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In this issue:

Cintia Gunda reviews the periodical *The Hungarian Nation's* efforts to forestall the dismemberment of Hungary after World War I;

Margit Balogh tells the story of Cardinal József Mindszenty's tours of Canada in 1947 and 1973 and their consequences;

Zsuzsanna Varga outlines the persecution of successful managers of producers' cooperatives in János Kádár's Hungary in the mid-1970s;

Anita Máté presents Dominican friar Kornél Bőle's account of his visit to the Hungarian colony of Árpádhon in Louisiana in 1928;

Balint Kacsoh reviews two new books on the origin of Hungarians

Other book reviews by:

Agnes Vashegyi MacDonald

Louise Vasvári

Béla Bodó

Endre Szentkiralyi

Anikó Gregor

and

Ákos Bartha

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Gender and Nation in Hungary Since 1919

Edited and introduced by Judith Szapor and Agatha Schwartz

Essays by:

Tímea Jablonczay
Fiona Stewart
Róbert Kerepeszki
David S. Frey
Andrea Pető
Tanya Watson
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Katalin Fábíán

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The Hungarian Nation: Post-World War I Propaganda Abroad for Protecting Hungary's Territorial Integrity

Cintia Gunda

World War I came to an end rather abruptly, in the span of six weeks between September 30 and November 11, 1918. The epic four-year long war, the last war of the great European empires, thrust the Habsburg Monarchy in a deep economic and moral crisis: war weariness, rising prices, falling standards of living intensified the already existing conflicts between the peoples of the empire, which comprised about fifteen nationalities who belonged to a dozen different religious denominations.

Amid defeat, imperial collapse, political upheaval, and massive social dislocation, national independence and survival became an all around concern in the Carpathian Basin and beyond. Scapegoating and a search for internal enemies had started long before the war was officially lost, resulting in the strengthening of anti-Semitic voices in the press and on the political scene. Many were afraid that the “alien Jewish morality” together with socialism would eventually destroy the nation, which could only be saved from total moral and physical destruction by reasserting Christian values. The “Judeo-Bolshevik” panic had the power to suggest not only the collapse of a nation but also the collapse of the whole order of nation-states in Europe.¹ The war and the following chaos prompted many to believe that national revival could only be brought about if the Jews were removed from the public and economic life of the country.²

By the summer of 1918 the leaders of Hungary's national minorities had begun to agitate for independence, abandoning all efforts to seek autonomy or coexistence with Hungarians under Hungarian rule. As a response, Hungarian authorities often used police force to suppress political activity among ethnic minorities.³ The Habsburg Monarchy's successor states, however, decided to take what they thought was their fair share of the Monarchy by force. The new states of Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later known as Yugoslavia), as well as

the greatly enlarged Romania, began to stake a claim to Hungarian territory⁴ and despite the armistice, Hungary was attacked from various directions. 350 to 400 hundred thousand⁵ ethnic Hungarians living in the occupied regions fled their homes for what was left of Hungary, adding a refugee crisis to the already long list of challenges the new regime in Budapest was facing.⁶ To top that, an influx of thousands of Jewish refugees from Galicia further intensified anti-Semitic tensions.⁷

By January 1919 most Hungarian territories inhabited by non-Magyar peoples had come under foreign rule. Fearing that military action would be seen as provocation by the Entente and believing that his good relations with the West would be enough to secure a fair treatment for Hungary in Paris, President of the Republic Mihály Károlyi did not try to prevent the annexation of Hungarian territory by force. He let the Czech, Romanian, and Yugoslavian armies occupy territories in Northern, Eastern and Southern Hungary, and thus, as it turned out, create a *fait accompli* for the Peace Conference.

This strategy failed, and when Károlyi was compelled by diplomatic failure to resign, the Bolsheviks and radical Social Democrats stepped into the vacuum and transformed Hungary in a communist dictatorship. The new regime, however, was no more successful in resisting the annexation of Hungarian territory than Károlyi had been.⁸ 133 days later, then, when the communist regime collapsed, the Red Terror unleashed by the communists gave way to the White Terror.⁹ Mob violence was directed in particular against Jews, exploiting the anti-Semitism that, in the previous two decades, had turned from a “modest opposition movement” to a mainstream ideology.¹⁰ Jews were no longer necessary to tip the ethnic balance in favor of the Hungarians in a smaller yet ethnically more homogeneous country that was emerging after the war. In addition to that, the middle class was terrified by the extent to which Jews dominated the professional sector (a fear that eventually led to the passing of the *numerus clausus* law in 1920).¹¹

Blaming Jews for every single calamity that fell upon Hungary had of course little effect on the country’s situation. Leaders of the pre-war political elite were struck by the degree of passivity the subsequent Hungarian governments exerted in regards to the occupying armies. They realized that no one was going to stand up for Hungary’s interests and this realization prompted them to take action. Action, however, came too late. During and before the Great War, the Habsburg Monarchy did little to inform the international public of its policies and construct a positive image of itself abroad. Count Albert Apponyi complained to Theodore

Roosevelt as early as 1904 that Americans were fairly ignorant of Hungary and her position, and offered to work as the regular correspondent of the American press on European matters, an offer that, sadly, was only realized in part.¹²

During the war, propaganda abroad was not limited to allied and neutral countries. Apponyi himself started a one-man campaign in the US and wrote five articles for *The New York Times* during 1914-16. His opinions, however, were often criticized as being "made in Germany." Other attempts in the US included the journalist Géza Kende's letter published in *The New York Times*, explaining Ambassador Constantin T. Dumba's ill-fated action (when he urged Hungarians to go on strike in munitions factories), Cleveland Consul-General Ernst Ludwig's book titled *Austria-Hungary and the War* (1915), and New York Consul-General Alexander von Nuber's pamphlet discussing the Pan-Slav danger to the Monarchy.¹³ *The New Republic*, a leading political weekly, as well as the *New York Times*, was willing to publish articles "from the other side" as late as 1918; however, only three Hungarian-Americans, namely Dr. Árpád Gerster, Alexander Konta, and Jenő Bagger-Szekeres, used this opportunity to present a positive image of Hungary. The bulk of the Hungarian social elite and intelligentsia did not exploit the potential of the American press.¹⁴

In Europe, propaganda attempts were made mainly in Switzerland and Germany,¹⁵ but these were feeble efforts compared to South Slav, Czech, Slovak, and, above all, British propaganda directed against the Monarchy and Hungary. R.W. Seton-Watson and "The New Europe" group used all possible means to persuade US public opinion about the necessity of the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, and French activist Andre Cheradame and the "Austria Delenda" group did the same in Europe. The Monarchy and Germany forming a giant Pan-German state; Hungary, the colonizer of the Slavs; "barbaric Magyars" exploiting national minorities: such was the image of Hungary in the pamphlets published by official and self-appointed propagandists during the war.¹⁶

Well aware of anti-Hungarian propaganda during the war,¹⁷ the old elite of Hungary had every reason to be worried about the country's international reputation. Bad publicity, the imminent threat of territorial dismemberment, the Czech, Serbian, and Romanian armies marching into the country, combined with the realization that Károlyi was not going to defend Hungary by arms, mobilized all layers of society in late 1918. In the final weeks of the year a host of social organizations emerged to protect and argue for Hungary's territorial integrity. Many of them were based on the conviction that without quality international propaganda

Hungary's cause would be lost and, accordingly, they started large-scale propaganda activity in the neighbouring countries and among the victorious powers.

The aim of the present study is to examine one of the most impressive efforts to plead Hungary's case abroad, *The Hungarian Nation*, an English language journal sponsored by the Hungarian Territorial Integrity League. Not much research has been devoted so far to propaganda for territorial integrity between the end of the war and August 1921, when Premier István Bethlen cut all open propaganda short. The most comprehensive work on the subject to date has been Lajos Pallos's article, "Területvédő propaganda Magyarországon 1918-1920" [Propaganda for Territorial Integrity in Hungary 1918-1920]. Pallos devotes special attention to social organizations conducting propaganda, but he focuses on the years before the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty and he does not even mention *The Hungarian Nation*. Anikó Kovács-Bertrand's thorough study of Hungarian revisionism, *Der Ungarische Revisionismus nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg* [Hungarian Revisionism after World War I]¹⁸ dedicates many pages to non-governmental propaganda for territorial integrity, but she, just like Miklós Zeidler in his comprehensive book *Ideas on Territorial Revision in Hungary 1920-1945*¹⁹ and Tibor Glant in his article about foreign language propaganda 1918-1920,²⁰ pays little attention to *The Hungarian Nation*.

The Territorial Integrity League

By far the most important and powerful of the emerging social organizations was the Territorial Integrity League²¹ (hereafter: TIL), founded in the last days of November, 1918, as a result of the efforts of Dezső Csánky, László Buday, Zsigmond Bátky and Count Pál Teleki.²² Following the short presidency of geographer Lajos Lóczy, who died in 1919, Teleki was elected president of the League. The manifesto of TIL was published in *Budapesti Hírlap* on December 3: it declared that the aim of the association was to organize the country's political, economic, cultural, and social clubs into a single organization which was to conduct propaganda at home and abroad.²³

Despite some initial criticism from the press (which labeled the organization "suspicious" and "harmful"²⁴), TIL became popular almost overnight. Charges of "counter-revolutionarism,"²⁵ were raised probably because the majority of its members represented the conservative middle

class and the elite of the pre-1918 era (such as Gyula Andrásy, Albert Apponyi, Ferenc Herczeg, Ferenc Molnár, among others). The Founders of the League did everything to attract followers from all layers of society; they justified the necessity of joining forces, without respect to social status, party and religious affiliation, with the need to build up the nation's self-esteem once again. In their view that was the only way to ensure that the country would have a firm moral standing at the upcoming peace conference. It seems their efforts were fruitful; Secretary-general Miklós Szegedy (soon replaced by Sándor Krisztics, editor of *The Hungarian Nation*) reported nearly a million members on December 14.²⁶ The supporters of TIL included such well-known public figures as Count Gyula Andrásy, Ferenc Herczeg, Count Albert Apponyi and Zsolt Beöthy. Numerous economic, scientific, and professional groups (such as the Hungarian Lawyers' Sport Association, the Székely National Council, and the National Balneology Association) joined forces with TIL. The Károlyi regime befriended the League, but did so unofficially; and Károlyi's wife, Katinka Andrásy, joined the organization.²⁷

The agitation of TIL targeted 1) the general Hungarian public, to keep nationalistic feelings alive, 2) the minorities of the occupied areas, to ensure that in case of a plebiscite they would opt for Hungary, and 3) the Allied Powers and the Paris Peace Conference.²⁸ The League meant to reach its target groups by the publication and circulation of pamphlets, postcards, maps, posters, leaflets, and books, all campaigning for Greater Hungary's territorial integrity. Besides, it volunteered to defend the country by arms if necessary.²⁹ The activities of TIL were financed partly by private contributions,³⁰ and partly by the government, which, at that stage, openly encouraged propaganda activities by social organizations.

During the Hungarian Soviet Republic (March–August 1919) the organization, like all other patriotic civil associations, was dissolved. The regime was unacceptable in the eyes of the Entente, which rendered any attempts for propaganda on the part of Kun and his associates impossible. Besides, the internationalist ideology of the Bolshevik regime, which did not recognize borders and nations, was irreconcilable with nationalist propaganda. Following the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic it was the presence of the Romanian occupation army that made it well-nigh impossible to conduct any sort of propaganda for Hungarian territorial integrity. Only after the Romanians had left Budapest in November 1919 were TIL and its activity revived, with substantial help from Hungary's new provisional government headed by Károly Huszár.³¹

On December 2, 1919 Hungary was once again invited to join the Peace Conference.³² This invitation had certain immediate consequences. The government felt that it had to earn recognition from the Entente by not supporting and not being (officially) involved in territorial propaganda anymore; instead, it encouraged propaganda covertly. By that time TIL had obtained a leading position among the several social organizations that were campaigning for territorial integrity and, after 9 months of forced suspension, its operation was in full vigor. The invitation to the conference fostered new hopes. Therefore, it seemed to make sense to launch informative English language publications presenting Hungary's viewpoint to the world. In consequence, in 1920-21 the League published a series of books simultaneously in London, New York and Budapest entitled *East European Problems*, with such well-known figures as Albert Apponyi, Ferenc Fodor, or János Kovács as authors. *EEP* consisted of twenty-four publications and was soon followed by its French version, *Questions de l'Europe Orientale*, which resulted in seven publications.³³ Journals were also launched: the English *The Hungarian Nation* in 1920, and the French *Les pays du Danube* in 1921 were distributed in Western Europe as well as the US.

Though it was seemingly pointless to keep on campaigning after the peace treaty was signed, in reality the possibilities of propaganda improved in western countries after June 4, 1920.³⁴ Count Apponyi himself shared this opinion, and he was not alone.³⁵ Besides, people were confident that the peace terms would soon be revised. Scarcely a month after the signing of the treaty, TIL declared that it intended to continue its activity since "it is of vital importance in regard to the impending revision of the peace treaty."³⁶ Certain signs indicated that although propaganda was officially called off, political circles did not want to terminate it once and for all; just two weeks before the signing of the treaty the government allocated 40 million crowns for propaganda, clearly for the times coming after Trianon. In 1920 and 1921 some government officials took up employment in the League, while receiving salary from their original employer, i.e. the government.³⁷ Soon afterwards, however, the government refused to finance directly the activities of TIL. The main reason for this must have been the fact that during the weeks before June 4 the League openly campaigned against the signing of the treaty. Although in most cases the League cooperated with the government, it would not acquiesce in the partitioning of the country, not even seemingly.³⁸

In the summer of 1920 propaganda activity abroad intensified, with the active participation of TIL. It campaigned relentlessly in the neigh-

bouring countries as well as Western Europe believing, like millions of Hungarians, in the imminent revision of the borders. In 1921, however, the government decided to examine civil associations and to dissolve those ones which were considered too irredentist. At that time the League was not dissolved like most other irredentist associations, thanks to its good relations with the government. Soon, however, it merged with other civil associations, which, at least legally, meant the end of TIL. Its activities, however, continued uninterrupted in the next two years.³⁹

In 1923 Premier Count István Bethlen admitted that international backing for revisionism was lacking. At that time Hungary was facing serious economic challenges, the victorious powers were not at all inclined to modify the frontiers, and neither were the countries of the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia). Bethlen decided to wait until Hungary became internationally consolidated and economically stronger. Once again, propaganda was called off, this time not only seemingly, which meant the end of the activities of the former TIL, and thus, the end of the publication of *The Hungarian Nation*.⁴⁰

The Hungarian Nation: Publication Details, Contributors, Structure

The Hungarian Nation (hereafter: *HN*) was the first English language journal about Hungary founded explicitly for propaganda purposes. The first issue was published a month after the Hungarian peace delegation had arrived in Paris, in February 1920, with the subtitle *A Monthly Review, Political and Economic*, to which, with the creation of a literary magazine, *Literary* was added from the 1920/6 issue onwards. The paper was published by Ferdinand Pfeifer (Zeidler Brothers), TIL's own dealer,⁴¹ and circulated by the Foreign Ministry's Press Department⁴² first in London, New York, Paris, Milano, Leipzig, Lugano, and from the 1920/6 issue on also in Bern and Geneva. In the course of four years 32 issues were published, their length varying between 14-30 pages. We know that initially at least 4,000-5,000 copies were published monthly⁴³ and sold for the price of 1 shilling or 20 US cents.

The renowned political scientist and university lecturer, Sándor Krisztics,⁴⁴ secretary-general of TIL, became the editor of *HN*. Krisztics had had some experience in editing: in 1916 he filled the same position for *The Hungarian Review*, another attempt to introduce Hungary to the English-speaking world.⁴⁵ From issue no. 6 on Krisztics was joined by Arthur L. Delisle, an English journalist based in Budapest, who had also

tried his hands at journalism before: in 1913-14 he edited *The Hungarian Spectator*.⁴⁶ A great many of the articles were written by Krisztics and Delisle themselves; the rest were contributed by prominent figures of Hungarian public life, aristocrats, academics, and journalists, such as Count Teleki, the Baron Gyula Wlassics, Count Apponyi, Consul-General Ernest Ludwig, Mayor of Budapest Jenő Sipőcz, the director of the Hungarian Statistical Office Alajos Szabóky, or the Bishop János Karácsonyi.⁴⁷ The majority of articles published in *HN*, however, did not indicate an author at all.

HN's aim was first and foremost to influence the outcome of the Paris Peace Conference, and it deployed its whole arsenal to achieve this goal. Historical, cultural, economic, political, ethnographical, and, above all, geographical arguments were employed to prove Hungary's right to her territories. To some extent, the structure of the journal reflected the structure of reasoning: each issue (until 1922/8-9, when all thematic sections disappeared) started with a collection of unclassified articles: appeals to the world or a world leader in particular, memoranda, reports of political events such as the dethronement of Charles IV or the Genoa Conference, summaries of Hungary's history or geography, and so on, all with a strongly propagandistic edge. These were followed by 3-6 articles grouped under the common title *Political Events*; articles of this section reported about the internal political situation of Hungary and the neighbouring countries, parliamentary elections, political parties, the program of the National Assembly as well as the debate and ratification of the Hungarian Peace Treaty in the US/British/French parliaments. They were designed to prove that Hungary was a most democratic country as opposed to the "barbaric" Successor States which exemplified the very opposite. They included excuses and apologies for the white terror (which, according to *HN*'s reasoning, never actually happened), anti-Semitism (which was claimed to be anti-Bolshevism) and the *Numerus Clausus* Act (which was presented as an "absolute necessity" and a "defensive measure").⁴⁸

The Nationalities of Hungary for the Integrity of the Country section collected articles asking for help on behalf of the Slovak, Croatian, German, Ruthenian, and Hungarian minorities that now suddenly found themselves outside Hungary. *Notes and Comments* comprised short (10-30 lines) reports, always without author, about the atrocities these minorities had to endure in the Successor States. "Forcible removal of school-boys from Igló,"⁴⁹ "The Magyars of Transylvania being exterminated,"⁵⁰ "Even the dead are taxed by the Roumanians,"⁵¹ "Dismissal of Hungarian Railway-men by the Austrians,"⁵² "Nationalities deprived of suffrage

rights in Yougoslavia [sic]⁵³ are just a few examples of the incessant stream of reports on the everyday life for nationalities in Serbia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia.

Articles in the section entitled *Economic Life* informed the public about the financial situation of the country, emphasizing that with all natural resources detached from Hungary, it was next to impossible to satisfy the demands of the victors. *Our Literary Magazine* was added in late 1920, presenting the works of Cecile Tormay, Ferenc Herczeg, Géza Lampért, Géza Gárdonyi, Kálmán Mikszáth and (most often) Delisle. Sections *Appeals* and *Social Conditions* appeared only once, describing the torments of Hungarians in Romania in a dramatic tone.

The journal changed format and abandoned all sections in 1923. The last couple of issues were double and triple issues, respectively, containing the same type of articles from the pens of the same authors as before. When Premier Bethlen, trying to please the western powers, put an end to all propaganda in 1921, activities, slogans, and charters of patriotic organizations were investigated. Moderate groups were reformed, extremist ones were disbanded. As has been explained, TIL was dissolved, its publications and propaganda material were taken over by the Hungarian National Alliance, and *HN* was terminated in mid-1923.

Style and Language

HN was written in excellent English, especially compared to the language of wartime publications from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The grammar and wording of the articles would have satisfied the tastes of a native speaker. The style, however, was exceedingly pompous and overdramatic; the journal did not confine itself to mere facts, but engaged in lengthy descriptions of the torments of and abuses against Hungarians. Phrases like “[the Treaty] ‘tore us limb from limb’ and threw the morsels to the vultures to feed upon”⁵⁴ were frequent on almost every page.

The very first article of the first issue is a fine example of the journal's style:

The Council of Paris has pronounced the verdict; [...] Never yet has peace been assured at so high a cost: the condemnation to death for the nations that had suffered defeat. Hungary belongs to them, her place is [...] among those assigned to the nations' catacombs. We have to prepare for death. No fear, the vaults are spacious enough, the whole nation will find room in them; slow, painful death by

starvation and cold, by artificially suffocating the weak breath of life still left to them, will embrace them all. Life is made impossible, we have to face death. [...] Unflinchingly they tore us to pieces, without a glance of pity for the mutilated body at their feet.⁵⁵

At other times the tone was elevated and solemn, such as when describing the ratification of the treaty in the Hungarian parliament:

The late autumn sunlight filtered through the painted windows of the dome, its glorious colour effects lightening the gloom and revealing the seats filled with sombre-clad men. All the cabinet ministers were in their places, and the deputies waited in silent immobility for the moment when they would be called upon to seal the fate of their country. To seal it forever? The answer is on the knees of the gods! [...] But as the solemn chant rose heavenward, heads were raised, cheeks flushed, eyes kindled, and it seemed verily as if the intrusive sunbeams were born of the words that ascended to the heights...⁵⁶

When writing about what ethnic Hungarians had to endure in their new countries, *HN* abounded in dramatic descriptions of the atrocities committed by Serbians, Czechs, and above all, Romanians against “Magyars” (“their finger and toe-nails are torn off by pincers,” “needles are driven between the nails and the flesh,” “[they are] used in experiments by the hangman’s apprentices”⁵⁷ and so on). This rhetoric was an answer to wartime atrocity propaganda, which painted a horrifying image of the ruthless “Teutonic Huns” and “Magyars,” who oppressed the Slavs, “Magyarized” them, stole their lands, but learned agriculture and industry from them.⁵⁸

Argumentation

The arguments put forward in *HN* in defense of Hungary’s territorial integrity were by no means new at the beginning of 1920. All the arguments listed by the journal had been around for years (some even for decades), and they tended to follow the logic of TIL pamphlets and leaflets circulated between 1918 and 1920. The reasoning tried to confute Andre Cheradame’s and Robert William Seton-Watson’s anti-Monarchy and anti-Hungarian propaganda during World War I, just as well as former Romanian, Czech, Serbian propaganda, accusing Hungary of having taken the

lands of the Slavs, oppressing and “Magyarizing” national minorities, and in 1914 provoking the war.⁵⁹

Since TIL was closely associated with the Hungarian Geographical Society⁶⁰ and many of its prominent figures were geographers, it is no wonder that the primary argument of the journal was of geographical nature. According to that argument St. Stephen's Hungary was such a perfect geographical and economic unit that it would have been unnatural to detach a single square mile of it. The Carpathian Basin was meant to be one country from the beginning of times, and while Greater Hungary exemplified unity in all respects, the Successor States lacked all kinds of (geographical, economic, ethnographical, and cultural) unity. Besides being, in Apponyi's words, “the finest natural geographic unity in Europe,”⁶¹ the

uniform, characteristic Hungarian region is possessed of its peculiar individuality as regards geographical economics as well. [...] The economic individuality of the basin system involves the outspoken individuality of the traffic within the boundaries of the Hungarian region. [...] The basin-system enclosed by the Carpathians is thus, geographically speaking, peopled by the Hungarians; the region belongs to them, for, economically, they have conquered it and penetrated it with their culture.⁶²

Even though Apponyi was anxious to point out the state of perfection represented by Greater Hungary, he did admit that “one factor... was wanting: *racial unity*. On this plea is [Hungary's] dissection planned.”⁶³ This statement leads us to the next pivotal point of the argumentation: namely, that though Hungary's population was ethnically mixed, Hungary did not treat the national minorities unkindly. Ever since St. Stephen welcomed western settlers in the country, Hungarians have been most tolerant towards foreigners, “and the policy of the ancient Hungarian constitution, founded on privilege, suffered shipwreck on the rock of the nationalities owing to *the hostility of the Vienna Government*.”⁶⁴ The argument was developed further in an appeal to US President Warren G. Harding: “Hungarians did not exterminate or enslave alien tribes and settlers;” instead, they lived peacefully together in a “community of rights and liberties.... All the inhabitants of the country were equal citizens of the nation, without regard to tongue or race.”⁶⁵ The Bishop János Karácsonyi went as far as stating that by ruling Croatia for long centuries, Hungary did not oppress the Croatian nation but saved it from assimilation with the Serbians.⁶⁶

HN was anxious to make readers aware that what they had heard and read before was merely malicious propaganda, and that minorities, having developed an intense attachment to Hungary over the centuries, did not wish to be separated from their “mother country:”

Facts were represented as if the parts of alien peoples under Hungarian rule were oppressed and had to be delivered from the yoke. And thus it happened. Soon, however, it was discovered that the liberators were worse tyrants than the ‘oppressors’ of old had ever been.

The events since come to pass upon the Hungarian territories furnish ample proof. Though one or the other of the “delivered” peoples might have betrayed some joy at the beginning, gladly welcomed the unification with its neighbouring kindred, prepared by a long press campaign [sic] and in the hope of improving its position, now [...] they all are entirely disillusioned and have [...] changed their views. Slowly it begins to dawn on the peoples seceded from Hungary that their adversaries are to be found not among the Magyars but in Prague, Belgrade and Bucharest.⁶⁷

In sharp contrast to what minorities were used to under Hungarian rule, the newly-formed Successor States abused them; the torments of the Croatians, Bunjevci, and Šokci under Serbian rule, the Czech abuse of Slovaks and Ruthenians, and the Romanian aggression and oppression experienced by the Hungarians and Saxons of Transylvania were enumerated in dramatic tone. Titles like “The people of Muraköz do not desire separation from Hungary,” “Ruthenians protesting against separation from Hungary,” “Slovakian, Ruthenian and German Declaration of Allegiance to Hungary,” “The Position and Wishes of the Wends under Yougoslav [sic] Occupation” and countless others assure the reader that detachment from Hungary was the worst possible option these nationalities could envision.

Addressed to their fellow workmen or the “civilised world,” appeals and petitions of authors, artists, and workers of Hungary and Transylvania, begged for intervention in almost every issue. Perhaps the best example of such appeals is the Union of the National Minorities of Hungary’s “Plea to the Nations of the World:”

Nations of the World! To you we apply for help! We, the Slovaks, Germans, Ruthenians, Roumanians, Wends and South-Slavs address our plea to you. Guiltless have we been condemned at Paris. We have been convicted to sunderance [sic] from our thousand year-old

home, from Hungary. For a thousand years that country has been our loving mother who has given us a fair treatment, and, though perhaps she did not always treat us quite according to our wish, yet she has been kinder to us than our new step-mothers. [...] They [i.e. the Peace Conference] have joined us to such peoples as are either on a much lower level of culture, or making use of such brutal force as will serve to suppress our national life. [...] With all our devotion and all our might we beg and plead for the Plebiscite!⁶⁸

The plea is not signed, nor does it indicate an author. It does, however, allude to another recurrent argument against the neighbouring peoples, namely, that they were inferior to Hungarians. Apponyi himself pointed out in his speech to the Peace Conference on January 16, 1920 that the cultural level of Hungarians could not be compared to those of the Romanians, Serbs, and Slovaks.⁶⁹ The main argument to support this statement was the destruction of Hungarian statues and memorials in the detached areas.⁷⁰

HN took great pains to reject responsibility for the war and to explain to the public that Hungary (and in particular István Tisza) opposed the war to the very last moment. The late premier was praised as one who “made herculean efforts to save the peoples from the dire disaster that he saw approaching.”⁷¹ The country was driven to war only by the aggression of Germany (Tisza was “taken off his feet by a comminatory message from Berlin”⁷²), and once she was at war, unlike the Romanians, she could not commit treachery and forsake her allies. The very first article of the very first issue, “Appeal,” calls it “more than undeserved fate” that a country which “had never played a major part in the politics of Europe and whose Prime Minister had protested up to the last minute (July 8, 1914) against any intention of conquest and had done everything in his power to prevent the outbreak of the war”⁷³ should be punished so severely. To this, Apponyi added, “had Hungary been able to decide for herself, there would have been no war;”⁷⁴ and considering all these mitigating circumstances, Hungary should not have been punished more severely than any other belligerent state.

Though *The Hungarian Nation* was circulated all over Western Europe and in the USA, we have reason to believe that it was meant for British and American audiences. The journal advertised itself as one “to all in Great Britain and America who desire to keep abreast of events and to be well informed on the trend of popular feeling in Hungary and the newly created States of Central Europe.” A large share of the articles was dedicated to the similarities and traditional friendship of the Hungarians

and the English, sometimes with anti-French overtones. “England and Hungary,”⁷⁵ “The Anglo-Hungarian Club,”⁷⁶ “English Culture and Hungarian Life,”⁷⁷ “The Anglo-Saxon World and Hungary,”⁷⁸ “Hungary’s Thank to Her Advocates in the English Parliament,”⁷⁹ and so on, all praise the English nation as “gentlemanlike, loyal and highspirited [sic],”⁸⁰ a people with an “uncompromising sense of duty, unswerving [sic] loyalty, independence of mind and love of liberty, an unconditional attachment to home and country,”⁸¹ not to mention the “unerring instinct of right and freedom” and the “manly, aristocratic heart”⁸² of the “English race.” According to the authors, the Magyars shared all these qualities and “the common traits of character” had made them “kindred nations” ever since the days of St. Stephen. Richard the Lionheart was Hungary’s national hero, Shakespeare was her national poet, and if the cultural similarities would not be enough to prove that Hungarians had a congenial spirit and mind with the English, *HN* pointed out that their histories had been parallel (e.g. those were the two earliest nations to have a constitution: Magna Charta and the Golden Bull).⁸³ In short, “Hungarian history, national character and national traditions predestined them to come under the influence of the only nation in Europe whose history, national character and national traditions were akin to those of the Magyars.”⁸⁴

To support the notion of the anglophile nation, co-editor Delisle shared with his readers his own experiences as an enemy alien in Hungary. “Our Friends, the Enemy” related in awe how scrupulously Hungarian authorities ensured during the war that English subjects have the freedom of movement, that they be treated with respect and would not feel unwelcome in Hungary.⁸⁵

Some articles were meant to confirm “the thousand-year-old Hungarian-English friendship” from the English side. “The Treaty of Peace with Hungary in the British Parliament” quoted several “honourable and gallant English MPs,” all undignified about the “great act of injustice” they were about to commit and generally speaking of Hungary very highly. Several MPs expressed their viewpoint that “the Treaty was contrary to the law of nature as well as to the interests and sentiments of the inhabitants.”⁸⁶ The thousand-year-old English-Hungarian friendship was mentioned as a matter of evidence. The fact, however, that for some reason Hungary and Great Britain fought on opposite sides in the Great War would have upset the theory of the “kindred nations;” therefore, the common explanation was that the two countries were enemies only on paper, while they were suffering from being separated. Delisle, Ludwig, and their fellow authors were eager to point out that “the Hungarian people

have not, during any stage of the war, regarded either the British or the Americans as their enemies, even so much as their technical enemies,"⁸⁷ and that the restoration of peace was the return to normal course of life.

Another recurrent argument for the preservation of Hungary's territorial integrity was that a strong and peaceful Hungary and Central Europe was in fact in the interest of western powers, but in the present situation Hungary was everything but strong, stable, and peaceful. "It is not merely in Hungary's interest but in that of all Europe to strengthen her, to restore the sources of [her] strength," because the only basis for "maintenance of peace in Eastern Europe is... a strong Hungary capable of life,"⁸⁸ Apponyi wrote in early 1921. Some overestimated Hungary's significance and stated that a "free, strong and independent Hungary will be the best guarantee for universal peace and progress, not only for the centre of Europe, but for the entire hemisphere."⁸⁹

The "From Wilson only a Wilsonian peace!" argument was, of course, inescapable. The Baron Julius Wlassics's series of articles, "The Right to Self-Determination," ran for almost a year in *HN*, discussing the Wilsonian principles and their practical realization in Central Europe. The former Hungarian consul-general in Cleveland, Ernest Ludwig, blamed Wilson in fiery articles for not acting according to his principles and letting Hungary down. In Ludwig's opinion it was Wilson whom "Hungary owes her dismemberment and her present catastrophe."⁹⁰ Others, like Transylvanus Viator, blamed also the Peace Conference for the failure of Wilson's principles, which "were conceived in the anaemic brain of an American doctrinaire and brought forth only to die after brief contact with the outer air, and lie forgotten among the archives of a Peace Conference that over-ruled their inspirer."⁹¹

Evolution

In August 1921, for reasons described above, (official) territorial propaganda came to an end. It might have been for that, or simply the realization that under the given circumstances irredentist demands would not yield results, that in the course of 1921-1922 *HN's* aggressive and unrealistic rhetoric was gradually replaced by a more moderate tone. The first realistic voices came in the 1921/3-4 issue from Apponyi, who was ready to accept that

it cannot be assumed that any modification of the treaties is to be expected within a short time. [...] Coolly considered it is a psychological impossibility that those who have composed the treaties should now, with the ink not yet quite dry on the paper, start the work of revision. To carry through this revision against the will of those in power [...] is an unreasonable thought. [...] [A] sound Hungarian policy is possible only on the basis of the treaties, [...] and the foremost task of this policy is to give assurance that Hungary does not aim at a forcible modification of the treaties.⁹²

Initially *HN*'s attitude to the peace treaty was total rejection, but a gradual change took place in 1921 and 1922. Demands were gradually being scaled down, and by 1923 the former "everything back!" claims were replaced by more realistic calls for border revision where the peace treaty had not taken railroad lines or other compelling economic factors into consideration.

The logic of reasoning, however, remained the same. The 1923/1-3 issue campaigned for re-attaching the territory that is generally referred to as the Partium (the lands between the trans-Tisza region in Eastern Hungary and Transylvania) to Hungary. When the "Memorandum on the Frontier Rectification Between Hungary and Roumania" summarized the arguments in favor of border modification, the same points were repeated once again that had been present in the columns of the journal since 1920, first and foremost that "1. This territory, in conformity with the immutable laws of nature, belongs to the Hungarian lowland. [...] 2. The Magyars are in an absolute majority in this territory. [...] 4. This territory has never before belonged to Transylvania."⁹³

Denying responsibility for the war, claiming "unprecedented barbarism"⁹⁴ directed against the "Magyar" population in their new countries, and asserting that "the Succession [*sic*] States aiming at the economic ruin of Hungary,"⁹⁵ and all the rest of the well-known arguments were also recycled to the very end. Above all, instead of openly demanding to annul the Peace Treaty, *HN* started to focus on articles that were designed to prove how aggressive, cruel, and, in terms of culture and civilization, inferior compared to Hungary the newly formed Successor States were. Typical headlines included "Czech Antagonism to Hungarian and Ruthenian Civilisation," "Struggle for Autonomy in the Territories Severed from Hungary," "Destruction of Monuments of Hungarian Art," "Renewed Czech Persecution of the Magyars," "The People of Burgenland Seek to Escape from Austrian Rule," or "The Future Czecho-Polish War!"

Frontier Regulation Commissions

The people of Hungary [...] hailed with joy the arrival of the frontier regulation commissions, while the Hungarian Government, though struggling with a constantly depleted treasury, willingly defrayed the expenses running into millions of crowns, required for the support of these commissions, in the confident belief that the Areopagus at Paris would honour its promise in due time.⁹⁶

Such were the hopes of Hungarian society after Millerand's letter and upon receiving the frontier regulation commissions, which came to Hungary in order to review the Trianon borders and suggest adjustments. Hopeful expectations, however, soon gave place to disappointment. Nothing was reported about the actual work done by the commissions, but since it had no evident result within a short period of time, by mid-1922 the general opinion was that the commissions had "discovered a means of fulfilling their tasks by carrying out only those provisions of the Treaty and appendices which were disadvantageous for Hungary and ignoring the rest."⁹⁷ The commissions were accused of being biased, superficial, "parasitic," exceedingly expensive to maintain, and they were held responsible for "preventing the population from doing anything to better its condition."⁹⁸ Besides the commissions not doing their job, Romanian, Czech, and Serbian authorities were said to have intimidated their Hungarian populations before the commissions' arrival, threatening them with death if they revealed any preference for Hungary.

Image construction

One strategy *HN* deployed to construct a positive image of Hungary abroad (above all in Britain) was publishing letters from notable English lords such as Lord Newton, war-time Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, head of the departments for foreign propaganda and prisoners of war, and from anonymous English MPs, noblemen or businessmen.

These writers usually started by thanking Delisle for the copies of *HN* and went on to ensure him that the writer of the letter held Hungary by no means responsible for the outbreak of the war, or to acknowledge that British subjects were indeed treated fairly in Hungary during the war. Besides, *HN* regularly reported the stances and appeals of the Oxford League for Hungarian Self-determination (OLHSD).

As part of a comprehensive image construction campaign, in spring 1922 *HN* started to advertise the University of Budapest Summer Vacation Courses. The courses covered Hungarian language, literature, history, geographical and economical conditions of Central Europe, French and German literature, Central European Politics, all held in English (a major gesture in an age when the European *lingua franca* was mostly French). The 1922/8-9 issue then gave a detailed account of the opening ceremony of the Summer Courses which was an event of the highest profile; the English students, Oxford professors and members of the OLHSD, who had “come to this country for the purpose of studying Hungarian conditions and gaining personal experience on the spot,”⁹⁹ were greeted with hussars and *hajdus* in “gorgeously picturesque uniforms,” crimson carpet, flaunting flags, Dean Siegiescu’s speech delivered in Latin, and all the pompous formalities and show that the interwar regime could put on. A great deal of the same issue was dedicated to the petitions and appeals of the University of Oxford and the OLHSD to the League of Nations and the civilized world in general.

Conclusions

The Hungarian Nation was an unprecedented attempt at justifying Hungary’s claims on her territories. The journal, published in Western Europe and the US, was the first serious propaganda effort since the beginning of the war that targeted an international audience, and as such, it was of surprisingly good standard. The background organization of the journal, the Territorial Integrity League, was perhaps the most influential organization of its kind, involving Hungary’s social elite and intelligentsia. The editorial board consisted of renowned scholars, politicians, and aristocrats, who had all joined forces to prevent Hungary’s dismemberment.

The journal, however, was doomed to failure. By the time the first issue was published, Hungary’s fate had been sealed. Besides, the reasoning of *HN*, which was a distant (and belated) response to wartime anti-Austria-Hungary propaganda, was too overheated, dramatic, and redundant, for it repeated the same arguments over and over again. Though written in excellent English and deploying innumerable historical and statistical facts, the political climate of the early 1920s rendered the journal’s ambitions unrealistic. Even after August 1921, when the former aggressive irredentist tone softened a bit, the objectives of *The Hungarian Nation* were well beyond reality.

This does not lessen the journal's merits though. It was, and remains, an interesting and impressive experiment, and a valuable source of information for us, reflecting the picture of the Hungarian nation the new-born, independent Hungary wanted the West to see.

Appendix

Major contributors of *The Hungarian Nation*

Dávid Angyal (1857-1943), born Engel, started out as a literary historian, and ended up as professor of modern history at the University of Budapest and an honorary member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He published a number of essays, studies, books on modern Hungarian history and was editor of several historical journals.¹⁰⁰

Count Albert Apponyi, (1846-1933), Hungary's „grand old man”, needs no introduction. After World War I he turned legitimist, headed the Hungarian peace delegation in Paris, where he tried to fight against Hungary's dismemberment with all possible means. From 1923 he represented Hungary in the League of Nations until his death. His eloquence, dedication, insight and realistic assessment of the situation make him stand high above his contemporaries.¹⁰¹

Not much is known about **Delisle, Arthur L., Esq.**, the co-editor of *The Hungarian Nation*, an English journalist who settled in Hungary. He was co-author of a book entitled *Austria of the Austrians and Hungary of the Hungarians* (Pitman: London, 1914, reprinted in 2009 by Kessinger Pub) and secretary of the Anglo-American Literary Society of Budapest. In 1914 he returned to England and offered his services in turning Hungary against the Central Powers.¹⁰²

Ferenc Fodor (1887-1962) was a renowned geographer, cartographer and historian. Between 1911-1919 he taught at the secondary grammar school of Karánsebes, but when the town came under Romanian rule, he refused to give his oath to the Romanian government and left for Budapest. In the capital he worked at the University of Economics as a close associate of Teleki.¹⁰³

Baron Albert Kaas (1885-1961) held a doctorate in law and political science from the University of Budapest. His Danish origins did not prevent him from becoming an MP for *Nemzeti Munkapárt*, and in the 1920s a representative in the National Assembly. A lecturer of the Faculty of Economics and member of the Order of Saint John, he was appointed Teleki's successor in the upper house after the Premier's suicide.¹⁰⁴

János Karácsonyi (1858-1929) completed his theological studies in Budapest before he was ordained in 1882. Historian, professor of theology and bishop, he became a full member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.¹⁰⁵

Sándor Krisztics (1890-1966), the editor of *The Hungarian Nation*,

former editor of *The Hungarian Review*, was a lecturer of international law, foreign policy and political science at the University of Budapest from 1920. From 1926 he taught law and political science at the University of Pécs, where he was appointed rector in the 1940s. Besides being director of the Hungarian Sociographical Institute, he also served as secretary general of the T.I.L.¹⁰⁶

Ernő Ludwig, Austria-Hungary's consul general in Cleveland during WW I, author of *Austria-Hungary and the War*, disappeared from public life after the war.

Alajos Paikert (1866-1948) studied law and agriculture at the University of Budapest. A founding member of the Hungarian Royal Museum of Agriculture, he became the Museum's director in 1923. He retired as under-secretary of state in 1930. A promoter of Turanism, he also founded the Turan Society and its journal in the 1910s.¹⁰⁷

Baron Gyula Wlassics (1852-1937) was an extraordinary man of his day; professor of criminal justice, deputy public prosecutor, MP, later Minister for Religion and Public Education, chair of the upper house, vice president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, member of The Hague Court of Justice. As a token of recognition he was granted nobility in 1916. During his long career he always stood up for civic reforms, such as civil marriage and women's admission to universities.¹⁰⁸

Arthur B. Yolland (1874-1956), a graduate of Cambridge and Oxford, moved to Budapest in 1898 (according to Jeszenszky in 1896¹⁰⁹) and became a Hungarian citizen in 1908. He was appointed professor of English Language and Literature at what is known today as Eötvös Lóránd University. Besides editing *The Hungarian Spectator* and compiling Hungarian-English and English-Hungarian dictionaries, he translated a great deal of Hungarian literature to English and wrote a number of studies about Hungarian culture and history in English. Incidentally, he is regarded as a founder of Hungarian football (soccer), having been a member of the first ever Hungarian football team (Budapesti Torna-Club Első Magyar Futball Teamje, First Hungarian Football Team of Budapest Sports Club).¹¹⁰

NOTES

I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Tibor Glant for calling *The Hungarian Nation* to my attention and for his insights and guidance without which I would not have been able to complete this article.

¹ Paul Hanebrink, "Transnational Culture War: Christianity, Nation, and the Judeo-Bolshevik Myth in Hungary, 1890-1920," *The Journal of Modern History* 80, 1 (March 2008): 59. Hereafter cited as Hanebrink, "Transnational Culture War".

² Béla Bodó, “White Terror, the Hungarian Press, and the Evolution of Hungarian Anti-Semitism after World War I,” *Yad Vashem Studies*, 34 (2006): 53. Hereafter cited as Bodó, “White Terror”.

³ Hanebrink, “Transnational Culture War,” p. 67.

⁴ Paul Hanebrink, *In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, 1890-1944* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 60. Hereafter cited as Hanebrink, *In Defense of Christian Hungary*.

⁵ Had the Hungarian government not closed the borders at the end of 1920, the number of refugees would have continued to increase. Ignác Romsics. *István Bethlen: A Great Conservative Statesman of Hungary, 1874-1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 145. Hereafter cited as Romsics.

⁶ Hanebrink, *In Defense of Christian Hungary*, p. 60. and Romsics 145.

⁷ Hanebrink, “Transnational Culture War,” p. 68.

⁸ Hanebrink, “Transnational Culture War,” p. 75.

⁹ Eliza Johnson Ablovatski. “‘Cleansing the Red Nest’: Counter-revolution and White Terror in Munich and Budapest, 1919.” Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 2004. UMI Microfilm 3159719, pp. 76-98. According to Ablovatski, the White Terror claimed 1,500 to 2,000 victims, three or four times the estimated number of victims of the Red Terror.

¹⁰ Bodó, “White Terror”, p. 47.

¹¹ Bodó, “White Terror”, pp. 52 and 70.

¹² Tibor Glant, “Roosevelt, Apponyi és a Habsburg Monarchia,” *Századok* 1997/6. pp. 1386-1401. Apponyi did publish some articles in *The Outlook* before the outbreak of the war to familiarize the US public with Hungarian conditions. Similar attempts were Jenő Golonya’s journal simply titled *Hungary*, published twice a month between 1903-1917 with the aim of making Hungary’s political and economic situation, natural beauties and history known to the upper layers of British and American society; *The Hungarian Spectator*, a journal edited by A. Yolland in 1913-1914; *The Hungarian Review*, a journal edited by Alexander Krisztics, published in 1916. See Géza Jeszenszky, “A ‘Hungary’, az első angol nyelvű magyar újság.” [*Hungary*, the First English Language Hungarian Journal] *Az Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár Évkönyve* 1976-77, pp. 471-499. Cited hereafter as Jeszenszky, ‘Hungary.’

¹³ Tibor Glant, *Through the Prism of the Habsburg Monarchy: Hungary in American Diplomacy and Public Opinion During World War I* (Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Monographs; Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications; New York: Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1998) pp. 83-115. Hereafter cited as Glant, *Through the Prism*.

¹⁴ Glant, *Through the Prism*, pp. 170-179

¹⁵ For details see Lajos Pallos, “Területvédő propaganda Magyarországon 1918-1920” [Propaganda for Territorial Integrity in Hungary 1918-1920], *Folia Historica XXIV* (Budapest: Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum, 2006), p. 38. Hereafter cited as Pallos, “Területvédő propaganda.”

¹⁶ Glant, *Through the Prism*, pp. 141-163.

¹⁷ Pallos, "Területvédő propaganda," p. 38.

¹⁸ Anikó Kovács-Bertrand. *Der Ungarische Revisionismus nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg* [Hungarian Revisionism after World War I] München: Oldenbourg, 1997. Hereafter cited as Kovács-Bertrand, *Ungarische Revisionismus*.

¹⁹ Miklós Zeidler, *Ideas on Territorial Revision in Hungary 1920-1945* (Boulder, Colorado: Social Science Monographs; Wayne, NJ: Center for Hungarian Studies and Publications, Inc.; distributed by Columbia University Press, NY, 2007) Hereafter cited as Zeidler, *Territorial Revision*.

²⁰ Tibor Glant, "Some Facts about Hungarian Propaganda for Territorial Integrity Abroad, 1918-20," *Hungarian Journal of English and American Studies* 2 (1) (1996): 43-55.

²¹ The full name of the TIL was Defense League for the Territorial Integrity of Hungary (Magyarország Területi Épségének Védelmi Ligája, generally known as TEVÉL in Hungarian).

²² Anikó Kovács-Bertrand, *Ungarische Revisionismus*, p. 50.

²³ Magyarország területi épségének védelmi ligája [Defense League for the Territorial Integrity of Hungary]. In: *Budapesti Hírlap*. Dec 3, 1918, p. 7.

²⁴ Balázs Ablonczy, *Teleki Pál* (Budapest: Osiris, 2005), 132.

²⁵ *Pesti Hírlap*, Dec 15, 1918.

²⁶ "A Területi Védelmi Liga megalakulása," *Budapesti Hírlap*, Dec 15, 1918, p. 7.

²⁷ Pallós, "Területvédő propaganda," p. 54. The reference for the one million members appeared only in *Pesti Hírlap* (Dec 17, 1918, p. 2). This high number might not be far from reality though, since entire civil associations and even religious communities such as the Israelite Community of Buda joined the association.

²⁸ Miklós Zeidler, "A Magyar Revíziós Liga" [The Hungarian Revisionist League], *Századok* 1997/2, p. 303; Pallós, "Területvédő propaganda," p. 54; and in more detail Zeidler, *Territorial Revision*, pp. 93-97.

²⁹ Pallós, "Területvédő propaganda," p. 53.

³⁰ In 1920 TIL was donated an impressive amount of 4 million crown. Kovács-Bertrand, *Ungarische Revisionismus*, p. 51.

³¹ Pallos, "Területvédő propaganda," p. 69. The organization was granted 1 million crowns by the Cabinet on December 2, 1919, but possibly because of disagreement between TIL and the government, the money might never have arrived. In the summer of 1921 József Ajtay, chief accountant of the League, complained about the arrears of the 250,000 crowns monthly payment and the 1 million crowns TIL was supposed to receive from the government. Kovács-Bertrand, *Ungarische Revisionismus*, p. 51.

³² Hungary had been invited to the Conference earlier in May 1919, but the invitation was withdrawn.

³³ Zeidler, *Territorial Revision*, p. 95.

³⁴ Pallós, "Területvédő propaganda," p. 83.

³⁵ Pallós, "Területvédő propaganda," p. 87.

³⁶ *Uj Nemzedék*, July 3, 1920, p. 3.

³⁷ Pallós, "Területvédő propaganda," pp. 85 and 87.

³⁸ Pallós, "Területvédő propaganda," p. 88.

³⁹ Pallós, "Területvédő propaganda," p. 92.

⁴⁰ Romsics, pp. 217-218.

⁴¹ Pfeifer's bookstore, located downtown Budapest, in the building of the National Casino, offered an incredibly wide choice of propaganda materials, written and musical, scientific and poetical. Miklós Zeidler, *A magyar iredenta kultusz a két világháború között* [Hungarian Irredentist Cult in the Interwar Years] (Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány, 2002), 69.

⁴² Kovács-Bertrand, *Ungarische Revisionismus*, p. 105.

⁴³ Kovács-Bertrand, *Ungarische Revisionismus*, p. 105.

⁴⁴ In HN, first names were translated to English. In the present study I will consistently use Hungarian first names.

⁴⁵ Jeszenszky, 'Hungary.' p. 471.

⁴⁶ Jeszenszky, 'Hungary.' p. 481.

⁴⁷ For a list of major contributors see Appendix.

⁴⁸ The *Numerus Clausus* Act was the common name of the 1920/XXV Act setting up racial quotas for Jews. The Act limited the number of Jewish students who could win admission to universities in relation to the proportion they represented in the Hungarian population.

⁴⁹ *HN*, 1921/1, p. 17.

⁵⁰ *HN*, 1921/1, p. 18.

⁵¹ *HN*, 1921/1, p. 18.

⁵² *HN*, 1922/6, p. 61.

⁵³ *HN*, 1922/7, p. III.

⁵⁴ Ernest Ludwig, "Some Economic Aspects of the Hungarian Peace Treaty," *HN* 1922/3-5, p. 35.

⁵⁵ Dr. Baron Albert Kaas. Appeal. *HN* 1920/1. pp. 1-2. It is worth noting that the word "death" turns up four times in a single paragraph.

⁵⁶ "A Nation's Obsequies," *HN* 1921/1-2 pp.1-2

⁵⁷ "Appeal from the workers of Transylvania to their fellow-workmen throughout the world," *HN* 1922/1, p. 16.

⁵⁸ Glant, *Through the Prism*, p. 147.

⁵⁹ Glant, *Through the Prism*, pp. 141-163.

⁶⁰ Zoltán Hajdú, "A magyar földrajztudomány és a trianoni békeszerződés. 1918-1920" [Hungarian Geography and the Peace Treaty of Trianon. 1918-1920], *Kisebbségkutatás* 2000/2. p. 228. http://www.hhrf.org/kisebbségkutatás/kk_2000_02/cikk.php?id=244 (date of access: Jan 25, 2010). Hereafter cited as Hajdú, "A magyar földrajztudomány."

⁶¹ Albert Apponyi, *The Peace Treaty Proposed to Hungary*. *HN* 1920/2, p. 22. Italics in the original.

⁶² Francis Fodor, "Hungarian the Land, Hungarian the Race," *HN* 1920/1, pp. 5-6. The idea of Hungary being a prefect geographical unity that must not be dismembered originated from French scientists Paul Vidal de la Blache and Elisée Reclus in the 19th century. See Hajdú, "A magyar földrajztudomány," p. 228.

⁶³ Apponyi., "The Peace Treaty," *HN* 1920/2, p. 22.

⁶⁴ "The Foreign Policy of Hungary (1918-1920)," *HN* 1922/2 pp. 23-27. Italics mine.

⁶⁵ "The Memorial of the Hungarian Territorial Integrity League to President Harding," *HN*, 1921/3-4, p. 26.

⁶⁶ John Karácsonyi, "The Historical Right of the Hungarian Nation to its Territorial Integrity," *HN*, 1921/1-2, pp. 8-12

⁶⁷ "Struggle for Autonomy in the Territories Severed from Hungary," *HN*, 1922/3-5, p. 27.

⁶⁸ "The Union of the National Minorities of Hungary and their Plea to the Nations of the World," *HN*, 1920/1 p. 11.

⁶⁹ According to Apponyi, the literacy rate of ethnic Hungarians in 1919 was 80% and 84% of the Magyar population was educated to at least baccalaureat level. The corresponding numbers for Romanians, Slovaks and Serbians were very small.

⁷⁰ An article in the February 1922 issue ("Destruction of Monuments of Hungarian Art," *HN*, 1922/2 pp. 21-23.) enumerated countless works of art from all over Greater Hungary that were mutilated, removed or blown up; Millennium memorials, the statues of Árpád, Kossuth, Petöfi, Arany, Bem, and Rákóczi from Marosvásárhely to Dévény fell victim to ethnic aggression. These reports were meant to illustrate how "barbaric" Hungary's neighbouring countries were. These appeals had some (formal) effect, an example being the "Petition of the University of Oxford to the League of Nations concerning the destruction of art treasures in Central and Eastern Europe" (*HN*, 1922/8-9 p. 84.), signed by numerous Oxford professors and college presidents.

⁷¹ Coloman Mikszáth, "Count Stephen Tisza and the World-War," *HN*, 1923/1-3, p. 5.

⁷² Albert Apponyi, "The Peace Traty Proposed to Hungary," *HN*, 1920/2, p. 22. Hereafter Apponyi, *HN* 1920/2.

⁷³ Dr. Baron Albert Kaas, "Appeal," *HN* 1920/1. pp. 1-2.

⁷⁴ Apponyi, *HN* 1920/2, p. 22.

⁷⁵ David Angyal, "England and Hungary," *HN* 1920/1. pp. 7-9.

⁷⁶ Rev.Dr. P. G. Nally, "The Anglo-Hungarian Club," *HN* 1920/1. p. 13.

⁷⁷ Arthur Yolland, "English Culture and Hungarian Life," *HN* 1920/3. pp. 37-39.

⁷⁸ Alajos Paikert, "The Anglo-Saxon World and Hungary," *HN* 1920/5 pp. 70-72. Hereafter cited as Paikert, *HN* 1920/5

⁷⁹ "Hungary's Thank to Her Advocates in the English Parliament," *HN* 1920/3, p. 37.

⁸⁰ Paikert, *HN* 1920/5, p. 70.

⁸¹ Yolland, *HN* 1920/3, p. 38.

⁸² Paikert, *HN* 1920/5, p. 70.

⁸³ Common features in British and Hungarian literature and history had been researched by Sándor Fest who wrote extensively about medieval and renaissance English-Hungarian literary and historical connections.

⁸⁴ Yolland, *HN* 1920/3, p. 37.

⁸⁵ Arthur L. Delisle, "Our Friends, the Enemy. How English People Fared in Hungary During the Great War," *HN* 1921/5, pp. 48-50.

⁸⁶ Ladislaus Okolicsányi, "The Treaty of Peace with Hungary in the British Parliament," *HN*, 1921/5-6, p. 46.

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Two Visits — Two Eras: The Canadian Tours of Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty, 1947 and 1973

Margit Balogh

Members of the generation who lived through the Cold War no doubt know the name of Joseph (in Hungarian József) Mindszenty who became a world-famous symbol of the struggle against communism. Many saw in him a “victim of history” a “martyr from behind the Iron Curtain” while others called him the “Hungarian Ghandi” or just a “stubborn old gentleman.” These were just a few of the epithets that people — depending on their sympathies or temperament — applied to Cardinal Mindszenty, the last of the Hungarian prelates who also held the title Prince Primate of Hungary. In his long life (1892–1975) he toured Canada twice, the first time in 1947 when he was in the prime of his life and then again in 1973 when he was nearing the end of his earthly existence. Each of these tours had an impact, in more than insignificant manner, on his future. The first trip contributed to his being arrested after returning to an increasingly communist-dominated Hungary, subjected to a show trial and being condemned to life imprisonment; while the second visit acted as a factor in his removal by the Holy See from his position as the Archbishop of Esztergom, the highest-ranking prelate of Hungary.

The 1947 Visit

At the time of Mindszenty’s first trip to Canada, Hungary was in the midst of a campaign by the country’s Communists and their allies to “separate” church and state and to break the churches’ influence. Although formally Hungary was still being governed by a coalition government, a communist political system was well on its way of being foisted on the country’s population. Under these circumstances conflict between the Hungarian state and the Catholic Church became endemic. The roots of this development can be traced on the one hand to communist ideology and on the other to the widespread

perception by Catholics in the country that a communist takeover will follow the same revolutionary and anti-church model as it did in Russia after 1917. As Pope Pius XII's Under-Secretary of State Domenico Tardini had already predicted in 1943 that, since the Soviet Union will survive the war, the peaceful and orderly co-existence of European nations will become impossible and in the "not too far future we'll face a new tragic war."¹ For Soviet leader Joseph Stalin until 1948 the security of his country was more important than the rapid bolshevization of all of Eastern Europe and good neighbourly relations counted for more than the creation of still more Soviet-style republics; that is for him the preservation of the wartime anti-fascist alliance was still essential, so in some Soviet-occupied countries he tolerated the search for national paths and did not make the Soviet model compulsory, not even in the matter of policy regarding the churches. This situation changed only at the end of 1947 and the beginning of 1948 — and the era of war-time and post-war Allied cooperation came to an end.

In regard to the situation of the Catholic Church it should be pointed out that although *de jure* in Hungary there had been no state religion since 1848, some of the Church's traditional privileges had not been abrogated by the country's bourgeois transformation. Until the mid-19th century the Prince Primate was considered the Hungarian Kingdom's highest ranking lay authority second only to the sovereign. By the 20th century such feudal ranks had lost their meaning and became mere symbols. Even during the time of the Dual Monarchy the public role of the Prince Primate was restricted to the crowning of the King while during the interwar period even this role lost its significance in a kingdom that had no king. (At the time Hungary was still a kingdom but the country's head-of-state, Miklós Horthy, was a politician who belonged to the Reformed Church.) In September of 1946 the top prelate of the Catholic Church became József Mindszenty, a man of enormous commitment and mission. He put his considerable energy into fighting for his Church's interests, for the preservation of a relationship between the country's regime and his Church that respected the latter's traditional position.

The question can be asked why Pope Pius XII, who had the choice of several individuals, selected Mindszenty for this sensitive assignment? Why not someone who might have been more flexible and accommodating in his dealings with his country's post-war political leadership? There can be no doubt that what was needed was a prelate with strong character, and unsailable personality and a "clean" past. Mindszenty, because of his monarchist past, could not be identified the Horthy regime — and his opposition to the country's right-radicals was recognized throughout the country. His anti-

Nazi stance, even if it had not been of an outspoken variety, was also known. For a pro-German Pope who in 1946 continued to look to Germany as Europe's bastion against communist expansion, Mindszenty's record recommended him for the position of Prince Primate of Hungary. Pius XII must have seen Mindszenty as the determined and uncompromising individual who could best lead the Church in Hungary threatened as it was by expanding Bolshevist influence. By his decision Pius XII made clear how he thought the Church should respond to the challenge communism posed to Europe in the post-war world.

Mindszenty considered himself not just a symbolic first flag bearer in the expected attack on religion and the churches but he believed himself, as Prince Primate of Hungary, to be the actual embodiment of this role as the country's highest-ranking lay authority. The problem was that by 1945 Hungary had ceased to be a monarchy and with that change the foundation of the Prince Primate's role as a public figure had also changed. Mindszenty had apparently acknowledged this fact, at least he did not refute it in public, but deep down in his soul he remained a monarchist to the end of his life.

If we have to describe the nature of church-state relations for the period of Mindszenty's time as Archbishop of Esztergom and Prince Primate of Hungary in one word, that word would be *resistance*. He wanted to be a hero, the hero of confrontation with bolshevism — and not a master of compromises. He lacked the capacity to understand post-war Hungarian society, the fundamental changes that it had undergone as a result of which the legal implications of the role of the country's Prince Primate appeared in a different content. János Drahos, Vicar-general who in his life had served under four Princes Primate, the last time under Cardinal Justinian Serédi, saw the essence of the changed situation as follows:

While law and order ruled in Hungary, the Lord placed an outstanding legal expert [Serédi] as the head of the Archdiocese of Esztergom... [but] now the age of rational arguments and reasoning has come to an end. The time of conflict has arrived. In the streets long-haired, belligerent youths are running around with machine guns... Therefore the Lord has sent us a Primate armed with a "gun". The true embodiment of Mindszenty is struggle.²

The logical basis of Mindszenty's behaviour and tactics was the belief that in East Central Europe a great transformation was about to happen. It cannot be denied that the struggle against atheism served also political ends and it brought him popularity but also criticism — and not only from left-wing political parties. It is also a fact that Hungary's government did not remedy the

Church's accumulating grievances. Despite documented requests, no diplomatic relations were established with the Holy See, the publication of a Catholic newspaper was not authorized, the associations that had been dissolved in 1946 were not restored, religious processions were not allowed, and attempts to establish a Catholic confessional party failed.

In the spring of 1947 a new disagreement developed between the Hungarian state and the churches that surpassed in severity all their previous confrontations. The conflict was over education and it began when the ruling coalition government decided that, in accordance with the provisions of the 1946 Act I guaranteeing the freedom of religion in the country, the teaching of religion had to be made optional. A huge wave of protest against this ruling surprised even the politicians. It became obvious that the program of gradually secularizing the country's schools got shipwrecked on the churches' pervasive influence over the masses. Before the law calling for the introduction of optional religious education could be passed, it was — at least for the time being — removed from Parliament's legislative agenda. In the meantime the plans for restoring diplomatic relations with the Vatican were also derailed. The government could not reach any agreement with the Holy See, while Mindszenty received a virtual free hand from Rome. The parties of the coalition, including even the Communist Party, reacted to the situation with a campaign to befriend the public. A visible example of this approach was the permission to hold the 20 August St. Stephen's Day religious procession. During it the Cardinal, accompanied by members of the Council of Bishops dressed in full ecclesiastic regalia, paraded the sacred relics of the country's first king in front of the adoring masses of the faithful as well as thousands of monks and nuns — and even some politicians. Later Mindszenty deemed these months the period of "olive branch politics."³ It was during this time that he received, without any trouble, his passport for his planned North American tour. How unusual this development was is illustrated by the fact that only a year earlier he got the permission to visit Rome only at the last moment.

It was during these months of olive branch politics, but still against the background of a tense political situation, that in June of 1947 Mindszenty undertook his visit to North America. He had been invited by Alexandre Vachon, the Archbishop of Ottawa, to participate in a congress dedicated to the Virgin Mary and celebrating the centennial of the Archbishopric of Ottawa. The proceedings of this Marian Congress were to be held from the 18th to the 22nd of June. Mindszenty was accompanied on his trip by András Zakar, his secretary who also served as the Cardinal's interpreter. The farewell Mindszenty gave at the time of his departure from Hungary: "God bless and

lead the Hungarian people” gave rise to speculations that perhaps the Prince Primate was not planning to return to his native land since a few week’s absence does not call for a good-bye with such pathos.⁴ Many argued that just at the time of elections in Austria Mindszenty’s absence from Central Europe was ill-timed. “It appears that such an excursion is more important for him than the future of Austria’s Catholics” someone complained.⁵ Mindszenty however, had good reasons to go. He wanted to be better informed about world affairs and he hoped that with his presence in Canada he could enhance the image of the Hungarian Catholic Church abroad. In the planned Marian Congress eight Cardinals were to participate and three of the eight were from Europe: in addition to Mindszenty there was Cardinal Pierre-Marie Gerlier, the Archbishop of Lyon, France; and Cardinal Joseph Frings, the Archbishop of Cologne, Germany. Mindszenty was the youngest of the three.

According to the event organizers the gathering’s purpose was to undertake preparations for the establishment of a just world. They stressed that the Congress was not a legislative or advisory assembly, it was authorized only to bring together representatives of the Catholic World to pray and call attention to the struggle waged for the creation of a just world. The Government of Canada gave full moral and material support to the Congress. Pope Pius XII did not take part in the gathering — he was not a “travelling pope” — but he appointed Cardinal James Charles McGuigan, the Archbishop of Toronto, as his personal representative. McGuigan presided over the Congress’ most important proceedings and celebrated the high holy mass held on the last day. For this day a special delegation arrived from Rome to help McGuigan in the performance of his tasks. The Congress was also attended by representatives of the Canadian Government, a fact that was protested by a convention of the Baptist Church of Canada held simultaneously in British Columbia. “Such participation,” complained the Baptists, “show the [Catholic] Congress before the world as if it was the business of Canada only, as if it had the blessing of the Canadian Government that ignored the convictions of the country’s Protestant community.”⁶

During Mindszenty’s visit, there was another religious gathering taking place, this one in Montreal. It was the convention of the Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne (JOC) or Young Christian Workers that had been founded in the mid-1920s in Belgium. The opening ceremonies of this gathering, held on June 24 at the University of Montreal, were presided over by Mindszenty. Representatives came from 48 countries and five continents and they gave Mindszenty a ten minute ovation as he entered the auditorium. No other cardinal was present at this event but their absence was compensated for by the great many letters of congratulations and thanks Mindszenty received in

connection with his participation in this event. June 24 also happened to be the holy day of St-Jean-Baptiste, the patron saint of French Canada. In the traditional St-Jean-Baptiste procession of the day, out of respect for Mindszenty, the Hungarian flag was prominently displayed and the masses of on-lookers who were venerating the Virgin Mary were also paying their respects to Hungary.⁷

The Marian Congress presented an opportunity for protesting against atomic weapons but it also gave a chance to the participants to voice their opposition to communism — something which more Congress attendees did than was anticipated. Before the closing ceremony Cardinal Joseph Spellman of New York brought up the spectre of the Third World War.⁸ His reputation gave much weight to his words and it is not surprising that Mindszenty shared his opinion.

In addition to the official proceedings there were various private functions as well. Through the efforts of Pál Zsámboky, a priest stationed at the time in New York but long time earlier the confessor to Emperor-King Charles IV of Austria-Hungary, Mindszenty managed to get an audience with Charles' widow, the Empress Zita who was living at the time in a nursing home in Ottawa.⁹

After the celebrations in Montreal Mindszenty travelled to New York City but before then he met with Otto Habsburg the claimant to the Hungarian throne.¹⁰ From András Zakar's reminiscences we know what they talked about: the establishment with American support of a confederation of Catholic states in East-Central Europe under Habsburg auspices — an idea that had been discussed in Washington but had been dropped by the end of 1943 or the beginning of 1944. Mindszenty acknowledged only that in these conversations with Otto, the Habsburg Archduke advised any monarchists in Hungary to be cautious. According to Mindszenty, Otto did not call on monarchists to organize a movement, instead he urged them to take leading positions in political parties and in public life.¹¹ The same information was reported to the Hungarian secret police in May of 1948. After his return to Hungary, Mindszenty conveyed Otto's message to István Kray a royalist politician: Otto had advised his supporters "not to risk their freedom while [Hungary] was under Soviet occupation." It should be mentioned that by this time Kray was an agent codenamed Magasházy working for Hungary's political police.¹²

Reflecting on all this in an interview Archduke Otto gave in 1993 he denied that in his talks with Mindszenty in 1947 they daydreamed about the restoration of the Habsburg Monarchy since this would have certainly been a grotesque idea. "We exchanged views about how Hungary could be helped in

reducing poverty in the country and how the [Catholic] Church could be aided.”¹³ (Of course we cannot really know what exactly had been said nearly half-a-century earlier by an ambitious young man who was unaware of the situation in Hungary.)

In New York Mindszenty was the guest of Cardinal Spellman who counselled him to give the widely respected Otto Habsburg authorization to act on behalf of Mindszenty in case it would be needed, considering Hungary’s precarious situation and the fact that even in America helping Hungary was becoming a difficult proposition. In response to this plea Mindszenty wrote a short letter: “I authorize Otto Habsburg to represent the Catholic population of Hungary should I be prevented from doing so.” According to Zakar’s recollection the letter said something different: “I don’t know what fate awaits me therefore I declare that Otto Habsburg is fully authorized to represent Hungarian Catholics especially in the United States.”¹⁴ What exactly this authorization meant remained a mystery. It is unlikely that it concerned purely matters relating to charity since if it did this would have been mentioned in the statement. More likely it referred to American and if necessary international affairs, concerns that Mindszenty had little influence over in view of the ever-tightening Iron Curtain. In talking about this affair in 1989, Otto Habsburg could not recall what authorization he received from Mindszenty forty-two years earlier. In any case the Archduke began cultivating the friendship of pro-Habsburg émigrés only from 1950 on but avoided creating the impression that he cared only for monarchists. He showed interest in the cause of all Hungarian émigrés and retained contacts with anti-monarchists as well.¹⁵

Mindszenty reported about his tour to the Council of Bishops on June 25, 1947. He said that the trip’s aim had been to exchange information, to say thanks for help received, and to visit Hungarians living beyond the seas. He had avoided asking for donations but whatever was given, he accepted. He praised the spiritual life in Hungarian-Canadian and Hungarian-American parishes and their schools. He regretted however the lack of a Catholic daily newspaper though he admitted that this was not missed by the faithful. He thought that Hungarian Catholicism had much respect internationally: “people do not talk about Hungarians having been [Hitler’s] allies, they only say that they do not want to be [Stalin’s] allies.” He told his audience that in the USA Communists are being arrested one after another. “The [war-time] alliance is about to break.” In concluding he predicted the approach of war: “*bellum in proximes*.” According to his associates Mindszenty had hoped to achieve more from his North American visit than he had gained: he was quite disappointed that Cardinal Spellman was not there to greet him when he arrived at the New York airport and only sent one of his aides to welcome him.¹⁶

In his report to the bishops Mindszenty made no mention of his talks with members of the Habsburg family or with politicians. Hungary's communist leader Mátyás Rákosi had learned about these talks even before Mindszenty arrived back in the country, but he remained silent about them waiting for the opportune moment to make this information public. This moment arrived on 7 February 1948 when there was an official meeting between the government and a delegation representing the Catholic Church. Rákosi's poker-faced announcement of the meeting between Mindszenty and Archduke Otto had the effect of a bomb exploding — the prelates present were taken aback by the news. Later in private they expressed disappointment over the Cardinal's involvement in politicking.¹⁷ When at the next meeting of the Council of Bishops's Gyula Czapik, the Archbishop of Eger, related Rákosi's announcement, Mindszenty did not react. Only when Czapik said that Rákosi even claimed that there were photos of Mindszenty and Otto meeting did the Cardinal interject that there "were no such photos." At the end of the Cardinal's report Czapik put a direct question to Mindszenty: "Had Your Highness met with Otto or not?" after a long silence the Prince Primate replied with one word: "yes".¹⁸

We may wonder why Mindszenty was reticent to disclose this information? Presumably because he suspected that his actions would not please the Council of Bishops — nor the Holy See. In fact there were rumours at the time that Pope Pius XII had refused an audience to a member of the Habsburg family — even though this person had never been involved in politics — in order to avoid creating the impression that the Vatican was in any way favouring the House of Habsburg. The meeting between Archduke Otto and the Prince Primate of Hungary cast doubt about the neutrality of the Holy See in the matter of Habsburg restoration and could be considered an embarrassment for the Catholic Church. Not surprisingly, when the meeting between Otto and Mindszenty began receiving media coverage in the West following the Cardinal's arrest in late 1948, many questioned the veracity of the reports that it had taken place — after all Mindszenty would not want to discredit the Vatican. Journalists in the West even claimed that spokesmen for the Prince Primate as well as Cardinal Spellman had denied that the meeting had taken place.¹⁹ These sources had turned a true event into "trumped up" charges by Mindszenty's prosecutors. In the meantime, for the Cardinal's accusers the meeting was "proof" enough to argue that Mindszenty, with American help, was plotting to overthrow Hungary's legitimate republican government and replace it with a monarchy headed by Otto Habsburg — from whom he had received instructions to accomplish this aim.

The Hungarian Aftermath of Mindszenty's First Canadian Visit

His Canadian experience inspired Mindszenty to announce, soon after his return to Hungary, a celebration of the "Year of the Virgin Mary" which was to last from 15 August 1947 (the Feast-day of the Virgin Mary) to 8 December 1948 (the Feast-day of the Immaculate Conception). The Marian Congress Mindszenty had attended in Canada demonstrated what masses the Catholic Church could muster and what influence the Church commanded in the northern half of the North American Continent. Mindszenty aim in holding the Year of the Virgin Mary was to do the same in Hungary: the events of this year were to demonstrate the real presence and power of the Church — notwithstanding the different political circumstances of the country. Mindszenty wanted to counter the growing power of communism by prayer and the demonstration of the influence of Catholicism.

The acceptance of the Canadian model succeeded, one might say succeeded too well. While between 1945 and 1948 the Communists in Hungary managed to eliminate the civil law in almost all aspects (ownership, political, social, ideological and cultural) it became crystal clear that they failed to liquidate completely religiosity and the churches. Hungary's faithful had become the Communist Party's primary ideological opponents and by the end of the 1940s the churches had become the focal point — what the Communists called the "clerical reaction" — to the country's socialist transformation; and the leading figure of this opposition had become one man: Joseph Mindszenty. He was the only public figure who had influence over the masses. His peasant background, the fact that he had been imprisoned during World War II by the right-radical Arrow Cross movement, and his austere character made him into a virtual hero of folk-tales. He became a veritable David combating the communist Goliath. (He even became popular with Arrow Cross émigrés who at the time of their rule loathed him — because he was the only public figure who refused to try compromising with the Communists.)²⁰ In spite of all his contradictions in the historical moment Mindszenty, this ultra-conservative and monarchist prelate, became the true defender of democratic values in Hungary — in contrast to many who claimed this role for themselves but in fact were helping the Communists to build a Bolshevik dictatorship. Cardinal Mindszenty fought not only to preserve religious freedom in Hungary but he also struggled for the protection of Hungarian democracy.

On 26 December 1948 Hungary's political police arrested him and a few weeks later the Peoples' Court in Budapest sentenced him to life im-

prisonment. The members of the British Commonwealth, among them Canada, were the first to protest this outcome. On the recommendation of the US Government, the United Nations called on the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Holland, to decide whether the show trials in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria violate the provisions regarding human rights of the peace treaties the Allies had signed with these countries. The Soviet delegation at the UN opposed this request claiming that it contradicted the UN's constitution and it represented an attempt at interference in the internal affairs of the countries concerned.²¹ The International Court of Justice released its decision on 30 March 1950 in the form of a non-binding resolution. It observed that there is a dispute about the interpretation and implementation of the peace agreement and that the countries concerned, including Hungary, must accept the decision of the three-member arbitration tribunal provided for by Article 40 of the treaty.²² On 5 October of the same year the UN Assembly condemned Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria for violations of human rights. All this was in vain: Mindszenty remained in prison, as did the other victims of the show trials. The Cardinal regained his freedom only on October 30, 1956 — and within a week he exchanged incarceration by the Communists for “exile” in the American Embassy in Budapest that was to last for a decade-and-a-half. When he left that building on 28 September 1971 he was also obliged to leave his homeland.

Mindszenty in Western Exile, 1971-1975

By then the world had changed a great deal. When Mindszenty applied for asylum at the gate of the US Embassy in 1956 the Cold War between East and West was at its height. When he left the Embassy fifteen years later East-West relations were far less acrimonious. This period was also the time of developing European integration, the de-colonization of Africa, and of the growth of the non-aligned bloc of nations. Still, the Soviet Empire appeared unassailable. In Hungary, after the humiliating collapse of communism in 1956, the new communist leader János Kádár managed to consolidate his power and make his country an accepted member of the community of nations. In 1962 the “Hungarian question” was left off the agenda of the UN Assembly — without managing to free Mindszenty from his “internal exile” in Budapest's American Embassy. In March of 1963 the Kádár regime proclaimed a general amnesty. Soon thereafter Canada established an embassy in the Hungarian capital. Mindszenty greeted these developments with indignation: “As possessor of the constitutional authority over historic Hungary I protest all

compromises [with Communists]; I protest the bagatellization, through the amnesty, of the affairs of a heroic nation.”²³ What the world took to be *détente*, the Kádár regime as success, for Mindszenty was still another sell-out of the Hungarian nation. His fanatic anti-communism made him put on paper incredible opinions: “a war of punishment such as that against [North] Vietnam would be morally justifiable” against the Kádár regime.²⁴ He penned this sentence in a letter addressed to American President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965 — a year after the United States, anxious to stop the North Vietnamese offensive against South Vietnam, increased its involvement in the war. It is hard to put a different interpretation on Mindszenty’s views than that he accepted the idea of war as a means of expelling the Soviets and their collaborators from Hungary. It would be rewarding to answer the question whether the struggle against communism could be morally taken as far as wishing for war. Would this be according to Christian teachings? To call for a war in the name of a “sacred goal” — that of defeating the much hated opponents? Only revolutionary utopians or millennial heretics thought in such extremist terms — but also, it seems, someone living in isolation and afflicted by the inevitable mental decline of old age. Mindszenty was not only a leader of resistance but he also started to be a believer in the Cold War turning into outright conflict, one that threatened mankind with extinction.

The 1973 Visit

Mindszenty had remarked several times: he would have preferred to die in Hungary but in the end he accepted the heaviest cross of his life and in 1971 he left his native land. He spent the last years of his life in Vienna where he considered as his pre-eminent task the creation of unity among the diverse communities of Hungarians in emigration. The most important events in this endeavour happened in 1973 and they consisted of short trips to West Germany and England and a longer tour of North America, followed by a visit to South Africa. Originally he had planned to spend quite some time in the United States but in the spring of the year he changed his mind and decided to tour Canada which he did in the second half of September, and spent only three days in America.

The eighty-two-year old Cardinal looked forward to his trip to Canada with a certain degree of nostalgia. His reception there did not disappoint him. Cardinal Paul Grégoire, the Archbishop of Montreal, welcomed Mindszenty in person at the city’s airport. There were invitations for him from every Canadian archbishop. After Montreal he visited Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary

and Vancouver as well. Canada's Hungarians connected the visit to celebrations of the millennial of Hungary's conversion to Christianity and received Mindszenty as the exiled Prince Primate of their native land. They even had commemorative coins struck with Mindszenty's portrait in bronze, silver and gold versions. They also published a commemorative booklet entitled *973-1973* with the full image of the Holy Crown of Hungary on the cover. The publication contained greetings of the Cardinal by Canada's federal, provincial and municipal dignitaries, though Governor General Roland Michener greeted only the 1000 years of Hungarian Christianity.

The Hungarian communities of the five cities Mindszenty visited took care of the hosting of the Cardinal and his entourage and covered all of their expenses. The hosts asked every Hungarian Canadian to make sure that they participated in as many of the festive occasions as possible.²⁵ There were masses of people everywhere. The rituals of the individual visits were predictable: the Cardinal's arrival, the speeches of welcome, the presentations of bouquets of flower, a press conference, the taking of official photographs, and the signing of the guest-books. For the assembled faithful there were prayers, blessings and greetings. The religious celebrations also had a pattern of their own: a mass, the giving of an audience, and the blessings of flags — all followed by a reception. Wherever Mindszenty went he was greeted by the masses of the pious and the curious. Into an otherwise often quarrelling community Mindszenty's miraculous presence brought faith, hope and enthusiasm. People did not care or could not understand the fact that Mindszenty came to them claiming to be the religious *and* the political leader of the Hungarians of the whole world.

The first major stop of the Cardinal's tour was Montreal. On arrival, as he would do elsewhere as well, he gave a press conference. He stressed with smugness that "the agreement between the Vatican and the Hungarian government would not prevent him from publishing his memoirs (expected in the spring of 1974), from visiting the Hungarians of five continents, and from expressing his opinions, etc."²⁶ He then refuted accusations against him, above all the claim that in 1956 he had demanded the return of the great estates to their former owners. The journalists present kept asking him about his forthcoming memoirs, his years in prison, the situation in Hungary, about communism, and his future plans. Mindszenty refrained from sharp political statements and gave restrained answers to questions; still, the press found the essence of his message in the following sentence: "I will fight to my last breath."²⁷

In Toronto the city's mayor, in honour of Mindszenty, declared 23 September 1973 "Hungarian day" and the Hungarian flag could be seen flying

all day at City Hall. (The flag itself was a national relic: at one point it covered the casket of the Hungarian patriot Pál Nyíregyházy.) The celebrations in Toronto got long and tiresome: had Mindszenty's speech not been left last, one reporter speculated, "half the audience would have left."²⁸ The organizers had told the Cardinal that while the Hungarian identity of the Magyar émigré community was strong, its members also had an attachment to Canada, a country that had given them home and livelihood. For these reasons a special Hungarian-Canadian identity developed in which the Canadian element got stronger and stronger as time passed. Mindszenty's hosts had asked him to be cautious when it came to instructing his audiences about Hungarian patriotism. The Government of Ontario held a reception for the Cardinal at the Ontario Legislature, but Premier William "Bill" Davis was not personally present but was represented by Claude Bennett, the Minister of Industry and Tourism.

We mention Winnipeg among the stops Mindszenty made because there Archbishop Cardinal George Flahiff was accompanied by Metropolitan Maxim Hermaniuk of Canada's Greek Catholic Church when Flahiff greeted the visitor at the city's airport. (By 1951 the mainly Ukrainian Uniate population of Canada had been organized into four Exarchates. In 1956 the Vatican took the Winnipeg Exarchate out of Canada's Latin Church hierarchy and elevated it to the rank of archbishopric.)²⁹ Metropolitan Hermaniuk's special respect was paid to the prelate whose fate under communist rule resembled the tribulations of the Ukrainian Archbishop Josyf Slipyj. During the visit to Winnipeg's Hungarian community, the speakers of the Saint Anthony of Padua Parish all paid tributes to Mindszenty's sacrifices and to his faithfulness to the Church, as did the city councillor who proclaimed Mindszenty an honorary resident of the city.

The celebrations tended to conceal many real problems behind the formalities. The most serious of these became evident in the fourth city Mindszenty visited: Calgary. It was here that the troubles of Hungarian organized religious life were revealed to Mindszenty in their most dramatic details. The complaints were numerous: the assimilation of Hungarians was an unstoppable process, the members of the community were becoming more and more materialistic, Hungarian patriotic spirit no longer motivated them, and most of their priests were no longer Hungarians — and in some cases it was actually a Hungarian pastor or minister who destroyed the unity of their little communities. Some people grumbled that in 1956 the local Hungarian priests refused to act as interpreters for them claiming that they were not in the business of being employment agents. In 1973 their churches were empty on Sundays and the buildings were in disrepair. Out of 3,000 families in the city

at best fifty came to celebrate mass.³⁰ This depressing picture painted by some was not an exaggeration. In Montreal a medical doctor described the very difficult circumstances under which members of the Hungarian-Canadian clergy had to operate: while members of priestly orders found companionship in monasteries, lay priests serving Hungarian-Canadian parishes were at the mercy of their parishioners. The Roman Catholic church fathers of Canada lived comfortable lives and looked upon priests who had landed here from Eastern Europe with suspicion. Many of these exiled clergy sought solace in alcohol, or in the arms of a woman, or became depressed.³¹

Among the Canadian cities visited by Mindszenty Vancouver was kind of a “frontier outpost” — Catholics hardly made up ten percent of the city’s population. Here the Cardinal entered the Our Blessed Lady of Hungary Church while the faithful sang a traditional song of praise of the Holy Virgin. (The church had been bought from a Protestant congregation in 1961 for \$60,000.) Lajos Horányi, the parish’s pastor, lay gravely ill in a Toronto hospital so Mindszenty was greeted by Béla Ugrin, a Jesuit priest (he was the brother of József Ugrin, the former member the Hungarian of Parliament representing the pro-democratic People’s Party). Also greeting Mindszenty was the Reverend Attila Csiszár, the minister of Vancouver’s Hungarian Reformed congregation. It was not only the parish’s 250 families who gathered to greet and hear the visitor, people came from neighbouring towns also. One of the functions the Cardinal performed was the planting of a pine-tree, into soil brought from Hungary, near the city’s 1956 Hungarian monument. Then came a quick lunch at the parish hall followed by a visit to Vancouver’s Hungarian House where there was a special exhibit organized just for the occasion. All this as followed by high mass in the city’s Catholic cathedral. The tapes recorded on these occasions were re-played in radio broadcasts courtesy of the Museum of the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie and Armed Forces.³² The Hungarian press of Canada saw in the elderly prelate a new Savonarola (the 15th century Florentine monk and popular leader). Mindszenty, with his assertive personality and uncompromising character, commanded the respect of everyone. His visit elicited all kinds of reactions and political actions; there were some among his admirers who began handing out flyers calling for the restoration of the lands that had been taken from Hungary in the post-World War I peace settlement.

Mindszenty’s Canadian tour cast a dark shadow on diplomatic relations between Canada and Hungary. Pierre Trudeau, Canada’s free-minded and non-religious Prime Minister — despite being urged to do so by Mindszenty’s Hungarian-Canadian hosts — declined to meet with the Cardinal, but sent Mitchell Sharp, the Minister of External Affairs, in his stead. (Mind-

szenty's private secretary knows the story differently, according to him it was the Hungarians who did not want a meeting between the Cardinal and Trudeau.)³³ No matter how it happened, Sharp, a Protestant by religious affiliation and a republican at heart, in the name of his government heaped praise on Mindszenty whom he called the hero of justice and the greatest truthful man "living today." All this happened despite the fact that the Hungarian Ambassador in Ottawa had warned Canada's Ministry of External Affairs that the government in Hungary would consider the participation of members of the Canadian government in the events connected with Mindszenty's visit an unfriendly act. Indeed, Sharp's welcome to Mindszenty — which was relayed to the Hungarians by the Soviet Ambassador to Canada — was followed by recriminations from Hungary's foreign ministry. In turn Sharp tried to minimize the role he had played in the affair and referred to his need to cater to the expectations of the people who voted for him — as well as to his private interest in matters of religion.³⁴ It is also true that the actual words Sharp used were more moderate than those that had appeared in news reports: "This is not the first time that I have addressed a large audience. This is not the first time, that I have addressed an audience that included distinguished personages. Never before, however have I ever addressed an audience that included such a distinguished personage as our guest of honour Cardinal Mindszenty. Never has this man abandoned his faith. Never has he bowed to the oppressor."³⁵ The Canadians added an explanation to the last of Sharp's sentences: the Minister of External Affairs referred to Mindszenty's opposition to Hungary's Nazi German occupiers. This statement in the end reduced the friction between Ottawa and Budapest, and no great damage was done to Canadian-Hungarian relations. At a meeting between Sharp and his Hungarian counterpart János Péter a few months later relations were deemed definitely "improving". At the same time János Bartha, the Hungarian Ambassador to Canada, however had a different opinion about what had transpired: "The events of József Mindszenty's Canadian tour and the statements made about it by officials of the Canadian Government did not surprise anyone. They just proved that Canada's leaders, despite their pretences of cooperation, consider the enemies of the People's Republic of Hungary their 'true friends'."³⁶

The highlight of Mindszenty's few days' side-trip to the United States was the consecration of the re-built Saint Ladislaus Church in New Brunswick, New Jersey. As far as the reception he got from American clergy leaders, Mindszenty must have been disappointed. He had hoped that Cardinal Terrence Cook of New York, the successor of Archbishop Spellman, would welcome him with sympathy reminiscent to that of his predecessor. Although Cook went to greet him at the airport, their relationship remained strictly

formal throughout the visit. They had breakfast together and Mindszenty sat through a mass celebrated by Cook — and afterward there were photographs taken, but it was obvious that the visitor was just a “decoration” at all these proceedings with whom the American prelate had no common topic to talk about. It was certainly difficult to conduct a conversation with a “living legend”, someone who had devoted his entire life to achieve what he considered important in the world. As Mindszenty’s secretary remarked: “He creates a feeling of inferiority in the people he meets or those who welcome him.”³⁷ It was difficult for Mindszenty to get a fifteen-minute interview with Cook before the American had to hurry off to watch a game of football. He showed little interest in the creation of a Hungarian parish in New York, a business that had been pending since 1929, nor in the matter of the appointment of a deputy bishop to attend to the spiritual care of scattered Hungarian communities in North America and Latin America.³⁸ Neither of these plans came to fruition at the time. The expansion of the institutions of Hungarian-American Catholics (parishes, weekend schools) were also of little interest to America’s Catholic leaders who wanted to preserve the faith without reference to ethnic religious organizations and the use of languages other than English. The idea of an independent Hungarian church organization, possibly with Mindszenty as its leader, was far from the mind of the American Cardinal.

Aside from the short discussion with Cook, Mindszenty did not have the opportunity to talk to any American prelate. Behind this circumstance we can suspect the influence of Archbishop Giovanni Cheli, the recently appointed papal representative to the United Nations — and through him of the Vatican. Mindszenty had no better treatment from members of the American government either, although President Richard Nixon greeted him in a telegram.³⁹ True, Senator Edward Kennedy spoke about Mindszenty’s visit in the US Senate, the Cardinal’s tour was paid attention to only by the emigrant press, although some of the mainstream dailies also mentioned his visit. Mindszenty’s newsworthiness was enhanced by the fact he did not avoid answering questions put to him by journalists about political issues.

The central point of the speeches Mindszenty delivered during this Canadian tour of his was the unity of the family. He linked the issues of the “Hungarian mother,” the “Hungarian family” and the “Hungarian school” to the cult of the Virgin Mary and the condemnation of abortion. The latter issue was always on his mind but he emphasized it now because earlier in the year the Supreme Court of the United States had made abortion legal in the country. (This was the reason why, during his tour of the USA the following year, Mindszenty refused to receive an honorary doctorate offered to him by an American university.) It was also increasingly becoming obvious that, by

the time of his Canadian tour, Mindszenty's previously measured public announcements had become a thing of the past — his statements were increasingly forthright even strident. Why did this change come about? The reason became evident during his press conference in Montreal where he mentioned his forthcoming memoirs. It was just before his trip to Canada that he had received a letter from Pope Paul VI in which the Pontiff asked Mindszenty to postpone the publication of the work. The Cardinal reacted to this request with indignation: if the Holy See brakes the promise made to him in the summer of 1971 that his memoirs could be published, he would no longer abide by the usual custom regarding “political correctness” in his public statements.⁴⁰

The Visit's Aftermath

The tour that had been originally planned for six weeks was shortened because of insufficient finances. On returning to Vienna Mindszenty issued a sort of “spiritual will” to the Hungarians of Canada and the United States:

Before I close my eyes, it is not the man, and not the pastor in me, but God and our common ancestors call on me to say [the following] and I would like to put this under the pillow of every Hungarian living anywhere on this planet, that they should have no rest from the prodding iron until the moment of their death: from the remaining few [Hungarians] we have to build a new Homeland. This is our task in this world. We cannot escape from this, only hide from it. [...] Put aside the rivalries, the unbridled striving for success, ... Do not look to the right nor the left, everyone do his share wherever fate had placed him/her. We [should] establish a community based on Christian principles. Let there be children in the family since this remains a blessing and brings a future, no matter what the world says. In the home — and in the weekend school if there is no other school — the child should acquire the Hungarian language and a Hungarian identity.⁴¹

In this document Mindszenty repeated the fact that in Hungary since 1956 more than three million foetuses had been aborted — protesting with this shocking number against abortion. (His facts were basically accurate: in Hungary the number of abortions per year in the decade before 1970 varied between 170 and 200 thousand.)

The content of this message also went against the expectations made of Mindszenty. In the discussions leading to his release from the American Embassy in Budapest the demand had been made that after his departure he

make no statements that disturbed the relationship between the Holy See and the Government of Hungary, or which offended that government of the Peoples Republic of Hungary. Furthermore, Pope Paul VI had pleaded with Mindszenty that he should not claim any authority over refugees from Hungary scattered throughout the world. Despite this, in a letter dated 28 November 1971 and addressed to the Hungarians of five continents, Mindszenty signed himself “Archbishop of Esztergom and Prince Primate of Hungary”. A single ambiguous sentence of this declaration created an immediate political storm: “We left the threshold of our prison, and the temporary and life-destroying border of a country, with confidence in our faith and with hope.”⁴² The Governor of the Province of Burgenland in Austria immediately protested the statement to Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky claiming that Mindszenty had called into question the “territorial integrity” of their country.⁴³ The media in Austria also interpreted the statement as a questioning of the status of the Austro-Hungarian state border — even though Mindszenty pointed out shortly after his statement that he had referred only to the so-called Iron Curtain complete with its minefields and other deadly obstacles. Nevertheless the Pope next asked Mindszenty that in the future he should clear all his statements, including his church sermons, in advance with the Papacy.⁴⁴ Not surprisingly Mindszenty never again issued a pastoral letter to Catholic Hungarians in emigration. The above-outlined appeal to the Hungarians of the world can better be seen as a “spiritual will” rather than an official appeal to the world’s Hungarian community. We found no record of Mindszenty having cleared it with the Holy See before issuing it. Presumably he did not, and it, along with his political statements during his tour, and his preparations for the publication of his memoirs sooner rather than later, all contributed — along with other developments — to his being removed from his ecclesiastic position by the Vatican.

Aside from being pre-occupied with matters of interest to the world’s Hungarian community, Mindszenty was concerned with more mundane matters, such as the case of the school of Toronto’s Hungarian parish, as well as some cultural matters. Concerning these issues he even wrote a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau.⁴⁵ Furthermore he remained in contact with István Bácsalmási, the school’s principal until his (Mindszenty’s) death. In his last letter to the Cardinal, Bácsalmási was pleased to report that after two years of efforts his school had received a grant of \$7,800 from the Canadian federal government. Bácsalmási also gave advice to Mindszenty how the organizations of Hungarian Canadians should be transformed. The association of former members of the Hungarian gendarmerie, he opined, could only be an institution destined for disappearance and is capable only of lamenting the

past. Since the organizations of Hungarian Canadians should be renewed and reformed, he felt the main task was to make Hungarian immigrants worthwhile members of the community that accepted them so that the young can be proud of their roots and their culture. For all this, Bácsalmási argued, solid material foundations were needed. Mindszenty was impressed with such reasoning and offered to dedicate the funds collected for a memorial statue to be dedicated to him to the cause of the education of the young.⁴⁶

In Hungary the authorities were worried that Mindszenty's activities would negatively impact their policies regarding religion and the churches. There were also signs that a new and different type of Mindszenty myth was being born. Mindszenty's overseas tours began creating an image for him as a man who represented old traditions and the old-style Catholicism toward the Hungarian émigré community that received all this with nostalgia. For the Cardinal the world tended toward compromise regarding communism, the rebellion of the young against tradition, and the sexual revolution, were all anathemas. But so were some of the new ideas about religion, as for example the revisions to Catholic liturgy that were being considered in the 1960s and the 1970s by the Second Vatican Council. The image Mindszenty began projecting was by this time not only the symbol of anti-communism, but also the symbol of conservative opposition to social (and religious) change.

The End

On November 1, 1973, Pope Paul VI wrote a hand-written letter Joseph Mindszenty, asking him — with reference to the Cardinal's unlimited love for his Church, for his avocation and for his homeland — that he renounce his title as Archbishop of Esztergom. After his resignation, the Pope explained, Mindszenty would be in a better position to decide whether it would be “appropriate to make his memoirs public for the purpose of the revelation of truth and the defence of his own good reputation.”⁴⁷ Mindszenty was deeply shocked by this papal request for giving up his position and he decided not to comply. He replied to the letter three times, and every time with a no. The first time on the 15th of November, then on the 21st, and then — after his return from his trip to South Africa — on the 8th of December.⁴⁸ It seems that he mailed only the last two of his replies. In his letter of the 8th of December he summed up his reasons for not resigning: 1. he did not trust the promises made by the Communists; 2. the ten-year-old agreement between Hungary and the Holy See brought only disappointment; 3. “if I resigned, I would only become an accomplice” he wrote,⁴⁹ he would be lending legitimacy to

Hungary's communist regime; 4. in the future the appointments of prelates would depend entirely on the communist state; 5. his resignation would negatively impact Hungarians in emigration; and 6. his resignation would harm the cause of the publication of his memoirs — and through that, the causes that he had fought for throughout his life. The essence of Mindszenty's reasoning was that with his resignation — even if according to the wishes of the Pope — he would be giving the “godless” communist regime of Hungary a gift.⁵⁰

After this Pope Paul VI no longer wanted Mindszenty's consent to his removal from office but decided to act on his own. He made his decision public on February 5, 1974: the Archbishopric of Esztergom was vacant. The decision shocked not only Mindszenty but the entire Hungarian emigration. The “Eastern policy” of the Holy See was deluged with critical comments. When Paul VI, after prolonged consideration, accepted the heavy cross of this decision and sacrificed Mindszenty, he sent a message to Hungary's politicians: for the Holy See what counted was not the gaining of political advantages or popularity but the serving the interests of Hungary's Catholics.

NOTES

A shorter version of this study was presented in Hungarian at the annual meeting of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada, held in conjunction with the Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Canada at the beginning of June, 2013, at the University of Victoria in Victoria, British Columbia. The full version of the study was translated from Hungarian into English by Nándor Dreisziger in consultation with the study's author.

¹ Hansjakob Stehle, *Die Ostpolitik des Vatikans 1917–1975* (München–Zürich: R. Piper und Co. Verlag, 1975), 279; Hansjakob Stehle, *Geheimdiplomatie im Vatikan. Die Päpste und die Kommunisten* (Zürich: Benziger, 1993), 236.

² The document collection of Csaba Szabó. Archives of the Mindszenty Foundation / Mindszenty Alapítvány Levéltára (hereafter MAL) 010. dossier. The words of Drahos, the Vicar-general, eerily remind us of the text of the report by a state security agent: Mindszenty “has one passion, if it is possible to call it a passion, conflict. This is the essence of his being. Without conflict he cannot exist. If someone is in a more advantageous position in a conflict with him, the greater effort he will make to struggle.” (Report dated at Budapest, 19 May 1948. Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történelmi Levéltára [hereafter ÁBTTL] /The Historical Archives of State Security Agencies, 3.1.8. Sz–222/9a. 240. fol.)

³ Proceedings of the meeting of the Council of Bishops, 8 October 1947,

item 1. *A magyar katolikus püspökkari tanácskozások története és jegyzőkönyvei 1945–1948 között*, ed. Margit Beke (Köln–Budapest: Argumentum, 1996), 251.

⁴ Report dated at Budapest, 19 June 1947. ÁBTL 3.1.8. Sz-222/4, 22 fol.

⁵ Report dated at Budapest, 24 June 1947. ÁBTL 3.1.8. Sz-222/4, 28 fol.

⁶ *Vancouver Sun*, 21 June 1947. Found in Gosudarstvenniy Arhiv Rossiyskoy Federacii (hereafter GARF) f. 6991. op. 3. gy. 50.

⁷ *L'Osservatore Romano*, 87 (no. 155) 6 July 1947, p. 2.

⁸ A confidential report by TASS about the concluding session of the Ottawa Marian Congress, 25 June 1947. GARF f. 6991. op. 1. gy. 78. l. 129–136:129.

⁹ Report of János Mészáros, Vicar-general, to Prince Primate Jusztinián Serédi, dated at Budapest, 10 April 1937. Archives of the Princes Primate, Esztergom /Prímási Levéltár, Esztergom (hereafter EPL) Processus V–700/44. 129–131. fol; see also in the same place, 160–164/b. fol. Zsámboky had the reputation of an iron-handed disciplinarian who was known to have administered physical punishment to “sinners” among his parishioners in his Csillaghegy parish church — and was “exiled” to New York for such behaviour. For official notes about the indiscretions committed by Pál Zsámboki, as well as a medical certificate dated August 1937 see: Aide memoire. Also, copies of several letters of complaint. ÁBTL 3.1.9. V–700/44.

¹⁰ Report entitled “A történekről összefoglaló jelentés,” ÁBTL 3.1.9. V–700/50. 152–156.

¹¹ Proceedings of Mindszenty’s interrogation, 5 January 1949, original: Mindszenty József gyanúsított kihallgatási jegyzőkönyve. EPL Processus V–700/1. 71–98:75–76. fol. (Its copy can be found in ÁBTL 3.1.9. V–700/1.)

¹² Document dated 12 May 1948 and entitled “Péter Gábor összeállítása Mindszenty Józsefről.” Politikatörténeti és Szakszervezeti Levéltár, 274 f. 7/24. ö. e. 187. fol. The same words were used in the records of the interrogation of István Kray: ÁBTL 3.1.9. V–700/6. 81. fol.

¹³ *Magyar Nemzet*, vol. 54, no. 72 (27 March 1993).

¹⁴ József Mindszenty, *Emlékirataim* (Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 1989, 4th ed.), 250. [No author indicated] *Mindszenty a népbíró elött* (Budapest: Állami lapkiadó, 1949), 98–99. Notes on the confession of András Zakar of 13 January 1949. For an English version of Mindszenty’s memoirs see Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, *Memoirs* (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1974).

¹⁵ Gyula Borbándi, *A magyar emigráció életrajza, 1945–1985* [The biography of the Hungarian emigration, 1945–985] (Munich: published by the author, 1985, re-published in Budapest: Európa Kiadó, 1989), 94.

¹⁶ Report dated at Budapest, 21 July 1947. ÁBTL 3.1.8. Sz-222/4. 49. fol.

¹⁷ The handwritten report of the agent codenamed “Bihari” (Béla Kovrig) (no date), ÁBTL 3.2.4 K-384/2. This report mistakenly dates the meeting as 9 February.

¹⁸ Report dated at Budapest, 17 March 1948. ÁBTL 3.1.8. Sz-222/7. 46. fol.

¹⁹ *L'Osservatore Romano* vol. 88, no. 303 (30 Dec. 1948), p. 1. The claim

that the meeting had never taken place originated with the Reuters News Agency.

²⁰ See the press products of the émigré Arrow Cross such as *Hidverők, Út és Cél, Tájékoztató Szolgálat*.

²¹ Memorandum by Anrei Vishinsky, deputy Foreign Minister, for Stalin, 28 December 1949. In Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvenniy Arhiv Socialni-Politicheskoy Istorii f. 82. op. 2 gy 1079, pp. 174-178.

²² Regarding the interpretation of the peace treaty regarding Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria see Vanda Lamm, *A Nemzetközi Bíróság ítéletei és tanácsadó véleményei 1945–1993* (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1995), 413-419.

²³ Ádám Somorjai, ed., *Mindszenty bíboros követségi levelei az Egyesült Államok elnökeihez. 1956–1971. Letters to the Presidents, Cardinal Mindszenty to the Political Leaders of the United States* (Budapest: METEM, 2011) the Hungarian version 198–199; the English version 631–633.

²⁴ Letter by Mindszenty addressed to US President Lyndon Johnson dated at Budapest, 21 March 1965. The last part of the letter is worth quoting (despite its awkward English): “Not a U Thant guest and shameful comedy in Budapest and Western support is necessary, but on moral basis because of the crass genocide and open breach of treaties a Vietnam punishing action would be convenient and justified.” National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA) Record Group (RG) 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. Hungary, Budapest, Subject Files Relating to Cardinal Mindszenty 1956–1972, Entry 2691-B, Box 3. SOC 12 Cardinal File, Jan–Sept 1965; NARA RG 59. General Records of the Department of State. Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66. Box 3222. SOC 12–1. Churches Sects Hung. 1/1/65.; Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum, Austin (Texas) National Security Files, Country Files, Hungary, Cardinal Mindszenty Correspondence, Box. 195. Folder 5. A published version of the letter can be found in Somorjai, *Mindszenty bíboros követségi levelei*, Hungarian version, p. 275; English version, p. 714.

²⁵ Circular letter by József Máté S. J., Toronto, 3 April 1973, MAL 808 MAL 808. dossier, “Kanada, 1973.” 1. ő. e.

²⁶ Copy, report from the Embassy in Ottawa, dated 4 October 1973. ÁBTL 3.2.9. R–8–009/3. 69. fol. Mindszenty’s memoirs appeared in the fall of 1974 instead of the spring as the Cardinal had hoped.

²⁷ See the folder called “Kanada, 1973,” MAL 808; also, the *Kanadai Magyarság*, 29 September and October 6, 1973; and *Magyar Élet* of the same date (October 6).

²⁸ MAL 808. folder named “Kanada, 1973,” 2. ő. e. the article by Anna Virágh [pen-name of Mrs. István Vörösváry-Weller] “Korunkhoz tartozik,” *Kanadai Magyarság*, 6 October 1973.

²⁹ ÁBTL 3.2.3. Mt–988/1. This is the patriarchate of the so-called Uniate Ukrainians.

³⁰ Summation by Péter Noel, Calgary-Edmonton, 26 Sept. 1973. MAL 808, folder “Kanada, 1973” 10. ő. e.

³¹ The letter of Dr. János Mahig to Mindszenty, Montreal, 15 March 1973. MAL 808, folder “Kanada, 1973,” MFN 10211, L-5056.

³² Program plans. MAL file 808, “Kanada, 1973.”

³³ Tibor Mészáros, *A száműzött bíboros szolgálatában. Mindszenty József titkárának napi jegyzetei (1972–1975)* (Abaliget: Lámpás Kiadó, 2000), 62. Entry for 25 September 1973.

³⁴ Memoranda, Hungarian Embassy, Ottawa, October 6th, 11th, 19th, and 22nd, 1973. ÁBTL 3.2.9. R–8–009/3. 72–75. fol.

³⁵ Summation by József Németh, head of the consular department, dated at Budapest 15 November 1973. MNL OL XIX–J–1–j Kanada 004280/8/1973.

³⁶ Report by János Bartha, Hungarian Ambassador, dated at Ottawa, 4 October, 1973. MNL OL XIX–J–1–j Kanada 004280/5/1973.

³⁷ Mészáros, *A száműzött bíboros szolgálatában*, p. 70. Entry for 28 September 1973.

³⁸ Mindszenty refused to remove this latter matter from his agenda. See the relevant documents in MAL 054. dossier: „Levelezés magyar emigráns püspök kinevezése ügyében.”

³⁹ Draft of telegram, President Nixon of József Mindszenty, 29 September 1973. Nixon Library National Security Council Files, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974. Box 755. (Mindszenty sent a polite reply: handwritten and typed draft of a telegram, Mindszenty to Nixon, MAL 086/5. Washington. MFN 10199, L-5034, 1973. október 2.)

⁴⁰ When in late June of 1971 József Zágón as the representative of the Pope held discussions with Mindszenty in the American Embassy about the Cardinal’s leaving his internal exile, he insisted on four conditions. The last of these was that Mindszenty should not publish his memoirs but should leave the manuscript in his will to the Holy See. Mindszenty did not except this proposal and to allay fears about the memoirs he showed the multi-volume manuscript to Zágón who, after familiarizing himself with its content, saw no obstacle to seeing a *substantial portion of the text* appear in print within Mindszenty’s lifetime. Zágón, however, could not have seen the entire manuscript as the volume describing the Cardinal’s role in the post-1945 events in Hungary, which later became the published part of the Mindszenty memoirs, was still not complete.

⁴¹ Typed message of József Mindszenty entitled “Dear Hungarians in Canada and the United States” and dated on All-Saints Day, 1973, MAL 808. dossier, “Kanada, 1973.” 8. ő. e. (The message appeared in the press with minor stylistic changes.)

⁴² “Articles, notes from 1971,” unnumbered collection, MAL 060. dossier, 507/1971.; in the same place, 040/b dossier, MNL OL XIX–A–21–c ÁEH Adattár, 17.1. Mindszenty József hercegprímás 1–101. Box 60, 1966–71. Item 50. For a

published version see József Mindszenty, *Hirdettem az igét. Válogatott szentbeszéddek és körlevelek, 1944–1975*, comp. József Közi Horváth (Vaduz, 1982; Budapest, 1989), 188–191.

⁴³ Memorandum 772/EU by François Leduc, French Ambassador to Austria, to Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann, dated at Vienna, 10 December 1971. Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères Série: Europe, Hongrie, versement aux Archives (1971–juin 1976), boîte 3330, dossier Questions religieuses (1 janvier 1971–30 juin 1976).

⁴⁴ Original of a letter written in Latin by Pope Paul VI to Mindszenty, 14 December 1971. MAL 060. dosszié, MFN 7910, L-2861. Published first in Latin in Gabriel Adriányi, *Die Ostpolitik des Vatikans 1958–1978 gegenüber Ungarn. Der Fall Kardinal Mindszenty* (Herne, 2003), 160–161. (Studien zur Geschichte Ost- und Ostmitteleuropas, 3.); and then in Hungarian in Gábor Adriányi, *A Vatikán keleti politikája és Magyarország 1939–1978. A Mindszenty-ügy* (Budapest: Kairosz Kiadó, 2004), 229–230.

⁴⁵ Copy of typed letter, Mindszenty to Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, dated at Vienna, 8 October 1973.

⁴⁶ Copy of letter, Bácsalmási to Mindszenty, dated at Willowdale, 29 April 1975. MAL 606 file, separate attachment.

⁴⁷ Original of a letter written in Italian from Pope Paul VI to József Mindszenty, dated at the Vatican, 1 November 1973. MAL 060. dossier, MFN 7935, L-2886. This letter has been published in several volumes. Its Hungarian text can be found in Ádám Somorjai, *Ami az emlékiratokból kimaradt. VI. Pál és Mindszenty József 1971–1975* (Pannonhalma: Bencés Kiadó, 2008), 35–36.

⁴⁸ The drafts of Mindszenty's letters were published by Somorjai, *Ami az emlékiratokból kimaradt*, pp. 36–40. The Hungarian original of the 8 Dec. 1973 letter can be found in MAL 060. dossier, MFN 7939, L-2890. Its Latin translation is in MFN 7938, L-2889. [21 November 1973]; MFN 7940, L-2891. The original of the 15 November 1973 letter is not in the archives but its text has been published, along with the other two letters, in Somorjai, *Ami az emlékiratokból kimaradt*, pp. 36–40.

⁴⁹ In the translation by Ádám Somorjai (*Ami az emlékiratokból kimaradt*, p. 38). The text of the letter's Hungarian original kept in the archives differs stylistically from the published version: „Ha lemondanék, részes lennék abban, hogy ez a kártékony békepapí had segítségével kiépült egyházi rendszer újabb megerősítést kapna” [If I would resign I would partake in the process through which this harmful ecclesiastic system that had been created with the help of peace-priests would receive a new infusion of strength] MAL 060. dosszié, MFN 7937, L-2888.

⁵⁰ Mészáros, *A száműzött bíboros*, p. 137.

Why Is Success a Crime? Trials of Managers of Agricultural Cooperatives in the Hungary of the 1970's

Zsuzsanna Varga

Historians have yet to fully analyze the Kádár era; while the earlier period of 1956-1963 and the final years before the collapse of communism in Hungary have been extensively researched, the two decades in-between — often called the Kádarian “golden era” — have received relatively little scholarly attention. I, however, have been intrigued for over ten years by a series of trials that had taken place at this time, all involving leaders of agricultural cooperatives.¹ The fact that these trials were so numerous also merits attention. According to my research thus far, over 1,000 heads of producers' cooperatives faced prosecution in the years starting with 1972, meaning that between 10 and 15% of the cooperative's leadership was affected. All this is especially surprising in light of the fact that party leaders used to value highly and praise openly the performance of the very same people only a few years earlier.

The first section of this paper inquires into the political background of this series of trials, while the second section examines the state and party institutions used by the dogmatic leaders who had gained power in 1972 to prosecute managers of agricultural cooperatives *en masse*. Finally, the third section offers an overview of these trials' main characteristics.

Struggles between the Agrarian and Heavy Industrial Lobbies

In the second half of the 1960's, Eastern and Western politicians, diplomats and tourists visiting Hungary were equally surprised by the diversity of the food supply in stores and markets. While other socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, were still struggling with a general shortage of food at the time,² Hungary was able to meet the demands of its population

in terms of quantity despite growing agricultural exports — and even had enough capacity to start meeting demands of quality as well. It was no coincidence that the Western press spoke of the Hungarian system more and more as “goulash communism”.

The rise of agricultural production was made possible by a special agreement between the government and agricultural producers in which the agricultural lobby forming around Deputy Prime Minister Lajos Fehér had a very important mediating role. This lobby convinced political leadership that significant investments in agriculture were necessary so that production from truly viable collective farms could replace the farm products that used to be produced on the private farms that had been liquidated a few years earlier.³ Another important factor was that this lobby convinced the Kádarian leadership to authorize, at least for the time being, not only initiatives from the membership that in some cases could result in deviation from the Soviet *kolkhoz* model, but also encouraged members of the cooperatives to improve the quality and quantity of production. The significance of these measures can be best understood in the context of the Kádarian re-collectivization of Hungarian agriculture after the defeat of the 1956 revolution that had caused producers’ cooperatives to become sites of passive resistance whereby the majority of members either sabotaged collective agricultural work or reduced production to a minimum.⁴ Political leadership also held an interest in eliminating the need for agricultural import as soon as possible, which pressed them to reach a compromise with the membership of the cooperatives. However, in the course of the 1960’s, these once temporary pragmatic measures had become a lasting solution, and the Act of 1967 on Producers’ Cooperatives officially legitimized these practices and even those that differed from the Soviet model but suited better local Hungarian conditions and the special interests of the members of the country’s producers’ cooperatives.

The second half of the 1960’s gave rise to a division of labour that became a permanent characteristic of the country’s socialist agricultural sector. While collective farms produced good results in field crop production and in the heavily mechanized operations, household plots became an important site of work-intensive activities (e.g. vegetable and fruit production) and the production of certain animal products such as eggs, poultry and pork. The rapidly improving performance of agriculture became profitable not only to agricultural producers, but also the entire population and even political leadership itself as the expansion of agricultural export contributed to the improvement of the balance of foreign trade.⁵

In light of the above, it may seem surprising that the beginning of the 1970's saw the emergence of a press campaign that suggested that producers' cooperatives were achieving their production results through fraud and speculation.⁶ These criticisms were first and foremost aimed at ancillary enterprises in the Hungarian countryside that developed rapidly thanks to the New Economic Mechanism of 1968. By ancillary enterprises we mean the fact that producers' cooperatives engaged in activities beyond agricultural production. For example, since the national construction industry could not meet the needs of the producers' cooperatives, these enterprises took the matter of building stables, storage facilities and other buildings necessary for collective farm production into their own hands, leading to a dynamic growth in construction activities. Agricultural collective farms had also found ways to fill the void left by the lack of small and medium enterprises in Hungarian industry. For instance, with relatively little investment, their ancillary branches managed to manufacture and thus solve the shortage of certain goods, which contributed to an improved balance of supply and demand. Other ancillary activities included the processing and selling of food, and thanks to these ancillary branches, producers' cooperatives could supply their membership with work all year round while also improving their income.⁷

Despite these outstanding results, the new press campaign focused only on the negative effects of the producers' cooperatives' work, claiming that ancillary activities distorted the development of these cooperatives and diverted the attention of their leaders and members from actual agricultural production, and that they also posed an unfair competition to industry by siphoning away its skilled labour force with promises of higher wages. This propaganda was part of a wider political struggle that would determine the fate of the reforms of 1968, and producers' cooperatives simply got caught in the crossfire between reform and anti-reform communists. To the former, producers' cooperatives were a positive and exemplary model, while the latter attempted to use them to prove the detrimental effects of the reforms.

While agriculture had become an exemplary branch of Hungary's new economic model — thanks to the flexible and successful adjustment of producers' cooperatives — heavy industrial enterprises found it difficult to adapt to reform. Agriculture and the food industry received praise not only for the improving standard of national alimentation, but also for its results in Russian *rubel* and US dollar based export; in comparison, industrial companies were under scrutiny due to the lack of modern and well-exportable products. Another criticism leveled against industrial

enterprises was that “a portion of these companies concentrated more on acquiring and maintaining national funding and benefits than on reducing the level of cost or improving productivity.”⁸

Having enjoyed a privileged position in previous decades, representatives of the country’s heavy industrial sector had found the above mentioned criticisms especially difficult to tolerate. It was a well-known fact that the concept of socialist economic development was closely intertwined with the primary role of the heavy industry, including the necessary improvement of production in defence-related industries during the Cold War.⁹ From the end of the 1940’s onwards, factory directors of this sector mostly found that national redistribution reserved a major share of investments for the heavy industry (mining, the electric energy industry, metallurgy and the mechanical industry), the result of which was a heavy industry lobby that could also lean on the ideological axiom that the leading role in building socialism was reserved for the working class. This notion was supported by the fact that tens of thousands of industrial workers were appointed to leading political, economic and social positions from 1949 onwards,¹⁰ the majority of whom also maintained good relations with the company they had previously worked for and was ready to mobilize their political clout in the service of these factories.

Members of the heavy industrial lobby included not only the heads of industrial ministries (after 1956: Ministry of Heavy Industry and Ministry of Metallurgy and Mechanical Industry) and the largest enterprises, but also the “worker cadres” who had infiltrated central or local party apparatuses or the labour unions. These functionaries were aware of the fact that both the party leadership and the party apparatchiks had a significant number of members who had reservations about — or rejected outright — the New Economic Mechanism that increased the role that the market played in Hungary’s economy. This means that they joined the ranks of the anti-reform communists out of sheer ideological rigidity and dogmatism.¹¹ However, the anti-reform stance of the heavy industrial lobby was influenced mostly by its own deteriorating economic position after 1968 due to the already mentioned difficulties of adjusting to the market.

Rezső Nyers, who is considered to be the “father of the reform” to this day, spoke of the forming anti-reform opposition as follows: “I have only heard after the fact that it might have been an organized counter-offensive, but I personally did not see it that way at the time. [...] By the way, in a fairly closed political system like ours, the “normal procedure” was not that the opposing faction openly took a stand or agitated; instead they found some aspect that could be undermined by reference to public

opinion and then pressured political leadership by means of veiled criticism and lobbying in influential circles.”¹²

The above cited quote from Nyers points to one of the most important characteristics of engaging in politics in a one-party state namely that an open confrontation of interests was impossible, leading all conflicts to manifest themselves in the ideological sphere.¹³ However, changes within such ideological axioms were indicative of a shift in political preferences as well, and two major issues may be of interest here that came to be interpreted differently during the preparation of the reforms of 1968 and resulted in greater maneuverability for producers’ cooperatives. One was the concept that state ownership was superior over other forms of ownership, a principle that had long been indisputable in a communist society.¹⁴ During the formulation of the reforms of 1968, however, it was admitted that “both state ownership and cooperative ownership are legally equal.”¹⁵ Nevertheless at the beginning of the 1970’s, a press debate began whether cooperative ownership really *was* equal to state ownership, and cooperative ownership was criticized above all for allowing household plots and the ancillary activities.

Soon the Party came to an agreement as to the hierarchy of interests in Hungarian society. According to this, individual and group (both company and cooperative) interests were subordinate to social interests (the interest of the people and the people’s economy). Furthermore, the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism went hand in hand with the notion that even socialist societies were characterized by the existence of social groups with different interests.¹⁶ Rezső Nyers characterized this change at the fall, 1966 session of the Central Committee as follows:

In socialism [...] we acknowledge personal interests in certain areas. Collective interest, however, belongs with the agricultural producers’ cooperatives, crafts and trades and retail sale, where economic activity is such that group interest rightfully dominates since they provide the tools and use them to aid the public interest. For example, at the Csepel Factory at Ózd [...], the interests of the whole society are dominant; therefore, ownership must also be public. But just as it would be inconsistent socialism to turn [the Csepel Factory] into a cooperative, it would equally be inconsistent socialism to nationalize small enterprises. To use a popular phrase in Pest, we might lose our pants in the deal and I am sure that cannot be in the interest of the people.¹⁷

As we can see, the reform process had made group interest become “acceptable”. However, from the beginning of the 1970’s, the superiority

of social interests had once again received greater emphasis along with the view that individual and group interests must be opposed when they are interpreted to be detrimental to the community or the State. The following example pertains to one of the early schemes of anti-reform communists. In the first half of 1970, the Labour Union of Iron, Metal and Electric Energy Industrial Workers conducted a joint inquiry with the Ministry of Metallurgy and Mechanical Industry's investigation department of the ancillary activities of agricultural producers' cooperatives in the Budapest region, and then sent a summarizing report to the highest economic policy body of the Party, the Economic Policy Committee, that operates alongside the Central Committee. The report called attention to the problem of producers' cooperatives paying their industrial workers such high premiums and other bonuses that, combined with basic wages, their incomes had significantly exceeded the hourly wages paid at state companies for the same work. According to the report's authors, this practice on the one hand produced an unreasonable disproportion of income between cooperatives and industrial companies, and on the other hand, the higher wages allowed producers' cooperatives to "lure away" industrial workers from the state sector. The report concluded:

The labour force draining effect arising from the introduction of the ancillary activities at cooperatives had long been a topic of discussion in our companies. This problem was also on the agenda of the meeting between the leaders of our Labour Union and the comrade Minister of Metallurgy and Mechanical Industry. Furthermore, this issue also surfaced at the ministerial meeting on the Soviet and Hungarian trade..., where it was stated that this large-scale labour-force draining effect of the cooperatives is detrimental to companies trying to meet the same trade demands.¹⁸

In 1971 the above-mentioned schemes eventually resulted in the Party's Political Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party becoming aware of the issues that had negative effects on the reforms. On March 9 of that year, the Committee discussed the report entitled "The Extent, Direction and Causes of Labour Force Movement, Restriction of Undesirable Labour Force Migration and Necessary Measures to Ensure Service Recognition."¹⁹ Within half a year, the non-agricultural activities of the producers' cooperatives were also brought to the Political Committee's attention. As a result, an important decision was born to significantly restrict the scope of such activities.²⁰

At the same time the Polish economic crisis and increasing criticism from Moscow of reforms in Hungary made the Kádarian leadership

more susceptible to the idea of restricting the cooperatives' scope of activities.²¹ Kádár himself summarized the situation to Hungarian leadership as follows:

I wish to state — though far from me to be superstitious — that the events in Poland must be taken seriously. As cruel as it may sound, [...] disregarding [them] would be a grave mistake. [...] the comrades preparing these economic regulations must carefully consider what direction we should take and what would be sustainable over ten years so we would not have to undo anything. I'm not saying that we are in the same situation as Poland but what happened there should tell us something.²²

The Polish economic crisis received much attention at the Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the spring of 1971. It was no coincidence that a few weeks later, at a labour union congress held in Budapest, chief secretary Sándor Gáspár stated that the social role of labour unions was to call attention to the conflict of interests in order to prevent social conflict. He also made it clear where the greatest tension lay in Hungary by saying, "in the past few years, it has been precisely in the most important field of the socialist system, the state industry, where the wages of physical labourers increased the slowest." Gáspár also stated that workers in "large industrial enterprises must receive greater attention and measures must be taken to improve their living standards and working conditions."²³

The year 1972 began with increasing Soviet criticism from higher and higher levels of power. In February Kádár related the outcome of his meeting with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev at Zavidovo to the Political Committee as follows:

At one stage of our negotiations, comrade Brezhnev talked separately and at great length — and stating [...] that this was his own personal opinion — of how much he was worried about some of the negative indicators of Hungary's economic situation and about certain phenomena that he regarded as very dangerous tendencies. [...] [He and his associates] perceived a process that [...] in Hungary, an increasing amount of assets and good labour force are slowly leaving the highly important state sector to join the more flexible collective and private sectors. Income relations are changing in a way that allows a relatively small part of the population to experience a rapid increase of income while significant working masses do not, or do so at very negligible rates. Prices are also increasing and certain consumer goods are now only available for those of higher incomes, causing workers to become discontent, which in time may incite serious

social or political tension. [...] Generally speaking, central authorities including the Government should manage processes and the necessary resources more effectively to reverse undesirable tendencies.²⁴

Within the Hungarian Party leadership the most important spokesmen of the anti-reform faction were the following: Central Committee Administrative Secretary Béla Biszku, Central Committee Foreign Affairs Secretary Zoltán Komócsin, and Central Committee Ideological Secretary (and later, Party Organization Secretary) Árpád Pullai. Using the external political pressure exerted primarily by Moscow but also by the leaders of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria to their advantage, at its meeting of November 14-15, 1972, this group succeeded in convincing the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party to shut down the New Economic Mechanism.²⁵ The decisions made at this session, especially that of increasing the wages of industrial workers and implementing beneficial measures for the fifty largest industrial companies clearly show that the balance of power had shifted in favour of the anti-reform communists; however, they had yet to relieve pro-reform politicians (such as Central Committee Economic Political Secretary Rezső Nyers, Deputy Prime Minister Lajos Fehér in charge of agriculture or Prime Minister Jenő Fock) from their positions at this time. First Secretary of the Party János Kádár discussed this possibility at the Central Committee's session, saying that "We said that the Party and the State do not need to dispose of these people even if they have made mistakes; what they need is for us to clearly establish what had gone right and well during [the reform's] implementation, where our current difficulties lie and where we had failed to accomplish our tasks."²⁶

Socialist Legality in Theory and Practice

In the few years following the decision of November 14-15, 1972, anti-reform communists attempted to force the removal of pro-reform politicians. Simultaneously, they also attempted to control and intimidate those local functionaries, primarily the managers of producers' cooperatives, who were faithful supporters of the New Economic Mechanism.²⁷

The key to exploring and understanding the above-mentioned process was a secretly operating and highly influential political body called the Coordination Committee. Contemporaries hardly knew anything about this body and its documentation has only surfaced a few years ago

thanks to the thorough researches of Béla Révész. The members of the Coordination Committee included the Administrative Secretary of the Central Committee, the Head of the Executive and Administrative Department of the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, the Attorney General and the President of the Supreme Court. In the first half of the 1970's this body was lead by Administrative Secretary Béla Biszku and the members, in order of the positions listed, were the following: János Borbándi, András Benkei, Mihály Korom, Géza Szénási and Ödön Szakács.²⁸

János Kádár summarized this body's scope of activities as follows:

This Committee shall preside over any and all penal policy issues or concrete criminal cases where there is uncertainty or a difference of opinion between the leaders of the involved authorities. The Committee cannot issue regulations and cannot be referenced in any executive processes. If no agreement is reached, the members of the Committee must turn to the First Secretary of the Central Committee, to the Secretariat or the Political Committee for further instructions.²⁹

Concerning the trials of the cooperatives' managers, we first need to examine the resolution of the Coordination Committee of June 26, 1972, which was the result of joint efforts of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Attorney General's Office, the Supreme Court and the Central People's Inspection Committee. The Committee's resolution called for a determination which areas of economic policy allowed the emergence of offensive practices in the agricultural sector that had thus far received insufficient legal regulation.³⁰ The Committee came to the conclusion that the greatest lack of regulation concerned private craftsmanship, private trade and the producers' cooperatives. Although the modified Criminal Code that entered into force on January 1, 1972 issued more severe penalties for economic offenses, the Committee was of the opinion that the new regulations did not guarantee the consistent accountability of the producers' cooperatives.³¹ As the following examples will show, political expectations often clashed with the administration of justice.

During the years 1971-1972 dozens of criminal procedures were initiated against heads of producers' cooperatives with charges of "breach of storage" of produce contract. It was a common practice at the time for producers' cooperatives to sell, during the months of November and December, their complete stock of corn harvested so that they could have enough cash to pay their members by the time of the customary year-end accounting. This proved to be a good solution because they knew that the companies that had no storage facilities would sign a storage contract with

them, and when the company required the produce as per their contract, the producers' cooperative would deliver it. In the event that a producers' cooperative used some of the stored stock, it made up for this either by purchasing the missing quantity on the free market or paid the purchaser compensation in cash at the current price of the missing crop. Consequently, companies purchasing produce from cooperatives never incurred any losses and even made a profit when crop prices increased over time, so this was a general and rational practice that courts acknowledged and thus often acquitted the managers of the cooperatives charged with a "breach of storage" contract. Courts were also inconsistent in their treatment of offenses involving forgery of year-end statutory accounting since they knew that in the majority of cases, producers' cooperatives listed sources of income or assets that would only be realized later to achieve a positive balance, which then enabled them to issue premiums. This was considered a property offense by law authorities, but courts usually classified it as an offense against economic management regulations and issued small penalties to those convicted of such mal-practices.

Just like in the cases mentioned above, differences arising in the courts' decisions were also striking in the case of economic mismanagement, more precisely, profligate use of resources.³² In the interpretation of criminal law, workers entitled to make decisions on their own were found guilty of economic mismanagement if they severely or frequently failed to comply with the requirements of rational management, resulting in a significant economic disadvantage for the enterprises they worked for. However, the modified Criminal Code did not have a clear definition of what constituted "rational management" or "significant economic disadvantage". The special case of "irresponsible indebtedness" was no less flexibly defined. This offense was established when financial liabilities significantly exceeded available financial assets and the significant risk of irresponsible indebtedness was directly violating or endangering the interests of companies, other state agencies, and ultimately, the people's (i.e. the national) economy.³³

Experiences of the years 1971-1972 had shown that the majority of courts did not react to certain offenses properly in the eyes of dogmatic members of the country's leadership. To use a contemporary phrase, there were great differences in terms of interpreting "socialist legality". In his explanation of this phenomenon, György Péteri calls our attention to the following:

[...] important segments of the party-state apparatuses not only refused to buy into, but also offered resistance to, the anti-capitalist demagogy of the

leftists. Significantly, this resistance manifested itself not only in such sectors of the party-state apparatuses that were directly involved in economic management, but also in such domains where the conservative left had traditionally prevailed: as the apparatuses of prosecution and judiciary or, even, the Administrative Department of the Central Committee.³⁴

The Coordination Committee considered two different ways of dealing with what it saw as “economic offenses.” On the one hand, it prepared a document that contained all areas requiring legal regulation, including the authorization and wages of part-time employment, accounting for any state funding taken by producers’ cooperatives, as well as defining the concept of dishonest and unjustified acquisition of profit. On the other hand, they declared that the judicial guidelines of 1963 were no longer applicable in view of recent changes to the country’s economic regime and suggested that new policies be devised as soon as possible.³⁵ Early in 1973 a document outlining the new regulations was finalized by the Coordination Committee itself. Among the most significant but unresolved issues of applicability, the Committee listed as the top priority the coordination of social, group and individual interests and the resolution of all emerging conflicts. The Committee clearly pointed to the economic sector where in its opinion this problem was most acute, and accordingly, urged more severe measures in the monitoring of producers’ cooperatives.³⁶

The Coordination Committee’s resolution allowed a frontal assault on producers’ cooperatives: after all there could be no doubt that there was some degree of infringement of economic regulations in the cooperatives — as well as in other branches of the economy. However, criminal procedures in the non-agrarian sector remained the same as before while the full weight of the law was applied to the producers’ cooperatives. In the first half of 1973 the Attorney General’s Office required all principal public prosecutor’s offices — as well as their appointed municipal and district prosecutor’s offices — to revise all regulations applicable to agricultural producers’ cooperatives. Considering “the significant economic-political character of the examined issue,” investigations were conducted at 606 producers’ cooperatives, more than one-fourth of all the producers’ cooperatives in the country.³⁷ At the insistence of the Coordination Committee, “social authorities” were also heavily involved, and in 1973, investigations conducted by the co-called People’s Inspection Committees affected 788 agricultural cooperatives or one-third of all collective farms in the country.³⁸

It may be of interest to provide a short explanation of People's Inspection Committees (hereafter PIC), since this organization has not received much attention yet in Hungarian research concerning the Kádár era. PIC was established in 1957 in order to assist state authorities in "enforcing state and citizen discipline and to protect the property of the people and expose any infringements thereof."³⁹ This organization had only a limited independent (paid) apparatus and the majority of its inspectors were active in "social work", meaning that they received a paid holiday as compensation for their work and received no other benefits. Following an inspection, People's Inspection Committee could initiate disciplinary or other compensation measures, while in more severe cases, they were required to report the offense to the proper authority, the police or the public prosecutor. People's Inspection Committees operated on the municipal and county levels as well, and they were all overseen by the Central People's Inspection Committee, which nominally answered to the government but was actually subordinate to the Party leadership. The merging of legislative, executive and judicial powers was also evident in the fact that the Attorney General always attended every session of the Central People's Inspection Committee while district People's Inspection Committee sessions were attended by the principal public prosecutors of the district in question.⁴⁰

Following the economic reform of 1968, producers' cooperatives posed a huge challenge to People's Inspection Committees, these being the only bodies that were permitted to inspect the economic activities of the cooperatives. This situation was a result of the Act of 1967 on Producers' Cooperatives that had given cooperatives even greater autonomy than before. Afterwards, the state supervision of cooperatives had become fundamentally different from that of state companies since the state was also the legal owner of these companies, while in the case of cooperatives, the state merely held a legal supervisory role by way of local councils, financial institutions and so on.⁴¹

As mentioned previously, the Central People's Inspection Committee nominally answered to the government, but in reality received its tasks from Party leadership as shown by the fact that the basic principles for formulating the action plan of 1973 came from the above mentioned November Resolution of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. It comes as no surprise then that this factor had become the key motif in the end-year report of 1973:

Based on the November 1972 Resolution of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the public activities of workers had

increased and they had taken a more determined stance against those who violate public honesty, the principles of socialist economic management and socialist morals. Whistle-blowing against unreasonably increased prices, declining quality, faulty invoices and large storage surpluses possibly accumulated to the detriment of the population, in order to protect the interests of the population against offenders of cooperative democracy, has increased to a higher than average level.⁴²

It was under these circumstances that the anti-reform communists presented a case to Party leadership that attempted to compromise reform communists, including the heads of the agricultural lobby, using the economic mismanagement and illegal foreign trade activities exposed at the Agricultural Machinery and Spare Parts Marketing Company (Mezőgazdasági Gép- és Alkatrész-kereskedelmi Vállalat, henceforth: MEGÉV) as an excuse.⁴³ At the beginning of September, Béla Biszku informed János Kádár that both Lajos Fehér and Rezső Nyers had intervened in the police investigation launched against the directors of MEGÉV and exerted pressure in order to close the case.

György Péteri analyzed the processes of this case in extensive detail and concluded that the core of the MEGÉV-affair

was a political conflict between the reform communist and conservative leftist networks within the top party-state leadership. This conflict took by mid-October 1973 a turn highly unfavorable for the reform communists: the strong man of the conservative left, Béla Biszku, managed to bring János Kádár into the conflict as the supreme arbiter by accusing the leaders of the reform communist network of having tried to hush up the affairs of the MEGÉV, thereby exploiting in an illegitimate manner their power positions and violating the norms and rules of due process.⁴⁴

On November 13, at the initiative of János Kádár, the Political Committee held a session where the Committee had established the personal responsibility of Lajos Fehér and Rezső Nyers as well as passed a resolution in defense of socialist legality. This resolution became a recurring point of reference in future trials against the managers of the producers' cooperatives; therefore, it may be important to cite its most significant points.

1. Economic usefulness does not exempt individuals from the obligation of observing and reinforcing the state laws and regulations currently in effect, nor does it exempt individuals from the legal consequences of committing an offense against these laws and regulations.

2. The offense of public corruption — as clearly stated by law — is punishable by removal from office in all cases, whether the objective of the perpetrator is the acquisition of “private profit” or to acquire undue advantage for the target group (company, etc.). [...]

5. To ensure socialist legitimacy, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Justice, the Attorney General, the President of the Supreme Court and all other party and state functionaries are obliged to present all disputes and cases requiring special consideration to the Coordination Committee at the Headquarters of the Party. The Interested Parties may turn to the Secretariat of the Central Committee or the Political Committee in the event of disagreement with the resolution of the Coordination Committee.⁴⁵

The resolution quoted above was only issued to members of the Coordination Committee, but this was enough to turn its principles into guidelines for the entire law enforcement, prosecution and court apparatus.⁴⁶ At the beginning of 1974, the Coordination Committee also discussed the issue of year-end statutory accounting fraud by producers' cooperatives where they expected the above mentioned regulations to be most felt. Before the end of the year, the Coordination Committee evaluated the exposure of cooperative offenses. Another issue that had surfaced by this time was the complicity in these matters of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry as supervisory body of the cooperatives — as well as the Ministry's publicity organization, the National Council of Producers' Cooperatives.

The supervision of irregular and illegal forms of economic management would be the task of the governing bodies. The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry and the National Council of Producers' Cooperatives [...] tolerate or in some cases, even ‘encourage’ heads of producers' cooperatives by passive silence to improve their economic performance at any cost, even to the detriment of the greater social interest. [...] These factors combined have ensured that despite the existence of supervisory bodies, their superficial inspections contributed to the numerous cases of mismanagement in cooperative economic practices.⁴⁷

The direct criticism of the heads of the Ministry and its publicity organ became possible due to the dismissal from their posts of two of their most influential supporters: Central Committee Secretary Rezső Nyers and Deputy Prime Minister Lajos Fehér had been relieved from their posts by the Central Committee in March, 1974. In 1975, further changes occurred during the Congress of the Party, including the departure of Minister of

Agriculture and Food Industry Imre Dimény, which further weakened the country's agricultural lobby.⁴⁸

The Trials' Characteristics

The “beheading” of the agricultural lobby created an opportunity for the opponents of reform to also exert pressure on the lobby's local representatives, which invites the question of what sort of role did state security agencies play in these cases? Thus far my researches show that their participation in the trials of the cooperatives' managers was rare, both in the preparatory stage and during the investigation itself.⁴⁹ One important factor was that after the large-scale reorganization of the Ministry of the Interior in 1962, in the words of István Papp, “we cannot speak of agricultural sabotage prevention or even agricultural prevention. The protection of producers' cooperatives became synonymous with the protection of public ownership and [was] considered more and more as a task of preserving public order by interior state bodies.”⁵⁰ As a result the prosecutions of the majority of agricultural economic organizations and institutions were relegated to police agencies in charge of protecting public ownership.⁵¹ As a result of producers' cooperatives having gained greater independence after 1967, the police could only inspect a cooperative if there was a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity, which meant that the role of the taking initiative in these matters — as mentioned before — rested with the People's Inspection Committees. It appears that from 1973 on, following the targeted reviews involving entire districts and counties, People's Inspection Committees started concentrating on cooperatives that either did not pass inspection or were not allowed to pass inspection.⁵² There was also a clear tendency from the beginning of the 1970's where a growing portion of inspection procedures ended in filing reports against the cooperative, and over two-thirds of these reports led to criminal charges.⁵³

In practice, trials against the heads of producers' cooperatives could be typically based on the issues investigated by People's Inspection Committees. For example, common themes were ancillary branch mismanagement, illegal or inappropriate use of state funding and breach of storage contract, but there were also cases of final accounts fraud, forgery of documents and bribery. By 1974, the registered cases involving producers' cooperatives became more numerous than ever. (This number kept rising until 1975 and then dropped significantly afterwards.)⁵⁴

The 1974 report of the Central People's Inspection Committee contains the following data on the improving efficiency of inspections:

In the year of 1974, we concluded a total of 141 criminal procedures including remaining cases from the previous year. Of these cases, 48 were concluded with a court sentence, 29 cases have a charge sheet but the court has not yet issued a sentence; in 30 cases, the investigating authorities established that there had been an offense, but used different methods of accountability due to the low risk that the offense or the perpetrator poses to society, and in 34 cases, investigation was closed due to the lack of evidence. In 1974, 36 reported cases will extend into 1975 due to prolonged investigations.⁵⁵

If we were to summarize what sort of producers' cooperatives faced trial in court, we would find that the majority of them were productive, sometimes nationally renowned cooperatives that used the possibilities afforded by the New Economic Mechanism to their advantage and their managers were daring entrepreneurs who were open to the new opportunities afforded by NEM.

Within the social group of economic leaders, the managers of producers' cooperatives constituted a special group that was elected to their positions (after 1967, by secret vote no less!) instead of being appointed like the directors of state companies, which means that the leaders of producers' cooperatives had to be approved not only by district and county party leaders, but also by the membership of their cooperative. This of course often resulted in conflict, especially when a manager went against local political leadership to represent the interests of the cooperative's membership. At the beginning of the 1970's, at the time when the anti-reformist faction of the Party launched its anti-cooperative offensive, many local party leaders felt that the time for retaliation against the local supporters of reform was at hand; in other words, local factors also contributed to the number of criminal procedures issued against heads of producers' cooperatives. For example, there were districts where the local party secretary initiated more "manager-trials" than the whole of the county combined.⁵⁶ This also explains why there were still locally initiated cases in the second half of the 1970's despite the fact that national policy on the matter had changed by that time.

Besides the managers of producers' cooperatives, other experts (lead agronomists and chief accountants) were also tried, as were regular members of producers' cooperatives, while another special group under prosecution comprised of local council, bank and state authority employ-

ees connected to producers' cooperatives who were mostly involved in cases of bribery. It was no surprise then that a common characteristic of the trials was the high number of defendants. We know of trials where there were 19 defendants in total, and witnesses were also numerous as shown by cases where 120 witnesses had been interrogated.⁵⁷

Of those tried, some were found innocent, but there were also some who had indeed been guilty of economic mismanagement. Nevertheless, even in the case of the latter, there were certain characteristics of the procedure, especially the stages of investigation, prosecution and trial that lent the air of a show trial to these cases.

One striking characteristic was that all trials contained the same charges, primarily of offense against public ownership (high-damage offenses, embezzlement, theft, misappropriation and negligence), and in the case of economic leaders, these offenses were considered especially severe in accordance with the modified Criminal Code.⁵⁸ Furthermore, having extended reporting obligations to all of these offenses made charging these people incredibly easy. All the courts needed was the confession of a member or employee of the producers' cooperative that the manager of the cooperative had known about the offense in question, and if they had not complied with their reporting obligation, they became accomplices by default.

Reconstructing the procedures from investigation documents, it appears that such incriminating statements were mostly made by members of producers' cooperatives during the pre-trial investigation. It is clear from the interviews that the police did not use physical violence to persuade people to give false confessions. Some of the accused were threatened to be kept in pre-trial detention unless they made an incriminating confession or were given promises to be released to go home to their family after they confessed. Coercing them by saying that "the others had already admitted to everything" was also an effective tactic. In many cases, charges were extended to the managers of producers' cooperatives based on these unfairly obtained, incriminating confessions. However, it is important to note that such false confessions were often retracted during the trials.

In the case of economic mismanagement and misappropriation, there was no need of involving members of the producers' cooperatives since only managers were in position to commit such offenses. However, pre-trial detention played a significant role regardless, with cases where people were held in pre-trial detention for 18 months or even for a few years due to reasoning that the severe risk these offenses posed to society

and the expected severity of the sentence may cause the defendant to escape or go into hiding. However, since these cases concerned well-known or even nationally renowned managers of producers' cooperatives, it is probable that the main reason for this practice was not to prevent escape; it is more like that the prosecutors expected the defendants to break down due to prolonged detention, isolation and emotional stress and make a confession, thus facilitating the work of law enforcement bodies.

The atmosphere of pre-trial detention was described by the president of the Rozmaring Producers' Cooperative, a cooperative famous for flower growing in the vicinity of Budapest, as follows:

But to get back to the interrogations, they could certainly keep people under pressure. An actual criminal would have laughed it all off, but I was in a different situation. As soon as they dictated what they thought was important, they gave it to me to sign, and to be frank, I didn't even read it. They did not harm me physically, but that feeling of helplessness [...] that atmosphere cannot be described. They learned how to create that atmosphere very well. If I called those policemen uncivilized, it would be slander since they had never hurt me [...] But the atmosphere they created could not be described in words. It would have easily broken someone more nervous and inexperienced than I am [...]⁵⁹

The long waiting period between the arrests and the court proceedings can be explained by the prolonged preparation of charge sheets. Charges were formulated based on predetermined assumptions, usually the concept that a rapid improvement of the cooperative's economic situation could not have possibly happened by "legal means". The author of a contemporary sociography accurately described the dominating political climate as follows: "If a cooperative produced bad results, they were suspicious, but if they produced good results, they were even more suspicious."⁶⁰ This preconception made the formulation of the charge quite easy, but gathering evidence was a considerably slower process, which is why the prosecutors attempted to force confessions out of the defendants. The means they used during investigation to achieve this were mentioned by several managers of producers' cooperatives in interviews. Some were being persuaded to confess by their appointed defense lawyers, while others were pressed by undercover cellmates.

I have found several recurring infringements committed by law enforcement agencies during not only the investigation but also the trial, such as the relative scarcity of exonerating witnesses. However, what was more significant was that, as we have discussed previously, the modified

Criminal Code established several means of intervention that ensured political influence by allowing for subjectivity in court.

One of the earliest trials is a good example of how political policies were enforced. Based on inspections of several producers' cooperatives by the People's Inspection Committee, a report was filed against the managers of these cooperatives. The resulting charge sheet that took almost a year to prepare read like a "dream-book" containing every possible economic offense even remotely relating to the activities of these cooperatives. First, they charged some managers with bribery, saying that they paid bribes to receive missing tractor components in time without having to wait in queue, or in another case, used bribery to speed up the repair of the cooperative's autobus. Whoever knows how a "shortage economy" works would realize that this sort of practice was common everywhere else as well in contemporary Hungary — and that paying bribes to suppliers was also common in higher-tier socialist industrial companies. The second major accusation was accounting fraud, where heads of the producers' cooperatives "filled" the balance sheets of 1970 to be able to pay the promised premiums to their members. According to the charges, the managers of the cooperatives neglected circulating capital and development capital funds just to be able to raise the incomes of their members. Still another significant charge was that the producers' cooperative had breached its contract with the Grain Purchasing Company. During the storage period of grains at the cooperative, circumstances were such that the local people had used up part of the stored grain, and when they were to hand over the grain to the Grain Purchasing Company, they bought the missing portion from elsewhere, which means that the Purchasing Company incurred no damage and the producers' cooperative effectively complied with its obligations set forth in the contract. This was such a standard practice that not even courts of first instance regarded it as fraud.⁶¹ The case was prolonged and the first sentence was issued on September 21, 1973, and the court considered the fact that the defendants mostly acted to protect the interests of the cooperative's membership rather than their own interests as an alleviating circumstance.

This case took an interesting turn during the process of appeal. Since the court of first instance was not aware of changing political expectations, the Attorney General made some necessary corrections to the appeal. "The county court had therefore made an error when it evaluated the idea that the defendants committed these offenses in favour of the interests of the membership of the producers' cooperative as an alleviating circumstance. Such an interpretation of the activities of the defendants is

wrong not only in terms of legal policy, but also in terms of economic policy, since the foregrounding of group interest by dishonest means is not an isolated phenomenon.”⁶² The Attorney General’s argumentation was not without consequences, which is shown by the following excerpt from the sentence issued by the Supreme Court:

During their activities, the first, second and third defendants attempted to secure unlawful advantages for the producers’ cooperative by means that are unacceptable in the socialist economic system [...] Serving the alleged or momentary interests of the producers’ cooperative to the detriment of the people’s economy and misleading governing and supervisory bodies are offenses that are extremely dangerous to society even when the perpetrators were not led first and foremost by selfish financial interest, such as in this particular case.⁶³

It is also shocking that the above quoted argumentation and “lashing out against group interest” was still included in court sentence explanations as late as the middle of the 1970’s: “The offense was therefore not committed for direct personal gain, but to serve the members and the cooperative in question at all costs, and to maintain the good reputation of the cooperative at all costs.”⁶⁴

In counties and districts where Party leadership was dogmatic, the standard practice was to issue severe several-year sentences for first offenders, with some sentences amounting to over 10 years. During appeal processes, the Supreme Court — especially after the political climate had changed in 1976 — was ready to significantly reduce the sentences issued by the lower courts. There were also cases where the defendants had already served the sentences issued by the Supreme Court in pre-trial detention.

No analysis of the “show trial” nature of the trials of the cooperative farm managers can ignore the role of the press. The anti-cooperative campaign can be well traced in contemporary press and the public pronouncements of leading politicians. As part of the campaign, several managers of producers’ cooperatives had been publicly denigrated long before their guilt had even been proven. Besides national newspapers (such as *Népszabadság* [Freedom of the People], *Népszava* [Voice of the People] and *Esti Hírlap* [Evening News]), county newspapers also slandered the heads of producers’ cooperatives. Of the countless possible examples, I only wish to quote one particularly characteristic article.

Some employees of the producers' cooperative [...] had warned the president several times that if he continued to manage the cooperative in such a way, he would end up in court. President A.K., however, did not believe them and said that 'excessive administration and strict order would weaken the efficiency of professional management.' It is now obvious that within the producers' cooperative, bribery was one of the most important ways of ensuring efficiency and ensured a flourishing enterprise of this criminal cooperative for a long time. The heads of the producers' cooperative, who according to the charge sheet, had incurred almost 1 million HUF of damage to the people's economy, are now awaiting their trial in pre-trial detention.⁶⁵

To add one more note to this particular case, this trial actually ended with the acquittal of the accused.

Those heads of producers' cooperatives who were members of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party were held accountable long after they had received an effective court sentence. They were forced to account for their offenses in front of the Party, even when they were proven innocent by the courts because, according to Party logic, they were still morally responsible. Party disciplining was managed by a separate party organ called the Central Inspection Committee [Központi Ellenőrző Bizottság], about whose activities information remains scarce in scholarly circles.

Conclusions

Simultaneously with the series of trials against the heads of producers' cooperatives, these cooperatives also faced several economic constraints (such as increased taxes, decreased investments, etc.) as well as administrative restrictions. The negative effects of these measures manifested themselves quickly, primarily in the food supplies of urban populations, which forced Kádarian leadership, so scrupulously observing their political promises of higher living standards, to relieve some of the pressure on producers' cooperatives. The global energy crisis of 1973 resulting from the drastic increase in oil prices also aided this process despite its delayed effects, since the capacity of the agricultural sector to generate foreign currency revenue became more necessary than ever.⁶⁶

It was of symbolic importance that in 1976, János Kádár attended the Congress of Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives for the first time.⁶⁷ Instead of self-criticism, the First Secretary of the Party spoke of praise and mentioned two areas of cooperative economic management that had

previously been under such heavy attack. He also acknowledged that household plots had a significant role in supplying the country's population with food — and then continued to say: “We have to be more consistent in our efforts to form an integral unit of collective and household farming within the agricultural producers' cooperatives.”⁶⁸ Speaking of cooperative ancillary branches, János Kádár emphasized that the Party and the Government approved of and supported any and all attempts that were closely tied to the activities of producers' cooperatives, such as repairing machinery in their own workshops, supplying their own construction work and especially of processing their own crops and produce.⁶⁹

The new re-valuation of the agricultural sector and the producers' cooperatives is evident in the March 15, 1978, session of the Central Committee that was entirely devoted to issues of agricultural policy. This session was also special due to the speech given by Lajos Fehér, who had been removed in 1974 but retained his membership in the Central Committee. Therefore, this paper shall end with an excerpt of his dramatic speech: “[...] in the past five, six years, there had been a veritable criminal prosecution campaign against cooperatives. There were several articles in our newspapers that gave the impression of cooperatives becoming a hotbed for economic offense and mismanagement.”⁷⁰ Citing statistics, he then spoke of how, within the whole economy, the ratio of offenses against public ownership was 20% between 1968-1975, while within producers' cooperatives, it amounted to a mere 11%,⁷¹ and added that the offenses committed to the detriment of producers' cooperatives were caused in three-fourth of all cases by outsiders (such as business agents) rather than members. At the end of his speech, Lajos Fehér suggested that the Central Committee establish a separate committee to investigate who had been responsible for the campaign against the cooperatives — and that the Committee initiate the rehabilitation of heads of the producers' cooperatives unjustly slandered in the trials.

The Party leadership failed to practice self-criticism; therefore the committee called for by Lajos Fehér was not established. Nobody had examined just how much financial damage the campaign against the producers' cooperatives had done to the national economy — or how much anguish and moral damage the torturous show trials had caused to the cooperatives' managers and their families, in fact to the entire cooperative sector itself. Accordingly, there was no rehabilitation of the campaign's victims either.

NOTES

¹ In Hungarian these units of agricultural production in the communist era were usually referred to as *mezőgazdasági termelőszövetkezetek*. In English-language literature they are variously called “producers’ cooperatives” “agricultural cooperatives” “collective farms” “Hungarian *kolkhozes*” or simply “cooperatives”. The CEO (chief executive officer) of a cooperative was called an “*elnök*” in Hungarian whose literal translation is “president”. In this essay I most often use “agricultural cooperative” and “manager” respectively for these terms in order to be in harmony with literature on the subject in English-speaking countries. See for example Mark Pittaway, *Eastern Europe, 1939-2000* (London: Arnold, 2004), 63-64, 70-72, 99-103.

² Igor Stebelsky, “Food Consumption Patterns in the Soviet Union,” in *Socialist Agriculture in Transition. Organizational Response to Failing Performance*, ed. Josef C. Brada – Karl-Eugen Wädekin (Boulder, 1988), 98–109.

³ István Papp, “Fehér Lajos agrárpolitikusi tevékenysége” [Lajos Fehér’s Activities as an Agricultural Politician], in *Magyar agrárpolitikusok a XIX. és a XX. században* [Hungarian Agricultural Politicians in the 19th and 20th Centuries] ed. Levente Sipos (Budapest: Napvilág, 2010), 279–283.

⁴ Zsuzsanna Varga, “Conflicts and Compromises between the Hungarian Socialist State and the Peasantry: Contextualizing the ‘Hungarian Agricultural Miracle’,” in *Integration through Subordination. The Politics of Agricultural Modernization in Industrial Europe*, ed. Peter Moser and Tony Varley (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 34.

⁵ *A mezőgazdaság és az élelmiszeripar összefoglaló adatai, 1960-1970*. [Summarized Statistics of Agriculture and the Food Industry, 1960-1970] (Budapest: KSH, 1972), 18–19.

⁶ The articles of the central newspaper of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party were especially sharp in tone. See *Népszabadság*, February 3, 1971: “Félmillió forint jogtalan újítási díj, a termelőszövetkezetek ellenőrizték rendszeresen közös vállalkozásaikat” [Undue Innovation Fee of HUF 500,000 – Producers’ Cooperatives Should Monitor Their Joint Ventures More Frequently]; *Népszabadság*, December 22, 1971: “Szövetkezeti gépekből maszek ócskavas” [From Cooperative Machinery to Self-Employed Scrapheap]; *Népszabadság*, January-February, 1972: “A Termoszig szövetkezeti ál-vállalat bűnös üzemelmei” [The Criminal Activities of Termoszig, a Fake Cooperative Sub-Company.]

⁷ Zsuzsanna Varga, “The ‘Modernizing’ Role of Agriculture in the Hungarian Economic Reforms,” in *Zur Physiognomie sozialistischer Wirtschaftsreformen. Die Sowjetunion, Polen, die Tschechoslowakei, Ungarn, die DDR und Jugoslawien im Vergleich*, ed. Christoph Boyer (Frankfurt: Max-Planck-Institut für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte, 2007), 201–218.

⁸ National Archives of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára, henceforth: MNL OL) M-KS 288.f. 4/97. ó. e. “Jegyzőkönyv a Köz-

ponti Bizottság 1968. december 4-i üléséről” [Minutes of the December 4, 1968 Session of the Central Committee]. 2. “Az 1968. évi gazdasági fejlődés a gazdasági reform és a jövő évi gazdasági munka fő irányai.” [Economic Development in the Year 1968, the Economic Reform and Next Year’s Economic Agenda.]

⁹ Pál Germuska, “Szocialista csoda? Magyar iparfejlesztési politika és gazdasági növekedés, 1950-1975” [Socialist Miracle? Hungarian Industrial Development Policies and Economic Growth, 1950-1975] *Századok* 1 (2012): 47–78.

¹⁰ Rudolf Tőkés, *A kialakított forradalom. Gazdasági reform, társadalmi átalakulás és politikai hatalomutódlás, 1957-1990* [The negotiated revolution. economic reform, social transformation and the political succession, 1957-1990] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1998), 98–107. The original title of the English edition of this book was *Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution. Economic Reform, Social Change and Succession, 1956-1990*.

¹¹ Hajdú, “A csőd kezdete,” pp. 85-89.

¹² Katalin Ferber – Gábor Rejtő, *Reform(év)fordulón* [Reform at the Anniversary] (Budapest: KJK, 1988), 32.

¹³ These debates can be traced in the journals *Társadalmi Szemle* [Social Review] and *Pártélet* [Party Life] as well as the daily newspaper *Népszabadság* [Freedom of the People].

¹⁴ János Kornai, *A szocialista rendszer. Kritikai politikai gazdaságtan.* [The Socialist System. Critical Political Economics] (Budapest: KJK, 1993): 94–121.

¹⁵ *A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt határozatai és dokumentumai, 1963-1966* [Regulations and Documents of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, 1963-1966] ed. Henrik Vass (Budapest: Kossuth 1968), 402–409.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ MNL OL M-KS-288. f. 4/83. ő. e. “Jegyzőkönyv a Központi Bizottság 1966. október 13-i üléséről” [Minutes of the October 13, 1966 Session of the Central Committee].

¹⁸ MNL OL M-KS 288. f. 15/192. ő. e. “A Vas- Fém- és Villamos-energia-ipari Dolgozók Szakszervezetének jelentése a szövetkezetek munkaerő-elszívó lehetőségeinek ellenőrzése tárgyában végzett vizsgálatok megállapításairól” [Report of the Labor Union of Iron, Metal and Electric Energy Industrial Workers on the Results of the Investigation Regarding the Labor Force Draining Potential of Cooperatives.]

¹⁹ MNL OL M-KS-288. f. 5/548. ő. e. “Jegyzőkönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1971. március 9-én tartott üléséről” [Minutes of the March 9, 1971 Session of the Political Committee.]

²⁰ MNL OL M-KS-288. f. 5/564. ő. e. “Jegyzőkönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1971. szeptember 7-én tartott üléséről.” [Minutes of the September 7, 1971 Session of the Political Committee.] The official results were Government Decree

41/1971 (XII. 14) on the Scope of Economic Activities of Cooperatives, and Government Decision 1048/1971 (XII. 14.) on the Non-Agricultural Activities of Agricultural producers' Cooperatives. In: *Törvények és rendeletek hivatalos gyűjteménye, 1971* [Official Compendium of Laws and Regulations, 1971] (Budapest, 1972), 515–517, 583–586.

²¹ Following the introduction of Polish government measures to raise prices in December 1970, Gdansk and others cities responded with strikes and street protests that ended in casualties. These events resulted in certain shifts whereby Gomulka, first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party had resigned and was replaced by Gierek, followed by the reformulated government's announcement of a price halt and wage increase. The Political Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party discussed the Polish situation as a separate issue on their agenda several times and also discussed it the at sessions of the Central Committee. See MNL OL M-KS 288. f. 5. 540. ö.e., 5. 542. ö.e., 4. 111. ö.e.

²² MNL OL M-KS-288 f. 5/548. ö.e. "Jegyzőkönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1971. március 9-i üléséről" [Minutes of the March 9, 1971 Session of the Political Committee.]

²³ *Népszava*, May 5, 1971.

²⁴ MNL OL M-KS-288. f. 5/575. ö. e. "Jegyzőkönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1972. február 22-én tartott üléséről" [Minutes of the February 22, 1972 Session of the Political Committee].

²⁵ MNL OL M-KS-288. f. 4/119-120. ö.e. "Jegyzőkönyv a Központi Bizottság 1972. november 14-15-én tartott üléséről" [Minutes of the November 14-15, 1972 Session of the Central Committee].

²⁶ MNL OL M-KS-288. f. 4/119-120. ö.e. "Jegyzőkönyv a Központi Bizottság 1972. november 14-15-én tartott üléséről" [Minutes of the November 14-15, 1972 Session of the Central Committee.]

²⁷ Tibir Simó, *A termelészövetkezeti vezetők társadalmi mobilitása*. [The Social Mobility of Presidents of Producers' Cooperatives] (Budapest: SzKL, 1975), Árpád Pünkösti, *Kiválasztottak* [The Chosen Ones] (Budapest: Árkádia, 1988).

²⁸ *Segédkönyv a Politikai Bizottság tanulmányozásához* [Manual for Studying the Political Committee] ed. András Nyírő (Budapest: INTERART, 1989).

²⁹ MNL OL M-KS-288. f. 5/623/1. ö.e. "Jegyzőkönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1973. november 13-án tartott zárt üléséről" [Minutes of the November 13, 1973 Session of the Political Committee].

³⁰ MNL OL M-KS-288. f. 31/V/1. ö.e. "Jegyzőkönyv a Koordinációs Bizottság 1972. június 26-án tartott üléséről" [Minutes of the June 26, 1972 Session of the Coordination Committee].

³¹ *Törvények és rendeletek hivatalos gyűjteménye, 1971* [Official Compendium of Laws and Regulations, 1971] (Budapest, 1972), 195–207.

³²Emil Erdősy, “A pazarló gazdálkodás az új gazdasági mechanizmus viszonyai között” [Economic Mismanagement in the Framework of the New Economic Mechanism.] *Magyar Jog és Külföldi Jogi Szemle* 12 (1967), 735-741.

³³Imre A. Wiener, “A pazarló gazdálkodás jogi szabályozásáról” [On the Legal Regulation of Economic Mismanagement] *Magyar Jog és Külföldi Jogi Szemle* 12 (1973): 712-717.

³⁴Péteri, “From Purge to Scandal,” pp. 87–88.

³⁵MNL OL M-KS-288. f. 31/V/1. ö.e. “Jegyzőkönyv a Koordinációs Bizottság 1973. január 22-én tartott üléséről” [Minutes of the January 22, 1973 Session of the Coordination Committee].

³⁶MNL OL M-KS-288. f. 31/V/1. ö.e. “Jegyzőkönyv a Koordinációs Bizottság 1973. február 19-én tartott üléséről” [Minutes of the February 19, 1973 Session of the Coordination Committee].

³⁷MNL OL XIX-A-2-II 23. d. “A Legfőbb Ügyészség összefoglaló jelentése a mezőgazdasági termelőszövetkezetek alapszabályai felülvizsgálata és hatósági jóváhagyása törvényességének vizsgálatáról” [Summarizing Report of the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Examination of the Legitimacy of the Revision and Official Approval of Statutes of Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives].

³⁸MNL OL XVII-2-a 5. tétel 16. d. “Jelentés a népi ellenőrzési bizottságok 1973. évi munkájáról” [Report of the 1973 Activities of the People’s Inspection Committees].

³⁹*A magyar állam szervei, 1950-1970* [Agencies of the Hungarian State, 1950-1970] (Budapest: KJK, 1993), 373.

⁴⁰Ferenc M. Horváth, “A ‘népi ellenőrzés’ Magyarországon 1957-1989” [“National Inspection” in Hungary 1957-1989] *Levéltári Szemle* 4 (1990): 29–40.

⁴¹Antal Bakóczy, “A társadalmi tulajdon elleni bűncselekmények alakulása” [The State of Offenses against Public Ownership] *Népi Ellenőrzés* 6 (1973): 1–4.

⁴²MNL OL XVII-2-a 5. tétel 16. d. “Jelentés a népi ellenőrzési bizottságok 1973. évi munkájáról” [Report of the 1973 Activities of the People’s Inspection Committees], 10.

⁴³Péteri, “From Purge to Scandal,” pp. 88-89.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 95–96.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

⁴⁶MNL OL M KS 288. f. 31/V/1. ö.e. “Jegyzőkönyv a Koordinációs Bizottság 1974. január 28-i üléséről” [Minutes of the January 28, 1974 Session of the Coordination Committee].

⁴⁷*Ibid.*

⁴⁸Hajdú, “A csőd kezdete,” pp. 85–89.

⁴⁹It will be the task of future research to explore the potential role of village agent networks.

⁵⁰In 1962, the independent Agricultural Sabotage-Prevention Depart-

ment was liquidated, but sub-departments supervising the agricultural sector remained in operation at county police departments. For further information, see Istvan Papp, “A Politikai Nyomozó Főosztály Mezőgazdasági (Szabotázs-) Elhárító Osztályának szervezettörténete, 1956-1962” [The Institutional History of the Agricultural (Sabotage) Prevention Department of the Political Investigation Department, 1956-1962] *Betekintő* 3 (2010).

⁵¹ After 1962, state security bodies distinguished three categories: one was for producers’ cooperatives, state farms, forestries, water management bodies and research institutes where it was still necessary to maintain an agent network. In the second group, sabotage prevention happened through official and social relations only, while the third group was only investigated in the case of reported offenses. *Ibid.*

⁵² Antal Bakóczy, “Az új gazdaságirányítási rendszer és a társadalmi tulajdon elleni bűnözés alakulása” [The New Economic Mechanism and Offenses against Public Ownership] *Belügyi Szemle* 2 (1973): 3–10.

⁵³ Unsuccessful reports of offenses comprised 38% of all reports in 1972, while a year later, this ratio dropped to 18%. MNL OL XVII-2-a 5. tétel 16. d. “Jelentés a népi ellenőrzési bizottságok 1973. évi munkájáról” [Report of the 1973 Activities of the People’s Inspection Committees].

⁵⁴ MNL OL XVII-2-a 22. tétel I. sorozat 2.d. 1970-1977. “Havi tájékoztatók a népi ellenőrzés szervei által indított téma és célvizsgálatokról” [Monthly Reports of Targeted Reviews by People’s Inspection Committees].

⁵⁵ MNL OL XVII-2-a 5. tétel 18. d. “Jelentés a népi ellenőrzés 1974. évi munkájáról” [Report of the 1974 Activities of the People’s Inspection Committees].

⁵⁶ MNL OL XVII-2-a 22. tétel I. sorozat 2.d. 1970-1977. “Havi tájékoztatók a népi ellenőrzés szervei által indított téma és célvizsgálatokról” [Monthly Reports of Targeted Reviews by People’s Inspection Committees].

⁵⁷ MNL OL XX-10-e-22.098/1973 (379.d.) “V.K.I. és társai periratai” [Charge Sheet of K.I.V. and Accomplices].

⁵⁸ *Törvények és rendeletek hivatalos gyűjteménye, 1971* [Official Compendium of Laws and Regulations, 1971] (Budapest: 1972), 195–207.

⁵⁹ Árpád Püskösti, *Vasalt ruha mángorolva* [Clothes Ironed and Pressed] (Budapest: Múzsák, 1989): 22.

⁶⁰ Tibor Zám, “Mennyit ér a tsz-elnök?” [How Much Is the President of a Producers’ Cooperative Worth?] in Tibor Zám, *Bács-Kiskunból jövök* [I Come from Bács-Kiskun] (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1973), 185.

⁶¹ MNL OL XX-5-d-110/1974 (4.d.) “A Szolnok Megyei Bíróság B. 515/1972/76. sz. ítélete P.J. és társai bűnügyében” [Decision no. B. 515/1972/76 of the Court of Szolnok County in the Criminal Trial of J.P. and Accomplices].

⁶² MNL OL XX-10-e-20.065-1974. “P.J. és társai periratai” [Charge Sheet of J.P. and Accomplices].

⁶³ MNL OL XX-5-d-110-1974 (4.d.) “P.J. és társai periratai” [Charge Sheet of J.P. and Accomplices].

⁶⁴ MNL OL XX-10-e-22.649/1975-76 (465.d.) “Sz.J. és társai periratai” [Charge Sheet of J.Sz. and Accomplices].

⁶⁵ *Esti Hírlap*, October 26, 1976.

⁶⁶ András Schlett, “Success and Failure of the Hungarian Agrarian Model” *Arhivele Totalitarismului* [Totalitarianism Archives] 1-2 (2012): 107.

⁶⁷ The First Congress of Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives was held in 1967 and the Second Congress was held in 1972.

⁶⁸ “A mezőgazdasági termelészövetkezetek III. kongresszusa” [Third Congress of Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives] *Népszabadság*, December 16, 1976.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ MNL OL M-KS-288. f. 4/154. ö. e. “Jegyzőkönyv a Központi Bizottság 1978. március 15-ei üléséről” [Minutes of the March 15, 1978 Session of the Central Committee].

⁷¹ MNL OL M-KS-288. f. 7/499. ö. e. “Jelentés a Titkárságnak a népgazdaságot károsító bűncselekmények tapasztalatairól” [Report to the Secretariat on the Experience of Criminal Acts Damaging the People’s Economy].

Document:

**Dominican Friar Kornél Bóle's Visit to
the Hungarian Colony of Árpádhon
(Albany, Louisiana) in 1928**

Anita Máté (editor)

Editor's introduction:

Kornél Bóle OP (1887-1961) was one of the best-known preachers in Hungary between the two world wars. As a member of the Dominican Order, he held missions in Budapest as well as in the countryside. He was one of the keynote speakers of the monumental Catholic celebrations of the era: the Saint Emeric jubilee in 1930 and the 1938 International Eucharistic World Congress. His sermons were even broadcast on the radio. Besides preaching, he was engaged in several projects: he founded the Credo movement (attempting to revitalize the faith of Catholic men in Hungary), served as the editor of the movement's periodical, *Credo*, regularly contributed to the other Dominican journal (*Rózsafüzér Királynője*) and published a number of books. Moreover, in the 1930s, he was commissioned by his superior to collect the materials for the final phase of the canonization process of Margaret of Hungary, King Béla IV's daughter, who died as a Dominican nun in the thirteenth century. The long awaited canonization took place in 1943.

In 1927 the Order sent him and Fr. Bertalan Badalik OP (who later became the bishop of Veszprém) to the United States to conduct missions among Hungarian immigrants. The mission trips were motivated by both spiritual and financial reasons, and they were not unprecedented: in 1921, the Jesuit Fr. Béla Bangha, another well-known preacher, spent a few months in the US, reaching out to Hungarian Catholics and collecting donations for the Catholic publication company in Hungary. Similarly, Frs. L. Shvoy and M. Marcell sailed overseas to raise money for the building of

their church, Regnum Marianum, and Franciscans were also drawn to work in America by the financial needs of their mother province. As for the Dominicans, the furnishing of the newly built Queen of Rosary Church in Budapest and the establishment of an institute for aspirants required massive funding.

The two Dominican friars undertook two mission trips to the US: in 1927/28 they spent almost seven months there, in 1932/33 about a year. During their stay, they travelled thousands of miles (often separately), gave missions for Hungarian parishes, schools and sisters, visited Hungarians in American churches and mixed parishes. Furthermore, Bőle translated the Pocket Manual of the Holy Name Society (a very popular devotional society for men founded by American Dominicans) into Hungarian, so that its members at the Hungarian parishes could read it in their mother tongue. Bőle and Badalik had all the necessary qualities for successful missionary work: outstanding oratorical skills, flexibility, versatility and good physical condition. What is more, Bőle was really committed to make the best of his stay. He used every opportunity to improve his English, to learn about the places he visited and to meet and talk to the people who lived there (which was an easy task for him as he had a very friendly personality, matched with a good sense of humor).

Bőle wanted to write a book about his experiences in America, so he took extensive notes of everything that happened to him. (He was probably encouraged by his previous book — written about his 1926 journey to Spain — which had just come out while he was in the United States.) He collected and made copies of articles written about the places, conducted research among Hungarian students at parish schools and during his second trip he even purchased a film camera to record important events. He probably started writing the book after returning to Hungary, but either he did not have the time to finish it then, or for other reasons, the book did not come out. The dissolution of the religious orders by the Communist regime in 1950 brought about a great purge, and as he later recalled, much of the manuscript (together with the film rolls but not his notes) got lost in the chaos. Thus, it was only in 1952 that he sat down again to write the book about his American mission trips. The manuscript of the first trip, which was completed in 1954, consists of more than 1200 neatly typed pages and has only recently been found and taken to the Archives of the Dominican Order in Vasvár, Hungary. Now it is being digitalized and prepared for publication.

The book is a unique and important source of America in the 1920s seen through the eyes of a priest coming from Europe. First of all,

we can learn more about the Hungarian communities, the parishes and the work of a missionary priest. We can see what life in America was like (e.g. the traffic, the workplaces, forms of entertainment etc.), and how immigrants lived when they had already settled down in their new country. It is especially of great value that he includes the histories of the Hungarian churches as they were published in special editions of Hungarian periodicals not or only partly accessible for us now: the *Magyarok Vasárnapja* (1908), *Szabadság* (1911), *Amerikai Magyar Népszava* (1924), *Amerikai Magyar Katolikus Naptár* (1926). Also, he provides informal details about people (colleagues and contemporaries), which can complement their official biographies. Besides giving a meticulous account of his days (including conversations, activities, thoughts and wonderings), he makes sure to give general factual information about the sights as well. It is worth mentioning that the book has multiple “time layers”. The first is the immediate setting: America in 1927/28 (including the topicalities e.g. the crime trials people were talking about) based on his notes. Then, due to the fact that he completed the book 25 years later, he refers to subsequent events (e.g. to his second trip or even his own times) making his account more comprehensive and interesting.

The following extract is about father Bőle's days in Árpádthon, a Hungarian settlement in Louisiana. The idea to visit his fellow countrymen in that desolate place came to him just a few weeks before that: in the early days of January 1928 while going to Chicago, he decided to take the train to San Francisco to reach the Hungarian Catholics there, and as he did not want to return to the east coast on the same route, he travelled in the south, via Los Angeles, Texas and New Orleans. Since he had heard about the strawberry growing Hungarians of Árpádthon, his missionary spirit led him to them. The history of the colony was recently published (see Royanne Kropog, *The Story of Árpádthon. Hungarian Settlement, Louisiana 1896-2006.*), describing what everyday life was like there. Now Father Bőle's account enables us to actually “see” them for a few days in 1928.¹

¹ Today Albany, Louisiana, can be found at the intersection of Louisiana Highway 43 and Interstate 12. The site of the former Árpádthon is between Albany and Springfield along Highway 43. The descendants of the region's Magyar pioneers still honour their Hungarian heritage. The community celebrates an annual Hungarian Heritage Day. Most recently this was held at Albany's Hungarian Presbyterian Church Hall. Also, the Árpádthon Hungarian Settlement Cultural Association holds an annual Hungarian festival on the first Saturday of October. See http://www.livingstonparish.com/hungarian_settlement.htm

Comments in square brackets in Bőle's account were added by the editor.

The Document

25 January, 1928.

In the afternoon I set out from New Orleans to discover the Hungarians of this region. I must confess that my knowledge of the peoples and conditions in this part [of the United States] was disordered... only my youthful energy helped to overcome this.

First of all, the Spanish monks I had been talking with had been telling me that they had been taking care of the Hungarians here. But how: since they knew no Hungarian and their flock did not know either Spanish or English? And then how did Hungarians end up here? How do they make a living? Who looks after them spiritually? How many of them are there? In what circumstances do they live? And so on. To these questions will come answers later.

But first let us look at the Dominican friars active in the region. They are members of the Rosarium Province of the Philippines. This Province [of the Dominican Order] has centers in the Philippines, in Spain and here [in Louisiana]. In this area there are friaries in the following places: New Orleans [...], Lakeview [today a part of the New Orleans metropolitan area], Ponchatoula, Hammond (where Árpádthon is and where I am going), Independence, Amite and Rosaryville where the [Dominican] Province's principal convent is — as well as a theological college. While I was there I met almost every member of this community.

Secondly, here is what we should know about the Hungarian colony of Árpádthon:

The 1911 Jubilee edition of the *Szabadság* daily wrote the following:

Árpádthon, Louisiana. The parish of Árpádthon was established in 1905 by Antal Hegyi. More than hundred Hungarian families live in the area and they undertook great sacrifices in the interest of its maintenance. [Hegyi's] successor for a few months was Ferenc Grósz then the Benedictine monk Oszkár Szilágyi got an appointment in a nearby Benedictine monastery as a teacher and he also takes spiritual care of the [Hungarians of Árpádthon].

I should add that Antal Hegyi had been a priest in the diocese of Vác and before he emigrated he was the parish priest of Csongrád. There he had the reputation of an iron-fisted, intensively patriotic man. Ferenc Grósz had been a priest of the Székesfehérvár bishopric and after he left Árpádthon he became the [Hungarian] parish priest in Perth Amboy.... He

was an energetic man, moved around a lot, founded things... At the end of his life he became an assistant pastor to the prelate Elemér Eördögh...

In the April 17, 1924 25th jubilee issue of the *Amerikai Magyar Népszava* Father Csernitzky, the [Hungarian] parish priest of Bridgeport, wrote the following [about Árpádhon]:

It was here that the then leaders of the Catholic community of the United States had planned a Catholic orphanage and a home for the aged. In this beautiful land, where walnut-sized strawberries ripen already in February, they could have bought a 2,200 acre property for a song, including a huge monastery with many rooms.[...] But at the time there was not enough money — and no enthusiasm. This despite the fact that the small Hungarian colony there looked forward to a great future — thanks to the efforts of the late Antal Hegyi and Ferenc Grósz. [Under the guidance] of father Oszkár Szilágyi they [even] managed to build a beautiful church in 1910. In the absence of a Hungarian priest, today the Hungarians of the region are served by a French priest.

And the 1926 *Amerikai Katolikus Naptár's* yearbook writes the following about Árpádhon in an article entitled “Parishes that have become English or have disappeared”:

...in the state of Louisiana many years ago in 1904 the then Hungarian leaders wanted to establish a significant institution. Just like many other [projects] this plan for a Catholic orphanage and a home for the aged was realized only in the imagination as the ancient curse of the Hungarians, dissention wrecked this humane and Christian plan. The backers of this [project] had been the fathers Antal Hegyi and Ferenc Grósz. In 1910 father Oszkár Szilágyi managed to build a church but later the small Hungarian community had to give that up as well. At the present some [Spanish-speaking] Dominican fathers serve these Hungarians.

The spiritual leaders of the Hungarians are Spanish priests!

[Next Father Bőle explains that his attention was brought to this colony of Hungarians under Spanish priestly guidance of friars from the Philippines by the Spanish cleric Bonaventura Garcia y Paredes. Bőle was anxious to visit this Magyar colony.]

[Bőle's account of his visit continues:]

We left New Orleans with its avenues with flowers and palm-trees. [...] We pass through a flood-plain. I see a huge prairie fire. Massive smoke billows to the sky and the flames keep shooting up. I had never

seen such a fire. This is America too. No one thinks of getting scared or controlling the fire. Perhaps it is not possible?

In another area everything is covered by water. Huge forests, big trees, everything under water. These big trees in time will rot away. Who cares? Says the Yankee.

A few Italian passengers recognize in me a priest. They introduce themselves and they obviously delight [in meeting] a Catholic father. These people have no love for the Protestants. After all they have no Virgin Mary and not even Saint Joseph!

Here we are, north of New Orleans. Hammond is a nice place. Our beloved Árpádhon [administratively] belongs here. It is not far from here, I will see it tomorrow!

As I enter [Hammond's] parish church, the local priest is filling out some kind of a form for a young boy. After we get through the introductions we go for a short walk. This was at my request as I wanted to see something of this region.

The church where the fathers work is dedicated to the Holy Spirit. The parish has two pastors and it is like a little mission.

I meet a German man. He is from Strassbourg. Members of this diligent people can be found everywhere, even here on the edge of primeval forests.

Before supper we pay a brief visit to the nuns. They have a primary school with four grades. They are nice, and are glad to see a rare visitor. After all such a priest from a distant land is not an everyday thing.

I was visited by a Hungarian family. It had to do with a letter of reference. The woman did not speak much. Her parents were from Bártfa. The man was from Cegléd. The man was well-spoken. They had three kids, three boys. One of them plays the trumpet, the other the violin, the third the harmonica. As I say good bye to them they invited me to their home, I should look them up and see the drawings of one of the boys — he can draw well. In the meantime the boy who was with them asked where I was from? I replied from Hungary, the same as your parents. Later when I blessed the boy I called him by name. His parents' eyes were in tears. Unfortunate exiles.

During supper we talked about the bolshevism that had been [in Hungary] and the present situation in Mexico. I was pleased that I could talk a little in various languages.

The nuns at the mission do blessed work. They are always cheerful and polite. (Other nuns often seem to be sour.)

At night I read a book about a pope.

26 January, Thursday. With the Dominicans this is the feast-day of Blessed Margaret [of Hungary].

I am among Hungarians in Árpádthon! We got here fast with a car. Their church is dedicated to Blessed Margaret. It's interesting that I should get here precisely on this day. I take this as the sign of good fortune. The church is of log construction, but it's pleasing. It is not too large [...] As I have mentioned, it was constructed by the Hungarian Benedictine [monk] Oszkár Szilágyi.

I hear that the colony has 76 Hungarian families. It has been carved out of primeval forests and it is still on the edge of such forest, but by now large fields were under cultivation. The colony is populated by the "strawberry Hungarians" — this is how they are called after their main activity. [...] they are served by an Irish priest by the name of Ryan, and a nun who takes care of the house [that serves as the parish hall].

I hear the names Bódi and Újvári. "You'll see them" says the priest "as there will be a wedding on Saturday, and you'll have to take part in it. We'll prepare for your mission."

[Bőle next describes his visit to the Dominican theological college of Rosaryville and then to the Dominican church of Ponchatoula.]

At the end [of these visits] we returned to Hammond. We were fairly tired and went to rest. Tomorrow we'll have another tiring day!

27 January, Friday.

[Here father Bőle describes his visit to the settlement of Amite and its Catholic clergy.]

28 January, Saturday.

Árpádthon. This is how its founders called it at the turn of the century.[...] When an American heard the name "Árpádthon" he couldn't pronounce it and simply called it Albany. You can choose between the names. As far as I am concerned, I vote for Árpádthon.

[...] The day's task will be to continue preparations for the mission. This is a much anticipated occasion for me. And presumably for [Árpádthon's Hungarians] too as the news of a visiting priest from the o'country must have spread at least a little. I don't know if there has ever

been such a visit by a Hungarian priest, especially a friar. As far as I know there hasn't been one.

The announcement of the mission happened only during a wedding — on the advice of the local pastor — as last Sunday no one knew of my coming so the visit could not be announced.

During the wedding unfortunately I forgot to ask who got married. They were a friendly Hungarian couple who exchanged vows during a mass. This is the most beautiful way to get married. The young, enthusiastic Irish priest officiated. I was there too so that people could see the missionary.

After the ceremony and during the departure from the church the newlyweds were showered with rice as a blessing and a sign of good wishes.

At the modest wedding feast I announced to the Hungarians present, as I did already in church, that in the evening the mission commences and everyone should come who can do so. And if they have any sick persons at home they [should tell me] and I'll go and offer them the sacraments.

During discussions I find out that [the Hungarians here] have two organizations, [and] that their chief activity is growing strawberries and that they make a good living. The strawberries ripen already in February and they are shipped in all directions. Because of their honesty the [Hungarians] have a good reputation.

In 1925 Gyula Bruszkay got a certificate for his 25 years [in this business]. He and one other person arrived here in 1896. Then came others. They all struggled hard, built homes [and some] had to start all over again when [their house] burned down. Then someone drove [cattle] into their [strawberry fields] to ruin their harvest. The local blacks also seemed to have been resentful of them. All in all they had enough trouble.

[In walking around the place] I had seen lot of houses without glass in their windows. The houses of the blacks were relatively nice.

In the evening there was a party of the young, still they came to hear the first speech of the mission. [During this mission] it was nice to hear Hungarian singing in the distance. István Resetár, a respected strawberry foreman, took charge of leading the singing. After all those years of separation from the home country the [people of Árpádhon] sang very well.

I stood before the... altar before my Louisinan-Hungarian flock and began my homily by telling them the story of Jesus and Zakaeus. [I told them that their [church] received its blessing today! And I explained

the significance and usefulness of this holy mission. Of course, before then I introduced myself saying who I was and where I came from. The spiritual link [with those in attendance] came about quickly. After all I am a Hungarian member of the order whose local Spanish members had [at one point] had cared... for the Hungarian faithful, even if they could not understand the Magyar language. But for now everyone can listen to the spoken word in the language of the old country.

The service ended by the singing of a beautiful song about [Saint] Mary in Hungarian. I implored those present to use the few days of my being here and come and take part in holy confession!

While our good Hungarians scattered in the direction of their homes they must have been discussing the mission. Our poor Hungarian [compatriots] — how long ago has it been that they had heard a sermon in the language of their homeland!

Later I had a good talk with Father Ryan who, despite his being Irish, looks after these Hungarian parish-folk — using English. I kept wondering how his predecessors managed when they spoke no Hungarian and the locals spoke no English. Father [Ryan] explained. The greatest problem was with holy confession. They alleviated the problem by producing a list of sins in Hungarian, numbered them and they printed the same list, with the same numbers, in English and Spanish translation. So, [during confession] the person doing the confession said the appropriate prayers and then showed [to the priest] the numbers on the list indicating the sins he or she had committed.... How different it will be now! People will be able to express in their own language their innermost thoughts. Well, let us see what Sunday will bring!

29 January. Sunday.

[...] We woke up to very cold weather. Winter has teeth here too, at least in the mornings — but not to the same extent as back home.

The parish priest held mass at 8 o'clock and at 10 [a.m.] I conducted the main service. Before then I heard confessions. The nuns assisted at the earlier mass and partook in holy communion. I gave altogether two homilies. The second of these was about the Holy Virgin — in true Hungarian fashion.

I sang during the main service with a strong voice [...] Let the angels — and the Hungarians — rejoice. [After the service] the Hungarians chatted happily in front of the little church before setting out for home... They were very thankful for being at a Hungarian mission at last.

I announced that in the afternoon there will be a homily and a lecture for young ladies.

They came in large numbers and listened keenly to my homily. It must have been strange for these flowers planted in foreign soil to listen to Hungarian speech; after all they had not heard magnificent Hungarian spoken outside of their home.

In the evening members of this small Hungarian community again got together — in ever increasing numbers.

Think about God! Think of our souls! Let us escape from sin and perdition through the grace of God! This is what the holy mission is for. The teaching, the examples, the encouragement fell upon the souls as the gentle rain [...]

The evening homily was about the goals of human beings. What are we living for? [...] so that we can get to know God, love him, serve him and this way we achieve salvation! [...]

The hours passed rapidly.

People began confessing in large numbers. One could get exhausted!

30 January. Monday.

In the morning people came for confessions. They appreciated the spiritual solace and blessings from God.

The elderly [Mr.] Spisak tells me how much [the members of the colony] would love if the settlement had a Hungarian school and a Hungarian priest. This is how their natural wish is expressed [...].

This strawberry-growing settlement is one of scattered farms that had been carved out from ancient forests. The edge of the forest is at the church. The paths from the settlement all lead there. Thank heaven, they are well trodden. The saying comes to my mind that where the threshold of the church is worn shiny, the path to the prison gets overgrown by weeds. [...]

Just as the church, the pastor's home is built from logs and it is modest but homey. My stay in it was pleasant [in the company of] the taciturn young Father Ryan.

I spent my free time learning English and when I got tired of doing that I worked on fixing the paths in the forest. [...] I read no newspapers [...] I enjoyed being alone [...] The weather was spring-like, early spring-like, much more mild than it is at home later in the year...

In my morning homily I called on the faithful to save our souls

[...] and told them to avoid capital sins, even minor sins. What is most important is that we restore our soul's health through holy confession [...] and prepare ourselves for salvation [...]

This morning not too many people came, as they had to go working but in the evening attendance was again much better.

January 31. Tuesday.

People came for confession by droves. One member of the flock asked me to tell people at home not to come here as there is always poverty here...

[An elderly man by the name of] Szombatics came to ask for a Bible. I promised to send him one. [...]

Joseph Deák asked me to send him copies of the Hungarian papers *Új Nemzedék* and *Nemzeti Újság*. He is obviously a man of understanding. I put down his address: Box 73.

A also visited a sick person. Everything was prepared for my visit in a [Hungarian] fashion in a pleasant, clean room. The woman was so glad that she could confess to a Hungarian priest! And I was happy to provide the sacred services.

This is how the final day of the month passed. Besides the church services I studied, prayed, read and talked to the quiet parish priest [...] enjoyed the English meals. As missionary life brings with it. Among the strawberry Hungarians, on the edge of the forest... From Detroit and Chicago I had been on an ever-changing travels.

February 1. Wednesday.

Already early in the morning people came for confession. Very nice confessions. It was apparent that God's mercy had ploughed into souls and the coming of a missionary was very useful.

Many of those confessing had not been to confession for ages. No wonder that instead of doing it with numbered lists of sins, they waited until a Hungarian missionary turned up. The record was 31 years. So it was worth coming here, if only for this one, hundredth lamb.

[Bőle here tells that the people confessing were from all corners of Hungary.]

In the evening the telegram came that two Dominican fathers from Rosaryville will come for a visit tomorrow.

During the morning homily I explained how a holy confession happens successfully.

In the evening we held the most solemn of veneration of the sacraments. The very young girls and some older ones, came dressed in white. This ceremony is usually the high-point of the mission. This was the hour of being emotionally moved and of tearful eyes [...]!

February 2. Thursday. The feast-day of Candlemas.

[This was] the final day of the mission. Árpádthon celebrated this holyday of the Blessed Virgin in Catholic spirit.

It was a crisp, cold day. Of course we have to understand the cold relative to the conditions of this place. This is far from the deep-chill we experience at home.

Many came for the confession. About 300 people took holy communion. This is a large number considering the size of this settlement.[...] We blessed the candles and held a procession. Then came high mass celebrated with the utmost gusto we could muster. [...] [Later] the children got instructions about the true respect for God, obedience, industry... So many people came that some said they had never seen so many worshippers together... Then the men got instructions to be good human beings, worthy family men, always true to the faith and country, always loving the old country left behind and responsible for their duties to the new. A talked to a few of them [...]

[When Bőle was ready to leave, two more people came to confess] I heard their confessions. Earlier they did not want to confess but than God they relented. They were very happy. Their daughter is a nun. [...]

The Devil is a crafty master. He wants to keep souls from the most sacred things!

Throughout the day there were many women young women dressed in white and men dressed in their Sunday's best around. They were all happy. I talked to some of them. Mihály Hlinka, who used to be a policeman in Budapest, Ferencváros, is a trustee here. He asked for a rosary. István Resetár is a righteous man as I could see, he heads the Hungarian Catholics in prayer and singing, keeping them together. This hearty man asked me to send him the prayer and psalm book *Orgonavirágok* edited by Gyula Takácsi when I get back [to Hungary]. (Later I sent this bulky and very rich book to him. May the good Hungarians sing in the church and keep their identity and Faith!) Mister Dolhay also wanted a copy.

During the last and very successful mission homily the Spanish friars arrived — there were three of them. At last they could see a true Hungarian, spirited, religious ceremony!

The beautiful missionary procession on the edge of the forest, near the strawberry-fields, during the sunset, was an experience that brought forth tears. The shine of the candles threw light on the hands holding them, from people's lips came the sound of songs sprang from the hearts. The flame of refreshed faith burned and tears sparkled in people's eyes.

I had organized the procession the way I used to at home: first came the people with the flags and the cross and then the children, the girls, the lads, the men, followed by the mission's cross on the shoulders of other men, followed in turn by the missionary priest, and then the women.

The emotionally moved participants sang and prayed...

Hungary's Catholic community had expanded. The Duna and Tisza embraced the Mississippi, the Carpathians with the primeval forest [...]

When we returned to the church the litany was held by the English [Irish ?] priest, but we sang the *Te Deum* in Hungarian. [Then came] the [Hungarian] national anthem with its soul-shaking relevance [...]

[Afterward] people came to say good-bye and thank everything. Children, girls, lads, women and men. They held my hand with tears in their eyes. Ever more so as they saw that the [visiting] Spanish fathers wanted to take me away with their car.

I consoled Father Ryan in his difficult tasks and asked him to love his Hungarians and serve them his heart. [and] I promised people to send photographs of the mission and whatever I had said I would send.

As the sun had set already, the Spanish priests were in a hurry. I said one last prayer before the church. in front of the crowd, the nuns and the Father. I got into the waiting car with heavy heart as taking leave of these good people hurt. The driver turned on the motor.

God be with you! God bless you all! [I shouted].

[They shouted back] God be with you Father. They waved and he clenched their handkerchiefs wiping their tear-filled eyes.

[...] The car was taking me away. The little church, the priests residence, the homes of the Hungarians, the strawberry fields all receded in the distance. My thoughts kept returning. [...] At the end of this mission I realize how the Lord had blessed this little mission. [...]

Benedictus Deus! Blessed be the Lord for all this! God be with you Hungarians of Árpádthon!

* * *

At the end of my second tour [of the United States] I wanted to get to this little Hungarian colony again as I had not forgotten them. I had exchanged letters with their leader István Resetár. and promised him that if I can, I'll come again. [...] But it did not turn out that way. To this day I regret not having seen these good Hungarians once more.

I would love to know what is happening now [as I write these lines in 1953] with the Hungarians of Árpádhon. As soon as I can, I'll write to [Mr.] Resetár. Let these Hungarians who have been cast to distant lands see and feel that their missionary priest had not forgotten them! [...]

A Review Article:

**Two Books by two Sandors about the
Origins of Hungarians**

Balint Kacsoh

Frank Sandor. *Magyar Origins. A 21st Century Look at the Origins of Ancient Hungarians*. Self Published. Maple Ridge, British Columbia, Canada, 2012. ISBN 978-0-9880065-0-8. 400 pages; available from Amazon.com (USD 24.26 + shipping as paperback).

Klára Sándor. *Nyelvrokonság és hunhagyomány. Rénszarvas vagy csodaszarvas? Nyelvtörténet és Művelődéstörténet* [Linguistic kinship and Hun tradition. Reindeer or miraculous stag? Linguistic and cultural history]. Typotex Elektronikus Kiadó Kft., Hungary, 2011. Published with the support of the György Lukács Foundation. ISBN 978-963-279-873-7. 472 pages; available from: http://www.tydotex.hu/konyv/sandor_klara_nyelvrokonsag_es_hunhagyomany (HUF 1652 as pdf download) or as paperback from <http://www.libri.hu> (HUF 4655 + shipping).

At first glance, the two books under review share only three features: the family name of the authors (who are probably unrelated), the topic, and the authors' enthusiasm. Just about everything else in these books is sharply different. According to the posting on Amazon.com, Mr. Frank Sandor was born to Hungarian Canadian parents who fled Hungary in 1956. He has an Associate Degree in Criminology from Douglas College, and attended both the British Columbia Institute of Technology and Simon Fraser University. It is unclear what he studied at these institutions, and Mr. Sandor did not mention any degree earned beyond his Associate Degree. In short, Mr. Sandor is an amateur historian and linguist with no formal education on the subject. In contrast, Dr. Klára Sándor is highly credentialed in the field (see her home page on the web: <http://www.sandorklara.hu/>, or the Hungarian edition of Wikipedia). Dr. Sándor belongs to a school, an intellectual lineage that includes such inter-

nationally recognized, prominent scholars as András Róna-Tas and the late Lajos Ligeti. She earned her doctorate in *turkology* at the University of Szeged in 1991, an advanced degree (*kandidátus*) in linguistics from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, MTA) in 1996, and she is the recipient of numerous awards. She was also a representative in the Hungarian Parliament delegated by the SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats), a now defunct liberal party.

The difference in the two authors' academic background is painfully evident from their writing style as well as the content of their books. Both authors wrote the book in the respective languages in which they were educated. Mr. Sandor's writing is loaded with spelling and grammatical errors, and his use of English generally undermines the reader's trust in the content. Mr. Sandor uses embarrassingly flawed spelling (e.g. he spelled "resurrection" as "reserection" [p. 137]), frequently misuses the Saxon genitive (e.g., "the pagan dharma wheels six realms of existence [p. 222]), does not know the difference between "*i.e.*" and "*e.g.*" (for example on pp. 66 and 298), and uses expressions like "this is not over exaggeration on my part" (p. 159) — as if there were such phrases as "over exaggeration," and its counterpart, "under exaggeration." Mr. Sandor confuses adjectives with adverbs: "This gives us a *probably* adoption time of this word to be between the 1st and 3rd centuries A.D." (I added the italics.) His writing style is mostly colloquial. His book lacks an index that would be badly needed, particularly because of the repetitious structure of the book. Dr. Klára Sándor, on the other hand, writes well: her style, spelling, and grammar are excellent. Although she used a somewhat formulaic approach to introduce the material of each chapter, and some of this felt cumbersome and contrived, there were no errors comparable to Mr. Sandor's. Dr. Sándor also inserted colloquial language on occasion (e.g., "Dzsingisz egyéb ügyekben nem sokat *lacafacázó* mongoljai" – p. 257; "*rissz-rossz* latinsággal megírt Csíki székely krónika" – p. 376), evidently in an effort to make her book an easier read. After all, her monograph is not meant as a scholarly treatise, but a popular science book. As expected from someone of her expertise, the book is well structured, has endnotes, references, and an index — although only for the names appearing in the text. The pdf version is fully searchable.

Both authors defined their reasons to write their books at the outset. Mr. Sandor, at least initially, set out on a personal quest to trace his Magyar origins through time. As a first generation Canadian, this is also a journey for defining his Magyar identity, with hopes to pass it on as a father. Dr. Sándor also mentioned personal reasons stemming from her

love for the deer of Hungarian mythology. The deer that is threatened by the attitudes of Hungarians — those who turn it into a rigid idol and those who ridicule it. These attitudes are usually aligned with one's political persuasion and represent the political right (conservative, patriotic/ nationalistic [the designation differs on one's affiliation]) and political left (liberal, cosmopolitan/anti-patriotic [the designation differs on one's affiliation]), respectively. Dr. Sándor describes the schism between "the reality of linguistic history" and "the truth of legends" as perceived by many, and states that the two aspects can be reconciled. Both authors' stated goals are worthy, although I feel that neither will succeed to their satisfaction. Mr. Sandor's semi-novel theory of Hungarian origins is seriously flawed (in spite of some accurate and even insightful observations), whereas Dr. Sándor's book is unlikely to convince the opponents of Finno-Ugrism. I must add that some of the opponents even deny the fundamentally Finno-Ugric nature of the Magyar language, whereas others accept it, but deny that the Magyars branched off from northern Ob-Ugric peoples, migrating to the south and finally to Central Europe. The first group is hopeless to convince. The second group has an important point: the origin of the "Uralic" speakers remains unresolved.

Dr. Sándor mostly presented material based on peer-reviewed scholarly publications, representing the state of the field, including its prevailing views, practices, and biases. Questioning Dr. Sándor's statements would be equal to disagreeing with most linguists and historians. Mr. Sandor, on the other hand, presented primarily his own research, which is admittedly in conflict with the "official history" accepted and promulgated by western and Hungarian academicians alike. Mr. Sandor believes that the West has had hostile attitude against Hungarians, and that the current take of the MTA on Hungarian origins is rooted in the politically motivated (therefore tainted) "science" of Finno-Ugrism that was invented by Budenz and Hunfalvy as agents of the Habsburgs. Mr. Sandor is hardly the first one to come up with that accusation. A vast volume of literature has been created by amateur researchers in the past 150 years to counter the "Finno-Ugric conspiracy." Mr. Sandor is clearly in this group, and he put forth an alternative explanation for Magyar origins. In his concluding chapter (p. 294), he quoted Sir Arthur Conan Doyle: "Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth," and added that his book was about the same idea. *I.e.*, the impossible notion is that the Hungarian language came from the "fabled Proto-Uralic language east of the Ural Mountains," and after he eliminated this impossible proposition, the "truth remains" (even if it sounds

unlikely): Hungarians came from around the Hindu Kush Mountains, and the Hungarian language and other Uralic languages descended from Sanskrit. Of course, one would need to eliminate *all* impossible scenarios to follow Doyle's proposition properly.

Mr. Sandor correctly described that the relationship between Magyar and Sanskrit had been observed by "another Sandor" (whose baptismal name was Sándor): Sándor Csoma de Kőrös (1784-1842). Dr. Sándor wrote about Csoma in her book, and mentioned that he had studied Sanskrit, but failed to mention Csoma's assertion that Sanskrit and Magyar were related both in their grammar and vocabulary. Neither Dr. Sándor, nor Mr. Sandor cited the small bilingual book by Gyula Wojtilla (*Kőrösi Csoma Sándor Szanszkrit-Magyar Szójegyzéke*), which was published by the MTA in 1984 and incorporated Csoma's work on the subject. Whereas this omission is understandable from the amateur Mr. Sandor, given her outstanding credentials, Dr. Sándor's oversight is puzzling.

Neither author mentioned the Indo-Uralic hypothesis, the works by the English Henry Sweet (1845-1915), the Hungarian László Szabédi of Kolozsvár (1907-1959), or the contemporary Dutch, Spinoza Prize-winning linguist Frederik Kortlandt (1946-), just to name a few relevant scholars. Surprisingly, Mr. Sandor reached an insightful (presumably independent) conclusion, which (although incorrect as stated) is close to the Indo-Uralic hypothesis: "This would make all Uralic languages a branch on the Indo-European group of languages" (p. 263). From a superbly credentialed linguist like Dr. Sándor, whose field and training are related to the origins of the Magyar language, the total exclusion of the Indo-Uralic hypothesis (*i.e.*, not even mentioning it with criticism) is inexcusable from a purely scholarly perspective — it is neglecting a field that is in conflict with the favoured model. However, Dr. Sándor is hardly alone with this omission. In fact, most books and conferences about the origin of Magyar language neglect to mention the Indo-Uralic hypothesis, or even its widely accepted counterpoint, which denies common origin, but accepts "early contacts" between speakers of Uralic and Proto-Indo-European (PIE). An example for neglecting the topic is the conference held at the MTA in April of 2013 (<http://www.arpad.btk.mta.hu/>). Given that an estimated one third of Hungarian vocabulary is deemed Indo-European (IE) in origin (or at least overlaps with it), this is not a trivial issue. Such omissions certainly provide ammunition to Mr. Sandor, when he (like many others) criticizes the "establishment-approved scholars," accusing them of ulterior motives.

To be sure, the accusations are mutual, even though not personal. The authors apparently don't know of each other's work. Dr. Sándor dedicated a whole chapter ("Fatum Morganum") to the amateur "researchers" of Hungarian origins, who had been labeled already in the 19th century (perhaps with some cynicism, a possible sly reference to the principle of Tengriism) as "*délibábos*," which is probably best translated as "mirage-chaser." The word *délibáb* (*mirage*) literally means "noontime puppet [apparition]." Since the words *noon* and *south* are the same in Hungarian (*dél*), the mirage-chaser amateur linguists and historians have come up with a similarly unflattering name for the Finno-Ugrist scholars: "*északi bábos*" ("northern puppet" mirage-chasers). The cardinal directions South and North indeed reflect where the two camps usually envision the Magyar *Urheimat*. Dr. Sándor correctly points out that the *délibábos* camp is not uniform in its degree of preparedness, motivations, intents, truthfulness, commitment, or fraudulence. She gives selected examples to illustrate her points. Unfortunately, her selection of authors, the selection of these authors' statements, and sometimes her assessment of these authors betray bias.

An example for the bias is Dr. Sándor's portrayal of the late Dr. László Götz and his "four-volume monograph" that was published under the joint title of *Keleten Kél a Nap* (*The Sun Rises in the East*). Dr. Sándor admits that Dr. Götz occupies a special place among the proponents of Sumerian-Hungarian relatedness — a notion both Mr. Sandor and Dr. Sándor dismiss. She states that unlike many others, Dr. Götz "did not use non-existent literature," "he did not confuse Sumerian and Akkadian readings" [of cuneiform signs], and "he tried to use counter-arguments to disprove/refute the arguments supporting Finno-Ugric kinship [*rokonság*] instead of mere 'Communist name-calling'." In the end, she adds, the views of Dr. Götz "cannot be sustained" and his arguments "have been refuted" (p. 47). It is telling that Dr. Sándor did not add any reference to prove the point that Dr. Götz's work had been refuted. The original publication indeed consisted of four volumes — prefaced by the late Professor Gyula László (whose "double conquest" theory "should be forgotten" as stated by Prof. Róna-Tas at the above mentioned MTA conference). However, if Dr. Sándor wants to live up to scholarly rigor, she should have noted that Dr. Götz wrote a 5th book, and the currently circulated two-volume version contains all five books. Curiously, there is not even a single example that Dr. Sándor found worthy of quoting from this huge (over 1,100 pages long) and dense *opus*, which is supported with scientifically valid, published references. The umbrella statement that

Götz's work had been refuted is hardly acceptable. Was he wrong about everything? And if he was wrong, what does it mean about the scientific literature on which he based his books? Dr. Sándor quoted ridiculous and obviously wrong statements by Badiny, Aczél, and others, but not from Götz. Even more curious is that Dr. Sándor did not single out Götz's treatise of the Turkic languages, particularly the relationship between the *lir-* and *saz-Turkic* languages vs. Sumerian and Magyar. In addition, Götz described that *lir-Turkic* nature of Chuvash language was a late development (which Götz did not invent, but cited a published reference). It is befuddling why Dr. Sándor, a professional turkologist would not comment on these topics in a concrete manner. Did she read Götz's book, or merely related what she had heard about it in academic circles?

In general, a main problem with Dr. Sándor's book is in the biased omissions, and accepting the prevailing dogma without applying scrutiny. Neglecting Csoma's work on Magyar-Sanskrit linguistic kinship while mentioning Csoma's Sanskrit studies, neglecting to mention the Indo-Uralic hypothesis, or neglecting to mention even the existence of the linguist Gábor Bálint de Szentkatolna (1844-1913) are but a few examples. She accuses the "mirage chasers" of bias (scientific, nationalistic, political, etc.), in which she has a point, yet she is guilty of the same. As mentioned, in spite of being a turkologist, she did not critique Götz's assessment of Turkic languages. But there is more. Dr. Sándor mentioned (and praised) the turkologist and Vice President of the MTA, Lajos Ligeti on several occasions throughout the book. She also mentioned the medieval chronicles about the origins of the Hungarians (Anonymus [*Gesta Hungarorum*], Simon of Kéza [*Gesta Hunnorum et Hungarorum*], Márk of Kált [*Chronicon Pictum*]). Finally, Dr. Sándor also mentioned the great turkologist (and long-time opponent of Budenz), Ármin Vámbéry. Yet, she omitted to mention a '*gesta*' that should be prominently important particularly for a turkologist because it was procured in Turkey and donated to the Academy in 1860 by Vámbéry: the *Tarih-i Üngürüşz* ("The Story of the Hungarians"). This book was well hidden in the stacks of the MTA's Library for well over a hundred years until the early 1970's. The book was originally written in Latin, and translated into Ottoman Turkish by Mahmud Tercüman (1510-1575) who rescued it from burning during the Turkish occupation of Hungary. The medieval Turkish was translated into Hungarian by József Blaskovics (1910-1990), an ethnic Magyar living in Czechoslovakia, working at Charles University in Prague as a professor of turkology. According to the witness account of Gyula Geönczeöl, Lajos Ligeti tried to prevent the translation and the publication of this book, and

threatened those who were involved with the project. In spite of his objections, partly because of support from Gyula Illyés, a Hungarian company (*Magvető*) published it in 1982 in limited numbers and minimum censorship of the text. Since then, in spite of the collapse of the communist system in 1989/1990, the book has been printed only outside Hungary. The *Tarih-i Üngürüş* contains statements that are in conflict with the official model of Magyar origins — beyond what the other chronicles contain. That was Ligeti's reason to object to its publication and (once the cat was out of the bag) that is why the professional scholars either neglect it, or (if they refer to it at all) dismiss it as unreliable as a source material. Dr. Sándor chose the path to neglect it altogether. So did Mr. Sandor whose saving grace is that he is neither a turkologist, nor a professional.

To return to Mr. Sandor's opus, I must reemphasize that his lack of scientific background made the reading painful and frustrating. Here, I would like to give some concrete examples to avoid accusations of non-specific "umbrella statements."

Regarding the Magyar language as a direct derivative of Sanskrit, Mr. Sandor came up with "Linguistic Laws" that he less than modestly named after himself as "Sandor's Laws" (following in the footsteps of "Grimm's Laws"). Rule 1: Reduce (shorten the word to a maximum of two syllables); Rule 2: Reuse (recycle Magyar words to translate foreign concepts, creating "hybrid words"); Rule 3: Soften (certain phonetic changes). To be clear, Mr. Sandor does not appear to understand that if a Linguistic Law exists, its application should consistently lead to predictable outcome. (As an aside: professional linguists are less than consistent about their application of sound "rules," and designate certain words inappropriately as onomatopoeitic, idophone, "vándorszó," etc. to avoid exposing the limitations of the model they intend to "fit.") "Sandor's Laws" are vague and can make almost anything fit without being able to predict. So, how do these Rules of "Sandor's Law" work? According to Mr. Sandor, applying Rule 1 to the Sanskrit word "*viropaNa*" meaning "grow/woman," we get the Magyar word: "*nő*". The "reduction" meant the disposal of "*viropa*", and we kept only "*Na*," which went through Rule 3, and softened to "*nő*." Never mind that the "*Na*" is a suffix, and is appended to many words in Sanskrit, e.g., "*varga*" to create "*vargaNa*." Mr. Sandor is also mistaken beyond the "rule:" the word "*viropaNa*" does not mean "woman" in Sanskrit. The root of the verb is {viruh} ("to cause to grow, to thrust out, to expel, to remove").

Mr. Sandor's Rule 2 example is even less insightful — it betrays that he is not only unfamiliar with Sanskrit, but his competency in Hun-

garian is compromised. Thus, the Rule of “Reuse” is exemplified with the Magyar word “*vasaló*” (“iron” — the tool for ironing *e.g.*, shirts), which he believes to be a hybrid between the Magyar word “*vásár*” (market, trade/trading) and the Sanskrit word “*loha*” (iron, the metal). But perhaps all of this was topped by his etymology for the Magyar word “*lovás*” (horseman), which he derived from the Sanskrit “*loha*” as well because the word “*lovás*” contains “*vas*” — and “*loha*” refers to iron and something “copper colored.” Mr. Sandor does not seem to realize that the Magyar word “*lovás*” follows the typical suffixation of words such as *cső – csöves*, *kő – köves*, and that the word “*lovás*” has as much to do with “*vas*” (iron) as the word “*lovak*” has to do with “*vak*” (blind).

After this, one would not be surprised to see Mr. Sandor’s etymology for the Magyar word “*püspök*” (bishop). He believes it came “from the Sanskrit name Puspaka which means “King of serpents” [sic]. If you check Mr. Sandor’s otherwise trustworthy (and valuable) source, spokensanskrit.de, you will find that the Latinized transliteration is *puSpaka*, and it means “kind of” (not “king of”) serpent (and not “serpant”).

The Appendices include a table of 200 Sanskrit words that are, in Mr. Sandor’s logic, the precursors of cognate Magyar words. Most of these were completely unrelated words (and some were listed twice). However, there were some that, almost as a total surprise, proved to be at least somewhat correct. For example, gold is “*arany*” in Magyar, and one of the dozens of Sanskrit word for gold is “*hiranya*” (should be correctly transliterated “*hiraNya*”; Mr. Sandor missed the similar “*aruNa*”). Other good catches include Magyar “*méz*” = Sanskrit “*mada*” (*honey*); Magyar “*nem*” = Sanskrit “*nahi*” (*no*; Mr. Sándor should have noticed the Sanskrit “*na*” as well); and Magyar “*hó*” = Sanskrit “*hima*” (*snow*). The Sanskrit “*kaSaya*” (dirt, filth) was equated with “*kő*” (*stone*), not realizing that “*katha*” is the cognate word for the Magyar “*kő*” in Sanskrit.

Appendix D (p. 345-351) deals with the etymology of “*tulipán*” (tulip), which was addressed also in the body of the text (pp. 137, 159-166). Mr. Sandor is hardly the first one to recognize that something is wrong with the history of the tulip motif in Hungarian art, but to his credit, he provided evidence that the etymology of the internationally used word “tulip” was also wrong. According to the “MTA-approved” version, the “tulip motif” entered Hungarian folk art only in the 18th century, and the flower reached Hungary from the West, *i.e.*, after the flower became a fad in the Netherlands. And, together with the flower, its name “tulip” arrived to Hungary from the West. This line of history was refuted in a book by

one of the so-called “mirage-chaser” amateur historians, Dr. Miklós Érdy (*A Magyarország Keleti Eredete és Hun Kapcsolata* [The Hungarians’ Eastern Origins and Hun Ties]). However, even mainstream academicians have come up with findings that undermine the traditional view about the Hungarian tulip motif’s origin in Western Europe. Marianne Rozsondai described tulip motifs on the leather covers of *Corvina* codexes made for Kings Mátyás (Mathias) and Ulászló II (Vladislaus II; <http://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00021/00379/Ksz2008-3-02.htm>). Both kings predated the famed journey of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, the envoy of Ferdinand I to the court of Suleiman the Magnificent. Busbecq is credited with obtaining tulip bulbs, which he gave to his friend Charles de l’Écluse. Charles de l’Écluse established cultivation of tulip in the Netherlands. Mr. Sandor is observant when he points out that the official etymology of “tulip” is wrong. The prevailing opinion is that the word is related to “*turban*” because of the appearance of the flower. However, Busbecq wrote in his *Turkish Letters* that he saw fields with blossoming flowers on his way from Adrianapolis to Constantinople, and among the flowers were those that “the Turks called *tulipan*.” *I.e.*, verbatim the Magyar word. The problem is that the Turks never called tulips *tulipan*, but “*lâle*.” Thus, when Busbecq gave the bulbs to de l’Écluse, he also transmitted the name, which he heard from people he met, and assumed to be Turkish. Yet the word the “Turks” mentioned to him was not Turkish. As Dr. Érdy, Mr. Sandor also pointed out that the highest genetic diversity of tulips is in areas where the Magyars came from. The conclusions by the two authors were somewhat different: Dr. Érdy placed the Magyars to the Tien Shan area, whereas Mr. Sandor to the Hindu Kush range. Nonetheless, both concluded that the tulip motif came with the ancient Hungarians to Europe. Mr. Sandor, unfortunately, ruined the finding by adding his typical etymology. He tries to derive the word from the Sanskrit “*tUlika*” (“painter’s brush”) because of their similar appearance. He failed to notice the relationship to the Finnish “*tulipalo*” (“fire”) and “*tuli*” (“flame”), even though when discussing the words for fire (p. 178), he recognized these Finnish and the cognate Estonian words. (As an aside, the Mongolian word for “flame” is “*döli*,” very similar to the Finnish.) In Table 6 (p. 178), Mr. Sandor gave the Sanskrit word for fire as “*tulika*,” which is a simple mistake. However, if it were correct, it would be related to Finnish, and more likely explanation of the word “*tulipan*” than the “painter’s brush” meaning.

Mr. Sandor’s approach is multidisciplinary, and is not limited to linguistics. As such, he ventures into the realms of archeology, numis-

matics, folklore, religion, and genetics. Unfortunately, he is not better at these than he is at linguistics.

Like Dr. Sándor, Mr. Sandor also addresses some of the medieval chronicles. It is a hit and miss approach at best — Mr. Sandor probably never studied Latin. The following telling comment is just an example: “Kezai writes Meotidis which is believed to be Meotis” (p. 78). Clearly, Mr. Sandor is unfamiliar with the 3rd declension of Latin nouns and adjectives, and can’t recognize a genitive case. And yet, he observed an interesting element (p. 144) in “*Emese’s Dream*” as described by Anonymus in the *Gesta Hungarorum*. According to the translated text, a divine vision appeared to *Emese* “in the form of a falcon that, as if coming to her, impregnated her [with her son, *Álmos*].” Mr. Sandor noted that the original Latin text was “*in forma asturis*,” which literally means “in the form of a craft,” and not “in the form of a falcon.” The issue is not simple, and Mr. Sandor was ill prepared to explain it. He concluded: “the tradition is fairly consistent in presenting the craft as either a hawk, falcon, osprey, *etc.*” He didn’t notice that “*in forma asturi*” means “in the form of hawks.” An “s” makes a difference, and *that* “s” may have a host of explanations. One of them is similar to the one offered by Mr. Sandor: an association between the words “craft” and “bird of prey.” Since the craft may refer to a wheel, and falcon-shaped Gothic fibulae displayed a wheel – the solar cross – on the falcons’ chest, the original translation is right on target even without contemplating the differences between classical *vs.* medieval Latin, or errors in copying.

Mr. Sandor interprets Simon de Kéza’s *Gesta Hunnorum et Hungarorum*’s famous passage about the *rovás* letters in a unique way. The passage about the “letters of the *Blacks*” has been a matter of controversy. Some equated the Blacks with Vlachs (“oláh” – a word related to “olasz”), but László Rásonyi identified them with the *Blaks* (or *Bulaqs*), a Turkic tribe. Mr. Sandor envisions that the event of acquiring the letters was not around the time of the Conquest, nor was it in the Carpathians, but much earlier in Bactria (which would be turned into *Blak* from the “Sanskrit name *Balak*”), and the mountains were the Hindu Kush (pp. 58-60). In reality, the Sanskrit name of Bactria is *Bahilka*, and not *Balak*.

Mr. Sandor asserts that the Magyars’ religion at the time of their arrival in the Carpathian Basin was Vedic Hinduism. To arrive at this conclusion, he dismisses other religions, including Tengriism (pp. 178-179), a religion discussed more in-depth by Dr. Sándor (pp. 133-135, 160-161, 257-258) who also describes the link between Tengriism and

Manicheistic Christianity (pp. 162-163). Tengriism, correctly pointed out by Dr. Sándor, is not just a syncretic religion, but it is a form of monotheism. In contrast to Mr. Sandor, Dr. Sándor asserts the majority of the 9th century Magyar settlers followed Tengriism, *i.e.*, the typical steppe religion of the “other nomads.” The insight shown by the two authors about Tengriism is very contrasting. Mr. Sandor states that the belief that Tengriism was the Magyars’ religion is based on a single word: “*tenger*” (sea). Mr. Sandor accepts that the Magyar word for “sea” “probably comes” from the word meaning “sky” and “sky god,” but concludes that “the evidence ends” at this conjunction. He is missing a major point, which was at least partially covered by Dr. Sándor, correctly citing a major discovery by Gyula László: the grave goods were placed next to bodies in Magyar graves in an arrangement that was symmetrical to that in life. Similarly, the cemetery was the mirror image of the village — all this was based on the belief that in the netherworld everything mirrored the one above. Dr. Sándor overlooked pointing out that this is the reason why the Magyar word for “sea” is the same as the Mongolian word for “sky,” and that in several languages one can find identical (or closely related) words for sky and sea, or sky and land/earth. Thus, the “as above, so is below” principle is, in and of itself, not a proof of Tengriism — we encounter it in Hermetic philosophy, Taoism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, *etc.* — but its manifestation as part of the burial customs is narrowing the possibilities.

Dr. Sándor and Mr. Sandor have contrasting takes on the genetic evidence of the Magyars’ origins. Dr. Sándor focuses on the general aspects of genetics and its limitation in identifying any people’s ancestors. She correctly points out that nations do not originate from an isolated population. She missed the opportunity to define ethnogenesis *vs.* the history of the ethnos, and how genetics may play a role in tracking down both. When staying away from the specifics, she also avoids discussing data that are difficult to interpret within the confines of the “MTA-sanctioned” Finno-Ugric theory. Mr. Sandor, on the other hand, tries to make the Magyars’ *paternal* genetic origin monophyletic, and ties it to a single Y chromosomal haplogroup subclade designated as R1a1a (identified with the M198 marker, *i.e.*, an SNP [single nucleotide polymorphism]). He cites data indicating that about 60% of Magyar men belong to this subclade. He also asserts that the Uralic speakers (other than Magyars) carry a different marker (known as M178), which is absent from the Magyar population. Thus, he concludes, “Hungarians do not share a common genetic origin with Estonian or any other Uralic language speaking people” (p. 25). Moreover, “if the marker is at least 4,000 years old,

Magyars sure as heck were not living near Uralic speakers east of the Ural Mountains as recently as 1,500 years ago” (p. 27). Mr. Sandor admits: “Magyars and other Uralic speakers do share a common language that cannot be ignored” (p. 27). Mr. Sandor identifies Magyars’ ancestors in the people whose remains are known as the Tarim Basin mummies (pp. 13, 33, 63).

What is wrong with Mr. Sandor’s assertions regarding the Magyars’ genetic background? In short, what he considers as “proof” is a “perhaps” at best. DNA-based genealogy is a rapidly developing field, and it can be confusing due to the changing terminology. Thus, Mr. Sandor never realized that the “Finno-Ugric M178 marker” that he described as absent from the (contemporary) Magyar population (p. 27) is identical with the “genetic subgroup” [Y haplogroup subclade] N1c identified in two individuals’ bones in “Conquest Era graves” that he mentioned later in the text (p. 107). Mr. Sandor attributed these N1c-positive individuals to “assimilated groups” that “may have been Alans.” It is noteworthy that the Alans’ typical Y haplogroup is definitely not N1c, but G2a — another piece of information Mr. Sandor is apparently unfamiliar with. Mr. Sandor cited an early study, which used a small sample, leading to an over-estimation of R1a1a (M198) in the population of present-day Magyars. The real proportion is lower than 60% and, in reality, Magyars have somewhat lower percentage of R1a1a in the population than some of the Slavic populations (*e.g.*, Ukrainians).

What Mr. Sandor also fails to recognize is that the M198 marker now designates a subclade known as R1a1a*, which has several further subclades. Unfortunately, the DNA of the mummies of the Tarim Basin have not been analyzed for these subclades, thus we can’t claim whether they are our ancestors or our ancestors’ cousins. They could have been just as much the ancestors of Slavic peoples (presumably with an M458 marker), or Turkic peoples (presumably with a Z93 marker), or Baltic (Finnic) and Central European (Magyar and Slavic) people (presumably with a Z280 marker). Whereas I must point out that Mr. Sandor has no proof for the Magyar identity of the Tarim mummies (which the “mainstream” science claims as Indo-European with just as much evidence as Mr. Sandor’s), there are some noteworthy genetic observations connecting the Tarim mummies to the Andronovo culture. Genetically, a dominant (not exclusive) Y haplogroup in the Andronovo culture was R1a, and several of the maternally inherited mitochondrial DNA haplogroups (*e.g.*, T, U5a) are also prevalent among present-day Magyars. An association between the Y chromosomal R1a haplogroup and the relatively novel gene

mutation (the rs12913832*G allele of the *HERC2* gene) resulting in blue/green eye color has been reported. Both the Andronovo and Tarim populations were prevalently blue/green eyed based on the DNA test. The Andronovo culture itself is a matter of controversy. Its designation as a culture of Indo-European speakers is shaky, yet it is the “consensus.” Designating it as Uralic is a minority opinion, which is based on the Seima-Turbino phenomenon, *i.e.*, the migration of Uralic speakers that started in the Andronovo territory. Mr. Sandor is wrong to represent the Tarim mummies as definitely Magyar. To his credit, he at least recognized the link; after all, kinship of some sort is likely with present-day Magyars as well as other Uralic speakers via the Andronovo horizon. Dr. Sándor, on the other hand, even though mentioned the Tarim basin related to various populations (such as the Uyghurs) and Sir Aurel Stein’s discovery of ancient documents written in various languages (such as Tocharian), she never mentioned the existence of these mummies (discovered by Stein in 1907).

The potential implications of these genetic observations, combined with linguistic data, are far reaching, and may support the Indo-Uralic hypothesis, challenging the current consensus model.

The last part of the final chapter in Dr. Sándor’s book (starting with p. 429) is an intriguing interpretation of the Magyar *csodaszarvas* (miraculous deer) legend, and I only wish Dr. Sándor had elaborated on the comparative mythology more than she did. In these pages, she turns our attention to the stories written on the night sky as constellations, and invokes our [developmentally] primary, image-based reasoning. The heavens served as gigantic storybook for our forefathers when telling legends to their children; the sky was a map, as well as a calendar. To prove the compatibility of the Finno-Ugric nature of the Magyar language and the Hun-Magyar legend of the miraculous deer, Dr. Sándor presented a similar legend of the Saami (Lappish) people, as recorded by the Saami writer, Johan Turi (p. 431). The legend is “written” in the constellations of the night sky: two brothers (constellation Gemini) are chasing the deer (whose antlers are the constellation Cassiopeia and body is composed of the constellations Perseus and Auriga), but another hunter is also after the deer (constellation Orion), and the water that is “being crossed” by the deer is the celestial river, the Milky Way (illustrated on p. 432). Dr. Sándor correctly identifies the parallel between the Saami legend and the Hun-Magyar version: *Hunor* and *Magor* are the twins (Gemini), Orion is Nimrod. The deer, at the same time is the same as the ancestral mother *Enéh*. Importantly, Dr. Sándor reminds the reader of the nearby constel-

lation *Cygnus* (Swan) and the felt swan found in a 5th century B.C. Scythian kurgan in Pazyryk. This swan is interpreted as the “escort of the dead” into the netherworld. Dr. Sándor could have expanded on this, and mention *The Swan of Tuonela*.

The constellation-based mythological story predates the Pazyryk kurgan, and predates the time when Finnic and Magyar peoples parted. Greek mythology inherited some of the same elements, such as Castor and Pollux (the “twin half-brothers”) whose mother, Leda, was seduced by Zeus in the form of a swan. Swan was also a sacred bird and related to the cult of Apollo that reached the Etruscans and the Greeks from Anatolia. The story of sacred twins is considered a part of proto-Indo-European mythology. Yet, we find it in Saami, Finnish, Magyar, and other Uralic speaking people’s mythology, along with the swan. Under the pen name Acharya S, D.M. Murdock offered a similar constellation-based explanation about the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus in her book *The Christ Conspiracy: The Greatest Story Ever Sold* (and offended many believers in the process). Interestingly, the “mirage-chaser” Badiny also described a constellation-based legend about Nimrod as Orion and his twin sons — but what he described was (supposedly) a Sumerian legend. To be sure, the deer was a revered, sacred animal depicted in Sumerian and Bronze Age Hatti art (e.g., the standards found in the royal graves at Alaca Höyük).

Mr. Sandor believes that Conquest era Magyars followed a Vedic religion. Although this claim cannot be supported, I must admit that there are echoes in Vedic mythology and several other religions, making the mistaken identification understandable. One of these echoes is the swan (*hamsa* in Sanskrit). In Vedic mythology, the *Hamsa* is associated with Surya (the Sun), and represents balance, perfect union, and life. I would also like to call attention to the etymology of the Magyar word for swan “*hattyú*” that was missed by both authors. The ancient swan symbolism around the River Kaidu on the southern side of the Tien Shan Mountains (which has the Khan Tengri peak), and the words meaning “swan” in various languages historically related to the region would also be revealing.

I admire Mr. Sandor for having the desire, commitment, and dedication to unveil the origins of Magyars. At the same time, due to the misguided notions that prevail throughout his book, I cannot in good conscience recommend it. On the other hand, I would recommend Dr. Sándor’s book, noting that the picture she portrays is not immune from biases and major omissions. Nonetheless, her book contains rich and relevant information, and is an enjoyable read.

Book Reviews

Katalin Kürtösi, editor. *Canada in Eight Tongues. Translating Canada in Central Europe/Le Canada en huit langues. Traduire le Canada en Europe central*. Brno: Masaryk University, 2012. 248 pages.

This book, edited by Katalin Kürtösi of the University of Szeged, is a collective effort of eight Central European nations' scholars. The volume contains 25 articles regarding the dissemination and reception of Canadian literature in translation in Central Europe. Scholars from Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria, specializing in Canadian Studies, shed light on Canada's literary and cultural output, as Kürtösi explains, in order for a "wider readership to obtain information about the presence of the Canadian imagination and knowledge and writing about that country in the Central European region" (9). Canada's official languages, English and French, unite eight languages of Central Europe. A loose historico-political periodization exposes readers to the Canadian poetry, prose, theatre, film, music, women authors, anthologies, theory, and criticism that have become part of the translated canon.

There is a general lack of representation and recognition of Canadian literature and culture globally. The reason behind this phenomenon may be found in Canada's self image, as David Staines explains in the introductory article of the volume: "Canada has never had a tradition of acknowledging itself as a cultural entity; it has never had a tradition of acknowledging its own excellence" (13). Canada's own cultural inferiority has to do with its colonial legacy whereby it sees itself as dependent or even stunted by British and American cultural influences. Writing in a "Canadian way" (Leacock in Staines 15) was considered "second-rate" (16) until not long ago, and thus "seeking external approval for their literature" (16) occupied the attention of homegrown writers and scholars while the importing of contemporary literature and culture from Britain, the US, and France, and classics in translation from elsewhere was the norm. For a Hungarian — in Canada, Hungary and around the world — the issue of national literature considered as second-rate is almost incomprehensible, since traditionally the poet, author and artist are the voice of the nation. Staines describes the development of Canadian literature and culture as it has been growing to recognize itself through a process of what I propose to grasp by the sociological concept of the 'looking-glass self'. The Ameri-

can sociologist, Charles Horton Cooley defines the ‘looking-glass self’ as, first, we *imagine* how we will appear to others, then we *imagine* how other people judge what we *think* we present, and lastly, we *develop* a self-concept, which is enhanced if we think that others’ evaluation of us is favourable, but diminished if unfavourable. Canada sees itself through this process of imagination transferred back to it through others’ eyes. The others’ eyes are not of the vestiges of colonialism in this present example, but those of Central Europe, with affirming curiosity.

From Hungary, five essays by noted scholars offer a tapestry of approaches and interpretations of Canadian literature and culture. Anikó Adám engages the literature of Quebec, poignantly written in French, and she reflects on the limited diffusion of the province’s output marking it as ‘rare et précieuse’ (61). While Quebecois plays have been making tracks on Hungarian theatre stages since the early 1990s, Adám argues for the creation of necessarily favourable conditions by publishers and literary associations in Hungary for the added propagation of Quebec’s literature. The topic of Canadian plays on Hungarian stages is further discussed in Katalin Kürtösi’s essay in English. Kürtösi highlights the repeated success and adaptation of Michel Tremblay’s *Les Belles-Soeurs* [*Sógornők*] across the country as well as in Marosvásárhely [Targu Mures], along with the drama anthology of *Seven Stories* by Moris Panych, translated expressively by Péter Szaffkó as *Történet a hetedikén*. Canadian performances of theatre and dance companies have been leaving their imprints, and their artists are now “household names” in Hungary (Kürtösi 216). Kürtösi concludes that Canadian, especially Quebecois, plays enjoy more recognition than other genres.

The topic of translation in Hungary is discussed in two articles in the volume. Gertrúd Szamosi surveys English Canadian literature and the strategies surrounding the popularization of their translated editions for Hungarian readers. Canada’s aboriginal and ethnic writers, such as Grey Owl’s *The Adventures of Sajo and her Beaver People* and Duncan Pryde’s *Ten Years of Eskimo Life* have enjoyed popularity in leaps and bounds, while Michael Ondaatje’s *The English Patient* has gained attention mostly due to the title character who adorns a Hungarian surname. Szamosi also underlines the importance Canadian writers of Hungarian descent, whose works have been translated, such as, Anna Porter, George Jonas, Susan M. Papp, and the children’s author Kati Reкаи. Following Szamosi’s wide angle overview, József Szili’s monograph describes his process of translating Northrop Frye’s *Anatomy of Criticism*. The challenges, as Szili reveals, were grounded in the attempts of translating many of Frye’s

terminologies into the Hungarian vocabulary of criticism. For example, the taken for granted term, *romance novel*, in fact demands several versions of translation in an effort to convey the same meaning in Hungarian. Frye's theories of history similarly beget difficulties for introducing new concepts in Hungarian. Lastly, Zoltán Kelemen takes a look at Leonard Cohen's poems and two novels. He emphasizes that while Hungarian audiences were already enjoying Cohen's music in the 1970s, a time of "re-copied cassette tapes, jam sessions with friends and the rare Cohen LP from the former Yugoslavia" (145), along with his concerts, although much later, and his translated songs, his poetic and novelistic achievements have been ignored. Kelemen argues that while the recent translation of *The Favourite Game* [*A kedvenc játék*] and *Beautiful Losers* [*Szépséges lúzerek*] has prompted interest, it still places the "potential Hungarian Cohen-reader... far away in space, in time and most of all, in literary appreciation," Kelemen argues (148). Overall, Hungarian scholars indicate a hope for Canadian works in translation while also paying attention to market demands.

Two articles from Czech Republic, by Don Sparling in English and by Petr Kyloušek in French, suggest that the Czech lands have a long and rich tradition of translating Canadian literature starting with Frederick Marryat's *The Settlers in Canada* from 1875. Sparling first links the two countries' cultural history by ice-hockey and reference words in Czech to such Canadian menageries as *log cabin*, *sled*, *joke*, and even *army boots*. By doing so, Sparling points to the imagery or the "mental construct" of Canada (40) in Czech people's minds, through translations. A chronological overview of translated texts takes into account May Agnes Fleming's books from the early 1900s through E. T. Seton in the interwar years, the publication of politically oriented works during the socialist regime, leading up to the present with a broad selection of texts by authors such as Susanna Moodie, Timothy Findley, and to the contemporary romantic fictions of Mary Balogh. Conversely, Kyloušek structures his discussion around two decisive periods both in Canadian and in Czech history: Quebec's Quiet Revolution and the Montreal Expo '67. Thanks to the efforts of the eminent critic, Eva Janovcová, the works of Marie-Claire Blais, Jacques Ferron, and Anne Hébert among others became available to Czech readers in translation from the late 1960s onward. The political transformations after 1989 ushered in an additional wave of French Canadian literature, and international book festivals have offered a diverse choice of Canadian literature for Czech readers.

Lucia Otrisalová and Marján Gazdík's paper assesses the presence of Canadian literature in Slovak translation. The authors trace the reasons

for the relative absence of Canadian literature in Slovakia, pointing to a lack of translation from English during the unstable political climate in that country. Further research through quantitative data collection also reveals to the scholars that the nature of the Slovakian book market may be more interested in universal rather than Canada-specific literature. The first Canadian book published after 1989 in Slovakia was Margaret Atwood's *Surfacing*. Gazdik devotes a separate essay to the reception of Atwood's books with a special attention to J. Juránova, Slovakian feminist writer and translator of many of Atwood's works. Lastly, Otrisalová discusses the most popular English Canadian novel in Slovak, Lucy Maud Montgomery's *Anne of Green Gables*. She argues that the historical and social contexts in the host country have affected both the translation and treatment of the novel during the socialist regime, whereby religious terms were removed or replaced with ideologies of the communist party in the translations. A restitution of these politically dictated discursive changes in Montgomery's work has been underway.

Only one article represents Slovenia: Jason Blake engages the reception of Alice Munro's works. Blake prefaces his discussion of Munro's translated books by suggesting the availability of Canadian literary works in Slovenian translation is on a wide spectrum. In fact, Slovenia boasts its book market by publishing translations immediately in the footsteps of the release of original works in Canada. Yet, Munro's books have surfaced only belatedly, partially due to "a sort of tokenism" (187) that advances books by Atwood and Ondaatje.

Petra Sapun Kurtin and Mirna Sindičić Sabljo from Croatia offer two studies in the volume. First, they survey Canadian literature in Croatia, exclaiming that "translations are crucial vehicles of cultural transfer" (49). To this effect, the early 20th century saw the prominence of adventure and "Native" novels (49) in translation. Following the Yugoslavian war, Croatia's independence has fostered a linguistic revival wherein contemporary Canadian literature has gained readership. In their second study, Sapun Kurtin and Sindičić Sabljo portray Canadian women authors in Croatian translation. They refer to 35 full-length books by such women authors as Cynthia J. Alexander, Anne Hébert, and Alice Munro among others. English and French short stories have also drawn a particular attention in Croatia, as Antonija Primorac explains. In her article, Primorac juxtaposes two well-received anthologies, *Antologija kanadske pripovjetke* [*An Anthology of Canadian Short Stories*] from 1991 which includes works by early to mid-20th century Canadian authors, and *Život na sjeveru - Antologija kanadske kratke priče* [*Northern Exposireu: An Anthology of*

Canadian Short Stories] from 2009. Primorac edited the latter anthology which includes the most recent Canadian short stories from English and French language sources, and it features the theme of multiculturalism.

Scholars from Serbia focus on English Canadian literature in translation with marginal reference only to Quebec authors. Milena Kostić and Ivana Vlajković assess Serbia's relations with Canadian culture through literature in the new millennium whereby Serbia seeks to find reconciliation for its own cultural identity. The authors voice their difficulty of compiling the bibliography of translated Canadian texts due to gaps not only in works involved but also in the quality of translations. Serbian is the "third most frequent language of translation with the Canada Council translation support programme," Tanja Cvetković argues in her article (149), and she offers a list of the most popular Canadian titles in Serbian translations. Through Robert Kroetsch's *The Studhorse Man*, published in 2009 by Nolit, Cvetković divulges the challenges of translation based on the cultural differences between the two nations. Linguistic difficulties and cultural differences, from "Canadianisms" to "the Canadian prairie mythical story" (151-2) prompt a kind of postmodern dynamic for Serbian readers.

Crina Bud and Moica Bottez from Romania explore Canadian fiction and theoretical texts in translation through a periodization of Romanian cultural politics. Bud, in her French article, argues that paratexts illuminate both the image and imaginary of Canada in Romania, often supplied in introductions by the editors and publishers of translations, and also in notations, or even by the particular translation of book titles, which have affected the reception of works in a given political climate. Bud draws on theoretical concepts by Northrop Frye, Marshall McLuhan, and Charles Taylor to frame her analysis and in turn self-referentially Canadianize her article. Bottez, in English, offers an overview of Canadian literature in translation starting before 1948 up to the present, emphasizing the ideological criteria in each era that gave cadence to particular Canadian works from classics to suspense books. Paying most attention to the period from the 1980s onward, Bottez illuminates a market-driven selection of Canadian books in translation with preference for sci-fi, thrillers and most recently fantasy books about vampires and werewolves. Belatedly, poems by Leonard Cohen and Malcolm Lowry are now available alongside with works by Atwood, Ondaatje, Yann Martel, Frye, and Hutcheon.

The Bulgarian scholars, Andrei Andreev and Diana Yankova, consider Canadian literature in translation over the past twenty years, and contend that there has been a "proliferation of Canadian titles on the

Bulgarian market” (27). From Montgomery’s *Anne of Green Gables* to Atwood’s, Findley’s and Ondaatje’s books the publishers in Bulgaria have been promoting Canadian literature through the International Translation Grants Program. The last two Canadian writers’ popularity is further demonstrated in two more articles from Bulgaria. Galina Avramova discusses Timothy Findley’s translated output in relation to the book market, and Madeleine Danov analyses Michael Ondaatje’s relevance in Bulgaria’s postmodernist transformations.

Canada in Eight Tongue is an erudite collection of scholarly essays discussing, analyzing and reflecting on the reception of Canadian literature and culture in translation. The representation of Canadian literature and culture in the Central European imagination, at least as it has been *interpreted* by the authors, is rich and eclectic, however, it has been fundamentally understated.

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Judit Szapor, Andrea Pető, Maura Hametz, Maria Calloni, eds. *Tradition Unchained: Jewish Intellectual Women in Central Europe 1860-2000. Twelve Biographical Essays*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2012. ISBN 978-0-7734-2933-8, 460 pages.

Gerda Lerner, the mother of women’s history, born in 1920 in Germany and an escapee from Nazism who died on Jan 21, 2013 at the age of 92, was only twenty years younger than Regina Jonas, the youngest biographical subjects in the volume under review here. Lerner said that when she entered the academic world in the late sixties the study of the lives of women was not a legitimate subject for historians. She worked to establish women’s history as a respected academic field and also began to publish primary source material that would allow scholars to reconstruct the lives of women. She perceived early on that women’s history is less a separate subject than a way of thinking, a strategy by which focus on issues which traditional history has obscured. As she said in her *The Majority Finds its Past: Placing Women in History* (1979: 127-132), traditional history, written and interpreted by men, is not only male-oriented but male-defined so that it is really “men’s history,” in which women are anecdotal. That women have a history has been obscured and misunderstood. Women’s history requires a paradigm shift in which gender must be added as an analytical category of history, which allows new questions to be asked,

leading to a fundamental re-evaluation of assumptions and methodologies of traditional patriarchal history.

In the over three decades since the publication of Lerner's seminal work, while there are now hundreds of books published related to women's history, the research on the history of Central European women still lags behind by decades. This hefty volume consisting of twelve biographical studies on Jewish intellectual women in Central Europe is, therefore, a very significant contribution not only to women's history broadly but also more specifically to European intellectual history, [Jewish] Cultural Studies, and Diaspora Studies. The volume obviously had a long road to publication since it is an outgrowth of a 2006 conference held at the Central European University with the title, "Jewish Intellectual Women In Europe: Gendering History, Politics and Culture," where an additional half a dozen papers were presented which didn't make it into the present volume.

Because the focus of *Jewish Intellectual Women* is primarily biographical, the twelve studies are arranged chronologically by birthdate of the subjects, which range from 1860 to the early twentieth century, but all are before World War I. Since several perished in the war and others were forced into emigration, it can be said that the lives of these women were framed by the Monarchy on one end and by the Holocaust at the other. This volume is a very different undertaking from the earlier 2006 *Biographical Dictionary of Women's Movements and Feminisms. Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, 19th and 20th Centuries* (Francisca de Haan, Krassimira Daskalova, and Anna Loutfi eds. Budapest: C.E.U. Press), which features some 150 brief biographical portraits, only two of which, of Esther Frumkin and Kate Leichter, overlap with the present volume. While all the women featured in the studies are Jewish and a few were born into observant families, most were already born into relatively well-to-do assimilated families and all (but the one woman who became the first female rabbi) maintained only cultural rather than religious ties to Judaism. The studies trace the very complex lives and (often fluid linguistic and national) identities of these cosmopolitan women. Although they represent roughly two generations by birth, all but Juliane Déry, who committed suicide at an early age, share the fate of having their lives destroyed by Nazism. All lost loved ones, many fled Europe, some to re-emigrate after the war, but others perished in deportation. These women, representing not only gender but also differing classes and ideologies, were all in some way intellectually creative pioneers who defied social norms of their time. They lived in Vienna, Budapest Trieste, Venice, Zagreb,

Kolozsvár and wrote in German, Italian (one even in Venetian dialect), Hungarian, and Croatian and one also in Yiddish, so it is perhaps not surprising that each is known almost exclusively by a restricted group in their native language.

The twelve authors of these biographical studies (among whom there is one male author and one male co-author) themselves are primarily native speakers of those same languages and it is therefore commendable that the English texts, presumably some in translation, are very fluid and readable. While each biography can also be read individually, they are best understood chronologically, and because one can get somewhat lost in the hefty individual stories, the Introduction and excellent bibliography is a necessary preliminary to reading the individual studies. As the Introduction states, the volume focuses on the rich familial, social and cultural lives of these women, marginalized by anti-Semitism, anti-feminism, and nationalism, and ultimately by the Holocaust, and those who survived, by emigration and even by the Cold War. The emphasis in the articles is biographical rather than an analysis of the works of the authors, which, while understandable, makes the volume read at times somewhat encyclopaedical, which is to be especially regretted in those cases where there is hardly more than a reference to titles of works published by these authors, works which often sound fascinating.

Within the confines of this review it is not possible to do more than offer a brief catalogue of the main points of the lives of the twelve women discussed in this volume, which will at least provide a chronological and geographical frame for their lives and give readers an overview of the variety of exceptional lives lived by these women and perhaps give some impetus to research more in depth some of their works. Judit Szapor, a scholar of the illustrious Polányi family and author of *Laura Polányi 1882-1957. Narratives of a Life* (1997), opens the volume with “An Outsider Twice Over: Cecil Wohl Pollacsek, Salonist in Fin-de-Siècle Budapest,” about the matriarch of the Polányi clan (Vilnius 1862 – Budapest 1939), whose life is an excellent illustration of bourgeois cosmopolitan Jewish world in Budapest at the turn of the century, although she was born in Vilna (today’s Vilnius) and spoke German, never really learning Hungarian. In contrast to all the other women discussed in this volume, other than publishing a few small articles, she was primarily a mother who gave birth to six children in ten years and was a *salonnière* known affectionately as “Cecil mama,” who received mostly Jewish university students and other intellectuals, among them György Lukács, Oszkár Jászi, and Ervin Szabó, as well as some foreign visitors.

Agata Schwartz's "Living and Writing as a Cultural Hybrid: The Case of Juliane Déry" (Baja, 1864 – Berlin 1899) discusses Déry, who was a successful writer for the theatre in German in both Vienna and Berlin (and who may have translated Petöfi into German) but who is today essentially unknown. Déry changed her name from Julianna Deutsch and converted to Catholicism and tried to hide her Jewish origins in her new German life. In her work she addressed themes of gender and class imbalance and attacked the sexual double standard. Like her father before her, she committed suicide. A useful supplement to the discussion of Déry might be also to consider her in the broader context of Jewish women who in spite of anti-Semitism appeared exotic and alluring, and prominently figured in literature and in the aesthetic imagination of later nineteenth and early twentieth century, such as, most famously, Sarah Bernhardt, whose forbidden otherness contributed to her popularity.

Michaela Raggam-Blech in "A Pioneer in Academia: Elise Richter" (Vienna, 1865 – Theresienstadt, 1943) discusses the life of the only one of these women whose life I have been very familiar with myself for a half a century because I was originally trained in Romance Philology and my professor in Berkeley, Yakov Malkiel, himself the last Jew to receive his Ph.D. in Berlin during the war, would always talk about her as the first female Romance Philologist to receive a doctorate (1901) and to become a university lecturer. She was a renowned scholar who, however, even before she was dismissed under the Nazi laws, had not received a salary and even her unsalaried position was due to the support of her mentor, the illustrious Romanist, Wilhelm Meyer Lübke. She and her older sister Helene (1861-1942), a scholar of English literature, only managed to study privately to prepare for university study and then go on to have scholarly careers because they were of independent means. After their parents' death they converted to Protestantism, neither married and they lived together as a couple. Although they had the chance to emigrate, they declined to leave and were deported to Theresienstadt, where they perished. Richter did not in any way consider herself a feminist and in her memoir, *Summe des Lebens*, written in 1940, she made disparaging remarks against Jews. It should be added that she also left behind diaries (1938-41), which are now available through the Vienna Library and which still await serious study.

Rochelle Goldberg Rothschild in "Esther Frumkin: Bringing the Revolution to the Jewish Street" writes about Frumkin (Minsk, 1880-Karaganda, 1943), the best-known woman in the Russian Jewish revolutionary movement, granddaughter of rabbis but herself an anti-religious, active in the Bund. She lobbied to make Yiddish a revolutionary language

of Jews. She was a journalist, one of the few professions open to women, taught Yiddish to working classes to preserve Jewish culture available only in Hebrew. She was liquidated in the Soviet purges, sentenced to eight years' detention, where she died in 1943.

Marina Calloni's piece, "Freedom and Resistance Against Oppression: The Legacy of Amelia Rosselli" about Rosselli (Venice, 1870 – Florence, 1954) is the longest and best-developed biographical piece in the collection. Like Déry, Rosselli, wrote for the theatre and dealt with questions of women's issues both in her theatrical and in her journalistic work and in a series of books for girls. Although Rosselli was very successful and was also the mother of two antifascist martyrs she has been forgotten, to be confused with her own granddaughter by the same name, also a well-known author. From the wealthy Venetian high bourgeoisie she was a liberal secularist and assimilated Italian patriot. In her *Memorie* she recalls that the key words in her family were religion and *patria*. She moved to Vienna with her husband but eventually got a legal separation from him. One son died in World War I, two were assassinated in World War II, and she went into Swiss, British, and finally U.S. exile with her two daughter-in-laws and her seven grandchildren. After nine years of exile she returned with her family to Italy in 1946. A useful addition for understanding Rosselli's life and also that of Alma Morpurgo, discussed below, would be David Lowen & Timothy Baycroft's "Border Regions and Identity." (*European Review of History* 15.3 (2008): 255-275), which discusses geo-cultural identity formation in 19th and 20th-century Trieste.

Donald Löwy and Maria Roth, "Julia Szegő: In the Shadow of History, a Life in Music" (Beregszász 1893 – Kolozsvár 1987) is about a Romanian Hungarian teacher, musicologist, folklorist and Lied singer. Szegő lost her husband and son in World War II but started a prodigious local career, was a student of Bartók, whose biography she wrote (1964) and also wrote her memoir, *Embernek maradni* (1988), and numerous other publications, many about *csángó* folksongs. In this essay a discussion of her memoir and her scholarly work would have added more weight to the piece.

Eleonore Lappin-Eppel's "Kate Leichter: The Making of a Jewish Intellectual, Socialist, and Fighter for Working Women" is about Leichter, born Katherine Pick, who was the first Austrian PhD in social science. Leichter (Vienna, 1895 – Ravensbrück, 1942) was a Social Democrat freedom fighter and one of the pioneers of Austrian women's politics and social policy who in interwar "Red Vienna" studied the living conditions of workers, the majority Jewish; although many were women she was

interested in them only as ‘female workers’ in the Marxist sense. While in her youth she received some religious instruction, as an adult she broke totally with tradition and is in this sense also very representative of Jewish left-wing intelligentsia of the period. During the period that the Gestapo put her in solitary in 1938 she managed to write a memoir, a kind of *Bildungsroman* of her earlier life, where she openly discusses problems with her young femininity and lack of good looks. In 1940 she was deported to Ravensbrück where she was gassed. Rachel Sidel, who presented a paper at the 2006 Central European University conference that was not published here, discusses in her *The Jewish Women of Ravensbrück Concentration Camp* (2004) Leichter’s exemplary humanity towards other prisoners in the camp. While most of the women in this volume are forgotten, Leichter is a revered figure in Austria today.

Dieter J. Hecht in “At the Crossroads: Martha Hofmann, a Zionist Pioneer from Austria,” studies Hofmann (Vienna, 1896 – Vienna, 1975), who never married and lived the life of a “New Woman,” becoming a teacher of Classics at a Jewish gymnasium and in 1920 writing a doctoral thesis on Plato. She also joined Zionist organizations and the Social Democratic party and worked for the Jewish Press. In 1938 she emigrated to various countries, including Palestine, but after the war returned to Vienna, where she successfully re-established her Jewish life. Under the pseudonym Melitta Holl she wrote and translated poetry, wrote plays, and in her interesting memoir of 1966 (*Konstellationen: Ausgewählte Essays, 1945-1965*. Vienna: Bergland) she writes of the transmission of culture in her family through female role models and her youth as a glorious cultural period in Vienna.

Anna Borgos in “A Woman Against the Current: The Life Paths of Edit Gyömroi” (Gelb, Rényi, Glück, Újváry, Ludowk) writes about Gyömroi (Budapest, 1896 – London, 1987), who had more last names through serial marriages than the more famous Alma Maria Mahler Gropius Werfel. Best known as the therapist of the poet Attila József, Gyömroi led a peripatetic life in Budapest, Vienna, Berlin, Prague, Colombo in Ceylon, and London, and had numerous different professional activities, finally remaining in Ceylon for many years and then moving to London and losing her connection to Hungary until the seventies. In London she became part of the Anna Freud Circle, although she did not publish regularly and was not really a major figure, but who was more important for being someone in contact with several significant intellectual movements in the twentieth century, most notably with the Budapest School of Psychoanalysis under Sándor Ferenczi, both in Hungary and later in exile.

Andrea Feldman's "Vera Erlich Stein: Odyssey of a Croatian-Jewish Intellectual" is about Stein (Zagreb, 1897-1980), a socio-cultural anthropologist and progressive feminist intellectual who studied the fragmented patriarchal society of interwar Yugoslavia, conducting the first extensive sociological research on South Slavic families. Although a Yugoslav citizen, she was a product of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Her husband, Dr. Benno Stein, a noted psychologist in Zagreb, was murdered in the Jasenovac death camp in Croatia, but she managed to flee in 1941. From 1945 to 1959 she worked as a psychiatric social worker with displaced persons in Italy for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. During the following decade she managed to establish a limited career as a Lecturer at the University of California in Berkeley but in 1960 returned to Zagreb and continued to do research there. It would be of interest to know if she as a feminist wrote in detail about her professional experiences at Berkeley, where at the time women faculty were exclusively relegated to non-tenured ranks.

Maura Hametz in "The Interstices of Life and Memory: Alma Morpurgo and the Central European Jewish Tradition" studies Morpurgo (Trieste, 1901 – Trieste, 2002). A writer of Sephardic origin who wrote five books, all published after her eighty-ninth birthday, among them *L'esilio, 1939-1955, ricordi dal Cile* (1997), where she writes of her exiled life in Valparaiso, Santiago, Rome, and ultimate return to Trieste. Her background was not unlike that of Amelia Rosselli, reflecting a similar cosmopolitan, European and patriotic Italy, at the same time as an ambiguity of identity in Trieste, much like that of the more famous Italo Svevo, neither fully Italian nor Austrian. In her very self-reflexive writing, which merits more consideration, she depicts well the lost world of Central Europe, particularly the Jewish world, and at the same time illustrates how for a woman who never married her multilingual Trieste background and culture allowed her to make a good living in Santiago as a translator and to assimilate in that country.

Claudia Prestel in "Confronting Old Structures: Regina Jonas, the First Female Rabbi," discusses Jonas (Berlin, 1902 – Auschwitz, 1944), the first female rabbi, whose identity was only re-discovered in 1990, after East German archives became accessible. Although only one photograph survives of Jonas, it should be noted that Diana Gróo has just made a "creative documentary" in Hungary with the title *Regina* (on which see Gábor T. Szántó. "Rabbi Regina: Film a világ első női rabbijáról." *Szombat* March 27, 2013. Unlike most of the other women in this volume, Jonas was born very poor and had enormous difficulty getting educated

and then getting ordained as a female rabbi. In her dissertation she conveyed feminist messages and created for herself the term *Fräulein Rabbiner*, so as not to be confused with a *Frau Rabbinerin*, a rabbi's wife. She felt initially that a female rabbi should remain unmarried but eventually had a deep affair with a famous widowed rabbi much her senior who would not marry her. Even in a liberal community she could work only because by 1935 there was a shortage of rabbis due to their emigration. She would not leave Germany and was deported along with her mother to Theresienstadt in 1942, where she continued to tend to her flock, and she was killed in Auschwitz in 1944.

Reading the biographies in this volume makes the reader wish for more such stories of so many others who have not received their due. As examples, one might cite just two women from very different backgrounds: Jozka Jaburkova (1896-1942), born poor, a pacifist, communist, newspaper reporter, and novelist, who perished in Ravensbrück; and Else Ury (1877-1943), the best-selling author of the beloved *Nestkästchen* series of books for girls, gassed at Auschwitz. In conclusion, what Calloni says in her article on the life of Rosselli, and what Gerda Lerner stated in broader theoretical terms, is applicable to this whole volume, that the reconstruction of the life of such Jewish women is critical for the re-interpretation of history.

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Thomas Sakmyster. *A Communist Odyssey: The Life of József Pogány/John Pepper*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2012. 249 pages. ISBN: 978-615-5225-08-6

A talented and ambitious politician, even if his character is strong and his intentions pure, rarely fails to acquire enemies during his career. If the politician's character and intentions are corrupt, as was the case with József Pogány/John Pepper, the subject of Thomas Sakmyster's new biography, his fate is sealed. If he is lucky enough to escape public disgrace, avoid arrest and escape execution, his talent, ambition and character faults will ultimately catch up with him after his death, as he is judged by history. No Communist, with the possible exception of Béla Kun and Tibor Szamuely, evoked so much hostility among his conservative contemporaries as József Pogány. In contrast to Kun or Szamuely, however, Pogány was disliked and even demonized by his socialist and communist comrades. Executed during the Stalinist purges in 1938 but rehabilitated in

1956, Pogány never entered the pantheon of communist heroes in Hungary or the Soviet Union. He remained a “forgotten communist” until the collapse of the one-party state in 1989, or, rather, the publication of Thomas Sakmyster’s book in 2012.

Pogány seems to have been, indeed, a rather dislikeable character: by all evidence, Sakmyster makes it clear in his study, he was arrogant, abrasive, egotistic, conceited, immoral, deceitful and, most importantly, opportunistic. He had either betrayed or was ready to betray, every idea, person and movement with whom he had come into contact during his relatively short life but long political career. Already as a teenager, he cut ties with his family and his Jewish background; to advertise his new found faith in Marxism, he even changed his family name from Schwarz to Pogány (pagan). The young Pogány was a social democrat and a Hungarian nationalist before 1918. In March 1919, however, he switched his allegiance to Communism (a movement that he had only a few months earlier denounced). In August 1919, after the collapse of the Council Republic in August, he became a stateless revolutionary; at least after 1922, he no longer displayed any interest in Hungarian politics and culture. Sent on a mission to the United States in the early 1920s, he learned English quickly, immersed himself fully in American culture and, by the mid-1920s, was well on his way to become an American “super-patriot.” In 1929, as a Comintern functionary in a secret mission in the United States, Pogány even thought about defecting, and leaving the life of a professional revolutionary behind for the pleasures and security of private life in Canada or the United States. Pogány, according to Sakmyster, betrayed not only every ideology and political movement; he was also disloyal to friends, comrades and family members. He owed his career in the Soviet Republic to Béla Kun, yet in exile in Vienna in the early 1920s, he called his friend a “scoundrel” and sought to remove him from the leadership of the Hungarian Communist Part. In Moscow, he was a friend and ally of Zinoviev, who accelerated his rise in the Comintern hierarchy; yet, in 1926, he joined the Stalinist campaign against his mentor and watched his political demise from the sidelines. The labour leader Jay Lovestone helped him to settle in the United States and find his way in the maze of American politics; yet in 1930, he denounced him as a traitor. A hedonist by nature, Pogány betrayed his wife on countless occasions and neglected his daughters.

Nonetheless, unlike the majority of contemporary conservative commentators, and later historians such as Elemér Mályus, Sakmyster does not demonize the subject of his research. Pogány, according to Sakmyster, was a man of considerable talent: he was a gifted journalist, and

imposing orator, a great organizer and talented tactician. Like the Nazi propaganda minister and fellow hedonist, Goebbels, he even harboured ambitions as a writer. As a sign of his political talent, he predicted the July Crisis would lead to a continental war, revolutions and to the destruction of multi-ethnic empires and the conservative liberal order. He recognized American “exceptionalism” as a real political force, and sought to create a moderate Labour Party on the British model and on the basis of an alliance between workers and poor farmers. He made a major contribution to history of the labour movement in the United States by publishing the *Daily Worker*. Yet, as Sakmyster makes it clear in his book, Pogány’s impact on both Hungarian and world history was, on the whole, negative. As a head of the Soldiers’ Council in 1918 and early 1919, he contributed to the demotion of two war ministers, thus making the reform of the army and the defence of the country against the invading Czech and Romanian armies more difficult. As the Commissar of War in the spring of 1919, and as minor military leader later in the summer, he made no meaningful contribution to the defence of his homeland and to the protection of the Soviet state. After the collapse of the Council Republic, with Béla Kun he helped to organize the March Action in Germany in 1921; the premature workers’ uprising resulted in thousands of casualties and led to a serious weakening of the German Communist Party in 1921. His attempt to move the American Communist Party closer to the political center by creating a moderate Labour Party after 1923 did not bear fruit. Through his vanity, self-aggrandizement, opportunism and vindictiveness, he injected poison into political debates and exacerbated tensions between political factions in every country in which he lived. Despite his considerable talent at political maneuvering, he failed to switch sides and abandon Bukharin in time in 1929. Although rehabilitated in the early 1930s, Pogány was never able to recover his earlier influence in the Communist movement. He did not prevent his own demise, foresee his arrest or change the minds of his prosecutors during the interrogation. Like thousands of Central European Communists of the first hour, he watched the unfolding of the Stalinist terror from the sidelines, until he himself was consumed by it in 1938.

Sakmyster wrote a highly important book on the life and political career of one of the most controversial characters in Hungarian history. The book is based on a number of new, hitherto unknown or underused primary sources, such as the unpublished oral memoirs of Pogány’s wife, Irén Czóbel, the archives of the Communist International and the Communist Party of the United States, and the FBI files on John Pepper. The book makes a major contribution to the study of the Hungarian civil war

after the First World War and to the understanding of complicated factions within the Communist movement both in Europe and the United States. But the *Communist Odyssey* is, first and foremost, an enjoyable read. Sakmyster is a masterful storyteller who brings places, events and protagonists back to life in his works. His well-written and engaging study should find a place in reading lists and syllabi of undergraduate and graduate courses in central European history.

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Róbert Hermann, editor. *Illustrated Military History of Hungary*. Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2012. 272 pages. ISBN 978-963-327-558-0.

Magyars on horseback! Raiding and pillaging feudal Europe! These are the images embedded in common mythology, but what are some other facets of Hungary's martial prowess through the years?

The authors of this eminently readable history give a detailed account of Hungary's military past and present, and base their results on solid research. Their stated goal in the introduction is to present the main military events and how they took place, and furthermore to show aspects of Hungarian military affairs which harmonize with or depart from European military developments. The book achieves its purpose, giving the reader a pleasant ride along the way.

Livening up the scholarly prose are the numerous maps and full-color pictures, which are useful and engaging. They tell a story in and of themselves when looked at independent of the text, showing a progression of historical events from archeological artifacts and flat medieval paintings, to manuscripts and ruins of castles, from Romantic paintings and hand-drawn maps of battle lines to grainy black and white photographs, and finally to contemporary color photographs of recent deployments. The illustrations and pictures give the reader an agreeable experience, breaking up the detailed scholarly accounts. The graphic design is superb, worthy of coffee-table status.

The chapters divide over a thousand years of military history into easily digestible chunks, from the first contacts with Europe by the Magyar marauders (by László Veszprémy), to Hungary's role as the defender of Christianity from Mongol and Ottoman hordes (József Kelenik). The ascent of the hussars (István Czigány), Hungarian participation in the Napoleonic wars, the Revolution of 1848-1849 from a military perspective (Róbert Hermann), service in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in the Red Army (Tibor Balla and Ferenc Pollmann), the post-World War One

limitations and the Horthy era (Norbert Számvéber), Soviet conquest and membership in the Warsaw pact (György Markó), Hungary's post-1989 international and NATO roles, all the way to contemporary peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the United Nations (János Isaszegi and István Ravasz), each of the chapters focuses on particular eras.

The book is objective and fair. Just as military advice to civilian superiors in established democracies tends to be unvarnished and objective, so too is this volume. Although written by Hungarian military experts about Hungarians, the research takes a broader view and is not afraid to put things into context and to criticize where relevant. For example, it tempers its overall proud stance when describing the Hungarian Conquest of 894-896. Whereas a lesser (and more nationalistic) work would proudly state the victory of the Hungarian tribes, this work concedes that the "achievement was to some extent due to a historical coincidence that the whole of the Carpathian basin at that time fell outside the sphere of influence of the great powers" (15). Later in the book, Hermann confesses that exact figures are not available for the human losses of the War of Independence in 1848-1849, because of "estimates obscured by the effects of a cholera epidemic... decimating both the civil population and the army" (145). In a final example, unlike the Soviet-era propaganda of the historians of the time, Markó states that "85% of the officers [trained in 1949-1951] had low-level general education having finished only the eight-year elementary school" (216). Such harsh objectivity is refreshing to read and strengthens the believability of the rest of the book's assertions.

Although the book addresses primarily military events and people, it does also delve into political developments, but only where necessary. Its descriptions of the military events are very detailed; yet the lay reader interested in the twentieth century and recent events can also find noteworthy nuggets amidst the scholarly details. For example, details about the concealed expansion of the Hungarian Army after 1920, or thousands of "politically unreliable" persons of military age conscripted into forced labour units in the early 1950's, or a very interesting description of the interplay between the Army and insurgents during the 1956 Revolution, both in terms of overlap and of tactical operations, are all facts not in the public common knowledge. In addition, the book contains details of peacekeeping operations including monitoring the Paris ceasefire in Vietnam after 1973, then later in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Georgia, and Uganda, as well as an overview of smaller operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As in the rest of the book, the facts are accurate and up to date.

The publisher, Zrínyi Kiadó, is the official publisher of the Defense Ministry of Hungary (in the interest of transparency, the reviewer has his own manuscript pending with Zrínyi Kiadó, with publication expected in the spring of 2014). The work seems to be a direct translation of a companion volume also published in 2012 under the title *Kis magyar hadtörténet*, with the the same chapters, photographs and illustrations, but with some slight variations, such as the English version containing a useful glossary of terms unfamiliar to the non-Hungarian reader.

Despite the high quality of its scholarship and the pleasant appearance of its colorful maps, illustrations, and photographs, the critical reader may find the occasional English language errors to be a slight annoyance. Infrequent as they are, probably due to translation mistakes, they are noticeable and detract slightly from the overall high quality of the rest of the work.

Taken as a whole, however, the book is an impressive volume of high quality work, fair and objective, with pleasant illustrations and photographs and useful maps, and is accessible both to the military historian as well as to the lay reader. The *Illustrated Military History of Hungary* is a worthwhile addition to any serious collection.

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Ildikó Barna and Andrea Pető. *A politikai igazságszolgáltatás a II. Világháború utáni Budapesten*. [Dispensing political justice in Budapest after World War II.] Budapest: Gondolat. 2012. 140 pages.

The history of Hungarian People's Court set up immediately following World War II has not become a major focus of Hungarian historians yet. This lack of interest is particularly important if we take into consideration the fact that this was the period when Hungary would have had to face the legacy of its active participation in World War II. This confronting of the past is still missing and this is why different narratives keep emerging on this issue in Hungary even today.

A pioneering research was conducted by Ildikó Barna, senior lecturer at Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Social Sciences, and Andrea Pető, associate professor at Central European University, Department of Gender Studies, in which they aimed to shed light on the working mechanisms of the so-called 'People's Court' (*népbíróság*) through the examination and statistical coding of archived resources about lawsuits.

People's Court was set up after World War II in order to explore the war crimes committed and to prosecute war criminals.

Previous historical studies on this topic were usually based on micro-level case studies in which only very few cases were analyzed thus the results could not be extended to all of the lawsuits. This time the researchers approached the available resources in a different way. They aimed to construct a random and representative sample from all the available lawsuit records material in Budapest from the period between 1945 and 1949. Throughout the research every single file of this sample was coded by using a standardized coding system in which several characteristics of the files could be recorded (for example, characteristics of witnesses, lawyers, victims, defendants). This coding made it possible to compile a database in which different multivariate statistical analyses could be conducted and the results could be generalized to all lawsuits of the People's Court in Budapest. This methodological approach rooted in quantitative sociology is quite unusual in historical sciences thus the implementation of this methodology itself is an innovative aspect of this research.

The reason the researchers' attention turned towards the People's Court's history is also notable. According to the authors the remembering of political jurisdiction in Hungary after the Second World War is in contradiction: the story shared by the public opinion and what the historians think differs significantly. This phenomenon has further consequences, for example, on the present debate on revising history curriculum or on the re-emergence of extreme right in Hungary. Furthermore, Hungarian historians are themselves divided along whether the history of People's Court is a story of jurisdiction or of political revenge perpetrated by Communists. Some believe that the People's Court was used for political purposes after the communist takeover instead of doing justice to the victims of the war while others argue that it was a tool for jurisdiction. Barna and Pető analyzed this controversial question by examining 500 tribunal cases from that period and found that from 1945 to 1949 the number of political cases was growing but it is an overstatement to say that People's Court was a tool of political pay-off. However, according to the book's conclusions many crimes committed during the war ended with acquittal. Because of this perceived failure the People's Tribunal could not fulfill perfectly its role in the jurisdiction after the world war.

The book consists of five chapters. The first one is a useful summary introduction to the Hungarian system of the People's Court for those who are not familiar with it. The development, the structure, the constantly changing legal background, and the changing working mechanisms of the

People's Tribunal are presented here. This chapter supports the argument of treating this period of time from 1945 to 1949 not as a homogeneous block as it has been the case in the previous literature but as a dynamically changing period. By treating the year of lawsuit as a variable statistical analyses are suitable for grabbing this change. As we will see the authors used this possibility in their analysis when they examined, for example, the differences in the types of lawsuits from one year to another.

The next chapter deals with the methodology of the research in details. The authors present the probability sampling method through which 500 (100 from each year) lawsuits were selected from the more than 22,000 available cases and the available information about each case were coded into a statistical database. Sampling is needed when there are no resources for examining all available cases. This sampling method applied by the researchers ensured that every case within a year had the same probability for being selected into the sample. No personal or researcher interest could affect this process like in case-study research thus the sample could be representative to all of the tribunal cases. However, this methodology doesn't explore deterministic relationships between factors but can shed light on stochastic relationships between them. It can answer the question whether one factor made more likely statistically to have a certain outcome or not. This attitude towards data is quite unusual in historical sciences. This chapter might seem to be too detailed for some readers, especially for those who are familiar with quantitative sociological methods, but this detailed description serves as a tool for forego the critics that, for example, questioning the appropriateness of using quantitative methods on historical sources by arguing that these methods are too rigid to be applied in such cases or questioning the generalizability of the results on the unexamined units of case population.

The presentation of the results of the research starts in the third chapter. The authors make a distinction between five types of cases discussed by the People's Court: 1. Crimes committed against Jews during World War II (43% of the cases), 2. Memberships in far right and/or Arrow Cross groups (26%), 3. Crimes committed against non-Jews during World War II (12%), 4. Political and ideological cases (12%), 5. Crimes committed against Jews after World War II (7%). The authors found that right after the war almost every case dealt with crimes committed during the war and as we head to 1949 more and more cases appeared to be political and ideological suits.

The authors give a statistical analysis of the cases. According to the results most of the defendants were male, mostly between 30 and 50

years old, usually coming from the countryside, having a bit higher educational level than the average, and half of them were members of Hungary's Arrow Cross Party. Besides the defendants' social-demographic profile authors were able to give detailed description of lawyers and witnesses and their possible impact on the outcome of the cases that is something that was out of previous studies' sight.

In the next chapter the authors examine the political jurisdiction and cases of People's Court from a gender point of view and focus on female participants, both as defendants or judges. According to the results one fifth of the defendants were female and they were overrepresented in cases of verbal anti-Semitism. Authors argue that the figure of female defendants as young and innocent victims of male influence was a misrepresentation of these women in the public opinion. The fact that female defendants were mostly middle-aged, had a higher-than-average education and that they were mainly from rural areas of Hungary suggests that women were active participants of these cases and not deceived victims.

In the fifth chapter the authors examine the Jewish victims and their possible experience during the suits with the aim of answering the question on how this experience contributed to the formulation of negative and reactive Jewish identity in Hungary. The main argument is that the People's Court became the symbol of the un-kept promise of jurisdiction. According to the results in half of the cases in which the victim was Jewish, the defendants were acquitted of the charge. According to the authors this fact gave the message that the ordinary members of the Hungarian society were not responsible for the deaths of 600,000 Hungarian Jews and for many criminal acts against others during World War II and rather, the country's — and Nazi Germany's — political elites could be considered as mainly responsible for the committed crimes.

The book fills a gap in the existing in social history of Hungary. The authors examine a rarely researched topic by using an innovative analytical tool. This book can be useful for a wide range of audiences. Historians, methodologists, sociologists, scholars in Gender and/or Jewish Studies will find it resourceful and thought-provoking. There is no doubt that scholars from these fields will get new insights and knowledge after reading this book and they will have an impetus for creating new innovative data collection methods, too.

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Ö. József Kovács: *A paraszti társadalom felszámolása a kommunista diktatúrában. A vidéki Magyarország politikai társadalomtörténete 1945-1965* (The liquidation of peasant society in a communist dictatorship. Social history of rural Hungary 1945-1965). Budapest, Korall, 2012. 574 pages. Korall Social History Monographs 3. Includes an English-language summary, "Forced Collectivisation of Agriculture in Hungary, 1948-1961."

This study of Professor Ö. József Kovács is the first comprehensive attempt to interpret the forcible establishment of Soviet-style collectivised agriculture in Hungary. It is based on several years of archival research, including documentation from the Hungarian National Archives (MOL – Magyar Országos Levéltár), the Archives of State Security Services (ÁBSZTL – Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára), all Hungarian provincial archives and numerous personal interviews with survivors of collectivization procedures. The author interprets collectivization both as a social process and as a priority political objective of Communist dictatorship. This twofold approach enables the author to evaluate collectivization not only as a social historical process but also as an integral political instrument of the Communist dictatorship.

The author analyzes four specific elements of collectivization: socialism as a policy objective, the resistance of traditional structures to collectivization, industrialization and everyday experiences of peasants facing coercion and oppression. This approach documents not only the declared policies of the dictatorship, but based on 40 live interviews with participants illustrates the personal experiences and mentalities of those subjected to collectivization.

The starting point is the transformation of the year 1945 leading to the distribution of land to individual peasants under Soviet direction. This was actually the first step in collectivization. Land distribution favoured primarily landless agrarian wage-earners, domestic workers and peasants with dwarf holdings, so that these groups constituted 90% of those receiving land. As a result, a new social class consisting of beneficiaries of Soviet-directed land distribution was created. This class became the social basis of Communist party activities as well as of collectivization following the assumption of political power by the Communist Party in 1948. The policies of collectivization were prepared by a systematic campaign of propaganda, initially promoted as the policies of the Communist Party, then following the political takeover as official government policies.

The first phase of collectivization took place during the Rákosi regime, in the period 1949-1953. Although these policies were clearly targeted to social groups which had benefited from the land reforms of 1945 and violent methods of recruitment were utilized, party activists were able to enrol a total membership of 376,000 controlling only 26% of the country's cultivated land areas. In addition, as a result of out-migration, inefficient management, organizational coercion and land confiscation agricultural income was predominantly based on production in household plots. According to estimates cited by the author 70% of agricultural income in this period was derived from them. The dismissal of Rákosi and the appointment of Imre Nagy in 1953 as prime minister resulted in the substantial revision of agricultural policies. The number and membership of collective farms declined. During the Revolution of 1956 the decline continued at an even greater rate, resulting in a membership of less than 100,000 and control of 7.2% of the country's cultivated land areas by collective farms in December 1956. The author characterized this first phase of collectivization as "the history of an imported failure in Hungary and the waste of natural resources."

Following the Soviet intervention and the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, the Kádár government did not intervene in agricultural matters in the period 1956 to 1958. There was a resurgence of agricultural activity in the private sector in these years. But a radical change took place in 1959. Preparations for renewed collectivization were made in 1958 as the regime became firmly established. In the spring of 1959 a national propaganda campaign was launched, mass meetings were held, and special party agents were dispatched to those rural communities which had been designated as targets of collectivization. The next phase was "agitation" in these communities: large numbers of party members, teachers, industrial workers were placed in selected locations with the mission of persuasion. This mission included eating-drinking parties, but in most cases more forcible methods as well. The basic objective was to break peasant opposition to collectivization.

It has been a generally accepted view that following the violent methods used in the Rákosi period, the Kádár regime, learning the lessons of the Revolution, used more refined methods of persuasion to obtain the peasantry's support. Until recently very little information was available concerning these methods. The research and analysis of the author confirm that these methods were not refined at all: they included verbal, psychological, administrative pressure and even physical violence. These sources also confirm the methods of organized violence and various forms of

resistance to it: flight from the countryside and demonstrations by women. The author characterizes these actions as “campaigns” and a form of “internal war” and substantiates his judgement with original party documents.

Another element of the collectivization campaign was propaganda and activity directed against religious organizations and influence. It was an integral policy of the Communist Party to diminish the influence of church schools and religious instruction in agrarian society. At the same time, this policy was not limited to church influence in rural Hungary, but was a national policy of opposition, criticism and defamation of church organizations, denominational schools and associations.

Collectivization was unable to address important social, economic and psychological issues that were a by-product of agricultural collectivization. These included the social, medical and retirement needs of elderly members. Another series of problems related to pockets of unemployment, labour force shortages and inadequate professional management. Official documents confirm that inefficient management, labour force organization and performance as well as badly chosen locations of collectivized farms were responsible for low production indicators. State subsidies were required to provide membership incomes comparable to those of private landholders. Traditional village society was disrupted, the peasantry lost its devotion to agricultural pursuits as well as to the village community's traditions and customs. These psychological impacts are observable in contemporary Hungary both in rural and urban communities.

Ö. József Kovács's study attained its objective. In addition to preparing an excellent scholarly study, the author has made a contribution to a better understanding of our society, of our social history as well as of a significant traumatic social process. In his concluding chapter the author provides a convincing summary of his study and recommends future research to evaluate the process of impoverishment resulting from property confiscations in agricultural collectivization.

Ákos Bartha, University of Debrecen

Obituaries

György (George) Bisztray **1938 – 2012**

György Bisztray was born in Budapest into a family of intellectuals, refugees from Transylvania after the post-World War I peace settlement. To his Hungarian friends he was “Gyuri” and to his Canadian acquaintances “George.” Following in his father’s footsteps, Gyuri studied languages and literature at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, where his father had taught until he was sidelined for his bourgeois background during the socialist transformation of Hungary’s higher education system in the late 1940s. In 1965 he left Hungary to continue his studies in Norway from where he moved to the United States. He completed his doctoral studies at the University of Minnesota in 1972. In 1976 he found a teaching appointment at the University of Alberta. In 1978 the opportunity of a lifetime presented itself for Dr. Bisztray when the Hungarian Studies chair was established at the University of Toronto, the first such chair to be created through the joint efforts of one of Canada’s immigrant communities and the Canadian government anxious to promote multiculturalism. The program’s Hungarian sponsors had hoped to fund a chair of Hungarian history but certain members of the U. of T.’s history department opposed the idea and the university’s administration decided to establish a chair of language and literature studies. For administrative purposes the chair was placed in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, a department that a few years later also became the home of a chair of Estonian Studies. Dr. Bisztray applied for the job and won the competition. As far as the writer of this obituary knows, he was the only professor with Canadian teaching experience among the applicants. He also had experience in language teaching.

As chairman of the newly-founded program Dr. Bisztray had a free hand in establishing a curriculum. There was a Hungarian language course (basic or intermediate) offered each year, as well as a course in Hungarian literature. Later Hungarian film studies were added and attracted many students. In order to enable Dr. Bisztray to focus on specialized courses, he trained Éva Tömöry, one of the program’s early graduates, to teach language courses. From then on Éva carried much of the chair’s language-teaching load while Dr. Bisztray taught upper-level courses. Some of these were taught in the Hungarian language which was a “first” in the U. of T.’s history. (Mrs. Tömöry continues to teach, almost every year, Hungarian language courses at the U. of T. to this day.)

Professor Bisztray’s other academic activities included joining the *Hungarian Studies Review* (HSR) as a co-editor. For some years the journal was supported by the Chair’s resources or those of the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures. Dr. Bisztray was also instrumental in making the journal a joint venture with the National Széchényi Library (Országos Széchényi Könyvtár or

OSzK) in Budapest. (The link between the journal and OSzK theoretically continues to our days.) Another lasting achievement of Dr. Bisztray's tenure was the establishment in 1985 of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada (HSAC). (HSAC continues with its annual conferences under the auspices of the Congress of Humanities and Social Sciences of Canada even nowadays.) Throughout these years Dr. Bisztray gave papers at conferences (usually in English but sometimes in one of the other half-dozen languages he spoke) and published articles and books. The most notable of the latter was his *Hungarian Canadian Literature* (University of Toronto Press, 1987). He retired from teaching, and from being a co-editor of the *HSR*, in 2004. He began his long battle with cancer soon thereafter. With his retirement the U. of T.'s Hungarian Chair was discontinued, although courses relating to Hungarian language, literature and history are sometimes still being offered, in recent years at the University's Munk School of Global Affairs.

N.D.

Jenő (Eugene) Horváth **1920 – 2013**

Jenő (Eugene) Horváth was born in Győr, Hungary. He obtained his secondary and post-secondary education in Budapest. During the war he served in Hungary's military. Following the 1956 revolution he came to Canada and settled in Vancouver where he continued his education at the University of British Columbia. He became a certified accountant in 1966 and practised his trade until 2012. His Canadian friends knew him as Gene. In his private life he was a collector of faience and Haban ceramics. His wife, the writer Maria Krisztinkovich (1918-2008), was also a collector. Between them they possessed the largest collection of the kind in Canada. Eugene also collected old books and maps. He published extensively on these subjects and on his and Maria's collections. The most recent of these publications was his *A Canadian Collection of Hungarica*, Vol. I: *Books 1494-1819*; Vol. II: *Maps & City Views 1493-1817* (Vancouver, 2001); there was also J. Eugene Horvath & Maria H. Krisztinkovich: *A History of Haban Ceramics – A Private View* (Vancouver, 2005); and *Hungarian and Other European Ceramics of the mid-17th to mid-19th Centuries* (Vancouver 2011). In old age Eugene donated most of his collections to various cultural and educational institutions including the National Széchényi Library in Budapest.

The Horvaths were avid supporters of Hungarian cultural and scholarly causes including the *Hungarian Studies Review* and the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada (HSAC). For the latter organization Eugene often published, at his own expense, booklets of the papers that he, his wife and others presented at HSAC conferences. He edited these papers with great care and precision.

(Adopted from the relevant writings of Éva Kossuth of Vancouver)

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

MARGIT BALOGH is a Senior Research Associate of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences' Research Centre for Humanities. She also teaches in Eötvös Loránd University's Faculty of Humanities and its doctoral programme in church history. Her research centres on 20th century church history in Hungary with special focus on Catholic social movements and church-state relations after 1945. Among her numerous edited documentary collections are the minutes of the Hungarian bishops' conferences between 1948 and 1965. Recently her biography of Cardinal József Mindszenty, world-renown for his uncompromising opposition to communism, appeared in a German edition.

CINTIA GUNDA graduated from the North American Department, Institute of English and American Studies, University of Debrecen, Hungary. Her thesis explored recent Latin American immigration to the United States and its social, cultural and political impact. After starting her PhD studies, also at the University of Debrecen, she focused on Hungarian immigration to the US and the life of the Hungarian American community in the interwar years, publishing an article on Vilma Banky, the Magyar-born American silent film actress. Her other interests include Hungarian-American relations in the interwar era and the Hungarian community's press in the United States.

BÁLINT KACSÓH is Professor of Anatomy and Physiology at the Division of Basic Medical Sciences, Mercer University School of Medicine, Macon, Georgia, USA. He earned his MD at Semmelweis University, Budapest, in 1984, and received his PhD in basic medical sciences/physiology/endocrinology from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1997. His primary fields of teaching are histology & cell biology, and endocrinology. Dr. Kacsóh is the author of the textbook *Endocrine Physiology* (McGraw-Hill). He cloned and sequenced the cDNAs encoding all classical anterior pituitary hormones in *Monodelphis domestica* — most of which were the first to be identified in a marsupial species. His interests include historical linguistics, Hungarian history and prehistory.

ANITA MÁTÉ teaches English and history at Budapest's Saint Margaret High School. Her main field of research is the history of Hungarian Catholic immigrants in the United States. She earned her PhD at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest in 2008. Her book, which was based on her dissertation, was published in 2011: *Amerikai magyar katolikusok és az óhaza 1918-1939* [American Hungarian Catholics and the old country 1918-1939] (Budapest: METEM 2011). Her other publications include articles on Hungarian travelogues about America, priests as immigrants, and the history of the Sisters of the Divine Redeemer. She is currently preparing Kornél Bóle's memoirs about his 1920s and 1930s American visits for publication.

ZSUZSANNA VARGA studied history and Russian at Kossuth Lajos University in Debrecen (Hungary). She received her PhD in Economic History in 1998. Since September 2000 she has been teaching in Eötvös Loránd University's Department of Modern Hungarian History. She is now an associate professor. Her first monograph, *Politika, paraszti érdekérvényesítés és szövetkezetek Magyarországon, 1956-1967* (Politics, the assertion of agrarian interests and cooperatives in Hungary, 1956-1967) was published in 2001. Professor Varga's research interests and publications are focused on the history of agriculture in socialist Hungary often in the wider East-Central European context. Recently she became a member of the European Rural History Organisation (EURHO)'s Management Committee.