

JHSR

Hungarian Studies Review

Hungary in Transition,
1918–1920

Co-edited by

Árpád von Klimó and Steven Jobbitt

Hungarian Studies Review

Sponsors

Hungarian Studies Association of Canada
Hungarian Studies Association (USA)

Volumes 46–47 (2019–2020)

Founding Editor
Nándor F. Dreisziger (*emeritus, Royal Military College of Canada*)

Co-Editors

Árpád von Klimó (*The Catholic University of America*) and Steven Jobbitt
(*Lakehead University*)

Associate Editors

Emily Gioielli (*Pasts, Inc. Center for Historical Studies, Central European University*) and Leslie Waters (*The University of Texas at El Paso*)

Book Review and Technical Editor

Richard S. Esbenshade (*University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign*)

Editorial Advisers

Oliver A.I. Botar (*University of Manitoba*)
Katalin Fabian (*Lafayette College*)
Géza Jeszenszky (*emeritus, Corvinus University*)
Thomas Sakmyster (*emeritus, University of Cincinnati*)
Agatha Schwartz (*University of Ottawa*)
Judith Szapor (*McGill University*)

All correspondence should be directed to our Managing Editor Steven Jobbitt,
c/o Department of History, Lakehead University, 955 Oliver Road, Thunder Bay,
Ontario, Canada, P7B 5E1. Email: sjobbitt@lakeheadu.ca

Copyright (2020) the Hungarian Studies Review

ISSN: 0713-8083
E-ISSN: 1705-8422

Opinions expressed in the journal are those of the individual authors and may not reflect the views of the journal's editors or editorial advisers.

In This Volume

Co-editors Steven Jobbitt and Árpád von Klimó look into the long history of *Hungarian Studies Review*, and shine a light on the achievements and legacy of our journal's founding editor, Nándor F. Dreisziger.

Ibolya Murber analyzes the processes of democratization in Austria and Hungary in the wake of World War I.

Judith Szapor, Béla Bodó, Boldizsár Vörös, Éva Forgács, Árpád von Klimó, and Steven Jobbitt reflect on the memory and legacy of 1919 in Hungary.

Leslie Waters presents some images related to the Republic of Councils in 1919, and provides a glimpse into the treasures to be found in Fortepan's online photo archive.

Balázs Ablonczy reports on the work of the "Trianon 100" Research Group, a project funded by the Momentum [*Lendület*] Program of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

László Borhi and Ferenc Laczó discuss the diplomatic and moral dimensions of the German invasion of Hungary in 1944.

Plus book reviews by

Árpád von Klimó, Paul Miller-Melamed, Steven Jobbitt, Alexander Vari, Richard S. Esbenshade, Leslie Waters, and Annina Gagyiova

A Note from the Editors

In fall 2018, after forty-five years of tireless service to *Hungarian Studies Review*, Nándor F. Dreisziger retired as editor of our journal. Attempting to fill his shoes has proven to be a humbling, though exciting, project, one that has been made all the more challenging by the global pandemic that struck in spring 2020, and by the growing uncertainty around the future of the humanities and social sciences within the academy, and in society more generally. Beyond working to assemble this present transitional issue under sometimes trying conditions, one of our main tasks—and challenges—since assuming the editorship of *HSR* was to find a university press we could partner with in order to ensure that the journal would remain viable and sustainable for years to come. After following up on a few promising leads, our editorial team decided unanimously on Pennsylvania State University Press, and we are glad we did. Though our contract with them does not officially start until January 2021, PSU Press has already demonstrated a clear commitment to *HSR*, and we are very much looking forward to our partnership with them.

For almost five decades, *HSR* has been a non-partisan, independent academic journal that has published high-quality articles, book reviews, and special issues on a wide variety of topics and themes. As editors, we remain devoted to the journal's scholarly traditions, and are especially committed to its interdisciplinary approach. We also believe firmly that a journal dedicated to Hungarian studies is as important now as ever. In the last few decades, the situation of Hungary, a democratic country since 1989, and a member of NATO and the European Union, has changed profoundly. So have the lives of Hungarians and communities of Hungarian descent in the region, and around the world. But the mission of the *Hungarian Studies Review* remains the same: to raise interest in and support the pursuit of Hungarian studies. Working in close cooperation with both the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada and the US-based Hungarian Studies Association,

HSR will continue to solicit original scholarship and facilitate provocative dialogue. As editors, we especially welcome new perspectives and critical, innovative approaches to a wide range of social, political, cultural, historical, and transnational topics related to Hungary and the region formerly encompassed by the Habsburg Empire, as well as the global Hungarian diaspora.

This current issue has been a true team effort, and we could not have achieved what we have without the encouragement of our editorial advisers and other scholars in the field, or without the support of our two sponsoring associations. We also would have been lost entirely without the commitment, counsel, and contributions of our associate editors, Emily Gioielli and Leslie Waters, or without the diligent work of Richard S. Esbenschade, our book review editor and eagle-eyed technical editor. This team made our transitional issue possible, and will provide solid editorial leadership as we move forward. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to our founding editor, Nándor. We appreciate the faith you have put in us, and can only hope you are satisfied with what we have produced here. We promise to keep your project alive, and to help nurture it into the future.

Steven Jobbitt and Árpád von Klimó

Contents

Editorial

- HSR*: A History of New Beginnings and a Tribute to Founding Editor
Nándor F. Dreisziger
STEVEN JOBBITT AND ÁRPÁD VON KLIMÓ 1

Hungary in Transition, 1918–1920

Article

- Conditions of Democracy in German Austria and Hungary, 1918–1919
IBOLYA MURBER. 9

Forum: The Memory and Legacy of 1919 in Hungary

Organized and edited by Judith Szapor

Introduction

- JUDITH SZAPOR 36

The Legacy of the 1918–1919 Revolutions: A Hundred Years On, Still Contested

- JUDITH SZAPOR 38

Violence Glorified or Denied? Collective Memory of the Red and White Terrors in Hungary, 1919–Present

- BÉLA BODÓ 44

Utopias in the Hungarian Republic of Councils

- BOLDIZSÁR VÖRÖS 55

Notes on the Centenary of the 1919 Hungarian Republic of Councils

- ÉVA FORGÁCS 59

(Contents continued)

Reflections on the 1919 Republic of Councils
ÁRPÁD VON KLIMÓ 62

The Significance and Legacy of 1918–1919
STEVEN JOBBITT 66

Photo Essay

Images of 1919: A Short Photo Essay
LESLIE WATERS. 72

Research Report

After One Hundred Years: The “Trianon 100” Research Group of the
Momentum Program of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
BALÁZS ABLONCZY. 75

For Discussion: The German Invasion of Hungary in 1944

The Allies, Secret Peace Talks, and the German Invasion
of Hungary, 1943–1944
LÁSZLÓ BORHI 89

An Attempt to Moralize Realpolitik: Reflections on
László Borhi’s Article
FERENC LACZÓ. 101

Book Reviews

Paul Robert Magocsi. *Historical Atlas of Central Europe*. Third
revised and expanded edition. Toronto, Buffalo, and London:
University of Toronto Press, 2018.
Reviewed by Árpád Von Klimó. 107

Norman Stone. *Hungary: A Short History*. London:
Profile Books, 2019.
Reviewed by Árpád von Klimó. 109

(Contents continued)

John Zametica. <i>Folly and Malice: The Habsburg Empire, the Balkans and the Start of World War One</i> . London: Shephard-Walwyn, 2017. Reviewed by Paul Miller-Melamed.	112
Borislav Chernev. <i>Twilight of Empire: The Brest-Litovsk Conference and the Remaking of East-Central Europe, 1917–1918</i> . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017. Reviewed by Steven Jobbitt	116
Zsolt Nagy, <i>Great Expectations and Interwar Realities: Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy, 1918-1941</i> . Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2017. Reviewed by Alexander Vari.	120
David Frey. <i>Jews, Nazis, and the Cinema of Hungary: The Tragedy of Success, 1929–44</i> . London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2018. Reviewed by Richard S. Esbenshade.	124
Árpád von Klimó. <i>Remembering Cold Days: The 1942 Massacre of Novi Sad, Hungarian Politics and Society, 1942–1989</i> . Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018. Reviewed by Leslie Waters.	129
Zsuzsa Gille. <i>Paprika, Foie Gras, and Red Mud. The Politics of Materiality in the European Union</i> . Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016. Reviewed by Annina Gagyiova.	132
Our Contributors	136

***HSR*: A History of New Beginnings and a Tribute to Founding Editor Nándor F. Dreisziger**

Steven Jobbitt and Árpád von Klimó

The publication of this combined 2019–20 issue marks the beginning of a new chapter for *Hungarian Studies Review* (*HSR*). Founded in 1974 as the *Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies* (*CARHS*), the journal has had its share of challenges and triumphs over the last five decades, and not a few “new beginnings” along the way. What makes this particular new beginning markedly different, however, is that for the first time in its history, *HSR* will be moving forward without Nándor F. Dreisziger at its helm. To say that *HSR* has been a lifelong labour of love for Nándor would be an understatement. Recruited by the journal’s co-founder, Ferenc Harcsár, in the early 1970s, Nándor has been the heart and soul of *HSR* from the outset, and can be credited not only for the journal’s many successes, but also its longevity. Nándor helped steer the journal to new heights in the 1980s, when *HSR* became attached to the newly-founded Hungarian Chair at the University of Toronto, and was key to finding new and often innovative ways to continue publishing the journal after support from the University of Toronto diminished in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From the traditional typesetting of the 1970s, to the advent of desktop editing in the 1990s, to the current digital age, Nándor did more than simply roll with the punches over the years. He adapted the journal in response to often abrupt financial, political, and technological changes, and built a solid foundation for a future generation of editors to build upon. It is an impressive achievement, and as the new editors of *HSR*, we hope we can live up to—and continue—the legacy that Nándor has left to us.

Nándor’s story as editor is in many ways remarkable. Few editors of academic journals can say they have served in the position for forty-five years, and even fewer have been bold enough to assume their editorial duties at the very beginning of their careers. But this is precisely what Nándor did, though as he noted in an email interview in

October 2019, his role as editor of *HSR* was not something he had ever dreamed would be permanent, let alone career-defining. As Nándor told us, he was first approached by the Hungarian-Canadian émigré leader Harcsár at the beginning of the 1970s.¹ Harcsár had read a prize-winning essay that Nándor had written as a graduate student at the University of Toronto, and felt that the up-and-coming scholar would make a fine editor for the serious academic journal he envisioned. Though Nándor had only just started his career as Assistant Professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario, he agreed to accept the editorial position, albeit not without some understandable hesitation. Reflecting on his early interaction with Harcsár, Nándor wrote, “When Harcsar asked me to become the editor I recall telling him that I would edit the journal until he found an experienced editor. He never did.”² Given Nándor’s dedication to *HSR* and his tireless work for the journal, it is perhaps fortunate that Harcsár was unable to find someone to replace him as promised.

As co-founder of *CARHS*, Nándor worked closely with Harcsár, whose Ottawa-based organization, the Hungarian Readers’ Service, was the original publisher of the journal. Harcsár’s death in 1979 posed a significant challenge for the new journal. As Nándor indicated, the journal had close to five hundred subscribers by the end of the 1970s. Most of these were Harcsár’s friends, however, and according to Nándor, this early support for the journal gradually evaporated after Harcsár died.³ Declining subscriptions were not the only challenge. Reflecting on the first few years of the journal’s existence in its original incarnation as *CARHS*, Nándor recalled how difficult it was to attract the attention of senior scholars in the field. Most of his early letters to leading Hungarianists in the diaspora went “unanswered,” and even the most prolific scholars working in Hungarian studies in North America declined to submit their work, or else promised to do so, but never delivered on that promise. Though the circle of contributors “expanded slowly,” and though some scholars like Stephen Béla Várdy became regular contributors, according to Nándor, the journal’s early reception in Canada and the United States “might best be described as mixed.”⁴

At the beginning of the 1980s the journal received a new lease on life when it found a home at the University of Toronto, where it was supported by funding from the university, and by the newly-created Hungarian Chair. Relaunched as *Hungarian Studies Review* in 1981,⁵ the journal flourished throughout the 1980s, publishing two issues a year⁶ with the University of Toronto Press under the joint editorial

leadership of Nándor and George Bisztray, Hungarian Chair and co-editor of the journal from 1981 to 2003. With the journal's editorial office under the umbrella of the Hungarian Chair, *HSR* was able to assemble a small but impressive editorial team, and at the beginning of the 1980s could list no fewer than twenty-five scholars and community members on its editorial advisory board. Moreover, in addition to the two co-editors, Michael F. Böröczki, who was based in Ottawa with the Hungarian Readers' Service, continued to serve as Executive Manager from 1981 to 1983, while between 1981 and 1985 Susan M. Papp served as Assistant Editor, a position that was paid for by the Hungarian Chair.⁷

The results of *HSR*'s transition to the University of Toronto and its press were substantial, and did not go unnoticed within scholarly communities on both sides of the Atlantic. According to Nándor, *HSR* was surprisingly well received "in some circles in Communist Hungary," for example.⁸ The journal even attracted the attention of Hungary's National Széchényi Library, which would prove to be vital to *HSR*'s survival in the 1990s and early 2000s. In North America, *HSR*'s reputation began to grow as well. Reviewing the journal in 1987 for the periodical *Hungarian Studies* (which had been established at Indiana University by Denis Sinor), Richard L. Aczel wrote, "over the . . . years of its existence [*HSR*] has produced a highly impressive body of scholarly work unparalleled in range, depth, and consistency by any other contemporary venture of its kind in the Anglophone world . . . The most impressive achievement of the *Review* . . . [has] been its publication of five special issues on themes of considerable importance . . . To all those with an interest in Hungarian studies in the Anglophone world . . . [*HSR*] continues to provide a rare and invaluable service."⁹

For a Canadian-based scholarly journal with comparably modest resources, this praise was significant, and certainly left a mark on Nándor, who made a point of highlighting Aczel's positive review in our email interview with him.¹⁰ However, despite the journal's growing reputation, the University of Toronto unexpectedly stopped contributing to *HSR*'s editorial expenses in 1988, and by 1990 the journal itself had been dropped by University of Toronto Press (the last issue printed by the press was volume 17, number 2 in Fall 1990). In light of the university's waning support, Éva Tömöry took on the newly-created Subscriptions Manager position in 1990 (a role she would continue to play with *HSR* until 2003–04¹¹), while the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada (HSAC), which had been founded in 1985, began co-sponsoring the journal in 1991. The other vital co-sponsor of *HSR* was the National

Széchenyi Library (NSL) in Hungary. Like HSAC, the library began supporting *HSR* in 1991, but whereas HSAC's role was primarily to offer financial and editorial support, NSL was responsible for the printing and distribution of the journal.

The partnership with HSAC and NSL marked the beginning of a new chapter for *HSR*, and for Nándor in particular. The loss of editorial support from the University of Toronto had a profound impact on Nándor's editorial workload, especially after the university's Humanities Publishing Services (HPS) came "to an abrupt end" in 1993.¹² Established in the 1980s by the Centre for Computing in the Humanities, HPS had provided an affordable typesetting service to journals affiliated with the University of Toronto. Because *HSR* was still attached to the Hungarian Chair, its editors could make use of these cost-effective services. The closure of HPS posed a significant problem for the journal, as *HSR* could not afford the prohibitive typesetting rates being charged by commercial presses. Recognizing that they had "no alternative but to try accomplishing this task on their own," the editors began exploring the possibility of personal computer-based desktop publishing. The transition proved successful, though the learning curve was steep. As the co-editors lamented in a 1993 editorial note, "advances in computer electronics—in particular, in desktop publishing—have made our task easier. Nevertheless, the switch required that the member of the editorial team in charge of production (Dreiszigler) learn a new word-processing program and purchase a suitable laserjet printer."¹³

Though the switch to desktop publishing in 1993 may have rendered the journal's operation "less expensive," it ended up imposing "even more work on one of [the] editors," and did not solve a host of other problems *HSR* was facing. These issues included "the shrinking of [*HSR*'s] subscription base, the unpredictable flow of articles, and the lack of help with the translation of good manuscripts from Hungarian to English."¹⁴ Daunting as they may have been, these challenges did not prove insurmountable. Bolstered by the new collaboration with both NSL and HSAC, Nándor was also able to count on the support of *HSR*'s editorial advisers, a number of whom remain active members of the journal's editorial board today. In 1994, for example, Oliver Botar (University of Manitoba) guest-edited a special issue on Hungarian artists in the Americas.¹⁵ Botar had already served as guest editor for the Spring issue in 1988,¹⁶ and would guest-edit a third issue in 2004, and a fourth in 2010 together with Hattula Moholy-Nagy.¹⁷ In addition to a special issue titled "Thousand Years of Hungarian Thought,"

edited by Bisztray in 2000,¹⁸ *HSR* also saw special guest-edited volumes by Agatha Schwartz (University of Ottawa), who teamed up with Marlene Kadar (York University) in 1999 to publish the first of two thematic issues on Women and Hungary (Part Two was guest-edited by Schwartz in 2002).¹⁹ In 2014, Judith Szapor (McGill University) co-edited the special issue “Gender and Nation in Hungary since 1919” with Schwartz.²⁰ This was the last special issue published by *HSR* under Nándor’s leadership as editor. Nándor was clearly grateful for these contributions, and noted that the guest-edited volumes were crucial to the continuation of *HSR*’s tradition of publishing special issues on topics of interest and importance to scholars working both within and outside the field of Hungarian studies.²¹

After Bisztray’s retirement as Hungarian Chair, Nándor became the sole editor of *HSR* in 2004. This editorial shift was followed by Nándor’s own retirement from the Royal Military College of Canada in 2005, and also by new developments in the way that *HSR* was supported, printed, and distributed. Beginning with the publication of volume 32 in 2005, the United States-based Hungarian Studies Association (HSA) became a co-sponsor alongside NSL and HSAC. Formed in 1970 as The American Association for the Study of Hungarian History, HSA adopted its current name in 2004, and continues to be an important supporter of *HSR*. HSA’s involvement with *HSR* came at a crucial moment, as support from NSL began to drop off by the end of the decade. The last issue of *HSR* printed by NSL came out in 2008 (volume 35, numbers 1–2), and though NSL officially continued to distribute the journal, this service in actuality also ceased after 2011. Starting in 2009, *HSR* was printed by Allan Graphics in Kingston, Ontario, though all issues of *HSR* from 1981 to 2018 are also currently available in electronic format on the NSL website.

In autumn 2018, Nándor retired fully as editor of *HSR*. As he wrote in an editorial note in the 2018 volume, “after editing this journal for four and a half decades, advanced age and the diagnosis of a progressive neurological disease prompt me to resign as editor and producer of this journal.”²² As presidents of HSA and HSAC respectively, Árpád and I agreed in November 2018 to serve as co-editors for this transitional 2019–20 issue, and to help negotiate a shift to a new publisher, one that would provide professional editorial support, and that would help us establish a presence in online databases like JSTOR and Project MUSE. In this task we have been assisted by Emily Gioielli (Pasts, Inc. Center for Historical Studies, Central European

University), Leslie Waters (University of Texas at El Paso), and Richard S. Esbenshade (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign). As a team of five, it has taken us over a year to assemble this current issue. Even though each of us has previous editorial experience, it proved to be a significant undertaking. Our collective respect for Nándor's achievements has only grown since we took up the editorial reins, and I think the two of us speak for the entire editorial team when we say we are in awe of what Nándor was able to accomplish in four and a half decades. His dedication to *HSR* is admirable, and his accomplishments humbling. As already noted, we can only hope that we will be worthy of the legacy he has left to us, and to generations of scholars yet to come.

Inspired by the journal's nearly half-century history, we look forward to *HSR*'s next "new beginning," and are excited about our new partnership with Pennsylvania State University Press, which officially begins in January 2021. Our colleagues at PSU Press have been very supportive and helpful with our transition, and have been instrumental in the publication of this transitional issue. Based on our interactions and experiences so far, we are confident that we made the right choice to partner with them for the journal's next chapter. Though much has obviously changed in terms of editorial structure and the production of the journal, we remain committed as an editorial team to *HSR*'s traditions, and are thankful for the continued support of HSAC and HSA, as well as the guidance of our editorial advisers. As editors we have much to learn, but as we hope this issue illustrates, we are firm in our commitment to an interdisciplinary approach to Hungarian studies, and will continue to offer a rigorous, non-partisan forum for scholarly discussion and debate. We also hope to introduce new features to *HSR*, and are looking forward to working with our editorial board, contributors, supporting associations, and readers to develop and further refine the project Nándor has handed over to us, and to continue to create dynamic, relevant, and critical content well into the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. Nándor F. Dreisziger, email interview with the authors, October 18, 2019. As R. L. Aczel wrote in his 1987 review of *HSR*, early discussions for the establishment of a North American periodical dedicated entirely to Hungarian studies began in earnest in 1971. See R. L. Aczel's review of *HSR* in *Hungarian Studies* 3 (1987): 260. On the role played by Ferenc

- Harczár, see Nándor F. Dreisziger, “Contributions to Ontario’s Culture,” *Hungarian Studies Review* 12, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 68–69. Dreisziger notes that Harcsár began his campaign to launch a serious journal “in tune with the aspirations of the Hungarian community” in 1970. He adds that, at the time, ideas like Harcsár’s “were gaining popularity with many Hungarian émigré leaders both in Canada and the United States.”
2. Dreisziger, email interview, October 18, 2019.
 3. Dreisziger, email interview, October 28, 2019.
 4. Dreisziger, email interview, October 28, 2019.
 5. As Dreisziger and Bisztray wrote in their first-ever editorial note in *Hungarian Studies Review*, the new title was “meant to eliminate the awkwardness of our original masthead. It also signifies our belief that we are now ready to shed our geographic limitations and assume the task of serving the interest of Hungarian studies wherever English is a recognized language of scholarly communication.” George Bisztray and Nándor F. Dreisziger, “Preface,” *Hungarian Studies Review* 8, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 5.
 6. 1989 was the only exception to this, when one 151-page double issue was published, instead of two separate issues. The publication of lengthy double issues would continue into the 1990s and 2000s. The special issue co-edited by Oliver A. I. Botar and Hattula Moholy-Nagy in 2010, for example, was 221 pages in length. See note 17 below.
 7. See George Bisztray and Nándor F. Dreisziger, “Preface,” *Hungarian Studies Review* 8, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 6.
 8. Dreisziger, email interview, October 28, 2019.
 9. R. L. Aczel’s review of *HSR*, quoted in George Bisztray, “Hungarian Chair at the University of Toronto: A Decennial Report,” *Hungarian Studies Review* 17, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 28.
 10. Nándor F. Dreisziger, email interview, October 30, 2019.
 11. The Budapest-based Tímea Király took over this position in 2004, and served as the subscriptions manager until 2008, when the position was phased out.
 12. Nándor Dreisziger and George Bisztray, “A Brief Note from the Editors,” *Hungarian Studies Review* 20, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 1993): 127.
 13. *Ibid.* As Nándor indicated, the very first paper submitted to *HSR* in electronic form came from Hungary. It was submitted by Géza Jeszenszky, professor at Corvinus University, and still an active member of *HSR*’s editorial board. Dreisziger, email interview, October 28, 2019.
 14. Nándor Dreisziger and George Bisztray, “A Brief Note from the Editors,” *Hungarian Studies Review* 20, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 1993): 128.

15. Oliver A. I. Botar, ed., “Hungarian Artists in the Americas,” special issue, *Hungarian Studies Review* 21, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 1994).
16. Oliver A. I. Botar, ed., “The Early Twentieth-Century Avant-Garde,” special issue, *Hungarian Studies Review* 15, no. 1 (Spring 1988).
17. Oliver A. I. Botar, ed., “Twentieth-Century Hungarian Art at Home and Abroad,” special issue, *Hungarian Studies Review* 31, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 2004); and Oliver A. I. Botar and Hattula Moholy-Nagy, eds., “Proceedings of the Symposium ‘László Moholy-Nagy: Translating Utopia into Action’,” special issue, *Hungarian Studies Review* 37, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 2010).
18. George Bisztray, ed., “Thousand Years of Hungarian Thought,” special issue, *Hungarian Studies Review* 27, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 2000).
19. Marlene Kadar and Agatha Schwartz, eds., “Women and Hungary: Reclaiming Images and Histories,” special issue, *Hungarian Studies Review* 26, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 1999); Agatha Schwartz, ed., “Women and Hungary, Part II: Studies in Twentieth-Century Politics, Education, History, and Literature,” special issue, *Hungarian Studies Review* 29, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 2002).
20. Judith Sapor and Agatha Schwartz, eds., “Gender and Nation in Hungary since 1919,” special issue, *Hungarian Studies Review* 41, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 2014).
21. Dreisziger, email interview, October 30, 2019.
22. Nándor F. Dreisziger, “A Note from the Editor,” *Hungarian Studies Review* 45, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Fall 2018): 2.

Conditions of Democracy in German Austria and Hungary, 1918–1919

Ibolya Murber

With the end of the First World War, the longstanding and apparently God-given Habsburg order broke apart. The war-weary population was angry and mobilized, and longed for stability and prosperity.¹ The long-lasting war with its devastating consequences functioned as a catalyst for democratization. The political and socioeconomic crises at the end of the war posed the utmost challenge for the new political elites, especially those on the losing side. No government considering itself civilized could deny the right to vote to the returning soldiers, who had risked their lives for the nation. Nor could it be denied to the many women who had replaced the men in the workplace. The democratization of political life promised a certain easing of the postwar crisis and inserted itself into the transnational democratization trend. Out of the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy arose the first democratic experiments in Central Europe, which had however to struggle with politically and socioeconomically unfavorable conditions and a lack of democratic experience. At the end of the lost war a rapid democratization of political life was proclaimed in both successor states. But its outcome and duration were completely divergent in Austria and Hungary. The democratic experiment survived in Austria until 1933,² while its counterpart had already failed in Hungary by 1919,³ although both provisional governments equally committed themselves in the late fall of 1918 explicitly to the construction of a democratic republic.

This study will analyze the Austrian and Hungarian transitions to increased democratization in the postwar years. Democratization is understood in terms of the contemporary democratic praxis, not a fixed model of democracy. The focus will be on the diversity and variety of forms of these democratic experiments, which were strongly dependent on structural and procedural conditions as well as the respective political cultures of both countries. My analysis is based mainly on a review of contemporary Austrian and Hungarian legislation, the protocols of

the Austrian and Hungarian Councils of Ministers, archival documents, and contemporary press reports.

Concepts of More Democracy

The history of democracy has established itself as a concept in the contexts of academic study and memory politics. The earlier approaches based on modernization theory assumed that states with a democratic deficit would see the so-called Western model of democracy (constitutional and liberal democracy) as desirable.⁴ The concept of “Western liberal democracy” was a product of the First World War. “It was the period after the First World War, in which democracy took on a mass democratic image, synchronized different speeds of development and experimented with new formulas for the procurement of freedom and equality, and in which was constituted what we came to recognize as Western, liberal, social democracy.”⁵ The concept of Western democracy at war’s end was, however, nothing more than a hope for a comprehensive democratization in Europe.⁶ But this democracy was in 1918 more an expectation than a real experience of democratic practice. In Central Europe after 1918, on the ruins of the Habsburg Monarchy, democracy was something in the process of formation; it was a transition to a democratic order. This period fell between the symbolic proclamation of a democratic form of government and the moment⁷ when citizens could for the first time elect their executive and legislative bodies in a free and fair vote. In this period the structures and institutions of democratic government were being constructed, and confirmed by the population by means of the elections to a constitutive National Assembly.

The successful transition from the authoritarian monarchy to a democratic republic lasted in the case of Austria from November 12, 1918, when the democratic republic was anchored in law, until spring of 1919, as on February 16 the voting for the constitutive National Assembly took place and on March 12 the constitutive National Assembly ratified the Law of November 12, 1918 regarding the organization of state and government. For Hungary, the determination of the time period of the transition to democratic governance is no easy undertaking, which itself points to the failure of the establishment of democracy. In public discourse, by the end of October/beginning of November 1918 the adjective “democratic” in the context of the change of government was in fact on everyone’s lips. During these autumn days the Social

Democratic Party newspaper, *Népszava* [Voice of the People] emphasized day in and day out that Hungary was experiencing a democratic new beginning. However, Count Mihály Károlyi, provisional prime minister, spoke of the “young republic with a democratic foundation” only on November 16, the day of the proclamation of the republic.⁸ At the end of 1918, the Hungarian Council of Ministers did not define why it regarded its own policy as democratic.

In spite of all of this, in no legal act—using contemporary terminology, in no *néphatározat* [people’s decision] or *néptörvény* [people’s law]—was it established that Hungary was a democratic republic. The written declaration of a democratic structure in Hungary was missing. In public discourse, democracy was packed in elegant phrases and promises and constantly theorized. Since up to the point of the establishment of the Hungarian Council Republic in March 1919 as a matter of fact no elections to a constitutive National Assembly actually took place, one can also establish no endpoint for the abortive democratic transition.

Democracy is a fundamentally controversial concept; it is a “concept of expectation.”⁹ At the end of World War I, democracy was shaped by expectations and hopes, and subsequently also by experiences. The concept of “democracy” is contested, which also has to do with the variety of democratic models. Basically, it is concerned with a political form of government, which presupposes a sovereign state. Until the end of 1921, with the allocation of Burgenland to Austria, full state sovereignty in Austria and Hungary did not exist.¹⁰ The partial foreign occupation burdened and even obstructed the population’s democratic expression of opinion. The residents of the Italian-controlled South Tirol and the Sudeten Germans of the Bohemian and Moravian areas did not take part in the Austrian elections held on February 14, 1919. Because of South Slavic occupation, the vote in southern Styria and southern Carinthia also took place only partially. As compensation for this, 50 seats in the constitutive National Assembly were retroactively assigned.¹¹ In the first Public Law of November 23,¹² the provisional government of Hungary in fact adopted the general and equal right to vote, but up to the end of February 1919 announced no elections for a constitutive National Assembly. The provisional government justified the postponement of the elections by the foreign occupation of Hungarian territory. Interior Minister Vince Nagy explained this reasoning in mid-January 1919 in Budapest to Archibald Cary Coolidge, leader of the US political mission, as follows: holding the vote would *de jure* confirm the surrender of the occupied territories.¹³

In assessing the democratic composition of a government after World War I, we must keep in mind the wide gap between contemporary attributions and objective political science criteria. The discrepancy between self-perception and the perception of others rested on several factors. It was not possible in Central Europe to import a consummate democratic model from the West. At war's end there was no catalogue of criteria, no sanctioned system of rules for an effectively functional Western democracy. "Democracy in the early twentieth century was far from becoming a reality, as little in Great Britain as elsewhere."¹⁴ Democratic structures and institutions between the world wars were characterized by diversity and a richness of forms.

Modernity and Political Participation in the Fin de Siècle¹⁵ Habsburg Monarchy

The effort for more political participation was at the end of the nineteenth century a transnational and long-term process. Samuel P. Huntington described the democratization drives across the history of democracy as waves.¹⁶ According to the American political scientist, the first wave of democratization took place between 1828 and 1926. In this wave, a series of states overcame the hurdles to democracy,¹⁷ if with great variations in democracy and its institutions and structures. These extranational democratic impulses awoke the appearance that the extension of voting rights and political participation were signs of modernization. Thus, the democratic expectations, also in the Danubian Monarchy at the end of the nineteenth century, became projection screens for progress, which resonated with the optimism about progress of the then still-prevailing liberalism.

The endogenous democratic traditions in the Habsburg Monarchy went back decades. The revolutions of 1848 served as a starting point, which in collective memory accompanied the ideas of nationalism and democratization under the sign of liberalism. In late fall of 1918, the Social Democrats of German Austria¹⁸ and Hungary also appealed to the liberal democratic traditions of 1848. The traditions of 1848¹⁹ symbolized for the Hungarian Social Democrats their demands for a republic, national independence and social emancipation.²⁰ In the fin-de-siècle period, however, nationalism in the Austro-Hungarian Empire increasingly detached itself from the liberal and democratic traditions of 1848. Particularly in the Hungarian half of the realm, an aggressive majority nationalism crystallized vis-à-vis minorities,

seeking to protect the alleged dominance of the Hungarian nation, the “supremacy” of the Hungarians. This “supremacy,” the superiority of the Hungarian-speaking population, was based not just on the growth in the number of citizens declaring themselves as Hungarians, but also their supposed higher level of culture as well as their political and financial dominance over the ethnic minorities.²¹ The 1897 Badeni Crisis,²² however, made it clear in the Austrian half of the Empire that the ethnic German representatives to the Imperial Council were not prepared to let go of the linguistic dominance of the German over the Czech language.

The expansion or rejection of the right to vote was in the Habsburg Monarchy closely bound up with the nationality question. The political elite of the Dual Monarchy considered the ethnic-linguistic endeavors in the second half of the nineteenth century, in light of the traditional German-speaking and Hungarian dominance as well as the unity of the empire, as a threat. The example of voting rights shows that the governments in Vienna and Budapest followed different concepts regarding their defense against ethnic minority demands. The expansion or rejection of the right to vote reflected the persistence of the traditional political elite as well as the political influence of the proponents of democracy. In Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century the majority of the socialist and liberal Left agitated for more democracy.²³ In the Habsburg Monarchy, the political supporters of democracy were otherwise engaged. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was the Social Democrats who decidedly engaged in the struggle for the general right to vote and for more democracy. The establishment of a democratic state and the introduction of the general, direct right to vote had been part of the political agenda of the party since the fifth Day of the Worker in 1868.²⁴ The Christian Social Party stood for the idea of universal voting rights for men from 1896.²⁵ With the 1907 expansion of voting rights in the Austrian half of the empire, the highest decision makers had in mind the preservation of their own power as well as the forestallment of the breakup of the Empire,²⁶ and not the democratization of the country. This moderate and evolutionary path to more democracy stood under the sign of saving the empire, and served the consolidation of the imperial power structure. Direct elections, the secret ballot, and the general right to vote for men,²⁷ however, also made possible the formation of two mass parties: the Social Democrats and the Christian Social Party. With that began the development of a mass society and the political integration of the worker and the rural population into state and society. In the wake of the Imperial Council elections

of 1911, both mass parties rose to be significant political and democratic forces in their half of the empire, which made possible their participation in the consolidation of state power after the end of the lost war.²⁸

The nobility of the Hungarian kingdom, whose grip on the reins of political leadership stood unaltered at the beginning of the twentieth century, on the other hand, protected its traditional privileges and not only resisted all centralizing tendencies from Vienna, but also blocked all attempts at the expansion of voting rights with the justification that this would endanger the national predominance of the Hungarians. Furthermore, the aristocratic political elite protected its supremacy over rising social classes, such as the politically organized workers and the still rather apolitical peasantry. This persistence and political leading role on the part of the nobility hindered the evolutionary and not war-dependent development of a political mass society. Because of the prevention of the introduction of universal suffrage, only parties made up of dignitaries, which to be sure intended no political representation of the new rising social classes, served in the Hungarian Parliament; thus, no mass parties could establish themselves. The Hungarian Social Democratic Party, founded in 1890, following the German and Austrian model, indeed stood for the democratization of political life, which for its part was also seen as a solution to the recognized threat of nationality problems. The greatest weakness of the party was however that, as a result of the restricted voting rights, it developed as an extraparliamentary opposition, and could not build up the strict and disciplined party and trade union structure of a mass party, as was the case in the Austrian half of the empire and in Germany. There did exist in Hungary on the cusp of the First World War further parties that took up democratization in their party platforms. The National Christian Socialist Party [Országos Keresztényszocialista Párt], founded in 1907, remained an oppositional minority in Parliament until the end of the war. The National Civic Radical Party [Országos Polgári Radikális Párt], founded in June 1914, represented the urban, democratically oriented intelligentsia, and demanded the introduction of universal suffrage and the secret ballot. But these measures found an extremely limited level of support among the Hungarian population. In the Hungarian half of the empire, the process of governmental and social integration of workers—not to mention the agrarian population, divorced from politics, which made up the overwhelming majority (over 60%) of the population—had not even begun. Democratic traditions in the Hungarian half of the empire before 1914 were anchored neither in the political

leadership nor in the population; thus here the chances for a successful development of a democratic state after the crisis-filled war years were far worse than in the Austrian half.²⁹

The First World War and Democratization

The development of a mass society began in the Danube Monarchy around the turn of the century. The first portents and trends appeared in the rapidly growing big cities of Austria-Hungary (Vienna, Budapest, and Prague). This period of social change threw into question the survival chances of the monarchy as a form of government and the position of the nobility, already before the war. Neither the Habsburg royal family nor the nobility in general was willing however to abdicate its longstanding positions of power. The First World War was waged in the name of national and imperial interests. The liberal narrative regarding the outbreak of the war sees it as the defensive reaction of a regime which had resisted the socioeconomic modernization and democratization of the turn of the century. Thereafter it saw no other choice but to fight a war for the retention of its positions of power.³⁰

On the one hand, the world war made possible the concentration of power in the executive branch and a restriction of citizens' rights and freedoms in all of the war-fighting states. Thus the war, especially in its first years, had an autocracy-producing rather than a democracy-producing effect. On the other hand, the "democratization of war," to use Eric Hobsbawm's phrase, points to the fact that wide swaths of the population were directly affected by the consequences of war, either on the military or the home front.³¹ The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy indeed declared war in the summer of 1914 with ambitious war aims; it however suffered one defeat after another on all fronts. It gained temporary control of territory starting in 1915, but only due to the economic and military support of its German allies, which necessarily led to power asymmetry in the German-Austrian alliance.³² The war began with a completely self-imposed domestic "castle truce," with the closing of ranks on the part of the state, the political parties, and the population in the entire Habsburg Monarchy. The war aims were the common denominator, which was meant to temporarily paper over the already existing chasm between the two halves of the empire, as well as the constantly increasing social tensions arising from modernization and industrialization. The declaration of war and of an expected quick

victory before the end of 1914 veiled only for a short time the many-sided and complex problems within the Habsburg Monarchy. The economic capacity of the monarchy was not sufficient over the course of the war for the simultaneous waging of war and the adequate feeding of the population. Thus the governments in Vienna and Budapest, like all of the warring states,³³ were forced to give in and to centrally direct the supply and demand of the civil population.

The socioeconomic burden of the world war intensified the political, economic, and social transformations of modern society,³⁴ the majority of which resulted from the structural change from an agrarian into an industrial society. This transformation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in addition burdened the multiethnic composition of the empire. Just like the Tsarist Empire of the Romanovs, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of the Habsburgs was a multinational imperium, shaped during the First World War by widespread war weariness as well as socioeconomic strain.

The material and human resources for waging war became ever more exhausted during the second half of the war. Up until 1917, the demands of the front could be “satisfactorily” addressed; as of 1918, however, the provisioning of the troops threatened to collapse. Hungary had always served as the “breadbasket” of the monarchy, but in the last years of the war strict state rationing of foodstuffs had to be instituted even there. Nevertheless, in the Hungarian half of the realm adequate state provisioning could be guaranteed up until the end of the war, even if at the cost of starving the urban population of the Austrian half. This supply discrepancy deepened the gulf between Austria and Hungary, both on the governmental-political side and at the level of the population.³⁵ State provision of foodstuffs was highly relevant to the rising discontent on the part of the population. The failure of state provisioning in the last two years of the war undermined citizens’ trust in their government. This loss of trust weakened the population’s internal acceptance of the state, the bureaucracy, and the ruling dynasty, as well as exhausting the integrational capabilities of the Dual Monarchy.

In spring of 1917, after the February revolution in Russia and the entrance of the US into the war, democracy came into fashion, leading to the increasing participation of the masses in politics, especially in the defeated states. The declaration of a democracy-professing republic in Russia in February 1917 took on a central role in the course of the war. This Russian announcement of a democracy deprived the Central Powers of their argument that they were fighting a defensive

war. The Bolsheviks' peace offering shook up the military chances of the Central Powers. The events in Russia pushed the Left in the Danube Monarchy and the German Empire unavoidably into an intensive democratic platform. "The democratic 'zeitgeist' was vehemently reflected in international debates."³⁶ But it consisted of two completely different understandings of a new social order, which from 1917 condensed into a propaganda war. With the entry of the US into the war began the crystallization of the idea of a "Western" democracy. This was based on a contemporary assumption: that democratization, the spread of the Western democratic model, was an inevitable function of modernity.³⁷ But in 1918 democracy was in practice only an expectation, rather than an experience. "War was supposed to bring democracy, and democracy would in the future make war impossible."³⁸ On the one hand, the idea of a liberal and social democracy was legally anchored and internationally institutionalized in the peace treaties of 1919–1920. On the other, the idea of the Bolshevik "total democracy"³⁹ began its triumphant progress after the Communists' accession to power in Russia in November 1917. This new type of regime strove from 1919 on for international expansion, in the form of Council Republics in Hungary and Bavaria, as well as within the framework of the Communist International (Comintern).

The Hungarian Social Democrats broke with the politics of the castle truce in the summer of 1916, and their Austrian comrades in the autumn of 1916, after Friedrich Adler assassinated Prime Minister Karl Stürghk.⁴⁰ The social democratic parties began to intensively engage in political struggle again, which also manifested itself in an increase in membership of their trade unions. The war's interminability encouraged the display of power on the part of Austrian Social Democracy; this power shift in favor of the Hungarian Social Democrats was far less pronounced. The growth in the socioeconomic tensions caused by the war called for an intermediary between the government and the workers. The tight labor market led in the last years of the war to the expressions of workplace grievances in the form of large numbers of walkouts and strikes. These furthered the radicalization of workers' culture, which in turn was reflected in new battle cries, such as demands for peace and democracy. In order to retain their own supporters, Social Democrats in both halves of the empire after 1917 needed radical solutions. The Party however supported the strikes only as long as that brought them advantage and increased their room for maneuver.⁴¹ In this can be seen Austromarxism's "specificity" and ambivalence.

The significant difference lay rather in the positions of the two parties vis-à-vis political power. The Austrian Social Democrats led a mass party, and starting in 1916 they were active as a strong oppositional party in the reactivated Imperial Council. With their countrywide network of trade unions, they could use well-established intervention mechanisms to defuse the radicalism of labor conflicts. Especially in the second half of the war, there was no shortage of labor conflicts and rebellions across the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The fact that the traditional political leadership in Vienna was forced by the threatened collapse of food provisioning to make concessions was a necessary condition for the governmental and political integration of the Austrian Social Democrats. This integration of the Social Democrats, already at hand before the war, was decisively propelled by the failure of the state supply system. The imperial power elite increasingly treated the Social Democratic Party and its trade unions as a partner, mirroring the situation in Great Britain, France, and Germany.⁴² Social democratic politicians received positions in the state supply system that constituted the first governmental roles for the party in its history. The general expansion of further social services compelled by the wartime conditions drove the absorption and further integration of the workforce into state structures.⁴³ These social achievements pointed the way towards the construction of a democratic welfare state at war's end.

The Hungarian Social Democrats, due to the extremely limited property-qualified voting rights, remained in extra-parliamentary opposition until the war's end. For that reason, despite its nationwide trade union network, in the case of labor conflicts it could offer no experienced and state-recognized mediation potential. Hungary's aristocratic political elite recognized the labor clashes of the last war years as a political but not a social conflict, and employed ever heavier state repression. As the provisioning crisis in the Hungarian half of the empire seemed less serious, the traditional political leadership did not see it necessary to share political responsibility with the Social Democrats and thereby further their political integration.

Since food shortages were less severe in Hungary, the state and the political elite were much less in need of a social democratic intermediary to "tame" unsatisfied industrial workers. The great estate owners of the political class took a restrictive position towards labor conflicts until the end of the war, which closed off the possibility of democratization. The state interventions on behalf of employees after 1917 were

carried out separately at the level of enterprises, and mostly concerned only the improvement of labor conditions and provisioning, as well as wage increases.

Late Fall 1918 – Spring 1919: The Hopeful “Wilsonian Moment”

The downfall of the Habsburg Empire opened the way to a new international order for Central Europe. The victor states were aiming to divide the centuries-old multinational realm into smaller, democratically organized national states. But as to the question of what this Central Europe of small states should look like, there were in 1918 different, competing concepts, one “Eastern” and one “Western.” In his appeal to the self-determination of peoples, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin proclaimed the self-delineated, rather theoretically considered, territorial sovereignty of every people. US President Woodrow Wilson understood under the same slogan the self-government of a democratic administration.⁴⁴ Although the word “democracy” appeared nowhere in his ultimately famous Fourteen Points, he delivered “the message of global democratization.”⁴⁵

In the last year of the war both transnational “ideological offensives”⁴⁶ reached the crisis-wracked Habsburg realm, where they hastened its disintegration and offered a new orientation for the region’s rebirth. Numerous obligations of modernity had piled up in complicated fashion in Central Europe by the end of the war. Territorial independence and the sovereignty of the nation formed the uncontested main goal. A further amalgamation of demands for national autonomy and increased participation crystallized in political discourse in the late fall of 1918.⁴⁷ The global “Wilsonian moment”⁴⁸ had finally reached Central Europe. The “messianic” expectation of understanding between peoples was attached to the person of the American President. The projection screen “democracy” in this way underwent a new extension of meaning: democracy became identified as the path to a “just peace” based on the right of nations to self-determination.

“Democracy” in the year 1918 in the Danube region had “suddenly” come into fashion, even become normality,⁴⁹ and served as a counterproject to that of the authoritarian “hated elders,” which could be identified with the Habsburg Monarchy with all its weaknesses and the war with all its suffering. Behind this declaration stood the contemporary assumption that Central Europe’s social and economic deficit stemmed

from a lack of sovereignty on the part of national states. According to these conceptions, the emergence of new national states and their democratic self-organization would open the door for economic catch-up on the ruins of the authoritarian Habsburg Monarchy.

At the beginning of November 1918, Count Mihály Károlyi, provisional prime minister of Hungary, as well as the Hungarian Social Democrats espoused this position, as the questions of state sovereignty and a republic as the form of governance came to the fore.⁵⁰ Thomas G. Masaryk, president of Czechoslovakia, characterized the First World War as a struggle between the “feudal” autocracy of the Central Powers on one side and the ideas of democracy and freedom of conscience, borne by the Entente, on the other. Subsequently, Czechoslovakia would be the “agent of the civilized and democratic West” in the East, guaranteeing the new order.⁵¹ The popularity of a putative democracy was also increased by the recognition that at Versailles only parliamentary democracies were acceptable as participants in the negotiations.⁵² The new political actors hoped by means of the declaration of a democratic new order to gain more sympathy from the victors, and thereby also better peace settlement conditions. Of course a rooted, stable democratic political culture was lacking across wide social strata. Especially in Hungary there were hardly political forces—aside from Social Democracy and some radical intellectuals—standing behind the political slogan “democracy.”

Democratic Actors in Austria and Hungary

The transition from monarchical authoritarian state to liberal democracy in Austria and Hungary was due to war and crisis, and the social democratic parties played a significant role in it.⁵³ Total war with its mass mobilization and industrial military production raised the value of the workers and their political representatives, the workers’ parties, vis-à-vis all war participants. The war could no longer be waged without the mass of workers. Those leftist parties that proved their national loyalty during the world war could leave behind their marginal position on the political spectrum. The organizations of the workers pushed unexpectedly quickly into the center of political life in the second half of the world war, and especially at the end of the war. In the vanquished states of the Central Powers, in Germany, Austria, and Hungary, the Social Democrats with governmental responsibility rose to be the driving forces of

democratization. The end of the war brought the simultaneity of the rise of both democratic and anti-democratic elements; both were offspring of the war. This simultaneity demonstrated that the Western model of liberal democracy was in no way seen as the only solution to the complex problems of that time. It was exactly the rise of Bolshevik, anti-democratic models as bogeyman that for the first time forged a community between the Western democracies. This new Western community of values identified itself as the counterpole to “world revolution,” and prepared for battle. But in parts of Central and Southern Europe, which had been particularly impacted by the world war and its consequences, another bogeyman crystallized, which mixed and conflated the radical leftist and social democratic visions of the future. The resulting aggressive anti-Bolshevism/anti-Marxism gave propulsion for the radical right wing, and smoothed the way to the undermining of the Western model of democracy between the world wars.⁵⁴

At the end of the war the struggle for political power was over how the old political elite could hold its ground and how the new political elite could generate new legitimacy. Despite a spectacular rupture at the level of the constitution and state institutions, there were multiple continuities. “Old” and “new” existed side-by-side in the transition period. Totally new centers of power formed, such as the grassroots-democracy-oriented workers’ and soldiers’ councils. But the old bureaucracy also remained at first completely untouched. Another great challenge of the turbulent postwar moment was to carry out political and economic consolidation, intertwined with the demobilization of a radicalized population.

The time had come for new actors and structures. On October 21, 1918 the provisional National Assembly of German Austria was constituted from the German-speaking representatives in the former Imperial Council,⁵⁵ and decided on the formation of its own Austrian state: “German Austria.” The government formed on October 30 under the Social Democratic leadership of Karl Renner was made up of parliamentary deputies of the old Imperial Council, and gained its legitimacy from neither the emperor nor elections. This continuity of personnel between old and new brought tested competencies in political negotiation and personal networks into the new government. Thanks to the universal male voting rights of 1907, these politicians, apart from the German National Party,⁵⁶ had a considerable following.⁵⁷ All of the parties of the Imperial Council took part in the grand coalition of the Social Democrats, the Social Christians, and the Greater German People’s Party,⁵⁸

and thereby gave their assent to the joint management of the crisis. The party leaders could thus count on being able to have a mitigating effect on the population by means of their party networks.

The new government and the Provisional National Assembly earned symbolic legitimation by operating until November 11 concurrently with the old imperial regime and the Imperial Council in Vienna, in parallel and without conflicts. The negotiated proclamation of November 11 declaring Emperor Charles's renunciation of any role in government gave the new power holders a further injection of legitimation.⁵⁹ The strength and importance of Austrian social democrats among the various parties was evident as they laid down several conditions regarding governmental participation.⁶⁰ The bourgeois parties, moreover, approved of the crisis management initiated by Austromarxists because they themselves lacked a sustainable crisis program.⁶¹

In the case of Hungary, the transition of power at first appeared to proceed, as in Austria, on constitutionally regulated tracks. However, in contrast to Austria there was until the end a lack of broad political consensus, but also of popular political participation. On October 24, 1918 a counter-government, the Hungarian National Council, constituted itself; within a week it formed the core of the new regime. This National Council was assembled from a parliamentary opposition party, led by the liberal-democratic Count Károlyi. Another two extra-parliamentary opposition parties also took part, namely the National Civic Radical Party, the party of the critical urban intelligentsia, and the Social Democrats. Because of the limitation of voting rights by property qualification and the lack of mass parties, the members of the National Council—except for the Social Democrats—had no party networks to fall back on. There were in Hungary before 1918 only parties of dignitaries, which focused their activities on the period of parliamentary elections, and beyond these labor-intensive periods they carried out no or almost no collective political activities in the name of their parties. Their representatives in Parliament were in fact active as individuals, but the parties as umbrella organizations played only a minor role.

The war government named by King Charles IV⁶² resigned on October 30. In the face of unrest in Budapest, the last monarch of the Austro-Hungarian Empire approved the appointment of Count Károlyi to head the government of Hungary.

His government coalition was not as broad as the one in Austria and Germany. It consisted of the small liberal-democratic party of Károlyi, the National Civic Radical Party of Oszkár Jászi, and the

Social Democratic Party. The Hungarian Christian socialist movement was fragmented, and it was much smaller than its Austrian equivalent. The moderate National Christian Socialist Party, under the leadership of Sándor Giesswein, supported the Hungarian National Council and Károlyi's program at the beginning, but did not join the provisional government.

For many people Károlyi embodied the break with the past and the hope for a new beginning and a better future,⁶³ because of his social program and message of peace, expounded in Parliament for months. Count Károlyi, as scion of a high noble family, was one of the richest men in the kingdom, and was the son-in-law of Count Gyula Andrássy, the monarchy's last foreign minister. Although Charles released the government one day later from its oath to the monarch, the royal appointment provided the Károlyi government with symbolic legitimation.

Károlyi was, at the end of October 1918—also in the eyes of national conservatives and liberal conservatives of the old political elite like Count Pál Teleky or Count István Bethlen, the future prime minister—an acceptable figurehead, who seemed a suitable representative of Hungarian interests.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the new government exhibited no wide-ranging personal continuity between old and new, as was the case in Austria. Except for Prime Minister Károlyi and Interior Minister Count Tivadar Batthyány, the old political elite was not represented in the new government. Moreover, Batthyány left the cabinet already in December 1918, as Károlyi's policies became "too far to the left" for him.⁶⁵ The often oppressive central and decisive role of Prime Minister Károlyi closed off the possibility of a course correction and minimized political adaptability to the oppressive circumstances.

Hungary's new beginning was thus not based in an understanding between political parties, as in Austria; politics crystallized around the person of Károlyi. He dominated state affairs, not only because of his accumulation of positions,⁶⁶ but much more due to the weakness of the parties. It was not that the party leadership of the Hungarian Social Democrats was less "clever" than that of their Austrian brothers-in-arms, or that they lacked political talent.⁶⁷ The party leadership, due to its previous restriction to extra-parliamentary opposition, did not possess those competencies and experiences in making politics that their Austrian comrades already held in autumn of 1918. They had up to the declaration of the Council Republic a mere four months to "learn politics." With these limited proficiencies and so little political experience, they had to take on the task in March 1919 of ruling the country and

stopping the advance of foreign armies. The almost hopeless international situation of Hungary simply demanded too much of them. Thus, they entered into an unfortunate party fusion with the Communists, and jointly proclaimed the Council Republic. It was a flight into the future.⁶⁸

In November 1918, the Communist parties in Austria and Hungary were established. Both Social Democratic leaderships recognized the threat of a "Bolshevik experiment" and, equally, that posed by the foundation of Communist parties. The direct sphere of activity of both Communist parties was, however, at first restricted to several seats on the workers' councils in the capital cities and a number of street demonstrations. The Hungarian Communist party pursued a consciously populist politics, coupled with sharp and censorious criticism of the government program and with it of the participation of the Social Democrats in the regime, and finally aimed at the complete undermining of the state's power.⁶⁹ In the face of this party the Social Democrats on March 21 saw themselves forced to go along with a fusion of parties and an undemocratic takeover of power, to save the country, with fatal consequences.

The Implementation of Democratic Institutions

The new rulers in Austria and Hungary took different paths in implementing the basic conditions for democracy. There was a basic consensus that such a democracy included the separation of powers, institutional control by the judiciary of the democratically legitimated executive, and a popularly elected parliament.⁷⁰ In the case of German Austria, Ernst Hanisch has established that an overemphasis on parliamentarism developed as a reaction to the weak position of the Parliament in the monarchy.⁷¹ The authority of the dynasty as well as its supporters, namely the bureaucracy and the army, passed in late autumn to the political parties.⁷² Their representatives agreed that the provisional National Assembly should be assembled proportionally from the delegates chosen in the last Imperial Council elections of 1911. To forestall unnecessary political rivalry and tension, the balance of power between the parties would not be put into question before the first elections. On October 30, 1918, the provisional National Assembly announced that it alone held the highest state authority. The Austrian provisional legislature was recruited from the old Imperial Council and was endowed with three presidents of equal status. The provisional legislative body bestowed executive powers on the provisional government (State Council)

at the end of October 1918. The creative function was given to the National Assembly.

Democracies differentiate themselves from other political systems through a high degree of opportunity for the citizens to participate in the selection of their political leaders.⁷³ In both states the general, secret, and direct right to vote was declared in late autumn of 1918. But the realization of the democratic promise proceeded differently in the two cases. It is instructive which institution approved these voting rights last, and whether the National Assembly elections actually took place. On 12 November the provisional National Assembly of German Austria⁷⁴ approved the law on the form of state and government of German Austria. The provisional National Assembly proclaimed in Article 9 the general, secret, and direct right to vote. The same article also fixed the date of the election of a constituent National Assembly for January 1919. The elections, held with a slight delay on February 16, 1919, ratified not only the interim consensus politics and a certain loyalty of the majority of the population to the provisional government's crisis management, but also conformed to the democratic expectations of the victorious powers.

By contrast, in Hungary there was far less attention paid to the democratic legitimation of the provisional state power. The Károlyi government, installed by King Charles IV on October 31, arose out of the National Council convened on October 24,⁷⁵ an exclusive power center with no democratic legitimation. This provisional cabinet under the direction of the National Council vested itself in Public Law I of November 22, 1918 with, in addition to executive, legislative authority as well.⁷⁶ The provisional government hesitated in setting a fixed election date, thereby abandoning a timely democratic legitimation of its own power and cementing a makeshift solution with few democratic elements. The legislative authority in Hungary thus had no body elected by the population, but rather an executive based on self-legitimation. The legislative function was subordinated to the executive. The intention behind this was similar to that in Austria, only in reverse. The new Austrian political elite expanded the authority of the legislature in order to counter its weak position from the period of the Monarchy. Hungary went in the direction of no separation of powers. The public law of November 22 also dissolved the old Parliament, elected before the war in 1910, which had continued to meet throughout the war. In the Hungarian constitutional tradition, the former (aristocratic) Parliament until 1918 played an important, if only symbolic, role—governmental authority always resided in the executive. The new, self-confessed

democratic provisional government wanted nothing to do with the old elite of the Monarchy that sat in Parliament. This is why the executive and legislative power became concentrated in the provisional government, which dissolved the old Parliament. It was not the case that head of government Count Károlyi wanted to erect an authoritarian dictatorship in the sense of criteria defined by Juan Linz.⁷⁷ The aim of the Károlyi government was to demonstrate the final break with the old system and to legitimize the new policy. At the end of 1918 the representatives of the old elite were not pressing much for political responsibility in the struggle with the consequences of war.

The general and equal right to vote was proclaimed by the provisional government in late autumn as an important achievement for democratization. Outside pressure, on the part of the victors as well as the transnational democratic wave, was strong enough to compel democratic signals even in Budapest. However, the government's priority was in the first place not the democratic and social reorganization of the country, but the assertion of the right to the entire territory of the former Hungarian kingdom. The new political elite could not escape its historical limitations. No one wanted to relinquish the national basic consensus, the territorial sovereignty of the Hungarian nation, in favor of democratic and social renewal. Because of its stubborn insistence on the state concept of "greater Hungary," the new, purportedly provisional government robbed itself of democratic legitimation. The proclamation of the Council Republic finally thwarted the elections.

The Austrian Social Democrats were successful in the immediate postwar years in initiating a social legislative process leading to the construction of a democratic welfare state that became an example for all of Europe. The provisional government in Budapest, by contrast, missed the chance to advance the struggle against the consequences of war with an intensive social legislative process. It had more interest in territorial questions than in alleviating the misery of the population. The problems of the wide strata of the population, stemming from the socioeconomic transition from an agrarian to an industrial state and from the world war, were of little concern to either the old or the new political power holders. The provisional government indeed declared on November 11 the necessity of a land reform law for the agrarian population. The actual passage of the "land law" (Public Law XVII) was however left until February 16. The belated realization of this promise to the disaffected agrarian population could no longer appease the pent-up and long-ignored social tensions.

Conclusion

Although the interim democratic crisis management in Austria, carried out predominantly by Social Democrats, was due to internal and external circumstances more successful than the Hungarian efforts at resolving the crisis with the participation of Social Democrats, political power in both states in general after 1920 shifted from “left to right.” Austrian democracy in the 1920s was able to become a symbol for the success of consensus-oriented crisis management in the immediate postwar years. The prevention of civil war was successful, but opposition to democracy increased among the right. In Hungary the concept of democracy however experienced a profound transformation. Democracy and the democratic actors of the immediate postwar years became discredited in Hungarian national memory in the interwar period. The national right-wing conservative regimes pinned the responsibility for the huge territorial losses, which made up almost two-thirds of the area of greater Hungary, on the democratic victor states. The old aristocratic political elite’s own blame for the separationist tendencies of the nationalities and the territorial losses was thus completely ignored. The national conservative restoration of the undemocratic Monarchy in 1920 accused the actors of the first democratic experiments of bearing sole guilt for the country’s decimation.

As a consequence of the postwar crisis management directed by the Left, a longing for the “good old days” of Right-oriented hierarchical order and its familiar enemy images arose. This rightward lurch was accompanied in both countries equally by the development and consolidation of long-lived stereotypes of “leftists” and Jews, who were accused of bearing affinities for the destructive revolutions. The military defeat, the social transformation accelerated by war, the unrecognized guilt, the territorial “amputations,” and the fragile national identity thus proved to be heavy burdens for both Hungary and Austria in the interwar period.

Translated from the German by Richard S. Esbenschade

NOTES

1. This study was produced during my Edith Saurer Fellowship in Vienna in 2019.

2. Anton Pelinka, *Die gescheiterte Republik. Kultur und Politik in Österreich 1918-1938* [The failed republic: Culture and politics in Austria, 1918–38] (Vienna: Böhlau, 2017), 20.
3. Ibolya Murber, “Mitteleuropäisches Krisenmanagement nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Wege Österreichs und Ungarns in eine Konsolidierung” [Central European crisis management after the First World War: Paths to consolidation in Austria and Hungary], *Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft* 30 (2018): 359–78.
4. Anja Kruke and Philipp Kufferath, “Einleitung: Krisendiagnosen, Meistererzählungen und Alltagspraktiken. Aktuelle Forschungen und Narrationen zur Demokratiegeschichte in Westeuropa” [Introduction: Diagnoses of crisis, master narratives and everyday practices: Current research on and narrations of the history of democracy in Western Europe], *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 58, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (2018): 12.
5. Tim B. Müller, *Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Lebensversuche moderner Demokratien* [After the First World War: Formative experiments of modern democracies] (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2014), 30.
6. Jens Hacke, “Die Krise des politischen Liberalismus in der Zwischenkriegszeit. Theoriegeschichtliche Sondierung” [The crisis of political liberalism in the interwar period: A theoretical-historical exploration], in *Nach dem “Großen Krieg.” Vom Triumph zum Desaster der Demokratie 1918/19 bis 1939* [After the “great war”: Democracy’s road from triumph to disaster, 1918/19 to 1939], ed. Steffen Kailitz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), 70.
7. Steffen Kailitz, “Nach dem ‘Großen Krieg.’ Vom Triumph zum Desaster der Demokratie 1918/19 bis 1939” [After the “great war”: Democracy’s road from triumph to disaster, 1918/19 to 1939], in Kailitz, *Nach dem “Großen Krieg,”* 30.
8. *Népszava*, November 17, 1918, 5.
9. Reinhart Koselleck, *Begriffsgeschichten. Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache* [Conceptual stories: Studies on the semantics and pragmatics of political and social language] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), 68.
10. For more on the handover of Burgenland/western Hungary to Austria, see Ibolya Murber, “A burgenlandi impériumváltás 1918-1924: kikényszerített identitásképzés és politikai erőszak” [Burgenland’s imperial transition, 1918-1924: Forced identity formation and political violence], *Múltunk – Politikátörténeti Folyóirat* 34, no. 2 (2019): 181–214.
11. *Népszava*, February 28, 1919, 1.
12. *Corpus Juris Hungarici* [Hungarian Body of Laws] (Budapest: Franklin-társulat, 1919), 202.

13. *Népszava*, January 18, 1919, 5.
14. Adam Tooze, “Ein globaler Krieg unter demokratischen Bedingungen” [A global war under democratic conditions], in *Normalität und Fragilität. Demokratie nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg* [Normality and fragility: Democracy after the First World War], ed. Tim B. Müller and Adam Tooze (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2015), 37.
15. Anton Pelinka and Karin Bischof, et al., eds., *Geschichtsbuch Mitteleuropa. Vom Fin de Siècle bis zur Gegenwart* [The history book of Central Europe: From fin de siècle to the present] (Vienna: New Academic Press, 2016).
16. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).
17. Some examples are the US, France, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Norway, Finland, Belgium, Denmark (in 1915), the Netherlands, and Sweden.
18. The Austrian workers’ movement was also rooted in the revolution of 1848. On the role the 1848 revolution played for Otto Bauer, see Ernst Hanisch, *Im Zeichen von Otto Bauer. Deutschösterreichs Außenpolitik in den Jahren 1918 bis 1919* [Under the sign of Otto Bauer: German Austria’s foreign policy in the years 1918 and 1919], in . . . *der Rest ist Österreich. Das Werden der Ersten Republik* [. . . the rest is Austria: The creation of the First Republic], vol. 1, ed. Helmut Konrad and Wolfgang Maderthaler (Vienna: Gerold, 2008), 216.
19. For more on the tradition of the 1848 revolution in Hungary, see Árpád von Klimó, *Nation, Konfession, Geschichte. Zur nationalen Geschichtskultur Ungarns im europäischen Kontext (1860–1948)* [Nations, denominations, history: On Hungary’s national culture of history in the European context, 1860–1948] (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2003), 55–91.
20. *Népszava*, November 17, 1918, 1.
21. Iván Bertényi, “A századelő politikai irányzatai és Tisza István” [The political tendencies at the beginning of the century and István Tisza], in *A magyar jobboldali hagyomány 1900–1948* [The Hungarian right-wing tradition, 1900–1948], ed. Ignác Romsics (Budapest: Osiris, 2009), 45.
22. The Badenist Voting Rights Reform was an attempt by Prime Minister Kasimir Felix Badeni in 1897 to permit Czech to be the official language alongside German in Bohemia and Moravia. The ethnic German representatives to the Imperial Council rejected the equation of the two languages and used obstruction to paralyze the work of the Council. In 1899 this language ordinance was withdrawn, thus reestablishing monolingualism in Bohemia and Moravia. This caused the Czech representatives to adopt the tactic of obstruction.

23. Ian Kershaw, *Höllenturz. Europa 1914 bis 1949* [To hell and back: Europe, 1914 to 1949] (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2016), 193.
24. See the 1868 Manifesto to the Working Population in Austria, in *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868–1966* [Austrian party platforms, 1868–1966], ed. Klaus Berchtold (Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1967), 109–10.
25. The 1896 Platform of the Christian Social Workers' Party, in Berchtold, *Österreichische Parteiprogramme*, 169–71.
26. Peter Berger, *Kurze Geschichte Österreichs im 20. Jahrhundert* [A short history of Austria in the twentieth century] (Vienna: Facultas, 2008), 13.
27. The general right to vote for men applied to the elections for the Imperial Council; at the regional level the right to vote based on property qualifications remained.
28. Ibolya Murber, "Il lungo 1917 e la caduta della monarchia asburgica [The long 1917 and the fall of the Habsburg monarchy], *Diacronie. Studi di Storia Contemporanea* 37, no. 1 (2019): 1–20.
29. Zsombor Bódy, "Élelmiszer-ellátás piac és kötött gazdálkodás között a háború és az összeomlás idején" [Between food supply market and centralized food supply during war and collapse], in *Háborúból békébe: a magyar társadalom 1918–1924* [From war to peace: Hungarian society 1918–24], ed. Zsombor Bódy (Budapest: MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2018), 151–94.
30. In this context, Christopher Clark's presentation of the responsibility of Serbia, Russia, and the Danube Monarchy is particularly impressive. *Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Allen Lane, 2012).
31. Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), 49.
32. An examination of the joint protocols of the Council of Ministers in the last years of the war makes clear that the common leadership of the monarchy was greatly concerned about its dependence on Germany, with all its sources and consequences, as well as about the loss of its own position as a great power.
33. Daniel Marc Segesser, "Der Erste Weltkrieg: Ein totaler krieg in globaler Perspektive?" [The First World War: A total war in global perspective?], in *Erster Weltkrieg. Globaler Konflikt – lokale Folgen. Neue Perspektiven* [World War I, global conflict—local consequences: New perspectives], ed. Stefan Karner and Philipp Lesiak (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2014), 39.
34. Aribert Reimann, "Der Erste Weltkrieg – Urkatastrophe oder Katalysator?" [The First World War: Seminal catastrophe or catalyst?], *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 54, nos. 29–30 (2004): 30–38.

35. Parliamentary debate on this question on February 26 1917, in *Képviseleti napló 1910* [Parliamentary Protocol 1910], Vol. 34 (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1917), 441.
36. Steffen Kailitz, “Nach dem ‘Großen Krieg,’” 39.
37. James Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 4.
38. Tim. B. Müller, *Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, 31.
39. Jacob L. Talmon, *Die Geschichte der totalitären Demokratie* [The history of totalitarian democracy] (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013).
40. In October 1916, Adler, son of the founding father of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, killed Stürghk, the Austrian Prime Minister, in Vienna. The perpetrator, a committed Social Democrat, declared during his trial that his deed had been a protest against the politics of the castle truce. The assassination split the party; the majority distanced themselves from it, while the radical leftists showed great sympathy.
41. Tamara Scheer, “Die Kriegswirtschaft am Übergang von der liberalen-privaten zur staatlich-regulierten Arbeitswelt” [The War economy in transition from a liberal private to a state-regulated work realm], in *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918* [The Habsburg Monarchy, 1848–1918], Vol. 11, *Die Habsburgermonarchie und der Erste Weltkrieg* [The Habsburg Monarchy and the First World War], ed. Helmut Rumpel (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, 2016), 480.
42. John Horne, “Arbeiterklasse und Arbeiterbewegung im Ersten Weltkrieg” [Labor and labor movements in World War I], in *Der Erste Weltkrieg und das 20. Jahrhundert* [The great war and the twentieth century], ed. Jay Winter, Geoffrey Parker, and Mary R. Habeck (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002), 204.
43. Monika Senghaas, *Die Territorialisierung sozialer Sicherung. Raum, Identität und Sozialpolitik in der Habsburgermonarchie* [The territorialization of social protection: Space, identity and social policy in the Habsburg Monarchy] (Berlin: Springer VS, 2015), 247.
44. Jörg Fisch, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker. Die Domestizierung einer Illusion* [The right of peoples to self-determination: the domestication of an illusion] (Munich: Beck, 2010), 144–89.
45. Tim B. Müller, *Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, 32.
46. Manfred Rauchensteiner, “‘Das neue Jahr machte bei uns einen traurigen Einzug.’ Das Ende des Großen Krieges” [“The new year made for us a sad entrance”]: The end of the great war] in Konrad and Maderthaner, . . . *der Rest ist Österreich*, 38.

47. Peter Krüger, “Die Friedensordnung von 1919 und die Entstehung neuer Staaten in Ostmitteleuropa” [The peace settlement of 1919 and the establishment of new states in East Central Europe], in *Das Jahr 1919 in der Tschechoslowakei und in Ostmitteleuropa* [The Year 1919 in Czechoslovakia and East Central Europe], ed. Hans Lemberg and Peter Heumos (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1993), 101.
48. Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment. Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
49. Tim B. Müller and Adam Tooze, “Demokratie nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg” [Democracy after the First World War], in Müller and Tooze, *Normalität und Fragilität*, 32.
50. *Népszava*, November 2, 1918, 1.
51. Ota Konrád, “Widersprüchlich und unvollendet. Die Demokratie der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik 1918 bis 1938” [Contradictory and incomplete: Democracy in the first Czechoslovak Republic from 1918 to 1938], *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 66, no. 2 (2018): 339.
52. Ewald Frie, “100 Jahre 1918/19. Offene Zukünfte” [1918/19 100 years on: Open futures], *Zeithistorische Forschungen / Studies in Contemporary History* 15, no. 1 (2018): 104. The Hungarian Social Democratic Party newspaper wrote about the prerequisites for a democratic order in connection with Germany: the victors “will make peace only with a German government that is supported by a majority of the population.” *Népszava*, November 24, 1918, 5.
53. In this context, see Gábor Egry, “Negotiating Post-Imperial Transitions: Local Societies and Nationalizing States in East Central Europe,” in *Embers of Empire: Continuity and Rupture in the Habsburg Successor States after 1918*, ed. Paul Miller and Claire Morelon (New York: Berghahn Books, 2019) 15–42.
54. Ibolya Murber, “Ein Instrument ungarischer Außenpolitik? Die österreichischen Heimwehren als Akteure in transnationalen rechtsradikalen Netzwerken in den späten 1920er Jahren” [An instrument of Hungarian foreign policy? The Austrian militias as actors in transnational Right-radical networks in the late 1920s], in *Über Grenzen hinweg. Transnationale Politische Gewalt im 20. Jahrhundert* [Beyond borders: Transnational political violence in the twentieth century], ed. Adrian Hänni, Daniel Rickenbacher, and Thomas Schmutz (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2019), 125–50.

55. The legislative period of the Imperial Council constituted in 1911 was extended by an imperially sanctioned 1917 law until December 31, 1918.
56. The German-National Party should be seen as a classic party of dignitaries, which was however the largest party in the Imperial Council, on the basis of the Imperial Council elections of 1911.
57. Also excepting two of the state secretaries, Ignaz Kaup, State Secretary for Health, and Johann Loewenfeld-Russ, State Secretary for Alimentation, who were previously imperial officials.
58. After the National Council elections of February 1919, a coalition of the Social Democrats and Social Christians constituted itself, holding until June 1920.
59. This although ex-Emperor Charles retracted his renunciation of participation in government in his March 23, 1919 Feldkirch Manifesto, not published in Austria. Carlo Moos, *Habsburg post mortem. Betrachtungen zum Weiterleben der Habsburgermonarchie* [Habsburg post-mortem: Reflections on the persistence of the Habsburg Monarchy] (Vienna: Böhlau, 2016), 192.
60. The three-page-long list of the Social Democrats' conditions can be found in Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖstA), Archiv der Republik (AdR), Bundeskanzleramt (BKA), Neues Politisches Archiv (NPA), Staatsratsprotokolle (SRP) Box 1. State Council meeting of October 30, 1918.
61. Ernst Hanisch, *Der große Illusionist. Otto Bauer (1881-1938)* [The great illusionist: Otto Bauer (1881–1938)] (Vienna: Böhlau, 2011), 147.
62. On December 30, 1916, Emperor Charles I was crowned King Charles IV in Budapest; he renounced his involvement in government on November 13, 1918.
63. Pál Hatos, *Az elátkozott köztársaság. Az 1918-as összeomlás és forradalom története* [The cursed republic: The history of collapse and revolution in 1918] (Budapest: Jaffa, 2018), 137.
64. Even the ex-Prime Minister István Tisza argued on October 22, 1918 in Parliament that Károlyi had the “relationship capital” vis-à-vis the West and the Entente powers that Hungary needed. See *Képviselőházi napló 1910* [Parliamentary Record 1910], Vol. 41 (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1917), 401.
65. Ibolya Murber, “Az osztrák es a magyar válságkezelés 1918–1920. Hasonlóságok es különbségek a közös birodalom összeomlását követően” [Austrian and Hungarian crisis management 1918–20: Similarities and

- differences following the collapse of the common empire], *Századok* 152, no. 6 (2018): 1310.
66. Károlyi was head of government and foreign minister from October 31, 1918; on December 12, 1918 he took over the representation of the Defense Ministry as well, and between January 11 and March 21, 1919 he also served as president of Hungary. This mirrors the case of Karl Renner, who alongside the prime ministership took on further ministerial responsibilities, such as the Interior Ministry and the Offices of Internal Affairs, Education and External Affairs.
 67. The leadership of the Hungarian party exhibited a substantially lower level of education than the Austrian Social Democratic leadership. Of the Social Democratic members of the government, only Zsigmond Kunfi, Minister without Portfolio for Labor and Welfare between October 31, 1918 and January 19, 1919, had a university degree. The others at the top of the party did not even possess a high school diploma.
 68. In this context, see Tamás Révész, *Nem akartak katonát látni? A magyar állam és hadserege 1918-1919-ben* [They didn't want to see any soldiers? The Hungarian state and its army in 1918–19], (Budapest: Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2020), 175ff.
 69. For more on the role of Béla Kun, see Ibolya Murber, “Einflüsse der russischen Revolutionen auf die Sozialisten Otto Bauer und Béla Kun [Influences of the Russian revolutions on the Socialists Otto Bauer and Béla Kun], in *Russische Revolutionen 1917: Presseanalysen aus Vorarlberg und internationale Aspekte* [Russian revolutions 1917: Media analyses from Vorarlberg and international aspects], ed. Werner Bundschuh (Feldkirch: Rheticus-Gesellschaft, 2017), 149–63.
 70. Steffen Kailitz, “Nach dem ‘Großen Krieg’,” 31.
 71. Ernst Hanisch, *Der lange Schatten des Staates. Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* [The long shadow of the state: Austrian social history in the twentieth century] (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1994), 266.
 72. Peter Berger, *Kurze Geschichte Österreichs im 20. Jahrhundert* [A short history of Austria in the twentieth century] (Vienna: Facultas, 2008), 57.
 73. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchie: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 7.
 74. Article 2 of this law established German Austria as an integral part of the Republic of Germany.

75. The so-called National Council composed itself, in a not completely legally clear manner, from representatives of the administration as well as parties and various political and administrative bodies—with a constantly changing membership.
76. *Az 1910. évi június hó 21-ére hirdetett országgyűlés képviselőházának irományai* [Records of the National Assembly House of Representatives constituted on June 21, 1910], Vol. 64 (Budapest: Pesti Könyvnyomda Részvénytársaság, 1918), 412.
77. Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

**FORUM: THE MEMORY AND LEGACY
OF 1919 IN HUNGARY**

Introduction

Judith Szapor

The centennial of the Hungarian Republic of Councils in March 2019 has passed without much fanfare in Hungary, its commemoration largely overshadowed by events centered on the approaching hundredth anniversary of the Trianon Treaty and highlighting the significance of the country's twentieth-century history as the main battlefield of current memory politics. In 2018, a representative volume examining the political and cultural legacy of the Hungarian Soviet Republic at its centennial was published not in Hungary but in Vienna, edited by Austrian and Swiss historians.¹ The volume contains contributions, in German, by Hungarian historians based in Hungary and abroad, as well as by many young Austrian, German, and Swiss scholars. Though until very recently this was the only substantial volume on the Hungarian Republic of Councils,² the collaborative effort offers evidence of the lively scholarly interest in the Hungarian revolutions, and demonstrates the benefits of a transnational approach to one of the most controversial but also iconic events of the postwar period.

A roundtable panel, held in Vancouver at the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada annual meeting in June 2019, considered the place and legacy of the Hungarian Republic of Councils (and the liberal-democratic revolution that preceded it) within twentieth-century Hungarian history and beyond. The editors of *Hungarian Studies Review* then extended an invitation to specialists of twentieth-century Hungarian history to address some general and specific aspects of this legacy. Participants were asked to respond to one or more of the following questions:

1. What is the political, intellectual, and cultural significance and legacy of the 1919 Republic of Councils in Hungary?
2. How can you characterize the participation of the Hungarian cultural elite in the Hungarian Soviet Republic?

3. What was the impact of the large-scale emigration of intellectuals and artists on Hungarian and European intellectual and artistic life?
4. What can you say about the role of respective political agendas of successive Hungarian regimes and governments in shaping the memory of the event?

Though arguably short-lived, the liberal-democratic Hungarian People's Republic and the 133-day Republic of Councils constitute a pivotal moment in Hungarian history. The six contributions that follow suggest possible new ways of thinking about this revolutionary moment in Hungarian history. They are presented here in the hope that they will help generate scholarly conversations on a topic whose study has continued to develop along ideological and political lines, entrenching, rather than narrowing, the divisions among the general public and historians alike.

NOTES

1. Christian Koller and Matthias Marschik, eds., *Die Ungarische Räterepublik 1919* [The Hungarian Republic of Councils 1919] (Vienna: Promedia, 2018).
2. Since the writing of these commentaries a handful of scholarly works have marked the centennial in Hungary. These include Lajos Varga, *Kényszerpályáról tévútra: Szociáldemokraták a Tanácsköztársaságban* [From forced path to lost way: Social Democrats in the Republic of Councils] (Budapest: Napvilág, 2019); Viktor Szabó, *A kommunizmus bűvöletében—A magyarországi Tanácsköztársaság propagandája* [Under the spell of communism: The propaganda of the Hungarian Soviet Republic] (Budapest: TIT Teleki László Ismeretterjesztő Egyesület, 1919); Péter Csunderlik, *A "vörös farsangtól" a "vörös tatárjárásig"—A Tanácsköztársaság a korai Horthy-korszak pamflet- és visszaemlékezés-irodalmában* [From 'Red carnival' to 'Red Tatar raid': The Republic of Councils in the pamphlet and memoir literature of the early Horthy era] (Budapest: Napvilág, 2019) and the commemorative issue of the journal *Múltunk*, 64, no. 1 (2019), <http://www.multunk.hu/2019-1-szam/>.

The Legacy of the 1918–1919 Revolutions: A Hundred Years On, Still Contested

Judith Szapor

On October 31, 2019 the prime minister of Hungary unveiled a memorial to the “nation’s martyrs,” victims of the Red Terror during the 1919 Republic of Councils. The memorial is adorned by symbols of Greater Hungary: a giant coffin and the figure of Lady Hungaria, representing the resurrection of pre-1918 Hungary, dissolved in the Trianon Treaty; it stands in a small square adjacent to Parliament, replacing the statue, removed last December, of Imre Nagy, the martyred prime minister of the 1956 revolution. In his speech, László Kövér, the speaker of the National Assembly, characterized the 1919 Republic of Soviets as the culmination of over half a century of civil war, waged from the mid-nineteenth century between agents of secularism, internationalism, socialism, and modernity on one side, and champions of God, family, and the Hungarian nation on the other.

Apart from the vehemence of the tone, there is not much that is new here: these elements of the Orbán government’s view of Hungary’s twentieth-century history, as well as its own role as the heir to the interwar Horthy regime, have been gradually introduced to the public in the last nine years. If anything was surprising at all, it was the degree to which the speech followed the letter and spirit of the 1930s—it could have been easily lifted from an official pronouncement of the mid-1930s. Equally striking was the anachronism of the ceremony: its visual references to a historical (and historicizing) tradition of a certain kind, its reaching for legitimization into the 1930s and epitomized by the Speaker’s traditional *bocskai* jacket, already an anachronistic relic in the 1930s. One is reminded of the famous lines from Robert Musil’s *The Man Without Qualities*, depicting the final days of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, a time that seemed out of joint: “But in those days no one knew what it was moving towards. Nor could anyone quite distinguish between what was above and what below, between what was moving forwards and what backwards.”¹

The memorial to the “nation’s martyrs” itself is not new, but is a reconstructed replica of a statue originally erected in 1934 and destroyed shortly after the end of the Second World War in 1945. Moreover, the ceremony itself mirrored the original unveiling, preserved on contemporary newsreel, down to the position of the gigantic national flags, the presence of religious dignitaries, and the traditional Hungarian aristocratic costumes. It seems that when it comes to the legacy of Hungary’s postwar revolutions and their place in the history of the twentieth century, there is, indeed, not much that has moved forward. Aside from the right-wing government’s backward move to the rhetoric and symbols of the authoritarian interwar era, there has been no forward movement towards reaching even a modicum of national consensus, either among historians or the general public. And as the divide between ideologically and politically motivated readings of the traumatic historical events of the twentieth century becomes increasingly entrenched, so do the respective popular narratives, informed by politics and propaganda but also by the memory of familial experiences that have become irreconcilable.

In the following I will offer comments on instances of memory politics associated with the 1918–1919 revolutions from their immediate aftermath to the present; they are but examples that point to continuities and patterns that have stood in the way of not only a scholarly consensus, but also a civil public discourse around these historical events.

Two elements, namely the lumping together of the two revolutions—the October 1918 liberal democratic revolution led by Mihály Károlyi and the March 1919 Bolshevik-inspired Republic of Councils—and the assigning of blame to both for Trianon, were a hallmark of the Horthy regime from the start and have also become tropes in the current Hungarian government’s rhetoric. The essays of Attila Pók on historical cases of scapegoating² and the recent, short commentaries on the memory politics around the post-World War I revolutions published in the liberal weekly *hvg.hu* by the young historian Péter Csunderlik³ do much to illuminate the process by which Károlyi turned from potential saviour of Hungary’s territorial integrity to its gravedigger. The historians rightly note that the counter-revolutionary regime needed a scapegoat—and lumping together the radical and the moderate left, Communists, Social Democrats, and even liberals, well served a regime that built its popular support on a rhetoric of victimhood and betrayal by the West. But I am also reminded of the historian György Litván exclaiming: they hated no one as passionately as they did Károlyi—because they

could never forgive him for betraying his own class. And I would add another psychological motive: they could never forgive him for their having supported him during the last months of 1918.

It is not difficult to see the similarity with today's government's rhetoric to lump together every shade of liberal thought and institution (including the European Union) as foreign and hostile to Hungarian national interests—a continuity that has been made manifest by the removal of Károlyi's monument from in front of Parliament, one of the first acts of the Fidesz government in 2010. A similar psychological explanation might also help explain the almost pathological zeal of the campaign against George Soros waged by the Orbán regime: the need to atone for the Fidesz leaders' own (neo)liberal past and the support by the billionaire philanthropist they had enjoyed at the beginning of their political career.

The Orbán government is of course far from being the first in twentieth-century Hungarian history to distort and exploit the memory of the post-World War I revolutions for political purposes. It is a legacy that had been at the mercy of the changing governments and regimes in the post-1945 era as well. After an initial period of recognition as the First Hungarian Republic, then a demotion (during the Stalinist period) as merely a bourgeois episode, in the 1970s Károlyi and the Hungarian October came to be accepted into the late Kádár era's pantheon of "progressive traditions." This was as much the result of the need to broaden the regime's popular support by going beyond the ideologically confining celebration of the legacy of the Republic of Councils as, curiously, the work of reform, reformed, or non-Communist historians. Led by György Litván and Gyula Hajdú, historians published the first biographies of Károlyi, began to publish his vast correspondence, and even (if with minor redactions) Károlyi's 1956 memoir, *Faith Without Illusions*, written by the disenchanted fellow traveler at the end of his long life.⁴ (Károlyi's "rehabilitation" proved to be the first step in a larger project during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the re-discovery of the democratic "counter-culture" of the Hungarian fin de siècle, whose political, literary, and artistic avant-garde served as a predecessor for the emerging democratic opposition of the soft dictatorship of the late Kádár era.)

The legacy of the post-1919 intellectual emigration had been shaped along an almost identical trajectory. Intellectuals and artists who left or escaped during or after the Republic of Councils in protest, because of their involvement, or as a result of the 1920 *numerus clausus* legislation, had been vilified by the Horthy regime; and, with the

exception of those who returned after 1945 as Communists, they continued to be ostracized or were forgotten during the Stalinist period. Their (for the most part) symbolic return in the form of TV interviews, books translated and published, and artistic legacy embraced did not happen until the 1970s—as part of the rediscovery of the early twentieth century’s progressive, modernist counter-culture described above. Even if their legacy cannot be simply erased, today their intellectual and artistic significance has been brought into question with government support and distinctions handed out (as in the interwar or, for that matter, the Stalinist period) largely on ideological grounds, as opposed to artistic or intellectual merit. And as before, such policy favors conservatism and lack of experimentation both in terms of politics and artistic and intellectual expression—so we should not be surprised by the renewed official celebration of the leading right-wing writers and intellectuals of the Horthy era and, in public projects, a reappearance of the interwar period’s trademark “neo-Baroque,” anti-modernist, historicizing style.

This forum discussion was prompted by the centennial of Hungary’s two postwar revolutions, an anniversary that has arrived at the tail end of the tremendous boom of World War I studies, monographs, edited volumes, and conferences generated by the centennial of the First World War. Moreover, the centennial was not an ordinary one, in that it did not mark a single event but one that was prolonged, stretched into four years, and included other events of lasting and global significance, such as the Bolshevik revolution and, tucked on to the war’s end, women’s suffrage in most European and Western countries. (This includes Hungary, where women practiced the right to vote in January 1920.)

We cannot blame historians for not letting anniversaries of significant historical events go without addressing—or, if one wanted to be cynical, milking—them. For they present unique opportunities not only to sell illustrated volumes on such perennial favourites in the history of the First World War as the great battles and the Christmas Truce, but also to consider them in a new light. One of the most fruitful scholarly discussions in twentieth-century European historiography to emerge in recent years was the one that presented a convincing case for making the beginning and end of the war more elastic, reaching back to 1907 and ahead to 1923, and turning the traditional narrative of the conflict between the two military alliances into a European civil war. But there is high irony in the fact that this important discussion, based

on a much more inclusive concept of Europe and the lived experience of considerably more Europeans, has never reached a popular readership.

The last few years also saw initiatives by scholarly institutions and universities in Europe and North America to connect these audiences and engage historians and the public in discussions on the war's social and emotional legacies. For with or without anniversaries, the general public has had an enduring fascination with the First World War. One of the possible reasons for that may be that the Great War had left a lasting mark on European societies, touched almost every family, and has lived on in family lore—and what made this centennial especially significant was the fact that we have now surpassed the “statute of limitations” on participants or eye-witnesses. One of the most disheartening aspects of the current memory wars waged by the Hungarian government is that this centennial passed without a chance to unearth these often conflicting personal and familial memories and confront them—and, potentially, bring them together—in the public realm.

John Horne, one of the leading historians of the First World War and a proponent, with Robert Gerwarth, of a new chronology of the Great War stretching from 1907 to 1923, suggests we take a closer look at defeat when considering the fate of European societies in the wake of the First World War. As he notes, “Defeat looms large in memory, and thus history, because it marks rupture and renewal even more obviously than its inescapable twin, victory.”⁵ He cites a great number of cases from postwar European history—but curiously, not Hungary's, even if I believe it would have fit his argument to a T—and argues that if a nation fails to confront and examine its defeat, it will condemn society to continuing trauma. No historian or, for that matter, politician would argue that such a task is easily accomplished. And I was never a fan of the adage about learning from history in order to avoid repeating it. But if there are any lessons to be learned from the rest of the history of the twentieth century, especially of the countries defeated in the First World War, it is that societies should avoid this task at their own peril—that is, if they are engaged in building a future and do not define themselves by their past defeats.

Historians should have a special role to play in this work of exploring and overcoming the traumatic past. Not that we can accuse them of not doing their fair share throughout the twentieth century, from Gyula Szekfű to Erik Molnár, in shaping the memory of the 1918–1919 revolutions—and, generally, supporting political

agendas. The liberal public, ever-diminishing liberal media, and small number of liberal or moderate conservative historians in Hungary have every reason to be outraged by the right-wing excesses of the current government's memory wars and its evocation of the most divisive rhetoric borrowed straight from the Horthy era. But they also have an obligation to offer, if perhaps not an equally and instantly appealing (by way of populist and nationalist rhetoric) but at least a professionally considered alternative, one that is based on an examination of historical evidence and popular memory. And, to close on a mildly optimistic note, there are signs indeed that young Hungarian historians have taken up this call.

NOTES

1. Robert Musil, *The Man Without Qualities: A Sort of Introduction. The Like of It Now Happens (I)*, trans. Eithne Wilkins and Ernst Kaiser (London: Secker & Warburg, 1953), 8.
2. Attila Pók, "Scapegoats in Post-World War I Hungarian Political Thought," *Hungarian Studies* 14, no. 2 (January 2001), 202–06; Attila Pók, *The Politics of Hatred in the Middle of Europe: Scapegoating in Twentieth Century Hungary: History and Historiography* (Szombathely: Savaria University Press, 2009).
3. Péter Csunderlik, "A történelemhamisítás emlékműve" [The monument to the falsification of history], *HVG*, October 31, 2019, https://hvg.hu/360/201944_a_tortenelemhamisitas_emlekmuve; Péter Csunderlik, "Összeesküvés-elméletek helyett szembenézés Trianonnal [Instead of conspiracy theories, a reckoning with Trianon]," *HVG*, January 11, 2020, https://hvg.hu/360/202002_trianon_es_azoncsonkitas.
4. Mihály Károlyi, *Hit, illúziók nélkül* [Faith without illusions] (Budapest, Magvető); 1977.
5. John Horne, "Defeat and Memory in Modern History," in *Defeat and Memory: Cultural Histories of Military Defeat in the Modern Era*, ed. Jenny Macleod (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 11.

Violence Glorified or Denied? Collective Memory of the Red and White Terrors in Hungary, 1919–Present

Béla Bodó

In the spring and summer of 1919, contemporaries were convinced that they had been witnessing history in the making. The famous liberal historian Henrik Marczali made what we today would call the first “oral history” interview with Béla Kun, the de facto leader of the Republic of Councils.¹ At the same time, but to a different end, the novelist Cécile Tormay was recording events as she saw them in her *An Outlaw's Diary*.² The battle over the sovereignty of interpretation (*Deutungshoheit*) of the recent past thus began even before the demise of the Republic of Councils at the end of July 1919. For the first several months after the collapse, its exiled leaders did not discuss the recent past; preoccupied by survival, the refugees, if they committed their thoughts to paper at all, focused their attention on the White Terror: on the paramilitary and mob violence and the political repression that followed the collapse.

The memory of the Republic of Councils, as it slowly took form in the winter of 1919, was thus colored from the start by (and it could be even argued that it was a reaction to) a later event, the White Terror. The exiled leaders of the Republic of Councils, such as József Pogány, saw the White Terror and the paramilitary groups as a tool in the hands of the feudal and capitalist elites to “exterminate the working class.”³ Non-communist refugees, such as the moderate socialist Oszkár Jászi, on the other hand, believed that the White Terror was the work of newly mobilized social groups, such as military officers, war veterans, enraged peasants, lower-ranking civil servants, and non-Jewish segments of the urban and petty bourgeoisie. In Jászi's view, the elite did not create, but merely sought to take advantage of, the murderous rage of these newly mobilized social groups in order to eliminate the agents of progress in Hungary, namely the progressive (mainly foreign, i.e. Jewish or German) intelligentsia. After they had done their duty, Jászi contended,

the more enlightened members of the political and social elite would push these radical groups into the background and restore the conservative liberal order.⁴

The Communist exiles turned the victims of the White Terror, particularly the executed leaders of the Republic of Councils, such as Ottó Korvin, into political martyrs.⁵ This new martyrology served several purposes. First, it was meant to justify Red crimes and divert attention from the mistakes and omissions made by the leaders of the Republic of Councils and from the violent aspects of Bolshevik rule. Second, the narrative about the White Terror was devised to undermine the reputation of Admiral Miklós Horthy and his National Army and cast doubt on the legitimacy of the slowly consolidating counterrevolutionary regime. Third, the colorful descriptions of the White Terror, the demonization of the enemy, and the hysteria about the counterrevolution and counterrevolutionaries helped to mend fences among the quarrelsome exiles. Whereas the debate over past policies, especially in regard to land reform and military strategy, tended to divide the exiles, the shared narrative about the White Terror helped to restore a semblance of unity.⁶

Only slowly were the exiled Communist leaders able to achieve a consensus on the memory of the Republic of Councils. The new agreement envisioned the recent past as a positive experience; it was a heroic, yet ultimately tragic, struggle on behalf of humanity to achieve emancipation and obtain social justice. The Republic of Councils thus came to be remembered in émigré circles as the first Hungarian government that extended political rights to the masses, and introduced sweeping social reforms. The Republic of Councils, the Marxist narrative went, moved working-class and poor peasant families into the confiscated castles and large apartments of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie; it opened museums and libraries to the working poor, who were hungry for culture, and sent proletarian children on holidays. In this narrative, the Red Terror played only a minor role. It is not that the exiled leaders of the Republic of Councils were apologetic about hostage-taking, confiscation of goods, mass executions, and other acts of violence. The radical refugees, as good students of Marx, considered violence “the midwife of history.” Machiavelli advised that the end always justified the means; for him, however, the end did not have to have a spiritual dimension. György Lukács and his comrades, on the other hand, considered Communism as mankind’s last home and final refuge. They did

not, however, just believe that any means could be used to reach this glorious end. Lukács and his companions were also convinced that the holy end sanctified the lowliest of means; it turned evil into good, and the readiness to use violence from a character fault into a sign of virtue.

How the Communists and the exiled moderate socialists remembered the Republic of Councils and the Red and White Terrors was of little concern to the large majority of Hungarians who never read their clandestine pamphlets and books. The incipient Horthy regime interpreted the recent past differently. The courts, which passed judgment on some of the captured Communist leaders in December 1919, declared the Republic of Councils a criminal enterprise and the party officials and civil servants, irrespective of their ranks, as villains. The demonization of the Republic of Councils left no room to acknowledge its positive achievements; progressive social legislation passed in this period and the initially successful attempt to defend the country from invading foreign armies remained a taboo in the interwar period. In the conservative and Right-radical narratives, the Republic of Councils stood outside the flow of Hungarian history; according to the official narrative, the Communist victory had no roots in pre-war social and political problems, economic backwardness, or the mistakes and omissions made by the political elites during the war.

The first memoirs and historical studies composed by conservative and Right-radical authors portrayed the two revolutions as the product of a Judeo-Bolshevik world conspiracy.⁷ They mirrored the political pamphlets written by exiled Communists in Vienna; both the Left and Right-radical authors tended to exaggerate the brutality of their opponents, and often published stories which were pure inventions.⁸ More restrained in this regard were the Horthy biographies, which first appeared on the market in the second half of the 1920s. Written by Right-radical authors, the first Horthy biographies celebrated the admiral as an anti-Bolshevik hero, who had single-handedly defeated the Communist threat, ended the Red Terror, and restored both law and order and the country's independence.⁹ The Horthy biographies of the 1930s and early 1940s, on the other hand, portrayed the Regent as a conservative statesman who hated both left- and right-wing radicalism equally.¹⁰ In this modified narrative, the Admiral not only defeated Bolshevism, but also, by first reining in and later dissolving the right-wing militias, helped to restore law and order. Both the older and newer Horthy biographies denied that the admiral had ordered or

witnessed any of the atrocities; the later works, however, claimed that Horthy was a major force behind the prosecution of crimes committed by the officers' detachments and the civic militias.

Simultaneously with the conservative turn in the Horthy cult, the members of right-wing militias began to publish their memoirs.¹¹ In their books, the ex-militiamen paid little attention to Horthy; instead of the political elite, the authors focused their attention on the rank and file of the paramilitary groups: on their struggle against Communists, Freemasons, and Jews; and, most importantly, on the militia uprisings in western Hungary in the summer and fall of 1921, which preserved Hungarian rule in part of the contested region. The new fascist and national socialist parties in the second half of the 1930s also traced their origins back to the militias' struggle against both Bolshevism and the remnants of the pre-war liberal order. In the early 1940s, perhaps the best known national socialist academic, János Makkai, hailed the militia members as middle-class revolutionaries and Europe's first fascists.¹²

The demonization of the democratic and the Communist experience and the denunciation of the Red Terror were not confined to written text: they also found expression in art, monuments, and public celebrations. Many war memorials made a reference to the Red Terror in the figure of a snake or dragon, which were commonly understood as the symbols of Bolshevism. During the yearly commemorations of the lost war, the speakers rarely neglected to condemn Bolshevik rule. In the interwar period, every village and town which had been victimized by the Red militias erected monuments to honor their dead. In Budapest, plaques marked the places of Red crimes. The statues of the leading intellectuals of the counterrevolution, such as Bishop Ottokár Prohászka and the early modern saint János Kapisztrán, served the same goal. Prohászka was a patron of the student militias, the main forces of paramilitary violence on university campuses, and one of the sponsors of the *numerus clausus* legislation. The main force behind the Kapisztrán cult was Army Bishop István Zadravec. A counterrevolutionary of the first hour, the army bishop was a close friend of the best known paramilitary leader, Deputy Colonel Baron Pál Prónay; he continued to defend the paramilitary groups, and justified extrajudicial executions, armed robberies, and violent attacks on Jews long after the main perpetrators, the members of the paramilitary groups and patriotic associations, had fallen out of favor with the political and social elites.

After the liberation of the country by Soviet troops from Nazi occupation and Arrow Cross terror in April 1945, one of the first actions

of the recently legalized Communist Party and its social democratic and peasant allies was to remove the statues and plaques, and change the names of the streets, which had reminded people of, and made references to, the Red Terror. The removal of these memorials was followed by the destruction of the monuments to leading political and cultural figures, such as Bishop Prohászka, who had been idealized by the interwar regime, and Prime Minister István Tisza, whose murder at the end of October 1918 had been remembered as a prelude to the revolutions, chaos, and Bolshevik rule. Some of the socialist victims of the White Terror were reburied in public ceremonies. The second half of the 1940s also witnessed the erection of public memorials that served to commemorate the sacrifices of the victims of the White Terror.¹³ By contrast, the prosecution of surviving members of White paramilitary groups for the atrocities committed proceeded at a snail's pace and was fraught with contradictions. The most infamous paramilitary leaders had either died before 1945, or had emigrated or went into hiding after the war. Legal documents, including many interwar testimonies, had been lost, and the court system was overburdened by more recent crimes. The new democratic regime between 1945 and 1948, and its Stalinist successor after 1948, were prepared to prosecute the murderers of socialist or Communist dignitaries or labor activists; they were, however, reluctant to provide justice to the victims of hate crimes: that is, middle-class Jews who had no socialist or Communist connections.

The official memory paradigm of the White Terror emerged during the trial of Iván Héjjas (in absentia) and his men in 1947 and 1948. In his verdict, the President of the Court drew, for the first time, a direct connection between the White Terror in 1919 and Hungary's alliance with the fascist powers in the late 1930s, its entry into the war on the side of its allies and its participation in the invasion of Soviet Union in 1941, the role of the political elite in the Holocaust, and the horrors of the Arrow Cross dictatorship in the final phase of the war. The judge's conclusion quickly congealed into a historical fact and received knowledge, which was then repeated countless times in textbooks and at public celebrations between 1948 and 1989.¹⁴ The rehabilitation of the Republic of Councils as a positive experience also began soon after the liberation; ironically, as my study of parliamentary speeches after 1945 has made clear, the main role in its rehabilitation, just as in the destruction of "uncomfortable" monuments, was played by Social Democrats rather than the Communist Party. The new (old) consensus was that the Republic of Councils represented a positive experience and served as a prelude to, and model for, the new state after

1948. Aware of the lingering negative memory of the Red Terror, Communist leaders, however, were reluctant to call the new regime a continuation of the Republic of Councils. Eager to establish their nationalist credentials, the evolving new political elite after 1945 invested heavily in the centennial celebration of the 1848 Revolution. The new narrative portrayed the Communist takeover in 1948 as the culmination and fulfillment of earlier struggles—particularly the Revolution of 1848—for national independence, political emancipation, and social justice.

The 1956 Revolution led to a drastic shift in the composition, meaning, and political importance of the collective memory of the Republic of Councils. The bloodshed that accompanied the Revolution gave the left-wing recollection of the White Terror immediacy and relevance that it had not possessed since the fall of 1919. The connection between the White Terror, on the one hand, and the Second World War and Holocaust, on the other, had already been made after 1947: a new charge, namely that the counterrevolution of 1919 paved the way for the “counterrevolution of 1956,” was added. This was not an idle accusation: to prove that charge, the political police were ordered to reexamine the files of known and convicted counterrevolutionaries. Although, on the whole, the search proved to be a waste of time, in a handful of cases, the police and the courts were indeed able to prove the existence of such links. The trial in 1957 of the most important catch, the minor militia leader Mihály Francia Kiss, who had been on the run since 1945, gave the court the chance to publicize the official line about the connection between the two events.¹⁵

Built to celebrate the forty- and the fifty-year anniversaries of the Republic of Councils, the large and intimidating statues of soldiers and male and female workers were meant to show strength on the side of the political elite and to send a message to the population about the futility of armed resistance. With the consolidation and growing popularity of the Kádár regime in the 1960s, however, this function gradually fell to the wayside. The Kádár regime, both in its totalitarian phase in the late 1950s and its authoritarian period after 1963, continued to regard the Red Terror as a positive event, and violence as a justified and necessary means to defend itself against the machinations of “counterrevolutionaries.” The statues erected and the street and public buildings named after enforcers, such as Ottó Korvin and Tibor Szamuely, testified in the 1960s both to the unbroken identification with the Marxist view on violence and to the continued paranoia about the counterrevolutionary

threat. The coverage of the Red and White terrors in high school and university textbooks also changed only slightly between 1956 and 1989. Yet, with the increasing popularity of the Kádár regime, the negative messages became supplemented by more positive narratives as well. The Kádár regime in the 1970s and 1980s remembered the Republic of Councils mainly for its military victories and its achievements in the social and cultural realms. The new narrative transformed the Republic of Councils into a forerunner of the socialist welfare state, and the Red Army from the vanguard of a world revolution into a defender of the nation.

The late 1960s and 1970s witnessed not only the reinterpretation but also the increasing commoditization and trivialization of the history of the Republic of Councils and the Red and White terrors. In the heyday of commemoration in the late 1960s, hundreds of poems and theater plays were written and performed, music was composed, and dozens of documentaries and adventure films were made about these historical events. Films such as *Bors Máté* (Matthew Pepper) provided wholesome entertainment. However, as propaganda material they were a poor substitute for hard-core ideological training; in any case, films such as *Bors Máté* were ill-suited to convert young men and women into fanatical defenders of the socialist system. The commodification and trivialization of the collective memory of the Republic of Councils continued in the last fifteen years of the regime's existence.¹⁶ The statues erected to honor the memory of the leaders of the Republic of Councils, such as Béla Kun, and the victims of the White Terror, however, were of modest size; instead of emanating threats and extolling violence in the service of a good cause, the newer works conveyed a humanist message about the futility of armed conflicts. It is not that old reflexes had completely died, however. In November 1988, on the eve of the regime change, the recently deposed Prime Minister, Károly Grósz, warned about the coming of a new "White Terror," if the party faithful were foolish enough to surrender power and opt for the restoration of parliamentary democracy. In a sign of the changing times, even his fellow socialists ignored the warning. The left-wing collective memory of the Republic of Councils and the Red and White terrors had expired as a political and intellectual force even before the complete collapse of the authoritarian regime.

The last thirty years has witnessed a partial return to the collective memory and commemorative practices of the interwar Horthy

regime. In the early 1990s, politicians in Parliament and opinion-makers in the media competed with one another to denounce the Republic of Councils as a government based on the exercise of naked power alone. After 1990, March 21, the day of the Communist takeover in 1919, was no longer celebrated as a public holiday. Memorials erected to honor the victims of the White Terror, unless they stood in cemeteries, were torn down and destroyed or transported to Memorial Park, “the museum of forgotten statues,” on the outskirts of Budapest. The textbooks, surprisingly enough, changed only gradually: even in the late 1990s, one could find high school and university textbooks which, at least in regards to the White Terror and the positive achievement of the Republic of Councils, continued to repeat almost verbatim the socialist narrative.¹⁷

While reminders of the Republic of Councils and victims of the White Terror were removed from public spaces, conservative and right-wing groups put up plaques, restored old statues, and renamed streets to honor the victims of the Red Terror. Intellectuals commonly identified with the counterrevolution, such as Dezső Szabó and Cécile Tormay, acquired the status of political saints in the same circles: their books have been republished, dozens of streets have been named after them, and many plaques and statues have been erected in their honor.¹⁸ The revival of the Horthy cult in the early 1990s put the role of the admiral during the counterrevolution in a more positive light; the celebration of Horthy as a man who singlehandedly defeated Bolshevism went hand-in-hand with the trivialization of the White Terror and the partial rehabilitation of its perpetrators.¹⁹ In the last ten years, a “war of memorials” sought to indict not only the leaders of the Republic of Councils, such as Béla Kun, but also fellow travelers, such as Mihály Károlyi; moderate and patriotic socialists, such as Imre Nagy; and cultural icons, such as the Marxist philosopher György Lukács (whose monument in the XIII district is being replaced by a Saint Stephen statue). The war over the interpretation of key events in modern Hungarian history is not confined to intellectual discussions. With the rise of paramilitarism and military violence, particularly against the Roma minority, the last twenty years has turned the recent revival of the cult of right-wing paramilitary groups and their leaders into a political and indeed a law-and-order issue of the first order.²⁰ The right-wing shift in Hungarian politics has led not only to the reassessment of the role of conservative statesman such as István Tisza; it has also raised the specter of the complete revision of modern Hungarian history and collective memory along conservative

and Right-radical lines by purging them of any positive reference to liberal, democratic, and social democratic traditions. The intense struggle over *Deutungshoheit* in regard to the meaning and significance of Hungary's first experiment with Communism and of the Red and White terrors will continue to have an impact on collective identity.

NOTES

1. Ignác Romsics, *Clio bűvöletében. Magyar történetírás a 19-20. században—nemzetközi kitekintéssel* [Under the spell of Clio: Hungarian history writing in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—with an international perspective] (Budapest: Osiris, 2011), 260–84.
2. Cécile Tormay, *Bujdosó könyv. Feljegyzések 1918–1919-ből* [An outlaw's diary: Notes from 1918–19] (Budapest: Génius, 1938).
3. József Pogány, *A fehérterror Magyarországon* [White Terror in Hungary] (Vienna: Arbeiter-Buchhandlung, 1920); József Pogány, “A munkásosztály kiirtása” [The extermination of the working class], in Györgyi Markovits, *Magyar pokol: A magyarországi fehérterror betiltott és üldözött kiadványok tükrében* [Hungarian hell: Hungary's White Terror as reflected in banned and persecuted publications] (Budapest: Magvető Kiadó, 1964), 402–19. On Pogány see, Thomas Sakmayster, *A Communist Odyssey: The Life of József Pogány* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2012).
4. Oscar Jászi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary* (London: P. S. King & Son, 1924).
5. Jenő Hamburger, “Mártirok” [Martyrs], in Markovits, *Magyar pokol*, 207–09; József Halmi, “Orgovány,” in Markovits, *Magyar pokol*, 64–77.
6. Arpad Kadarkay, *Georg Lukács: Life, Thought, and Politics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
7. See Peter Csunderlik, *A “Vörös Farsangtól” A “Vörös Tatarjárásig”—A Tanácsköztársaság A Horthy-Korszak Pamflet-És Visszeemlékezés Irodalmában* [From “Red carnival” to “Red Tatar raid”: The Republic of Councils in the pamphlet and memoir literature of the early Horthy era] (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 2019), 99–141, 232–62. See also Paul Hanebrink, *A Specter Hunting Europe: The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2018).
8. Ladislaus Bizony, *133 Tage Ungarischer Bolschewismus. Die Herrschaft Béla Kuns und Tibor Szamuelys. Die Blutigen Ereignisse in Ungarn* [133

- days of Hungarian Bolshevism: The rule of Béla Kun and Tibor Szamuely: The bloody events in Hungary] (Leipzig and Vienna: Waldheim-Eberle, 1920).
9. Jenő Pilch, *Horthy Miklós* [Miklós Horthy] (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1928).
 10. On Horthy biographies in the interwar period, see David Turbucz, *A Horthy-kultusz* [The Horthy cult] (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Emlékek, 2015).
 11. Dr. Jenő Héjjas, *A nyugatmagyarországi felkelés: kecskemétiak az 1921. évi nyugat-magyarországi harcokban* [The uprising in western Hungary: Kecskemétiak in the 1921 battles in western Hungary] (Budapest: Magyar Ház, 2006; first published 1935[?]); Gyula Somogyváry, *És mégis élünk* [And yet we live] (Budapest: Auktor, 2004; first published 1943).
 12. János Makkai, *A háború utáni Magyarország* [Hungary after the war] (Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1937).
 13. László Prohászka, *Szoborhistoriák* [Statue Stories] (Budapest: Városháza, 2004).
 14. Budapest City Archive (Budapest Főváros Levéltára or BFL), 13672/5 Nü Bp Nü 1946, Héjjas és társai Bp Nb. VII5e 20630/49.
 15. Supreme Court of the Hungarian Republic (Magyar Köztársaság Legfelsőbb Bírósága), Verdict (Végzés). Budapest, November 28, 1994, Budapest City Archive, XXV. 4.a. 1798/57 FB Bttö, Fr. Kiss Mihály, 74–83; István Rév, “Covering History,” in *Disturbing Remains: Memory, History and the Crisis of the Twentieth Century*, ed. Michael S. Roth and Charles Salas (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2001), 231–51.
 16. Péter Apor, *Elképzelt Köztársaság: a Magyar Tanácsköztársaság Utóélete, 1945-1989* [Imagined republic: The afterlife of the Hungarian Council Republic] (Budapest: MTA Történettudomány Intézet, 2014).
 17. See Béla Bodó, “Memory Practices: The Red and White Terrors in Hungary as Remembered after 1990.” *East Central Europe* 44, no. 2–3 (2017), 186–215.
 18. For a highly favourable account of the life of Tormay, see Krisztina Kollarits, *Egy bujdosó írónő, Tormay Cécile* [An outlaw female writer: Cécile Tormay] (Vasszilvány: Magyar Nyugat Könyvkiadó, 2010). For a more critical approach to post-1918 right-wing feminism, see Judith Szapor, *Hungarian Women’s Activism in the Wake of the First World War: From Rights to Revanche* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018).
 19. For the recent literature on the White Terror, see Emily Gioielli, “White Misrule: Terror and Political Violence during Hungary’s Long World War I” (PhD diss., Central European University, 2015); Gergely Bödök, “Vörös- és Fehérterror Magyarországon (1919–1921)” [Red and White

- Terror in Hungary, 1919–21] (PhD diss., Károly Eszterházy University, 2018); Béla Bodó, *The White Terror: Antisemitic and Political Violence in Hungary, 1919-1921* (London: Routledge, 2019).
20. On the changing political climate in Hungary in the last ten years, see György Csepeli, ed., *Új tekintélyelvűség a mai Magyarországon* [New authoritarianism in today's Hungary] (Budapest: Apeiron, 2011); for a positive portrayal of the members of the right-wing militias as patriots, see József Botlik, *Nyugat-Magyarország sorsa. 1918-1921* [The fate of western Hungary, 1918–21] (Vasszilvány: Magyar Nyugat, 2008); Pál Földi, *Rongyos Gárda* [The Ragged Guard] (Budapest: Anno, 2010).

Utopias in the Hungarian Republic of Councils

Boldizsár Vörös

In regard to the first question (namely, the political, intellectual, and cultural significance and legacy of the 1919 Hungarian Republic of Councils), in this brief commentary I will discuss the Republic of Councils as a system that operated to foster utopias (although, according to those shaping public opinion at the time, this was realised only much later), and look at it in its political and cultural context.

Both before and after the establishment of the Republic of Councils, political groups participating in the dictatorship published works on the kind of world order they intended to create in the long term. The Hungarian Social Democrats had published August Bebel's book *Woman and Socialism* in several Hungarian-language editions prior to March 21, 1919; during the tenure of the Republic of Councils this work was put in print by the new, united party's book publishing office. The book postulated, among other things, that the tools of production, the means of transportation, and land would be under social ownership. In the ideal economic-societal system to come, the conditions of life would be equal for everybody. According to Bebel, the new society would be built upon "international solidarity": people of the world would unite and do their utmost to spread the new social system to every corner of the world.¹ The most important communist notions about the ideal world order of the future, similar in many respects to those of Bebel, could already be found in Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin's *The Programme of the Communists (Bolsheviks)*, which had also been published several times in Hungarian by the Party of Communists in Hungary before the Republic of Councils came into being, while during the dictatorship of the proletariat it was published by one of the groups of the Commissariat of Public Education. Bukharin illustrated the state of affairs to be achieved thus: "In the end the entire world must become one single workers' factory, in which the whole of humanity will work for itself in the largest possible workshops with the best machinery and with no employers or capitalists to realise one single, strictly

elaborated, calculated, and measured plan.”² The leading intellectuals of the Republic of Councils must have drawn great inspiration not only from the details, but also from the whole far-reaching visions for the future contained in these foreign works, helping them formulate their own versions of the theme.

Probably the most significant of these works was the vision outlined in the supplements to the *Néptanítók Lapja* (Journal of elementary teachers), in the series of lessons on universal and Hungarian history, published by the Commissariat of Public Education. The People’s Commissar of Public Education ordered teachers to use these during their teaching. The teaching material said the following about the future ideal world order: there will be no “wealthy,” nor hungry poor, because the fruits of common labour will be shared equally; class division will come to an end. There will be no robbers, nor thieves, since if they cannot profit from stealing, they will not take the property of others. There will be no misery and sin in the world, nor will there be poor and uneducated people, because in the communist society every skill of every person will be needed. In the new social order, every child will be educated in the same way and turned into a cultured person in uniform schools. Up to now even the talentless children of the rich graduated from academic institutions, while the most outstanding intellectual skills were lost if a child had no means to study. Everyone will begin a career in accordance with their abilities and thus everyone will find a place suitable for them, where they can best use their skills for the common good of all their fellow men and women in the future “society.”³

Descriptions of the ideal world order of various lengths also appeared in newspaper articles, leaflets, and placards regarded as official organs, and indeed in a utopian state novel published in several parts in *Néptanítók Lapja*, which portrayed a communist Hungary in the distant future of 2020. Based on works of this type it can be concluded that the opinion makers of the dictatorship had a utopian vision of the future and tried to mediate it with various types of material aimed at the target groups of their propaganda. In some illustrations of the future, some of the components were more detailed than others, obviously depending on which target group the authors primarily intended to address, and, accordingly, where their writings would be published. Hence, in the teaching material cited earlier, roughly half of the texts discussing the ideal conditions to come dealt with the education and training of the new generations; their purpose may have been to bring the presented

system closer to schoolchildren and make it more comprehensible by including details of learning they were personally familiar with.

The Hungarian Republic of Councils as a dictatorship of the proletariat was defined and presented in the works of its leading thinkers as a political system operating temporarily in the process of building the ideal world order. This is clearly demonstrated by Section 1 of the Constitution passed in June 1919, which stipulated that “The dictatorship of the proletariat is merely a tool to eliminate all manner of exploitation and every kind of class rule, and to prepare the classless social order in which the chief tool of class rule, state power, will cease to exist.”⁴ How long this transitional period would last was addressed by Karl Radek in his *The Development of Socialism from Science to Reality*, published in Hungarian as a brochure before March 21, 1919 by the Party of Communists in Hungary and during the Council Republic by the united party: “*The socialist revolution is a long process because it begins with the dethronement of the capitalist class and only ends with the complete transformation of the capitalist economy into a workers’ community. This process will take at least a generation in every state and this is the period of time necessary for the dictatorship of the proletariat.*”⁵ There can be little doubt that this view influenced Jenő Varga when he spoke of “socialist self-awareness” in the future at the Councils’ General Session in June 1919, stating that it would be realised “by the next generation, in the era of complete communism.”⁶

The function of utopias at that time was to urge people to create a new world, better than the one before it, while they could also be used to legitimise the radical measures of those who controlled the dictatorship, including the use of terror. According to this logic, such means were necessary to create the ideal conditions aspired to. In an article titled “The Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” published in the March 22 issue of *Vörös Újság* (Red News), the leading newspaper of the Republic of Councils, the author wrote, “It is necessary that the working class create order with an iron fist. But this dictatorship will only be a transitional period. This will be followed by a period of prosperity and complete freedom for everybody. However, until then we will have to use the tools of power.”⁷ Taking all of this into consideration, I believe that the study of depictions of an ideal world order that can be regarded as official during the tenure of the Hungarian Republic of Councils contributes not only to the understanding of the ideology, propaganda, and political system of the dictatorship, but also to the demonstration of certain attributes of the utopias.

NOTES

1. Ágost Bebel, *A nő és a szocializmus* [Woman and socialism], trans. Béla Somogyi (Budapest: Népszava, 1918), 499.
2. Nikoláj Bucharin, *A kommunisták (bolsevikiek) programja* [The programme of the Communists (Bolsheviks)], trans. Endre Rudnyánszky, The Library of Communism (Budapest: Kommunisták Magyarországi Pártja, 1919), 15.
3. Vilma Bresztovszky, *Bevezető leckék a történelem tanításához* [Introductory lessons for the teaching of history], Appendix to *Néptanítók Lapja*, no. 17 (1919): 7.
4. “A Magyarországi Szocialista Szövetséges Tanácsköztársaság alkotmánya” [The constitution of the Federal Socialist Republic of Councils of Hungary], *Tanácsköztársaság* 1, no. 78 (June 28, 1919): 1.
5. Karl Radek, *A szocializmus fejlődése a tudománytól a valóságig* [The development of socialism from science to reality], trans. László F. Boross, The Library of Communism (Budapest: Magyarországi Szocialista Párt, 1919), 21.
6. A Tanácsok Országos Gyűlésének (1919 június 14–1919 június 23) naplója [The minutes of the General Session of Councils (June 14–23, 1919)] (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1919), 30.
7. “A proletárság diktatúrája” [The dictatorship of the proletariat], *Vörös Újság* 2, no. 38 (March 22, 1919): 3.

Notes on the Centenary of the 1919 Hungarian Republic of Councils

Éva Forgács

The Hungarian Republic of Councils, or, as it is referred to in shorthand, the Commune, lasted 133 days, from March 21 until August 1, 1919, and inspired Hungarian socialists and left-leaning artists in many ways. While a number of facts about the fundamentally dictatorial nature of the short-lived regime led by Béla Kun have retroactively come to light, during its existence there were, apparently, a number of artists, thinkers, and socialist workers who sincerely believed that it was a political renewal in the direction of social equality. The nationalization of some of the land and the cultural assets of aristocratic families—historic as well as Jewish—remained one of the legacies of the Commune. While it had a troubled history with regard to freedom of speech and freedom of the press, its existence was too short for the regime to become visibly and unequivocally dictatorial. The mixed legacy of the Commune originates precisely from its short existence: a number of the dictatorial measures were just germinating, or not yet visible, before it was crushed.

The Hungarian cultural elite mostly embraced what appeared to be a new era of social justice. Theaters, museums, and art schools all of a sudden opened to everyone, and it was an issue of good faith and unselfishness to engage in the activities of educating poor children and facilitating access to high culture for masses of people. As we know, however, a lot of this was illusory. Lajos Kassák, for example, confesses in his autobiography that the performance of a modernist play by the *Ma* group generated inappropriate reactions in its working-class audience: laughter at the wrong moments, and general lack of understanding. This led Kassák to reconfigure his theatrical and performance events so they included poetry recitals and classical music performed on stage, rather than expressionist stage works.¹ There was no time to educate a new audience that would be receptive to modernist visual and literary languages, and Kassák's early return to a sort of classicism forecast the later dominance of Proletcult and Socialist Realism as art for the masses. With all the good intentions to attract new audiences to

philosophy, sciences, and the liberal arts as they cultivated these in the Galilei Circle and The Free School for Social Sciences, and with further principles elaborated in the more exclusive Sunday Circle,² there was only so much they could do in 133 days.

The wave of emigration following the defeat of the Commune drained the Hungarian cultural scene in an unprecedented way. The list of later Nobel Prize-winning physicists, economists, and internationally successful artists and filmmakers is long and well known. A number of Hungarian journals and newspapers mushroomed in Vienna, the free city geographically closest to Hungary, but émigrés settled in many European countries as well as in the United States, Canada, and Australia. Admiral Miklós Horthy's right-wing regime retaliated and introduced the first laws limiting the number of Jewish students in institutions of higher education, which led many young people to seek education abroad. One of the proud statements of Hungarian art history writing is that the Hungarian contingent in the Bauhaus was the largest to attend the school from any single country; but if we consider the quota on Jews in Hungarian colleges and universities, we must see that migrating to Germany to study was not due to the avant-garde mentality of many talented young people, but rather to the restrictions they had to suffer at home.

The memory of the 1919 Commune has been troubled in Hungary. First of all, the general view, instantly generated by the inter-war political regime of Admiral Horthy, was that it was an eminently Jewish enterprise, which made it profoundly unpopular to the majority of the Hungarian population. Confirming this view was the marked, distinguished importance given to it during the post-1945 Communist decades. However, a number of more nuanced and thorough studies in art history, literary history, history, and sociology have revealed a more complicated and realistic image of the idealism and many positive deeds of the participants. Issues 93 and 94 of the Budapest-based theoretical-art historical journal *Enigma*, edited by Csilla Markója, included excellent studies of the activities of artists and art writers during the Commune. Scholarship of the Hungarian avant-garde, especially on Kassák, both in Hungary and the United States, has also revealed many facts and objective notes on the Hungarian avant-garde's history during the Commune, and a lot of the memoirs of the participants from Kassák to Árpád Szélpál³ to Ervin Sinkó⁴ to Anna Lesznai⁵ have become available. All this has, in fact, given us a fairly balanced view of the era, even if current Hungarian politics ignore this chapter of Hungarian history.

NOTES

1. Lajos Kassák: *Egy ember élete* [The life of one man] (Budapest: Magvető, 1983), 2:513–14.
2. On these activities and circles, see Mary Gluck, *Georg Lukács and his Generation, 1900-1918* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), esp. chap. 2, “The Historical Formation of a Generation,” 43–75.
3. For the memoirs of Árpád Szélpál, written in Paris, see Árpád Szélpál, *Forró hamu* [Hot embers] (Budapest: Magvető, 1984).
4. Ervin Sinkó, *Optimisták – Történelmi regény 1918/19-ből*, [Optimists: A historical novel from 1918–19] (Budapest: Magvető, 1965).
5. Anna Lesznai, *Kezdetben volt a kert* [At the beginning there was the garden] (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Kiadó, 1966).

Reflections on the 1919 Republic of Councils

Árpád von Klimó

1) The political, intellectual, and cultural significance and legacy of the Republic of Councils

One hundred years later, the short-lived Republic of Councils in Hungary is not celebrated and hardly remembered. It would be more than a stretch to try to connect the successes of today's political opposition in the local elections (October 13, 2019), which was the first after almost a decade of unchallenged rule of Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party, to the chaotic events of 1919.

But this impossible comparison demonstrates why the memory of the Republic of Councils is so complicated today. The Hungarian experiment of 1919, somehow related to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and more directly to the military and civilian protests and the shifts within the Hungarian Parliament and government in the fall and winter of 1918–19, was, for some of its protagonists, part of a series of world-historical events, which also made it easy for its enemies to exorcise it from Hungarian national history. But it was also embedded in a complex way within the Hungarian socialist labor movement, World War One, the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, and the revolts and nationalist agitations in many parts of the Hungarian Kingdom. In short, it is still today not easy to define clearly what the Republic of Councils even was, and, therefore, it is difficult to connect it to our time. Was it just an attempt to create a Bolshevik state in Hungary, to be aligned with Soviet republics in Slovakia, Ukraine, and Russia, or was it rather an odd coalition of some left-wing adventurers, coffeehouse literati, social reformers, many different social and cultural political movements, modernist artists, and nationalist officers who tried desperately to defend Hungary's borders?

No wonder that the memory of 1919 has been extremely politicized and has never really been a popular *lieu de mémoire* in Hungary, in contrast to the Rákóczi rebellion, 1848, or 1956.

2) The participation of the Hungarian cultural elite in the Hungarian Soviet Republic

The three names mentioned below, Kassák, Lukács, and Lugosi—though many other intellectuals, artists, and social reformers could be added—create a somewhat distorted picture of 1919. Only a small, mostly educated elite—some technocrats, some military specialists—fully engaged in the Republic of Councils. It was in November 1918, when broader strata of the population (mostly) in Budapest, including many women, servants, waiters, etc. who had never been politicized before, went out in the streets to protest or even create new professional organizations or other institutions. But only a few of these more diverse actors were still engaged during the Republic of Councils, and the majority of the middle classes remained absent.

If I may refer to my own family, a possible answer is apparent. My grandfather István Klimó, a young painter born in 1883, had just returned from a POW camp in what had become Poland. On June 12, 1919, at the height of the Republic of Councils, his first child, my father, was born to his wife, Gizella Kovács (b. 1888), a former actress. His older brother Jenő (b. 1873) was a higher civil servant of the State Railroad, had a position that was necessary for the Republic of Councils, and tried his best to feed the family of five (Jenő's daughter, István's wife, and my father). The youngest brother, Endre, and his wife had died of the Spanish flu in Vienna a few months before.¹ It is easy to see that this formerly middle-class family, which did not have any property, had trouble surviving during these months.

While my grandmother was pregnant, her former colleague Béla Lugosi (b. Blaskó, 1882–1956) was very active in 1919. He was only one year younger than my grandfather, had also come from Transylvania, and had been a member of the Hungarian National Theater since 1902 (like my grandmother, who had been on the stage since 1904). During World War I, Lugosi fought as an officer of a ski patrol and was wounded.² In March and April of 1919, Lugosi founded the trade unions of film and theater actors. The decision to participate surely depended on myriad conditions, causes, and motivations. A very ambitious actor like Lugosi, who had also starred in films before World War I, saw it as an opportunity to create something new. He was later also engaged in actors' guilds in Hollywood, and protested the Horthy regime and the Holocaust.

3) The impact of the large-scale emigration of intellectuals and artists on Hungarian and European intellectual and artistic life

The exodus of thousands of intellectuals and artists from Hungary after 1919 contributed to a more provincial or inward-looking interwar culture in Hungary (especially with regard to the film industry), while the émigrés added flair to the literary and film scenes in Vienna, Berlin, and finally Hollywood. However, it is not that easy to measure whether this migration was mostly caused by the reaction against 1918–19, or rather based on individual decisions to seek better opportunities abroad.

4) The role of respective political agendas of successive Hungarian regimes and governments in shaping the memory of the event

The Horthy regime that was established after the collapse of the 1919 Republic of Councils regarded itself as renewing the continuity of the Hungarian Kingdom that was overthrown by the revolution of 1918. It is likely that many Hungarians were hoping that the new regime would bring stability and economic recovery which occurred during the 1920s. For the authoritarian system under Horthy, the demonization and delegitimization of 1918–19 was crucial. Consequently, the end of the Horthy regime and of the short-lived Arrow Cross dictatorship made a reevaluation of 1918–19 possible. However, the Stalinist regime under Mátyás Rákosi had its problems with the Republic of Councils, not least because Stalin had the leader of 1919, Béla Kun, and a few other Hungarian Communist leaders executed, while Rákosi, ironically, had survived the Stalinist Purges because he was imprisoned in Hungary and had only emigrated to the Soviet Union in 1940!

Therefore, it was only in 1969, when the János Kádár regime attempted to create a new image, that the state invested a lot of money in the commemoration of 1919 as part of its attempt to distinguish itself from both the Stalinism of the 1950s and the anti-Stalinist revolution of 1956. During the 1970s and 1980s, this led to a few national, regional, and local commemorations of 1919, but the decline of the Communist regime only accelerated the downfall of its legacy, and the memory of 1919 was finally buried—at least until today—in the anti-Communist fervor of postsocialism. However, there are still some personalities,

like the modernist artist Lajos Kassák, the philosopher György Lukács, and even the Hollywood star Béla Lugosi (who invented the modern Dracula), who participated actively in the Hungarian Bolshevik laboratory of 1919, and who have become icons of Hungarian twentieth-century modernity. The crushing of the Republic of Councils, the brutal, often antisemitic terror of right-wing extremists, and the propaganda of a “Judeo-Bolshevik Myth”³ drove many Jewish intellectuals and artists from the country, but this terrible exodus can hardly be added to the positive legacy of 1919.

When we look at the revival of anti-Bolshevik and revisionist propaganda in today’s Hungary, we also should not forget that the historical context is completely different from the 1920s and 1930s. Hungary and most of its neighbors are now members of the European Union and cultivate excellent diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations, which explains why the revived cult of Trianon (closely related to anti-Bolshevism) does not lead to an outcry in Slovakia, Romania, or Serbia. The neighboring countries know that the references to the Horthy period are mostly directed towards the Hungarian public and the wider Hungarian community in the region.

NOTES

1. In our family archive in the old apartment where Jenő lived since 1905 is a form that Commissar Jenő Landler signed, confirming that Jenő Klimó would keep his position in the Hungarian State Railway Authority (under the Ministry of Commerce).
2. See <https://www.workers.org/2019/03/41345/>.
3. See the recent book by Paul Hanebrink, *A Specter Haunting Europe: The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).

The Significance and Legacy of 1918–1919¹

Steven Jobbitt

When viewed in political and transnational context, the revolutionary events of 1918–1919 represent a remarkable juncture in Hungarian history. As an almost inevitable consequence of the destruction and suffering of World War I, the Hungarian People's Republic ushered in by Mihály Károlyi's so-called Aster Revolution in late October 1918 was a direct response to the internal contradictions of Austro-Hungarian capitalism and imperialism, and to the moral and political bankruptcy of the empire's prewar elite and wartime leadership. In turn, the short-lived Republic of Councils (often associated with the name of its commissar for foreign affairs, Béla Kun), emerged as the second socialist state in the world, and replaced the pacifist Károlyi regime with a more revolutionary, militarized response to Hungary's social, political, and geopolitical problems. Fueled by class frustrations and a desire for radical change, Hungary's postwar revolutions were part of a broader global swell of uprisings that included the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, demobilization riots in England in 1918 and 1919, a year of general strikes and revolutionary upheaval throughout Europe and North America in 1919, the intensification of anti-imperial nationalist sentiment in Central Europe and the Balkans, and the explosion of anticolonial movements in the Global South more generally.

Despite their obvious place in both global and national history, the significance of Hungary's back-to-back revolutions in 1918 and 1919 was diminished at the time by the fact that they were short-lived. As others have rightly pointed out, the revolutions were also overshadowed by a series of equally remarkable events that included not only the Spanish flu pandemic and widespread shortages due to war, but also the occupation of significant swathes of Hungarian territory by foreign armies, a growing internal refugee crisis, and, in the wake of the collapse of the Kun government in early August 1919, the White Terror, the emergence of the Horthy regime, and the territorial

dismemberment wrought by the Trianon Treaty. Viewing the events of 1918 and 1919 from his vantage point as a gymnasium (high school) teacher in Karánsebes (now Caransebeș in Romania), the Hungarian geographer Ferenc Fodor described a world turned upside down and rendered unfamiliar, dangerous, and unsettling. Having visited Budapest in early January 1919, Fodor would later reflect on the “total chaos” he witnessed in the capital, and recognized that this would result in nothing less than the complete loss of Hungary’s multi-ethnic hinterland.² For Fodor, the revolutions at the nation’s center were in many ways merely the backdrop against which a more serious national crisis was being played out, one that would lead first to the “foreign” occupation of Hungary’s outlying regions, and ultimately to the disastrous truncation of the Kingdom of Hungary in 1920.

As dramatic as Fodor’s account of 1918–1919 may have been, his reason for visiting Budapest in early 1919 sheds important light on another aspect of this revolutionary period, at least as far as professionals like Fodor go. Traveling to Budapest as a young geographer and aspiring scholar, the conservative-nationalist Fodor was visiting the capital to meet with more well-established geographers, and was keen to present them with his first major work, a geography of the Szörénység region. As Róbert Győri has illustrated in some of his recent research, for geographers at the nation’s center, the pace of geographical knowledge production, which had been more or less business as usual during the war, became feverish from autumn 1918, and continued in this manner during the Károlyi period. Looking in particular at the Hungarian Geographical Society, Győri argues that very little changed in the professional lives of the society’s roughly 1,600 members between the end of October 1918 and March 1919. Encouraged by Károlyi and the looming peace negotiations, geographers (many of them conservative nationalists like Fodor) were in demand, and had a high profile both politically and amongst the general public. Jobs and research, Győri notes, were only really affected once the Republic of Councils was established, but even then the most significant changes occurred amongst the leadership, and not amongst the rank and file of Hungarian geography.³

The speed at which the Hungarian Geographical Society “recovered” after the collapse of the Republic of Councils may suggest that the twin revolutions had little lasting impact on the Society itself, and on Hungarian geography more generally. The pre-revolutionary leadership was rehabilitated just days after the Kun regime fell, and in October

1919 the Society established a committee to investigate the activities of its fellows during the revolutionary period, and to condemn those who may have damaged the interests and honour of Hungarian Geography. Of the Society's 1,600 members, only 10 received serious reprimands, and most members were quickly rehabilitated, many by 1922. Given the need for geographers and geography teachers in the wake of Trianon, it is quite likely that there was no interest in punishing even the most "guilty," as their talents and scientific expertise were required to wage revisionist battles both at home and abroad.⁴ Though the case of the Hungarian Geographical Society is hardly representative, it suggests that the revolutions of 1918 and 1919 may have had a relatively insignificant impact within at least some professional circles during the interwar period.

Of course, as with so many historical events, the political memory and propagandistic legacy of the revolutions of 1918 and 1919 are perhaps more important than their relative significance at the time. Prime fodder for political and ideological messaging during the Horthy era, the discursive utility of these revolutions, and especially the Republic of Councils, has not been lost on Viktor Orbán and his ruling Fidesz party as they continue to transform the historical narrative in "illiberal" Hungary.

Though it is true that the centenary of the Hungarian Republic of Councils was not widely commemorated in Hungary in 2019, the Fidesz government did of course use the opportunity to replace Imre Nagy's popular statue in Martyrs' Square with a memorial to the victims of the Red Terror. Never one to miss a rhetorical opportunity, Orbán included references to 1919 and the Republic of Councils in a number of different speeches leading up to the centenary. Orbán has argued, for example, that there have only been two "true" Hungarian revolutions: 1848 and 1956. Drawing a direct line from these key nineteenth- and twentieth-century national uprisings, Orbán has argued that the changes that Fidesz have made since coming to power with a two-thirds majority in 2010—and especially the Fundamental Laws (*Alaptörvénye*) that entered into force on January 1, 2012—represent a continuation of this revolutionary tradition.⁵

1919, by contrast, was not a Hungarian revolution, nor was it an expression of Hungarians as a "freedom-loving people." According to Orbán, 1919 was a subversive action launched "in the service of foreign interests and foreign ambitions."⁶ Orbán has argued that, like the forces of globalized capital and European Union policies that

supposedly threaten the nation today, Kun's Soviet-backed revolution was designed and promulgated by external enemies bent on weakening the state and creating chaos. Referencing 1919 and the Republic of Councils directly, Orbán stated in a speech given in April 2018 that "Our opponents have no interest in Hungary having a strong and well-functioning government: they want a weak state and a weak government, which carries out the instructions that are sent here."⁷

Of course, from Orbán's point of view, seeds planted by foreign conspirators only flourish in soil made rich by traitors willing to betray their nation and its people. Speaking on June 19, 2018 at the inauguration of the Monument to the Victims of Soviet Occupation, Orbán noted that Hungarians were betrayed not only by the Soviets and the West in 1919 and again after World War II, but also by domestic actors keen on restructuring the nation along foreign lines. The rise of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919, he concluded, "teaches us that a treacherous and irresponsible government can lead . . . to the loss of one's country." The memorial to the victims of Soviet oppression, therefore, "imposes the obligation on us to create a Hungary in which similar events can never happen again . . . All unreasonable ideas, confused thoughts, and plans serving foreign interests must be kept outside the country's borders."⁸

Overlaid with images of sinister internationalist intrigue and memories of chaos in the capital (and echoing the scenes depicted in Cécile Tormay's *An Outlaw's Diary*), the combined revolutionary events of 1918 and 1919 have provided Orbán with a propagandistic weapon which, though he may not wield it often, is nevertheless used with discursive precision when he does. Like Prime Minister István Tisza, who is celebrated for having fought to the bitter end to protect his country and who was "martyred" for it, Orbán positions himself as a builder of fences and defender of borders against those "who want to take our homeland from us; [and who] want us to give it to others." Speaking in April 2018 at the inauguration of the Ludovika Campus of the National University of Public Service, Orbán announced proudly that Budapest is one of the world's safest cities, but that "one bad decision, one misguided choice would be enough to render Budapest unrecognizable." Conjuring up images sketched out in graphic detail by Tormay a hundred years earlier of a city ruled by decadent leftists and overrun by a "flood" of degenerate foreigners, Orbán spoke of the need to defend the homeland "from the threats of immigration and the chaotic

situation in Europe.” Making direct reference to the military legacy of the restored Ludovika campus and the role it had played historically as a bastion of state security, Orbán reminded his audience that “Ludovika has always taught its students to see Hungary as an independent, free, and Hungarian country.” It was for this reason that these very same students fought against “those who besieged it in 1919 and . . . those who closed it down after World War II.” Restoring the building and renewing the campus, he concluded, not only revives the city, but also revives “the old spirit” of resistance that will protect the nation from the same sort of internationalist forces that tore it apart in 1918–1919.⁹

NOTES

1. Research for part of this essay has been supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office of Hungary – NKFIH [contract number K 125001].
2. Róbert Győri and Steven Jobbitt, *Fodor Ferenc önéletírásai* [The autobiographical writings of Ferenc Fodor] (Budapest: Eötvös József Collegium, 2016), 89.
3. See Róbert Győri and Charles W. J. Withers, “Trianon and its Aftermath: British Geography and the ‘Dismemberment’ of Hungary, c.1915–c.1922,” *Scottish Geographical Journal* 135, nos. 1–2 (2019): 73–78; and Róbert Győri and Charles W. J. Withers, “Trianon és a brit földrajz I” [‘Trianon and British geography, part I’], *Földrajzi Közlemények* 144, no. 2 (2020): 206–15.
4. See Róbert Győri, “The Communist Leadership of the Hungarian Geographical Society after the Hungarian Soviet Republic, 1919: Sin, Penance, and Absolution,” in *EUGEO Budapest 2015: Congress Programme and Abstracts*, ed. Hungarian Geographical Society (2015): 126–27.
5. See for example “Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on 15 March,” March 15, 2016, <https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-15-march>.
6. *Ibid.*
7. “Viktor Orbán’s speech at the Inauguration of the Ludovika Campus in Budapest,” April 4, 2018, <https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-inauguration-of-the-ludovika-campus-in-budapest>.

8. “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at the inauguration of the Monument to the Victims of Soviet Occupation,” June 19, 2018, <https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-inauguration-of-the-monument-to-the-victims-of-soviet-occupation>.
9. “Viktor Orbán’s speech at the Inauguration of the Ludovika Campus in Budapest,” April 4, 2018, <https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-inauguration-of-the-ludovika-campus-in-budapest>.

Images of 1919: A Short Photo Essay

Leslie Waters



FIG. 1. Image courtesy of Fortepan/Frigyes Schoch

The 1919 May Day celebration was the Republic of Council's largest public holiday. Kigyó tér (present-day Ferenciek tere), was decorated with an elaborate gate celebrating proletarian revolutions in Hungary, Germany, and Russia (fig. 1). The gate conveniently covered statues of Péter Pázmány and István Werböczy, two of the leading personalities of the Catholic Reformation in Hungary. On the opposite side of the square stood busts of Vladimir Lenin and Karl Liebknecht (see fig. 2). The two photos demonstrate the ways in which the Republic of Councils prioritized the creation of a pantheon of revolutionary heroes to replace conservative symbols.



FIG. 2. Image courtesy of Fortepan/Frigyes Schoch

As the artists who supported the Republic of Councils attempted to forge connections between their avant-garde style and revolutionary politics, posters emerged as a particularly effective medium. Artists such as Mihály Biró, Róbert Berény, and Ödön Dankó, whose work can be seen in figure 3, created images that became a lasting part of the Republic's legacy.

Film star Béla Lugosi (fig. 4) supported the Republic of Councils in 1919 and remained committed to workplace organizing and trade unionism throughout his career. He became famous internationally for his cinematic portrayal of Count Dracula.

The Republic of Councils' efforts to influence Hungarian artistic culture and alter public spaces illustrate that a revolutionary transformation of Hungarian aesthetics was an important part of the regime's agenda. With the collapse of the Republic of Councils, public art in Hungary reversed course and embraced more traditional forms of representation.



FIG. 3 Image courtesy of Fortepan/László Péchy



FIG. 4. Courtesy of Fortepan/Noémi Saly

After One Hundred Years: The “Trianon 100” Research Group of the Momentum Program of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Balázs Ablonczy

The Momentum [Lendület] funding scheme was initiated in 2009 by József Pálincás, the President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) at that time. The program aimed at attracting young Hungarian researchers who had left the country with well-endowed research funding to repatriate while enjoying competitive and solid financial support. To quote one of the entries on the webpage of the HAS, the project was conceived for the purpose of “decreasing the migration of young and successful researchers, securing the cultivation of talent, enhancing career advancement opportunities for young researchers and increasing the competitiveness of the network of research institutes under the auspices of the HAS as well as that of universities.” The call, which was initially tailored to the needs of the natural sciences, went under significant changes, enabling the participation of humanities scholars like Géza Pálffy (HAS Research Centre for the Humanities), Attila Bárány (University of Debrecen, Faculty of Humanities), and Boglárka Weisz (HAS Research Centre for the Humanities). At the same time, the application for and eventual awarding of funding for the project Trianon 100—which was, together with ten other projects, selected from a pool of about one hundred applicants—confers a tremendous responsibility. Trianon 100 was the first endowed historical project that focuses on the twentieth century and, as such, can be a trailblazer for other projects with a similar scope. The research group comprises twenty-one members who are contracted for a variety of tasks, but only one full-time and one part-time position have been created so far. Beyond these core members, we are closely collaborating with twenty to twenty-five researchers; about thirty to forty other colleagues have participated in our events as presenters or carried out research projects for us, including scholars based in Hungary, Hungarian scholars from neighboring countries, and

international researchers, bringing the total number of collaborators to approximately seventy or eighty people as of now. Most of them are, naturally, historians, but our cooperation transcends disciplinary boundaries and encompasses collaboration with art historians, sociologists, archivists, literary historians, and geographers.

Prehistory: Research on Trianon since 1920

The perception of the Trianon Peace Treaty has always been conditioned by public life and memory politics that have never ceased to influence its historiographical depictions. Although the manner in which the treaty would be addressed was predetermined by the immediate sense of loss, the first professional attempts at a scholarly assessment were made soon after the treaty, in the forms of publications and editions of primary sources and subsequent commentaries. Such undertakings included a two-volume selection of primary sources (the third volume remained unpublished) edited by Francis Deák and Dezső Újváry,¹ and the publication of those materials which recorded the activities of the Hungarian peace delegation,² as well as several books authored by statistician László Buday,³ which set the foundations for further research. Jenő Horváth, a diplomatic historian,⁴ and the historian-journalist and diplomat Gusztáv Gratz⁵ are exemplary in this sense, albeit deeply influenced by the *zeitgeist* and their own biases. When considering 1945 as a caesura in relation to the discussions of the Trianon Peace Treaty, one should not necessarily attribute much significance to the alleged sensitivity of the question, either for the occupying powers or for the Communist Party that was already preparing for the *Gleichschaltung* of society—even if such sensitivity was not completely absent. One should rather focus on how the preparations for the second Trianon in-the-making, the Paris Peace Treaty, paralyzed the will of the elites and drained their energy.

After an approximately fifteen-year hiatus, the scholarly assessment of the Trianon Peace Treaty finally resumed. Zsuzsa L. Nagy's 1965 monograph *A párizsi békekonzferencia és Magyarország 1918–1919* (The Paris Peace Conference and Hungary, 1918–19)⁶ analyzed the debates about the “Hungarian question” within the limits of her time. Although some historical works had been progressively addressing the new order that followed the Great War, especially in relation to the Little Entente, France, or “Eastern security,” the first monograph that put the treaty into focus was Mária Ormos's *Padovától Trianonig* (From Padua

to Trianon) in 1983.⁷ Relying on French diplomatic sources, Ormos's work opened up new avenues towards further research. Géza Jeszenszky dealt with the changes in the attitudes of the British public and opinion leaders in his dissertation, published in 1986 as *Az elveszett presztíz* (Lost prestige).⁸ Lajos Arday analyzed the priorities of British politics concerning Hungary during the peace conference in his 1990 *Térkép csata után* (Map after battle),⁹ while Ernő Raffay put the inner dimensions of the collapse in the center in his 1987 *Erdély 1918–1919-ben* (Transylvania in 1918–19).¹⁰

Large-scale primary source editions were initiated in this period as well, aiming at contextualizing the Peace Treaty of Trianon in a broader framework of diplomatic history. Most importantly, the series under the leadership of Magda Ádám as editor-in-chief (*Documents diplomatiques français sur l'histoire du bassin des Carpates 1918-1932*) developed into a two-decades long undertaking; its volumes were also published in Hungarian and provide much-needed, though not fully utilized, information about the period.¹¹ Miklós Lojkó's works were similarly important in relation to the British context.¹²

The transition of 1989 considerably broadened historical scholarship's space for maneuvering; however, paradoxically, it was soon pushed back into a narrowly conceived professional discursive space. Freedom of expression, later coupled with the information-technological revolution(s), resulted in historians' loss of monopoly on discussions about Trianon. Expert views were increasingly outweighed by works and acts of public history and memory politics. Some representatives of these currents are the journal *Trianoni Szemle* (Trianon Review), as well as the adjacent Trianon Kutató Intézet (Trianon Research Institute); the journal *Nagymagyarország* (Greater Hungary); the Trianon Museum in Várpalota; and myriad blogs and publicly available video series. The state-endorsed Nemzeti Összetartozás Napja (Day of National Unity) was introduced in 2010 as part of this process of restructuring memory politics.

Several pieces of work stand out among the historical knowledge production of the past three decades, however. Some of the most influential books include Ignác Romsics's 2001 monograph about the Trianon Peace Treaty¹³ and Miklós Zeidler's book appearing the same year about the idea of Hungarian revisionism.¹⁴ Zeidler also edited the primary source collection *Trianon*, published in the series *Nemzet és emlékezet* (Nation and memory),¹⁵ while György Litván edited sources

about the negotiations of the four Great Powers.¹⁶ The 2010 work of the present author *Trianon-legendák* (Trianon legends) also bears mentioning.¹⁷ Others focused on specific aspects of the context of the peace treaty, thus helping to broaden the horizons of research. Géza Boros elaborated on the monuments commemorating Trianon;¹⁸ Éva Kovács investigated the discourses of memory;¹⁹ Lajos Pallos gave important insights on propaganda concerning the defense of territory;²⁰ and Gergely Romsics published about the Trianon discourses of post-1989 Hungarian politics,²¹ just to name a few from among the rich and insightful contributions.²²

When surveying international literature, it becomes immediately apparent that the Hungarian peace treaty rarely features as a singular event. Setting aside that literature that falls beyond academic historiography, the Trianon Peace Treaty is usually depicted as part of a larger process. It has been discussed as one of those proceedings of the peace conference that concerned Central and Eastern Europe, the transformation of these regions, or as part of the grand narrative about the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the birth of the successor states.²³ The characteristic attitude of “extra Hungariam non est vita” (there is no life outside Hungary) had little resonance in this sphere. This was reflected in the early foreign publications on the topic, for example the books of C. A. Macartney (*Hungary and Her Successors*, 1937)²⁴ and Francis Deák (*Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*, 1942),²⁵ just to name a few. This trend largely continued from the 1960s to the 1970s and onwards, when the number of publications rose exponentially, as demonstrated by the works of John C. Swanson²⁶ and Mark Cornwall.²⁷ They could utilize important books, such as the compilation of Bela Kiraly, Peter Pastor, and Ivan Sanders.²⁸ (Paul Gradwohl and Anikó Kovács-Bertrand also relied on these works). With regard to the historiographies of the successor states, two trends dominated. On the one hand, Trianon was often missing from the narratives of neighboring countries’ historiographies, as the fulfillment of national progress and the establishment of independent nation-states in 1918 rendered a detailed analysis of the peace treaties unnecessary. On the other hand, when Trianon was present, it was embedded in a narrative that adopted the patterns of traditional nation-centered history (one of the best examples is Marián Hronský’s 2011 *Trianon: Vznik hraníc Slovenska a problémy jeho bezpečnosti*).²⁹ However, a new generation of historians (such as Roman Holec, Miroslav Michela, László Vörös,

Lucian Leustean, and others) that has emerged in both Bratislava and Bucharest is interested in novel approaches, and thus is prone to frame their respective research within regional and transnational terms.

The plan

Upon winning the grant in 2016, the HAS-Momentum Trianon 100 Research Group presented a five-year research plan. The proposal was built on four main pillars, taking into consideration the historiographical traditions detailed above:

1. International context: documents and interpretations
2. Hungarian society and the postwar collapse
3. The solidification of the peace system
4. The memory of Trianon in Hungarian society

A brief explanation of the pillars now follows. Perhaps the first point is going to be the least attractive for a broader public, as it encompasses not-so-spectacular sources of diplomatic history. The main contribution pertains to the inclusion of the perspectives of the as yet (in Hungary) scarcely discussed victorious great powers (Italy, Japan and the USA), and unexplored aspects of the involvement of neighboring countries (Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) in the preparation of the peace treaty and in the peace conference itself. We plan to publish the resulting source collections in the most traditional form. We are also exploring opportunities for online release; however, this option seems to be less viable than the paper-based one. Within the same pillar, more primary sources will appear that have never been published, despite being closely connected to the activities of the Hungarian peace delegation (memoirs, the journal of the peace delegation, etc.). We will provide an analysis of the geographical-historical argumentation of the peace delegation as well. Many prestigious scholars in the field are participating in this part of the project: Miklós Zeidler (Eötvös Loránd University [ELTE], Faculty of Humanities), Tibor Glant (University of Debrecen, Faculty

of Humanities), Balázs Juhász (ELTE, Faculty of Humanities), Péter Wintermantel (independent researcher), Árpád Hornyák (University of Pécs, Faculty of Humanities), Attila Simon (Fórum Intézet [Forum Institute]), Béni L. Balogh (Hungarian National Archives [HNA]), and Róbert Győri (ELTE, Faculty of Social Sciences). As of 2019, the resource exploration and collection of archival sources was complete in all cases, and some of the envisioned works have already been published, while others are in press.

The second pillar consists of social historical inquiries. Our research focuses here on the performance of the Hungarian state during the years of 1918–21. We concentrate on several issues, including the country's economic nosedive, the social crisis, the question of the army, paramilitary violence, the role of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, and the wave of refugees. We hope to be able to go beyond the assertions of Istvan Mócsy published in 1983,³⁰ especially in relation to the integration and composition of refugees. We will seize the opportunity to finally approach these issues based on relevant archival sources. Our intervention will clarify issues of the army and war violence (possibilities for and alternatives to resistance, the army as a social entity, etc.). We will engage with such defining economic players, policies, and general circumstances, amidst the turmoil of economic collapse, as the fuel needs of cities, food requisition and distribution by the authorities, and governmental regulation of prices and trade. At the policy level, we pay special attention to housing policies, in relation to the issue of refugees and broader concerns of social politics. The stabilization of the counter-revolutionary regime was enabled in part by its competence in finding more fitting (at least from its point of view) solutions to these pressing questions, as compared to the Soviet Republic or the Károlyi regime, thereby succeeding in securing significant societal support. Zsombor Bódy (Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Faculty of Humanities) leads the research pertaining to social issues. Tamás Révész (HAS Research Centre for the Humanities) and Szabolcs Nagy (HNA Archives of Veszprém County) deal with questions of the army and war violence. The issue of refugees is investigated by István Gergely Szűts (HNA Archives of Veszprém County) and by the author of this summary. We both benefit from the immense statistical help of Gábor Koloh (The Museum and Library of Hungarian Agriculture).

The third pillar serves the purposes of establishing a Central European context. The Hungarian peace treaty is not a self-contained

entity; in that sense, it is impossible to comprehend its repercussions without sufficient knowledge about the history of the region as a whole. Here we should emphasize three major points of interest. The transitional states that were established in Central Europe are important more than just anecdotally or for filling chronological holes. Between 1918 and 1924, numerous entities emerged that existed for only a few days, weeks, or months (for example, Gabriele d'Annunzio's Fiume, the Banat of Leitha, and the Republic of Central Lithuania). In the territory of Greater Hungary, one may mention the Szekler, Banat, Eastern Slovak, Spiš, Kalotaszeg, and Prekmurje republics. We investigate these attempts in a comparative manner, trying to establish commonalities and reasons for (non-)success. We are also looking into the potential influence of Wilsonian ideas and early fascism. This branch of research is carried out in collaboration with the newly established Central European Research Institute of the National University of Public Service. We are interested in exploring the local and regional dimensions of imperial transitions through local case studies (i.e., utilizing the materials of smaller archives) in order to uncover the effects of imperial transitions on local societies. The major research questions pertain to the ways in which state administrations were affected by the transitions, as well as how public space or the school system were affected. Furthermore, we analyze patterns and strategies of the representatives of new state power, contrasting them to those of minority elites (and other groups), as well as the delimitation of the discursive space within which all these players navigated. The research is carried out in tandem with the European Research Council Consolidator Grant-funded project NEPOSTRANS, under the leadership of Gábor Egry. The works about the transitions in Kassa/Košice, Bártfa/Bardejov, and Szatmárnémeti/Satu Mare have been concluded and the results are partially published, while the research concerning some northern Hungarian towns—Szepes/Spiš, Zombor/Sombor, Gyulafehérvár/Alba Iulia, and Arad—is in progress. This pillar's participants include Attila Simon, Veronika Szeghy-Gayer (State Science Library of Košice), and Tamás Sárándi (Museum of Mureş County). We will touch upon the border issues of Hungary and the newly established states: how space was used (smuggling, border crossing, in situ demarcation of the border), and the destruction of economic and social ties (or their regeneration). Among the most important contributors are Róbert Győri, István Gaucsík (Slovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of History), and Péter Bencsik (University of Szeged, Faculty of Humanities).

The fourth pillar deals with the place of Trianon in Hungarian collective memory. This pillar goes furthest in terms of multidisciplinary. Literary historians and sociologists are deeply involved in this subproject, along with historians. This pillar is made unique by its time span as well as its chronological arch, ending with contemporary issues. Our goal is to investigate the locus of Trianon and revisionism in the evolution of Hungarian and foreign political thought, historiography, belles-lettres, and the politics of memory. Furthermore, we survey the historiographies of neighboring countries as well, how their research progressed in relation to Trianon, what other traumas they have had to come into terms with, how these traumas are (in)comparable to Trianon, and whether these attempts were successful or not. We will deal extensively with representations of Trianon in public spaces, and a survey of monuments is currently in the making. These areas of interest will be reflected in a large sample poll and two qualitative, focus-group-based analyses aimed at learning about the image of Trianon in Hungarian society in general and its meanings for history teachers. Among others, art historian Flóra Mészáros (Gáspár Károli University of the Reformed Church, Faculty of Humanities), historian Réka Krizmanics (Central European University), and literary historian Júlia Vallasek (Babes-Bolyai University) are participating in the realization of the fourth pillar. Csaba Zahorán (HAS Research Centre for the Humanities) compares Hungarian and Romanian memory politics. Gergely Romsics (HAS Research Centre for the Humanities and ELTE, Faculty of Social Sciences) is expected to deliver a synthesis of Hungarian foreign political thought in relation to Trianon. Balázs Bazsalya (ELTE, Faculty of Social Sciences) coordinates the sociological research projects that we have launched in coordination with the Research Institute for National Strategy, and the first products of this research are already completed. We have finished a large-sample survey of Hungarian history teachers that is going to be published in the spring of 2020.

Achievements

We believe that scientific performance needs to be measured not only by its own standards. Historical scholarship, fortunately, continues to speak to many people, and society reflects on its discoveries, debates, and recent results. This is particularly true for such important topics as the Trianon Peace Treaty. Therefore, we consider it our task to

popularize our work in various ways. We run the website *trianon100.hu*, as well as a Facebook page that has more than four thousand followers—a number that is growing dynamically and is uncommonly large for a Hungarian research group. Our articles and interviews with members of the research group are published in the national press, both in print and electronic version. The research group collaborated with the popular history journal *Rubicon* on the publication of its special issue on Trianon in 2017, contributing over sixty pages.³¹ Our writings feature regularly in the journal *Múlt-kor* and on different online platforms.

The research group has published seven volumes at the time of writing, some of which have already been printed in multiple editions.³² By the end of 2019, the first monograph of the project came out as well, that of Tamás Révész about the military policies of the Hungarian state in 1918–19.³³ Other works are currently at different stages of the editorial process and are expected to come out in 2020. These volumes include a contribution about Romanian, Serb, and US preparations for the peace treaty with Hungary and a collective volume based on the papers that were presented at our November 2018 conference on refugee issues. Moreover, another collective volume is going to be published soon with a prestigious British publisher, investigating the links between the Trianon peace treaty and geography.

In the course of such a long-term research project, it is to be expected that new initiatives will arise along the way that will be worth including. In our case, these new inspirations may comprise monographs, exhibition scenarios, the development of new city walking tours, or a movie idea. Based on these initiatives, three other books have already been published in cooperation with our research group,³⁴ as well as another volume of popular history, aiming to summarize the research work accomplished, focusing on social and cultural history and microhistory.³⁵ Furthermore, the members of our research group have published about thirty articles and book chapters in Hungarian and international outlets, including *Történelmi Szemle*, *Századok*, and international journals,³⁶ while they have also presented at more than forty conferences in Hungary and abroad. They have published about forty popular history contributions, and given presentations directed at general audiences across Hungary and beyond (seventy to eighty events altogether); the total audience at these events amounted to several thousand. From among the conferences that Trianon 100 itself has

organized, the one entitled *Hullóidő* (Falling time), concerning Szekler identity, stands out. This conference was co-organized with the HAS Centre of Social Sciences, Institute for Minority Studies, and took place in Budapest, on May 25, 2018. We consider our international conference *Úton* (On the road), focusing on issues of refugees, mobility and migration, similarly important. The event took place in Budapest on November 9–10, 2018, with Peter Gatrell (University of Manchester), a well-known authority on refugee history, giving the keynote speech. We are proud of the workshop that we organized together with Romanian, Slovak, and Serb historians in September 2018, as well as an internal workshop in Vienna in collaboration with the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute in December 2018. Meanwhile, the research group builds and shares databases on our website. We published a map-based database of Trianon memorials across the Carpathian Basin (<http://trianon100.hu/emlekmuvek>) that will ultimately contain the descriptions and exact locations of about 350 monuments in the region. We also granted public access to our database of Trianon refugees (<http://trianon100.hu/menekultek>) in May 2019; it was visited by close to fifty thousand users in the first three days after launching. The database contains over fifteen thousand names, and its apparent success illustrates how this initiative is one of the many ways through which historical scholarship can enable the understanding of the past.

Should all our plans come to fruition, our research group's final output will consist of twelve to fourteen volumes, dozens of professional and popular articles, presentations, and conferences by 2021. These results should enable us to present Hungarian society with fresh and valid knowledge that establishes a framework for thinking and learning about Trianon for decades to come. On the other hand, we strive for an “about-face” that is long overdue in our historical scholarship. While research into political and diplomatic history remains important, we wish to give a larger role to social and cultural history as well as to the history of mentalities. We also provide a broader, regional comparative perspective, in order to have a more complex understanding of what happened to Hungary between 1918–24.

Translated from the Hungarian by Réka Krimanics

NOTES

1. Francis Deák and Dezső Újváry, eds., *Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary*, 2 vols. (Budapest: Royal Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1939–41).
2. Jenő Cholnoky, ed., *A magyar béketárgyalások: Jelentés a magyar békeküldöttség működéséről Neuilly s/S.-ben 1920 januárius–március havában* [The Hungarian peace negotiations: A report on the activities of the Hungarian peace delegation in Neuilly s/S in January–March 1920], 4 vols. (Budapest: M. kir. tudományegyetemi nyomda, 1920–21).
3. Especially László Buday, *Magyarország küzdelmes évei* [Hungary's years of struggle] (Budapest: self-published, 1923).
4. Jenő Horváth, *A trianoni békeszerződés megalkotása és a revízió útja* [The making of the Trianon peace treaty and the road to revision] (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1939).
5. Gusztáv Gratz, *Forradalmak kora. Magyarország története 1918–1920* [The age of revolutions: The history of Hungary, 1918–20] (Budapest: Magyar Szemle Társaság, 1935).
6. Zsuzsa L. Nagy, *A párizsi békekonferencia és Magyarország 1918–1919* [The Paris Peace Conference and Hungary, 1918–19] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1965).
7. Mária Ormos, *Padovától Trianonig 1918–1920* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1983); published in English as *From Padua to the Trianon, 1918–1920*, trans. Miklós Uszkay (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1990).
8. Géza Jeszenszky, *Az elveszett presztízs. Magyarország megítélésének megváltozása Nagy-Britanniában (1894–1918)* [Lost prestige: The transformation of the estimation of Hungary in Great Britain, 1894–1918] (Budapest: Magvető, 1986).
9. Lajos Arday, *Térkép csata után. Magyarország a brit külpolitikában 1918–1919* [Map after battle: Hungary in British foreign policy, 1918–19] (Budapest: Magvető, 1990).
10. Ernő Raffay, *Erdély 1918–1919-ben* [Transylvania in 1918–1919] (Budapest: Magvető, 1987).
11. Magda Ádám, György Litván, and Mária Ormos, eds., *Documents diplomatiques français sur l'histoire du bassin des Carpates 1918–1932* [French diplomatic documents on the history of the Carpathian Basin, 1918–32], 5 vols. (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1993–2010); Magda Ádám and Mária Ormos, eds., *Francia diplomáciai iratok a Kárpát-medence történetéről*, 5 vols., trans. József Barabás (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1999–2013).
12. Miklós Lojkó, *British Policy on Hungary 1918–1919: A Documentary Sourcebook*, SSEES Occasional Papers 28 (London: School of Slavonic

- and East European Studies, 1995); *Meddling in Middle Europe: Britain and the "Lands Between" 1919–1925* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005).
13. Ignác Romsics, *A trianoni békeszerződés* [The Trianon peace treaty] (Budapest: Osiris, 2001).
 14. Miklós Zeidler, *A revíziós gondola* [The revisionist idea] (Budapest: Osiris, 2001); published in English as *Ideas on Territorial Revision in Hungary, 1920–1945*, trans. Thomas J. DeKornfeld and Helen Dilworth DeKornfeld (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2008).
 15. Miklós Zeidler, ed., *Trianon* (Budapest: Osiris, 2003).
 16. György Litván, *Trianon felé. A győztes nagyhatalmak tárgyalásai Magyarországról* [Towards Trianon: The victorious powers' negotiations about Hungary] (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi intézete, 1998).
 17. Balázs Ablonczy, *Trianon-legendák* [Trianon legends] (Budapest: Jaffa, 2010).
 18. Géza Boros, "Trianon köztéri revíziója, 1990–2003" [The revision of Trianon in public spaces, 1990–2003], *Mozgó Világ* 29, no. 2 (2003): 3–22.
 19. Éva Kovács, "Trianon, avagy 'traumatikus fordulat' a magyar történetírásban" [Trianon, or the "Traumatic Turn" in Hungarian historiography], *Korall* no. 59 (2015): 82–107.
 20. Lajos Pallós, "Területvédő propaganda Magyarországon" [Propaganda in defense of territory in Hungary] 1918–1920, I–II. *Folia Historica* 24 (2005/06): 33–95, 26 (2008/09): 37–75.
 21. Gergely Romsics, "Trianon a Házban. A Trianon fogalom megjelenése és funkciói a pártok diskurzusaiban az első három parlamenti ciklus idején (1990–2002)" [Trianon in the House: The appearance and functions of the concept of Trianon in party discourses during the period of the first three parliamentary cycles (1990–2002)], in *Az emlékezet konstrukciói. Példák a 19–20. századi magyar és közép-európai történelemből* [The constructions of memory: Examples from nineteenth- and twentieth-century Hungarian and Central European history], ed. Gábor Czoch and Csilla Fedinec (Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány, 2006), 35–52.
 22. Space limitations do not allow me to list all the relevant works here, but I consider the works of Nándor Bárdi and László Szarka essential in providing a history of Hungarian minorities, first and foremost their collaborative synthesis, Nándor Bárdi and Csilla Fedinec, eds., *Minority Hungarian Communities in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), and Bárdi's own volume, Nándor Bárdi, *Az otthon és a haza. Tanulmányok a romániai magyar kisebbség történetéről* [The

- home and the homeland: Studies on the history of the Hungarian minority in Romania] (Jyväskylä, Finland: University of Jyväskylä, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Art and Culture Studies, Hungarian Studies, 2013).
23. From among the works of émigré scholars, beyond the regularly cited works of Oszkár Jászi, we should mention Lajos Hatvany's book *Das verwundete Land* [The wounded land] (Leipzig: E. P. Tal und Co., 1921), a work that has never been translated into Hungarian.
 24. C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 1919–1937* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937).
 25. Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference: The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942).
 26. John C. Swanson, *The Remnants of the Habsburg Monarchy: The Shaping of Modern Austria and Hungary, 1918–1922*, East European Monographs 568 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
 27. Mark Cornwall, *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
 28. Béla K. Király, Peter Pastor, and Ivan Sanders, *Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, A Case Study on Trianon* (New York: Social Science Monographs, Brooklyn College Press, 1982).
 29. Marián Hronský, *Trianon: vznik hraníc Slovenska a problémy jeho bezpečnosti, 1918–1920* [Trianon: The establishment of Slovakia's borders and problems of its security, 1918–20] (Bratislava: Veda, 2011).
 30. Istvan I. Mócsy, *The Effects of World War I. The Uprooted: Hungarian Refugees and Their Impact on Hungary's Domestic Politics, 1918–1921*, East European Monographs 157 (New York: Social Science Monographs, Brooklyn College Press, 1983).
 31. *Rubicon* 28, no. 7–8 (2017).
 32. Miklós Zeidler, *A magyar békeküldöttség naplója – Neuilly – Versailles – Budapest (1920)* [The diaries of the Hungarian peace delegation: Neuilly, Versailles, Budapest (1920)] (Budapest: MTA BTK, 2017); Balázs Juhász, ed., *Trianon és az olasz diplomácia – Dokumentumok a békeszerződés előkészítéséről 1919-1920* [Trianon and Italian diplomacy: Documents about the preparations of the peace treaty, 1919–20] (Budapest: MTA BTK, 2018); Zsombor Bódy, ed., *Háborúból békébe: a magyar társadalom 1918 után* [From war to peace: Hungarian society after 1918] (Budapest: MTA BTK, 2018); Attila Simon, ed., *Csehszlovák iratok a magyar-szlovák államhatár kijelöléséhez (1918-1920)* [Czechoslovak files relating to the demarcation of the Hungarian-Slovak borders, 1918–20]. (Budapest: MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2019).

33. Tamás Révész, *Nem akartak katonát látni? A magyar állam és hadserege 1918–1919-ben* [They didn't want to see a soldier? The Hungarian state and its army in 1918–19] (Budapest: Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont, 2019). This was followed by Béni L. Balogh, ed., *Románia és az erdélyi kérdés 1918–1920-ban: dokumentumok* [Romania and the Transylvanian question in 1918–20: Documents] (Budapest: Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont, 2020); and Tibor Glant, *Az Egyesült Államok útja Trianonhoz – Az Inquiry és Magyarország jövője, 1917–1918: források* [The United States' path to Trianon: The inquiry and the future of Hungary, 1917–18: Sources] (Budapest: Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont, 2020).
34. Gábor Demeter and János Szulovszky, eds., *Területi egyenlőtlenségek nyomában a történeti Magyarországon* [In search of territorial inequalities in historical Hungary] (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpontja and Debreceni Egyetem Társadalomföldrajzi és Területfejlesztési Tanszéke, 2018); Béni L. Balogh, Gergely Kunt, and Anikó Schmidt, eds., *Trianon arcai* [The faces of Trianon] (Budapest: Libri, 2018); Balázs Juhász, ed., *Rapaich Richárd: Antant-ellenőrzés Magyarországon* [Richárd Rapaich: Inter-allied military control in Hungary] (Budapest: Meritum, 2019).
35. Balázs Ablonczy, *Ismeretlen Trianon – Az összeomlás és a békeszerződés történetei, 1918-1921* [Unknown Trianon: Histories of the downfall and the peace treaty, 1918–21] (Budapest: Jaffa, 2020).
36. Some of these are available on our website, <http://trianon100.hu/publikaciok>.

**FOR DISCUSSION: THE GERMAN INVASION
OF HUNGARY IN 1944**

**The Allies, Secret Peace Talks, and the
German Invasion of Hungary, 1943–1944**

László Borhi

On March 19, 1944, Wehrmacht and SS divisions brought an end to the relative peace that had prevailed in Hungary while much of the continent experienced devastating warfare. A report prepared by American intelligence in October 1944, shortly after Regent Miklós Horthy was forced to resign, asserted that, “At the time of the German occupation of Hungary . . . [Hungary had] the largest [number of] and best-treated Jews in Axis Europe . . . The Hungarian Government did not always follow suggestions from Berlin and maintained a higher degree of political independence than other Nazi satellites. The Horthy regime hesitated following the Nazi policy to its ultimate goal of deportation, starvation and extermination.” Prior to the German occupation, “persecuted Jews of neighboring Axis lands looked upon Hungary as a place of refuge.”¹ The Mapai secretariat in Jerusalem made the following note: “German invasion: The process began of turning Hungary from a ‘paradise for Jews’ into a land in which the Final Solution was put into action.” David Ben Gurion was concerned that the “invasion [was] a sign of new calamity.”² “Paradise” was relative, of course. Hungary was only a “paradise” in comparison with other parts of German-occupied Europe, where the Jews were murdered on the spot en masse or were deported to German-run death camps. Nevertheless, young Jewish Zionist leader Rafi Benshalom, who arrived in Budapest from Slovakia in January 1944, was shocked: “For me, in Europe of 1944, this seemed like a fantasy . . . Jews seeking entertainment could still visit coffee houses, cinemas and theaters. While in Poland, hundreds of thousands of Europe’s Jews were being annihilated and the whole world lived in fear.”³

All this changed after the moderate Kállay cabinet resigned in the wake of occupation, and Horthy appointed a new pro-German administration under Döme Sztójay. Gestapo units arrived with lists of

opposition and anti-German elements, who were arrested in droves. Many of them were sent to concentration camps, including the prime minister. Unintentionally, the Germans helped pave the way for the Communist takeover in Hungary by deporting political figures who could have resisted the Communists. With the active assistance of the new Hungarian administration and the Hungarian gendarmerie, Hitler's men, including Adolf Eichmann and his cohort, deported the majority of the last intact Jewish community in Europe to Auschwitz where most of them were gassed.

When I began researching the Holocaust in Hungary many years ago as an undergraduate, I was interested in the imprint of the secret talks in the Hungarian, international, and mainly British press. I was shocked to find that *The Times* (UK) published verbatim quotes of top-secret Hungarian communications addressed to the British Foreign Office. The secret talks were hardly secret. Later I was interested in finding out why these talks occurred, as, at the time, I thought the argument that the Hungarians had not acted in good faith was unconvincing, on the basis of documentary sources beginning to come to light. Yet I had no inkling that seemingly disparate events—the secret peace initiatives, the Allied strategy to defeat Hitler, the German invasion of Hungary, and, indirectly, the Hungarian Holocaust—would all intersect.

The German invasion of Hungary did not have to happen, or at least not as early as it did, on March 19, 1944. Despite some reluctance to satisfy *all* the Führer's military and economic needs in the early phase of the war, Horthy's Hungary was a reliable ally. The question remains: why was Hungary invaded mere months before the Red Army reached the Hungarian borders and penetrated the Carpathians? Hitler's order to implement Operation Margarethe offered two main reasons for the move: Hungary's impending "treason," and the fact that Hitler would not tolerate having "a million" Jews withheld from Germany's grasp. The meaning of his remarks on the Jews was clear. Hitler had already chastised Horthy for not having dealt with the Jewish Question radically enough when Horthy visited the German leader in Schloss Klessheim in 1943. When Horthy was summoned for another visit with Hitler on March 16, 1944, he and his entourage were berated for their ongoing negotiations with the "Anglo-Saxons." Hitler declared that he did not want a repetition of the Badoglio affair (Italy's 1943 surrender to the Allies), and he insisted that Germany would not tolerate one million Jews in the rear of its armies.⁴ What did Hitler mean by "impending treason," a motive that seems to have been extremely important for understanding his decision to invade?

In order to understand this, we must go back to an all but forgotten, but all the more fateful, episode of the Second World War: Hungary's (and the other minor Axis states') efforts to break with Hitler, which began in the summer of 1942.⁵ By then it was becoming apparent in the capitals of the Axis satellite states that the Germans might lose the war. Hungary was the first state to explore the possibility of a separate arrangement with the Western Allies, and Romania, Finland, and Bulgaria rapidly followed suit. As early as March 1942, Horthy dismissed László Bárdossy, the prime minister who had dragged the country into war with the Soviet Union. The Regent replaced him with Miklós Kállay, a little-known figure in Hungarian politics, and charged him with the recovery of the country's sovereignty. This, of course, was more easily said than done: first, because of the sizable pro-German political forces in the country; second, because of the difficulty of making contact with Allied officials in neutral capitals; third, because of the fear that if the leadership in Berlin discovered the secret dealings, the country could be occupied by the German army; and, finally, because the Allies themselves were not sold on the importance of the peace initiatives emanating from Axis Europe.

Even though Franklin Roosevelt's confidant Adolph Berle saw these initiatives as a chance to break the Germans' southeastern flank and thereby advance the prospect of victory, he found few followers in Allied capitals.⁶ Stalin expressed disinterest in the Finnish proposal to conclude a separate peace in January 1943, and Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill accepted the formula of unconditional surrender, which, as they were aware, was inimical to the surrender of Hitler's allies.⁷ The chief motivation behind unconditional surrender may have been to reassure Stalin that there would be no deal at the Soviet Union's expense. In addition, Axis efforts may have been seen as a German ploy to split the Allies.

Nevertheless, a steady flow of individuals, diplomats, and various other officials and private personalities travelled to neutral capitals to find contacts among mainly, although not exclusively, Western representatives. The first Hungarian to be taken seriously was Albert Szent-Györgyi, the winner of the 1937 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, who, like a sizeable segment of the Hungarian middle class, had a pro-British outlook. His putatively secret mission did not go unnoticed in Berlin. In fact, the Germans, including Hitler himself, received accurate updates on the secret talks concerning a separate peace a separate peace, including the ones American and Hungarian representatives conducted in Turkey in late 1943 and early 1944.

In fact, the Hungarian peace attempts were initially driven by a desire to avoid a second Trianon, that is, having to return to the pre-1938 borders.⁸ At the same time, even well-informed diplomats harbored illusions regarding British and American policies, and were convinced, at least through much of 1943, that Anglo-American troops would occupy the Danubian basin. These were not entirely unfounded: it seemed logical that after their victory in North Africa, the Allied landing would take place in Italy or the Balkans, which would then lead them to Budapest and Vienna. It was also hoped, with no basis whatsoever, that the West would view Hungary as a bastion against Bolshevism and perhaps even a potential participant in a post-war anti-Soviet crusade. National myth played a role here: Hungarians (like Slovaks and Poles) recalled their role as defenders of Christianity against the Ottoman Turks, and now, it seemed, a similar role against godless Bolsheviks awaited them.

Evidence suggests that by March 1943, the British discovered that the Hungarian initiative could be exploited to aid the Allied war effort. In a memorandum to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was actively involved in the implementation of US policy in Axis Europe, the Special Operations Executive explained that "His Majesty's Government" no longer feared Hungary's occupation by the Germans, which would be a "positive" outcome because it would increase the burden on the German army. The advantage could be even greater if the turmoil could be timed to coincide with an Allied landing in Europe.⁹ Eventually, this position would guide Allied policies regarding the Axis satellites. Allen Dulles, the OSS representative in Switzerland at the forefront of talks to extract the satellites from the war when the time was ripe, was well aware of the Kállay administration's dilemma: if it acted too early, before the Allies were in a position to help, the Germans would invade; but if it acted too late, it would face another devastating peace agreement. The State Department urged caution: a precipitate turn of events in Hungary could lead to "the destruction of those elements," which might be of more use to the "United Nations" when there was hope that a political volte-face could be successfully executed.¹⁰ Negotiations were conducted in this spirit. An experienced Hungarian diplomat, György Barcza, held secret talks with a British intelligence representative in Geneva, Frederick Vanden Heuvel. Vanden Heuvel told him that his government did not expect the Hungarian government to do anything that would lead to German occupation, and in light of the serious consequences, he could not imagine Hungary breaking with the Axis.¹¹

Due to these talks, Hungary's image in London changed for the better. The Foreign Office, recognizing that Germany would lose the war, noted that the Hungarians had reduced their contributions to the Axis war effort to a "suicidal" level.¹² Hans Bernard Gisevius, an OSS agent working in the German Foreign Office, reported that Hitler was mad at the Hungarians for trying to deceive him, and hoped to get rid of the prime minister and the "traitors." In September, László Veress concluded a preliminary armistice agreement on behalf of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry with the British consul-general in Istanbul Knatchbull-Hugessen, which, as the British agreed, would not be published until the British invaded Hungary (in which case the Hungarians agreed to surrender). An Anglo-American invasion of the Danubian basin would never materialize, and the British were aware that they could provide no assistance to the Hungarians.¹³ During the Quebec meeting of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, it was agreed that the second front would be opened in Normandy, and there would be no operations in the Balkans, nor would the offensive on the Italian peninsula reach Central Europe. As plans to defeat Germany crystallized, the message to would-be Hungarian peace makers began to change. Allen Dulles told Barcza that Hungary had to follow the Italian example and shoulder the consequences. If the Hungarians failed to recognize the consequences of the situation created as a result of Italy's capitulation, it would mean they had renewed their alliance with Germany and would therefore be subject to the same treatment as the Germans. Thus, Hungary had to make the necessary moves to distance itself, "even at the risk of a German invasion."¹⁴

In the same spirit, the deputy chief of the British staff was interested in the intensification of the crisis created by the Italian defection. A memorandum to Chief of Staff Alan Brooke stated that a Hungarian capitulation would cause great political and military turmoil in Germany, and if Romania followed suit, Germany would face a critical situation that could be resolved only by the occupation of Hungary. If the Germans took the risk of moving troops from other theaters to Hungary, Germany's weakening in other theaters would be to "our advantage." The sooner the Hungarians acted, the better.¹⁵ Apparently the plan was put into effect. In September, the Political Warfare Executive reported that, at present, the Secret Intelligence Service assets in Bern were working to extract Hungary from the war. The aim was "to discredit the Hungarian government in the eyes of the Germans," which would lead to Hungary's occupation by the Germans.¹⁶ Lewis Namier

expressed the Jewish Agency's grave concerns to the Foreign Office regarding this policy. A break with the Germans, he argued, would jeopardize the lives of 800,000 Jews who lived in relative safety in Hungary. Germany would not tolerate Hungary's defection, and would respond to such a move with invasion and the extermination of the last surviving Jewish community in Europe. The only hope for Hungary's Jews, he opined, was that the Hungarians did nothing until it was probable that the Germans would not be able to react.

Hungary, while still actively contributing to the German war effort—particularly in Ukraine, where the Hungarian army was tasked with carrying out the duties associated with military occupation—stepped up its efforts to find a way out of the war while getting something in return, although the prize was getting increasingly smaller. Hungary's ambassador in Stockholm, Antal Ullein-Reviczky, told R. Taylor Cole, the OSS representative in Sweden, that his government was well aware that Hungary had to do whatever the Allies demanded. This would greatly accelerate events leading to surrender without the term unconditional surrender ever being mentioned in Budapest.¹⁷ Internal correspondence reveals that the terms had yet to be decided, but the Hungarians were left in the dark about this fact. On December 18, the regent's son Miklós Horthy Jr.'s message was delivered to Allen Dulles: to wit, if the Allies expected Hungary to capitulate, he would ensure that it happened.¹⁸

Facing military complications in Italy, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt calling attention to the potential "landslide" (i.e., defection) of Hungary and Romania and the need to take advantage of it.¹⁹ Sometime in the next few weeks, the decision was made to "detach the satellites." According to a memorandum signed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Admiral William Leahy, the strategic objectives of the Allies would be promoted by the defection of Hungary and Romania from the war, even if such a move resulted in the German occupation of these countries.²⁰ Strategic decisions during the war were made by the president, but in all other matters, the JCS's directives determined policy; in other words, both the OSS and the State Department were subordinated to military policy. Only a day after the Leahy memorandum was signed, William Donovan informed Dulles of the now-official policy. Regarding the ambivalent directions to the Hungarians, he wrote, "for your personal information" the JCS have approved the immediate detachment of Hungary and the other Axis satellites. "Adolf and his boys" were informed, and the JCS directives were to guide Dulles's steps. The purpose of this policy was revealed in a memorandum found

in the W. Averell Harriman papers, according to which an invasion of the satellite states would spread the Germans thin in the western theater of war at the time the second front was opened.²¹ A newspaper clipping from the Soviet Army's journal, *Krasnaia Zvezda*, reveals that Moscow was aware of this policy. *Krasnaia Zvezda* argued that German victories over its unfortunate ally only made the German position more difficult, as the diversion of troops to the satellites made their already weak position in the west even weaker. This would make it easier to strike a blow at the Germans from the west.²²

In the meantime, secret talks between a representative of the Hungarian government and the OSS were taking place in Ankara. These centered on two main issues: the terms of Hungary's capitulation; and a "high-powered" American military mission to be sent to Hungary, headed by a robust, intelligent "American specimen," as Dulles put it.²³

According to an OSS report, by early 1943, Hungary had renounced all "political and territorial" demands and was willing to furnish the Allies with intelligence related to German troop movements.²⁴ In return, the Hungarians wanted to be treated as a "liberated" country and receive recognition for the Hungarian contribution to Allied victory. The Hungarians understood that they were going to conclude an armistice agreement, and this was related to the American military mission discussed in the Ankara negotiations. An OSS memorandum stated that the purpose of the talks was to give Hungary an "eleventh-hour" opportunity to distance itself from the Axis by voluntarily cooperating with the Allies—without, however, jeopardizing relations with the Germans. All forms of cooperation excluding military assistance, of course, were to be discussed.²⁵ In the meantime, the Americans learned that Germany was aware of the secret negotiations conducted with the Hungarians through Fritz Kolbe, a US agent in the German Foreign Ministry.²⁶ Nevertheless, the talks continued.

The Allied offensive to get the Hungarians to finally act decisively and break with the Nazis intensified. On December 11, 1943, immediately after the Tehran Conference of the Big Three ended, US Secretary of State Cordell Hull issued a warning to the German satellites that because of their "reckless" participation in the war, they would share the consequences of Germany's defeat. On March 16, 1944, the day Horthy received Hitler's "invitation" for a visit, Hull declared that in order to preserve their independence and territorial integrity, the satellites had to break with Hitler. The longer they procrastinated, the more serious the consequences would be.²⁷ Frances Deak, who claimed to be

negotiating on behalf of the “US High Command,” told the Hungarian envoy in Lisbon Andor Wodianer that unconditional surrender was a flexible formula, but if the Hungarians acted too late, his “American friends would not be in a position to help.”²⁸ On the one hand, in Ankara, the Hungarians were told that Washington expected the Hungarians to accept unconditional surrender, otherwise the talks would be broken off and “hostilities” would begin.²⁹ On the other hand, the Hungarians made it known that immediate surrender would allow pro-Nazi elements in the country to seize power, but at the same time, they reiterated that US troops would meet no resistance and asked for an American officer to personally bring the terms of surrender to Budapest.³⁰

The OSS’s Operation Sparrow flew into Hungary on March 16, 1944, the day the regent of Hungary attended a meeting with Hitler where he was told that Hungary would be occupied due to its impending treason. Ferenc Szombathelyi, the head of Hungarian intelligence, claimed that Florimond Duke, who headed the US military mission, handed him the American terms of surrender. Duke, however, asserted that his mission had no political purpose and was supposed to negotiate Hungary’s contribution to the Allied war effort. Which account is correct has yet to be determined.³¹ But be that as it may, the German invasion of March 19, 1944 may have been triggered, at least in part, by the Führer’s conviction that he was about to lose a crucial ally.³² In this sense, the Allied ploy to spread the Germans thin succeeded—for a while. They expected the Germans to send ten to fifteen divisions, and they eventually sent ten. When Lipót Baranyai, the former president of the Hungarian National Bank, who had also acted as a vehicle for peace feelers, reminded Allen Dulles of the potential consequences of a German occupation, he allegedly replied, “We are up to our elbows in blood, a few hundred thousand lives here or there will not matter.”³³

D-Day was perhaps the most important single operation in the drive to win the war. Had it failed, the consequences would have been unfathomable. Difficult moral choices had to be made. Lewis Namier’s dark prediction came true. Already on March 13, 1944, Goebbels noted in his diary the Führer’s statement that after the invasion, he would go after the Hungarian Jews. The country’s darkest political forces were propelled into power, and the elderly and inept regent gave them a free hand to deport Hungary’s Jewish population in collaboration with the SS and Gestapo elements that came on the heels of the Wehrmacht to finish off the Holocaust. The Gestapo also unintentionally helped Stalin by arresting and partially deporting many political elements that could

have stood in the way of the country's Sovietization, which was already in full swing a little over a year after the March 19 invasion. The fate of the Jews caused few headaches in the capital cities of the Allies.

Some of Prime Minister Kállay's contemporaries placed the blame for the failure of Hungary's defection policy on his alleged weakness, irresolution, and timidity. Diplomat György Barcza, for instance, bitterly noted in his memoirs that Kállay wanted to delay as long as possible but failed to realize that he could run out of time. This wound up being both a personal and national tragedy.³⁴ But Barcza thought very differently about Kállay's strategy during the secret talks in 1943. In May 1943, he wrote that those who wanted Hungary to make the move to break with Hitler immediately "have no idea of the consequences of such a move." The Germans would invade, and they would arrest and perhaps execute the democratic opposition and would kill tens, perhaps even hundreds of thousands of Jews.³⁵ He was mistaken on one point. The Germans actually needed the collaboration of Hungarian Nazis, who could hardly wait for the demise of the "liberal" old regime under Miklós Kállay, the man they accused of protecting the Jews. We now know that the premier negotiated in good faith, and was eventually ready to accept unconditional surrender. For the Allies, the secret peace talks were important only so long as they encouraged the Germans to invade Hungary and thereby spread them thin in the western theater of war. As noted in a paper prepared by the OSS in the wake of the tragedy of the Hungarian Jews, "the fate of these millions of Jews [in German-occupied Europe] had elicited slight notice from the world, which was more interested in the larger issues of the war."³⁶

NOTES

1. "The Jews of Hungary," October 19, 1944. R&A 2027. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 226, Entry 191, Box 1.
2. Tuvia Friling, *Arrows in the Dark: David Ben Gurion, the Yishuv Leadership, and Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 2:4.
3. Cited in Zoltán Vági, László Csósz, and Gábor Kádár, *The Holocaust in Hungary: Evolution of Genocide*. (Lanham, MD: Alta Mira Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, 2013), xlvii.

4. Allen Dulles, the OSS resident in Bern, received firsthand information about the Hitler-Horthy meeting from his Hungarian contact, the diplomat György Bakách-Bessenyei. "To the Secretary of State," March 22, 1944. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 226, Entry 190c, Dulles Files, Hungary, Box 6.
5. To the best of my knowledge the only British monograph that deals with the Hungarian peace efforts during World War II is Elisabeth Barker, *British Policy in South-East Europe in World War II* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1976).
6. "Memorandum," December 17, 1942. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Record Group (RG) 226, Entry 210, Box 593.
7. A couple of days before the German invasion of Hungary, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden asserted that unconditional surrender delayed rather than encouraged the break with Hitler. Eden's Telegram, March 17, 1944. NARA RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Central Files 1940-1944, Box 2960.
8. In the Peace Treaty of Trianon, concluded in 1920, Hungary lost roughly two-thirds of her territory. The focal point of Hungarian interwar foreign policy was to recover all, or at least the ethnically predominantly Hungarian parts, of the detached lands.
9. NARA RG 226, OSS "Withdraw Records" Entry A1-210, SOE Branch Files 1943 Hungary, Box 286, WN 12125-12127. "SOE Policies in Hungary." March 24, 1943.
10. NARA RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Decimal Files 1940-1944, Box 2955. "Memorandum by the Department of State to the British Government." April 28, 1943.
11. The Macartney Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Box 4. Barcza's telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. May 23, 1943.
12. Memorandum by F. K. Roberts, Head of the Foreign Office Central Department, June 5, 1943, in *Magyar-brit titkos tárgyalások 1943-ban* [Hungarian-British secret negotiations in 1943], ed. Gyula Juhász (Budapest: Kossuth, 1978), Document 31/a, 154.
13. Telegram from the deputy chief of staff to the chief of staff, August 23, 1943. In Juhász, *Magyar-brit titkos tárgyalások*, Document 47, 219.
14. Barcza's report to the Foreign Minister, August 5, 1943. The Macartney Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Box 5.
15. Telegram from the deputy chief of staff to the chief of staff, August 23, 1943.
16. Memorandum by the Political Warfare Executive, undated [September 1943]. NARA RG 226, Entry 192, Box 88.

17. Memorandum by William Donovan to the Department of State, October 23, 1943. NARA RG 218, JCS, Geographical Files 42-45, Box 191.
18. Memorandum by Jackson to Dulles, Horthy Jr.'s letter to Dulles, December 18, 1943. Papers of Allen Dulles, Seely Mudd Library, Princeton.
19. Churchill's letter to Roosevelt, October 7, 1943, in *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, ed. Warren F. Kimball (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2:498-99.
20. Memorandum by the Chairman of the JCS William Leahy, November 2, 1943, cited in Memorandum by Cordell Hull to William Leahy, March 16, 1944. NARA RG 218, JCS Geographical Files 42-45, Box 191.
21. Undated memorandum [December 1943], "Overall Deception Policy for War with Germany." Papers of Averell Harriman, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Box 171. The historian Patrick K. O'Donnell argues that "Even the failed Sparrow Mission to Hungary drew German divisions from the front, degrading their operational effectiveness for the Normandy invasion." Patrick K. O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII's OSS* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 312.
22. Telegram by Harriman, "Article by Gavrillov, 'The Occupation of Hungary by Hitler,'" April 6, 1944. Harriman papers, Box 537.
23. NARA RG 226, Entry 190, Box 593. Hungarian Special Plan, undated [1943].
24. "Hungarian Scheme," undated [January 1944]. NARA RG 226, Entry 210, Box 447.
25. Report on Draft Agreement, December 23, 1943. NARA RG 226, Entry 211, Box 226.
26. Telegram from Bern, January 2, 1944. NARA RG 226, Entry 211, Box 5.
27. Consideration of Draft Statement for Satellites, Memorandum from Hull to the Chiefs of Staff, March 16, 1944. NARA RG 218, JCS Geographical Files 42-45, Box 191.
28. Francis Deak is cited in Antal Czettler, *A mi kis élethalál kérdéseink. A magyar külpolitika a hadba lépéstől a német megszállásig* [Our little life-and-death questions: Hungarian foreign policy from entry into the war to the German occupation] (Budapest: Magvető, 2000), 439.
29. Answer to Hungarian Interim Reply, February 1944. NARA RG 226, Entry 226, Box 447.
30. "Situation in Hungary," February 14, 1944. NARA RG 226, Entry 211, Box 447.
31. According to Douglas Waller, Béla Király asked Duke for the American peace proposal. Duke told him that they had none other than the regular

- terms of unconditional surrender. Hungarian intelligence chief Ujszászi told the Americans that he had arranged a meeting with two cabinet members, who would lay out the government's offer to switch sides. Douglas Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage* (New York, Free Press, 2011), 196–97.
32. Terry Crowdy notes that, as conceived in the Bodyguard Plan, deceptions in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and Italy played a key role in supporting the Neptune landings by deterring the Germans from moving reserves to Normandy. Crowdy adds that “they also had an important part in paving the way for the Anvil landings in southern France. The part of Bodyguard covering the eastern Mediterranean was codenamed Zeppelin . . . One of the outcomes of Zeppelin was the German occupation of their supposed ally, Hungary. It was clear that the Germans had taken in the long running order of battle deception.” Terry Crowdy, *Deceiving Hitler: Double Cross and Deception in World War II* (New York: Osprey, 2008), 281–83.
 33. Aladár Szegedy-Maszák, *Az ember ősszel visszanéz . . . Egy volt magyar diplomata emlékiratából* [One recalls in fall . . . From the memoirs of a former diplomat] (Budapest: Európa-História, 1996), 1:330.
 34. Károly Urbán and István Vida, eds., “Részlet Barcza György Diplomataemlékeim című emlékiratának második kötetéből” [Excerpt from the second volume of György Barcza's memoir entitled *My memories as a diplomat*] *Századok* 121, nos. 2–3 (1987), 397–98.
 35. Memorandum by Barcza, May 21, 1943. Macartney Collection, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Box 5.
 36. NARA RG 226, Entry 191, Box 1, Research and Analysis 227, October 10, 1944. The historian John S. Conway has written that “British and Allied policy on the European Jewish Question was often deliberately blind to the unfolding catastrophe.” John S. Conway, “The Holocaust in Hungary: Recent Controversies and Reconsiderations,” in *The Tragedy of Hungarian Jewry: Essays, Documents, Depositions*, ed. Randolph H. Brahm (New York: Social Science Monographs and Institute for Holocaust Studies of the City University of New York, 1986), 4.

An Attempt to Moralize Realpolitik: Reflections on László Borhi’s Article

Ferenc Laczó

László Borhi’s article “The Allies, Secret Peace Talks, and the German Invasion of Hungary, 1943–1944” explores the role of secret peace talks between the Western Allies (the United States and the United Kingdom) and Hungary as one of the potential causes behind the German invasion of the latter country on March 19, 1944. Borhi’s arguments—which have been rather widely appreciated as well as repeatedly critiqued in the Hungarian-language media in the first half of 2019, including by the author of these lines—thus focus on a *single factor* in what is a larger and more complex story.

While the connections between such secret talks—which, as Borhi rightly notes, were not all that secret to the Germans—and the decision to launch Operation Margarethe is certainly worth studying further, and the author does present some interesting evidence in this regard, he would have been well-advised to analyze Nazi Germany’s decision-making process more directly and in a more encompassing way. I claim that only such a broader analysis could have allowed him to make a convincing case about the reasons behind the March 1944 invasion of Hungary, an invasion of a fellow Axis state that had manifold and devastating consequences.

Additional factors behind Nazi Germany’s decision—the rapidly evolving situation on the Eastern Front, with the Red Army approaching the borders of Hungary; anti-Semitic obsessions as a factor in German calculations; broader regional issues such as, perhaps most importantly, Germany’s future possibilities to cooperate with and mobilize the resources of Romania; the recent “defection” of Italy as an intervening influence on German thinking, etc.—are all alluded to but not considered in depth. In other words, the article studies Allied–Hungarian negotiations and the former’s admittedly self-interested encouragement of Hungarian political illusions without aiming to establish the *relative weight* of this one factor as compared to several others.

A key conclusion of Borhi's article seems to be that "the German invasion of March 19, 1944 may have been triggered, at least in part, by the Führer's conviction that he was about to lose a crucial ally" (p. 96). As compared to some of Borhi's previously published assertions, this is not a particularly strong claim, nor does it offer a truly original insight. Borhi announces that "I had no inkling that seemingly disparate events—the secret peace initiatives, the Allied strategy to defeat Hitler, the German invasion of Hungary, and, indirectly, the Hungarian Holocaust—would all intersect" (p. 90). However, such connections have been studied by scholars before, not least by the recently deceased Randolph Braham, the former doyen of Holocaust historiography, on whose theses concerning Hungary's counter-productive negotiations with the Allies Borhi actually appears to draw. Unfortunately, Borhi's article does not discuss its exact relation to the existing secondary literature and, therefore, does not sufficiently explain what is novel about his findings.

According to my assessment, there are two issues that seem to distinguish Borhi's depiction from earlier professional ones: his refocusing the discussion on the Western Allies, and the moralizing impetus behind his arguments. Let me address both in turn.

It is indeed conspicuous how little the article analyses various Hungarian actors. The author briefly sketches the immense odds behind Hungarian attempts at a separate peace: "first, because of the sizable pro-German political forces in the country; second, because of the difficulty of making contact with Allied officials in neutral capitals; third, because of the fear that if the leadership in Berlin discovered the secret dealings, the country could be occupied by the German army; and, finally, because the Allies themselves were not sold on the importance of the peace initiatives emanating from Axis Europe" (p. 91).

I consider all these to be highly relevant observations. I also wonder whether more could not have been said about those who were nonetheless in favor of secret negotiations. Could we perhaps say that such people were—despite all their agreeable intentions and desirable goals—recklessly chasing dangerous illusions, and ultimately helped bring about the invasion of their country, with all its tragic and disastrous consequences?

While relevant Hungarian actors lack sharper contours on the pages of the article, Borhi makes rather strong claims regarding the Allies. For instance, he states that "Eventually, this position [to view

the German invasion of Hungary as a positive outcome and to try to time it to coincide with the Allied landing in Western Europe – FL] would guide Allied policies regarding the Axis satellites” (p. 92). It is clear that such a position, which aimed to provoke conflict between two Axis enemies, was based on rational premises.

At the same time, Borhi’s generalization that such a calculation indeed guided Allied policies requires more elaborate and substantial proof. How precisely did the Allies aim to encourage such an invasion, and what was the actual impact of their actions? Borhi touches on these questions and seems to suggest that the Allies exerted a large and perhaps even decisive impact. However, this is not conclusively proven, and in fact sounds unlikely.

Borhi’s refocusing on the Western Allies—i.e., away from Hungary’s ultimately counterproductive attempt to exit the war—holds the promise of an important addition to the scholarly literature. This refocusing, however, is executed in a rather problematic manner, as Borhi employs strangely moralizing language.

I am not convinced by the analytical value or even simple relevance of the conceptual opposition the article suggests between Hungarian negotiators’ “good faith” and the Allies’ (implied, rather than stated) bad faith or, let us say, scheming. (I should clarify that Borhi’s current English-language article admittedly does not really use such loaded labels, but his argument suggests such a moral critique, especially through references to the threatened but neglected Jews of Hungary. Borhi has also articulated such a moral critique in his earlier publications, most notably in his widely read and debated article that was published on *Index.hu* on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the invasion.¹) It remains unclear to me what qualifies as “good faith” to the author and why; furthermore, we do not find out how he has established the difference between good faith, on the one hand, and scheming, on the other.

It seems to me that such a moralizing opposition is ultimately misleading, and even inappropriate. What I gather from the evidence is that the representatives of both Hungary and the Western Allies aimed to realize their respective national interests at a time of the greatest conflagration in world history. A crucial difference between them was that, whereas the Hungarian politicians and diplomats who wanted to exit the war and their country’s Nazi alliance had a very hard time figuring out how to achieve their central goal (and, as we know, they gravely failed in the end), helping to provoke a conflict between two of their

enemies seemed like a plausible strategy to the Western Allies, not least because of the rather short-sighted Hungarian willingness to negotiate with them. Moreover, such a potential conflict between Axis powers indeed appeared to be in their interest.

It is another matter that such Hungarian representatives, who were in an extremely difficult situation internationally and were probably short-sighted as well, were also in a vulnerable position in their own country, as pro-German forces remained dominant. Due to the latter factor—and contrary to the admittedly amoral hopes the Allies might have harbored—the German invasion starting on March 19, 1944 did not result in any major conflict, nor did the overall German war effort suffer. I would therefore be tempted to talk of a *rational, if provocative Allied miscalculation* regarding Hungary.

An issue Borhi's article leaves unaddressed concerns the political and military context of the so-called secret talks. The situation at the time was clearly asymmetrical. Even though in the very first paragraph of the article we read about "relative peace" in Hungary, Hungary was in fact an aggressor in World War Two; the "best-treated" Jews in the region were heavily discriminated against, and tens of thousands of them had already been murdered by 1943–44. As one of the aggressors facing imminent invasion by the Red Army and another defeat, Hungary was not exactly in a position to negotiate as an equal.

By 1943–44, segments of the country's elite were trying to reach out to their counterparts on the enemy side to ask for their benevolence and acquire some—unlikely—benefits. We might have a certain amount of sympathy for the ambitions of such members of Hungary's political elite (I certainly do), but we should also acknowledge that they took risks when they were highly unlikely to succeed. And that unlikelihood was not due primarily to the Western Allies' rational, if provocative scheming, but much more simply to the actual balance of forces in Central and Eastern Europe at the time.

Borhi's article is not focused on trying to account for the causes of the Holocaust in Hungary, nor does he discuss its main phase in the spring and summer of 1944. At the same time, the article does suggest rather direct connections between the German invasion of Hungary and the brutal destruction of Hungarian Jews, as well as, and more unusually, the country's subsequent Sovietization.

The former connection amounts to an especially moot question, since what I called above the rational Allied miscalculation clearly

acquires a strongly unfavorable moral dimension if we directly connect an (however partially) Allied-provoked German invasion to the genocide of local Jews. I would therefore like to briefly note here that the German invasion may have been, for lack of a more appropriate adjective, a necessary precondition, but it was not a sufficient precondition for the massive and utterly brutal extension of the Holocaust to the majority of Hungary's Jews in 1944. Scholars of the subject agree that only the proactive and highly efficient cooperation of Hungarian state institutions with their occupying Nazi German ally could have led to the deportation and murder of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews in such a short period near the end of the war in Europe.

This in turn raises an intriguing problem of historical judgement. Prior to 1944, various concerned observers in Allied countries predicted that a German occupation of Hungary would lead to such a human-caused catastrophe, and Borhi's article offers relevant quotes in this regard; it did, but not exactly for the reasons such observers feared. What they should have feared as much as German Nazi plans to destroy the last, and despite significant losses, still largely intact Jewish community of Central and Eastern Europe was the power and fanaticism of Hungarian *génocidaires*. In other words, there were indeed people of good faith in Hungary in 1943–44, if perhaps too few and too naïve. More decisively for the genocide in 1944, however, there were also too many others with the worst intentions towards their discriminated fellow citizens, and they were clearly not directly triggered by the Western Allies but by a Nazi invasion they, in fact, viewed as an opportunity to carry out genocide.

In sum, László Borhi's article deals with an important and controversial subject. It presents some suggestive evidence, but frames its subject rather narrowly. Most importantly, the author could have provided a broader and more convincing analysis of the main reasons behind Germany's decision to invade Hungary in March 1944. This would have been necessary to establish the *relative weight* of secret talks in this decision and what specific impact the practices of the Western Allies had on Hungary and the war in Europe as a whole. Moreover, the article could have adopted a less moralizing tone, and tested more precise—not to mention appropriate—analytical categories than “good faith.”

NOTE

1. László Borhi, “A szövetségesek provokálták ki a német megszállást, nem törődve a magyar zsidókkal” [The Allies provoked the German occupation, without consideration for the Hungarian Jews], Index.hu, March 18, 2019. https://index.hu/techtud/tortenelem/2019/03/18/nemet_megszallas_1944_angolszasz_felelosseg_borhi_laszlo/.

Book Reviews

Paul Robert Magocsi. *Historical Atlas of Central Europe*. Third revised and expanded edition. Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 2018. 224 pages, 61 main maps and 40 smaller maps, bibliography, index. ISBN 978-1-4875-2331-2

This is the rare case of a book that has been reviewed almost one hundred times before, if we include the eighty reviews of the first edition of 1993 and the fifteen reviews of the second edition of 2001, which introduced twenty new maps, partly because of political changes during the 1990s. It was also a different kind of atlas, because in contrast to the first edition, now the maps were produced digitally, which allowed for easier revision for the third edition that we review here. (Readers should consider buying the electronic version, with added features, which is available at the same price as the paperback!)

The “Historical Atlas of Central Europe” has been a major Canadian-US research project for more than a quarter century. The book has even changed its name, after many Central Europeans found the designation “East Central Europe” in the first edition somehow offensive; but more importantly because the territory covered by the atlas is “Central Europe” “in purely geographical terms” (xiii). It could easily be argued that such purity can be contested, because geographers are part of the ongoing struggle to define what “Europe” is and where the “center” of the continent lies.¹ The same problem, from the standpoint of constructivist approaches, arises regarding “ethnic groups.” In the atlas there are maps and statistics (Map 30, p. 97; Map 55, p. 189) that show and list the main “ethnolinguistic groups” that represent more than fifty percent of a population marked in bold font, and other such groups with colors that cover certain areas; this could also be seen as a simplification of a very complex reality. However, we would not have the atlas if it would have been created by constructivist historians. And that would be a great problem, because the *Historical Atlas of Central*

Europe is not only a very useful tool for research and (most of all) teaching, but also a very beautiful, very well-edited publication. And it is a very direct way to tell the history of this part of the continent with the help of short descriptions (mostly not longer than one to two pages), geographical maps, and statistics in sixty-one chapters. The third edition also adds new materials, mostly because of political changes in the Balkans, where Montenegro and Kosovo have appeared, although the renaming of Macedonia as “North Macedonia” came too late to be included in the maps. This shows how important the atlas is, because it documents all these changes and makes them easily visible. The text of the second edition has been revised, and, what is more important, the statistical data in the tables has been corrected and updated; finally, the bibliography has been extended. The quality of the photographic representation of the maps is also much better than in the second edition.

The narrative the maps and statistics tell begins with geography in the stricter sense of the word, looking at the geographical parts of the area with the main mountains and plains, rivers and seashores (Map 1, p. 3). Two smaller maps look at rainfall (Map 1a, p. 4) and “vegetation and land use” (Map 1b, p. 4), and a short text describes the climate of the three main zones (Northern, Alpine, Balkans). Chapter 2 starts the historical narrative, beginning with the fifth century, when Central Europe was divided into a “civilized” Roman Empire and an “uncivilized” world beyond its borders (5). The end of antiquity had a major impact on Central Europe, because it was a time of large movements of various peoples, illustrated in Map 2 (p. 5). Chapters 3 through 13 deal with the medieval period, providing maps of various kingdoms and empires, but also provide looks into the economy (chapter 11), cities (chapter 12) and the church administration (chapter 13). Chapters 14 through 22 focus on the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, and chapters 23 through 36 on the “long nineteenth century.” Chapter 38 and 39 are dedicated to the dramatic five years after World War I, 1918-23, that completely changed the political borders and state system of Central Europe. Chapters 39 through 48 describe the major changes in specific sub-regions, from Poland and Lithuania (ch. 38) to Bulgaria and Greece (ch. 48), during the twentieth century. The following five chapters, 49–53, are about the catastrophic two decades between 1930 and the late 1940s, when Central Europe was the theater of another World War, the Holocaust, and major population “movements,” very often brutally enforced. The last eight chapters are more mixed; they look into population (ch. 54) and “ethnolinguistic distribution” (ch. 55); post-war

industrial development (ch. 56); Communism in 1980 and post-communism after 1989 (ch. 56, 61); and the Catholic and Orthodox churches (ch. 59, 60). I have summarized the structure of the *Atlas* here because it shows the main themes and directions of the volume. The reader will get quick and very reliable information about the major political, economic and demographic developments of Central Europe from the end of the Roman Empire until today.

In addition to the maps and the short chapter texts there is an extremely useful index of place names. The editor decided to use today's place names as well as the relatively few English names that are available (like Belgrade, Warsaw, or Vienna), but all the different historical names or the names in other languages are listed in the index, making it extremely helpful.

I did not expect that I would be one of the reviewers who could help Paul Robert Magocsi to further improve his maps by finding mistakes, because I do not have the eye for such details, but I found one: the diocese of "Perugia" on Map 59 (The Latin (Roman) Catholic Church in the twentieth century) is misspelled as "Perugio." But this is a very small mistake that can easily be overlooked in such a major accomplishment for all who are interested in the history and present situation of (not only Central) Europe today!

Árpád von Klimó
The Catholic University of America

NOTE

1. See the discussion in James Koranyi and Bernhard Struck, "Space: Empires, Nations, Borders" in *The Routledge History of East Central Europe since 1700*, ed. Irina Livezeanu and Árpád von Klimó (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017), 27–78.

Norman Stone. *Hungary: A Short History*. London: Profile Books, 2019. 245 pages. ISBN 978-1-7881-6050-9

This was supposed to be a book review. But the fact that the author of the book, the British historian Norman Stone (March 8, 1941 – June 19, 2019) passed away shortly after its appearance does in some way connect this last work with the life of the scholar. What is also extraordinary

about this book is the fact that it is the very last book of a historian who had never written a book on Hungary before, although he did study Hungarian, and visited archives there already in 1962, surely one of the very first Western scholars to work in the country only a few years after the 1956 revolution and just months after the Cuban Missile Crisis. This tells us something about the author. Norman Stone was an unusual, and surely more adventurous historian compared to his colleagues. In Czechoslovakia—or to be more precise, in Bratislava—he was even arrested and imprisoned for a couple of months for trying to smuggle a Hungarian dissident out of the bloc. After writing his dissertation about the Eastern Front of World War I—a topic almost completely neglected by British, French, or German research at that time, mostly because of lack of command of Eastern European languages—Stone unfortunately (from the perspective of Hungarian Studies!) turned to other topics and other parts of the world. His career continued in three phases, first in Cambridge (1967–84), then in Oxford (1984–97), and finally, again quite unusually, at Bilkent University in Ankara (1997–2017). Stone spent the last years of his life in Budapest, somehow bridging the distance between England and Turkey. His historiography, as demonstrated in his *Europe Transformed, 1878–1919* (1983) and *The Atlantic and Its Enemies: A Personal History of the Cold War* (2010),¹ tended to be extremely well-written, funny, thought-provoking, and broad in scope, though not without an eye for telling details; and it always found a large audience, which also had to do with Stone’s journalistic talent. He was called a “maverick”; he had many personal problems and his conservatism was loathed by many academics in Oxford and in other places, which explains why he fled to Turkey, where he was allowed to smoke and did not have to bow to absurd political correctness. His defenses of Margaret Thatcher and Turkey (he did not qualify the massacres of Armenians as “genocide”), and, in this book, his praise for Viktor Orbán, will not please many liberals and leftists. But those who would avoid him for these reasons would miss one of the best-written books on Hungarian history in the English language, that is partly very funny and full of insightful anecdotes and stories. And Stone is very honest when he mentions his own flaws and the limits of his knowledge. The best things about *Hungary: A Short History*, however, are the broad, European perspective and the distance with which he looks at the history of the small country in the center of the continent. Specialists of Hungarian history will not find many new ideas, but the book is not written for them, although it is mostly accurate and reliable—if we

overlook Stone's tendency to leave out the more problematic aspects of the Fidesz regime of the last decade. But apart from that, Stone does not fail to criticize the stupidity of Hungarian nationalism and the often short-sightedness of her elites in often tragic historical situations, which they made worse by their own stubbornness.

The story begins with the consequences of Mohács, when "Hungary fell to foreigners" in 1526 (2), explaining, in the next chapters, why it took more than three hundred years for the country to recover from the setback and enjoy a European modernization, looking to Britain for a liberal model. This long period is covered in the first four chapters, and was marked by the struggle against the Habsburgs for self-determination, which ended in national independence in 1918, but also in absolute disaster. Under Regent Miklós Horthy, whose lack of intelligence Stone emphasizes, the country became more and more dependent on Germany, driven by the desire to revise the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which ended in an even greater catastrophe with the Holocaust (1944/45) and the complete breakdown in 1945 of "Hitler's Last Ally" (149). Chapter 6 describes the brutal Communist takeover, and chapter 7 the horrors and ludicrous paradoxes created by Stalinism. Stone's assessment of János Kádár (ch. 8) is balanced, and it shows how this historian has a great idea of the tragedies of human lives, recounting the miserable youth of János Csermanek (Kádár's name when he was born in the then-(Austro-)Hungarian port city of Fiume, now Rijeka, Croatia). The final chapter is a very condensed, and somewhat open-ended, history of Hungary since 1980, which ends with a paragraph that speaks about "a moment of hope"—obviously in comparison to Hungarian history since the sixteenth century!—and the sentence "A shadowy version of the old Habsburg unity is coming about, and Hungarians learn" (245). Stone seems to indicate that since the end of state socialism in 1989 the European Union made mistakes and "mismanaged" the transition, but that the disappearance of borders dividing Hungary from other former parts of St. Stephen's realm will bring some advantages in the long run. This is a great book, and it is fun to reading even if one does not share the author's political leanings. When reading it, we should mourn a great historian, who we might wish had turned to writing Hungarian history earlier on.

Árpád von Klimó
The Catholic University of America

NOTE

1. Norman Stone, *Europe Transformed, 1878–1919* (Glasgow: Fontana Press, 1983); Norman Stone, *The Atlantic and Its Enemies: A Personal History of the Cold War* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

John Zametica. *Folly and Malice: The Habsburg Empire, the Balkans and the Start of World War One*. London: Shephard-Walwyn, 2017. 766 pages. ISBN 978-0-8568-3513-1

The application to the graduate school where I ended up doing my Ph.D. in modern European history required all candidates to write an essay on the following question: which work of historical significance do you wish you had written, and why? This was quite annoying to your typical college student, since none of the other graduate programs required such additional labor. In hindsight, however, the exercise was brilliant, as it made one think deeply about what makes for good history and how historians enrich, and complicate, our understanding of the past. If I were writing that essay today, I might choose John Zametica's book *Folly and Malice: The Habsburg Empire, the Balkans and the Start of World War One*.

I say that with two major caveats. First, I disagree ardently with the author's overarching argument that the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire—the "sick man on the Danube," as the prologue is entitled—was "an anomaly condemned to death by the progress of history" (4). Zametica's work unfolds as unabashedly determinist in its view that the nation-state was not only ascendant in the nineteenth century, but that national interests make any kind of supranational governing system, including today's European Union, a largely futile undertaking. Overlooking or willfully ignoring decades of research that has demolished the notion of a decrepit and doomed dual monarchy (and several pages of the prologue are devoted to the "shambles of the [dualist] system" created by the 1867 Compromise), Zametica comes off as such an extreme evangelist for national identity and sovereignty that he specifies the ethnic origins of Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić (actually a Cincar whose real surname was Pasku) and cites a Serbian general's satisfaction at learning that the June 11, 1903 conspirators who murdered Serbian King Alexander and his dreadful wife Draga Mašin were not Serbs per se, but rather "Cincars, Bulgars, Czechs, Vlachs and Jews" (9, 197).

While such ethnic precision points to the awe-inspiring meticulousness that pervades this work and about which I will write more, the above example is also indicative of its second significant flaw: Zametica's bulky, 643-page tome (not including seventy-five pages of detailed endnotes and a useful bibliography) tips heavily towards exculpating Serbs from any kind of activities that might have antagonized Austria-Hungary in the period before the First World War. The historiography on the war's origins sorely needed a corrective to the abundant literature, capped in 2012 by Christopher Clark's more broadly conceived study *The Sleepwalkers*,¹ that makes Serbia out to be the south Slavic nemesis par excellence, whose irredentist pretensions and propaganda explain, if not excuse, Habsburg leaders' decisive choice of war against the small Serbian thorn in its side in the immediate aftermath of the Sarajevo assassination. Yet rather than nudging the needle toward a more balanced accounting of Austro-Hungarian insecurity and Serb nationalist agitation, Zametica practically leaves the latter out of the big picture altogether. So, for example, we learn that Croatia rather than Serbia was the hotbed for south Slavic nationalism, and that Ilija Garašanin's famous *Načertanije* (outline) for "Great Serbia" was originally penned by a Polish exile, revised by a Czech, and in any case had little influence on Serbian foreign policy, making it "a classic example of a historiographical straw man argument" (190). In both instances, the author's highly detailed clarifications are essential contributions to the scholarly literature. Yet one reads this book wondering whether all the so-called Serbian nationalism ever even existed outside the imaginations of Habsburg officialdom and careless historians.

Another case in point concerns the influence on young Bosnians of Serb nationalist Bogdan Žerajić's suicide after attempting to assassinate Bosnian Governor-General Marijan Varešanin in Sarajevo in June 1910, despite Gavrilo Princip and friends' Yugoslavist rather than Serb nationalist ideological orientation (which Zametica proves conclusively and crucially, considering how many scholars unthinkingly label the Bosnian assassin a "Serbian nationalist"). Yet here too there is no mention of how the Serbian press heroized Žerajić, including in the August 5, 1910 issue of *Politika*. Similarly, one finishes this book feeling that Austro-Hungarian leaders in July 1914 were scrambling to find any evidence whatsoever of the anti-Habsburg propaganda alleged in their ultimatum to Serbia; or that Serbs respectfully stopped celebrating the national holiday Vidovdan the moment they heard about the Sarajevo assassination. Instead, Zametica painstakingly documents the relentless efforts of official Serbia to live peacefully with the vast empire to its

north—even after the regime annexed what he attests are the irrefutably Serb lands of Bosnia and Herzegovina—and in the days following the Archduke’s murder.

Yet document it does, and therein lies the main reason that any historian of the origins of World War I should take this book seriously. If the author’s presentation is one-sided, the case he makes for Serbia is firmly grounded in a close reading of primary sources, their context, and all the major literature in every relevant language. Whether Zametica is explaining why Franz Ferdinand—a “die-hard paleoconservative” (635)—was not the peace-loving and reform-minded Successor he is often made out to be (the Archduke’s alleged Trialism, which still crops up in serious literature, is decisively and, one hopes, lastingly undermined here); showing how the 1903 regicide was not the turning point in Serbian foreign policy away from Austria-Hungary and toward Russia (in fact, he shows how, right up to the July Crisis in 1914, Russia was never a dependable ally and support for Serbia); or dissecting the hidden aggression behind the June 1914 Matscheko Memorandum, which most scholars interpret as being devoid of war planning against Serbia, his cascade of revisionist arguments are intricately sourced and fastidiously reasoned.

Indeed, this book is as much a polemic with other historians as it is a narrative of the origins of World War I in the Balkans. On numerous occasions, Zametica feistily takes scholars to task—Christopher Clark, Luigi Albertini, and Sean McMeekin earn particular opprobrium—for uncritically accepting and enthusiastically furthering such “fantastic hogwash” (401), “false constructs” (456), “misleading legends” (482), and other “myths” (634), as the appearance of a telegram from Russia fortifying Serbian leaders on the deadline of the ultimatum (July 25), or the role of the Black Hand in the Sarajevo assassination.

Regarding the latter, Zametica’s erudition is awesome, the pace and detail of the narrative exciting (he exactly corrects both the order of the cars in the imperial procession and of the assassins lining the Appel Quay), and no scholar will ever again be able to write on the political murder without first reading him. For what Zametica has essentially done is not to prove conclusively what individual or organization was behind the Sarajevo assassination (confoundingly, definitive documentation is just not there), but to reason his way through the maze of original sources and testimonies (including an impressively close reading of the assassins’ trial transcript) to show the origins and weaknesses of the near century-long obsession with Apis’s “terrorist” Black Hand Society. In a chapter wittily entitled “Black Hand—Red Herring,”

Zametica contextualizes Apis's actions within the domestic political crisis in Serbia in order to undermine the Black Hand leader's own confession (at the 1917 Salonika show trial) to having organized the Sarajevo conspiracy. Rather, he argues, the loose cannon Major Vojislav Tankosić, who was named in the ultimatum and whose personality is given great attention in this work, handed over the weapons to Princip and friends on his own initiative. Apis, concludes the author, actually tried to stop the assassination (both through the Serbian ambassador to Vienna and directly with the assassins in Sarajevo) once he learned about his freewheeling subordinate's precipitous action in support of the young Bosnians (who, again contrary to many standard historical accounts, initiated the conspiracy on their own rather than being "recruited" by the Black Hand).

It may be easy to criticize Zametica for the broad, pre-determined brushstrokes that encompass his arguments and for what he leaves out in terms of Serbian nationalist activities. But dismissing his work outright, say because of the author's unseemly support for Radovan Karadžić during the Yugoslav secessionary wars and at the Bosnian Serb leader's trial in the Hague Tribunal, would be an easy way for scholars to continue avoiding some of the fictional hand-me-downs about this critical era that are rooted in the work of the likes of Luigi Albertini and Stanoje Stanojević on the Sarajevo assassination, and which Zametica has finally rooted out. It's one thing to write "a rip-roaring good [his]story" (396), but it's quite another to do so based on the primary sources rather than relying on dated secondary literature that often played fast and loose with such critical facts as the ideology of the Sarajevo assassins and an alleged last-minute Russian telegram bolstering Belgrade before the ultimatum expired. Zametica's blatant biases aside, *Folly and Malice* is a breathtaking display of how expert historical sleuthing works, and how easily even the most respected academics incorporate and transmit "false constructs" in the process of writing their complicated works.

Paul Miller-Melamed
McDaniel College

NOTE

1. Christopher Clark, *Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

Borislav Chernev. *Twilight of Empire: The Brest-Litovsk Conference and the Remaking of East-Central Europe, 1917–1918*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017. 301 pages. ISBN 978-1-4875-2449-4

On March 3, 1918, the Central Powers and Bolshevik Russia signed the second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (the first Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had been concluded between the Central Powers and Ukraine on February 9, 1918). According to the terms of the second treaty, Russia (or, more accurately, the “old empire”) ceded 780,000 square kilometres of territory and roughly fifty-six million people. Russian losses amounted to “twenty-seven percent of the former empire’s arable land, twenty-six percent of its railways, thirty-three percent of its textile industry, seventy-three percent of its iron and steel production, eighty-nine percent of its coal deposits, and ninety percent of its sugar production.” From the point of view of many observers, the conditions imposed by the treaty were unnecessarily harsh, and marked an “imperial collapse on [a] scale [that] was almost wholly unprecedented” (214).

As Borislav Chernev notes in his recent book commemorating the centenary of the Brest-Litovsk Conference, “few treaties in the history of international relations have been vilified as much as the second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk” (213). Given the magnitude of what Russia appeared to lose and what the Central Powers temporarily gained, it is of course understandable that many scholars have zeroed in on the supposedly draconian nature of the treaty, or that they have treated the Brest-Litovsk Conference as a massive and misguided diplomatic failure on the part of the inexperienced Bolsheviks. Though there is undoubtedly some truth to these claims, Chernev nevertheless argues that such black-and-white assessments of Brest-Litovsk conceal the complexity and nuanced history behind the conference and the two treaties that resulted from it. Drawing on a rich body of primary sources from archives in multiple countries, Chernev’s well-researched and provocative study challenges readers to think about the history of the Brest-Litovsk Conference in new ways, not only with regard to who may have won or lost, but also in terms of the role the conference played in shaping Europe—and especially East Central Europe—in the early twentieth century.

For students of World War I who have viewed the conflict and its aftermath primarily from a Western-centric perspective, the

biggest surprise will no doubt come in the opening chapters of the book. Though the armistice of November 11, 1918 and the Paris Peace Talks that followed may have marked a distinct end to the war on the Western Front, Chernev points out that, in East Central Europe, peace talks began already in December 1917, with hostilities extending well into 1923. In terms of the peace talks themselves, it was at the Brest-Litovsk Conference, and not the Paris Peace Conference, that the notion of open negotiations was first introduced, largely because of the Bolshevik desire to use the conference as a platform for the articulation and dissemination of revolutionary propaganda. Perhaps more surprisingly, it was at Brest-Litovsk, and not Paris, that the concept of national self-determination made its debut as part of peace negotiations. Introduced on the first day of the peace conference by Adolf Ioffe, chairman of the Russian delegation, the concept of national self-determination was announced as the cornerstone of Bolshevik peace conditions. Based upon ideas first espoused by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in a pamphlet published in 1915, the so-called Ioffe Program prompted Western liberal-democratic leaders to articulate similar policies, and predated not only Woodrow Wilson's announcement of his Fourteen Points by a few weeks, but also David Lloyd George's commitment to a postwar peace settlement "based on the right to self-determination or the consent of the governed" (48).

The Bolshevik insistence on a peace plan based on the principle of national self-determination proved popular—or at least potentially useful—to multiple parties taking part in the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations. For the Bolsheviks, national self-determination was first and foremost an ideological commitment, one that ran parallel with the Marxist call for "the suppression of the ruling classes by the proletariat at home and abroad as a prelude to permanent revolutions" (49). As Chernev points out, however, Bolshevik support of self-determination for "suppressed" nations was also a key aspect of their foreign policy, and was deployed tactically, if also sincerely, as a means of transforming inherited imperial structures along communist lines. The Central Powers, by comparison, also latched on to the notion of national self-determination, and were determined to use it to their advantage over the course of the negotiations. Austria-Hungary and Germany, for example, posed as "liberators and protectors of small nations in the East" (67), and in this way attempted to justify the occupation of eastern territories. Bulgaria, in turn, found the concept useful as a means of formulating foreign policy goals. Mobilizing the idea of national self-determination in their ultimately failed quest to secure regional

hegemony in the Balkans, the Bulgarian delegation sought “international recognition for the annexation of newly-conquered territories,” arguing that the expansion of the state would liberate ethnic Bulgarians living outside the country, thus achieving national unification.

As the Bolsheviks themselves recognized, support for national self-determination could, and likely would, fuel movements for independence and decolonization, and would thus hasten the collapse of empires, including the Russian Empire that they had just inherited. Ukraine is perhaps a good case in point. Highlighting the ways in which Ukrainian delegates appealed to the Brest-Litovsk system as a means of pursuing their own domestic goals, Chernev argues that there was a clear connection between the peace process in 1917–1918 and the origins of modern Ukrainian statehood as an anti-colonial project. Given the imperial war aims of Germany and Austria-Hungary, it is perhaps ironic that the signing of the peace treaty with the Central Powers in February 1918 laid both the ideological and practical groundwork for Ukrainization. Having been assured the right to national self-determination, the brief period of nation-building that followed the signing of the treaty in fact anticipated “certain elements” of the indigenization [*korenizatsiia*] policy that would later be implemented in Ukraine by Soviet authorities in the interwar period (121).

For the Central Powers, the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations presented significant opportunities for the continuation and even temporary fulfilment of imperial goals. The rise of nationalist fervour throughout the region, however, coupled with the growing frustration of the masses at home (especially over food shortages), only contributed to growing discontent and radicalization. Chernev argues that, as the talks dragged on, the Central Powers were motivated increasingly by fear of revolution, particularly in Austria-Hungary. Though the October Revolution arguably had “little immediate effect on the workers of Habsburg East Central Europe,” the deteriorating food situation, which had politicized the masses and had been provoking protests since the middle of the war, created conditions within which the Brest-Litovsk conference “captured the popular imagination” (84). This growing sense of fear was only heightened in mid-January 1918 as strikes broke out in Austria, and spread to Hungary and Germany. Beginning at the Daimler Motor Works in Wiener Neustadt on January 14 after officials announced that flour rations would be cut in half, the number of protesters grew quickly and strikes flared up in other towns and cities, with workers and strikers demanding bread and peace. As Chernev suggests,

the Great January Strike was “the opening act of the Central European revolutions of 1918–1919” (119).

While there is much to like about this book, Hungarian specialists will find little regarding the Hungarian perspective on Brest-Litovsk, save for a few brief and isolated statements regarding Hungarian responses to diplomatic developments during the conference. The reader learns, for example, that the Hungarian prime minister, Sándor Wekerle, was very uncomfortable with Austria-Hungary’s rather favourable response to Ioffe’s notion of national self-determination, and in particular with the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister’s claims that aspects of the Ioffe Program could in principle serve as the basis of “a general and just peace” (51). From Wekerle’s perspective, Austria-Hungary’s admittedly opportunistic accommodation of Bolshevik principles regarding self-determination and minority rights “had the potential to undermine Magyar dominance in the Kingdom of Hungary” (55). This is an important point that would be worth pursuing more fully, though Chernev fails to develop it any further. Likewise, he indicates that the January strikes in 1918 also spilled over into Hungary as early as January 18, when streetcar workers walked off the job in Budapest. As in Austria, these strikes grew in size very quickly, and spread to other cities like Nagykanizsa and Szeged (110). Unfortunately, by limiting his analysis to one page, and by drawing on only a few non-Hungarian primary sources and József Galántai’s otherwise dated *Hungary in the First World War*,¹ the reader is left wondering not only about the impact that these strikes had in Hungary, and how they may have differed from those in Austria and Germany, but also about the role they may have played as precursors to the Hungarian revolutions of 1918 and 1919.

Of course, given the already impressive linguistic and geographic scope of the book, it is both understandable and perhaps also forgivable that Chernev has given the Hungarian side of the story short shrift. That being said, he does drop a bomb of sorts near the very end of the final chapter, one that makes up for earlier oversights. Reflecting on the second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk from “the perspective of Imperial collapse and decolonization,” Chernev argues that it has less in common with Versailles (the treaty to which it is typically compared), and more in common with Trianon, which the victorious powers “imposed on Hungary” in 1920. Though often regarded simply as a nation-state in and of itself, Chernev suggests that, like the Russian Empire, Hungary was in many ways also a colonial power, albeit a junior one within the much bigger Habsburg Empire.

As provocative—and I think necessary—as Chernev’s comparison between the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Trianon might be, I doubt the book will find its way into many university-level courses that focus specifically on Hungarian history. But it can and should find a home on the shelves of students and scholars interested not only in the history of World War I and the peace negotiations and treaties that followed, but also in the history of East Central Europe and the early years of the Soviet Union more generally. Chernev’s masterful study will also appeal to readers who revel in the detail-oriented analyses of diplomatic history, or who appreciate the intricacies and complexities of international relations. Beautifully written and skilfully edited, *Twilight of Empire* is a valuable and entertaining history, and if nothing else, provides clear and often dramatic insight into the meeting of “two vastly different worlds,” one bent on shaping the future along revolutionary lines, and the other content with preserving the imperial status quo, and containing the Bolshevik threat.

Steven Jobbitt
Lakehead University

NOTE

1. József Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War* (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1989).

Zsolt Nagy. *Great Expectations and Interwar Realities: Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy, 1918-1941*. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2017. 341 pages. ISBN: 978-9-6338-6194-3

With the country lacking the possibility of a nationally driven foreign policy during the years of Austro-Hungarian dualism, cultural diplomacy was a pursuit that Hungarian politicians could engage in only with the creation of an independent state in 1918. After the turmoil of the immediate post-war years, punctuated by the demise of the short-lived democratic-liberal Hungarian republic born on November 16, 1918 and the rise and fall of the Soviet Republic of Councils in the spring and summer of 1919, Hungary turned into a conservative authoritarian regime under the leadership of Regent Miklós Horthy for the rest of the interwar period. It is therefore the cultural diplomacy of this regime that

Zsolt Nagy's book examines, by focusing on state agencies, cultural institutions, scholarly publications, tourism, radio, and newsreels as instruments for creating a specific image of Hungary for audiences abroad.

The core chapters of the book are framed by the perspective of the transition from a rather ineffective wartime propaganda, whose reach was limited, to a more coordinated peacetime cultural diplomacy supervised by the government and various national institutions during the interwar years. After uncoordinated attempts during the early 1920s by a variety of right-wing groups at persuading the Allies of the injustice of the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty, it was mostly after 1927 that cultural diplomacy gained more traction in Hungary's foreign policy. The institutions in charge of this effort were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Religion and Public Education. Subordinated to the broad goals of revisionism and improving Hungary's image abroad, Hungarian cultural diplomacy of the late 1920s and 1930s tried to change negative Western European perceptions of Hungary. It attempted this by emphasizing the country's belonging to the sphere of Western civilization and modernity, which—in the interpretation of its proponents—entitled Hungarians to claim cultural superiority over their southeastern neighbors. The architects of this new strategy were Count Kuno Klebelsberg, the Minister of Religion and Public Education in the István Bethlen government between 1922 and 1931 and, to a lesser extent, Miklós Kozma, the first head of Magyar Távirati Iroda (MTI – Hungarian Telegraphic Office), whose reach as cultural propagandist also extended to a variety of other media such as radio and newsreels.

However, there was often disagreement about what kind of image of Hungarianness to highlight for the consumption of foreign audiences. Ever since the rise of Hungarian nationalism in the nineteenth century, Magyars oscillated between adopting Western and Oriental identities. The split consciousness that the continuous movement between the two caused in Hungarians' self-image was well encapsulated by Endre Ady's metaphor of *komp-ország* (ferry-land) that he coined at the beginning of the twentieth century. During the interwar period, however, rejecting both the internationalist image proposed in 1918–19 by liberals and communists and the oriental fantasies of extreme right-wing groups, conservative nationalist governments chose to emphasize instead the Western and Christian character of Hungary. Instantiated by the promotion of the image and cult of St. Stephen, the first Christian king of Hungary, over that of Árpád, the pagan chieftain who led the Magyar tribes to Pannonia, this self-image connected Hungary both to

European civilization and a transnational Catholic ecumene. By virtue of the battles that the medieval kingdom of Hungary fought against the Ottomans, this connection was further cemented in the portrayal of Hungary as *scutus Christi* (the shield of Christianity), a trope that came to be frequently used in debates about the Hungarian national character that took center stage during the interwar period.

As the chief architect of Hungary's cultural diplomacy, Klebelsberg warned against relying on past achievements; he wanted the country to enter the future on new terms based "on the rejuvenation and reconstruction of the country's cultural life," which would allow "Hungary to join European cultural life" (94). Therefore the ambitious cultural reconstruction program that he set out for Hungary included not just the expansion of public education domestically and the borrowing of foreign models for the rebuilding of the country's scientific infrastructure, but also the establishment of several outposts of Hungarian culture abroad. Following in the footsteps of some older Hungarian cultural institutions established in Vienna and Rome prior to the war, he developed a new network of Collegium Hungaricum institutes in Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, together with a "Hungarian-French University Information Institute in Paris, and five lectureships at institutions of higher education in Germany, Estonia, Finland, Sweden and Poland" (117). A lesser-known outpost of Hungarian culture abroad, discussed in detail by Nagy, is the Hungarian Reference Library in New York City, opened in 1937 with materials purchased indirectly by the Hungarian government from the widow of Károly (Charles) Feleky, an American-Hungarian collector of English-language books, journals, and news clippings about Hungary. The activities of these institutions were supported from home not just financially but also through a wide array of foreign-language publications aiming to acquaint foreign audiences with Hungarian culture, science, and literature, among which the *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie* and the *Hungarian Quarterly* stood out.

Propaganda in the service of tourism was also soon enrolled to help with these efforts. With the foreign orientation of its tourism development, Hungary differed from fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, where the focus of the state fell on developing domestic tourism. Based on a wide array of archival evidence, Nagy convincingly explores the variety of connections and interactions between different government organizations, Hungarian embassies abroad, and municipal and civic tourist organizations at home, whose ultimate aim was to attract more foreign tourists to Hungary. In parallel, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

also made it one of its priorities to sponsor foreign journalists and public figures to write and speak favorably about Hungary, a practice in which the country competed with the Little Entente powers. The 1930s indeed turned into a golden age of Hungarian tourism, with Budapest and Lake Balaton being visited by many Germans, Austrians, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Americans, along with travelers from the neighboring countries. Conflict over the meaning of Hungarianness resulted in tourism promoters presenting an image of Hungary which included the modern architecture, spa culture, and cosmopolitan nightlife of Budapest, together with romantic and folkloristic highlights such as the wilderness of the Hungarian *puszta* (plain) and the *matyó* costumes of Mezőkövesd—a composite image which continued to place the country in an ambivalent Western/Eastern position.

In the last chapter of the book, Nagy analyzes the role that radio programming and *Kulturfilme* (culture shorts) had in Hungary's overall cultural diplomacy efforts. Once turned operational, radio broadcasts were used by the government both as an effective outreach tool to Hungarian speakers living in the neighboring countries and as a medium enabling it to promote Hungarian culture abroad. Economic considerations were also important, since radio programming enabled the government to collect a license fee from listeners. Rather than giving in to pressure from extreme right-wing groups to broadcast exclusively in Hungarian, and in line with Klebelsberg's efforts to Europeanize Hungarian culture, radio broadcasting was multi-lingual, including numerous programs in English, French, German, and Italian, as well as music ranging from *magyar nóta* (Hungarian folk songs) to American jazz. The author's discussion of the infrastructural development of radio broadcasting, with a veritable race developing between Hungary and its neighbors for the greatest possible power and reach of their respective radio stations, provides another interesting comparative insight. The production of Hungarian newsreels and *Kulturfilme* was also an endeavor that encountered fierce competition on the international market for such fare from the Little Entente countries. Although Hungarian propagandistic shorts like *Hungária* (produced in 1928 and remade in 1934) were successful both at home and abroad, they had to compete against similar products such as the Czech *Saint Wenceslas* and the Romanian *Romania Today—Picturesque Romania*, which lessened their overall impact on foreign audiences.

The book breaks new ground by providing thematic, comparative, and analytical insights into the way interwar Hungarian cultural propaganda was developed at the intersection of governmental and

private interests. With its wide and informed coverage of the history of Hungarian cultural diplomacy during the interwar years, Nagy's work can be usefully read along such publications as Andrea Orzoff's *Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948* (2009),¹ which discusses parallel propagandistic image-making efforts in interwar Czechoslovakia. In contrast to Czechoslovakia, whose propaganda campaigns were largely effective, Hungary's efforts—based as they were on the promotion of the country's cultural superiority and the need for the revision of its borders—ultimately foundered, due not just to the country's siding with Germany in WWII, but also to a sense of cultural arrogance that could not accept Hungary's status as a minor power and acknowledge interwar realities.

Alexander Vari
Marywood University

NOTE

1. Andrea Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914–1948* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Frey, David. *Jews, Nazis, and the Cinema of Hungary: The Tragedy of Success, 1929–44*. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2018. 462 pages. ISBN 978-1-7807-6451-1

The late (Jewish) American-Hungarian Andy Vajna, known for producing the *Rambo* films, among many others, was in 2011 installed by the then-new Fidesz government as “film czar,” and established the Hungarian National Film Fund. In late 2018, he came under fierce attack in the pages of the regime-true paper *Magyar Idők* for his “un-Hungarian” choices of director and screenwriter for a historical epic about János Hunyadi, hero of the 1453 defense of Belgrade (the project was suspended after Vajna's sudden death a few months later). Around the time Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was being savaged by Jewish communities and their allies at home and abroad for the 2014 erection in central Budapest of the Memorial for Victims of the German Occupation, which was seen as a nationalist distortion of the memory of the Holocaust, the Vajna-controlled fund rescued the production of the universally acclaimed, Oscar-winning Auschwitz drama *Saul fia* (Son of Saul).

David Frey's award-winning study¹ of the Hungarian film industry from the advent of sound film to the German occupation concludes with a blistering critique of Orbán's revival of a "conceptualization of national identity based on cultural, and even racial, distinction" (397). He does not mention Vajna—who, as fate would have it, was born the year Frey's account ends—but the contradictions of the Hollywood producer imported to nationalize Hungarian film, denounced by his patron's allies for crimes against Hungarian memory, after having either defied the prime minister's anti-Semitism or protected his flank in a crisis, generating an international triumph for the state, seem to perfectly reprise and reflect the continuous and convoluted political and economic struggles thoroughly detailed in this excellent volume.

As his title indicates, Frey sees both the determinant conditions and the internal nature of Hungarian film in this period as riven with paradoxes. The industry operated on a capitalist basis, while subject to state domination; the 1932 film *Repülő arany* (Flying gold), for example, was an "attempt to leverage international backing to forge a Hungarian cosmopolitanism . . . [which] functioned as national" (52). Hungarian film thereafter took advantage of "international film nationalism" (53), in the form of émigrés returning from Nazifying Germany, while the construction of "a 'Christian national' Hungarian film industry" depended on "Hungarian 'film Jews'" (13). These ambiguities left "Hungarian bureaucrats, from censors to diplomats . . . tantalized and confused" (74). Ironically, however, "it was also these internal contradictions and imbalances that prevented the Hungarian motion picture industry from ruining itself" (11). By the end of the decade, when a would-be *Gleichschaltung* was on the table, it was sabotaged at every turn by conflict and competition between different interests (producers, distributors, exhibitors), institutions and agencies, and political orientations.

The narrative begins with a brief description of the 1912–18 "first golden age of Hungarian film" (29), which produced such later international luminaries as Alexander [Sándor] Korda, Michael Curtiz, and Béla Lugosi, and ended with Hungary as the third-greatest film power, behind the US and Denmark, in terms of numbers of films produced. But the brutality of the counterrevolution, and the early Horthy regime's heavy-handedness, left the industry in ruins within a decade. The arrival of sound film at the end of the 1920s constituted a challenge, especially to a linguistically isolated, relatively poor country, but also

an opportunity. At a moment when defining national identity became paramount, especially in the new states of East Central Europe, “sound nationalized film.” (35). While the interwar state was historically conditioned to want to dominate culture, the memory of the nationalizations during the reviled 1919 Council Republic, as well as continuing economic crisis, prevented it from playing a major role in film financing. Combined with the capital-intensive nature of film production, especially in the sound era, and the particular nature of Hungarian development, this meant that “Jewish capital” predominated. The influx of exiles from Berlin (site of the European vanguard until the end of the Weimar Republic); the possession of relevant skills, education, and aptitudes conducive to success in a thoroughly modern arena; and their local and international connections meant that Jews (or, “Jews”—Frey makes clear his view of the term as ascriptive) dominated the creative side as well.

The power and popularity of the “Hollywood model” offered great success to its imitators and developers in Hungary, but also “a clear concept of nation, envisaging the liberal cosmopolitan, consumption-oriented middle class of Budapest as the symbol of modern Hungary” (91). Inevitably, however, this “urbanist” ideal was contested, as “discussions of ‘national film’ and a healthy ‘national film culture’ became surrogates for the basic question of ‘What is Hungarian?’” (76). The mogul István Gerő, head of what was known as the “Gerő trust,” a movie theater conglomerate which soon moved into film production, became the target of attacks on what nationalists such as the Turul Society saw as a “Jewish conspiracy” (112). The so-called “Jewish Question,” which by the late 1930s became an obsession across the Hungarian intelligentsia, was “not always linked to the Jewishness of those who made the films” but to “cosmopolitan, middle-class, and urban Hungary and its mass culture” (183). This was compounded by the growing influence of Germany—a desperately desired market for Hungarian film—and its attempts to impose its “Aryan paragraph” (146). The government’s response was the creation of the Film Chamber, “a component of a corporatist wave” (194) meant to subject the industry to the perceived national will; but it was continually foiled by “jurisdictional questions” (193) and “conflicts of interest” (203).

The passage of the First Jewish Law in 1938 was followed by the 1939 “production crisis” which, Frey argues, though not unconnected, (also) “came down to matters of risk, entrepreneurship, and interwar Hungary’s tormented relationship with the capitalist system” (208). The

outcome was a “hybrid system . . . partially sat[ing] rightist desires for centralization, increased government direction, and minimized risk,” but also “reintegrat[ing] Jewish capital and talent” (210). As might be expected, this led to the well-known “strawman” practice, of Christian fronts for Jewish talent and capital, and an order “fraught with contradictory bureaucratic, financial, and moral imperatives” (211). At the same time, the 1938 and 1940 Vienna Awards, and the Transcarpathian and especially Yugoslav territories annexed in 1939 and 1941, coupled with the destruction, disabling, or absorption by Nazi aggression of much of European film production capacity, opened up unprecedented opportunities for Hungarian film: “Hungarian Garbos and Gables were the means by which their nation would re-establish its pre-1918 cultural, political, and economic authority in Central Europe and the Balkans” (274). These dreams were fulfilled to a surprising degree through the course of the war, but were ultimately foiled by Germany’s manipulations to prevent any challenge to its dominance in the Nazi “New Order.” In the final analysis, “political squabbles, contrary political and economic imperatives, talent shortages, cultural inertia, and international pressures . . . stymied the establishment’s attempts to unite behind any lucid concept of a Christian national film system” (336).

Based on exhaustive and wide-ranging research carried out for his 2003 dissertation and since in numerous archives in Hungary, Germany, and the US, covering and illuminating a veritable alphabet soup of governmental, quasi-governmental, and private agencies and institutions, this work fills a significant lacuna in Hungarian film studies in English, which have mostly focused on the postwar period, and, to the extent this era is covered at all, on individual films and directors.² Its transnational perspective—not just during the war, but from the start, with the “transnational origins” (46) of Hungarian film—is most welcome, in the context of still largely national film studies. Also appreciated is its relentless excavation of the conflicted, contested, multi-sided nature of national identity and the struggles around it, which belies the traditional picture of uniform and “totalitarian” forces of anti-Semitism and German-occupied Europe. It also introduces the reader to fascinating, largely unknown aspects of Hungarian film history, such as the “lynchpin” (274) role of Yugoslavia post-1936 in the expansion of the industry; the role of the “narrow” (16 mm) film trade, for alternative genres and venues, and mightily struggled over both domestically and vis-à-vis Germany; and the wartime crisis of raw film stock supply, dominated by Germany and used as a cudgel against Hungarian production, leading to forced economizing and loss of quality.

A couple quibbles, in no way meant to diminish Frey's achievement: I find unfortunate his uncritical use of the term "backwardness," as in "an intermixing of government, business, and culture unique to the smaller and less democratic European states" (36). Alongside the almost uniformly positive portrayal of the role of Hollywood, and of those acting according to purely capitalist or market dictates, as questioned only by narrow-minded nationalists, this seems to privilege a Western and liberal orientation. (Here it should be noted that plenty of "Jewish" cosmopolitan "urbanists" in interwar Hungary were critical of capitalism, liberalism, and the West.) And while Frey introduces "populism" as "encompassing an enormous spectrum of thought" (89), and as "simultaneously conservative, revolutionary, and divided, with strong left and right-wing components" (125n68), as his narrative and the spread of Right-radical ideology proceed, the use of the term becomes (e.g., at 338 and 364) increasingly constricted, as practically a surrogate for anti-Semitic proponents of a "changing of the guard." While it is true that the interwar Hungarian populist movement had an increasingly problematic stance on the "Jewish Question," and several individuals drifted close to or into the Arrow Cross orbit (while others were or became Communists), the movement had significant roots in agrarian socialism and stood (mostly) steadfastly opposed to the neo-feudal aristocratic order. Several populist writers in fact signed onto the intellectuals' protest letter against the First Jewish Law, or otherwise opposed the wartime regime. Thus the "failure of populism" was not just bureaucratic, or a conflict between ideological and commercial imperatives: it was political—as Frey actually shows in his fascinating analyses of several wartime films, in which "dangerous" class critiques were forcibly transferred by the powers that be into racial ones (A harmincadik [The thirtieth]; Dr. Kovács István [Dr. István Kovács]); or shelved altogether (Szerető fia, Péter [Your loving son, Peter]). (I would have loved to see such incisive analyses of some of the prewar films.) Finally, while the book is well written, I found numerous typos, missing or misplaced hyphens, and other minor technical issues.

I will close with another aside: the prominent actor Antal Páger appears here as the exemplar of artistic anti-Semitism, labeled as "fascist-leaning" (347) and "the ubiquitous face of Hungarian rightist populism" (359), and said to have been enlisted to "prepare an industry blacklist"—all no doubt true. What Frey doesn't mention is that, after fleeing to Austria, France, and finally South America at the end of the war, Páger was rehabilitated and returned to Hungary in August 1956, on a special plane chartered by the Communist government. He then

went on to star in the most remarkable Holocaust film of the pre-1989 era, Zoltán Fábri's 1966 *Utószezon* (Late season).³ Perhaps his story indicates a way forward?

Richard S. Esbshade
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

NOTES

1. Frey's book was awarded the Hungarian Studies Association Book Prize in 2019.
2. But see also, appearing roughly simultaneously, Gábor Gergely, *Hungarian Film, 1929-1947: National Identity, Anti-Semitism, and Popular Cinema* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018).
3. See Máté Zombory, András Lénárt, and Anna Lujza Szász, "Elfeleltett szembenézés: Holokauszt és emlékezés Fábri Zoltán *Utószezon* c. filmjében" [Forgotten reckoning: Holocaust and memory in Zoltán Fábri's film *Late season*], *BUKSZ* 25, no. 3 (2013), 245–56.

Árpád von Klimó. *Remembering Cold Days: The 1942 Massacre of Novi Sad, Hungarian Politics, and Society, 1942–1989*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018. 268 pages. ISBN 978-0-8229-6545-9

In January 1942, Hungarian occupying forces conducted a series of raids against Serbian partisans in the occupied territory of Vojvodina, which Hungary had reannexed during the invasion of Yugoslavia several months before. The most eventful of these raids occurred in the city of Novi Sad, where over the course of three days Hungarian soldiers and gendarmes executed more than a thousand civilians, most of whom had no connection to the partisans. Witnesses both in the city and in neighboring Croatia (where the executions could be seen from the southern bank of the Danube) brought immediate attention to the atrocities, and it became one of the most high-profile crimes of the Second World War. The Novi Sad massacre and its long afterlife as a site of memory is the subject of Árpád von Klimó's latest monograph.

The first section of the book chronicles the raids and their immediate aftermath. Klimó describes how military leaders in Novi Sad summoned tens of thousands of people to appear before ad-hoc verification committees, over the protests of civilian authorities, who

argued that the actions would destabilize the city. The action quickly devolved into “the random killing of innocent civilians,” with Jews making up a disproportionate number of the victims (27). This has led scholars to suggest that Novi Sad be considered a precursor to the Holocaust in Hungary in 1944. Klimó argues that Serbian–Hungarian territorial rivalry over the city, as well as the growing belief among members of Hungarian society that persecuting Jews furthered social justice and aimed to rectify “the unequal distribution of wealth” in the country, were important contributing factors to the atrocities in Novi Sad (38). However, he contends that the desire on the part of Hungarian officers to contribute to Hitler’s vision of a “New Europe” by copying German occupational strategies was the main reason for the massacre (41). Klimó’s detailed description of the historical event brings in new scholarship on borderlands, wartime atrocities, and perpetrator motivations that contextualize the Novi Sad massacre within the broader European historiography of the Second World War. From a meta perspective, it also serves as his own contribution to the memory of the massacre.

The first section concludes with two chapters describing various responses to the Novi Sad massacres. These included a somewhat half-hearted attempt to hold officers responsible for the raid during the war, mass reprisals against ethnic Hungarians by Tito’s partisans, and a series of postwar trials in both Hungary and Yugoslavia. Klimó argues that the postwar trials had revenge as their main motivator, part of the continent-wide phenomenon of the “politics of retribution” explored by István Deák, Jan Gross, and Tony Judt, among others. The postwar period also saw a distortion of the memory of the crime, as many commentators, especially those aligned with the Hungarian Communist Party, attempted to exonerate the “Hungarian people” from any responsibility for war crimes, attributing them solely to class enemies or the country’s German minority (92).

In the second part of the book, Klimó explores Novi Sad as a “site of memory” by tracing the development of popular memory of the massacre through the post-World War II decades. He begins with the Stalinist period in Hungary, where he argues that the “future-oriented Stalinist discourse” had little place for remembrance of the massacre, or the war in general (109). It was not until the 1960s that the Novi Sad massacre became widely discussed, due largely to the success of the novel *Cold Days* and its subsequent film version, which was one

of the first explorations of personal responsibility for crimes committed in the name of the “institutional structures” of the state (142). By dramatizing the event, author Tibor Cseres and director András Kovács transformed Novi Sad into a “symbol of Hungarian guilt” and gave a lasting descriptor—the Cold Days—to the 1942 massacre (156).

Remembering Cold Days concludes with a look at how memory of the Novi Sad massacre intersected with larger trends in historical memory in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War. Klimó suggests that “radical shifts in Hungarians’ understanding of their past and in remembering the victims of mass violence” might be considered one of the domestic catalysts for regime change (153). While Novi Sad was one of the first instances of mass violence that was widely discussed, this process broadened in the 1980s to include remembrance of the Second World War in Hungary more generally. Klimó also touches upon contested interpretations of the Novi Sad massacre and the postwar reprisals in Yugoslavia, and the 2011 trial of Sándor Képiró for his role as an officer during the raids, which brought a renewed focus to the Cold Days in the twenty-first century.

Remembering Cold Days moves forward the historiography of a number of fields, including the history of World War II violence, postwar trials, the cultural history of postwar Hungary, domestic and international politics of memory, and 1989 regime change. It also effectively demonstrates the many ways in which collective memory manifests—politically, juridically, artistically, historically—and weaves these strands together into a compelling narrative. Klimó’s work offers plenty of avenues for future research: the specifically Jewish aspects of the memory of Novi Sad, the postwar massacres of Hungarians and Germans in Vojvodina, and the distinct role of the Cold Days in the much broader memory wars during the breakup of Yugoslavia all deserve deeper investigation than this one monograph can provide. In particular, Klimó’s contention that changes in historical memory in Hungary helped motivate regime change has implications for Central and Eastern European historiography more broadly, and will hopefully lead other scholars to take up similar case studies in order to determine whether this was a regional or even continent-wide phenomenon in the leadup to 1989.

Leslie Waters
The University of Texas at El Paso

Zsuzsa Gille. *Paprika, Foie Gras, and Red Mud. The Politics of Materiality in the European Union*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016. 164 pages. ISBN 978-0-2530-1946-2

When in 2017, after the publication of this volume, an openly discussed double standard for food quality within the European Union shook the public in East Central Europe, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared at the extraordinary Consumer Summit of the Visegrád Four countries in Bratislava, “Central Europeans are treated as second-class citizens when it comes to the quality of food products.” The scandal came in more than handy for his populist-nationalist Fidesz party. While official rhetoric typically alludes to the threat of immigrants to Hungarian cultural identity and sovereignty, this outcry confirmed another dominant narrative of the relationship with the European Union, whereby Hungary is subject to inequality and exploitation. In this account, mainly western European multinational companies use the eastern market to sell goods of inferior quality, exemplifying the developmental chasm between East and West, despite Hungary being a full member of the single market. Hungarian-American sociologist Zsuzsa Gille, in her study *Paprika, Foie Gras, and Red Mud: The Politics of Materiality in the European Union*, connects her analysis brilliantly with the above-mentioned discourse, and shows that nothing less than national identity is complicating the relationship between the nation state and the supranational European Union. She argues that practices of production and consumption which became increasingly governed by new regulative EU standards began to negatively affect public opinion on the question of Hungary’s EU membership.

With the Hungarian paprika ban in 2004, the foie gras boycott in 2008, and finally the red mud spill in 2010, Gille introduces three distinct scandals that shaped how ordinary Hungarians view the European Union’s impact on their daily lives. Each of the incidents discussed touches upon domestic economic practices and notions of national identity, and, as Gille intends, will provide the reader with an alternative understanding of the relationship between them. By grasping the political in seemingly apolitical practices, Gille attempts to conceptualise a “new modality of power” (4) from the context of the local, shedding new light on globalisation as an external force.

The bulk of the book is devoted to three concrete case studies, starting with the first to take place, the paprika ban in the autumn of 2004. Anyone who has ever been to Hungary, and even those who have

not, may well know that paprika powder is a basic ingredient of Hungarian cuisine. When it was found that the concentration of aflatoxin B1, a carcinogenic mycotoxin, in some paprika powder products far exceeded allowed EU levels, the elementary spice in domestic cooking practices disappeared overnight from the shelves, becoming unavailable to Hungarian consumers for several days. Gille shows how Hungary's accession to the single market led to paprika powder being diluted with cheap imports from Spain and Brazil. Hungary assumed that paprika from these markets would be protected by EU regulations, but instead discovered that tests at ports of entry and in Spain were not carried out at all. It is therefore an example of how confusion about competencies of supranational and national authorities can lead to the entry of contaminated paprika into the single market and then Hungary. Gille demonstrates in this chapter how EU membership also amounted to deregulation and selective regulation in Hungary.

In the subsequent chapter she moves on to highly specialised foie gras production, a product which Hungary succeeded in retaining and even increasing its market share of. Gille describes how in 2006 the Austrian animal rights organisation Vier Pfoten (Four Paws) charged the Hungarian foie gras industry with operating unethically. After the paprika fiasco, this was the second such scandal to shake the Hungarian public. Gille succeeds brilliantly in creating a balanced analysis of different players in the conflict, including the Hungarian poultry industry, small-scale farmers, workers, and Four Paws, as well as substantial German economic interests in the form of the German poultry giant Wiesenhof. Various inconsistencies within the Austrian-led animal rights campaign resulted in defensive reactions from the Hungarian public, which saw national traditions that had been practiced for centuries—and therefore national identity itself—at stake. Official narratives responding to this controversy expressed a general sense of victimhood in relation to the powerful supranational organisation.

The third case study, on the red mud catastrophe in 2010, differs insofar as it is not centred on food production but on the waste product of a highly alkaline by-product of aluminium production. When the largest pond, Number 10, burst its banks, it covered the small town of Devecser in western Hungary in red mud, not only making major parts of the area inhabitable but taking the lives of ten inhabitants. During the investigation of this environmental and human disaster, it became obvious that a major factor was the EU's waste code, which did not categorise red mud as hazardous, as it had been previously considered

according to the Basel Convention. Gille points to the imbalances in the regulation processes whereby marketisation and democratisation had to be accomplished by the time of EU accession, while environmental regulations were given a period of up to 15 years to align. In addition to other factors, Gille also detects controversial privatisation strategies among the causes of the catastrophe.

The last, methodologically rich chapter, “Neoliberalism, Molecularization, and the Shift to Governance,” further elaborates the relationship between small and big in the context of nation states and supranational organisations. Here she is especially interested in questions of agency, and in how supranational governing practices are fulfilling their criteria of transparency and democracy.

While *Paprika, Foie Gras, and Red Mud* is meticulously researched and convincingly argued, one would have liked to know more about the potential benefits of EU membership, how EU funds are being used and who specifically is profiting from them. Other than as potential beneficiaries, the role of the party in power, Fidesz, remains underexposed in the analysis. It would have enriched the scope of the book to look deeper into contradictions between the party’s rhetoric and its political practices.

Beyond that, the methodologically profound study gives a highly original interpretation of the rise of EU scepticism in the region and specifically in Hungary. Fidesz’s critique of immigration policies and the allegedly illegitimate influence of internationally operating NGOs is connected with a particular form of national identity which has been shaken by the three cases Gille describes in her book. To a major extent these cases explain why Orbán is able to build his political success partly by criticizing the European Union, from which Hungary as well as a tightly connected political elite is profiting.

Ultimately, its main merit lies in deepening the understanding of the real issues at stake between the European Union and the Hungarian population, without looking through the lenses of Fidesz’s performative rhetorical practices. Gille rather explains why Fidesz’s anti-EU campaigns, including questions of unequal food quality and the challenge of migration, fall on a hotbed of popular perceptions shaped by mechanisms for coping with new standards and regulations which came along with EU membership.

In this context, Gille identifies a weakness in liberal politicians in addressing inequalities between Western Europe and Hungary within the frame of the supranational European Union. Therefore, her aim is

nothing less than to provide sociologically informed “alternative interpretations of [the inequalities’] origins, not in order to strengthen the right wing but to combat it” (135). It can only be wished that Gille’s book will be read not only by people interested in the small nation of Hungary. Above all it should be read by those concerned about the increasingly tense relationship between East Central Europe and the European Union, and who wish to increase their understanding beyond well-known patterns of interpretation.

Annina Gagyiova
Charles University Prague

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

BALÁZS ABLONCZY earned his Ph.D. in 2004 from Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) in Budapest, Hungary. He is Associate Professor at ELTE, and research fellow at the Center for Humanities, Institute of History, Budapest. He is currently the coordinator of the Trianon 100 “Momentum” Research Group (2016-2021) funded by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Author of 14 books, his latest is *Ismeretlen Trianon—Az összeomlás és a békeszerződés története, 1918-1921* (Unknown Trianon: Stories of the collapse and the peace treaty, 1918–1921), published in 2020.

BÉLA BODÓ is a Professor of Eastern European History at the University of Bonn, Germany. He was born in Hungary, completed his undergraduate education at the University of Debrecen and the University of Toronto, and received his M.A. and Ph.D. from York University, Canada, finishing in 1998. Before moving to Bonn in 2015, Professor Bodó was an Associate Professor at Missouri State University, Springfield, Missouri. In 2013 and 2014, he was a fellow at the Imre Kertész Kolleg in Jena, Germany. Professor Bodó’s teaching and research focuses on Central and East Central European social and political history. He has written extensively on the history of domestic and political violence in the region after the First World War. His latest book, entitled *The White Terror: Antisemitic and Political Violence in Hungary, 1919–1923*, was published by Routledge in London in 2019.

LÁSZLÓ BORHI is Peter A. Kadas Chair and Associate Professor at the Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University. He is also Scientific Counsellor of the Institute of History at the Center for Humanities, Budapest. His publications include *Dealing with Dictators: The United States, Hungary and East Central Europe, 1942–1989* (Indiana University Press, 2016) and *Hungary in the Cold War: Between the Soviet Union and the United States, 1945-1956* (CEU Press, 2004). He is currently working on a manuscript entitled *Strategies of Survival: Life and Death between Hitler and Stalin, 1944-1953*. Borhi was awarded the Gold Cross of Merit of the Hungarian Republic in 2006.

ÉVA FORGÁCS is curator, critic, and Adjunct Professor of Art History at Art Center College of Design, Pasadena. She was curator at the Hungarian Museum of Decorative Arts and Professor of Art History at the Moholy-Nagy University in her native Budapest. She was awarded an EURIAS fellowship at the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen in Vienna in 2012–2013. Her books include *Hungarian Art: Confrontation and Revival in the Modern Movement* (DoppelHaus Press, 2016); *The Bauhaus Idea and Bauhaus Politics* (CEU Press, 1995); *Between Worlds: A Sourcebook of Central European Avant-Gardes* (MIT Press, 2002), co-edited with T. O. Benson; and two volumes of essays. She has published a wide range of essays and reviews in journals, edited volumes, and catalogues.

STEVEN JOBBITT is Associate Professor of History at Lakehead University in Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada. He is an editor of *Hungarian Studies Review*, and a member of the editorial boards of *Földrajzi Közlemények*, *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin*, and *Hungarian Cultural Studies*. His published work focuses primarily on topics related to Hungarian historical geography, and includes the book *Fodor Ferenc önéletírásai* [*The autobiographical writings of Ferenc Fodor*] (ELTE Eötvös József Collegium, 2016), co-edited with Róbert Györi.

ÁRPÁD VON KLIMÓ teaches European History as Ordinary Professor at The Catholic University of America. He is the author of *Remembering Cold Days: The 1942 Massacre of Novi Sad and Hungarian Politics and Society, 1942-1989* (Pittsburgh University Press, 2018) and *Hungary since 1945* (Routledge, 2018). He also co-edited the *Routledge History of East Central Europe since 1700* (2017), and is an editor of the *Hungarian Studies Review*. He is currently working on a project on global anticommunism in the early 1970s, focusing on the followers of Cardinal Mindszenty.

FERENC LACZÓ is an assistant professor with tenure (Universitair Docent 1) at Maastricht University, where he teaches European history with a focus on Central and Eastern Europe. He is the author of three books, including *Hungarian Jews in the Age of Genocide: An Intellectual History, 1929–1948* (Brill, 2016). He is the co-editor, with Luka Lisjak Gabrijelcic, of *The Legacy of Division: East and West after 1989* (CEU Press–Eurozine, 2020) and, with Włodzimierz Borodziej and Joachim von Puttkamer, of *The Routledge History Handbook of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 3: Intellectual*

Horizons (Routledge, 2020). Beyond in English and his native Hungarian, his writings have appeared in Czech, Danish, German, Hebrew, Italian, Polish, Slovene, and Turkish translation.

IBOLYA MURBER is Associate Professor at Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE). She earned her Ph.D. from ELTE in 2005, and completed her habilitation at ELTE in 2013. Between 2001 and 2004 she served as an archivist at the Hungarian National Archives in Budapest, and between 2007 and 2016 was a faculty member at the University of West Hungary in Sopron. She has been a visiting professor at the University of Vienna and Saarland University, and in 2019–20 held an OeAD Richard Plaschka Fellowship in Vienna. Her research focuses on twentieth-century history, and is centered primarily on diplomacy and international relations, Central European migration, and Austro-Hungarian relations.

JUDITH SZAPOR is Associate Professor at the Department of History and Classical Studies, McGill University, Montreal. She has written on intellectual, women's, and student movements, Jewish assimilation, and the intellectual migration in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries in Hungary and Central Europe. Her second monograph, *Hungarian Women's Activism in the Wake of the First World War: From Rights to Revanche* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2018) was published in paperback in 2019. She was a senior fellow at the Wiesenthal Institute for Holocaust Research in Vienna in 2018, and at the Institute for Advance Study of Central European University in Budapest in 2020. Her current, SSHRC-funded research project explores the impact of Hungary's notorious 1920 *numerus clausus* law on Hungarian Jewish women and families.

BOLDIZSÁR VÖRÖS studied history and Hungarian literature and linguistics at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. He is a senior research fellow at the Institute of History of the Research Centre for the Humanities, Budapest. His research fields are Hungarian cultural history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with special regard to political propaganda (for example, analyses of monuments, newsreels, feasts, burials, newspapers, curricula, literary pieces, and naming, as well as the investigation of peculiar phenomena such as rumours and jokes related to political and social changes). In addition to his books, including *"A múltat végképp eltörölni"? Történelmi személyiségek a magyarországi szociáldemokrata és kommunista propagandában 1890-1919* ("To finally wipe away the past?" Historical personalities in Social

Democratic and Communist propaganda in Hungary, 1890–1919) (MTA Történettudományi Intézete, 2004), he is author of a number of articles and papers.

LESLIE WATERS is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Texas at El Paso. She received her PhD in history from UCLA in 2012, and is a former Fulbright and Mellon fellow. Her research focuses on the ways in which border changes affect broader society, including migration, ethnic cleansing, and identity politics. Her first book, *Borders on the Move: Territorial Change and Ethnic Cleansing in the Hungarian-Slovak Borderlands, 1938–1948* is forthcoming from University of Rochester Press. Dr. Waters is a member of the Hungarian Studies Association and Slovak Studies Association executive committees. She teaches courses on modern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and comparative borderlands.

Call for Submissions

The editors of *Hungarian Studies Review* are seeking proposals and submissions for the following types of manuscripts:

- *Articles*: 5000–7000 words (plus notes) based on original research and analysis. Submissions will be subject to peer review.
- *Thematic Article Cluster*: 2–4 articles (5000–7000 words per article plus notes) and an introduction (800–1000 words) on a theme. Proposals should be sent to the managing editor prior to submission. Subject to peer and editorial review.
- *Roundtables*: A cluster of 5–7 statements (800–1000 words per text with very limited notes plus a short introductory essay) that reflect conversations and debates about a topic or theme that have come primarily from an in-person or virtual roundtable. Proposals should be sent to the managing editor prior to submission. Subject to editorial input and review.
- *Forums*: A cluster of 4–6 essays (1500–2500 words with limited notes) and an introduction (800–1000 words) on an issue related to a historical or contemporary debate, controversy, or question pertinent to Hungarian studies. Proposals should be sent to the managing editor prior to submission. Subject to editorial input and review.
- *Book reviews**: Reviews of 1000–1500 words that provide a description of the contents as well as provide a critique of a book. Submissions will be subject to editorial review.
- *Review essays**: Longer reviews of several works on a given topic, conceived as several linked book reviews. Submissions will be subject to editorial review.
- *Primary Source Translation and Commentary*: Translated Hungarian sources (in whole or in part) accompanied by an introduction/commentary. Proposals should be submitted to the managing editor prior to submission. Subject to editorial review and copyright restrictions.
- *Reports on New Media and Digital Content*: Overviews and analyses of online material and resources including digital collections, databases, websites, and webinars. Proposals should be submitted to the managing editor prior to submission. Subject to editorial review and copyright restrictions.

The editors of *HSR* also welcome submissions beyond those outlined above, including project and conference reports, polemical scholarly debates, pedagogical discussions, and photo essays (subject to permissions). We also welcome proposals for special thematic issues.

The journal provides copy-editing assistance to contributors, though we will return submissions to authors prior to consideration for publication if significant revisions are necessary.

*The editors are prepared to secure review copies of books.

Please consult the most recent version of the *Chicago Manual of Style* for details on how to format your submission. *HSR* uses endnotes for articles and essays, and in-text parenthetical references for book reviews.

Send all submissions and proposals to our managing editor, Steven Jobbitt: sjobbitt@lakeheadu.ca.

Send all suggestions for books to review to our book review editor, Richard Esbenshade: rseshenshade@gmail.com

