur de coins et médailleur. Quant au lieu de la frappe, la désignation vague „faite en Transylvanie” peut être remplacée par celle bien plus précise „à l'atelier monétaire de Gyulafehérvár”.

La description des médailles.

Type 1.

1. A. + CONSTANTINVS · BASSARABA — DE · BRAN·
KOWAN Buste tourné à droite. En bas les initiales · C · H ·

R. + D · G · VOIVODA + ET + PRINCEPS + — + VA·
LACHIAE + TRANS + ALPINAЕ + Au milieu de cartouches
un blason rond surmonté d'une couronne, flanqué de griffons des
deux côtés. Sur le blason un aigle avec une croix dans le bec, de
côté en haut soleil et lune, en bas 17 — 13.

Argent, 46 mm., Budapest, Cabinet de Médailles (30,40, 31,85
gr.); Academia Română (30,95, 30,405, 27,9 gr.); Vienne Münz·
kabinet (27,35 gr.); Vienne, Schottenstift (31,171 gr.). — Moisil
op. cit. N° 2.

2. (Pl. N° 2). A. · CONSTANTINVS · BASSARABA — DE ·
BRANKOWAN · Buste comme sur la précédente, en bas les
initiales · C · I · H ·

R. + D † G † VOIVODA + ET + PRINCEPS † — +
VALACHIAE + TRANS + ALPINAЕ + Blason et année
comme sur la précédente, mais exécutés comme un relief.

Argent, 46 mm. Budapest, Cabinet de Médailles (33,57, 43,33
gr.); Academia Română (43,2, 42,54, 42,30, 39,2 gr.); Vienne,
Schottenstift (38,625 gr.); — Moisil, *op. cit.* N° 3.



1



2



3



4



5



6

3. (Pl. N^o 1). E. CONSTANTINVS BASSARABA — DE BRANKOWAN Buste à droite sans initiales.

R. D : G : VOIVODA ET PRINCEPS — VALACHIAE TRANSALPINAЕ Blason comme sur la précédente mais en bas, dans des cartouches, les initiales C — H.

a) Or, 35 mm. Budapest, Cabinet de Médailles (20,79, 17,34 gr.); Academia Română (20,91, 20,80, 17,28 gr.); Vienne Münzkabinet (17,455 gr.); — Moisil, *op. cit.* N^o 1.

b) Argent, 35 mm. Budapest, Cabinet de Médailles (16,69, 16,32, 17,34 gr.); Academia Română (15,2, 14,72, 14,20); Vienne, Münzkabinet (21,88 gr.); Vienne, Schottenstift (19,057 gr.); — Moisil, *op. cit.* N^o 4.

Type 2.

4. (Pl. N^o 3). A. CONSTANTINVS BASSARABA DE BRANCOWAN Buste de face, bord en cercle.

R. D G VALACHIAE TRANSALPINAЕ PRINCEPS ET VOIVODA Aigle avec une croix dans le bec, en haut couronne. De côté en haut soleil-lune, en bas 17 — 13.

Argent, 36 mm. Budapest, Cabinet de Médailles (21,15 gr.); Academia Română (12,25 gr.). — Moisil, N^o 6.

5. A. CONSTANTINVS BASSARABA DE BRANCOWAN Buste comme sur la précédente, mais ta tête tournée un peu à droite.

R. D G VALACHIAE TRANSALPINAЕ PRINCEPS ET VOIVODA Comme la précédente, mais la couronne est placée plus haut et les rayons du soleil sont moins nombreux.

Argent, 36 mm. Academia Română (25,67 gr.). — Moisil, N^o 5.

Lajos Huszár.

Zur Frage der gepidisch-rumänischen Symbiose in Siebenbürgen.

Seitdem die Sprachwissenschaft als wichtige Hilfswissenschaft der Geschichtsforschung betrachtet wird, werden die sprachwissenschaftlichen Resultate besonders auf dem Gebiete der Siedlungs- und der Urgeschichte sehr oft mit großem Erfolge angewandt. Für deren Erforschung haben sich die Ergebnisse der Sprachwissenschaft — neben denen der Archäologie — als die wichtigsten, ja die einzigen Hilfsmittel erwiesen, ohne die man auf diesen Gebieten, wegen des Mangels an historischem Quellenmaterial, nur im Dunkel herumtasten würde. Es ist daher nichts Auffallendes daran zu finden, daß in der Literatur über die Urgeschichte eines Volkes oder über die Siedlungsgeschichte eines Gebietes, die Linguisten des öfteren eine hervorragende, ja führende Rolle spielen.

Trotz dieser wichtigen Stellung der Sprachwissenschaft in der Ur- und Siedlungsgeschichtsforschung kann es nichtsdestoweniger keinem Zweifel unterliegen, daß sowohl die Urgeschichte, wie auch die Siedlungsgeschichte *historische* Disziplinen sind, deren Zielsetzung, Gesichtspunkte und Methode die der Geschichtsforschung sein müssen. Die Sprachwissenschaft kann hier nur als Hilfswissenschaft mitwirken, indem sie das *Quellenmaterial* hergibt. Wie aber jeder geschichtliche Quellenbeleg bei jeder einzelnen Frage auf seine Glaubwürdigkeit und seine Beweiskraft hin immer wieder nachgeprüft werden muß, müssen auch die sprachwissenschaftlichen Ergebnisse stets sorgsamer Kontrolle unterzogen werden. Wenn sie nun die Probe in jeder Hinsicht bestehen, kann erst erwogen werden, was für Schlüsse aus ihnen gezogen werden können. Die erste Etappe der Kontrolle der sprachwissenschaftlichen Ergebnisse — ob sie nämlich zuverlässig sind oder nicht — ist eine Aufgabe rein sprachwissenschaftlicher, die andere hingegen vorwiegend geschichtswissenschaftlicher Natur. Dieser innige Zusammenhang der Sprachwissenschaft mit der Geschichte auf den erwähnten Gebieten setzt bei den Forschern voraus, daß sie in beiden Wissenschaften die notwendige Schulung besitzen, um die Ergebnisse beider Wissenschaften selbständig nachprüfen zu können.

Diesen Anforderungen konnten aber die Forscher bis jetzt nur ausnahmsweise nachkommen. Es gibt nämlich sehr wenig sprachwissenschaftlich geschulte Historiker, die mit dem linguistischen Beweismaterial kritisch umgehen können, wie auch die

Sprachforscher nur in seltenen Fällen historisch denken. Diesem Zustand ist es in erster Reihe zuzuschreiben, daß, trotz der großen Menge der siedlungsgeschichtlichen und ON-Kunde betreffenden Arbeiten, die Zahl der methodisch einwandfreien Arbeiten verhältnismäßig sehr gering ist. Da auch von der Herausbildung einer allgemein maßgebenden siedlungsgeschichtlichen Forschungsmethode noch immer nicht gesprochen werden kann, finden wir bei den einzelnen Forschern Individualmethoden verschiedenen Wertes, so daß ihre Arbeiten einen sehr mannigfaltigen Gesamteindruck machen.

Im Folgenden gedenke ich einige Beiträge zur Methode der Siedlungsgeschichte zu liefern, indem ich die Methode und die Ergebnisse der Arbeit von Ernst Gamillscheg, dem vielverdienten Berliner Romanisten, über die gepidisch-rumänische Symbiose in Siebenbürgen¹ sowohl vom Standpunkte der Sprachwissenschaft, wie auch von dem der Geschichte einer näheren Kontrolle unterziehe.

Nach der Theorie von G. hätten sich die Rumänen, gleich wie die westromanischen Völker, aus einem Konglomerat von bodenständigen romanisierten Urbewohnern und von germanischen Eroberern entwickelt. Es wird außerdem noch vorausgesetzt, daß dieses germanische Volk die Gepiden gewesen seien. Da nun die Gepiden im V—VI. Jh. in Siebenbürgen zweifellos nachgewiesen werden können, nimmt G. als selbstverständlich an, daß die Herausbildung der Rumänen aus Germanen und Romanen nur in Siebenbürgen vor sich gehen konnte. Daraus sollte aber gleichzeitig folgen, daß die Urheimat der Rumänen in Siebenbürgen zu suchen sei. Wie mit dieser Auffassung der Bodenständigkeit der Rumänen im alten Dazien die nach dem Balkan hinweisenden vielen sprachlichen und historischen Beweise² in Einklang gebracht werden können, darum kümmert sich G. überhaupt nicht. Diese Seite der Frage glaubt er damit erledigen zu können, daß er die von verschiedenen Forschern gegen die rumänische Kontinuität zusammengetragenen schwerwiegenden Beweise einfach keiner Erwähnung würdigt.

Die Theorie von G. ist allerdings nicht neu, denn sie ist gänz-

¹ Ernst Gamillscheg, *Die altgermanischen Bestandteile des Ostromanischen: Romania Germanica*, Bd. II. Berlin u. Leipzig, 1935, S. 233—266 (Grundriß der german. Philologie, Bd. XI/2).

² Vgl. Tamás, *Romains, Romans et Roumains dans l'histoire de la Dacie Trajane*: Arch. Eur. C.-Or. I, 1—96, II, 46—83, 245—374.

lich dem rumänischen Gelehrten Constantin C. Diclescu³ entnommen. G. hat zu Gunsten dieser Theorie nichts Neues ermittelt, er versucht gar nicht, die von vielen Seiten gegen D.-s Beweismaterial erhobenen Einwände zu widerlegen und begnügt sich vollkommen mit der bloßen Wiederholung der Diclescu'schen Beweisführung! G. glaubt die fast allgemein ablehnende Stellungnahme der Kritik den Untersuchungen von D. gegenüber bloß dadurch entkräften zu können, daß er den Kritikern vorwirft, die historische Begründung der Aufstellungen von D. außer Acht gelassen zu haben, obzwar diese Begründung — nach G. — lückenlos gelungen sei. Es heißt also, daß D. die Theorie der Symbiose der Gepiden und der Rumänen, sowie die der Kontinuität der Rumänen in Siebenbürgen, historisch begründet hätte. Man sollte demnach also glauben, daß es D. gelungen sei historische und archäologische Argumente zu entdecken, die die Kontinuität der Rumänen in Siebenbürgen außer jeden Zweifel setzen. Man könnte auch daran denken, daß D. möglicherweise einige archäologische Funde angeführt hat, die mindestens das Fortleben der römischen Kultur in Dazien nach dem Aufgeben der dazischen Provinz beweisen. Von solchen Beweisen ist aber bei D. gar keine Spur zu finden! Die ganze historische Beweisführung für die Symbiose der Rumänen mit den Gepiden, sowie für die römisch-rumänische Kontinuität im ehemaligen Dazien besteht seltsamerweise einzig und allein darin, daß D. die Anwesenheit der Gepiden in Siebenbürgen im V—VI. Jh. nachweist⁴ — womit er allerdings nichts Neues entdeckt. Alles dagegen, was er über die vermeintlichen romanischen Untertanen der Gepiden sagt, ist eine auf Grund durchaus persönlicher linguistischer Argumente aufgestellte Hypothese! Es ist also vollkommen rätselhaft, was G. unter „gelungener historischer Beweisführung“ bei D. versteht, zumal eine solche bei D. gar nicht anzutreffen ist.

Die Kontinuität der Rumänen in Siebenbürgen, sowie deren Symbiose mit den Gepiden im V—VI. Jh. werden von D. und nach ihm von G. einzig und allein durch linguistische Mittel „bewiesen“. Diese Beweisführung kann uns als Musterbeispiel dafür dienen, wie man die Sprachwissenschaft für die Siedlungsgeschichte nicht heranziehen darf. D. und G. führen zur Verteidi-

³ Constantin C. Diclescu, *Die Gepiden*. Bd. I. Leipzig, 1923.

⁴ Über die die Gepiden betreffenden historischen und archäologischen Resultate D.-s s. die Besprechung von A. Alföldi: *Protestáns Szemle*, XXXIII—1924, 389—393 und *Revue des Etudes Hongroises* IV—1926, 187—191.

gung ihrer Hypothese dreierlei Argumente an: A) rumän. Appellativa, die nach ihnen ostgermanischer, „also“ gepidischer Herkunft wären, B) rumän. PN, die gleichfalls aus dem Ostgermanischen, d. h. Gepidischen stammen sollen, und C) gepidische ON aus Siebenbürgen.

A) D. und G. versuchen einige rumän. Wörter (bei G. 26 an Zahl) aus dem Ostgermanischen herzuleiten. Da aber nach ihrer Meinung die Rumänen mit Ostgermanen anderswo, als in Siebenbürgen, nicht hätten in Berührung kommen können (vgl. die oben erwähnte „historische Beweisführung“!), in Siebenbürgen aber von den Ostgermanen nur die Gepiden nachzuweisen sind, ginge daraus klar hervor, daß diese Wörter nur gepidischen Ursprungs sein könnten. Obzwar der ostgermanische Ursprung dieser Wörter beinahe von sämtlichen Forschern abgelehnt wurde,⁵ so daß sie schon deshalb für historische Zwecke vollkommen wertlos sind, könnte man sie selbst in dem Falle nicht zu ähnlichen Behauptungen verwenden, wenn ihre ostgermanische Herkunft über jeden Zweifel nachgewiesen werden könnte. Die Annahme nämlich, daß „ostgermanisch“ diesmal ausschließlich nur „gepidisch“ bedeuten müßte, daß also die Rumänen von den Ostgermanen einzig und allein mit den Gepiden Beziehungen angeknüpft hätten, fußt gänzlich auf der Hypothese der rumän. Kontinuität in Siebenbürgen. An und für sich kann man aber aus diesen Wörtern — vorausgesetzt, daß sie überhaupt etwas mit Germanen zu tun haben — für das Gebiet der Übernahme keine sicheren Schlüsse ziehen. Über die Gepiden wissen wir nur so viel, daß sie mit den Goten sehr nahe verwandt waren, inwiefern sich aber ihre Sprache von der der Goten — die wir sehr gut kennen — unterschied, ist eine offene Frage geblieben. Wir haben deshalb keine lautlichen Kriterien um die gepidischen Elemente von den gotischen bei der Untersuchung der ostgermanischen Bestandteile des Rumänischen (oder irgendeiner anderen Sprache) auseinander halten zu können. Wenn man also nicht aprioristisch die These der rumän. Kontinuität in Siebenbürgen bejaht, und die Argumente dafür erst nachträglich zusammenträgt, wird man zugeben müssen, wie auch P. Skok⁶ betont, daß die ostgermani-

⁵ P. Skok: ZfrPh. XLIII—1923, 183; ib. XLI, 420; Revue des Etudes Slaves III, 70; Giuglea: Dacorom. III, 966; Puşcariu, ib. 837; G. Weigand: Balkan-Archiv, II—1927, 307—310. Vgl. über die von G. aufgestellten gepidischen Etymologien auch die kritischen Bemerkungen von L. Tamás: AECO. II—1936, 312—3.

⁶ Skok: ZfrPh. XLIII—1923, 187.

schen Elemente des Rumän. auch aus dem Gotischen stammen können. In diesem Falle könnten sie aber nur südlich der Donau, d. h. im alten Moesien oder sonstwo übernommen worden sein.

B) Genau dasselbe ist auch über die vermutlichen gepidischen PN zu sagen. Sie könnten mit ebensolchem Rechte aus dem Gotischen, wie aus dem Gepidischen hergeleitet werden, für die Frage der Urheimat der Rumänen könnten sie uns also selbst in dem Falle keinen zuverlässigen Beweis liefern, wenn ihre Deutung jede Probe bestehen würde. Dem ist aber bei weitem nicht so. Schon G. Weigand, in seiner Besprechung des Diculescu'schen Werkes (o. c. 309) hat kurz darauf hingewiesen, daß PN wie *Aldea*, *Berea*, *Bodea*, *Gotea*, *Manea*, *Monea* slawischen Ursprungs sind, wie überhaupt der weitaus größte Teil der rumän. PN aus dem Slawischen stammt. Auf wie schwachem Fuße die Deutungen dieser PN aus dem Ostgermanischen stehen, fühlt auch G., der sie selbst für unsicher erklärt. Nur sollen sie „an Wahrscheinlichkeit gewinnen, sobald die Kontinuität des Rumänentums im Gepidenreich bejaht wird“ (246). Nach G. muß man also zuerst an die Kontinuität der Rumänen in Siebenbürgen fest glauben, um überhaupt die Beweise dafür annehmen zu können!

Von diesen PN stammt *Berea*⁷ bestimmt aus dem slaw. PN *Berislav*, *Berivoj* usw., der in dieser Form (neben *Borivoj*) besonders in den südslawischen Sprachen häufig ist (Maretić: Rad LXXXI, 113, Weigand: Jber. 26/29, 145). Der PN *Manea* hat mit got. *manna* ‚Mensch‘ nichts zu tun, da er teils aus dem sl. *Manislav*, teils aus dem christlichen *Emanuel* > *Manuil* gebildet ist (Paşca,⁸ 274). Ob *Monea* aus *Si-mon*, oder *Solomon* stammt, wie Weigand und Paşca meinen, oder aber — wenigstens ein Teil dieser Namen — auf den griechischen *Monomachos* zurückgehen, ist in jedem Einzelfalle besonders nachzuprüfen. Jedenfalls darf er mit dem got. PN *Munisa* nicht verglichen werden. *Onea* ist nach Paşca's richtiger Erklärung ein Hypokoristikon von *Ioan* (o. c. 292, 260). Es ist aber sehr gut möglich, daß er aus dem PN *Onuphrios* stammt, der besonders bei den Kleinrussen sehr beliebt ist (vgl. *Oniško*, *Onač*, *Onačko*, *Onuško*, *Onučko*, *Onas*, *Onanko* usw. Žerela Ukrajiny III, 504; Hrinčenko II, 1068). Den Ursprung der PN *Aldea*, *Aldomir*, die

⁷ Das Suffix *-ea* ist slaw. Ursprungs (Pascu, *Sufixeale româneşti*. Bucureşti, 1916, 299—300) und hat mit dem latein. *illa*, woran G. (S. 245) denkt, nichts zu tun.

⁸ Ştefan Paşca, *Nume de persoane și nume de animale în Țara Oltului*. Bucureşti, 1936, Academia Română.

auch im Bulgar. sehr verbreitet sind, darf man vielleicht im Türkischen suchen (R á s o n y i: Arch. Eur. C.-Or. I, 228, Pa ş c a o. c. 159). Zum PN *Bodea*, den Paşca (o. c. 181) nach Weigand (S. 145) aus dem bulgar. *Bodjo*, *Boda* erklärt, ist zu bemerken, daß er — besonders in Siebenbürgen — auch aus dem ungar. FN *Bodó*, *Boda* (aus dem slaw. *Bud-imir* etc.) stammen kann. Was den Namen *Badea* betrifft, kann er mit größter Wahrscheinlichkeit aus dem rumän. *bade* ‚Oheim‘ erklärt werden, obzwar auch hier an slaw. Ursprung zu denken ist (vgl. ruthen. *Badevyč*, *Badovyč* Žerela II, 151; *Badjak* ib. IV, 257; poln. *Baduła* K o z i e r o w s k i, WPSl. 282, *Badura* ib. 287; tschech. FN *Báda*, *Badal*, *Badalik* K o t í k 67, 111; zu *badati* ‚stechen‘). *Bândea* braucht gar nicht aus dem germ. *Bando* hergeleitet zu werden, da doch Erklärung aus dem altbulg. *Bōdimirъ*, *Bōdislavъ* auf der Hand liegt. An das ungar. Hypokoristikon *Bende* des *Benedictus* kann man — im Gegensatz zu Paşca, S. 170 — wegen lautlicher Schwierigkeiten kaum denken. Der Ursprung des PN *Guma*, *Goma* ist uns zwar unbekannt, doch wird er wohl nur zufällig mit dem got. Worte *guma* ‚Mann‘ zusammenklingen.

Diese Bemerkungen dürften deutlich erkennen lassen, daß aus diesen PN — wie aus PN überhaupt — gar keine zwingenden Schlüsse für die Urheimat der Rumänen gezogen werden können.

C) Während die Appellativa und die PN für die älteste Siedlungsgeschichte eines Gebietes, oder für die Urheimatsfrage eines Volkes schon deshalb überhaupt keinen Beweis liefern können, weil man das Gebiet der Übernahme dieser Elemente sehr schwer bestimmen kann, haben die ON in diesen Fragen eben wegen ihrer Gebundenheit an einen Ort, einen Fluß oder an ein Gebiet eine hervorragende Beweiskraft. Für die Erforschung der ältesten Siedlungsgeschichte eines Gebietes bieten sie — mit der Archäologie zusammen, deren Resultate aber für die Geschichtsschreibung noch immer nicht zugänglich gemacht worden sind — die wichtigsten Erkenntnisquellen, ohne die keine siedlungsgeschichtliche Forschung möglich ist. Diese Quellen müssen aber von den Historikern — wie schon erwähnt — sorgfältig nachgeprüft werden. Die geographischen Namen sind nämlich vom Gesichtspunkte des Historikers von ganz verschiedenem Wert. Während z. B. bei der Erforschung der ältesten Siedlungsverhältnisse eines Gebietes die Namen der größeren Flüsse und Seen, sowie die der ältesten Siedlungen ausschlaggebend sind, werden bei der Frage der ethnischen Verhältnisse eines Dorfes oder eines kleineren Gebietes während einer bestimmten Periode meistens die

Flur- und Familiennamen die größten Dienste erweisen. Die Siedlungsnamen selbst besitzen dann erst eine entscheidende siedlungsgeschichtliche Beweiskraft, wenn ihre Herkunftsquelle mit den Benennungen der sich in der Nähe befindenden größeren Gewässer übereinstimmt, oder wenn ON identischen Ursprungs auf einem Gebiete gruppenweise vorkommen. Sporadisch vorkommende vereinzelt ON sind schon deshalb für weitgreifende siedlungsgeschichtliche Zwecke schwer zu verwenden, weil solche Siedlungen ihre Namen nicht von den darin wohnenden Volksplittern selbst, sondern von der Nachbarschaft zu erhalten pflegen.

Wenn wir nun zum Problem der rumän. Kontinuität in Siebenbürgen und zur Frage der gepidisch-rumän. Symbiose zurückkehren, glaube ich mit Recht betonen zu dürfen, daß diese beiden Fragen — obzwar sie ziemlich eng zusammenhängen — auch bei der Prüfung der geographischen Namen auseinander zu halten sind. Es kann nicht jeder Name, der in der Kontinuitätsfrage ein wichtiges Votum zu besitzen scheint, schlechthin auch auf die Gepiden bezogen werden. Andererseits aber dürfen auch die eventuellen Gepidenspuren nicht als Beweise für die gleichzeitige Anwesenheit der Rumänen betrachtet werden. Bei D. ist diese Auseinanderhaltung nicht durchgeführt, was allerdings beweist, daß er es nicht verstand, die sprachwissenschaftlichen Ergebnisse für die Siedlungsgeschichte zu verwerten. Wenn er z. B. die rumän. Namen der großen Flüsse Siebenbürgens durch die Gepiden vermitteln läßt (*Mureş* dem antiken *Maris* gegenüber, unter Einwirkung des germ. *môra* ‚Morast‘, *Olt* dem antiken *Aluta* gegenüber), argumentiert er nicht für, sondern gegen die Kontinuität der Rumänen. Im Falle der Kontinuität hätten doch die Rumänen die aus der Römerzeit ererbten Namen erhalten müssen. Es kommt nirgends vor, daß die fortlebenden Urbewohner einer Gegend die altererbten Namen der größten und bedeutendsten Flüsse vergessen, und die Benennungen der neuen Ankömmlinge übernehmen würden! So etwas ist selbst bei den in bescheidenerem Umkreis bekannten Namen der unbedeutenden Ortschaften äußerst selten zu finden. Wenn man die linguistische Seite der Beweisführung D.-s gelten ließe,⁹ könnte höchstens behauptet werden, daß die Rumänen erst nach der Ansiedlung der Gepiden

⁹ Die Etymologien D.-s sind jedoch gänzlich verfehlt. Eine Anzahl seiner FlußN ist rein ungar. Ursprungs (*Galda*, *Arpadia*, *Ciocadia*, *Amaradia*, *Cisnadia*, *Lopadia*; auch das in den FlußN *Crivadia*, *Cernadia* auftretende -d

nach Siebenbürgen eingewandert sind. Ob die Rumänen diese germanischen Namen unmittelbar von den Gepiden, oder durch Vermittlung irgendeines anderen Volkes übernommen hätten — d. h., ob sie im V—VI. Jh., oder noch später eingewandert sind — bliebe aber auch dann noch immer eine offene Frage. Für diese letzte Annahme bringt D. selbst ein Argument, indem er den bei Jordanes belegten gepidischen ON *Galtis* mit *Galt* am Olt identifiziert. *Galt* ist nämlich der deutsche Name des Ortes, wogegen dieser rumänisch *Ugra*, *Ungra* (aus dem ungar. *Ugra*) heißt. Im Falle einer Symbiose der Gepiden mit den Rumänen hätten doch vielmehr die Rumänen den gepidischen Namen bewahren müssen.¹⁰

Während D. wenigstens das Problem der alten Siedlungsverhältnisse Siebenbürgens methodisch ganz richtig gefaßt hat, indem er die Beweise für seine These in den Namen der bedeutendsten Flüsse und in denen der daran liegenden Ortschaften gesucht hat, glaubt G. die beiden Hypothesen — d. h. die der Kontinuität der Rumänen in Siebenbürgen und die der Symbiose der Gepiden und der Rumänen — mit einem einzigen Siedlungsnamen begründen zu können! Aus den von D. angeführten geographischen Namen — vielleicht weil die anderen ihm selbst zweifelhaft erschienen — greift er den ON *Radnót* \approx rum. *Iernut* heraus und erblickt in ihm „einen unwiderleglichen Beweis dafür, daß die Rumänen nicht vom Süden her in ein rein slawisches Gebiet vorgestoßen seien, sondern daß nördlich der Donau die römische Überlieferung niemals unterbrochen wurde“ (S. 241). Der Name soll nämlich aus einem gepidischen PN **Ardnot* stammen, der im Rumän. in seiner ursprünglichen, nicht umgestellten Form fortleben würde, während das ungar. *Radnót* eine in slawischem

ist ungarisch). Auch die gepidische Vermittlung der Namen der großen Flüsse konnte er nicht beweisen. Vgl. Melich, *Honfoglaláskori Magyarország*, 69, 53, 265, 289, 294—5, 301; Weigand: Jber. XXVI/XXIX (1921), 74—5.

¹⁰ Auf Grund dieser Übereinstimmung hat G. Kisch eine Theorie über die gepidisch-sächsische Kontinuität in Siebenbürgen aufgestellt (*Germanische Kontinuität in Siebenbürgen*: Korrespondenzblatt des Vereins für siebenb. Landeskunde LII—1929, 129—141). Somit ist die Liste der überhaupt vorstellbaren gepidischen Kontinuitätstheorien erschöpft, denn wir haben auch eine über die gepidisch-ungar. Kontinuität von J. Karácsonyi (*Die Vorfahren der Szekler und die Szekler Madjaren*. Volk unter Völkern. Breslau, 1925; *A székelyek ősei és a székely magyarok*. Cluj-Kolozsvár, 1924 und Márki-Emlékkönyv, 1927, 98—124). Den Zusammenhang des gepidischen *Galtis* mit dem sächs. *Galt* bestreiten Melich, *Honfoglaláskori Magyarország*, 290, und W. Scheiner: *Balkan-Archiv*, II—1926, 55.

Munde lautgesetzlich entstandene Form wäre.¹¹ Er schließt daraus, daß „die Geschichte des Namens ein Beweis dafür ist, daß sich zwischen die gepidische Periode und die altrumänische keine Periode einschiebt, in der die Romanen in Siebenbürgen gefehlt hätten“.

Aus dieser ON-Dublette lassen sich zugunsten der Kontinuität der Rumänen in Siebenbürgen seit der Römerzeit natürlich keine Schlüsse ziehen. Zu diesem Zwecke wären nämlich nur jene geographischen Namen geeignet, die schon zur Zeit der Römerherrschaft quellenmäßig auftreten, nicht aber die angeblich gepidischen ON.

Es ist aber unschwer nachzuweisen, daß der ON *Radnót* nicht einmal für die in die gepidische Zeit (d. h. bis zum V—VI. Jh.) zurückreichende ON-Tradition der siebenbürgischen Rumänen einen Beweis bildet. Die Herleitung des Namens aus einem **Arndnot*, also aus einer Form mit auslautendem *-ot*, ist schon deshalb nicht richtig, weil der ungar. Endung *-ót* (mit langem *-ó-*) kein kurzes *-ot* zugrunde liegen kann. Die ältesten Belege für *Radnót* haben ausnahmslos den Auslaut *-olt* (später *-out*; Csánki, V, 891, über diese Namensformen s. später), woraus im Ungar. regelmäßig *-ót* entstand. Man könnte also höchstens aus einem recht unwahrscheinlichen PN **Arnold* ausgehen. In diesem Falle aber wäre das Fehlen des *-l-* im rumän. *Iernut* mit der These der ununterbrochenen Tradition seit der gepidischen Zeit nicht in Einklang zu bringen. Auch an der Bildungsweise unseres ON kann man nicht ohne Bedenken vorbeigehen. Die aus PN gebildeten ON pflegen in jeder Sprache auf eigene Art abgeleitet zu sein. Im Deutschen z. B. werden sie durch das Suffix *-ing*, oder durch genitivische Konstruktionen gebildet, im Slaw. finden wir verschiedene Suffixe, im Rumän. dienen dazu die Ableitungssilben *-ești*, *-eni*. Der bloße PN wird aber als ON in diesen Sprachen nicht verwendet. Bei den mitteleuropäischen Völkern ist diese letztere Art der ON-Bildung aus PN (außer dem Türkischen) nur im Ungar. regelmäßig. Freilich kennen wir die ON-Bildung der Gepiden und die der Ostgermanen allzuwenig, um in diesem Zusammenhang Entscheidendes sagen zu können.

Wenn aber dieser Name tatsächlich gepidischer Herkunft wäre, der im Rumän. seit der gepidischen Zeit ohne Unterbre-

¹¹ Durch dieselbe Metathese wird dieser Name von G. Kisch (Archiv des Ver. f. Siebenb. Landeskunde XLV, 202) aus dem PN *Arnold* erklärt. Daraus kann allerdings kein *Radnót* entstehen! Vgl. darüber weiter unten.

chung fortgelebt hätte, oder mit anderen Worten, wenn in der Nähe von *Radnót* \sim *Iernut* die Rumänen bis zum heutigen Tag ununterbrochen gewohnt hätten, müssten wir Rumänenspurten unbedingt auch in anderen ON der umliegenden Nachbarschaft entdecken. In einem einzigen Dorfe hätten sie sich doch keinesfalls durch mehrere Jahrhunderte erhalten können. Wir müßten hier außer den Namen der bedeutendsten Flüsse der Gegend auch eine Anzahl von Siedlungsnamen finden, die *a*) rumänischen (ja sogar gepidischen) Ursprungs sind und *b*) die im Ungar. eine aus dem Rumän. entlehnte Form aufweisen. Um diese Frage beantworten zu können, müssen wir sämtliche ON der Umgebung von *Radnót* von diesem Gesichtspunkte aus näher untersuchen.

1. Gewässer N: *Maros* \sim rum. *Mureş*, der bedeutendste Fluß Siebenbürgens, an dessen Ufer unsere Ortschaft liegt. Der rum. Name kann wegen seines *u* nicht unmittelbar auf die antike Form *Maris*, *Marisus* etc. zurückgehen, denn *Mureş* setzt eine *Moriş* voraus, das im altungar. *Moris* bereits vorhanden ist. Da im Ungar. die Entwicklung *a* > *o* und daraus seit dem XIV. Jh. *a* normal ist, kann dieses *Moris* (l. *Moriş*) auch ungarisch sein. Dabei ist allerdings auch der Möglichkeit einer slawischen Lautentwicklung Rechnung zu tragen¹² | *Küküllő* \sim rum. *Târnava*, linker Nebenfluß der *Maros*, der südlich von *Radnót* in einer Entfernung von etwa 20—25 Km. in ost-westlicher Richtung fließt und nach seiner Vereinigung mit dem *Nagy-Küküllő* \sim Groß-Kokel \sim *Târnava mare* unweit von *Gyulafehérvár* \sim *Bălgrad* in die *Maros* mündet. Der rum. Name ist slawischen Ursprungs¹³ | *Nyárád* \sim *Niraj* (vgl. *Nyárád-Szent-Márton* \sim *Sânmartinul Niragiului*, *Nyárádtő* \sim *Niraştău* usw.), linker Nebenfluß der *Maros*, dessen Mündung etwa 20 Km. östlich von R. ist | *Lekence* \sim rum. *Lechința*, rechtes Nebenwasser der M., das R. gegenüber in die M. mündet¹⁴ | *Ludas* \sim rum. *Valea Ludoşului*, mündet etwa 3—4 Km. westlich von R. in die *Maros* | *Aranyos* \sim rum. *Arieş* etwa 20 Km. weit von R. fließender linker Nebenfluß der *Maros* (1075/1217: *Aranas* MonStr. I, 59).

2. Siedlungs N: Östlich von R.:¹⁵ *Csapó* \sim *Cipău*

¹² Vgl. Melich, o. c., 52—3.

¹³ Melich, o. c. 31.

¹⁴ St. Kniezsa, *Lekence-Lechnitz*: UngJb. XVI—1936, 481—7.

¹⁵ In Klammern folgen die sich auf die Ortschaften beziehenden ältesten Belege. Die nach den Belegen stehenden Zahlen geben die Seitenzahl des Werkes von Csánki (*Magyarország tört. földrajza a Hunyadiak korában*, Bd. V.) an.

(1332—7: Thapev, Kapov, 1347: Chapow 872) | Ugra ~ Ogra (1376: Wgra, Vgra 900) | Kerellő-Szent-Pál ~ Sânpaul (1332—7: 895) | Buzás-Besenyő ~ Beşinău (1349: Beseneu 869) | Kerellő ~ Chirileu (1332—7: Kerelev 883) | Vidraszeg ~ Vidrasău (1383: Vidrazeg, 1428: Vidradzeg 901) | Nyárádtő ~ Niraştau (1332—7: Narad, Naradyu Ortva y,¹⁶ 658) | Nagy-Cserged ~ Cerghidul mare, Kis-Cserged ~ Cerghizăl (1438: Cherged 872) | Nagy-Teremi ~ Tirimia mare, Kis-Teremi ~ Tirimia mică (1263: possessio duo Theremi 898) | Teremi-Újfalu ~ Satu nou (1473: Wyfalu 900) | Vajdakuta ~ Vaidacuta | Vámos-Udvarhely ~ Vameş-Odriheiu (1332—7: Oduorbed, 1390: Odwarhel 899) | Kórod ~ Coroiu (1369: Korougy 885) | Kórod-Szent-Márton ~ Coroiu-Sânmartin (1332—7: 885) | Balavására ~ Bălăuşeri (1325: Balauasara 867) | Küküllő-Széplak ~ Suplac (1332—7: Sceploc 896).

Südlich von R.: Oláh-Sályi ~ Şeulia română (1379: Sauly 891) | Szélkút ~ Sălcud | Dég ~ Deag (1360: Deegh 874) | Kincses ~ Chinciş (1424: Kench, 1438: Kinches 883) | Bord ~ Bord (1348: Burdfolua, 1351: Bord 871) | Oláh-Kocsárd ~ Cucerdea română (1278: Kuchard 884) | Gyulás ~ Giuluş (1413: Gyulastelkee, Gywlastelke 879) | Bábahalma ~ Bobohalma (1332—7: Babalhalma, 1438: magnus mons Hegesholm alias Babaholm, villa Babahalma 867) | Erdőalja ~ Subpădure (1466: Erdewallya 876) | Somostelke ~ Futac (1438: Somostelke 893).

Das Tal der Klein-Kokel (von Osten nach Westen): Héderfája ~ Idrifaia (1331: Hedruhfaia 879) | Bonyha ~ rum. Bachnea (sic!) ~ sächs. Bachnen (1291: Bahna 862) | Bernárd, Bernád ~ Bernadea (1301: Barnad 869) | Felső-Kápolna ~ Căpâlna de sus (1361: Kapulna 882) | Mikefalva ~ Mica (1332—7: villa Nycolay, 1392: Mykefalva 887) | Abosfalva ~ Abuş (1361: Obusfolua 866) | Pocsfalva ~ Păucea (1361: Pochfalua, 1384: Pousfalua 890) | Szász-Csávás ~ Ceuaş (1301: Chawas 872) | Désfalva ~ Deaş (1301: Deesfalua, poss. Hagmas, terra Hagmasfew 874) | Harangláb ~ Hărănglab (1301: Haranglab 879) | Gálfalva ~ Ganfalău (1332—7: villa Galli 877) | Borzás ~ Boziaş (1441: Bozyas 871) | Szőkefalva ~ Săuca (1370: Zeukefolua 897) | Csüdötelek ~

¹⁶ Ortvy Tivadar, *Magyarország egyházi földleirása a XIV. század elején a pápai tizedjegyzékek alapján*. Budapest, 1892. Enthält die Bearbeitung und Lokalisierung der in den Listen der päpstlichen Steuereinnehmer in den J. 1332—7 aufgezeichneten ungarischen ON. Zu diesen ON ist zu bemerken, daß sie nur siedlungsgeschichtlichen, aber keinen sprachwissenschaftlichen Wert besitzen, da sie — von landesfremden Leuten geschrieben — faßt alle entstellt sind.

Cuştelnic (1383: Chedeutelek 873) | Dicső-Szent-Márton ~ Dicio-Sânmartin (1278: Dycheu sent Martun 864) | Dombó ~ Dâmbău (1278: Dumbo potaka 875) | Adámos ~ Adamuş (1405: Adamus 866) | Sövényfalva ~ Şomfalău (seit 1332—7, vgl. 1405: Sewenfalva 892) | Királyfalva ~ Craifalău (1348: Kyralfolva 884) | Küküllővár ~ *Cetatea de baltă* (1197: Cuculiensis castrum ZW. I, 3).

Westlich von R. (Kom. A.-Fehér): Kutyalva ~ Cuci (1359: Kugfalva F.¹⁷ IX, 4, 399) | Oroszi ~ Orosia | Szent-Jakab ~ Sâniacob | Cintos ~ Aţintiş (1357: Acentus ZW. II, 141) | Maros-Gezse ~ Gheja | Csúcs ~ Ciuci (1366: Chuch T. I, 145) | Kapud ~ Mureş-Capud | Csekelaka ~ Cecălaca (1296: Chekeloka W. V, 149) | Batizháza ~ Botezu (1374: Batizhaza ZW. II, 430) | Maros-Koppánd ~ Copandul de Mureş (1285: Coppon F. V, 3, 310; 1291: Cuppan ZW. I, 178) | Nagylak ~ Noşlac (1298: Nayglok ZW. I, 212) | Káptalan ~ Căptălănul de Mureş | Oláh-Péterlaka ~ Petrilaca română (1332—7: Peturlaka Ortway 631) | Istvánháza ~ Iştihaza (1407: Estwanhaza ZW. II, 432) | Magyar-Bükkös ~ Bichiş (1303: Bykus ZW. 228) | Lándor ~ Nandra (1395: Nandortelke ZW. II, 159) | Gombuc ~ Gâmbuţ (1303: rivus, mons, villa Gumbuch ZW. I, 227) | Ozd ~ Ozd (1300: Ozd TörtTár 1895, 236) | Magyar-Herepe ~ Herepea ungurească (1332—7: Herepal, Herepel Ortway 630; 1363: Herepe T. I, 123) | Magyar-Sülye ~ Şilea ungurească (1319: Syle ZW. I, 342) | Medvés ~ Medveş und Ursu? (1319: Medwes ZW. I, 342) | Szent-Benedek ~ Sân Benedic | Elekes ~ Alecuş (1332: Elekes ZW. L, 454) | Forró ~ Fărău (1299/1372: Forro ZW. I, 530; 1303: Forrou ib. 228).

Am rechten Ufer der Maros, östlich von R.: Orbó ~ Oarba | Csapó-Szent-György ~ ? (1347: Zentgyurgy 734, heute ein Gehöft) | Magyar-Dellő ~ Dileul maghiar (1344: Dellew 698) | Oláh-Dellő ~ Dileul român (seit d. J. 1486: Olahdellew 698) | Szent-Margita ~ Sânmărghita (1408: Zentmargita 736) | Szent-Miklós ~ ? | Sós-patak ~ Şeuşa de Câmpie (1414: Sospatak 730) | Mező-Pete ~ Petea de Câmpie (1447: Pethe 725) | Újfalu ~ *Vaidei* (1473: Wyfalw 743) | Malomfalva ~ Malomfalău (Szeklergebiet) | Mező Uraj ~ Oroiu de Câmpie (1367: Uray 743).

Nördlich und nordwestlich von R.: Maros-Lekence ~ Lechinţa de Mureş an der Mündung des Baches Lekence

¹⁷ Abkürzungen: ZW.: Zimmermann—Werner, *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen*, Bd. I—III, T.: *Codex dipl. familiae Teleki de Szék. A széki gróf Teleki család oklevéltára*, I—II. Die übrigen s. Arch. Eur. C.-Or. I (1935), 102—5.

(1263: Lekenczethw 718) | Nagy-Iklánd ∼ Iclandul mare, Kis-Iklánd ∼ Iclanzel (1419: Ikland 709) | Mező-Kapus ∼ Căpușul de Câmpie (1377: Kapus 712) | Gerebenes ∼ Grebenișul de Câmpie (1332—7: Gerebenus 705) | Mező-Bánd ∼ Bandul de Câmpie (1332—7: Band Ortva y 657) | Dátos ∼ Dateș (1263: Datus 697) | Maros-Ludas ∼ Mureș-Luduș (1377: Ludas 719) | Keménytelke ∼ Chimintelnicul de Câmpie (1333: Kementeleke 713) | Mező-Szengyel ∼ Sânger (1333: Zengel 733) | Mező-Bodon ∼ Budiul de Câmpie (1377: Bodon 694) | Mező-Szakál ∼ Săcal (1365: Zakaltelke 731) | Mező-Tóhát ∼ Tăureni (1454: Thohath 741) | Záh ∼ Zau (1339: Zah 745) | Gerend-Keresztúr ∼ Grind-Cristur (1289: Kereztur 714) | Kecze ∼ Cheța (1444: Keche 715) | Hadrév ∼ Hădărău (1270: Hodryv 707) | Órke ∼ Urca (1289: Heurke 723) | Egerbegy ∼ Agârbiciu¹⁸ (1318: Egerbeg 701).

Von den angeführten 6 FlußN sind im Rumän. 1 (*Târnava*) slawischen, 5 (*Mureș, Niragiul, Lechința, Ludoșul, Arieșul*) hingegen ungarischen Ursprungs. Von den 102 ON stimmen die rumän. Namen mit den ungar. in 95 Fällen vollkommen überein, und nur 7 weichen von einander ab. 3 davon (*Satu nou, Subpădure* und *Tăureni*)¹⁹ sind ÜbersetzungsN, wirkliche Sondernamen sind also nur in 4 Fällen festzustellen (*Futac, Cuștelnic, Cetatea de baltă, Vaidei*). *Cetatea de baltă* und *Vaidei* sind rumänisch, während der Ursprung von *Futac*²⁰ und *Cuștelnic* mir nicht bekannt ist. Zu diesen, sowie zu den ÜbersetzungsN ist zu bemerken, daß sie sich — mit Ausnahme von *Cetatea de baltă* — alle auf sehr spät (am Ende des XIV. Jh.-s, ja in der zweiten Hälfte des XV. Jh.-s) erwähnte Ortschaften beziehen. Sie können also das Vorhandensein der Rumänen in dieser Gegend höchstens von dieser Zeit an bezeugen. Was diejenigen rumän. ON betrifft, die mit den ungar. übereinstimmen, so ist es bei deren überwiegender Mehrzahl ganz klar, daß sie aus dem Ungar. stammen und von den Rumänen aus dem Ungar. übernommen sind. Aber selbst bei der ON slaw. Ursprungs ist es in vielen Fällen nicht zweifelhaft, daß sich die rumän. Namen durch ungar. Vermittlung erklären (*Dombó* ∼ *Dâmbău* aus dem slaw. **Dǫbov(a)*, *Orbó* ∼ *Oarba* aus dem slaw. **Vrbov(a)*, *Lekence* ∼ *Lechința* s. oben), woraus wir auch schließen dürfen, daß die anderen ON, die teils slawischen (*Gambuc*

¹⁸ Die rumän. ON-Formen sind nach S. Moldovan—N. Togan (*Dicționarul numirilor de localități cu populațiune română din Ungaria*. Sibiu, 1909) zitiert.

¹⁹ Aus *tăuri*, Pl. von *tău* < ungar. *tó* + *eni* (Tamás).

²⁰ Ein *Futak* ∼ serbokr. *Futog* gibt es auch im Kom. Bács-Bodrog, westlich von Újvidék-Novisad (1250: terra *Futok* Cs. II, 137).

aus dem slaw. *гѡбѡсѡ*), teils unbekanntem Ursprungs sind (*Bonyha, Gezse, Szengyel*) durch das Ungar. ins Rumän. gelangten. Jedenfalls kann man unter diesen Namen keinen einzigen finden, der aus dem Rumän. stammt. Auch gibt es auf dem ganzen Gebiet keinen einzigen ungar. ON, der rumänischer Vermittlung zu verdanken wäre.²¹

Diese Tatsachen sprechen eindeutig dafür, daß die Ungarn bei ihrer Ansiedlung im Laufe des X—XI. Jh. hierzulande wohl Slawen, aber keine Rumänen vorgefunden haben. Sonst wäre es

²¹ Dasselbe kann übrigens über das ganze Siebenbürgen (mit Ausnahme vom Kom. Hunyad) und über die Komitate Arad, Bihar, Szatmár, Ugocsa, Máramaros und Temes gesagt werden. Unter den *vor dem XV. Jh.* belegten ON gibt es auf diesen Gebieten keinen einzigen, der im Ungar. rumän. Ursprungs wäre. Ja, selbst die rumän. Namen dieser Ortschaften sind, von einer ganz geringen Anzahl von ÜbersetzungsN abgesehen, alle fremden (ungar., deutschen, oder slaw.) Ursprungs. Die überwiegende Mehrzahl dieser ON stammt aus dem Ungar., während die Anzahl der unmittelbar aus dem Slaw. übernommenen ON (in der Umgebung von Gyulafehérvár = Karlsburg, Nagyszeben = Hermannstadt, sowie am Osten des Burzenlandes, am Süden des Komitats Hunyad und im Komitate Krassó-Szörény) und die der ON deutschen Ursprungs (auf dem Gebiete des Sachsenlandes) verhältnismäßig sehr gering ist. Wohl gibt es hier auch ON, die von einigen Forschern für rumän. gehalten werden, die aber keiner Kritik widerstehen können. So z. B. *Szolcsva* ∼ rumän. *Sălciva* (1365: *Zolchwa* Cs. V, 739) das von Weigand (Balkan-Archiv I—1925, 24) aus einem rumän. **sălciva* (*apă*) ‚zusammenziehendes Wasser‘ erklärt wird, ist in Wirklichkeit slaw. Ursprungs, vgl. den slowen. ON *Solčava* (Imenik-Registar II, 969). Von den erstaunlich wenigen, vor dem Ende des XIV. Jh. belegten siebenbürgischen ON, die Drăganu (*Români în veacurile IX—XIV. pe baza toponimiei și a onomasticeii*. București, 1933) für rumän. hält, erwähne ich nur den ON *Szancsal* ∼ *Sâncel* (501), der nach ihm aus irgendeinem **sânt(u)cel* stammen sollte. Der Name ist unbekanntem Ursprungs. Rumän. kann er wegen lautlicher und morphologischer Schwierigkeiten nicht sein, zumal wir für diesen ON keine Analogien im Rumän. finden. Es ist zu bemerken, daß die Einwohner der Ortschaft Szancsal im XIV. Jh. Mohammedaner waren, die türkischen Ursprungs gewesen sein dürften (1315: *Zanchal*, 1341: Egidius filius *Bazarab* de *Zanchal*, 1350: poss. *Bezermen Zanchal* Cs. V, 894). — Die ersten rumän. ON tauchen im oberen Tale des Flußes Temes, in den Distrikten Lugos und Karánsebes (im heutigen Komitat Krassó-Szörény) seit der Mitte des XIV. Jh. auf, doch ist die Priorität der Slawen und die der Ungarn auch hier zweifellos festzustellen. Dagegen setzen sie im Komitat Hunyad etwas später ein. In den oberen Tälern der Flüsse Sztrigy und Cserna sind die ältesten rumän. ON seit dem Ende des XIV. Jh.-s belegt. Die rumän. ON der in den unteren Tälern derselben Flüsse, sowie an den Ufern der Maros liegenden Ortschaften stammen dagegen überwiegend aus dem Ungarischen.

unverständlich, warum die Ungarn ausgerechnet nur rumän. ON nicht übernommen hätten. Auch müßten wir im Falle der Kontinuität der Rumänen seit der gepidischen (geschweige denn seit der römischen) Zeit auf diesem Gebiet die rumän. ON mindestens im Rumän. selbst vorfinden, wogegen wir doch hier (mit Ausnahme der oben angeführten, erst von dem XV. Jh. an belegten ON) lauter Namen ungarischen Ursprungs begegnen. Schon aus diesem Grunde ist es vollkommen unwahrscheinlich, daß die Rumänen allen anderen Belegen zum Trotz gerade im Falle von *Radnót* \sim *Iernut* eine in die gepidische Zeit zurückreichende Tradition bewahrt haben. Wenn irgendwo in der Wissenschaft das Prinzip gilt, daß ein Beleg kein Beleg ist, so ist es gerade die siedlungsgeschichtliche Verwertung der ON, wo wir mit vollem Rechte behaupten dürfen, daß ein Name kein Name ist, selbst dann nicht, wenn die Erklärung des Namens übrigens vollkommen sicher wäre. Solche Fälle sind aber äußerst selten — ich selbst kenne keinen einzigen — denn diese sporadisch vorkommenden ON entpuppen sich bei genauer Betrachtung gewöhnlich als falsche Deutungen.

Unsere durch die Gesamtbetrachtung des ON-Materials dieses Gebietes hervorgerufenen Zweifel bezüglich der rumänischen Kontinuität erweisen sich auch bei der näheren Betrachtung des ON *Radnót* \sim *Iernut* als vollkommen berechtigt. Die Geschichte des ON einerseits, und die der Ortschaft andererseits beweisen klar, daß unser ON nicht gepidisch sein kann, daher auch der rum. Name nicht in die gepidische Zeit zurückzuführen ist. Unsere Ortschaft, für die wir seit dem J. 1288. unzählige Belege besitzen (1288: *Renolth Karácsonyi*, II, 336; 1300, 1346: *Renolth*; 1347, 1383, 1385, 1465, 1492, 1494, 1498, 1500, 1505, 1507, 1523: *Radnolth*; 1439: *Radnowth*; 1448: *Radnoth*; 1483: *Raynolth*, *Rajnolth*; 1506: *Rannoth Csánki* V, 891) taucht als Gutsbesitz des Geschlechtes Kökényes-*Radnót* auf, bei dessen Mitgliedern der Name *Radnót* auch als PN vorkommt. Dieses Geschlecht aber stammt nicht etwa von den Gepiden Siebenbürgens ab, ja sein Stammsitz war nicht einmal in Siebenbürgen, denn es ist laut der Wiener Bilderchronik spanischen Ursprungs²² und sein ursprünglicher Gutsbesitz befand sich im Komitat Nógrád nord-östlich von Budapest!²³ Es ist also klar, daß unsere Ortschaft von

²² Wiener Bilderchronik 44.: *Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum tempore ducum regumque stirpis Arpadianae gestarum*. I. Budapestini, 1937, 298.

²³ Karácsonyi, János, *Magyar nemzetségek a XIV. század közepéig* (Ungar. Geschlechter bis zur Mitte des XIV. Jh.-s). Bd. II. Budapest, 1901, 336.

den Bewohnern der Umgebung nach dem Namen ihrer Besitzer benannt wurde, diese Umgebung aber muß laut der Bildungsweise des ON aus suffixlosem PN ungarisch gewesen sein.

Der Name *Radnót* steht übrigens im Ungar. nicht vereinzelt da, er kommt als PN und ON auf verschiedenen Gebieten Ungarns des öfteren vor. Zur Veranschaulichung des Gesagten mögen folgende Belege genügen:

1. 1288: Mykud de genere *Kukenusrennolth* W. IV, 332; 1322: *Renoldo* comite de genere *Kukenes rodnold* AnjOkm. I, 270; *Kykini* autem et *Renaldi* origo est in Yspania, Wiener Bilderchr. §. 44: ScriptRerHung. I, 298; vgl. auch *Karácsonyi*, II, 336—342, und *Beké Antal*, Az erdélyi káptalan levéltára Gyulafehérvárt: Tört. Tár 1889, S. 581, 586, 550.

2. 1289: *Renoldus* palatinus W. XII, 479; 1291: *Renoldus* quondam palatinus W. V, 59; 1309: Gywlas filius *Renoldi* quondam Palatini AnjOkm. I, 190; 1330: domine Anna nuncupate filie *Renoldi* quondam palatini AnjOkm. II, 478; 1336: *Rednoldi* quondam palatini AnjOkm. III, 303; 1335: Ladislai filii Nicolai de Puthnuk contra *Rednoldum* fratrem suum F. VIII, 4, 132; 1340: filii *Rennoldi* AnjOkm. IV, 38—9; 1347/1356: filiorum *Rednoldi* AnjOkm. V, 29; 1363: Anna filia *Radnoldy* de Puthnuk ZichyOkm. III, 218 (zwei Glieder des im Kom. Gömör begüterten Geschlechtes süditalienischen Ursprungs Rathold > Rátót, vgl. *Karácsonyi*, III, 7—17).

3. 1235: *Arnoldus* comes Zaladiensis et comes *Rednaldus* W. VII, 7 (eine sonst unbekannte Person im Kom. Zala, d. h. im Südwesten Ungarns).

4. *Radnót*, ON im Kom. Gömör (1427: *Radnothfalua*; 1430, 1454: *Radnolthfalwa* Cs. I, 144).

5. *Ranódfa*, ON im Kom. Baranya (1480, 1492: *Radnolthfalwa*; 1542: *Ranolthfalva* Cs. II, 519).

6. Ein Teil des Dorfes *Tuzsér* (Kom. Szabolcs) hieß im Mittelalter *Renolt-* und *Radnoldtuzséra* (= Renolds Tuzsér, zum Unterschied von Gyöstuzséra; 1354: *Renolth tusera* ZichyOkm. II, 580; *Renolt tusera* ib. 581; 1355: *Renolttusera* ib. 597; 1387: *Radnoldtusera* ib. IV, 326; vgl. Cs. I, 528), vgl. dazu die Urkunde, nach der Petrus filius magistri Ladislav filij *Renoldy* de Bozteh... possessionem suam Thuser nuncupatam... in vicinitate possessionum filiorum Keheden et filiorum *Renoldy* adiacentem, aquisitam, ut dixit per *Renoldum* palatinum auum eorum... Nycolao dicto peres... verkauft (1316, AnjOkm. I, 405—6).

7. *Radnótfája* ∼ rum. *Iernutfaia* ∼ sächs. *Etschdorf*, ON im

Kom. Maros-Torda, südlich von Szász-Régen \sim Sächsisch Reen (1332—7: Sacerdos de *Arnolfaya*, villa *Reduoldi*, *Reinolfaya*, villa *Renuoldi*; 1453: *Ranolthfaia* Cs. V, 728).

8. *Radnoldi filii Demetrii de Radnoffalva*... (Lücke!) fluvii Balog (1334/1392: ZW. I, 463) soll nach ZW. I, 596 mit Radnót-fája identisch sein. Möglicherweise kann sich dieser Beleg auf die unter 4. angeführte Ortschaft beziehen.

Aus diesen Belegen, glaube ich, geht klar hervor, daß der Name *Radnolt* \sim *Rednolt* $>$ *Radnót* mit *Renolt*, *Reynolt* usw. identisch ist, denn beide Formen kommen als Namen einer und derselben Person, sowie einer und derselben Ortschaft vor. Da aber der Name *Renolt*, *Reynolt* zweifellos aus dem deutschen *Raginwald* $>$ *Reinolt*, *Renold* usw. stammt, muß natürlicherweise auch unser Name *Radnót* irgendwie daraus erklärt werden.

Die Entwicklung *Renolt* $>$ *Radnolt*, die wir in mehreren Fällen nachgewiesen haben, hängt mit der im Altungar. auch bei anderen Namen bezeugten Dissimilation *-nn-* $>$ *-dn-* zusammen. Diese Dissimilation ist z. B. im ON *Gelednek* (Kom. Bars, an der Gran) zweifellos festzustellen, dem ein slowak. *Hliník* gegenüber steht (1075/1217: *Gelednuk* MonStr. I, 59; 1237: *Gelednek* ib. 323 usw.). Der ungar. Name ist nämlich eine Übernahme des altslowak. **Glin:nikō* (aus slaw. *gliná* ‚Lehm‘), woraus einerseits im Slowak. **Hlinnik* $>$ *Hliník*, andererseits im Ungar. **Glinnik* $>$ **Glidnik* $>$ *Gelednek* entstanden sind. Dieselbe Entwicklung ist auch im Namen *Vinna* \sim *Vidna*, slowak. *Vinné* (Kom. Ung) nachzuweisen (*Wynna*, 1249: Sztáray Okl. I, 4; 1258: ib. 9; 1335: *Vydna*, *Wydna* ib. 93, 102; 1408: *Vidna*, *Wynna* Cs. I, 400; die späteren Belege lauten allerdings wieder *Winna*, *Vinna*, s. Sztáray Okl. I, Index, 573). Auf Grund dieser Beispiele können wir also eine Entwicklung: deutsch *Raginwald* $>$ *Reinnold* $>$ *Rennold* $>$ ungar. *Rennolt* (vgl. die Belege *Rennolth* unter No. 1. und 2!) $>$ *Rednolt* \sim *Rodnolt* $>$ *Radnolt* $>$ *Radnót* als vollkommen gesichert annehmen.²⁴

²⁴ Hierher gehört wahrscheinlich auch der ungar. Name der Stadt *Stolzenburg* (Kom. Szeben), der ungar. *Szelindek*, rumän. *Slimnic* heißt. Der lautlich übrigens möglichen Erklärung von W. Scheiner (Balkan-Archiv III—1927, 142) gegenüber, nach der der ungar. und rumän. Name aus dem slaw. *slivnik* (von *sliva* ‚Pflaume‘) stammen sollte, halte ich es für wahrscheinlicher, daß unser Name auf ein slaw. **slyvnikъ* zurückgeht, das mit den poln. Wörtern *słynąć* ‚berühmt sein‘ (russ. *slyt’* ‚im Rufe stehen‘) zusammenhängt und somit mit dem deutschen Namen semantisch verwandt ist. Für die Metathese **Szlidnik* $>$ **Szednek* $>$ *Szelendek* (1380: *Zelenduk* XW. I, 512) vgl. slaw. *lednik* $>$ ungar. *lednek* und *lendek* (NySz. II, 556), ON *Rendek* aus früherem *Rednek* (Cs. III, 98, 249), usw. Vgl. Kniezsa: MNy. XXXIII—1937, 168—9.

Der ON *Radnót* stammt also aus dem deutschen PN *Reinold*. In seiner Bildungsweise als ON und in seiner Lautform läßt er sich indessen nur aus dem Ungar. erklären.

Was die rumän. Form *Iernut* \sim *Ernut* betrifft, so haben wir zwar für ihre Erklärung keine sicheren Anhaltspunkte, doch ist es vollkommen klar, daß sie weder gepidisch, noch sonstwie vorungarisch sein kann. Dagegen spricht vor allem die rumän. Benennung *Iernutfaia* der Ortschaft Radnótfája, deren zweiter Bestandteil (*-faia*) doch ganz deutlich ungarisch ist (Radnótfája = ‚Radnót's Baum‘, vgl. unweit von hier *Hédertája* \sim *Idrifaiia*, usw.). Da es unmöglich zu sein scheint im Rumän. eine Metathese *Renót* $>$ *Ernut* nachzuweisen, könnte man vielleicht annehmen, daß diese Ortschaft (eventuell nach zwei Besitzern verschiedenen Namens) zweinamig war (*Renold* und *Arnold*). In diesem Falle wäre der eine Name im Ungar., der andere im Rumän. erhalten geblieben. Dafür scheinen die Listen der päpstlichen Steuereinnehmer zu sprechen, in denen Radnótfája außer den Namen *Reduoldi*, *Reynolfaya*, *Renuoldi* auch in der Form *Arnoldfaya* vorkommt. Doch sind diese von ausländischen Steuereinnehmern geschriebenen Listen hinsichtlich der Formen der ON vollkommen unzuverlässig.

Es erübrigt noch auf den anderen, von G. ebenfalls nach D. zugunsten der These der gepidisch-rumän. Symbiose angeführten geographischen Namen, nämlich auf den BergN *Muntele Gotului* einen kurzen Blick zu werfen. Dieser Berg liegt südwestlich von Hermannstadt an der Südgrenze Siebenbürgens in einem seit altersher faßt vollkommen unbesiedelten Gebiete. Sein Name ist zuerst gegen die Mitte des vorigen Jh.-s, in Lenk's Geographischem Lexicon belegt. Wenn nicht einmal auf vereinzelt dastehende ON siedlungsgeschichtliche Theorien gebaut werden dürfen, so kann das im Falle eines einzelnen BergN noch weniger empfohlen werden, besonders, wenn der betreffende BergN bloß aus neuester Zeit belegt ist. Die BergN und die Namen der kleinen Bäche sind nämlich viel mehr verschiedenen Änderungen ausgesetzt, als die SiedlungsN. Schon aus diesem Grunde sind wir nicht berechtigt, aus den heutigen Namen auf uralte siedlungsgeschichtliche Verhältnisse zu schließen. Dementsprechend ist auch der Name *Muntele Gotului* durchaus ungeeignet um daraus irgendwelche siedlungsgeschichtliche Folgerungen zu ziehen. Da er dem heutigen Sprachgefühl nur ‚den Berg des Goten‘, oder ‚den Berg einer Person namens Got‘ bedeutet, sieht man nicht ein wie daraus auf eine massenhafte gotische Siedlung geschlossen werden könnte.

Ja, wir sind nicht einmal dazu berechtigt wenigstens einen einzigen Goten dahinter zu suchen, denn der Name *Got* läßt auch andere Deutungen zu. Er kommt nämlich sowohl im Ungar., wie auch in den slawischen Sprachen des öfteren als PN vor: Ung. 1211: *Got*, ein Höriger des Stiftes Tihany in Kolon, Kom. Zala, PRT. X, 508; 1358: Stephanus dictus *Goth* civis castris Albensis (Székesfehérvár ~ Stuhlweißenburg) AnjOkm. VII, 152, 154; vgl. auch die häufigen ungar. FN *Góth*, *Goóth* (Illésy, Az 1754—55. évi orsz. nemesi összeírás. Budapest, 1902, 44, 123). Hierher gehören auch die ON *Gót* ~ *Gut* (Kom. Fejér; Cs. III, 330, vgl. 1347: Michaelis de *Goth* homo regius AnjOkm. V, 119), *Guotfalva* ~ slowak. *Gôtovany*, Kom. Liptó, usw. | Polnisch *Gotosa* (wohl *Gotosza!*) PN, T a s z y c k i, Najdawniejsze polskie imiona osobowe 110; *Gotowicz* Kozierowski, WPSl. 278. | Tschechisch *Hotek*, *Hotěk*, *Hotyš* (aus früheren **Gotek*, **Gotyš* usw.) FN, K o t í k, Naše příjmení 19; *Hotaš*, *Hotaše*, *Hofata* (aus **Gotaš*, **Gotaša*, **Gořeta*) PN, G e b a u e r, Slovník I, 476.

Diese Namen sind wahrscheinlich aus den Vollnamen deutschen Ursprungs *Gotthard*, *Gottlieb* usw., die in diesen Sprachen sehr verbreitet waren (vgl. den tschech. PN *Hotart!* G e b a u e r ib.), verkürzt und weitergebildet worden. Es gibt auch im Bulgarischen einen PN *Goto*, der mit *Goga*, *Goco*, *Gočo*, *Gošo*, *Goša*, *Geto*, *Geko*, *Geta*, *Gečo*, *Gešo* usw. zusammen, eine Koseform des Namens *Georgios* ist (Weigand ib., 123). Über die Bildung vgl. *Evdojka: Do-ta*, *Nikola: Ni-to*, *Vuk: Vu-to*, *Benefacij = Bonifacij: Be-to*, *Bogdan: Bo-to*, *Lazar: La-to* usw. (Weigand ib., 111). Angesichts des engen Zusammenhanges der rumän. PN mit den bulgarischen, ist der Ursprung des rumän. FN *Gotea* am wahrscheinlichsten in diesem bulgar. PN zu suchen.

Man könnte im Falle des rumän. BergN auch an den VolksN *gotъ*, *gotinъ*²⁵ denken, der in den kirchenslawischen Denkmälern serbischen Ursprungs in der Bedeutung „Bulgarer“ gebraucht wird (D a n i č i ć, Rječnik iz književnih starina srpskih I, 228; vgl. auch M a ž u r a n i ć, Prinosi za hrvatski pravno-povjestni rječnik 332). Dieser Erklärung würde der Umstand eine gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit verleihen, daß unmittelbar in der Nachbar-

²⁵ D. (S. 192) und nach ihm G. (S. 245) halten die Formen des Namens *Got*, *Gotin* — mit *o*-Vokal — irrtümlich für rumänisch. Sie glauben nämlich, daß dieser Name im Slaw. nur mit dem Vokal *ъ* (*Gъtъ*, *Gъtinъ*) vorhanden sei. Es ist dies aber eine unüberlegte Meinung, der doch die Tatsachen widersprechen; vgl. Miklosich, *Lexicon palaeoslovenico-graeco-latinum*. S. 139, unter *Gotinъ!*

schaft von *Muntele Gotului* sich ein Berg namens *Muntele Comanului* (Spezialkarte) befindet, der seinen Namen möglicherweise von einem Kumanen erhielt. Die beiden Namen sind vielleicht gleichzeitig entstanden, denn nur so wäre die Unterscheidung des einen Berges vom anderen durch Volksnamen verständlich.²⁶

Wie dem aber auch sei, unterliegt es keinem Zweifel, daß auf unseren BergN weder die Theorie der gepidisch-rumän. Symbiose, noch die der rumän. Kontinuität in Siebenbürgen, noch etwa die der gotischen Siedlungen in Siebenbürgen aufgebaut werden kann.

Über den sonderbaren Einfall von Gustav Kisch, nach dem der ON *Gabud* ~ rum. *Găbud* (Kom. Alsó-Fehér, an der Maros) den VolksN der *Gepiden* erhalten hätte,²⁷ ist zu bemerken, daß diese Ortschaft früher *Kapud* hieß (1264: *Cupud* W. VII, 96; 1441: *Kapud* TörtTár. 1889, 751; vgl. auch Lipszky II, 48), also aus dem ungar. *kapu* ‚Tor‘ stammt.

Durch die obigen Ausführungen glaube ich zur Genüge gezeigt zu haben, daß man (1) auf rein spekulativ-linguistische Art an die Deutung der PN und ON und an die Untersuchung siedlungsgeschichtlicher Probleme nicht herantreten darf und daß (2) die Erforschung der rumän. Siedlungsverhältnisse in Ungarn ohne eingehende Kenntnisse auf dem Gebiete der ungar. Sprachwissenschaft und der Geschichte durchaus unmöglich ist. Es ist also leicht zu verstehen, daß G., im völligen Mangel dieser Kenntnisse sich auf dem ihm gänzlich fremden Gebiete durch scheinbare Ähnlichkeiten irreführen ließ. Zum Schlusse bemerke ich, daß ich auf Grund der geschichtlichen ON-Überlieferung in Siebenbürgen, und überhaupt im ganzen süd-östlichen Ungarn, Gepidenspuren durchaus nicht ausfindig machen konnte.

István Kniezsa.

²⁶ G. Kisch, *Siebenbürgen im Lichte der Sprache*: Archiv des Vereins für siebenb. Landeskunde, Bd. XLV, 183, glaubt eine Gotenspur auch in dem von Lenk, *Geogr. Lexikon* angeführten BergN *Munte Gotsi* entdeckt zu haben, in dem er diesen als *Gofi* liest. Die von Lenk gebrauchte Orthographie erlaubt aber diese Lesung *c* = rumän. *ț* nicht, denn bei ihm hat die Schreibung *ts* — nach der alten siebenbürgisch-ungar. Gebrauch — immer den Lautwert von *č*!

²⁷ G. Kisch, *ib.* 183.

Sur la méthode d'interprétation des cartes de l'Atlas Linguistique Roumain.

La linguistique romane et balkanique est à la veille de s'enrichir d'un nouvel instrument de travail.* Les prospectus annonçant la publication prochaine des premiers fascicules sont pleins de promesses.¹ Il est donc à espérer que les enquêtes entreprises par MM. S. Pop et E. Petrovici, une fois publiées, fourniront des matériaux abondants à ceux qui s'appuyant sur l'aire d'extension actuelle des faits phonétiques et lexicographiques du roumain se consacreront à des études de géographie et de géologie linguistiques. L'Atlas contiendra les réponses faites au Questionnaire normal par un seul individu du point exploré, il constituera donc un recueil de parlars individuels ou de faits de 'parole'.² Quant aux textes recueillis à l'aide du Grand Questionnaire, ils tâcheront de nous donner une idée de la 'langue' d'un certain nombre de points choisis.

Les matériaux cartographiques de l'ALR ne demanderont donc que d'être interprétés avec la sobriété et la précaution requises pour ce genre de recherches. On sait combien les opinions sont partagées au sujet de la valeur et de la méthode d'interprétation des cartes descriptives.³ Aussi croyons-nous que M. Pușcariu, dans son article, aurait dû éviter de formuler certaines conclusions imprimées en italiques qui ignotos fallunt, notis sunt derisui. L'esprit qui a suggéré à M. P. les enseignements dont il s'agit, est malheureusement difficile à combattre par des argu-

* Les observations qui suivent nous ont été suggérées par l'article de M. Sextil Pușcariu intitulé *Les enseignements de l'Atlas Linguistique Roumain*: extrait de la Revue de Transylvanie III (1936), 12 p., 15 cartes.

¹ Sur le plan et la méthode de l'ALR v. Pușcariu: Dacoromania VI (1931), p. 504, ss.; Pop, Sever: *ib.* VII (1934), p. 55, ss.

² Cf. à ce sujet I. Iordan, *Introducere în studiul limbilor romanice*. Iași, 1932, p. 213.

³ En dehors du livre de M. Iordan rappelons ici les paroles suivantes de M. P. Skok: „[les Atlas linguistiques élaborés jusqu'à présent] ne sont, somme toute, que le recensement linguistique à travers l'espace au temps qui correspond au parcours de l'explorateur. Or, il est clair que ce recensement n'est valable que pour la période de ce parcours. Il va sans doute changer dans la suite des temps” (*Projet d'un Atlas linguistique yougoslave: Zvláštní otisk ze zborniku prací I. sjezdu slov. fil. v Praze 1929. Sv. II, p. 2.*). On n'ignore pas non plus que des recherches plus ou moins simultanées entreprises par deux ou plusieurs explorateurs aboutissent à des résultats souvent bien divers.

ments, et rien ne pourra empêcher ses élèves d'imiter l'exemple donné par le maître.

En attendant nous nous permettons de faire quelques observations critiques sur la façon dont M. P. entend interpréter les données de l'ALR. Les romanistes occidentaux s'occupant d'études roumaines n'auront certainement pas de peine à retenir des réflexions suivantes celles qu'ils jugeront fructueuses au point de vue de la formation de leur propres jugements.

Ce qui est particulièrement surprenant dans le raisonnement du savant roumain c'est qu'il tire de la répartition géographique actuelle de quelques mots d'origine latine des conclusions censées valables pour l'extension territoriale du roumanisme médiéval et même pour celle de l'élément latinophone de la Dacie Trajane à l'époque de la conquête romaine (II—III^e siècle après J.-Chr.). On dit que la géographie linguistique est en même temps géologie linguistique, mais on sous-entend que l'époque exacte des diverses couches consécutives reste à être établie à l'aide des chartes, des textes anciens, etc. On a même parlé de la nécessité d'une collaboration plus étroite entre les adeptes de la méthode gilliéronienne et ceux de la méthode historique. Qu'on se rappelle également combien de fois M. Bartoli a eu recours dans ces divers travaux à la „*conferma dei documenti*”⁴ sans laquelle on ne conçoit guère de chronologie absolue quelque relative que cette dernière puisse être. D'après M. P. tous les mots d'origine latine conservés dans les régions plus ou moins latérales de la Transylvanie prouveraient à l'unisson que le roumain, tel qu'on le parle aujourd'hui dans cette province, dérive directement du latin importé par les colons de l'empereur Trajan.⁵ Rien n'aurait bougé depuis l'époque latine dans ces aires latérales, les mots *arină*, *nea*, *păcurar*, etc., continueraient d'une manière ininterrompue les mots correspondants du latin populaire de Dacie ARENAM, NIVEM, PECORARIUM. Avec un peu

⁴ Cf. p. e. *Per la storia del latino volgare*: Archivio Glottologico Italiano XXI (1927), pp. 5, 9, etc., et *Introduzione alla neolinguistica*. Genève, 1925, passim.

⁵ M. Bartoli fait remonter les destinées du roumain transylvain également jusqu'à Trajan, v. *La spiccata individualità della lingua romena*: Studi Rumeni I (1927), p. 23. Il va même plus loin quand il écrit: „Ne sappiamo se COMEDERE sia trapelato nella Dacia dalle *provinciae* vicine prima di Traiano, secondo una nota opinione di N. Iorga” Quant à l'hypothèse de M. Iorga à laquelle Bartoli fait allusion cf. L. Tamás, *Romains, Romans et Roumains dans l'histoire de la Dacie Trajane*. Budapest, 1936, p. 57, n. 14.

d'esprit de suite on pourrait affirmer également que l'istroroumain continue le latin vulgaire de la Péninsule istrienne et le macédonroumain le latin vulgaire des provinces romaines de langue grecque(!). Bien mieux. La phase antérieure COMEDERE transportée en Amérique prouverait-elle que *comer* vient du latin vulgaire américain? Ce serait absurde, de même qu'il est absurde d'établir des rapports immédiats entre le latin trajanien et le roumain transylvain. Celui-ci, loin de continuer le latin de la Dacie Trajane (qui à partir de 271 aurait dû, d'ailleurs, se développer isolément s'il avait pu subsister), se rapproche avec le moldave et le valaque à tel point des parlers roumains sud-danubiens qu'il ne nous est pas permis d'en chercher la commune origine dans le bassin des Carpathes. On voit donc que M. P. confond antériorité relative („antérieur" est chez lui synonyme de „datant des débuts de l'ère chrétienne") avec antériorité fixée à une époque déterminée, et diffusion géographique actuelle du roumain avec les étapes successives que présente l'agrandissement ou plus exactement la dispersion graduelle du territoire linguistique roumain à travers les âges. Rendons donc à l'histoire ancienne et médiévale et à la linguistique historique ce qui est à elles, à l'ALR ce qui est à l'époque moderne.

C'est ici qu'il convient de préciser l'emploi des termes techniques bartoliens quand on veut les appliquer au latin d'Orient ou balkanique et aux divers parlers roumains issus du roumain primitif. On sait que dans les figures de Bartoli le roumain s'oppose à *Iberia*, *Gallia* et *Italia* sous le nom de *Dacia*.⁶ Or, la Dacie

⁶ D'après Bartoli „Alcuni studiosi preferirebbero altri nomi o binomi, per es. *Dacia e Mesia* oppure *Romenia e Macedonia*. Ma questi e altri binomi complicherebbero le cose, specialmente dal lato tipografico... Col nome *Dacia* non solo indico la Dacia Traiana e la Dacia Aureliana, ma simboleggio anche i Romeni sbalestrati nella Macedonia (compresi i Megleniti) e nell'Istria mia nativa." Cf. *La spiccata individualità l. c.* p. 21—22. Pour des raisons exposées dans notre livre (v. ci-dessus n. 5) nous préférierions dire *Moesia* en désignant par ce terme les provinces de langue latine situées entre la Save, le Bas-Danube et la ligne de Jireček—Skok. Ceux qui, par amour de simplifier les choses, continueront à réunir sous le nom de Dacie les Roumains nord-danubiens, les Méglénites, les Aroumains et les Istroroumains risqueront d'être les victimes de cette terminologie et de baser, volontairement ou involontairement, leurs interprétations sur l'hypothèse arbitraire de la continuité latino-romano-roumaine en Dacie. Même en admettant que les deux Dacies aient contribué à la formation de la langue roumaine il faudrait remplacer *Dacia* per *Moesia* parce qu'en face des trois parlers sud-danubiens il n'y eut qu'un seul parler nord-danubien. N'oublions pas non plus que la „phase antérieure" de *Dacia Aureliana* est MOESIA!

est constamment considérée par les savants comme une aire latérale de la Romania. Jusqu'à la mort de Théodose et l'avènement d'Arcadius cette position latérale a été une réalité vivante, à partir de la fin du IV^e siècle, pourtant, le latin des provinces orientales sera de plus en plus enfermé dans une aire isolée. Le revirement a été trop brusque et trop profond pour qu'on puisse le considérer comme négligeable. C'est pourquoi les innovations latines antérieures à l'époque carolingienne telles que *cochlearium, ecclesia, pensare, spissus, cum-initiare, etc.*, sont extrêmement rares en Mésie tandis que dans la Péninsule ibérique on a *cuchara, iglesia, pensar, espeso, comenzar*. D'autre part les innovations romanes postérieures au VIII^e siècle sont en Mésie des plus nombreuses,⁷ on pourrait infiniment multiplier les exemples du type RES — *causa* — (*lucru*), SOLVERE — *pacare* — (*plătire*). Aucune langue romane ne pourrait rivaliser avec le roumain sous ce rapport.⁸

On peut donc dire d'une manière générale qu'au point de vue de l'évolution organique le latin d'Orient ne fait corps avec l'Occi-

⁷ A cette époque *Mésie* ne signifie plus le latin des provinces sud-danubiennes parce que les Romains sédentaires à habitations fixes ne survivaient plus au VIII^e siècle. Sauf la côte dalmate, le reste du territoire autrefois latin était déjà complètement slavisé. Le latin d'Orient n'était plus parlé à l'intérieur de la Péninsule que par des pâtres nomades et transhumants qui grâce à leur forme de vie migratoire avaient réussi à se soustraire au sort commun des éléments romanisés sédentaires. Le terme de Mésie (ou de Dacie si l'on veut s'en tenir à l'usage de Bartoli et de Pușcariu) correspond donc à une notion très élastique appliquée à des réalités géographiques toujours changeantes.

⁸ A l'avis de Bartoli „il romeno è in certo modo il più latino e il meno latino tra i linguaggi neolatini, cioè la Dacia è tra le *provinciae* la più fedele a Roma e insieme la meno fedele”, cf. *La spiccata individualità, l. c. p. 20*. Notons cependant que rester fidèle aux phases antérieures dans les cas où les idiomes romans occidentaux ont innové (p. e. INCIPERE — *cum-initiare*, etc.), n'est autre chose que répugner aux innovations latines, donc infidélité. La chose devient plus évidente encore si l'on remplace dans la définition de Bartoli „latino” par „neolatino”, pour voir ce qui en résulte: „il romeno è... il più neolatino e il meno neolatino tra i linguaggi neolatini...” L'absence des innovations latines occidentales étant normale en roumain on doit supprimer „il più neolatino”. Ce qui reste c'est „il romeno è il meno neolatino tra i linguaggi neolatini”. Ceci pour compléter les enseignements qu'on peut tirer de la même définition et pour montrer qu'il n'y a pas de différence essentielle entre l'opinion de Bartoli et celle de Weigand au sujet de la place que nous devons attribuer au roumain dans la famille des langues romanes. En effet, „il meno neolatino” peut être tenu pour synonyme de „romanische Balkansprache” (cf. *Balkan-Archiv I—1295, p. VIII*).

dent que grâce aux phases primaires ou antérieures conservées en Mésie et dans une ou plusieurs provinces occidentales. Le caractère 'plus latin' de la Mésie (ou de la Dacie symbolique) provient dans certains cas du fait que la Péninsule balkanique, à partir de la fin du IV^e siècle, ne pouvait plus participer aux innovations latines surgies dans les régions occidentales aux cours des V—VII^e siècles. A moins qu'elle n'eût innové, elle n'avait qu'à conserver dans son état d'isolement la phase antérieure. Les cas où la Mésie constitue une aire mineure conservatrice par rapport aux autres provinces occidentales appartiennent selon Bartoli à une figure *a normale* :

1. — <i>Iberia</i>	<i>Gallia</i>	<i>Italia</i>	DACIA ⁹
<i>cochlearium</i>	<i>cochlearium</i>	<i>cochlearium</i>	LINGULA

La figure opposée est considérée comme normale :

I. — IBERIA	GALLIA	ITALIA	<i>Dacia</i>
APERIRE	APERIRE	APERIRE	<i>discludere</i>

La comparaison des deux figures nous invite à en tirer la conclusion suivante. Les cas où la Dacie (Mésie) s'oppose à toutes les autres provinces en guise d'aire mineure conservatrice sont moins nombreux que les cas où elle devient innovatrice. Le cas normal est donc APERIRE — *discludere* (COR — *anima*, FURNUS — *coctorium*, etc.) ce qui veut dire que le nombre des phases antérieures conservées en Mésie est inférieur à celui des phases latines orientales inconnues ou rares dans les provinces occidentales. Il ne faut donc pas songer à une quantité plus considérable de phases conservées exclusivement en Dacie (il s'agit de quatorze mots — en partie connus aussi en d'autres aires isolées — et de quelques couples dites grammaticales, cf. Bartoli, *La spiccata individualità*, l. c. p. 23—5). Dans l'Empire d'Occident dont la vie linguistique unitaire s'écarte après le IV^e siècle de plus en plus de celle des provinces orientales il est naturellement plus difficile de trouver des phases antérieures, conservées seulement dans l'une des provinces occidentales, parce que les innovations venant de tous côtés tendaient viribus unitis à les supplanter.¹⁰ En nous appuyant sur les réflexions précédentes nous

⁹ Nous reproduisons cette figure d'après *Introduzione* p. 10, § 5. V. aussi la figure suivante.

¹⁰ Étant donné ces prémisses ou, si l'on veut, ces réserves, nous pouvons souscrire à l'avis du savant italien selon lequel „il romeno è in certo modo il più latino... tra i linguaggi neolatini". Cf. encore ci-dessus n. 8.

croyons qu'il est plus 'normal' de considérer la Mésie (ou la Dacie) comme une aire isolée de la Romània. Pour compléter ce que nous avons dit jusqu'ici examinons encore la figure suivante:¹¹

IBERIA	<i>Gallia</i>	<i>Italia</i>	DACIA
EQUA	<i>caballa</i>	<i>caballa</i>	EQUA

A notre avis l'Ibérie et la Dacie ne se trouvent pas dans les mêmes conditions. La première reste incorporée à la Romània tandis que la Dacie en sera isolée dès la fin du IV^e siècle. L'Ibérie conserve donc la phase antérieure en vertu de sa position latérale, et la Dacie à cause de son isolement. C'est pourquoi d'ailleurs le roumain présente des affinités curieuses avec le sarde¹² qu'il ne partage ni avec l'espagnol ni avec le portugais.

Le dépérissement successif du latin d'Orient est en grande partie également la conséquence de sa désannexion du bloc latin occidental. Entraîné dans la sphère gréco--byzantine il ne pouvait pas s'alimenter du latin qui, à l'Occident, restait la langue officielle de l'Etat et de l'Eglise. Pendant que dans la Romània occidentale les Germains succombent à la force de la civilisation latine et deviennent des Romans, les envahisseurs slaves déciment et assimilent les éléments latinophones sédentaires. Le latin d'Orient ne survivra bientôt que sur les lèvres des pâtres autochtones romanisés qui, grâce à leur vie nomade et à leur séparation sociale, ne donnaient guère prise aux forces slavisantes. A partir du VII—VIII^e siècle le terme de Mésie (ou de Dacie) ne désigne plus le latin des provinciaux orientaux disparus, mais uniquement le parler des pâtres roumains. Pendant longtemps ces derniers avaient vécu en symbiose avec les ancêtres des Albanais et l'on sait combien profondes furent les traces de ce contact. C'est l'avance slave qui contribuera le plus efficacement à la dissolution de cette symbiose et à l'éparpillement de plus en plus prononcé du bloc roumain primitif. C'est au cours des IX—XII^e siècles (selon Philippide depuis le VII^e) que s'accomplit le processus d'éparpillement du roumanisme primitif. Dans les derniers siècles du moyen-âge il faut déjà parler d'Aroumains, de Méglénites, d'Istroroumains et de Roumains septentrionaux immigrés dans les régions nord-danubiennes. Chose curieuse, c'est précisé-

¹¹ Cf. *Introduzione* p. 6, § 4. Nous ne reproduisons qu'une figure, mais nous entendons parler de toutes les trois (I—III).

¹² Cf. Pușcariu, *Locul limbii române între limbile romanice: Ac. Rom. Discursuri de recepțiune XLIX. București, 1920. p. 15—8.*

ment dans les provinces restées latines même après l'évacuation de la Dacie Trajane qu'il ne reste plus de Roumains, en échange on les trouvera en Istrie, dans les provinces balkaniques de langue grecque et au nord du Danube jusqu'à la Moravie, la Pologne et la Russie méridionale.

Les Roumains ont donc abandonné leur espace nourricier primitif. Ce fait est d'une importance capitale pour l'interprétation des cartes de l'ALR. On peut notamment dire, toutes réserves faites, que depuis le IX—X^e siècle le roumain primitif, disparu au théâtre de sa naissance, ne survit plus que dans quatre aires postérieures (aree seriori) isolées les unes des autres. Ce phénomène n'a pas son pareil dans l'histoire des langues romanes, les hispanophones du Levant constituent également une aire postérieure, mais la mère patrie ou l'aire antérieure subsiste dans l'Ibérie jusqu'à nos jours. Les conséquences de cet isolement quadruple ont été des plus grandes. Chaque parler a subi des innovations inconnues aux autres. Les mots hongrois, saxons et ruthènes du roumain du nord sont confinés entièrement au territoire du roumain du nord, l'aroumain est inondé d'éléments grecs modernes, le méglenite fourmille d'éléments bulgares et turcs-osmanli et le croate menace de submerger entièrement l'istroroumain. Le pourcentage des éléments albanais n'est plus le même, c'est le roumain du nord qui conserve le plus fidèlement cet héritage balkanique.

Ajoutons encore que les pâtres nomades ne pouvaient pas constituer des aires isolées à limites géographiques immobiles, mais plutôt des aires mobiles. On peut même dire que jusqu'au XIII^e siècle il n'y avait que des aires mobiles dont les déplacements étaient déterminés par les conditions de sécurité, par la recherche de pâturages convenables et par le rythme des saisons. Ceux qui préfèrent simplifier les choses auront peut-être volontiers renoncé à apprendre ces détails. Nous leur recommandons d'enquêter sur les Aroumains nomades d'aujourd'hui pendant l'été et pendant l'hiver. Qu'ils fassent cette besogne successivement pendant trois ans, et ils auront appris beaucoup plus au sujet de la vie médiévale des quatre parlers roumains¹³ qu'ils n'apprendront jamais des travaux qui seront conçus dans l'esprit du programme de M. Pușcariu.

¹³ Qu'on lise à ce sujet l'étude de Th. Capidan, *Fărșeroții*: Dacoromania VI (1931). Le savant roumain écrit entre autres: „...Fărșeroții erau plecați la munte, și a umbla după mutările lor era un lucru foarte greu” (p. 149).

Nous ne pourrions guère approuver la façon dont M. P. entend déterminer les aires latérales du roumain. D'après lui les dialectes trandanubiens peuvent être considérés comme recouvrant des aires latérales de même que les régions des extrémités ouest, nord et est du territoire „daco-roumain". Cette conception arbitraire pourrait être admise à la rigueur dans le cas où les Roumains auraient habité de tous temps le territoire gigantesque s'étendant des confins septentrionaux de l'antique Dacie Trajane aux limites de la Grèce moderne d'une part, et de la Péninsule istrienne jusqu'à la Mer Noire d'autre part. Il faudrait supposer encore que ces Roumains fussent depuis l'époque de leur formation ethnique et linguistique des éléments sédentaires établis en Istrie, en Yougoslavie, en Grèce, en Bulgarie, en Roumanie et peut-être même dans la Pologne et la Russie méridionales. Or, l'histoire de l'Europe Orientale ignore l'existence d'un pareil peuple puissant, elle prouve par contre que les Roumains ont toujours été et en partie restent encore le peuple pasteur par excellence de l'Orient européen. Somme toute, la conception erronée du savant roumain se trouve en contradiction avec tout ce qu'on sait sur l'histoire des quatre embranchements du roumanisme et sur le rôle que l'élément roumain a joué dans l'histoire des Balkans.¹⁴ M. Pușcariu oublie que jusqu'à la poésie populaire roumaine rien ne parle en faveur de son hypothèse 'sédentaire'.

Les quatre aires postérieures et isolées du roumain primitif, séparées les unes des autres depuis mille ans, ont donc eu des destinées diverses. Chacune s'est évoluée en raison de tendances innovatrices propres à elle ce qui naturellement n'exclut pas la possibilité de développements convergents. Chacune devait avoir des aires latérales propres à elle, il n'y a donc pas lieu d'accoupler des aires latérales sud-danubiennes avec certaines aires nord-danubiennes. N'oublions pas que les chapitres les plus mouvementés de la vie lexicologique des parlers roumains sont postérieurs au X^e siècle, et que ces chapitres n'ont pas été écrits par le même auteur. Au lieu de dégrader les parlers sud-danubiens au niveau de simples aires latérales du roumain du nord, il eût été plus instructif d'organiser une enquête spéciale pour l'aroumain du moins (y compris les Fărșeroți d'Albanie). Même l'istroroumain mériterait une attention spéciale vu

¹⁴ Cf. P. Mutafčiev, *Bulgares et Roumains dans l'histoire des pays danubiens*. Sofia, 1932.

que les Istroroumains établis respectivement au nord et au sud du Monte Maggiore ont vécu pendant des siècles sans se douter de leur voisinage. Ils apprirent l'existence des „Dacoroumains” et de leurs congénères balkaniques par des voyageurs désireux d'étudier leur dialecte. Nous ne saurions dire non plus dans quelle mesure les témoignages des Roumains sud-danubiens établis dans le Quadrilatère pourront remplacer les Atlas qu'on devrait faire, dans la mesure du possible, aussi pour les autres parlers. Quels enseignements pourra-t-on tirer de la répartition géographique des faits linguistiques cartographiés dans le Quadrilatère? Constatons que cette fois encore les Roumains sud-danubiens ne trouveront pas leur compte.

Après avoir attribué aux parlers sud-danubiens le rôle d'aires latérales M. P. cherche à répondre à la question de savoir quelles régions doivent être tenues pour centrales. Il affirme que l'ancienne Valachie, la Moldavie et la Transylvanie sud-orientale sont centrales par rapport aux extrémités ouest, nord et est du territoire daco-roumain. Vers le sud le territoire du roumain du nord n'aurait donc pas de zone latérale. Au point de vue des innovations bulgares postérieures à l'immigration des Roumains en Valachie, en Moldavie et en Transylvanie, cette circonstance ne saurait nous surprendre, aussi l'appartenance à la même Eglise gréco-orientale aura-t-elle contribué à spiritualiser la frontière linguistique roumaine vers le sud. A partir des XV—XVI^e siècles les deux voïvodats sont soumis au Sultan dont la suzeraineté durera jusqu'à l'avènement de Charles de Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. C'est pourquoi dans l'Ancien Royaume le nombre des éléments grecs et turcs est beaucoup plus considérable que dans le bassin des Carpathes transylvains. Par contre, les éléments albanais importés simultanément avec les éléments latins et la plus ancienne couche des éléments slaves ont exactement la même diffusion des deux côtés des Carpathes y compris les aires les plus latérales. Ces éléments albanais avec les mots dits „Balkanwörter” dérivent en Transylvanie tout aussi peu du latin vulgaire de la Dacie Trajane que les mots *arină, nea, aiu, cotătoare*, etc. Ce sont, si l'on veut des aires antérieures importées ou transportées dans des aires postérieures, telles qu'on en trouve dans l'espagnol du Mexique, dans le portugais du Brésil, dans l'espagnol du Levant, dans le yiddish de Pologne, etc.

Si les régions indiquées par M. P. peuvent être considérées comme centrales ou plus exactement innovatrices au point de vue des phases postérieures d'origine méridionale ou d'origine moldo-

valaque, il n'en est pas de même pour les innovations d'origine septentrionale ou occidentale. Bien qu'il y eût des centres d'innovations hongroises aussi dans les deux voïvodats (les fondateurs des villes moldaves et valaques ont été les Saxons et les Hongrois; en Moldavie il y a aujourd'hui encore des Tchango), le pays classique d'où rayonnaient les emprunts hongrois dans les régions transcarpatines a tout de même été la Transylvanie (y compris le Banat et le pays de Maramarosh). Le mot *harang* 'cloche' p. ex. n'est pas seulement un banatisme comme le veut le Dictionnaire de l'Académie Roumanie, il se trouve également dans les départements de Gorj, de Mehedinți et dans la vallée du Timok.¹⁵ Est-ce que l'Atlas s'occupera aussi des couples étrangères (CLOPOT — *harang*) ou seulement des cas où du moins la phase antérieure est représentée par un mot d'origine latine?

Nous ne pourrions épouser l'opinion du savant roumain d'après laquelle les régions indiquées du territoire septentrional devraient être tenues pour centrales aussi par rapport à l'istroumain, au méglénite et à l'aroumain. Y a-t-il des phases postérieures d'origine moldo-valaque dans les parlers sud-danubiens? Nous n'en connaissons aucune. On trouve des „daco-roumanismes” dans les écrits de quelques écrivains macédo-roumains, mais ils ne sauraient nous intéresser cette fois. Même entre les parlers sud-danubiens il est assez rare de trouver des points de contact, tels que Tsarnareka où l'aroumain se mêle au méglénite. La survivance d'un mot latin dans les aires latérales du roumain du nord est donc un phénomène tout à fait indépendant des destinées du même mot dans les parlers sud-danubiens. La conservation de *arină* 'sable' dans quelques aires latérales du roumain du nord et dans l'aroumain constitue deux faits autonomes appartenant l'un à une aire postérieure isolée du roumain primitif et l'autre à une autre aire également postérieure et isolée du même roumain primitif. La preuve en est que le mot est d'usage général en aroumain tandis qu'au nord du Danube il n'est conservé que latéralement. Il n'y a donc pas lieu de grouper les dialectes sud-danubiens autour des régions centrales fictives du roumain du nord. Prétendre qu'une aire latérale „daco-roumaine” vaut bien tout un parler sud-danu-

¹⁵ Cf. T. Gilcescu, *Cercetări asupra graiului din Gorj*: Grai și Suflet V (1931), p. 121; Arhivele Olteniei VII (1923), p. 520; E. Bucuța, *Româniți dintre Vidin și Timoc*, p. 129, 131.

bien est une erreur que nous ne saurions partager.

M. P. pousse très loin les simplifications. D'après lui le mot *cotătoare* 'miroir' aurait été répandu primitivement sur tout le territoire „daco-roumain”. Il serait même antérieur au slave *ogлиндă*. Le latin SPECULUM se serait perdu chez les Roumains comme en France, mais ils auraient formé — comme les Français *miroir* de (*se*) *mirer*¹⁶ — un dérivé avec le même suffixe instrumental, *cotătoare* de *a căută* 'regarder'. Malgré l'identité sémantique et morphologique de *miroir* — *căutătoare*, le français et le roumain ne se trouvent pas dans des conditions pareilles, parce que les Français ont conservé la phase postérieure tandis que les Roumains, supposé que *cotătoare* ait jamais été général, ont sacrifié celui-ci à *ogлиндă*. Quant à la phase primitive, qui a survécu en provençal et ailleurs, on n'en trouve nulle trace dans les quatre aires isolées du roumain primitif, l'istroroumain a *spegălj*,¹⁷ l'aroumain *grendă*, le méglénite *uglindală*.¹⁸ Nous nous estimons donc en droit de supposer que SPECULUM était inconnu dans le latin des pâtres balkaniques, le miroir n'étant pas un accessoire indispensable de leur vie journalière. Les divers embranchements roumains connurent l'usage du miroir à des époques diverses, on ne simplifie pas les choses en supposant arbitrairement la continuité de cet usage. Les Roumains transylvains, eux aussi, donnèrent un nom au miroir indépendamment de leurs frères moldo-valaques, *cotătoare* est donc une innovation latérale à laquelle ne correspond aucune phase antérieure de même que *ogлиндă* ne peut guère être tenu pour une phase postérieure à **spechiu*, *speklu*. Nous sommes convaincus que des recherches faites avec la méthode „Wörter und Sachen” aboutiraient à un résultat analogue. L'ancienneté de *cotătoare* ne doit pas être exagérée, la plus ancienne source dans laquelle il apparaît est, jusqu'à preuve du contraire, le Dictionnaire de R. Pontbriant.¹⁹ Nous n'en admettons pas moins qu'à un moment donné les aires de *cotătoare* et de

¹⁶ M. Gamillscheg reconstruit dans FEW un galloroman **miratorium* ce qui n'est pas nécessaire parce que *parloir* ne dérive pas non plus de *PARABOLATORIUM.

¹⁷ Nous trouvons ce mot dans le glossaire de Glavina ap. Pușcariu, *Studii Istroromâne* III, p. 193. C'est un Fremdwort plutôt qu'un Lehnwort.

¹⁸ Cf. Th. Capidan, *Meglenoromâni* I, p. 90.

¹⁹ Dicționarul româno-francesu. Bucuresci și Göttinge, 1862. Il contient de nombreux transylvanismes tels que *chindeu* 'essuie-main', *hinteu* 'char, voiture', *tărcatu* 'bariolé', *uéga* 'verre', etc.

ogлиндă se sont heurtées l'une contre l'autre. C'est alors que la lutte a pu commencer pour la suprématie ou pour l'exclusivité. Ajoutons encore que dans les quelques villages de Hongrie ayant des roumanophones plus ou moins nombreux on rencontre la variante *cocotoare*.

D'après le savant roumain *ogлиндă* serait un mot d'origine daco-slovène et dériverait de *glenda*. Cette explication boite de plus d'un côté. D'abord on ne tient plus les anciens colons bulgares de Transylvanie pour les descendants des Dacoslovènes de Miklosich.²⁰ Ensuite le daco-slovène *glenda* aurait abouti en roumain à **glindă*. Si *ogлиндă* était une innovation d'origine transylvaine, son aire actuelle devrait recouvrir plutôt toute la Transylvanie et *cotătoare* serait conservé dans des aires latérales moldo-valaques. Or, c'est précisément le contraire qui est vrai. Que faire de l'aroumain *grendă* qui est certainement bulgare d'origine et dont la forme originale doit avoir été *glendă*? Est-ce qu'il vient du „daco-slovène”?

M. P. ne parle nulle part de la fonction séparatrice des Carpathes à l'époque antérieure à Trianon. Nous ne croyons pas qu'on puisse entièrement négliger le fait que les Roumains transylvaniens étaient, jusqu'à la fin de la guerre, séparés de leurs congénères moldo-valaques par une frontière politique. Cette circonstance, loin de rendre absolument impossible la pénétration sporadique des innovations méridionales, pouvait dans de nombreux cas empêcher leur libre diffusion. Les cartes de *aiu*, *păcurar*, *cuminecătură* montrent bien que l'aire conservatrice s'étend presque exactement jusqu'à la ligne frontière de la Transylvanie d'avant-guerre. Dans les cas où les aires moldo-valaques n'empiètent que relativement peu sur le territoire transylvain on pourra éventuellement songer à des déplacements conditionnés par l'annexion de cette province à l'Ancien Royaume. Pas toujours, bien entendu. Ainsi il est très probable que la répartition actuelle des aires de *păcurar* et de *cioban* ‚berger' est à peu près la même qu'avant la guerre. C'est que dans les régions méridionales de la Transylvanie il y a des bergers qui depuis longtemps font l'hivernage dans l'Ancien Royaume.²¹ C'est à eux qu'on attribue l'im-

²⁰ D'après Miletič il s'agit de colons venus de Bulgarie au cours du XIII^e siècle, cf. *Sedmogradskitě Bъlgari i tehnikat ezik* : Spisan. na Bъlg. Akad. na Naukitě. Kn. XXXIII. Sofia, 1926. V. encore notre compte rendu dans *Ungar. Jahrb.* VIII (1928), p. 185—6.

²¹ C'est l'opinion aussi de M. Pop, v. *Dacoromania VIII* (1936), p. 165. Il ne faut pourtant pas oublier qu'il s'agit de pâtres d'origine sud-danubienne.

portation de *cioban*. Étant donné qu'il s'agit d'un terme de la vie pastorale, nous voudrions savoir d'après quel critère on a réussi à localiser dans l'aire de *păcurar* les aires isolées de *cioban*. Est-ce qu'elles ont quelque consistance ou se déplacent-elles suivant le va-et-vient saisonnier des troupeaux et des bergers? On répondra peut-être par la profession de la régularité des migrations de transhumance, mais il n'en reste pas moins à savoir si l'enquête a toujours été faite dans les lieux d'hivernage, dans ceux d'estivage ou plutôt seulement dans les uns ou les autres suivant l'occurrence. Il va sans dire que ces réflexions intéressent la méthode de collection de toute la terminologie pastorale. Si l'on songe au fait que les ancêtres des Roumains étaient des bergers nomades qui ne commencèrent à adopter une vie sédentaire qu'à partir des derniers siècles du moyen âge, on comprendra que ni dans les Balkans ni au nord du Danube il n'y a pas lieu d'établir des rapports de dérivation continus entre le latin et le roumain d'un même point géographique. Ce qui vaut pour les peuples néo-latins sédentaires de l'Occident doit être accepté à plus forte raison encore pour les divers parlars issus du roumain primitif unitaire.

D'après M. P. il n'y aurait pas de dialecte transylvain du tout. A notre avis c'est une affirmation gratuite non à cause de son caractère négatif, mais à cause de l'argumentation sur laquelle elle s'appuie. Il n'y aurait pas de dialecte transylvain parce que les parlars de ce territoire n'ont aucune particularité spécifique qui soit complètement absente dans les dialectes transcarpatiques.²² On n'a qu'à appliquer ce critère à double tranchant aux dialectes moldave et valaque (même sud-danubiens) pour qu'ils disparaissent à leur tour. Le rhotacisme, de rigueur en istroroumain, est facultatif dans le roumain du nord (autrefois il était beaucoup plus répandu), la palatalisation des labiales se rencontre un peu partout sauf l'istroroumain, celle des dentales n'est pas limitée à la Transylvanie, le gérondif en *-alui* est méglé-

Voilà ce que dit M. Densusianu au sujet des *Săcelenii*: „Putem spune cu siguranță că Săcelenii au venit dela sudul Dunărei, ca păstori, să se așeze lângă Brașov (cf. *Histoire de la langue roumaine* I, p. 328)..., v. *Păstoritul la popoarele romanice*. București, 1913. Extras dis Vieața Nouă, p. 23. — Ces mêmes pâtres ont d'ailleurs également l'habitude de passer l'été dans les Karpates du nord-est, cf. S. Opreanu, *Transhumanța din Carpații orientali*: *Lucrările Institut. de Geogr. IV* (1931), p. 230.

²² C'est également l'opinion de M. Tagliavini, v. Il „*Lexicon Marsilianum*”. Acad. Rom. Etudes et Recherches V. București, 1930, p. 13, n. 2.

nite et aroumain, etc., etc. Il suffit d'admettre la conception de Gauchat²³ pour les faire ressusciter et même pour les diviser en plusieurs sous-dialectes. Il y a des chances d'ailleurs que l'étude phonologique des parlers roumains aboutisse à des résultats positifs.²⁴

M. P. se trompe également en admettant que le caractère plus conservateur du roumain du nord s'expliquerait par la situation périphérique et 'relativement isolée' où seraient demeurés les ancêtres des Roumains de Dacie après l'évacuation officielle de la province par Aurélien. Le mot „relativement" employée par le savant roumain est une échappatoire bien débile qui n'explique pas du tout comment le „roumain de Dacie", isolé du roumain balkanique, présente-t-il tout de même la même physionomie ancestrale que les parlers sud-danubiens. Quelque relatif que fût cet état d'isolement depuis 271 après J.-Ch., on devrait supposer que le roumain septentrional d'aujourd'hui continue le latin de Dacie du III^e siècle, et les parlers sud-danubiens le latin balkanique des IV—VI^e siècles. Nous disons franchement que dans ces conditions l'unité linguistique des quatre embranchements du roumanisme, effet d'un développement commun qui a duré jusqu'aux IX—X^e siècles, devrait être considérée comme un miracle produit par l'harmonie préétablie. Inutile d'ajouter qu'en matière de linguistique nous ne croyons pas à cette sorte de miracles. L'hypothèse de M. P. laisse trop de choses inexplicées. Rappelons p. ex. une fois de plus le fait que parmi tous les parlers issus du même roumain primitif c'est précisément le „daco-roumain" qui conserve le plus fidèlement non seulement certains mots latins mais aussi les mots „balkaniques" et albanais.

Le caractère plus conservateur du roumain septentrional est d'ailleurs chose très relative. Il apparaît plutôt dans le lexique tandis qu'au point de vue de la grammaire, de la „structure interne", il nous serait difficile de tenir l'aroumain pour moins conservateur que le roumain septentrional. M. P. tâche de réduire les 'archaïsmes' de l'aroumain (Dacoromania VIII—1936, p. 321, ss.) au minimum d'importance, sans que son argumentation emporte la conviction. Le caractère plus conservateur du roumain du nord deviendrait encore plus problématique si l'on avait aussi

²³ *Gibt es Mundartgrenzen?* Archiv f. das Studium der neueren Sprachen u. Literaturen CXI (1903), p. 356, ss.

²⁴ D'après M. Troubetzkoy „ergeben die phonologischen Unterschiede immer deutliche und scharfe Grenzen" (cité par M. Lazicius, *A magyar nyelvjárások*. Budapest, 1936, p. 50).

pour les dialectes sud-danubiens des textes suivis à partir du XVI^e siècle.²⁵ Ainsi p. ex. on ne peut savoir si la première personne de l'imparfait aroumain *eram* 'j'étais', *alăvdam* 'je louais', a généralisé l'*m* final avant ou après le XVI^e siècle, si l'on avait des textes anciens on pourrait démontrer sa présence probablement aussi en aroumain et ce serait un cas comparable à celui du conditionnel passé (aroum. *alăvdarim*) qui se trouve encore dans les plus anciens textes septentrionaux, mais qui n'existe plus du tout dans les dialectes du roumain du nord. Ajoutons encore que le parler septentrional a été de tout temps l'objet de recherches incomparablement plus détaillées que les parlers balkaniques et nous sommes sûrs que MM. Pop et Petrovici trouveraient encore chez les Aroumains beaucoup d'archaïsmes s'ils étendaient leurs enquêtes aux Roumains balkaniques.

Au lieu de dire que le nombre des mots latins de l'aroumain inconnus au roumain septentrional est „grandelet” („un număr măricel de cuvinte”: Dacoromania, *ib.* p. 324), nous préférons dire qu'il est grand. Il s'agit de 97 mots.²⁶ Ce nombre est même extraordinaire si l'on songe à l'invasion des éléments grecs, aux dimensions puissantes.

A en juger d'après le caractère des enseignements tels qu'il se présentent sous le prisme du savant roumain, il est à prévoir que l'interprétation des cartes de l'ALR aboutira dans bien des cas à des conclusions suggérées par les besoins de la théorie fictive de la continuité latino-roumaine nord-danubienne.²⁷ Nous avons montré pourquoi les données de l'ALR ne sauraient être susceptibles d'être mises au service de cette théorie. En même temps nous signalons quelques points de vue dont la négligence

²⁵ On sait que les premiers textes aroumains datent du XVIII^e siècle et que les premiers textes méglénites ont été notés et recueillis par G. Weigand. Ireneo della Croce nous donne à la fin du XVII^e siècle un petit échantillon de langue constitué par quelques mots istroroumains, mais l'étude proprement dite de ce parler commence également par l'activité du savant allemand.

²⁶ Cf. Capidan, *Aromânii*, p. 145—50. M. P. n'indique pas le chiffre. Cette liste n'est pas complète. Nous n'y trouvons pas le nom de nombre *yinyif*, *yinghiț* < VIGINTI., v. sur ce dernier Pușcariu, *Etym. Wb.* 1924; Capidan, *Meglenoromânii*, p. 128., et *Aromânii*, p. 302.

²⁷ Nous avons consacré à l'examen critique de cette théorie un volume à part: *Romains, Romans et Roumains dans l'histoire de la Dacie Trajane*: Archivum Europae Centro-Orientalis I (1935), pp. 1—96, II (1936), pp. 46—83, 245—374, v. aussi Etudes sur l'Europe Centre-orientale No 1. Budapest, 1936.

voulue ne ferait que porter préjudice à la méthode d'interprétation des faits linguistiques. Nous pouvons dire pour conclure que l'ALR ne saurait d'aucune façon prouver la continuité du roumain nord-danubien à partir de l'époque du latin populaire de Dacie jusqu'à nos jours, de même qu'il serait absurde d'affirmer sur la foi d'atlas linguistiques détaillés des parlers sud-danubiens (qu'on ne fera probablement jamais, pas même pour l'aroumain!) que ces derniers dérivent bel et bien du latin vulgaire des mêmes territoires où ils sont parlés à l'heure actuelle.²⁸

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²⁸ Notons encore que les couleurs sont distribuées sur les cartes annexées à l'article de M. P. de façon à produire l'impression que les régions explorées sont habitées exclusivement par des Roumains: les régions minoritaires auraient dû être distinguées de quelque manière convenable du territoire roumain. Dire p. ex. que le pays des Sicules appartient à l'aire de *cuminecătura* ou à celle de *zăpadă* ne correspond à aucune réalité.

COMPTES RENDUS. — BESPRECHUNGEN.

ANTUN DOBRONIĆ: *Robinja Hanibala Lucića i muzičko-dramska pučka gluma u Pagu* (Vjesnik Etnografskog Muzeja u Zagrebu Knj. II sv. 3—4, pp. 40—90 et séparément).

L'historiographie littéraire croate s'est assez souvent occupée du premier drame croate à sujet laïque de même que de la personne de son auteur. La base des études y relatives a été jetée par Branko Vodnik¹ et tous ceux qui après lui se sont occupés de l'oeuvre de Lucić n'ont fait que continuer et élargir ses travaux. L'auteur des présentes lignes a procédé de même lorsqu'il a soumis les résultats de Vodnik à une révision en s'efforçant de les compléter de nouvelles données et de nouveaux points de vue.² L'étude de M. Dobronić que nous allons examiner met aussi largement à contribution les deux travaux mentionnés, mais elle relève d'un esprit tout différent.

Le public croate connaît avantageusement M. Dobronić comme compositeur et professeur au Conservatoire de Zagreb, mais — à ce que nous sachions — c'est la première fois qu'il s'aventure dans le domaine de la philologie. Il pouvait avoir deux motifs de faire cette tentative, d'abord la circonstance qu'il est né lui aussi à l'Ile de Lesina (1878), lieu d'origine de Lucić, puis le séjour qu'il a fait dans l'Ile de Pago où il a pris connaissance d'un drame populaire du même sujet que celui de Lucić. Contrairement à ce qu'on en enseignait jusqu'à présent, il prétend que ce n'est pas le drame de Lucić qui a servi de modèle au drame populaire, mais qu'au contraire c'est le drame de Pago qui était la source le Lucić. Bien qu'il ne méprise pas la méthode philologique de Vodnik et la mienne, il trouve qu'elle doit être complétée de la méthode génético-psychologique et pense que lui, artiste créateur, est mieux qualifié à le faire que nous autres qui ne sommes que des historiens de la littérature.

Vodnik connaissait déjà le drame populaire de Pago qui a été publié dans l'année 1846 de la *Zora Dalmatinska* et il a constaté que

¹ V. Rad *Jugoslovenske Akademije* 176 (1909), pp. 83—134.

² Bajza, *Podmaniczky-Magyar Benigna a horvát költészetben*. Budapest, 1935, 5—41, 65—77.

cette oeuvre n'est autre chose qu'une transcription abrégée et corrompue d'une scène du drame de Lucić. On savait en outre que le drame populaire est représenté chaque année dans l'île de Pago. Dobronić en publie le texte tel qu'on le récitait il y a 26 ans et décrit exactement la représentation en illustrant ses explications par des dessins. C'est la partie la plus précieuse de son étude. Il est dommage qu'il omette de comparer le texte de 1846 avec le sien, mais il constate que tous les deux comprennent 160 vers et que toute la différence entre les deux versions consiste en ce que le texte plus récent a été modernisé. Le drame de Pago et l'oeuvre de Lucić sont écrits également en vers de 12 syllabes à rimes doubles (6 || 6, 6 || 6; abab), les rimes du drame populaire sont assez incertaines, mais celles à la fin des vers sont en général conservées (6 || 6, 6 || 6; xaxa). Selon M. Dobronić sur les 160 vers du drame de Pago 79 sont identiques, mot par mot ou peu s'en faut, avec ceux de Lucić, et 13 autres vers s'accordent pour le sens avec 17 vers du poète de Lesina. L'édition de M. Dobronić indique aussi toutes ces concordances. Malheureusement il procède assez superficiellement dans ses rapprochements, de sorte que l'auteur de ces lignes, sans se donner la peine d'approfondir spécialement cette question, a constaté une foule d'autres concordances.³

M. Dobronić ne s'occupe pas de plus près du texte du drame populaire de Pago. Pourtant s'il avait remarqué que les rimes doubles sont presque sans exception identiques à celles de Lucić et que les rimes simples le sont aussi pour la plupart, tandis que les vers dépourvus de rimes ne peuvent être dépistés qu'exceptionnellement chez Lucić, il aurait été amené à constater que le drame populaire a été tiré de l'oeuvre de Lucić par quelqu'un qui n'était guère un habile versificateur. Dans le drame populaire Derenčin est le domestique du marchand, pourtant ne voilà-t-il pas soudainement appelé le neveu du ban (v. 44), une autre fois on le nomme Mathias (v. 154) exactement comme on appelle chez Lucić le domestique de Derenčin. Tout cela n'est guère de nature à donner de la force à la thèse de M. Dobronić. Le récit de l'histoire de la vie de Robinja que cette dernière fait au marchand dans le drame populaire (vv. 95—123) est rempli de contre-sens, étant bâclé de plusieurs passages de Lucić (vv. 5—6, 159—167, 245—68). Nous ne voulons pas nous étendre sur d'autres détails, ce qui vient d'être dit suffira pour prouver que l'examen critique des textes est défavorable à l'hypothèse de M. Dobronić.

Notre auteur explique la genèse du drame populaire comme suit.

³ Les vers 19—24 du drame de Pago sont les mêmes que les vers 369, 370, 367, 368, 4, 303—4; P. 44—45, L. 13—14; P. 55—56, L. 127—8; P. 61—62, L. 127—8 (ces vers se répètent); P. 71—72 et 76—78, L. 147—8, 140; P. 73—75, L. 137—8; P. 83—84, L. 293—4; P. 99, L. 160; P. 104, L. 258—9; P. 107, L. 249; P. 126—7, L. 420, 418; P. 131, L. 194; P. 149, L. 202.

La défaite d'Udbina (1493) a bouleversé la population croate de cette contrée jusqu'au tréfonds de son âme. La poésie populaire a nécessairement dû réagir. La perspective historique indispensable à la poésie épique faisant défaut, l'événement ne pouvait donner naissance à une épopée populaire. Et comme cet événement demandait impérieusement son expression poétique adéquate, le peuple l'a revêtu d'une forme dramatique. Du reste le littoral dalmate est le pays du drame, tandis que le berceau de la poésie épique doit être cherché dans les contrées Est et Sud de la terre yougoslave. Ceci serait l'explication génético-psychologique. Que l'auteur nous pardonne si nous trouvons que c'est parler pour ne rien dire. Il est vrai qu'à la fin du moyen-âge et au commencement des temps modernes, chez les Serbes on ne trouve point de drame, et chez les Croates presque exclusivement sur le littoral de l'Adriatique. Mais ce drame croate est un écho du drame italien. La forme ancienne de la poésie épique croate, je veux parler de la *bugarštica*, florissait aussi sur le littoral et Vodnik ne manque pas de rendre compte des *bugarštica* relatives à Derenčin (des fragments). Même si l'on ne possédait pas de poèmes semblables, Lucić lui même fournit le témoignage qu'au temps où il a composé son drame (1515—1519) il y en avait. Voilà deux passages:

Čuo si pojući Derenčina bana
Da vitez izući naših je bil strana. (479—480)

Vas svit Derenčina tvojega još dida,
I hrabra, i smina u *pisneh* poviđa. (939—940)

Il est vrai que M. Dobronić essaie de donner du mot souligné, entre autres, l'explication qu'il se rapporte au drame de Pago, mais cette idée est dénuée de tout fondement. Dans son drame et ailleurs aussi Lucić désigne la chanson, le poème c o n s é q u e m m e n t par les mots *pisan*, *pisanca*, tandis que dans la dédicace adressée à Paladinić il donne à son drame le nom *razgovor*. Je ne veux même pas m'étendre sur le fait que M. Banašević, mentionné aussi par M. Dobronić (p. 73), place le berceau de la poésie populaire épique serbe également dans la Dalmatie. Il serait absolument incompréhensible que le drame populaire, né sous l'influence directe de la défaite d'Udbina, fasse du héros de l'événement tragique, du ban de la Croatie Mirko Derenčin, le domestique d'un marchand. Mais le drame populaire ne respire nullement l'atmosphère héroïque de cette journée sanglante. Mû par la pitié chrétienne, un marchand rachète de ses deniers une jeune fille captive du Turc, voilà tout le sujet du drame.

M. Dobronić tire un autre argument du fait que le drame populaire est une oeuvre primitive tandis que celle de Lucić témoigne d'un art plus avancé; il aurait donc été, selon lui, absurde de faire d'un ouvrage plus parfait un autre plus primitif. Je crois que le lecteur

me fera grâce de la réfutation de cet „argument”. Encore un autre argument serait fourni par le fait que chez le peuple mélodie et paroles naissent ensemble et qu'il est par conséquent inadmissible de supposer que le peuple ait fait une mélodie après coup sur un remaniement du texte de Lucić. Je ne suis pas versé en folklore musical, je n'ai donc pas d'avis à donner sur cette question de principe, mais je lis chez M. Dobronić même que chaque vers du drame est chanté sur une mélodie toujours la même et que cette mélodie accuse des caractères liturgiques. C'est également M. Dobronić qui rapporte que selon une tradition de Pago, le drame y est venu d'Obrovac, contenu dans un imprimé glagolitique. Mélodie liturgique, imprimé glagolitique... n'est-ce pas un prêtre qui aura fabriqué, ce drame populaire? L'oeuvre de Lucić a été imprimé deux fois (1556, 1638), il n'était donc nullement inaccessible. Le fait que dans le texte populaire l'amour est relégué au second plan semble aussi indiquer un auteur prêtre. Naturellement le remaniement doit dater de bien après la défaite d'Udbina, à une époque où le nom de Derenčin ne disait plus rien au remanieur.

Notre auteur expose, d'après F a n c e v et N o v a k, la grande floraison de la poésie dramatique à Lesina. Mais je me demande pourquoi dans ces circonstances-là Lucić a dû chercher à Pago le sujet d'un drame destiné à glorifier Raguse, alors qu'il a pu le trouver tout fait dans le poème du Ragusain Džore Držić, dont il s'est du reste approprié 20 vers. Držić est mort en 1501, pourquoi ne peut-on donc démontrer aucune connexion entre son poème et le drame populaire de Pago? Voilà qui serait difficile à comprendre si l'histoire de la captive et la défaite d'Udbina étaient en rapport et que ce rapport ne serait pas seulement une invention de Lucić. Le poème de Držić a été la source de Lucić, ceci est acquis, tandis que l'hypothèse selon laquelle Lucić se serait inspiré du drame de Pago ne'st qu'une suggestion peu heureuse de M. Dobronić.

Restons-en à la thèse de Vodnik: le drame de Pago est un remaniement populaire de l'oeuvre de Lucić. Ce qui lui confère de l'importance, c'est que le peuple de Pago a adopté et a conservé jusqu'à nos jours le drame de Lesina du moins sous cette forme, et c'est une preuve de plus du talent poétique de Lucić.

Joseph Bajza.

ANDRÉ HORVATH: Νεοελληνικὲς μελέτες στὴν Οὐγγαρία ("Les études néohelléniques en Hongrie"). Tirage à part de la revue *Νέα Ἐστία*, 1. mai 1937, 12 p.

M. André Horváth, privat-docent de l'Université de Budapest, qui vient de consacrer un ouvrage très fouillé à la vie et l'oeuvre de Georges Zaviras, philologue grec établi en Hongrie au XVIII^e siècle (*Zaviras György élete és munkái*. Budapest, 1937. Magyar-görög Ta-

nulmányok, 3.), a fait paraître dans une des meilleures revues grecques contemporaines le texte de sa conférence faite à Athènes, en avril 1937, sur les travaux des néohellénistes hongrois. C'est une synthèse objective et approfondie de cette branche de la philologie hongroise, qui donne une idée complète non seulement de l'état actuel, mais aussi de l'évolution historique des études néogrecques en Hongrie. L'auteur ne se contente pas de faire voir les mérites incontestables des hellénistes de notre pays (Guillaume Pecz, Jules Moravcsik, Désiré Vértesy, etc.), mais pour mieux adapter ses vues et ses appréciations au goût et à la tournure d'esprit de son public athénien, il met en valeur cette sympathie intellectuelle dont les philologues hongrois ont donné tant de témoignages à l'égard de la vie et de la civilisation néohelléniques. Il a raison d'insister sur le fait que ces savants, d'accord avec les Grecs eux-mêmes, n'ont pas tardé à reconnaître la langue vivante d'aujourd'hui pour la seule expression adéquate de la pensée néogrecque.

L'auteur souligne à juste titre l'importance de l'activité de Georges Zaviras et des autres érudits grecs établis en Hongrie, qui, par leurs travaux et par leur érudition acquise dans les écoles de Hongrie, ont contribué à resserrer les liens intellectuels entre ce pays et leur nation.

Ladislav Gáldi.

C. A. MACARTNEY: *Hungary*. With a Foreword by H. A. L. FISHER, P. C. D. C. L. „The Modern World”, London, Ernest Benn Limited. 1934, 8vo, 376 p.

“The history of the Magyars is truly a romance, and a most gallant one. Strangers in a strange land, *a small people surrounded by vast nations*, an outpost precariously stationed on Europe's most exposed bastion, condemned to ceaseless struggle against assault from every side, *they have resisted, survived, and even grown strong where any nation less virile and less proudly conscious of its historic mission must have perished off the face of the earth*. Thus, if today they are passing through a dark period of their fortunes, *they are right in refusing to despair. They have faced ill-fortune before, and overcome it. They will do so again.*”

This is the conviction that runs through the chapters of a very able — nay, brilliant — book on Hungary the author of which has here expressed his opinion as a man. At times he unconsciously allows his historical training to suppress the subjective feelings which are however too strong to be really silenced.

The eminent scholar and politician who wrote the Foreword himself alludes to this fact: “Mr. Macartney's clear, judicious and well-informed volume should help materially to instruct and clarify British public opinion upon a problem which gives concern to every

Foreign Office in Europe, and all the more by reason of the author's manifest sympathy with *this stalwart Asiatic people who have remained so true to type for a thousand years and have played so valiant a part in the defence of Europe against the Moslem peril. The Magyars are indeed Asiatics, but ... at the very threshold of their history were brought into the fold of the Latin Church. Accordingly they have never since the days of King Stephen been regarded as aliens in Europe. No Hitler has demanded their expulsion on the plea that they do not belong to the Aryan race. Not even the Basque is more secure of his place in Europe.*"

What a pity that the eminent *savant* who wrote the Foreword should have believed that "the bitter cry of the minor nationalities of the Hungarian kingdom" which was "made audible in Europe and awoke in Chicago ... an answering echo", was founded upon grievances of so terrible a nature as to warrant and justify the dismemberment of a country which for a thousand years and more had stood with firm determination as an outpost of Christian culture and Western civilisation and braved the shocks of barbarism and misapprehension with a courage born of a sincere conviction of its historical mission!!

We are not concerned with the rights and wrongs of a question which will never be solved by anger or illusion; but the fact must be put on record that the "nationality" slogan was the invention of Vienna voiced at a time when Austria feared a united Hungary and believed in the policy of dividing Hungary against herself. As we shall see, the first opportunity Hungary enjoyed after 1526 of showing the genuine mentality of her leading race found the Magyars exercising a political generosity perhaps unparalleled in European history.

Wherever we turn in this most readable book, we find the same conflict between the feelings of the man and the convictions of a historian trained in a school of history which in certain questions is inclined to be short-sighted. Whichever phase of Hungarian history we take, we see a love for Hungary and the Magyar people struggling to admit the greatness of that race despite the many faults and shortcomings attributed by that certain school of history to the post-Stephen policy of the Magyar "nation".

In the short historical survey with which the book opens Mr. Macartney shows the importance of Hungary's geographical position, Hungary being, "not only a vital centre lying near the heart of Europe", but also "a meeting-place of Europe and Asia; a bulwark of the West against the East, a spear-head thrust by the East into the heart of the West". He tells us that "the Magyars are still what their fathers were before them; a gallant, romantic, and truculent oligarchy, a nation of conquerors, by their virtues and their weaknesses alike a problem to Europe". We hear that "for a thousand years the boundaries of the political State of Hungary coincided almost exactly with the natural

limits of the Middle Danube Basin"; that "the problems of Hungary even today are very largely the problems of the whole basin"; and that "*the extraordinary interest of the Magyar people lies in their unique success in creating and maintaining a synthesis between centre and periphery*". The Magyars brought with them many great qualities which helped them in their work of building a State where there had never been any lasting political organisation before their arrival. "Amenable to civilizing influences" and possessing "a culture which was outlandish and Asiatic, but not inferior to that of the general run of the peoples of Eastern Europe", they instinctively founded a political system which enabled them to hold the balance between East and West during nearly seven critical centuries of their history — from the days of the Mongol invasion until the unprovoked catastrophe of 1920. "The Magyar is politically conservative, and does not lightly change his institutions"; and the State the Magyar conquerors succeeded in establishing in Hungary "was a national State in a sense in which hardly any other European State was national, because *it was based upon the free and equal community of the Magyar nation.*"

We cannot help wondering what makes Mr. Macartney believe that when the Magyars came to Hungary "the present Czechs and Slovaks" were "indifferentiable".

Mr. Macartney quotes from King Stephen's "political testament to his son": "guests and immigrants are so useful that they may worthily be assigned the sixth place in the king's hierarchy. ... A kingdom of one tongue and one habit is feeble and fragile. Therefore, my son, I bid thee nurture them (the guests and immigrants) with a good will and maintain them honourably, that they may live with thee more gladly than they dwell elsewhere." This advice was faithfully observed by the Hungarian nation: and the gentry or lesser nobility, which was originally a closed caste, "constantly received fresh recruits". "Not only individuals, but whole villages were not infrequently ennobled for prowess in war, or some other cause. Many immigrants, such as the Cumans in the thirteenth century, were admitted as a body as nobles, as were many of the Slavs and Roumanians along the northern and eastern frontiers." It should not be forgotten that "the Magyars claimed their territories by right of conquest, not because they were inhabited by Magyars; and there was no reason for them to insist that every member of their political nation should be Magyar by birth or speech. In fact, from St. Stephen's day onward, they admitted large numbers of non-Magyars to the membership of their nation and enjoyment of its privileges... It seems certain that the privileged class which constituted the Hungarian "nation" was, up to the sixteenth century, overwhelmingly Magyar, and Hungarian policy remained to a peculiar degree national." The Magyarisation of a large proportion of the non-privileged classes "was not due to any conscious

attempt to assimilate the non-Magyars of Hungary". Hungary resisted all attempts at absolutism; and "came far nearer to representative government, of a sort, than almost any other European country of the day" (fifteenth century).

"In 1526 the long duel between the Habsburgs and the Magyar nation — for in spite of many fair words on both sides, and long periods of genuine co-operation, *a duel it has always been* — commenced in earnest". Hungary was then divided into three units; and the most important of the three for Hungary was Transylvania, the principality now incorporated in Greater Rumania which "kept alive the Hungarian spirit, Hungarian culture, and to some extent the Hungarian political tradition... Its population was largely non-Magyar, for it contained a considerable and increasing population of Vlachs or Roumanians, who at one time, for brief moment, seized the power, although ordinarily they were serfs without political rights. Both the Saxons and the Székely, however, regulated their own internal affairs, their representatives meeting with those of the Magyars to discuss matters of common interest." These were the "three nations of Transylvania", which in those days knew nothing of a Rumanian nationality, though the number of the Rumanian immigrants fleeing from the tyranny of their hospodars or from the terrors and horrors of Turkish invasion was continually increasing. But "the predominant partners" (of this alliance of the "three nations") "were the Magyars, particularly in those periods when the frontier of Transylvania extended far down into the plain. The rulers and most, at least, of the politically active population, were Magyar; the culture (which was often brilliant) was Magyar; the institutions kept alive the traditions of Magyar national independence, and the policy was a Magyar national policy."

At the end of the seventeenth century, when "Hungary was dis-united, ravaged, and depopulated" and "the Habsburgs were at the zenith of their power", the opportunity at hand to create a strong Hungary and definitively reconcile Crown and Nation was lost: from that period onward — and in reality right down to 1867 — the relations between Crown and Nation and therefore between Austria and Hungary were strained: "and during the latter seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries *the Habsburgs carried through a series of measures which profoundly altered the structure of Hungary, and sowed the seeds of the problems which were to lead to the Treaty of Trianon in 1920.*"

The Habsburgs "re-colonised" the regions depopulated by the ravages of the Turkish occupation; the country was inundated with non-Magyar immigrants. This deliberate policy of "de-nationalisation" — almost as ruthless as that pursued by the Succession States today — weakened Hungary but did not strengthen Austria. Germans, Serbs,

Rumanians and others were settled in districts calculated to serve to outflank any Magyar expansion; and the advance of culture was sacrificed to a blindfold centralism which ultimately made Trianon almost inevitable. Vienna did her best also to prevent Hungary becoming prosperous or even well-to-do; she was relegated to the status of a hereditary province. The Germanising efforts of Joseph II., "the most dictatorial as he was the most brilliant of all the Habsburgs", only served to strengthen the national resistance of the Hungarians; and on his death-bed Joseph was compelled to revoke the greater part of his reforms. The Hungarians possess a grit and persistence not found in any other country in Continental Europe; and it was this grit and persistence, combined with a political maturity still strikingly in evidence in Hungary, that withstood the attempts at absorption by force and by stratagem or graciousness which Vienna had recourse to for the purpose of undermining the strength of the proud and uncompromising people which had always fought so strenuously to maintain its liberties. This over-subtle policy of Vienna drove the Magyars to resort to means which they would of themselves never have employed, — the endeavour to Magyarise the non-Magyar minorities. As Mr. Macartney rightly observes, "the motive behind this was purely political and was at first directed solely against Vienna. *Its first aim was the defence of the ancient Hungarian State against foreign domination, which had so largely taken the form of the spread of German language, culture, and ideas. Only by strengthening their own national feeling could the Magyars hope to save themselves from ultimate absorption. If the national minorities could be Magyarized, they could become potent allies in the struggle against Germanization; whereas if they retained their own identities, it was at least possible that they would combine with the Crown against the Magyars.*" As a consequence, we are told, "the whole history of Hungary from 1840 to 1918 consists essentially of a triangular contest between" the Nation, the Crown and the nationalities.

It should not be forgotten that Magyar was not made the official language of Hungary until 1839. The struggle then began which found Louis Kossuth advocating uncompromising nationalism and Count Stephen Széchenyi striving to inculcate the idea of moderation. And it should never be forgotten that when, in 1848, Vienna gave the Hungarians a free hand, "the franchise was extended, and placed on a very broad basis; the exemption of the nobles from taxation was abolished, together with the patrimonial courts, all *corvées* and other vestiges of serfdom, and the *jus aviticum*. The tithe was abolished and religious freedom guaranteed."

The Crown once more appealed to the non-Magyar nationalities; and there ensued the great struggle — developing in Transylvania into "a horrible racial war" — in which a section of the nationalities

highly valuable both intellectually and morally fought on the side of the Hungarians, — the martyrs of Arad indeed including more non-Magyars than Magyars. Hungary triumphed over Austria and the section of the non-Magyar nationalities which had been misled by the Vienna Government, but she was driven to capitulate by the intervention of Czarist Russia.

The complete agreement between the Magyars and the non-Magyar nationalities had been frustrated; but Vienna had no reason to boast of having won a fight in which only absolutism had gained a momentary success.

When in 1867 Hungary and Austria finally came to an agreement (under the political instrument known in history as the "Compromise" or "Ausgleich"), the Hungarians had shown qualities of forbearance and forgiveness almost without a parallel in history. And — as Mr. Macartney tells us — "it may be noted that *one point upon which the Magyars had insisted was that Francis Joseph should grant a constitution to his Austrian dominions*". "The authors of the Compromise, on the Hungarian side, were moderate and even conservative men... They... made terms which, at the time of their conclusion, on the morrow of Königgrätz, were undoubtedly moderate."

It was an open secret that "the heir apparent, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, ... detested the Magyars, and it was rumoured that he intended to postpone his coronation and use the interval before taking the oath to reorganize the Monarchy on a new system which would diminish the rights of the Magyars in favour of the Slavs. And the prospect of a renewed alliance between the Crown and the nationalities was alarming indeed for the Magyars."

The nationality policy of post-Compromise Hungary was based upon Act XLIV of 1868, of which Mr. Macartney says that "as a model for the treatment of national minorities within a national State, this law could hardly be surpassed. *The present Minorities Treaties guaranteed by the Council of the League follow its provisions closely, but are, on the whole, far less liberal.*" One of the complaints made against this Act is that it does not distinguish "between the total population of the country and the dominant nationality within it". That is however the fault — if a fault — of the Magyar language; and we cannot help thinking of Defoe's "True-Born Englishman". Another point made against the Act is that it "remained very largely a dead letter". But "the avowed aim was to bring the State *as near as possible to the ideal of a unitary national State*". Mr. Macartney makes it quite clear that, if the law remained very largely a dead letter, its failure was due to an *ab ovo* determination on the part of the recalcitrant members of the national minorities not to become members of a national Hungarian State.

That there is something wrong with the suffrage conditions in

Hungary, is known to every schoolboy in that country; but it is quite impossible for Western scholars with no prolonged personal experience of circumstances to form a judgment respecting the hiatuses. It should not be forgotten that Hungary's central position is a danger as well as an advantage. The only firm breakwater able to defy the onset of the waves of pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism and pan-Latinism too (the latter a force usually left entirely out of account when speaking of the conflicting currents in Europe), Hungary has always had to face perils of absorption not known to any other country in Europe; and her population comprises so many volatile elements that the delay in realising universal suffrage with secret ballot everywhere is not due solely — as people farther West would suggest — to a lack of liberalism.

Mr. Macartney deals very briefly with the Great War and its consequences: but he naturally could not fail to speak in the highest terms of Count Stephen Tisza, a typical Hungarian, who when finally persuaded against his will to consent to the war against Servia, stipulated "that the Monarchy made no territorial conquests, a condition on which he insisted in the main throughout the war".

It should not be forgotten that the Hungarians were the first to stop unnecessary bloodshed in 1918: and there can be no doubt that the Armistice concluded on November 1st. between General Diaz and the Austro-Hungarian Delegates should have been respected by the Entente and made the basis of the peace conditions with Austria and Hungary. There is something very sophisticated about the argument that "Diaz... commanded only in Italy", whereas "in the south was the French *General Franchet d'Esperey*, Commander of the *Armée d'Orient*, who on 6th. November advanced to Belgrade and *was preparing, according to his own account, to march on Germany through Hungary*". That the Entente should have repudiated the Armistice concluded with General Diaz was bad enough; but still worse were the mistakes made by Count Michael Károlyi, the new Premier of Hungary, who after permitting the Hungarian armies returning from the various fronts to be disbanded, allowed himself to be kept waiting for hours in an ante-room by General Franchet d'Esperey. I very much doubt whether General Franchet d'Esperey would have made much progress on his way through Hungary to Germany if the Hungarian divisions had been left intact; it is much more probable that the French General would have found it more convenient to betake himself to Greece. But the worst mistake of all — a mistake of a character almost defying definition — was that made by Colonel Vyx, the French officer in command in Budapest in March, 1919. Though warned of the danger threatening from Russia, — though given full details of the preparations going on behind the scenes —, he deliberately shut his eyes to the truth and allowed the communists to take possession of Hungary.

Mr. Macartney has very little to say about the so-called "Peace Negotiations". But what he does tell us is highly significant. "The small powers of Central and Eastern Europe were left almost to their own devices. *Only France, among the larger Powers, played an active role, and that was obscure and tortuous.* The Allies were not, technically speaking, bound to apply the "Fourteen Points" to Hungary; indeed, Wilson had specifically informed the last Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry that the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugoslavs must themselves "*be the judge of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations*". There was, however, a clear moral obligation to apply the principle of self-determination; and *as regards Hungary, there were no entangling pledges, since the secret Treaty with Roumania, which had promised her an outrageous slice of Eastern Hungary, had been invalidated by her conclusion of a separate peace with the Central Powers.* It required, under the circumstances, no great gift of prophecy to foretell *a lively scromble for territory at Hungary's expense.*"

Our author is not very well informed concerning the circumstances connected with the formation of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Yet his sympathy with the Hungarians makes him feel that we do not know the real truth. He tells us that "on 31st. October the new Hungarian Government telegraphed its good wishes to the Slovak National Council". After prolonged negotiations between Budapest and Prague in the course of which Colonel Vyx "held that the Czechoslovak occupation (of Slovakia) was contrary to the armistice terms", the conditions proposed by Budapest were rejected by the Czechs, who "were unwilling to risk a plebiscite under these conditions".

Speaking of the Congress convened to meet in Újvidék on 25th. November, 1918, our author tells us that "the system of representation adopted seems to have been scarcely proportional", no less than 55.34⁰/₁₀ of the local population having, according to the official statistics, consisted of Magyars and Germans, whereas there were only 6 Germans and 1 Magyar invited to be present at the Congress.

After the Rumanians had declared war again, the Rumanian troops occupied Transylvania; and on December 1st., at Alba Julia (Gyulafehérvár) "a meeting of Transylvanian Roumanians declared for the union of Transylvania with Roumania, subject to safeguards for themselves and for the minorities".

It would be interesting to have private interviews with those non-Magyar politicians who at the time voted "of their own free will" for union with Bohemia, Serbia and Rumania respectively and have been disappointed in their hopes.

The Communist nightmare was soon over; the Soviet owed its overthrow, not to the advance of the Rumanian troops or to orders from Paris, but to the opposition of the Hungarian peasantry and

smallholders and to the disappointment of the working classes, who were the first to discover the fraud. The Rumanians remained a few months in Budapest, which they "had been looting... with great thoroughness": and Hungary once more became her own mistress.

"There followed a reaction" — we are told — "in the most exact sense of the term. The word is usually associated with excesses, which were not lacking... But the violence was only an incidental accompaniment of the really important thing that was being accomplished, which was the restoration of the old political and social regime in its entirety, so far as this could be accomplished. It is the completeness, and the purposeful character of the restoration which may earn for it the name of "reaction" in its truest sense, and which distinguish the post-war history of Hungary so clearly from that of almost all other countries." Mr. Macartney then gives a brief survey of events in Hungary between 1920 and 1932, when General Gömbös became Premier in succession to Count Stephen Bethlen. He shows that Gömbös's accession to office brought about no essential change in the policy of the "nation" which is coeval with Hungarian history.

He then passes on to describe "in greater detail the various factors which compose Hungarian Society today. The description will afford an opportunity for showing more fully *what are the problems which confront Hungary today, and what the efforts which she is making to face them.*"

Our author deals in succession with the Constitution, the Church, the Gentry, the Traders, the Peasants, the Workmen, the National Minorities and the Crown.

It would of course be impossible in the space available to deal exhaustively with all these sections of the book. I would therefore take two of these factors and attempt to analyse what Mr. Macartney has to tell us about them.

Perhaps the best sections for the purpose — because their subjects are more easily accessible to an outsider — are those dealing with the Gentry and the Peasants.

*"To the reader of romances, and even to the ordinary tourist, especially if he or she travels with good recommendations, the magnate, with his country mansion, his polished manners, his reminiscences of Vienna and Ascot, his charming wife who, like himself, speaks excellent English, and is in all probability his third or fourth cousin through at least one common ancestor, is the typical Hungarian. Not so to the born Hungarian, who envies the magnate and pays him every form of respect, but in a corner of his heart despises him for his foreign ways, and is well aware that the magnates are only the façade of the "nation", while the solid fabric is composed of the lesser nobles, the old *servientes regis*, known today in popular parlance as the "gentry."*

Although Mr. Macartney's description of the feelings of the

gentry for the magnates breathes the atmosphere of Jókai's world, he is perfectly right in saying that the lesser nobles are the "solid fabric" of the Hungarian "nation". There is much truth also in what he says when he tells us that "the position of the magnates is the offspring of a flirtation with Western feudalism; but Hungary's ancient constitution was made by and for the spiritual ancestors of the gentry, and in preserving it they have in fact been defending, not their own interests alone, but the work of Arpád and St. Stephen also".

We are informed of the historical importance of the County, the bulwark of Hungarian constitutional liberties; and the County owed its power to the support of the gentry, who defended Hungary against the Germanising and centralising efforts of Vienna. Here our author, under the influence of the historical school in which he was trained, misinterprets the role played by the gentry in their struggle against absorption. "The narrowness of the range of interests which they defended even qualifies very seriously the gentry's claim to rank as the defenders of the nation... Had the ruling class shown itself more generous, the measures taken by the Crown in the period of semi-absolutism could hardly have proved so dangerous to Hungarian national unity... Under a broader and more liberal interpretation of the national cause, the bulk of the new elements would probably have been fully assimilated before the rise of modern nationalism." The action of the Hungarian gentry in that critical period of their history cannot be judged by absolute standards; full allowance must be made for the pressure of circumstances; and it must not be forgotten that, had one method failed, the Vienna Court would have found another more suitable for the purpose of disuniting the inhabitants of Hungary.

Mr. Macartney praises the sincere patriotism of the Hungarian gentry: "no sacrifice is too great for any member of the ancient gentry class in the service of his country. The great weakness lies" — he adds — "in *the absence of a true social conscience*". In support of his thesis that "the Hungarian "nation" was so long confined to a small minority of the population that it is difficult for its servants to understand that this is no longer the case", Mr. Macartney quotes Count Joseph Mailáth ("*La Hongrie rurale, sociale et politique*"): — "many of the old gentry, instead of increasing their numbers by combining with the "small men" who engage in other occupations and are of a practical turn of mind, esteem them but little and do not care to consort with them... For them the aim of education is not to teach them anything, but to allow them to live easily, to display a greater luxury, and to await, if need be, some high post." These words are taken from a book published in 1909 which has little or nothing in it relevant to present-day Hungarian conditions.

Mr. Macartney strays very far afield when he says that "it was

they, too, (the gentry) who led the campaign against the nationalities in Hungary". From personal experience I can say that the result of this "campaign against the nationalities" was to place almost more non-Magyars than Magyars in high and responsible positions in Hungary. When I came to Hungary forty years ago quite a remarkable proportion of the men in power had non-Magyar names or were non-Magyars by origin; even today the proportion of non-Magyar names among the members of the political, administrative and educational professions is strikingly large. To give only one instance, among my own colleagues there are 11 of German, 10 of Slav and 17 of Magyar race.

When dealing with the Hungarian peasants, Mr. Macartney is on firmer ground. "The Hungarian peasant and agricultural labourer is the complement of the Hungarian magnate and country gentleman... If the landowners form the type and quintessence of the Hungarian "nation", the peasants represent the indispensable substratum without which the "nation" could not exist." And we might add that if the gentry is the solid fabric of the Hungarian "nation", the peasants are the foundations upon which that fabric rests. Though it is hardly correct to say that Hungary has almost always been ruled "against the peasants — never with admission of their equality" —, a circumstance which should remind us that the English peasantry that revolted in the days of Richard II. has been simply eliminated, — it is certainly true that the Hungarian peasant "still remains obstinately true to his native influence". We may doubt whether "the life of such an isolated village is a very narrow one" today; and nowadays even the *tanya* (homestead) is connected with the outside world at least by a wireless apparatus and in many cases also by a son or a daughter studying in the Faculty of Arts of the Budapest University or in the College of Music.

I am compelled also to doubt whether the Hungarian peasant is "less thrifty, and also less hard-working, than the German, French, or Slav". Historically, we are told, "misery has long been his lot, and contributions his portion". And I doubt whether the circumstances of Dózsa's insurrection and overthrow were more revolting than those accompanying the English peasants' rebellion of 1381. It is true, of course, that the peasants in Hungary remained longer subject to feudal disabilities than the serfs of Western Europe; but it must be remembered that the moment the Magyars obtained a free hand again, "in 1848 the whole system of previous centuries was swept away at one blow. The political and legal distinctions between different classes of Hungarians vanished altogether; the family entail of noble property was abolished; all alike became subject to taxation; the serf's dues and obligations, including the tithe, were wiped out, and he became owner of his land in full title. *The liberation was not optional, but*

compulsory; the compensation to the former owner was paid, not by the peasant but by the State, and even, by a provision rare in history, the legislation was made retroactive, and peasants who had paid their landlords sums for their liberation between 1840 and 1848 received those sums reimbursed."

"Moreover", — we are told — "these reforms were not only generous, but enduring, being so embedded in the other legislation of 1848 as to form an inseparable whole with it, and as other parts of that legislation constituted Hungary's charter of liberties against Austria, *the social reforms could never be repealed without invalidating the whole structure.*"

Emigration was of course a biting problem; and no doubt it was due largely to a mistaken policy.* But there were other reasons too: economic depression and — last not least — dreams of eldorados beyond the Atlantic. In the late nineties of last century and the opening years of the present century I had many opportunities to talk with former emigrants from Slovakia and the Lowlands who had returned disappointed and disillusioned to their old homes; they had found the labour conditions overseas no better than in Europe. The strange thing is that they did return after all; that does not point to their having been driven abroad by "Slavery Acts" or similar retrograde legislation.

Another point to remember is that the burdensome legislation weighed quite as heavily — if not even more heavily — on the Magyar peasants than on their non-Magyar fellows; just as the suffrage legislation proved far more injurious to the interests of the Magyar lower classes than they did to the peasants and industrial workers of other races.

When the Land Reform action came, the peasant was given his full share of the benefits. "A point to which Hungarian writers refer with pride is that the full price was paid to all recipients of compensation, whereas in the neighbouring countries, where the agrarian reform was carried out in part with the political object of weakening the position of the Magyar landowners, the compensation received by the latter was far below the real value of the land." Mr. Macartney has a very high opinion of the new "agrarian reform", the elasticity of which distinguishes it sharply from most measures of the kind. "In its combination of national and personal considerations, in its subordination of economic to moral factors, in the subtle connections which it imposes between the ownership of land and the support of patriotic and social ideas, *it is probably unique.*" But the Reform —

* The Direction of the Arch. Eur. C.-Or. reserves the right to examine this question more closely.

according to Mr. Macartney, and here we agree with him — "has obviously not yet solved the peasant problem in Hungary". Every new scheme is liable to have weak points; and the Hungarian Government could not profit much by the examples of its neighbours. We must not forget of course that the book was written before the recent improvement in the situation of the agrarian classes; it would today be very wrong to write that "the agricultural labourer can hardly hope to lead much more than an animal existence".

We are told that "the social insurance system has been greatly improved"; that "the housing situation was greatly improved under the Agrarian Reform Act"; that "the agricultural poor are probably better and more spaciouly housed in Hungary than in England (except where the new Council houses are available) and much better than in most parts of Ireland".

Mr. Macartney's statement that "it would be unfair to ignore the progress which these measures represent, but foolish also to assert that they touch more than the fringe of the problem", would be endorsed by most Hungarian politicians, who are perfectly well aware that so far only a beginning has been made and that the hardest tasks have still to be faced.

I doubt whether the industrial workers are "the least regarded of all social classes in Hungary". I must confess that my own personal experience does not point that way; I have seen very cordial relations between masters and employed — almost as cordial as those existing in many parts of the country between landowner and agricultural labourer. With the political role of the industrial workers we are not concerned; but we are surprised to read that "Budapest, where the municipality can afford statues to foreign journalists, . . . leaves whole colonies of human beings to huddle in cellars, kilns, and holes in the ground". If this is true, it is not Hungary that is to blame, but the men who made the peace treaties without thinking of the consequences involved to millions of their fellow-beings. Nor could I endorse the statement — made evidently in good faith — that "the habit of regarding the workers as an inferior brand of humanity" is still very widespread.

We are told (p. 282) that Hungary's nationalities legislation "entitle (that legislation) to rank among the most liberal in Europe".

"The Magyar race is still a small and isolated fragment, surrounded by nations alien and naturally hostile to it, and far more numerous. It cannot even be called absolutely safe, even within its present narrow limits." The Magyars "are as fully justified as France, Italy, or Germany in making their State a national one, in which the whole nature of the State, the whole system of education, administration, and justice are essentially Magyar . . . It is generally admitted by the minorities that in such questions as allocation of contracts,

land distribution, etc. *no discrimination is shown against them by the authorities.*"

Dealing with the question of treaty revision, Mr. Macartney tells us that "there is no truth in the suggestion so often made that the demand for revision is confined to a few aristocrats and big land-owners". The Peace Settlement of 1919—20 "was nominally concluded, not on any basis of spoliation or of *vae victis*, but of international justice". But "the atmosphere which prevailed in Paris in 1919 and 1920 was hardly favourable to strict equity. It is an old maxim that no man should be judge in his own cause, and *the Allied statesmen were both plaintiffs and judges... They consulted the advocates of one party, and one party only...* It is hardly likely that in a different atmosphere *the Czechs would have been able to obtain under the Treaty nearly twice as many ex-Hungarian subjects as they had themselves asked for in their first statement of claims...* And if it is certain that the British and American delegates struggled bravely and sincerely against the influences of war psychology and suggestion,... it is hardly contestable that *one of the Powers which sat in the seat of judgment was not interested in applying the principles of justice at all. France...* had already decided on her policy of making allies of at least two of Hungary's neighbours, and *was intent throughout, not on getting a just settlement, but on strengthening her friends.*"

I must protest energetically against the suggestion (p. 316) that Hungary "proceeded to indulge in an experiment in Bolshevism". I have already pointed out why Bolshevism was able to make headway in Hungary; the responsibility for that tragic interlude rests solely and exclusively with those whose representative simply handed the keys to Béla Kun and his associates and who had already foreshadowed the impossible conditions of peace which were to be foisted on Hungary.

We are told that the principle of national self-determination "was applied only in connection with the defeated Powers, and is not recognized by any State today as a valid cause for altering frontiers in time of peace".

The environment of the peace treaties was thus very unfavourable to Hungary; and we are rather tired of hearing that the Magyar — who apparently suffered from some idiosyncrasy "that all higher culture in Hungary must be Magyar" — suppressed non-Magyar culture. My personal experience of non-Magyar regions of pre-War Hungary was that the non-Magyar nationalities had all preserved, not only their languages (and it was a peculiar disappointment to me, after having mastered the Magyar language, to find my new treasure of no use whatever in the greater part of Upper Hungary and in parts even of Transylvania), but also their ancient customs, costumes and traditions.

The principle which served as a convenient war catchword was a very dangerous basis for a peace policy: yet the Entente Powers decided to adopt it *en bloc*, thus splitting up into weak fragments a unit which had been pre-ordained by God and Nature. "Hungary vehemently denied the charge of oppressing her nationalities, . . . and asked that plebiscites should be taken in the areas in question. Theoretically, the point was a perfectly sound one; for it is quite true that the makers of the Treaty appear to have identified, almost automatically, the principle of what the Magyars called "nationality-union" with that of national determinism . . . The willingness of the Magyars to put their faith to the test ought to be set to their credit; and the reply of the Allies that the main nationalities concerned had already signified their wish spontaneously, was too comprehensive to be very satisfactory. . . . But further, the Magyars argued, the dismemberment of Hungary would be disastrous for the country as a whole, and not least for the nationalities. Hungary was not merely a historic unit, but also a singularly perfect economic and geographical unit . . . The natural economic connection between highland and lowland was exceedingly close, and could not be broken except to the lasting detriment of all concerned . . . Such industry in the Burgenland and Slovakia as survived the loss of its traditional markets would be killed by the much stronger organizations of Vienna and Bohemia respectively . . . State-formations would spring into being which every expert geographer would condemn in advance, for geographical absurdities never last long. The part of Hungary left would be surrounded by such frontiers as cannot by any means be called natural, and would therefore be the causes of eternal feuds, political disturbances, and moreover of cultural and economic decadence. The process of dismemberment must be disastrous to the peoples living on both sides of the new frontier. If this argument seems weak, it must be remembered that it had been held valid in the very similar case of Bohemia and Moravia, next door to Hungary." And we might add that history has endorsed it.

"What is sauce for the goose might have been supposed to be sauce for the gander; and the same argument under which the Sudetic lands were incorporated in Czechoslovakia might certainly have been applied to exclude Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia from it . . . The races were so intermingled as to make a clean cut on ethnographical lines quite impossible . . . But at Paris the point of view was taken that the regime of the new States would be less oppressive than that of the Magyars had been, particularly as those States were being required to sign treaties guaranteeing the protection of their minorities." We are surprised to read that "the Ruthenes had been exceptionally neglected by the Magyars before the War": apparently Mr. Macartney has not been informed of the pre-War efforts made by Hungary on behalf of Ruthenia or of the Commissioner for Ruthenia having been

an Englishman (Egan). "It is difficult to deny" — concludes Mr. Macartney — "that these frontiers were drawn in a manner exceedingly unfavourable to Hungary. Wherever it was to the advantage of Czechoslovakia, Roumania or Yugoslavia that the national principle should be applied rather than the economic, it was duly applied; wherever those three States found that economic or even strategic considerations outweighed national, the national principle suddenly lost its importance. ... Even writers decidedly unfavourable to Hungarian claims concede that several hundred thousands of Magyars could be restored to Hungary without placing more than insignificant numbers of other nationalities under Magyar rule ... It must in fairness be admitted that their (the Hungarians') claim on the purely Magyar areas has been considerably strengthened by the history of the past ten years ... Given the continued prevalence of contemporary ideals, the claim of Hungary to a form of revision which should bring the political line into closer conformity with the ethnographical, is a very strong one."

"I believe it to be common ground" — writes our author — "that the oppression of one nationality by another can never bear any good fruit, and that *the ideal of the future must be in co-operation between equals*. In such co-operation *the Magyars, thanks both to their central position and to their great natural talents, cannot fail to bear an honourable and signal part.*"

We cannot but be grateful to Mr. Macartney for his painstaking endeavour to present a lucid and comprehensive idea of Hungary and the Hungarians. We regret that he should have insisted on stressing the use of the name "Magyar" in contradistinction to "Hungarian"; for hundreds of thousands of "Hungarians" who are not Magyars by race are very good and loyal "Magyars" in feeling and political conviction. We thank him for his picture of the work done by the treaty-makers: he has enabled us to see clearly that Hungary was sacrificed to an ideology which may be perfectly sound in theory but has failed to stand the test of practical life. He has stressed the great qualities of the Hungarian people; and thereby he has convinced us of the importance to Europe and the world at large of that stability and consistence which has characterised the Hungarians throughout the centuries.

We must not forget, however, that the Hungary prior to 1526 — which in essentials differed but little from the other great States of Europe — was a different Hungary from that which between 1526 and the Great War was fighting a duel — at times furious, at others less strenuous — against Vienna and the ambitions of Germanising imperialists; that for 150 years she had to play a game of chess simultaneously against two powerful opponents — a game in which she never succeeded in achieving more than a stalemate; and that the post-War Hungary has in many fields set Europe an example of

liberalism and stability which shows how foolish it was for the treaty-makers of 1920 to weaken her and reduce her to a position of absolute subordination. And when we hear of the terrible misery and want prevailing in Budapest, we cannot but remember the "truck-dwellers" of the years immediately following the Great War and the distress areas of South Wales.

Bound hand and foot, Hungary has nevertheless done yeoman work in the cause of human progress and human culture; this is one of the things that loom large in a book alive with sympathy and affection for a people whose greatest crime has been to cling to traditions and ideals which may provisionally be out of vogue but must in the long run prove pillars of strength and safety to a Europe divided against herself.

May I in conclusion quote a passage from the Preface to a book on Hungary written 20 years ago ("Hungary", in "The Nations' Histories" series, T. C. & E. C. Jack, London, 1917)? "The Magyars have had a hard task in their endeavour to weld into one united nation the many and various peoples under their sway. Their neighbours have ambitions — fostered by the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators — which aim at a dismemberment of their country. It may be that the natural boundaries of that wonderful country — the Carpathians and the Danube — will cease to play the part assigned to them in Hungarian history; but the memory of the deeds wrought of old by their ancestors, of their sacrifices in the cause of culture and of the faith they profess, and of their own consistent endeavours to give Hungary her due place in the modern system of national states, can never die, and will always serve to remind them and the world of a mission unselfishly undertaken and nobly fulfilled."

Arthur B. Yolland.

ETIENNE NÉMETH: *Les colonies françaises de Hongrie. Etudes Françaises* p. p. l'Institut Français de l'Univ. de Szeged. Szeged, 1936; in-8, 115 + une carte.

M. Németh s'est proposé de réunir dans son ouvrage toutes les données historiques et linguistiques connues relatives aux rapports médiévaux franco-hongrois, de même qu'aux colonies lorraines établis au XVIII^e siècle dans le Banat et ailleurs. Comme les travaux touchant à quelque détail de cette question sont éparpillés dans un certain nombre de monographies historiques et dans des articles de différents périodiques, une synthèse révisée et complétée sur de nouvelles recherches serait appelée à combler une véritable lacune. Malheureusement le livre de M. N. ne répond que fort imparfaitement aux exigences qu'on a le droit de formuler vis-à-vis d'une synthèse pareille et si l'on a jugé nécessaire de s'en occuper ici, c'est que certaines mises

au point s'imposent, étant donné qu'écrit en français il est susceptible d'induire en erreur le lecteur étranger pour qui la littérature scientifique d'expression hongroise n'est pas accessible.

Par la nature même du sujet, le livre de M. N. se divise en deux parties. La première est consacrée aux rapports franco-hongrois au moyen-âge. L'auteur n'ajoute rien à ce qu'on savait déjà sur ce chapitre de l'histoire hongroise, mais se contente de réunir un matériel qu'il a compulsé dans un certain nombre d'études linguistiques et historiques en langue hongroise. A l'exception du livre de Borchgrave (*Essai historique sur les colonies belges qui s'établirent en Hongrie et en Transylvanie pendant les XI^e, XII^e et XIII^e siècles*. Bruxelles, 1871) il omet d'utiliser les sources d'expression étrangère, particulièrement les travaux de l'historiographie belge où le problème des colons wallons, relevé et discuté dès le XVII^e siècle (Fisen: *Hist. eccl. Leodiensis*, 1796; Foullon: *Historia Leodiensis*, 1735, II. 6, 27, 182; *Historiae Leodiensis compendium*. 1655, 149, 174) est jusqu'à ces dernières dizaines d'années sujet à des controverses souvent débattues (cf. p. ex. Bouille: *Hist. de la ville et du pays de Liège*. 1731, II, 35; Dewez: *Hist. du pays de Liège*, 1822, I, 36, 43, 338; Hénoul: *Journ. de la Prov. de Liège*, 1847, 19 juill.; Gobert: *Les rues de Liège*, II, 31). Si cette lacune s'explique par le fait que ces sources ne sont guère accessibles en Hongrie, en revanche il est surprenant qu'en parlant des Français de l'Esztergom médiéval, l'auteur ne mentionne même pas le livre de M. Schünemann (*Die Entstehung des Städtewesens in Südosteuropa* I.) consacré en grande partie au rôle qu'ont joué les Latins dans cette ville. Il ignore également les théories de M. Drăganu (*Români în veacurile IX—XIV pe baza toponimiei și a onomasticeii*, 1933; cf. Kniezsa: *Pseudorumänen in Pannonien u. in den Nordkarpathen*, Arch. Eur. C.-Or. I, 97, II, 84; Gáldi: *Le romanisme transdanubien*, Studi i Documenti It.-ungh. Annuario 1936, 28), ce qui, d'ailleurs, est bien pardonnable.

D'autre part il est indiscutable que l'auteur assemble scrupuleusement toutes les données et toutes les opinions relatives à cette question qu'il a trouvées dans la littérature historique et linguistique hongroise. (Il lui échappe pourtant une ou deux choses, ainsi une hypothèse intéressante, bien que discutable de M^{lle} Emma Lederer: *Századok*, LVII—LVIII, 126). Son livre peut donc servir de manuel bibliographique de la question, avec la restriction qu'on vient d'indiquer. Néanmoins on ne peut s'empêcher de le blâmer de son manque absolu de toute critique vis-à-vis de ses sources. Il assimile p. ex. (d'après Karácsonyi, MNy. XIX, 2) les *Flandrenses* des chartes avec les Wallons (p. 24), ce qui est certes inadmissible. Il se peut qu'exceptionnellement un colon français originaire du Nord soit appelé *Flandrensis* (encore n'en connaissons-nous aucun cas indiscutable), mais c'est une singulière erreur que de vouloir voir dans tous les Flamands des Français.

Aussi la commune de *Batár* (p. 24), établissement flamand, doit-elle être rayée du nombre des colonies wallonnes (cf. István Szabó: *Ugocsa megye*, 1937, 286), Il en est de même de *Forgolány*. L'hypothèse, selon laquelle le nom de personne Fulgram, nom germanique bien connu, qui a donné origine au nom de cette commune (1320: usque ad possessionem *Folgram*) ne pourrait désigner qu'un Français, est inadmissible. La théorie qui veut que les villes de *Kolozsvár* (p. 37) et de *Szatmár* (p. 44), puis les villages de *Girolt* (p. 38), de *Borbánd* (p. 47) doivent leur nom à des colons français est aussi absolument controuvée. Non seulement aucune donnée historique ne la justifie, mais des raisons phonétiques s'y opposent. Le nom de lieu *Kolozs* qu'on rencontre dès le XII^e siècle sous forme de *klus* ne peut dériver du français *clos*, parce que l'*u* du vieux mot hongrois ne peut pas remonter à un *o* ouvert français. Il est impossible de tirer *Girolt* d'un *Giralt*, *Girauld* français, dont le *d'z* initial aurait donné en hongrois *gy* (*d'j*). L'étymologie de *Szatmár* (1231: *Zothmar*) n'est pas mieux fondée. Même si l'on parvenait à démontrer que le prétendu nom germanique **Sotmar* eût réellement existé, rien ne prouverait que la personne qui l'aurait éventuellement porté fût un Français. S'il est probable que le nom de village *Borbánd* (et non *Borband*) se rattache à *Brabant* (p. 47), il n'est nullement démontré que cette localité fût habitée ni dénommée par des Wallons. Quant à l'étymologie fantaisiste dont Karácsonyi a affublé le nom de lieu *Császári* (MNy. XXI, 24), l'auteur se contente de donner les deux références qui démolissent cette hypothèse malheureuse, puis d'ajouter: „Ce que Karácsonyi a dit du village *Császári* est donc du moins contesté.”

Nous trouvons en outre que le rapport entre *Gyan* (n. de l.) et *Jean* reste à prouver, que la question de l'établissement de Wallons près d'Eger n'a pas reçu une solution satisfaisante et que toute l'esquisse historique de M. N. marque peu de progrès sur Borchgrave.

Le manque de décision de l'auteur ressort chaque fois qu'il lui arrive d'enregistrer des opinions opposées. Il est alors visiblement embarrassé d'opter. P. ex. il ne sait à qui donner raison, lorsqu'il rapporte les divergences de vue entre M. Pais (REtHongr. I, 13) et Auner (Századok L, 38) d'une part et Pleidell (*A magy. várostörténet első fejezete*, 1934) d'autre part, au sujet des Latins de Pannonie que les uns considèrent comme des Français (ce qui pris trop absolument est peut-être une généralisation un peu hâtive) tandis que le troisième s'efforce de démontrer, sans être bien convaincant, qu'ils étaient un reste de la population romanisée de cette province (cf. Kniezsa, *ou. c.*; Gáldi *ou. c.*).

La seconde partie s'occupe de la question de la colonisation lorraine en Hongrie au XVIII^e siècle. Là l'auteur met bien plus largement à contribution les sources allemandes et françaises aussi et enrichit nos connaissances de quelques nouvelles données. Il réussit entre

autres à prouver incontestablement que, contrairement à ce qu'on en pensait jusqu'à présent, l'immigration isolée de Français a commencé bien avant 1750. D'une façon générale cette partie de l'ouvrage est nettement supérieure à la première.

La carte qui se trouve annexée au livre est absolument sans valeur.

Géza Bárczi.

SACERDOȚEANU, AURELIAN: *Considerații asupra istoriei Românilor în evul mediu. Dovezile continuității și drepturile Românilor asupra teritoriilor lor actuale.* București, 1936, Biblioteca Istorică 2. XIII + 311 p.

L'auteur qui s'est déjà fait connaître par une série d'études sur l'histoire médiévale des Roumains, se propose de rééditer les arguments traditionnels de la continuité des Roumains dans la Dacie Trajane. Bien qu'il n'oublie pas de promettre, comme les autres défenseurs de la thèse roumaine, des recherches objectives et absolument désintéressées („pentru a fi în cadrul unei cât mai obiective cercetări" p. 9), il ne réussit naturellement pas à masquer par cette déclaration ses tendances chauvinistes trop manifestes. Après une introduction où il commet l'erreur de mêler d'arguments nationalistes les problèmes à examiner („existența Românilor în actuala țară, prin numărul lor covârșitor, este cea mai hotărîtoare dovadă a dreptății lor" p. 6), il divise sa matière en deux parties bien distinctes. Dans la première il passe en revue l'évolution historique du problème de l'abandon de la Dacie, tandis que dans la seconde il essaie d'apporter des arguments philologiques à l'appui de la thèse roumaine.

Déjà l'historique du problème présente plus d'un point discutable. L'auteur commence par exposer avec une grande richesse de détails, mais avec fort peu d'originalité les idées des humanistes italiens concernant les origines des Roumains. Il les cite de seconde main, d'après l'étude de A. Marcu (*Riflessi di storia rumena in opere italiene dei secoli XIV et XV*: Ephemeris Dacorom. I, p. 338—386). Mais pourquoi faut-il passer sous silence les auteurs médiévaux (Roger Bacon et les autres, v. L. Tamás, *Romains, Romans et Roumains dans l'histoire de la Dacie Trajane*: Arch. Eur. C.-Or. II, p. 53, ss.) qui, encore non éblouis par les apparences trompeuses d'une coïncidence territoriale, n'avaient guère pensé à voir dans les colons de Trajan les ancêtres des Roumains? Pourquoi faut-il accuser de parti pris l'historien Szamosközi (dont le nom signifierait „Sălăgeanul, adică din Sălaj", p. 44) qui fut le premier à rompre avec la thèse humaniste de la continuité latino-roumaine en Dacie? N'est-ce que le ressentiment personnel qui peut ébranler la foi en une théorie aussi improbable? Plus loin M. S. malgré l'absence totale de preuves positives, porte une accusation

analogue contre Sulzer, le célèbre précurseur de la conception rösle-rienne, dont l'esprit critique s'était formé, selon une remarque judicieuse de L. Şăineanu (*Istoria filologiei române*, 1895, p. 33), dans l'atmosphère rationaliste du Siècle des Lumières. Malheureusement l'auteur n'essaie même pas d'élargir les cadres de sa synthèse et il ne se donne guère la peine de démêler, au prix de recherches personnelles, les fils souvent enchevêtrés de la filiation historique. Il n'ajoute rien à ce que nous savions déjà sur l'école latiniste de Transylvanie quoiqu'on n'ait pas encore suffisamment élucidé les relations de la fameuse triade avec les chroniqueurs d'outre-mont. A propos de Gibbon, il ne croit pas nécessaire de faire état des remarques de M. Tamás (*ou. c. pp. 64—65*) qui montrent d'une façon frappante les possibilités de filiation de l'idée de la continuité, de Cantémir à l'Anglais Gibbon. En ce qui concerne l'époque moderne, l'auteur insiste avec une emphase déplacée sur l'impartialité des savants roumains („putem însă constata, cu deplină mândrie, că nicio dată nu se vede o patimă sau o prezentare tendențioasă în opera acestora" p. 137), pour pouvoir s'attaquer avec une véhémence tout à fait insolite aux „pseudocercetările lui Hunfalvy" (p. 129), aux „încercările nepricepute ale Pseudo-maghiarului Trem!" (p. 169), à l'ouvrage obscur d'„un oarecare(!) Mutafčiev" (*ibid.*), etc. Tout cela contraste singulièrement avec les belles promesses d'objectivité et d'impartialité et fait preuve d'une incompréhension totale de la vie scientifique d'aujourd'hui. Il semble inutile d'entrer dans les détails de ces pages de pamphlet dont l'auteur n'hésite pas à opposer à l'étude volumineuse et très fouillée de M. Friedwagner l'autorité „scientifique" d'un Seton-Watson (p. 170).

Après ces antécédents, c'est avec la plus grande précaution qu'il faut traiter les prétendus arguments philologiques et historiques de la seconde partie. L'auteur ne sait se débarrasser du raisonnement aprioristique des défenseurs de la continuité; en comptant manifestement sur la prédisposition affective de ses lecteurs roumains, il ne présente pas la continuité comme la conclusion logique d'une argumentation serrée, mais il la prend pour chose prouvée et en fait le noyau de toutes ses considérations. Il se garde bien d'entrer dans l'analyse des problèmes complexes de la formation du peuple et de la langue roumains, ce qui ne surprend pas, puisque M. S. n'ose guère approfondir les questions de philologie balkanique (même le livre essentiel de M. Sandfeld n'est cité que dans une note trop sommaire, p. 222). Pour combler la fameuse lacune plusieurs fois séculaire, il met à contribution toutes les hypothèses traditionnelles. Il ne renonce pas à l'idée du christianisme dacien, malgré le manque de témoignages épigraphiques (ce qui est admis même par M. Iorga, *La place des Roumains dans l'histoire universelle*, I, 1935, p. 43; pour la critique des prétendus monuments chrétiens de Dacie v. Tamás, *ou. c. p. 91*). Pour le chercheur roumain, tous les *Vlachi*, *Blaci* sont des Roumains, quoi-

qu'en grec le nom *Vlah* soit attesté au sens de „berger” dès le XI^e siècle (Th. Capidan, *Aromâni*, 1932, pp. 32—33). Il va sans dire que les chroniques de Nestor et du Notaire Anonyme du roi Béla sont également cités comme autant de témoignages de la présence des Roumains en Dacie. Nous ne revenons pas sur ces assertions définitivement réfutées (v. Tamás, *ou. c. Arch. Eur. C.-Or. II*, p. 350, ss.). En ce qui concerne l'appartenance ethnique des *Blaci* de Gelou, M. S. pourra profiter des remarques suggestives de M. D. Pais (*Scriptores Rerum Hung. I*, 1937, pp. 66—67). Pour les *Romani* de la Transdanubie, l'auteur se contente de répéter les opinions émises par MM. Drăganu et Pușcariu sur les „Urväter der Rumänen” (cf. L. Gáldi, *Le romanisme transdanubien: Studi e Documenti Italo-Ungheresi*, Annuario I, 1937, pp. 28—50). On retrouve naturellement toutes les tentatives connues pour démontrer quelques traces des Roumains dans les chartes royales de Hongrie, même avant le XIII^e siècle. Ces essais d'interprétation, initiés jadis par M. O. Densusianu (*Hist. de la langue roum. I*, p. 316), ne prêtent presque pas de matière à la discussion. Pour le XI^e siècle M. S. cite sept chartes où il croit avoir relevé des noms roumains. Il semble ignorer que les documents de 1019, 1024, 1036 et 1082 c'est à-dire quatre sur sept sont des faux (cf. Szentpétery, *Arpádkori kir. okl. hiteles jegyz. 1923*, pp. 4—9). En ce qui concerne la lettre de fondation de l'abbaye de Tihany (1055), il ne se borne pas à citer *Petra* (qui, très probablement n'est que la traduction latine de *Oroszkő*, v. Kniezsa, *Pseudorumänen in Pannonien und in den Nordkarpathen: Arch. Eur. C.-Or. II*, p. 141), mais il énumère aussi en italiques *Kukurea*, *Brokina rea*, „Mortis (?) *Vuasarakuta rea*” (sic!), *Febe rea... hodu utu rea* (p. 253), dans le seul but de suggérer l'identité — d'ailleurs purement graphique — du suffixe hongrois *rea* (aujourd'hui *-ra*, ex. *utu rea = utra*) avec l'adjectif roumain *rău*, *rea* (< latin *reus*)! On voit naturellement revenir aussi la *piscina Rotunda*, mais sans renvoi à Drăganu, le vulgarisateur de cette belle trouvaille (ce n'est que la traduction de *Kerektő*, cf. Kniezsa, *l. c.*). Dans les citations latines, l'auteur roumain ne fait pas preuve d'une „acribie” philologique. Au lieu de „*magnum fluuium Donau*” il écrit sans le moindre scrupule „*Magnanum, fluvium Donavi*” (p. 252) et une phrase comme „*dedimus... decimam equorum nostrorum in Insula quae vocatur Csepel*” (Fejér, *C. D. I*, 305) est écorchée de la manière suivante: „*dedimus... decimam nostrorum (!) in Insula...*” (p. 253). Remarquons encore que la *silva Murul* d'une charte fausse de 1024 (Fejér, *C. D. I*, 309) est devenue par je ne sais quelle métamorphose „*pescăria Murul*” (p. 253). Faut-il encore rappeler *Fenes* qui est orthographié *Tenes* (p. 195) et *Olazy* qui est considéré comme une ville de Roumains (p. 258)? Toutes ces exemples vont de pair avec les graphies telles que *Hôman* (pour *Hóman*, p. XVI), *Horlik* (pour *Holik*, p. 67), etc. En conclusion on peut donc établir que

l'étude de M. Sacerdoțeanu, malgré ses investigations assez étendues (v. pp. VII—XXX), ne fournit aucun argument nouveau en faveur de la continuité latino-roumaine de Dacie qui, en tant que thèse scientifique, n'est qu'une survivance tardive des élucubrations humanistes, mise au service d'une cause nationale.

Ladislav Gáldi.

KR. SANDFELD et HEDVIG OLSEN: *Syntaxe roumaine. I. Emploi des mots à flexion*. Paris, 1936, in-8, 374 p.

Ce beau livre des deux excellents linguistes danois vient combler une lacune très sensible des études de linguistique roumaine. Depuis longtemps on éprouvait le besoin d'une description fidèle et pénétrante de l'état actuel de la syntaxe roumaine. Personne n'était plus qualifié pour répondre à cette attente que M. Sandfeld dont l'esprit synthétique a donné naissance à la „linguistique balkanique” et Mlle Hedvig Olsen, à qui on doit plusieurs études remarquables de syntaxe roumaine.

Comme les auteurs le déclarent eux-mêmes, „le titre du présent volume demande quelques mots de justification” (Avant-propos, p. 5). Déjà les autres ouvrages de M. Sandfeld ont fait voir qu'il n'aime pas s'attarder aux problèmes épineux de systématisation et de terminologie linguistiques et que, malgré ses scrupules de théoricien, il préfère un système traditionnel, mais commode et limpide à un autre qui, quoique théoriquement mieux motivé, l'obligerait à une révision complète des faits connus et à toute une série de reclassements insolites. C'est bien le souci de clarté qui lui avait fait dire dans la préface des „Pronoms”: „Comme personne, à ma connaissance, n'a su jusqu'ici donner une définition acceptable de ce qu'il faut entendre par un pronom... j'ai cru préférable, pour des raisons pratiques, de m'en tenir à la tradition jusqu'à nouvel ordre” (*Syntaxe du français contemporain*. I, 1928, p. XII). Dans cette „Syntaxe roumaine” on retrouve la même conception: „C'est pour des raisons pratiques... que nous avons suivi la tradition en traitant ici des matières qui ne relèvent pas toutes de la syntaxe proprement dite.” Les auteurs ont donc divisé leur matière en deux volumes, dont le premier comprend la syntaxe, plus exactement la théorie de l'emploi des mots à flexion tandis que le second sera consacré à l'étude des „groupes de mots” (pourquoi ne pas dire „syntagme”?) et à la structure de la phrase.

Il serait facile de faire des objections théoriques contre ce „système” qui s'accorde aussi peu avec la conception de John Ries, de Saussure ou de Gombocz qu'avec celle de Viggo Brøndal. Toutefois il est certain que c'est un procédé prudent et utile, qui pour des raisons pratiques peut rendre d'excellents services. Personne

ne pourrait nier que les fonctions du nom, du pronom, du nom de nombre et du verbe sont décrites et analysées avec un grand souci de précision. Les „règles” générales se présentent toujours comme des conclusions logiques découlant des faits relevés, et les cas de flottement qui jouent ici un rôle de beaucoup plus important que dans les autres langues romanes, ne sont jamais serrés dans le lit de Procruste d'une formule trop rigide. Les auteurs n'imposent pas aux faits linguistiques leur conception ou les remarques d'autres grammairiens, mais au contraire ils laissent les exemples parler pour eux-mêmes. Le choix des citations est fait avec un soin extrême. On regrette pourtant l'absence presque totale des poètes et de certains écrivains classiques (C. Negruzzi). L'exposé est divisé en paragraphes concis et nettement délimités qui facilitent grandement l'utilisation de cet ouvrage désormais indispensable et qui nous permettent, à nous aussi, de grouper nos remarques dans le même ordre:

§ 28. Rem. 2. A propos de la phrase *cartea face pe omul om* on trouve l'explication suivante: „L'article est peut-être motivé ici par le souci de marquer *omul* comme sujet de *om*”. Il aurait mieux valu dire qu'on préfère la forme articulée (*omul*) pour éviter une construction régulière mais peu claire et mal sonnante: **cartea face pe om om*. Dès que le conflit homonymique de l'objet et du complément prédicatif disparaît, on a *pe om: Pe om da, cumnate; dar femeii ce-i trebuie?*

§ 110. Pour montrer le conflit des pronoms toniques avec les pronoms atones, on cite trop peu d'exemples littéraires ce qui pourrait faire penser qu'il s'agit d'un type de syntagme populaire. Il serait utile d'ajouter quelques citations comme celle-ci: *voi ați cutezat a vâ împotrivi mie și a-mi omori atâția viteji* (Negruzzi, *Nov.*, ed. S. Pușcariu, p. 84).

§ 139. A propos de l'emploi d'un pronom personnel (ou réfléchi) datif atone à sens possessif, on cite plusieurs cas du type *ciocârlii își joacă jocul lor*, mais on voudrait avoir d'autres exemples pour l'usage normal de *își, și* en fonction possessive: *sub asprimea silită a vorbei își ascundea o slăbiciune pe care nu și-o cunoscuse* (C. Petrescu, *Apostol*, p. 173).

§ 173. Pour illustrer l'emploi d'un vocatif suivi de *al, a* ajoutez: *Iți mulțumesc, vrednice al mieu tovarăș de arme* (Negruzzi, *ou. c.* p. 85). Il y aurait lieu de remarquer que parfois cette tournure prend une valeur affective toute particulière: *O dulce al nopții mele Domn, De ce nu vîi tu? Vină* (Eminescu: *Luceafărul*).

§ 299. A côté du gallicisme *e venit* (ex.: *sunteți venit mai de curând de cât mine*”, Brătescou-Voinești) il eût été intéressant de rappeler la forme *este născut* (cf. *il est né, è nato*, etc.): *Alecu Russo este născut într'un sat bășarabean* (Loghin, *Ist. lit. rom.*⁴, p. 122).

§ 324. Au sujet des diverses variantes morphologiques du futur il est nécessaire d'en faire sentir aussi la valeur stylistique. On n'a qu'un exemple assez banal de Caraivan (Dar de-acum *uita-vom* toate cele și ne-om duce) qui, très certainement, ne peut nous récompenser de l'absence de quelques citations poétiques: *Adormi-vom, troieni-va* | Teiul floarea-i peste noi, Și prin somn *auzi-vom* bucium | De la stânele de oi (Eminescu: Povestea codrului); Mai *sună-vei* dulce corn | Pentru mine vre odată (id.: Peste vârfuri).

§ 326. „Le futur s'emploie comme ‚futurum in praeterito‘ dans le style indirect: *Insfârșit își împărțiră* rolurile: sublocotenentul *va veghea*... până la ora două (Rebreanu).” N'est-ce pas plutôt un exemple roumain du style indirect libre?

§ 333 et suiv. Il serait nécessaire de consacrer un paragraphe à part aux emplois assez complexes du subj. passé, et de délimiter l'usage des phrases comme celle-ci: Nu putem... să ne dăm seama dacă a rămas sau nu dela Huni vreun cuvânt în limba română. Mai probabil e să *nu fi rămas* (Giurescu, *Ist. Rom.*², p. 191). De même il serait à étudier les cas de subjonctif de probabilité dans les phrases principales: a fost odată un împărat și o împărăteasă, care aveau trei feciori: *al mai mare să fi avut șapte anișori* (Caragiale, *Op. I.* ed. Zari-fopol, p. 117).

Il est certain que nombre de ces détails auxquels nous venons d'ajouter nos remarques, seront repris plus amplement dans la seconde partie, qui apportera — espérons-le — aussi une bibliographie raisonnée des études de syntaxe roumaine. Peut-être pourrait-on demander aux illustres auteurs de signaler, s'il y a lieu, aussi les concordances balkaniques qui mettraient les faits de syntaxe roumaine en un cadre plus large, jetant ainsi les fonds d'une syntaxe historique de la langue roumaine. Toutes ces considérations ne pourraient naturellement pas diminuer la haute valeur scientifique de ce livre classique, digne fruit de longues années de dur labeur et de méditation.

Ladislav Gáldi.

SULICA SZILARD: *A magyar irodalom és művelődés hatása a román irodalom és művelődés fejlődésére* („L'influence de la littérature et de la civilisation hongroises sur la littérature et la civilisation roumaines”). Acta Litterarum ac Scientiarum Reg. Univ. Hung. Francisco-Iosephinae, Tom. III. Fasc. 1. Szeged, 1937, in-8, 59 p.

Cette brève esquisse qui vient de paraître dans la série des publications de l'Université de Szeged n'est qu'un rapport préliminaire sur un ouvrage de grande envergure où l'excellent spécialiste des relations hungaro-roumaines développera avec une abondance de détails encore plus considérable ses idées concernant le rôle de l'influence hongroise

dans la formation et l'évolution de la vie littéraire roumaine de Transylvanie. Cette nouvelle synthèse qui, à en juger d'après le projet que nous avons sous les yeux, devra beaucoup à l'apport personnel de l'auteur, viendra combler une lacune très sensible de l'histoire comparée des littératures des peuples danubiens. M. Sulica promet de nous offrir dans les cadres vastes de sa synthèse aussi une sorte de relevé statistique des résultats déjà obtenus faisant voir les travaux à faire. Il est donc à espérer que son ouvrage pourra servir de guide sûr et précieux aux recherches ultérieures.

Au début de son ouvrage M. Sulica constate que parmi les peuples avoisinants, seuls les Hongrois et les Polonais étaient à même de transmettre aux Roumains les grands courants intellectuels de l'Occident (p. 3). Il n'en reste pas moins que, si l'on considère l'ensemble des régions habitées par des Roumains, on ne peut négliger la contribution des Russes et des Grecs, ces précurseurs de l'influence française, au processus d'européanisation des Voïvodats roumains (cf. F. Brunot, *Histoire de la langue française*, t. VIII, 1934—5, pp. 3—8). Inutile de rappeler que les premières adaptations de *Métastase* sont venues également par le canal du grec et qu'on ne pourrait guère dénier l'importance de l'apport russe dans l'oeuvre d'un Costache Negruzzi. Et peut-on passer sous silence les contacts serbo-roumains qui ne manquèrent pas d'influencer l'évolution de la pensée nationale roumaine et qui créèrent une atmosphère favorable pour les fables de Dimitrie Țichindeal, inspirées de Dositei Obradović ?

Nous avons l'impression que l'auteur a parfois trop restreint le champ de ses investigations et qu'il n'a pas tenu compte de tous les facteurs qui avaient fait sentir leur effet à un moment donné, parallèlement et simultanément. Par rapport au XVIII^e siècle il a parfaitement raison de faire ressortir l'importance de l'union avec l'Église catholique et des réformes de Marie-Thérèse pour la vie intellectuelle des Roumains de Transylvanie, mais il oublie de signaler qu'à cette époque qu'on aime considérer comme une „période de décadence” des plus sombres, il y a au-delà des montagnes sinon un renouveau proprement dit, mais au moins une activité littéraire plus féconde, et que dans la première moitié du siècle on y fait paraître plus de livres roumains que pendant les deux siècles précédents. Il est certain que cet affermissement de l'industrie typographique ne resta pas sans conséquence pour la Transylvanie non plus, car autrement comment pourrait-on comprendre qu'un terme d'imprimerie, comme *diortositor* ‚correcteur’ puisse franchir, malgré son caractère nettement fanariote, la ligne des Carpathes pour figurer sur le frontispice d'un grand nombre de livres édités à Balázsfalva-Blaj et ailleurs, et pour entrer enfin aussi dans le dictionnaire trilingue (1822—3) de Ioan Bobb, cette fameuse figure du mouvement uniaste et un des déposants du „Supplex

Libellus" de 1791? Et toujours à propos du XVIII^e siècle ne serait-il pas lieu de consacrer plus d'attention au rayonnement de la culture hongroise de la Transylvanie dans les provinces d'outre-mont, de parler des projets de Saül, cet excellent homme d'état moldave (cf. Carra, *Histoire de la Moldavie et de la Valachie*, 1781, p. 189), qui voulait faire écrire l'histoire de son pays par des Jésuites hongrois (v. A. Bitay, *Világirodalmi Lexikon*, p. 1465), et de signaler les rapports de Gheorghe Lazăr avec les Piaristes de Kolozsvár-Cluj? De même, à propos du XIX^e, rien ne serait plus intéressant que de montrer au public hongrois l'état d'âme de cette Moldavie où G. Asachi recrute pour ses écoles des professeurs transylvains ayant fait leurs études à l'Université de Pest, où l'on salue avec enthousiasme les réformes de Széchenyi (cf. A. Bitay, *Erd. Irod. Szemle*, 1927, pp. 84—97) et où les meilleurs poètes de l'époque se disputent l'honneur de chanter l'éloge de François Liszt (v. Oct. Beu, *Liszt în România: Convorbiri Lit.* 1930, nov. et L. Gáldi, *Liszt Ferenc Romániában: Vasárnap*, 1935, pp. 304—5).

Au point de vue de la littérature comparée, la partie la plus amplement développée est celle qui concerne le XIX^e siècle. L'auteur a raison de souligner l'influence du néohumanisme hongrois sur les écrivains roumains, mais il eût été préférable de ne pas traiter ensemble trois poètes aussi différents que Budai—Deleanu, Eminescu et Coșbuc (les motifs de ce groupement sont d'ailleurs fort peu convaincants, v. p. 46). Dans le même chapitre il y a une phrase susceptible de donner place à une équivoque: „L'hymne roumain est dû aussi à un poète transylvain (André Muresanu)" p. 47. Sans doute M. Sulica fait allusion au fameux „Deșteaptă-te Române..." qui est en effet un chant national mais non pas l'hymne roumain dont l'auteur est, comme on sait, Vasile Alexandri.

Pour terminer nous nous voyons obligés d'attirer l'attention sur une question de détail qui n'est nullement négligeable. Il est curieux de voir, avec quelle inexplicable ténacité l'auteur, qui est d'ailleurs très objectif et qui dispose d'une orientation digne de tout éloge, cherche à passer sous silence les travaux de philologie roumaine des spécialistes hongrois de nos jours. A propos des mots d'origine hongroise du roumain, il ne cite que les travaux plus ou moins périmés de Cihac et d'Alexics, sans faire état des recherches y relatives de M. Tamás—Tremel (Ung. Jahrb. VIII—IX; Magyar Nyelv XXIX) qui font voir, avec une préparation philologique incomparablement supérieure aux études précédentes, non seulement l'intérêt linguistique, mais aussi l'importance culturelle du rayonnement de la langue hongroise. M. Sulica déplore souvent l'état actuel des études roumaines en Hongrie, mais il oublie de mentionner à côté de ses „découvertes" propres à „révolutionner" l'histoire littéraire („sikerült bebizonyítanom azt az általam felállított eredeti megállapítást, ezen a téren szinte

revolucionáris — sic! — jellegű, új szintézist, hogy a magyar könyv... hatása — ...kimutatható a XV. sz. végétől a mai napig", p. 57), l'activité des collaborateurs de la revue „Archivum Europae Centro-Orientalis”.

Néanmoins nous sommes convaincus que l'ouvrage promis, muni sans doute d'une bibliographie raisonnée des travaux concernant les rapports hungaro-roumains, apportera des correctifs à cet égard aussi et qu'il pourra servir de point de départ à une synthèse non moins indispensable: ce serait d'écrire, sur le modèle de l'excellent ouvrage de M. Béla Pukánszky sur la littérature allemande de Hongrie, l'histoire de la littérature et de la civilisation des Roumains de Transylvanie. Il n'est guère douteux qu'une telle étude synthétique fera encore mieux voir les interférences des divers courants d'idées dans les cadres naturels de cette unité géographique nettement délimitée.¹

Ladislav Gáldi.

YRJÖ WICHMANN'S *Wörterbuch des ungarischen Moldauer Nordcsángó- und des Hétfaluer Csángódialektes nebst grammatikalischen Aufzeichnungen und Texten aus dem Nordcsángódialekt*. Herausgegeben von BALINT CSÜRY und ARTTURI KANNISTO. Lexica Societatis Finno-ugricae IV. Helsinki, 1936, 8^o, XIV + 218 S.

Das hübsch ausgestattete Wörterbuch enthält die vom hervorragenden finnischen Sprachwissenschaftler Y. Wichmann gesammelten Materialien, die in den Jahren 1906—07 auf seiner Studienreise nach dem Moldaukreis Roman zur Aufzeichnung gelangten. Zwei Gelehrte haben sich ans Werk gesetzt um den wertvollen Nachlaß der wissenschaftlichen Forschung in seinem vollen Umfange zugänglich zu machen: B. Csüry, der rührige Spezialkenner der ungarischen Volkssprache und A. Kannisto, der auf dem finnisch-ugrischen Sprachgebiet so erfolgreich wirkende Präsident der Finnisch-ugrischen Gesellschaft. Obwohl das zur Veröffentlichung herangezogene Material teilweise in einigen lautgeschichtlichen Studien Wichmanns bereits ausgebeutet und somit schon früher bekannt wurde, muß das Wörterbuch nichtsdestoweniger als höchst willkommenes Quellenwerk begrüßt

¹ La Rédaction se permet de renvoyer ici à l'étude de M. Ladislav Gáldi: *A román irodalomtörténet tájrajzi problémái*: Apolló, I—1935, pp. 339—384, cf. encore *Az erdélyi román irodalmiság történetéért*, ib. 1936, pp. 277—79) qui, même à l'avis de la critique roumaine compétente (v. la revue Făt-Frumos, 1936, pp. 37—39) offre une synthèse objective de l'aspect intellectuel des diverses régions roumaines à travers l'histoire. Pour le premier drame roumain, resté en manuscrit, qui était destiné à l'école roumaine de Balázsfalva-Blaj, v. L. Göbl: *A legrégibb román iskolai dráma*: Debreceni Szemle, 1934, pp. 204—8.

werden, besonders wenn man an die großen Schwierigkeiten denkt, die der ungarische Mundartforscher auf rumänischem Staatsgebiet zu bekämpfen hat. B. Csüry arbeitet übrigens auch an einem ähnlich angelegten Wörterbuch der südlichen Csángós, das nach seiner Erscheinung ermöglichen wird das Verhältnis des von szeklerischen Einflüssen wenig berührten nördlichen und des mit dem Szeklertum enger zusammenhängenden südlichen Dialektes vielfach klarzulegen.¹

Der mitgeteilte Wortschatz ist ziemlich reich, er geht allerdings sowohl bezüglich seines Umfanges wie auch an der Genauigkeit der phonetischen Transkription weit über die bisherigen mehr oder weniger gelegentlichen Sammlungen hinaus. Die Erläuterung der Wörter, der Beispielsätze (die man oft gern zahlreicher vertreten sehen würde), und der Texte (179 Sprichwörter, 5 Rätsel, 36 Stücke aus der Volksdichtung, ein von dem Szabófalvaer A. Robu verfaßter Originalbrief) wird im allgemeinen in deutscher Sprache vorgenommen, wobei auch das Ungarische sehr häufig herangezogen wird. Außer den Appellativen begegnen wir zahlreichen PN und ON ferner Bemerkungen über Volksbräuche. Die grammatikalischen Aufzeichnungen bieten eine sorgfältig zusammengestellte Paradigmenliste der Deklination und der Konjugation.

Die Wichtigkeit des von Wichmann zusammengetragenen Materials für die ungarische Sprachwissenschaft ist schon deshalb sehr groß, weil das Gebiet der nördlichen Csángós eine seit Jahrhunderten von den übrigen Ungarn getrennte Sprachinsel bildet, wo sich demzufolge manches Altertümliche bewahren konnte. Der Mangel methodisch angelegter Dialektwörterbücher, die den Wortschatz der einzelnen Mundarten monographisch darstellen würden,² läßt den großen Wert des

¹ Vgl. darüber Csürys Referat *Wichmann György északi-csángó hagyatéka*: Magyar Nyelv XXXII (1936), 286. Der Text dieses Referates bildet von einigen Abweichungen abgesehen auch das zum Wörterbuch geschriebene Vorwort. Letzteres enthält z. B. nähere Angaben über die Nationalitäts-, Sprach- und Religionsverhältnisse von 42 Moldaudörfern. Eine Auswahl von in Bogdánfalva (südlich von Bacău, ung Bákó) gesammelten Pflanzennamen hat Csüry bereits veröffentlicht, vgl. Magyar Nyelv XXIX (1933), 249—51, 316—21. Von seinen wichtigeren Beiträgen zur Kunde der moldauischen Mundarten erwähnen wir noch *A moldvai csángó igealakok* („Die Verbalformen der Moldauer Csángós“): *ib.* XXVIII (1932), 20—30, 148—54; *Régi magyar levelek Moldvából* („Alte ungarische Briefe aus der Moldau“): *ib.* XXVII (1931), 74—76; *A csángó miatyánk* („Das Vaterunser der Csángós“): *ib.* XXVI (1930), 170—02, usw. Phonologische Probleme der Moldau-Csángós berührt Gy. Laticzius in seiner *Einleitung in die Phonologie* (in ung. Sprache, A Magyar Nyelvtudományi Társaság Kiadványai 33 sz. Budapest, 1932), vgl. dazu die Besprechung von Alan S. C. Ross: *Leeds Studies in English and Kindred Languages*, N^o 5 (1936), 96—103.

² In diesem Zusammenhang muß das unlängst erschienene Wörterbuch der Szamoshát-Gegend (Kom. Szatmár) lobend hervorgehoben werden, das

von uns besprochenen Werkes noch deutlicher erkennen. Es ist anzunehmen, daß unsere auf die Nordcsángómundart bezüglichen Kenntnisse noch an manchen Punkten ergänzt werden, wenn das von G. Lükö vorzugsweise in dem noch immer ganz ungarischen Iugani (ung. Jugán, vorher Kozmafalva) gesammelte Sprachmaterial gedruckt wird.³

Die in rumänischer Umgebung lebenden Csángós gebrauchen viele Lehnwörter moldauischen Ursprungs. Letztere werden im Wörterbuch gewöhnlich zu den betreffenden Csángówörtern zum Vergleich hinzugefügt. Die Anordnung der Wortzettel des Nachlasses scheint sogar darauf hinzuweisen, daß Wichmann die Absicht hatte, die rumänischen Elemente getrennt zu behandeln (Vorwort, S. XIII). Diesem Umstand ist es vor allem zuzuschreiben, daß wir in diesem Zusammenhang manche Ergänzungen und Berichtigungen machen könnten. Das Zeitwort *bokonyil*⁴ ‚prügeln, durchpauken‘ geht z. B. offenbar auf rum. dial. *bocăni* ‚battere, frapper‘ zurück (vgl. darüber Dicț. Acad. Rom.); *botoló* ‚Waschbleuel‘ stammt aus rum. *bătălău* ‚batoio, palette‘; *herjápka* ‚Egge (die Stacheln od. Zähne von Eisen)‘, die Bedeutung dieses Wortes scheint angesichts von rum. *hreapcă* ‚(faux à) ramassette‘, womit das Wort sehr wahrscheinlich zusammenhängt, etwas ungenau zu sein; *kóda* ‚Streifen, Band auf dem Festkopfsputz der Mädchen‘ wird irrtümlich mit *cordea* ‚Streifen, Band‘ verglichen, es handelt sich vielmehr um rum. *coadă* (vgl. *coadele fetelor*); *kumpana* ‚unglückliches Ereignis‘ ist rum. *cumpănă*, das nicht nur ‚Brunnenschwengel‘, sondern auch ‚Gefahr‘ bedeutet; *kurkál* ‚verwickeln, verwirren‘ entspricht einem rum. *încurcă* (vgl. auch *proszkál* < *improșcă*, *serkál* < *incercă*; zum eventuellen Fehlen des *în-* s. I. Jordan, *Compuse romînești cu în-*: Buletinul Institutului de Fil. Rom. Iași, vol. III—1936, S. 57 ff.); *szárika* ‚Hosenbein‘ hängt offenbar mit *sarică* ‚Zottenmantel‘ zusammen; ob *szulimán* wirklich ‚eine Arznei‘ bedeutet, läßt sich durch rum. *suliman* ‚Schminke‘ (*a se sulimăni* ‚sich schminken‘) nicht verwarscheinlichen; *sinyil* ‚Rätsel raten‘ kommt von rum. *cimili* ‚poser une devinette, deviner‘, oder besser gesagt von der mundartlichen Variante *ciñili*; *stira* ‚unfruchtbar‘ ist rum. *știră*, etc.

In den Texten finden wir einige Wörter, die im lexikalischen Teile

von Csűry verfaßt wurde: *Szamosháti Szótár I—II*. Budapest, 1935—36. Die zahlreich angebrachten wörterklärenden Abbildungen steigern die Brauchbarkeit des Wörterbuchs in hohem Maße.

³ Vgl. Lükö Gábor, *A moldvai csángók. I. A csángók kapcsolatai az erdélyi magyarsággal* („Die Moldau-Csángós. I. Die Beziehungen der Csángós zu dem Siebenbürger Ungartum“). Néprajzi Füzetek 3. Budapest, 1936, S. 44.

⁴ Wichmann hat die Bezeichnung der Laute auf Grund der Transkription der Finnisch-ugrischen Forschungen vorgenommen. Wir sind diesmal leider nicht in der Lage dieselbe Transkription anzuwenden und schreiben die angeführten Wörter nach dem geläufigen ungarischen Alphabet.

nicht verzeichnet wurden: *perikulósz* ‚gefährlich‘ < *periculos* ‚id.‘ (18), *ke* ‚daß‘ < *că* ‚id.‘ (62, 160), *szekurje* ‚Axt, Beil‘ < *secure* ‚id.‘ (77), *prág* ‚Schwelle‘ < *prag* ‚id.‘ (144). Bemerken wir noch, daß z. B. das Sprichwort ‚düssz fejár pénzét fekete napaknak‘ (Sammle weißes Geld für schwarze Tage) die Übersetzung von rum. ‚a stringe părăluțe albe pentru zile negre‘ (vgl. auch *bani albi de zile negre*) ist.

L. Tamás.



OSZK

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár