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THE CENTRAL JOURNAL OF THE HUNGARIAN
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FOR THE HOMELAND



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FOREWORD

Over the years the Honvédségi Szemle / Hungarian Defence Review has gone through several name changes and reorganizations, but regardless of its name at any one time, it has always been the flagship scientific journal of the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF). It has served as a sounding board and professional discussion forum for generations of Hungarian military officers and security and defence specialists. In its earlier incarnations it published several joint issues with the military scientific journals of the armed forces of Austria, Great Britain, Romania and other nations. However, this special issue is the first fully in-house English language issue. It is the result of an ambitious joint project by the journal's editorial board and the scientific research department of the HDF General Staff. It has a twofold purpose. First, it makes the international marketplace of ideas accessible to Hungarian officers – a forum where they can reach an international audience, and learn about the views of international military and security policy specialists. Second, it is intended to provide a window to the rest of the world onto Hungarian scientific thought on military and security matters.

The works published in this issue achieve both purposes. Both Hungarian and foreign authors address such vitally important current events as the Ukrainian crisis and the Islamic State. Both are of particular interest to the Hungarian Defence Forces. Ukraine – with an ongoing mid-intensity conventional conflict – is right on Hungary's eastern border. Should the situation worsen significantly, we can expect that large numbers of refugees would try to cross into Hungary. As a European nation, we would not be able to ignore their plight – especially since many of them would likely belong to Ukraine's sizeable Hungarian minority. The Islamic State has already declared its intention to restore the Caliphate to its former glory – a project that would require the reoccupation of Hungary as well, since it was under Ottoman occupation in the 16th and 17th centuries. Clearly, the IS is a threat not only to the Middle East, but also to Europe – that is why the Hungarian Parliament authorized the HDF to participate in the international mission to support the Iraqi government and suppress the IS.

Other authors look into the future, and find reason for cautious optimism in Angola's role in Africa's regional security schemes, and in the direction the Hungarian training and development organization is moving. Even the historical essays have a significant value added for the future, as lessons learned.

In the future I hope to see such English language issues at least once a year – and I hope to see more foreign contributions in the table of contents. Until such time as the next special issue comes out, I highly recommend the essays in this one, not only to military specialists, but also to civilian security policy experts as well as to the interested general public.

*Lieutenant General Zoltán Orosz,
Deputy Chief of Defence, Hungarian Defence Forces*

Brig. Gen. Attila Géza Takács:

UNFINISHED WAR: THE LESSONS OF NATO „OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR” (OUP) MISSION IN LIBYA

ABSTRACT: The NATO operation in Libya was an important milestone. One of the most important results is that the operation highlighted the caveats of the NATO command structure and the urgent need for NATO reforms. These issues originate from two sources: lack of operational capabilities due to resource shortage of the members and internal tensions coming from the clashes of national interests. Another important outcome is that the Alliance repeated the mistake identified after the operation in Iraq: intervening in the regional power balance without any other alternative. Overthrowing the actual government resulted in an unstable state in Iraq and Libya that endangered regional security.

During the Libyan crisis in 2011, the political and military objectives of the war were achieved within a relatively short period of time, so it can be considered a NATO victory; however in any other aspect, it is still an unfinished process. The Libyan crisis is only one part of the “Arab Spring” series, which is more than a simple wave of uprisings.

IN Libya, at the same time, we witnessed a new type of warfare emerge. The concept of Blitzkrieg, the combination of the air force and swiftly manoeuvring land forces, was constructed during the Second World War. Today, the key to success is the combination of Special Forces and information operation supported by any other armed service branch. The result is the “non-linear war”. The Libyan example attracted the attention of Moscow as well.

KEYWORDS: Libyan operation, Arab Spring, unfinished war, new warfare method, NATO reform, non-linear war, hybrid war

INTRODUCTION

The Libyan crisis of the spring 2011 drew our attention to unprecedented features of modern warfare. Numerous analyses of the events were published around the world reflecting the gravity of changes witnessed. The Libyan crisis and its consequences demonstrated the lack of capabilities of NATO and indicated the limits of the multipolar world power-balance. The crisis proved the effectiveness of modern warfare and predicts the future characteristics of war. The principles applied in the Libyan War can be observed in the Crimean crisis as well, although the Russian Federation has already improved them.

Information warfare is not a new principle, as the intention to mislead the enemy was present throughout the history of war. The only modification has been the dimensions of such operations. After the creation of virtual space (cyber space), information warfare moved from physical space to cyber space. The conduction of the latest wars, the communication, intelligence, and the control of precision weapons systems are all orchestrated from cyber

¹ Peter Pomerantsev: How Putin Is Reinventing Warfare? http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/05/how_putin_is_reinventing_warfare (Accessed: 10. 11. 2014.) Abstraction, created by Vladislav Surkov, Putin's direct political advisor .

space. The high-end technology is not available for all armies and non-state actors. This, by leading to the simultaneous presence of different generations of warfare in the operational theatre, often creates hybrid war².

Another novelty is that the opposing forces are forced to gain ascendancy over their counterparts by information operations. Therefore, a new capability was founded on this new type of operation in a new domain. A capability existing in virtual space can be combined with conventional capabilities in physical space. What could be the results of such a combination? It may lead to the emergence of new tactics, methods of warfare; or it may result in events that are beyond comprehension for our minds, which are used to the physical world.

Presumably, the above mentioned fact led to the failure of the regimes in the “Arab Spring” countries. The social tensions in these countries grew in an invisible place but precipitated in the physical space. This means that the use of force³ (or violence) occurred in the cyber space,⁴ the only remaining issue is its legal interpretation.

These modifications pose numerous questions. For instance, what is the impact of these changes on the future of force development? The list could go on, but in order to find answers, the latest events in North Africa should be examined along with the correlation between them, and their consequences.

ARAB SPRING OR SOMETHING ELSE?

In order to understand the events of the past few years in the Arab World, the precursor economic and social trends should be discussed first. Even if we are accurate, we will not have a clear picture of the background situation because it is highly complicated and not all the information is available. We can only make assumptions from the published details. However, it can be concluded that the phenomenon created a civil-war-like conflict in the Muslim states. The term „civil war” must be applied carefully to the affected countries. The social and religious culture there has a different understanding of weapon handling, and it is not the „sanctity of life” that is the most valued. The individual is subordinate to the community (the Ummah) and its rules and its will. A civil war always causes changes in society, except for the “Arab Spring” countries. There are tensions between different age groups, there is even fighting against the government forces, but there is no significant democratic development after the war. Perhaps, later on we might observe it.

What are the facts, to be aware of when examining this region?

Around 23%⁵ of the global population (1.57 billion) practises Islam, and the Muslim community grows faster than the world average. Although the community creates one block stretching from West Africa through the Middle East and South Asia to South-East Asia, the block itself is composed of 24 separate countries. They strictly adhere to their traditions. When moving to a different culture, not even the third, or fourth generation is likely to

² Definition: “Hybrid warfare combines different types of threats, including conventional, subversion and cyber.” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg interpretation. <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2015/05/14/nato-eu-work-together-hybrid-warfare/27333967/> (Accessed: 18. 05. 2015.)

³ According to Clausewitz it is the abstraction of War.

⁴ Matthew C. Waxman: Cyber attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2 (4). <http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/cyberattacks-use-force-back-future-article-24/p25251>. (Accessed: 02. 04. 2014.)

⁵ Drew Desilver: World’s Muslim population more widespread than you might think. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/07/worlds-muslim-population-more-widespread-than-you-might-think> (Accessed: 01. 03. 2015.)

companies influenced the governments in accordance with their interests in natural resources and cheap labour force. That means it is very difficult to make a difference between national and global private interests, which further complicates the situation in these states. In many cases, it is the national interest to protect national economic institutions which are private companies.

We can conclude from the above mentioned facts that not only the internal economic, social, and demographic tensions led to the uprising or civil war, but the external interests also catalysed the series of crises. This is the most remarkable in Syria, but is also considerable in the other affected countries. The aforementioned tendencies were strengthened by the extremist religious movements and organisations gaining momentum in the regions struck by insurgency. The Al-Qaeda terrorist organisation infiltrated those countries where the old regimes prohibited their thesis and activities. The old state systems, which guaranteed some balance and predictability in the region, collapsed and thus further escalated the “Arab Spring” in the countries. We can recognise many similarities in the crisis situations of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya¹⁰, Mali, and Syria. The starting point and the results are almost the same, all of them are failed states¹¹.




Figure 2: Failed States 2013

<http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable>
(Accessed: 02. 11. 2014.)

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

The UN Security Council resolutions authorise the use of force to respond to crises in most cases. There is an agreement between the UN and NATO about completions of UN resolutions signed in New York in 2008¹². In that document it is stated that the UN requests NATO to implement the resolutions. It happened differently in case of Libya. NATO was not nominated to implement the Resolution¹³ on Air – Sea blockade and Humanitarian Assistance. Anyone had the chance to carry out a military operation against the Libyan Government to protect the population.

France brought the UN Mandate into effect with Operation Odyssey Dawn together with Great Britain, both of them having a history of interests in North Africa. The leading role was in the hands of France, negotiating with the Arab League, deploying forces conducting military operations. NATO – after some hesitation – took over the mission two weeks later.

¹⁰ Besenyő János – Marsai Viktor: Országismertető, Líbia. <http://mek.oszk.hu/12900/12977/12977.pdf> (Accessed: 30. 10. 2014.)

¹¹ J. Eli Margolis: Estimating State Instability. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-56-no.-1/pdfs-vol-56.-no.-1/Estimating%20State%20Instability%20-Extracts-Mar12-20Apr12.pdf> (Accessed: 02. 11. 2014.)

¹² Joint Declaration on UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation, New York on 23 September 2008.

¹³ Resolution 1973 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on 17 March 2011.

The French decision and action was made not on behalf of the EU or other international organisations, but it was rather based on the interest of its own coalition.

Much to the astonishment of NATO, its own INTEL system failed to effectively detect the signals and symptoms of the uprising and crisis in Libya. The Alliance did not consider that anyone would take the initiative and implement UN SC Resolution 1970 (Arms Embargo with Humanitarian Assistance) and UN SC Resolution 1973 (No Fly Zone). The NATO member countries were therefore not able to react quickly enough and to provide proper forces to the Operation Unified Protection (further OUP). The other challenge was that of the operational leadership as the tasked Joint Headquarters lacked experienced staff officers and were unable to conduct Air, Sea, Humanitarian Assistance, and Arms Embargo operations simultaneously. The lessons learned from the Libyan operation forced NATO to modernise the command structure from January 2013.



Figure 3: Arab Spring Region 2012

<http://imgarcade.com/1/arab-spring-map-2012/> (Accessed: 01. 03. 2015.)

WHAT HAPPENED IN LIBYA?

Right before the uprising, peaceful demonstrations have taken place from 15 February, 2011, aiming to free a lawyer, and to protest against the massacre of 1,200 prisoners in Abu Salim Prison in June 1996. The event was unsuccessfully controlled by the Armed Forces, turning the demonstration into a riot. The cases of Egypt and Tunisia sparked the Libyan uprising. An important detail is that the revolution was organised in Benghazi via online social media within 3 days. This is unprecedented, and also strengthens the argument that the younger generations, by becoming a critical mass in social development, have a leading role in the Arab Spring.

The government established by the opposition in Benghazi was recognised by many countries, for instance by the USA, France, Italy, Belgium, Qatar and other Arab League member states. The early legitimisation of the opposing government is more than what the UN SC Resolution permitted. The objective of the UN was to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe instead of overthrowing the Libyan regime. By perceiving the international support, the opposing “government” could reasonably aim for the overthrow of the Gadhafi regime. This, however, led to the escalation of the crisis.

The Gadhafi government could not cope with the riots all over the country, their only chance was hiring the Tuareg tribe as a mercenary to counter the uprising. As a side effect of the military operation, the local population fled to the neighbouring areas. The refugee camps accommodated 530,000 people and the international community attempted to support

them. This took several months to come in effect, therefore the humanitarian assistance cannot be labelled successful.

The success of the governmental and the opposing forces varied day by day. The government deployed all armaments at its disposal and controlled the coastal area, except for the oil fields and refineries in the east, but had no decisive force to terminate the conflict.

Despite the Arms Embargo, the Berber tribal¹⁴ fighters received French, Italian, and Belgian weapon shipments through the West Nafusa Mountain in the vicinity of the Tunisian border on 29 June, 2011. That indicates the presence of Special Forces on land, which is against the UN SC Resolution. This kind of international support enabled the integration of the opposing forces, leading to the victory of the “counter-government” and NATO. The Alliance announced the victory as early as possible and finished the mission. This was an unusual step, because there was no consolidation phase to promote the reconstruction after the high intensity operation. A consolidation phase is stated in NATO and EU crisis response measures¹⁵, and it was confirmed in the Lisbon Summit Final Declaration 2010¹⁶ too. In case of Libya this scenario was put aside.

The international operation took 214 days, 26,300 aircraft sorties and 3,100 ships were deployed all together. The sudden redeployment of the International Forces indicates the lack of resources for the operation. Perhaps, the further phase of a likely-long-continuing operation could not have given the chance to the Alliance to declare a victory just like it did in Iraq or Afghanistan. The OUP mission without a consolidation phase can be recognised as an *Unfinished War*.

We did not have to wait too long for the continuation of the crisis series. The Tuareg tribes invaded the northern areas of Mali¹⁷, which was another shock for the international community. Gadhafi had an agreement with the Tuareg leaders, which was in effect as long as he was alive. The Al-Qaeda took advantage of the unclear situation and expanded its influence to Libya and Mali. The international response was much more modest in case of Mali, as there were no forces to offer. France, once again created a hasty coalition to support the Mali government with Operation Serval. This mission was transformed into an EU operation aiming to avoid the Libyan or Iraqi syndrome. The task was to keep the regime in position and to avoid another hub of crisis similar to that of Libya.

The operation in Mali was still not finished when the Syrian uprising erupted¹⁸ along the (Turkish) border of NATO. A similar uprising as in Libya, inconvenience, uncertainty, panic and the forces are winded for the West. At this time the Russian Fleet stepped on the stage, making the interests of the Russian Federation clear. The West was paralyzed when seeing the rapidly accelerating events. There were no resources, the consequences were more unpredictable, the interests were more complicated and the intentions were hidden. The only response could be a power demonstration on the Mediterranean Sea.

¹⁴ Besenyő János: Western Sahara. IDRResearch Ltd./Publikon Publishers, Printed by: Ad Librum, Budapest, 2009, 28.

¹⁵ NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS).

¹⁶ Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon Active Engagement, Modern Defence / point 24.

¹⁷ Besenyő János: The European Union mission in Mali - Hungary's involvement in the mission, Contemporary Military Challenges/Sodobni Vojaski Izzivi November 2013, 25–37. http://www.slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/svi_15_3.pdf (Accessed: 30. 10. 2014.)

¹⁸ Middle East unrest: Silence broken in Syria By Lina Sinjab BBC News, 19 March 2011 / <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12794882> (Accessed: 12. 04. 2015.)

Then Moscow check-mated the world! The Russian Federation realised the postponement of the international intervention in Syria and executed her operational plan from 2008 against Crimea. It was a very simple action, a copy of SOF operations in Libya by the West. This was the moment when the modernised Russian Army, which was developed in the past 20 years, was introduced.

The Russian expansion plan was ready in 2008, waiting for the right time to be executed. Putin made that clear at the NATO Bucharest Summit in his speech¹⁹. He claimed that the Crimean Peninsula became a Ukrainian territory only by an internal decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, without any legitimate official international agreement between the two countries. He did not finish his thought, however, he could have said that “formally the Crimea belonged to the Russian Federation”. It sounds speculative, but Moscow verified it.

The first part of the expansion plan was an intervention in Georgia (former republic in the Soviet Union) in 2008, interrupted by the quick response of the British forces. The Russian Land Forces were not fully prepared, not even the Rules of Engagement were so sophisticated. Five years later the Russian dream came true. In his speech in 2008, Putin also talked about the Russian Area of Interests, that we can observe today.

LESSONS AND CONSEQUENCES

The military power of NATO was lashed down with simultaneous long-standing operations in the past two decades. The North African crisis-series surprised the Alliance and it could not respond to them sufficiently. The OUP mission started off as a limited war in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, and not to entirely overthrow the Gadhafi regime. However, by the international community losing control, the Libyan opposition turned the limited war into a total war in the Clausewitzian sense.

The term „arms embargo” must be redefined, as some members overrode the decision of the Alliance on the basis of their national interests.

The unification of opposing forces could not have been reached without the activity of the Special Forces. The SOF capability is likely to have a key role in the future conflicts.

The precision weapons lived up to the expectations. Whilst the airstrikes claimed 400-500 civilian lives in Kosovo, during the Libyan operation 50–100 civilians were killed.²⁰ Such a drop in collateral damage demonstrates the development and application of this particular weaponry.

The Air and Sea operations were successful, but it does not mean that a war could be won without land forces. The example of Kosovo and Libya are exceptions to the rule, Kosovo has been an ongoing operation lasting for more than 15 years, and Libya is an Unfinished War.

The relations of the US and French-British coalition to NATO do not necessarily make the cohesion inside the Alliance stronger. Seemingly, the Smart Defence initiative works, when the members generate a new capability by their joint efforts. In the meantime, we can observe the national interests behind the cooperation, which are sometimes stronger than

¹⁹ Text of Putin’s speech at NATO Summit (Bucharest, April 2, 2008)

<http://www.unian.info/world/111033-text-of-putins-speech-at-nato-summit-bucharest-april-2-2008.html> (Accessed: 30. 10. 2014.)

²⁰ An Interim RUSI Campaign Report, September 2011, page 5. <https://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N4E7B610E8D672/#.VHTbGd5v9Sk> (Accessed: 25. 11. 2014.)

the common objective. These capability-coalitions weaken the NATO cohesion. The Iraqi operation was not supported by all NATO nations. In Afghanistan, we could hear the main issue all the time: Together in and out. What were they afraid of? In Libya, the situation changed; some members revised the joint decision in accordance with their interests, and others had no capability to contribute to the military operation. In Mali, the Alliance could not react as a whole, only a small coalition engaged. In the Syrian case, the Russian Federation had an advantage, and benefitted from the forceless and divided Alliance. How strong is the cohesion of NATO? The French-British coalition might be stronger than the cohesion of the EU or NATO. France, the United Kingdom, and Germany provide two thirds of the Alliance's European budget. The Franco-British cooperation²¹ goes on its separate path defined by their interests. The German economy is strongly connected to Russian private companies, and above all, Germany can find free markets only in the area of the southern post-Soviet states, which are members of the SCO.²²

The NATO member states were overexerted by the operational tempo speeding up in the last two decades. In contrast, Russia and China established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which covers about a quarter of the world's area in total. This area is the "Heartland"²³ according to Halford Mackinder. The SCO became powerful both economically and militarily. NATO will have to face SCO within a short period of time. The multipolar world approaches to the bipolar structure again. At the moment both of them (NATO, SCO) have a common interest to counter the Muslim World in unifying its power, as that would constitute a third pole; for instance the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL/DAES).

The mission of Special Operation Forces becomes more diverse: establishing local contacts, training of opposing forces, any type of evacuation, control of airstrikes, defence of critical infrastructure, weapon hand-over, unification of opposing forces. They are the main actors of "Cold Peace"²⁴.

The consequence of the Syrian crisis is the occupation of Crimea, along with the aggression in Eastern Ukraine. Where is the end of the crisis-series?

The NATO and Russian forces are unbalanced. The Airpower and Sea Power of NATO are global, but its land forces can be barely mobilised. Four armies of Russia (land forces) are well-trained, modernised, and fully deployable in a large scale operation. The supporting services are also improved but not global capable. There is no significant technological gap between NATO and Russia. How will the internal relations of SCO be modified if China's sea-power once assumes control of the Pacific region?

NATO's reform is inevitable. The (Cold War) command structure became bureaucratic, static, and inflexible. A modern war is complex, varies in means of warfare, uses different technologies, dictates a high tempo, and happens on the TV screens of the global population. The OUP in Libya attested the weaknesses of NATO. The "Arab Spring" will be of concern for the international community in the future.

²¹ Claire Taylor: Franco-British Defence Co-operation, 8 November 2010. www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05750.pdf (Accessed: 06. 02. 2015.)

²² Global Security, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/sco.htm> (Accessed: 06. 02. 2015.)

²³ Halford Mackinder: Geographical Pivot of History. The Geographical Society, Vol. 23, No.4, April 1904, 421–437. <http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/eBooks/Articles/1904%20HEARTLAND%20THEORY%20HALFORD%20MACKINDER.pdf> (Accessed: 06. 02. 2015.)

²⁴ Julian Lindley-French: NATO-Russia and the New Cold Peace. <http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.hu/2014/03/nato-russia-and-new-cold-peace.html> (Accessed: 02. 11. 2014.)

The timing of Russian power demonstration is not an accidental occasion. Russia ensured that no one can take countermeasures against the Crimean operation. The Russian expansion can be controlled by the internal affairs, depending on how much longer her own population can bear the economic sanctions. The Western World made a premature assumption when it believed that the Russian military power might have evaporated.

During the invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, Moscow combined the information operations with SOF capabilities and took the initiative to shape the Russian area of interest. Russia successfully divided the Western World with her rhetoric on various media platforms to different target audiences. Due to the open market, Moscow could tie her natural resources to the European economy, influencing the governments, through their dependency on natural gas. Russia's aim is not to confront with any state, but to re-establish its global power position, using non-state actors and tools. This is a new Russian approach called non-linear war²⁵. Future wars might not necessarily take place between states, but rather between non-state actors, because the conventions do not concern them and they have no infrastructure to attack. These non-state actors influence society, and the voters.

Is it a "Cold Peace" or is there an undeclared war going on? Let's play with a hypothesis: a unified Europe with Russia would be a Eurasian superpower²⁶, pushing the USA and China to the periphery. The control of the Pacific region causes a clash of interests between the USA and China, leaving no way to be allied partners and thus they cannot create a counter-pole against the Eurasian Power. Today, there is a Transatlantic Power (the USA and Western Europe), therefore the only way for Russia is to couple with China as a strategic partner (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation). This settlement is not enough for Russia to surpass the United States in terms of political might, but enables it to become a global counter-pole. Subsequently, the question to answer is whether it is reasonable to presume that a third power (the EU) could emerge between the greatest two.

CONCLUSION

The OUP in Libya is the turning point of modern war. The characteristics of war have changed. Is it a new type of war? No, the recent technology supports warfare. The combination of Information Operations and SOF Operations is a new phenomenon, but it belongs to the tools of Joint Operations. We observed it in Libya and Eastern Ukraine, it is a new type of warfare. Some researchers describe it as non-linear war, when the confrontation happens not between states but between economic interest groups that decide to engage in armed conflicts.

The new combination of warfare reminds me of Liddell Hart's Indirect Approach²⁷, when the aim is to weaken the enemy so that it becomes unable to counter the challenge militarily. The NATO Comprehensive Approach does not fit the Libyan case. It is a good theory, but it does not work in practise. Clausewitz writes in his book (On War) that the "civil" component does not want to be subordinated to military leaders.

The basic attributes of war remained unchanged in modern war: it is a tool of politics, and it is called limited war as long as the regime survives. In the meantime, the use of force gained a new area of cyber space, which gives way to new combinations of conventional arms

²⁵ Peter Pomerantsev: How Putin Is Reinventing Warfare.

²⁶ Halford Mackinder: Geographical Pivot of History 1904, 436.

²⁷ Liddell Hart: The Strategy of Indirect Approach. <https://archive.org/details/strategyofindire035126mbp> (Accessed: 06. 02. 2015.)

and services. We can recognise two of them already: in Libya, the uprising was organised in cyber space, combined with Special Force capabilities, supported by Air Force. In Ukraine, the information operations were combined with SOF operations, supported by the Russian Land Forces troops. We can draw the final conclusion that during a war, the events of the physical and cyber space are connected and have an impact on each other. Is it necessary to win in both the cyber and physical space in order to be victorious? That is the question of the future. The future military service-branch shall be the cyber force, in addition to the land, air, and naval forces. Remaining „analogue” in this sense is comparable to going to war blindly, without sufficient intelligence.

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Lt. Col. Luís Manuel Brás Bernardino:

THE ROLE OF THE ANGOLAN ARMED FORCES IN THE AFRICAN REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

“...It is equally significant that Angola responded to its post-conflict internal challenges of reconstruction by looking abroad...”¹

ABSTRACT: The participation of the Republic of Angola in the African Peace and Security Architecture represents, in the current sub-Saharan context, the example of a search for strategic affirmation of a rising regional power, through a participatory, influential foreign policy and commitment, a bet on strategic balance duality in which the Angolan Armed Forces are an instrument of military cooperation and conflict resolution in Angola’s conjunctural interest space.

This article demystifies this paradigm and discusses the possible interests of Angola within the framework of participation in the African Peace and Security Architecture, constituting a framework for development and an affirmation of military capabilities. Employing the Armed Forces has a regional and continental assertion mechanism for Angola’s external policy in the context of a non-permanent member of the Security Council in the United Nations.

KEYWORDS: Angola, African Peace and Security Architecture, Security and Defense, Angolan Armed Forces

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of conflict in post-independence Angola was one of the most violent in the sub-Saharan region and in Africa as a whole and echoed the main arguments that had been put forward as endogenous factors generating intra-state conflict there. It was only after the signing of the Luena Agreement (4th April 2002) that it was possible to start along the road to development in a setting of peace and security. The Angolan armed forces were obliged to play an important role in the country’s reconstruction and assertion of state sovereignty. They participated in such important areas as support for development, domestic security, border control, involvement in regional conflict prevention systems and, as a last resort, acting almost instinctively as a factor in Angola’s foreign policy to defend its interests at both regional and continental levels.²

More recently in this context, the Angolan armed forces have been endeavouring to improve security in the sub-Saharan region, as reinforcing external security also helps to strengthen domestic security, especially border control and maritime defence. These aspects were reflected in the documents that served as a theoretic and conceptual basis for the Strategic Concept of

¹ Assis Malaquias: Angola’s Foreign Policy: Pragmatic Recalibrations. South Africa Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), 2011, 17.

² Miguel Júnior: A Formação e o Desenvolvimento das Forças Armadas Angolanas. Luanda, Editorial Nzila, August 2003, ISBN 972-8823-25-8, 67–69.

Security and National Defence, which revised the 1993 Strategic Concept, and Law 2/93 of 26 March, the National Defence and Armed Forces Law,³ which were considered the cornerstones of the development of the capability of the ‘new’ armed forces and security forces in Angola.⁴ Their political and strategic orientations point to greater participation in regional security. We believe that this will help assert Angola at regional level and show its armed forces as an active part of foreign policy and a structural mechanism for external action by the state, serving not only security, but also Angola’s development and assertion in the sub-Saharan region.⁵

This article analyses Angola’s involvement in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and answers the question of how important Angola’s involvement in the African Regional Security Architecture is. We address Angola’s foreign policy in the African regional organisations in which it is represented, identify its main contributions to regional and continental security and defence and pinpoint participation scenarios and possible strategies for bolstering the Republic of Angola in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF ANGOLA’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Recent developments in global conflicts, especially in the sub-Saharan region, are the subject of constant academic reflection and many specialised geopolitical analyses and studies. In this setting, regional African organisations, acting as a complement to states’ sovereignty missions, have been the main agents of development, security and regional defence in Africa. We believe that the creation of the APSA is a very different approach to those in Africa in the 20th century, especially in terms of proactive mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of regional conflicts. Insecurity and underdevelopment in Africa due to globalisation began to affect world stability and this was reflected in different geostrategic areas as a factor of permanent disruption for the international community.

The creation of the APSA represents a “pan-Africanisation” of the security sector. At strategic and operational levels it covers the entire continent, involving and committing states and organisations in politico-strategic cooperation for better standards of living for the people.⁶

In their regional area of intervention, these players are responsible for member states’ security and conflict prevention (also represented by the early warning system), thereby placing them in the regional and African security context. They are therefore the focal points and main interlocutors for strategic cooperation policies on security in Africa. In this framework, the AU takes a more interventionist attitude, in contrast to the ineffectiveness of its predecessor. It has set up structures and mechanisms to ensure an acceptable level of success in management of regional conflicts and is now the central feature of cooperation strategies for security and defence in Africa.

³ Lei de Defesa Nacional e das Forças Armadas de Angola (LDNFA) – Lei N° 271993 de 26 de Março de 1993. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/angola/hosting/1_def.pdf

⁴ Ana Leão – Martin Rupiya: A Military History of the Angolan Armed Forces from the 1960s Onwards – As Told by Former Combatants. South Africa: International Security Studies (ISS). <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=108507>

⁵ Christine Messiant: L’Angola postcolonial – 1. Guerre et paix sans démocratisation. Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2008, ISBN 978-2-8111-0029-2, 367–370.

⁶ Jakkie Cillier: Toward a Continental Early-warning System for Africa. South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 102. <http://www.iss.co.za/Pub/papers/102/Paper102.html>

The Peace and Security Council has set up a Continental Early Warning System⁷ that connects units in the field monitoring tense situations to other complementary sub-regional mechanisms that are linked to supranational politico-strategic decision centres.

This network is an opportunity for Angola to make a name for itself in the context of peace cooperation in the sub-Saharan region, especially by helping to implement a situation centre and exchanging strategic information in an inter-regional operations network. Although this continental early warning network is not yet complete, it is intended to be the most reliable indicator for assessing threat levels and regional conflicts. As we have seen, it can monitor developments in an emerging crisis, where Angola's involvement is a necessity rather than a priority for the security of the country and the region, with effects on the level of conflict in Africa.

At a time when peace and a security are a strategic priority for Africa, as development is closely linked to security, the implementation of conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms and especially the continental forces based on the African Standby Brigades is a strategic priority, in which Angola can play an important role. Angola has participated actively in the SADC and ECCAS, creating an ambiguity and apparent vagueness in its strategic line of foreign policy action, which has served it well, especially in defining regional priorities for asserting its military potential.⁸

For Angola, it is not a problem but rather an articulated solution to its internal security and defence dilemmas (such as border control, especially in the north and east but also in the south), a chance to develop as a multi-faceted regional power. The fact that it plays simultaneously on these boards provides Angola with a number of opportunities that the Angolan armed forces are preparing to include in their capability development strategies, boosting its vocation as a rising regional power.⁹

As a member of two different sub-regional organisations, Angola is fuelling a structured, strategically appropriate dichotomy that, in terms of regional security, is designed to contribute to a better, fuller definition of its regional foreign policy. Where the SADC is concerned, Angola has seemed to be focusing on greater political and diplomatic visibility and commitment in its relations with Jacob Zuma and South Africa since 2013. It has contributed resources to the regular operational manoeuvres of the Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade (SADC-Standby Brigade).

Military exercise "Dolphin" is still the largest and has involved the deployment of troops from the Angolan armed forces and National Police and some civilian elements with a view to training for humanitarian intervention in emergency areas. Military exercise "Blue Zambezi" trains capability for airborne insertion of human and material resources in the region. It essentially involves the SADC countries' air forces, and Angola has played an

⁷ The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is one of the five pillars of the African Peace and Security architecture (APSA) and is responsible for data collection and analysis and is mandated to collaborate with the UN, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centres, academic institutions and NGOs with its information to be used by the Chairperson of the Commission to advise the Peace and Security Council (PSC), on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action. <http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/28-continental-early-warning-system-cews>

⁸ Luís Manuel Brás Bernardino: *A posição de Angola na Arquitectura de Paz e Segurança Africana. Análise da Função Estratégica das Forças Armadas Angolanas*. Coimbra, Editora Almedina, ISBN 978-972-40-5000-3, 251.

⁹ Messiant: *L'Angola postcolonial*, 367–370

active part, including organising a military exercise in Cabo Ledo (2012), which was praised by the international community.¹⁰

Angola also helped prepare and implement a memorandum of understanding on the formation of the SADC-Standby Brigade in late 2007. It was a significant step in the introduction of this regional prevention and security mechanism and support in setting up the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe¹¹. This centre has administered a substantial number of training courses in peacekeeping operations for members of the region's armed forces, including those from Angola.

According to 2014 data in an annual publication, the Angolan armed forces (under politically oriented restructuring since 2007) currently have around 107,000 personnel. Of these, around 100,000 are in the Army (95% of the Angolan armed forces personnel), around 6,000 in the Air Force (4%) and 1,000 in the Navy (1%), an additional 10,000 paramilitary personnel were not included in this tally. Regarding weaponry, the Angolan armed forces are equipped with materiel from different sources, though most of it is of Russian, Cuban or Chinese origin left over from the MPLA-UNITA war before 2002. The Army has around 300 armoured vehicles (200 Soviet T-55s 50 T-60s and also 50 T-52s), around 1,100 reconnaissance and combat vehicles and light infantry personnel carriers (600 BRDM-2) (250 BMP-1/BMP-2 and BMD-3) (250 BTR-152/BTR-60/BMD-3) and 1,408 artillery pieces (over 100 mm calibre) of different origins, calibres and operability.¹²

The Angolan Navy (although it is in the process of acquiring more naval assets) has nine ocean patrol vessels, amphibious vehicles, a small naval air contingent and an equally small but growing force of marines.¹³ This shortfall is one of Angola's main weaknesses in terms of maritime security capability, considering the vast maritime area and coastal area over which it has (or is supposed to have) sovereignty.

The Angolan Air Force is relatively substantial in the sub-Saharan region. It has 83 fighter aircraft (of different types and in various states of repair), around 70 utility and transport helicopters, and 44 attack helicopters (22 Mi-24 Hind and 22 Mi-35 Hind) most of them of Soviet origin.¹⁴ This provides the forces with a good strategic capability for intra-theatre transport and support for ground manoeuvres and maritime operations. This is a strategically relevant element in the current context of the armed forces of the region's countries and an important contribution to the APSA. This is clearly visible in their operational use in recent regional military exercises, such as the SADC's "Dolphin" and "Blue Zambezi" and the ECCAS exercise "Kwanza", not to mention military exercise "FELINO" conducted in Angola by the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) in 2011.

The Angolan armed forces are still being consolidated and restructured and their naval capability is rather small. This is an aspect that needs development and investment in new equipment and specialised crew training as a way of finding a balance between operability and representation among the other armed forces instruments. This will be a bet on the future, as security and defence are three-dimensional and are vital in Angola's vast maritime area.¹⁵

¹⁰ <http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2013/blue-zambezi-exercises-bring-sadc-troops-catumbela>

¹¹ <http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/services-centres/rptc/>

¹² Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2014. ISBN: 978-1-85743-722-5, 420–421.

¹³ Military Balance, 420–421.

¹⁴ Military Balance, 420–421.

¹⁵ António Manuel Luvualu de Carvalho: Angola. Economia e Petróleo (2002–2010). Lisbon: Universidade Lusíada Editora, ISBN 978-989-640-099-6, 67–68.

The land component, the Army, seems to have surplus personnel and a number of problems in terms of equipment and training. It would be advisable to reduce and optimise resources in order to guarantee less but better equipment, thereby improving operability. The Angolan Air Force has a degree of capability in regional terms. Pilots and support personnel have been trained in a number of countries. Their proficiency has been maintained at an appropriate level, which enables Angola to deploy air assets in the African theatre of operations for African regional organisations where its geostrategic interests are well-known. This is an important asset in a regional context and Angola needs to make the most of it in the near future.

The Angolan armed forces have been undergoing restructuring and resizing since 2007 and are preparing to take on new challenges, not only in reinforcing Angola's internal security and defence responsibilities but also as an active feature of its foreign policy in the sub-Saharan region and Africa as a whole.

ANGOLA'S STRATEGY IN THE SADC

The Southern African Development Community is a sub-regional economic organisation and was officially founded at the Southern African Development Coordination Conference held in 1980 by the so-called front-line countries (Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, later joined by South Africa and Zimbabwe in 1994). In 1992 it changed its name to SADC, merging the region's countries into a regional common market confined to Southern Africa. In terms of cooperation in the area of defence, in mid-2001 the SADC established a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security, which would serve as a tool for dealing with political, defence and security challenges in the region. The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, consisting of the member states' ministers of defence, was set up for the purpose.

The formation of the Mutual Defence Pact (2003) and the strategic decision to set up the SADC Standby Force Brigade (SADCBRIG) are particularly significant in terms of regional security activities, in which Angola has played an active role since its creation. In 2004, the SADC adopted its Strategic Indicative Plan for the SADC Organs (SIPO), which identified the organisation's main security and defence weaknesses and proposed some corrective measures. It set up two bodies for the purpose, which associated the member countries' inter-state political and diplomacy committees, the Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee of foreign ministers and the Interstate Defence and Security Committee, comprising the member states' ministers of defence.

Today, the SADC is a sub-regional organisation that has a vast number of development support and security and defence programmes. The integration of security and sustainable development strategies in the region has facilitated consistent economic growth and an improvement in regional security (thanks to the economic and financial success of South Africa and Angola), making it a highly successful organisation in Africa. As we have seen, the series of military exercises "Dolphin" has made it possible to use military, police and civil resources and forces in operational training activities in order to increase the operational level of the member states' SADCBRIG contingents. Angola has devoted particular attention to this aspect, as demonstrated by its growing commitment in recent years to regional dynamics in the SADCBRIG and involvement in these joint and combined military exercises.

If we compare the main capabilities of the SADC countries' armed forces, we find that Angola is not in a superior position, as the region's military power is South Africa. The figures may be misleading, however, as we must not forget SA's economic capacity in terms of GDP, which reflects on its financial and industrial capability, population, education

and growing armaments and defence industry. This alone gives it a clear advantage over the other countries in the organisation. When compared to the region's other countries, the Angolan armed forces have higher combat potential in all components (land, air and sea), but especially in terms of its army.

The Angolan Air Force's fighter and transport planes and helicopters give it a clear quantitative and qualitative advantage, surpassed only by the South African Air Force and equalled by that of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The SADC countries' naval component is very small, although the Angolan Navy is in the median of most countries that have a navy or coastguard in the region.¹⁶

Some theoretical reflections advocate the need for Angola to maintain organised and prepared armed forces capable of facing up to the main current and future threats to the country. It is also important to assess whether this principle should be followed in spite of the financial and personnel restrictions associated with restructuring and resizing the Angolan armed forces. These adjustments are in fact essential to the sustainable development of the armed forces. But it is necessary to balance the country's investments in health, education and manufacturing sector in detriment to the priority that has been given to defence and domestic security.

While a reduction in the defence and security budget seems to be a reality, it is necessary to know how and where to disinvest (or rather not invest), without affecting the essentials and maintaining the operational standards that the Angolan armed forces need for their mission in African regional organisations and their sovereignty duties enshrined in the Constitution.

At international level professionalization is one of the most used forms to solve this problem, but it seems that the end of compulsory military service would pose a huge risk in a country like Angola, as it is the country's main school for citizenship training and it also seems to be one of the principal factors of national unity and cohesion. It has been a crucial factor in instilling a sense of identity in the rebuilding of the Angolan armed forces since 2002.

The Angolan armed forces, currently undergoing restructuring, are facing the challenge of doing more with less and of being another of the state's regional foreign policy instruments, thereby helping to make a name for Angola in Africa.

CONCLUSIONS

Angola has an active, comprehensive regional foreign policy in which some of its strategies are linked to its armed forces' activities in the SADC. The answer to the central question: "*How important is Angola's involvement in the African Regional Security Architecture?*" has to do with the Angolan government's political priorities pursuant to its aspirations to be a rising regional power in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In order to answer this question, we need to reflect on Angola's recent history and the Angolan armed forces' role in the defence of its sovereignty. The main issue since Angola gained its independence has been its land and maritime borders, which comprise a constant concern for the Angolan executive power. The Army, or its derivative border control force and National Police, has had the task of waging war to win the peace but is currently more involved in supporting the country's development.

¹⁶ Eugénio da Costa Almeida: Angola. Potência Regional em Emergência. Lisbon: Edições Colibri, October 2011, ISBN 978-989-689-131-2, 123.

The air force is a significant asset for the prevention and resolution of conflicts in the APSA in general and SADC in particular. There is also a need to enlarge and lend operational consistency to the navy, which is still dangerously small. Maritime security and integration of a naval component in the APSA is one of the main challenges both for Angola and the regional organisations.

In the future, the Angolan armed forces are preparing to be more professional, interventional and operational in the sub-Saharan region, thereby becoming a tool of Angola's foreign policy and asserting Angola's position in the SADC. This will help create and strengthen the right working conditions for the African Peace and Security Architecture.

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Lt. Col. Endre Szénási:

CRISIS IN UKRAINE: A COLLISION OF INTERESTS. WHAT'S NEXT?

ABSTRACT: Ukraine has become a conflict zone between the West and Russia resulting in disastrous consequences for Ukrainian society. The roots of the conflict stretch far beyond Ukrainian national intentions. It is a conflict between the Western World and Russia, where European, Russian and Ukrainian interests are jeopardized mostly for the benefit of US foreign policy goals. The US plays an essential role in the Western attempt to remove Ukraine entirely from the Russian sphere of influence.

It is unlikely that Russia will abandon her foreign and security policy goal of herding Ukraine back into the Russian orbit or at least forcing Ukraine to serve as a "buffer zone" between Russia and the West. Ukraine is unable to resolve the crisis on her own and is unfit to become a member of the EU or NATO. The most probable outcome of the crisis will most likely permanently damage Western-Russian relations, which will fulfil the Russian expectations regarding the future status of Ukraine.

KEYWORDS: foreign and security policy, crisis, hybrid and information warfare, Russia, Ukraine, West, US

THE DIFFICULTY OF THE TOPIC

The analysis of the conflict between the West and Russia in Ukraine is very challenging, due to several considerations:

- Even though there are historical roots and examples of conflicts between the West and Russia, the crisis in Ukraine is current. From this point of view we lack a historical perspective.
- Even though the current implementation of Minsk-2 agreement lowers the intensity of the armed conflict, the ceasefire could fail rapidly, resulting in new waves of war between Kiev and the Russian-backed separatist forces. This could change the security situation in Ukraine beyond recognition, making some of the article's assumptions obsolete in a very short time.
- The disastrous social tendencies, the growing indebtedness of the Ukrainian state that is on the verge of bankruptcy, and other internal and external factors create conditions where any Ukrainian government can be overthrown or at least forced to resign. The resulting policy changes could also make some of the article's assumptions obsolete quite rapidly.
- In the crisis in Ukraine information warfare is actively used by all sides involved, complicating the situation assessment.
- I have worked with a huge quantity of official documents made by NATO, EU, OSCE, UN and Hungarian national sources analysing the crisis in Ukraine that cannot be quoted for several reasons. Most of the documentation is either classified or at least restricted from public view. These sources are often unavailable even for me due to

- serious limitations. The majority of the readers could not realistically get access to such original documents, even if they were quoted. A classified analysis would significantly change the conditions, while similar restricting factors would remain (i. e. problems related to the selected national, NATO, EU, OSCE, UN or other classification etc.)
- The officially unacknowledged and unstated foreign policies are extremely difficult to quote from universally accepted sources, since they are mostly personal opinions of certain authors and do not appear in officially accepted policy documents¹ of the states involved. On the other hand, omitting them would hamper any serious analysis of the crisis in Ukraine.
 - I have access to a huge quantity of semi-official Russian and Russian-backed separatist sources in Russian. The validity of the information provided by such sources is most often difficult to prove and also difficult to quote. According to my observation, the information published by such sources can be proved after some time passes and the evolving events could prove or disprove the data or the analysis. More importantly: Russian and separatist sources generally provide more accurate information about the war in Eastern Ukraine than Kiev does. A great example of this is the proficiency and accuracy of military maps. Due to the constraints of the current article, I am unable to prove such observations.
 - The scientific community is mostly sceptical about information coming from illegal sources, such as „terrorist organisations” or „illegal armed groups”.
 - I challenge the official positions of all parties involved in the Ukrainian conflict. My views under no circumstances represent official Hungarian, NATO, EU or OSCE positions.
 - I believe that Russian values, interests and intentions are often gravely misunderstood and even deliberately misinterpreted by the Western World. This leads to surprises, policy failures and too many unintended consequences. A greater understanding of Russian policies is often misinterpreted or branded as an alignment with Russia, thereby it is more or less rejected out of hand in this heavily politicised conflict. *„From the start of the Ukraine crisis in fall 2013, the New York Times, the Washington Post and virtually every mainstream U.S. news outlet have behaved as dishonestly as they did during the run-up to war with Iraq. Objectivity and other principles of journalism have been thrown out the window. The larger context of both Ukrainian politics and Russia’s role has been ignored.”*²

THE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY GOALS OF THE OPPOSING PARTIES

The crisis is driven by the desire of both the West and Russia to integrate *all* of Ukraine into their own sphere of influence. I have to emphasise this because it has a serious impact on the way the crisis is handled by the opposing parties and the most possible outcomes of the crisis, which will be discussed later.

¹ National security strategies, military doctrines etc.

² Robert Parry: US Media Coverage of Ukraine: ‘Group-Thinking’ the World into a New War, Global Research, February 2, 2015. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-media-coverage-of-ukraine-group-thinking-the-world-into-a-new-war/5429016> (Accessed: 29. 03. 2015.)

As virtually everything, the existence of spheres of influence is also a subject for debates. Some NATO documents suggest that the Alliance has no sphere of influence at all, since all major decisions in NATO are based on consensus and membership is a result of entirely democratic choices of free nation states. On the other hand, NATO documents suggest that the foreign policy of Russia reflects 19th century imperial views that include spheres of influence, especially in the post-Soviet space. I believe that accepting the existence of spheres of influence for one party and denying their existence for the other party involved does not confirm to any scientific standards.

Even though the Ukrainian state has the least resources to shape her own future it makes sense to discuss *Ukrainian* policy goals first.

The main aim of the nationalist power in Kiev is to demolish the historical relationship with Russia, hoping to get rid of all forms of Russian influence in Ukraine. These policies promote close ties with the West to the maximum extent possible. Ukraine wants to be integrated into the West, to achieve NATO and EU membership. Ukraine also wants to restore the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country within the internationally recognised borders. A necessary part of the solution of the crisis is to achieve economic prosperity and sustainable development in Ukraine.

Ukraine works hard to eliminate the political influence of the minorities that oppose Kiev's foreign policy goal to align with the West. The biggest Russian minority lives in Ukraine, and this causes most of the minority-related "headaches" in Kiev. The forces that came to power during the last revolution on the Maidan made several violent attempts to weaken the influence of the minorities. Typical examples include the pressure applied to discredit and eventually destroy the Party of the Regions (including unusual and unexpected "suicides" of members of Parliament³), the prohibition of the Communist Party (both of these political forces are considered to be pro-Moscow by nationalists), and the *forced* "Ukrainisation", meaning the promotion of the Ukrainian language, education and culture. These actions violate the rights of not only the Russian minority, but also of all minorities, no matter whether they are ethnic or strictly political.

The Ukrainian aim to punish Russia for all real and imaginary historical sins against Ukraine mostly stays unmentioned in our political culture.

The policy aims of *NATO* and the *EU* greatly coincide with the policies of Kiev. Even though it does indeed make sense to evaluate Western policies it is necessary to distinguish between the aims of the US and the EU. The *US* aims to sustain global "primacy" (global "leadership" or "hegemony") that includes the officially unacknowledged tendency to suppress or at least weaken *all* rivals. Western sanctions against Russia perfectly fit the aim of weakening two major rivals of the US, Russia (including the Eurasian Union lead by Russia since 2015) and the EU at the same time, with obvious benefits for US foreign policy.

Amongst the strategic aims of the EU we can also find the need to weaken a strategic rival, which is Russia, even if this could, of course, never be officially acknowledged. At the same time, the EU runs into a contradiction, because its sanctions against Russia also damage fundamental European interests. Therefore, the interest of the EU is to put pressure on Russian foreign policy while minimising the negative effects of the sanctions on the EU. It is also a European interest not to allow Russian energy exports to Europe to completely stop because of the tough economic sanctions (in other words: a new war in economic terms).

³ Verkhovna Rada.

There is also a European interest to get more access to Ukrainian markets and to get control of certain Ukrainian strategic industrial and agricultural production capacities.

It is worth mentioning that certain foreign policy goals of the West (including the EU and the US) fully coincide. The West is interested in weakening, thereby limiting the influence of the Eurasian Union (especially Russia). If Russia is unable to integrate Ukraine into the Eurasian Union, this major foreign and security policy goal is (at least partially) achieved. If Russia was able to integrate a politically and economically severely damaged Ukraine, that would also weaken the Eurasian Union. The same Western foreign and security policy goals would therefore be achieved in another way.

Even if they are publicly unacknowledged, there are Western desires to promote dissatisfaction amongst the Russian population towards Putin's regime, to install a coloured revolution in Moscow and to achieve a regime change where a pro-Western, liberal government would be installed. The most important task of the new Russian, pro-Western government would be the "permanent" handover of all major Russian resources such as oil, gas, coal, steel etc, to Western companies. Long-term legally binding agreements could be signed, making economic deals to last for several decades. This would include the handover of all serious Russian production capacities to western owners as well. If this were achieved, Russia would become a "champion of democracy and human rights" according to western opinion makers no matter what tools and mechanisms the new government would use to suppress Russian resistance against such changes.

There is bad news for the West: Putin's public support soars and Russian alienation from the West has increased to levels not seen even during Soviet times⁴. This creates favourable conditions for Moscow to avert any Western attempts to overthrow the Russian president, or to substantially influence Russian foreign and security policies.

All Western foreign and security policy objectives would be reached if a stable, democratic and prosperous Ukraine became a member of both NATO and the EU. If Putin's regime were destroyed and Russia would become a loyal, junior partner of the West, deeply integrated in the Western sphere of influence. If the Eurasian Union and other organisations led by Russia fell apart. The achievement of all these objectives appears to be highly unrealistic.

The foreign and security policy aim of *Russia* is to deny NATO and EU membership for Ukraine in the *short and medium terms*. Russia wants to minimise the negative consequences of the anti-Russian policies of Ukrainian nationalists and to punish those leaders that are responsible for them. Russia would like to return *all* of Ukraine to the Russian sphere of influence in the *long term*, to integrate Ukraine into the Eurasian Union, and to make all these changes "*irreversible*". The defence of Russian minority rights in Ukraine and the protection of their cultural identity is an essential foreign policy goal for Russia for obvious reasons. One might notice that the successful preservation of the Russian identity in Ukraine would also allow Russia to keep the grip on all important aspects of the Ukrainian statehood, such as shaping Ukrainian foreign and security policies, maintaining economic and cultural ties between Ukraine and Russia, neutralizing Ukrainian nationalism, etc.

The current realities appear unfavourable to achieving long-term Russian foreign policy goals in Ukraine. Therefore Russia is interested in weakening the government in Kiev by promoting and preserving instability. Russia aims to discredit the current Ukrainian

⁴ Michael Birnbaum: Russia's anti-American fever goes beyond the Soviet era's, Washington Post, 8 March, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russias-anti-us-sentiment-now-is-even-worse-than-it-was-in-soviet-union/2015/03/08/b7d534c4-c357-11e4-a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html (Accessed: 29. 03. 2015.)

government, to destroy Ukrainian public support for anti-Russian nationalism and Western integration. Maintaining and promoting such conditions would allow Russia to „prepare the ground” for substantial policy changes in Ukraine that would certainly serve Russian interests better than the current government in Kiev.

Russia is interested in the maintenance of a low intensity conflict in Ukraine because this creates favourable conditions for depleting the political, economic and military capital of Kiev, making way for conditions where a regime change against the current nationalist government would become a necessity. Meanwhile the Russian armed forces stand ready to handle any foreseeable escalation of the war in Eastern Ukraine, helping the separatists to achieve control of new territories.

Western sanctions against Russia have not been successful in forcing Russia to change foreign and security policies, to withdraw support to separatists in Eastern Ukraine, and to restore the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within the internationally recognised borders. The unexpectedly low oil prices appeared to create favourable conditions for the success of Western sanctions, but as yet, with no visible results.

By fully integrating Crimea into the Russian Federation, Russia has passed the point of no return since there is no turning back without an enormous loss of credibility for any Russian government. It can be safely assumed that such Russian *capitulation* is highly unlikely, unless the Russian state *fails* entirely.

The policy goals of the *Russian backed separatists* cannot be evaluated independently from Russian policies. The masses of the *local* Russian majority in Eastern Ukraine do not want to remain subordinated to Ukrainian nationalism. Despite that, the survival of separatism in Eastern Ukraine cannot be achieved without the necessary level of support coming from Russia. The armed resistance of separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine would be limited to partisan warfare if Moscow cut support to them.

Because the separatists are desperately dependent on Russian support, the independence and the genuineness of their views, actions, and even achievements are questionable. The separatist leaders are subordinated to the leaders of the Russian state, even if they deny that. Otherwise – assuming a genuine separatist leadership – it is unexplainable why both Minsk agreements⁵ were signed when separatists were advancing, achieving a chain of serious military victories. We need to note that separatist independence from Kiev is an unfinished business because many cities in Donetsk and Lugansk regions are still under the control of Kiev. Winners do not normally sign peace agreements when the objectives of the war have not yet been achieved. It would be a waste of historical opportunities to allow the losing side to regroup, to replace losses, to build new frontlines in strategic directions to support future offensive or defensive operations.

Separatist leaders sign peace deals containing unfavourable conditions for them (such as removing all illegal weaponry and military formations from separatist controlled areas, handing back to Kiev the control of the borders with Russia etc.) because they are instructed by Moscow to do so. Moscow’s expectations and calculations override genuine separatist interests, at least in the short and medium terms. In the long term however, separatist interests coincide with Russian interests.

⁵ Minsk-1 and Minsk-2.

FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS WITH THE WESTERN AND UKRAINIAN EVALUATION OF THE CRISIS

The official Western analysis of the crisis in Ukraine can often seem to be objective or fair for Western or Ukrainian nationalist readers when it comes to the interpretation and evaluation of Russian views and actions in Ukraine. Western official positions and the Western mainstream media clearly and consequently reject Russian policies in most of the cases. Russian official views and actions can normally not be accepted as understandable, even when it comes to secondary or less important topics such as whether the “donation” of Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) by Hruschov within the framework of the then Soviet Union complied with historical and contemporary Soviet legal requirements. It is deliberately ignored by the West that such “donations” resulting in changing internal administrative borders within the Soviet Union were incomparably less important than the changes that came later, after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the resulting birth of independent nation states.

The Western tenacity in support of former, internal Soviet administrative borders universally accepted by international law as borders of states, becomes ever more absurd in the case of South-Ossetia in Georgia. The rejection of the mere possibility of Ossetian unification⁶ means that *the West defends Stalinist Soviet administrative borders against Russia*. This is so *absurd* that western policy makers carefully avoid this topic.

Most Western policies do not allow agreement with any Russian positions touching upon serious issues. Such policies are intentionally based on a denial of basic facts, such as the fact that the democratically elected former Ukrainian president, Mr. *Janukovich* was *violently overthrown by radical nationalists, where neo-fascist armed gangs played an essential role* with far reaching consequences. These radicals were armed, trained, integrated into military formations and later sent to fight at the Eastern Front to confront fighters and more importantly even civilians that have a Russian identity. It is unquestionable that arming, training, and organising radicals into military formations creates enormous national security threats for any state, even for *failed states*. I believe that Ukraine is one of them.

It is not allowed either to acknowledge in official Western positions that the nationalist and violent takeover of power in Kiev in 2014 has been extensively and actively supported by the West, especially by the US. Western plans and activities to prepare such events stretch back far before the events on the Maidan. *Western politicians travelled to the Maidan* and made speeches to show their *direct* support, which would normally constitute a direct intervention into the internal politics of any independent nation state. Amongst them were US senator, Mr. John McCain and “*Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Victoria Nuland, who pushed for the Ukraine coup and helped pick the post-coup leaders*”⁷

⁶ This could be the unification of North-Ossetia (that is part of Russian Federation) and South-Ossetia (that is part of Georgia according to the internationally recognised state borders). However, South-Ossetia is *de facto* an independent state due to Russian recognition, legal guaranties and military presence. South-Ossetia is hardly a truly independent state, being heavily dependent on Russia. South-Ossetia is increasingly integrated into the Russian Federation.

⁷ Robert Parry: Nuland’s Mastery of Ukraine Propaganda, Global Research, March 16, 2015, 2. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/nulands-mastery-of-ukraine-propaganda/5436995> (Accessed: 30. 03. 2015.)

The Ukrainian non-governmental organisations received extensive financial and other support from the West. Western secret services undoubtedly supported the opposition of former Ukrainian president Janukovich, but this is probably the easiest to deny by Western powers.

The West also conveniently forgets the resolution of the European Parliament on 13 December 2012, according to which: “[...](the European Parliament is – the auth.) *concerned about the rising nationalistic sentiment in Ukraine, expressed in support for the Svoboda Party, which, as a result, is one of the two new parties to enter the Verkhovna Rada; recalls that racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic views go against the EU’s fundamental values and principles and therefore appeals to pro-democratic parties in the Verkhovna Rada not to associate with, endorse or form coalitions with this party.*”⁸ Since the resolution of the EP, far more radical and violent political parties than the Svoboda Party – for example the Right Sector, etc. – have appeared, gained public support and even seats in the Verkhovna Rada in Ukraine. For these reasons, the message of the resolution of the EP mentioned above should be far more important today than ever. However, current Western policies deny that. Furthermore, the official policies of NATO and the EU would suggest the nonexistence of this resolution, leading to the conclusion that the West suffers from *deliberate “amnesia”* in political terms.

Official Western policies also ignore that the Ukrainian far right uses openly fascist symbols, such as that of *the former German SS divisions* on the Eastern Front in World War II.⁹ This case and several other examples show Western intentions to whitewash Kiev and also the extent of double standards the West applies in Ukraine.

The biggest Russian minority outside Russia, consisting of approximately *ten million Russian people*, lives in Ukraine. „*The most numerous ethnic minority are Russians (17% of Ukraine’s population), followed in decreasing order of their numbers by Belarusians, Crimean Tatars, Moldovans, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Poles, Jews etc.*”¹⁰ For such reasons the forced “Ukrainisation” that is promoted by radical Ukrainian nationalists in power could easily become similar to a “*Russian Trianon*”, if such Ukrainian policies are also supported by the West and unsuccessfully countered by Russia. Of course, the term of “*Russian Trianon*” has never appeared in official NATO, EU, OSCE or UN documents.

„*A central piece of the West’s false narrative on the Ukraine crisis has been that Russian President Vladimir Putin “invaded” Crimea and then staged a “sham” referendum purporting to show 96 percent support for leaving Ukraine and rejoining Russia. More recently, Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland claimed that Putin has subjected Crimea to a “reign of terror”. Both elements have been part of the “group think” that dominates U.S. political and media circles, but this propagandistic storyline simply isn’t true, especially the part about the Crimeans being subjugated by Russia.*”¹¹

The West holds to the denial of *classic war crimes committed by mainly Ukrainian armed radicals and even the Ukrainian military*. This topic is considered to be a taboo

⁸ European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2012 on the situation in Ukraine. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-0507+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (Accessed: 29. 03. 2015.)

⁹ Robert Parry: The New York Times Whites Out Ukraine’s Brown Shirts, Global Research, February 11, 2015. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-new-york-times-whites-out-ukraines-brown-shirts/5430716> (Accessed: 29. 03. 2015.)

¹⁰ Vil Bakirov: The study of ethnic minorities in Ukraine (Poles and Hungarians in Ukraine). 2014, 1.

¹¹ Robert Parry: Crimeans Keep Saying No to Ukraine, Global Research, March 24, 2015, . <http://www.globalresearch.ca/crimeans-keep-saying-no-to-ukraine/5438563> (Accessed: 29. 03. 2015.)

in the Western World, where public opinion gets limited access to such information. The methods of the violent takeover of power at the Maidan have already provided examples of classic war crimes. The Western way of handling the “sniper story” during the violent events at the Maidan is a perfect example of Western double standards. The leaked telephone conversation between the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs and EU High Representative has provided frightening details about the fact that the *same* snipers shot dead Ukrainian civilians protesting against Janukovich, and the policemen defending the former Ukrainian president. The conversation was (most probably) leaked by the Russian secret services and the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs *officially confirmed its authenticity* later on. “*The recording of a telephone conversation between Foreign Minister Urmas Paet and High Representative Catherine Ashton that has been leaked online is authentic.*”¹²

The Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs can hardly be called “pro-Russian” by reasonable analysts. The concerns of the Estonian minister were related to the possibly *disastrous* political fallout of the sniper incident capable of *entirely* delegitimizing the new government in Kiev. What makes it worse is that the shots of the snipers came from the headquarters building of the Maidan revolution, with the knowledge and at least tacit support of the commander, Mr. Parubij, who later assumed the position of the Head of the National Security and Defence Committee in the Verkhovna Rada. Thus he was assigned to a highly sensitive position from the Ukrainian national security point of view. The pro-Maidan Ukrainian civilians shot dead – not the police officers! – have become “heroes” according to the official Ukrainian propaganda. The Ukrainian government made several desperate attempts to destroy all evidence of the sniper actions. An example was the destruction of all the trees holding sniper bullets, thereby making it impossible for independent experts to make appropriate investigations. These war crimes have been widely published by mainstream Russian media¹³, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹⁴ etc.

Since the intensification of the armed conflict in Ukraine – which undeniably possesses the characteristics of civil war, since mainly Ukrainian citizens fight fellow Ukrainians – *a long chain of classic war crimes has been “accomplished” by both of the opposing parties*, especially in Eastern Ukraine. The Russian and the pro-Russian separatist media are full of the documentation of war crimes committed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which Western officials refuse to notice. It is safe to conclude that *there is no civil war in the world where opposing parties do not commit classic war crimes*. There are reports of shelling of civilian infrastructure and civilians themselves, virtually on a daily basis¹⁵, even after the signature of the Minsk-2 agreement. Some of them could be “errors” or “accidents”, but – based on the intentions and the number of incidents – the majority of war crimes are committed on purpose. Kiev and *the West blame exclusively the pro-Russian separatists and Moscow, without the minimum level of objectivity*. This is unfortunately quite understandable, since

¹² Statement by the Press Department of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the telephone conversation between Foreign Minister Paet and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton, 5 March, 2014. <http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/19353> (Accessed: 29.03.2015.)

¹³ Recent Ukraine human rights violations released in ‘White Book’ report. <http://rt.com/politics/170148-russia-ukraine-white-book/> (Accessed: 29.03.2015.)

¹⁴ ‘White Book’ on violations of human rights and the rule of law in Ukraine. <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-dgpch.nsf/03c344d01162d351442579510044415b/38fa8597760acc2144257ccf002beeb8!OpenDocument> (Accessed: 29.03.2015.)

¹⁵ e. g. Laura Smith-Spark – Khushbu Shah – Jason Hanna, CNN: Civilians increasingly under fire as Ukraine devastation grows. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/03/world/ukraine-fighting/> (Accessed: 29.03.2015.)

the admission that Kiev commits war crimes on an industrial scale would not only undermine the image of the new power in Kiev, but also Western public opinion's support for pro-Kiev policies, including sanctions against Russia.

The government of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada have extremely problematic views when branding the separatists in Eastern Ukraine simply as "terrorists", when calling the operations in Eastern Ukraine "antiterrorist operations" etc. This branding is fully supported by NATO and EU policies. It is a very comfortable position from Kiev's point of view since there is no need for any arguments, whether the cause of the "terrorists" is justifiable or not, whether there should be negotiations with the "terrorists" or not, etc. If somebody insists on a Russian national identity and fights Ukrainian nationalism with weapons, that should not automatically make that person a "terrorist", even though that person would thus act against the will of the current power in Kiev. According to universal logic, there should be no negotiation with terrorists, terrorist's arguments should not be taken seriously, their liquidation is necessary... These views can lead to the conclusion that the majority of the ten million Russians in Ukraine that support the political and military goals of the pro-Russian separatists, can (or even should) be eliminated, jailed and deprived of minority rights without any limits or restrictions.

There is a need to formulate a policy based on principles regarding terrorism. In this case, at least two important questions would arise: "*where are the boundaries of terrorism?*" and "*who should be considered a terrorist?*". Those Ukrainian citizens who have a Russian identity and fight the Ukrainian Armed Forces with weapons are branded as "terrorists" by Kiev and the Western World. Those Russian citizens who fight with weapons on the side of pro-Russian separatists can also be called "terrorists". The question becomes difficult when we try to brand Russian Regular Armed Forces in Eastern Ukraine as terrorists. If they are terrorists, then the Russian state itself is also a terrorist. Interestingly, on the official maps of the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council, portraying the status of the "Antiterrorist Operations" in Eastern Ukraine openly for the public, terrorists and Russian Regular Armed Forces are clearly distinguished.

Further questions would arise. Do we call "terrorists" those Russian regular military personnel, who lack a means of identification (badges, IDs etc.)? "Yes" would be a logical answer. I personally doubt that there is a significant presence of Russian regular military personnel in Ukraine that can easily be identified, because they wear Russian uniforms with badges etc. It would contradict Russian policies on hybrid warfare, where ambiguity and deniability are key to success.

The bottom line is that if we come up with the idea, that *the Russian state itself is a terrorist that would have far-reaching consequences that are disastrous for international security and the contemporary world order.*

THE CONDITIONS OF A FROZEN CONFLICT: CALM BEFORE STORM?

The full realisation of the Minsk-2 agreement, also suiting Kiev's additional conditions that are subject to debate by pro-Russian forces and the Kremlin itself, assume the total capitulation of Russia. If all illegal fighters and weaponry are removed from areas currently controlled by the pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian state regains full and effective control over the borders between Russia, Donetsk and Lugansk regions, Russia would lose the possibility to effectively support the separatists. Allowing this would equal to Moscow's *capitulation* in favour of Kiev and the Western World generally. Since Russia is not prepared to do this, the failure of Minsk-2 agreement is very likely and a future escalation of the war is probable.

RUSSIAN ACTIONS TO CHALLENGE THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY COURSE OF UKRAINE

Russian support for the separatists in Eastern Ukraine is carefully “masked” and officially denied by Moscow. There is enough Russian support for the separatists in Eastern Ukraine to create conditions where the location of the frontline is primarily a question of political decisions by Moscow. This contradicts the positions of both Kiev and the separatists that imply that their own military achievements are the driving force in the war in Eastern Ukraine.

The Russian actions to protect real or anticipated Russian national interests have provided several unexpected elements and characteristics that were not foreseen by Western decision makers. The Russians have been using methods of hybrid warfare successfully enough to get full control over Crimea without confronting any significant resistance from the Ukrainian military. This effectiveness surprised and alarmed the West and made the weakness of Ukraine obvious when confronting Russia.

The Russian implementation of hybrid warfare and their achievements could encourage the countries of the post-Soviet space to accept Russian leadership (dominance) and to take part in the Russian-led integration process. On the other hand, a successful Russian implementation of hybrid warfare also provides deterrence against the West.

The settlement of the Ukrainian crisis would provide a “bill” for the winner, whoever the winner was. *Even though the West has greater economic capabilities than Russia, the Eastern integration of Ukraine is incomparably cheaper than the Western.* According to some experts, the Ukrainian adoption of European standards that would allow Ukraine to produce goods for Europe would cost *USD150 billion*. This is a sum that would not be paid by either Ukraine or the West in the foreseeable future. This means that even if Ukraine integrated into the West, economically it would not be an equal partner, rather a consumer market.

POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE

There is no foreseeable chance for a rapid settlement of the crisis in Ukraine even if the nationalist government fails (or is overthrown) and/or Western and Russian foreign and security policies change substantially. If the nationalist government in Kiev were overthrown, it is unclear which political forces would prevail. It could result in more radicalism in Kiev leading to a confrontation with Russia that would likely to meet an ever-harder Russian policy confronting the ambitions of Kiev. If eventually a pro-Moscow government comes to power in Kiev, it is also unclear how much stability and prosperity would follow in the short and medium term.

Ukraine cannot resolve the crisis politically, economically and – least of all – by military means. Despite very significant Western political support and far less extensive economic and military support the resources at the disposal of Kiev to fight Moscow’s will are very limited. The Western lack of cohesion and slow decision-making mechanisms combined with requirements for consensus strengthens the perspectives of the promotion of Russian national interests.

THE MOST PROBABLE OUTCOMES OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE, CONCLUSIONS

Ukraine has become a conflict zone between the West and Russia resulting in disastrous consequences for Ukrainian society. The roots of the conflict stretch far beyond Ukrainian national intentions. It is a conflict between the Western World and Russia, where European, Russian, and Ukrainian interests are jeopardized mostly for the benefit of US foreign policy goals. The US plays an essential role in the Western attempt to remove Ukraine entirely from the Russian sphere of influence.

It is unlikely that Russia will abandon her foreign and security policy goals of getting Ukraine back into the Russian orbit or at least forcing Ukraine to serve as a “buffer zone” between Russia and the West. Ukraine is *unable* to resolve the crisis based on her own power and is *unfit* to become a member of the EU or NATO.

There are two most probable outcomes of the crisis in Ukraine. *Most probably* the Ukrainian state will go bankrupt and living standards will deteriorate unbearably. This would undermine the credibility of any pro-Western government that would be sooner or later overthrown. Radicals could come to power, but they will not be able to solve the basic problems of the Ukrainian society. Rather, they would worsen the conditions in Ukraine, thereby destroying their own social basis.

The West will be both unwilling and unable to provide sufficient support to Ukraine to make sure that Ukraine does not return into the Russian orbit. Thus later on, a pro-Russian government would come to power, and Russia would make Ukrainian integration into the Eurasian Union a “one way street”. Keep in mind that Ukraine is more important for Russia than for the West.

The second of the two most probable options is that the West would provide “just enough” financial resources to avoid the total bankruptcy of the Ukrainian state. This would be enough to keep pro-Western governments in power, but it would not be enough to create a prosperous economy in Ukraine. If it lasts for too long, Russia would take what she can, and the rest of Ukraine would struggle to survive as a “no man’s land”, since Ukraine would be still unfit to join the EU or NATO.

The crisis will most likely permanently damage Western-Russian relations and will fulfil Russian expectations regarding the future status of Ukraine.

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Lt. Dávid Vogel:

NATO'S KOSOVO FORCE MISSION IN TRANSITION: FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER THE DEPLOYMENT PAST EXPERIENCES, FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

ABSTRACT: Following the reports of international and non-governmental organisations on the situation in Kosovo in 1999, the violence, the ethnic cleansing and the mass migration, forced the international community to respond. The deployment of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) was the right answer in the right time. But circumstances have changed during the bit more than one and a half decades: Kosovo is a self-proclaimed sovereign state but KFOR troops are still on the ground. The paper's aim is to give a summary of the events and to make suggestions for the years to come, as well as for the future of the mission.

KEYWORDS: Kosovo, KFOR, NATO, Balkans, Yugoslavia, Hungarian Defence Forces

"NACHRICHT"

The following study was written by a security and defence policy expert and was not meant in any way to reflect on or analyse the legal aspects of the status of Kosovo or the international documents that were adopted by various parties in the matter. The focus is merely on the role of NATO's Kosovo Force.

The sovereignty of the State of Kosovo was recognised by Hungary on March 18, 2008,¹ so Kosovo might be regarded as such.

POWDER KEG OF EUROPE

When discussing the current situation in the Balkans, it is needless to say that it all started centuries ago. First of all, for a better understanding of the situation, in order to have a clearer picture of what Kosovo was put to during the centuries, here is a short overview of how the status of this small, only 10,908 square kilometres of land changed in the course of time.²

According to historians, the recorded history of the area started when today's Kosovo was part of the Serbian Empire of the Nemanjic Dynasty in the 12th century. The next important episode is the renowned Battle of Kosovo of 1389 that brought changes to the area that can be sensed clearly more than 600 years later. The ethnic and religious proportionality of the entire region was altered by this event. Regarding these aspects nothing significant happened during the next more than half a millennium, only in 1912, when the Ottoman Empire was defeated in the First Balkans War and the western part of the territory, Metohija, became part

¹ Government Resolution 2034/2008. (III. 19.) on recognizing the Republic of Kosovo and on establishing diplomatic relations (in Hungarian). In: *Határozatok Tára* 2008/12, 90. <http://www.kozlonyok.hu/kozlonyok/Kozlonyok/10/PDF/2008/12.pdf> (Accessed: 02. 06. 2015.)

² http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/mobile/europe/country_profiles/3550401.stm (Accessed: 02. 06. 2015.)

of the Kingdom of Montenegro and the eastern part became Serbian territory. The change was recognised by the Treaty of London in 1913, then five years later the areas were united again as part of the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later called Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This lasted till 1941, when Kosovo became part of Albania, protectorate of Italy at that time. Merely five years later, Kosovo was taken into the newly coined Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. During the first almost two decades (1946-63) the province was named the Autonomous District of Kosovo and Metohija, with a limited level of self-government, from 1963 to 1974 the province was granted equal status with Vojvodina, and thus was named the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija. The year of 1974 brought significant changes: both Vojvodina and Kosovo were granted increased autonomy, and parallel to this Kosovo's official name was changed to the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. However, the reforms lasted for fifteen years and during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the constitution was reversed and the province was restored to its 1963-self.³ In return to this, Kosovo Albanian leaders declared independence in 1990. As a reaction, Belgrade disbanded the Kosovo government.

In the year following the independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia in 1991, war broke out in the Balkans and the Ibrahim Rugova-led self-proclaimed state started facing increasing ethnic tensions and an armed conflict, especially from March till September of 1998 when Serbian police forces clashed with the Kosovo Liberation Army. That was the moment when the attention of the international community was drawn to the conflict. The result of the massive exodus and the killings was that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation gave an ultimatum to Belgrade to stop its hostile actions. After the failure of the internationally-brokered peace talks in March 1999, NATO started launching air strikes against Yugoslavia for a period of 78 days (March 24, 1999 – June 10, 1999). The very same day, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, by 14 votes to none against, with only China abstaining.⁴ This document gave birth to NATO's Kosovo Force that is still in operation.

THE MANDATE

When discussing KFOR, especially its fate, one needs to familiarize with its mandate first. As it was evoked in the 8-page long resolution, the *primary responsibility of the Security Council is the maintenance of international peace and security*.⁵

The document – stating that *there has not been full compliance with the requirements of previous resolutions such as UN SC Resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, UN SC Resolution 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, UN SC Resolution 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and UN SC Resolution 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999* – specified the tasks and the actors for the solution of the crisis in Kosovo. The Resolution, having been enacted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, made it mandatory and legally enforceable.

The firm *determination to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced*

³ Independent International Commission on Kosovo: The Kosovo report: conflict, international response, lessons learned. New York, USA, Oxford University Press, 2000, 35–36.

⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, 1999. <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/3610039.05534744.html> (Accessed: 02. 06. 2015.)

⁵ Ibid.

persons to their homes, in order to avoid the deterioration of the situation and a threat to international peace and security in the greater region required a strong military presence from the international community. In order to achieve these goals, the UN Security Council decided on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required.

Under Point 9, the document clearly described the “responsibilities of the international security presence:

(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations.”⁶

In Point 4, Annex 2, the document – in my opinion to strengthen the commitment of the United Nations – is more precise and identifies NATO as the key player of the military involvement, as well as highlights its authorization: “the international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.”⁷

Also a very important part of the document is Annex 1 that contains the *Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers*⁸ held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999.

“The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ The Statement adopted by the foreign ministers of France, the United States of America, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada and Russia was sent to the UN Security Council Permanent Member China as well. <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/foreign/fm990506.htm> (Accessed: 03. 06. 2015.)

- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
- *The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;*
- *A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;*
- *Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.”*

The parts quoted literally or contentwise are the ones that constitute the military or security aspects of the document and the international military involvement, giving the authority and the framework for KFOR activities in the region.

Originally, the mandate and the authority for *the international civil and security presences were established for an initial period of 12 months, but to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise.*⁹

KFOR ON THE GROUND

When discussing KFOR, especially the early phase of the operation, another document needs to be mentioned. Even though the mandate of KFOR was granted by the UN Security Council by its Resolution on June 10, 1999, the talks between the parties were already ongoing about the details and the technicalities of the expected document. This is the reason why the Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia¹⁰ was signed on June 9, 1999, a day before the UN SC Resolution.

The Agreement outlined KFOR’s very first tasks in fulfilling its mandate, by defining the Air Safety Zone (ASZ),¹¹ the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ)¹² and other technical details of the demilitarization after the Entry into Force Day (EIF Day).¹³ Meeting the regulations laid down in the UN SC Resolution and the Agreement, the withdrawal of Serbian forces had been accomplished by June 20, 1999.

⁹ This type of legislation is quite unique in the history of the United Nations, usually the mandate is given for a set period and the decision of the renewal is the responsibility of the UN Security Council. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, 1999. <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/3610039.05534744.html> (Accessed: 02. 06. 2015.)

¹⁰ <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm> (Accessed: 03. 06. 2015.)

¹¹ A 25-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. It includes the airspace above that 25-kilometre zone. <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm> (Accessed: 03. 06. 2015.)

¹² A 5-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. It includes the terrain within that 5-kilometre zone. <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm> (Accessed: 03. 06. 2015.)

¹³ Considering the nature of the listed tasks, all of them were carried out immediately, so the Agreement has no real relevance for KFOR’s operations sixteen years after its deployment.

As it is stated on the website of the transatlantic Alliance, KFOR's original objectives were¹⁴ to:

1. deter renewed hostilities,
2. establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order,
3. demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army,
4. support the international humanitarian effort,
5. coordinate with the international civil presence.

The particular tasks were then also defined¹⁵ including:

1. the assistance with the return or relocation of displaced persons and refugees;
2. reconstruction and de-mining;
3. medical assistance;
4. security and public order;
5. protection of patrimonial sites;
6. border security;
7. interdiction of cross-border weapons smuggling;
8. implementation of a Kosovo-wide weapons, ammunition and explosives amnesty programme;
9. weapons destruction;
10. support for the establishment of civil institutions, law and order, the judicial and penal system, the electoral process and other aspects of the political, economic and social life of Kosovo.
11. special attention to the protection of minorities, including regular patrols near minority enclaves, checkpoints, escorts for minority groups, protection of heritage sites such as monasteries, and donations including food, clothes and school supplies.

This more detailed list of duties meant that even though several international – and non-governmental organisations were present and operating in Kosovo – the biggest ones namely the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),¹⁶ etc. – KFOR was – directly or indirectly – involved in almost all the areas of life and had a very extensive set of tasks.

At the deployment KFOR was originally composed of around 50,000 people from 36 countries, NATO members, partner countries and other non-NATO states. The units subordinated to the KFOR Commander were grouped into four Multinational Brigades (MNBs) and stationed in bases and camps throughout Kosovo.¹⁷ This structure then changed to five Multinational Task Forces (MNTFs) in June 2006.¹⁸ In February 2010, Multinational

¹⁴ http://nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (Accessed: 21. 05. 2015.)

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement was engaged in providing emergency and help for victims of the conflict. National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies from 12 countries were involved originally, along with the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Movement activities were co-ordinated by the International Committee of the Red Cross. ICRC, Red Cross and Red Crescent activities in Kosovo. <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jr55.htm> (Accessed: 03. 06. 2015.)

¹⁷ Namely MNB East, MNB Centre, MNB Northeast, MNB Southwest. NATO's role in Kosovo http://www.nato.int/summit2009/topics_en/04-kosovo.html (Accessed: 03. 06. 2015.)

¹⁸ Namely MNTF Centre, MNTF North, MNTF South, MNTF West, MNTF East. http://www.nato.int/summit2009/topics_en/04-kosovo.html (Accessed: 03. 06. 2015.)

Battle Groups (MNBGs) were formed with the same geographical distribution. These units operated until October 2010 when they merged into today's MNBG East and MNBG West.¹⁹ However, due to operational effectiveness the MNBGs are no longer regionally limited, they have no fixed areas of responsibility. Under the order of the KFOR Commander they can be deployed anywhere in Kosovo.

The violent events of March 2004 also shaped the structure of KFOR. The worst clashes between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians since the start of the mission had started in a still unclear situation in the divided town of Mitrovica and truly surprised the KFOR troops and the command as well. During the disturbance, around two dozens of civilians were killed, thousands of ethnic Serbs were forced to leave their homes, approximately 1,000 buildings, including private houses, public facilities and even Serbian Orthodox church buildings were damaged or destroyed, towns and villages were ethnically cleansed.²⁰ The lessons learned after the sudden escalation of the conflict made KFOR re-evaluate its structure and establish so-called Joint Regional Detachments responsible for liaising and monitoring their respective municipalities in order to have better situational awareness for the military decision makers. The initially five JRDs merged into JRD Centre, JRD North and JRD South in October 2013.²¹

At present, KFOR consists of two MNBGs, three JRDs and a Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU), a Gendarmerie Force and a KFOR Tactical Reserve Manoeuvre Battalion (KTM) the latter two responsible for patrols as well as crowd and riot control (CRC).

Not only violence, but also the assistance in development transformed KFOR. On June 12, 2008, the North Atlantic Alliance agreed to start implementing additional tasks in Kosovo, which included:

1. assisting the stand-down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),
2. helping stand up of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF),
3. establishing a civil-led body to supervise the Kosovo Security Force.²²

These new responsibilities of KFOR were all in connection with the self-defence of Kosovo, the meanwhile self-proclaimed²³ and partially recognised sovereign state.²⁴ The reason for this was complex, the Kosovo Protection Corps was considered as a transitional post-conflict solution. It had a mandate only to provide disaster-response duties, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance in remote areas, support in de-mining and contribute to rebuilding infrastructure. However, it had only very limited capabilities, regarding both its human resources and its technical equipment. In order to have a modern and more capable force fundamental reforms were needed: in January 2009, KPC ceased its operational activities and was formally dissolved on June 14, 2009. At the same time, the Kosovo Security Force was established to maintain key capabilities available for emergency situations.

This move created the need for NATO's help in advising so the NATO Liaison and Advisory Team (NLAT) and the NATO Advisory Team (NAT) were set up in order to fulfil this task.

¹⁹ <http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor/library/facts-figures.aspx> (Accessed: 03. 06. 2015.)

²⁰ Kosovo clashes 'ethnic cleansing'. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3551571.stm> (Accessed: 03. 06. 2015.)

²¹ Samantha PARKS: Multinational Battle Group – East (KFOR). <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/119365/jrd-e-jrd-s-conduct-merger-ceremony#VW8Mw9IcTOg> (Accessed: 03. 06. 2015.)

²² http://nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (Accessed: 21. 05. 2015.)

²³ Kosovo Declaration of Independence. <http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635> (Accessed: 04. 06. 2015.)

²⁴ All NATO members recognise the State of Kosovo except Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com> (Accessed: 03. 06. 2015.)

The new force was to meet three criteria and be professional, multi-ethnic and controlled by civilians. The team helped set up and train this lightly armed volunteer force, with duties like security tasks that are not suitable for the police, emergency response, explosive ordnance disposal, management of hazardous material, firefighting and civil protection. The recruitment that started on January 21 2009, focused strongly on ethnic proportionality. The initial operational capability was reached only eight months later, with approximately 1,500 personnel; then full operational capability was declared by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on July 9, 2013,²⁵ with around 2,200 personnel. The KSF's total strength is limited to a maximum of 2,500 active personnel and 800 reservists. The NLAT, established in July 2013, with approximately 35 advisors was to mentor KSF at brigade level and above, focusing on staff capacity-building and training.²⁶ However, the overall setting up of a military force under NATO auspices needed more than just meeting the training regulations and other standards of the transatlantic Alliance, the control of this armed organisation had to meet NATO standards as well, meaning that the force had to have a civil body with all the authorisation to have full control over it. This environment was established with the help of the NAT.




Figure 1: Number of KFOR troops

However, KFOR not only took up but handed over tasks as well. The improving security situation set the ground for the so-called unfixing process. Historic and religious sites with exceptional importance, called Properties with Designated Special Status (PrDSS) that had been guarded by KFOR troops, were gradually handed over to Kosovo Police. By late 2013, such monuments included the Gazimestan Monument, Gracanica Monastery, Zociste Monastery, Budisavci Monastery, Gorioc Monastery, the Archangel site, Devic Monastery, and the Pec Patriarchate.²⁷ Today, only the Decani Monastery is under KFOR protection.²⁸

These structural transformations and the changes in the tasks can be followed in the figures of the troops as well, all influenced by the security situation of the Area of Responsibility.

²⁵ NATO Secretary General statement on Kosovo Security Force reaching Full Operational Capability http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_101882.htm?selectedLocale=en (Accessed: 04. 06. 2015.)

²⁶ NATO's role in Kosovo http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (Accessed: 04. 06. 2015.)

²⁷ NATO's role in Kosovo. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (Accessed: 04. 06. 2015.)

²⁸ Kosovo: A bridge for people. <http://aco.nato.int/kfor/news-room/articles/kosovo-a-bridge-for-people.aspx> (Accessed: 22. 05. 2015.)

As shown on the diagram below, as of May 2015, KFOR's total strength is 4,687 people, from 31 troop contributing nations, including 10 non-NATO members.²⁹

FROM DEPLOYMENT TO EXIT: STAGES OF THE MISSION

After the deployment of KFOR, the international force started actively participating in shaping the security environment and bringing peace and stability to the region. This early stage was called Focused Engagement. After carrying out certain assigned tasks and thanks to the positive changes of the security situation of the Area of Responsibility, KFOR achieved a milestone and transitioned from Focused Engagement to the next phase of the operation called Deterrent Presence, on August 7, 2009.³⁰ The reduction of troops continued as the security environment improved and on January 31, 2010, KFOR had successfully achieved the so-called Gate 1, reducing the number of troops on the ground to around 10,200. The further move to Gate 2, with the total of approximately 5,000 troops was authorised by the North Atlantic Council on October 29, 2010. Gate 2 then was declared on February 28, 2011.³¹ This is the current situation, the next stage before the last phase of the mission, the Minimum Presence, is Gate 3, then eventually, this will be followed by the exit.

So far all the above were facts. Facts grouped and analysed but they all represent the past. So the real question is, when is Gate 3 coming? What is needed to make that move and even further: what kind of future does KFOR have?

In my opinion, there are at least two ways to answer these questions. One is maybe more exact: an analysis of the tasks given in its mandate and KFOR's own mission tasks and objectives that were mentioned previously. The latter ones of course are based on the mandate, they are only more precise. The 24, oftentimes overlapping, responsibilities are mostly particular enough to decide whether they should still be considered valid or maybe just partially valid, or not valid at all. Reading through the list, in my opinion, none of the mentioned points are 100 per cent of concern in 2015. Those that can be partially justified are providing safe and secure environment and the freedom of movement. Looking back at the history of Kosovo, the unfortunate events of 2004 and the clashes after the proclamation of independence in 2008³² can be mentioned as the only "large-scale" events that eventually needed more than the use of a regular police force. Regarding the issue of freedom of movement, roadblocks might also be brought up, however, these – at least in my opinion – do not pose a threat for the local communities and can be taken care of easily if carried out in a well-planned manner. It also needs to be mentioned that these roadblocks do not mean that certain areas, villages cannot be accessed at all: it is only true from a certain direction, but do not mean a complete blocking, like in the well-known case in Kosovska Mitrovica where Austerlitz Bridge³³ was blocked by concrete and other heavy obstacles for many years

²⁹ http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_05/20150508_1505-kfor-placemat.pdf (Accessed: 03. 06. 2015.)

³⁰ Leonard Philippe: The General Officer's Perspective. In KFOR Chronicle December 7, 2009, 2. http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/site7423/general/chronicle%20archive/2009/chronicle_11.pdf (Accessed: 03. 06. 2015.)

³¹ NATO's role in Kosovo. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (Accessed: 04. 06. 2015.)

³² In March 2008, following the proclamation of independence by Pristina, Serbian protesters seized the UN courthouse in Kosovska Mitrovica, injuring more than 100 people when clashing with UN and NATO forces, killing a UN police officer. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/mobile/europe/country_profiles/3550401.stm (Accessed: 09. 06. 2015.)

³³ Also known as New Bridge, Mitrovica Bridge, Ibar Bridge.

making it impossible to cross from one side to the other even for military vehicles. This could have been seen as a violation of the freedom of movement, however the other bridges were adequate to serve the locals of the city and the incoming traffic as well. An interesting fact is, that even though the roadblock was removed by KFOR, the “obstacle” is still there: a garden was planted on the day following the removal.³⁴

Naturally, when reading bi-weekly or monthly reports of KFOR, especially if they are about certain periods of the year, like the holiday season around Christmas (according to the traditions of the Serbian Orthodox Church) or in June around Vidovdan / Saint Vitus Day, the documents can report about minor clashes, usually verbal attacks or stone throwing. The days throughout the year look quite monotonous: calm and stable, as mentioned in official documents.

Even though Liaison Monitoring Teams (LMTs) – subordinate units of the JRDs – oftentimes report about mass protests or marches, even temporary roadblocks, almost all of these occasions are in connection with a local problem, like shortage of electricity, inadequate housing, or corruption, and have nothing to do with ethnic or religious tensions.

This example takes us to the other way of answering the above put questions. LMT’s, “the eyes and ears of KFOR” as they are often referred to, are in close connection with the local population. According to their key leader engagement matrix,³⁵ they regularly meet and negotiate with formal and informal leaders, important members of the communities, minorities, religious groups and, of course, everyday people as well, which is summarized in a report at the end of the day. Depending on their Area of Responsibility, they mostly write about usual events, the flow of life, and sometimes about illegal activities. However, these activities – to a certain extent due to changes in KFOR’s role – are none of KFOR’s concern: trafficking and smuggling of different materials such as fuel, tobacco, perfume, wood or even cattle in the municipalities close to the Approximate Border Line (ABL), illegal wood-cutting, illegal arms possession or illegal border-crossing. Today, these are the responsibilities of the Kosovo Police (KP), the Kosovo Border Police (KBP) and with the EULEX on stage since February 16, 2008,³⁶ KFOR is only the third responder.

So, bearing these factors in mind, is there really a need for a force of almost 5,000 people in Kosovo?

To be more precise in the answer, the country can be separated into different areas: problematic ones and non-problematic ones. The current JRD structure in a way reflects this point of view, since with the merges of the previous five JRDs, now we can talk about JRD South and JRD Centre as non-problematic ones, and only JRD North with all the municipalities with ethnic or religious tensions. In this respect, could or should KFOR be transformed in both its structure and locations? In my opinion the answer to both of the questions is a definite yes. Especially, if we keep in mind that in accordance with the plans 90 days after Gate 3 is achieved, Camp Bondsteel, the headquarters of Multinational Battle Group East, the largest US military installation on the Balkans is subject to close.

³⁴ Mitrovica, Northern Kosovo: after three years the barricade on the ‘Austerlitz’ bridge has been removed. <http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor/news-room/press-releases/mitrovica-northern-kosovo-after-three-years-the-barricade-on-the-austerlitz-bridge-has-been-removed.aspx> (Accessed: 05. 06. 2015.)

³⁵ The Key Leader Engagement matrix (KLE matrix) is a set of data organised according to levels of authority both in KFOR and with the local authorities, religious entities, informal leaders, etc. in order to have counterparts for the different levels of KFOR leaders for their negotiations.

³⁶ http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/AE20150403_FactSheet2.1.pdf (Accessed: 05. 06. 2015.)

Without the intention of wanting to be too provocative, can we suppose that two regions, the current Area of Responsibility of JRD North and the rest merging into one area (the current JRD Centre and JRD South) could satisfy the needs? In order to avoid any sudden deterioration of the current, mostly calm and stable security situation the LMT structure should stay the same for the near future, however, the concept should be altered in a way and Troop Contributing Nations would need to install Field Houses instead of Field Offices³⁷ or being totally behind the fences of KFOR camps.

As of today, the three Joint Regional Detachments consist of 29 LMTs with 317 personnel from 10 Troop Contributing Nations, being responsible for a total of 38 municipalities. Although the dimensions of the municipalities and thus of the LMTs are quite different regarding the size of the territory, the population, and the ethnic proportionality. When we take a closer look at the LMTs and how they operate, the picture is not that favourable either. The current JRD North is made up of seven LMTs, with no Field Houses and only two Field Offices (covering six municipalities). Regarding the Field Houses, the situation is almost the same in JRD Centre, as well: 10 LMTs with only one Field House and seven Field Offices (covering 13 municipalities including the capital city). JRD South is in a lot more improved situation: six out of its 12 LMTs have Field Houses and nine have Field Offices (covering 19 municipalities).

The real importance of the Liaison Monitoring Teams is that not only do they contribute to the Situational Awareness of KFOR – inevitable in any military planning – but also represent KFOR. They are visible, they are “everywhere” so the local population knows that the situation is under control, and “Big Brother is watching”. Without LMT Offices, or preferably LMT Houses, the situation is completely different. Of course, the difference between these two types of facilities cannot be highlighted enough, and I think that this system has already proven its value in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EUFOR ALTHEA mission, in the form of the LOT Houses operated by the Liaison Observation Teams. Even though the numbers reflect significant differences between the NATO and the EU mission.

Country	Area (km ²)	Population (PAX)	Municipalities	LMTs / LOTs (PAX)
Kosovo	10,908	1,816,675	170	29 (317)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	51,197	3,791,622	143	17 (131)

Figure 2: Comparison of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina in light of their LMT/LOT structures

These numbers look even better for KFOR if we consider the ethnic dimensions of the two countries:

Kosovo:

- Albanians 92.9%,
 - Serbs 1.5%,
 - Ashkali 0.9%, Egyptian 0.7%, Gorani 0.6%, Roma 0.5%, other/unspecified 0.2%.³⁸
- Bosniaks 1.6%,
Turk 1.1%,

³⁷ The idea of Field Houses – instead of Field Offices – is the intention to have KFOR soldiers (LMT personnel only) housed in the same environment as the locals, meaning that KFOR or the given nation rents a house for the purpose of opening an LMT office where the personnel who runs the office actually lives on the spot. This solution of course raises security concerns, but works more effectively than Field Offices.

³⁸ Kosovo. In CIA The World Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html> (Accessed: 09. 06. 2015.)

Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- Bosniaks 48.4%,
- Serbs 32.7%,
- Croats 14.6%,
- other 4.3%.³⁹

Even in this situation, LMTs and JRDs are also in favour of certain modifications for the future⁴⁰ in order to balance the differences among the LMTs in the number of their personnel, in the geographic dimensions of their Areas of Responsibility, although these changes are only minor ones. So now, knowing the situation and the needs of the non-kinetic forces, we need to talk about the kinetic elements as well. As it has been mentioned previously, these units are now the two Multinational Battle Groups (East and West), the Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU) and the KFOR Tactical Reserve Manoeuvre Battalion (KTM). Even though years before these units had completely different Areas of Operation this is not the case anymore: today, the biggest difference is the Areas of Intelligence Responsibility of the two MNBGs. So in this manner they are in many ways overlapping each other, even though we cannot forget that their equipment and their functions and tasks based on these are different, of course. But would it be a far-fetched idea to have these forces under one command, at battalion level, consisting of highly mobile, flexible and rapidly deployable companies with a potential to intervene under any circumstances if the security situation changes for the worse?

Naturally, the location or locations of this unit is a very important question. We need to keep many factors in mind, like the importance of Pristina, the bad – though improving – road conditions, the hot spots, and the illegal activities that might be of concern for KFOR. Considering all these, I think that the current locations – the camps and the headquarters – offer a wide range of possibilities to find the best solutions for all the elements of this unit.

In my opinion, applying these changes in the near future would be very reasonable. Furthermore, with the NATO Response Force (NRF) and especially with the concept of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) adopted at the Wales Summit in 2014⁴¹ this battalion-size unit can be reduced even more. Making this step in the upcoming years looks even more realistic if we take into account that according to Agim Ceku, the Security Forces Minister of Kosovo, the country is about to transform KSF into Kosovo Armed Forces by 2019, comprising of 5,000 active soldiers and 3,000 reservists. This information is especially interesting when considering the sizes of militaries like the one of Montenegro, with only 2,094 soldiers on active duty⁴² or the one of NATO-member Latvia, with 5,350 personnel.⁴³

³⁹ Bosnia and Herzegovina In CIA The World Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html> (Accessed: 09. 06. 2015.)

⁴⁰ So far JRDs have already articulated some of their needs regarding transformation, namely from JRD North: maintaining current capabilities and in one case raising the number of the sub-teams of an LMT by one unit, keeping in mind the importance of the gender dimension (to have at least one female in all LMTs), and also raising the number of the LNOs on JRD level; from JRD Centre: raising the number of LMTs by one (in Pristina) and the number of JRD-C personnel as well in order to improve analysing capabilities; from JRD South: strengthening JRD capabilities.

⁴¹ <http://www.aco.nato.int/page349011837.aspx> (Accessed: 11. 06. 2015.)

⁴² Kosovo to Have Armed Forces by 2019. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-decides-to-form-kosovo-armed-forces> (Accessed: 11. 06. 2015.)

⁴³ <http://www.armedforces.co.uk/Europeandefence/edcountries/countrylatvia.htm> (Accessed: 04. 06. 2015.)

CONCLUSION

As is well-known and also stated on NATO's website, *any future decision on further reducing KFOR's footprint in Kosovo will require the approval of the North Atlantic Council*.⁴⁴ Due to the fact that decisions by the NAC need unanimous support from the members, this move can be tough to make. The situation is quite the same with the operation of the Field Houses which also needs national approval that can be hard to get. Not to dig deep into politics, but the "lead nations" of KFOR – namely the United States, Germany and Italy – are also playing a major role in shaping the future of KFOR, their interests influence future decisions, not to mention those of the original players of the conflict, Serbia and Kosovo, especially in the light of their EU and NATO partnerships and/or memberships. These relationships bring into picture the European Union itself and Russia, of course, the greatest opponent to Western integration processes in the Balkans. However, we cannot forget about the non-state actors either: the Muslim influence, especially from certain countries like Bahrein, Qatar or Saudi Arabia, Wahhabi groups, and last but definitely not least, the groups of international organised crime involved in the previously mentioned illegal activities of trafficking almost anything that makes profit for them. Unfortunately, these latter examples of players of the current situation in Kosovo are strongly against a strong and able government, exact borders or strong law enforcement and armed forces that would really make their activities a lot more difficult to continue.

So the situation is very complex, meaning that the answer should be given very cautiously in order to avoid the mistakes and the right criticism like the one in 2004 when KFOR troops failed to control Kosovo Albanian riots targeting the ethnic Serbs.

However, in my opinion something has started in the minds of the decision-makers, even though only in a subconscious way. Looking at the official mottos of the KFOR Commanders that reflect their way of thinking and send a message to KFOR troops as well as to the Kosovo citizens, there is an interesting change in 2015. Mottos of the previous years and the current one are as follows:

Concluding my thoughts, I truly hope that these three very strong words of the current KFOR Commander's motto reflect not only his ideas but the intentions of the North Atlantic Council and the Troop Contributing Nations as well – especially the NATO-members' – and that they are going to focus their efforts even more in order to prevent the situation in Kosovo from becoming a frozen crisis.

⁴⁴ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (Accessed: 09. 06. 2015.)

Year	Motto	Emblem
2011	Together for Progress	
2012	Together as One	
2013	Forward together	
2014	More together	
2015	Example, Endeavour, Entrust	

Figure 3: Official KFOR Mottos and emblems (2011–2015).

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Juliette Bird:

NATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGIES: FANCY A GOOD READ?¹

ABSTRACT: The author recommends National Counter Terrorism Strategies as high quality, professional documents that are both interesting and representative of national character. The challenge of writing a comprehensive national Counter Terrorism (CT) strategy is addressed and common aspects of most strategies are set out. Taking France, the United States and the United Kingdom as examples, different national approaches are illustrated. Likewise, the ability to exhibit flexibility and adaptability in the face of changes in the terrorist threat is described in relation to the same three countries. Finally, the difficulties of implementing a fully comprehensive, cross-government approach are outlined and illustrated by a recent quotation from the UK Home Secretary. In closing, readers are encouraged to participate in international discussion of national CT strategies and thus to drive the implementation of the UN Global CT strategy which calls for all countries to put in place a national CT strategy.

KEYWORDS: counter-terrorism, strategy, national, global

TRY A COUNTER TERRORISM BLOCKBUSTER

1. Like the best TV advertisements, national Counter Terrorism (CT) strategies often stand out from their context for their sheer professionalism, attention to detail and overall quality. And so they should; both involve enormous expert (and, in the case of TV, financial) investment per second-on-air or per line of text – far more than the equivalent in ‘normal’ film footage or in much official documentation. At the risk of sounding like a hopeless enthusiast² the author would strongly recommend leafing through a few. Not only are they top quality but they are fascinating reflections of national character. The French do not think like the British - and neither do the Americans. One supposes that a Norwegian would, likewise, take a different line to a Turk but nevertheless all those mentioned are part of NATO and supposedly share a similar outlook on security issues.

2. Why is this interesting? Because increasingly, given the level of media coverage, populations across Europe, North America and more widely are unable to ignore the issue of terrorism, and many are loudly, though often uninformedly, criticising their governments for their approach to terrorism both at home and abroad. The availability of national Counter Terrorism Strategies for consultation and comparison should be advertised. Many governments are trying to communicate with their people and working hard on transparency but often get little recognition for their efforts.

¹ This article reflects the author’s own views and opinions which do not necessarily correspond to the official position of NATO on the topic. This is a version of a presentation first delivered by the author at NATO School Oberammergau during the Defence Against Terrorism course of November 2014.

² The terms geek, nerd or anorak can be used to describe someone who is so involved in their specialist topic that their enthusiasm and attention to detail can easily overwhelm casual interlocutors.

3. What are governments trying to do with these strategies? They are issuing a statement of intent, a rallying cry, trying to round up the relevant players within their countries and attempting to point them collectively in the right direction so that coherent action becomes a reality.

4. And do they manage to exert such a unifying influence? Well, that varies from country to country and from one section of the population to another, but certainly wider exposure of the strategy brings greater involvement from a wider swathe of society and promotes discussion – whether the response is positive or negative. And that in turn gives governments a chance to tailor, to tweak, to refute or to underline, to apologise or to legislate.

WHAT DOES A CT STRATEGY REQUIRE OF ITS WRITERS?

5. Governments with CT strategies will, usually, have forced themselves to think about the variety of aspects of life that are of relevance to terrorism and to effective actions against it. They will have mapped out the efforts they believe are required from different components of the civil service, of law enforcement, defence and security agencies, of education and social welfare ministries and well beyond. It is a big challenge just scoping what CT means to a nation and who might be involved in delivering it. There are a lot of toes available to be stepped on in the prioritisation process since every relevant area is likely to think itself the most important. And of course CT doesn't stand alone; it is integral to national security and defence and should cascade from those strategies but also tie into community relations, employment and, at its most fundamental level, the relations between a government and its people. Taking all these interests into account is an unenviable job (or a splendid challenge) but success can be impressive. We should, at least, interest ourselves in the result.

6. CT involves such a wide variety of players that bringing together their efforts and getting over traditional clashes of approach or long-standing rivalries can only be done from the top. CT strategies will usually, therefore, at least nominally, be the responsibility of the Head of Government, a Prime Ministerial or a Presidential or Cabinet Office type role, and progress against the strategy will be reported to Parliament. Only with this type of senior oversight can internal and external policies be made coherent and the efforts of Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence be brought together and combined in an (ideally) harmonious whole to include Justice, Welfare, Education, Overseas Aid, Borders and Immigration, Charities and the wider Non-Governmental sector.

ARE THERE ANY GENERAL OBSERVATIONS? WHAT IS COMMON TO MOST CT STRATEGIES?

7. A CT strategy must be based on a solid national threat assessment. This is usually set out at the beginning of a strategy to illustrate the context and attempt to relativise the risks of different aspects of the terrorist threat. The main threat picture faced by the nation is usually summarised and broken into themes so the responsibilities can be divided up.

8. It is striking that most good examples set out some fixed principles which are applicable whatever the origin of a threat to the nation. These include compliance with Human Rights legislation, maintenance of civil liberties and working to ensure the Rule of Law. They state up front the (essential but demanding) requirement to balance security and transparency and only to put in place measures that are proportionate to the threat. Most indicate that they wish to be responsive to their populations and give some means for the public to communicate their views.

9. All national strategies try to set a unified goal that the whole community can identify with and in which each individual can visualise his potential contribution. To have such a motivating and inclusive effect, many choose to avoid too many specifics, preferring to pass on the task at a more granular level to the writers of an action plan that can be updated more frequently at a less senior level. A strategy document will usually, however, commit to regular cross-government progress reports.

10. Those who launch CT strategies typically tend to cast a not-too-unpleased-eye over the past and look to maintain continuity and vigilance into the future. They evoke national values and underline the need for patience in the quest for a long-term solution. Some place the national effort in the international context and refer to the United Nations' framework, others prefer to focus on domestic priorities at the expense of the global picture.

THREE NATIONAL EXAMPLES

A) France

11. The 2006 French White Book³ sets out to understand better how terrorist groups work, to define a strategy in response and to inform French citizens of the risk and of what is being done to protect them. The lengthy narrative paper (135 pages) is academic in style; philosophy and history are used in support of the discussion of terrorist motivation.

12. The history of Al Qaida (AQ) and the evolution of global terrorism are set out, together with coverage of recruitment, finance, communication and *modus operandi*. The report highlights the specific threats to France (direct references to France by terrorist groups and reactions triggered by new French laws or actions⁴) and worries that terrorists will move towards the use of nonconventional weapons. In preparing to set out the national response, the paper discusses 7 terrorist attack scenarios and flags up the relevance of different national plans (Vigipirate, Piratome, Biotox etc).

13. The main body of the document focuses on the role of national, and in some cases international, structures. First it covers monitoring, detecting and warning of risk (including electronic interception, access to personal data, coordinated national intelligence service activity and intelligence cooperation through the European Union (EU), the Club of Berne, NATO and the G8). Then penal, financial and immigration systems are addressed, as is hate speech and the role of the armed forces (as support to civilians at home and as an emissary force abroad). CT-relevant aspects of cooperation in the context of the UN and elsewhere are detailed.

14. A whole chapter is dedicated to plans for the protection of the population against various threats (bio, cyber etc), and another covers crisis management measures including public communication. Coverage of compensation for victims and the pursuit, prosecution

³ The current White Book (Livre Blanc) on 'Defence and National Security' (in French) is from 2013 <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/134000257/> (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015.), but the more specific Livre Blanc 'France facing terrorism' from 2006 on 'Internal security confronting terrorism' (in French) <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/064000275/> (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015.) is still current although recent CT relevant legislation must also be taken into account.

⁴ The law of 15 March 2004 on wearing of religious dress or symbols at school is cited as is France's participation in ISAF.

and punishment of terrorists leads to a chapter on exercises and the need for official and public vigilance (the latter includes the role of transport operators, schools and the man in the street). The threat (in terrorist hands) and potential (in official hands) of new technologies is addressed, both in the national and the EU context. State transparency coupled with efforts to improve communication and to counter hate speech and international work against terrorist propaganda are recommended. A political approach including solutions to regional crises, reconstruction of failed or failing states and continuous dialogue that includes those who hold radical views is identified as the way ahead. Cohesion, national identity and the defence of justice and liberty within democracy and the rule of law are the concluding principles.

15. The more recent *Livre Blanc de la Defense* (2013) adds a counter radicalisation aspect to the government approach, undertakes to modernise Vigipirate to ensure a coherent, cross government response to terrorism and commits to strengthening international cooperation through the exchange of information and analyses in order to ensure that internal security and external security are both part of the same holistic approach.

B) United States

16. President Obama's National Strategy for CT⁵ was put in place in June 2011 and forms part of the overall National Security Strategy⁶ (NSS) which came into effect in May 2010 and was updated in February 2015. In the 2010 version, Weapons of Mass Destruction are recognised within the NSS as the greatest threat to the American people, particularly in the hands of violent extremists. The need to disrupt, dismantle and defeat AQ is listed next. The current NSS specifically recognises nuclear weapons in the hands of irresponsible states and terrorists as the gravest danger to security.

17. Whilst the 2011 US CT strategy picks out many of the same issues as its French equivalent it reflects a totally different national character from that seen in the French *Livre Blanc*. Being shorter (at only 19 pages) it has to be much punchier. It carries additional weight as it effects a major change in policy i.e. the end of the 'Global War on Terrorism' and a new focus on a specific organisation, namely AQ. The thrust of the strategy is to harness all aspects of national power for a cross-government and multinational effort, whilst recognising that this approach will require patience. It reads as a rallying cry and opts for clarity rather than providing complex ideas.

18. The document sets out the threat faced by the nation; lists and enlarges upon the principles guiding CT efforts (adhering to US core values, building security partnerships, appropriate use of CT tools and capabilities, resilience as a culture); and adopts 8 overarching goals:

- a) Protect national population, homeland and interests
- b) Disrupt, degrade, dismantle and defeat AQ
- c) Prevent terrorist development, acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction
- d) Eliminate safe havens
- e) Build enduring partnerships and capabilities
- f) Degrade AQ links to its affiliates and adherents

⁵ National Strategy for Counter Terrorism June 2011. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015.)

⁶ Fact Sheet: The 2015 National Security Strategy (and link to full document) is at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/06/fact-sheet-2015-national-security-strategy> (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015.)

- g) Counter AQ ideology and its resonance and diminish drivers of violence
- h) Deprive terrorists of enabling means (e.g. finance, communication, facilitation, travel etc).

19. It divides its focus geographically (homeland and 8 regions) and highlights AQ ideology, messaging and resonance as a specific issue requiring global action. Only a brief mention is made of other terrorist groups and state sponsors.

20. When presenting the new CT strategy to the UN Counter Terrorism Committee⁷, Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator for CT, emphasised that it was not helpful to view foreign and security policy solely through a CT prism but that CT policies reinforced broader national security interests. He stressed the need for a whole-of-government approach and cautioned that threats in different places demanded different tools. He underlined the need for international partnerships. He also focused on the need to diminish drivers of violent extremism, to reduce the effectiveness of terrorist propaganda (in order to reduce the flow of recruits) and to provide positive alternatives for those vulnerable to radicalisation. He noted that CT efforts must take place within a framework of human rights and rule of law.

C) UK

21. The UK's CT strategy dates from 2006 and is known as CONTEST. It sits under the 2010 National Security Strategy. Three versions of it have been published (2006, 2009 and 2011) with the biggest changes taking place in 2011 when work against one of the main work streams (Prevent) was considerably amended in response to public and official reactions, including a Government review. 2011 also saw the widening of the strategy to include all forms of terrorism. CONTEST is based on four pillars:

- 'Pursue – to stop terrorist attacks' both at home and against national interests abroad,
- 'Prevent – to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism',
- 'Protect – to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack' (reduce vulnerability by protecting Critical National Infrastructure etc. based on a National risk assessment), and
- 'Prepare – to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack' and build resilience to aid recovery.

22. The full 2011 publication⁸ runs to 120 pages and enters into considerable detail but is summarised in 7 pages. First the strategic context is set out, highlighting the most relevant national threats, the four pillar structure is explained and reference is made to the most recent strategic advice that emphasises the need to address the long term factors that enable terrorism. The UK's fundamental values are set out, and effectiveness, proportionality, transparency, flexibility, collaboration and value for money are given as principles for the strategy. The government commits to increased transparency and asserts that the strategy will be proportionate to the risks faced and only activities necessary to address these risks will be engaged in. Under each pillar goals for a 5 year period are set out, recent progress is reviewed and descriptions are given of what 'success will look like'.

23. Under Pursue, reflecting a 2010 government review of CT powers, work is to continue on reviewing these powers, improving prosecution rates and using deportation when it can be

⁷ National Strategy for Counter Terrorism: Statement Before the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee <http://m.state.gov/md169022.htm> (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015).

⁸ CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism – available for download from <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest> (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015.)

human rights compliant. Improved ability to detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist threats is to be sought together with improved judicial proceedings (including better use of sensitive and classified material) and efforts to develop the CT capacity of international partners.

24. Under Prevent, the results of the 2011 Prevent review⁹ are reflected in commitment to work, nationally and internationally, to prevent radicalisation and to challenge extremist ideologies even when these are espoused by apparently non-violent organisations. Exclusion of foreign extremists becomes possible. There is recognition that ‘securitisation’ of integration work is unhelpful, and consequently a narrower focus is given to Prevent to work cross sector and cross community to protect those vulnerable to radicalisation. A final section of the Prevent chapter is devoted to CT and the internet.

25. Under Protect, to reduce UK vulnerability to terrorist attack, more work at borders, identification of travellers, tackling transport vulnerability and protection of infrastructure and crowded places are foreseen.

26. Under Prepare, the result of the inquest into the 7 July 2005 London bombings lies behind the realisation of the need for improvement of communications between emergency services and with the public. Work modelled on Mumbai (2008) type attacks is to continue, and preparedness for the highest impact risks (including the use of CBRN materials) is to be improved. The specific risk of terrorist attack on the Olympic and Paralympic games to be held in London in 2012 is addressed.

27. Annual reports have since detailed achievements against both the short term objectives and the longer term, core CONTEST objectives¹⁰. As an aside, it is interesting to note that the work streams of the policy have had phenomenal take up with civil servants and law enforcement officers who often identify with them personally and describe themselves as working ‘in Protect’ or ‘on Prevent’ etc.

ABILITY TO ADAPT?

28. The surge in strength of ISIL/Da’esh¹¹ and the issue of Foreign Terrorist Fighters travelling from over 80 countries to Iraq and Syria to fight has grown in importance since all three of these national strategies were put in place. With the adoption of UNSCR 2170 and 2178 in 2014, further changes in legislation (relating to terrorist travel, financing and facilitation) and overall approach (e.g. to women, youth, educators and religious leaders) are required but it is interesting to note that making these, and other, changes caused little, if any, disruption to the earlier national strategic level approach.

A) France

29. Without redrafting the *Livre Blanc*, France has been able to respond to the evolution in the terrorist threat and new guidance from the UN. A new bill was agreed in 2012, enabling the government to prosecute French nationals having committed acts of terrorism abroad,

⁹ The Prevent review, 2011 Prevent strategy and Lord Carlile’s overview of Prevent strategy are available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011> (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015.)

¹⁰ Most recent annual report on CONTEST dated April 2014 ISBN 978-1-4741-0173-8, available for download at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contest-annual-report-2013> (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015.)

¹¹ The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and its acronym in Arabic (also known as the Islamic State).

and further new powers were adopted in autumn 2014¹² that enable the French authorities to confiscate the passports of potential Foreign Terrorist Fighters and prevent them from leaving the country. The new legislation allows action against those suspected of travelling abroad to join a militant organisation and takes a step forward by creating an offence of terrorism (the previous offence used in such cases was merely of ‘criminal association’). It permits blocking of websites and obliges action against content that encourages terrorism with a penalty of up to 7 years imprisonment.

30. The French Minister of Justice, Christiane Taubira, spoke before the UN CT Committee on 10 February 2015¹³ and highlighted: firstly, the penal and legislative measures taken (see above); secondly, a government plan not only to monitor and dismantle networks but also to support families affected by violent extremism; thirdly, a widening of the government response to include measures in the fields of security, justice, education, prisons, local politics and the work place and; lastly, analysis of the indoctrination process leading individuals towards violent extremism to enable setting up of deradicalisation (‘désendoctrinement’) programmes. She spoke of partnerships established with universities and research bodies, of a programme already launched in prisons and of the need to follow experiments being conducted elsewhere. She underlined the essential nature of international cooperation.

B) USA

31. Since the adoption of its CT Strategy, the US has modified (predominantly external) aspects of the strategy through Presidential Policy Guidance communicated publically through two Presidential speeches, one in May 2013¹⁴ delivered to the National Defense University and the other a year later given at the West Point Military Academy¹⁵. The first highlighted the AQ ideology as a persistent threat and pointed to the evolving threat, including a foothold for extremists in Libya and Syria but also radicalisation at home in the US. US citizens were warned that their nationality would not act as a protection if they targeted other US citizens. The use of drones, under presidential oversight, as an alternative to Special Forces’ lethal action (as used earlier that month to kill bin Laden) and to boots on the ground more generally, was adopted. Overall the focus was on a comprehensive approach involving targeted action against terrorists, effective partnerships, diplomatic engagement and overseas aid.

32. In his West Point speech a year later, the President’s key point was the creation of a CT Partnerships Fund of up to USD 5 billion to train, build CT capacity and enable partner countries on the front line (he mentioned work in Yemen, Somalia, Libya and Mali). He reserved the right of the USA to take direct action when necessary but spoke out against the involvement of US troops in the ‘increasingly sectarian war’ in Syria, preferring to support Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. He returned later to the need to ‘train a network of partners’.

¹² French National Assembly, Law 2014-1353 of 13 November 2014 ‘Strengthening measures with respect to the fight against terrorism’ (in French). http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/dossiers/dispositions_lutte_terrorisme.asp (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015.)

¹³ Speech by Madame Taubira Minister 10 February (in French). http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/allocution_mme_taubira_ministre_10_fevrier_2015.pdf (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015.)

¹⁴ Remarks by the President at the National Defence University. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015.)

¹⁵ Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015.)

33. The subsequent creation of the US-led coalition to counter ISIL/Da'esh has moved matters still further forward, but the emphasis remains on cooperative effort and a network of partners.

C) UK

34. The UK too has shown flexibility and ability to adapt although unlike France and the US, it also opted for an additional review of its overall strategy between the usual 5 year reviews. Since the major changes of 2011 to Prevent, the issue of Foreign Terrorist Fighters travelling from the UK to Iraq and Syria to fight has grown in importance. Already, the Prevent changes were good preparation for a wave of returning, radicalised nationals, but a further set of measures was put before Parliament in November 2014 and received Royal assent as the 'CT and security bill' on 12 February 2015¹⁶. This is intended to disrupt those seeking to travel abroad to engage in terrorism activity and return to the UK. It also enhances government ability to monitor and control suspects and to combat the underlying ideology. The bill permits temporary exclusion from the country and confiscation of travel documents amongst other measures.

CHALLENGES WHEN IMPLEMENTING A CT POLICY

35. Each parcel of responsibility, from youth clubs and universities to the management of schools, prisons and borders, from appropriately adapted legislation to the handling of intelligence is part of a continuum, all of which has to be actively managed simultaneously. All those parcels of work have, somehow, to be joined up. No one involved can ever afford to stop working to maintain links to the other players. Across the whole of government and civil society, staff have to make the strategy live. This is not an easy task at any level as the following quote¹⁷ from the UK Home Secretary, Theresa May, reveals:

'Each week (...) I also chair the weekly security meeting, in which I review the work we're doing to protect the public from the risk of a terrorist attack.

Around the table (...) sit representatives from MI5, MI6, GCHQ, JTAC, the Metropolitan Police, the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, Border Force and organisations like the National Offender Management Service. Government departments that play their part in delivering our counter-terrorism strategy – including the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Cabinet Office, the Treasury, the Northern Ireland Office, and the Departments for Education, Communities and Local Government, International Development and Transport – all attend too.'

FINAL THOUGHTS

36. Good CT strategies make quality reading. They are stimulating and informative, not only about the terrorism threat and different proposed approaches to it, but also for the national

¹⁶ Counter Terrorism and Security Act. www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-and-security-bill (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015.)

¹⁷ Home Secretary Theresa May on Counter Terrorism 24 November 2014. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-theresa-may-on-counter-terrorism> (Accessed: 27. 03. 2015.)

character and history that is on display, both through the stance adopted and through the detail of the text itself.

37. CT strategies are fascinating national snapshots that illustrate the evolution of the overall (national and international) approach to terrorism. It is interesting to consider national measures and the amendments made to them in the light of international developments, not just in terms of an environment with emerging terrorist activities but also with respect to the UN response. It can be a good illustration of how international guidance can cascade down to nations and be made concrete in national CT measures. Following the evolution of CT strategies is also an effective way to monitor whether countries can stick to their principles as the threat from terrorism mutates.

38. This paper looks at three national examples, all of which have demonstrated flexibility in their response to a changing threat picture. All three appear to require updates in the near to mid-term future, and the outcomes, together with new comparisons that will become possible, are bound to be interesting.

39. We, as readers, should at least try to take up the offer of transparency made by governments. We should read some of the CT strategies out there and consider their wider contexts. Even if we don't agree with all the content, if we can bring ourselves to identify the good points, question the challenging ones and be part of a stimulating international discussion, we will contribute to further transparency. This is one way that a priority from the UN Global CT Strategy – that nations institute and implement a national CT strategy – can be achieved. Discussion of those strategies already in the public domain may encourage other nations to go public with their own CT strategies – or even prompt them to create a strategy *ab initio* if one is not already in place.

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Roland Gömöri:

ISIL – THE NEW FACE OF TERRORISM

ABSTRACT: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), stemming from the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaeda, managed to redefine terrorism in the last couple of years. ISIL became a major competitor of its mother organisation, while it also evolved the concept it inherited from its mother organisation. It runs a quasi-state in Syrian and Iraqi territories it occupies, striving to create a state that strictly adheres to its medieval interpretation of Islamic law. The author, after he observes the history of ISIL, takes a look at the “proto-state” the group developed, as well as its relationship to minorities.

KEYWORDS: Al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, terrorism, minority

INTRODUCTION

In the recent years, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (henceforth: ISIL) revolutionized terrorism in many ways. The organisation, originally stemming from the Iraqi wing of Al-Qaeda, managed to gain a foothold in the war-torn countries of Syria and Iraq, meanwhile it gradually shifted from the main goals of its „mother” organisation. ISIL currently controls large swathes of territory both in Syria and Iraq¹, building upon both the support of Iraqi Sunnis disillusioned with the Shia-controlled government and the general chaos in the civil war affected Syria.

The current article examines the route the ISIL covered from its roots in 2003’s Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), through the events of the so-called „Arab Spring”² that helped it to gain a foothold in the mainly Sunni areas of Syria, until the group’s grand announcement of a caliphate in 2014. The author afterwards takes a look at the “proto-state” ISIL founded, as well as the relation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant to minorities.

FROM THE AQI TO THE „STATE”

If we want to discuss the formation of ISIL, we cannot ignore the role of the United States in it. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent ousting of its leader Saddam Hussein led to a power vacuum in the country that could not be filled by the Governing Council appointed by the U.S. forces. Among the variety of groups emerging in the struggle for power, a local branch of Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was formed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The group initially followed the ideological guidelines of its „mother” organisation, inciting

¹ However, more realistic analysts tend to separate the areas actually controlled by ISIL from the vast desert areas filling in the blanks between the network of roads and towns both in Syria and Iraq. See: <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21646752-sustaining-caliphate-turns-out-be-much-harder-declaring-one-islamic-state-not>

² More on this topic: Besenyő János: Can the „Arab Spring” present a real threat to Europe? Strategic Impact (Romania), ISSN: 1841-5784, No. 50., 1/2014, 32–44. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/241476196/Can-the-Arab-Spring-present-a-real-threat-to-Europe>

insurgency in Iraq and conducting terrorist attacks against the U.S. forces present there, as well as the civilian populace.

From its beginning already, one of the original goals of AQI was the formation of a state in the Sunni-majority parts of Iraq, based of Al-Qaeda's extremist interpretation of Islamist ideology. The focus occasionally drifted from the faraway enemies of Al-Qaeda (the United States and, to an extent, Israel), and AQI eventually triggered a sectarian civil war in Iraq between Sunnis and Shias. Tensions were also increased by Sunnis being gradually forced out of government positions, partly due to the intervention of the United States in Iraqi internal affairs.

The actual trigger for the sectarian clashes was the 2006 February bombing of an important Shia holy place in Samarra. However, these clashes were not an opportunity, but rather the doom of the initial organisation. While the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was already crippling for AQI, the main issue was that the organisation turned on itself, hunting for apostates among its ranks. This infighting – between 2007 and 2008 – combined with the support of local Sunni tribal leaders shifting towards a formal cooperation with the U.S. occupiers, marked the dismantling of the original Al-Qaeda branch in Iraq.³

After a transitional period, the revival as the Islamic State in Iraq, and then the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant began with Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi assuming leadership of the remnants of the group in 2010. The development of the „caliph” of ISIL started in 2004, when U.S. troops arrested him on the grounds of being „a Sunni foot-soldier”. In the Camp Bucca prison of U.S. forces, al-Baghdadi could meet jihadists of the then AQI, building a network of connections with religious extremists. In a certain sense, the U.S. had a role in al-Baghdadi's ideological development.⁴

However, while he contributed a lot to the organisation's metaphorical „rise from the ashes”, AQI's revival as ISIL can mostly be attributed to external reasons.

Firstly, we should return back to 2006. As mentioned above, Sunnis felt they were gradually being forced out of the Iraqi government, and nothing could symbolise that any better than the appointment of Nouri al-Maliki, a Shia, as prime minister. Nouri al-Maliki also followed a sectarian policy favouring Iraq's Shias (due to Iranian influence), contributing to a growing radicalisation in the ranks of Sunnis. It must be noted that the same policy was followed by Syria's Bashar al-Assad, an Alawite. As for Iran, it was already noted: the country's leadership supported the formation of Shia militias in the aforementioned two countries, causing further radicalisation.⁵

Still remaining at the Sunni issue, ISIL's expansion can be attributed to the simple fact that in the previous years, regional actors created an ample space for it in which it could expand. In Iraq, regions like Anbar Province (the source of the ISIL surge in the summer of 2014), Fallujah or Mosul were largely ignored by the central government of Maliki that maintained only a frail presence in these areas. The same could be said about the Kurd-controlled areas in northern Iraq with large Christian and Yezidi minorities. And during the „Arab Spring” the north-eastern regions of Syria were also abandoned by the Assad regime in a similar manner.⁶

³ <http://mondediplo.com/2014/09/04islamicstate> (Accessed: 11. 04. 2015.)

⁴ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30681224> (Accessed: 20. 04. 2015.)

⁵ <http://mondediplo.com/2014/09/04islamicstate>; <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21604627-crisis-iraq-has-roots-going-far-back-history-recently-foolly> (Accessed: 11. 04. 2015.)

⁶ <http://mondediplo.com/2014/09/04islamicstate> (Accessed: 11. 04. 2015.)

It could also fill such a vacuum at a more abstract level. The Shia policies towards the Sunnis – described above – created a „minority complex” in the Sunnis of the Middle East, who struggled to come to terms with their past and form a long-term vision about their future. Any attempts at organising themselves ended with failure, let it be anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism, socialism, nationalism, or variations of Islamism. The „Arab Spring” was also an ambiguous experience, with most of the movements failing to achieve longstanding results. Thus, the formation of an “Islamic State” could prove to be the inspiration that many of these Sunni Muslims crave.⁷

The greatest fortune for the forming ISIL was, of course, the aforementioned „Arab Spring”. In the course of events Syria got entangled in a dangerous civil war, where most of the international community, by supporting – somewhat erroneously – the regime’s opposition, actually contributed to the stalemate that gave way to the rise of ISIL in Syria. The organisation managed to exploit the disorder in the country to create territorial and political space for itself from which it could expand and operate. The conflict also provided the ISIL militants with means to attract funding for themselves, as well as to recruit foreign fighters for their cause.⁸ By 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq expanded its territorial goals, reflecting to this shift by changing its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. At the same time, Al-Baghdadi attempted to broker a merger with the *Jabhat al-Nusra*, Al-Qaeda’s wing in the Syrian civil war. However, the leadership of Al-Qaeda rejected the proposition, which led to clashes between the fighters of the two groups in Syria. This culminated in February 2014, when the Al-Qaeda leadership announced its dissociation from ISIL.⁹

By June 2014, the group had gathered tremendous resources, having approximately 20,000 foreign fighters at its disposal, along with a significant financial basis. It must be noted, however, that 2014’s ISIL was a world away from the original AQI. (This will be discussed later in detail.) Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi brought a more militaristic viewpoint to the table, which could also be attributed to his aforementioned stay at Camp Bucca, where he could meet several former leaders of Saddam’s military. Actually, his two deputies, each responsible respectively for operations in Syria and Iraq, are former senior officers of the Iraqi army.¹⁰ This change of view can be observed in the change of ISIL’s tactics and ideology, compared to those of Al-Qaeda.

June 2014 is an important month in the history of ISIL, as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the formation of a „caliphate”, naming himself a new „caliph” and thus effectively expanding ISIL’s authority over every Muslim in the world. Whether or not we can talk about a real caliphate, this announcement was initially a huge boost to the cause of the organisation, as it increased the influx of both funding and volunteers willing to partake in a war for the caliphate.

Afterwards, the swift expansion of ISIL into the so-called „Sunni Triangle” of Iraq was a clear demonstration of its power that finally caught the attention of the international community. This prompted the United States to launch a series of airstrikes against ISIL targets, only 3 years after the American withdrawal from the country. Since then the expansion of ISIL has stalled, with Iraqi Kurdish forces – the Peshmerga – managing to roll back ISIL’s advance with Western aerial and material support.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ UN Report S-2014-815, 6.

⁹ Ibid, 7.

¹⁰ Ibid, 8.

AL-QAEDA VS. ISIL

As Resolution 2170 (2014) of the UN Security Council also points out, ISIL could be regarded as a splinter group of Al-Qaeda. However, while Al-Qaeda may be the source organisation from where ISIL originates, there are major differences in the ideology, strategy, and tactics of the two groups.

One of the most basic differences was the timetable for their goals. Osama bin Laden, when founding Al Qaeda, imagined the caliphate as a final, long-term goal in the farther future, and the acts of terrorism the group committed served as tools towards the achievement of this goal.¹¹

Compared to this, ISIL moved up the timetable for the establishment of a caliphate, forming a “proto-state” in the areas that were available to the group at the time. With this move, the group secured itself plenty of foreign supporters, fighters and funding. It also became a major competitor of Al-Qaeda, which, while it also made calls for the establishment of the caliphate, never managed to come even close to such levels of support, troops and funding. However, this territoriality also provided ISIL with a significant weakness (detailed in the next chapter).

Another main difference is the organizational structure. Al-Qaeda established itself as a flexible network of autonomous cells, while ISIL requires a top-down bureaucratic structure to operate; this also stems from its territoriality.

A great issue and difference between Al-Qaeda and ISIL, however, is an ideological one: their relation to the Western world. Al-Qaeda (and its former leader Osama bin Laden) is a creation of the modern world: the group made terrorism a franchise operation, corporatising it; while its foot soldiers were experts at navigating this world.¹² However, unlike ISIL, the group regarded itself as an “elite” group of jihadist, while ISIL was far more inclusive, following a more unifying approach. This, too, may have contributed to its upsurge.¹³

While one of the outright novelties of ISIL’s operations was its extensive use of modern communication methods (with additional emphasis on social media) for propaganda and recruitment, the group’s ideology itself was a medieval-esque interpretation of Islam – too radical even for Al-Qaeda – its main goal being the establishment of a 7th-century-era caliphate.¹⁴ The minority policy of ISIL in the occupied territories, discussed in detail later, also fits this framework.

A „PROTO-STATE“ OF TERRORISM

ISIL brought changes to the movement of global terrorism that was determined beforehand mainly by Al-Qaeda. The most important of these changes is that ISIL actually strives to *exert control* over certain territories (parts of Syria and Iraq), and this territoriality is a fundamental part of its self-definition as a „caliphate”.

In the framework of this, ISIL pretends to be a state, “mimicking a civil administration by appointing judicial, internal security and communications officers”¹⁵. It attempts to

¹¹ <http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/> (Accessed: 11. 04. 2015.)

¹² <http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/> (Accessed: 11. 04. 2015.)

¹³ <http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/the-jihadist-popularity-contest/> (Accessed: 12. 04. 2015.)

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ UN Report S-2014-185; 8–9.

apply shari'a – its own medievalistic approach, of course – in the areas it controls.¹⁶ It also polices these areas, employing two different police forces: an “Islamic police” for ordinary law enforcement and a *hisba*, a “morals police”¹⁷.

The state has several streams of revenue, making it mostly self-sufficient (another difference from Al-Qaeda): oil trade on the black market, donations, taxation, theft, human trafficking and ransom payments for kidnappers. The S-2014-185 report of the UN Security Council quotes the global media branding ISIL “the world’s wealthiest terrorist organisation”¹⁸. However, there is far less information about the “burn rate”, the expenditure side of ISIL’s finances. Main expenses are constituted by the limited services it (attempts to) provide the population it governs; as well as the payments for its members, especially the foreign fighters it employs.¹⁹

Even though ISIL’s territoriality is a boon to the projects of the group, it may also prove to be a major weakness. The legitimacy of the group, having declared the caliphate in its lands, depends on the territories it controls. And the infrastructure and weaponry it needs to protect its interests make it much more exposed (and an excellent target for foreign airstrikes) than Al-Qaeda ever was.

ISIL AND MINORITIES

The relationship of ISIL with the minorities in the areas it controls is, like many of its other policies, based on shari'a.

Christians and Jews are in an ambiguous position. In theory, they are regarded by classical Muslim thinking as *dhimmi*s (people of the book), and are thus given the “choice”: conversion to Islam; paying of an extra tax, the *jizya* in exchange for being allowed to live and work in the “caliphate”; or death.²⁰ ISIL set the aforementioned tax at a progressive rate; “four gold dinars for the wealthy, two dinars for middle-income, and one dinar for the poor”²¹.

In practice, however, there have been series of atrocities committed against these religious minorities²²: several ancient Christian landmarks in the area have been attacked by ISIL militants²³, and Mosul, having had a significant Christian majority before, is literally emptied of Christians.²⁴

¹⁶ For details see: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143679/andrew-f-march-and-mara-revkin/caliphate-of-law> (Accessed: 11. 04. 2015.)

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ UN Report S-2014-185; 19.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

²⁰ Besenyő János – Gömöri Roland: Arab Spring, Christian Fall? – The situation of Christian minorities in the Middle East after the Arab Spring, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, June 2013. http://www.ict.org.il/Article/998/Arab_Spring_Christian_Fall (Accessed: 14. 04. 2015.)

²¹ <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143679/andrew-f-march-and-mara-revkin/caliphate-of-law> (Accessed: 11. 04. 2015.)

²² In Iraq, the history of incidents regarding Christians dates back to the U.S. invasion in 2003. Their already dwindling numbers are further decreasing with the expansion of ISIL in the area.

²³ An example: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28408926> (Accessed: 11. 04. 2015.)

²⁴ See for examples: <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5585/muslim-persecution-of-christians>; <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5169/christmas-slaughter-muslim-persecution> (Accessed: 14. 04. 2015.)

However, even Christians and Jews are in a better position than Shia Muslims or the Yazidis. The former are simply regarded by ISIL as apostates and blasphemers, while Yazidis, according to ISIL religious scholars, are an “unbelieving group ‘by origin’ (*asli*)” and thus they “can only be given an ultimatum to repent or face the sword.”²⁵

CONCLUSION AND THOUGHTS

ISIL currently presents a threat to Middle Eastern regional stability, as well as global security on multiple fronts.

Firstly, it presents an opportunity for like-minded jihadists to unite under the banner of and assist in the establishment of a caliphate. This could lead to the destabilization of the whole region – at this very moment ISIL is questioning the Middle Eastern order established by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, while the group extends its activities both in the Middle Eastern and North African regions and South Asia.

The influx of foreign fighters, besides tilting the power balance towards ISIL, presents a threat on a much larger scale as these people, laden with battle experiences, return to their home countries and could prove to be a security risk in their countries. Connected to this issue is the effect of ISIL propaganda (especially on social media) that provides an incentive for lone-wolf terrorists to carry out attacks all over the world. One does not have to look far: the attacks in Paris in January 2015 are such an example.

ISIL is also committing crimes against humanity on a large scale, let it be the attempted genocide against the Yazidi community, the destruction of invaluable archaeological relics like ancient Christian and Shia holy places and religious persecution of the aforementioned groups, or the extensive human trafficking it conducts in the area.

While the group has finally caught the attention of the international community following its upsurge after June 2014, the fight against it will predictably be protracted. Even more, as the group rose in a political and economic vacuum: it does not depend from international recognition, and it is mainly self-sufficient and as such, largely immune to formal sanctions. However, strategic airstrikes might seem to prove effective: strikes launched against oil refineries and other strategic positions may just give the edge for local troops on the ground – the Iraqi army or the Kurdish Peshmerga, for instance – to stall or even roll back the advance of ISIL.

At the same time, the international community should press for a resolution of the situation in Syria, if it wants to eliminate ISIL’s foothold in the country. If it does not do so, the group will retain a strategic position from where it could launch a counterattack, undermining any advances made against it in Iraq. A major impediment is that the Western powers are unwilling to cooperate with Bashar al-Assad’s regime, even though the humanitarian situation of, for instance, religious minorities like regional Christians was far more adequate under Assad than now.

However, if ISIL is truly to be defeated, its ideology and the support it enjoys from the population must be undermined. If Sunni positions are represented adequately in Syria and Iraq (Nouri al-Maliki’s ousting was a good step in the latter), and the controversies in the group’s view of Islam are highlighted, it might provide assistance in the long term.

²⁵ <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143679/andrew-f-march-and-mara-revkin/caliphate-of-law> (Accessed: 11. 04. 2015.)

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Zoltán Prantner:

THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF ISIL

ABSTRACT: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), emerged in Iraq in 2010, could considerably extend its influence in a short time due to its victories in Syria in 2011 and 2012 and when it could take the advantages of the 2013 Sunni demonstrations in Iraq. The prestige of the terror-organization was especially increased by the skill of al-Baghdadi's direct underlings who were freed from the Abu Ghraib prison with several hundred associates in July 2013. Because of these veteran fighters, several of them had been high-ranking officers in Saddam Hussein's Army previously, approximately one third of Iraq and Syria was under the influence of ISIL. In its success the joined foreign units, fighting on the front, and the human supply continuously arriving from different countries of the world had an unquestionable role. ISIL tries to function as a state in order to consolidate its authority. That is why al-Baghdadi formed a cabinet for the Caliphate, which was established in the end of June 2014, and different committees help this governing board. His soldiers are equipped with the most modern weapons that were seized after the victories over the Iraqi Security Forces, the Syrian Army or the Syrian rebels.

KEYWORDS: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, terrorism, foreign volunteers, chemical weapons

Only a few hundred fighters fell under the commandship of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi when he became the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq on May 16, 2010. However, the Islamist leader could successfully take advantage of the disintegration of the Iraqi armed forces and the power vacuum, emerged in the neighbouring Syria, where he gained a firm foothold. In the recent months he radically expanded the strength of his army that facilitated to keep the seized territories as well as to occupy new areas. Therefore there is no lack of volunteers. Apart from the two concerned Arab states, Iraq and Syria, foreign citizens also align in mass under the flag of the Islamic State. There is no problem in equipping the recruits. They have deterrent arsenal and unstinted supply due to the stores that were captured from their enemies on the occupied military bases.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE TERROR ORGANIZATION

Nowadays Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-appointed leader of Muslims, stands at the top of the terror-organization. A cabinet of advisers helps his work. The Americans imprisoned almost all of his deputies during their Iraqi mission. Al-Baghdadi met with their majority when he was in custody with them in the American prison, Camp Bucca.¹ The great majority of these men have Iraqi ancestry. However, there are some important areas, like religious guidance, recruitment, or media production, where foreigners work in high-positions. Above

¹ Terrence McCoy: How the Islamic State evolved in an American prison. In: The Washington Post, November 04, 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/11/04/how-an-american-prison-helped-ignite-the-islamic-state/> (Accessed: 01. 08. 2015.)

them, several foreigners rose to high ranks as a tribute for their merit which was previously testified in the struggle for Islamic State. For example, Abu Mohammad al-Adnani al-Shami, al-Baghdadi's chief spokesman is Syrian. Another instance is the ethnic Chechen Omar al-Shishani, who led one group of foreign fighters and also got place in the seven-member cabinet.²

The leader of the ISIL had preference for persons with military skills in the leadership-team. That is why it is not a coincidence that about one third of the high-positioned persons were high-ranking officers in the Iraqi armed forces during the Saddam-era. For example, one of his main deputies, Fadel Ahmed Abdullah al-Hayali (nom du guerre Abu Muslim al-Turkmani) who directed Iraq until his death on November 7, 2014, was a lieutenant-colonel in the Istikhbarat, the intelligence unit of the Iraqi military and also served as a Special Forces officer in the Special Republican Guard. His colleague, Abu Ali al-Anbari, who was entrusted with the direction of the occupied Syrian territories, also served previously in Saddam Hussein's Army and demobilized as major general.³ These two men, al-Baghdadi, and the advisers of the cabinet comprise the executive branch of the government, known as al-Imarat.

The structure of the terror organization is like that of a military unit. They divided the controlled areas into 12 districts. To control them, Al-Baghdadi appointed local governors according to their tribal identities, who have their own subordinates and limited autonomy. Accordingly, the deputy makes the decision of the government known as an order to the affected members of local network who forward it to the local councils with detailed instructions. Apart from this, they have to build up and keep on preferably consistent relationship with the tribes living in the mentioned region. Meanwhile their military commanders' task is to plan and execute joint operations with the former members of the Baath Party and other armed Sunni groups.

In line with this a three-member war cabinet coordinates the military operations. Eight councils help their work: 1.) Financial (weapons and oil sales), 2.) Leadership (drafting laws and key policies), 3.) Military (defence of the State), 4.) Legal (decisions on executions and recruitment), 5.) Fighter Assistant (foreign fighter aid), 6.) Security (internal policy and executions), 7.) Intelligence (collecting information on ISIL enemies) and 8.) Media (mass media). Finally, a Shura Council also operates independently above all of these bodies. It controls the decisions of the local councils and governors to make sure that they are sticking to ISIL's version of Islamic law. The influence of this council is well pictured by the fact that it also has officially the right to depose al-Baghdadi if the leader's policy becomes reverse to the religious standards of ISIL according to its judgment.⁴

According to reports, approximately 1,000 medium or top ranking field commanders help the functioning of the terror-organization in the middle of 2014. Almost all of them have more or less technical, military and security experience. Their appreciation is well indicated

² Ben Hubbard – Eric Schmitt: Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS. In: The New York Times, August 27, 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-as-factor-in-isis-successes.html> (Accessed: 01. 08. 2015.)

³ Ruth Sherlock: Inside the leadership of Islamic State: how the new, caliphate' is run. In: The Telegraph, July 09, 2014. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10956280/Inside-the-leadership-of-Islamic-State-how-the-new-caliphate-is-run.html> (Accessed: 01. 08. 2015.)

⁴ Nick Thompson – Atika Shubert: Anatomy of ISIS: How the 'Islamic State' is run, from oil to beheadings. In: CNN, September 18, 2014. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/18/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq-hierarchy/index.html?hpt=hp_t1 (Accessed: 01. 08. 2015.)

by their salaries that range from \$300 to \$2,000 per month. Due to their involvement, the ISIL could give effective military training to newcomers without establishing training bases which could get airstrikes by its enemies.⁵

THE FIGHTERS OF THE ISIL

The ISIL continues its recruiting-campaign at a global level for enlarging the number of its fighters. Its efforts proved to be surprisingly successful. While the CIA estimated their strength between 20,000 to 31,500 persons in September 2014, a senior Kurdish leader put their number at least 200,000, almost seven times bigger, one month later.⁶ At the same time, the militants have remarkably different social backgrounds. Only a minority is highly-educated and graduated previously as engineers, medics or technology specialists. According to certain reports, some fighters are criminal offenders who were sentenced to imprisonment earlier.⁷ We can ascertain about the proportion of genders that although the number of female volunteers rose drastically during the latter months, their scale is still insignificant to the men's.

The combatants of ISIL fall into three main groups. The first one consists of Iraqis, and a smaller proportion of Syrians who cooperated with al-Qaeda in Iraq in the past. There were only a few hundred of them in 2011, but their number grew rapidly during the elapsed period. The role of the Middle Eastern nationalist volunteers, who have been associated with the terror-organization previously, is also important.

The second group consists of foreign volunteers. The foreign combatants' number was estimated at least 12,000 persons in June 2014, who came from one of the 81 countries of the world.⁸ In taking armed jihad on foreign soil the internal instability, emerged in the region after the Arab Spring, had an unquestionable role.⁹ The great majority (circa 70%) came from such a close Arabic country like Lebanon (890), Jordan (2,089), Palestine (114), Kuwait (71), Saudi Arabia (2,500), Egypt (358), Algeria (200), Libya (556), Morocco (1,500) or Tunisia (2,400–3,000).¹⁰ Tel Aviv did not prove to be an exception either in relation to the volunteers and the Shin Bet estimated the number of Arabs with Israeli citizenship, who fights for ISIL, between 40–50 men, in November 2014.¹¹ Almost 300 persons from China,

⁵ Ruth Sherlock: *ibid.*

⁶ Patrick Cockburn: War with Isis: Islamic militants have army of 200,000, claims senior Kurdish leader. In: *The Independent*, November 16, 2014. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-with-isis-islamic-militants-have-army-of-200000-claims-kurdish-leader-9863418.html> (Accessed: 12. 19. 2014.)

⁷ Unfortunately, the mass release of militant Islamists was not a singular occurrence and there were several instances in the North African Arabic States after the Arab Spring. These fundamentalist utilized the declination of central authority and practically expanded freely the number of their supporters and financial sources even if it was not so rapid like in Iraq. Some of them also latched on to political life where they played more and more active role. (Besenyő János: „Arab tavasz” – politikai rendszerváltás az észak-afrikai arab államokban. In: *Kül-Világ*, VIII. évf. 4. sz. 2011, 74–75.)

⁸ Richard Barrett: *Foreign Fighters in Syria*. The Soufan Group, New York, June 2014, 9.

⁹ The effects of the Arab Spring and the strengthening of Islamist tendencies see more details: Besenyő János: Can the „Arab Spring” Present a Real Threat to Europe? In: *Strategic Impact*, No. 1/2014, 32–44.

¹⁰ It ain't half hot here, mum. In: *The Economist*, August 30, 2014. <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerners-go-fight-syria-and-iraq-it-aint-half-hot-here-mum> (Accessed: 12. 19. 2014.)

¹¹ Assaf Uni: Israelis Are Joining ISIS. In: *Vocative*, November 07, 2014. <http://www.vocativ.com/world/isis-2/israelis-fighting-isis/> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.)

mostly members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, also assumed the struggle and travelled to Syria.¹² We can regard the enhancements from the neighbouring Turkey as considerable and continuous. At least 1,000 persons arrived for fighting from the NATO-member state, where the disaffection of Islamists grew considerable in the background, until the middle of September 2014.¹³ The proportion of Dagestan and Chechen combatants, who came from the Northern Caucasus regions of the Russian Federation, is probably the most shocking. Actually their number in Syria was estimated between 400–1,000 persons who fight in separate military units under their own commandship. If we can trust in one of the published announcements of the Syrian Army, then about 14,000 fighters have served for much or less time in these units, regarded the most effective forces of ISIL, and 3,691 has died among them since the beginning of the conflict.¹⁴

In addition to this, currently the persons' number who were the citizens of one of the Western States was estimated to 2,000–3,000. Fewer than 20 men travelled to Afghanistan for fighting between 1979 and 2001 from France, where several deadly terror attacks occurred during the 1990s. According to the current trend, the veterans' number was in excess of 700 persons in the middle of 2014!¹⁵ The situation is more shocking in the case of Belgium, which is six times smaller than France, still 250–400 extremists left the country for Syria.¹⁶ The German volunteers represent a middle category and the number of the adherents was estimated about 550 in the end of November 2014.¹⁷ This is three times more than the Norwegians, Swedish, Dutchmen and the Austrians, whose number is approximately 150.¹⁸ In the case of Denmark, as well as Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo in the Balkans, the number of those inhabitants who travelled to armed jihad exceeded 100. The proportions are different in the case of other affected European countries. According to official announcements, in Italy, Finland, Ireland, Macedonia and Spain on average 30–50 persons have been affected by the Syrian struggles till now. Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Hungary represent the lowest proportion. According to the actual results of investigations, the number of volunteers is about 10 persons or fewer from these states.¹⁹ The precise definition of this number is especially complicated in the case of our country. Nowadays we can only

¹² 300 Chinese are fighting alongside ISIS in Iraq, Syria. In: The New York Post, December 15, 2014. <http://nypost.com/2014/12/15/300-chinese-are-fighting-alongside-isis-in-iraq-syria/> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.)

¹³ Ceylan Yeginsu: ISIS Draws a Steady Stream of Recruits From Turkey. In: The New York Times, September 15, 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/world/europe/turkey-is-a-steady-source-of-isis-recruits.html> (Accessed: 12. 19. 2014.)

¹⁴ Mohanad Hashim: Iraq and Syria: Who are the foreign fighters? In: BBC News, September 3, 2014. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29043331> (Accessed: 12. 19. 2014.)

¹⁵ Richard Barrett: op. cit., 18.

¹⁶ Ben Winsor: Why So Many Jihadists Come From Belgium. In: Business Insider, September 05, 2014. <http://www.businessinsider.com/belgian-fighters-in-iraqsyria--isis-2014-9> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.)

¹⁷ 550 Germans join ISIL terrorist group in Iraq, Syria: German minister. In: Islamic Invitation Turkey, November 22, 2014. <http://www.islamicinvitationturkey.com/2014/11/22/550-germans-join-isis-terrorist-group-in-iraq-syria-german-minister/> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.)

¹⁸ Sweden says up to 150 people left country to join ISIS. In: CTV News, October 22, 2014. <http://www.ctvnews.ca/mobile/world/sweden-says-up-to-150-people-left-country-to-join-isis-1.2065155> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.), PST underestimate number of terror fighters from Norway. In: The Local, December 02, 2014. <http://www.thelocal.no/20141202/double-the-number-of-freedom-fighters-are-from-norway-pst> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.)

¹⁹ About the repartition per countries of the European volunteers in January 2014 see more details: Foreign fighters from Western countries in the ranks of the rebel organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad in Syria. In: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center January, 2014, 3–5. <http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20616> (Accessed: 12. 19. 2014.)

rely on uncertain blog entries without authentic sources at best. According to these notes minimum four Syrian–Hungarian dual citizens have died during the combats till now.

In addition, nearly 100 Americans, at least 130 Canadians and 200 Australians fight in the Arabic country according to the estimation of the FBI. They do this despite the fact that they can easily lose their citizenship and they have a good chance to be brought to justice with charges of terrorism if they return home.²⁰ It seems to be more astonishing that the largest western contingent of ISIL consists of Britons who are considered being the most bloodthirsty terrorists in Syria. According to Khalid Mahmood, Britain's first Muslim Member of Parliament, their number is as high as 2,000.²¹

The third group consists of new local affiliates. The reason of their affiliation is remarkably different. The militia members and ex-Baathists have made tactical alliances with ISIL. Besides this, the proportion of those recruits who were forced to join through intimidation or violence from occupied territory is considerable.

There are three main methods of recruitment. Most of the recruiters are likely to use Internet-based platforms for finding potential volunteers. In addition to this there is also considerable persuasion, based on personal contacts. Besides these, the most common method is still the enlistment. Prisons also proved to be perfect places for recruiting. Several members of armed men were previously imprisoned in Iraq or Syria before they gained their liberty back in a mass jailbreak or escape.²² It is also observable mainly in the instance of Maghreb countries that local civil society groups previously impressed the sympathizers who then travelled to Syria with their support.

THE ARMAMENT

Currently we do not have reliable estimations, how many weapons could be found on the territories controlled by ISIL. However, all of the experts agree that the fighters of the terror-organization are well-armed with conventional weapons and ammunition that were made mostly in the 1980s or 1990s. Getting arms was easy because in the beginning the clashes occurred in Iraqi zones where there had been many arm-stores previously. Meanwhile, fighting against American and coalition forces, the rebels broke into depots, which had been built up during Saddam Hussein's governance, full of different variants of AK-47 assault-rifles, PK machine-guns, RPG-7 anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade launchers and RKG-3 anti-armour hand grenades from the one-time Eastern bloc. In addition to small arms, they

²⁰ Alessandria Masi: *ISIS Recruiting Westerners: How The 'Islamic State' Goes After Non-Muslims And Recent Converts In The West*. In: *International Business Times*, September 08, 2014. <http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-recruiting-westerners-how-islamic-state-goes-after-non-muslims-recent-converts-west-1680076> (Accessed: 12. 19. 2014.); Winsor, Ben: *Hundreds Of Westerners Have Joined ISIS, And Here's Where They Came From*. In: *Business Insider Australia*, Augustus 28, 2014. <http://www.businessinsider.com.au/isis-is-recruiting-westerners-countries-2014-8> (Accessed: 12. 19. 2014.)

²¹ Donna Rachel Edmunds: *'2,000 British Jihadis Fighting With ISIS', Says Muslim MP*. In: *Breitbart*, November 23, 2014. <http://www.breitbart.com/london/2014/11/23/claim-there-are-2000-british-jihadis-fighting-with-isis-says-muslim-mp/> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.)

²² State of emergency: *ISIS militants overrun Iraq city of 1.8mn, free 2,500 prisoners*. In: *RT News*, June 18, 2014. <http://rt.com/news/165044-militants-seize-mosul-iraq/> (Accessed: 12. 23. 2014.); Suadad al-Salhy: *Al Qaeda says it freed 500 inmates in Iraq jail-break*. In: *Reuters*, July 23, 2013. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/23/us-iraq-violence-alqaeda-idUSBRE96M0C720130723> (Accessed: 12. 09. 2014.)

also got Chinese Type 63 107 mm Multiple rocket launcher systems, shoulder-fired missiles as well as large quantities of C-4 and other I.E.D. components.²³

ISIL got another opportunity for expanding its arsenal after the outbreak of the Syrian war as well as the Iraqi civil war that emerged after the American secession. The situation became especially alarming after June 2014, when the terrorists seized considerable quantities of American made weapons in the occupied Iraqi military bases. Namely, the American armed forces gave modern arms in huge quantities from their weapon-supplies to the Iraqi Army before withdrawing from the country in 2011. However, the disintegration of the Iraqi armed forces intensified after the offensive of terror-organization in January 2014. The soldiers deserted in mass due to the horrible casualties and they dropped their armaments. ISIL seized the American-originated weapon supplies of five Iraqi divisions in the districts of Anbar, Mosul, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk and Diyala in the beginning of the summer. These armaments were enough to equip about 200,000 persons.²⁴ One fourth of the snatched supplies, which consists of several shoulder-fired American FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles, around 30 T-55s with a 100 mm rifled gun as well as five to ten T-72s each with a 125 mm main gun, several hundred armoured Humvees, Hummer GMCs and M1088 trucks, according to unconfirmed reports, one or two American M1 Abrams tanks, 90 mm M79 Osa rocket launchers, Croatian RBG-6 semi-automatic grenade launchers, 52 American 155 mm M198 Howitzer medium-sized artillery pieces with GPS aiming system and Chinese Type 59-1 field guns as well as Polish and Soviet made 23 mm ZU-23-2 and ZSU-23-4 Shilka anti-aircraft guns and at least one SCUD rocket, were transported to Syria in a short time.²⁵

ISIL renewed its offensive against Syrian governmental targets in Raqqa, Hasakah and Aleppo governorates in the middle of July and it could continue expanding its military capabilities. Among others they seized at least 12 130 mm M-46 towed field guns that can strike targets 27 km away. In addition, they captured around 400–500 122 mm Grad rockets and at least seven BM-21 truck-mounted multiple rocket-launchers, several operational T-55 tanks, several hundred RPGs, tens of thousands of rounds of small-arms ammunition, dozens of military vehicles, assault rifles, hand grenades and several anti-tank guided missiles.²⁶

²³ John Ismay: Insight Into How Insurgents Fought in Iraq. In: The New York Times, October 17, 2013. <http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/insight-into-how-insurgents-fought-in-iraq/> (Accessed: 12. 23. 2014.)

²⁴ John Blosser: Report: US Weapons Now in Hands of ISIS. In: Newsmax, September 8, 2014. <http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/ISIS-weapons-ammunition-American/2014/09/08/id/593216/> (Accessed: 12. 23. 2014.); Princy George: Analysis: Why has the Iraqi army struggled to counter ISIL advance? In: Jane's Defence Weekly, June 15, 2014. <http://www.janes.com/article/39259/analysis-why-has-the-iraqi-army-struggled-to-counter-isil-advance> (Accessed: 12. 23. 2014.)

²⁵ Isis leader calls on Muslims to, build Islamic staté.' In: BBC News, July 1, 2014. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28116846> (Accessed: 12. 23. 2014.); US-made Stinger missiles have likely fallen into ISIS hands, officials say. In: Fox News, June 16, 2014. <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/06/16/us-made-stinger-missiles-have-likely-fallen-into-isis-hands-officials-say/> (Accessed: 12. 23. 2014.); Jeremy Bender: As ISIS Routs The Iraqi Army, Here's A Look At What The Jihadists Have In Their Arsenal. In: Business Insider, July 8, 2014, 2014. <http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-military-equipment-breakdown-2014-7?op=1#t-55-tanks-1> (Accessed: 12. 23. 2014.); Mehmet Kemal Firik: ISIS's weapon inventory grows. In: Daily Sabah, July 02, 2014. <http://www.dailysabah.com/mideast/2014/07/03/isiss-weapon-inventory-grows> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.); Mitchell Prothero: Iraqi army remains on defensive as extent of June debacle becomes clearer. In Stars and Stripes, July 14, 2014. <http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/iraqi-army-remains-on-defensive-as-extent-of-june-debacle-becomes-clearer-1.293417> (Accessed: 12. 23. 2014.)

²⁶ Charles Lister: Not Just Iraq: The Islamic State Is Also on the March in Syria. In: The World Post, August 7, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-lister/not-just-iraq-the-islamic_b_5658048.html?utm_hp_ref=tw (Accessed: 12. 23. 2014.)

Moreover, SA-7 Grail man-portable low-altitude surface-to-air missile systems, American BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missiles, Chinese HJ-8 and Russian AT-4 Spigot anti-tank systems as well as 12,7 mm DShK machine guns and Chinese 37 mm twin-barreled anti-aircraft guns regularly appeared on the propaganda videos of the terror-organization.²⁷ The danger increased when the terror-organization recently published an online guide describing how to use shoulder-launched missiles. The information proved to be useful for the militants in practice. One of them shot down an Iraqi Mi-35M attack helicopter with a Chinese FN-6 man-portable air defence system on October 3, 2014 and five days later another Beel-IA-407 was shot down near Baji.²⁸

In addition to small arms, artillery pieces and tanks, ISIL also prized drones, aircrafts and helicopters. For instance, they seized UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and cargo planes when they occupied Mosul in June 2014.²⁹ Although western experts and the leadership of American armed forces did not expect the deployment of these armaments, now it seems that experience confuted their opinion. Namely, the terror-organization has several fighters who are well-versed on using these weapon systems and more or less experienced in conventional warfare. According to the reports of witnesses, former Iraqi fighter pilots trained their Syrian comrades with three MiG-21 or MiG-23 planes, captured from the Syrian Army, over the recently occupied al-Jarrah military airport in October.³⁰ This news was supported by the Syrian cabinet's announcement when they reported the destruction of two of the mentioned three jets.³¹

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

However, the main threat is posed by the non-conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons as well as raw materials for weapons of mass destruction that were seized by ISIL. For instance, the occupation of al-Muthanna chemical complex caused especially serious alarm due to the further fate of 2,500 chemical rockets filled with the nerve agent sarin, stored on the territory of the factory in June 2014. According to experts, it was unnecessary to overrate the importance of the danger because the nerve gas, stored there for too long, became useless for attack due to the non-adequate conditions. New fears emerged not more than one month later due to the theft of around 40 kg of uranium compounds from Mosul University in July 2014. This time experts ruled out the opportunity for turning the stolen

²⁷ Thomas Gibbons-Neff: ISIS propaganda videos show their weapons, skills in Iraq. In: The Washington Post, June 18, 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/06/18/isis-propaganda-videos-show-their-weapons-skills-in-iraq/> (Accessed: 12. 23. 2014.)

²⁸ Kirk Semple – Eric Schmitt: Missiles of ISIS May Pose Peril for Aircrews in Iraq. In: The New York Times, October 26, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/27/world/middleeast/missiles-of-isis-may-pose-peril-for-aircrews.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1 (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.)

²⁹ Tyler Durden: Al Qaeda Militants Capture US Black Hawk Helicopters In Iraq. In: Zero Hedge, June 10, 2014. <http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-06-10/al-qaeda-militants-capture-us-blackhawk-helicopters-iraq> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.); Eli Lake – Jamie Dettmer – Nadette De Visser: Iraq's Terrorists Are Becoming a Full-Blown Army. In: The Daily Beast, June 11, 2014. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/11/iraq-s-terrorists-are-becoming-a-full-blown-army.html> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.)

³⁰ Sylvia Westall: Islamic State flying three jets in Syria: monitor. In: Reuters, October 17, 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/17/us-mideast-crisis-jets-idUSKCN0I60TM20141017> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.)

³¹ Syria says shoots down two of three Islamic State jets. In: Reuters, October 22, 2014. <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/22/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-jets-idUKKCN0IB1H220141022> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.)

material into a viable nuclear weapon within years due to the lack of acceptable material and technical background. At the same time, they did not find it impossible to combine a radioactive source with explosives for constructing a “dirty-bomb”.³²

Nowadays it seems that ISIL cannot produce weapons of mass destruction in the foreseeable future. However, it proved several times that it did not boggle at using chemical and biological derivatives, captured on North-Iraqi military bases, on the front. For instance, they seized mustard gas in the al-Muthanna facility, which was more stable. According to suspicions based on the generated symptoms, they used it against Kurds during the struggle around Kobani in July 2014 as well as in the second half of October.³³ Industrial chlorine is also relatively available without troubles due its wide use in daily life. It can be shipped and stored relatively easily in liquid state. It can easily get to the air with an improvised device and after dispersing it hinders the breath of target persons. However, the latter also means its main limitation. It only hinders and does not paralyze the respiration of the target persons in most of the cases. Therefore, it is useless in battles; it is effective only for generating fear. This was proved by the attacks in September 2014 against 11 officers of the Iraqi Security Forces as well as 40 soldiers and militants. All of them survived the attack.³⁴

Finally, we would also like to append to this that ISIL continuously gets weapon supplies of different types and quantities in lesser proportion from foreign countries above the captured arms. The support of foreign governments and organizations pass into the state on one of the smuggling routes running across Turkey.

CONCLUSION

This series of successes makes unequivocal that the Iraqi and Syrian states are not capable for fighting against ISIL alone. Wide international cooperation and possibly a direct intervention are necessary to restrain the extremists not only in the territory of the two concerned countries, but at global level too, if necessary. The first soothing steps for realizing the latter occurred on August 2014, when the United States started its airstrikes against the military positions of ISIL. Different governments all over the world made concrete decisions for suppressing ISIL’s global recruiting campaign. The authorities proceeded more definitely against persons who got on their horizon. Apart from this, they continuously followed the related entries on internet platforms and they removed the different propaganda videos and reports from Youtube and Twitter.

³² Matthew Cottey – Dina Esfandiary: The very small Islamic State WMD threat. In: Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences, October 15, 2014. <http://thebulletin.org/very-small-islamic-state-wmd-threat7729> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.)

³³ Jonathan Spyer: Meria Special Report: Did ISIS Use Chemical Weapons Against the Kurds in Kobani? In: Gloria Center, Global Research in International Affaires, October 12, 2014. <http://www.gloria-center.org/2014/10/meria-special-report-did-isis-use-chemical-weapons-against-the-kurds-in-kobani-warning-graphic-content/> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.), Emma Graham-Harrison: Kurds fear Isis use of chemical weapon in Kobani. In: The Guardian, October 24, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/24/kurds-fear-isis-chemical-weapon-kobani> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.)

³⁴ Iraqis say ISIL used chlorine gas in attacks. In: Al-Jazeera, October 24, 2014. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/iraqi-isis-chlorine-gas-attacks-20141024145426293714.html> (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.); Loveday Morris: Islamic State militants allegedly used chlorine gas against Iraqi security forces. In: The Washington Post, October 23, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/islamic-state-militants-allegedly-used-chlorine-gas-against-iraqi-security-forces/2014/10/23/c865c943-1c93-4ac0-a7ed-033218f15cbb_story.html?hpid=z1 (Accessed: 01. 05. 2015.)

Above the efforts for rolling back the number of volunteers, another important task of the international community is to demolish the economic background of ISIL. The American airstrikes particularly target the oilfields under ISIL authority because these are the main financial sources of the extremists. They also took strong measures for eliminating foreign financial aids. Due to the diplomatic communication in relation with this subject, the rich Gulf States brought pressure to bear on mainly Saudi and Qatari individuals who had financed the terror-organization.

Despite all of this, we cannot consider the situation tranquil. Although the new government in Iraq scored several victories during the past weeks, the previously lost important cities are still under the control of ISIL. The circumstances are more critical in Syria where huge efforts are made by the Free Syrian Army in order to become an effective armed force. Above such conditions, it has got little chance for fighting successfully against ISIL's army, which has outstanding morale and preparedness.

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Peter Busch:

TERRORISM AND THE INTUITIVE JOURNALISTIC NARRATIVE

ABSTRACT: The Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris and the use of the Internet by the so-called Islamic State have yet again raised questions about Western media coverage of terrorist acts. This article reviews recent literature and investigates afresh why terrorist attacks tend to dominate the news agenda. It argues that governments, security forces as well as media organizations need to be aware that a particular mode of storytelling has come to rule journalistic practices. This mode is termed intuitive journalistic narrative here. By investigating historic cases of videos depicting hostages, it is shown how this intuitive narrative contributes to magnifying terrorist acts. The article also shows that media organizations realise this when they find the time to reflect on their practices. Yet lessons learned from previous coverage tend to be easily forgotten when journalists face breaking news situations. Media as well as governments' public affairs officials need to recognize this in their communication activities in crisis situation.

KEYWORDS: Terrorism, Media, Hostage Videos, Islamic State, Iraq

Acts of terrorism, particularly of urban terrorism, are often regarded as acts of communication: the violent attack, the suicide bombing, or the hostage taking are means to attract media attention and thereby spread whatever message the perpetrators aim to convey.¹ In the context of the emergence of new and social media, particular importance has been assigned to the instantaneous availability of imagery that serves to magnify 21st century “propaganda of the deed.”² Indeed, current academic and public discourses focus on the threat posed by the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS), its brutal killing of hostages, and the impact the distribution of these and other IS messages – especially on Twitter – have on attracting new IS recruits world-wide.³

Against the background of these discourses, a fresh look at the journalistic coverage of terrorist violence seems necessary. While not denying the significance of visual representations of violence or the potential power of the new communication space, established journalistic practices of storytelling need to be re-evaluated. These practices, specifically what will be

¹ David Omand: Ethical Guidelines for Using Secret Intelligence for Public Security. In: Review of International Affairs, 19, 2006, 614. See also: Joseph S. Tuman: Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimension of Terrorism, Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2010), 31–43, and Joshua Alexander Geltzer: US Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Signalling and the Terrorist World-View. London, Routledge, 2010, 10–29.

² Neville Bolt: Strategic Communication in Crisis. In: The RUSI Journal 156/4, 2011, 44–53.

³ Jytte Klausen: Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq. In: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 38:1 (2015), 2. James P. Farwell: The Media Strategy of ISIS. In: Survival, 56:6, 49. J. M. Berger – Jonathan Morgan: This ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS supporters on Twitter. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper No. 20, March 2015. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/brookings-analysis-paper_jm-berger_final_web.pdf (Accessed: 03. 09. 2015.)

termed ‘intuitive journalistic narrative’ here, help explain why mainstream media find it hard to resist following an agenda largely controlled by the group or network behind the terrorist act.

In order to unpack the relationship between terrorist attacks and the media, a brief survey of recent scholarship on media, war, and conflict will be followed by a discussion of television narratives. To analyse the professional practice of employing the ‘intuitive narrative’, one case is discussed in detail: the kidnapping and beheading of the British hostage Ken Bigley in Iraq in 2004. This case also reminds us of the origins of IS a decade ago when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group used videos showing the beheading of Western hostages to catch the attention of a global audience. Finally, a brief discussion of subsequent cases of hostage takings explores the extent of ‘media learning’ in covering terrorist acts.

JOURNALISM AND CONFLICT

Media and terrorism are regarded as being closely linked in our media-saturated age. Accordingly, some believe that if journalists toned down or limited their reporting of terrorist acts, the political message associated with the violence would be denied the limelight that the attackers seek.⁴ They would be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ as former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher put it in 1981.⁵

Even more than thirty years after Thatcher’s speech, the discourse among defence and security experts echoes her basic assumption. The problem of information management in recent wars and the fight against terrorism is regarded as even more challenging. The challenges of the new media ecology, the immediacy of reporting, or the enemies’ cunning use of new and social media are usually given as examples.⁶

These attitudes are to some extent reflected in the recent media studies literature. When Simon Cottle refers to ‘mediatised conflict’, he argues that 21st century conflicts are not only represented or mirrored in the information space. Cottle stresses that in our ‘mediated societies [conflicts] are often known, represented and even discharged through the media’.⁷ In other words, the media’s performative representation and enactment of conflicts is important, as well as the space granted to news events (often ritualistically), and how professional journalistic narratives encode ‘stories’ in various cultural situations.

In a similar vein, Hoskins and O’Loughlin stress the interpenetration of media and warfare that they called ‘diffused war’. This war is ‘immersed in and produced through a new media ecology’.⁸ War penetrates every walk of mediated life: from news and documentaries to movies, soap operas, as well as to Facebook, podcasts, blogs, and video games. This is a society where ‘mass self-communication’, to employ Manuel Castells’s phrase, profoundly affects the mediation of political violence. In this society, we not only produce some of the globally disseminated content ourselves, we have also learned to become ‘monitorial

⁴ Randall G. Bowdish: *Cerberus to Mind: Media as Sentinel in the Fight against Terrorism*. In: *Strategic Insights*, vol. 5, issue 5, 2006. <http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/11117/bowdishMay06.pdf?sequence=1> (Accessed: 03. 08. 2015.)

⁵ Margaret Thatcher: *Speech to American Bar Association*, 15 July 1981. <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106096> (Accessed: 01. 15. 2015.)

⁶ Klausen: *Tweeting the Jihad*, 3–4.

⁷ Simon Cottle: *Mediatized Conflicts*. Maidenhead, Open University Press, 2006, 186.

⁸ Andrew Hoskins – Ben O’Loughlin: *The Media at War*. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 7.

citizens' – media users who monitor news and other sources for information that matter to us personally.⁹ Consequently, flux and unpredictability are important aspects of social reality.¹⁰ Journalism, faced with 'an unparalleled degree of human agency and user control in our lived experience of mediated reality', has to become fluid itself, embracing uncertainty and complexity.¹¹

Dealing with this uncertainty and complexity is not easy. One of the 'coping strategies' for journalists in the highly competitive and increasingly underfunded news business is to rely on their professional practices, often learned in journalism school or similar training courses. These very practices and journalistic narrative constructions that have come to dominate the profession help explain why acts of terrorism in particular tend to attract seemingly disproportionate media attention.

One key feature of journalism – right from its inception in the coffee houses of London and Paris – is that it deals with news as a commodity.¹² Pamphlets as well as early newspapers could only survive if they found readers who were willing to pay for the information provided. This basic principle has not changed, even if the Internet has eroded the traditional funding model of 20th century journalism. Consequently, the field of journalism has established professional norms, values, and styles that enable journalists to produce newspapers, broadcasts, and websites that provide useful information. As the journalistic sector expanded, education of journalists was increasingly standardised. Training programmes and university degrees were established, particularly in the United States.¹³ These programmes and degrees were instrumental in defining what 'good' journalism ought to look like. Textbooks on how to be a journalist also summarised the news values that aspiring journalists were expected to internalise in order to find good stories and tell them in a way that appealed to readers, listeners, and viewers. Definitions of what journalism is or what news should be providing were consequently formulated. 'News is what's different,' was one of the slogans that quickly became one of the commandments every young journalist was to take to heart.¹⁴ Indeed, journalism trainees learn that consumers of media products do not seem to be interested in the ritual everydayness of our lives. Accordingly, there are certain 'news factors' like the relevance of a story, the scale of the event, its timing, the availability of pictures and its proximity to the readers and viewers that determine newsworthiness.¹⁵

One additional news factor listed in journalism textbooks is 'drama'. While dramatic events and stories, full of suspense and emotional twists and turns, have traditionally made good newspaper copy, 'drama' and 'conflict' are seen to be even more important in television

⁹ Michael Schudson: *The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999. Zygmunt Bauman: *Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty*. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007.

¹⁰ Mark Deuze: *The Changing Context of News Work: Liquid Journalism and Monitorial Citizenship*. In: *International Journal of Communication*, 2, 2008, 848–865.

¹¹ Deuze: *The Changing Context of News Work*, 860.

¹² Brian McNair: *What is Journalism?* In: *Making Journalists: Diverse Issues, Global Models*, edited by Hugo de Burgh, London, Routledge, 2005, 27.

¹³ Christopher Simpson: *Science of Coercion. Communication Research and Psychological Warfare 1945–1960*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1994.

¹⁴ These educational doctrines are not limited to Anglo-Saxon journalism, but dominate journalism textbooks in other Western countries as well. An example is Germany's standard textbook: Walther Von Laroche: *Einführung in den praktischen Journalismus*. Berlin, Econ Verlag, 2004.

¹⁵ Jon Smith: *Essential Reporting: The NCTJ Guide for Trainee Journalist*, London, Sage Publications, 2007, 16–22.

newscasts. This focus on dramatic, exciting, and ultimately entertaining events has been criticised as ‘dumbing down’ and endangering the vital political and educational role modern media order to play in liberal democracies. Theodor Adorno warned of the dangers of the ‘culture industry’ immediately after 1945, Neil Postman deplored that we were ‘amusing ourselves to death’ in the 1980s, and Michael Ignatieff noted the growing virtuality of the representation of war, conflict, and violence at the turn of the 21st century.¹⁶ From the perspective of professional journalism, however, ‘drama’ as well as ‘emotion’ are seen as vital elements of news stories.

INTUITIVE JOURNALISTIC NARRATIVE

This journalistic perspective is succinctly summarised in Al Tompkins’s book *Aim for the heart -- a guide for TV producers and reporters*. Tompkins, a fellow at the Poynter Institute, wrote this ‘guide’ after gaining years of practical experience in American broadcast journalism. For Tompkins, television journalism is about storytelling, which is much more than fact telling. This does not mean news stories on television should not be based on facts and thorough research. A thorough grasp of the facts and the background of an event are necessary to condense what happened in such a way that makes it possible to tell a short, compelling, and factual news story. The key is to find the right focus of the story and to connect it to ‘the viewer’s heart’, as Tompkins puts it.¹⁷

Tompkins cites a television report he made in 1993 to illustrate his point. He was assigned to cover the return of soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division from their peacekeeping mission in Somalia. While driving to the airport he considered the various angles of the story. He then decided to focus on an army wife called Marla and her child who were waiting for the return of Marla’s husband. Tompkins ignored traditional and oft-repeated images of an air force plane on the tarmac, soldiers disembarking and running towards their families. Instead, he showed the army wife’s face close-up, expectantly gazing towards the plane, thereby capturing the emotions that Marla was going through. While many of his colleagues told the general story of ‘soldiers coming home’, Tompkins narrated the story ‘Marla awaits husband’. Tompkins finds it useful to reduce the essence of television reports to three words: a subject, a verb and an object. He stresses that the verb is usually the key to a good story. So the story about soldiers returning from Somalia turned out to be about Marla. And she was *waiting* for her husband.

Tompkins’s reduction of the story to three words amounts to what this article terms intuitive journalistic narrative. The narrative revolves around one central character. This could be a person like Marla, a politician, a celebrity, or an institution like the government or the army. This person, institution, or ‘character’ faces a challenge. From a journalistic perspective, the rule is that the greater this challenge, the better the story. Usually, several other players of minor importance are involved, and the story ends with some form of solution. In the above example, Marla is the main character. She faces the challenge of ‘waiting’, which one of the sentences of Tompkins’s report make abundantly clear: ‘To be an Army wife, you

¹⁶ Theodor Adorno – Max Horkheimer: *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. London, Verso, 1979. Neil Postman: *Amusing ourselves to Death*, London, Methuen, 1987. Michael Ignatieff: *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*. London, Chatto and Windus, 2000.

¹⁷ Al Tompkins: *Write for the Ear, Shoot for the Eye, Aim for the Heart: A Guide for TV Producers and Reporters*. Lanham, Taylor Trade Publishing, 2002.

have to get good at waiting.¹⁸ There are less important actors, like her child, involved, and the solution is that Marla is reunited with her husband Charles.

The task of journalists is to find this narrative in everyday life. Almost every event that journalists cover contains stories that could be told following this simple scheme. The intuitive journalistic narrative seems straightforward and simple, but knowing who in a certain situation faces the biggest challenge often requires careful analysis. There are, however, events and situations that produce exciting intuitive journalistic narratives in abundance. Wars, conflicts, and terrorist attacks fall into this category. These events generate many stories that are dramatic and powerful. Because of the nature of these events, journalists can easily find many characters who face enormous challenges, possibly even the ultimate challenge of life and death. Indeed, for journalists, it becomes a problem to cope with the overwhelming amount of information available in a very fluid situation full of dangers and uncertainties. The media coverage of one of the many kidnappings in Iraq demonstrates the important role the intuitive journalistic narrative played dealing with the challenges of flux, uncertainty, and immediacy.

KEN BIGLEY'S KIDNAPPING AND KILLING

Before discussing Ken Bigley's kidnapping in detail, it is worth noting that television news items usually fall in four categories: breaking news, political, or economic news, light news, and investigative reporting. Breaking news increasingly dominate 24-hour news channels.¹⁹ Political or parliamentary reports fall in the category of 'hard news.' Stories about celebrities, sports, or entertainment are usually seen as lighter news. Investigative reports are news items that the media themselves generate. Prominent examples were the reporting of the Watergate scandal in the 1970s or the reporting in the context of Edward Snowden's revelations of US and British intelligence gathering practices.

It is also important to remember that television journalists construct their stories by using not just images, but also narration, sound bites, sound in general, and sometimes music. These elements make television a powerful emotional medium. Appealing to the audience's emotions maybe deplored by many observers, but psychologists agree that an emotional involvement in a story can be beneficial. According to social identity theorists,²⁰ listeners and viewers recall facts and events easier if they become emotionally involved. Like it or not, television with its appeal to many senses is an emotional medium. Storytelling that is based on the intuitive journalistic narrative tends to make TV stories more emotional still. While there are undoubtedly other factors – 'the spectacle'²¹ or imagery,²² routinely seeking out dramatic and powerful emotional stories of conflict and struggle could play into the hands of terrorists as the case study will show.

¹⁸ Tompkins: *Write for the Ear*, 9.

¹⁹ Kieran Baker: *Conflict and Control: The War in Afghanistan and the 24-hour News Cycle*. In: *Media and War*, edited by Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman, London, Sage Publications, 2003, 244–247.

²⁰ See: Henri Tajfel (ed.): *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

²¹ Douglas Kellner: *Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy: Terrorism, War and Election Battles*, Boulder, Paradigm, 2005.

²² Barbie Zelizer: *When War is Reduced to a Photograph*. In: *Reporting Wars*, edited by Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer, London, Routledge, 2004, 115–35.

Ken Bigley's ordeal began on 16 September 2004. That morning a minivan drew up to his house in an affluent suburb in West Baghdad. According to eye-witnesses, ten militants jumped out of their vehicle and seized Bigley and two of his colleagues, the Americans Eugene Armstrong and Jack Hensley. It soon became clear that the three men had fallen into the hands of one of the most ruthless insurgent groups in Iraq, the Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, later known as Al Qaeda in Iraq and the origin of what is now IS. The group's leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had already been responsible for a number of brutal beheadings, among them the widely publicised killing of the American contractor Nick Berg.²³

Two days after their abduction, al-Zarqawi's group posted a video of the three kneeling and blindfolded hostages on the Internet.²⁴ A militant wearing a black hood declared that the three men would be killed within two days unless female prisoners held at Abu Ghraib and Umm Qasr prisons were released.²⁵ A second video, released on 20 September, proved that these were no empty threats. It showed the beheading of Eugene Armstrong and contained a new 24-hour ultimatum stating that 'the head of the other will follow this one' if the group's demands were not fulfilled. When this ultimatum was not met either, the kidnappers killed Jack Hensley and posted a video of his beheading on the Internet on 22 September 2004.²⁶

It soon became clear that al-Zarqawi had different plans with Bigley. The 62-year-old civil engineer was the first British hostage in Iraq. This was a 'new' experience for British journalists and their audience. His capture promised the potential to generate more media interest in the United Kingdom than the abduction and killing of Armstrong and Hensley as the two men were not the first Americans whose lives had ended in front of the camera lens of kidnappers. Al Zarqawi's group seemed to have realised this.²⁷ On the same day the video of Hensley's beheading was released, al-Zarqawi's group posted a video of Bigley. Information about the existence of this video reached the newsrooms of British broadcasters just over an hour before their main evening news bulletins. It did not leave editors a lot of time to make a decision on how to deal with it. All major British television stations decided to show extracts of the video. The grainy footage was a far cry from recent IS video productions. However, it showed Ken Bigley pleading for his life, and this had an immediate impact on the British news agenda. Newspapers picked up on the story the following day, publishing still images of Bigley as well as a transcript of his emotional appeal:

'I don't want to die, I don't deserve it, and neither do those women deserve to be held in the Iraqi prisons. Please, please release the female prisoners who are held in Iraqi prisons. Please help them, I need you to help, Mr Blair. You are now the only person on God's earth

²³ Dawn Perlmutter: Mujahideen Blood Rituals: The Religious and Forensic Symbolism of Al Qaeda Beheadings. In: *Anthropoetics*, 11:2, 2005–2006, 2. <http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap1102/muja.htm> (Accessed: 03. 12. 2015.)

²⁴ Patrick Cockburn: Iraqis tell Britain: Release our prisoners or we will kill hostage. In: *The Independent on Sunday*, 19 September 2004, 1.

²⁵ Adrian Blomfield: Hostages will die within 48 hours, say Iraqi kidnappers. *The Sunday Telegraph*, 19 September, 2004, 26. For a summary of Bigley's 23-day captivity see: *The Bigley Killing: One Man's Ordeal: How the story unfolded*, *The Observer*, 10 October 2004, 16, and *Timeline: Ken Bigley*, BBC News Online, October 8, 2004: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3726846.stm> (Accessed: 03. 01. 2015.)

²⁶ The videos are still available on the Internet, e.g. on websites like 'goregrish.com': <https://goregrish.com/video/83/jack-hensley-beheading> (Accessed: 03. 08. 2015.)

²⁷ As Michael Ignatieff put it: 'An accomplished terrorist – al-Zarqawi is undoubtedly one – understands us better than we seem to understand him.' Michael Ignatieff: *The Terrorist as Film Director*. In: *The Sunday Times*, 11 November 2004, 4.

*that I can speak to. ... Please, please help me to see my wife who cannot go on without me. And my son. (Breaks down) Please help me ... please help me.*²⁸

Realising that the kidnappers did not intend to kill Bigley as quickly as his American colleagues, Bigley's family in Liverpool tried to help. They organised press conferences, appealing to the kidnappers to spare Bigley's life as well as putting pressure on the government of then Prime Minister Tony Blair to work for Bigley's release. In turn, Tony Blair and Jack Straw, then Foreign Secretary, involved the American as well as the Iraqi governments. Bigley's kidnapping became a major news story in Britain and continued to dominate the media as well as the political agenda until mid-October 2004.

Al-Zarqawi's group fuelled the story with the release of another video on 29 September 2004. Bigley, again dressed in an orange jumpsuit to make him appear like one of the Muslim prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay, was filmed in a cage. This 'staging' was not only directed at the British public. It was also designed to appeal to the audience in Iraq and the Middle East in an attempt to demonstrate that the US and its allies were not all-powerful.²⁹ This message apparently fell on fertile ground: CDs with hostage videos were reportedly proving very popular merchandise in Baghdad.³⁰ Bigley was made to repeat the same pleas as in the first video, directly addressing Prime Minister Blair, but he seemed increasingly distressed. By now his ordeal had become a global news story. Other governments became involved. The Irish prime minister offered Bigley an Irish passport in the hope that this would save his life. But these attempts were in vain. On 8 October 2004 Abu Dhabi television received the video that showed Ken Bigley's beheading. The kidnappers had either decided that they had received sufficient media attention or they might have felt increasing military pressure on their hideout. Al-Zarqawi had certainly made his point: the kidnapping of Bigley and his American colleagues had dominated the news agenda for 23 days. Questions about Tony Blair's Iraq policy were raised not only by Ken Bigley's family but also in the British parliament.³¹ The hostage taking also demonstrated to a local and global audience that Iraqi insurgents were not completely powerless in the face of the occupation of their country.

While the story of Ken Bigley's ordeal was unfolding, some journalists asked to what extent they had become tools of terrorist activity. Broadcasters were aware that the videos were being drip fed to maximise their impact.³² This suggested al-Zarqawi's thorough understanding of how Western news channels operated. The availability of new material to 'freshen up' the reporting certainly made it easier for journalists to keep the story alive. However, the 'drip feeding' of the videos were not the only reason why the Bigley story came to dominate the news agenda. This article argues that by following the intuitive narrative, as journalists had been trained to do, the story developed a life of its own and led journalists to neglect the ethical guidelines that the profession has given itself.³³

The dramatic and emotional appeal of the main story 'Ken Bigley pleads for his life' – to use Al Tompkins simple sentence structure – is immediately apparent. Ken Bigley, the main

²⁸ Edited version of Ken Bigley's video message: Plea to Prime Minister. In: *The Guardian*, 23 September 2010, 1.

²⁹ Makram Houry-Machoo: Kidnap Videos: Setting the Power Relations of New Media. In: *Communicating War: Memory, Media and Military* edited by Sarah Maltby and Richard Keeble, Bury St. Edmunds, Arima Publishing, 2007, 163.

³⁰ Luke Harding: Iraq crisis: brutal kidnappers gain in popularity. In: *The Guardian*, 21 September 2004, 4.

³¹ Jamie Wilson – Matthew Taylor: For family, a horrific wait in vain. In: *The Guardian*, 9 October 2004, 4.

³² Jon Snow interview. In: *Documentary* by Jason Burk: Channel Terror, BBC, 2005.

³³ For an overview of ethics guidelines and rules see Matthew Kieran (ed.): *Media Ethics*, London, Routledge, 1998.

character, faced the ‘ultimate’ challenge. He was held in captivity, his fellow hostages had been executed, he was dressed in prison clothing, and he was pleading for his life, breaking down in the process. Ken Bigley himself mentioned other players in this story: his family and Prime Minister Tony Blair. Importantly, these actors became main characters in their own right as the days went by. Bigley’s mother, his son, and his wife had to deal with major challenges as well. They tried to save Bigley’s life. They pleaded with the hostage takers; they appealed to politicians and kidnappers. They were propelled into the limelight and had to deal with publicity and instant fame. This as well as the reaction of the wider community in Liverpool amounted to powerful, dramatic, and emotional stories.

The Prime Minister and his reaction also became a story. He himself faced a major challenge: how would he react to Bigley’s ordeal? How would he deal with being appealed to directly? Could he do anything to rescue Bigley? Tony Blair’s involvement provided journalists with a major political story. At the same time, the Bigley story provided ‘breaking news’. Constant updates were provided, not only by new videos the kidnappers released, but also by relatives speaking out or through the release of official statements from the government. The story was also a light news story, a human-interest story. Bigley was a normal citizen, with a normal family living in Liverpool. The whole city of Liverpool became involved and held vigils and prayer services. This provided additional material for journalists, additional images they could use, additional stories that could be told. In short, the Bigley story had it all: it provided breaking news, hard political stories, and human interest stories. Exciting and unusual imagery in the form of grainy videos was available as well as material from Westminster and various locations in Liverpool. In essence, the kidnappers planted the seeds with their videos of the main emotional story of Ken Bigley facing imminent death. The additional stories following the journalistic narrative of main characters facing challenges in a very difficult situation were created in the Western media spaces – basically intuitively and more like a reflex than following editorial reflection.

EVOLUTION: MEDIA LEARNING

The scope and intensity of the media coverage of Bigley’s plight did worry several journalists – even while the crisis was going. ‘We must stop bolstering the beheaders’ demanded the Guardian’s David Aaronovitch on 28 September 2004, one day before the video depicting Ken Bigley in a cage was made public. He quoted the father of Daniel Pearl, one of the first Westerners to be killed in front of a camera well before the invasion of Iraq, who had called the videoed beheadings ‘exhibition killings’. Aaronovitch deplored that journalists now monitored extremist websites constantly in order not to miss the latest video of Western hostages or other cruelties. He proposed that journalists ‘should not broadcast images, appeals and statements that clearly vindicate the Nazi-like criminality of men like Zarqawi’.³⁴

This self-restraint did not materialise during the Bigley crisis. Bigley’s beheading was not shown on television, but his final video was – up to the point when the killer took out his knife.³⁵ Showing hostages under duress and facing imminent death went against previous principles of British journalism, as the former editor-in-chief of ITN, Stewart Purvis, pointed out:

³⁴ David Aaronovitch: We must stop bolstering the beheaders. In: *The Guardian*, 20 September 2004, G2, 9.

³⁵ The report of CBS’s Mark Philips on 9 October 2010 for instance showed 30 seconds of the final video, including Bigley’s last words and the beginning of the killing.

*'There was a convention in British broadcasting that said it was really not proper to actually transmit the words of somebody who had been kidnapped or was being held hostage in some other way. In other words, someone who had lost control of their [sic] own ability to speak freely. And the view was that by transmitting the words out of people's mouths that weren't really their own words, you were in a sense playing the terrorists' game.'*³⁶

Some European broadcasters, German public television for instance, followed these 'old-fashioned' rules and refrained from showing Ken Bigley's video or even still images of his captivity in news bulletins. It took British broadcasters not much longer to return to the same principles. When Margaret Hassan, a British Care worker, was kidnapped in Iraq shortly after Bigley's beheading,³⁷ it quickly became clear that British news media were keen to show more restraint. The BBC, after initially broadcasting short clips of videos showing Hassan pleading for her life, reverted to still images of her, only reading out excerpts of what she had said in her videos. As the then head of BBC News, Roger Mosey, put it:

*'I think the BBC took a more conservative view ... I have no doubt that at times we showed less than our rivals did. And we were very happy with that. I think where they ended up, interestingly, was in a very similar place to where we were. So in fact the policy on Sky and ITN became more conservative and even some Middle East broadcasters ... there was a time when we were waiting for footage from Abu Dhabi TV and they also decided not to broadcast some of the terrorist videos. So overall the broadcasters I think moved to our position.'*³⁸

Even more restrained was the coverage of the hostage taking of the Briton Peter Moore. He and his four bodyguards were kidnapped in 2007 by a different group – al-Zarqawi had been killed by an American air strike in 2006. Nevertheless, the operation of the group that seized Moore was spectacular in size: more than 30 militants dressed in police uniforms were involved. This operation received coverage in the British media. However, as time went by and despite the release of videos showing Peter Moore, news coverage was limited. Interviews with the relatives of the victims were also very rare and controlled. They usually took place in groups of several relatives, with the knowledge and corporation of the British Foreign Office. While this certainly deprived the kidnappers of the publicity they might have been seeking, the fate of the hostages remained terrible. Peter Moore spent two years in captivity and was released in December 2009, several months after his bodyguards had been killed one after the other.³⁹

CONCLUSIONS

Terrorists seek publicity to spread fear and make their messages heard. The intuitive journalistic narrative is one of the reasons why terrorism-related stories like the kidnapping of Ken Bigley can come to dominate television news. This narrative is an essential element

³⁶ Stewart Purvis interview. In: Documentary by Jason Burk, Channel Terror, BBC (2005).

³⁷ For a summary of her kidnapping see Daniel McGory: Last moments of woman who knew she was to die. In: The Times, 17 November 2004, 5.

³⁸ Roger Mosey interview. In: Documentary by Jason Burk, Channel Terror, BBC, 2005.

³⁹ For a wealth of material on Peter Moore – including speculations about Iran's involvement in the hostage taking – see a collection of articles and videos in The Guardian: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/15/peter-moore-hostage-video> (Accessed: 03. 08. 2015)

in the habitual and ritualized coverage of rolling television news stations. It led British and international media to follow an agenda essentially controlled by Ken Bigley's kidnappers. In addition, widely accepted and practiced narrative constructions of news in accordance with principles like 'newness', 'drama', and 'conflict' played an important part in determining the prominence of the Ken Bigley story.

There are no doubt other reasons why terrorist attacks and kidnappings are sometimes not treated with more restraint. In Ken Bigley's case, Iraq was very high on the news agenda in 2004, making hostage crises in that country more likely to pass the journalistic filters. Moreover, the use of video technology and the Internet in the digital age also posed new questions that journalists, under the heavy pressure of real-time news, had to grapple with.⁴⁰ The hostage videos were readily available to anyone on the Internet, altering television journalism's gate-keeping role and begging the question if failing to screen extracts on mainstream television would have made a difference. Indeed, there was an active demand for these gruesome videos. The Sunday Telegraph reported that a Dutch pornography website received a record number of hits when it posted a copy of Bigley's video.⁴¹ While these aspects of terrorism and its representation in the media have been debated before,⁴² the intuitive journalistic narrative also plays an important role.

Being aware of this narrative structure leads to a better understanding of why media professionals, under certain circumstances, intuitively jump on dramatic stories and magnify them by finding related stories of similar power and emotional attraction. In this process, media coverage can develop a life of its own. The Bigley story serves as a prime example. Interestingly, it also demonstrated that once the narrative is established, contrarian positions have little chance of gaining public support. Boris Johnson, the current Mayor of London but then conservative Member of Parliament, faced fierce criticism for an article he published in his magazine *The Spectator*. Vigils in Bigley's home town demonstrated in Johnson's view that Liverpoolians were wallowing in their victim status and had overreacted to Bigley's killing. This caused a public outcry and Johnson quickly apologised for his remarks.⁴³

Western media dealt with subsequent hostage crises differently. Freed from the pressure of the immediacy dominating the competitive news business, new practices emerged that took account of the human rights and the dignity of the hostages and their relatives. Simultaneously, these practices undermined terrorist narratives and deprived hostage takers of the limelight they were seeking. Editors and journalists re-discovered their long-established ethical principles. After all, journalism schools and colleges do not only teach reporters how to detect intuitive narratives and tell powerful stories, they usually also include lessons on ethical standards. In crisis situation, however, the intuitive reaction of journalists is to look for 'good' stories first and consider the ethical consequences later. This is particularly true in novel situations for which no professional standards and practices exist. In the wake of Ken Bigley's ordeal, journalists and editors eventually learned important lessons and managed to re-establish the balance between storytelling and ethics.

⁴⁰ Stewart Purvis interview. In: Documentary by Jason Burk, Channel Terror, BBC, 2005.

⁴¹ Olga Craig: The new tricoteuses. In: The Sunday Telegraph, 17 October 2004, 24.

⁴² On the pressure of new media and the Internet see for example: Daniel Matheson and Stuart Allan: Digital War Reporting, Cambridge, Polity Press 2009. Dan Gilmore: We, the media: grassroots journalism by the people for the people, Sebastopol, O'Reilly, 2004.

⁴³ Helen Carter – Patrick Wintour: Johnson apologises after article claims Liverpool overdid morning. In: The Guardian, October 16, 2004, 1.

A decade after the beheading of Ken Bigley, it has become clear that it remains a challenge for journalists to establish and adhere to professional practices that help maintain this balance. The coverage of recent IS atrocities and the attention global media devoted to beheading videos made and distributed by IS demonstrate that some lessons have to be re-learned. There was generally much more restraint in airing these brutal and shocking videos in mainstream media, yet IS managed to set the global media agenda. The intuitive journalistic narrative was at work again, be it in the coverage of John Cantlie,⁴⁴ the British photojournalist whom IS uses as a kind of war correspondent or in the stories about ‘Jihadi John’,⁴⁵ the British born IS fighter depicted as the executioner in several beheading videos. Not only journalists should be reminded that their own practices and their way of telling stories potentially serve the interest of groups like IS. Governments and security forces should also be constantly aware of the power of the intuitive journalistic narrative to dominate the news agenda when they formulate their public reactions towards terrorist violence.

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⁴⁴ See on the last video in the IS ‘series’: N.N.: ‘John Cantlie: British photojournalist appears in new Isis propaganda video’. In: The Independent, 10 February 2015.

⁴⁵ Particular attention was devoted to the story when the real name of ‘Jihadi John’ became known. British news outlets constantly updated the story on live web pages. See for example: ‘Jihadi John named as Mohammed Emwazi: February 27 as it happened’. In: The Daily Telegraph, 27 February 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11436615/Jihadi-John-named-as-Mohammed-Emwazi-live.html> (Accessed: 03. 12. 2015.)

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Peter Kent Forster:

“KNOW YOUR ENEMY”: WHAT IS A TERRORIST?

ABSTRACT: The author discusses that terrorism is neither a new nor monolithic concept. It is a dynamic tactic of asymmetric conflict typically rooted in real or perceived grievances aroused by local issues. Notwithstanding, the ideological drivers of terrorism, on occasion, may have global appeal. This was true of the anarchist movement at the end of 19th century and is true of today's violent Islamist extremism. Understanding these realities, this article examines the factors that motivate and maintain terrorist organizations as well as those that cause them stress. It also explores the evolution of 21st century terrorism and suggests comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies to combat it.

KEYWORDS: Terrorism, counter-terrorism, extremism, violent Islamist extremism, jihadism

INTRODUCTION

The Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu once said, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”¹ No statement is more applicable to understanding terrorism and devising strategies to combat it. This paper provides a condensed guide to what might be understood about terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies to fulfill Sun Tzu’s dictate. After providing a brief historical perspective of terrorism that includes a definition, most of the paper is devoted to assessing the current state of the converging fields of motivations, operations, and technologies. It will conclude with a brief discussion of the development of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.

In April 2015, the United States remembered the victims of the Oklahoma City and the Boston Marathon bombings, which occurred eighteen years and one day apart. These two terrorist attacks were perpetrated by individuals who were motivated by different political goals but shared a belief that violence against symbolic targets in which innocent civilians died has a transcendental impact on society. These acts epitomize “propaganda by the deed” that emerged from the anarchist theory of Peter Kropotkin and Elisee Reclus.² The reason for noting this fact is that, while terrorism evolves and changes, there are foundational principles. Today, there are governmental and legal definitions; academic definitions, and even al Qaeda’s definition. The simple proliferation of definitions exposes the lack of unanimity and reflects perspectives and biases. While the debate over “what is terrorism?” appears academic, defining terrorism is important to developing counter strategies, including differentiating terrorism, a national security issue, from crime, a law enforcement one; pursuing prosecution, and enhancing the global cooperation.

Within this context and for the purposes of this paper, terrorism is organized, asymmetric politically motivated violence that exceeds societal norms by purposefully targeting

¹ Sun Tzu: *The Art of War*. Lionel Giles translation, New York, Barnes and Noble Books, 2003, 17.

² Marie Fleming: *Propaganda by the Deed: Terrorism and anarchist theory in late nineteenth-century Europe*. In: *Study of Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 4, Issue 1–4, 09 January 1980, 1.

“noncombatants.”³ Traditionally, the perpetrator of terrorism has been a group, but in today’s environment, a terrorist may be independent of group affiliation and may simply be inspired by a message. Terrorism is about creating power through political violence and can succeed as evident in contributing to the British acceptance of the UN Partition of Palestine.⁴ Terrorism is about describing behavior and context rather than morality.⁵ Ultimately, the goal of defining terrorism is to understand terrorists and the victims in order to improve the prevention and mitigation of, and recovery from incidents of terror.

GROUP IDENTITY

Defining terrorism also allows us to examine the topic across time. Terrorism is not new, and understanding its history may yield strategies for combating it today. For example, the first century *Zealots* believed that they could not remain faithful to Judaism under Roman law.⁶ Their goal of mass insurrection to end Roman rule in Judea shares similarities with the Provisional Irish Republican Army which, while having a predominantly Catholic membership, was not religiously motivated but was more nationalistic in its objective. On the other hand, the seventh century *Thugs* killed to provide sustaining blood to the Hindu god Kali but were not beyond killing to generate funds to pay for sanctuary.⁷ Their approach certainly represented the rationality of self-preservation, which is not needed by an apocalyptic or strictly religiously motivated group.

In the eleventh century, the *Hashashshin* added public exploitation by conducting highly public killings in which the perpetrator often embraced martyrdom or one might say, suicide, by waiting for those responding to the murder of a prominent citizen to arrive at the scene and dispatch the perpetrator.⁸ The *Hashashshin* sought to instill fear and insecurity in their enemies, the impious, while seeking to garner support among the pious population through a display of perceived piety. They also practiced *taqiyya* or using deception to hide their true faithfulness in order to gain trust and closeness to their enemy. The former is a trademark of The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or *Da’esh* and the latter was evident in different events ranging from the 9/11 hijackers efforts to blend into American society to Abdullah Hassan al-Asiri’s attempted assassination of Saudi Crown Prince (then Deputy Minister of the Interior) Muhammad bin Nayef in 2009.

Similar to *Jihadism*, the anarchists of the mid- to late-18th century engaged in a global terrorist campaign assassinating, among others, Czar Alexander II, President McKinley, and Habsburg Empress Elisabeth. A global phenomenon, the anarchists’ appeal may shed light on the joining factor, why people join movements, which is prevalent among foreigners who travel to Syria and Iraq to join *Da’esh* or are inspired by al Qaeda or *Da’esh* to perpetrate violence at home.

³ J. M. Berger: *Jihad Joe – Americans who go to war in the name of Islam*. Washington, Potomac Books, 2011.

⁴ Maajid Nawaz: *Radical: My Journey out of Extremism*, Guilford CT, Lion Press, 2013, 45.

⁵ Berger: *Jihad Joe – Americans who go to war in the name of Islam*.


⁶ David Rapoport: *Terrorism in historical context*. In: *Terrorism Studies: A Reader*, edited by John Horgan and Kurt Braddock. London and New York, Routledge, 2012, 13.

⁷ Rapoport: *Terrorism in historical context*, 15.

⁸ Rapoport: *Terrorism in historical context*, 15.

Emerging from the Russian anarchist movement, *Narodnaya Volya* often is referred to as the first modern terrorist group.⁹ Modern terrorist groups often characterize themselves as seeking recognition for their conceived social and political injustices, responding to regime separation or securitization of the environment by a government or interloper, or promoting a reaction either within society generally or from the targeted government in response to an action. Simply, they define real or perceived grievance and promote them to attract recruits, improve the morale of their membership, send a message to the enemy, or seek to garner support among a general population.

Within this context, it is important to understand that the global environment is not an innocent bystander in creating terrorists. Events, whether the suppression of ethnic populations, American involvement in Vietnam, or the Arab-Israeli conflict, have a direct influence on developing terrorists. Adapting Joseph Nye’s model characterizing the variables of war, terrorist movements are a combination of perceived or actual grievances experienced by individuals, communicated by personalities who can unite, motivate and lead a group, and an international environment that may be exploited to support the grievance. These elements are exposed to a spark that ignites violence.¹⁰



Spark igniting violence

Figure 1: Drivers of radicalization

While violent Islamist extremism has a tendency to overwhelm the news and analysis of terrorism today, this brief introduction to the history exposes that a diversity of group identities and causes result in terrorism. In the 1960s, Kenya’s Mau Mau revolt was a nationalist effort that sought the ouster of the British. The Red Army *Fraktion* assumed a revolutionary or left-wing ideological perspective by opposing American involvement in Vietnam and Western economic values in the 1970s. The apocalyptic *Aum Shinrikyo* had few tangible ideas of what might compose a new Japanese society but still sought to destroy the existing state. Single issues groups such as the Environment Liberation Front (ELF), an eco-terrorist organization, focuses solely on grievances related to ecological issues.

And hate groups, whether the American Ku Klux Klan (i.e. KKK) or neo-Nazi skinheads play upon racial, ethnic, and religious differences to inspire violence against those who are different.

In 1979, a previously misunderstood dimension to the terrorism landscape gained momentum. An insurrection against the repressive regime of the Shah of Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, American support for Israel, and the influence of Ayatollah Khomeini, Abdullah Azzam, and his protégé, Osama Bin Laden converged to strengthen the politicization of Islam. The result was violent Islamist extremism, a combination of militant Islam and a demand for religious purity, which continues to draw adherents who question their identity, seek unity through faith, and justify *jihād*, from the Pakistani youths of London’s Newham Borough, Caucasian boys in Boston, and well-to-do Saudis in Riyadh. This phenomenon will be discussed in more depth shortly.

⁹ Rapoport: Terrorism in historical context, 19.

¹⁰ Joseph S. Nye Jr.: Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 6th ed., New York, Pearson Longman, 2007, 102–103.

Whether we explore the Spanish Inquisition, Andreas Brevik's Manifesto, or the tenets of *ihadism*, it remains clear that religion motivates extremism in unique ways. Religious motivation blends personal obligation with a moral one. Affront to God's will may be used as an unequivocal justification for action, even if it is violent. And, ultimately, religiously motivated terrorism changes the perception of death from one of supporting a cause, many terrorists are willing to die for their cause, to die in God's service.

Part of the reason that there is no unanimity in the definition of terrorism is that the motivations and identities are not monolithic. Previously, I provided some characteristics from which we crafted a definition. But the broad strokes of a definition are only a starting point for understanding terrorism and thus developing counter strategies to combat it. While a historical perspective provides context, recognizing the motivational and operational drivers and processes also is critical. Understanding differing motivations and ideologies is critical to formulating an agile counter-terrorism strategy that recognizes opportunities for compromise to end violence as well as those in which conciliation is not viable and force is required. For example, groups motivated by regional autonomy such as the *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)* may compromise to achieve part of their objectives. On the other hand, conciliation with the leadership of *Da'esh* or *Aum Shinrikyo* is highly unlikely, and thus a viable policy choice may be the elimination of the leadership through death or forced disengagement in hopes of incapacitating the group.

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND TERRORISM'S CENTER OF GRAVITY

While terrorist groups and the individuals who comprise them share some common beliefs and ideologies, their motivations and objectives also can diverge significantly. We conclude this part of the discussion of terrorism with an assessment of why individuals embrace terrorism and then examine the potential threats to the group's center of gravity emerging from individual preferences.¹¹ Terrorist groups typically emerge in response to real or perceived local or regional grievances, but it is the group's membership that needs to internalize the complaint and embrace activism. Maajid Nawaz talks about the conflict in Bosnia in the 1990's as a catalyst for Islamism spreading in Europe. The killing of white Bosnians simply because they were Muslims galvanized the European Muslims.¹²

Simply focusing on group motivations and identities fails to recognize that terrorist organizations are comprised of individuals, who either solely or as a part of a subgroup may have perspectives that differ with those of the leadership. Furthermore, individual motives for engaging vary and include those recognized by conventional wisdom – social disenfranchisement, poverty, and purpose. Notwithstanding, other motives may be more subtle than anticipated. Individuals join extremist organizations to belong or define their identity, to satisfy an individual adventurism and religious commitment, or because of a psychotic tendency towards violence. Often, the individual exhibits multiple characteristics.¹³ Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the recently convicted Boston Marathon bomber, reflected religious and violent tendencies as well as succumbing to the influence of his brother. The challenge for terrorist groups is to indoctrinate individuals into the group's philosophy, thereby channeling the different individual motivations to support the group's strategic, operational, and tactical

¹¹ Carl von Clausewitz: *On War*. London, Wildside Press, 2009, 141.

¹² Nawaz: *Radical: My Journey out of Extremism*, 38, 58, 60.

¹³ Berger: *Jihad Joe – Americans who go to war in the name of Islam*, 207–208.

objectives. As would be expected, frictions emerge which may result in shifting tactics and splintering or coalescence among groups and subgroups. These circumstances may offer opportunities to exploit cleavages. The disagreement in 2005 – 2006 between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the core al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan over targeting Shi'a Muslims in Iraq resulted in al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) separating from the core and establishing the foundation for *Da'esh*. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, after being stripped of his title of “Emir of Sahel” and a stern rebuke by al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) Shura Council, broke with AQIM and formed his own organization *al-Mu'a'qi'oon Biddam* (Those who Sign with Blood).¹⁴ Belmokhtar's decision echoes the challenges of maintaining cohesion in terrorist organizations. A charismatic leader, who attracts recruits, takes action to raise his legitimacy and generate propaganda, has financial resources acquired by criminal activity and requires little from a core leadership, particularly if they disagree over strategy and operations. Belmokhtar's case also reflects the growing concern of the nexus between criminal activity and terrorism that improves small group capability.

Like any organization, a terrorist group must manage this “preference divergence” or face dissolution and extinction.¹⁵ This is accomplished by balancing control and autonomy, weighing operational costs, and managing personal preferences.¹⁶ Terrorist organizations must pay attention to their driving factors or those things that are necessary for the group's survival. The most fundamental drivers are clearly communicated grievances that attract new recruits, unify adherents, and grow perceived legitimacy of struggle among a general population. The importance of multiple media sources to broadcast their narrative, exploit the group's successes, and draw attention to the enemy's weakness or failures has grown significantly with the Internet. Beyond media and recruitment, other operational drivers are physical safe havens for planning and training, cash, and indoctrination. Finally, periodic activity is needed to retain legitimacy as a participating group. Nasir ul-Wuhasyshi, the head of AQAP, epitomized this reality when he pressured Ayman al-Zawahiri to take action in August 2012.

THE NEW PARADIGM IN THE TECHNOLOGY AGE

As established in the previous section, terrorism is neither monolithic nor new. In the 21st century however, terrorism's strategic and operational environment has changed. Shifts in the international system, violent Islamist extremism that is mobilizing people globally, and a changing technological landscape have converged to modify the terrorist paradigm.

The Arab Spring and subsequent Middle East civil wars have created a power vacuum in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. An increasing number of extremist groups have filled the void, acquiring territory and accessing resources to generate money. While some might argue that controlling territory is contradictory to the definition of a terrorist group, this is not the case. While controlling territory may add the connotation of insurgency to a counter-terrorism strategy, insurgents may still be terrorists. When *Da'esh* captured Mosul in 2014,

¹⁴ Rukmini Callimachi: Algeria terror leader preferred money to death. January 20, 2013. <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/20/algeria-terror-leader/1849045/> (Accessed: 05. 10. 2015.)

¹⁵ Jacob N. Shapiro: *The Terrorist Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations*. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2013, 61

¹⁶ Shapiro: *The Terrorist Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations*, 61, 81.

they continued to pursue terrorist tactics such as car bombings and kidnappings.¹⁷ Groups such as AQAP and *al Shabaab* have controlled territory but continue to perpetrate violence against civilians and not execute the responsibilities of a state.

A proliferation of groups has coincided with local grievances being joined with a global extremist religious ideology, in which violence has become more indiscriminate.¹⁸ By embracing the communication realities of the Internet, *jihadism* has become a global concept similar to communism or the anarchism of the late 18th century. This does not presume that the previously discussed motivations and goals have become obsolete, but only that they have been surpassed, at least currently, by the phenomenon of violent Islamist extremism.

Terrorist organizations are adaptive. They adjust tactics in order to defeat countermeasures, copy successful operational methods to exploit weaknesses, and seek relationships with criminals if it furthers their objectives. The Internet reflects this adaptive competitiveness. The Internet has facilitated the spread of *jihadism* and mobilized youth globally. While the events that incite extremism may be local, they are just as likely to be communicated instantaneously and globally via Twitter, Tumblr, or YouTube. Cyberspace gives unfettered distribution free from many constraints imposed by traditional media. Its push-pull feature disseminates strategic messages, operational knowledge, and tactical propaganda, such as the beheading of a captive or the improvised explosive device (IED) destruction of an enemy military vehicle to multiple audience. The pull feature draws recruits in greater numbers, albeit with less competence, and instills religious zealotry.

It spreads the message beyond any intended audience. Individuals internalize messages available through similar sources and reinforced by an echo chamber that allows them to gravitate to messages that align with their preconceived perceptions and ideally convinces them to join the effort through a variety of means, including traveling to the conflict zone, now Iraq and Syria, or by taking action at home. On September 21, 2014, *Da'esh* spokesman Ali Muhammad al-Adnani, via an online message, called upon the faithful to "...strike the soldiers, patrons, and troops of the *tawāghīt*..."¹⁹ In subsequent weeks, Michael Zahaf-Bibeau attacked the Canadian parliament; Man Haron Monis held captives at the Lindt Café in Sydney; and Zale Thompson struck a New York City police officer with an ax. While a direct correlation between the speech and these actions may be difficult to establish, it is reasonable to assume that it was a contributing factor.

Finally, society's growing dependence on networked systems, the evolution of Internet-based technologies and the lack of governance over the Internet indicate that the Internet will become more impactful. As far back as 2004, Younis Tsouli (aka *Irhabi007* of terrorist 007) hacked American universities and taught others how to use computers in destructive ways. It would be foolish to believe that sophisticated terrorists organizations are not developing offensive cyber capabilities and concealing more critical communications and transactions via the Dark Web which makes identification and attribution of extremist activity difficult. Furthermore, while intelligence agencies collect large amounts of data and companies such

¹⁷ Hayes Brown: One of the World's Scariest Terrorist Groups Now Controls a Major City in Iraq. Think Progress June 10, 2014. <http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/06/10/3446907/isis-iraq-mosul/> (Accessed: 05. 13. 2015.)

¹⁸ The Homogenization of Terror. The Soufan Group, April 7, 2015. <http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-homogenization-of-terror/> (Accessed: 04. 07. 2015.)

¹⁹ Caleb Weiss: Islamic State Spokesman Again Threatens West in New Speech. The Long War Journal, September 21, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/islamic_state_spokesman_again.php (Accessed: 05. 10. 2015.)

as Twitter have become more aggressive in shutting down extremists' accounts, the terrorists continue to benefit from strict privacy laws, anonymity, and jurisdictional ambiguity. Notwithstanding, web-based interactions do leave "digital exhaust" that may be exploited by intelligence and law enforcement if they discover and analyze it in a timely fashion.²⁰

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY

The challenges of the 21st century threat are diverse. The proliferation of groups, technologies, and geographic areas has created an environment in which *jihadism* controls more territory, has more fighters, and demonstrates resilience having survived for more than 25 years. Although creating a schism in the jihadist movement, *Da'esh* is a formidable adversary that demonstrates operational capability, controls territory, and has financial resources. *Da'esh* is challenging counter-terrorism strategies in its messaging, persistence, and recruitment including Muslims from outside of Syria and Iraq. It is too early for sound research to predict the impact of today's foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), but recent events provide a glimpse of the FTF's future threats. The *Charlie Hebdo* attack illustrated how a small group with some training can carry-out an attack that can capture world headlines. It also reflects the patience of potential perpetrators and hence the longevity of the threat. The Kouachi brothers had trained in Yemen seven years prior to the Paris attacks and, although known to intelligence services, were still able to launch the attack. Third, it remains to be seen whether *Charlie Hebdo* will inspire copycats although the attack in Gardener Texas in May 2015 on a Muhammad characterization conference appeared to be a less sophisticated and fortunately less successful rendition. The Texas episode as well as Zahaf-Bibeau's attack also show the danger presented by those who do not or cannot leave the country but still decide to pursue violence. Richard McFadden, Director of Canadian Security Intelligence Service, testified before the Canadian Parliament in 2013 that five years ago the CSIS was not worried about domestic terrorism but is now because Canadians have joined the "dispersed" *jihadist* or at least embraced the message.²¹

So, what strategy should be devised to confront this threat? First, it is critical to understand that the threat is global and thus at the nation-state level, an effective strategy includes a willingness among the global community to share risks, assume burdens, and take responsibility for global order. This concept of a global community counter effort has been captured in the promotion of partnership and capacity in the European Union's Counterterrorism Strategy and President Obama's May 2013 speech pointing to "leveraging effective partnerships."²² Combating terrorism requires a combined effort to share intelligence, improve counter-terrorism capacities, insure respect for human rights, enact standards for prosecution, and apply military force in a judicious manner that balances objectives with potential negative effects. Many of these concepts are encapsulated in the European Union Counterterrorism Strategy and are being pursued and updated. Third, at a national level, regional specialist need to be developed in order that they might understand the underlying

²⁰ Digital exhaust: Unstructured information or data that is a by-product of online activities. Dictionary.com, May 2015. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/digital+exhaust> (Accessed: 05. 10. 2015.)

²¹ Richard Mcfadden: Statement at National Homeland Security Conference. Los Angeles, CA, June 2013.

²² The White House Office of the Press Secretary Fact Sheet. May 23, 2013. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-president-s-may-23-speech-counterterrorism> (Accessed: 05. 10. 2015.)

political, economic, and social dynamics of an area and be able to better predict indicators and warnings of problems. Yet, a regional approach must avoid concentrating on a single region, group, or event. The convergence of technology and globalization can alter the security environment quickly. *Da'esh's* rise to prominence and its growing number of worldwide allegiants are indicative of this phenomenon. Furthermore, technology is a force multiplier that allows small groups to have global impact, thus concentrating only on a single group will result in missing other threats.

Fourth, there is an increasing need to recognize the data explosion that has occurred. While I discussed the risks earlier, there also are opportunities. Although social media allows knowledge sharing anytime and anywhere, it also leaves a footprint. Activities that were once private now leave traces. Intelligence agencies and law enforcement need to be able to make sense of the huge amount of data available to them in a timely fashion that generates actionable intelligence. This will require sharing information across agencies, both domestically and internationally, engaging private sector partners that have more refined tools and perhaps resources to dedicate to a specific task, and developing agreements on arrest and prosecution. Fifth, the counter-narrative needs to be enhanced. There has been a woeful failure to exploit the mistakes and weaknesses of extremists' messages. For example, an opportunity to send a message to future would-be extremists was missed when the American Omar Hammadei was killed by his own *jihadist* allies.

Sixth, counter-strategies should be comprehensive. Again, both the European Union and the United States have recognized this reality. Passive support remains critical to extremist groups. As a result, counter-terrorism needs to have a long-term "left-of-boom" approach. This requires community engagement to identify those who are vulnerable, intervene against those who are an imminent threat, and mitigate the impact of those who take action. "Prevent" in the European Union strategy addresses many of these concerns as do recent efforts at engagement by the Department of Homeland Security.²³ But community engagement needs to be more sustained, and better resourced to answer difficult and complex questions. It entails developing a cultural knowledge of at-risk communities. What are the community's internal struggles that drives radicalization? What is important to communities? Who are the formal and informal leaders? And what positive contributions can the diaspora community make in de-radicalization?

CONCLUSION

In his remarks on May 23, 2013, President Obama talked about Al Qaeda's core in Afghanistan and Pakistan being decimated and the new threats of al Qaeda affiliates, localized domestic groups, and homegrown terrorism. He further laid out a plan for a comprehensive counter-strategy that required all elements of American national power and cooperation abroad.²⁴ These remarks capture both the diversification of the threat and the means for combatting it. Part of this strategy requires a risk-based approach that identifies threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences and develops counter-strategy to avoid, prevent, and mitigate the risks.

Terrorism is not new but it is dynamic. Combatting violence that targets individuals and exceeds any socially acceptable norm is a worldwide endeavor. Notwithstanding, two truths

²³ European Union Counterterrorism Strategy. Brussels, November 30, 2005, 9.

²⁴ The White House Office of the Press Secretary Fact Sheet. May 23, 2013. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-president-s-may-23-speech-counterterrorism> (Accessed: 05. 10. 2015.)

about terrorism remain. It will never be fully eradicated because groups and individuals will always seek to exploit their perceived grievances by pursuing violence. Second, while terrorism is not always futile, it does not represent an existential threat to Western society. As a result, it requires a continued a commitment to resilience, global engagement, and a promise to understand the threat and minimize the vulnerabilities.

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Márton Péri:

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON'S THEORY OF CONSTRUCTING A POLITICAL PARADIGM AND HIS MARITIME STRATEGY CONCEPT

ABSTRACT: *"The Clash of Civilizations",¹ written by Samuel P. Huntington in 1996, confronted political and cultural history at the end of the 20th century. One main feature of this work, which challenged the hitherto monolithic consensus of political writings, was the creation of a new way of constructing political-cultural paradigms which are presumably able to predict future developments. However, this paper aims at presenting that the main thesis which was crystallized in this brilliant work can be found in an embryonic form even in his earliest works about "practical," or "applied" political theory.*

KEYWORDS: *civilizational paradigm, maritime strategy, clash of civilizations, cold war*

INTRODUCTION

Samuel P. Huntington was born in 1927, and as a sort of child prodigy he started his studies at Yale University at the age of 16, earned his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1951 at the age of 23, and became a full professor there in 1962. He is known as the author of a dozen books, each of them an event in the academic world, and of around ninety articles. His first volume that attained particular success was *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations* (1957). Some more important ones are *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (1981), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996), and *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (2004). His academic work was characterized by a provocative, even paradoxical writing style and by the obvious originality of his conclusions. His well-known article the '*Clash of Civilizations?*'² published in 1993, created by far the greatest debate in the columns of the journal *Foreign Affairs* in the history of the periodical, and later this debate spread into the international academic milieu as well.

In spite of the fact that his closest friends from these early years of his career, Brzezinski and Kissinger, made their way into the world of politics, he himself always remained a scholar. However, besides various scholarly posts, he also held important administrative positions, or positions with the combination of both, including being deputy director at the Columbia University Institute for War and Peace Studies (1958–59), planning coordinator of the National Security Council under President Jimmy Carter (1977–78), executive director and director of Harvard's Center for International Studies (1975–76, 1978–79), and director

¹ Samuel P. Huntington: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996.

² Samuel P. Huntington: *The Clash of Civilizations?* *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (1993), 22–49.

of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard (1989–2000). Thus he gained a twofold perspective: a theoretical as well a practical one. He soon formulated his view that the practical has to be steeped into a sound theory which should determine even the most concrete strategic steps, criticising and attempting to mend the contemporary strategic practice of the United States.

It was to this purpose that in 1954 Huntington published a seminal article entitled “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy.”³ In it he sought to articulate the connection between the geopolitical conditions of the time and the need for and functions of the U.S. Navy. Although the article of the 27 year old young scholar and its recommendations have often been quoted, used and regarded as fundamental endorsements concerning the post-war US maritime strategy concept still sixty years after its publication, it has been very rarely referred to apart from naval military writers and is almost never mentioned in any of the biographies or bibliographies of Huntington. This paper seeks to analyse Huntington’s article comparing its logic to the theory pattern the author used in his other books, probably most explicitly in the widely debated “Clash of Civilizations”. A close reading of Huntington’s early paper on the role of the US Navy after the Second World War will hopefully prove that he was already using the same strategy of creating a theoretical paradigm while using the same principles in his article at the beginning of his career as forty years later.

HUNTINGTON’S PARADIGMS IN “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS”

Huntington’s basic idea in his article “The clash of Civilizations”, published in the journal *Public Affairs* in 1993, due to which his work became almost emblematic, was that the end of the cold war brought about the decline of ideologies and in the 21st century cultures and religions would be the driving forces that will determine international politics and international conflicts. The reception surpassed every expectation, setting off an up to that moment never seen debate in the Journal. Huntington, besides the warmest praises, was accused of superficiality, over-simplification, western superiority, even racism. All these reactions motivated the scholar to take his basic idea further and explain it in a detailed way. Therefore, in 1996 he published his book with almost the same title, now extended to 650 pages, offering a radically different prism through which to view world politics. Now the focus was limited only on the theory of paradigm-creation which Huntington finalized in this volume and considered as a basic requirement for all theoretical writing in the fields of political-cultural sciences.

Even in some of his earlier works, Huntington made attempts at formulating the need of creating all-embracing strategies. In the preface of the *Third Wave* (published in 1991) he defined the terms and the criteria for the creation of political theories. He writes:

*A good theory is precise, austere, elegant, and highlights the relations among a few conceptual variables. Inevitably, no theory can explain fully a single event or group of events. An explanation, in contrast, is inevitably complex, dense, messy, and intellectually unsatisfying. It succeeds not by being austere but by being comprehensive.*⁴

³ Samuel P. Huntington: National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 483, 489. (May 1954.) <http://blog.usni.org/2009/03/09/from-our-archive-national-policy-and-the-transoceanic-navy-by-samuel-p-huntington> (Accessed: 12. 04. 2015.)

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington: *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century*. University of Press Oklahoma, 1991, 13.

A more detailed description of the characteristics of forming a theory can be found in the preface of the book *The Clash of Civilizations*. Here Huntington justifies the need for the creation of paradigms by writing:

*Simplified paradigms or maps are indispensable for human thought and action. On the one hand, we may explicitly formulate theories or models and consciously use them to guide our behavior. Alternatively, we may deny the need for such guides and assume that we will act only in terms of specific "objective" facts, dealing with each case "on its merits." If we assume this, however, we delude ourselves.*⁵

He argues that we cannot get rid of our prejudices which will inevitably form a biased, distorted picture about reality; they will determine our priorities and judgement, which, in lack of simplified but useful guides, will lead us into dead-ends. He states that: "*we need a map that both portrays reality and simplifies reality in a way that best serves our purposes.*"⁶ He is acutely aware of the paradox which lies in the need of simplification which coexists with the urge of complexities which enables comprehensiveness. He quotes from Thomas Kuhn's work *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*,⁷ turning to the world of natural sciences for parallels. He does so in order to emphasise the importance of replacing the old paradigms which are no longer capable of explaining new situations and of creating new ones. Such a theory may be accepted as a paradigm, "but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted."⁸

Admitting all that, Huntington still claims in an emphasised way that: "*We need explicit or implicit models.*" Then he lists five points which he regards as the essential criteria for forming a paradigm. These models are able to:

1. order and generalize about reality;
2. understand causal relationships among phenomena;
3. anticipate and, if we are lucky, predict future developments;
4. distinguish what is important from what is unimportant; and
5. show us what paths we should take to achieve our goals.⁹

The application of this simple, but useful set of tools will, if not guarantee, but at least enable the correctness of the attempts of forming such theories which, if they emerge victorious in the competition, will have the chance of becoming paradigms to determine and guide concrete political decisions.

THE MARITIME STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The Second World War precipitated the shift in global naval power and made the American Navy outgrow its tradition-rich ally, the Royal Navy, already before the hostilities, although Alfred Thayer Mahan a few decades earlier still used examples of the British fleet to illustrate his doctrines concerning sea power. Nonetheless, as Michael A. Palmer puts it: "The US Navy of 1941 had yet to win its Trafalgar, had yet to test itself in the battle against a first

⁵ Huntington: *The Clash of Civilizations*, 30.

⁶ Huntington: *The Clash of Civilizations*, 31.

⁷ Thomas S. Kuhn: *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. University of Chicago Press, 1962.

⁸ Kuhn: *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 17–18.

⁹ Huntington: *The Clash of Civilizations*, 30.

class enemy in fleet action.”¹⁰ It did though and its Pacific victories denoted a new era of the American service. In spite of this convincingly vindicated triumph, Bernard Brodie’s word in the Foreign Affairs in January 1946 marked a new, less bright phase in the life of the fleet: “the Navy’s indubitably superb accomplishment in the greatest of all naval wars will not facilitate its taking the lead in revaluing its own place in the national security.”¹¹

Forty years before the formulation of his paradigm-theory, Huntington felt impelled to write because in the first half of the fifties, the Navy was facing a quandary arising from its own success in World War II. The *Constitution* of the United States directs Congress to “provide and maintain a navy,” whereas its language regarding an army is “raise and support.”¹² The apparent implication is that land forces are to be created as needed to meet emergency requirements but a navy is to be maintained in peace as well as in war. This way of thinking in connection with land services had long been eclipsed by geopolitical and technological circumstances, the structural requirements for an army in support of a strong force to be maintained in continuous readiness. However, its essence may reiterate itself as budgets tighten. The Constitution’s wording infers that the Navy is required to perform some essential function for the Republic in both war and peace, thus justifying its maintenance costs in peacetime. Nonetheless, by the early fifties the crisis of the Navy was easy to spot since this basic question was not properly addressed. Both the armed forces and the whole state were facing an entirely new political reality which required the formulation of appropriate and adequate responses mutually on political and strategic level.

Due to the otherwise victorious end on the Second World War, the Navy needed to re-orientate, or rather redefine its goals since its main target, victory, had been attained. This situation gave rise to four special sets of challenges to the US Navy: the continental nature of the USSR, demobilization, the newly attributed importance of nuclear bombing capabilities, and the absence of naval enemy.¹³

The armies along with the navies of the Axis powers had been defeated and, beginning in the last phase of the war, a new geopolitical situation was taking shape. The Soviet Union, with fundamentally different strategic characteristics, substituted Germany and Japan as America’s primordial adversary soon after the war’s end (and in the thoughts of many strategists, even before). From the perspective of the US Navy, the main feature of the new menace was the fact that the Soviet Union was a land power with limited maritime interests or capabilities and it presented no immediate naval threat, so a large, extended fleet with more than 3,3 million personnel was hardly justifiable.¹⁴ Although the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal did his best to mitigate the extent of the demobilization at the dawn of the cold war with the Soviet Union, by 1946 already 7000 ships had been decommissioned, and manpower had also been reduced exponentially dropping to a staggering 400 000 in 1950.¹⁵

Another challenge presented itself due to the strategic lessons learnt during the World War and due to the technical development of the first period of the atomic age when air-

¹⁰ Michael A. Palmer: *Origins of the maritime strategy: American naval strategy in the first postwar decade*. Contributions to naval history. Naval Historical Center. 1988, 1.

¹¹ Bernard Brodie: *New Tactics in Naval Warfare*. Foreign Affairs 24, 210–223.

¹² The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription. http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html (Accessed: 12. 04. 2015.)

¹³ Jakub J Grygiel: *The Dilemmas of US Maritime Supremacy in the Early Cold War*. Journal of Strategic Studies Volume 28, Issue 2, 2005.

¹⁴ George Baer: *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1994, 278. (note 5.)

¹⁵ Jeffrey Barlow: *Revolt of the Admirals*. Washington DC, Naval Historical Center, 1994, 21.

delivered bombs were thought to be the ultimate solution as Admiral Chester Nimitz put it in his famous speech in 1947.¹⁶ Due to the appearance of this new separate service, critics of the Navy appropriately posed the question what roles or mission a post-war fleet with all the adjoining troops might play that other forms of the defence force were not able to provide just as well, if not better, and possibly more cheaply. The Navy's problems were also aggravated by the intensity of intra- and interservice arguments. The battles with joint organizations—the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the newly created Department of Defence further weakened the bargaining power of the naval service in the debilitating struggle.¹⁷

This was the overall scenario when the young Huntington tried to offer a remedy for the crisis of the Navy by pointing out that the creation of a strategic concept was essential and would be the only fruitful solution. He claimed that “the shifts in the international balance of power will inevitably bring about changes in the principal threats to the security... These must be met by shifts in national policy.” Therefore, a new strategic concept must be developed related to some other security threats. He strengthened his point by the frequently quoted warning that: “If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service on the resources of society.”¹⁸ Thus Huntington established in fact the importance of the creation of an overall new paradigm which would guide the US in its decisions about re-constructing its conceptions of the role of the Navy in a new political situation.

Huntington stated that the Navy had to reassess its purpose as it had needed to do several times before. The US Navy had to adapt its strategic concept to the new geopolitical reality not only to keep its role and funding but also to serve the key interests of the US. He argued that the United States—a maritime power—was engaged in a global struggle with a continental power. Since an American command of the seas was given, it stood to reason that the Navy's mission would be to project U.S. power inland. This explanation was limited; the fact of the threat from the Soviet Union sufficed to justify the instrumentality of power projection ashore.

An important correspondence between the two texts distant in time, the article about the Navy and of the *Clash*, is that they were both produced in a historical vacuum: after a strong crisis which demanded an intensively applied strategy, a sudden reversal of the state of affairs appeared which questioned the maintenance and thus the existence of the hitherto applied strategies. The article concerning the Navy was written in the post-World War II situation, when the sudden turn from war to peace was established; the *Clash* was created at the appearance of the ideological and political vacuum after the end of the Cold War, both moments are characterized by Huntington by the same words: “postwar uncertainty, demoralization, and confusion,” etc. The remedy offered is also the same: the necessity of the creation of a realistic doctrinal paradigm.

Constructing his article he already uses the same criteria for the creation of a paradigm for the Navy that he later formulated systematically in the *Clash*. He uses the same five points, the five criteria, on the macro-level of his text, that is, in the overall structure of it and also on

¹⁶ Baer: *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*, 278.

¹⁷ Melvyn P. Leffler: *The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952*. Volume 1: *Origins* 67–89. In *The Cambridge History of the Cold War Volume 1: Origins*. Edited by: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521837194.005> (Accessed: 11. 04. 2015.)

¹⁸ Melvyn P. Leffler: *The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952*. Volume 1: *Origins*. 67–89.

the micro-level, that is, on the level of paragraphs. The conceptual composition of the article follows the five steps, thus Huntington uses a method to construct his argumentation so that it provides a framework for the whole work. The introduction supplies the definition of the notion of “strategic concept”, then follows the general display of the situation, which gives place to the exhibition of the causal relationships of the shifts in the international balance.

The ordering of the minor units of the text is logical as the paragraphs mirror the structure of the major structure by following the principles of the five points, showing an intense awareness and a unified pattern of thought, which finds its expression in the complex rhetorical built-up of the text. The second paragraph of the article is an eloquent example of the exact correspondence with the five criteria formulated later in the *Clash*. First, addressing the question of the resources in the military service, he presents the general picture of the functioning of the human and material components, then comes, corresponding to the second point of the set, the mapping of the causal relationships between the allocation of these to the military service and between the public support of this service, which is an essential datum in a democratic society. Then, the argumentation uses the support of anticipation (the third element of the set) of what will happen if there is no strategic concept adapted to the new demands. Finally, the path to be taken is formulated, (the fifth element of the set), claiming that “the service has the responsibility to develop this necessary support, and it can only do this if it possesses a strategic concept which clearly formulates its relationship to the national security.”¹⁹ Thus even the micro-structure of the text of the article not only foreshadows but already applies the same criteria which forty years later will be explicitly grouped as the essential prerequisites of paradigm-construction.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would remark the fact that Huntington’s article had such an impact on maritime circles that Robert C. Rubel, the former Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, in his article “National Policy and the Post-Systemic Navy”[19],²⁰ named a whole period after Huntington, calling it the Huntingtonian-era, the period which succeeded the Mahanian era, and confessed himself being a follower of the scholar in that he promoted the importance of a shift of paradigm in the present-day maritime policy just as Huntington did in the 50s. Although the *Clash* is a grandiose work of cultural history and the maritime article a work with a more restrained scope, they both seem to build on the same theoretical structure as they share the same effort to formulate the importance and the objective of a new paradigm.

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¹⁹ Huntington: National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy.

²⁰ Huntington: National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy.

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Brig. Gen. József Szpisják:

THE HUNGARIAN TRADOC: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE NEW HUNGARIAN DEFENCE FORCES TRAINING AND DOCTRINE CENTRE

ABSTRACT: In 2014 the Hungarian Ministry of Defence (MoD) established the Hungarian Defence Forces Training and Doctrine Centre (HDF TDC). Its mission is to maintain the HDF Lessons Learnt system in order to develop viable responses to operational and doctrinal challenges and shortages; develop and update doctrines, pamphlets and field manuals for the training system; to contribute to the training of soldiers and NCOs and to the education of commanders; and provide support unit training. It also includes a small scientific research section, and the HDF's arms control organization. After the establishment of the centre we thoroughly inquired the experience of other nations with TRADOC-like establishments.

KEYWORDS: TRADOC concept; lessons learned; concept development; doctrine development; training and education; HDF TDC

The Hungarian Defence Forces Training and Doctrine Centre (HDF TDC) was established on 1st of April 2014, but experiments with TRADOC-like organizations go back almost two decades. The very first organisation in this experimentation process was the Ministry of Defence Operations Centre, established in 1997. Between 1997 and 2014 the Ministry of Defence Operations Centre was subject to many changes: it was transferred from the Ministry to the Defence Force, then returned to Ministry control, then it became a subordinate organisation of the General Staff, it shed some of its functions and acquired new ones. These changes were reflected by changes in its name and in its table of organisation, its primary functions were relatively constant: the coordination of disaster relief operations and peacekeeping missions, and processing the experience gained in these activities (i.e.: Lessons Learnt). The common characteristics of all successor organisations were the same: unique, mission-oriented organisation, specialised for tasks which did not match the J (Joint) Staff structure, and wide international co-operation.

The unification of all operation related tasks was the motive for restructuring the Defence Staff. In 2010 many of its operational functions were transferred to the Joint Force Command (in Székesfehérvár), when that organisation took over the control of ongoing operations. The OC's operational tasks were reduced to minimum but it was given some brand new functions: doctrine development and standardization. The organisation's new name – HDF Command and Doctrine Centre (HDF CDC) – reflected this change.

In 2014 the CDC's residual operational tasks, the Operational Duty Service (Situation Centre) was finally transferred to J3, and henceforth the emphasis was on deep and thorough doctrine development. In April the CDC acquired the functions – and personnel – of the J7. It was a logical decision by the Chief of Defence Staff (CHOD) to group these mutually supportive functions into one single TRADOC-like structure under his direct subordination. The new functions were reflected in the organisation's new name: Training and Doctrine Centre – TDC. I was appointed (on 10 March 2014) to oversee the amalgamation of the

CDC and the J7, and to command the new organisation. It is important to emphasize that the amalgamation did not require moving any of the branches. We kept our offices in the building of the ministry, probably this was the reason for the limited timeframe we were given to achieve full operational capacity.

Another, parallel predecessor organisation established in the previous period (in 2000, to be exact) was the Recruitment and Training Command (HDF RTC), a brigade-level organisation. The RTC's primary purpose was to revitalize and reform the basic training conscripts had to undergo, but the timing of its establishment was unfortunate: just a few years later conscription was suspended and the Command was disbanded. In any case, this organisation had no authority over the doctrine and field manual development process, nor did it have any direct contact with the ongoing operations, therefore it was unable to integrate the latest experience (lessons) into training.

The first proposal for the creation of a Hungarian TRADOC-type organisation was drawn up in 2009 and it included two fundamentally different versions. Both of them kept J7 in the Defense Staff, since that represented the training function in J structure. The first version was a concept and principal developing, more like an academic organisation without any subordinates. The second one was closer to the original American model, as beyond the Lessons Learnt, the Concept Development, the Manual Developing and the Training Methodology Branches it had several training institutions as subordinate organisation. Due to the financial restriction the plan was never realized.


WHAT IS TRADOC?

In order to prepare for my new appointment I had to make a thorough but quick study of international examples of TRADOC-type organizations. I directed my staff to focus on NATO-member nations, but in the course of our research we studied Australia as well. I understood the importance of relying on leading examples, but I also directed a review of the experience of those NATO forces whose potential and financial resources were similar to those of the HDF. After the thorough analysis of the leading NATO nations' and Australia's TRADOC organizations we sent a questionnaire to NATO countries about their experience and we found that 13 out of the 28 NATO-members have TRADOC-type organizations. Some of them do not even have a name for it in the national language, but retained the original US term. Three other armies do not have TRADOC in their organization, but they have liaison officers delegated to US TRADOC in Fort Leavenworth. So, 57 percent of the NATO Armies found it imperative to achieve synergy in the field of Lessons Learnt, Doctrine Development and Training. The organizational structure and missions may be slightly different from country to country, but the main thing is the unification of these three main functions under a single command.

The obvious starting point to gain this insight is to study the model every Army with a TRADOC-like organisation follows, the US Army's TRADOC. The US Department of the Army established TRADOC in 1973 as part of a major reorganisation of the Army.¹ The intention was to solve command and control problems in the Army establishment that became evident in the early 1970s. The authority of TRADOC's predecessor, the Continental

¹ Transforming the Army: TRADOC's First Thirty Years 1973–2003. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Military History Office, Fort Monroe, VA, 23651, 2003, 7.

Army Command (CONARC), reached from the headquarters of the armies to the corps and divisions and included most of the major Army installations as well. But CONARC was also responsible for the training and education establishments and for unit readiness. The Command's duties and responsibilities were too variegated for efficient focus.




1. Figure The US Army Organisational chart (source: USA TRADOC)

The main idea behind TRADOC was to get the Army ready to fight the next war. Consequently, the primary concerns were improvements in individual training, better support for training in units, new training doctrine and a new emphasis on, and direction for, combat development. Many aspects of the Vietnam experience had contributed to a degradation of training within CONARC. To address these difficulties a “back to the basics” approach was adopted: officer training courses were to prepare officers for their next assignment, the physical aspects of basic combat training were toughened, and advanced individual training was made more performance oriented. The other major outcome was the publication of easily readable and usable “how to-fight” manuals and audio-visual training aids. A further major initiative in the area of training was the standardization of the so called Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP).

One of the biggest dilemmas was that while seeking solutions to the problems noted during the Vietnam War, TRADOC commanders were aware that the main effort should go towards the wars of the future. Heavily influenced by the 1973 Yom Kippur War with its increased lethality in tank warfare, antitank guided missiles, and artillery, TRADOC adjusted its emphasis from training the Army to win at tactical level, to develop the Army to win at strategic level as well. TRADOC undertook a major portion of the combat development mission and the systems acquisition process.

TRADOC came into existence in July 1973, as the United States withdrew from Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli War ended. The Army's focus for almost a decade had been on counterinsurgency warfare against an enemy with vague contour. Then in contrast, the Arab-Israeli War was a conflict unprecedented in tempo, lethality, and consumption of resources. On top of that, these events occurred against a background of concerns over increasing Soviet military power across the globe. It was obvious that the existing Army

doctrine was outdated. Therefore a Tactical Doctrine Office was created, separate from both combat development and training functions, and reporting directly to the commander of TRADOC. The capstone document, Field Manual FM 100-5, “Operations,” was significantly revised to provide the basis for the aforementioned “how to fight” series, and came to play a more central role in defining Army new doctrine system.²



2. Figure US TRADOC organization (source: US A TRADOC)

Following the establishment of TRADOC, the Army’s training system had undergone a measured but major transformation. The essence of the new training concept was a systematic way to go about setting training objectives through the careful determination of tasks (Mission Essential Tasks) to be trained, conditions under which certain training would be required, and the setting of performance standards. This revitalization brought to training development an appreciation of rapidly advancing training and education technology and an understanding of how it might be applied to training. The previous training system had been in use since World War I. The Army Training Program was a time-oriented process that prescribed how many hours would be devoted to each subject and task. The ATP was based on the old school traditions: unlimited availability of manpower (i.e.: conscripts), time and money. After the Vietnam War and especially in the light of the Arab-Israel War it became obvious that the US would have no time for extra preparation, once a war was declared. Other factors which also forced TRADOC to consider the new training system were the downsizing of the Army and the shrinking defence budgets. The Army not only needed better training, it also needed efficient and cost-effective training.³ The new philosophy was called Systems Approach to Training. This philosophy was based on the aforementioned war experiences and focused on the performance of the soldiers, leaders and units.

² Transforming the Army, 35.

³ Transforming the Army, 83.



Figure 3. The synergy of “TRADOC” function (source: author)

TRADOC continued CONARC’s participation in international standardization programs held under the umbrella of NATO and ABCA.⁴ These programs covered a wide variety of military topics, including weapons, tactical air operations, mobility, NBC defence, intelligence, standardization in the fields of command and control, aviation, air defence, communications, and quality assurance. The 1977 Department of Defence appropriation formally committed the U.S. to standardization, or at least interoperability, with its allies. During the

1980s it became evident that a doctrine to guide U.S. Army operations in cooperation with allied forces was an important need. It was also true that future wars of any significant dimension would likely to involve allied participation.⁵




Figure 4. Organisation of UK JFC (source: author)

In summary, the main function of the US Army TRADOC is the fusion of operational experience, concept development, and training. The operational experience is processed by the Lessons Learnt establishment. Concept development is working in two directions: the development of thinking and procedures (doctrine and manual development), and the improvement and procurement of equipment and technology. The new approaches, tactics and training standards are used in leadership education and the training of individual soldiers and units, and are tested in real operations.


⁴ American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies’ Program

⁵ Transforming the Army, 83.

First we studied the British Army experience because of the good relationship we built with British Military Advisory Training Team. The British system is vastly different from the American, most importantly from my perspective it does not concentrate all TRADOC functions in a single organization. The United Kingdom Joint Forces Command (JFC) achieved its operational capability in 2013 – its creation was part of the most significant transformation of UK Defence in a generation. The JFC brings together over 20,000 military and civilian personnel to ensure that joint capabilities are correctly prioritized and are ready for operations. In addition, JFC includes the Defence Academy. A number of units have also been transferred to the command in order to ensure better training and coherence for a range of specialties, from doctors and nurses to linguists and military surveyors. A key aim of the establishment of the JFC is to create a more direct link between frontline experience and top-level planning. The new Command is already making its mark around the world. A key task for the JFC is to ensure that lessons learnt on operations are absorbed into the development of future concepts and capabilities, helping the Navy, Army and RAF to build on their strengths in the future.⁶

From my perspective the most important subordinate institution of the UK JFC is the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). This is a Ministry of Defence think tank, embedded within the Defence Academy. DCDC produces concepts and doctrine for defence, underpinned by thorough research and experimentation. This helps to inform decision makers in defence strategy, capability development and operations.

One of DCDC's unique tasks is to 'maintain legal compliance and sustain a favourable legal environment for defence activity and capability'. The legal team provide legal advice and input into all our publications to make sure that they are all legally compliant. They also give the MOD specialist advice on international weapons law.⁷



5. Figure Organisation of UK DCDC (resource: author)

DCDC is the contact point to the international standardization bodies, and works routinely with NATO, the European Union, the United Nations and a wide range of nations, as well as government departments and non-governmental organizations. It is not just co-operating within these administrations but takes a leading role in doctrine development, therefore much of NATO's body of doctrines reflects the UK doctrine system. With all this influence, I was intrigued to learn the British attitude to doctrine implementation. In spite of their status a leading member of NATO, they prefer to adopt NATO doctrine (Allied Joint Publications (AJP) wherever possible, rather than producing a national one and expecting the world to follow. Where the UK is not able to accept NATO's approach they make sure that British publications remain compatible.

The next organisation we studied was the Canadian Army, which had provided significant assistance to the HDF through its advisory missions and language training. In the Canadian's

⁶ <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/joint-forces-command>

⁷ <https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/development-concepts-and-doctrine-centre>




Figure 6. Organisation of the Canadian Doctrine and Training Centre (source: author)

view training is the process that forges soldiers and material over time into combat ready units and formations. Such a process requires an effective, efficient training establishment that produces the combat effective and readiness for all elements of the force – this is the mission of the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (CADTC). CADTC comprises a number of departments: the Peace Support Training Centre, the Canadian Army Command and Staff College, the Combat Training Centre (CTC), a formation with units at 5th Canadian Division Support Group, and the Canadian Manoeuvr Training Centre (CMTC). Of these organizations we found the Peace Support Training Centre and the Canadian Manoeuvr Training Centre the most interesting.

Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) is the Canadian Armed Forces centre of excellence for Peace Support Operations (PSO) training. It trains more than one thousand soldiers, NCOs and officers prior to their deployment on operations, additionally it provides mission specific PSO training to contingents and Task Forces every year as a mobile training team. During the past several years, PSTC became the Canadian Army centre of excellence for Information Operations (Info Ops), and provides the basic training of select CAF members for Civil-Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations.

The Canadian Manoeuvr Training Centre (CMTC) is a national training centre which designs and delivers collective training in Full Spectrum Operations in the existing operating environment. The Centre’s weapons effects simulation technology; purpose-built urban infrastructure; role-playing civilians; and resident Opposing Force enables the chain of command to confirm the readiness of the Canadian Army to conduct domestic and international operations. The cadre of Observer Controller Trainers ensures that commanders and soldiers alike are able to learn and gain the most from this training. Short of an actual deployment, CMTC provides the most realistic and dynamic experience imaginable of operational situations up to and including force-on-force combat.⁸

⁸ <http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/doctrine-training/index.page>




Figure 7. Organisation of the Australian Vice Chief of Defence Group (source: author)





Figure 8. Organisation of Australian Defence Forces Warfare Centre (source: author)

We found that Australia also relies on a decentralized system. The Australian Vice Chief of the Defence Force Group provides military strategic effects and commitments advice and planning, joint military professional education and training, and joint and combined ADF doctrine.

I found the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre (ADFWC) particularly interesting and relevant for our inquiry. It is part of a broader joint education and training environment that values the lessons and experience of the past, yet at the same time it has the courage and the spirit to apply personal expertise and opinion to those lessons and experience. The ADFWC encourages staff and students to challenge traditional thinking using their own expertise and professionalism, melding into the joint approach. The centre coordinates the development and promulgation of Joint and Combined ADF doctrine in accordance with Australian Defence Force Joint Doctrine, develops and conducts individual joint training for other defence organisations and other government personnel to enhance their effectiveness

in a Joint operational environment. It also provides joint constructive and virtual simulations to support ADFWC and other Defence and international organisations.


The Polish experience was particularly interesting since their military traditions are very similar to the Hungarian ones. The Polish Armed Forces' training and education system consists of a two-level structure, the Military Education Department on behalf of the Ministry of Defence directs all military academies. These schools train and educate cadets for first officer's job and provide courses for officers chosen for promotion. The second level of this structure is based on NCO schools, training centres and field training centres subordinated to the relevant service commanders. The NCO schools train and educate NCO candidates and improve NCOs' qualifications, meanwhile the Training Centres provide specialist training and education. The core training activity is conducted at unit level.



9. Figure The structure of the Polish MoD (source: Polish Doctrine and Training Centre)

DTC supports training and education activities at both levels: it is subordinated directly to the Chief of General Staff of the PAF and it prepares doctrines and field manuals necessary to educate military personnel, furthermore, it defines lessons learned based on analyses of all Service HQs and troops training process, observations and experience from missions abroad and peace time practice.

The Spanish Army had a major transformation from a territorial structure to a functional and operative structure in 2004. This gives the Spanish Army the capacity to assume the missions entrusted to it by the Constitution, and the other commitments contracted with the International Security and Defense Organisations to which Spain belongs. The current organisation of the Spanish Army maintains its three main bodies: Headquarters, Force and Force Support, each of them with its command element. The Spanish Training and Doctrine Command (MADOC) is located inside the Force Support structure and its fundamental mission is to centralise the different activities in order to improve the readiness. MADOC is the organisational solution that meets and integrates all these characteristics. It is designed



10. Figure The organisation of Spanish TRADOC (source: MADOC)

to make the coordination and unification of all the efforts that are made throughout the Readiness System easier, interrelating with all the functions that make it up.

Vertical integration of the activities of each one of the Readiness Functions, since it includes both Army Commanders and Troops. Horizontal integration of the different Readiness Functions of the Preparation for each one of the Army Branches and Services, and overall the Spanish Army.

THE HDF TDC

The TDC mission is to develop viable concepts, doctrines and training manuals that meet the operational challenges (with the implied task of overseeing the HDF’s Lessons Learnt activities), in order to train and educate soldiers and leaders (including all DS related training tasks as well), support unit training and enhance the capabilities of the HDF’s combat forces, as well as implement arms-control treaties.

It is clearly a broad mission indeed, but if we take a closer look we can recognise that these missions are just different aspects of the same thing. The main focus is on the operational requirements. The concepts are the basis for doctrine and field manual development. These are the starting points for managing the basic and specialist training of soldiers and NCOs, contribute to the education of leaders and oversee unit training, including exercises and bilateral (international) training. By maintaining the HDF Lessons Learned system we enable the system as a whole to adapt to the latest developments.

I would draw your attention to a unique feature of the Hungarian J structure: the J2 and J7 are missing. J2 is integrated into the Military Intelligence and Counter intelligence Service, while J7 was amalgamated with HDF TDC. At the beginning this reorganisation




Figure 11. Organisation of the Hungarian MoD (source: Hungarian MoD)

(i.e.: reducing J7 by one level) caused some turbulence for the new organisation. HDF TDC faces many challenges, one of them came from our legal status. TDC is a so called „mid-level organisation” or „higher level Command military unit”. This expression and the figure above clearly indicate that training and doctrine issue is not represented at strategic level, as a consequence NATO and other international partners are not able to find their relevant Hungarian counterpart to co-operate with. This could be resolved by assigning to the TDC all training establishments of the HDF as subordinates. At this moment the main training installations (e.g.: Bakony Training Centre) remain under the control of JFC (Székesfehérvár), while others (e.g.: Ludovika Cadet Battalion and the NCO Academy) are under the direct command of the CHOD.

The HDF TDC was created by the merger of the previous J7 and the Command and Doctrine Centre. The main branches are under my direct command, and my COS directs the support elements. This is a fairly manpower-heavy structure for two reasons: first, it frees up positions in the MOD, second, this way it has the manpower to carry out independent (not function oriented) tasks.

The easiest way to understand the tasks of the TDC is to interpret it as a process. The main focus is on the operational requirements, and we develop viable concepts for meeting operational and doctrinal challenges. Having proper concepts we manage the development of doctrines, pamphlets and field manuals for the training system. Based on the field manuals the HDF TDC manages the basic and specialist training of soldiers and NCOs, contributes to the education of leaders, and oversees unit training, including exercises and bilateral training. By maintaining the HDF Lessons Learned system we enable the system as a whole to adopt the latest solutions to operational difficulties. Lessons Learned and international experience form the basis of our doctrine development function. Since NATO standardization is the

other basis of doctrinal development, we also represent the HDF in NATO’s standardization bodies. We take into consideration the standards promulgated by the NATO alliance, as well as the operational requirements of future missions. Based on these foundations we develop doctrines, general principles, regulations and terminology for the HDF training system. Finally, we turn doctrine into reality: we plan training. This includes planning and coordinating individual training and we support unit training by planning exercises including such international coordination as necessary and plan the exercise budgets as well. Based on continuous monitoring of our training processes we evaluate and modify the HDF’s training system as necessary. As you can see some of the training related responsibilities are not classical TRADOC functions but rather strategic level (J7) tasks.

Uniquely the centre also incorporates a department tasked with enforcement of the CFE treaty, the Open Skies and Vienna Document 2011 agreements and other arms control agreements. This is a legacy from the predecessor organization: the HDF Operations Centre was responsible – among many other tasks – for arms control, and HDF TDC assumed this function along with the other tasks of the HDF OC.

THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CENTRE

One of our biggest achievements is that the Defence Staff earned the Scientific Research Centre qualification. The Research Centre is led by the head of the Doctrine Analysis and Evaluation Branch. The Centre conducts research on security and defence issues and incorporates international developments into its analyses and recommendations in support of conceptual and doctrinal development. Thus all products issued by the CHOD have a firm scientific foundation.

This Centre also oversees the military doctoral (PhD) programs financed by the MoD: research topics, the selection of the PhD candidates, scholarship recommendations.




Figure 12. Organisation of HDF TDC (source : HDF TDC)

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

We maintain good relationship with the US Army's TRADOC (my visit in June 2014 at TRADOC HQ in Fort Monroe, Virginia was the first by a Hungarian General Officer). This relationship is very important for us since we consider the American TRADOC as the archetype for our own organisation. We have benefited from their experience in the areas of entry level military training, military occupational specialty training, battle drill, etc. are valuable, update and based on operational experience.

We maintain a good relationship with our Czech counterpart, the Training Command and Military Academy in Vyškov. Our interest is mainly due to the fact that the Czech Army has had a TRADOC organisation longer than we did. We are keen to learn as much as possible from their experience. Since both Armies are involved in the Visegrad 4 (V4) Battle Group project, we will also be able to deepen our cooperation in training. Finally, as a relatively small army, similar to ours, the Czech Army has some useful experience to offer in doctrine development.

The Austrian Military Academy has a relatively long and very fruitful cooperation with our Terminology section. As a result of this liaison an Austro-Hungarian Terminography (a dictionary of military terms) will soon be published in Vienna. We also adopted the Austrian translation system, and last year we established the Hungarian STANFOR system (Hungarian acronym for STANag TRANSlation). In a relatively short time and with very limited human resources we managed to translate about 10 doctrines and several other allied publications into Hungarian.

The Bundeswehr Planning Office Scientific Support & Interoperability Branch delegation – Colonel Kretzer – visited our predecessor organisation last October, and we are going to repay the visit this year. The common interest is doctrine development. I am certain that we have many things to learn from the German way of the interoperability. There is still plenty of room for developing this partnership.

The Central European Defence Cooperation / V4 Training Catalogue: This catalogue is a revised version of the former Visegrad Group (V4 countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) Training Catalogue of 2010. On 4-6 February 2014, the Training Chiefs (J7) of seven nations (Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) of the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) decided to enhance the military cooperation among the Central European countries. One of the main areas of this military collaboration is training. During the February meeting the Training Chiefs of the various nations' General Staffs supported the idea to refurbish and expand the former Training Catalogue, including not only training and live-fire range usage, but military courses and exercises, as well. An additional, interesting initiative is to extend the V4 database with countries such as Austria, Croatia and Slovenia. I believe this Training Catalogue will greatly serve the efforts of our 7 nations by increasing interoperability and bringing our military troops closer, in a comprehensive way, in order to meet all challenges in the 21st century and to provide adequate mutual support, as well.

The HDF TDC is a new organisation and we rely on international experience in order to improve our organisation. Especially from this perspective we expect good relationship with the military diplomatic corps.

My vision for the future is to develop the TDC in order to qualify us to have a J7 directorate-level influence on the system which makes life easier: we can be more effective and more efficient. In an ideal world a military commander does not need to explain what

his organisation is about to his international counterpart. I hope that in the near future my organisation will be licensed to control every classical TRADOC area of responsibility. As minimum we should have authority over the NCO Academy and the Ludovika Cadet Battalion and in the long run the Peace Support Training Centre (Szolnok). Just at that time I will have the right to proudly change our name from HDF TDC to the much better recognizable HDF TRADOC. The restructuring of the organisation brings the reconsideration of the mission of J1, since this is the organisation responsible at this moment for the education of leaders. At strategic level the CHOD wants us to have training and doctrine taken in hand in a single organization.

SUMMARY

HDF TDC is the first Hungarian organisation that brings together four areas into one single (stand-alone) organisation. These four areas, working together multiply the effect and build up cohesion and synergy. The TDC is relatively new, therefore our experience is limited, but we are keen on learning from other armies and I hope this article helped the readers understand our way and vision.

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Lt. Col. Tamás Kender:

FUTURE GROUNDED

“Home defense is a national cause”¹

ABSTRACT: Hungary has always been in a very specific geostrategic position in the Carpathian Basin. Being a buffer zone between the East and West and defending Europe's Southern flank from the Islamic expansion determined the country's faith in the past and this does not seem to change in the future either. While facing old and new challenges – with the worsening security situation within and around Europe – the Hungarian Armed Forces are struggling to keep up the pace and that is particularly true for the Land community. Though the last decades' participations in international crisis response operations brought us tremendous experience and purposeful development/procurement of some gears, the bulk of the conventional equipment has been aging, and the strength of the ground forces has decreased because of the lack of sufficient finance. In order to support future developments, realistic options should be reckoned and developed.

KEYWORDS: Worsening security situation, ground forces, current conditions, aging equipment, development options

PREFACE

All living things are born with some curiosity. Particularly human beings, we have more in us. We want to understand our past and present and have the urgent need to know what the future holds. However, knowing is still just not enough sometimes, we also want to have an influence somehow. For that some of us would ask the stars, or would turn to the oracles, others would make sacrifice to the gods, but a few make plans, or strategy.

When thinking of our own history there could be debates whether our ancestors, when they got to this region, were running from the East, or they had a plan to raid further to the West. Was it tactics or strategy that surprised the Western European empires? Then, a couple of decades later was it strategy that Hungarian tribes settled down and took Christianity or just the pure necessity to survive?

In his book Millennium, Tom Holland writes that back in 899 monks described wild squadrons of savage horsemen pillaging civilized Christian countries in the West. *“The invaders were rumoured even to have drained their victims of their blood”* and as time passed the surprise went with it. *“That the invaders were in truth not demons but rather tribesmen from their outer limits of the world, a people known as Hungarians, was widely acknowledged.”* The success story of the light horsemen with their deadly arrows ended when Henry the Fowler recognizing their tactics, strengths and weaknesses prepared a trap. First he persuaded his followers to invest in warhorses and mail coat to transform them

¹ 2011. évi CXIII. sz. tv. 1.§

into “*loricati*”: men of iron. He also had fortresses raised, and bases established along the eastern border of the Reich, not only for defense, but to launch counter-offensives. He also summoned criminals, thieves, bandits to be trained for launching offensives against the Wends. Then to test his force he destroyed the raiding Wends and then was ready for the Hungarians. He stopped paying tribute to them and as a consequence they “*as the Wends had done dispatched a raiding party to pillage Saxony too: it was cornered, confronted and wiped out. Once again, it was the heavy cavalry, singing to the Almighty as they rode, who led the slaughter*”² Thus superior forces outsmarted and defeated our “conventional” tactics. We could not raid further into the West, we could not return to the East, so we had to stay somewhere in between. For that we needed to be transformed from barbarian savages to civilized Christians. That did not go easily, and still has its effects on our culture.

Throughout our history this geostrategic position we were stocked in decided our fate. As the last stand between Christianity and barbarian hordes the Hungarian Kingdom was the shield and sword for Europe for centuries. The long wars had their price. Hungary lost its independence and a vast part of its territory. Being a buffer zone in the middle meant to be ruled by Ottomans, Austrians, or Russians for about half a millennia. That has effected Hungarian society, culture, politics and with that the military. Since 1921 Hungarian strategists have thought that our homeland’s defense policy should rely on strong alliance because of the lack of strong national economy³. Trusting this idea had its side effects. Political goals have always been ambitious, although the will to support the means to achieve those goals was rather modest. Without the sufficient support for the means, the military had to fulfill impossible missions with great sacrifices. A whole field army was lost when it had been sent to the river Don with an improper structure, unrealistic mission, and insufficient equipment against superior forces. The catastrophe had been seen before the first train departed to the front. Some hundred years ago Machiavelli pointed out that “*Because the life of the state depends on the excellence of its army, the political institutions must be organized in such a manner that they create favorable preconditions for the functioning of the military organization.*”⁴ I would rather say, that a state that has ambitions and interests to enforce, must rely upon itself and to avoid unnecessary risks it needs a tool which can be used for each direction. Luck is untrustworthy. As Machiavelli *acknowledges Fortuna’s power; only when people and states make themselves as strong and powerful as possible can they resist becoming a helpless toy in her hands.*⁵

There were, and still are theses about how one single service could achieve strategic goals but not one of them could survive a real war. If we acknowledge the thesis that “*the aim of war is to subject the enemy to your will*”⁶, we understand that to achieve that we must use all possible ways and means. Thus, when talking about Land Forces’ future we must understand that since the Great War no ground echelon, not a single arm has operated alone and achieved success. As of today combined joint operations are the one-on-one at both tactical and operational levels. The Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) is a combined

² Tom Holland: Millennium. Abacus. London, 2008, 42–55.

³ Dombrády Lóránd: A magyar katonai gondolkodás jellemzője a második világháború előtt. In: A magyar katonai gondolkodás története. Tanulmánygyűjtemény. Szerk.: Ács Tibor. Zrínyi, 1995, 130.

⁴ Felix Gilbert: Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War. In: Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Edited by Peter Paret, 1986, 29.

⁵ Felix Gilbert: Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War, 24.

⁶ Felix Gilbert: Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War, 29.

joint force. Not a single part of it should be handled as a stand-alone force, or be developed for the detriment of the other.

Today and in the future modern technology will evolve and be “*in its restless energy, creating new kinds of weapons that may in time make nuclear war obsolete and create the conditions in which the principles of classical strategy were formulated.*”⁷ History must be examined cautiously and be learned from, not to repeat mistakes. We must keep this in mind when thinking of our Land Forces’ future.

SECURITY AND DEFENSE

The word *security* itself comes from the Latin word *securitas*, in where *cura* means danger which with the *se-* (without) preposition brings us to the conclusion that security might mean: *without danger, or not endangered*. Of course we can ask at once: How do you know that you are not in danger? Really, you do not. The problem is that *being or feeling endangered* are two different faces of reality.⁸

Referring this back on society, it means that what people feel or know about it is always different from real security. Civilians are not trained for recognizing or understanding all signs of threat, they are dependent on their feelings, on the opinion of their political leaders, experts and mostly the *media*. On the other hand, people working in the security business have their built-in paranoia and besides that their pure being is based on threat.

Also, security has many levels and faces in our life. It can range from the individual, through a small community to state level or above. It has different meanings in the world of economy, information, environment; it could be external or internal affairs etc. Nevertheless, society has its priorities of what is more important. For us, military, the most important, of course, is the security of the sovereignty of the country, which we must maintain and defend. For that we have to have the capability to project power, to deter, defend and attack. These capabilities always depend on the ambition and capabilities of the country. So, security is not a stand-alone status of the community. It has to be maintained via means of defense. Amongst these means is the military power which is understood today as a military tool against military type threats. According to the nature and the level of the threat, it can be global, regional or local. We, the military, normally say we must maintain our military capabilities according to that threat. The problem is, again, that military and civilians see threat in different ways.

CHALLENGES OF THE FUTURE AND PRESENT

What is our greatest challenge at this very moment or in the near future? It is hard to choose from the many. I think we should consider *time* first as something we cannot win against. Since we started measuring it, time has incredibly sped up, and today everything is happening much faster than it used to. You can travel around the globe within twenty-four hours, for information it takes a minute. The growth of the world population is doubling and is to reach circa 10 billion in about just 30 years. Potable water supply and sources of energy are to run out with that growth. Even the climate change has sped up causing severe weather that has

⁷ Gordon A. Craig – Felix Gilbert: Reflections on Strategy in the Present and Future. In: Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Edited by Peter Paret, 1986.

⁸ Gazdag Ferenc: A biztonsági tanulmányok alapjai. Tankönyv. Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, 2013, 13–18.

impacts on people, animals, and crops. Science gives us technology to kill and survive. The superpowers have the will and ability to take control of the situation although the waning resources make them impatient.

Our region has its own specific challenge of just being here “in the middle”. The inherited ethno-cultural conflicts have been here for centuries, and they seem to be continued. With the growing population of the third world extreme poverty and discontentment bring millions of poor immigrants to Europe with hope that not always comes through. All of these challenges are already existing and they are still accelerating further.

Examining the most current history of our surroundings we can say that describing the security environment as *fragile* is a very polite word. *Tense* is much closer, but *bellicose* or *war-like* is pretty much the truth about it. There is no doubt, that these changes have happened so fast, that taken by surprise no country or alliance could react at once, and it takes time even to decide what to do.

In the last 14 years there were three wars in the Balkans when Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and then Kosovo chose to be independent from former Yugoslavia; and then Ukraine chose European partnership over Russia. When the country tried to loosen its bonds with the Big Bear, it did not take this option lightly. Having every means to bring Ukraine on its knees, Russia destabilized the region, *Anschluss*-ed the Crimean peninsula and still gives heavy support to the East-Ukrainian separatists for gaining more influence there. No one sees how this conflict would end, yet. The terrorist attacks in the heart of Western Europe proved that the ethno-cultural mixing already started, but seclusion is more common than assimilation, and that leads to radicalization.

Not every challenge is known and the most dangerous are those we do not see, do not understand. When Clausewitz describes the *fog of war*⁹ he means luck on the battlefield that has its ups and downs. The future is the same. There are challenges we think we know and others we do not know yet, but we have some suspicion about it. Laser technology is used already, automatized machines take over the jobs of people, Artificial Intelligence and nano-technology are experimented in the labs today. Information technology and bio-robotics researches are beyond our imagination. What the nature of these challenges would bring to us, we can only guess.

However, there is one thing we know for sure. There are countries with sufficient resources, strong will and capability not only to develop new technologies but also to use them. The only question is how far we are lagging behind?

Our military has its capabilities. However these capabilities are different. From the two of our services Air Force is much more forward than the Army. But within the services arms have their differences, too. While our fixed wing rules the skies, helicopters hardly take off the ground. Having a closer look into our ground forces we can see that some infantry units have much better equipment than others. Besides, today the not-so-new special operations unit has modern equipment from mostly US support. How could all this happen?

When it joined the Alliance Hungary offered a lot to bring to the table and since then many modifications of that offer have had to be made. The reason for this, I believe is that we did not speak the same language and no-one understood clearly the requirements.

I believe that understanding requirements and capabilities on both sides – political and military – is the key to avoid premature decisions and the dream of unachievable goals. By

⁹ Carl von Clausewitz: A háborúról. I. kötet. Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, Budapest, 1961.

capabilities I mean what our country – economy, society and politics – can and will do. By requirements there are two sides of the coin.

When I read two research studies about Hungary's future by a group of scientists¹⁰ the first thing that hit my eye was that they covered all areas of life – political, economic, medical etc. – but military security. It is obvious I could say. I believe, however, that not a single part of life can be examined separately from the others. They must be handled comprehensively. One thing is what military we want to have and for what purpose. The other is what our partners – EU and NATO – expect from us. If the two requirements are not the same, we are in trouble. We need to have two different kinds of army.

Let's have a look at the purpose first. What are the security challenges we are to face sooner or later? In order to respond to them we must understand the nature of future conflicts and the mission and tasks stemming from them. First of all, we must understand what war will look like in the future. Even conventionalists understand that it cannot be the Second World War again. We cannot always prepare for the last one. Wars are evolving, along with human and technological evolution. The nature of war, military operations are undergoing many changes.¹¹

The Clausewitzian definition that “*war is employing violence in order to enforce our enemy to be subject of our will*”¹² is as questionable as the thesis that “*war is the continuity of politics with other means*”. Why? Today's technology provides us many means to achieve our goals without a shot fired, and wars are going on between non-state actors for business purposes with using all elements of a conventional conflict known. I believe that defining wars in the near future will be harder. One definition could be like: *War is when state(s) or non-state actor(s) will use all means from non-lethal to the most violent ones within its(their) power in order to enforce the other state(s) or non-state actor(s) to be subject to its(their) will.*

That means that the present conventional vs. non-conventional debate will end. When non-conventional becomes a general way of war, it also becomes conventional. It will be a part of the full spectrum. Also, wars will be asymmetric. No two equal forces would clash for long. As soon as someone wins the other goes under and starts asymmetric warfare. And finally, no war can be won without the support of society. You must win the people first. Information is weapon, it is power. Media is the fifth dimension. So there could be conflicts won without fighting any battles. If we recognize these new patterns of war in time we can prepare for them. As General Deák stated in one of his articles “*predicting the nature of future conflicts that Central-East NATO countries – with Hungary amongst them – might be involved in could help to point optimal directions and priorities for development of the military*”.¹³

¹⁰ In these two studies the future researchers advice on 8 different possible future of the country. Although they see how external and internal problems are affect eachother, they focus on economoy-political relations and do not examin what security problems would be caused. More to see in: Magyarország holnap után. Tanulmánykötet, szerk.: Nováky Erzsébet, 2001, és Nováky Erzsébet: Magyarország 2025. Gazdasági és Szociális Tanács, 2010.

¹¹ Deák János: A háború és hadsereg a XXI. században, különös tekintettel a magyar honvédség jövőképre. Hadtudomány (online), 2014, 42.

¹² Carl von Clausewitz: A háborúról. I. kötet, 37.

¹³ Deák János: A háború és hadsereg a XXI. században, 42.

FUTURE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

So what kind of conflicts could there be here, in what kind of operational environment?

Even if there is not much chance for it, nuclear war is not totally forgotten, yet. A slight change in Russian defense doctrine has just been made and it confirmed that Russia would be ready to use its nukes if felt threatened. Thus, in the neighborhood it would be wise to be prepared for operating in NBC environment.

In Europe the main effort is still to be carried out by conventional armies. That means steel. Bombers, fighters, tanks and APC's, with robust fire support in a combined joint environment. What really is changing is the precision. *The strikes will be more accurate from larger distance, with automated systems.*¹⁴

Because the ratio of strength and capabilities is in favor of the more developed or larger countries, asymmetric, non-conventional warfare involving as great civilian masses as possible would be the means of war. Also, using all the possible technology available will widen the circle of participants, and military, para-military, and civilian actors will not be able to be differentiated.

Growing cities are becoming larger with expanding suburbs. The people are moving in the populated areas and developing them into *giga-cities*. Winning or threatening them will be the key for adversaries. Thus *media* is becoming (if has not become yet) the goal, ways and means of war. That means television, radio and most importantly, the Internet.

Because of the wide spectrum and incredible speed of technological progress new assets, weapons, or weaponizable assets will be available to anyone. Personal UAVs, robots, laser devices, nano-tech gizmos, communication or even spy devices etc. will be ordered from on-line stores, can be home-made, or even printed in 3D.

No military can operate without the support of the citizens. The citizens are members of society that raises the army, and decide the mission via political directions. Society continuously changes. Growing immigration and ethno-cultural mixing in Europe change the way of thinking of the nations, and also change security issues.¹⁵

To respond to these challenges globally and regionally NATO/EU, including Hungary, built concepts and strategies. Hungary has a National Security Strategy (NSS)¹⁶ that describes most of the above mentioned problems. Some are highlighted and to be responded to by the National Military Strategy (NMS)¹⁷. Both documents were made with respect for NATO's and the EU's strategies.

The NMS laid down the expectations and goals of the HDF and also gave us a time frame. Rephrasing its main message is that HDF runs at a basic level and would reach its full spectrum capabilities in accordance with the changes of our security environment. For that there is a circa 10-year period of time.

What I regard here as a question; does everyone really understand in what condition our land forces are and where we are heading now?

¹⁴ See more in: Molnár István: A jövő háborúinak és fegyveres konfliktusainak jellemzőiről. Kard és toll (online), 2005.

¹⁵ So given that situation when civilizations are mixing, Huntingtons thesis of clashes along breaking lines between cultures, or civilizations is becoming either impossible or chaotic.

¹⁶ Issued in 2012.

¹⁷ Issued in 2012.

PRESENT CONDITIONS

The backbone of the ground forces is – and always has been – the foot soldier. Two brigades of BTR¹⁸ borne infantry and one light (air transportable) mixed battalion. A bit over 600 APC¹⁹s arrived into the country in the early 90's as a part of the Russian debt consolidation. By the end of 2010 about one third of the 15-25-year-old vehicles had been *modernized*²⁰, and then modern radio systems were built in. In order to achieve NATO standard command and control capabilities the command posts were equipped further with digital communication – information hardware and software up to company level. Battalion level is still pending. To sum it up, we can say that about three mechanized battalions and the reinforcing modules (recce, combat engineer, NBC) for another one are nearly combat ready, but they are just not, yet.

The battalions are on continuous training that is wearing off the equipment. In 2020 there will be 20-30-year-old BTRs still in service as the bulk of the force, and that is acceptable if the equipment gets the necessary maintenance. Though it must be kept in mind that aging assets need more care, and spare parts are getting rare to find and more expensive to buy. Vehicles which do not go through *modernization* age faster and their maintenance is more and more challenging.

Taking the initiative in the past meant armor. Guderian in *Achtung Panzer* dreamed about a panzer *armée* to break through the enemy's defense. We can say that for today the patterns of war have changed, thus an armour battalion – with two companies, 14 tanks each – is enough for our operational goals. The T-72s – one could say – are not the state of the art war machines, but they still do. According to their age though they are in their late thirties and maintaining these steel monsters is really demanding. Without sufficient materiel and spare parts they will stop running within a couple of years.

Our ground fire support is based on D-20 152 mm towed guns at a brigade level, and mostly 82 mm mortars at battalion level. These Cold War veterans are ready for retirement. The new 60 mm mortars are very few and small to be used above a light company level. Anti-armor units and subunits were reorganized to make use of the missiles more economical.

Most of all the combat support troops are fighting with the same problem. They are using special vehicles, heavy machines, or even are building bridges with equipment from the 60's and the 70's.

The success story of the Special Operations Forces – a battalion strength unit – is depending on a thin line of American support that takes as long as we are taking part in coalition operations. In the light of present and future patterns of war, losing it or even weakening it is not an option.

Finally, the personal equipment of the individual soldier. Although there are programs within NATO and the EU aiming to develop a modern soldier-system to rule the battlefield, our efforts were enough only to support soldiers participating in international peace support operations.

¹⁸ Bronetransporter – troop carrier (BTR 80 with 14,5 mm; BTR 80/A with 30 mm guns) – that is not infantry fighting vehicle.

¹⁹ Armored Personnel Carrier – normally lightly armored wheeled transport vehicle with supporting gun system.

²⁰ That meant a higher level technical maintenance, the turrets got break system and night vision optics from the 50 years old D-944, also internal smoke ventillation system was built, and anti-slippery cover was installed upon the steel body.

Simplifying the situation on the ground, it seems that without putting huge effort in the maintenance most of the aging equipment is going to have been worn out by 2020, and only one third of it will last some five or six years longer. There is nothing new under the sun; these problems are well known by everyone in the military. The reason to put these problems on the same page here was to make some points to be understood deeply. “*Keeping the basic elements of the capabilities*”²¹ means that:

- The main equipment of the land forces will have worn out by 2020-2025.
- This means that it will happen just about at the same time as our NATO assigned units should be combat ready
- Economising on maintenance will speed the amortization up.
- According to the age of the equipment, spare parts are becoming more difficult to get, more expensive to buy and build in
- Unbalanced spending means differentiating between units, that is between soldiers, and it has a serious moral effect

Before shaping any hasty opinion or making sentences beginning “if we had had..”, I would say let us think first. Just run over again what our history taught us, what requirements we must face, and then ask ourselves again; what options we could have.

OPTIONS

Taking into account all the above listed facts and assumptions first we can describe what we do need. The future operational environment comes to us and either we prepare for it or not. In order to not just to survive but to operate on the future battlefield, land forces require capabilities; to develop and to maintain. According to general Deák’s vision the armed forces with ground component are in need of capabilities such as:

- *tactical-operational level capabilities to stop the enemy, including combat capabilities of land-air task-organized forces based on reconnaissance, fire and maneuver capabilities*
- *air-defense capabilities (anti-aircraft and anti-missile)*
- *combat/defense capabilities against airborne and special operations forces*
- *own special operations capabilities*
- *information operations/warfare capabilities*
- *logistics support that can ensure the continuous combat capability of maneuver elements*²²

For the land forces I would translate this list, such as:

- the capability of leading the force with modern, interoperable, robust, secure C4I²³ system supporting the joint operational picture
- remotely controlled, or semi-automated self-propelled ground and air reconnaissance/ firing systems
- night combat capabilities at individual and unit levels
- individual and collective protective systems and gears against small arms/CBRN²⁴
- CBRN/Shell/mid-caliber ammo-protected transportation for mobility

²¹ NMS 2012.

²² Deák János: A háború és hadsereg a XXI. században, 44.

²³ Command, control, communication, coordination, information and intelligence.

²⁴ Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear.

- combat engineer capabilities for mobility and counter mobility
- combat logistic capabilities of repair, maintenance, transportation, and supply
- combat medical capabilities at all levels
- to support all the above a well-organized and trained reserve system

And:

- the capability to fight and survive in a hybrid environment, where civilians, non-combatants, para-military and military are mixed and non-separable from each other
- and last but not least I must confess that I am a believer in special operations. By that I do not mean Special Forces, but a force that can plan, organize, conduct and support special operations with its all capabilities in a joint manner. If you wish, a special operations capable Land Force.

The goals and means are set. To get there we need a concept, so to find the way let's see what we can do.

As most military persons would say a *complete rearmament* is the one and only solution. That actually would mean to get rid of all our “old rusty” equipment and acquire new types of them. Before running to the market it also should be considered that with new equipment one must organize the supply system as well. One gun needs many different kinds of ammo, transport, targeting system, spare parts and tools, also some infrastructure investments are needed. Changing all the BTRs at once would mean acquiring several hundred modern APCs with C4I/firing/protection systems plus all annexes. Introducing them at the same time would take the units off for about a year, and also the costs would be very high. Acquiring and introducing new equipment to the troops step by step would solve this problem, and would generate some other. It would take much longer and there would be no two units in the Army compatible or interoperable with each other at the same time. The old equipment in store would need to be taken care of before refurbishing for further use, or selling or dismantling. Each course of action costs money and takes precious time. The military has no budgetary fund for this action, so it can be solved with government support only.

Taking all these factors into consideration others would rather support a *modernization project*, understanding that not all the equipment is waste. Some might be considered for improving their mobility/protection/firepower/C4I and should be used further in reserve or other units. It makes sense, and here “going Dutch” would mean good. However, would saving money really save money? Modernization means that some capabilities *are* improved. There are two ways of it: to develop ourselves or to use others' experience. The first one means you spend money on long term projects and developers without the knowledge of the equipment; the second means you buy out others' developments and licenses then adopt them. Improving steel for a STANAG 4 level protection, or changing turret and gun for – let's say – a remote controlled one effects the whole system. For example, higher armour protection on an APC would affect the engine and gears because of the additional weight. So such modernisation might take much longer, would cost a fortune, and you cannot be sure of the outcome.

Learning from the past of our reforms in the military one could say *reorganization to “lighter”* is the best (and cheapest) solution. That would mean getting rid of the old and heavy equipment, and organize foot-borne infantry units instead, with less mobility/protection and fire power of course. Having a closer look at the possible threats there is still the question of conventional or unconventional. Here I would mention that when unconventional is making common sense, it is becoming conventional. I believe that changing of the ratio of forces from heavy to middleweight then light would not answer the question, would not solve the problem.

Is there any final optimal solution at last? I think going back to the original problem of what threat we are to face in the future, and what, or how our society would think of it, answer the question, whether we like it or not.

There might be, of course other options. The most likely course of action – according to the budget cuts – would be a mixture of all the three versions. Development in some areas, modernization in others and reorganization will happen as well. What I think we should avoid in the future is buying or accepting *old, used equipment for rearmament*, or having some *partial improvement as modernization*. These steps would cost unfairly lot, and would make longer suffering instead of healing. The most important thing is thinking of the land component as a system within a system. The development of one part has an impact on the other.

The priorities should be on equipping and organizing/reorganizing land units at battalion level with organic capabilities of:

1. Early warning – that consists of reconnaissance and surveillance, data collecting, processing and info projection
2. Immediate reaction – high readiness, stockpiled materiel, training, equipment
3. All-terrain and all-weather (including night) combat – weapons and equipment
4. Anti-armor – active and passive
5. Non-lethal equipment and training
6. High mobility and maneuverability – ground and air
7. Fire support – organic and capability of call for joint fire
8. Limited counter-air for direct support for maneuver
9. Survival – concealment, pure water, fortification, active anti-EW measures
10. Mobility and counter-mobility support including C-IED
11. CBRN – detection, protection and decontamination
12. Self-supply and medical evacuation and treatment
13. C4I capabilities – secure, voice and digital data supported

These organic capabilities ensure that a battalion-level ground unit – when trained and equipped – can efficiently operate in a joint operational area on very short notice. This also means that jointness appears at the lowest possible level e.g. platoon. To get there fast, from base to objective, and fight, transport and close air support are also crucial. Thus introducing new helicopters to the armed forces might be more important for the Army troops than the Air Force. Precision strike – requested and guided from the ground – saves lives of soldiers. That also means that all battlefield systems are equally important.

To respond to all kinds of threat there are two options. One is organizing a *multipurpose force* with many tasks; the second is organizing *forces to tasks*. Both options have their pros and cons.

A *multipurpose force* must be ready for anything, so it should be equipped for the worst case scenario. That means a heavy response to whatever the challenge is. It seems to be a bit expensive when there is no imminent serious danger, and going heavy to crisis response overseas could also be costly.

Having more *forces with different capabilities* – heavy, middle and light – can answer any challenge according to the danger, and separately. Keeping three different kinds of capabilities might sound expensive, although missing any of them would cost more to the others, or failing a mission.

I believe, however, that the second option is still more viable, because there is no need for too much equipment from one of its kind but the units can be organized and equipped

step by step without losing any capability. Also the current units would stay intact with their current *modernized* capabilities while the others could be reorganized and supplied. This way the land commander gets the flexibility in his hands to react accordingly, and also, when tasking the battalions with different capabilities as regiment(s), or brigade(s) he can use the forces more economically.

What we always must keep in mind is that what purpose the Army is needed for. According to the NMS the primary job is still defending the country with (or without) the Alliance. Going expeditionary is a mission impossible without our own strategic transport capability and without sufficient national logistic support.

According to some *élite* forces' view there are still two basic requirements that determine a force readiness and reaction capability. One is the "how", meaning that soldiers and units must be in such conditions, which make them able to do their job effectively. For that they need a mindset which allows them to think smartly and act without hesitation. That can be achieved by *tough training* that we should not be afraid of anymore. Our rules for doing that need revising and correcting, and trainers and trainees need the trust of their superiors and of each other.

When taking threats into account there is a big question mark whether answering internal/external dangers should we divide between police and the military. The logic behind it is clear, however, better understanding counterterrorism and special operations would help to gain more advantages on our side. The most recent actions in our security environment confirm that to *prevent destabilization actions* and *terrorism* from within, police and military must work in close coordination and must work out *joint counter measures* including intelligence, communication, information and direct action.

The other requirement – the *legal background* – is the most important element of allowing the forces doing their job correctly. Without legal support soldiers should fight with one or both hands behind their back with possible enemies who do not have any similar restrictions.

PLANNING FATE

History taught us that the geostrategic position, between West and East, where we had been led by our ancestors and we have been living ever since, decides our destiny. Although Hungary does not regard anyone as enemy, the threats it must face in the present and the future still exist and will exist. The country has its interests and, as a member of the European Community and of the Alliance, Hungary needs a capability to deter, to defend; and if necessary, to attack. To get it, however, is not just a question of money, but also of collective thinking.

Besides being pessimistic, our other Hungarian heritage is that when we arrive to the questions of *what*, or *how* nine out of ten will answer *why not*. The easiest way is to say nothing, or just shrug a shoulder. To find a way, however, that responds to the challenges we are facing we need to be open minded and creative.

According to our limited resources we have never been a member of the *materiel centric warfare* club. So, we should not act like one. We can choose between the *maneuver* and the *guerrilla* schools. We have always liked to look at ourselves as a *maneuverist*, but did we really have the tools and mindset to be one? There are supporters of the asymmetric way,

and there are articles²⁵ with reasonable thoughts supporting the idea. However, one must consider the culture we inherited and the environment we live in. I believe that there is an urgent need for a paradigm shift in military thinking and we must see ourselves a little bit from the outside. We may not need to be rigid and choose one, but use any pieces we can from each culture, combine them and we might build a new paradigm.

What I was trying to highlight in this article was some thoughts on our reality of planning the future. Before starting to plan the future we should reckon the past and the present, we must appreciate the geostrategic environment we live in, and take into account the expectations and possibilities offered by our own country. We must also recognize that the different pictures that the civilian control and the military have on threats and the necessary counter-measures will take both sides off the track. Our primary job is to educate non-military decision makers on what *achievable strategic military objectives* really mean, and how the *goals-ways-means* philosophy work in military planning. The difference between tailoring the force for the purpose(s) or the purpose(s) for the force should be clear for everyone.

The decision on the direction we would take in the future, and with that the faith of the Land forces lies in the hands of our society, and our political leaders. However, we, the military have the responsibility for assisting with the best professional advice for that decision should be wise.

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²⁵ Fábián Sándor: *Alternatív stratégia „kis” államoknak*. In: *Biztonságpolitika* (online), 2013. http://www.biztonsagpolitika.hu/documents/1388413562_Fabian_Sandor_Alternativ_vedelmi_strategia_-_biztonsagpolitika.hu.pdf (Accessed: 11. 02. 2015.)

Péter Marton¹ and Péter Wagner:

IN RETROSPECTION: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN DEFENCE FORCES' ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN

ABSTRACT: The article offers a retrospective assessment of the Hungarian Defence Forces' efforts in Afghanistan since 2003 (the start of the HDF's activities there). It outlines a few basic considerations as to what may constitute a basis for such an assessment. This is followed by an overview of how Hungary fits into the system of burden-sharing within the coalition of the Afghanistan mission, and the issue of how much Hungary has done compared to its partners. It then looks at the example of the PRT and the deployment of the Hungarian Special Forces to gain a closer understanding of the impact of Hungary's involvement, for example the question of how much this involvement was appreciated by others.

KEYWORDS: Afghanistan, ISAF, Hungarian Defence Forces, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), special operations, NATO

BASIC GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT

Even if there had been no specific *raison d'être* for it in the tragic form of the 9/11 attacks, the Afghanistan mission (or more precisely the mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan) would still have been necessary for NATO's health. That NATO should "go out of area or out of business" originally emerged as a call in the context of the 1990s and was heeded ultimately in the form of taking on a role in Afghanistan's stabilisation, by taking over the leadership of ISAF in 2003.

What followed was a spectacular exercise in improving interoperability involving over fifty countries, including NATO member states and NATO's partners around the globe. It increased the collective potential of the countries concerned in applying their militaries in the joint production of the public good of global security. That NATO provided the framework for this leaves NATO with considerable political capital. It remains to be seen if this legacy is put to use elsewhere, although the Libyan intervention has already, arguably, constituted an example of this (even as operations in Afghanistan were still underway at the time).

In an age of interdependence, it is a salient and persistent feature of the contemporary strategic landscape that countries need to work together to achieve common ends. NATO may thus, on occasions, play a key role in mobilising and coordinating a critical mass of countries for such purposes. The Hungarian Defence Forces' contribution to the ISAF mission was thus beneficial to Hungary in this abstract and indirect sense, too, through its aptitude for laying the foundations for a global extension of cooperative security and for reaffirming NATO's leading role in this.

¹ In conducting research for this article, Péter Marton benefited from the support of the Bolyai János Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

ISAF did have an important and specific strategic purpose, however, and in light of this the above argument needs to be expanded. The assistance of Afghanistan's post-Taliban government in establishing security across the country, before fledgling Afghan security institutions could be expected to take over these tasks, was the means to achieving the larger end of preventing al-Qaida from returning to the country's territory to once again find a safe haven there. It was, in other words, an indirect line of operation, designed to contribute to the latter objective even as other kinds of efforts were also necessary to achieve the same end.

The theory behind this was that a landlocked failed state or one with a rogue and supportive quasi-government (such as the Taliban) could be a critical enabler of the jihadist movement, and that denying the jihadist movement this sanctuary and the accompanying support was vital to defeating it comprehensively.

Complications emerged, of course, for example in the form of the relatively safe haven the jihadist groups concerned could enjoy within Pakistan, in parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) such as North Waziristan. The officially deniable use of drones to strike related targets in Pakistani territory eventually proved to be a way to work around this problem. This was possible from Afghan bases while the original rationale for the Afghanistan mission had to remain as it had been: Afghanistan had to be sustainably stabilised, both for the sake of the ability to strike al-Qaida's Pakistani refuge and for making sure that Afghanistan itself is spared from jihadist conquest. Given that this strategic effort was increasingly challenged from 2005 on by a complex insurgency, ISAF gradually had to engage in counterinsurgency-related tasks as well.

In the meantime, other theatres emerged where the global jihadist movement's presence took on importance as a threat to the West: most notably in Yemen and in Iraq – in the latter's case, a theatre of the United States' and its partners' own making. Today, there are even more regions of concern in this respect, including Syria and Libya as well. The overall situation has thus worsened, and this was bound to call into question Afghanistan's strategic relevance over time. Afghanistan is beyond doubt a potentially very useful base for the jihadist movement, but at present the movement has a strong presence right on the threshold of Europe – a more pressing challenge given the geographical proximity. This comes in the form of the Syrian-Iraqi theatre, which the jihadist combatants of the Islamic State themselves merged when they symbolically erased the international border (and the sand berm along it) between the two countries. ISAF's mission thus has to be evaluated in light of the global strategic gains and losses, with a view to the larger fight against jihadi terrorism. ISAF's legacy and what Afghanistan's new leadership together with its external supporters make of it, is but one component in this greater struggle.

The threat of terrorism is of concern for Hungary, too. While the country itself may not be a prime target for the jihadist groups in question, it does host specific targets (e.g. embassies) that may be. Moreover, Hungarian citizens may lose their lives in terrorist incidents not only within Hungary but elsewhere in the wider world, too, especially given their increased mobility as exchange students, migrant workers, travelling professionals, and tourists. Even distant jihadi terrorism may thus affect the country directly. Moreover, Hungary is part of a group of deeply integrated and open countries, where interdependence is markedly high – Hungary thus has the guard duty of a sovereign to make sure its territory is not used for logistical purposes by terrorist groups. Still, the rationale for Hungary's participation in the Afghanistan mission cannot be explained wholly in terms of the country's interest in counterterrorism.

It is of more profound significance that Hungary is a NATO member state that ultimately depends for its defence on NATO's collective security guarantee. With a view to the distant possibility of this becoming vital, Hungary has to prove its worth in the alliance's foreign missions, where this is the most important for its allies. This takes on relevance especially given the country's low defence budget, which is no significant contribution to the Alliance's collective capability and does not in and of itself provide an adequate long-term defensive capability to Hungary. Given that the allies' appreciation has always been a fundamentally desired effect of Hungary's participation in the Afghanistan mission, one obviously relevant measure of the Hungarian Defence Forces' performance in Afghanistan is how much it was able to serve that purpose.

This kind of "feedback" has to be taken into account with a view to the dynamically changing strategic context. As the Afghanistan mission was and is but one part of the larger fight against jihadi terrorist groups, Hungary's contribution matters all across this large and complicated campaign: its Afghanistan contribution counts along with what it does in other theatres of this struggle – for example against the Islamic State in Iraq (even though the efforts against the latter are not within a NATO framework as such). The present study is not interested in analysing these other efforts, but their importance has to be borne in mind.

As for Afghanistan, Hungary has made its contribution there in various different dimensions. A simple categorisation may refer to support related to diplomacy, development, and security. A comprehensive overview of what Hungary's contribution was worth therefore has to include an assessment of all of these separate but related fields, and the Hungarian Defence Forces' activities can be evaluated as but one component of Hungary's overall efforts therein.

MULTI-DIMENSIONAL BURDEN-SHARING IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF THE AFGHANISTAN MISSION

The fact that Hungary was a part of the Afghanistan mission and gave it vocal support was noted and appreciated by the country's allies, including the United States. U.S. diplomats speaking at public events about the U.S.-Hungarian relationship regularly began with the statement: "We're standing side by side in Afghanistan." Needless to say, this would not have been appreciated as much as it was without the presence of Hungarian troops in Afghanistan, on the ground; yet the importance of diplomatic support is not to be underestimated either. Managing a diverse coalition such as ISAF requires a critical mass of countries regularly willing to publicly reinforce a sense of mission in the participants along with the specific related goals they seek to achieve.

As to development, Hungary was a part of the coalition of countries contributing to Afghanistan's development in various ways, for example through contributions to the different trust funds set up to help finance reconstruction as well as the build-up of the Afghan National Army and Police. Aid was also delivered through non-governmental channels supported from government resources and in the form of projects run by different ministries (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health etc.).

In the dimension of security, a significant Hungarian military contingent saw to a diverse set of tasks. Hungary provided a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT), Special Operations Task Units (SOTUs), Air Mentoring Teams (AMTs), and a unit involved in the protection of Kabul International Airport (KAIA). Not all of these served a purely security purpose. The OMLT, besides playing an important

role in training a battalion of the Afghan National Army, was a precious opportunity for military-to-military diplomacy between Hungary and the United States in the form of cooperation with the Ohio National Guard within the OMLT's framework.

The PRT was the most complex element of Hungary's role in Afghanistan. In official Hungarian communications, it was often mentioned as a unit "leading development" and "providing security" in Baghlan Province, in northern Afghanistan. It clearly had both development-related and security-related tasks, but in fact was rather an armed task force fulfilling strategic liaison and small-scale humanitarian and development functions as we will eventually outline in detail later on in this study.

There is one more aspect to the military domain of assistance to Afghanistan (and the coalition): the provision of arms, equipment, and other assets to the Afghan National Army, either as military aid or in the form of sales with preferential conditions. Hungary has done its share of this cooperation as well.

Assessing the proportionality of burden-sharing between members of the coalition in these various different domains, specifically with a view to the elements of their military contribution, comes with certain difficulties. A basic and unquestionable reference point or benchmark compared to which proportionality may be measured is hard to identify. Economic potential and population size may both be relevant, although population size in fact less so, in the case of modern, technology-intensive, "lean and mean" militaries. Economic potential clearly holds more relevance, but measuring it may occur in different ways. Nominal and purchasing power parity-based GDP values may be very different for each and every country, and depending on which one is used for comparison, one gets very different degrees of difference between individual countries' values. Furthermore, counting nominal GDP has its methodological challenges, and so does comparing purchasing power across different countries and their different economies and cultures. With these problems in mind, the ratio of any contribution to the GDP (however the latter is measured) may shift over time, and a country's effort may thus grow or decrease along the time axis. Furthermore, contributions in one category of military tasks may show an entirely different value than in others, stemming from the different capability set that a country and its military may have. It is then difficult to assess how the different values trade off against one another (or in other words, which kind of contribution matters more). The same applies for multiple further categories of contribution (including non-military contributions) that also have to be taken into account. The overview of the basic data that follows here has to be evaluated in this light. The aim is to provide a basic sense of how much Hungary has done compared to others.

In the decade between 2001 and 2011, Afghanistan have received about \$57 billion in aid (actual disbursement as opposed to the larger sum of pledges).² In line with this significant effort, during the period of the Baghlan PRT's stay in Afghanistan, the Central Asian country was Hungary's primary target of official development assistance – a very noteworthy contribution from a small emerging donor, who may rather be expected to concentrate the few resources it has in areas of more direct strategic importance from its point of view, for example in its immediate geographical neighbourhood.

As far as the military efforts are concerned, Hungary did much on just about all fronts. This, as we show below, made for an outstanding contribution.

² Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan. Asia Report N°210, International Crisis Group, 4. August 2011. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/210-aid-and-conflict-in-afghanistan.aspx> (Accessed: 28. 01. 2015.)

Along with the United States, thirteen other countries led multinational Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan; Germany led two of these (Kunduz and Fayzabad); South Korea shared leadership of one (in Parwan) with the United States; and one of the thirteen was the Hungarian-led PRT in Baghlan, inherited from the Netherlands in 2006.³ It is important to bear in mind that these PRTs do not all count as identical contributions. This is due, first of all, to the need to take into account proportionality (somehow; with the difficulties indicated above), and secondly it is due to the PRTs' differences in size, structure (e.g. if there was a civilian element within them), and the scope of the tasks they carried out – as well as much else beyond these.

Besides the United States at least twenty-one countries deployed OMLTs to Afghanistan and once again we find Hungary among them (more countries have pledged such contributions without actually carrying it through).⁴ The mentoring of Afghan Air Force personnel was yet another important dimension of contribution where Hungary, along with several other East-Central European countries, was in particular expected to make an effort given its comparatively greater experience in operating the hardware to be used by Afghan counterparts. Hungary was among the thirteen partners of the United States present in this field,⁵ training Afghan personnel on Mi-17 transport and Mi-35 combat helicopters.⁶ Hungary was also among the twenty-five U.S. partner nations contributing Special Forces task units for different tasks in Afghanistan.⁷ Additionally, Hungary has donated arms and equipment to Afghan forces – for example 20,000 AMD-65 assault rifles in 2007.⁸

As this cursory overview may suggest, within the 50-plus member coalition of ISAF, which in fact was a „coalition of coalitions,” Hungary was a member of the inner core of contributors. The number of troops deployed indicates the same: in terms of soldiers deployed per GDP dollars, Hungary was among the most significant contributors.

To refine our assessment beyond numbers and the issue of proportionality, one does, however, need to take into account further factors that mediate the relevance of these quantitative aspects. One is the issue of how dangerous, challenging, and strategically significant these contributions were, in comparative terms, and another is the broader context of the fight against jihadi terrorism, as well as the question of how sustainable results in Afghanistan may be.

The issue of differences between different countries' areas of operations is significant as the distribution of risk in Afghanistan showed certain persistent patterns. Generally speaking, the east and the south of the country were the most dangerous in terms of insurgency-related

³ Out of a total of 26 PRTs. „Provincial Reconstruction Teams”, USAID, 16 January 2015 (last update), <http://www.usaid.gov/provincial-reconstruction-teams> (Accessed: 28. 01. 2015.)

⁴ NATO's Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams. NATO, October 2009. <http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/factsheets/omlt-factsheet.pdf> (Accessed: 28. 01. 2015.)

⁵ Improving NATO Support to Future Air Advisor Operations. Joint Air Power Competence Center, US Air Force, April 2014. http://www.japcc.org/publications/report/Report/JAPCC_Air_Advisor.pdf (Accessed: 28. 01. 2015.)

⁶ Kollár József ezredes: Szállító és harci helikopter erők missziós felajánlásának jelenlegi helyzete, a Légi Kiképzéstámogató Csoport (Air Mentor Team) végrehajtott misszióinak gyakorlati tapasztalatai. In: Repüléstudományi Közlemények – különszám, 2011. április 15. http://www.szrfk.hu/rtk/kulonszamok/2011_cikkek/Koller_Jozsef.pdf (Accessed: 28. 01. 2015.)

⁷ Karen Parrish: Special Ops Task Force Helps Shift Afghanistan Trend Line. DoD News, US Department of Defense, 2013. május 15. <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120051> (Accessed: 28. 01. 2015.)

⁸ Magyar fegyvereket is találtak a táliboknál. Index, 20. May 2009. http://index.hu/kulfold/2009/05/20/magyar_fegyvereket_is_talaltak_a_taliboknal/ (Accessed: 28. 01. 2015.)

incidents; alternatively, closeness to the Pakistani border may also serve as a good indicator of the level of risk in different areas. When studied from this angle, Hungary's contribution contained certain especially high-value elements, such as the special operations deployment in Wardak Province. The PRT, for its part, carried out its activities in northern Afghanistan, which was considered to be generally safer. Yet Baghlan Province was of strategic significance given that it sits on vital north-south logistical corridors between Kabul on one end and Kunduz and Mazar-i-Sharif on the other. Insurgents have, after some time, focused on this area, too, and thus the PRT ended up sustaining the most significant casualties of all units serving within the Hungarian contingent in Afghanistan: four insurgency-related deaths in all.⁹ With these four combat casualties, Hungary qualifies as one of the countries that made the greatest sacrifice in terms of human lives, proportionately to its population.

The issue of the overall effectiveness of the Afghan mission is difficult to judge, even on a coalition level. The Afghanistan undertaking is, at the time of writing this, open-ended. There is an ongoing insurgency, there is a new leadership (since the presidential elections of 2014), one with limited capacity and dependent on continued external support, and there is a continuing military advisory mission and a sustained financial effort to help Afghanistan, while its external sponsors have no clear intentions for the long run. These and many other factors warrant caution when trying to formulate a bottom line strategic assessment. The aid delivered in Afghanistan has certainly helped millions of children receive basic education there, especially in areas less affected by the insurgency. The majority of the population currently has access to basic health care. These are significant improvements compared to the past under the civil war period or the ensuing Taliban rule. Yet, in the post-Taliban context, the Taliban-led insurgency can only be regarded as contained for now, and this leaves a question mark hanging above all of the positive developments.

THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM'S RECORD

The Hungarian-led PRT in Baghlan Province started operating in October 2006. In the government's interpretation, its mission was as follows: "the personnel of the Hungarian PRT are responsible for coordinating the reconstruction process in Baghlan Province and are actively participating in the reconstruction. On the one hand, this means civil projects (development of infrastructure, that is, building and renovating schools, hospitals and bridges) and on the other hand, the provision of military support to reconstruction-related tasks (patrolling, force protection, convoy escort)."¹⁰

The Hungarian contingent in Afghanistan had grown in numbers ever since the beginning of the country's involvement there (2003). First, a medical team, and subsequently a Light Infantry Company were deployed (the latter from 2004 to 2006). The trend continued with the establishment of the PRT, that was, at the same time, a milestone in other respects. The Hungarian Defence Forces have from hereon had its own Area of Operations assigned to it. The last time the Hungarian military operated like this was in the course of WWII. This independence and responsibility was a major step forward in the wake of the support role played in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo earlier on. Furthermore, the PRT came with a complex set of tasks. It was not purely a military mission but one that would demand diplomacy

⁹ In addition to which there were three other lethal, non-combat-related casualties.

¹⁰ Hungary in Afghanistan: Review. Website of the Hungarian Government. <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/hungary-in-afghanistan/review> (Accessed: 23. 02. 2015.)

and development-related activities. Working out a practical approach towards these was an even greater challenge than operating on one's own.

Due to reasons of domestic political nature, the decision regarding the deployment of the PRT was only announced four months ahead of the official start of its mission, in June 2006.

It nevertheless was brought forward, and time for preparations was available, even though it did not clearly show in the quality of the PRT's concept for the diplomatic and development-related components of the mission. Rather unusually from the point of view of practices by others, not only NGOs but specific government ministries (?) were also to be given roles in development assistance, including the Ministries of Health, Education, and Agriculture.¹¹

The PRT was manned by 160 troops along with a Political Adviser (POLAD) at the time when it started its operations. The first development-related projects were launched in April 2007. In that year, police trainers joined the PRT, and certain agricultural and health-related projects also got underway. By the time of the ensuing (6-month) rotation of the PRT, the contingent grew to 240 troops. This was complemented by the presence of a 40-strong Montenegrin detachment.

The PRT was not a combat unit, and it did not have adequate weaponry or capabilities for such purposes. Its national caveats prohibited it from involvement in offensive operations or counter-narcotics activities, and troops were only allowed to use their arms for self-defence. Military tasks consisted of security and CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) patrols.¹² In the minds of the operational planners of the HDF, CIMIC was a kind of substitute for international development assistance (or equivalent to it). The PRT commanders had not only a substantial CIMIC budget (of 125 million HUF in 2006 and 225 million HUF in 2013, in nominal terms) at their disposal but they also had access to the "PRT development budget", a yearly 2-million-USD fund earmarked for international development assistance projects in Baghlan Province.¹³

Through its CIMIC unit, the PRT thus acted similarly to an NGO in Baghlan, financing infrastructure and reconstruction projects in the fields of education, healthcare, and security. All the other Hungarian ministries used allocations from the „PRT development budget” to finance their projects in Baghlan. Roughly half of the USD 2 million went to Hungarian NGOs that were active mostly in education and healthcare.

The peak years of the PRT's development-related efforts were 2007-2008. During this period, besides its own resources, it could draw on further significant financing from other donors too (Japan, Greece, and the European Union), totalling about 3.5 million USD in

¹¹ In the Spring of 2006 parliamentary elections took place in Hungary. In the preceding months no substantial decisions were taken, and the new government was in a position to oversee the PRT's issue upon its official formation on 9 June 2006. They nevertheless immediately brought a decision that day which suggests that the decision had been priorly prepared. See: Wagner Péter: Az afganisztáni nemzetközi fejlesztési együttműködés magyar eredményei és tapasztalatai. MKI-Tanulmányok, No. 14. (2010), Magyar Külügyi Intézet, 2010. július 20., 4–5.

¹² CIMIC is historically speaking a new concept. Militaries have been using this approach more widely in the wake of the developments of the 1990s, related to more frequent involvement in peacekeeping and crisis management operations. Given the need for sufficiently intensive and well-managed relations with the local populace, this new capability „has become an important tool for military commanders to interact with the numerous civilian entities in theatre.” See: Stijn van Wezel: CIMIC Concepts & Capabilities: Research into the CIMIC Operationalisation of Nations. Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence, Enschede, August 2011, 4.

¹³ Commanding a PRT was one of the most complex challenges hitherto assigned to a Hungarian officer. Besides overseeing military operations the PRT commander was also tasked with diplomatic functions and directing development-related efforts. It was unprecedented for a Hungarian officer (in the rank of Colonel) to be put in charge of dispensing such a significant amount of money as was available in the CIMIC fund.

additional funding. After the global financial and economic crisis hit Hungary in 2008-2009, the resources of the PRT development budget quickly contracted (parallel to how the Hungarian forint lost in value against the Euro). By 2011, the PRT had only (approximately) 500,000 Euros available, and in 2012 its budget was further reduced.¹⁴

After 2009 the PRT grew less active not only in the domain of development but in its military activities as well. Insurgent groups operating in the province (the Taliban and Hizbi-Islami) stepped up their campaign, and this meant that several of the provincial districts became inaccessible for the PRT and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Related to this, the PRT received some criticism for its supposed conflict-avoidance. Due to the national caveats and the lack of combat support capabilities, its commanders could not help the situation.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, beginning in earnest in 2010, brought some change. United States Special Forces and a German Battle Group, along with ANSF, were involved in the latter. Paradoxically, even though it was partly paralysed in its activity, the PRT's value has thus risen, given its formal battlespace owner status, even though it could not participate in combat. Its CIMIC and other activities could nevertheless complement others' efforts, especially in the „shape” and „hold” phases of counterinsurgency operations.

The PRT started to wind down its activities after this, from 2011 on. Because of a shortage of funding and even, to some degree, a lack of interest, the PRT could not intensify its diplomacy and development-related efforts, as ISAF partners would have expected.¹⁵ While other PRTs in Afghanistan have eventually had a more prominent civilian leadership element, in the case of the Hungarian unit, this did not happen. Even the Ministry of Defence felt unsure about the future of the PRT, due to some mixed signals received from the political leadership. There was, in higher circles, a perceptible consideration of an early exit in the Autumn of 2010, in the wake of a deadly ambush where two of the PRT's soldiers were killed. In 2012 there again appeared consideration of a withdrawal six months ahead of the, by then, already scheduled departure of the PRT from Baghlan province.¹⁶ Eventually ISAF partners' insistence resulted in staying the course, but by February 2013, when the PRT's last rotation came to an end, its personnel has dropped to 110 troops.

The PRT's experience epitomises certain peculiarities of Hungarian foreign and security policy. The unit's mission was a crucial element in shaping the relationship with the United States and mitigating any prospective fall-out from criticism received regarding Hungary's low defence budget. The PRT gave Hungary membership in an exclusive club of partner nations. Along with Lithuania, it was among the first from the former Warsaw Treaty countries to undertake the leadership of a PRT.¹⁷ This gave the Hungarian flag a visible place on ISAF's placemat, making this a salient contribution within the coalition.

¹⁴ Venczel Zoltán – Wagner Péter: Magyarország nemzetközi fejlesztési tevékenysége afganisztánban. In: DEMNET, October 2012, 7–8.

¹⁵ The departure of NATO troops went ahead in a coordinated process, based on agreement with the Afghan government. In the framework of the process known as „Intequal” most PRTs were gradually „civilianised” (their civilian component was strengthened), before their mission eventually came to an end. See: Wagner Péter: Ambíciók és valóság. Biztonságpolitika.hu, 26. December 2012. <http://www.biztonsagpolitika.hu/?id=16&aid=1265>, (Accessed: 24. 02. 2015).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Formally speaking Lithuania started its PRT a year earlier, however, their operations received substantial support from the United States without which they would not have been feasible. The international element was thereupon much more pronounced in the Lithuanian-led PRT.

THE EXPERIENCE OF HUNGARY'S SPECIAL FORCES

From the perspective of the Hungarian Defence Forces, the MH 34th Bercsényi László Special Operations Battalion (34th SF Bn) offered a new and unique capability in the context of Hungary's participation in the ISAF mission. Although the unit's history goes back to WWII, its modern special operations capability was the result of a recent transformation complete by 2005. With this in mind, the deployment of the first special operations detachment to Afghanistan in 2009 came, relatively speaking, early.

The creation of this special operations capability enjoyed major support from the United States. Through its Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, the U.S. government provided material assistance and training to the battalion. Until 2010 a mobile training team (MTT), consisting of 7 to 8 U.S. special forces soldiers, provided support in preparations, and from 2006 on, the Battalion received a significant amount of U.S. military assets and equipment.¹⁸ Among these were SOPMOD M4A1 carbines, Remington rifles, MP5 submachine guns, satellite-uplink-capable radio assets, and portable health-related equipment. In the summer of 2011, half dozen all-terrain military vehicles were provided to the HDF, as well as more than a hundred special items upgrading the soldiers' individual armoury.¹⁹

The first foreign military mission of the Battalion came even before 2009, with a six-month rotation in the PRT in Afghanistan and involvement in the NATO Training Mission–Iraq (NTM-I) over the course of 2007-2008.²⁰ In the framework of the latter, the task of a 15-strong detachment was to mentor and advise a Base Defence Battalion (BDB) and to train a PMC (Private Military Company) unit responsible for protecting the 70-strong NTM-I adviser team working at the Iraqi Military Academy, the Joint Staff College, and the Command College based at ar-Rustamiyah military base.²¹

NATO planning for the coordination of Special Forces detachments of its member countries began in 2008. For this purpose, Combined Special Operations Task Force 10 (CSOTF-10) was set up, which the Hungarian Special Operations Task Unit (SOTU) was among the first to join. Based in Wardak Province in eastern Afghanistan, the Hungarian SOTU, together with its American partners, played a determining role in establishing the basic training curricula for Afghan police Special Forces.²² So-called Provincial Response Companies (PRC) were thus trained, mainly in the south and east of Afghanistan, for the purposes of counterinsurgency and law enforcement, starting in 2009.²³

In 2012, the Hungarian participation in this format doubled with the deployment of another SOTU to eastern Afghanistan. From the Hungarian Special Forces' perspective, the two units with their command elements were an experiment in preparation for the prospective future deployment of a Special Operation Task Group (SOTG). In Afghanistan,

¹⁸ Geröcs Imre: A Magyar Honvédség különleges műveleti képesség múltja, jelene. In: *Hadtudományi Szemle*, 2012, 5. évf., 1–2. szám, 297.

¹⁹ Wagner Péter – Marton Péter: The Hungarian Military and the War on Terror. In: *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 2014, 2. szám, 107–120.

²⁰ The 34th SOB provided one of the rotations of the PRT in 2008. This mission was nevertheless not truly of such character where specifically a special operations capability would have been required.

²¹ Torma Béla – Wagner Péter: Homokvihar Bagdadban. *Zrínyi Kiadó*, 2014, 289.

²² In U.S. terminology, an SOTU is the equivalent of an Operational Detachment-Alpha unit.

²³ Wagner Péter: Az MH Különleges Műveleti Csoport afganisztáni tevékenysége I. *Biztonságpolitika és Terrorizmus blog*, 5. February 2012. <http://wagnerpeter.blogspot.dk/2012/02/mh-kulonleges-muveleti-csoport.html> (Accessed: 05. 02. 2015.)

the contingent was now called „HUN SOTG(-),” with the minus signal indicating that full capability has not yet been reached.

From November 2013 until July 2014 Hungarian participation increased further upon the deployment of staff elements to Task Force 10, which was American-led and included Special Forces from eight European allies and partners.²⁴ With around 40 operators on the ground, including the commander of the 34th SF Bn, Hungarians now took over the command of SOTG-West for eight months, with the implication that within this Area of Responsibility, they were in charge of the SOTUs concerned.

From the second half of 2014 onwards, parallel to the „Inteqal” (transition) process and ISAF’s drawdown of troops in theatre, the Hungarian presence dropped to 20 (comprising of an SOTU and staff officers), and it re-located to northern Afghanistan. Currently, it is continuing training in the framework of NATO’s Resolute Support mission.

Assessing the quality of the Hungarian special operations contribution from a professional point of view is difficult due to the secrecy surrounding it attributed to demands of operational security. It does, however, seem a remarkable feat that a mere four years after its acquisition, the special operations capability has been put to use in Afghanistan, and that a further four years later, it was able to fulfil even a command role. Measured according to such milestones, the development of the capability is thus comparatively much faster than elsewhere within the Hungarian military’s ground forces, which are struggling, in some cases since the change of system in 1990, to sufficiently modernise. U.S. support clearly had a significant role in this, as well as the political will and support in both Hungary and the United States for this new role for the HDF in Afghanistan.

The Hungarian leadership was, in the case of the special operations deployment, willing to send troops to Afghanistan without national caveats and with kill or capture operations included in their mandate. This was unprecedented, and thus represents a major step forward for the traditionally risk-averse Hungarian political elite. This was a case of calculated risk-taking, responding to partner demands and expectations. Furthermore, although the command of SOTG-East within CSOTF-10 was handed over to Hungarian officers, it was evident that the U.S. deputy commander assigned to the Task Group element was closely involved in overseeing activities. Equally importantly, aside from the operators themselves and some of their equipment, the United States continued to provide for much of the operational needs of the Hungarian forces involved (including logistics and intelligence).

There was one especially notable instance of the Hungarian Special Forces’ involvement in combat that received attention in the Hungarian media, and this came upon formal U.S. recognition of the performance of the troops involved. This was the result of the effective intervention, in the vicinity of a village in Wardak Province, of Hungarian Special Forces in an intense firefight with hostile elements. It resulted in the saving of American lives and prevented the enemy from capturing friendly forces, dead or alive. For this reason, the commander of the U.S. 10th Special Forces Group and the Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command Europe awarded the Combat Infantry Badge to ten Hungarian operators.²⁵

²⁴ These were: Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. See: Special Forces – Empowering our Lines with Allies and Partners. NATO Allied Command Operation, 2. July 2013. <http://www.aco.nato.int/saceur2013/blog/whats-special-about-special-forces.aspx> (Accessed: 05.02.2015.)

²⁵ Wagner Péter: A MH Különleges Műveleti Csoport afganisztáni tevékenysége III. Biztonságpolitika és Terrorizmus blog, 22. February 2012. http://wagnerpeter.blogspot.dk/2012/02/mh-kulonleges-muveleti-csoport_22.html (Accessed: 06.02.2015.)

CONCLUSION

As we have shown in the overview provided in the article, Hungary was, in nominal terms, a significant contributor to the Afghanistan mission – for example in terms of GDP-proportionate measurements of its contribution. The latter came in various forms. Hungary has taken part in most of the different military tasks and other required duties, and thus it was the member of an inner core of contributors whose services were certainly appreciated by the leader of the coalition, the United States.

Achieving just this, namely the appreciation (by the U.S. and by NATO partners in general), was one of the key foreign policy goals of successive Hungarian governments, and the country's extensive involvement in Afghanistan can be explained firstly with reference to this. In a closer examination of the PRT as well as the Hungarian Special Forces' performance, a very positive overall assessment persists.

The Hungarian leadership of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Baghlan Province put the country (and its flag) in a prominent, visible spot on ISAF's placemats and increased the awareness of Hungary's role in Afghanistan. The Hungarian Special Forces' deployment from 2009 on represented a bold move towards involvement without caveats (specifically in the case of the SOTUs) and further improved Hungary's reputation, especially through the Special Forces' partnership with their U.S. counterparts. Even if the PRT's overall performance displays a more mixed record, these contributions have proved beyond doubt very valuable for the Hungarian military in various ways.

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Capt. Károly Zentai:

MANHUNTERS IN VIETNAM

ABSTRACT: The article addresses the organisation, equipment and typical engagements of the US Army and the USMC snipers in the Vietnam War, and examines the reasons for this conflict having become a milestone in the American military sniping trade.

KEYWORDS: Vietnam War, bodycount, marksmanship, sniper team, long range shooting

THE GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE TYPICAL NORTH AMERICAN RIFLEMAN

The sniper is a shooter equipped with a special weapon – a rifle which is more accurate than the average servicemember's weapon. He engages targets from far – the distance could be many times longer than the effective range of the ordinary rifleman. The story of the sniper and the development of their weapons are closely related. The combat skills of the operator and the outstanding accuracy of the weapon system have always made the difference to other warriors.

The long barrelled, muzzle loading rifle was the most effective weapon for the Americans' tactics in the Revolutionary War. In certain combat situations the rebel riflemen – in many cases they were former hunters – were able to kill British officers and NCO's from 250 meters. That was impossible with a regular British smoothbore musket, and the English commanders received a horrifying lesson. Recognizing the potentials of the riflemen, on 14 June, 1775, the Congress authorized the state of Pennsylvania to create at first six and later nine rifle companies.¹ One of the first American expert military marksmen, Timothy Murphy was a member of the 1st Company. Using his custom-made double barreled hunting rifle he became the hero of the Revolutionary War.² The 1st Pennsylvania Continental Regiment was built on these rifle companies, under the command of Colonel William Thompson. George Washington's main engagements were supported by these riflemen – they slowed down the

¹ James L. Nelson: June 14, 1775: Raising Today's Army, 2011. <http://www.thehistoryreader.com/modern-history/june-14-1775-raising-todays-army/> (Accessed: 02. 08. 2015.)

² In 1777 Murphy was a major contributor to the victory: „As the battles around Saratoga raged, the British, having been pushed back, were being rallied by Brigadier General Simon Fraser. General Benedict Arnold (still a good guy at the time of Saratoga) rode up to General Morgan, pointing at Fraser and shouted „ ...that man on the gray horse is a host in himself and must be disposed of”. Morgan gave the order for his best marksmen to try and take him out. Timothy Murphy climbed a nearby tree, finding a comfortable notch to rest his double barreled rifle, took careful aim at the extreme distance of 300 yards, and squeezed off a shot. General Fraser tumbled from his horse, shot through the midsection. He was taken from the field and died the next day. Another British Senior officer, Sir Frances Clarke, General Burgoyne's chief Aide-de-Camp, galloped onto the field with an important message. Murphys second shot dropped him. He was dead before he hit the ground. These two unerring shots did more than anything else to shatter the morale of the British and to turn the tide of the most important battle of the Revolution.” <http://www.americanrevolution.org/murphy.php> (Accessed: 02. 10. 2015.)

advancing British soldiers and covered the retreating rebel army in case of breaking contact. It is a historical fact that a well aimed long range shot is able to decide a battle. In this era a saying was born: "*Fear the man who owns only one gun.*"³ Usually these warriors were hunters or woodsmen who depended on their own weapon – before, during and after the war. This "bloodline" of shooters has continued through the Civil War and the World Wars until today. Every technical invention, every successful engagement made this inheritance more and more effective in combat. Besides the wars, hunting and national shooting competitions have also served as the cradles of this military trade.

RESTARTING THE SNIPING TRADE IN EVERY WAR

If we talk about snipers, marksmen or sharpshooters an interesting phenomenon can be observed from conflict to conflict. In a certain phase of a war a demand surfaces for "long range killers", but after the end of the fights the need for precision rifle shooting, stalking and deliberate killing fades away. Take the Korean War as an example. After the invasion of South Korea by the Northern Communists, the United Nations allies and the United States became involved in the conflict. Initially the advancing and retreating maneuvers were very similar to World War II combat. The next two years were more like the stalemate of World War I. The commanders in the trenches needed an instrument to engage targets from a distance – the specially trained and equipped shooter and his rifle. The two services, the Army and the Marine Corps, started to revise and print brief field manuals about sniper training and guidelines about how to deploy military marksmen. The available telescopic sights and weapons were from the era of the two World Wars – M1903 Springfields and Garand M1C models. At that time sniper schools or courses did not exist. North Korea used snipers from the start of the conflict, equipped them with soviet Mosin-Nagant rifles or their Chinese clones. These few enemy marksmen were able to inflict many casualties, and the usual answer from the U.S. forces was massed fire. Being aware that snipers are the best countersnipers, many commanders developed their own sniper courses and techniques in the battlefield, as they did in World War II. The best shot of the company was designated as a sniper and equipped with the best available rifle.

After the Korean War the few snipers of the Army and the Marine Corps became again regular members of the services and the special weapons of their trade were put in storage. There was no room for their role in peacetime. The personal way of killing and other techniques were compared to murder and "bushwhacking". In the military leaders' vision of future war, the large-caliber guns and tons of bombs decided the battles, taking away lives anonymously.

After the Korean ceasefire the cut in sniper slots and training did not mean that this trade entirely disappeared from the ranks of the services. Many former snipers became instructors in marksmanship schools or members of competition shooting teams, maintaining the basic skills which were essential to snipers.

In the era of the Cold War the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union made total mutual destruction possible. In the military leaders' vision the next European war would be fought between huge forces on flat terrain, supported by tactical nuclear strikes. In this picture the place of the rifleman was in armored personnel carriers. In the '60s many NATO members adopted the .223 Remington hunting cartridge, designated as the 5,56x45mm

³ John L. Pluster: *The History of Sniping and Sharpshooting*. Paladin Press, 2008, 143.

NATO round. The full-automatic assault rifles designed to the new cartridge were lighter and shorter than the older semi-automatic weapons firing the 7,62×51mm NATO round. In the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps, with the newly issued M16's, every marine and soldier could carry almost two times more ammunition and engage targets with automatic, but less accurate fire. The capability of firing 100-150 rounds per minute drew attention away from painstaking individual marksmanship training.

There were still a few voices in the wilderness, who believed that there was a place for accurate, long range rifle shooting in the military. Among them was Brigadier-General George O. Van Orden, who recommended the Winchester Model 70 rifle for individual sniper weapon in 1942. After the Korean War he suggested the adoption of the very powerful .300 Winchester Magnum sport and hunting cartridge for military sniping. Due to supply difficulties the Marine Equipment Board at Quantico rejected the idea.⁴

In an official report, another high ranking officer, Colonel Henry E. Kelly stated: *"Apparently the sniper is no longer considered essential in our infantry. The squad sniper, actually only a designated and specially armed infantryman, has been dropped from the rifle squad of the future. Likewise no provision is included for a sniper detachment in the battle group organization."*⁵

Further combat experience was needed to change the view about the role and the importance of the military sniper: the Vietnam War.

At the beginning of this conflict the sniper capability had already existed in the structures of the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps – in theory. There were differences between the two services in unit organisation and weaponry, but the principles of how to deploy snipers were very similar. A Marine company usually deployed a two-man sniper team which operated together, from a "fire base". Occasionally the pair worked independently, but in the area of the company. In the cases of Army companies the riflemen equipped with sniper weapons normally functioned as unit snipers, like in the Korean War. But in Vietnam their methods of operations and tactics did not remain the same during the conflict. To successfully engage the enemy, they changed, learnt or invented whatever was needed.

TRAINED SOUTHERN ASIAN SHOOTERS

The fact, that the first North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units in the southern areas did not have enough marksmen, convinced Hanoi to launch a sniper school system in 1965. These efforts resulted in twelve companies, which consisted of freshly trained snipers. Five companies comprised the 700th NVA Battalion and seven other independent sniper companies infiltrated through Laos into South Vietnam. Later these sniper companies were divided into 18 platoons, and two platoons were assigned to each NVA division. Thus, three or four sniper teams were parceled out to the battalions. After meeting the initial requirement, the NVA slowed down its sniper training. Their sniper training course took three months, the curriculum consisted of long range shooting up to 1,000 meters, camouflage techniques, stalking, setting mines and booby traps. The most common sniper weapon of the NVA was the M1891/30 Mosin-Nagant bolt action rifle with PU telescopic sight. Some of these rifles

⁴ Martin Pegler: *Out of Nowhere*. Osprey Publishing, 2004. 282.

⁵ Col. Michael Lee Lanning: *Inside the Crosshairs: Snipers in Vietnam*. Random House Publishing Group, 1998, 50.

were issued with this words written on the buttstock: *"this long-range weapon is for use only by experts. Use to shoot unit commanders and American advisors."*⁶

In the jungle the typical NVA sniper engagements consisted of several shots because the snipers could escape on the well concealed routes, and the thick vegetation slowed down the reaction forces. To engage distant targets, the North Vietnamese snipers occasionally used tracer bullets to observe the misses and the effect of the wind. In attacks, these marksmen did not play a significant role, but in defense they successfully delayed or pinned down American servicemembers. The five-man NVA sniper squads were able to cover withdrawals, as well as cover each others' flank. Moving backward from position to position, they allowed an NVA unit to escape in order to mass again for the next attack.

A platoon leader of the 25th Division was killed with a single shot on 2 April 1970, when the NVA 271st Regiment successfully used snipers near the Cambodian border. The parent unit, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, found enemy snipers stalking and shooting from many directions. As a report detailed:

*"2Lt Ronald Kolb, with 3/C/2-27 Inf was killed during this maneuver, and SSG Melvin Kalili, Platoon Sergeant of the 1st Platoon, was killed when he went to aid the wounded point man. The intense enemy fire was very accurate and well-directed. The men of Company C were effectively pinned down and had difficulty locating the source of the enemy fire. They remained pinned down by the sniper fire following the firefight for over six hours and had extreme difficulty extracting their casualties. The dead point was left overnight because it was impossible to reach his body."*⁷

THE NEED FOR TRAINED MANHUNTERS. THE BODYCOUNT METHOD

In this type of war, the Army and the Marine Corps constantly had to change their fighting concepts and to devise innovative methods and techniques to face an enemy whose operations ranged from NVA division-level offensives to Vietcong hit-and-run raids. One of the most effective and economical change during the Vietnam War was the deployment of properly equipped and trained snipers and sniper teams. The exploitation of the shooting skills of an individual was not new in wartime, but the way the U.S. military set up new standards and developed the expertise in Vietnam definitely was. The snipers of the Army and the Marine Corps eliminated enemy personnel at distances often in excess of 800 meters with one bullet fired from a specially designed rifle. The two-man sniper teams could operate in the open spaces of the Mekong Delta and in the mountain highlands as well, killing enemy soldiers before they heard the muzzle-blast of their rifles. On the side of economics, virtually every second sniper round produced a body count, which is drastically better bullet-to-body ratio than the statistics of other wars or the regular riflemen in Vietnam. According to the studies about World War II combat, the U.S. troops used 25,000 small arms rounds for every enemy soldier killed. This number increased 50,000 in the Korean War.⁸ When the United States entered the Vietnam War, the technologically advanced individual weapons made fully automatic fire possible for every American infantryman, and increased the expenditure of ammunition to 200,000 rounds for every dead enemy soldier. The snipers of the Army and

⁶ John L. Pluster: *The History of Sniping and Sharpshooting*, 548.

⁷ Army 18th Military History Detachment, 25th Infantry Division, Small Unit Combat After Action Interview Report, 1970. <http://www.history.army.mil/documents/vietnam/renegr/rtxt.htm> (Accessed: 02. 08. 2015.)

⁸ Kiss Á. Péter: *A gépkarabély és használata*. Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 72.

the Marine Corps in Vietnam expended 1.3 to 1.7 rounds per one killed enemy soldier. In Vietnam the success of the operations was represented by the numbers of the killed enemies and not by areas taken from the NVA. Lieutenant General John H. Hay Jr., the commander of the Army's 1st Infantry Division in 1967, pointed out a key feature of the use of snipers in Vietnam in a study written in 1974:

“The use of snipers was not new in Vietnam, but the systematic training and employment of an aggressive, offensive sniper team - a carefully designed weapon system - was. A sniper was no longer just the man in the rifle squad who carried the sniper rifle; he was the product of an established school.”⁹

Yet, when the Vietnam War started, the United States had no properly trained and equipped sniper teams. In peacetime the sniper units of the earlier U.S. conflicts had been disbanded and the marksmen discharged or went back to the rank of the infantry. The “fair-minded” Americans had a tendency to forget the existence of a warrior, who kills deliberately with a single bullet, without warning. But in wartime the services recognized the need for renewed sniper training again. In Vietnam the Marine Corps fielded their first sniper team in October 1965. The Army started its in-country sniper training in the spring of 1968, but in the meantime some sniper weapons used by marksmanship competition teams were already adapted to the unique war zone, unofficially.¹⁰ Later the policy was eased and snipers got formal support and became one of the most effective weapon systems of the war. But the result came from the individuals behind the rifles, who met the standards for acceptance into training and the expectations of their superiors.

THE MARINES' RESPONSE

On 11 July 1965, several U.S. marines were wounded and two were killed by a Vietcong sniper, near Da Nang airbase.¹¹ More and more sniping incidents followed and the NVA marksmen were proving to be a real threat. Being confident that they could cause significant losses, and carry out counter-sniper activity, in 1966 Marine units did their best to get proper sniper rifles and telescopic sights from marksmanship competition teams. Thus, initially the USMC marksmen used Winchester Model 70 sporting rifles in .30-06 caliber, equipped with nine-power Unertl optics. In 1953 the national championship at Camp Perry was won by Staff Sergeant Don Smith, who used one such rifle.¹² There were no problems at all with the accuracy of the Winchesters, but in 1964 the Model 70 was redesigned and the parts of the new rifle were incompatible with those of the old one.¹³ Many professional marksmen also noticed that Winchester Model 70s made after 1964 just did not measure up. The Corps needed a new sniper rifle, it was decided. The search for the new sniper weapon was headed by Colonel Walter Walsh, who founded the Marine Scout-Sniper School in 1943 at

⁹ Lieutenant General John H. Hay, Jr.: *Vietnam Studies, Tactical And Materiel Innovations*. Department Of The Army, Washington, D. C., 1989. <http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/tactical/chapter6.htm> (Accessed: 02. 08. 2015.)

¹⁰ Col. Michael Lee Lanning: *Inside the Crosshairs: Snipers in Vietnam*, 3.

¹¹ *A Chronology of The United States Marine Corps 1965–1969*. Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., 1971. https://archive.org/stream/ACHronologyOfTheUnitedStatesMarineCorps1965-1969/ACHronologyOfTheUnitedStatesMarineCorps1965-1969_djvu.txt (Accessed: 02. 09. 2015.)

¹² Frank G. Mcguire: *Snipers-Specialists in Warfare*. *The American Rifleman*, July 1967, 28.

¹³ Chuck Hawks: *Winchester's Model 70: The Rifleman's Rifle*. http://www.chuckhawks.com/win_70.htm (Accessed: 02. 09. 2015.)

Camp Lejeune as a captain.¹⁴ His team selected the modified Remington Model 700 rifle in 7.62x51mm NATO caliber. The bolt action rifle was made with a dulled wooden stock, epoxy fiberglass bedding of the receiver and a heavy barrel. At the Marine Corps the Remington, mounted with the Redfield 3-9x40 Accu-Range optical sight, was designated as the M40 sniper weapon system. Its reticle was connected to the variable magnification to calculate distances. To use it, the shooter simply zoomed in and out until the gap between two thin horizontal lines (representing about half a meter, normally the distance from a man's chin to his belt) aligned on the target. As the shooter zoomed, a synchronized distance scale inside the scope moved back and forth to show the distance in yards. The sniper then applied proper holdover, and fired. Using the Redfield scope was fast and accurate, but it measured distances up to 600 yards, which was not enough for military use. Firing M118 Special Ball sniper cartridges, the M40 proved very accurate: it broke „the one-minute barrier” – it was the first U.S. military sniper rifle that shot smaller groups than 1 inch at 100 yards.¹⁵

In Vietnam the Marine Corps' sniper training was carried out in division-level schools. The 3rd Marine Division established the first one, under the leadership of two former competitive shooters, Captain Robert Russell and Gunnery Sergeant Marvin Lange. The course lasted only a few days, and the candidates were sent to the field for on-the-job training. Later the school of the 3rd Division extended to four weeks. The 1st Marine Division also organized a sniper school, based on the initiative of the commander, Major General Herman Nickerson Jr. He personally travelled to Okinawa to recruit an experienced competitive shooter, Lieutenant Edward James Land to be the head of the training. The expectations of the general were clear: *“I want mine to be the best school in the Marine Corps. I want them killing VC and I don't care how they do it - even if you have to go out and do it yourself.”*¹⁶

Nickerson found the perfect man for the job. Land was one of the greatest advocates of an effective and well organized sniper capability. Six years before, when the Marine Corps had had no sniper training, the frustrated Lieutenant Land established a two-week sniper course on his own, in Hawaii, which became the first Stateside course since World War II.¹⁷ For the sniper school of the 1st Division in Vietnam, he brought in Sergeant Carlos Hathcock, a former Hawaii course graduate, who already operated unofficially in sniper role and scored 14 kills. Another serious competitive rifleman, Gunnery Sergeant James Wilson headed the school's instructor team. Since they had no proper shooting range, Land and his instructors were carrying out real sniper missions to gain experience, before the first candidates arrived. According to Land's mindset, a sniper instructor cannot teach the trade to young marines if he had not actually done it himself. When the shooting range was built at the Marine base southwest of Da Nang on Hill 55, with their fresh experience, their years of long-range shooting expertise, and Land's historical knowledge, they launched their first formal course in November 1966.¹⁸ From the initial three days of training the team expanded the length of the course to two weeks and the results were more than satisfactory. In the following three months, the first 17 graduates of the course killed more enemy in action than any Marine

¹⁴ Bill Vanderpool: *The Amazing Life of Walter R. Walsh. The American Rifleman*, 2010. <http://www.americanrifleman.org/articles/2010/10/21/the-amazing-life-of-walter-r-walsh/> (Accessed: 02. 09. 2015.)

¹⁵ John L. Pluster: *The History of Sniping and Sharpshooting*, 555.

¹⁶ John L. Pluster: *The History of Sniping and Sharpshooting*, 559.

¹⁷ Michael Humphries: *The Father of USMC Sniping*. 2008. <http://www.tactical-life.com/firearms/the-father-of-usmc-sniping/> (Accessed: 02. 10. 2015.)

¹⁸ Jay Taylor: *Point of Aim, Point of Impact*. AuthorHouse, 2011, 30.

battalion in South Vietnam. In the meantime the Marine Corps was following the sniping developments in Vietnam, and in the next year opened a four-week sniper school at Camp Pendleton, led by returned sniper veterans who prepared the new instructors in Vietnam before coming home.

In 1968 the Headquarters of the U.S. Marine Corps made official what had already been happening, and authorized a sniper platoon in each marine regiment, plus one sniper platoon for the divisions' Force Recon battalions.

The 1st and the 3rd Marine Divisions produced more than 10,000 sniper kills by the end of the war.¹⁹

THE ARMY WAY

Similarly to the Marine Corps, the Army's marksmen initially were equipped with several types of older weapons from the era of World War II and the Korean War – Springfield Model 1903A4s, Garand M1Ds and even a few British Lee Enfield rifles.

Some units filled the gap with ordinary M16s mounted with 3x Colt telescopic sights or other commercial optics.²⁰ The Army, dealing with the issue, sent various types of sniper weapons and optics for testing to Vietnam, in order to select the most appropriate ones. The efforts resulted in a new sniper weapon system, the XM-21, which was based on the National Match version of the M-14 semi automatic rifle.²¹ Since 1957 the Army Rifle Team had been using this version in competitions. Unlike the ordinary service M-14, the National Match M14 had glass-bedding: the receiver area of the stock contained an epoxy-fiberglass layer, so the surfaces conformed tightly to each other, fixing the action to the stock perfectly. Despite the ordinary appearance, it had been heated over 300 degrees to eliminate the internal dampness and with resins it had been placed in a vacuum which sucked together the materials into the wooden fibers. As a result of this manufacturing procedure the stock became resistant to warping and dampness. The barrels were selected for accuracy, the mating metal surfaces were honed and the trigger mechanism was adjusted for crisp release. The Army's Marksmanship Training Unit (AMTU) in Fort Benning mounted the National Match M14 with a new telescope/mount system under the development of the Army's Limited War Laboratory. It has to be called „system” because this optical sight - the ART, or Adjustable Ranging Telescope - had a unique mounting mechanism which was as interesting as the riflescope itself. The mount was a special cradle synchronized to the riflescope's zooming ring. Looking through the scope, the shooter zoomed the magnification in and out, until the distance between two stadia lines represented 0.75 meter on the target, or approximately from the top of a figure's head to his waist. The shape of the zoom ring was elliptical: as the shooter rotated it, the whole riflescope raised or lowered in its mount, compensating for the estimated distance automatically. It was quite reliable because the cam of the zoom ring was carefully adjusted to the sniper bullet's trajectory. With the M118 Special Ball sniper ammunition, the XM-21's

¹⁹ Col. Michael Lee Lanning: *Inside the Crosshairs: Snipers in Vietnam*, 141.

²⁰ H. Shawn: *USMC Scout Sniper Weapons of the Vietnam War*, 2012. <http://looserounds.com/2012/08/02/usmc-scout-sniper-weapons-of-the-viet-nam-war/> (Accessed: 02. 13. 2015.)

²¹ Mel Ewing: *U.S. Army M21 and XM21*, 2014. <http://www.snipercentral.com/us-army-m21-xm21/> (Accessed: 02. 14. 2015.)

accuracy was two minutes of angle (about 2 inches at 100 yards) or better. From 1968 to the end of the conflict more than 1,400 XM-21s were shipped to Vietnam.²²

At approximately the same time as the Marine Corps launched its sniper training in Vietnam in 1966, some Army units acted similarly.

At the 25th Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel Truman Boudinot was responsible for the division's sniper selection and training. Equipped with "accurized" M14 semi automatic rifles mounted with available telescopic sights, these sniper teams were "*particularly useful in harassing Vietcong movements, eliminating their Vietcong counterparts, and adding extra protection around the base camp perimeter*", according to the division's newspaper.²³ By the middle of 1967, their efforts had resulted in a week-long sniper course, with growing emphasis on the scouting role of the sniper teams. The 1st Air Cavalry Division also organized a divisional level sniper school near Bong Song. The trainees used the regular M16 mounted with a Colt 3x telescopic sight, which was not a real long range combination and their function was similar to today's Designated Marksmen. In the Mekong Delta, where NVA and Vietcong personnel frequently were observed across vast wetlands and paddy fields, company and battalion commanders begged for sniper equipment. The M16s just did not have the effective range. The immediate solution was to use M14s with bipods, but what they really needed was rifles with optical sights. Responding to frustrations and lost chances to engage the enemy, in 1968 the greatest change started in modern U.S. Army sniper training, initiated by Major General Julian J. Ewell, the commander of the 9th Division. General Ewell understood the role of the snipers and involved expert trainers from the Army's Marksmanship Training Unit (AMTU). The Fort Benning based unit was created in 1956 when the Army's competitive shooting program was restored.²⁴ Under General Ewell's supervision, an AMTU instructor team was dispatched to Vietnam in order to lead the newly established 9th Infantry Division Sniper School. The Army Marksmanship Unit team, led by Major Willis L. Powell and consisting of seven non-commissioned officers, arrived in June 1968. Upon arrival they helped with the construction of a 500 yard range at Dong Tam and occasionally accompanied ambush patrols to gain experience. Brigadier General James S. Timothy was in charge of accelerating progress. The curriculum of the school included the basic sniping subjects: range estimation, camouflage, stalking, with students firing up to 900 yards with XM-21 rifle, which is the effective range of the ART scope.²⁵ By the end of December 1968, 72 trained snipers had completed the course, which meant six snipers per battalion. Despite the numbers, General Ewell did not see the expected results: he discovered that the new snipers were being used as ordinary infantrymen and most company commanders were careless in the issue.²⁶ General Ewell made the battalion commanders responsible for their proper employment.²⁷ When the snipers started to get personal attention and proper assignments, the results were extraordinary. According to the combat reports from October 1968 to June

²² John L. Pluster: *The History of Sniping and Sharpshooting*, 567.

²³ Vol 1 No. 15 Tropic Lightning News June 10, 1966. <http://www.25thida.org/TLN/tln1-15.htm> (Accessed: 02. 15. 2015.)

²⁴ Col. Michael Lee Lanning: *Blood Warriors: American Military Elites*. Random House Publishing Group, 2007, 256.

²⁵ Col. Michael Lee Lanning: *Inside the Crosshairs: Snipers in Vietnam*, 178.

²⁶ Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell: *Sharpening The Combat Edge*. Department Of The Army Washington, D.C., 1995, 120. <http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/Sharpen/ch06.htm#b4> (Accessed: 03. 01. 2015.)

²⁷ US Army Sniper Program. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/vietnam2-sniper.htm> (Accessed: 02. 15. 2015.)

1969 these 72 snipers killed 1,158 enemy soldiers. The Sniper School of the 9th Division and its instructors became the core for any Army sniper training in South Vietnam. They instructed future cadre and students for six U.S. divisions, who went on to establish further schools. In 1969, when the 9th Division started the withdrawal from Vietnam, the school's instructor team was sent to the 25th Infantry Division, where they established a new school near Cu Chi. In the same period the 23rd Division organized three-week-long sniper courses under the supervision of a former Olympic level competitive shooter, Major Lones Wigger. The 101 Airborne Division's sniper school was run by former competitors, too. All these courses equipped their new graduates with XM-21 rifles before sending them back to their units. Arriving at Fort Benning from his tour in Vietnam, Major Willis L. Powell founded a course for sniper instructors and wrote the first sniper manual in the history of the U.S. military: Training Circular 23-14, Sniper Training and Employment. In a very short period the sniping trade in the U.S. Army advanced so far as never before.

THE LEGACY OF THE VIETNAM WAR: SNIPING BECAME A REAL MILITARY TRADE

As soon as American ground combat ended in Vietnam, the Army and Marine Corps closed their sniping establishments. The schools, the sniper slots, the effort to develop tactics were gone. It might have remained that way but there was a human driving force: Jim Land, the same officer who had founded the 1st Marine Division Sniper School in Vietnam. By 1976, Land was a major and the USMC's chief of marksmanship. This could have been just another staff job, but to Major Land, who knew the price paid to develop marksmanship and sniper knowledge, this position became a challenge. At Marine Corps Headquarters he would explain the value of precision fire to anyone who would listen - not just as the minimum use of force but an essential capability, as critical a component of modern warfare as a machine gun or mortar.

He followed high ranking officers to sporting events, accosted them in the corridors of the Pentagon corridors, and cornered them over lunches. Land urged that the Corps needed four things: a sniper military occupational specialty, proper weapons, a formal sniper school, and real scout-sniper billets in the units' table of organisation. After a year of this lobbying, his campaign achieved its first victory. At Quantico's Precision Weapons Facility, technicians rebuilt the aging Remington M40, replacing its wooden stock with a synthetic McMillan fiberglass one, and adding a match-grade H&S or Hart barrel. This new version, the M40A1, fired impressively: on average, 1-inch groups at 100 yards with M118 Special Ball ammunition.²⁸ Continuing his campaign, the next year Major Land scored double victories: the Marine Corps reinstated the scout-sniper specialty and it created scout-snipers billets in each Marine infantry battalion. In 1977, Gen. Louis H. Wilson approved the concept and established a program in which every Marine infantry battalion would have a team of eight snipers within a special platoon of scouts and snipers called the Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) platoon to reflect the additional roles of reconnaissance and adjusting air strikes and artillery.²⁹ Land's greatest achievement soon followed, on 1 June 1977, with a new Scout-Sniper Instructor School at Quantico which is still in full operation today. The school's

²⁸ Mel Ewing: USMC M40A1, 2014. <http://www.snipercentral.com/usmc-m40a1/> (Accessed: 02. 16. 2015.)

²⁹ Charles Henderson: Marine Sniper: 93 Confirmed Kills. Berkley Trade, 2001, 285.

first commandant, Captain Jack Cuddy, and its NCO in charge, Gunnery Sergeant Carlos Hathcock devised the curriculum, drawing on Hathcock's extensive combat and shooting experience. Graduates of the Quantico school soon began instructing division-level Basic Sniper Training Courses at Camp Pendleton, California, and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

Although the U.S. Army snipers performed well in Vietnam, after the war the service emphasised the mechanized, and possibly nuclear, warfare on the flat terrain of the Central German Plain. After the war, the Army continued to exclude authorization for snipers, and the infantry school did not see the marksmen as having any role on the future battlefield. Yet both instructors and veteran snipers were still on active duty, and many of them were serving in the Army Marksmanship Training Unit (AMTU). Major Willis Powell and his staff, who had established Army sniper training in Vietnam, continued to take part in regular marksmanship training. For the next decade the Army left the organisation and training of sniper teams to local commanders. A few individuals actively supported the inclusion of marksmen in their units, but most continued to ignore long-range shooting. The Army reestablished a sniper program only in the middle of the 80's under the name of Special Operations Target Interdiction Course (SOTIC) with sniper training as its core subject. In 1988 the army's marksmen were to be armed with the M24 modified bolt-action Remington Model 700s with a 10x power Leupold M3 Ultra telescopic sight. Delivery of the weapons to the sniper school and to units began in April 1988. One year later an updated sniper doctrine was released: a revised version of TC 23-14, Sniper Training and Employment.³⁰

SUMMARY

Some years after the Vietnam War the Army and the Marine Corps were able to consolidate their sniper training and the slots for long range marksmen were integrated into their organisations. The leaders of the services recognised the need for precise match grade rifles, optical sights and ammunition and the best available equipment was issued to the snipers. The key figures of the succesful sniper training were former competitive shooters with personal interest in the subject and in many cases they had combat experience. Even today the recruiting, selection and training are carried out according to strict standards. The era of the Vietnam War was the first instance when the opinion and experience of shooters did count in the process of selecting a sniper weapon. Due to the persistence of dedicated specialists (often in the face of organizational inertia), both the US Army and the Marine Corps had excellent sniper capabilities from the very beginning of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan in the new century.

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³⁰ Col. Michael Lee Lanning: *Inside the Crosshairs: Snipers in Vietnam*, 155.

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Lt. Col. Győző Csanádi:

CYBER WAR: POOR MAN'S WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND A NEW WHIP IN THE HANDS OF THE RICH

ABSTRACT: Governments, including secret and military services, have already realised the importance of cyber warfare capabilities. In order to enforce a political will, there have been several solutions developed throughout history. Clausewitzian¹ axiom still seems to be valid: War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. I will define a common denominator called destruction quotient in order to compare the efficiency of different warfare technologies including the estimation of cyber-war capabilities potential.

According to my hypothesis, it is necessary to distinguish between the physical and cyberspace in terms of necessary investment and its efficiency. In physical space where conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction make their effects through the development process, the newer the technology, the higher the cost and so is its destruction quotient. One invested dollar can cause more damage in dollars but with higher expenses as technology develops. Meanwhile in cyberspace the trend of the development is similar but the same or higher losses can be caused with significantly less investment.

Although cyber-warfare measures are now used for hidden operations, it seems that to invest in a cyber-warfare capability is quite ruminative because it seems significantly cheaper than to invest in a nuclear arsenal.

Cyber war tools being cheap but effective measures of destruction seem to be a good choice for poor but violent countries to avoid high costs of deterrence. However, great powers have also realised the importance of cyberspace and its military use.

KEYWORDS: cyber-war, weapons of mass destruction, cyber warfare centre, efficiency, case study

PRINCIPLES AND SPACES OF WAR

Throughout history we can follow the technical evolution of weapons while technology elaborates the technical realisation of armed conflicts.

With new computer technologies today, we have a new battlefield – cyberspace.

The thesis that “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means”² is still valid but having new means of pressure we could change the slogan: a cyberwar is merely the continuation of policy by other means.

Conventionally a war takes place in physical space. Cyber activities happen in cyberspace³ but they could have an effect on physical space by manipulating the equipment that executes

¹ Carl Philipp Gottfried (or Gottlieb) von Clausewitz (1. June 1780. – 16. November 1831.) a Prussian general and military theorist.

² Carl von Clausewitz: On War. Chapter 1, Section 24. In the Princeton University Press translation, 1976.

³ Cyber-space: The notional environment in which communication over computer networks occurs. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/cyberspace

physical processes such as industrial tools, traffic, energy or even military systems controlled by electronic subsystems.

In the further study, there will be three possible warfare technologies analysed: two of them in physical space (conventional and nuclear warfare) and one (cyber) in cyberspace.

In the air, on the ground or the sea, the battlefield has an impact on the neighbouring space. Cyberspace is in a special position since it is neighbouring all the others. Because of this special position, it is worth turning our attention to cyber battlefield and the special activities in cyberwar.

Applying aforementioned warfare measures does not necessarily mean the exclusive use of one means. Normally, conventional warfare works with a combination of all the three, although the usage of nuclear weapons has not been executed in practice except for the first two blasts during WW2⁴.

EFFICIENCY

Destruction quotient

Count Raimondo Montecucoli's⁵ advice has never been more valid: "For a war you need three things:

1. Money.
2. Money.
3. Money"

It is not really true since nobody can estimate the value of a single human life and a war costs many lives, blood, and suffering.

In order to establish a common denominator between different kinds of warfare technologies it is possible to estimate how much loss can be caused by the investment of a specific warfare technology. With the data of the costs and the costs of the damage caused it is possible to define a quotient, namely *destruction quotient* (Q_d) that measures the efficiency of the destruction capability of a specific warfare technology.

$$Q_d = \frac{\text{Value of destruction}}{\text{Invested Expenses}}$$

Where:

Q_d = destruction quotient, the common denomination in order to compare the efficiency of warfare technologies

Value of destruction= cumulated price of the demolition that the specific military (warfare) activity caused. Usually it is based on the estimation of lost values, loss of profit, damaged infrastructural elements. These numbers are often indicated as war compensation claims.

Invested Expenses= cumulated price of a military (warfare) activity

⁴ U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, June 19. 1946. President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers, Harr S Truman Library & Museum. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/index.php

⁵ See Chapter 6 of Book 3, A Warriors Life (2013), Roger Gard's translation of Servitude et grandeur militaires by Alfred de Vigny along with Gard's notes. Raimondo, Count of Montecucoli Italian and Habsburg Monarchy general (21. February 1609. – 16. October 1680.) Prince of Holy Roman Empire and Neapolitan Duke of Melfi. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/390681/Raimondo-Montecucoli>

What effect could be reached with conventional forces?

In order to estimate the efficiency of conventional war technologies, please find the chart attached below, showing the calculation of *destruction quotient*.

Efficiency of the conventional military technologies				
Conflict	Military expenses (\$ billion)	Caused infrastructural losses (\$billion)	Destruction quotient (one invested \$ caused losses in \$)	Description
WW1	\$2.441 ⁶	\$3.286 ⁷	1.346	Total war with the technologies of WW1
WW2	\$16.659 ⁸	\$39.722 ⁹	2.384	Total war with WW2 technologies
Persian Gulf War	\$109.796 ¹⁰	\$1,098,077.000 ¹¹	10.001	Coalition war with land heavy combined operations
Yugoslavian Campaign	\$8.073	\$18.316 billion ¹²	2.269	Coalition air force operation
		\$32.405 with resettling refugees	4.014	
		\$140.9 ¹³ according to Yugoslavian claims	17.453	

⁶ Original value is \$208 million. The inflation adjustment is calculated by <http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>
Source: A világháborúk adatai (Data of world wars) <http://mek.niif.hu/00000/00056/html/258.htm>

⁷ Original value is \$280 million. The inflation adjustment is calculated by <http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>
Source: A világháborúk adatai (Data of world wars) <http://mek.niif.hu/00000/00056/html/258.htm>

⁸ Original value is \$1.384 billion. The inflation adjustment is calculated by <http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>
A világháborúk adatai (Data of world wars) <http://mek.niif.hu/00000/00056/html/258.htm>

⁹ Original value is \$3.300 billion. The inflation adjustment is calculated by <http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>
A világháborúk adatai (Data of world wars) <http://mek.niif.hu/00000/00056/html/258.htm>

¹⁰ Stephen Daggett: Costs of Major U.S. Wars, Congressional Research Service, June 29, 2010. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22926.pdf>. The original value of Persian Gulf War: \$102 Billion, the original value of Yugoslavian Campaign \$ 7.500 billion. The inflation adjustment is calculated by <http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>

¹¹ Youssef M. Ibrahim: Gulf War Is Said to Have Cost the Region \$676 Billion in 1990–91. The New York Times, 25. April 1993. <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/25/world/gulf-war-is-said-to-have-cost-the-region-676-billion-in-1990-91.html>. The original value: \$676 billion. The inflation adjustment is calculated by <http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>

¹² Abby Scher: The True Cost of War Resist newsletter. Third World Traveller: July August 1999. The original value: \$13 billion, with refugees: \$23 billion. The inflation adjustment is calculated by <http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Foreign_Policy/TrueCostWar.html

¹³ Christopher S. Wren: Yugoslavia Gives NATO \$100 Billion Damage Bill. The New York Times, 29. September 1999. The original value: \$100 billion. The inflation adjustment is calculated by <http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>

As a summary of the efficiency factor, the chart shows the development of the technologies in terms of the demolition power with the measurement of the *destruction quotient*.

What is the efficiency of a nuclear bomb?

The biggest nuclear bomb in the world ever created is the Russian Tsar-bomb. It is a thermonuclear weapon with the capacity (yield) of 50 megatons, compared to the US bombs dropped on Japan with approximately 12 and 21 kilotons¹⁴, the difference is 2,500 times. However, the increase of the yield does not mean a linear increase in the damage capacity.

According to one estimation most of the nuclear arsenals are less than a megaton with the average of 400 kilotons.¹⁵

With the calculation of a website,¹⁶ it is possible to emulate what we can do with the biggest bomb in the world. There are numerous studies and analyses¹⁷ about nuclear weapon impacts but luckily nuclear weapons are used primarily to deter.

One old B24 mounted nuclear bomb costs \$75 million. The known calculated cost of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki damages estimated \$2 billion¹⁸ each. Therefore if a WW2 technology 10-20 kiloton nuclear bomb is used, one dollar causes \$26,666 losses.

Modern warheads are even more effective (approximately 20 times bigger yield in average), but to have correct numbers of the estimated demolition¹⁹ is quite a hard job and it may be the subject of an independent study. Consequently in order to make a comparison the last used weapon data will be used.

Summary of warfare technologies in physical space

In order to compare the efficiency of conventional and nuclear weapon technologies using *destruction quotient* please find the diagram below.

The chart shows an exponential development of the efficiency of the weapon technologies. As a summary, it can be stated that as time goes by, *the efficiency of the various weapon technologies is rising*.

How effective a cyber-attack can be

Having cyber warfare attack capabilities, a well-trained staff can start to develop effective technologies against cyber defence elements and become effective enough to attack anybody's infrastructure, who is using modern computer technologies.

¹⁴ In order to compare yield of bombs. <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Effects/effects1.shtml>


¹⁵ <http://www.nukefix.org/weapon.html>

¹⁶ Ground Zero is an app that shows the thermal damage caused by a nuclear explosion. <http://www.carloslabs.com/projects/200712B/GroundZero.html>

¹⁷ Martin Zuberi: Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Strategic Analysis, RMIT University Library, 4. November 2010. <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq5.html>, or Michelle Hall: By the Numbers: World War II's atomic bombs. CNN Library, 6. August 2013. <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/06/world/asia/btn-atomic-bombs/>

¹⁸ <https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20100228160851AAc4FuT>

¹⁹ Research Study on Impacts of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Various Aspects, Commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, FY 2013, March 2014, or Christine C Harwell (Editor) Experiences and Extrapolations from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1985.



*“If someone is able to attack information that is needed by decision makers, or that is crucial to organizing logistics and supply lines of an army on the ground, that means they can induce chaos in a nation”*²⁰ said Sami Saydjari, who worked as a Pentagon cyber expert for 13 years and now runs a private company.

The more unusual the solution, the more successful the effect. An unexpected action is a great factor of efficiency. “Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does not know what to attack.”²¹

To measure cyber activities is not easy because of their nature being a *clandestine operation*²². Therefore showing some case studies will refer to the capabilities of the new warfare method.

Famous Cyber attacks

Beginnings

The first belligerent action against a so-called secure electronic activity is of almost the same age as electronic communication.

In 1903, Nevil Maskelyne,²³ a British magician and inventor managed to disturb Guglielmo Marconi’s²⁴ demonstration of his secure radio communication insulting the system with his own Morse code. Since that moment many extravagant or nonconformist people have taken actions against working electronic information systems.

²⁰ Ed Pilkington and Robbie Johnson: China flexes muscles of its ‘informationised’ army. The Guardian, 5. September 2007. <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/sep/05/hacking.internet>

²¹ Sun Tzu: The Art of War.

²² A clandestine operation is an intelligence or military operation carried out in such a way that the operation goes unnoticed by the general population. For more details please find: <http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/clandestine-operation/>

²³ Nevil Maskelyne (1839–1917), British magician and inventor. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/367963/John-Nevil-Maskelyne>

²⁴ Guglielmo Marconi (25. April 1874. – 20. July 1937), Italian inventor and electrical engineer. Creator of the first working long-distance radio transmission. Developer of Marconi’s law and radio telegraph system.

In 1965 William D Mathews, having found the vulnerability of Multics²⁵ operation system, managed to intimidate the user's password file.^{26 27}

After some isolated cases of youngster groups, in 1983 an effective group of hackers named "The 414s"²⁸ managed to break into some serious high-profile computer systems including Los Alamos National Laboratory and Security Pacific Bank. The incident soon became the focus of press interest and as a result attracted the attention of the legislation.

Following the rising number of governmental and corporate computer break-ins, the US Congress passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and declared breaking into a computer system²⁹ a crime.

In 1988 Robert T Morris³⁰ created Morris *Worm*³¹, which managed to infect 6,000 networked computers in the ARPAnet³² slowing down the computers.

In the same year the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) was created addressing network security in DARPA³³

Last decade

Pandora's box was open and since that moment thousands of enthusiastic computer geeks, criminals and secret services have been making serious efforts to break into systems and manipulate data.

Since cyber-attacks have become visible and more harmful, they arouse the attention of state legislators, military and secret service officials.

"With technological developments being in the process of striving to increase the types of weapons, a breakthrough in our thinking can open up the domain of the weapons kingdom at one stroke. As we see it, a single man-made stock-market crash, a single computer virus invasion, or a single rumor or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the enemy country's exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country on the Internet, all can be

²⁵ Multics (Multiplexed Information and Computing Service) is a timesharing operating system begun in 1965 and used until 2000. The last Multics system running, the Canadian Department of National Defence Multics site in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, shut down October 30, 2000. <http://www.multicians.org/history.html>

²⁶ On building Systems That Will Fail, Turing Lecture Paper. <http://larch-www.lcs.mit.edu:8001/~corbato/turing91/>

²⁷ Open Sourced Vulnerability Database 23257: IBM 7094 CTSS System Text Editor Multiple Instance Password File Local Disclosure. <http://osvdb.org/show/osvdb/23257>

²⁸ The 414s was a group of friends and computer hackers in 80's taking their name after the area code of their hometown. According to their statement their intention was only to challenge their self with getting into places hidden.

²⁹ Technology, Timeline: The U.S Government and Cybersecurity. The Washington Post, 16. May 2003. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50606-2002Jun26.html>

³⁰ Robert Tappan Morris is an American computer scientist and entrepreneur. He is best known for creating the Morris Worm in 1988, considered the first computer worm on the Internet, and for companies he has founded. <http://www.findingdulcinea.com/news/on-this-day/July-August-08/On-this-Day--Robert-Morris-Becomes-First-Hacker-Prosecuted-For-Spreading-Virus.html>

³¹ An internet worm is a program that spreads across the internet by replicating itself on computers via their network connections. Mike Barvise: What is an internet worm? BBC, 9. September 2010.

³² The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) was an early packet switching network and the first network to implement the protocol suite TCP/IP. <http://www.darpa.mil/>

³³ The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was established in 1958 to prevent strategic surprise from negatively impacting U.S. national security and create strategic surprise for U.S. adversaries by maintaining the technological superiority of the U.S. military. http://www.darpa.mil/our_work/

included in the ranks of new-concept weapons.“ as a translation says about so called new “Unrestricted Warfare”³⁴

“Mafiaboy” dilettante DoS attack³⁵

In 2000 a 15-year-old Canadian student launched a serial of denial-of-service attacks blocking large commercial websites like Yahoo!, Amazon.com, Fifa.com Dell E*TRADE eBay and CNN causing an estimated loss of \$1.7 billion.

As the so-called “mafiaboy” (his real name is Michael Calce) said later in an interview he was part of a Russia-based hacker group fighting for the supremacy against other gangs. His purpose was much more a youth game than an intentional attack against the internet³⁶.

Titan Rain

Since 2003 a series of organised cyber-attacks has hit the federal government of the United States³⁷ ongoing for at least three years³⁸. Details of the three-year attack series are poorly documented, but some characteristic cases can be found such as the 1st November, 2004 case when 20 hackers based on controlled proxies³⁹ managed to break into the following unclassified systems:

- U.S. Army Information Systems Engineering Command at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
- Military’s Defense Information Systems Agency in Arlington, Virginia.
- Naval Ocean Systems Center, a defense department installation in San Diego, California
- United States Army Space and Strategic Defense installation in Huntsville, Alabama.

Although the systems were unclassified, they were able to store precious information crumbs in a professional intelligent service.

The originator of the attack remained unidentified and there is no evidence about it but in December 2005 the SANS Institute⁴⁰ labelled the series of attack as “most likely the result of Chinese military hackers attempting to gather information on U.S. systems”.

³⁴ Translation from Unrestricted Warfare. Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999. 25.

³⁵ A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is an attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users. A DoS attack generally consists of efforts to temporarily or indefinitely interrupt or suspend services of a host connected to the Internet.

³⁶ Joachim P. Menezes: My motive wasn’t criminal says Mafiaboy, Itbusiness.ca, 22. April 2009. <http://www.itbusiness.ca/news/my-motive-wasnt-criminal-says-mafiaboy/13195>

³⁷ <https://cyberwarfaremag.wordpress.com/tag/titan-rain/>

³⁸ Bodmer – Kilger – Carpenter – Jones: Reverse Deception: Organized Cyber Threat Counter-Exploitation. New York, McGraw-Hill Osborne Media, 2012. ISBN 0071772499, ISBN 978-0071772495

³⁹ Proxy is a server in the network where users connect and the server put the user requests trough in order to provide fastest services. Controlled proxy is a hacked proxy that provides unwanted mostly malicious services. http://www.geoedge.com/meetus_university/39/using-proxy-services-to-qa-ad-campaigns

⁴⁰ SANS Institute is a private U.S. company that specializes in information security and cybersecurity training <https://www.sans.org/>

The technology of using masked proxy⁴¹, zombie computer⁴², spyware/virus hides the real identities of the attackers but the precise and co-ordinated execution suggests that the case is based on state-sponsored or corporate espionage activities.

With the growing economic and political importance of China, the state tries to modernize the military capabilities as well. In 1999 two Air Forces colonels introduced a new way of warfare titled “Unrestricted Warfare” using computers as modern weapons (see quotation about “Unrestricted Warfare” above).

Estonian cyber-attack 2007

It is considered to be the second largest co-ordinated (state sponsored) cyber-attack after Titan Rain.

The history of the Baltic States is full of pain and continuous struggle between the great powers’ hugging grip. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the freedom of Estonia was regained but the remains of recent history are still there.

In 2007 the government decided to relocate the Soviet World War II memorial in Tallinn. The movement of the statue (what the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn symbolised) and the different political interpretations of the events led to a controversy between Russian minorities and Estonians as well as between the Russian Federation and Estonia. The tension escalated to two-night riots in Tallinn (Bronze Night), the siege of the Estonian embassy in Moscow, and a few weeks’ long cyber-attack against the main political institutions of Estonia.

During the attack governmental websites, web-pages of banks, universities and newspapers were targeted. The main method used was the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) with a wide range of means. The Denial-of-Service Attack generally means that a target networked computer’s online service becomes unavailable due to overwhelming traffic from the attacking sources. Most simple attacks always use and exploit the limitations of TCP/IP protocol.

In Estonia a more sophisticated series of methods was used when multiple controlled systems targeted a single system using single machines, botnets⁴³.

The attack in Estonia was built up for a few weeks and peaked on 9 May, the Victory day. The attackers were using Russian language forums and blogs to share tools and instructions in order to co-ordinate the steps. The attacked sites included the prime minister, the parliament, other ministries and mail servers.

The attack initiated a number of efforts to mitigate similar future actions and highlighted the importance of network security in the modern military doctrine.

On 14 June 2007 a joint communiqué of the NATO defence ministers was issued promising immediate action. Since August 2008 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCSCOE)⁴⁴ has been operating next to Tallinn.

⁴¹ Masked Proxy Is a technology in order to help hiding somebody’s identity in the cyberspace. <http://whatismyipaddress.com/hide-ip>

⁴² Zombie is a computer connected to the Internet that has been compromised by a hacker, with some tools and can be used to perform malicious tasks.

⁴³ Botnet (roBOT -NETwork) is a collection of programs communicating with other similar programs in order to perform tasks. This can be as mundane as keeping control of an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel, or it could be used to send spam email.

⁴⁴ Estonia proposed the concept for a cyber-defence centre to NATO in 2004, right after joining the Alliance. In 2006 the concept is approved by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and in 2007 negotiations held between potential Sponsoring Nations.

Cyber-attacks during the Russo-Georgian War 2008⁴⁵

By reading through the material about the reasons and accusations of fighting factions of the Russo-Georgian War, it is possible to find some awful patterns of the modern and post-modern warfare starting from an organised military activity against a minority to the interference in the interior matters of an independent country.

The war took place between 7 and 12 August 2008, resulting in Russian military victory.

That was the *first war when a military operation coincided with cyber warfare*⁴⁶.

The cyber-activity was continuous and did not cease after the end of military actions.

On 20 July one massive zombie attack was launched against Georgia. The Georgian presidential website was hacked and the traffic redirected showing pro-Russian content one day long.

As a response, on 5 August a Russian-based news agency and a radio website were hacked whose profile was related to the interior political issues in Georgia.

The content was changed in order to make the Georgian point of view more popular.

According to some evidence, a sophisticated computer attack increased the pressure and led to a *physical explosion*⁴⁷ in the *Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline* near Refahiye in Turkey. This is one of the few known Cyber-to-Physical attack⁴⁸ cases, and it proves that direct attacks from cyberspace can cause physical damage or jeopardize the physical existence of objects and people.

Some sections of Georgian Internet services were rerouted⁴⁹ and the traffic was blocked or diverted. Although Deutch Telecom AG.⁵⁰ could temporarily provide its services for Georgia, some hours later the traffic was diverted again to Moscow-based servers between 07-09 Aug, during the first days of the military actions.

RIA Novosti, a Russian news agency website was disabled for some hours on 10 August due to attacks on DNS servers and the main servers.

The Georgian presidential website on 11 August started to show pictures of President Saakashvili and Adolf Hitler showing similar gestures of the two politicians, visually suggesting negative similarities between them demonstrating an example of cyber warfare and PSYOPS⁵¹ combination. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs used a blog in order to work and the presidential site was moved to US servers. Even the National Bank of Georgia and the Georgian Parliament websites were hacked and showed the ominous Hitler/Saakashvili pictures.

The Russian government denied any allegations in connection with the cyber-attacks stating that it was individuals' activity in Russia. A Russian criminal gang called the Russian Business Network⁵² (RBN) was accused of the attacks.

⁴⁵ Besenyő János: Újfajta háború? Internetes hadviselés Grúziában. Seregszemle, VI/3., December 2008. 61–63.

⁴⁶ John Markoff: Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks. The New York Times, 12. Aug 2008.

⁴⁷ Robert M. Lee – Michael J. Assante – Tim Cornway: ICS CP/PE (Cyber-to-Physical or Process Effects) case study paper – Media report of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline Cyber Attack SANS, 20. Dec 2014. <https://ics.sans.org/media/Media-report-of-the-BTC-pipeline-Cyber-Attack.pdf>

⁴⁸ Kelly Jackson Higgins: Anatomy Of A 'Cyber-Physical' Attack. DARK Reading, 14. Jan 2015. <http://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/anatomy-of-a-cyber-physical-attack/d/d-id/1318624>

⁴⁹ In this context: redirected.

⁵⁰ The main provider of state internet services in Georgia.

⁵¹ Psychological operations (PSYOP) are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. JP 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

⁵² The Russian Business Network (commonly abbreviated as RBN) is a multi-faceted cybercrime organization, specializing in and in some cases monopolizing personal identity theft for resale.

According to analysts, the Russian attacks unveiled and exploited the vulnerable parts of the internet. One website called *StopGeorgia* provided a free software called *DoDHTTP* with a list of Georgian targets.

Some analysts suppose there are signs that behind the attack there is a “trained and centrally coordinated cadre of professionals”⁵³

Operation Olympic Games and Stuxnet (from 2006)

Operation Olympic Games⁵⁴ is an unacknowledged cyber-war campaign against Iranian nuclear facilities. Initiated by the George W Bush administration allegedly it is still ongoing in order to prevent the development of Iranian nuclear weapon capability. The operation takes place in close cooperation with an Israeli cyber war capability⁵⁵, Unit 8200⁵⁶. This project uses offensive cyber weapons and using a malicious code it has managed to launch a successful attack against Natanz⁵⁷ computer controlled nuclear centrifuges. The code successfully disturbed the proper working of one fifth of the centrifuges, approximately 1,000 out of 5,000 centrifuges. The code used leaked from the target machines and became public and became known by the name “Stuxnet”. Stuxnet is a computer worm and the main objective of the code is to attack programmable logic controllers⁵⁸. Using Microsoft Windows operating systems and networks Stuxnet seeks Siemens software. In the Iranian facility the code managed to modify the speed of centrifuges without notice and caused a hidden error in the uranium enrichment process. Stuxnet is composed of three main parts:

1. Worm that executes all the malicious activities
2. Link file that executes the propagation of the worm
3. The rootkit that prevents the detection of the malicious code and activities

The operation was continued and speeded up by President Obama administration in 2012⁵⁹

⁵³ Bill Woodcock the research director at Packet Clearing House, a California-based non-profit group that tracked Internet security trends. Travis Wentworth: How Russia May Have Attacked Georgia’s Internet. Newsweek, 22. Aug 2008. <http://www.newsweek.com/how-russia-may-have-attacked-georgias-internet-88111>

⁵⁴ David E. Sanger: Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran. The New York Times, 1. June 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

⁵⁵ Josh Halliday: Stuxnet worm is the ‘work of a national government agency’. The Guardian, 24. September 2010. <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/sep/24/stuxnet-worm-national-agency>

⁵⁶ Unit 8200 is a signal intelligence unit of Israeli Intelligence Corps. The largest unit in the Israel Defence Force composed of several thousands of soldiers. http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/05/11/Enter-Unit-8200-Israel-arms-for-cyberwar/UPI-93881305142086

⁵⁷ Natanz Nuclear facility is an enrichment factory of Iranian nuclear programme with 19,000 operational centrifuges in order to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6). This highly toxic and aggressive concordant is a fuel either for nuclear plants or bombs. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11927720> <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0021961479901265>

⁵⁸ Programmable Logic Controller is a small industrial computer in order to control industrial electromechanical processes. <http://support.automationdirect.com/faq/index.html>

⁵⁹ David E. Sanger: Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran. The New York Times, 1. June 2012.

Iranian Cyber Army

After the Stuxnet affair (see the paragraph above), Iran put the focus on cyberspace as an important factor of confrontations. With the combined efforts of the governmental security and private firms the cyberwar capability called Iranian Cyber Army⁶⁰ (ICA) was established.

According to a study of an American security and military institute⁶¹, in 2009 Iran became one of the top five most powerful countries in terms of cyber forces. According to the study, the *annual budget of ICA is \$76 million and it has made a more than \$1 billion infrastructure investment.*

According to Iranian officials, Iran is the fourth largest cyber force after the US, China and Russia.

Sony incident 2014

On 24 November 2014 a hacker group named “Guardians of Peace” or “GOP” demanded the cancellation of a film premier in New York City on 18 December. The comedy, titled “The Interview”, made fun of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un by imagining his assassination in its plot.

The hacker group attack on the Sony Pictures Entertainment released confidential data of the firm on 24 November 2014. The data included personal information about employees and families, e-mails, amounts of salaries even copies of unreleased Sony films.

According to US Intelligence officials, the software, the technical realisation and the sources of the attack suppose North Korean sponsorship. North Korea has denied all responsibilities and accused some former Sony Pictures employees.

In order to deal with ongoing damage Sony Pictures have spent *\$15 million.*

North Korea has her own cyber warfare agency called Bureau 121.^{62 63} The agency is part of the General Bureau of Reconnaissance of North Korea’s military. Bureau 121 was created in 1998 and *manned by North Korea’s most talented computer experts, about 1,800 specialists.* Most of them graduated from the University of Automation Pyonyang, although they are scattered around the world, their families have special privileges at home.

Summary of Cyber-attack cases

To sum up the aforementioned cyber-attack cases, the following allegations can be made:

Continuous and developing

Hacking electronic communication technologies is of almost the same age as the electronic communication and is continuously developing in the prospect of importance

⁶⁰ Iranian Cyber Army, The Offensive Arm of Iran’s Cyber Force – See more at: <http://www.phoenixts.com/blog/iranian-cyber-army/#sthash.71S2CA5m.dpuf> <http://www.phoenixts.com/blog/iranian-cyber-army/>

⁶¹ Defense Tech. <http://defensetech.org/about-defense-tech/>

⁶² Ju-Min Park – James Pearson: In North Korea, hackers are a handpicked, pampered elite. Reuters, 5. Dec 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/05/us-sony-cybersecurity-northkorea-idUSKCN0JJ08B20141205>

⁶³ Samuel Gibbs: Did North Korea’s notorious Unit 121 cyber army hack Sony Pictures? The Guardian, 2. December 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/02/north-korea-hack-sony-pictures-brad-pitt-fury>

and sophistication. As time goes on the effectivity of cyber-attacks is getting higher and higher. The main factors of the danger of cyber activities are threefold:

- the rising dependency of modern life on electronic controls and networks means a bigger and more and more attractive target for adversary actions.
- the rising interest of either governmental or private actors even criminals and individuals
- technological development of cyber war tools

Popular

The perpetrators of cyber-attacks can be classified and put in three main groups:

1. *Amateurs* with harmless (romantic, infantile, enthusiastic etc.) intentions but painful results like magician Maskelyne or “mafiaboy”
2. *Criminals* like Russian Business Network
3. *Professional* state or company actors like Unit 8200, ICA or Bureau 121

Effective

Cyber attacks

- can demonstrate the knowledge and power of competing youngsters
- can cause financial loss (“mafiaboy” and Sony cases)
- can cause prestige loss in (Russo-Georgian war)
- can cause disruption in the state functions (the Estonian and Georgian cases or Titan Rain)
- can cause leaking of important data (Titan Rain and Sony incident)
- can cause physical damage (the case of gas pipeline and nuclear centrifuges).
- can be combined with other military activities (Russo-Georgian war)

Unexpected

Since cyberspace is growing and has several physical connections it is not easy to predict the area and aim of cyber-attacks and this fact causes two major negative effects depending on the way of building defence:

1. Building “paranoid” defence costs a lot and is more or less ineffective because there is no way to defend against all threats since human thinking has an inexhaustible imagination of demolition.
2. Negligence can cause unexpectedly high losses, like in the “mafiaboy” case.

Mostly denied

Cyber-attacks sometimes use illegal or semi legal tools and in general immoral activities like blowing up a pipeline. Therefore state actors cannot take responsibility for them since all states definitely introduce themselves as ones representing positive values.

Most of the state actors deny their responsibility or accuse other criminal groups as it was demonstrated in Estonian, Georgian, Titan Rain and Sony cases

HOW MUCH DOES IT COST?

Cost of conventional warfare

In the war about the quantity and quality of the fighting forces, we can consider two main types of winning strategies: offensive and defensive attitudes⁶⁴.

Normally, the more powerful army attacks and the weaker one defends. The strategy of the first is to maximize the success, of the second is to minimize the losses.

It is difficult to measure the size of a conventional military force, but in case of home defence, there are parameters to make detailed plans. Since all countries keep their offensive ambitions behind the stages, it is easier to measure the defensive attitude and its costs.

Independent countries not having weapons of mass destruction and having a declared home defence strategy in their military expenditures per capita

Country	Popu- lation ⁶⁵	Annual defence budget (\$ billion) ⁶⁷	price per capital (dollars per) individual	GDP per Capita ⁶⁶	Percentage of spending from the GDP per capita
Austria	8,223,062	\$3,22	392	44,402	0.887%
Finland	5,268,799	\$3,66	695	40,045	1.735%
Ireland	4,832,765	\$1,13 ⁶⁸	234	41,300	0.566%
Switzerland	8,061,516	\$4,83	599	54,800	1.093%
Ukraine	44,291,413	\$4,88	110	7,400	1.486%
Average					0,961%

Having a conventional force is legal, indisputable and obvious. If a country does not pay for its own defence, sooner or later foreigners will pay for it.

As a summary, if a country wants to defend herself with conventional forces, all citizens must spend approximately one dollar out of a hundred on this service. In this case the declared aim of the military forces is only to defend the country.

If a country wants to exert foreign influence and underpin it with military forces, it must add more deterring weapon systems.

The comparison of the leading technologies of the wars for world dominance can be based on the comparison of the price of some characteristic weapons in different services. In order to have a common denominator the original prices must be converted into USD and adjusted by the inflation.

⁶⁴ Please find more details about defence and attack attitudes in the works of Sun Tzu: The Art of War. <http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html>, <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm>

⁶⁵ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/>

⁶⁶ http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2013+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc

⁶⁷ <http://www.globalfirepower.com/defense-spending-budget.asp>

⁶⁸ <http://www.military.ie/>

Some characteristic weapons from different eras and services			
Era	Army (tanks)	Naval warship and aircraft carriers)	Air (bombers)
WW1	Mark-1 ⁶⁹ \$0.5million	HMS Dreadnought ⁷⁰ 1906 Cost ⁷¹ \$8,493 million	Siemens-Schuckert R.VIII ⁷² \$2,954 million ⁷³
WW2	T34 ⁷⁴ \$5.346million ⁷⁵	USS Midway (CV-41) 1945 Best aircraft carrier ⁷⁶ \$1,174 billion ⁷⁸	Consolidated B-24 Liberator ⁷⁷ \$4,492 million ⁷⁹
Cold War	Chieftain FV4201 ⁸⁰ \$13 million ⁸²	USS Nimitz ⁸¹ \$4.388 billion ⁸³	Boeing B-52H Stratofortress ⁸⁴ \$14,43 million ⁸⁵
Post Modern	AMX-56 Leclerc ⁸⁶ \$23 million ⁸⁷	USS Gerald R. Ford Aircraft carrier \$11.5 billion ⁸⁹	Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit ⁸⁸ \$900 million

The most effective and powerful weapons are the weapons of mass destruction. If we do not consider prohibited and well-hidden chemical and biological weapons, we can only take into consideration nuclear weapons.

If we have a closer look at the fact how much it costs to build one nuclear weapon, including technologies, raw materials and the two main parts of the weapon, the result is awful.

⁶⁹ <http://spartacus-educational.com/FWWmother.htm>, <https://sites.google.com/site/landships/home>

⁷⁰ [http://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/H.M.S._Dreadnought_\(1906\)](http://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/H.M.S._Dreadnought_(1906))

⁷¹ Cost to build £1,783,883 converted according to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tables_of_historical_exchange_rates_to_the_United_States_dollar

⁷² G.W. Haddow – Peter M. Grosz: *The German Giants – The German R-Planes 1914–1918*. (3rd ed.) Putnam & Company Ltd., 1988.

⁷³ Original 1916 cost was 750,000 Marks, converted by <http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>

⁷⁴ <http://www.missing-lynx.com/articles/russia/rpt34/rpt34.htm>

⁷⁵ Original cost 135.000 (1943) rubles converted by http://u16201083.onlinehome-server.com/currency-converter/russian-ruble-rub_usd-us-dollar.htm/1943

⁷⁶ Nigel Davies: *The best aircraft carrier of World War Two? Rethinking history*, 22. February 2013. <http://rethinkinghistory.blogspot.hu/2013/02/the-best-aircraft-carrier-of-world-war.html>

⁷⁷ http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail-page-2.asp?aircraft_id=80

⁷⁸ Original cost was \$90 million. <http://chiefengineer.org/?p=4228> Adjusted by <http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>

⁷⁹ Original 1941 price was \$297,627 inflation adjusted by <http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>

⁸⁰ <http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/chieftain.htm>

⁸¹ <http://www.nimitz.navy.mil/>

⁸² <http://www.livesteammodels.co.uk/dhmg/chief.html>

⁸³ Inflation adjusted by <http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>

⁸⁴ http://www.military-today.com/aircraft/b_52h_stratofortress.htm


⁸⁵ <http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104465/b-52-stratofortress.aspx>

⁸⁶ <http://www.defense-update.com/products/1/leclerc.htm>

⁸⁷ <http://top10stand.blogspot.hu/2014/07/10.html>

⁸⁸ http://www.military-today.com/aircraft/b2_spirit.htm

⁸⁹ Rober Johnson: *The single most expensive piece of military equipment ever has reached a massive milestone*. Business Insider, 18. April 2013. <http://www.businessinsider.com/uss-gerald-r-ford-huntington-ingalls-2013-4?op=1>



The invention of the nuclear weapon technology

The cost of the Manhattan Project⁹⁰ (based on 2015 prices) is \$24.8 billion⁹¹.

Although it is a project from the '40s, a modern weapon needs similar infrastructural and monetary efforts having in mind that since that time technology has developed greatly.

Possession of nuclear weapons

Having the “know-how” of the nuclear weaponry is not really enough. It is necessary to procure or produce the nuclear weapon. A nuclear weapon is constructed of two major parts:

1. the warhead or bombs
2. the delivery system.

According to a study⁹², it is possible to identify average prices of nuclear weapons. The cost of a modern warhead is \$20million. Here are some more data about the delivery systems:

Nuclear weapon delivery systems	
One modern land based missile	\$85 million
One submarine based missile	\$200 million
One old B52 ⁹³ based bomb costs	\$75 million
One modern bomber aircraft launched missile considering the share of stealth bomber	\$270 million

⁹⁰ <http://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/manhattan-project/>

⁹¹ Alex Wellerstein: The price of the Manhattan Project. Restricted Data, 17. May 2013. <http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2013/05/17/the-price-of-the-manhattan-project/> and

⁹² Z. Witmond of New York, NY, asks “How much does it cost to create a single nuclear weapon?” and is answered by Senior Scientist & Co-Director of the UCS Global Security Program Lisbeth Gronlund, Ph.D. <http://www.ucsusa.org/publications/ask/2013/nuclear-weapon-cost.html#.VSZB0F2sUWM>

⁹³ <http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/bomber/b52/>

A Guardian publication⁹⁴ states there were 106 estimated nuclear targets in the UK in the '70s. To threaten a country like the United Kingdom supposes an influential political role in the world.

Pakistan is a country far from the UK but has a reasonable quantity of nuclear weapons⁹⁵ (120 warheads) to strike such an amount of targets that was planned to destroy in the UK during the cold war.

The development of technology and maintaining an atomic arsenal with 120 warheads with the cheapest delivery system (old fashioned B52H bombers with each carrying 16 bombs, altogether approximately 7 bombers (\$53.4 million each⁹⁶) would cost out like the following:

- \$25 billion for development
- \$0.4 billion for bombers
- \$9 billion for bombs
- \$10,406 maintenance cost per flying hours⁹⁷

Without the maintenance, to possess a Pakistan-sized but significantly more obsolete nuclear power would cost \$34.4 billion.

Game with numbers, Hungary has nuclear arsenal

In order to avoid offence to other countries it is a good example to use Hungarian economic and defence figures.

Considering \$133.424 billion as the estimated Hungarian GDP, and the military expenditure is 0,83 in 2013, \$1.1 billion per year is one fourth the total defence budget. So it means that it takes a Hungary-sized economy spending all military expenditure for a minimum of 31 years to keep a nuclear power that can have a worldwide effect.

In order to paralyse the infrastructure, there is a significantly cheaper solution. “There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind”⁹⁸

It can be relatively easy and cheap to block or paralyse an adversary’s infrastructure or enforce his will without the usage of conventional or nuclear weapons. It is enough to create an effective cyber-war capability. Which means, a group of well-educated people are needed along with some IT investment.

In order to demonstrate the power of cyber-warfare capabilities by using the lessons learned from real cases it is possible to make another theoretical experience with real numbers of Hungary.

⁹⁴ <http://www.robedwards.com/2014/06/revealed-the-106-cold-war-nuclear-targets-across-the-uk.html> referring to Guardian news 05. June 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/05/uk-government-top-secret-list-probable-nuclear-targets-1970s>

⁹⁵ <http://www.quora.com/How-lethal-are-Pakistans-nuclear-weapons-How-much-area-would-be-immediately-destroyed-in-a-single-attack>

⁹⁶ About the price of a unit. <http://www.minot.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3724>

⁹⁷ <http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/bomber/b52/>

⁹⁸ Napoleon Bonaparte. <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/138977-there-are-but-two-powers-in-the-world-the-sword>

Another game with numbers, building a Hungarian Cyber-Warfare Center

To create a university is not illegal, to have and defend a small building complex of installation that contains only computers (not chemicals or nuclear centrifuge) is not prohibited either and is significantly cheaper than hide nuclear plants or procure and train a new regiment of tank troops.

So what is needed to create a cyber-war potential? Some educated or well-trained people, absolutely legal infrastructure and an up-to-date computer system – a supercomputer.

Costs of educating people

According to the World University Ranking site⁹⁹, the best 10 universities in the area of technical education in 2014-15 are the following (see: chart). In order to estimate an average cost of a trainee, it is also necessary to know Tuition Fees / year of the universities.

Best universities in the world teaching Computer science			
Ranking	Name	Country	Tuition Fees / year ¹⁰⁰
1	Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)	United States	\$45,016
2	Stanford University	United States	\$14,728
3	California Institute of Technology (Caltech)	United States	\$41,790
4	Princeton University	United States	\$41,820
5	University of Cambridge	United Kingdom	\$38,108
6	Imperial College London	United Kingdom	\$42,244
7	University of Oxford	United Kingdom	\$34,965
8	ETH Zürich –Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich	Switzerland	\$22,700 ¹⁰¹
9	University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)	United States	\$38,010 ¹⁰²
10	University of California, Berkeley	United States	\$26,194 ¹⁰³
Average			\$36,997

The four-year education of one student costs \$147,988. This means that approximately 1,800 students can learn at one of the top Information Technology Universities for \$267 million, which is the price of one single modern bomber aircraft launched missile.

⁹⁹ <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2014-15/subject-ranking/subject/engineering-and-IT>

¹⁰⁰ <https://www.ethz.ch/en/studies/financial/tuition-fees.html>

¹⁰¹ <http://www.ausbildungsbeitraege.info/PrognosETH/Expenses.aspx> calculated by online expense budget calculator

¹⁰² <http://www.registrar.ucla.edu/fees/gradfee>.

¹⁰³ <http://grad.berkeley.edu/admissions/costs-fees/>

Cost of scientific background

The annual budget of the Budapest University of Technology and Economics is around \$107¹⁰⁴ million. Supposing a university like the Budapest University of Technology and Economics (BME) including all professors, tutors, students, computer systems down to the dry-cleaners and gardeners, tomorrow changes its activity in order to support nothing else but cyberwar scientific research, it would equal the approximate cost of one land-based missile with a modern warhead.

Infrastructure

To build a new university building complex on the basis of an existing building (like the enlargement of Ludovika, an ongoing Hungarian state project) costs approx.: \$87,5 million.

Sum of expenses and schedule

To sum up, the shopping list of the procurement of a good cyberwar capability usable worldwide is the following:

Cyber warfare centre shopping list (all amounts)	
Build a new education and resource centre on the basis of a historic building in a big city	\$100 million
Educate 1,800 tech students in the best universities	\$267 million
Give the whole annual budget of a university like BME	\$110 million
Price of a supercomputer ¹⁰⁵	\$100 million
All	\$460 million

To create a cyber-warfare centre, it is necessary to have basic resources (see chart above) and launch a capability building project in order to have the infrastructure and trained manpower of the cyber warfare centre. During the next years it is enough to pay the running costs only.

The minimum duration of the capability building project is four years, which corresponds to the length of the usual university training.

Distributing the costs in the four-year-long project means \$254 million per year including the running costs of a BME sized university busy with the scientific background work in order to create sufficient know-how for the centre. To estimate the running costs of the cyberwar centre, the annual budget of a BME sized university seems to be more than enough.

At the end of the four-year period there will be a brand new cyber-war centre installation with 1,800 well-trained specialists and an up-to-date supercomputer system.

Considering the Hungarian economy and military budget, to establish a theoretical Cyber Warfare Centre described above in the first four years costs 23% of the total annual military expenditures, and later only 10% to cover the running expenses.

¹⁰⁴ https://www.bme.hu/sites/default/files/bme_belso_koltsegvetes.pdf

¹⁰⁵ David Goldman: Top U.S. supercomputer guns for fastest in world. CNN Money, 29. Oct 2012. <http://wayback.archive.org/web/20130302030515/http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/29/technology/innovation/titan-supercomputer/index.html>, and <http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/07/technology/enterprise/cray-supercomputer/>

Comparison of the efficiency of a cyber-war centre and a nuclear bomb

The estimated cost of a good cyber-war centre was \$460 million. If the centre launches only one attack like “mafiaboy” - as an amateur 15-year-old Canadian student did in 2000 causing \$1.7Billion-damage, the destruction quotient of that attack is $Q_d=3.695$. Thus one dollar investment into the described cyberwar centre causes a loss of \$3.695, a better performance than the WW2 total war ($Q_d=2.348$) technologies could cause.

If only 50% of the well-trained and top-educated staff could repeat what the outsider “mafiaboy” did, it would mean one dollar investment can cause the loss of \$3,326 dollars, minimum one magnitude of order¹⁰⁶ higher than a nuclear weapon system can ever cause! Considering the quotient of the Nagasaki nuclear bomb (approx. 27 dollars damage per one dollar invested the cyber-war centre should cause \$12,42billion¹⁰⁷ losses to have equal performance with a Nagasaki nuclear strike. Thus, if the centre can repeat “mafiaboy sized” attacks 8 times or only every second person in the centre can make a Sony incident size attack the centre has a stronger demolition capacity than the Nagasaki nuclear weapon.

CONCLUSION

In physical space warfare technologies, as shown in paragraph 3.1, become more and more expensive meanwhile efficiency is rising as evidenced in paragraph 2.4.

In cyberspace it is possible to reach a similar effect at lower costs as it was demonstrated in paragraph 3.4.

Conventional weapons are legal, necessary and take up minimum one hundredth (1%) of people’s economic production.

Having weapons of mass destruction is illegal and hunted, it implies huge investments and in reality they are only for deterrence.

Cyber weapons are semi legal –cheap and easy to deny possession. However, they can be as effective as or even more effective than the “old” solutions.

Considering the aforementioned facts, investment in a cyber-war capacity is cost effective and in the future governmental focus may turn to this dimension of warfare.

If rising countries wanted to develop their rules in the political theatre it would seem to be a good choice to use cyber capabilities that have the power of a nuclear weapon. Meanwhile great powers have taken a new painful whip into their hands.

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¹⁰⁶ Calculating with a Nagasaki sized bomb means two magnitude of order, in order to allow the consideration of the technology development it is assumed that a modern warhead or bomb can cause one magnitude of order higher demolition than Nagasaki bomb could cause.

¹⁰⁷ \$460 multiplied by 27 = \$12,42 billion. If the centre can cause higher loss means the cyber-war centre capacity of demolition is stronger than a Hiroshima style nuclear strike.

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Gen. (Ret.) Zoltán Szenes:

THE REFORMER – END ACCOUNTS. A SOLDIER OF THE POLITICAL REGIME CHANGE, BY GEN. (RET.) FERENC VÉGH

Last year Zrínyi Publishing House of the Ministry of Defence published General Végh's memoirs, which are – very aptly – titled “End Accounts”. The former Commander of the Hungarian Defence Forces surprised the readers with a classic memoir, in which military career was characterized as the constant change and “tours”. This message is not exaggerated, as the author studied in Moscow and in Pennsylvania, traveled in Latin America, visited China and India. Gen Végh had numerous military duties and private trips in most European countries. It is absolutely true, as he wrote in his book, that his carrier developed from “the stream to the ocean.”

The reader of the book by the former Force Commander and Chief of Defence Staff, should not expect an American memoir which unveils earlier secrets, ventilates intimacies or arises sensational stories. Neither a Russian-type memoir which we used to read, based on the dry and boring official military history archival data. The book is an amazing true story of one soldier who had become the number one soldier in Hungary at a relatively young age, later was appointed Ambassador, and as a result of an unfortunate accident which ruined his career, he was forced to continue his life in a wheel-chair. Ferenc (Francis) Végh had an American-style dream career, having become the Army's premier soldier from a working class family with the help of the military system. During his military career he had everything a man could achieve in glory: the highest military and diplomatic rank, numerous domestic and international awards, a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree and knowledge of languages (Russian, English and Turkish). In a number of points the book returns to the conviction that the roots bring you home, inherited from the parents, and the wings was the army. However, the personality of General Végh and his human greatness were demonstrated during his serious disease when he was fighting for the best, when he still had the strength and faith to begin again, to find a new meaning in life, to be useful for the military and civil society. If we were in the USA, a Hollywood movie would be made based on his life story to give examples to the people of the era from purposefulness, strength and perseverance. Ferenc Végh also draws strength from famous companions in distress: from General George Patton, who was also killed in a car accident, having suffered a spinal fracture in 1945, or from the world-famous British physicist, Stephen Hawking living in wheel-chair since his 21 years of age. With the memoir the purpose of the author was only to show the next generation his life, his work and the struggles for young people, the future of the home defence. He encourages his readers to “live a full life you want to remember for ever.”

The author had the typical military career which began in a tank regiment. He earned his Master degree in Moscow, at Malinovsky Armour War College. At that time, to study in the Soviet Union offered a serious career opportunity. After graduation he was serving in the Eastern part of Hungary, in small garrison towns (Kiskunfélegyháza, Kalocsa, Mezőtúr). At the age of 37, he was appointed the commander of a tank regiment. Ferenc Végh became well known in the Army, when he managed to make his tanks „jump” from the railway wagons at one military exercise of the former Warsaw Pact in 1985. The second time when he appeared in the media was in 1989, when his armour brigade, which was formed during the 1987 military

reform, was disbanded in the spirit of a unilateral armaments force reduction initiative. Ferenc Végő was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army Corps in Cegléd and promoted to Colonel at the age of 42. After the political regime change he was one of the lucky officers who could study in the West. He first learned English in the USA, then graduated from the US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. These two years have been decisive in his life, as he describes it in his book as “a personal military regime change.” Back home he became commander (at age 45) in Cegléd in 1993 and was promoted to Major General. He received public civil awareness when the military district was reorganized in ‘Western-style’ and his initiatives got great support from political, security and military circles. During this period, Ferenc Végő deliberately used the media to build a supporting social public environment towards the military, as he learned it in the US Army War College. Shaped his life from then on the “history”, he owes a lot - as this is mentioned several times in his book - to his mentors, late Lieutenant General Antal Annus and General János Deák. In 1994 Hungary signed the PfP program agreement and then joined the NATO peacekeeping activities. The new PfP country handed over military bases to the Alliance and provided host nation support to NATO troops. The political and military leadership was seeking a young military leader who graduated from the West and sought to be a ‘NATO-compatible’ commander. General Végő first formed the Euro - Atlantic Working Group for the Hungarian MoD and then he occupied a post of the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff. On 06 June 1996 the President of Hungary appointed him Commander and Chief of Staff which post he held for three years. As the 53th national military leader since the establishment of the Hungarian Defence Forces in 1848, he did a great job in transforming the Hungarian Military into modern, NATO-type forces. The subtitle of the book is absolutely correct because the memoir presents that military era from a historical perspective where the four-star general was serving.

Ferenc Végő was a convinced pro-reform leader with advanced knowledge which he tried enthusiastically to apply for the interest of the country and the Hungarian Military. During the Cegléd era he was dealing with border protection, crisis management and peacekeeping tasks as well as developing new capabilities (eg. Air mobile Battalion). As early as the mid 1990s he recognized that the Hungarian Army needed further modernization. The Hungarian Military, like he personally, also underwent a „trip” reform: “It’s like in shipping, when an overloaded boat arrives at a narrow canal and we have to get through it. Smaller vessels are needed. We cannot take everyone and everything with us. Sorting, selection must be made.” (p.291)

The command of the Hungarian Defence Forces gave him the opportunity to reform the military in accordance with his conviction. The force transformation, of course, was not a “personal” mission, the MoD, the Defence Staff and the government were all involved in the process, but he was very much able to get his pretty good ideas accepted. The reorganization and restructuring was not only downsizing but in the medium and long term it provides also plans to become a “dream” NATO-compatible forces as the result of the changes. During his tour the Armed Forces Command Headquarters was closed down and a western design Joint Chiefs of Staff structure was set up. General Végő was a catalyst in the development of international relations, the development of a NATO integration program. Measures were taken to introduce culture and style change in everyday life. He introduced a new leading warrant officer system and built a new NCO training system. He was in favour of the volunteer force, and able to bring four thousand contract soldiers into the Army. The positive results confirmed his activities, justified the right directions which prompted further efforts. He thought, if we were NATO members, „the army finally will receive modern weaponry, and

the tight years will be over” (p. 310.) Despite some disappointments, he made proposals to accelerate and deepen the military reform that might get more resources for the development. He realized that the political and military leadership had to choose between two options: to maintain the traditional military forces in overall capability or to start the specialization because there would be not enough financial resources to modernise the total force. “This issue will be the topic for much debate in the future” - he wrote. (p.317.) And he was right, because now the government position is still in the fluctuating cycle between these two positions. The problem can only be resolved, if the size of the defense budget proposed by NATO for the member states will reach 2% of the GDP. The number of the military personnel was cut – from 85 thousand to 60 thousand – during the second governance cycle, but the funding did not increase significantly. In 1998 Ferenc Végő already realized that the country would not be able to fund armed forces bigger than a division in the future.

However, the huge transformation caused a number of difficulties and conflicts. He realised at that time the Army was not a coherent and integrated organization: “There were two different generations with different professional cultures and contradictions arising from them” (p. 289) Therefore the General had not only supporters but there were “suspicious” people too, resisting his reform goals. As long as working in military environment he was easily able to handle the difficulties and received prestige, position and rank. But it was already too much for him when the planning and execution of the strategic review of 1999-2000 was transferred to the administrative office of the Ministry of Defence. He regarded this decision as a kind of civil dictatorship because the military-professional ideas and opinions were often disregarding or neglected. Although having learned and accepted the principle of democratic civil control over the military, in his book General Végő repeatedly emphasizes that civil leadership means taking responsibility, civil control is not equal with „civil command”. Although he was a supporter of the integrated MoD model and proposed merging the Civil Administrative Office with the Defence Staff, the efforts to eliminate the duplication between the two “sides” proved unsuccessful. The political pre-conditions for creating an integrated Ministry of Defence were just matured in 2001.

The memoir also describes why General Végő really had to leave the highest military post at the age of 51, and why he ‘emigrated’ to Turkey as did his historical predecessors like Ferenc Rákóczi, Lajos Kossuth or Lázár Mészáros. It shouldn’t have happened. After all, he felt the political confidence after the governmental change to continue the military reform. The new political power confirmed him in the post of Commander and Chief of Defence after the 1998 election, he was promoted General and received the fourth star. By the end of the election year, the Hungarian Armed Forces basically fulfilled the minimum military requirements of NATO Membership. On 12 March 1999 Hungary became a member of the Alliance. Gen Végő attended the highest domestic and foreign accession ceremonies, representing the Defence Forces. Although the Hungarian military met all international and domestic requirements during the air bombardment of Yugoslavia, he had to resign on 1st August. The staff reorganization, the elimination of the Military Hospital and other conceptual proposals were opposed and rejected by him and finally forced him to step down. In doing so, I am sure, he had in his mind the teaching of General Sullivan, the Chief of the US Army when he made his decision: “A strategic commander always knows (1) what happens (2) what does not happen, and (3) how to influence the events”. General Végő resolved the conflict situation by requesting retirement and by the decision to start a new, a diplomatic career.

Ambassador Ferenc Végő’s foreign service career ended quickly because on the 16 April 2001 he had a tragic car accident. He fought in the coming years to improve his health

conditions: surgery, rehabilitation, therapy followed each other. “Fight manfully and bear the troubles patiently” was his favourite Latin proverb password that time. Disability retirement at the age of 54 followed. However, despite his health problems he remained active, working for the Army Comrade Society. He gives lectures, writes articles for the journal of Military Technology, and advises the retired officer communities. Few people know that in 2003 - 2004 he was a military expert on The Hague Tribunal (ICTY) trial of Milosevic.

I recommend this book to friends, comrades, relatives, soldiers, diplomats, and to all those who are interested in defence issues. The book is not only a memoir but also a historical document. The work will be useful both for officials and military but it can also serve as an important source for researchers. The purpose of the book can be described with the following piece of poetry: “Once you die, this book will preach. Wholeheartedly in love with me the joy and the song, let us see the future, let me tell the song was how dear to me in this jolly world of the living” (Anna de Noailles, French poet)

Végh Ferenc: Vég(h)elszámolás. A korszakváltás katonája. Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 2014.

Col. János Besenyő:

WINNING WARS AMONGST THE PEOPLE: CASE STUDIES IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

About a book by Péter A. Kiss

It is not an easy task to review a close associate's scientific publication: there is always some latent suspicion that the personal relationship – whether good or bad – between author and reviewer overwrote the objectivity of the latter. Therefore I was a bit hesitant when I was asked to write a review of *“Winning Wars amongst the People.”* I have known Dr. Kiss for several years: we started our doctoral studies in the same class (although concentrated on different subjects), and over the years we cooperated in several projects. Based on that experience I subsequently invited him to work in my department as a research fellow. Let the reader decide, whether this review is biased in any way.

The book is based on the author's contention that Western professional literature on asymmetric warfare has a serious gap: it does not address with adequate thoroughness the subject of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the domestic context. Current academic analysis, as well as most publicly accessible doctrinal publications and international and national security documents generally treat the question of asymmetric warfare either as the fight against terrorism or as expeditionary operations in the third world. This focus is entirely rational as it reflects recent European and American experience. However, it shunts aside the possibility that in the near future the governments in the European Union's core areas may also face asymmetric challenges from their own citizens.

The author argues that should that possibility become a reality, the Western experience in expeditionary operations will mostly be irrelevant. In Asia and Africa the expeditionary forces exercise control over foreign populations in foreign lands; they are not subject to the constraints of local laws, and their rules of engagement (ROE) allow them wide latitude in the use of deadly force and other coercive measures. Deploying military forces in national territory is a fundamentally different proposition: the troops face fellow citizens – frequently their own friends and brothers, and their actions are governed not by a permissive ROE but by the national constitutional framework. Consequently, the security forces must apply counterinsurgency measures that are fundamentally different from those they learned and practiced in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. By emphasizing the special circumstances of an asymmetric challenge in domestic context, the book seeks to discover those principles that would allow a Western nation to meet the challenge without outside assistance or interference and at the same time remain within the boundaries of laws and ethics, protect the nation's culture, observe its values, and retain its liberties, traditions, and way of life.

Part One (the first three chapters) lays the foundations for understanding asymmetric warfare. It puts to rest the simplistic idea that a disparity in strength of the belligerents equals 'asymmetry,' and, conversely, that 'symmetry' equals 'parity.' Asymmetry, according to Kiss, consists of several elements, the most important of which is a difference in the status of the belligerents: one is an internationally recognized state, the other is a non-state actor. Disparity in strength does play a crucial role: the belligerents' resources, strengths and

weaknesses are so different as to be incommensurable. Partly (but only partly) as a result of this disparity in strength the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the belligerents cannot be compared: the non-state actor operates below the threshold of the utility of the state's forces and employs some measures (e.g., street politics, riots, litigation) that are generally not considered as part of warfare. Another element is the international community's view of the belligerents: the non-state actor tends to be viewed with sympathy: he is the underdog, the romantic rebel, "Che" Guevara gazing into the future, Robin Hood robbing the rich to give to the poor. Part One also outlines the historical background and provides an explanation (in essence, the social and economic circumstances of the modern, industrial state) for the dominant role of asymmetric warfare in today's conflicts.

The case study is an excellent way to analyze and understand warfare, and the author makes full use of it in Part Two. The four conflicts (the Rhodesian Bush War, the Khalistan insurgency in the Punjab, Kosovo's struggle to shake off Serb domination, and French intifada) satisfy the fundamental criteria for case studies. They cover a broad spectrum of asymmetric conflicts on three continents, from classic rural guerrilla war to massive and widespread urban unrest (maximum variation). There is a wealth of accurate and easily accessible information on all of them, and an analysis of the measures applied by the various security forces offers a clear picture of the principles of counterinsurgency (information-oriented selection). The conditions, events and the measures applied by the belligerents offer meaningful lessons to European security specialists (paradigmatic case selection).

In order to compare conflicts that took place in very different circumstances, in widely separated locations and in different times (and also to impose a certain amount of discipline on his own imagination and curiosity), the author has created an analytical framework.

Analysis begins with a very short *background to the conflict*, which introduces the conditions and events that brought on the conflict in the first place.

The *space, forces, time and information factors* (the fundamental elements of strategic and operational planning) follow. Since fourth generation conflicts are "wars amongst the people," the author introduces the concepts of *social space* (the ethnic, demographic, economic, political conditions) and *international space* (the shifts in international public opinion and the actions of the powers able to influence, or intervene in, the conflict). These are assigned as much importance as the military-geographic characteristics of the *physical space*. The asymmetry between the belligerents makes a comparison of *forces* difficult, nevertheless the author makes an attempt – with rather useful, and occasionally startling, results. Since the cases describe past events, the factor of *time* appears only as opportunity lost, or as a resource exploited at the most appropriate moment. *Information* – effective intelligence and security – is the life-blood of fourth generation conflicts, and is given special consideration.

Understanding the principles of *command and control* (C^2) of the belligerents is fundamental to studying any asymmetric conflict. The integration of military and police operations with the administrative and judicial functions of the state often leads to significant distortions in the hierarchical organizational structure of the security forces. The C^2 of the non-state belligerent (or belligerents) may be unknown, or it may be known, but impossible to understand. Nevertheless, we must try to understand it, in order to understand how his operations were planned, initiated and controlled.

In today's fourth generation conflicts *strategic communication* plays a particularly important role: the conflict is a violently competitive theatre, in which the belligerents play for the support of domestic and international public opinion. Combat operations are media events: it is not enough to carry them out successfully – they also have to be successfully

and convincingly communicated to the world. The case studies compare the belligerents' communications and their success or failure.

The *legal environment* of an asymmetric conflict often shows a dual character: national laws generally apply, but the generally accepted rules of international conflict may also be applicable to a limited extent. The author examines whether the affected state insists on maintaining the peacetime legal framework, or adopts special legislation. It is also important to know how closely law reflects reality: to what extent do the laws and the justice system assist or hinder the security forces, and to what extent they limit or guarantee the citizens' constitutional rights.

A brief sketch of the *sequence of events* describes the development of the conflict from its root causes to its final outcome.

The *doctrines* and procedures of the belligerents provide an insight into the measures the state and the non-state actors deploy to realize their goals. An armed conflict – whether between nation states or within a nation state – is a political struggle. The goal of combat operations is not combat operations themselves, but to create more favourable conditions for an eventual settlement. Therefore, each case study closes with a few paragraphs on the conflict's *political resolution* and its aftereffects.

This analytic framework is consistently applied not only to the conflicts that the author selected for detailed study, but also serves as the basis for Part Three, in which the author presents his conclusions and recommendations. In many ways the conclusions are conservative: they reinforce a number of counterinsurgency lessons from the recent (and some from the distant) past. The importance of intelligence, the need to integrate military, administrative, judicial and economic measures, the employment of local militias, the advisability to exercise restraint in the application of force – these are some of the uncontroversial conclusions. There are, however, some far more interesting elements as well, that deserve further study and research. One such is the author's analysis of the interplay between the physical space, the social space, and the relative strength of the belligerents. Another – perhaps the most important – such conclusion is the author's contention that a government faced with an asymmetric challenge should do everything in its power to avoid the interference of international actors (both governments and non-governmental organizations). Even assistance offered with the best intentions by a close ally can be detrimental to a national government, because the values, goals and interests of the host nation and the one providing assistance rarely coincide.

The last chapter puts into practical perspective the material of the previous eight chapters. It is yet another case study – but this time it is a look into the future, rather than the past. The analytical framework is deployed again to lay out a blueprint for preparing national forces, as well as the nation, to meeting an asymmetric challenge. The author selected Hungary – perhaps not altogether wisely since he works for a Hungarian government institution – as the subject for this last case study.

I found the author's arguments and conclusions convincing, yet I missed a few things. First of all, in a book published in 2014 the internet and social media as a means of strategic communication, source of intelligence and tool of command and control should have quite prominent treatment. The author himself, to his credit, acknowledges that this is one of the book's shortcomings. Second, I accept the author's contention that there is a great deal of difference between counterinsurgency in expeditionary operations and counterinsurgency in the homeland. The author offers this distinction as a self-evident truth that needs no further explanations or elaboration. I feel that it should have been supported by a more thorough analysis and some recent examples, rather than presented as an *ex cathedra* declaration. (The

author's position, however, is supported by current US or British doctrine: in their own way they both make the same distinction.)

Altogether I found the book well written, easy to read and convincing. It has received some praise from military professionals. One of the modern theorists of asymmetric warfare (William S. Lind) endorsed it as recommended reading for anyone in the business of preserving the security of the state.

Winning Wars amongst the People: Case Studies in Asymmetric Conflict. By Peter A. Kiss, Potomac Books, Dulles, 2014. ISBN 978-1-61234-700-4, 289.

Bálint Somkuti:

SOMALIA: A COUNTRY STUDY

About a new book published by the Defence Staff, Scientific Research Centre

Writing book reviews is not an easy task when the subject of the book is something obscurely distant, a faraway place or rare phenomenon. Describing places, people, items in a couple of words, of which dozens of pages are spent in the subject, turning the readers' attention to lesser known issues is a tough job. Writing a book review about something everyone knows or thinks to know about is even more challenging. Somalia is such a topic. Be it popular movies like *Black Hawk Down* or *Captain Philips* even daily news from major news channels about anti-piracy activities, Somalia is a place about which most people know something. And as it is usual in case of common knowledge most information is either partially or completely false. Another aspect of the challenge is to write about one's own work, since the author of the present work was one of the lecturers of the above study.

As the back cover text says Somalia was once the prototype of a failed country. Even the term was coined by an Italian trained Somalian ex-colonial bureaucrat. In 2010 the authors (Col. Istvan Resperger, then Lt.Col. Janos Besenyő, and Almos Peter Kiss) have written the first ever country study in Hungarian about Somalia, therefore they can be considered experts in this area. The second edition, another excellent work by the HDF Defence Staff, Scientific Research Centre, not only improves on the first edition but also presents the recent events in the country.

188 pages promise a detailed introduction and the study, like its first edition, fulfils these expectations. As the seventh and the first reissued volumes of country studies mostly published by the recently formed HDF Defence Staff, Scientific Research Centre, the volume also follows the pattern set by its predecessors. Chapters dealing with geography, society and economy of Somalia form the structure of the study. Geographical, demographical particularities of the country are introduced in great detail.

The roughly ten-page-long geographical description of Somalia seems short at first glance, especially compared to the complete length of the study, yet no crucial information is missing from those pages. The now usual subject country centric map, which helps to immerse the reader in the vicinity and distances of Somalia, is spot on as the first introduced map. Among relief, and hydrogeology specific details essential is also to be found in the first chapter like general terrain passability information.

The social situation is abysmal in Somalia even if taking into account the improvements of recent years. Suffice it is to say the last census was held a complete, full and amazing 40, yes forty, years ago in 1975. Any statistician can take even those almost two generation old results with a big spoon full of salt, yet ever since there has been no official capable and willing to undertake on the most important statistical survey of a land. Continuous violence, famine, migration and interfighting among clans have inflicted serious civilian losses whose magnitude can only be guessed. Among such literally crucial information, clans and the local habit of a „xeer” gems are to be found like a detailed description of the famous oriental

hawala system, which is the cornerstone of the local economy and the hotbed of uncontrollable finance of the above armed groups. Another important aspect of the inhabitants' life, namely religion, is also thoroughly detailed.

Naturally, the history of the biggest country in the Horn of Africa cannot be left out. Starting from the beginning of written history through the colonial age and finally the liberation from colonial rule is discussed in required detail. As a „natural” consequence disputes caused and/or left open by colonial rule have led to a number of armed conflicts and wars, most important of which, The Ogaden War, is presented in depth. The disastrous adventure has led to the fall of the country's strong man Siyaad Barre. In my opinion – and I hope the readers forgive a historian its bias – the best part of the study is the detailed description of the following chaos, the rise and fall of the Islamic courts' and the quasi stabilization of Somalia. It is another additional advantage of the book that it presents the public administration, and the jurisdiction in their respective historical context providing the reader with invaluable local knowledge, which can be and is crucial in crisis situations.

The chapter titled “Armed forces, militias, terrorists, and pirates” contains information about the various armed factions and significant international forces operating in the area. From the UN mandated AMISON military AND, very importantly, civilian component, to the Somali National Army, the still powerful armed groups, private armies, and Islamic movements' armed wings are all discussed. The infamous Somali pirates and recent antipiracy efforts are presented at the end of the chapter.

And last but not least in the final chapter the economy of this trouble country is discussed in great detail. These pages are another favourite of the author of the present review. Information, which seems nuisances but on the other hand in certain situations means life or death for the locals, is also listed. Economic parameters such as energy supply, traffic tap water supply, and water purification are also given along with such practical information (hats off for the authors!) as three letter IATA codes for major airports or contact information for Mogadishu port authority. The above may seem as trivial, but on the spot where internet availability can be non-existent these are vital pieces of information.

The excellent chronological events spreadsheet at the end of the study and the abundant list of resources also provide much needed guidance in the information-rich book, summing up the efforts of the international community in the last 4 years, which finally seem to bear fruit and show signs of visible improvements. The short but informative chapter describing EU (and Hungarian) – Somali relations helps to understand the role Europe plays in the life Somalia.

It seems almost superfluous to point at the excellent 8-page-long index, although the author of this review has seen major publications with incomplete or even completely missing indices. Everyday users and scholars alike are spared from spending countless minutes from browsing through the pages looking up the needed information. Alas as always the devil is in the details and a thorough eye can find minor mistakes. Somewhere around pages 30-40 a page, a map, or a paragraph has been inserted probably at the final moment, or even after it and this insertion has shifted most indexed words a page further than shown in the index. In most cases this is a minor error and not a really disturbing one.

To sum up, the second edition of the Somalia country study provides an excellent overview of the biggest country in the Horn of Africa. Its subject is not only timely, since Hungarian soldiers also participate in the UN missions, but also a proof that concentrated and well-funded projects can and will have maximum results.

Kiss Álmos Péter – Besenyő János – Resperger István: Országismertető –Szomália. 2., bővített kiadás. Honvéd Vezérkar Tudományos Osztály, 2014.

András Kocsor:

ABOUT THE BOOK „AFRICAN TERRORIST AND SECESSIONIST ORGANIZATIONS”


To write a review of a book such as this is not an easy task. Still, in truth it must be admitted that we are in a much easier position than the authors of the aforementioned work, who undertook no small task. This is not just a brief report on present-day Africa. Its intent is to give a comprehensive picture, and to cover every aspect of the situation in the black continent. It accomplishes these goals by examining the relations between different terrorist organizations, the geopolitical and local political environments and – sometimes – other ideologies. No doubt, we have a reference book in our hands that contains analysis too, so we get our money’s worth.

The work itself is made up of 22 articles. It starts with discussing Egypt in detail, then in a very logical order it goes on to describe Libya, Tunisia and Morocco in the west, only to continue with the countries of the Sahel region and finally the armed organizations of Central Africa.

Even the title itself – which might not be immensely inviting at first read – has a simple but very interesting aspect: terrorism is not a recent, developing phenomenon. It is an existing, well-established entity, which is very much present, deserves investigation and demands attention to itself.

The book’s approach to terrorism, however, is even more fascinating. It treats terrorism as a whole, but examines its actors in their own context – avoiding a holistic approach – so it focuses on the analysis of individual characteristics rather than relying too heavily on common features.

The first three articles – which form the introductory part of the book – make this point clear immediately. They look at the evolution of the most significant organizations operating in Egypt, meanwhile pointing out the main characteristics of these groups. The authors are doing a superb job in breaking down the differences and similarities, and at the same time, they manage to avoid getting lost in the labyrinths of overanalyzing historical explanations. Instead, we see how those available resources or the closeness and quality of connections between these groups effect activity and even determine primary targets. If somebody can successfully finance his own actions by committing various crimes, and enjoys good relations with larger organizations – thus bringing forth some support – it allows the group to strike considerably larger blows on its chosen enemies (rocket attacks from the Sinai Peninsula, or even attempted assassinations against powerful Western politicians), but if these are not available, the huge risk factors and extremely high costs no longer allow it to carry out an ambitious course of action. These terrorists are forced to settle for Western tourists, or small attacks against “the servants of the criminal system” that – in their hopes – would



lead to the disruption of public order in the region they want to overcome. However, this is not necessarily a failed strategy, because in a number of countries, for example in Tunisia, tourism is the most important source of income. There are divisions that prefer to attack domestic targets through car bombs and suicide bombers. They reject all patriotic feelings and ideas in favor of restoring the pan-Arabic Caliphate, while other groups, nationalistic in nature, e.g. in Algeria, do not feel the need for using heavy weapons in their own countries.

We learn about the much discussed concept of the so-called “Islamic Caliphate” and its historical background. By the time we reach Gömöri Roland’s article that describes Africa’s oldest Islamist political clustering, we have an overall picture of the organizational structure of such groups and the delicate relationship between each other or the government in power. Through this, we can instantly understand the goals and methods of the long-existing Muslim Brotherhood in light of the world surrounding it, and especially the attitudes of governments towards it.

The authors show us that operability is unimaginable without the experienced veterans of international jihad, a large variety of specified methods, effective and fanatical executive staff and necessary financial funding. However, these are worth nothing if there is nothing that can “take the role of a compelling enemy” and directly or indirectly provide satisfying targets for terrorism to choose from. These targets may vary in each region. In Egypt, for example, they range widely. But at the same time, other active organizations – which just recently managed to gain a foothold in their countries thanks to the political upheavals of the recent past – are forced to focus their attacks solely against the government’s police forces, and often, the oversaturated army.

In Black Africa, however, these groups clearly took actions against their country’s status quo. Therefore we often find prominent members of the opposition among their supporters. For example, some Nigerian generals stripped of authority willingly support terrorists on their way to replace the Christian leadership.

We also find that leaving Egypt, it becomes more and more difficult to identify a group with a definite membership or elaborate ideology. These groups behave differently in North African countries, since extreme jihadism could not grow strong enough before the events of 2011. These include countries like Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya or Zin el-Abidin Ben Ali’s system in Tunisia.

The chaos following the Arab Spring was quickly exploited by extremist groups, which had no time to organize themselves around specific ideas, and for this reason members are constantly exchanged between them and their structure is reorganized over and over again. This is their biggest weakness, but perhaps also their greatest strength. Although – particularly in Libya – the population does not sympathize widely with radical Islam, its loose conception gives a certain flexibility to these organizations which allows them to continually replace the fallen or deserted, and makes it almost impossible for the authorities to get a grip on them. For this reason, you can find sympathizers almost anywhere who are willing to provide safe shelter for those fleeing from law enforcement. The article written by János Besenyő and Zoltán Prantner about the Ansar as-Saria provides a deep insight into these elements. Of course, in many countries the strong international assistance and gritty governmental actions have successfully suppressed terrorism. But in other places, such as Algeria, the tense relationships with neighbors and the tremendous economic dependence on Western powers result in the opposite.

This book and its writers give us more than satisfying examples of all of the above, and all of them reach their goal. We can see how Nigerian resources fell into foreign hands, by

the fault of the dictatorial leadership. It nicely leads us through every step of these kinds of processes: how some people took advantage of the impoverished, and how terror groups were organized alongside ethnic divides and tensions.

Every author portrays all the processes clearly in a unified style, but each with his/her own priorities in mind – in his investigation, Ádám Mayer focuses on the social basis and opportunities provided by the surroundings of the groups he discusses, while Béla Tamási and Viktor Marsai ponder about Europe's and more importantly Hungary's vulnerability. Although the focus is on different points, the book as a whole is very readable, thanks to its simple language and carefully constructed logic. The reader does not feel lectured, but can also see that there is more than a crash course in the papers.

It is an essential and important feature of the book that every small topic is filled with a huge amount of exact data and information – i.e. names, dates, figures, technicalities – Fortunately, the authors make sure that they are easy to understand and their readers do not get lost as they are given specific examples and events.

The bibliography in most cases is very mature and impressively wide-ranging, the volume finds the right balance between the need for explanations and accurate indication of the sources. This might seem as a quite weightless sentence, but this book satisfies an enormous need in the Hungarian palette. Nothing proves this better than the torturing lack of Hungarian authors in the bibliography. This was undoubtedly noted by our authors and perhaps this is the reason for the precise, detailed and reader-friendly structure of their book.

To understand the political, security, economic or ethnic situation of today's Africa is a very difficult and complicated task. The book "African terrorist and secessionist organizations" provides excellent help with it. Anyone who is interested in this topic will find an excellent foundation in this volume.

The authors: Zoltán Prantner, János Tomolya, Roland Gömöri, Viktor Marsai, János Besenyő (alongside Prantner), Éva Ladányi and dr. István Kobolka, Béla Tamási, Gábor Búr, Szilveszter Póczik, Dávid Vogel, Dóra Molnár, Éva Remek, Noémi Ritter, György Suha and Gergely Tóth, Ádám Mayer; Tamás Bálint and Mariann Zsifkó, Péter Marton and Veronica Waeni Nzioki, Álmos Péter Kiss, Mariann Vecsey, Zoltán Vörös, Sándor Nagy, Attila T. Horváth.

African Terrorist and Secessionist Organizations. Honvéd Vezérkar Tudományos Kutatóhely, MH Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság (MH ÖHP), MH Geoinformációs Szolgálat (MH GEOSZ), 2015.

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Károly Zentai is serving as an instructor at the Military Sciences and Officer Training Faculty of the National University of Public Service. He has a post-graduate master degree diploma in the field of military leadership. As a Ph.D student at the Doctoral School of Military Sciences of the National University of Public Service, he is currently conducting researches about the deployment of precision man-portable supporting weapons.

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Lt. Col. Győző Csanádi is a senior officer in the Hungarian MoD/General Staff CIS Branch. He has three Bachelor's Degrees and graduated obtaining a master's degree in Management of Information Systems in 2002. Firstly he served in various field artillery officer commander positions from 1988 until 1997. After acquiring a special degree in Information Technology, he joined the Air Force and continued his work as Radar and Air C2 Information Technologies field-engineer and held other positions until 2007. From 2007 to present he has served as staff officer dealing with the co-ordination of mainly Air-Force C2 systems development planning and administrative issues. He was the National Representative of NATO CIS software workgroups, and also fulfilled the position of CIS Chief in EUFOR HQ, Bosnia and Herzegovina. After a four-year NATO position in a Corps level NATO HQ, he continued his service in Hungarian MoD/GS.

He frequently publishes scientific articles. His special interests are information technology and information management issues. Since he has a vast experience of various Information Systems management (e.g. NovellNetWare, OpenVMS and UNIX systems) and he is also a programmer, he has a broad and quite detailed view of the military applications in use.

Gen. (Ret.) Prof. Zoltán Szenes

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Gen. (Ret.) Prof. Zoltán Szenes is the Head of the Department for International Security Studies at the National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary. He is a retired General, former Chief of the Hungarian Defence Forces (2003–2005). He holds MSc from the Defence College of Logistics and Transportation (Sankt Petersburg, Russia) and the Budapest University of Economic Science and PhD from the National Defence University, Budapest. His areas of expertise include Security and Defence Studies, NATO, EU Common Security and Defence Policy. He teaches Security Studies, NATO Studies, Comparative International Defence Policy and the Hungarian Defence Policy at BA, MA and PhD level. Gen. Szenes was a Chair of the Committee for the Military Sciences at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (2008–2014). He has been an Adjunct Professor at the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia and lecturing very often in NATO and PfP Countries. His publications deal with the Hungarian Defence Policy, NATO, EU CSDP and peace support operations. He is a member of several Scientific and Non-governmental Organizations, including the Hungarian Association of Military Science.

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János Besenyő is a Colonel in the Training and Doctrinal Centre of the Hungarian Defence Forces. He has a MA in Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University (Defence Administration

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Bálint Somkuti is a military historian. He has an MA in History from the Karoli Gaspar University of the Reformed Church, a postgraduate diploma in International Sales and Purchasing from Budapest Business High School, and a PhD in Military Sciences from the National University of Public Service, Budapest. He is currently teaching at the same university in the area of unconventional/irregular warfare, terrorism and grand strategy on both the Anti-terrorist Faculty and the Staff Course. He works currently for the Hungarian Ministry of Defence Armament Development Department. Between 2013–2014 he was the president of the Hungarian Reservist Organization. Balint Somkuti participates habitually in national and international seminars and regularly publishes articles in journals on the subject of security, terrorism and interest advancement.

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András Kocsor graduated with a degree in history from the University of Szeged, Faculty of Arts in 2014. His field of research is the modern history of Africa, especially the eastern region, the relations of the countries with each other and with the former colonial powers. He wrote his thesis on the subject on the Nigerian civil war and its effects on the diplomacy between Great Britain and France, the actions and attitudes towards the fighting sides.

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
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
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


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
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
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