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Transylvania: Its Past and Present

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Preface

The present collection of essays on the subject of Transylvania and its peoples, especially the Székelys, has been in the making for a long time. While a few of the papers in this anthology are the results of recent research, others have been in the editing process for nearly a decade. And it is an eclectic selection. A few of the papers deal with very specialized subjects while one of them, Dr. Diószegi's, is an overview of nearly a century of evolution. One paper belongs to the field of biography, or more precisely still, historical diaries.

The focal point, if the volume has one, is the period of the Second World War, perhaps the most traumatic age in modern Transylvania's history. In the book review section an even larger period is covered, ranging from the twenty-first century, in Dr. Kósa's essay, all the way back to the early medieval period in the review of recent literature, including genomic research, related to the ethnogenesis of the Székely people, in fact of the entire Hungarian nation.

If apologies have to be made in connection with this volume they are due to a few of the collections' authors who had waited an inordinate amount of time to see it through the translating and editing process. If gratitude has to be expressed it should go to people who have helped with editing and proofreading, above all Dr. Jason Kovacs of the University of Toronto. Even greater appreciation has to be conveyed to Mrs. Éva Tömöry, of the University of Toronto's Hungarian Program, who put aside her numerous duties and took time out from her work of her doctoral thesis to help with the resolution of major computer problems the editor of this volume experienced during the preparation of this collection of essays. In the meantime work on another special volume of this journal, a collection of papers and readings on the modern art of László Moholy-Nagy continued to stall. I and the chief editor of that volume, Professor Olivér Botár of the University of Manitoba apologize for these delays to the contributors of that volume.

It would perhaps not be appropriate to talk about the affairs of the *Hungarian Studies Review* in this preface as the situation can change in the months that this volume will await being printed. But a few notes might be

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appropriate. Our journal has signed an agreement with EBSCO communications company to the effect that current volumes of our journal will be made available on the internet through EBSCO to the students and faculty of a great many English-speaking universities. At the same time we have a promise from the management of the National Széchényi Library of Hungary that past volumes of our journal, those not already on a website, will be archived and made available on the internet. Whether our journal will survive until these two developments take effect remains to be seen.

Nándor Dreisziger
Kingston, July 2009

Transylvania in Hungarian History: An Introduction

Nándor Dreisziger

Few words arouse stronger emotions among Hungarians than the name *Erdély* or Transylvania. While for most people in the English-speaking world “Transylvania” conjures up the image of Dracula, for Hungarians it is associated with a proud and time-honoured national past, as well as a real and tangible present. This circumstance should not surprise anyone. Transylvania is home to the largest Hungarian community living outside of Hungary. In fact this community is one of the largest minorities existing in any country that is a member of the European Union. Transylvania is also the place where Hungarian presence had existed uninterruptedly for at least eleven centuries, and it is the place where Hungarian culture flourished even in times when in other Hungarian lands it languished because of Ottoman Turkish or Austrian Habsburg rule.

The geographic limits of the land known as Transylvania have changed with the passage of time. Before 1920 this term was used to designate an area of the Carpathian Basin that was smaller than what the word describes nowadays. For most Hungarians, the word *Erdély* today signifies the lands that had been transferred from Hungary to Romania as a result of the Treaty of Trianon of June 1920. Most of the time this rather inaccurate and unhistorical definition will be used in this volume. When it will not be used, the context and meaning will be explained.

Although Transylvania had always held a significant connotation for Hungarians, it is since 1920 that they think of this land with an especially heavy heart. It was in the post-World War I peace settlement, in particular in the above-mentioned Treaty of Trianon, that the transfer of this land to Romania was inscribed into international law. The background of this event is complex and is rooted in centuries of history.

Early in the second century a.d. the Romans added this land to their expanding empire and called it Dacia. Some fifteen decades later, in the early 270s a.d., they Romans evacuated the province. From that time on, and especially since the time of the barbarian invasions of the Roman Empire a century-and-a-half later, until the thirteenth century, there is little concrete evidence of peoples speaking a Romance language (similar to Latin, Italian, French, Spanish etc.) in what is now Transylvania. Romance-speaking peoples, in particular the Vlachs, did live in the central mountains of the Balkans. In fact, maps of this age place the putative ancestors of the Romanians south of the lands of the Bulgarians, exactly the opposite as we know the locations of Bulgaria and Romania in the Modern Age.¹

From their Balkan homeland the Vlachs began their migrations north in the thirteenth century, migrations that were accelerated no doubt by the beginning of Ottoman Turkish expansion into the Balkans. By the time of the following century, they established themselves as the dominant ethnic population in what became known as Wallachia, the land between the Transylvanian Alps and the Lower Danube River. Here they converted to the eastern branch of Orthodox Christianity. Their priests used Church Slavonic as the language of liturgy. Under various leaders they at times served as a client state of the Kingdom of Hungary, or acted as an independent principality.

One of the most famous, one might say infamous ruler of Wallachia was Vlad III “the Impaler” (ruled in 1448 and from 1456-62). Myths and legends about this man probably inspired the main character in the nineteenth century English author Bram Stoker's book *Dracula* (1897). This work, along with its Hollywood-produced film incarnations, did more than any other media to immortalize this notorious individual.

Prince Dracula's connections to Transylvania were tenuous, even though he was born there and grew up there.² Whether he was mentally deranged or only a ruthless ruler can be the subject of debate. According to one legend, after coming to power for the second time in 1456, he wished to impose order in a realm that had experienced much anarchy and rampant crime as a result of internecine fighting and foreign invasions. In doing this Vlad used cruel punishments, including the impaling of criminals — as well as the prisoners of war captured in his wars with Wallachia's enemies. The executions were public and gruesome, and instilled fear into the hearts of Wallachia's and especially, Vlad's opponents.³

Legend has it that Vlad's demise resulted from his raids against the prosperous and powerful Saxon (German) towns of Transylvania and, in particular, the impaling of many (some sources say a few dozen, others say thousands) of the residents of Kronstadt (Brassó in Magyar, Brasov in

Romanian). The good *burgers* of southern Transylvania's ethnic German community appealed to their overlord and protector King Mátyás Corvinus of Hungary. Vlad had also alienated many elements of his country's aristocracy. Their leader, Vlad's own brother Radu, also conspired with Mátyás. In the end Vlad was captured and was imprisoned in Hungary. While in prison, his supporters started a publicity campaign to have him released, while Vlad's enemies spread vile rumours about him to justify his continued incarceration.

During the mid-1470s Vlad was allowed to return to his Wallachia, where his brother had held the reigns of power till his death a few years earlier and where another enemy of Vlad, Basarab the Elder, had been installed by the Turks after Radu's death. Vlad, with the help of foreign support, was able to regain power, but his new reign was short-lived. The Turks were determined to restore Basarab to power, and few in Wallachia seem to have rallied around a man with Vlad's reputation. Several legends exist as to the circumstances of his death — or murder.⁴

Whether a demented madman or a protector of the Wallachian nation, the true story of Vlad has been obscured by relentless propaganda against him throughout much of his lifetime — as well as since the appearance of Bram Stoker's *Dracula* over eleven decades ago. His image in the West portrays him as a depraved man, while in his own country, as well as in other Orthodox lands, he is more likely to be seen as a national hero.⁵

The Germans of Transylvania, as mentioned above, had been Vlad's enemies and were probably the sources of the most strident of anti-Vlad propaganda. Their connection to Transylvania has not been explained and it should be for those who are not familiar with that land's history.

The ancestors of these German-speaking people immigrated to Hungary in the middle of the twelfth century and were settled by King Géza II in south-eastern Transylvania to bolster the region's ability to protect the south-eastern frontier-lands of the Carpathian Basin. Though most of them were not from Saxony but from the western parts of what today is Germany, in time they became known as Saxons, in Hungarian *Szászok*. Later more German-speaking immigrants came to this part of Transylvania. Eventually they gave rise to a coherent ethnic community that was prosperous and had a fair amount of economic and political clout. Some of their settlements including the already-mentioned Kronstadt, became affluent urban centres that are even today picturesque places with many distinguished buildings and a great deal of charm. They include Hermannstadt (Nagyszeben for Hungarians, Sibiu for Romanians) and Karlsburg (Gyulafehérvár or Alba Julia), to mention the most obvious and the most charming.

Transylvania's Saxon minority usually enjoyed a fair amount of autonomy within the Kingdom of Hungary. In Transylvania itself, they constituted one of the three of the region's "founding peoples", along with the Magyars, and the Magyar-speaking Székelys. They were Catholics, the vast majority of whom became Protestants by the middle of the sixteenth century. But by then they were not the only non-Hungarian ethnic group in Transylvania.

The immigration of Vlach tribesmen into Wallachia followed, and to some extent co-existed with their gradual migration further north, into Transylvania. The new arrivals were slow to achieve economic and political influence. Most of them were shepherds and lived in the most mountainous areas. The Vlachs were not admitted, were in fact in no position to demand admittance, to the ranks of the three "founding peoples" of the land. Their descendants became a major factor in the political affairs of Transylvania only in the modern era. However their influence very gradually grew, as their numbers grew, and their numbers increased in a manner disproportionate to the demographic growth of Transylvania's the other ethnic groups. Especially slow was the natural growth of the Székely population. To prevent the impoverishment of their families through the subdivision of their land-holdings with the passage of generations, they practiced birth control. So, while the Vlachs kept increasing in numbers due to continued immigration *and* a higher birth rate, the Székelys, and to a lesser extent Transylvania's Magyar and Saxon populations, experienced limited demographic growth. Wars and internal strife also affected these groups differently. The Magyars, Székelys and even Saxons were more likely to do military service in wartime and to suffer casualties. They also bore the brunt of invasions as dwellers of urban centres and of the valleys and other lowlands, while the Vlachs were more likely to escape destruction and death in their highland hideouts.

From the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth centuries, Transylvania witnessed the competition for influence of the two dominant empires of the day: the Ottoman Turkish and the Habsburg. In this struggle the princes of Transylvania often managed to play one side against the other with considerable success. Still, repeated military struggles cost the population, and especially the three privileged founding peoples, a great deal in terms of material losses and lives lost.

The Ottomans were expelled from much of the Carpathian Basin at the end of the seventeenth century. This victory of Christian Europe over the Ottoman Turks resulted in the establishment of Viennese rule over the whole of Hungary, including Transylvania. From this time to the nineteenth century Vienna administered Transylvania as a separate province of the Habsburg

Empire. More wars followed, including at least four wars of liberation fought by Hungarians (mainly from the eastern and northern regions of the Carpathian Basin) against Habsburg rule. Added to this was the fact that the Habsburgs, unlike the Ottomans before, wanted to control most aspects of Transylvania's politics, and tried to inflict military conscription on its people. This situation resulted in, among other things, the flight of tens of thousands of Székelys and other Transylvanians to the lands beyond Habsburg control, east of the Carpathian ranges.

Hungary emerged from Habsburg domination briefly in 1848-49, and in a more lasting manner in 1867, this time as a result of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. From 1867 to the end of World War I, Transylvania became an integral part of Hungary and was ruled directly from Budapest. By this time, however, significant demographic shifts had taken place in the region as the Romanians had become the most populous ethnic group. In the meantime, to the south, Romania shook off the increasingly feeble tutelage of the Ottoman Empire and emerged as an independent nation. The stage was set for the growth of Romanian separatism in Transylvania that reached its zenith during World War I.

As is commonly known, during the first two years of this conflict Romania remained neutral. Both the Central Powers and the Allies hoped to attract Romania to their side, but it was the Allies who were in a better position to offer inducements to the government in Bucharest. They made a secret offer to Romania of Transylvania, on the condition that the country join the alliance against the Central Powers. The Romanians, encouraged by Russian successes against the German and Austro-Hungarian forces on the Eastern front, committed themselves. A few weeks later, in late August 1916, they declared war on Austria-Hungary and began the invasion of Transylvania. By then the Russian offensive had spent itself and some hastily assembled German and Austro-Hungarian forces defeated the invading Romanian armies.

The Central Powers collapsed in the fall of 1918. This provided Romania with a new opportunity to attack, which she did — a few days before the war's end. This time the Romanian armies were successful. They occupied Transylvania and, for a brief time in 1919, most of Hungary. In the following year, in the Treaty of Trianon between the victorious Allies and Hungary, the peacemakers awarded Transylvania to Romania, along with the eastern portions of the Hungarian Great Plain. In fact, more formerly Hungarian land was given to Romania than was left to Hungary. Transferred with these lands were about 1,700,000 ethnic Hungarians. Of all the territorial losses the Kingdom of Hungary suffered it was this loss that left the deepest wound on the

Hungarian psyche. There seemed little justification for detaching so much territory with so many Magyar residents from Hungary. Although in the transferred territories Romanians constituted the most populous ethnic group (they made up a little over half the total population), many predominantly by Magyar-populated cities and counties were included in the lands transferred.

The post-war peace settlement ushered in a new era for Transylvania's Magyar-speaking population. From being the politically dominant ethnic group, they became a reviled minority. Tens of thousands of them left and migrated to a Hungary impoverished by the war, post-war revolutions, and the economic devastation that the new territorial settlement brought for the country. For the Magyars left in Transylvania the decades of Romanian rule brought the loss of many of their rights and the beginning of relentless Romanization of their communities. During World War II for three years a part of Transylvania reverted to Hungarian rule, but with the war's end the pre-1940 borders were restored and the local Hungarian population once again became a disfavoured minority. Just as over two decades earlier, thousands of Hungarians left Transylvania. They fled their native towns and villages to escape the return of Romanian rule and the anticipated "settling of scores" as Soviet and Romanian armies advanced in pursuit of the retreating Axis forces. After the war the policies of Romanization resumed in Transylvania's Magyar-populated regions and continued with lesser and greater intensity until they reached a climax during the rule of dictator Nicolai Ceaușescu. One especially nefarious aspect of the new Romanization was the forced mixing of populations. Hungarians, especially professional people, were sent to work in predominantly Romanian regions of the country, while Romanians were relocated to work and live in Hungarian ethnic enclaves.

The end of communist rule two decades ago brought some relief for Transylvania's Magyar-speaking populations, although the decades of strident anti-Magyar propaganda and the vicious anti-Hungarian sentiments it engendered in the Romanian population persisted for years and often caused much grief. But with time conditions improved and at least the grinding poverty of the Ceaușescu years gradually disappeared. Romanization continued especially as the result of the re-emergence of the Orthodox Church as a powerful social and political force in the country. And the exodus of Hungarians continued, though never on the scale of the departure of Transylvania's Saxon population during the time of the Great Dictator. There is still a solid Hungarian presence in some areas of Transylvania, especially in the Székelyland, while German-speakers have all but disappeared from the beautiful Saxon cities and villages of south-eastern Transylvania. On the whole however, Transylvania has become a predominantly Romanian land.

The position of the majority population appears solid. Yet, there is a cloud on the horizon for the future of Romania and its predominant Romanian culture. It is posed by the same demographic processes which had caused the gradual rise of Romanian ascendancy over a period of seven centuries. That cloud is posed by Romania's rapidly growing Roma (Gypsy) population. It seems rather ironic that a nation whose political fortunes were largely due to its high fecundity compared to other peoples in the region, is now threatened by the rapid demographic growth of an ethnic group within its midst. The process also poses a threat to Transylvania's Hungarians — but only in the long term. In the near future this situation might help to ameliorate the problems of their minority status: it is becoming increasingly obvious to the majority Romanian population that the long term threat to their social and political dominance is posed not by the Hungarians but by another ethnic group, and this circumstance should reduce the scale and prevalence of anti-Magyar sentiments in Romania, sentiments that have, in the past, caused so much strife and grief.

The papers and review articles in this volume focus mainly on the history of Hungarians there in the past nine decades, as well as on the relationship between them and the people — and governments — of Hungary. With two of the papers and an excerpt from one Transylvanian's reminiscences dealing with the era of the Second World War, one might say that the years 1939 to 1945 constitute the real focus of the volume. This might be justified since these years were pivotal in the region's history. The war and its outcome sanctified the territorial settlement reached with regard to Transylvania after the First World War, while it contributed to the prolongation of bad relations between Hungarians and Romanians. It also further weakened the demographic position of the Magyars in that land as a result of the flight of still more thousands of people. We hope that discussions of these developments in our volume will contribute to the rise of a more thorough knowledge of the history of Transylvania and its peoples. One day perhaps in the English-speaking world the name Transylvania will not conjure up the image of “Count Dracula” but will elicit a desire for a greater knowledge of the troubled past and difficult present of this land and its peoples.

NOTES

¹ See for example map 3 in Magocsi, Paul R., ed., *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 9.

² The house that was his childhood home is in Sigishoara (to Hungarians, Segesvár), Transylvania. Vlad's parents lived in exile there at the time, a situation

that had often been the fate of Vlad's family. The building is a major tourist attraction today.

³ The actual process of impalement requires great skills on the part of the executioners, who were themselves punished, possibly impaled, if their victim died in the process, rather than after suffering unimaginable agonies over a period lasting sometimes days.

⁴ On Vlad's tempestuous life and times see the internet entry on him: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Vlad_III_the_Impaler, accessed on 28 March 2009.

⁵ On the subject of Western stereotypes about East European history and historical figures see Piotr Wandycz, "Western Images and Stereotypes of Central and Eastern Europe," in *Vampires Unstaked: National Images, Stereotypes and Myths in East Central Europe* ed. André Gerrits and Nanci Adler (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1995), 5-23. Some of the other papers in this volume relate more directly to Vlad the Impaler and his image. See my review of this volume in *The International History Review*, vol. 18 (1996): 993f.

Remembering Szatmár, Remembering Himself: The Geography of Memory and Identity in Ferenc Fodor's "Szatmár Földje, Szatmár Népe, Szatmár Élete"

Steven Jobbitt

In 1952, the Hungarian, conservative-nationalist geographer Ferenc Fodor finished compiling his geographical "biography" of Szatmár-Németi (now Satu Mare) a once-important Hungarian city located in the northern reaches of the Partium, an historic region of the Kingdom of Hungary nestled between Transylvania to the east, and the Great Hungarian Plain to the west. Begun during World War II, and entitled "Szatmár földje, Szatmár népe, Szatmár élete" (The Land, People, and Life of Szatmár)¹ this introspective, 325-page study sought to refresh memories of a lost city which, torn from the Hungarian body in 1920 by the harsh terms dictated by the Treaty of Trianon, had been briefly returned to Hungary during World War II, only to be re-attached again to Romania after the combined German-Hungarian defeat of 1945. By tracing the historical and geographical evolution of the city, and by carefully illustrating its fundamental Hungarian character, Fodor hoped to preserve a permanent place for Szatmár in the Hungarian national consciousness. "Szatmár lives within me," he wrote in the introduction, "and memories from my youth demand that I continue to feel this life, and render it perceptible to others."² The communists, he implied, might not appreciate his efforts, but future generations of moral, nation-loving (and potentially nation-building) Hungarians would.

Having spent his formative years in Szatmár, Fodor felt an "urgent need"³ to testify, both as a Hungarian and as a scholar, to the profound Hungarianness of the city, and to what he saw as the interconnected geographical and historical forces which linked the land to the Hungarian people, and the Hungarian people to the land.⁴ His education in Szatmár's Catholic gymnasium at the turn of the century had given him his "first substantial glimpse" into the complex moral, material, and spiritual make up of Hungary and its

people, and more importantly had helped to make him who he was.⁵ Half a century later, with Szatmár lost indefinitely to its “Romanian oppressors,” and with his own health failing, Fodor felt compelled to write the city’s biography, both for his own sake, and for the sake of Hungarian geographical science, and by extension also Hungarian national memory.¹

Shocked, as we shall see, by the dilapidated state of the city’s archives, and unable to trust the ethnic Hungarians of the region to protect and preserve a “correct” memory of Szatmár, Fodor felt both obligated, and also justified, to draw heavily on his own memories and adolescent experiences in order to ensure that the city would “live on” in the minds of his readers.⁷ Fodor, in fact, presented himself as being ideally positioned to write a “biography” of Szatmár. Underlining the importance of a morally-informed subject whose ties to the land and its people served to enhance, rather than detract from, an accurate biographical study of a particular place, Fodor wrote: “Every biography stems from two fundamental sources, the life of the subject being examined, and the life of the examiner himself.” The closer the two are related, he continued, the more possible it is “to arrive at a faithful rendering of the subject being studied.” Consciously writing himself into the geo-historical narrative he was creating, Fodor concluded that “only a researcher with intimate ties to the land can faithfully construct the life of his native country.”⁸

Admitting that his study contained an unmistakable “subjective element,” he defended his approach, writing: “If we want to depict the living being of a country in place of its dead, dismembered body, we need to feel that life subjectively; the soul of the land must dwell within us. Only in this way can we come to know or recognize the essence of its life: only in this way can we synthesize a biography.”⁹ Suggesting that an “outsider” could of course also “examine and dissect the character of the land, and the history of the people,” Fodor further attempted to underscore his own legitimacy as a biographer by adding that such a study would inevitably “kill the life of the land with the autopsy.”¹⁰

Fodor’s conviction that he, and perhaps only he, could breathe “Hungarian life” back into Szatmár was very much a product of his own synthetic approach to geography, an approach that he had developed under the tutelage of Count Pál Teleki and others during the Horthy period, and which ran parallel to, and no doubt was inspired by, the idea of *szellemtörténet* popularized by the interwar writings of the historian Gyula Szekfű. Championed by Count Kunó Klebelsberg, Bálint Hóman, and others as the cornerstone of neo-nationalist thinking in post-Trianon Hungary, the idea of *szellemtörténet* sought to overcome the spiritual and moral poverty of the so-called “objective” approaches of the liberal period.¹¹ Indeed, if the liberal-positivist scholarship

that dominated the Hungarian academy at the *fin-de-siècle* had been predicated, as William Everdell has put it, on “keeping the ghost’s out of one’s machines,”¹² then the synthetic approach was about reintegrating these subjective phantoms into Hungarian history and geography, at least to the extent that they could resurrect and enliven the de-mystified, and thus spiritually moribund, methodologies of modern Hungarian scholarship.

Beyond breathing life back into the memory of Szatmár as an “authentic” Hungarian space, Fodor’s “underground” manuscript was also part of a more personal effort to remember himself. Having been compelled to reinvent himself as a socialist geographer in the post-WWII period, and recognizing that he was nearing the end of his life, Fodor devoted much time and energy to scholarly and autobiographical projects aimed at constructing, and ultimately preserving, a “proper” memory of himself, one which would cast him in an idealized conservative-nationalist light, and which would help to counteract the charges of opportunism leveled against him as he offered his academic services to the building of a socialist Hungary. Situating his manuscript within the broader body of his published and unpublished socialist-era work, this essay concludes by suggesting ways in which we can understand his geographical biography of Szatmár as an integral component of this much larger autobiographical project.

Remembering Szatmár

As it was for many Hungarians, the return of Szatmár-Németi (and indeed the rest of Transylvania) to Romania at the conclusion of World War II came as a serious blow to Fodor, and would remain a source of considerable anxiety for him until his death in 1962. Writing in 1952, Fodor lamented the fact that the reinstatement of Trianon borders between Hungary and Romania had cut researchers off from the resources and factual data needed to produce a truly comprehensive geo-historical rendering of Szatmár and its environs. With important documents left “dormant” in archives that had fallen once more into foreign hands, how would it be possible to keep the memory of the city alive?¹³

Though Fodor’s desperation over the uncertain fate of Szatmár no doubt peaked in the wake of communism’s rise to power during the postwar period, his concern over the fragility of Hungarian memory and, by extension, Hungarian identity, had already been triggered by a three-day trip that he took to the then newly-liberated city in July 1941. The short homecoming, in fact, was deeply unsettling. Though he was undoubtedly relieved that his spiritual

and intellectual “home town” had been returned to Hungary after twenty years of Romanian “occupation,” and though he was pleased to have had the opportunity to rekindle memories from his youth, Fodor could not shake the unnerving feeling that much had changed, and that the very Hungarianness of the city and its surrounding area had suffered untold damage in less than a generation. The speed at which Hungarian memory had begun to fade in the city appears to have startled Fodor. Having had the chance to finally go back, he discovered, much to his horror, that “home” itself was very much in the process of disappearing.

Indeed, two decades of Romanian efforts to suppress Hungarian history and culture, and to claim the region as “their own,” had certainly taken its toll.¹⁴ Though Fodor would attempt to downplay the lasting impact of Romanian nation building in Szatmár, he was obviously concerned about both the nature and nationalist implications of the changes that had already taken place. The Romanian “occupiers,” he noted, had wasted no time in implementing projects aimed at giving the cityscape a “new color.”¹⁵ As early as 1920, Romanian officials had begun to rename streets, buildings, and other important landmarks. According to Fodor, this process was deliberately provocative, with the new names intended as an “obvious insult to Hungarian nationalist sensibilities.” Szent István Square, for example, was renamed “Piata Trianon,” while the Panonnia Hotel was rechristened as the Dacia Hotel (and this despite “the sensational Hungarian style” of the building itself).¹⁶ Business signs in Hungarian were redone in Romanian, and advertisements in Hungarian were not allowed. Even gypsy musicians were forbidden to play the traditional Hungarian csárdás.¹⁷ So thorough was the forced transformation, then, that the city had literally ceased to “sound” Hungarian.

From Fodor’s point of view, the Romanians had stopped at nothing to reinvent the city in the two decades that it was under their control. In fact, beyond simply renaming existing buildings and spaces, city planners had embarked on an ambitious program of “urban renewal” in the interwar period, one that appeared to be directed more than anything else at wiping out “a thousand years of Hungarian history and tradition” in the city.¹⁸ Identifying certain structures as uniquely “Hungarian” from an architectural point of view, Fodor lamented the fact that these structures had been targeted by the Romanians for demolition, and had been replaced (or were scheduled to be replaced) by “inferior” Romanian ones. These efforts to transform the city, he added, were haphazard at best, and only proved, as far as he was concerned, the civilizational backwardness of the Romanian people. In pointing this out, Fodor noted that many of the projects undertaken by the Romanians in the interwar period remained unfinished when the Hungarians took control of the

city in 1941. In some cases, he wrote, the Romanians had only gotten as far as destroying the buildings, and had made no apparent attempt to construct new ones in their place. Underscoring this point, he concluded that, unlike Hungarians, Romanians were “destroyers,” not “builders.”¹⁹

Responding indignantly to Romanian attempts to transform the region, Fodor reeled at the audacity of a foreign people engaged in what amounted to a harsh, and ultimately barbaric, re-coding of the land and its people.²⁰ With an unmistakable splash of bravado, Fodor initially rejected these Romanian efforts as inherently superficial, maintaining that, though these foreign occupiers could destroy Hungarian structures and change Hungarian place names on paper, they would never be able to “write” these names successfully and permanently “into the ground.” “There was no way,” he insisted, “that the Hungarian spirit of the city would be transformed into a Romanian one.”²¹ But Fodor was perhaps less sure of himself than he would lead us to believe. His confident pronouncement that Romanian efforts to re-imagine the city would never succeed, in fact, was betrayed by a concern over the state of the city’s archives. Having traveled to Szatmár in the summer of 1941 to collect material for his comprehensive geographical study of the city, Fodor was appalled to find boxes of irreplaceable maps and documents “mouldering away on dusty shelves” in archives that Hungarians had not had access to for some years.²² This obviously troubled Fodor. Indeed, without archival sources — without these national narratives and symbolic representations of the land — there was no enduring memory; no Hungarian past, and thus no Hungarian present or future.

Fodor’s concern over the state of the documents as he found them in 1941 was exacerbated not only by the geo-political realities of postwar east central Europe (and in particular by the silence imposed by the communists over the Trianon question), but also by the questionable loyalties of the Hungarians left in the city. Indeed, despite his obvious disdain for the Romanians, a people he refers to throughout the manuscript as barbaric and uncivilized, he is careful to point out that the real blame for the disappearance of Hungarian memory quite likely lay with the Hungarians themselves. Fitting his own narrative into the critical-analytical framework laid out by Szekfű in *Három Nemzedék*, Fodor devotes much space to dissecting the history of Szatmár’s moral and spiritual decline during the long nineteenth century, pointing to the decadent liberalism of the post-1867 period as a regrettable, but in retrospect inevitable, precursor to the “treacherous ethnic Hungarian opportunism” of the interwar period. Though he praised, on the one hand, the idea of an undefeated Hungarian spirit, he was also critical of many of those who remained in Szatmár after Trianon for their apparent willingness to assimilate

and even collaborate with their Romanian “occupiers.”²³ Such a state of affairs, he argued, did not bode well for the future of Szatmár as a historical, or even spiritual, Hungarian space.

Indeed, despite Fodor’s conviction that communism would not last forever, and that Hungary would once again be given the opportunity to return to its proper Christian-nationalist roots, there is a distinctly desperate quality evident in his work; a melancholic, even elegiac element that betrays Fodor’s own doubts about the possible rehabilitation of the city (and with it the nation) in the future. Treacherous Hungarian elements, after all, had done much to undermine the Hungarianness of the city, while Romanian efforts to re-code the region had already transformed the landscape, if only in a superficial way. Even the archives — those all-important reservoirs of national memory — were in danger of disappearing forever. Perhaps, then, Fodor offered his biography of Szatmár not so much as a template for the re-building of a reunified Hungary, but as a time capsule, or “gift,” to be bestowed upon future generations of Hungarians so that they might properly “mourn” what had been lost to the nation.²⁴ Perhaps, in the final analysis, this is all that he could do. Having devoted himself to what historian Susan Crane has described as “the preservation of what would otherwise be lost both mentally and materially,” Fodor could at least ensure that Szatmár, and the region as a whole, would be remembered “properly” by future generations.

As limited as this form of remembering may have been in practical nationalist terms, it was by no means inconsequential in an ontological sense. As the literary scholar Aaron Beaver has pointed out in a recent essay, the type of mournful, elegiac writing that runs through Fodor’s manuscript has profound existential implications. Drawing on the ontological notion of being-for-others that Jean-Paul Sartre develops in *Being and Nothingness*, Beaver argues that the elegy (and Fodor’s work can certainly be read in this way) does more than simply commemorate the object of one’s memory. In remembering what has been lost, the elegy quite literally constitutes, and thus preserves, this selfsame object. In the absence of elegiac memory, he argues, the dead “not only cease to exist, but in a very real sense *never existed at all*.”²⁵ For Fodor, then, the biography of his “home city” didn’t simply ensure that the city would be remembered. In a profoundly solipsistic way, it guaranteed the city’s very existence for Hungarians — past, present, and future.

Remembering Himself

Though Fodor’s biography of Szatmár was obviously intended as an under-

ground, socialist-era vehicle for the preservation of conservative-nationalist memory, it was also intended as a vehicle for the remembering of himself. Having been stripped of his teaching position and his academic credentials by the postwar communist regime, Fodor struggled until his death in 1962 to reinvent himself as a socialist geographer. Not unlike Czesław Miłosz's "Alpha" intellectual outlined in *The Captive Mind*, Fodor found himself in a position whereby a scholarly "conversion" to socialism was the only way to remain relevant as an intellectual.²⁶ Perhaps more importantly, it was the only way he could continue to make a life for himself and his family as an academic. Such a conversion was by no means easy for Fodor from a moral or personal point of view, as it meant opening himself up to charges of opportunism. This no doubt weighed heavily on him, and must be taken into consideration when we analyze the underlying meaning of underground socialist-era manuscripts like "Szatmár földje, Szatmár népe, Szatmár élete." As a time capsule, this study served not only to preserve the memory of the city and the nation, but also to defend Fodor against those who might criticize him of deviating from his conservative-nationalist values, and of betraying Hungary and its people.

The careful packaging of his work, therefore, one in which nation, city, and self were intimately linked, provides a useful glimpse into the important connection that exists between memory and personal identity, or, more accurately, the act of remembering and the act of identifying oneself with a carefully selected set of narratives, images, objects, and even physical spaces. As Paul Ricoeur argues in *Memory, History, Forgetting*, the act of remembering something other than oneself is intimately tied to one's perception of self—to how one sees oneself in the present, and to how this self-image is projected into the future. Connecting this to his conceptualization of "pragmatic" or "active" memory as being creative in a fundamentally phenomenological sense, Ricoeur suggests that, in remembering an object (or, in Fodor's case, an entire city), one remembers oneself.²⁷

This self-constructing or autobiographical function of memory outlined by Ricoeur was obviously present in Fodor's socialist-era underground work, and especially in his biography of Szatmár. Particularly relevant in this light is how Fodor periodizes, and then analyzes, the modern era from the beginning of the nineteenth century to World War II. Dividing this era into three periods (namely Christian conservatism, 1800-1867; degenerate "Jewish" liberalism, 1867-1920; and Romanian barbarism, 1920-1939), Fodor suggests how Szatmár was first built into a modern but morally and culturally conservative city by a string of visionary bishops, and then how this "brilliant, shining" example of Hungarian morality and industriousness slowly decayed

between 1867 and the First World War, a period of decadent liberalism and aggressive assimilationist policies which only served to weaken, rather than strengthen, the nation.²⁸ Though he admits that this period brought unprecedented growth and economic prosperity to Szatmár, he laments the unprincipled and immoral way in which the process of modernization was carried out, and is even more critical of the adverse, degenerative impact that the wholesale “Magyarization” of ethnic minorities had on the city socially and culturally. Weakened by these factors, the city’s Hungarian citizens faced a difficult struggle against the oppressive and ultimately crippling “occupation” by the Romanians during the interwar period.

Layering and then analyzing the history of Szatmár in this way allowed Fodor to do two things. First, it provided him with an opportunity to identify an authentic Hungarian core, one which was at once Catholic, morally conservative, and fiercely patriotic, especially when provoked. The real heroes of Fodor’s narrative are undoubtedly the members of this ethnic body, Christian men and women (but primarily clergymen, teachers, and scholars) who functioned as the true builders of modern Hungary in the first half of the nineteenth century, and who went on to serve as its principal defenders during the subsequent periods of internal decline and foreign occupation. Second, it allowed him to position himself, albeit indirectly, within this ethnic core, and to tie his own identity as a conservative-nationalist Hungarian to the self-image of this group. When read against other unpublished autobiographical sources, it becomes readily apparent that he saw himself as being part of an heroic Hungarian vanguard who, even when they were “barricaded” behind the gates of their schools and churches, managed to hold back the forces of degeneration and tyranny. In the introduction to yet another lengthy underground study “A magyar lét földrajza,” for example, and also in a number of autobiographical sketches written at different points in his life, Fodor referred to his pedagogical work, his scholarship, and his social activism as constituting part of a moral defence for Hungary. When he wrote, therefore, that “it was from behind the gates of Szatmár’s Christian schools, churches, and other institutions that the rootless and unpatriotic spirit of the liberal period was held at bay,” it is easy to see how Fodor, who attended a Catholic gymnasium in Szatmár, and who later taught in Catholic schools, might have seen himself as being part of this line of nationalist defence.²⁹

The fact that Fodor refers to Szatmár as his home city, even though he was not born there, provides further insight into the autobiographical elements that run through his study. Fodor was born, in fact, in Tenke (now Tinca), a small village roughly 50 km from Szatmár, and only moved from there to this much larger regional centre as a boy of ten to begin his studies as a gymnasi-

um student. Given that a good number of his formative years were spent in Szatmár, it is perhaps understandable that he would regard it, rather than Tenke, as “home.” As he himself admits, “one’s home is not necessarily where one was born, but where one gains self consciousness, an awareness of one’s purpose in life, and a sense of one’s relationship to the outside world. Szatmár is my spiritual and intellectual homeland.”³⁰ Again, when read against other unpublished autobiographical material, it becomes clear that Szatmár was not simply a place in which he became aware of himself, but rather was a place where he began to imagine or invent himself—as a scholar, as a man, and as a nationalist.³¹ Szatmár was significant because it marked his first attempt to “code” himself, to lay down roots, and to begin his lifelong struggle to distance himself from his impoverished, provincial, working-class origin in Tenke. Though he would refer back to Tenke with fondness (especially during the communist period, when it was politically astute for him to do so), Szatmár was his true hometown, however imagined it may have been, and served as a familiar symbolic space in which he could find meaning and solace, even under communism.

Though central to the expression and preservation of his own sense of self, Fodor’s scholarly work alone was by no means sufficient to satisfy the autobiographical impulse which had become so acute during the war years. Even the detailed and ethnographically-informed “Élettörténet” (Life History) that he had begun writing in January 1941 was insufficient, especially in light of his experiences in Szatmár in the summer of that same year. Recognizing the fragility of narratives unsupported by factual evidence, Fodor began collecting and organizing documents, letters, photographs, and other keepsakes to support, and even illustrate, the life narrative that he was so desperate to write, and ultimately bequeath to the future. His own identity and reputation had often come under attack during his lifetime, and he certainly feared what would happen after his death, an event that he felt was close at hand. If his “narrative of self” was to have any staying power, therefore, it would need to be as airtight and “ironclad” as possible.³²

This need to provide an objective grounding for his life story manifested itself most obviously in a series of twenty-one scrapbooks that he began assembling sometime between the summer of 1941 and the end of the war in 1945. Though the bulk of the project appears to have been completed after the war, and perhaps even during the communist period, the project itself was, at least at the outset, an obvious response to the profound sense of existential destabilization, and at times hopelessness, that Fodor felt during the war.³³ Though devoid of excessive descriptions, the documents and photographs that he included in his scrapbooks were nevertheless carefully organized so as to

tell a particular story, one that would supplement, and help solidify, other purely textual narratives of self. The documents and images in Fodor's scrapbooks, in fact, overlapped and intersected with each other to create an integrated network of meaning; a discursive and symbolic nexus intended to establish a cohesive personal narrative by dispelling the forces of fragmentation and dissolution that had plagued him throughout his life. Assembled into a meaningful, organic totality, Fodor no doubt hoped that these scrapbooks would contribute to the "accurate" telling, and re-telling, of his life story.

Organized more or less chronologically and thematically, the scrapbooks trace Fodor's development through time, from his birth in Tenke in 1887, to his old age in Budapest in the late 1950s. Focusing either on a particular period of his life, or on a particular aspect of his nation-building work (his boy scout activities, for example, or his pedagogical work in Pécs and Budapest during the war), the scrapbooks rely on carefully crafted montages and strategically positioned documents and photographs to construct a "factually-based" narrative of Fodor's personal history. Much like the totalizing narrative of Szatmár-Németi constructed in "Szatmár földje, Szatmár népe, Szatmár élete" — one which gave voice to a "timeless" Magyar identity evolving teleologically over time — the life story that emerges from this process of strategic positioning and careful layering is one of a creative, moral, and fundamentally autonomous subject linked organically and meaningfully to his own past, and to his own familial and geographical roots.³⁴

As Hayden White has argued, autobiography itself is "the product of a particular emplotment imposed on the facts of an individual's life."³⁵ Paul Ricoeur takes this idea a bit further, arguing that emplotment is what establishes the transition from the mere recounting of a life story to its explanation.³⁶ The first of Fodor's twenty-one scrapbooks provides an excellent illustration of this idea of "emplotment" suggested by White and developed by Ricoeur. Though the organization of the photos and documents is not chronologically consistent, the self-conscious narrative that Fodor attempted to construct is certainly evident. Answering questions of where he was from, and, more importantly, of what he had become in the years leading up to the beginning of World War II, Fodor intended this first scrapbook to serve as an introduction to, and overview of, his life, at least up to 1940-41. Having established in the opening few pages his "authentic" village roots, Fodor then showed how he shaped this raw material into a fully-developed, productive, and ultimately moral masculine self. Highlighting scholarly successes both as a gymnasium student in Szatmár, and then as a university student in Budapest, Fodor traced the trajectory of his academic career to the end of the 1930s.

His inclusion at the end of this first scrapbook of congratulatory letters written by officials at the Ministry of Religion and Education in 1938 and 1939 suggest a continuity between his early training, and his later work for the nation. As it would be in each of the following scrapbooks, the focus here was very much on himself, rather than his family. The family, in fact, when it was represented, merely served as a passive backdrop against which his own identity as a scholarly Christian male was fashioned.

Of course, Fodor could not help but include images which no doubt reminded him of the more distressing and unpleasant events of his life. Photos of his mother's grave, for example, and of his son Zoli who died suddenly and tragically in 1936 at the age of twenty, documented what had been lost to him over the course of his life. And yet, despite the painful, and even negative memories, that Fodor included in this and other scrapbooks — memories which pointed to the fragility of his identity, and to failures and disappointments both major and minor — the project as a whole tended to gloss over his lifelong struggle against melancholy, dissolution, and disappointment. Focusing instead on his personal achievements, and especially on his academic successes, Fodor's scrapbooks projected an idealized image of a unified and triumphant self. Much like his synthetic geographies, and especially his underground socialist-era work, his scrapbooks functioned as a fetish of sorts, an object of obvious symbolic import through which he could resolve his lingering sense of ontological incompleteness and existential anxiety. Though intended primarily for his descendants, the scrapbooks also offered Fodor a sense of solace and meaning during otherwise difficult and uncertain times.

Beyond being embodied in his personal papers and unpublished, "underground" nationalist geographies, the autobiographical impulse was also reflected in his published socialist-era scholarship, especially in biographical and quasi-biographical studies which focused on the lives and work of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Hungarian geographers and scientists. His *Magyar Vízimérnököknek a Tisza-völgyben* (Hungarian hydrological engineers of the Tisza Valley), which won an award from the Academy of Sciences in 1955, and was published in 1957, was an obvious example of this, especially given the emphasis Fodor placed on the "heroic" nation-building work of the conservative-nationalist icon Count István Széchenyi. Even more telling in this respect was his 1953 study of the life and work of Antal Balla, an important though little-known eighteenth-century Hungarian cartographer and natural scientist who, much like Fodor, had cultivated other educated gentlemanly interests such as archaeology, music, and art alongside his scholarly work. Granted, the narrative of this short work is for the most part mechanical and uninspiring, focused as it is on the more technical aspects of Balla's

cartographical and scientific endeavours. The brief glimpses that he provided into Balla's personal life, however, combined with the praise that he lavished on the more creative, artistic side of his work suggests that Fodor projected his own self-image onto the object of his study. The image of himself that he constructed in his own scrapbooks, in fact, runs parallel in many ways with the image that he conveyed of Balla. Foregrounding the nation-building importance of his scholarly work, Fodor nevertheless integrated images and texts documenting not only his talents as an artist, photographer, and musician, but also his skills and achievements as a botanist and gentleman adventurer. Water colours of birds and landscapes that he painted were included in a number of his scrapbooks, for example, as were references to public performances he gave playing the *tárogató*, or shawm (a double-reed instrument not unlike an oboe). Textual accounts and photographs of his many scientific and touristic excursions, moreover, reflected the self-image of a man who saw himself as being deeply connected to the land through both his work and his passionate love of all things natural.

A montage of three photographs taken in 1912 and mounted in book four of his scrapbooks speaks volumes to the way that Fodor regarded himself, and how he wanted to be remembered. Taken within a year of his arrival at his first teaching post in the provincial town of Karánsebes (Caransebeş), the pictures capture a number of the more important, interconnected aspects of his life which he regarded as being integral to his identity and sense of self. At the top of the page is a photograph of Fodor posed with his *tárogató*. He is outside, amidst nature, his weight on his left leg, a cape strung over his shoulders. He appears to be playing the instrument, though the way he is looking at the camera suggests that the photograph was definitely staged. The caption reads simply: "1912, spring." In the middle of the page is a photograph of the room which served as Fodor's study in Karánsebes. As in so many other pictures of his living and work spaces that he included in his scrapbooks, his desk is fore-grounded. The caption: "my bachelor apartment."

On the bottom of the page is a photograph of Fodor obviously dressed for an excursion. He is wearing a Bavarian-style hat, a cape, and leather boots which come up to just above the calf. He is sitting at the base of a tree on one of its exposed roots. In his hand is a walking stick, and on his knee a knapsack. The photographer is slightly below him, giving the image itself an unmistakably noble and majestic air. The caption: "1912."³⁷

This sense of nobility and gentlemanly accomplishment is certainly present in his study of Balla. Indeed, Fodor no doubt saw a kindred spirit in Balla, a man motivated not only by the pursuit of science and the love of his country, but also by the beauty and wonder of nature. Balla, he writes, was an

artist rather than a mere technician, a highly-cultured scholar who illustrated his maps with intricate drawings of Hungarian flora, and who inundated his work with mythical and religious symbolism. “It was only after him,” Fodor assures us, “that the profession [of cartography] became a dry [technical] craft.”³⁸

Such a statement ultimately says as much about the nature of scholarship under communism as it does about the state of Hungarian cartography at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In making this claim, Fodor drew attention to his own situation, and to the situation of others who, like him, were compelled to become mere political functionaries, bending their scholarship to the pragmatic demands of socialist state-building. By praising Balla’s maps and their artistic, humanistic content, and by further voicing his contempt for the functional yet unimaginative cartography which followed in his wake, Fodor was suggesting — if only implicitly — that he would prefer to be remembered as a creative, free-thinking scholar, rather than as a communist-era drone.

The fear, in fact, that he would not be remembered “correctly,” or that he would be forgotten altogether after his death, underlines Fodor’s biography of Balla as much as it does his biography of Szatmár. In a way very similar to his anxiety that Szatmár would be remembered correctly, if at all, his lament that Balla’s name had “disappeared without a trace from Hungarian intellectual history,” and that German-speaking scholars had even attributed some of his scholarly achievements to Austrian scientists, blends with Fodor’s own anxiety that he himself would eventually be buried and forgotten by a regime guided by a foreign political and ideological agenda. In preserving the memory of a city like Szatmár, or an important Hungarian intellectual like Balla, he was, if only by proxy, also preserving the memory of himself.

Appendix

Excerpts from “Szatmár’s földje...”

[Author’s notes:] The following passages are from Fodor’s work, “Szatmár’s földje...” They are reproduced here in English to illustrate the tone and contents of his manuscript. The first part has been selected from his descrip-

tions of Szatmár's history, the second from his account of the city's and its inhabitants' fate under Romanian rule from 1919 to 1940. The passages were translated into English by Nándor Dreisziger in consultation with the author of this paper.

Part 1

The Settlement of Szatmár-Németi and its Life in the Middle Ages

According to the all-knowing Anonymus, Szatmár pre-dates the [Hungarian] conquest. He has to tell of course how the Hungarians took the city. His story, in an old-fashioned translation, goes like this:

It was decreed that Tass, the father of Lehel, and Zábók, the son of Elend, from whom descended the Csakij clan, as well as Horka's father Töhötöm, and the grandfather of Gyul and Zombor, the ancestor of the Maglót clan, marched against Mén Marót. With their army divided into two, they go to the fort of Zothmár, which they took after a three-day siege. On the fourth day they entered the fort and captured Mén Marót's soldiers, put them into chains, and tossed them into the deep dark dungeons. They also took the sons of the inhabitants hostage and left the fort manned by their own soldiers and set out in the direction of Mezes....

This is how Anonymus described the events. We now know that he projected the geographic and political conditions of his own age back to the times of the conquest.

The fact that Kér, Gyarmat and Szatmárnémeti were located on islands free from the floods means that the grasslands that in the 10th century stretched from Csap along the banks of the Tisza continued in the direction of Transylvania along the banks of the Szamos. These islands served as location for the eastern defence works of the region. Szatmár retained such a function even after the flood-free area of the grasslands was enlarged. Hydrography determined the location of the royal fortresses such as Szatmár. My own researches have established the location of the earliest grasslands of this region, they were east of the Nyírség and alongside the Szamos.... A third such grassland, one that stretched from Huszt through Várfalu to Erdőszáda, was part of the lands occupied by the conquerors and is known as the Szamos-

háta.

Ferenc Maksai came to similar conclusions when he suggested that the eastern frontier of the lands occupied during the conquest was at the Láp and that the Szamos watershed was taken over only in the 10th and 11th centuries, a short distance beyond Szatmárnémeti. The eastern frontiers of the Szamos drainage system up to the Tur creek, was occupied only in the 12th century.

This suggests, as Maksai argues, that in the lower valley of the Szamos, with the exception of Kér and Gyarmat, all along the river we find royal possessions, in addition to Szatmár and Németi, Olaszi, Jánosi, Csenger, Óvári, Solymos, Dob, Recsege, etc. East of Szatmár in the Szamos valley we find only a few villages that had been in the possession of the clans of the conquerors, namely Krassó, Kolcs, Lápos and the estates of the Koplony clan, and Romád of the Gutkeled, and in the direction of south, Erdőd of the Hontpázmánys. Among these Krassó dates from the 12th century, Lápos from the early 13th, Erdőd from the turn of the 11th and 12th centuries, that is all of them are late settlements and definitely post-date Szatmár. From all this it becomes clear that Szatmár began as a frontier post. The question then is when and by whom it was established? But it is clear that it is not a fort that pre-dates the conquest.

In this connection let us consider first the theories of János Karácsonyi. He says that by 1230 the fort had been definitely established, but he considers the claim that by 1236 it was a royal city to be false. He believes that king St. Stephen's victory over the Bulgarian ruler Kean in 1020 resulted in the region being made royal property. In the second half of the 11th century some places in the Szamos region (Hermenszeg, Angyalos) were settled by Flemish or Walloon immigrants. The name of Szatmár was for a long time Szotmár (Karácsonyi derives the name from that of one of these settlers). The name was changed to Szatmár only around 1400. In 1411 the settlement of St. Egyed was part of the town. The use of this name points to the Walloons among whom the worship of this saint was common, according to Karácsonyi.

In Szatmár's neighbourhood there was once a village named Gelyénes (according to old ways of spelling Gylianus, Gyleanus, Kelyanus). This village must have been named after Saint Kilianus who was a respected saint in the Rhine Valley. Southwest of Szatmár could be found the village of Hédre which got its name from a settler named Hédrech (Chudruch) who was of Germanic descent. All this points to the fact that the region of Szatmár was settled by Germans.

The earthen fortifications in the bend of the Szamos must have been built when King Béla had to defend himself from the claimant to his throne, Boris of Kiev. From these beginnings started the fort of Szatmár. It became a

county seat when the *ispán* [in Latin *comes*] was transferred here from Sárvár. These are the theories of Karácsonyi, but they don't stand up in the light of evidence produced later.

According to Maksai the above speculations are wrong. He believes that Szatmár as a settlement and as a county seat was established during the reign of St. Stephen. The presence of any Germans here is not mentioned in any documents before 1216. The residents of the settlement around the fort were Hungarians. Szatmár's origins are doubtless Hungarian. Its name comes from the Turkic name of its first *ispán*. Contrary to the claim of Anonymus, the settlement cannot be older than the 11th century. Maksai also points out that all the villages around this place were Hungarian settlements. They were all possessions of the original Magyar clans, except for the royal estates. Dara was the possession of the Csák clan, established no later than the 13th century. Pete belonged to the Gutkeleds and was a pre-12th century settlement. Daróc was a royal village dating from before 1100. Lázári belonged to the Káta clan and dates from the late 12th century. This clan also owned Homok, which dates from the early 1200s. Vásári at first belonged to the Káta clan; it is one of the oldest settlements of the region. Batiz is probably a royal establishment that later belonged to the Hontpázmány family. They owned Szentmárton also, a pre-13th century settlement. Vértes belonged to the Kalony clan and was founded between 1234 and 1241. The neighbouring village of Gelényes, which later was abandoned, dated from the early 13th century....

These communities surrounded Szatmár and they were undoubtedly Magyar settlements. There is also no doubt that Szatmár pre-dated all of them.

In conclusion, according to the best scholarly opinion, Szatmár was a Hungarian settlement from the age of St. Stephen.

Maksai acknowledges that the Hungarians of the region assimilated some Slavic populations. In this region about fifteen Slav villages existed in the Middle Ages, but of these only two pre-dated the conquest. The Slavs assimilated rapidly. In the Middle Ages there was no trace of the Vlachs [the ancestors of the Romanians –ed.] in this region. In the late Middle Ages only Berend and Bezence had any such populations, as well as the no longer existing village of Medgyes. This is as close as the Vlachs came to Szatmár.

Let us now consider the origins of Németi and German settlement in the region.

Karácsonyi thinks it possible that Németi was founded by settlers who arrived in the country with Queen Gizella, the wife of King Stephen, but he thinks they settled elsewhere first and only later moved here. Maksai also believes that Németi's population was originally German but he cannot establish the time of the settlement's foundation. There are no documents

relating to the Germans there prior to 1216. In all probability the settlement was established in the 12th century. The saying that the settlers came with royalty is only a popular myth. Perhaps they arrived in various stages. Németi could not have been established before Szatmár was....

Part 2

Szatmárnémeti as Satu Mare.

In the First World War the national strength of the Hungarian nation was tragically sapped. The country could not hold on to its frontier regions and not even the periphery of its very heartland. The glorious resistance by the Székely division ended precisely at Szatmár. On the 21st of April, 1919, on Good Friday, the division's machine guns were still standing on Deák Square, but because they were surrounded on one side by the Reds (vörösök) and the other by the Romanians (oláhok), they had to retreat from there. They were soon followed by the Romanians who entered the town with fixed bayonets. Thanks to the Székely division communist rule in Szatmár lasted only a few weeks, and as a result could do little damage. But then came, quite unexpectedly, another barbaric rule. Szatmár became Satu Mare and remained such for 21 years, 4 months and 15 days.... [later in his manuscript Fodor writes 19 years, 5 months and 14 days].

It is difficult to understand how Szatmár became Satu Mare. In its entire history the city was never known by that name. The name Satu Mare was put in writing first in 1768, by mistake by a Hungarian man, József Zanathy, the justice of the peace, an amateur philologist. When the Romanians renamed city, they could hardly have been aware of that. So, with typical Romanian rationale, they decided on Satu Mare (big village). The Romanians no doubt were aware that this would present a problem, as places with such name abound in Romania which gives rise to confusion. For this reason in 1922 the official state gazetteer of Romania named the city simply as "Satmar". At the same time the city itself requested that this name be used as the name Satu Mare only created misunderstandings and did not do justice to the fact that it is a city. In 1923 Romania's Department of Interior decreed that the city should be known as Satmar, but the government institute in charge of municipalities did not agree to this and insisted on the name Satu Mare.... At

the same time the county, which was not under the jurisdiction of this institution, was named Satmar! In 1935, the Romanian Academy requested that the city's name be changed to Satmar, but this too was rejected.

We don't want to deal with the political history of Romanian occupation but with our city's evolution. We cannot even tell all the sufferings and injustices that the Magyar inhabitants of this ancient city had to endure during two decades. Besides, this was a fate that it shared with every city of Transylvania — everything happened here that happened elsewhere... for the purposes of breaking the Hungarian spirit. We will enumerate only the measures that played a role in the city's evolution. A pivotal event was the fact that the city lost its ability to administer itself. For many years there was no longer an elected body to enact bylaws, only a special committee appointed by the [central government]. In 1934 even this apparent measure of self-government was taken away, the government deciding that the decisions of this special committee should be approved by the city's [also appointed] administrator, to make them binding. In any case the city's fate became a political football. The possibilities of developing the city were greatly limited by the fact that the officials of the city kept changing with the changing fortunes of the parties that ruled the country. That is, long-term plans for the city's development could not be implemented. In every decision the interests of a certain political party played a predominant role. Since the decisions of a particular government could usually not be implemented during the term of that government, the next government failed to carry out or actually nixed the previous administration's plans. Szatmár was awarded a number of state institutions, but most of them on paper only since before the directive to this end could be implemented the government responsible was removed from power. To give an example, in 1920 Szatmár received the headquarters of the no. 4 railway district, but this office never came to the city. Only a railway inspectors' office was brought to the city, but in 1939 it was moved elsewhere.

A most important administrative and political move happened during the city's two decades long Romanian occupation when in 1925 the government in Bucharest moved the county seat here. [Prior to 1920] the city had waged a long struggle for this to happen but Hungary's government ignored these aspirations.... Nevertheless, the possibility always existed that this decision of the [Romanian] government was not final and that the county seat would be transferred to Nagybánya. The struggle between the two cities went on for years when finally the county seat was established in Szatmár. The county administration's various departments were located in the Hotel Pannonia [that had been renamed Hotel Dacia] and in the City Hall. In the end Nagybánya was transferred to [another] county....

A few administrative offices [related to agriculture, commerce, etc.] were established in the city. The situation of these was not stable. There were always plans to move one or the other somewhere else. The life of the city was characterised by the fact that nothing was steady, everything was insecure, everything was in a state of flux... as party politics determined all decisions, everything was subordinated to it.

The city almost lost Szatmárhegy, as it was completely neglected. In 1934 the people of [this city district] seriously wanted to separate from Szatmár....

Among the city fathers... we often find renegade Hungarians; they had names such as Chereches [Kerekes], Pogacias [Pogácsás],... At other times newcomers became mayors; for example, the man who was appointed mayor in 1938 had lived in Szatmár only for two years. Only [later] did international events elsewhere in Europe have an impact and a Hungarian man, István Antal, was appointed deputy-mayor. It often happened that when a mayor or city perfect was replaced, the new government brought charges of corruption against him....

A great blow was received by the city in 1938 when it was demoted to the rank of a town, with the excuse that its population had fallen below 50,000. This, despite the fact that in 1920 the city's population was estimated to be 58,000, and in 1930, 51,000....

Even though throughout the entire period of Romanian rule there was never a municipal election in the city, the municipal voters' list was maintained. Just how this was done is illustrated by the fact that in January of 1940 the number of eligible voters was said to be 4,134!

In 1935 Szatmárhegy again tried to separate from the city, i.e. from the town of Satu Mare.... In December of 1938 all men of 30 and over were allowed to vote on whether they wanted to separate. 20 voted yes as opposed to 218 who voted no.

The special committees were appointed to administer the city so that the Hungarian majority could not use its numerical weight to control its own destiny, and to make sure that it would be at the mercy of the [city's] Romanian minority. By 1938 the result of this was that out of the 76 municipal officials 59 were Romanians, i.e. 77.6%, this at a time when, even according to [Romanian] statistics, out of the city's total population only 27.1% spoke Romanian....

[Translator's note: Fodor next begins to enumerate the incidents that resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of Szatmár's people for real or alleged pro-Hungarian activities.]

Already in 1921 four of Szatmár's inhabitants became victims of a

show trial: Kamil Irányi (a Lutheran minister), János Szücs (a Lázárite Roman Catholic priest), Ilona Varga and János Varga. In 1922, Irányi received a five-and-a-half year jail sentence, as did Szerafin P. Szabó (a Franciscan priest) and Imre Sándor. In 1933 three students [accused of anti-Trianon agitation] were banned from all the schools of the country.

From 1932 on, the city was terrorized by the so-called “anti-revisionists”. On the 20th of March that year these people destroyed the premises of the paper *Szatmári Ujság* (Szatmár newspaper) and beat up its editor. From this time on Szatmár’s Hungarians would dread the gatherings of these people....

In December of 1938 [the Romanian authorities] arrested the former notary public István Csengery for [alleged] revisionist contacts and spying. In January of 1939 two young men, István Zagyva and István Antal were arrested on the ground that they were trying to establish a [secret] Hungarian armed unit. In 1937 the Reformed minister of Szatmárhegy was interned because he walked out of his church before the singing of the Romanian anthem was finished.

Unfortunately, the various Romanian political parties were always able to divide Hungarians between themselves and Hungarian political parties. Only at the end of the 1930s could the Hungarians be rallied around an organization called Magyar Népközösség (Hungarian People’s Bloc), but this was only the Hungarian version of a Romanian right-wing movement....

The Romanians carried their chauvinism so far as to pass a decree in 1940 that compelled people attending a theatre or movie production to not leave before the singing of the anthem of the Romanian royal house was finished. Whoever disobeyed this edict was immediately arrested on grounds of being disrespectful to the sovereign....

[end of the appendix]

NOTES

¹ The correct Hungarian name for Fodor's "hometown" is actually Szatmár--Németi, a city which was created in the eighteenth century by the amalgamation of the "sister cities" Szatmár and Németi. In spite of this, Fodor insists on referring to the city after the amalgamation almost exclusively as Szatmár. This is potentially confusing, since Szatmár is also the name of the county in which Szatmár-Németi was historically located. His constant use of "Szatmár" as the name of the city, however, is

by no means insignificant. Szatmár was developed as a fortified position, and was inhabited from the beginning, or so Fodor argues, predominantly by Magyars, or ethnic Hungarians. Németi, by contrast, was founded and was for centuries populated primarily by Germans, and served as a commercial centre rather than as a defensive position. It played, in many ways, a decadent, capitalist "Pest" to Szatmár's morally-stable "Buda," and was dependent on the latter for its safety and security (at least this is how Fodor portrays it).

² Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtár Kézirattára (MTAKK) Ms 10.740/1, Ferenc Fodor, "Szatmár földje, Szatmár népe, Szatmár élete" (Budapest, 1954), 2.

³ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁴ See also MTAKK Ms 10.739/1./1-2, Ferenc Fodor, "A magyar lét földrajza" (Budapest, 1945).

⁵ Reflecting on his schooling, Fodor would later write that he had been politicized from a very young age. See Magyar Vizügyi Múzeum Dokumentációs Gyűjteménye (MVMDGy) H-20/1 28-97. Ferenc Fodor "Életem eseményei (1887-1959)," (n.d. 1959?), 4.

⁶ Fodor, "Szatmár földje, Szatmár népe, Szatmár élete," 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ On Klebelsberg's importance to the development and dissemination of *szellemtörténet*, see Steven Béla Várdy, *Modern Hungarian Historiography* (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly, 1976), 50-61. See also Bálint Homan, "A történelem útja," in *A magyar történetírás új útjai*, ed. Bálint Homan (Budapest: A Magyar Szemle Társaság, 1932). This volume of essays was the first comprehensive work outlining and explaining the principles of *szellemtörténet*.

¹² William R. Everdell, *The First Moderns: Profiles in the Origins of Twentieth Century Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 15.

¹³ Fodor, "Szatmár földje, Szatmár népe, Szatmár élete," 1.

¹⁴ For an excellent discussion of Romanian cultural politics during the interwar period see Irina Livzeanu *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).

¹⁵ Fodor, "Szatmár földje, Szatmár népe, Szatmár élete," 251.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 251-52.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 252.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 255. Fodor's disparaging assessment of the Romanians as stewards of the city, it should be noted, was far reaching, so much so that it even included a sophisticated ecological critique of the "hydrological management" of the city and its water supply. Arguing that all the city's hydrological problems had been solved by

Hungarian engineers in the pre-Trianon period, Fodor contended that “no one had to worry anymore about flooding,” or about the quality and abundance of drinking water. The Romanians, however, had been delinquent in the upkeep and continuation of earlier Hungarian hydrological work. Any thought they had give to flood control remained, “like so much else,” merely a plan (and this despite the fact that they had the benefit of drawing on the existing plans of experienced, and thus also culturally and intellectually “superior,” Hungarian experts). It was for this reason, he argued, that in February and March of 1940, the city and region suffered some of its worst flooding since the “big flood of 1888.” Though not as destructive as this earlier flood, the damage was considerable, and would have been worse if it were not for the work done by Hungarians prior to World War I. See *Ibid.*, 250-54.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 251-252.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*, 1.

²³ *Ibid.*, 243-49.

²⁴ Susan Crane, “Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory,” *American Historical Review* 102/5 (December, 1997): 1372.

²⁵ Aaron Beaver, “Lyricism and Philosophy in Brodsky's Elegiac Verse,” *Slavic Review* 67/3 (Fall 2008): 600. The italics are Beaver's.

²⁶ See Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), trans. Jane Zielonko, 82-110.

²⁷ Drawing on the distinction made by the ancient Greeks between “mneme” and “anamnesis,” Ricoeur distinguishes between passive or cognitive memory, and active or pragmatic memory. “To remember,” he writes, is either “to have a memory or to set off in search of a memory.” See Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 4.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 169.

²⁹ Besides “A magyar lét földrajza,” see MVMDGy H-20/1 28-97. 1/1, Ferenc Fodor, “Önéletrajza/Curriculum Vitae” (Pécs, 1940); and MVMDGy H-20/1 28-97. 1/3, Fodor Ferenc, “Élettörténet,” (written in Pécs and Budapest between 1941 and 1950). On the nature of conservative Christian nationalism in Hungary in the first half of the twentieth century, see Paul Hanebrink, *In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, 1890-1944* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006).

³⁰ Fodor, “Szatmár földje, Szatmár népe, Szatmár élete,” 2. It is interesting to note that in an autobiographical sketch written in 1931, Fodor referred to Szatmár as his “second homeland” (második szülőföldem). See also MVMDGy H-20/1 28-97. ¼, Ferenc Fodor, “Emlékezetül” (Budapest, 1931), 4.

³¹ See in particular Fodor's “Élettörténet” noted above.

³² There is a strong sense in Fodor's autobiographical work, in fact, that he was well aware of the long-standing scepticism in certain scholarly circles over the veracity and objectivity of autobiography as an historical source. It was as if he sought to address what Jeremy Popkin describes as “the anxiety that comes from the

fact that the autobiographical author is caught in the process of defining his or her own narrative identity without being sure that readers will accept the result.” See Jeremy Popkin, *History, Historians, and Autobiography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 47. The first two chapters of this book deal in great detail with the relationship between history and autobiography, and the problem of objectivity and veracity in autobiographical sources. For a sustained discussion of the notion of an “ironclad identity,” see Thomas Ort “Men Without Qualities: Karel Capek and His Generation, 1911-1938” (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 2005).

³³ In the absence of any supporting documentation, Fodor's scrapbooks are difficult to date. Only the first and last books can be dated with any degree of certainty. The first book contains photographs of Szatmár taken in the summer of 1941, and therefore could not have been assembled any earlier than July of that year. A caption under one of these photos, furthermore, indicates that the picture is of “Deák Square, which is now called Horthy Square.” Since the square in question was renamed after Admiral Miklós Horthy, the regent of Hungary in the interwar period who was still in power when Szatmár was reclaimed by Hungary early in World War II, it is very likely that the book was put together before the city fell to the Russians on October 26, 1944, or at the very least before it was officially returned again to the Romanians in May 1946. The last book, numbered “twenty-one,” contains documents dated between March 1955 and September 1959, the year his health deteriorated to a point that he could no longer do things on his own. 1959, then, marks the end of the project. There is at least one other clue which helps determine the progression of this ambitious autobiographical undertaking. In book eight, Fodor includes a photograph of Vira and their son Zoli, taken in May 1927 on the occasion of his confirmation. There are two ragged holes in the top half of the picture. Written across the bottom of the photo is the following: “This picture, which once hung on our wall, was hit by a bomb fragment during the siege [of Budapest] in 1945.” We can surmise, therefore, that at the very least this and all subsequent scrapbooks were put together sometime after the siege of Budapest.

³⁴ There is, in fact, a real sense that Fodor sought to resolve in his scrapbooks a quintessentially modern problem identified by Ricoeur, namely the paradox of how an individual, like the nation or any group, can be seen as the same even as it changes over time. Narration, argues Ricoeur, plays an important role in this attempted resolution. As he writes: “Without the aid of narration, the problem of personal identity is... an antimony without resolution.” Of course, unlike Fodor, Ricoeur is too much of a postmodernist to hold out hope for resolution, and rejects the possibility that the negotiation of identity could ever lead to a stable result. See Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narration*, 3:355 and 3:356-58. Commenting on this, Jeremy Popkin adds: “[One] distinctive characteristic [that] Ricoeur attributes to autobiography is its lack of closure. Autobiographical narratives necessarily lack a real beginning or ending, and they are therefore always subject to revision and reinterpretation.” Popkin, *History, Historians, and Autobiography*, 47.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 35.

³⁶ Cited *ibid.*, 39.

³⁷ This is a common masculine motif that runs through his scrapbooks.

³⁸ Ferenc Fodor, *Balla Antal élete és műszaki munkássága. 1739-1815* (Budapest: Budapesti Műszaki Egyetem Központi Könyvtára, 1953), 53.

Promoting Tourism: Hungarian Nation-Building Policies in Northern Transylvania, 1940-1944

Balázs Ablonczy

In this study I try to present the history of the region of Transylvania that was returned to Hungary in the Second Vienna Award of 1940 from a point of view that has been quite neglected hitherto.¹ More precisely, my aim is to outline aspects of the policies of nation-building that were implemented by the region's Hungarian administration and explain how the development of tourism combined with and fitted into the policies of nation-building and on occasion, exclusions from it. I base my research on source materials that had come to light two years ago. At first glance the policies of promoting tourism and nation-building appear not to be related but as my research progressed I became increasingly convinced that I was dealing with two closely related phenomena. The subject of the build-up of Northern Transylvania's tourism by itself is worth investigating but in covering it there is the risk that the analysis deteriorates into an enumeration of plans, budgets, jurisdictional quarrels, and unfulfilled deadlines. But the whole story of how the officials involved in this enterprise, along with community leaders and people involved in tourism, envisaged the revitalization of a relatively backward (in comparison with Hungary proper)² region, tells a lot about the Hungarian government's and public's approach to nationality policies as well as concepts about modernization — and also about the Hungarian image of Transylvania. Primary sources for the study of this subject are few as the records of the ministries dealing with the promotion of tourism in Northern Transylvania of the times had been destroyed during the 1944-45 siege of Budapest.

National Pilgrimages

The number of monographs dealing with the history of tourism in Hungary is rather small, and as far as I know no one has explored the interconnection of tourism and nation-building, despite the fact that this subject is extensively covered in literature dealing with Western Europe and the New World.³ Some of the observations made in these works are relevant to our subject. One of these is the fact that tourism as a notion of economic activity is the product of the nineteenth century. In this connection we should mention the date 5 July 1841 when Thomas Cook, the father of modern tourism, sent off from one of London's railway stations the first touring group — whose members paid him one shilling each. The success of this experiment prompted Cook to establish his tourist bureau, one which by the 1880s was organizing overseas tours.⁴ His activities defined the relationship between the tourist industry and the state not only in the English-speaking world but also on the European continent: tourism became considered part of the realm of private enterprise and was treated as such. This despite the fact that the development of tourism was not unrelated to state activity such as government regulations regarding paid holidays for employees or the mandating of health insurance for them. In Central Europe, in particular in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, first it was some of the Austrian provinces that discovered the importance of the promotion of tourism. The province's authorities, with their limited resources, tried to foster travel for recreational purposes.⁵

The growth of European and overseas tourism had an impact beyond its immediate effects on economic activity. In Britain and France for example the existing practice of relaxation at baths and spas was expanded by the idea of recreation at seaside resorts.⁶ In France the discovery (actually, re-discovery) of the “terroir” is linked closely to the evolving of the bourgeois image of the world: it was through this that a synthesis emerged between the republican ethos and the long-standing public attachment to France's diverse regions.⁷

In searching for parallels with the development of the image of Transylvania in Hungary and its impact on tourism the following case seems relevant. In central Sweden the cult of *dalecarlia* that began emerging among city dwellers at the end of the nineteenth century signified a desire to return to one's roots. The archaic peasant world of this region (where people still wore the old folk costumes abandoned elsewhere) and its image as unspoiled wilderness, combined with the democratic traditions of the local inhabitants coincided with the liberal ideals of Swedish society and its budding cult of the national heritage. Not surprisingly, the first *skanzen* opened in Stockholm as

early as 1892. In 1909 came the first suggestion for the establishment of national parks. Visits to Dalarna, that “Valhalla of Swedish peasant life,” were facilitated by the building of the country's railways, and pilgrimages to the region became a compulsory aspect of identifying with Swedish national character. The proliferation of the bicycles in the country in the interwar period gave rise to massive bicycle touring in the region. With the accession of the Social Democrats to power in 1932, tourism became identical with modernity, and recreational travel began receiving funding from the state.⁸

Closer to the region studied in this paper, in pre-war Austria the concept of the love for ancient German lands was put in the service of tourism to promote the greater-German or all-German ideal. Tourists were expected to visit German lands that had come under foreign rule as the result of the post-war peace settlement. They were advised to seek accommodation in German-owned establishments. Their guide-books even told them which hostels were owned by non-Germans: Czechs, Slovenians, Italians, etc. In former Austrian lands attendance at religious (Roman Catholic) events had the blessing of the promoters of such tourism, even though elsewhere they cared little for the Church.⁹ In Austria, however, unlike in Transylvania of 1940-1944, the state remained neutral in the conflicts generated by such nationalist tourism.

We have only limited information about the national aims of the Hungarian movement to encourage tourism and other return to nature activities. Nevertheless a recently-published study points out that in this phenomenon too nationalist elements had appeared rather early and in time such tourism became a project to promote national interests through which “knowing your land” increasingly transmuted into “military expedition”.¹⁰ The change can be observed in the history of the organization Erdélyi Kárpát Egyesület (Carpathian Association of Transylvania). It was founded in 1873 in the ethnically mixed region (Slovak, German and Magyar) of Szepesség and confined its activities to the promotion of tourism until 1889-90 when nation-building ideas entered into its rhetoric. But, the encouragement of tourism for the sake of recreation and learning always remained an aim of this association. It was the Magyar Tanítók Turista Egylete (the Tourist Club of Hungarian Teachers), an organization established in 1896 that implemented most the idea of using tourism to promote the nation. Soon after its founding it began to sponsor tours of Transylvania for middle-class visitors from central Hungary who were given the impression that through their visits they were reclaimers of the land in face of a local population who cared little for the cause of the Magyar nation or was hostile to it.¹¹

If we have to sum up the European, and in a sense the overseas experience in tourism before the time dealt with in our paper, we can say that it

began in a natural way as an economic activity based on the increasing desire of people for recreation. It had certain historical antecedents: the tradition of the “Grand Tour” by members of the upper-classes and the ideal of the return-to-nature espoused by some writers during the Age of Enlightenment. In time, however, the aims of modern tourism would incorporate not just recreation but an assortment of ideals such as the promotion of national interests and the preservation of the simple peasant life and culture — as well as of other socio-political and economic values. These concepts of tourism varied from one region to the next as did the approach to them by various state authorities.

Tourism in Interwar Hungary

Between the two world wars Hungary's practices in the promotion of tourism stood about half-way between the Western European and the early Dual Monarchy's model of tourism sponsored by community associations (even if they didn't reject help provided by the state), and the model characterized by the totalitarian state's desire to control all aspects of the population's activities that developed in contemporary Italy and Germany.¹² The community-based tourist clubs founded before World War I were joined in the 1920s and 1930s by similarly inspired organizations as well as commercial travel bureaus. As these establishments had limited financial means, the promotion of tourism called for the intervention of the state. Such intervention was not new in Hungary. Before World War one, when tourism in Hungary consisted mainly of visits to mineral baths or spas, the state apparatus that developed in post-Compromise times (1867) tried to regulate the legal and health aspects of such activity.¹³ In 1902 the Idegforgalmi Utazási Vállalat was established in Budapest (in 1926 it became known as IBUSZ). In the mid-1920s it gained the monopoly of selling tickets for MÁV (the Hungarian state railways) and became an important player in organized tourism.¹⁴

The onset of the Great Depression further deepened the Hungarian tourist industry's dependence on the state — especially in the creation and maintenance of infrastructure, and in advertising. It also led to attempts at the promotion of tourism at home. Efforts to this effect were implemented by the Országos Magyar Vendégforgalmi Szövetség or OMVESZ (National Hungarian Tourist Federation). One of OMVESZ' successful slogans was “Utazgassunk hazánk földjén” (Let's keep travelling in our native land) which resembled the “Come to Britain!” and “See America First” movements in Great Britain and the USA respectively.¹⁵

Hungary's government established the Országos Magyar Idegenforgalmi Hivatal (Hungarian National Tourist Bureau, hereafter OMIH) in 1935. This was the most influential organization created in the country for the regulation of the tourist industry. OMIH was to coordinate and oversee the promotion of tourism, the investments in infrastructure, tourist propaganda, as well as the training (starting with 1939) of tourist guides. It was also responsible for establishing guidelines for the promotion of internal and international tourism. OMIH soon established offices in various parts of Europe and even overseas, then in Hungary, and after 1938 when the country began regaining some of the territories that had been detached from it in the post-war peace settlement, in these lands as well. OMIH was headed by the politician Géza Tormay. After his death in May of 1940 the organization's scope of activities was revised.¹⁶ It became a part of the Ministry of Commerce. In the period examined in this study it functioned as section XIV of that Ministry, first under László Gál and after March 1944 under Baron Gyula Brandenstein. In 1937 the organization's budget reached almost 700,000 *pengő*s.¹⁷

The primary task of the OMIH and its branches was propaganda. This was produced not only through the traditional means of posters and flyers but through the novel means of film (shown occasionally in movie theatres in various cities) travelling picture exhibitions, and the sponsoring of photography competitions or folk-costume shows.¹⁸ A few months before the Hungarian re-acquisition of northern Transylvania, a Hungarian tourist official by the name of István Hallóssy identified the main aim of tourist propaganda as being the fostering of a favourable attitude to travel. In a speech he called for the spreading of authenticity that is the rejection of gaudy superficiality. In its place, Hallóssy suggested the injection of that “ancient Magyar force that assimilates everything...” He called for “Hungarian national tourist propaganda” as well as the more effective presentation of the various regions' natural beauty, of their flora and fauna, as well as the folk-costumes of the local population.¹⁹

It is not possible to estimate the impact of Hallóssy's admonitions on the propaganda activities of OMIH but from the surviving official record of this institutions two facts become evident: 1. The propaganda produced in connection with Northern Transylvania concentrated on three regions: Kalotaszeg (the region around Kolozsvár [today's Cluj]), the Székelyföld, and the winter playgrounds of the Radnai and Borsai mountain ranges. 2. In this tourist propaganda emphasis was given, as it was done in connection with Hungary proper, to the theme of folk traditions: rituals, costumes etc.

From February of 1941 on, the Hungarian tourist organizations (OMIH, MÁV and IBUSZ) published the *Hungária Magazin* edited by the

popular radio announcer Lili Filotás. This glossy, illustrated monthly publication closely reflected its sponsors' philosophy of tourism. It tried to offer a picture of recreational life in wartime Hungary as well as elaborate on the folk costumes and traditions of the above listed regions of Transylvania.²⁰ The regions that fell outside of the area identified by the promoters of tourism was ignored, often in face of the protests of local officials from the communities involved. One such official complained in 1943 that “since our liberation” the Székelyföld received much help in the realm of the promotion of tourism, but Northern Transylvania “got nothing so far in this respect.”²¹

“We all have to know the eternally Hungarian Transylvania” proclaimed an OMIH publication of the times.²² The idea that travel in Transylvania was a national pilgrimage was further reinforced by the identification of that land as the Kalotaszeg and the Székelyföld. Some of the traditional products of these two regions (including the *székely pálinka*, a locally produced brandy) reminded people of pine forests and snow-capped mountains.²³ Sometimes tourist posters and publications about Transylvania were filled with pictures only of the people in Kalotaszeg and/or Székelyland costumes or buildings characteristic of only these two regions.²⁴

What confrontations these in certain cases Budapest-induced practices inspired, is aptly illustrated by the dispute that arose in 1941-42 between the OMIH leadership and Károly Kós, writer, noted architect and the custodian of the ethnographic artefact collection of the Reform Church of Kalotaszeg. At the end of 1940, OMIH made plans for the building of a bureau in the community of Kőrösfő. The building was to house a tourist office, a museum for the Reform Church's artefact collection, a store to sell tourist memorabilia, as well as a hostel for travellers. OMIH had Győző Nagy prepare the buildings plans — he had planned many other such buildings for other places in Hungary. Then they asked Kós to modify the plans to reflect the architectural character of its surroundings; in effect he was told that he should plan a “peasant house”. This task Kós accepted, free of charge, and planned a building on land provided by the village for a nominal fee. But he could not explain to the officials in Budapest that their plan could not be implemented through building a “peasant house”.²⁵ Arguments went back and forth with OMIH officials insisting on a traditional, one-story building while Kós felt that such a structure could not accommodate all the functions planned for it.²⁶ In the end the building wasn't built. This coupling of tourism and ethnographic traditions was not the predilection of OMIH officials only. This is illustrated by a speech made in the House of Parliament in the fall of 1940 by József Varga, the minister in charge of tourism:

I have always supported and will continue to support folk-art that is significant from the point of view of tourism. I propose to build, in addition to the existing structures featuring ethnographic collections, additional such buildings in the most important regions of folk-art. These structures will be entrusted with the displaying of ethnographic artefacts as well as with their preservation.²⁷

There can be little doubt that, through its policies, OMIH had a major impact on the evolution of the image of Transylvania, or at least, on those who were creating that image for Hungarians. Through the publications inspired by it, through books, placards, a Transylvania was mirrored that reminds us of the image, still prevalent in Hungary, of that land as a idyllic “garden of fairies.”²⁸ This image was counterbalanced only by the emphasis on the Magyar (and civilized) nature of the region's cities. Unlike some other scholars I don't consider this image in itself harmful, but it leaves the question what political approaches and deeds it inspires and whether and to what extent it allows the people espousing this open to other views.

Pictures from the Tourist Guides

Before we examine the activities of the Kolozsvár office of OMIH and its role in nation-building, we should examine the “Transylvania image” promoted by contemporary Hungarian tourist guides, and the reception these got from the public. We should also survey what image of this land the above-mentioned publication *Erdély* tried to project, how this “little Hungarian world” tried to represent itself to its local readers and the outside world.

Between 1940 and 1943 no fewer than eighteen works appeared in Hungary about Transylvania. Incidentally, this is the same number that appeared about the subject between 1788 and 1940, and 1944 and 1986.²⁹ It must be stressed that these eighteen publications were not all travel guides, among them there were travelogues,³⁰ breviaries,³¹ learned essays,³² and flyers pertaining to a particular city or district.³³ Comprehensive tourist guides to Transylvania were few and varied in quality and political outlook.

First off the mark with such a publication was the author from Nagyvárad [today's Oradea] Sándor Aba, who was no doubt aware of both the political and commercial advantages of publishing on the subject. His work appeared in the spring of 1941, and it filled 320 pages. Its author claimed that the book was designed to inform Hungarians and Transylvanians, especially young readers, about their country.³⁴ Forty-five percent of the pages covering

Transylvania were filled with ads. Although Aba claims to have visited all the regions he described, officials of the OMIH were not happy with the volume. They described it poorly organized and edited. They couldn't refrain from mentioning that the work's author was of Jewish background. They also tried to hinder the book's distribution by calling on people involved in the tourist industry not to promote the book.³⁵ Yet Aba was more fortunate than József Dávid, the author of *Székelyföld írásban és képen* [The Székelyland in writing and pictures] whose publication was banned on the initiative of OMIH and against whom court proceedings were started by the government.³⁶

Aba's book, it should be mentioned, did not use, with a few exceptions, the nationalist rhetoric of most other tourist publications. The official tourist guide of OMVESZ dealing with eastern Hungary and northern Transylvania was also neutral in language.³⁷ The nationalist discourse in this volume was represented by the introduction that was written by the noted writer Zsolt Harsányi. He did what many other authors of travel guides had done: compare the region returned to Hungary to Switzerland. He saw the task of the promoters of tourism there in stressing winter sports, travel in the countryside and the spending of time at mineral spas. He concluded his introduction with the wish that his readers will visit Transylvania with the feeling that “they are visiting the land of unbreakable racial strength where a free man [becomes] freer and the Hungarian spirit more Hungarian.”³⁸ This illustrated hardbound book contained only essential tourist information and did not get into the subject of historical analysis. Yet in this guide what is not there says a lot: this OMVESZ volume presents us with a Hungarian Transylvania in which we get a hint of the existence of other ethnic groups only when an orthodox church or a synagogue is mentioned.³⁹ Still, this book creates the impression of a tourist guide rather than a publication designed to influence the political attitudes of its readers.

The book of János Tulogdy, *Erdély kis turistakalauza* [The little tourist guide of Transylvania] placed emphasis on brevity and described the main stations of a tour of Transylvania that are still most frequented today.⁴⁰ In Ödön Nagy's book about Lake Gyilkos and its vicinity the various ethnic groups of Transylvania appear — and in positive light. This dedicated tourist writes for example that on the eastern pastures of Fehérmező the pastors of three nationalities tend their flocks in peace in the “spirit of Transylvania.”⁴¹ The author Milton Oszkár Reich revised and re-published a 1910 tourist guide of his. In this he still gave the population data of the 1900 census and in discussing the history of the Székelys he endorsed the idea of their Hun descent, even though in once place declared this theory a “myth”.⁴² The new edition made use of most of the tourist guides that appeared in the two years before its

publication. The work was outdated though balanced, one that didn't offer much new for tourists. In this it resembled the work of Gyula Gáspár, *A visszatért Erdély útikönyve* [The travel guide to the returned Transylvania].⁴³

Several publications went much further than these in their analysis of the nationality problem in Transylvania. One of these was the book edited by geographer Gyula Prinz and written mainly by faculty members of the University of Kolozsvár. In his introduction to the volume Prinz deemed Transylvania, the “Switzerland of the East”, a utopia since its life didn't concentrate in one place but spread out to several centres. As such, it had no chance of becoming a political unit of its own.⁴⁴ For this reason, Prinz argued, Transylvania had to belong to Hungary. He described the years of Romanian rule as a transitory period that brought no benefits. Interestingly this work that justified Transylvania's absorption by Hungary through mythical geographic explanations got an unexpected reception by OMIH officialdom: the head of the OMIH office in Marosvásárhely likened it to Sándor Aba's supposedly inaccurate book. This official even called for radical measures to curb the proliferation of such tourist guides.⁴⁵

The Budapest office of OMIH could hardly disapprove of the tone of most of these tourist guides as it published the most stridently nationalistic of guides to Transylvania in 1941. This pamphlet-sized publication didn't have its author identified. It went beyond some of the other guides as it listed hotels and other accommodation available to tourists. On its pages there were often crude statements such as “Romanians don't belong among the historical nations of Transylvania.... They crept into the land's empty mountainous regions as sheep shepherds from the Balkans, occupying first the mountains and then the valleys. From the 17th century on, their numbers grew continuously.” Only in its introduction did the publication mention the positive aspects of centuries of peaceful coexistence among the various ethnicities. But from other parts of this work we learn that Transylvania is the home of “unalterable Magyar folk-art” where the “*temetői kopjafák*” (carved wooden head “stones” characteristic of the region's cemeteries) speak of the “uninterrupted Hungarian past”. And the publication's author or authors go on:

The Székelys speak the purest Magyar language, full of ancient phrases and spoken virtually without local accent. Their poetry... is uniquely colourful. Their music is one of the earliest products of Hungarian folk music, one that has inspired many great musicians ([among them] Bartók and Kodály). Their cities and towns are orderly, their yards and houses are exceedingly clean. Their folk-costumes are not overly elaborate... and everybody wears these....

Their architecture is ancient... their woodcarvings are world famous... Their pottery offers the best of Hungarian folk art...

Through the author's rhetoric the past and present merge while the heroes of the past enter present-day life to reinforce the idea of the continuity of national evolution while he (or she) proclaims that getting to know Transylvania is a patriotic duty for Hungarians:

Whoever travelled the land of Transylvania yearns to return there. Besides the awe-inspiring scenery, their soul becomes filled by the marvellous flavour of the unalterable ancient Magyar life. Through Transylvania we can behold the thousand-year-old Magyar past. We can understand that endless selfless struggle that our nation... had fought for Transylvania's soil. We can understand the sacrifice brought by the valiant warriors of Saint László, the heroes of Hunyadi, the soldiers of Gábor Bethlen, the [followers] of Rákoczi, the *honvéds* of Bem, and we understand the supreme sacrifice of the young Hungarian intellectual giant Sándor Petőfi... We all have to know the eternally Magyar Transylvania.⁴⁶

Not all the local OMIH officials liked this work and we have to note in their favour that some of them were not reluctant to voice their opinion to the organization's Budapest headquarters. The first draft of the publication's manuscript was in fact severely criticised by the head of OMIH's Kolozsvár bureau, but he mostly censured what was missing from the volume and not its tone.⁴⁷

The above mentioned organization, the Erdélyi Kárpát Egyesület or EKE, had been active during the last decades of the nineteenth century and indeed to the First World War, but declined in importance as a result of the war and the transfer of Transylvania to Romania. It experienced a revival in the early 1930s but in 1935 the Romanian authorities closed its offices and expropriated its collections. EKE was re-born in 1940 and its journal *Erdély* reported abundantly on the organization's life till 1944. This life included tours but also the creation of tourist infrastructure (the marking of walking paths, the building of safe stations, places where skiers could warm up, etc.) as well as the organization of folk-dance festivals and the development of folk-art collections. The editor of *Erdély* in these years was first the noted linguist Attila T. Szabó and then János Xantus. Among its authors were university teachers (including Ernő Balogh) as well as such legendary figures as Gyula Merza (1861-1943) one of the founding fathers of tourism in Transylvania.

The joy associated with northern Transylvania's return to Hungary and the regaining of the old EKE headquarters soon gave way to despair in

face of the behaviour — lack of understanding and even outright enmity — of the tourist organizations of Hungary, especially Magyar Turista Szövetség (Hungarian Tourist Federation, hereafter MTSz). As Géza Polgárdy, an influential official of this organization, pointed out:

[The Transylvanian branch of the MTSz] was inundated by its Budapest “supporters” and “well-wishers” as water floods the fields after the dykes break. Everyone was giving advice and everyone wanted to help, every tourist official visiting [northern] Transylvania felt duty-bound to shower his liberated co-workers in the tourist industry with help.... All these well-wishers... brought only chaos to the Kolozsvár EKE headquarters. In the end the local officials had to find ways to bypass the Federation. Furthermore, they even tried to set up their own tourist organization.⁴⁸

There were even disputes over jurisdiction: which tourist organization had control over the so-called Zichy Cave? And, members of EKE were not invited to a banquet in Budapest because “they were too poor and would not want to take part in any case.”⁴⁹ Further, a map produced by EKE was severely criticized in *Turista Élet* for alleged inaccuracies. And then in March 1941 MTSZ cancelled EKE's membership for “non-payment” of dues.

The situation improved later to the extent that some MTSZ officials (among them the above mentioned Géza Polgárdy) even wrote for *Erdély*, among those who previously had criticized EKE. And, by 1943 this same author took the side of this organization in one of its disputes. EKE also made concessions, possibly in response to pressure from Budapest: It agreed to the exclusion of Jews from its membership. Seventeen people were affected.⁵⁰ We have to note that militantly anti-Semitic diatribes never appeared in this periodical between 1941 and 1944. On a few occasions though, certain accommodations were identified as being owned by Christians while others were not recommended for “obvious reasons”.⁵¹ Such restraint was rare at the time and must be commended. It should be added that the coverage in *Erdély* was limited to things Hungarian. The activities of the well-organized and dynamic (at least until 1942) Siebenbürgischer Karpathenverein are not covered in the periodical.⁵² Nor are the activities of Romanian tourist organizations alluded to. Romanians, if they are mentioned at all, are noted as shepherds who might be approached for directions by tourists who had become lost. Beyond this, in the Transylvania of *Erdély*, Romanians don't exist. They were there as oppressors, as the people who persecuted EKE

before 1940, but they then disappeared: they are not friends, not enemies, not rivals — they simply did not exist.⁵³

This subconscious/conscious negating stance coexisted with the discourse, which though not overwhelming in the periodical, aimed at making tourism a Hungarian nation-building experience. The theoretical reflections of theologian Sándor Tavaszy about the subject (equating the knowledge of nature with the knowledge of one's homeland, with patriotism, with public and self-education that of necessity leads to the refinement of one's soul)⁵⁴ others simplified and took them out of their context, while still others turned them into a programme of action.⁵⁵

It would be unjust to accuse the contributors of *Erdély* of narrow-minded nationalism: they were happy about being re-united with Hungary, they became disappointed in the tourist organizations of the mother country, and they were concerned that their new-found “Hungarian” existence might come to an end. Since they were financially dependent on the various Hungarian agencies in charge of travel, tourism and even sport, they tried to meet the expectations of these through adjusting their own political discourse including the use of nationalist phraseology. It seemed that the spirit of the age demanded these dubious concessions, but if these writers had doubt about what they wrote, these dissipated with the growing flood of tourists from Hungary. Even the veteran tourist promoters among them resigned themselves to the demanding behaviour of these visitors, their boisterousness, their noisy, all-night parties, and the habit of the women from Budapest of wearing pants and heavy makeup.⁵⁶

The Economics of Nation-Building through Tourism

Tourism can be not only an instrument of spiritual nation-building,⁵⁷ it can also be — as many people at the time believed — a means of economic advancement. After the Second Vienna Award the Hungarian authorities saw in the development of tourism and small crafts the vehicle of lifting northern Transylvania, and especially the Székelyföld, from economic backwardness. Already after the re-acquisition of Sub-Carpathia Premier Pál Teleki appointed a special commissioner for tourism in the region the person of Béla Padányi-Gulyás, one of his former students. After the re-occupation of northern Transylvania the question of the economic development of these lands was discussed at a special “Transylvania conference” at which Teleki saw the future of the Székelyföld's economy in the fostering of small crafts, medium-sized industries and mining, all of which required a great deal of

investment.⁵⁸ Hungarian plans for infrastructure development included new railway lines, highways, new bus and airline services, the construction of spas, everything that was needed for the development of tourism.⁵⁹ Not all of these projects were realized, yet much was accomplished at the cost of millions of *pengős* of investment. There was even money found for the modernization of the telephone system and the repair of bridges.⁶⁰

The Hungarian government also invested in the building of hotels and the development of spas, especially in the Székelyföld and the Radnai Mountains (today's Muntii Rodnei). The building and repair of tourist stations went on throughout Hungarian Transylvania. Ski resorts were also developed, and OMVESZ began organizing visits to Transylvania's villages. To coordinate tourist activities OMIH opened its Kolozsvár office.

It is interesting to know how Elek Horváth, the person appointed to head this office, reacted to directives from headquarters. He says little about the subject in his autobiography.⁶¹ Horváth had a good education and had a lot of experience in journalism and administration. By 1940 he was working for the Ministry of Commerce's Office of National Tourism. After the Second Vienna Award he was sent to Kolozsvár with a mandate to oversee the development of tourism in the returned territories. In the spring of 1941 his mandate was reduced and confined to four counties in central Transylvania, including the Kolozsvár area.

Horváth probably had good personal contacts in the Ministry and even the office of the prime minister. He was an exception in the management of Hungarian Transylvania's tourism. Most of the directors of the other bureaus had their training locally, mainly with EKE. Horváth, despite his relative youth, also had good contacts with many of Hungary's populist writers, including Géza Féja and Gyula Illyés — for the latter he even organized a Transylvanian holiday. Horváth also developed good relations with local writers, among them Áron Tamási and Albert Wass.⁶²

Horváth tried to create the impression that he was a determined and innovative bureaucrat, yet he failed to gain the good will of his superiors in Budapest. His office's activities and financial affairs were repeatedly investigated, and though no major breaches of regulations or lapses in duty were discovered, these procedures often led to him being reprimanded.⁶³ His monthly reports were often rejected, in September of 1942 for example, because the accounting was out a fraction of a *pengő*.

The scope of the Kolozsvár office's authority was determined by the order of the Ministry of Commerce of early 1941. This order required the bureau to gather information, respond to requests from headquarters, report to OMIH each month about its activities including its financial transactions.⁶⁴

The office's records suggest that more than this was involved: the office's staff prepared travel plans, took plans in the supervision of hotels and hostels, provided guiding for out-of-country visitors, and from February of 1942 on, was directly in charge of the management of OMIH's 120-bed youth hostel in Kolozsvár. This hostel was part of the program that was designed to provide inexpensive accommodations for students visiting the regained territories. This hostel functioned till 1944 when it was converted to an improvised hospital for victims of Allied bombing raids. And the office had still other functions: it trained tourist guides and held photo competitions. It also sponsored folk-costume festivals, such as the one organized in June of 1941 in Kőrösfő, which was attended by several hundred people as well as celebrities such as the writers János Kemény and Zsigmond Móricz, as well as the French consul of Kolozsvár.⁶⁵ The aim of holding such an event became obvious from a report on another folk-costume festival that was held two years later in Szék: "In my opinion [reported on the event Elek Horváth] the folk-costume show of Szék was a very fortunate event from the point of view of national politics as it supported the Magyar [ethnic] island in Szolnok-Doboka County with its 85% Romanian population."⁶⁶ To discharge all these functions, the Kolozsvár office had a staff of five, including a secretary and a caretaker.

Although a large gap existed between the plans for developing tourism in Transylvania and what was becoming accomplished, and the land was not turning into a "Székely Switzerland", huge sums were invested in the region by the Hungarian government, despite the country's ever increasing military expenditures. The railway-building and the start of air traffic between Budapest, Kolozsvár and Marosvásárhely (today: Tirgu Mures) both aimed at facilitating tourism. Tourist travel was often subsidized and the owners of resorts were offered loans to help finance their investments. Many tourist hostels were renovated, expanded or newly built.⁶⁷ Construction work on one of these structures continued even in September of 1944 by which time the front had reached Transylvania.⁶⁸

The influx of Hungarian tourists started in December of 1940, after the military administration of the region came to an end. This happened despite warnings from OMIH that tourist infrastructure in the region was not on a par with that in Hungary. First there were conducted tours — one of these, by IBUSZ, had been organized already in October of 1940. Individual tourists began pouring in during the first half of 1941. Local tourist offices were inundated with requests for advice regarding travel and accommodations. Such inquiries also came from travel bureaus and associations, on behalf of groups interested in visiting "our beautiful Transylvania" seeking a

vacation above all in the mountain or lake-side resorts of Székelyföld.⁶⁹ At first the local tourist offices recommended all resorts, even ones with limited resources. Later, in response to complaints, smaller places were omitted and only the ones that could accommodate larger number of visitors were publicized. Among the cities only ones that could offer “cultural treasures” (above all Kolozsvár and Marosvásárhely) were recommended.

There were a number of reasons why tourism managed to grow at a seemingly high rate in Transylvania. The war had led to higher incomes for Hungarians. At the same time the war also limited their opportunities for foreign travel. As a result, tourism grew exponentially from 1941 to 1943. We don't have complete statistics, but we can site examples. Visitors to Kolozsvár in 1943 increased by 27.5% over the previous year's number. Some 60,000 visitors spent 140,000 days in the city. In the same year even some small resorts reported 100% occupancy rates.⁷⁰ The increase in visits to rural areas was also remarkable. While in Hungary proper such activity grew by only 4%, in northern Transylvania this growth was 56%.⁷¹ The official in charge of the IBUSZ office in the resort town of Szováta (today's Sovata) remarked in the summer of 1943 that getting a room for a day was impossible there, and those who wanted a room for a week or for a month had to book it many months in advance. “Such masses are vacationing here as [we] never had before,” and that many new arrivals without reservations had to spend the night outdoors.⁷² War conditions forced even some prominent Hungarian celebrities to take their vacations in this region. Included among them was the well-known actress Gizi Bajor.

The records of the Kolozsvár tourist office indicate that the vacation season of 1944 started with the same promise and tourism suffered a decline only in the second half of the summer when Romania switched sides in the war and the front soon arrived to Transylvania. Elek Horváth's enthusiasm for his work had not been sapped by the Nazi German occupation of Hungary in March of 1944. “In the second half of the month,” he reported late in March, “[we] distributed a large number of Transylvania flyers [among the German troops].”⁷³ Horváth was soon drafted into the Hungarian army, but was allowed to return to his job later. In the early summer he was still inspecting hotels. Records of his activities become thinner for the mid- and late summer but suggest that the office's activities became curtailed. On the 14th of September the order came from OMIH in Budapest that the office with its staff should evacuate to western Hungary. By this time the guns could be heard not far from Kolozsvár. The evacuation could not take place, perhaps the required trucks could not be obtained, and the office's records remained in Kolozsvár. Horváth's last instruction to István Láposi, the staff member who

planned not to flee, was to safeguard the office's belongings and to continue wearing his OMIH uniform.⁷⁴ He was obviously oblivious to the danger that would await a uniformed man when Soviet troops arrived.

“Eminent National Interest”

How the activities of Hungary's authorities in charge of tourism fostered both the cause of recreational travel and nation-building in Hungarian Transylvania from 1940 to 1944 can be better appreciated after an examination of overall Hungarian policies in the region.

For Hungary's leaders the elimination of all traces of a Romanian past in for example Kolozsvár was a primary requirement. Even Premier Teleki made a derogatory remark about the architectural heritage of Romanian rule, especially in reference to Orthodox church buildings, at a sitting of the Transylvania conference, for which he immediately apologized. In case of government buildings he thought of the removal of Romanian ornamentation, but for church buildings he suggested not uniform treatment but case-by-case handling that left the door open to their preservation as they were, their remodelling and also their demolishing.⁷⁵ his approach was implemented first in Kolozsvár: the removal of the visible traces of Romanian rule. Romanian commercial signs in obvious places were deemed unacceptable by OMIH. The same office saw to it that preference was shown to taxi drivers who were bilingual and insisted that taxi meters be switched to the Hungarian *pengő*.⁷⁶

A delegation from Hungary visited the spas of Székelyföld to gain an idea how much investment was needed for their improvement. The people in charge came to the conclusion that, in addition to the loans that some resorts had already requested, 1,500,000 *pengős* were needed in terms of loans to finance the planned modernization. To lighten the burden on the Hungarian state, the delegation's members divided those who had already applied for loans (the total of which approached a million *pengős*) into three categories. Into the first belonged those resorts whose owners were Hungarians (95 applicants). Into the second those whose owners' ethnic status was not clear (13 applicants), and into the third those whose proprietors had left northern Transylvania either before or after the Vienna Award. The delegation also recommended the control of prices in the tourist industry since these were 30 to 50%, but sometimes 100% higher than those of Hungary — even though accommodations in the region were often not on the same standard as those in Hungary. They also urged that permits for the rental of rooms in private homes be made mandatory — they were not needed during Romanian rule. In

extending Hungarian practices to northern Transylvania the members of the delegation hoped to gain a firmer control over tourism i.e. the means of excluding “undesirable elements” from it. The delegation concluded that the prospects for improving tourism in the Székelyföld's spas were good.⁷⁷

On April 3, 1941 the Hungarian government issued a decree concerning the fate of tourist establishments that were owned or had been abandoned by Romanians. These could be leased through the local OMIH offices, after approval by county authorities. The directives in this regard specified who could be considered for these establishments' new managers: priority had to be given to Hungarian applicants.⁷⁸ From OMIH's records it becomes obvious that this recommendation was closely observed by the officials in charge.⁷⁹ At the same time it occasionally happened that these officials tried to compromise in the case of Romanian-owned establishments. For example, Elek Horváth tried to convince the authorities in Budapest that a villa owned by one Marius Sturza, a Romanian University Professor, should be converted into an OMIH-run property, but was told that state sponsorship should not be used to create competition for private enterprise in a resort town.⁸⁰

The fate of Kolozsvár's Romanian-owned Astoria Hotel deserves special attention. For a while after the change in ownership of the city, the hotel escaped harm probably because it was the headquarters of the local Hungarian army command. After the soldiers left, in January 1942 the hotel's permit was withdrawn, yet at the end of the year the Astoria was allowed to resume business. Yet neither the local city government nor OMIH officials allowed the hotel to carry on in peace. They conducted regular inspections, demanded accounting reports monthly (which they asked for from no other establishment) and from time to time discussed the possibility of converting the building into a hospital. The hotel's owners fended off such plans through their connections in high places and their use of resourceful Hungarian lawyers. Attempts to convert the hotel to other use had to come to an end in March of 1944 when the newly-arrived Gestapo established its local headquarters in the hotel.

After the hotel had re-opened in December of 1941, Horváth had to admit, with some reluctance, that Astoria was the best hotel in the city, it filled an important function in reducing the chronic shortage of tourist accommodation, and that its owner satisfied all the regulations governing hotel management.⁸¹ In fact, the Kolozsvár OMIH office used to direct its visitors to the hotel.

Other minority-owned establishments were not so fortunate. In the review of permits the first priority of the Hungarian authorities was the exclusion of Jewish-owned businesses from the tourist industry. This was

above all the doing of the city administrations, but OMIH records suggest that the staff of this establishment went along. As a result of the re-assessments of permits of 1941 many hotels and resorts changed management or closed down. By early 1943 there remained only one Jewish-owned hotel in Kolozsvár, and only one first class, and one second class inn.⁸² By then a campaign was being prepared in Budapest for further restrictions.

Conclusions

In this study I tried to take a glance at a hitherto neglected aspect of the “little Hungarian world” of northern Transylvania that was re-united with Hungary during 1940-1944. Here the euphoria of “returning to the motherland” was soon replaced by the routine of everyday existence and the people of this region became acquainted with some of the darker aspects of life in interwar and wartime Hungary: an all-pervasive bureaucracy, a highly hierarchical social order, and a culture of political intolerance. The ambitious plans to develop the region's tourist industry had to be abandoned or scaled back because of the lack of sufficient funds, but even these revised schemes often proved difficult to achieve.

When we examine the ideology that hid behind the planned investments of millions of *pengős* we have to come to the conclusion that the ideas of nation-building through the development of tourism corresponded with the general nation-building and sometimes exclusionist ideology of official Hungary. The result was the concept of travel to Transylvania as a “patriotic pilgrimage”. The idea of a summer vacation that was part of people's patriotic duty was fostered by national propaganda and was endorsed in the over-abundant tourist literature of the times. Travel to this region was also fostered by the increasing difficulty of travel abroad in a war-torn Europe.

The policies of Hungary's agencies in charge of tourism strengthened the process that had been in existence ever since the beginning of the century that identified Transylvania as two distinct regions: the Székelyföld and Kalotaszeg (including Kolozsvár). This Transylvania was perhaps never before or since on the minds of Hungarian to the same extent as between 1940 and 1944. The tradition of travelling through Transylvania via the Nagyvárad (today: Oradea) – Kolozsvár – Marosvásárhely – Székelyföld route developed at this time and persists for Hungarian tourists even today. This image of Transylvania as consisting of these regions coincided with the vision of this land as an ethnically pure one in which Romanians, Jews and Saxons (Germans) did not exist. A cause and effect relationship should not be

implied, but this image of Transylvania probably contributed to the trend of these people, especially Romanians and Jews, becoming excluded from the tourist industry — and even deprived of their properties.

The concept of Transylvania as an archaic and folkloric — and half-modern community (where there are also ski-hills, spas and house-crafts) continues to persist even in today's Hungary. This, despite the fact that the “bastions” of Magyar culture and civilization — the cities — that were supposed to be there in 1940-44, are now devoid of any Hungarianness. Today the Magyar character of Transylvania is increasingly a rural one and the Hungarian image of this land relates less and less to the reality. It is not an image any more — it is just an illusion.

NOTES

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¹ The bulky volume by Dániel Csatári, *Forgószélben: Magyar-román viszony, 1940-1945* [In the whirlwind: Hungarian-Romanian relations, 1940-1945] (Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó, 1969) is written mainly from the perspective of the also neglected field of Marxist labour movements, while the much more recent work of Béni L. Balogh, *A magyar-román kapcsolatok 1939-40-ben és a második bécsi döntés* [Hungarian-Romanian relations in 1939-40 and the Second Vienna Award] (Miercurea-Ciuc [Csíkszerda]: ProPrint, 2002) concentrates on the diplomatic road to the Second Vienna Award, while the same author's article, “Az erdélyi magyar menekültkérdés 1939 és 1944 között” [The Hungarian refugee question in Transylvania between 1939 and 1944], *Regio*, (Fall-Winter 1999): 243-266 deals with the refugee crises of the years 1940-44. Sándor Oláh, in his *Kivizsgálás. Írások az állam és társadalom viszonyáról a Székelyföldön, 1940-1989* [Examination. Writings on the relationship of the state and society in Székelyland] (Miercurea-Ciuc [Csíkszerda]: Pro-Print, 2008), analyzed the approaches of the Hungarian administration to economic questions, while Péter Hámori in his “Magyar társadalomszervezési kísér-

letek Észak-Erdélyben” [Hungarian attempts at organizing society in Northern Transylvania], *Korall*, 18 (Dec. 2004): 65-97, examined the socio-political impact of Hungarian rule. Gábor Egry newly published book, *Az Erdélyiség “színeváltozása”* [The transformation of Transylvanianism] (Budapest: Napvilág, 2008), outlines the ideology of the Transylvanian Party. Others that might be added include: Attila Szavári, “Magyar berendezkedés Észak-Erdélyben 1940 szeptember – 1941 április” [Hungarian settling-in in Northern Transylvania...] *Magyar Kisebbség*, 2004, no. 4: 272-304; Zsuzsanna Simon, “Észak-Erdély köz és szakigazgatása a második bécsi döntés után” [The administration of Northern Transylvania after the Second Vienna Award], *Regio*, 1995 no. 4: 50-82; and Levente Benkő, “Magyar nemzetiségi politika Észak-Erdélyben 1940-1944” [Hungarian nationality policies in Northern Transylvania, 1940-1944], *Pro Minoritate*, Fall 2002: 7-41. In the historiography of wartime Northern Transylvania a significant contribution was made by a special volume of the journal *Limes* (no. 2, for 2006), especially the articles by Csaba Gidó, Márton László, Edit Csilléry, András Tóth-Bartos and Sándor Oláh. This volume, aside from listing ongoing research projects on our theme, sums up existing knowledge, which is not much. We could continue enumerating works that touch on the subject but the fact remains that there is no comprehensive monograph.

² On this subject see Csaba Gidó and Márton László's article, “Észak-Erdély és Magyarország 1940. évi fejlettségének összehasonlítása” [A comparison of the development of Hungary and Northern Transylvania in 1940], in the above mentioned special issue of *Limes*, pp. 19-41.

³ A brand-new book on the history of tourism in Hungary is by Márta Juszti, *A turizmus története a két világháború között* [The history of tourism between the two world wars], a doctoral dissertation, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, 2002. Also, the same author's “Utazgassunk hazánk földjén!” [Let's travel in our native land], *Korall* 26 (Nov. 2006): 185-208; and, Lajos Kudar, *Turizmusunk története dióhéjban* [The history of our tourism in a nutshell] (Budapest: Tinta, 2003), 19-30. On the interconnection between tourism and nation-building see John K. Walton, ed., *Histories of Tourism: Representation, Identity and Conflict* (Cleveland: Multilingual Matters Limited, 2005), especially the studies by Shelley Baranowski, Kristin Semmels and John M. MacKenzie. Also, Katherine Haldane Grenier, *Tourism and Identity in Scotland, 1770-1914: Creating Caledonia* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2005).

⁴ Piers Brendon, *Thomas Cook. 150 Years of Popular Tourism* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1991).

⁵ Jill Steward, “Tourism in Late Imperial Austria,” in *Being Elsewhere: Tourism, Consumer Culture and Identity in Modern Europe and North America*, ed. Shelley Baranowski and Ellen Furlough (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 114-115.

⁶ Alain Corbin, *Le territoire du vide. L'Occident et le désir du rivage, 1750-1840* (Paris: Flammarion, 1990). For an English-language summation of the subject see John Urry, *The Tourist Gaze. Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies* (London: Sage, 1990), 17-27.

⁷ Patrick Young, “La Vieille France as Object of Bourgeois Desire: The Touring Club de France and the French Regions, 1890-1918,” in *Histories of Leisure*, ed. Rudy Koshar (Oxford–New York: Berg, 2002), 183-184.

⁸ Orvar Löfgren, “Know your country,” in Baranowski and Furlough, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-148. Similarly motivated tourism developed in Holland and in Quebec, Canada. See Jane Nadel and Klein, *Fishing for Heritage: Modernity and Loss Along the Scottish Coast* (Oxford-New York: Berg, 2003), pp. 175-176.

⁹ Pieter Judson, “Every German Visitor has a *Völkisch* Obligation he must Fulfill,” in Koshar, ed., *Nationalist Tourism*, pp. 151-158.

¹⁰ Alexander Vari, “From Friends of Nature to Tourist Soldiers: Nation-Building and Tourism in Hungary, 1873-1914,” in *Tourism. The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism*, ed. Anne E. Gorus and Diane P. Koenker (Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 64-81.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, especially pp. 74-75 and 80-81.

¹² On the German model see Shelley Baranowski, *Strength Through Joy. Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), especially pp. 118-151; and on the Italian one, Victoria de Grazia, *The Culture of Consent. Mass Organization and Leisure in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, second ed. in 2001).

¹³ László Kósa, *Fürdőélet a Monrchiában* [Life at the baths in the Monarchy] (Budapest: Holnap, 1999), 39-42.

¹⁴ Kudar, *op. cit.*, 20.

¹⁵ John Beckerson, “Marketing British Tourism. Government Approaches to the Stimulation of a Service Sector,” in *The Making of Modern Tourism. The Cultural History of the British Experience*, ed. Hartmut Berghoff, Barbara Korte, Ralf Schneider and Christopher Harvie (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); and Marguerite S. Shafer, “Seeing the Nature in America,” in Baranowski and Furlough, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-184; also, Michael Berkowitz, “A New Deal for Leisure,” in the same volume, pp. 185-212.

¹⁶ Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 24 May 1940, Record Group K 27, Magyar Országos Levéltár (National Archives of Hungary, hereafter MOL).

¹⁷ Jusztin, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-144.

¹⁸ A 45-minute film by the OMIH about Transylvania was severely criticized at the time, mainly because of its omissions, by one Miklós Fogolyán. His letter of 10 June 1941 can be found in fond 830, dossier 70, 19. f. at the Archive Națională Direcția Județeană Cluj (hereafter ANDJC).

¹⁹ István Hallóssy, *Az idegenforgalmi propaganda új irányai* [New directions of foreign tourist propaganda] (Budapest, [1940]), p. 15 and *in passim*.

²⁰ The first issue devoted to Transylvania was published in Sept. 1940. The last appeared in September of 1944, after parts of the land became a battle-ground.

²¹ A letter by Baron János Jósika to an unknown addressee, 22 April 1943, Zilah. Fond 830, dossier 119, 95. f. ANDJC. Other documents, containing similar complains, can also be found in this dossier.

²² *Erdély északi része és a Székelyföld* [The northern part of Transylvania and the land of the Székelys] (a travel guide) (Budapest: OMIH, 1941), not paginated.

²³ Aprónyomtatványtár [collection of small publications] items 16/1942, A21/1941, A16/1941. Országos Széchényi Könyvtár [National Széchényi Library, hereafter OSzK].

²⁴ *Idem.*, items 289/1941, 288/1941, 225/1941.

²⁵ Károly Kós's letter to an OMIH official, 25 Jan. 1941. Fond 830, dossier 21, 25-27 f. ANDJC.

²⁶ The letter of László Gál, OMIH's president, to the OMIH office in Kolozsvár, 17 Jan. 1941. *idem*, dossier 30 f.

²⁷ Varga's speech of 15 Oct. 1940. *Az 1939. június 10-re hirdetett országgyűlés képviselőházának napója* [Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Parliament called for 10 June 1939] (Budapest: Athenaum, 1941). vol. VII, p. 450.

²⁸ The expression is that of Nándor Bárdi. See his *Tény és való. A budapesti kormányok és a határon túli magyarság kapcsolattörténete* [Fact and reality. The history of relations between the Budapest governments and Hungarians beyond the border] (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2004), 133.

²⁹ Adrienne Sebestyén, "Erdélybe utazni más'. A magyar turisztikai irodalom Erdély-képe" ['Travel in Transylvania is different.' The image of Transylvania in Hungarian travel literature] in *Erdély-(de)konstrukciók* [Transylvania (de)constructed], ed. Margit Feischmidt (Budapest: Néprajzi Múzeum [Museum of Ethnography], 2005), 54.

³⁰ For example, Sefket Széfeddin, *A hét vár országa* [The land of the seven fortresses] (Budapest: Stadium, 1942).

³¹ Lajos Lévai, *Székelyföldi Kis Tükör* [The little mirror of Székelyföld] (Budapest: Kócai, 1942).

³² László Cs. Szábó, *Erdélyben* [In Transylvania] (Budapest: Nyugat, 1940).

³³ József Biró, *Kolozsvári képeskönyv* [Picture book of Kolozsvár] (Budapest: Officina, 1940).

³⁴ Sándor Aba, *Erdélyi útikalauz és a magyar városok ismertetése* [A Transylvanian tourist guide and description of Hungarian cities] (Nagyvárad: Nemzeti könyv és Papírkereskedés, n.d.).

³⁵ An OMIH circular dated 30 Sept. 1941, fond 830, dossier 79, ANDJC.

³⁶ The letter of Elek Horváth to OMIH [Dec. 1941], fond 830, dossier 32 2-3, ANDJC.

³⁷ Károly Kaffka ed., *Az utas könyve. Magyar utazási kézikönyv és útmutató* [The book of the traveller. Hungarian tourist handbook and guide] ([Budapest]: OMVESZ, 1940. Third edition (containing the new sections on eastern Hungary and northern Transylvania) (Budapest: OMVESZ, 1941).

³⁸ Harsányi's introduction to Kaffka's book.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-111 *in passim*.

⁴⁰ The volume was published in Budapest by *Magyar Turista Élet* in 1940.

⁴¹ Ödön Nagy, *Gyilkostó. Részletes útikalauz* [Lake Gyilkos. Detailed travel guide] (Marosvásárhely: Kiss Ernő Könyvnyomda, 1943), 55.

⁴² M. O. Reich, *Erdély* [Transylvania] (Budapest: Eggenberger, 1942), 10 and 18. The new addition of the book also dealt with southern, in 1942 Romanian Transylvania.

⁴³ Budapest: Franklin, n.d.

⁴⁴ Gyula Prinz ed., *Erdély — Útmutató Erdély vendégei számára* [Transylvania — guide for visitors to Transylvania] (Pécs, n.d.). On this see the study of Róbert Keményfi, “Kulturális hatóerőnk' mitikus történeti földrajz háttéré” [‘Our cultural prowess’ background to mythical historical geography] *Korall* vol. 31 (April, 2008): 101-131.

⁴⁵ The letter of József Zsák to OMIH, 12 Aug. 1941. Fond 32, dossier 32, 30. f. ANDJC.

⁴⁶ *OMIH-kalauz cit.* no pagination. It is analysed by Sebestyén, *op. cit.* pp. 56-57.

⁴⁷ The letter of Elek Horváth, Kolozsvár, 8 March 1941, fond 830, dossier 18. 13-15 f. ANDJC.

⁴⁸ Quoted in Géza Polgárdy, *Harcok, munkák és küzdelmek. Tíz esztendő a magyar turista közéletben (1934-1944)* [Conflicts, projects and struggles. Ten years in the public life of Hungarian tourism] ([Budapest?]: Magyar Hegymászástörténeti Társaság, 1998), 47-48.

⁴⁹ *Egyesületi élet*, vol. 1 no. 1 (1941): 10-11.

⁵⁰ See the issues of *Erdély*, 1941 no. 12; and 1942 nos. 3, 7 and 12.

⁵¹ Károly Czirják, *A Horthy-csúcson* [On the Horthy peak], *Erdély*, 1943, no. 9, 138-140.

⁵² Dietlinde and Rudolf Rösner, “Zur Geschichte des Sektionens des Siebenbürgerische Karpathenvereins im Nösnergau und im Reener Ländchen” in *Der Siebenbürgische Karpatenverein 1880-1945*, ed. Heinz Heltmann-Helmut Roth (Innsbruck: Wort und Welt Verlag, 1990): 128-134.

⁵³ Nevertheless the editor of *Erdély* missed the Romanian laws protecting the environment. János Xantus, “Természtvédelmet, de sürgősen” [‘We want’ environmental protection and soon], *Erdély*, 1942, no. 1, pp. 1-5.

⁵⁴ Sándor Tavaszy, “A természetjárás a nemzetnevelés szolgálatában” [The exploration of nature in the service of educating the nation], *Erdély*, 1942, no. 1, pp. 1-5.

⁵⁵ *Erdély*, 1943, no. 2, p. 31; also in the same periodical, 1942, no. 12, pp. 190-191.

⁵⁶ Ernő Balogh, “Tanulságul” [As a lesson], *Erdély*, 1944, no. 6, pp. 81-82. Czirják, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-140.

⁵⁷ The subject of tourism as spiritual nation-building in contemporary Vichy France is described in Anne-Marie Thiesse, *Ils apprenaient la France. L'exaltation des régions dans le discours patriotique* (Paris: Editions de la maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1997), 95-102.

⁵⁸ Erdélyi értekezlet jegyzőkönyve [Proceedings of the Transylvania conference], record group K 28 267. cs, pp. 183-184 f. Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives, hereafter MOL).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

⁶⁰ See the report of Minister József Varga, printed in *A magyar idegenforgalom évkönyvéből* [From the Yearbook of Hungarian Tourism] (Budapest: Idegenforgalmi Újágírók Egyesülete, 1942), 13-20. On railway development see Mihály Kubinszky and Ferenc Horváth, *Magyar vasúti építkezések Erdélyben* [Hungarian railway constructions in Transylvania] (Budapest: MÁV, 1998), 224-238.

⁶¹ Autobiography, typed mss., in the Papers of Elek Horváth, manuscript group XIV, 44. Archives of Veszprém County.

⁶² Some of his correspondence with these authors can be found in fond 830, dossiers 59, 83 and 97, ANDJC.

⁶³ Three such investigations were carried out in 1941, two in 1942, and one in 1944.

⁶⁴ *Az Országos Magyar Idegenforgalmi Hivatal szervezeti szabályzata* [The regulations of national Hungarian Tourist Office] (Budapest: Stádium, 1941), 23-36.

⁶⁵ Fond 830, dossier 71, ANDJC.

⁶⁶ Horváth's report to OMIH in Budapest, 25 May 1943, in the same records, dossier 112. 82. f.

⁶⁷ *Erdély*, 13 Jan. 1943.

⁶⁸ *Erdély*, 1944, no. 9, pp. 125-128.

⁶⁹ This is documented in fond 830, dossier 9, ANDJC.

⁷⁰ Reports by resorts about the 1943 season, fond 830, dossier 119, ANDJC.

⁷¹ Data provided by OMVESZ, in the same fond, dossier 120, 17. f.

⁷² Report of Árpád Záborszky to Elek Horváth, 10 July 1943, in the above cited fond, dossier 118, 65. f.

⁷³ This was Horvath's only comment regarding the coming of the Germans. Report for March, 1944, in the same fond, dossier 140.

⁷⁴ Horváth's directions to Láposi, 19 Sept. 1944. In the same fond, dossier 150. Horváth survived the war, left Hungary in 1948 and emigrated to the United States. There he worked in libraries and took active part in the life of the Hungarian-American community. He died in 1994. István Láposi's post-1944 fate is not known.

⁷⁵ Proceedings of the of the Transylvania seminar, pp. 139f. K 28, 267. cs. MOL.

⁷⁶ For documentation see fond 830, dossiers 44, 53 and 129, ANDJC.

⁷⁷ For the delegation's report see fond 830, dossier 153, ANDJC.

⁷⁸ See the report of "Gál" to the Kolozsvár office of OMIH, April 1941. In the above fond, dossier 64.

⁷⁹ Letter, Elek Horváth to Hermann Müller, 10 Oct. 1941. Fond 830, Dossier 78, AMDJC.

⁸⁰ Gál's letter to Horvath, 11 Feb. 1941. Fond 830, dossier 63. AMDJC.

⁸¹ Letter, Elek Horváth to OMIH, 15 Dec. 1942. Fond 830, dossier 118. 166-167. f. AMDJC.

⁸² Enclosure in letter, Gál to Horváth, 5 Jan. 1943. Fond 830, dossier 118.
126. f. AMDJC.

A Story of Survival: the Hungarians of Romania, 1919-1989

László Diószegi

The story of the Hungarian minority of Romania during the seven decades covered in this study is a sad one. It is a tale of uncertainties, mistreatment, deprivations of rights, and in general, a seemingly hopeless struggle for cultural survival. During these seventy years there had been few periods that gave cause for optimism. The strategic goal of successive Romanian regimes — whether ostensibly democratic or blatantly authoritarian — had always been the establishment of a homogeneous Romanian nation state. Nevertheless, the prolonged struggle of the Hungarians for the preservation of their ethnic identity cannot be considered to have been in vain. There had been setbacks for them, especially as a consequence of a population explosion in Romania combined with the forced resettlement policies of the country's immediate pre-1989 regime, but they had survived what will hopefully be the worst of the periods of mistreatment since they had come under Romanian rule nearly nine decades ago.

True, from 1919 to 1989 there had been a decline in the proportion of Hungarians in the population in Romania, in particular in Transylvania. In absolute terms, however, their numbers increased. This development is noteworthy in view of the fact that elsewhere in the post-1919 history of the Hungarian diaspora of the Carpathian Basin there has been a regrettable decline not only in ratios but in absolute numbers as well. It is also important that the decrease in the proportion of the Hungarian population in Romania did not translate into a commensurate decline in their influence in cultural and political life. The results of the recent national elections in Romania — from the point of view of Hungarian political parties in the country — repeated the electoral patterns that had been established in the interwar period, and gave the Hungarians of Transylvania a stable representation in the Parliament in

Bucharest. The past several decades have witnessed partial successes even though the general trends — and unfortunately this is undisputable — are unfavourable from the point of view of demographics as well as social, economic, and cultural developments.

The Demographic Situation

The vast majority of Hungarians in Romania became Romanian citizens as a result of the boundary changes imposed by the Peace Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920). The Hungarian census of 1910 listed 1,661,805 citizens whose mother tongue was Hungarian in the regions that the peace settlement transferred to Romania. These regions included historic Transylvania and the Bánát, i.e. the districts of Körös and Máramaros, a geographic area that in time acquired the name Transylvania in popular parlance.¹

Among the Magyar-speaking citizens of post-1918 “Greater” Romania, the number of Hungarians living outside of Transylvania was also significant. In this connection we can rely only on estimated figures because of the incompleteness of statistical data. According to these, in 1920 about 150 thousand Hungarian residents of Romania lived outside of Transylvania. These people had settled, in the distant or not-so-distant past, in Bukovina, Moldova, and in the cities of the Regat (Wallachia), mainly Bucharest.

According to the Romanian census of 1930, the population of Transylvania was 5,548,363. This particular figure can be considered fairly realistic. The Romanian ethnic group had increased by 400,000 compared to the census of 1910 and constituted the majority in Transylvania with a population of 3,207,880. The census recorded a total of 1,353,276 Hungarians, a figure which indicated a decrease of almost 200,000. This finding can not be considered realistic even when one considers the fact that 197,000 Hungarians had left Transylvania between 1919-1927.² The Romanian census was manipulated for political reasons. The number of those whose mother tongue was Hungarian had decreased as a result of the classification of the Jewish, Gypsy, Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox population as Romanian. In reality there can be little doubt that there were at least 1,600,000 Hungarian-speaking persons living in Transylvania in the interwar period.

The third largest ethnic group in Transylvania was the German. In the interwar years it numbered about 500,000. From the point of view of their political, economic and cultural situation, the Germans were the natural allies of the Hungarians. However, this alliance was rarely realized because of the two groups' often differing political outlook and perceived interests.

The ethnic map of Transylvania was very varied. The Hungarian administrative map of 1910 indicated that there was only one county in which an ethnic group made up more than 90 percent of the population — the County of Udvarhely (Odorhei), where the Hungarians made up 95 percent of the population. In four counties Rumanians made up the majority with population ratios between 75 and 90 percent, and in two counties the same was true for Hungarians. Rumanians were the majority in nine counties with populations making up 50-75 percent of the total, while Hungarians had such majorities in two counties. In the five remaining counties there was no clear-cut majority for either of these ethnic groups. As far as the geographic regions are concerned, Hungarians were significant in Székelyföld (south-eastern Transylvania), in the borderland between Hungary and Romania, and in the central Transylvanian regions of the Szilágyság and the Kalotaszeg. In addition, there were several smaller “ethnic islands” with Hungarian majorities. Many of Transylvania's urban centres used to be such places.

Two v-shaped areas, with their base on the northeastern and southern frontierlands of Transylvania and their apex in the Bihar or Apuseni mountains, had Romanian majorities. Both of these regions were forested and mountainous where a relatively low number of people lived on a relatively large area, with 75-85 percent of them being Rumanians — the predominant majority of them being shepherds and peasants. There were significant areas of mixed population, where none of the nationalities formed a majority. Transylvania's Germans lived mostly in such areas. The most important area of mixed Hungarian-Romanian population was the large Transylvanian basin, and a belt near the western border, behind a zone with Hungarian majorities.

An examination of the distribution and settlement pattern of the Hungarians in Transylvania reveals striking anomalies and abnormalities. While the predominant majority of the Rumanians lived in small villages spreading over huge areas, about 30 percent of the Hungarians lived in towns located in areas populated mainly by other nationalities. The statistics show that in 1910 there were 28 — and in 1930, still 19 — Transylvanian urban centres where the proportion of the Hungarian population was over 50 percent (Arad [Arad], Bánffyuhunyad [Huedin], Csíkszereda [Miercurea-Ciuc], Dicsőszentmárton [Tirnaveni], Felsőbánya [Baia Sprie], Gyergyószentmiklós [Gheorgheni], Kézdivásárhely [Târgu Secuiesc], Kolozsvár [Cluj], Marosvásárhely [Tîrgu-Mures], Nagyenyed [Aiud], Nagykároly [Carei], Nagyszalonta [Salonta], Nagyvárad [Oradea], Sepsiszentgyörgy [Sfîntu-Gheorghe], Szatmárnémeti [Satu-Mare], Székelyudvarhely [Odorheiu], Szilágysomlyó [Simleu], Torda [Turda], Zilah [Zalău]).

This pattern of settlement would heavily influence the future of Transylvania's Hungarian community. The fact is that urban populations were far more susceptible to assimilative pressures and the manipulation of their ethnic identity by the authorities. In towns with predominantly non-Hungarian hinterlands the Magyar communities were culturally isolated and soon underwent the processes which in the long run resulted in the erosion of the Hungarian character of these places.

The religious make-up of post-1920 Transylvania was even more complex than its ethnic composition. As a result of the centuries long co-existence of ethnic groups there had developed some overlaps, but in general it can be stated that the region's Unitarians and Calvinists were Hungarian, whereas the majority of its Greek Catholics and almost all the Orthodox Christians were Romanian — while the Lutherans were all German.³ The majority of Roman Catholics were also Hungarian — most of them lived on the eastern territory of Székelyland, in Csík (Ciuc) county, but there was also a significant number of German Catholics who lived in the Bánát. The predominantly Romanian population of the above-mentioned north-eastern triangle was Greek Catholic, whereas that of the southern Romanian-populated region was Orthodox.

Statistics on the migrations of Romania's Hungarian community are scarce. Romanian demographers, working with incomplete data, have arrived at the conclusion that the population growth of Transylvania's Romanian population exceeded that of the Hungarian by such margin that a fundamental change in the region's ethnic balance was inevitable. This suggestion, which was widely advertised, was posed not only as a question of demography but also a scientific theory. Later on, Romanian propagandists attributed changes in Transylvania's ethnic balance to this discrepancy in natural population growth. In reality, the difference between the rate of increase of Transylvania's Romanian and Hungarian populations was not so much the result of varying rates of demographic growth but of the Bucharest government's policies of forced assimilation and large-scale resettlement.

The Legal Situation

The Greater Romania that emerged from the First World War was highly centralized state whose administration was patterned on that of the pre-war Romanian Kingdom. Nothing came of the promises that had been made regarding autonomy for the country's newly-gained territories: Transylvania and Bessarabia. The protection of the new Romania's minorities was supposed

to have been guaranteed by the resolutions of Gyulafehérvár (today's Alba Julia)⁴ and the minority protection clauses of the post-World War I peace treaties, but these national and international agreements were, more often than not, disregarded. The Gyulafehérvár resolutions in particular, offered extensive guarantees to all of Romania's minorities in religious, economic and political affairs and in the realm of education. The Romanian constitution of March 29, 1923, however, guaranteed only the civic rights of individual citizens. The new constitution that was proclaimed after the establishment of royal dictatorship by King Carol in February, 1938, went no further. These constitutions proclaimed the equality of Rumanians (but not of the citizens of Romania) in the realm of race, language, religion; the freedom of assembly and association as well as of the press; and the right to education. Neither of these constitutions guaranteed any collective rights to the national minorities.

On August 4, 1938, King Carol's regime, in its desire to gain wider support both domestically and internationally, passed a new nationalities statute which gave national minorities equal rights with Rumanians in matters of race, religion and language. The new Minority Statute, however, was limited in its effect by the fact that its provisions were not reinforced by other legislation. Furthermore, the High Commission on Minority Affairs established by this statute did not possess powers to enforce its provisions.

The legal regime for the protection of minorities in interwar Romania was in practice circumscribed and provided limited benefits. Nevertheless the very existence of minority protection provisions gave comfort to minorities and encouraged them in their struggle to obtain at least partial protection for their cultures.

The fundamental issue determining the fate of the Hungarians in Romania was their right to citizenship. The Romanian state, in its quest for the creation of a homogeneous nation state, tried to decrease the number of minorities through denying citizenship to their members, or making it difficult for them to attain the status of citizens. Accordingly, even though the minority protection agreements signed by Romania called for the granting of citizen status to all people born in the country as well as those who were permanent residents there, the statute of February 24, 1924, made the right to residency status — and not the place of residence — a condition of citizenship.⁵ The right to citizenship, specified in the minority protection agreement signed by Romania after the war, was eventually implemented in October of 1939 through an amendment to the legislation dealing with citizenship rights. During the intervening two decades huge number of Hungarians had been forced to leave the country.⁶

As far as the rights of the minorities were concerned, the constitution of 1923 endorsed the idea of the equality of all citizens. Nevertheless, Romania's Parliament passed many laws that violated the rights of minorities. Among these was Bank Act of 8 May 1934, and the Act of 16 July 1934, which specified that 80 percent of the employees, and 50 percent of the directors of banks had to be Romanians.⁷

The situation was similar in regard to the use of minority languages. The constitutions of 1923 and 1938 — despite the provisions of the minority protection treaties — did not address the issue of the rights of the minorities to the use of their mother tongue. Furthermore, Romania's Parliament passed numerous acts that restricted the use of the Hungarian language. In the courts, for example, lawyers were not allowed to use any other language but Romanian, and accountants had to do their book-keeping also in Romanian.

Education

In the focus of political struggle of Transylvania's Hungarians between the two world wars stood education which was of fundamental importance from the point of view of the survival of their culture.

The right of minorities to education in their own language was proclaimed by the Gyulafehérvár declarations as well as the Minority Protection provisions of the post-war peace settlement. At the beginning of the 1919-1920 school-year, the Romanian authorities in charge of education tried to delegate authority over the teaching of minorities to church-run schools. As a result of this policy, the Hungarian language lost ground in the state schools, whereas the number of Hungarian denominational schools increased rapidly.

The restriction of the mother tongue education of minorities living in Romania began in 1921 after the ratification of the peace treaties. The authorities in charge of education, under the leadership of Minister of Education Constantin Angheliescu, strove to reduce the influence of the still rather powerful network of denominational schools. Romania's land reform, implemented through the legislation of 30 July 1921, deprived the Hungarian churches of their basic income and precipitated a crisis that threatened the existence of their schools.⁸ The functioning of these beleaguered church-operated schools was exacerbated by a series of discriminative measures. With the deprivation of the right to publicize themselves and their activities, a great many long-established Hungarian schools had to close.⁹

Greater Romania's primary level state schools were first regulated by the act of 26 July 1924. The legislation stipulated that elementary schooling

had to be uniform in the whole country, that its direction and control was the function of the state, and that no school could be established without the prior approval of the Ministry of Public Education. The act also specified that the language of education had to be Romanian, except in communities where the language was non-Romanian. In these, the Ministry of Education could establish primary schools to function in the language of the minority, to the same extent as those in Romanian communities.

When it came to the implementation of this act, the provisions regarding these ratios were not realized. The proportion of Hungarian elementary schools was much below what it should have been according to the results of the 1930 Romanian census — and the situation was even worse in the case of kindergartens. According to the calculations of Árpád Kiss, at the end of the 1934-35 school year there were a total of only 112 Hungarian-language state elementary schools in Romania, and by the 1936-37 school year this number had decreased to 44, that is, to one percent of the total number of schools in the country. This meant that, out of the total of about 96,809 Hungarian pupils registered in state elementary schools, in 1934-35 there were only 11,485, and in 1936-37 only 4,527 who could study in their own language.¹⁰

In the Romanianization of the state schools prominent role was played by the provisions of article 159 of the law of July 26, 1924. These provisions provided any teacher who moved to a county with a large non-Romanian population with a 50 percent pay bonus, a parcel of land of 10 hectares, as well as improved pension benefits. Counties in which teachers were qualified for these incentives included Csík (Ciuc) with 85.7 percent Hungarian population, Háromszék (Trei Scaune) with 86.6%, Udvarhely (Odorhei) with 95.1%, Maros-Torda (Mures-Turda) with 45.9%, Bihar (Bihor) with 33.8%, Szatmár (Satu-Mare) with 31.9%, Szilágy (Sîlaj) with 36.6%, Kolozs (Cluj) with 32.6%, Szolnok-Doboka (in east-central Transylvania) with 15.8%, Torda-Aranyos (Turda) with 22.2%.

Minorities were further burdened by the fact that the state expected the local communities to shoulder all the costs of maintaining the elementary schools (school construction, maintenance, the upkeep of the headmaster's residence, etc.) except for the wages of the teachers. Considering the fact that, contrary to the provisions of the law, minority denominational schools did not enjoy any state support, it becomes obvious that the communities of Romania's minorities were burdened with a double than the normal share of education costs. They had to pay for the denominational schools that taught in the minority's language, and they also had to pay most of the costs for the

maintenance of the state schools that were increasingly Romanianized — the latter amounted to 14 percent of the taxes collected in a particular settlement.¹¹

The decrease of the number of state schools that taught in Hungarian had a very negative impact on Transylvania's Hungarian community. The threat existed that the implementation of the regulations of the law governing denominational schools (which barred students with Romanian family names or ancestry from attending), and the closing of more and more of these schools, would force an increasing number of Hungarian students to attend state schools that were gradually becoming Romanianized.

As far as the legal status of denominational schools was concerned, the framers of minority protection treaties had not been aware how important Hungarian denominational education had been in the past in Transylvania. Because of this these treaties did not include any provisions for the protection of denominational schools from state regulations, Romania's legislators could classify the denominational minority schools into the same category as private schools that were operated for profit.¹² The exceptions to this were the schools of the Orthodox Church which enjoyed all the benefits extended to state schools.

Many of the regulations governing education in Romania of the 1920s had a negative impact on the country's minorities. Although these measures caused concerns and difficulties for the Hungarian community, they failed to disrupt the Hungarian elementary school system. In 1931 for example, nearly 75 percent of Hungarian children were still receiving education in their mother tongue. Almost 62 percent of these students attended church-affiliated schools where they received a high-quality education and one that was Hungarian in spirit.

The restriction of such education began in earnest in the early 1930s. Between 1931 and 1937 the number of Hungarian public schools declined from 427 to 44. This meant that a very large percentage of Transylvania's Hungarian pupils, that is close to hundred thousand students, no longer received their education in the mother tongue.¹³ Statistical data of the Hungarian denominational education reveal that after 1932, negative tendencies occurred there as well. This was manifested above all by the fact that instead of experiencing growing enrolment as had been the case previously, from this time on these schools faced a decline.¹⁴

The combined enrolment of the Hungarian religious and public schools in 1935 was 77,346 — two years later it was down to 62,000. By that time in the state-supported schools only 4,527 students received education in their Hungarian mother tongue. With nearly 93 percent of Transylvania's Hungarian students receiving their education in the Magyar minority's church-

affiliated schools, the burden of culture maintenance had shifted overwhelmingly to this sector of the minority educational network.

The Churches

The Churches play a fundamental role in the preservation of ethnic identity and culture in minority populations. This was especially the case in Transylvania where the Churches had for many centuries played an important role in education and culture maintenance. Such long-standing traditions of freedom of religion and equality among the denominations helped Transylvania's churches to serve the interests of minorities without which their survival could have been jeopardized.

The tradition of religious freedom in Transylvania included the right for denominations to maintain their religious and cultural institutions. After the acquisition of the region by Romania, that country's government undertook to respect the religious autonomy of the Székely (Hungarian) and Saxon (German) minorities, and to support their institutions financially. At first, the country's constitution even guaranteed the equality of religions in Transylvania. A revision of the constitution in 1923 however, declared the Orthodox Church to be supreme in the country and accorded preferred status to the Greek Catholic Church.¹⁵

In the meantime the process of depriving Transylvania's Hungarian minority churches of their assets continued. Romania's Land Reform Act of 30 June 1921 violated the concept of equality of religion proclaimed by the country's first post-World War I constitution. Pursuant to this law, the Hungarian churches were deprived of most of their landholdings. The Roman Catholic dioceses of Nagyvárad (Oradea), Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia), Temesvár (Timișoara), and Szatmár (Satu-Mare) lost 95 percent of their holdings, while the Reformed Church elsewhere had to part with 45 percent of its lands. All-in-all, Romania's Hungarian churches lost a total of 84.5 percent of their estates.¹⁶

The loss of these lands, and the income from them, confronted these Churches with grave difficulties. From this time on the churches had to maintain their religious services and support their schools from their much decreased incomes, just when state support for minority education was also reduced.

The Political Situation

Confronted by such difficulties the leaders of Transylvania's Hungarian minority tried to organize themselves politically. After several failed attempts, in December of 1922 they established the National Hungarian Party (Országos Magyar Párt, hereafter NHP). The party accepted as member every citizen of Romania over the age of 20 who considered himself Hungarian by descent, mother tongue or cultural background. This party represented the interests of Transylvania's Hungarians in Romania's Parliament until its dissolution at the time of the establishment of a royal dictatorship in Romania in 1938. It fought a continuous struggle for the maintenance of Hungarian schools. On fifteen different occasions it registered its complaints in this matter with the League of Nations. Though it functioned as a political party, the NHP tried to represent the collective interests of the Hungarian minority. After its dissolution in 1938, the Hungarians of Transylvania tried to voice their concerns through the organization known as the Front for National Re-birth (Nemzeti Újjászületés Frontja). The effectiveness of the Front was limited by the fact that during King Carol's dictatorship the role of Parliament was severely restricted. According to the country's new constitution, the government became responsible to Parliament but to the King, and most legislation was promulgated not by Parliament but by a cabinet appointed by Carol.

The Second Vienna Award of 30 August, 1940, brought dramatic changes in the life of the Hungarian community in Transylvania. The award returned the northern and eastern parts of Transylvania, an area of 43,104 square kilometres, to Hungary. In devising the new frontiers between Hungary and Romania the arbitrators tried to implement the principle of nationality. As a result, in the new "Hungarian" half of Transylvania, Hungarians (numbering 1,380,507) became a majority; at the same time, a sizeable Romanian minority, 1,029,469 inhabitants, found themselves included in the newly-enlarged Hungary. In southern, "Romanian" Transylvania, the Romanian majority became more predominant (with 2,274,569 individuals) while the Hungarian and German minority population amounted to "only" 363,206 and 490,640 respectively.

Transylvania's August, 1940 partition better reflected the region's ethnic realities than did the post-World War I settlement, but it did not solve its accumulated problems — nor did it resolve the fundamental issue of intolerant nationalism. Problems were not resolved, only modified. Before the Second Vienna Award, Europe was faced the explosive dilemma of a 1.6 million-strong Hungarian minority in Romania; after it there was the equally acute problem of a million-strong Romanian minority in Hungary. At the

same time, the issue of nearly a million Germans, Hungarians, South Slavs, Gypsies etc. remaining in Romanian Transylvania, persisted.

In reflecting upon the experience of the Hungarian minority in Romania in the interwar period we can conclude that Romanian policy toward minorities was characterized by an impatient and aggressive nationalism that permeated all of East Central Europe at the time. Throughout these two decades the situation of Romania's minorities kept worsening. The maintenance of minority culture and identity was becoming more and more difficult. The contradictions of Romania's parliamentary system, the restrictions on minority political organizations, the expropriation of much of the minority Churches' estates, the systematic Romanization of the educational system all threatened the long-term survival of the country's minorities. Yet, this period was also characterized by the minorities' struggle for their survival and by their faith in the positive outcome of this struggle. The minorities couldn't hope to win the contest against the Romanian state, but on occasion they managed to wring some concessions from Bucharest that gave them hope for the future.

With World War II everything changed. At war's end, the provisions of the Second Vienna Award were annulled: Transylvania was reunited under Romanian rule. Furthermore, the whole region, with its myriad problems, became a part of the Soviet sphere of interest. The arrival of communism didn't improve the prospects of Transylvania's minorities. The maintenance of national or ethnic identity was not a priority according to communist ideology. At the same time, the new communist state began to deal with nationality problems with little understanding but strident determination. Especially threatening was the attitude of Romania's communists toward private property. As has been pointed out above, land ownership had been the financial underpinning of Transylvania's minority Churches and their schools.

The total expropriation of these assets meant that the Romanian state gained a complete monopoly over all aspects of education and could promote the interest of the country's majority without any restrictions. Romania's socialist transformation had negative effects on the whole Romanian population, but the country's majority disadvantaged less than its minorities.

Post-World War II Demographics

Obtaining reliable data on the demographic evolution of Transylvania's minority populations in the period surveyed in this study is made difficult by the fact that during Romania's age of communism statistics were manipulated

with impunity. Even the terminology used to determine the inhabitants' minority status kept changing. The term "minorities" first became "nationalities" then "citizens of the homeland," and finally in the case of Hungarians, "Rumanians of the Hungarian nationality." The manipulation of the data reinforced certain natural tendencies such as the high birth-rates among the country's Romanian population. Not surprisingly under the circumstances, the demographic data reveal the ever increasing predominance of the Romanian population in Transylvania, and the corresponding relative and sometimes absolute decline of the minorities.

Especially remarkable is the decline of Transylvania's Jewish population. In 1930 3.2 percent of the region's inhabitants declared themselves to be Jewish, while in 1977 only 0.1 percent did. The Holocaust during World War II and the post-war mass emigration of Jews meant that this minority had virtually disappeared from Transylvania despite the fact that, from the middle of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th, this ethnic/religious group had played a influential role in the region's cultural and economic evolution. This development had a serious impact on Transylvania's Hungarian minority as the Jews, especially the intelligentsia, had often made substantial contributions to Hungarian community and cultural advancement.

From the point of view of the Hungarian minority, the Romanian authorities' manipulation of demographic data regarding Transylvania's Gypsies was also disadvantageous. Romania's Gypsy population has always been one of the largest in Europe, numbering over a million. Despite this, Romania's communist governments, taking advantage of the Gypsies' ambiguous cultural status, often determined their numbers ridiculously low, in 1966 at 49,000 for example. In most cases Gypsies were listed as Rumanians, even those who lived in Hungarian communities and considered themselves Hungarian Gypsies.

Very dramatic was the decline of Transylvania's German minority. In 1930 this ethnic group numbered 544,000. By 1966 its numbers had declined to 372,000. This largest of German communities in Eastern Europe experienced a further drastic decline following a deal between Romania's Ceaușescu's regime and West Germany, as a consequence of which, by the end of the 1980s, Transylvania's German minority had declined to under 200,000.¹⁷

The decline, more precisely the relative decline of the Hungarian minority was continuous throughout these decades, though it was not nearly as dramatic as that of the German. In 1930 there were 1,353,000 Hungarians in Transylvania, making up 24.4 percent of the region's total population. In 1966 this number had grown to 1,597,000 and in 1977 to 1,651,000, but these

numbers represented only 23.8 percent and 22 percent of the total population respectively. Other unfavourable tendencies were also apparent. In regions of formerly mixed (Romanian-German-Hungarian or Romanian-Hungarian-German) populations, Hungarians began to assimilate to the Romanian majority. The emigration of Germans also had a negative consequence. They were replaced mainly by Romanian immigrants from southern Romania (the former Wallachia) — people who had no experience in co-existing with people of other ethnicities. Similar trend prevailed in Transylvania's cities. The influx into such urban centres of masses of Romanian and other non-Hungarian workers inevitably altered their ethnic makeup. Even cities that had been traditionally Hungarian lost their Magyar character in the course of a few decades. Cities such as Arad (Arad), Brassó (Braşov), Kolozsvár (Cluj), Nagybánya (Baia-Mare), Nagyvárad (Oradea), Szatmárnémeti (Satu-Mare) Temesvár (Timișoara) and other historic centres lost their Hungarian majority and Hungarian character.

The Post-1945 Political and Legal Situation

Throughout the period surveyed in this study Romania's policies regarding the political activities and legal rights of minorities have been characterized by the increasing limitation of their opportunities and the encouragement of their assimilation to the country's Romanian majority. Occasionally such policies were interrupted by a tactical retreat in the quest for assimilation, only to be followed by renewed efforts in this direction.

Such tactical retreats were often caused by internal and/or external political considerations. In the elections of November 1946, for example, the Communists in Romania needed the support of the Hungarian People's League (Magyar Népi Szövetség, hereafter HPL). Until the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty of February 1947, the government in Bucharest was anxious to prove its “accommodating” attitude towards the minorities, mainly to make sure that the peacemakers would legalize the restoration of Romania's pre-1940 western borders. Later concessions made to the minorities were proclaimed not “rights” but “privileges” and gradually many of them were withdrawn.

In a similar manner, some concessions were made by the Ceaușescu regime in the spring of 1968 when it feared Soviet intervention and needed the support of all of the country's peoples. As communist Romania became more and more isolated within the Soviet empire, it avoided the political thaw that was experienced by some of the Soviet satellites. In an increasingly

totalitarian atmosphere there were fewer and fewer occasions when the regime tried to solve the country's problems through the building of consensus as opposed to dictatorial decrees.

During Romania's evolution since the end of World War II, for Transylvania's Hungarian minority a memorable period was the time of the leadership of Petru Groza that commenced in March of 1945. Many Hungarians look back on this early post-war era with some nostalgia. First of all, Groza, a Transylvanian by birth and upbringing, spoke fluent Hungarian. His government made many concessions to the region's minorities. This was the time of the restoration of many of Transylvania's minority theatres. The small Turkish and Tatar minorities received their own schools, for the first time in their evolution. It was in this period that the Hungarian university of Kolozsvár (Cluj) reopened, and the Hungarian-speaking Csángós of Moldavia received their own schools.¹⁸ Unfortunately for the Hungarians, these concessions proved ephemeral.

We may ask the question whether there is real ground for a positive assessment the Groza government's deeds. Indeed, the above-mentioned concessions certainly indicate some empathy with the minorities, empathy that has been usually lacking in Romanian policy throughout the decades. But we have to keep in mind the other developments that had taken place in this period that had a negative impact on the Hungarian community. During the late 1940s and the early 1950s there had been a purge conducted by the government in the ranks of the HPL, as well as among Hungarian intellectuals and educators. It was in this period that numerous community leaders were imprisoned, among them Edgar Balogh, Márton Áron, Kurkó Gyárfás, József Meliusz, Ede Korparics, Lajos Csörgör, Lajos Jordáky and János Demeter. This was the beginning of the abolition of the independent Hungarian economic institutions and the disruption of the Hungarian co-operatives. The forced Romanization of Transylvania's Hungarian cities also accelerated. The edict of 9 May, 1947, restricted the right of Transylvania's inhabitants to change the place of their habitation, a restriction was abolished only in 1989 with the fall of the Ceaușescu regime. Communication with Hungary was made more and more difficult. For travel abroad special permits became compulsory and the number of border-crossing points was drastically reduced.

These measures had a very negative impact on Hungarians. To be fair, however, it is important to note that the developments of the 1950s afflicted all inhabitants of Romania regardless of nationality. The nationalization of private enterprises, the arbitrary arrests, the fear of imprisonment did impact every citizen of the country. For Hungarians however, these losses came on

top of those suffered between the two world wars, and the new hardships had more serious consequences.

The establishment of the Maros Hungarian Autonomous Area can be deemed to have been a continuation of the Groza government's policy of pretending accommodation with the country's minorities. The events of the 1980s suggest that this indeed had also been an empty gesture. In fact, it can be argued that this development had a negative effect on Transylvania's Hungarian community. First of all, it coincided with what might be called the "decapitation" of the region's Hungarian intelligentsia. No Magyar intellectual critical of the regime was safe from imprisonment, whether he or she was a liberal, a social-democrat or a communist. The establishment of the "autonomous region" gave the government an excuse to abolish the HPL. The regime argued that where such "enlightened concessions" had been made to the minorities, there was no need for an organization to speak on their behalf.

The creation of the "autonomous region" also served as the starting point of the isolation or ghettoization of Transylvania's Székely region. The region's existence gave an excuse to Romanian authorities to transfer here certain educational institutions from such cities as Kolozsvár (Cluj) thereby reducing the chances of Hungarian culture maintenance in those mainly mixed-population cities. Certain rights that the Hungarian minority had enjoyed (such as the right to bilingual traffic signs, and the right to public services in Magyar) outside of the region were also abandoned with the excuse that these rights or services existed in the autonomous region. These losses were not counterbalanced by any advantages, since as far as administrative self-government was concerned, the autonomous region had no more autonomy than any other local jurisdiction in the country.

The 1956 anti-Soviet uprising in Hungary was deemed an extremely dangerous development by Romania's authorities. The political thaw that preceded the revolution had certain reverberations in Transylvania especially among the Hungarian intellectuals who hoped that a similar thaw might come to Romania. The authorities in Bucharest took steps to intimidate the openly defiant intelligentsia of Kolozsvár (Cluj). The large party delegation that appeared in the city in August, found such a defiant atmosphere that it felt best to offer some concessions, including the launching of two new Hungarian papers the *Korunk* (Our Age) and *Napsugár* (the Sun's Ray).

The suppression of the revolution in Hungary was followed by reprisals against Hungarians in Rumania as well. No exact statistics exist regarding the proportions of the retributions, but anecdotal evidence suggests that thousands and even perhaps tens of thousands were persecuted. Taking advantage of the anti-Hungarian sentiments in the communist party and the

country, the authorities abolished many of the Hungarians' existing rights. In the country's communist party the new view was that the previous “lenient” policies toward the Hungarian minority had been mistaken and the toleration of Hungarian schools had been a mistake.

In the 1960s the processes of de-Stalinization and economic decentralization became more marked in some of Eastern Europe's Soviet satellites. Romania's Hungarian intelligentsia kept hoping that the same might happen in their country too. In particular, they expected the government of Nicolae Ceaușescu, which had just replaced that of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, to embrace the idea of de-Stalinization and abandon the ultra-nationalistic minority policies of its predecessor. Ceaușescu's first pronouncements quickly dashed these expectations. The new leader promised change and a new ideology but his statements offered no ground for hope on the part of Romania's minorities. Indeed it was under the new leader that the concept of the socialist national state became prevalent. Already in these early speeches Ceaușescu proclaimed that the problem of the minorities in Romania had been solved implying that the process of the Romanization of Romania's nationalities had been completed.

Of course in Bucharest the “project” of the assimilation of the nationalities was not considered completed. In the records of the Communist Party of Romania the idea of the “homogenization” of the country's population crops up repeatedly. In this process there were only temporary, tactical retreats in the process, the ultimate goal remained the same.

In the increasingly dictatorial times of the 1980s, Ceaușescu, who now called himself Romania's “Conducator”, didn't even make any tactical retreats any more. Under him began a campaign of hate mongering against Hungarians.¹⁹ This came on top of increasing economic disorder and a worsening of food distribution in the country. In the media, the crisis was blamed on the Hungarians. Soon they became seen as a threat to Romania's unity. These accusations allowed the problem of the minorities to become a problem for the country's security and police agencies, in particular for the much-feared Securitate.

The prime target of the new anti-Hungarian campaign became the minority schools. This was the time that the process of the “relocation” of Hungarian intellectuals. Hungarian educators (as well as members of the professions) were assigned jobs in non-Hungarian communities outside of Transylvania, while Rumanians were offered positions in Hungarian communities. These measures resulted in the dramatic decline of Hungarian-language education and the complete eradication of Hungarian secondary schools — and, within secondary schools, of courses offered in Hungarian. In

certain parts of Transylvania, such as Mezőség and the Bánát, by the mid-1980s all Hungarian secondary schools had been closed. In the predominantly Magyar-speaking counties of Hargita (Harghita) and Kovászna (Covasna), students found it nearly impossible to get a secondary education in Hungarian. What courses remained offered in Hungarian were often assigned Rumanian-speaking teachers making minority-language instruction impossible.

During the second half of the 1980s Bucharest became more and more intolerant in its dealings with the Hungarian intelligentsia. After all, a minority deprived of its educated leaders became much weaker and could offer far less resistance to the authorities. All this was done under the direction of the communist party leadership in Bucharest. The number of Hungarian students allowed to proceed to Romania's colleges and universities was increasingly curtailed. At the same time, many of Transylvania's Hungarian intellectuals were offered exit-visas and were blatantly admonished to emigrate to Hungary.²⁰

As a symbolic part of these processes, the name of the National Council of Hungarian Workers (Magyar Dolgozók Országos Tanácsa) was changed to the Council of Workers of Hungarian Nationality (Magyar Nemzetiségű Dolgozók Tanácsa).

To the planned elimination of the Hungarian presence and future in Transylvania came the diabolical plan for the destruction of the Hungarian past. The government talked of the need for agricultural reform, of the need for an increase in the acreage cultivated, about industrialization and the systematization of settlements, but the actual aim was the destruction of non-Romanian villages, all in the name of progress. Members of minorities moved out of their villages, settled among people of other ethnicities in the newly-established, large agro-settlements, would have had no chance of hanging on to their ancestral cultures. With the elimination of the traditional village network came the abandonment of cemeteries and the destruction of monuments reminding people of their ancestral culture. Romania's "Conducator" could not complete the last of his plans for the total Romanization of Romania. It was not international protest against his ideas that stopped him but the revolutionary process that began in East Central Europe in 1989. It spread to Bucharest and swept Ceaușescu from power.

Conclusions

In summing up the fate of Romania's Hungarians in the twentieth century, let me make a few observations with the unavoidable bias of my own experi-

ences. Transylvania used to be the most beautiful and brightest pearl of the Hungarian Crown. This phrase does not simply represent the great power pretensions of some Hungary's past governments as Transylvania has a special place in the hearts of Hungarians even today. One explanation is the fact that, during the times of the Ottoman occupation of much of Hungary, Transylvania was basically independent and assumed the role of the guardian of Hungarian culture and even of the concept of a continuing Hungarian state. We should also keep in mind that many of Hungary's leading intellectuals, scientists and politicians hailed from Transylvania. Many elements and components of Hungarian culture, in particular of literature, are also of Transylvanian origin.

What is the situation today? The Hungarian factor in Transylvania has for all intents and purposes been restricted to the land of the Székelys. The Hungarian word is rarely heard in such cities as Nagyszeben (Sibiu), Déva (Deva), Segesvár (Sigishoara) and Brassó (Braşov). At the same time places such as Nagyvárad (Oradea), Bánffyhunyard (Huedin) and Beszterce (Bistriţa) have also become romanized. The vast number of monuments commemorating the Hungarian reformation, the last battered towers of the depopulated villages of the Szilágyság and Mezőség in the Transylvanian Basin, are only dilapidated ruins.

The Hungarian community in Transylvania had suffered great losses in the last decades of the twentieth century. Apart from the attacks on the intelligentsia and the mass emigration, one sore spot is the fact that the generations Hungarians who had grown up in Transylvania's Romanian age, keep getting closer and closer in mentality to that prevailing in Bucharest since — being Romanian citizens — this is the only way for them to become equal partners — or adversaries — of the members of the country's majority.

Is this really the destiny of Transylvania's Hungarians? Despite the sad facts, we may safely state that it is not. The Hungarian community of nearly two million will stay a mass that is too big to assimilate, even if the potential partners in minority existence, such as the Germans and the Jews have virtually disappeared from the nationality map of Romania. The events in December, 1989 opened up new opportunities for Transylvania's Hungarians, despite their contradictions. The restoration of private property offers the prospect of the Hungarian Churches regaining at least some of the assets they had owned during the interwar years. The re-establishment of the cultural, academic and communal institutions of the pre-communist era has also started. Contacts with Hungary have also improved. Many predominantly Hungarian-speaking villages have been paired with communities in Hungary which has helped them culturally and even in the realm of economics.

The prospects of Transylvania's minorities are further improved by the fact that international public opinion nowadays has a greater influence on policy-making in Romania. In Bucharest there is an increased understanding that continued good relations with the members of the European union is predicated on Romania's acceptance of European norms and values. Nevertheless, a marked decline of strident nationalism in the country, and a rapprochement between Hungary and Romania on the pattern of Franco-German friendship in recent times, is still far in the future.

In the struggle of Transylvania's Hungarian minority for cultural survival, Hungary once again can play a role. Alas, the much desired cooperation between Budapest and Bucharest is still plagued by old suspicions and attitudes. In dealing with the Romania however, Hungary might be able to use her somewhat greater economic prosperity and closer links to Europe to her — and the Hungarian minority's — advantage.

NOTES

Since this paper was written primarily for Hungarian audiences it uses Hungarian place names. Their closest Romanian equivalents, where such exist, are given in parentheses. County names are often only approximate as county boundaries have changed a few times since 1919. In accordance with general usage nowadays, the term “Transylvania” in this paper refers to the area of the historic Kingdom of Hungary annexed to Romania after World War I. An earlier version of this study was read at the conference “Hungary Through the Centuries: A Millennial Retrospection” held at the University of Toronto in September of 2000.

¹ András Rónai, *Erdély népességi viszonyai* [Population circumstances of Transylvania], based on the 1910 census of the lands of the Hungarian Holy Crown (Budapest: Magyar Királyi Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1920).

² István Sulyok and László Fritz, eds., *Erdélyi magyar évkönyv, 1918-1929* [Hungarian Annual Review of Transylvania, 1918-1929] (Kolozsvár, 1930).

³ Alajos Kovács, “Erdély népmozgalma vallásfelekezetek szerint az 1921-27. években” [Population Migrations in Transylvania According to Religious Affiliation in 1921-27], *Magyar Statisztikai Szemle* 7, 11 (1929).

⁴ On December 1, 1918, delegates of the Rumanians of Transylvania, the Bánát and Hungary, gathered at Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia) and proclaimed the union of Transylvania with the Kingdom of Rumania. On December 24 this union was put into effect by a royal proclamation issued by King Ferdinand of Rumania, signifying the birth of Greater Rumania.

⁵ Lajos Nagy, *A kisebbségek alkotmányjogi helyzete Nagyomániában* [The legal situation of the minorities in Greater Romania according to the constitution] (Kolozsvár: Erdélyi Tudományos Intézet, 1944), 78.

⁶ In the period from 30 October 1918 to 30 June 1924 alone, the number of Hungarians who left the country approached 200,000. Sulyok and Fritz, *Erdélyi magyar évkönyv*, p. 2.

⁷ Nagy, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

⁸ Table no. 28, "A magyar egyházak földbirtok vagyona..." [The landholding of Hungarian Churches...] in *A román agrárreform és az erdélyi magyar egyházak* [Rumania's Agrarian Reform and the Hungarian Churches] ed. Zoltán Darkó, vol. 1 (Nagyvárad, 1927), p. 912.

⁹ Sulyok and Fritz, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

¹⁰ Árpád Kiss, "Az állami magyar tannyelvű elemi iskolák és a magyar tagozatok" [The Hungarian-Language State Elementary Schools and School Divisions], *Magyar kisebbség* (1936): 205.

¹¹ Nagy, p. 140.

¹² Artur Balogh, *A kisebbségek nemzetközi védelme* [The International Protection of Minorities] (Berlin, 1928), 159.

¹³ Kiss, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ Official enrolment decreased from 75,037 to 57,473 in the matter of a few years.

¹⁵ "...being a religion of the overwhelming majority of Romanians, the Orthodox Church is the ruling church in the state of Romania; the Greek Catholic Church is preferred to other confessions." Nagy, p. 229. See also the text of the Constitution, paragraph 19.

¹⁶ Imre Mikó, *Huszonkét év. Az erdélyi magyarság története 1918 december 1-jétől 1940 augusztus 30-ig* [Twenty-two years. The history of the Hungarians of Transylvania from 1 Dec. 1918 to 30 Aug. 1940] (Budapest: Studium, 1941), 77-78.

¹⁷ As a condition of this agreement the Bonn government paid Bucharest a large sum for every German who was allowed to emigrate to West Germany.

¹⁸ [Editor's note:] For a report on the Csángós in the popular media see Frank Viviano, "In the Shadow of Attila," *National Geographic* (June 2005): 67-83; http://www.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0506/gights_n_sounds/index.html

¹⁹ [Editor's note:] On this subject see Moses M. Nagy, "Emile M. Cioran Looks at Rumanians and Hungarians: Characterization or Caricature?" *Hungarian Studies Review*, 19, (1992): 69-75.

²⁰ Among them Zoltán Kallós, a researcher of folk-music.

Transylvania in International Power Politics during World War II

Nándor Dreisziger

...in the Transylvanian question...
[Hitler] held the most perfect instrument... of blackmail.

Alexandre Cretzianu

From earliest times, the land known today as Transylvania has been coveted by various nations and empires and has often been the object of diplomatic wrangling or the scene of wars of conquest. What made the region attractive to both masses of migrants and conquering armies have been its central location in the heartland of Eastern Europe and its fertile land complete with abundant resources. The years of the Second World War were no exception to this time-honoured tradition of keen competition for, and conflict over, Transylvania.

From September of 1939 to the war's end, the struggle for Transylvania continued, intensified if we consider the fact that during the interwar years the governments of neighbouring lands conspired to gain (or retain, as the case might be) control over Transylvania. This paper will point out that, in this struggle, at first two of Eastern Europe's small nations, Romania and Hungary, played influential roles; however, as the war progressed, increasing interest was displayed and influence was exercised by certain Great Powers, especially the Third Reich. In the end, the deliberations over Transylvania's fate were concentrated in the hands of the powers that emerged victorious in the war, and the final settlement of the "Transylvanian question" was imposed by the country that achieved preponderant influence in Eastern Europe at war's end: the Soviet Union.

Some eighteen-and-a-half centuries before the occupation of Transylvania by the Red Army in the fall of 1944, the Roman Empire — the superpower of the early Christian Era — conquered this land and held it for over 150 years. Barbarian incursions into the Empire later prompted the Romans to abandon most of their frontier provinces: Dacia was evacuated in

271 a.d. In the centuries that followed this land served as home to a succession of nomadic and semi-nomadic nations, including (in rough chronological order) the Goths, the Huns, the Gepids, the Avars, the Bulgars, and proto-Magyar tribes. After the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin late in the ninth century, Magyar control was gradually extended over Transylvania. Incursions by nomadic peoples from the east — first by the Pechenegs and the Cumans and then, in the thirteenth century, by the Mongols — usually proved quite destructive, but did not lead to lasting occupations.

More important than these military incursions was the immigration of new ethnic groups during the Middle Ages. Beginning with the early years of the eleventh century, Hungary's kings encouraged the transmigration of the proto-Magyar Székelys from other frontier areas of the Carpathian Basin to southeastern Transylvania where they were expected to serve as guardians of the Kingdom of Hungary against attacks by nomadic tribes. To strengthen the defences of southern Transylvania even further, in the following century German-speaking settlers from the Rhineland and elsewhere were invited to settle there and establish fortified cities that were to serve as defensive outposts as well as centres of commerce and industry. In time, the Hungarians, Székelys, and Germans (Saxons) of Transylvania would constitute the three founding nations of the land, and established a kind of a political condominium there while maintaining varying degrees of autonomy within the Kingdom of Hungary. Later immigrants to the land, Vlach tribesmen from the Balkans — the predecessors of modern-day Romanians — failed to achieve such a privileged status and became a major factor in the political affairs of Transylvania only in the modern era. In the meantime, from the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth centuries, the region witnessed the competition of the two dominant empires of the day for influence: the Ottoman Turkish and the Habsburg. In this struggle the princes of Transylvania often managed to play one side against the other with considerable success until the decline of Ottoman influence in East Central Europe led to the establishment of Viennese rule over the whole of Hungary, including Transylvania, which the Habsburgs administered as a separate province of their empire.

The Hungarian nation emerged from Habsburg domination briefly in 1848-49, and more effectively in 1867 as a result of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise.¹ From 1867 to the end of World War I, Transylvania became an integral part of Hungary and was ruled directly from Budapest. By this time, however, significant demographic shifts had taken place in the region as the Romanians had become the most populous ethnic group.² In the meantime, to the south, Romania shook off the increasingly feeble tutelage of

the Ottoman Empire and emerged as an independent nation. The stage became set for the growth of Romanian separatism in Transylvania which would reach its zenith during World War I.

From the First World War to the Second

The keen struggle for Transylvania during the Second World War can only be explained by developments that had taken place during and immediately after the First World War. As is commonly known, for some time during this conflict Romania remained neutral. Both the Central Powers and the Allies — and, especially, Russia — hoped to attract Romania to their side of the war, but it was the Allies who were in a better position to offer inducements to the government in Bucharest. In fact they made a secret offer to Romania of Transylvania, on the condition that the country join the alliance against the Central Powers. The Romanians, encouraged at first by the successes of the Russians against the German and Austro-Hungarian forces in the so-called Brusilov offensive, committed themselves, and a few weeks later, in late August 1916, declared war on Austria-Hungary and began the invasion of Transylvania. By then the Brusilov offensive had spent its fury and hastily assembled German and Austro-Hungarian forces defeated the invading Romanian armies and, within a few months, they occupied much of Romania.

The collapse of the Central Powers in the fall of 1918 gave a new opportunity to Romania to attack, which she did — a few days before the war end. This time the Romanian armies were successful. They occupied Transylvania and, for a brief period of time in 1919, most of Hungary. In the Treaty of Trianon between the victorious Allies and Hungary of June, 1920, the peacemakers awarded Transylvania to Romania, along with large portions of the Hungarian Great Plain. In fact, more formerly Hungarian land was given to Romania than was left to truncated Hungary. Transferred with these lands were about 1,700,000 ethnic Hungarians.³

Of all the territorial losses the Kingdom of Hungary suffered in the wake of World War I, it was the severing of Transylvania that left the deepest wound on the Magyar psyche. The lands awarded to Romania constituted the largest of the dismembered chunks of the ancient Kingdom of Hungary, and they served as the homeland for the largest number of ethnic Hungarians with the exception of the area left to Hungary herself. Though Romanians constituted the most populous ethnic group (they made up close to 54 percent of the total) in the transferred territories, many counties and some cities were

populated predominantly by Magyar-speaking residents (while a few other centres had German majorities).⁴ Furthermore, Hungarians both in Transylvania and elsewhere generally considered that land to be the cradle of the modern Hungarian nation. Indeed, during the centuries when central Hungary was under Turkish occupation, and North-western Hungary was ruled by Vienna, Hungarian culture — and, at times, even political influence — thrived only in Transylvania. But there was more to the interwar Hungarian preoccupation with the loss of Transylvania than such sentiments. During this period many of truncated Hungary's leaders were of Transylvanian stock. The two most prominent were Count István Bethlen and Count Pál Teleki. The former served as Hungary's Prime Minister from 1921 to 1931 and remained an “elder statesman” thereafter. The latter was Prime Minister just before Bethlen, and again from 1939 to 1941. Both of them were convinced that the loss of Transylvania dealt a mortal blow to Hungary's strategic interests and constituted a grave threat to the survival of Magyar culture in Transylvania itself.⁵

It should not be surprising under the circumstances that Hungary's foremost foreign policy aim during the interwar years and early war years was the revision of the territorial settlement imposed in 1920, in particular the regaining of much if not all of Transylvania. Until 1938 this aspiration was frustrated by the existence of the Little Entente — a political and military alliance of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, backed most persistently by the French — that was designed to frustrate Hungarian ambitions. The disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the onset of war in Europe, however, made conditions increasingly ripe for attempts to re-draw the map of Eastern Europe.

While Hungarians were eager to undo the post-war territorial settlement, Romanians were determined to hold on to what they had gained. They had convinced themselves that Transylvania was rightfully theirs not only because of the fact that they constituted the largest ethnic group there, but because of the historical legitimacy of their claim. According to one school of Romanian historiography — one which had gained wide popular acceptance among Romanians — Transylvania had been Romanian ever since the days of Roman Dacia. Accordingly, Hungarians were only “latecomers” there and the Treaty of Trianon only ended a long “foreign domination” of the land. Furthermore, that treaty did not satisfy all Romanian aspirations as it did not award to Romania the boundary promised by the Allies in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1916, nor did it restore all the lands to greater Romania that Roman Dacia was supposed to have had. While not all Romanians were ready to press even greater territorial demands against Hungary, they were

steadfast in their belief that what they had gained, was rightfully theirs. An indication of this attitude is the reaction of the masses in Bucharest to the news of the Second Vienna Award that in 1940 returned part of Transylvania to Hungary. According to some reports, it was not uncommon to see people cry in the streets, while others (or the very same people) called on Romania's leaders to defy, by force of arms if necessary, the German-Italian decision.⁶ There was even another parallel between the situation in Hungary and that in Romania. While in the former (as has been pointed out above) men of Transylvanian birth had at times come to dominate the government, in Romania the same happened though less frequently. After the end of World War I, former Romanian-Transylvanian politicians, such as Julius Maniu and Alexander Vaida-Voevod, gained prominence in Bucharest politics — the former was prime minister twice, in late 1918 and again from 1928 to 1930, and the latter was government leader in 1932-33. Both of them were ardent believers in a Romanian Transylvania. Nothing illustrates better the irreconcilability of the Hungarian and Romanian positions regarding Transylvania than the slogans that were popular at the time in the two countries. In Hungary, the cry was "*Mindent vissza!*" ([we want] everything back), while in Romania the national slogan was "*Nic'un brazda!*" ([we yield] not one furrow).⁷

The international developments of the second half of 1938, of 1939, and the first half of 1940, made many Hungarian leaders confident that the long-awaited opportunity to regain some or all of Transylvania would soon present itself. They had good reasons to think so. After the summer of 1938 Romania's international position kept deteriorating. The so-called Bled Accords with Hungary and, especially, the Munich settlement between Czechoslovakia and Germany, emasculated the Little Entente. Romania's diplomatic position further deteriorated in the late summer of the following year. At the time, Bucharest was aligned with Britain and France, but the sudden rapprochement between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia at the end of August and, especially, the occupation of Poland by these two powers in September, greatly weakened Romania's strategic situation. The country's predicament was further exacerbated by the fact that Hungary was not the only country eager to press territorial demands against it. In the wake of the Great War, Romania had gained lands not only from Hungary but also from Bulgaria and Russia. The Bulgarian claim to Dobruja probably did not alarm Bucharest unduly, but much more threatening was the desire of the Soviet Union to regain Bessarabia. Furthermore, Romania was also a possible target for an attack from still another quarter: Germany. The Ploesti oil-fields were one of the most important sources of energy in Europe, and Hitler could not

afford to allow them to fall into hostile hands. Against these dangers the Romanians had few defences. France and Britain were hardly in a position to offer serious help. Although they had issued a guarantee to Romania in the spring of 1939, but as German influence throughout Central Europe grew, this commitment gradually lost its credibility.

Wartime Hungarian Plans

Bucharest's increasing difficulties gave rise to various plans in Budapest to solve the "Transylvanian question" in a manner satisfactory to Hungary's interests. How differently Hungary's civilian and military leaders approached this issue is illustrated by the plans that were advanced by ex-Premier Count István Bethlen and Chief-of-the-General Staff, Henrik Werth. The scheme of the former — outlined in a long, secret memorandum to the government — started with the premise that Germany would lose the war against the West European democracies. Accordingly, Bethlen argued, Hungary should remain neutral in the European struggle and preserve her strength for the attainment of her national aims at the end of the war. Bethlen hoped that by participating in some kind of a security arrangement for post-war Europe, and by not annexing Transylvania but allowing it to become an autonomous member of a loose East European federation, Hungary could obtain Western diplomatic support for her plans.⁸ General Werth's plans for Transylvania were quite different. The Chief-of-Staff was not willing to wait until the outcome of the war was settled. When the Russian threat against Romania surfaced in the winter of 1939-40, Werth urged his government to prepare for the recovery of Transylvania by force should an armed conflict develop between Moscow and Bucharest.⁹

In April of 1940 Werth approached Regent Miklós Horthy and the government with a memorandum. The Chief-of-Staff began by asserting that Germany would more than likely emerge victorious in the war. Werth, who had just held discussions with members of the German General Staff, informed his civilian superiors that the Germans had offered their co-operation against Romania. But simple military co-operation was not sufficient according to Werth. Hungary had to abandon her neutrality and become an ally of Berlin so that she could regain the lands she had lost in the wake of World War I. Knowing that certain members of his audience were not convinced of Germany's invincibility, Werth added that even if Germany did not win the war, Hungary could retain her conquests because at the end of an

exhausting struggle the Allied Powers would be “too weak to send large forces in the Danube Valley.”¹⁰

The approach that the Hungarian leadership after some delay adopted towards the question of Transylvania differed from that advocated by Werth. Teleki was repelled by the idea of abandoning the country's neutrality. Unlike Werth, he was doubtful about the prospects of a German victory. He felt that the superiority of moral strength and physical resources was on the Allied side. In a letter to Horthy, he rejected the Chief-of-Staff's proposals and accused him of not seeing the problem of Hungary's interests from the point of view of a Hungarian (Werth was an ethnic German). Teleki also asked Horthy to see to it that soldiers did not meddle in politics.¹¹

Although Teleki rejected Werth's plan of regaining Transylvania with German military help, he did not give up hope of attaining a revision of his country's eastern boundaries through other means. The opportunity seemed to have presented itself in the summer of 1940. At the time Hitler was still hoping to force Britain to her knees and thereby ending the war in Western Europe. To do this Hitler needed peace elsewhere in Europe, especially in the south-east, from where came many of the foodstuffs, fuel and raw materials needed by the German war machine. In the meantime, the Russians had decided to act. At the end of June they confronted Romania with an ultimatum demanding the return of Bessarabia. The Soviet move caused hectic activity in Hungary.¹² The *honvéd* was mobilised and frantic efforts were made to ascertain Rome's and Berlin's attitudes to a Hungarian occupation of Transylvania in case of a Russo-Romanian conflict. But that conflict never came about. Romania surrendered Bessarabia without a fight. And from Berlin came word that Germany would be most unhappy about any disruption of peace in Eastern Europe.¹³

Even though the best opportunity for regaining Transylvania was now gone, the Hungarians continued their threatening attitude towards Romania, demanding at the same time that the dispute be submitted to a conference attended by the statesmen of Germany, Italy, Hungary and Romania. Teleki's aim was evident: threatened by a Hungarian-Romanian conflict at the time when Germany's interest demanded peace in Eastern Europe, the Axis powers would be forced to support the Hungarian claims in any negotiations on the issue. But, for the time being, Hitler did not wish to act as a mediator in a territorial dispute between Hungary and Romania. At a meeting of the German, Italian and Hungarian leaders in Munich during mid-July, he rejected the idea of a four-power conference and told the Hungarians to negotiate with the Romanians on a bilateral basis.¹⁴

In order to counter the threats to his country, Romania's King Carol took steps to improve his country's international position. In the spring of 1939, after the German occupation of Prague and Hungary's re-annexation of Ruthenia, King Carol mobilized Romania's army and, to imbue his people with a spirit of resistance, proclaimed the above-mentioned slogan "not one furrow" — referring to Hungarian aspirations regarding Transylvania. It was at this time that Bucharest accepted an Anglo-French guarantee, but balanced it with an economic agreement with Germany which, in the words of one historian, "assured a dominant position for Germany in the Romanian economy."¹⁵ While King Carol had realized the need to appease the Germans already in 1939, most of his subjects did not do so until the fall of Paris to the *Wehrmacht* in June of 1940. This development caused disappointment and a great deal of soul-searching in Bucharest. Its lessons were not lost on King Carol and his advisers. Soon, Romania renounced the Anglo-French guarantee. Next, the government sought a rapprochement with the extreme rightist Iron Guard, against which it had just carried out a bloody persecution campaign in the wake of the assassination of the country's Prime Minister by Gardist fanatics. At the same time, more right-wing politicians were co-opted into the country's leadership and, anti-Semitic laws were introduced with conspicuous references to the example shown by Nazi Germany.¹⁶

As could be expected under the circumstances, the Hungarian-Romanian discussions, mandated by Hitler in July, achieved nothing.¹⁷ There was no real reason for Bucharest to make substantial concessions: by this time Romania had acquired a new friend in Germany. The Hungarians could do no more than continue their threats against Romania and hope that Hitler, for the sake of peace in south-eastern Europe, would intervene in the dispute. They did not have to wait long. In August the *Führer* decided, for reasons that will be explained below, to settle the question of Hungarian-Romanian relations. This was almost what the Hungarians desired, but they wanted Hitler to act as a mediator in the dispute and not as an arbiter. They did not want to see another Vienna Award announced in which Germany and Italy imposed a settlement favourable mainly to German interests. If everything else failed, Teleki was prepared to accept arbitration, but he wanted the Romanians to ask for it: if Bucharest called for arbitral award, Budapest could insist on certain preconditions. Moreover, if the revision of the boundaries came about through arbitration requested by Romania, the settlement would have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the West, and Hungary would have a better chance to retain the territories gained at the end of the war, even in case of an Axis defeat.

This was Teleki's plan. Its essential feature was to threaten war in south-eastern Europe and compel the Romanians to request Hitler's diplomatic intervention. But in this plan Teleki was double-crossed. At the critical moment, Werth informed the Germans that, as a final measure, Hungary was willing to accept arbitration rather than go to war.¹⁹ After such a disclosure, it was not difficult for Berlin to call Teleki's bluff. In the end the fate of Transylvania was settled by another German-Italian dictum, one which transferred northern Transylvania and the "*Székelyföld*" (easternmost Transylvania) to Hungary.²⁰ The new territorial arrangement, as well as the manner it was imposed, left both sides bitterly dissatisfied.²¹

The events of the summer of 1940 amply demonstrated the fact that the ambitions and feelings of Hungarians and Romanians regarding Transylvania mattered little. What tended to determine the course of events in Eastern Europe at the time were the plans and machinations of the two great powers in the area, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Accordingly, our attention might well turn to an examination of these two states' approach to the "Transylvanian question" during the war.

Soviet Intentions

At the time of the outbreak of World War II neither the Third *Reich* nor the USSR had direct ambitions concerning Transylvania. Both of them, however, had indirect interests in the region that began surfacing in the winter of 1939-40, and became quite obvious in the months thereafter. These interests stemmed from the fact that both dictatorships had concerns about and ambitions in areas abutting Transylvania, especially in certain other regions of Romania.

Russia's designs on Bessarabia have been noted. The region had been assigned to the USSR's sphere of influence in the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact of August of 1939. Throughout the winter and the spring following, Soviet spokesmen made no secret of their government's interests in the region. Soviet motives for expanding to the southeast have been the subject of controversy and have been interpreted in widely different ways. According to some, Stalin and his associates were interested only or primarily in forestalling possible German moves in that part of Europe. Others have described Soviet intentions differently. Vojtech Mastny, in his *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, acknowledges that in part the Soviet moves were basically defensive: "Stalin sought to offset the growth of the German domain in the west by expanding his own in the east." Mastny, however, adds that another Soviet motive was Stalin's desire to "extend his

tyranny into neighbouring countries...”²² Another historian, Adam B. Ulam, points to still another Soviet motive. In his view, the Soviet leadership was painfully aware of the fact that in a possible war “the Ukraine was the Achilles' heel of the Soviet Union...” and, a move to detach this fertile and resource-rich land from the USSR “would be facilitated by the existence of sizable pockets of Ukrainians” beyond the Soviet borders. In this respect, “Romania occupied a vital strategic position...”²³ Writing more recently, British authors Anthony Read and David Fisher have stressed that Stalin was so intent on pressing his demands for Bessarabia, and even for Bukovina — which had never been part of Russia, and had not been mentioned in the secret protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact — that he was willing to risk a crisis in German-Soviet relations.²⁴ Stalin's more than purely defensive posturing, in fact his often blatantly expansionist ambitions, are emphasized in a still more recent work, in historian R. C. Raack's *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945*.²⁵

While during the winter of 1939-40 the Soviets satisfied themselves with more-or-less veiled threats against Romania, in the late spring of 1940 they stepped up their preparations. The Red Army began concentrating its divisions along the Romanian frontier and began staging border incidents “at the rate of two or three a week...”²⁶ These preparations, however, did not result in either drastic diplomatic action or a military assault against Romania for the time being. Hitler's successes in the West probably discouraged the Soviet leaders from undertaking the latter. Moscow finally made its move at the end of June, 1940, at the time of Hitler's triumph over France. Bucharest was given an ultimatum to hand over Bessarabia, as well as northern Bukovina. The latter region (as has been mentioned above) had not belonged to the Russian Empire before 1918, but had a large number of Ukrainian inhabitants. The ultimatum was well timed. Romania's traditional ally, France, had just collapsed, and the Hungarians as well as the Bulgarians were also pressing their irredentist claims for the lands they had lost to Romania in the wake of World War I. Under the circumstances, the Romanians were not likely to resist. In fact, it seems that Stalin and his associates had great expectations when they presented their ultimatum. They had hoped that Bucharest would not only surrender the regions in question without resisting, but would then proceed to request a Soviet guarantee of the rest of Romania and thus become client state of Moscow.²⁷ They, however, were to be greatly disappointed. In the summer of 1940 Romania would not become a satellite of Soviet Russia, as the leaders in Bucharest would find a seemingly much more powerful — and, possibly, a more congenial — protector for their country in Nazi Germany.

Hitler and Transylvania

From the summer of 1940 to August of 1944 the country that had the greatest influence over the fate of Transylvania was the Third *Reich*. More precisely, the destiny of this land was in the hands of Nazi leader Adolf Hitler. The *Führer's* interest in Transylvania was a function of his interest in Romania, in Hungarian-Romanian relations, and in his dealings with the Soviet Union. Numerous factors helped to shape Nazi German attitudes to Romania. Some of these resulted from events in the distant past, others were the consequences of more recent developments. Many Germans probably remembered that Romania had entered the First World War on the Allied side, despite the dynastic and other links that it had to the countries of the Central Powers before 1914. Furthermore, post-World War I Romania had been a beneficiary of the despised Versailles system and had been a client state of France (and more recently also of Britain). In contrast, Hungary had fought alongside Germany to the bitter end in 1918, had been a victim of the post-war peace settlement, and had been friendly to the Axis powers ever since the beginning of the Italo-German rapprochement in 1937. There were also Nazi German grievances on account of Romanian domestic affairs. The extreme right-wing and anti-Semitic Iron Guard movement had had a checkered history in King Carol's Romania. What many Nazis probably remembered was the campaigns of persecution that were visited upon Iron Guardists, usually after one of their assassination attempts on the life of a Romanian leader.²⁸ They would also recall the fact that, in November of 1938, Corneliu Codreanu, the leader of this movement, along with 13 of his associates, were shot while in police custody. In comparison, the Hungarian government's occasional persecution of right wing extremists in Hungary must have appeared to Nazi German observers an insignificant and bloodless affair. Hitler and his associates also had a reason to look upon King Carol with derision. Despite his royal (Hohenzollern) background, this playboy king scandalized many by divorcing his queen (the mother of the future King Michael) and living with his Jewish mistress, Helen (Magda) Wolff, alias Madame Lupescu.²⁹

Though these sentiments were in the minds of Hitler and other Nazi leaders at the time, what determined their day-to-day attitudes to Romania and their plans for action there were the immediate political and strategic circumstances of the times. The most important consideration for Hitler was

undoubtedly his concern for the energy requirements of his armed forces, in particular the Nazi war machine's need for Romanian petroleum from the Ploești oil fields north of Bucharest. At the time, Romania was already the Third *Reich's* largest supplier of oil, in contrast to the Soviet Union, which was a distant second.³⁰ Germany, in Hitler's view — and his generals no doubt agreed with him wholeheartedly — could not afford to risk losing this absolutely vital war material. It was for this reason that the Soviet military build-up in Western Ukraine made the German leadership anxious.³¹ As a result, various plans were made by the *Wehrmacht* to occupy Romania or, at least, the Ploești region.³² The plan involved moving troops through Hungary, which did not perturb Hitler's generals as they considered it an easy task — a mere matter of marching.³³ It might be recalled that it was these plans that had prompted General Werth, Hungary's Chief-of-Staff, to request that his government offer an alliance to the Germans.³⁴

In the end, no German attempt was made at the time to pre-empt a possible Soviet move to occupy Romania and her all-important oil fields. One reason for the about-face in German strategic planning was undoubtedly the beginning of Hitler's Western offensive. But even more important might have been the fact that, faced with the Soviet threat, the Romanians began to draw closer and closer to Nazi Germany — quite “swiftly” as some commentators have observed.³⁵ An important step in this process was the start of new negotiations between Berlin and Bucharest during early March, 1940, aimed at the reaching of an agreement which was to provide for the delivery of German arms to Romania in return for additional quantities of oil.³⁶ After considerable delays, a new regime of petroleum deliveries was agreed upon. The Germans even established a line of credit with the Romanians for purchase of increased supplies from the Ploești oil fields.³⁷

Although Hitler seems to have been irked by Soviet machinations against Romania, and would have probably have preferred to curb them, he was reminded by Ribbentrop that Bessarabia had been promised to the Soviets, and that the Pact of 1939 had also proclaimed Germany's “disinterestedness” in that part of Europe.³⁸ Evidently, some concessions had to be made to Stalin. The first of these would be German acquiescence to the Soviet demand for northern Bukovina, and the second would be German pressure — supplemented by similar advice from Rome — on Bucharest to yield to the Soviet ultimatum regarding Bessarabia. The Romanians were told that a part of the price of German friendship would be their compliance with Soviet territorial demands.

The Second Vienna Award

With the Bessarabian question out of the way, the road was cleared for the coming into the limelight of the question of Transylvania. That this was so was made sure by the Hungarians who were convinced that the time had come for settling that issue. As has been outlined above, the Teleki government threatened war, hoping to force Hitler (and Mussolini) to intervene in the dispute and put pressure on the Romanians to yield. While Hitler certainly did not want to see a conflict develop in south-eastern Europe which could threaten the flow of oil and other resources from that region to the *Reich*, he was not willing to become a tool for Hungarian ambitions either. As has been outlined above, he declined the Hungarian request to act as a mediator, and told the two sides to resolve their differences through negotiations. When these failed, Hitler decided to arbitrate. By this time he had found a plan that was to solve his concern over the safety of his Romanian oil supplies: he would attack and destroy the USSR in one massive military campaign in the spring of 1941. To prepare for this great undertaking, he needed peace in south-eastern Europe, and to achieve that peace, he had to see to it that the simmering conflict over Transylvania was extinguished. The Hungarians would receive some of their lost lands back, while the Romanians would have to reconcile themselves to such a loss in return for a German-Italian guarantee of the rest of Romania. Hitler probably suspected that both sides would be unhappy about the outcome of a new Vienna Award, and that it would be followed by both Romania and Hungary aligning their policies even closer with those of the Third *Reich*. What he could not predict, was the degree to which he would be able to exploit the "Transylvanian question" to Germany's advantage in his dealings with Budapest and Bucharest after August of 1940.

The fact that the Second Vienna Award disappointed both the Romanians and the Hungarians could be predicted, that it angered the Soviets as well, might not have been expected by casual observers at the time. "Stalin and Molotov were furious," to use the words of Anthony Read and David Fisher.³⁹ They were displeased both with the way it was arrived at and the provisions it contained. The Germans, with the cooperation of the Italians, had once again re-drawn the map of a part of Eastern Europe and confronted the Soviets with a *fait accompli*. In failing to consult the Soviet government, Berlin violated both the spirit and the terms of the 1939 Pact. Furthermore, the territorial guarantee that Germany and Italy offered to Romania as part of the Award, was seen in Moscow as being aimed directly against the USSR. It is not surprising that the Award's announcement was followed by weeks of recriminations between Moscow and Berlin. Authors Read and Fisher remark

that at this juncture the Transylvanian question caused “very serious strain” in German-Soviet relations, and came “close to destroying the pact [of August, 1939].”⁴⁰

Initially at least, the most disappointed in the Award were the Romanians. No one had prepared them for the magnitude of the coming territorial changes. They had abandoned their Allied orientation quite some time ago and had done everything to please the Germans; accordingly, they did not believe that Berlin would force them to make great concessions to Budapest. For this very reason they had refused to make any such concessions during their discussions with the Hungarians and offered to make only frontier adjustments when they discussed the matter with the Germans.⁴¹ Illustrative of the Romanians' shock at the final territorial settlement was Foreign Minister Manoilescu's fainting when the map of the new Transylvania was unfolded during the Award's announcement in Vienna. At home in Bucharest (as has been mentioned) on hearing the news, people cried in the streets. Massive demonstrations were organized against the Award, and demands were made for the recovery of not only the lost territories but also the occupation of all the territory that had been promised to Romania by the Allies in 1916.⁴²

Romania's leaders, however, soon recovered from shock and accepted the realities of the new order in Europe. Germany was now the dominant power on the continent and her friendship had to be earned. The loss of northern Transylvania was just a part of the price that had to be paid for Romania's former association with the Allies, and now the last vestiges of this orientation had to be rooted out. King Carol, now completely discredited, had to leave the country. Power was transferred to Marshal Ion Antonescu who became Prime Minister and *Conducator*, the Romanian equivalent for *Duce* or *Führer*. Under his guidance the process of Romania becoming a satellite of the Third *Reich* accelerated. The descent to the status of an Axis client state would have many stepping stones, but the most significant one would be Antonescu's request for German troops, ostensibly to train the Romanian Army, but in reality to underscore Bucharest's acceptance of its new role as a useful Axis ally.⁴³ This step was accompanied by other measures in Romanian domestic and foreign policy.

At home, the process of Romania's transformation into an Axis satellite was accompanied by several changes. The most disturbing of these was the resurgence of the Iron Guard, the formerly persecuted fanatical fascist movement. Prominent Guardists were co-opted into Antonescu's government, including Prince Mihai Sturdza, who became the new foreign minister. At the same time, the Guard experienced an expansion of its membership and an increase in its activities. The latter usually manifested itself in growing

Guardist propaganda — usually aimed against liberals, Jews, capitalists, and foreigners — as well as actual physical attacks against members of these groups. In foreign policy the most important step Antonescu's regime took, second only in importance to the stationing of German troops on Romanian soil, was the country's accession, in November, 1940, to the German-Japanese-Italian Tripartite Pact. Antonescu's prime motive for this move was probably the demonstration of his devotion to the Axis, with an eye to paving the way for a reversal of the Second Vienna Award, should the Hungarians not keep up with him in the race for Hitler's graces.⁴⁴

The Hungarians, however, were not about to allow Antonescu's Romania to overtake them in this race. Not unlike in that country, in Hungary too, the weeks and months that followed the Vienna arbitration witnessed the growth of Nazi German influence and the further alignment of Budapest's policies with those of the Third *Reich*. The first move in this direction came hard on the heels of the announcement of the Vienna Award. The German leaders asked Hungary to sign a protocol giving extensive rights and privileges to the country's German minority. Beyond such guarantees as access to minority education, the agreement gave Hungary's Germans the right to profess the Nazi ideology. Who qualified as an ethnic German was to be determined by an organization of Germans in Hungary. Next came economic concessions, including promises of additional food exports to Germany as well as of lumber from those parts of Transylvania that had been recently transferred to Hungary. In the realm of military affairs, the Hungarians found themselves acquiescing in the German demand for transit for the troops destined for Romania. The operation was shrouded in secrecy — the trains travelled at night to keep them from public view. In November these concessions were capped by Hungary's accession to the Tripartite Pact.⁴⁵ The Hungarians had the dubious honour of becoming signatories before the Romanians did. For now, they could assure themselves that they were ahead in the race for Hitler's good will. But it would soon become obvious that the race would have to be contested again and again.

An important factor in this race was the fact that in Antonescu Hitler found a man to his liking. The little, red-haired general made a good impression on the *Führer* at the time of his first official visit to Berlin in November, and the two remained on good terms thereafter.⁵⁰ That was in sharp contrast to Hitler's relationship with Horthy, the admiral who in 1938 had the effrontery of telling the German leader that, if a war would break out between Germany and England, the latter would prevail, because of her navy. Not surprisingly, it would be during Antonescu's November visit that the

Führer would make a hint to him about the possibility of a future revision of the Vienna Award's terms in favour of Romania.⁵¹

The most serious consequence of the emerging race between the Hungarians and the Romanians for Hitler's good will was their involvement in Hitler's war against Russia. In this connection the Romanians stood to benefit mainly because of the strategic importance of their country in any assault against the USSR. Not surprisingly, Antonescu was asked to participate in the preparations for *Operation Barbarossa*. No such invitation was extended to the Hungarians. Hungary was strategically not as important, and Hitler worried that any secrets passed on to the Hungarians would find their way to London. One of Antonescu's motive for offering full-fledged participation in the German attack on Soviet Russia was the recovery of the territories that Romania had lost to the USSR the year before. His other motive has been identified by one historian: "he... intended to demonstrate the superior value of Romania's friendship to Germany as compared with that of Bulgaria,... and of Hungary...."⁵²

The Hungarians — with some exceptions, the most notable of which was General Werth — had hoped to stay out of that conflict. They managed to do so for a few days, until great pressure was brought on them from various quarters. The most weighty consideration in the minds of decision-makers in Budapest was undoubtedly the fear that, if they stayed out of the war, they would fall out of favour with Hitler and might forfeit the territory they had only recently regained from Romania.⁵³

An Instrument of Blackmail

This rivalry between Romania and Hungary continued through most of the war, and Hitler exploited it to the fullest.⁵⁴ Whenever one side or the other failed to live up to the German leader's expectations, it would be threatened with territorial changes in favour of the other side. "The master of the 'New Order' knew," remarked the Romanian diplomat Alexandre Cretzianu, "that in the Transylvanian question... he held the most perfect instrument... of blackmail...."⁵⁵ The most blatant use of this "instrument" was probably made by Hitler in March of 1944 when he summoned Horthy to Salzburg to demand an explanation for the Hungarian government's "treasonous" behaviour, including its secret attempts to negotiate a separate peace with the Western Allies. The *Führer* told the Regent that unless Hungary complied with German demands — appoint a subservient government, allow German troops and security forces to occupy the country, solve the "Jewish question",

etc. — she would be taken over by her Axis neighbours. In any such occupation, Romania would not only regain northern Transylvania, but would seize much additional Hungarian territory.⁵⁶

Threatened with such dire consequences, the Horthy complied with Hitler's demands, at least for the time being. By August of that year, however, the Regent was once again making preparations for Hungary's exit from the war. In this undertaking, however, the Romanians "beat him to it" and managed to switch sides first. This time Hitler was ready to give all of Transylvania to the seemingly still "loyal" Hungary. The entrance of the first divisions of the Red Army into Transylvania quickly drove home the lesson that the age of Hitler being the arbiter of the fate of Transylvania was about to end. Indeed, by the time the Hungarians had tried to leave the war in mid-October — in a pitifully unsuccessful attempt — an angry Hitler was in no position to offer Transylvania to anybody: it was by then firmly in the hands of the Soviets and their new-found Romanian allies. The new arbiter of the future of that land was by now Stalin, the very man whose ambitions in that direction had been so thoroughly disappointed only four years earlier. Before the post-1940 Soviet policies are examined, however, attention might be paid to the views on the Transylvanian question of the other major Allied Powers, whose technical experts — and sometimes even leaders — also had opinions on the matter.

British Attitudes

The attitudes of the Atlantic democracies to the problem of Transylvania during the Second World War were influenced above all by the nature of the relationship that existed between the Danubian states of Romania and Hungary on the one hand, and Great Britain and the United States on the other. As long as Romania was under the Franco-British guarantee, for example, she enjoyed British diplomatic support; however, when she began drifting into the Axis orbit, she increasingly became treated as an enemy country until, in December of 1941, Britain finally declared war on her. Hungary's case was not very different. Contrary to what might be expected, before the autumn of 1940 there had been some sympathy toward the Budapest regime in London, despite Hungary's links to Italy and Germany. This favourable assessment of Hungary had, in fact, pre-dated the war and manifested itself occasionally. In the late fall of 1938, for example, the British accepted the results of the First Vienna Award — which returned the Magyar-populated districts of Czecho-Slovakia to Hungary — without

protest. The British government, however, reacted differently to the Second Vienna Award. Prime Minister Winston Churchill in fact declared that his government could not recognize a territorial arrangement imposed by countries that were at war with Britain.⁵⁷ The transit of German troops destined for Romania through Hungary, Budapest's accession to the Tripartite Pact and, especially, Hungary's participation — even though belated and limited — in the German assault on Yugoslavia in April of 1941, further alienated the Foreign Office, yet an actual British declaration of war on Budapest did not come until December of 1941.

The new official attitudes in London were not reflected in the first relevant analysis that was produced by the British experts assigned the task of preparing plans for a post-war world.⁵⁸ The study, entitled “The Problem of Transylvania,” was completed in mid-December 1942. It examined several possible scenarios that might develop regarding Transylvania during the war and, especially, at the peace negotiations. How any territorial settlement between Hungary and Romania might be arranged, was to depend largely on which of the planned confederation of states — the northern, the central, the southern, or a variation of these — the two states in question might belong to.

In all of these, Hungary was to end up with a settlement that was more favourable to her than the post-World War I territorial arrangement had been. In the eyes of the British experts, Hungary was entitled to most of the lands between the “Trianon border” and the western frontier of historic Transylvania. Possibly, she could get the Székely districts of south-eastern Transylvania as well, and even a “corridor” between the two. Failing this, the Székely region was to get autonomy within Romania. And, in a final settlement, the two countries were to possess minority populations of equal size: about a million Hungarians for Romania, and the same number of Romanians for Hungary.

The ideal solution, according to the study, would be the creation of a sovereign Transylvania, organized on the pattern of the Swiss cantons, with a great deal of cultural autonomy for the various districts and equality of the local (Romanian, Magyar and German) languages. The authors of the study, however, saw few prospects for the realization of this solution. They thought that it could come about only if both Hungary and Romania belonged to the same post-war East European confederation that the British experts (and others) had in mind for the region, and they doubted whether either Budapest or Bucharest would support such a solution.⁵⁹

These recommendations were formulated while in British government circles attitudes to Hungary were quite negative. After February 1943, however, British views on Hungary began to soften.⁶⁰ By this time Romania

must have appeared to London a more stalwart Axis ally than Hungary, and the Soviet Union began to show an increasing interest in Romania especially for the purposes of the post-war reorganization of the region. This revival of British sympathy toward Hungary proved of little benefit to her, as London's ability to influence events in that part of the world kept diminishing. By early 1944 the British government could hardly have exerted influence there without American support, but American interest in the region was marginal at best and, by the time it had intensified somewhat, it was too late for the Atlantic democracies to counterbalance the overwhelming influence that the Soviets had acquired in Eastern Europe.

American Plans

In the United States interest in the Transylvanian question was confined, until almost the very end of the war, to the experts who were charged with the task of developing plans for the possible territorial reorganization of post-war Eastern Europe. These experts discussed the Transylvanian question early in 1943, within the Territorial Subcommittee of the State Department's Advisory Committee that had the task of working out recommendations for future American peace proposals. The members of this committee quickly rejected both the idea of giving all of Transylvania to Romania, and that of awarding all of it to Hungary. The former was seen as leaving too many Magyars under Romanian rule, the latter as leaving even more Romanians under Magyar sovereignty. The 1940 arrangement was also deemed as unsuitable, partly for economic and partly for ethnic considerations. The concept of an independent Transylvania appeared attractive to some committee members, but they did not think that there was much support for it either in Bucharest or in Budapest — or, as a matter of fact, in Transylvania. Still another idea that emerged was the concept of an autonomous Transylvania confederated with Romania and Hungary. Later this idea was elevated to the status of a “recommended” solution, along with another proposal that the Western border of post-Trianon Romania be re-drawn more in line with linguistic realities.⁶¹

The Territorial Subcommittee's “recommendations” served as basis for the plans of another State Department bureau, the Division of Political Studies. This body's proposals regarding Transylvania envisaged the retrocession of the western parts of post-1919 Romania to Hungary — but they left the Székely counties within Romania. In late 1943 and early 1944, it was the Inter-Divisional Country and Area Committee's (IDCAC) turn to examine the Transylvanian question. The IDCAC reiterated the idea of ceding a substan-

tial strip of western Romania to Hungary — with a population of over one million inhabitants — and recommended autonomy for the Székely region within a post-war Romania. A later IDCAC document, dated 1 March 1944, did not repeat the proposal for Székely autonomy and talked only of minor border adjustments in favour of Hungary, but resurrected the possibility of creating an independent or autonomous Transylvania.⁶²

The IDCAC's recommendations were in turn examined by still higher-level State Department committees during the late spring and early summer of 1944. In this process they were also abridged. By the time they were presented to President Roosevelt in September of 1944, they contained only a single sentence which called for the return to Hungary of a “narrow strip” of land along the western border of post-1919 Romania.⁶³ By then, of course, the strategic realities had reduced the American position on Transylvania to not much more than academic theorizing.

Stalin: the Arbiter of Transylvania's Fate

From September of 1944 on, the country that was in singular position to determine the future of Transylvania, was the USSR. By then gone were the days when the Kremlin looked upon Hungary's interests in the region with disinterest bordering on sympathy, as it did in the early summer of 1940.⁶⁴ Since then, Hungary's leaders had committed many “crimes” in the eyes of the Soviets: they had allowed the settlement of the Transylvanian issue without consultation with Moscow, they had permitted German troops to move through Hungary, they had participated in the German invasion of Yugoslavia and, more importantly, in that of the Soviet Union itself.

Stalin's determination to exact revenge from Hungary for her misdeeds became abundantly clear in late 1941, during the discussions that the Soviet leaders had with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden during his visit to Moscow in mid-December. The two sides were in the process of drafting a treaty of alliance and military assistance when the Soviets revealed their plan for a secret protocol to the treaty concerning the redrawing of Europe's borders after the war. Here Stalin's plans for punishing Hungary were revealed. Hungary was not only to relinquish any territories she had regained before and during the war, but Czechoslovakia was “to be enlarged in the south at the expense of Hungary which ought to pay the deserved penalty for her behaviour...” Regarding Hungary's eastern borders, Stalin had similar proposals. He announced his plan to have Soviet military and naval bases in post-war Romania, which would be “somewhat expanded in the west

at the expense of Hungary... [as] additional punishment to Hungary for her role in the war.”⁶⁵

While Stalin's suggestions of December 1941 may have been an accurate illustrations of his vengeful attitude toward Hungary, they were not entirely accurate prognostications of Soviet policy on the Transylvanian question during the next four years — and they were certainly not precise forecasting of wartime Soviet rhetoric on this issue. During the Anglo-Soviet discussions of policy toward lesser Axis allies in 1943, reference was made to the restoration of wartime conquests only, and not to further territorial punishments for the vanquished. But when it came to Soviet propaganda, even this principle was shunted aside. When liberation movements were being established among POW officers in the USSR, the Soviets wanted to have the example of the Free Germany Committee copied by Hungarian and Romanian officers in their custody. For this purpose, they tried to make sure that rumours reached the former that, after the war, Transylvania might end up in Hungary, as an “autonomous” province. To the Romanians, however, they told that “Transylvania will be Romanian.”⁶⁶ Stalin proved himself a good student of Hitler in exploiting the Transylvanian issue to his advantage.

By the summer of 1944 the strategic situation in Eastern Europe had changed in a way as to make the Soviet leadership favour Romania over Hungary in any negotiations over the future of Transylvania. The latter country had been occupied by the Germans in March and a more compliant pro-Nazi government had been installed in Budapest. In the meantime, elements of Romania's elite began secret armistice negotiations with the Soviets. The latter in the meantime made preparations for a massive Red Army offensive into Romania — while ceasing operations on the Polish front while the *Wehrmacht* prepared to liquidate the Polish Home Army. On August 23, three days into the Red Army offensive, Antonescu was ousted and the new regime under King Michael defected from the Axis. Soon, Russian forces — and their new-found Romanian allies — made their way into Transylvania from the south, where their entry had not been anticipated.

In the negotiations that accompanied these changes the Transylvanian question occupied an important position. At first the Soviets offered to annul the Second Vienna Award should Romania switch sides in the war. When the actual armistice deal was signed, however, the transfer of northern Transylvania (or a “large part” thereof) to Romania, was made subject to the approval of the coming peace conference. Nevertheless, early in March 1945 the Soviets permitted a new Romanian government, dominated by then by the communists, to establish control over all the Transylvanian lands that had belonged to Romania between 1919 and 1940.⁶⁷ Stalin's long-standing

ambition to control Romania (including Transylvania) had at last been realized. Theoretically, the acquisition of northern Transylvania by Romania's Soviet-controlled regime was still to be approved by the peace conference, but few in Eastern Europe expected that approval not to materialize in view of the overwhelming influence the Soviets had achieved in that region.

Indeed, the post-war peace negotiations brought no change to the state of affairs that had developed in Transylvania by early 1945. True, the question of the Romanian-Hungarian border was on the agenda at both the Potsdam Conference and at the subsequent series of meetings designed to prepare the peace treaties with the vanquished Axis states, but nothing came of the American efforts to keep this issue alive. The British government had decided, even before July of 1945, to call for no more than the restoration of the pre-1938 borders in Eastern Europe. The Americans persisted a little longer, sometimes only half-heartedly, but could do little in the face of persistent Soviet opposition. The issue was finally taken off the agenda in September of 1946. Unlike the Versailles peace treaties in the wake of the First World War, the treaties that followed the Second did not even contain any guarantees of the rights of minorities living under alien rule.⁶⁸ Sponsored by the new European superpower of the post-war era, the Soviet Union, the new solution for the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute sealed the fate of Transylvania and her peoples for a long time to come.

NOTES

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¹ The Compromise or *Ausgleich* of 1867 reorganized the Habsburg Empire into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary in which the Kingdom of Hungary became autonomous. In addition to the dynastic link, which meant that Francis

Joseph was at once Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, the two halves of the Monarchy shared defence policy, foreign policy, and constituted a customs union.

² Béla Köpeczi, Ambrus Miskolczy, and Zoltán Szász, *Erdély története, 1830-tól napjainkig* [The History of Transylvania from 1830 to Our Days], vol. III of *Erdély története* [History of Transylvania] Béla Köpeczi *et al.* eds. (Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó, 1986), p. 1196 (citing the results of the 1850-51 census), and p. 1739 (here the results of the 1910 census are cited).

³ For a succinct overview of Hungary's treatment by the peacemakers see C.A. Macartney and A.W. Palmer, *Independent Eastern Europe: A History* (London: Macmillan, 1962), 118-30, and 161-67. Their conclusion illustrates Hungary's fate aptly: "Hungary was the diminished remnant left after the claims of Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Yugoslavia and Austria had been met." (p. 130). Concerning the ethnic composition of the territories transferred from Hungary to Romania, Macartney and Palmer give the following statistics: 2,800,000 Romanians, 1,700,000 Hungarians, 560,000 Germans, and 200,000 others (p. 168).

⁴ According to statistics derived from the 1910 Hungarian census, in six of the counties transferred to Romania (Szatmár, Bihar, Maros-Torda, Udvarhely, Csík and Háromszék), Hungarians constituted the absolute majority. In two other counties (Brasso and Ugocsa) Hungarians were the largest ethnic group, while in one (Nagyküküllő) the Germans were. In the other fourteen transferred counties (or part of counties), Romanians constituted the largest group or had absolute majorities. Mihály Korom, "A második bécsi döntéstől a fegyverszünetig" [From the Second Vienna Award to the Armistice], in *Tanulmányok Erdély történetéről* [Studies about Transylvania's History], ed. István Rác (Debrecen: Csokonai Kiadó, 1988), 170f.

⁵ On István Bethlen's ideas regarding this issue see my article, "Count Istvan Bethlen's Secret Plan for the Restoration of the Empire of Transylvania," *East European Quarterly* VIII (1975): 413-23. This paper points out that Bethlen would have probably accepted the establishment of an autonomous Transylvania within a larger East European federation. The best political biography of Bethlen is Ignác Romsics, *István Bethlen: A Great Conservative Statesman of Hungary, 1874-1946* (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Social Science Monographs – Atlantic Research and Publications, 1995), Mario Fenyó, transl. A short biography of Teleki is by Loránt Tilkovszky, *Pál Teleki, 1879-1941: A Biographical Sketch* (Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó, 1974). Balázs Ablonczy's much substantial biography of Teleki has been cited in the introduction to these endnotes.

⁶ Nicholas Nagy-Talavera, *The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in Hungary and Romania* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1970), 306f.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

⁸ István Bethlen's secret memorandum, undated but probably written in early September, 1939. It is printed in *Magyarország külpolitikája a II. Világháború kitörésének időszakában, 1939-1940* [Hungary's Foreign Policy in the Era of the Outbreak of World War II], Gyula Juhász, ed. (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1962), volume IV of the series *Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához, 1936-*

1945 [Diplomatic Documents on Hungary's Foreign Policy, 1936-1945], general ed. László Zsigmond (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1962-82), doc. no. 577 (pp. 743-61). The memorandum is summarized in English in my study: "Count Istvan Bethlen's Secret Plan..." pp. 413-23.

⁹ C.A. Macartney, *October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, 1929-1945* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1957, 2nd edition, 1961, 2 vols.) Published in the United States as *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945* (New York: Praeger, 1957.) 2 vols. The references in this paper are to the British edition. Vol. 1, pp. 388-89.

¹⁰ Werth's memorandum is cited in Gyula Juhász, *A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája, 1939-1941* [The Foreign Policies of the Teleki Government, 1939-1941] (Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó, 1964), pp. 103f. The same author's textbook on Hungarian foreign policy during the Horthy era does not go into much detail: Gyula Juhász, *Magyarország külpolitikája, 1919-1945* [Hungary's Foreign Policies, 1919-1945] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1969), pp. 216-19. This book was published later in English: Gyula Juhász, *Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1919-1945* (Budapest, 1979).

¹¹ Juhász, *A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája*, p. 106. Werth was not only a *Sváb* (a "Swabian," i.e. an ethnic German), but was married to a citizen of the Third Reich. According to Nagy-Talavera, in the 1941 census Werth declared himself a German. *Op. cit.*, p. 145.

¹² Juhász, *A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája*, pp. 121-24.

¹³ Telegram [from Ribbentrop], to State Secretary von Weizsäcker, 1 July 1940, giving instructions to von Erdmannsdorf, the German Minister in Budapest. Also, memorandum by [Weizsäcker], 2 July 1940, detailing the German *démarche* to the Hungarians. Printed in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* (hereafter *DGFP*), ed. Raymond James Sontag, John W. Wheeler-Benett, *et al.*, Series D (1937-1945), Vol. X, *The War Years, June 23-August 31, 1940* (London, 1957), doc. nos. 75 and 81.

¹⁴ News of Hungary's threatening attitude was reported to Berlin by Erdmannsdorf. See his telegraphic reports of July 1st and 2nd, printed in *DGFP*, Series D (1937-1945), Vol. X, *The War Years, une 23...*, doc. nos. 69 and 85. The record of the discussions between Hitler, Count Ciano and the Hungarian delegation, of 11 July 1940, is given in doc. no. 146 (179-82). These events are summarized in Juhász, *A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája*, pp. 150f.

¹⁵ Nagy-Talavera, *Green Shirts*, p. 303. In his memoirs, Romanian diplomat Alexandre Cretzianu tells the story of the economic negotiations with the Germans and the origins of the Anglo-French guarantee. According to him, Viorel Tilea, the Romanian Minister in London, told the Foreign Office that the Germans had presented his government with an ultimatum to accept the proposed economic pact. Tilea's ruse worked: it resulted in the offer by London and Paris to extend a guarantee to Romania, in order to forestall a possible German invasion of that country. British efforts to have Moscow, Warsaw, and Ankara involved in the guarantee were not successful. Alexandre Cretzianu, *Relapse into Bondage 1918-1947: The Political Memoirs of Alexandre Cretzianu*. S.D. Spector, compiler, chapter 7 in *Southeastern*

Euorope 16 (1989 [1997]) pp. 58-61. Romanian discussions with the Foreign Office were conducted at the time by Tilea and Cretzianu.

¹⁶ Nagy-Talavera, *Green Shirts*, pp. 304-05.

¹⁷ The story of these negotiations is outlined in András Hory, *Még egy barázdát sem* [Not even one furrow] (Vienna, 1967), pp. 34-73. Hory was a senior diplomat in Hungary's diplomatic service during the late 1930s. He headed the Hungarian delegation. For an English-language summary of these talks see my *Hungary's Way to World War II* (Toronto: Helicon, 1968), 130-33.

¹⁹ Memorandum by Teleki addressed to Regent Miklós Horthy, 1 September 1940. Printed in Miklós Szinai and László Szücs (eds.), *Horthy Miklós titkos iratai* [The Secret Papers of Miklós Horthy] (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1965), doc. no. 49 (pp. 233-9). There is some controversy concerning the question whether the Romanians had requested arbitration, or agreed to it only after they were confronted by an Italo-German ultimatum to do so. Nagy-Talavera suggests that King Carol had asked Hitler to arbitrate (*op. cit.* p. 306), while Korom, citing Romanian sources, argues that the Romanians agreed to arbitration at the last moment, only under heavy pressure. See Korom, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

²⁰ The Award transferred about a million Romanians to Hungary and left almost half a million Hungarians within the new boundaries of Romania. A settlement which would have been satisfactory to both sides was probably impossible. For further details see Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, vol. I, pp. 422-24; also, Andrew Ludanyi, *Hungarians in Romania and Yugoslavia: A Comparative Study of Communist Nationality Policies*, appendix B. A doctoral dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1971 (pp. 493-96). For the Award's text, see *DGFP*, Series D (1937-1945), Vol. X, *The War Years, June 23...*, doc. no. 413 (pp. 581-84).

²¹ While many Hungarians were unhappy with not getting more of Transylvania back, some were displeased by the fact that certain railway lines connecting the *Székelyföld* to other Hungarian territory, were left passing through Romania. Teleki, in particular, was displeased with the way the whole affair had transpired and, especially, with Werth's indiscretion. He protested the Chief-of-Staff's actions to Horthy, and offered his own resignation, to make room for the appointment of someone who could reign in the soldiers. Horthy promised to remedy several of Teleki's grievances, but refused to accept his resignation. Teleki's memorandum to Horthy, 1 September 1940, *loc. cit.* See also Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, vol. I, p. 433; and my study, "Civil-Military Relations in Nazi Germany's Shadow: The Case of Hungary, 1939-1941," in *Swords and Covenants: Essays in Honour of the Centennial of the Royal Military College of Canada*, ed. Adrian Preston and Peter Dennis (London: Croom Helm, 1976), 230-32.

²² Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 28f.

²³ Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 299.

²⁴ Anthony Read and David Fisher, *The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939-1941* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1988), 463-73, 503-05.

²⁵ R.C. Raack, *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995). According to Raack, Stalin's "grandiose plan" in the early spring of 1940 was to wait till Germany, as well as France and Britain, became exhausted in a war of attrition — on the pattern of 1914-18 — and then move against Europe. "Stalin," Raack remarks, "had woefully miscalculated." (p. 52). For my own views on this subject see "Stalin's Wartime Plans for Transylvania, 1939-1945," in *Hungary's Historical Legacies: Studies in Honor of Professor Steven Béla Várdy*, ed. Dennis P. Hupchick and R. William Weisberger (Boulder and New York: East European Monographs/Columbia University Press, 2000), 146-54.

²⁶ Read and Fisher, *The Deadly Embrace*, p. 463.

²⁷ Adam B. Ulam, *Stalin: The Man and his Era* (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), 525. According to Raack, in Britain many people failed to recognize the real motives behind "the Soviet move" and judged it "as defensive." See Raack, *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945*, p. 54. Indeed, the late C.A. Macartney found evidence of Soviet attempts to cause domestic unrest in Romania and put further pressure on Budapest at the time. According to Macartney's sources, communists in Transylvania had been ordered to proclaim "a Soviet Republic in Transylvania simultaneously with the Russian advance into Bessarabia." Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, vol. I, n. 2, p. 405.

²⁸ Prime Minister Ion Duca was assassinated on 29 Dec. 1933, and Prime Minister Armand Calinescu was shot to death in broad daylight, in downtown Bucharest, on 21 Sept. 1939. In April of the previous year, an alleged Guardist plot to kill King Carol was "discovered" and resulted in renewed persecution of Guardists. The members of this organization almost did manage to kill the king, at the time of his escape from Romania in September, 1940, but the bullet-riddled royal train, with the Iron Guard in hot pursuit, managed to cross the Yugoslav border before the Guardists had a chance to finish their job. Nagy-Talavera, *op. cit.* p. 308.

²⁹ At one point Carol swore to keep Madame Lupescu in exile, but promptly reneged on his promise. See Nagy-Talavera, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

³⁰ Read and Fisher, *The Deadly Embrace*, p. 464. The Romanians also supplied Germany with grains, meat and timber.

³¹ Read and Fisher point out that, even after the settlement of the Bessarabian issue, the presence of large numbers of Red Army troops there continued to make Hitler "extremely nervous." *The Deadly Embrace*, p. 503.

³² Read and Fisher tell the story of German Minister in Bucharest Wilhelm Fabricius devising a plan for German commandos sailing from Vienna to Bucharest on the Danube using passenger ships. (*The Deadly Embrace*, p. 503.) For an account of the Hungarians receiving information to the effect that a German move for the occupation of a part or all of Romania was imminent, see Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, vol. I, pp. 395f.

³³ Swiss-Hungarian historian Peter Gostony (Péter Gosztonyi) has told the story (possibly apocryphal) how Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, the then Chief of the German High Command (OKW), assessed the problem of the *Wehrmacht* occupying Hungary on its way to Romania. When asked how much time the *Wehrmacht* would need for this operation, Keitel replied “24 hours.” When asked how much time would be needed if the Hungarians resisted, Keitel responded “12 hours.” When pressed for an explanation of the difference, Keitel quipped that in case of a hostile occupation of Hungary there would be no need for speeches of welcome. Péter Gosztonyi, *A magyar honvédség a második világháborúban* [The Hungarian Army in the Second World War] (Roma: Katolikus Szemle, 1986), 21.

³⁴ While General Werth advocated a German alliance, Hungary's civilian leaders made plans for the proclamation of a government-in-exile, in case the Germans actually made their move. This story is told in my “Bridges to the West: The Horthy Regime's Reinsurance Policies in 1941,” *War and Society*, 7, 1 (May 1989): 1-23.

³⁵ Read and Fisher, *The Deadly Embrace*, p. 464.

³⁶ Telegram, Fabricius to [Ribbentrop], 7 March 1940, printed in *DGFP*, Series D (1937-1945), Vol. VIII, *The War Years, Sept. 4, 1939 to March 18, 1940* (London, 1954), doc. no. 660. Ribbentrop told *Luftwaffe* boss Hermann Göring that the deal was very advantageous to the *Reich*. *Ibid.*, doc. no. 678.

³⁷ Telegram, Neubacher (Germany's special representative for economic questions in Bucharest), to [Ribbentrop], 28 May 1940, printed in *DGFP*, Series D (1937-1945), Vol. IX, *The War Years, March 18 to June 22, 1940* (London, 1956), doc. no. 338.

³⁸ Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, pp. 298f.

³⁹ Read and Fisher, *The Deadly Embrace*, p. 504. József Kristóffy, the Hungarian Minister in Moscow, became aware of this fact rather late, in early October. See his telegram to Budapest of 3 Oct. 1940, printed in *A moszkvai magyar követség jelentései 1935-1941* [The Reports of the Moscow Legation, 1935-1941], ed. Peter Pastor (Budapest: Századvég Kiadó & Atlanti Kiadó, 1992), doc. no. 180 (p. 256).

⁴⁰ Read and Fisher, *The Deadly Embrace*, pp. 504f.

⁴¹ On July 26, Romanian Minister President Gigurtu told Ribbentrop that Romania would try to base a settlement with Hungary “on the formula of boundary revision plus exchange of population, for a large-scale boundary revision alone would create a Romanian irredentist movement and lead to new complications...” The record of this conversation is printed in *DGFP*, Series D (1937-1945), Vol. X, *The War Years, June 23...*, doc. no. 233 (p. 305.).

⁴² Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, Vol. 1, p. 431.

⁴³ The sending of a German military mission to Romania had been first suggested by King Carol. See Cretzianu, *Relapse into Bondage... Political Memoirs*, p. 146. This fact is also confirmed in the documentary evidence: Fabricius to the Foreign Ministry, 2 July 1940, printed in *DGFP*, Series D (1937-1945), Vol. X, *The War Years, June 23...*, doc. no. 80.

⁴⁴ At the same time this conservative military man might also have been courting the *Führer's* friendship in order to build up his own position *vis-à-vis* the Iron Guard whose ideas and unruliness he (and his friend and adviser Mihai Antonescu) disliked. For an analysis of post-August, 1940, Romanian politics see Cretzianu, *Relapse into Bondage... Political Memoirs*, pp. 158-70; as well as Nagy-Talavera, *op. cit.*, chapter XI. Soon, Antonescu would move to curb the Iron Guard's influence.

⁴⁵ For a more detailed outline see my *Hungary's Way*, pp. 140-42. In this book I suggested that, not unlike Antonescu, Teleki made concessions to Hitler not only to keep ahead of Bucharest in retaining Hitler's goodwill regarding Transylvania, but to strengthen his position at home against an ever more vociferous extreme right. (*Ibid.*, pp. 142f.)

⁵⁰ Norman Stone, *Hitler* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1980), p. 107. Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, Vol. 1, p. 444.

⁵¹ Hitler's words: "The last chapter in the history of Transylvania is not yet written," are quoted by Nagy-Talavera, *op. cit.*, p. 318. On Antonescu's Berlin visit and Hitler's reception of him see also Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, Vol. 1, p. 444.

⁵² Norman Rich, *Hitler's War Aims*, 2 vols., (New York: Norton, 1973-1974), Vol. 1., p. 252.

⁵³ The catalyst in Budapest's decision to abandon the original stance had been a mysterious incident in which planes, identified by some as those of the Red Air Force, bombed the city of Kassa (today's Košice). The incident resulted in cries for "retaliation" and convinced the then Hungarian Prime Minister László Bárdossy that the Germans had staged the attack to force his hand. On this see my articles: "New Twist to an Old Riddle: The Bombing of Kassa (Kosice), June 26, 1941," *Journal of Modern History*, 44 (1972), 232-42; and "Contradictory Evidence Concerning Hungary's Declaration of War on the USSR in June, 1941," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 19, (1977), 480-88. These studies suggest that the air-raid might have been carried out by the Soviets after all, but was meant to hit a Slovak target, in retaliation for the Slovak declaration of war on the USSR the day before.

⁵⁴ This is not to say that there were no secret contacts between the two countries aimed at making arrangements for Transylvania's future in case Hitler lost the war — which became more and more obvious to both sides after 1942 — but nothing came of these feelers. Maurice Czikkann-Zichy, *My Life: Politics and Diplomacy in Turbulent Times* (Englewood, N.J., Universe Publishing, 1986), pp. 40-41. Also, Dániel Csatári, *Forgoszlében: Magyar-Román viszony, 1940-1945* [In the Whirlwind: Hungarian-Romanian Relations, 1940-1945] (Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó, 1969), pp. 246-51.

⁵⁵ Cretzianu, *Relapse into Bondage... Political Memoirs*, p. 176. "Moreover," Cretzianu added, "[Hitler] knew that Romania knew [this]."

⁵⁶ The most up-to-date account of Horthy's visit with Hitler of March 1944 is Thomas Sakmyster, *Hungary's Admiral on Horseback: Miklós Horthy, 1918-1944* (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1994), 325-33. An earlier work is Mario D. Fenyo, *Hitler Horthy and Hungary; German-Hungarian Relations, 1941-1944* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), especially pp. 163-74.

⁵⁷ András D. Bán, ed., *Pax Britannica: Brit külügyi iratok a második világháború utáni Kelet-Közép-Európáról, 1942-1943* [Pax Britannica: British External Documents on Post-World War II East Central Europe, 1942-1943], (Budapest: Osiris, 1996), p. 25. This theme is explored at greater length by Eva S. Balogh, "Peaceful Revision: The Diplomatic Road to War," *Hungarian Studies Review*, X (Spring-Fall 1983), 43-51.

⁵⁸ In particular, Foreign Research and Press Service, later known as the Foreign Office Research Department. Earlier it had been under the aegis of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and was staffed by eminent scholars such as Arnold Toynbee and C.A. Macartney.

⁵⁹ "The Problem of Transylvania" 21 December 1942, printed in Bán, *Pax Britannica*, pp. 152-169. Summarized by the editor on pp. 26-28.

⁶⁰ The following is based on István Mócsy, "Hungary Amidst the Great Powers: the Failed 1943 Peace Mission," *Hungarian Studies Review*, X (1983) 118-21. See also Gyula Juhász, ed., *Magyar-brit titkos tárgyalások 1943-ban* [Hungarian-British Discussions in 1943] (Budapest, 1978).

⁶¹ Ignác Romsics, ed., *Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary* (Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1992), 17-22. For another overview see Romsics's paper: "Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary and the Paris Peace Conference, 1941-1947," in *20th Century Hungary and the Great Powers*, ed. Ignác Romsics (Boulder, Colorado: Social Science Monographs; Columbia University Press, distr., 1995), especially pp. 160-61.

⁶² Romsics, *Wartime American Plans*, pp. 27f.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁶⁴ As Kristóffy, the Hungarian Minister in Moscow, explained the Soviet attitude in his report to Budapest of 11 July 1940. See Pastor, *A moszkvai magyar követség jelentései*, doc. no. 180 (pp. 256f). In this same report Kristóffy reported that, as far as he knew, the Soviets had designs on Subcarpathia, the land just north of Transylvania.

⁶⁵ Minutes of the meeting of 16 Dec. 1941, printed in *War and Diplomacy, The Making of the Grand Alliance: Documents from Stalin's Archives*, Oleg A. Rzheshhevsky, ed. (London, etc.: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996), doc. no. 4 (pp. 11-22). Stalin appears to have talked of the pre-1940 Romanian-Hungarian border when he suggested its extension to the West. This interpretation of the document is questioned by Korom (*op. cit.* pp. 178f).

⁶⁶ Mastny, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-05. Because Hungarian POW officers refused to denounce Horthy, Soviet talk of a "Transylvania within Hungary" quickly ended.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 155-257, *in passim*. The conditional nature of northern Transylvania's transfer to Romania in the armistice agreement of August is pointed out by Korom, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

⁶⁸ The above information is based on Romsics, "Wartime American Plans... and the Paris Peace Conference," pp. 163-67. For a detailed treatments of this subject see Bennett Kovrig, "Peacemaking after World War II: The End of the Myth of National Self-Determination," in *The Hungarians: A Divided Nation* (New Haven:

Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988), Stephen Borsody, ed., pp. 69-88; and, Stephen D. Kertesz, *Between Russia and the West: Hungary and the Illusions of Peacemaking, 1945-1947* (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1984).

Escape from Transylvania: September-October 1944 From the Diaries of Paul Diósady

Editors' notes: The following is excerpted from chapter 15 of the autobiographical writings of Paul Diósady. The chapter is entitled: "We have to flee again, this time from Marosvásárhely to Budapest, 1944." Diósady was a young chemical engineer at the time who in September 1944 decided to flee the approaching Red Army along with his wife Inci, a teacher of classics, and their infant son Levente. After many adventures and despite great difficulties they made it to Budapest — not long before the Red Army arrived there also. Eventually they ended up in Toronto, Canada, where Levente grew up and became a professor of chemical engineering at the University of Toronto. The translation of this chapter was done by Nándor Dreisziger in consultation with Levente Diósady.

At the end of August and the beginning of September the sound of artillery fire from the southeast intensified. This signified that the Russians were trying to take the mountain passes that were in that direction. This development was made possible all of the sudden by the decision of the Rumanians... not to resist the Red Army but to switch sides in the war.... After this the Russian army absorbed the Romanian forces and arrived at the Carpathian mountain ranges in short order. At this time it became obvious that, no matter how many ties we have to Transylvania, we have to leave and go to Hungary proper, if possible, to Budapest.

At the end of the school year I had taken my family from Marosvásárhely to Koronka to avoid the expected bombings of the city. For the summer, we rented the home of the local superintendent of schools. We owned a one-horse buggy with which I commuted to work — a distance of seven kilometres. A co-worker of mine, Dezső Kádár, and his wife were good friends of ours. They had no children and they stayed in the city. Dezső had a well-built wagon and two strong horses, with which he used to visit nearby

villages to buy raw hides for our [leather-processing] company, and whatever he could re-sell in the city on his own. He was an excellent businessman who could find something to talk about with anybody, a quality that would prove very useful for us later. When the noise of shelling became louder, we and the Kádárs decided that will set out for Budapest, according to a plan we had agreed upon earlier. In the capital there were two large and several small leather-processing plants, where people knew us or at least heard about us, and where we could probably find work....

Actually, to the very last minute we were hoping that we wouldn't have to leave Marosvásárhely, as the few things that had been nice in our lives we experienced here. It was here that we got jobs in line with our training, and it was here that we could get married. We managed to get a nice, large apartment here that we furnished with beautiful furniture hand-crafted my local cabinet makers. And it was here that our son Levente was born who was not yet a year old when we had to pull up roots. As we had to leave ore suddenly than expected, we never worked out detailed plans as to what to take with us and what to do with things we would leave behind. As it often happens with refugees, we left with great hopes and in the end we had to deal with many disappointments....

By the end of the week the situation had deteriorated. This was indicated by the arrival to Marosvásárhely of the first horse-drawn wagons of German settlers from the Ukraine. Our factory closed its doors. We paid the workers and went home to begin our preparations.... Kádár loaded his wagon with fodder for the horses and non-perishable food for ourselves.... We stopped in Marosvásárhely to collect a few things: but aside from a few books, critical documents, and some clothing there was no room for anything more. My buggy had a collapsible roof but no sides. We compensated for this by putting a rug over the top, which made the buggy into a big box. Its front was still open, at least the rain could not come in at the sides. The wagon also had a canvas roof which was important as it kept our belongings as well as the food and fodder dry.

So we started with two carts and, much like a Gypsy caravan, we left Marosvásárhely. The wagons of the Germans fleeing from the Ukraine preceded us in an endless line. They were a terrible sight. I have no idea how many hundreds of kilometres were behind them and for how long more their horses would last, even though these horses were used to heavy work. Our horses had never been used for a long journey.

Interestingly our thee horses seemed to have realised that they belonged to one another. If one cart got ahead in the line, the horses in the other became anxious and tried to catch up. On the way to Szászrég, we had to

go up a steep, winding road. It was here that the two carts got separated for the first time. On one occasion our horse went crazy. My wife Inci had to climb from the back onto the driver's seat and with the baby on her lap, she tried to hold the reins, while I got off and tried to restrain the horse holding its bridle-bit, which was not easy as the horse was a strong, heavy Metlneburg-type horse. Increasing our fright in situation was the fact that in midst of all this Levente slid from Inci's lap. Fortunately, we calmed the horse and no harm came to anyone, aside from the panic we experienced...

We got to Szászrég in the evening. We had covered 40 kilometres that day. On this basis it seemed that we would be able to cover this much each day as we had planned. Since Budapest was 600 kilometres away, we figured on a 15-16 days' journey. Unfortunately, because of the interruptions, our trip lasted more than a month.

We had already developed a routine for our nightly stops. We would first look for accommodation for the ladies and the baby so that at least they would spend the night under cover. While they took care of the baby and prepared some food for us, we took the horses, preferably some place under cover, gave them fodder and water.... We obtained hay and water on location while the oats came from our wagon. With the horses satiated by pales of water and food, they settled down to rest. We brought a lot of fodder with us so that we wouldn't have to stop and spend time procuring this on our journey.

Levente was a good baby. He didn't cry a lot and slept well. The adults discussed what had to be done next morning and tried to lock out their concerns from their minds and tiredness soon made them sleep. Dezső and I slept beside our horses.

The next morning we ate early, took care of the horses, and with heavy hearts set out on the day's journey. We soon discovered that the breasts of our horses became blistered... The problem wasn't visible yet, but it was obviously bothering them. We had some medication which seems to have relieved their pain. Still they didn't want to get going, usually we had to push the wagons at first till they got used to their harness. After another day of a 40 km journey we looked after ourselves and the horses and everyone slept like a log till the morning.

At least, for the first part of our trip, we had good weather. When the rains first came, we decided that, for the sake of the horses, we wait. We looked for better accommodation so that we could rest as well. Soon it became obvious what we didn't bring with us that was needed and what we brought needlessly. Nearly all documents that didn't seem necessary, including school reports and photographs, we had left behind... while I brought with me some German and French-language technical books and Inci a few of her favourite

volumes including one by Homer. These weighed more than 50 kilos. On the back of the wagon I had tied up our bicycle, which proved very useful when we stopped in a village to do a few errands to get some supplies.

The flood of refugees resulted in prices going up, everything was ten times more expensive than before. Hay cost us 40 *pengős* a day — 5 *pengős* used to buy a dollar in those days. People took advantage of us as they pleased, but without hay we wouldn't have been able to go on.

In the villages we passed through we didn't get the impression that people were panicking, but those official who had been posted there from elsewhere had already fled westward. In one village we knew the notary public and his family, the Rápoltis. We stayed with them. They also decided to come along. In the evening they called together all their trustworthy neighbours and acquaintances and distributed among them the belongings they were not planning to take with them. This was a much better way of handling this than we had done: this way possessions went to people more worthy of them....

One larger community we went through was Dés, a county seat with some 6-7000 residents. By the time we reached this place warplanes appeared in the sky above. There were air-raid shelters built into the hills opposite the railway station. All of us took refuge there except me — someone had to stay with the horses.

At the station there were huge piles of firewood arranged in rows about two meters apart. I positioned the two wagons in between two rows and could do nothing but wait for the bombing of the station. Those in the shelter didn't know what was going on outside. When someone took a peak, on closing the shelter's iron doors these made a sound similar to an explosion — causing panic inside every time. In the end the station was not bombed, it was probably not an important military target....

We continued our journey toward Nagykároly. One night, from a village near this city we witnessed the awesome sight of a city being bombed. This was Szatmárnémety and we saw it from 20-25 kilometres. It was like a beautiful but horrific star-burst: from the ground the planes were being shot at and from the sky fell the bombs....

On the second of October we stopped outside a village in the Nyírség and, on blankets spread under a roadside tree, we celebrated Levente's first birthday. Instead of a birthday cake we had a watermelon.... The horses enjoyed the unexpected rest.

We took lodging in the village and in the morning we set out for Debrecen. Kádár owned an estate near Debrecen, complete with farm buildings and close to 100 acres of fine cultivable land. It was leased by a reliable

family. They received us very warmly. Here we were supplied with everything we needed and we rested for four days, almost forgetting about the war.

Then the artillery fire again became audible in the distance. The Russians had been stopped for a while but soon after they had penetrated the passes of the Carpathians... they reached the borders of pre-1940 Hungary.... The country became a war-zone.

On hearing the gunfire, we resumed our journey. We first stopped in a village in the sandy, north-eastern part of the Hortobágy. The carts sank into the sand almost to their axle, the horses couldn't pull them and we got stuck. Some local peasants brought a couple of oxen. These managed to pull the wagons, along with the horses, out of the sand. We were lucky that the Russians did not catch up with us, as the Axis Powers decided to make a stand at the eastern border of the Hortobágy. Both sides assembled powerful tank forces on the two sides of the *puszta*. It was here that one of the remarkable battles of the war, the tank battle of the Hortobágy took place. It lasted two weeks. Though the Axis Powers suffered heavy losses, they managed to hold up the Russians for a long time till they replaced their [even greater – ed.] losses. Both sides lost many men and hundreds of tanks. The remains of these lay scattered throughout the sandy soil for many years after the war. While this battle raged the Russians crossed the Tisza River at Szeged and opened another front in the south of the country.

In the meantime we managed to make our way all the way to Tiszafüred where we got lodging that appeared to be very good. Nevertheless, Kádár and I again slept with the horses to make sure nothing was stolen.... In villages it was common for small animals and fowl to sleep in the barns... and these were full of fleas. Thus during the whole night we were trying to get rid of fleas, slept little and continued our journey the next day tired. The horses were also tired and didn't greet the morning preparations with enthusiasm....

The bridge on the Tisza here had been bombed and had been replaced by a pontoon bridge the military had constructed. On one side of this the road went down steeply, on the other, it went up on a steep incline. This was not the main problem. The real problem was that our horses, by the time we have arrived to Tiszafüred, were full of blisters. We were caring for them much as the injured are treated in hospitals. But the three horses had decided not to go any further. They didn't want to get started. The locals surrounded us looking on as we struggled with the horses. None of them offered to help.

In the meantime the officers from the troops guarding the bridge came over and told us that every able-bodied man was needed for the war-effort and no such person would be allowed to proceed further west from here. It was

here that Kádár's diplomatic skills became obvious. He managed to convince the officers that he would be able to get each of them a pair of fancy high boots... the kind German officers were wearing. Kádár told the officer that he would ship each of them these boots from his warehouses in Debrecen or Budapest, and they believed him, even though we didn't have single sample of leather in our possession.

Kádár also managed to convince the peasants standing nearby to help push our wagons to the bridge. They eventually did, but as soon as they stopped pushing, the horses stopped. We pleaded, and they pushed some more. They asked, "how far should we push? to Budapest?" ... At last we made it on to the bridge. The next problem was how we would get off the bridge. Kádár once again got together those milling around on the shore, onlookers, soldiers, etc., and got them to pull us off the bridge. This went a bit easier, after all we had to be moved from here as at any moment the bridge could have been needed for military purposes....

After this we proceeded as fast as possible toward Budapest, avoiding any big cities on the way. We reached Fót. We got very good accommodation here and began thinking that we'll stay here and commute to Budapest where we were hoping to find jobs. Alas, on the first night it was announced that everyone had to partake in the digging of ditches as part of defence-works. Upon this we harnessed the horses and left Fót, and that same night we arrived in Pest. I left my wife and child with the family of József Csóka, a relative of Inci, who was luckily at home when we arrived. Kádár also left his family with acquaintances and by next afternoon we were in the factory district of Újpest, just to orient ourselves for the time being.

Kádár's trade didn't tie him to a place. He soon purchased a quantity of finished leather and took it to the nearby countryside to trade it for raw hide and while there he bought food. Within a day he was continuing the work he had been doing in Marosvásárhely. For me matters seemed more difficult because I didn't want to get trapped in an insignificant job. So I prepared myself for doing several interviews so that I get a suitable position and my salary would not be worse than what I had in Vásárhely. I was not aware of the fact that in general large firms and positions with a wide scope of responsibilities required more experience than I had been able to obtain in the past....

First I talked to one of the managers of the Wolfner firm who told me that the nearby Mauther leather-making factory was looking for a technical director. I went there and at once I was able to speak to the chief director, János Lengyel, who immediately offered me an excellent contract with the customary one month probation time. This had been made possible by the

resignation and departure of the company's technical director. Thus, without much further stressful job-search, I managed land a position with one of Hungary's, indeed Europe's biggest leather manufacturers.... Lengyel outlined the tasks that awaited me and described my compensation package. The latter we discussed in detail the following day and put on paper. It was obvious that I had assumed heavy responsibilities, but I always prefer climbing uphill to walking on plain ground.

I asked Lengyel to give parking place for my buggy and horse, let me start work the next day, and have someone take me home and bring back the buggy. He immediately arranged everything so I could take the good news home.

After this the most important thing for us was for Inci to get a transfer from the Ministry of Education to teach in Budapest — and to find out what happened to our relatives while we were on our journey. The newspapers were full of ads by people looking for their friends and relations. We joined these people, although we were not hopeful that we would get news soon as much of Hungary east of Budapest was either cut off or was occupied by the Soviet army....

A review article:

Hungarians Beyond the Borders: Diaspora Existence in Transylvania and Elsewhere

László Kósa

Balázs Balogh and Zoltán Illyés, eds. *Perspectives of Diaspora Existence. Hungarian Diasporas in the Carpathian Basin – Historical and Current Contexts of a Specific Diaspora Interpretation and Its Aspects of Ethnic Minority Protection*. Trans. Gábor Komáromy. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2006. 272 pages.

The Institute of Ethnology, and the Research Institute of Ethnic and National Minorities, both of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in collaboration with the Kriza János Ethnic Studies Association of Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár in Romania, has organized a conference about the Hungarian diaspora in the Carpathian Basin. It was held on June 8–11 of 2006, in the school and orphanage of the Hungarian Reformed Church of Romania, in the western Transylvanian town of Zsobok (Romanians call this place Jebucu). The conference was interdisciplinary with a wide variety of disciplines being represented (ethnology, cultural anthropology, sociology, history, theology, pedagogy, linguistics, political science, etc.). The proceedings of the conference constitute a selection of the papers given. They were selected by the editors with an international audience in mind. The result was the volume at hand. It contains more studies of interest than can be reviewed in a review article such as this one.

It should be stated in advance that in the region between the Baltic and the Balkans, which includes the Carpathian Basin, the primary though not exclusive factor that determines national and ethnic identity is language. Because of this, observations about diaspora existence there are always

closely linked to theories about linguistics and cultural concerns. Several of the studies in this volume suggest that in this respect two paradigms face each other. The idea is perhaps best expressed by János Péntek, a professor of linguistics at Babes-Bolyai University and a native of the region (Kalotaszeg) where the conference was held: “The difference in recognising variability or diversities conspicuously clear in the paradigm, in theory and in minority politics: one regards linguistic and cultural diversity as a value while the other aims at uni-lingual reductionism...” (p. 75)

Professor Péntek analyses not only the themes pertinent to the conference but also the experience of his region, Kalotaszeg. Until 1918 this region of a particular local Magyar culture existed in the vicinity of the cultural centre Kolozsvár (now Cluj-Napoca) and as a result was the subject of many sociological studies. Knowledge about it and its place in Hungarian national consciousness reach far beyond the place's local geographic even Transylvanian boundaries. Professor Péntek, relying on his own linguistic researches, calls attention to valuable conclusions that are important not only from the academic point of view but also for the sake of the survival of diasporas.

The preface to the book as well as many of its papers emphasize that one weakness of Hungarian diaspora research, both in the past and in the present, is the lack of a solid theoretical basis. For this reason special praise must be paid to the four introductory theoretical studies that try to remedy this situation. The very first one, Gábor Biczó's “Transnational Dimensions of the Diaspora Issue and Hungarian Diaspora Research,” outlines various, mainly American (R.E. Park, Colin Green) diaspora theories, then deals with their impact, and then weighs the possibility of their universal application. Unfortunately however, despite the title of his study, he does not as much as outline briefly Hungarian research relevant to the subject.

The word “diaspora” (in Magyar *diaszpóra*) has no commonly accepted definition in Hungary. The participants of the 2006 conference understood it to be no more than a word that refers to something related to ethnicity. Hungarian definitions of the word have traditionally been heavily influenced by politics and historical consciousness. It is important to keep in mind that up to the end of the 19th century, in the Hungarian language this word was used in connection with migrant minorities (Jews, Armenians and Greeks) and the emerging Hungarian immigrant community in the United States. It was also at that time that Hungarian intellectuals began paying attention to Magyar minorities living in the historic Kingdom of Hungary among larger minority (i.e. non-Magyar) populations, minorities that, despite their being situated in Hungary, faced the possible loss of their Magyar language. The Hungarian word

szórvány was used to describe their case, which is officially at least a precise translation of the word diaspora, but its meaning in practice diverged. This term became more widely used after 1920 when as a result of the post-war peace settlement (the Treaty of Trianon), a third of Hungary's people with a Magyar identity and Magyar language ended up in neighbouring countries where many of their smaller communities definitely faced the prospect of assimilation.

All the conference's participants had taken a stand, overtly or covertly, directly or indirectly, regarding János Péntek's paradigm referred to above. The paper of Zoltán Ilyés is based on the Hungarian scholarly literature on the subject and the author's extensive expertise in anthropology and sociology. It suggests numerous approaches to diaspora studies. Among the models he examines are the various and greatly differing minorities that had come into existence as a result of the truncation of both Hungary and Germany in the post-World War I peace settlements. The examples he uses are constructed both through his knowledge of the historical circumstances and Ilyés's own experiences in the regions discussed. At the end of his study the author urges a change in diaspora studies to the effect that the conceiving of assimilation as a loss must be reassessed. This conclusion however, does not necessarily and logically flow from the arguments presented in the body of his paper.

A very different approach to the problem is taken by political scientist Barna Bodó. His subject of interest is the Hungarian and German minorities of south-western Romania, the region known as the Banat (Bánság in Hungarian). The examples he refers to pertain to this area. He makes no secret of the fact that the efforts aimed at the sustenance of minority cultures in this region bring meagre results. His call for more effective action is not the act of scholarship; nevertheless he urges scholars to help in the formulation of a Hungarian strategy for diaspora studies.

The problem of minority assimilation was touched on not only by the above-described papers but almost without exception by the other papers in the volume. The vast territorial rearrangement of Central Europe after the First World War resulted in millions of people acquiring new citizenship without having left their homes. The accompanying regime changes also caused new tensions between peoples and countries. As a result the problem of linguistic and ethnic assimilation became a key question of diaspora existence – and not only for minority Hungarians.

The loss of language by children born from mixed marriages has always been seen as a demographic loss or gain for one or the other side of the ethnic rivalry, a loss or gain that had significant political, economic, social and cultural implications for both sides. During the time of the Austro-Hungarian

Dual Monarchy, Hungarian society looked upon the assimilation of non-Magyar minorities positively and their cultural persistence negatively. The minorities viewed these processes in the opposite manner. Much of Hungary's urban German and Jewish population constituted an exception to this generalization, as most members of these two groups approved and even encouraged assimilation to the Hungarian nation.

Only one paper in the volume, the study by Tamás Kiss, is devoted in its entirety to the phenomenon of assimilation. It deals with the demographics of Hungarians in Transylvania, more precisely, those Hungarians of the Carpathian Basin who live under Rumanian rule. This excellent study concludes that much of the assimilation of Hungarians results from ethnically mixed marriages.

Vilmos Keszeg in his study analyzes the careers and life-histories of minority Transylvanians. He had asked his informants not about diaspora existence but about discussions of it. The histories he reveals chronicle individual diaspora lives. The strategies his informants use for cultural survival are full with examples of continuous compromising of original values. Typically, these individuals at first oppose and repudiate mixed (both the ethnic and the religious kind) marriages, but in time they make peace with the idea and adopt to their new circumstances.

Folklorist Zoltán Magyar based his study on extensive field-work. The many examples he uses suggest that historical folklore is a fundamental constituent of the ethnic consciousness of people living in a diaspora situation, especially where there are no ethnic schools and ethnic churches to foster such consciousness. An oral tradition of stories about atrocities against an ethnic group, or about struggles waged to avert such atrocities, also play a role in the maintenance of ethnic consciousness.

We have mentioned the Kalotaszeg region where the place that hosted the conference is situated. The Hungarian population of this district was the subject of the study of Balázs Balogh and Ágnes Fülemile. From the point of methodology, this is the most accomplished work in the volume. It uses original sources as well as the results of anthropological, sociological, ethnographic, linguistic and historical researches. It also speaks of its authors' personal knowledge of the situation. We will discuss only those aspects of this study that pertain most to the main themes of the volume. The authors argue that the decline and disappearance of the peripheral Hungarian ethnic islands of this region and the transformation of solid Magyar settlements into diaspora ones had been taking place even during the time the region belonged to Hungary. At that time these processes were caused by two factors: one, the majority population was already Romanian, and two, by the conflicts between

the two ethnicities. In recent decades these processes accelerated. This was brought about by urbanization and the drastic political measures of the Romanian regime — such as the coerced collectivization of agriculture and the forced promotion of manufacturing. These processes impact not only the region's isolated Hungarian communities but also almost all parts of Kalotaszeg.

The village of Oltszakadát (now Sacadate) in south-Transylvania represents in some respects the opposite of what is happening in the Kalotaszeg region. Its Hungarian population lives in isolation as the nearest Hungarian community is dozens of kilometres from it. Its Hungarian population is under 200 and forms a minority in this mainly Romanian settlement. The evolution of this community through the twentieth century is examined by Edit Kádár through the eyes of the historical demographer and sociologist. Her study, illustrated by tables rich in demographic and sociological data, conclusively argues that the village's Hungarian minority has survived because of its strict adherence to the use of the Hungarian language and the region's unique Lutheran religion.

Most of the volume's studies, for obvious geographic, historical and demographic reasons, deal with the situation of Hungarians in lands belonging to Romania. We have to bemoan the paucity of studies regarding diaspora situations in other parts of the Carpathian Basin. For this reason we applaud the one study in the collection that deals not with a Romania-related theme. This is the paper of cultural anthropologists Virág Hajnal and Richard Papp who did their research in a village of the historical region of Szemérség, now a part of Serbia. Most of the Hungarians of the area had settled there some eight or nine centuries ago, but those of the village of Dobradó got there only some 120-130 years ago — into a village of mixed ethnicity and mixed religion, but with a majority of Slav population. Till 1918 it belonged to the Lands of the Holy Crown of Hungary, in particular to the autonomous Kingdom of Croatia. The linguistic situation of these people was determined by these circumstances. The authors of the study did their research here after the break-up of Yugoslavia, just when the question of ethnic identity, and relationship to the “mother country” (Hungary), became a more relevant one for the village's Magyar residents. This was also the time when Hungary “discovered” the Hungarian diaspora even though making contact with this particular Magyar ethnic island was not successful for various reasons.

Pál Péter Tóth offers thought-provoking data related to ethnic identity in the diaspora. From working with questionnaires among immigrants to Hungary, he concludes that most of these people come not from Magyar diaspora communities but from large, predominantly Hungarian ethnic

islands. This is not surprising in view of the fact that most Magyars in the neighbouring countries live in such ethnic islands. The author remarks however, that the emigration of many people from these tends to turn them into diaspora communities, ones in which Hungarians become minorities. This phenomenon gives rise to the question: why is it that Hungarians tend to leave their ethnic islands while their co-ethnics in diaspora existence tend to stay? We have no answer to this question.

The last paper in the volume is by Balázs Borsos. It uses the data provided by the volumes of the *Magyar Néprajzi Atlasz* (Budapest, 1989-1991) to provide a picture of the situation of the Hungarian diaspora communities of the Carpathian Basin primarily during the beginning of the 20th century. It does so mainly through the use of maps.

The author of this review had attended the conference and can say that the presentations were often followed by comments and discussions that unfortunately are not presented in the proceedings. It is also regrettable that the conference paid little attention to the Hungarian diaspora living in towns and cities as well as industrial districts. The role of the churches has also not received enough attention during the conference.

There can be no doubt that the disputes that emerged as a result of the differing interpretations presented at the conference will continue. In the matter of assimilation vs cultural survival we have to agree with those who consider the assimilation of Hungarians into other ethnic groups as a loss to this ethnic group. The warning given in the conclusions of János Péntek's study should be heeded, that is policies aimed at the equality of opportunity among nationalities for culture maintenance should be respected (pp. 76-78).

In the 20th century the Magyar ethnic group has produced so many examples of diaspora existence that their study could be the theme of not one but a series of scholarly conferences. The international scholarship could benefit from the examination of these examples. As has been mentioned above, a comprehensive survey of Hungarian inquiries into these situations during the early part of the 20th century is missing from the volume. This is regrettable as there had been initiatives during the interwar year whose achievements, regrettably, have been largely forgotten. I refer to the journals *Magyar Kissebbség* [Hungarian minority] and *Látóhatár* [Horizon], the minority studies institute of the University of Pécs, the Hungarian Institute of Sociography, as well as Transylvanian initiatives mentioned at the beginning of Vilmos Keszeg's paper. The next era of Hungarian history, the post-World War II communist dictatorship, produced nothing as during much of this time not even plans could be made for the scholarly study of Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries. It is not a consolation that the situation in this

respect hardly differed in the other Soviet satellites. In the Soviet Union however, in particular in the Maklai Mikluho Institute in Moscow, numerous researchers studied the question of assimilation — in reality the processes of the birth of the communist “melting pot”.

We write this to emphasize that Hungarian diaspora studies took root really only after 1990. This explains the unevenness (and other problems that we did not touch on) that we pointed out in our evaluation of this volume. Whether we call this a beginning or a renewal, scholarship only explains but does not excuse the problems, theoretical shortcomings, the obscurity of ideas, as well as the contradictions of diaspora research. Nevertheless the thought of organizing the 2006 conference and the publication of the proceedings in Hungarian as well as in an abridged English edition must be seen as welcome developments. It should also be mentioned that the life-spans of the participants covered almost six decades, even though the majority belonged to the younger generation (those between 30 and 40) of middle-aged researchers. This bodes well for the future.

A review article:

**Controversies about the
History of Transylvania Revisited
(1986-2004)**

Andrew Ludanyi

Béla K. Király, László Veszprémy, *et al.*, eds. *History of Transylvania*. Trans. Bennett Kovrig, Péter Szaffko, *et al.* Toronto and New York: Hungarian Research Institute of Canada and Atlantic Research and Publications, East European Monographs, No. 581 and Atlantic Studies on Society in Change, No. 106. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 2001. (A translation and re-edited version of *Erdély története* originally edited by Béla Köpeczi, László Makkai, Zoltán Szász, *et al.*, 1986.), Vols. 1-3....

The *History of Transylvania* being reviewed here is a thorough compendium of studies collected in three volumes. It is a scholarly achievement that evolved over decades and has a seminal history of its own. A perusal of the front piece of the three volumes provides a hint of the complex organizational effort that went into the production of the English translation of the three-volume *Erdély története* published in 1986. Yet the English version is at the same time something more and something less than the Magyar version published by the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

The publication of the Magyar version in 1986 had the effect of a bombshell in East European historical studies and also in the state-to-state relations of Romania and Hungary. It represented a break with the past and a significant fracturing of the post-World War II monolithic, ideological control of Romanian historians over Transylvania's past. Up to 1986, under the aegis of proletarian internationalism, but more significantly under the influence of Soviet hegemonial demands, nationality issues and conflicts were swept under the rug. They were the concerns of each satellite state, the internal matter of the respective communist party states. In Romania under Gheorghe

Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceaușescu the country became more and more a Romanian nationalist party state.

The Romanian reaction to the 1986 publication of *Erdély története* reflected much passion because Nicolae Ceaușescu's political order depended on Romanian nationalism to bolster an otherwise faltering and discredited dictatorial system. As early as on 27 February 1987 the Council of Nationalities convened in Bucharest addressed this "historical" challenge. President Ceaușescu provided the keynote address and described the three volumes as a "falsification of history." He went on to accuse the authors and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences of disturbing the "harmonious relations" between brotherly socialist states. But, he was not satisfied with this political condemnation. He also put his personal authority on the line as a historian, reaffirming the veracity of the theory of Daco-Roman continuity as well as presenting the official Romanian perspective on a number of other contentious issues that had been raised or challenged by *Erdély története*. Ceaușescu was followed onto the podium by other political, minority, and so-called scholarly leaders who continued the tirade of denunciation from prepared texts concerning a work that had not been read by the members of the platform party.

This official party statement was supported by the frenzied attacks of Romanian historians with the intent of informing the outside scholarly world about this "scholarly travesty." On 7 April 1987 a full-page advertisement appeared in the *London Times* which accused the Hungarian Academy of Sciences of supporting the "falsification of history." This was followed by reviews and review articles in the *Romanian Review* and the publication of a special English-language pamphlet entitled "A Conscientious [*sic*] Forgery of History of Transylvania under the Aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences" under the authorship of Stefan Pascu, Florin Constantiniu and others. According to Béla Köpeczi's introduction to the new English version of *Erdély története*, *History of Transylvania*, the authors of this pamphlet

...reiterated the basic tenets of Romanian historiography with regard to Daco-Roman continuity, the autonomy of the Transylvanian voivodeship, the national endeavors of the voivode Mihai Viteazul, the justified rebellion of Transylvania's Romanians during the Hungarian War of Independence in 1848-49, and the oppression of Romanians by Magyars in the period of the Dual Monarchy.... They credited Transylvania's Romanians for the annexation enshrined in the Treaty of Trianon, evoked the oppression of Romanians and the deportation of Jews between 1940 and 1945 in Northern Transylvania, and reiterated that the nationality question had been satisfactorily settled in Romania.

They branded *Erdély története* a revisionist and chauvinist work reminiscent of Hungarian historiography in the Horthy era. (pp. 10-11)

The general international scholarly reception of *Erdély története* was the opposite of this official Romanian line. Extensive reviews appeared from the pens of Norman Stone, Gerhard Seewann, Martyn Rady, James Niessen, Thomas Szendrey and others that put the appearance of the three volumes in a much more positive light. Although the reviewers provided both positive and negative critiques of certain aspects of the three volumes, they also observed that this work was a welcome, even invaluable addition, to the study of Transylvanian history.

Two scholarly conferences were also devoted to the assessment of these volumes, one held in Debrecen, Hungary, in October, 1987, the other in Paris in November, 1992. The Debrecen conference provided the forum for twenty-eight historians. It permitted a thorough survey of the three volumes with critiques of the major subjects, methodology, themes and time periods of the work. The great merit of the conference was that the critiques appeared under the editorship of István Rácz in a collection published in 1988 under the title *Tanulmányok Erdély történetéről* [Studies on the history of Transylvania]. This work provided detailed critiques which became invaluable for the newer editions of the series as well as for the publication of the abridged one-volume versions of *Erdély története* appearing in Magyar in 1989, in German in 1990, in French in 1992, and in English in 1994.

The Paris Conference, although more limited in participation, but recorded on videotape and subsequently broadcast on television, included three French participants as moderators/commentators, three Romanian participants, two of them signatories of the Times advertisement, and three Hungarian authors/editors of the original three-volume work. Although the position of the Hungarian authors and the Romanian participants had not changed dramatically since 1987, the tone of the discussion was much more civilized and informed. At least two factors were responsible for this. First, the political climate changed after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the death of Ceaușescu in 1989, and the presence of the French historians as moderators and commentators acted as brakes on extremist dialogue. The end result of these discussions and of the reviews which appeared at that time was that the authors/editors now felt justified in attempting to have the entire three-volume set translated into English. In this effort it is important to note that a trans-Atlantic effort came into being including not only the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, but also the Hungarian Research Institute of Canada, the Atlantic Studies on Society in Change series and the East

European Monograph series, with the financial support of the Soros Foundation.

In the short-run, the publication of the English language *History of Transylvania* in 2001, did not have the kind of polarized response either at the level of scholarship or interstate relations as did its Hungarian predecessor. The changed political climate was one reason, but probably more significant was the fact that the work was now in a language easily accessible to scholarship on a global level. This also means that in the long-term this English version will have greater impact on the perceptions and scholarship of the Western world. While this result is in itself to be applauded, it also throws into stark relief the great obstacle that faces scholarship appearing only in Magyar. Scrutinizing Transylvanian history through the English-language window means missing much of the original message, because *History of Transylvania* (2001) is both something more and something less than *Erdély története* (1986).

The English version is less than the original because its physical limitations are more pronounced. The original had a 7" by 10" per page format whereas the new version has only 5 1/2" by 8 1/2" of space per page. Although this increases the overall number of pages of the English version, it eliminates the wealth of maps, diagrams, charts, and pictures that appeared in the original version. *Erdély története* had an exuberant collage of visual documentation, including 783 black and white photographs, 127 colour photographs, 58 maps, 38 tables, and 27 charts and diagrams. *History of Transylvania* retains only the maps, but even those appear only in black and white and usually only on the 5 1/2" by 8 1/2" reduced space of the individual pages, i. e., there are no fold-out or coloured maps.

History of Transylvania is less than its predecessor in one other way. It does not try to cover developments since the Treaty of Trianon (1920). In the introduction to the compilation Béla Köpeczi excuses this omission by presenting two arguments: first, the political constraints of the time when it was written provided a distorted perspective. Therefore, this section did not deserve to be translated; second, historical objectivity is unattainable in the analysis of "recent events." This is a weak excuse and the result is unfortunate. The 1920-1989 section should have been rewritten just for the English edition. This would have counteracted the negative effects of a study such as that of Kurt W. Treptow's edited volume on *A History of Romania* (New York, 1996), which continues to perpetuate the time-worn dogmas of the past.

Treptow's edited volume of 1996 was almost a direct but unstated response to the English one-volume abridged version of *Erdély története*. It provides a basic summary of most of the Romanian arguments discussed

above. The appearance of the three-volume *History of Transylvania* in 2001 is therefore a welcome addition to the literature because in a real sense it approaches Transylvanian history from a new perspective, even if it lacks a discussion of many important twentieth-century developments, including the Second Vienna Award (1940) and the nationality policies of the respective governments from 1920-1989. It emphasizes the history of the region, including all the peoples that have contributed to the formation of its history. In other words, it does not regard Transylvania as the stage on which only one people enacted their aspirations. It uses a comparative approach, which enables the reader to appreciate the region's events from the perspective of all the major actors — Magyars/Szeklers, Romanians and Germans/Saxons and Swabians — as well as the contributions of Jews, Armenians, Bulgars, and others, even peoples who have stepped off that stage, or have been absorbed by others, such as the Goths, the Huns, or the Gepids, and the Avars.

The strength of this approach becomes evident when it is compared to Treptow's *A History of Romania*, which tries to construct the history of the region as if it had always been a Romanian "country." This approach is a unilinear interpretation that deposits into history the present political borders of Romania and lets these borders dictate the content. In other words, it assumes that the "Romanian countries" were destined to become Romanian even before the unification of Wallachia (Oltenia) and Moldavia with Transylvania following World War I. It assumes that a national destiny was already unfolding in the mind and the actions of Michael Viteazul (Michael the Brave) during his brief voivodeship of the "three countries" at the beginning of the seventeenth century (1599-1601).

The contrast between these two approaches is reflected in the number of pages of text devoted proportionately to the different phases of the region's history. *History of Transylvania* devotes approximately 330 pages to the prehistory of Transylvania, 250 pages to its medieval evolution, and 300 pages to the period from the 1526 battle of Mohács to the end of the Fifteen Years War (1591-1606). It devotes the entire second volume to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with a slight overlap into the beginning of the nineteenth, leaving the third volume to confront the problems of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (to 1920). Compared to this, Treptow's volume devotes a scant fifty pages to ancient history, mainly to develop the Daco-Roman thesis. His study then devotes the next eighty pages to the Middle Ages ending with the "First Unification of the Romanian Lands" (1599-1601). The next chapter devotes seventy pages to the "Early Modern Age" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whereas 160 pages

are devoted to the modern age (1821-1918), and 185 pages to the twentieth century from 1918 to 1989.

History of Transylvania contains an evolved discussion of the region's past and relates it to the struggles of its peoples. It avoids the pitfalls of an ethnocentric bias. Overall, it succeeds in achieving this purpose. Its weakness is in part a consequence of human fallibility and mortality. The original authors/editors are not the ones who reedited the English version. Many of the authors had passed away by the early 1990s, including András Mócsy, Zsolt Trocsányi, and László Makkai. Many new authors joined the ranks of the reediting process including Gábor Vékony, Ambrus Miskolczi and István Bóna. Furthermore, the translation and reediting also added Béla K. Király, László Veszprémy, Bennett Kovrig, and Péter Szaffko to influence the final reformulated text and content of the three volumes. The influence of the content and translation of the abridged 1994 version also had its impact. In terms of the format, this resulted in a better final product. In terms of content, it led to an overly cautious presentation. The dropping of the analysis of the 1920-1989 period indicates this fact.

The English translation of *History of Transylvania* is generally good, with the exception of some unfortunate weak points in the preface and in the acknowledgments which were probably added at the last moment without the benefit of a stylistic review. The volumes are also marred by some typographical and spelling errors. These — or, at least, many of them — could have been screened out with the help of additional proofreading. But an enterprise of this magnitude is bound to retain such imperfections regardless of the efforts to eliminate them.

The content of *History of Transylvania* also requires some specific reflections to pinpoint its merits. First, the addition of brief biographical sketches of prominent individuals as an appendix (Vol. I, 807-815, Vol. II, 799-810, and Vol. III, 810-819) is definitely beneficial. Second, the retention of the diversity of interpretations is also an asset. Unlike the homogenized nationalist versions of the region's history, the Béla K. Király-edited volumes continue the diversity of its predecessor. Just two examples may suffice. First, the two interpretations of the Hungarian settlement of Transylvania differ. István Bóna's interpretation, presented with archaeological evidence, argues that the Hungarians entered Transylvania from the east and used it as a base for conquering the Pannonian lowlands and the central plains. László Makkai presents the contrasting argument that the Hungarians had first conquered the plains region and Transdanubia and then spread eastward, incorporating/consolidating Transylvania in the eleventh rather than the tenth century.

A later section, Vol. I, 593-769 of the *History of Transylvania* presents two other conflicting interpretations, relating to Suleiman the Magnificent's policies of expansionism into central Hungary and Transylvania. Two historians, Katalin Péter and Agnes R. Várkonyi, argue that Ottoman Turkish policy at the time was not driven by an insatiable appetite for new territories but by rational considerations, and by a flexible application of Ottoman power. This included, among other considerations, a willingness to depend on indirect control through local princes, as in Transylvania, or through voivodes in Wallachia and Moldavia. But the counterarguments are also presented by Gábor Barta, who contends that much of Ottoman policy was driven by an irrational desire for expansion. These are characteristics of the three volumes that indicate a rejection of dogmatic interpretation on all the significant issues of Transylvanian history.

This openness and commitment to listen and to present a balanced view of existing interpretations is one of the principal merits of the three volumes of *History of Transylvania*. As Péter Takács points out in his critique of the first version of the compilation (*Tanulmányok Erdély történetéről*):

The authors have approached historical problems in a scientific way. This approach should take the place of those arbitrary interpretations which have led millions of people to accept a distorted image of their past. The authors have also smashed a taboo. So far even historians themselves have ... believed that if they keep quiet, they will not do any harm to the past. Today the authors convince us that silence is no remedy for injustice, misinterpretations and false evidence. (p. 283)

This same conclusion also applies to the Béla K. Király-edited version! These three volumes should be on the bookshelves of all Central and East European research centres and in the collections of all major universities in the English-speaking world.

Editor's note: A slightly different version of this review article appeared in the *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 31, 1-2 (2004): 127-30. We're indebted to this journal's editors for permission to re-print the review here.

Editor's note: In the appendix below we reproduce most of the review of the original, Hungarian version of *Erdély története* by the late Thomas Szendrey (1941-2003). It appeared in vol. 16, nos. 1-2 (Spring-Fall, 1989) of our journal, pp. 137-50.

APPENDIX

A History of Transylvania: Its Impact and Reception

Thomas Szendrey

Béla Köpeczi, ed. *Erdély története*. 3 vols. Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1986.

History should be written *sine ira et studio*, but that is never wholly possible; nor can it ever measure up to the Rankean ideal, but nonetheless should attempt to approach it. These volumes on the history of Transylvania certainly attempt this in spite of the great temptations and difficulties involved in writing about this part of the world and its competing nationalisms.

However, there is another factor in the writing of history than the scholarly intentions of the historians, namely the political-cultural context in which one of necessity must live and work. Then there is also the network of world politics and the particular place in it occupied by both reader and writer, which in turn gives rise to interpretations and evaluations, indeed misinterpretations and re-evaluations based upon subjective interests. This is something no writer or historian can fully anticipate or control. The work has a life of its own and becomes a part of the consciousness of its readers, living on and influencing life in its myriad dimensions. This review is thus an expression of this consciousness in the life of one historian, hopefully a fair and meaningful one.

A detailed and comprehensive three volume history of Transylvania has been published under the aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and edited by the then minister of cultural affairs Béla Köpeczi, a literary and cultural historian of some renown. The work has generated more controversy among historians, politicians, and the public in Hungary, Rumania, and indeed throughout the world, mostly on account of the bitter response it has elicited from Rumanian academic and political circles. This has been augmented and followed by the defence of the volumes by spokesmen for the Hungarian government as well as those by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.¹ Furthermore, scholars throughout the world, especially those concerned with the history of East Central Europe and also those dealing with minority issues, have also responded to the volumes and the controversy surrounding them in both the media and scholarly publications.² One needs to add that if the interest extends beyond purely academic circles and is perceived of in political terms, even the language of publication, i.e. Hungarian, mostly ceases as an issue of concern. After all, numerous significant and controversial books have been published in the Hungarian language without generating interest and controversy of this magnitude, extending from the pages of leading world newspapers to the halls of the U.S. Congress and beyond.

Obviously, there must be a number of reasons for this vast interest in a rather lengthy (almost 2,000 pages) and detailed scholarly work dealing with a small and isolated geographical entity populated mostly by Hungarians, Rumanians, and Germans (Saxons); a part of Rumania since the peace treaties after World War I, it was for most of its history a part of the Hungarian kingdom and also for approximately 150 years an independent principality quite conscious of its Hungarian ties. The interest is certainly not evoked either by the style and detail of the three rather hefty volumes, representing difficult reading even for one well versed in the history of the people and nations involved. Perhaps the interest can be explained in part because nothing comparable has been written or published in Hungary for more than forty years; this, however, would only explain the interest in the volumes by Hungarians and Hungarian-reading specialists and scholars dealing with these topics....

The concern and interest of Rumanian historians and the reading public in Rumania should be and is self-evident. The volumes deal with topics which involve their ancestors in Transylvania, the development of the Rumanian nationality there, and their status in the region, among other issues.³ Nonetheless, the volumes deal with these topics in a way which often challenges the assumptions of Rumanian national sentiment and especially Rumanian nationalist historiography. Indeed, the response to these volumes

border on politically induced hysteria, by no means a proper response to volumes from which the Hungarian chauvinistic mentality and tone, which had marred some other writings on this theme, are decidedly missing. One cannot but believe that the Rumanian response, especially by its political leaders and many of its historians and writers, is unwarranted and unjustifiable.⁴

There must be more to the generally expressed Rumanian attitude toward these volumes than a concern with scholarship and alternative interpretations; the tone of the writings and polemics directed against the work certainly points in such a direction. In the judgment of this reviewer this something else is the politization of scholarship, especially history, to serve the goal of creating a unitary national state by the current regime at the expense of destroying the national past of the major ethnic minorities in Rumania today, namely the Hungarians and Saxons of Transylvania. The changes in nationality policies the past twenty years certainly point in this direction. Consider the following; many local archives, especially in Transylvania have been gathered together and forcibly removed to Bucharest and other locations; decrees have limited education in the languages of the minorities and publication opportunities have been greatly restricted. The list could be extended to include political and socio-economic decisions which have impacted negatively on the quality of life in Rumania, but these have also affected all citizens of the state regardless of nationality and have led to some limited manifestations of dissatisfaction with the regime and the unparalleled and unprecedented number of refugees (and not just ethnic Hungarians) seeking refuge in Hungary and elsewhere.

All of these events have had an impact on the conscience of peoples throughout the world, especially in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada (which together with Hungary sponsored a resolution on human rights at the Vienna conference on cooperation and peace) and which has resulted in some unpleasant and damaging political publicity for the Rumanian regime. Quite simply, the fate of the largest national minority in East Central Europe — the Hungarians of Transylvania — is a matter of some concern and this is by no means totally unrelated to the history of Transylvania and its peoples. Thus, the publication of this three volume *Erdély története*, by the publishing house of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, has once again focused attention on an issue which for the past forty years has been kept alive mostly outside of Hungary. It is to this situation that we must now turn.

With the imposition of the Soviet hegemony over East Central Europe in the immediate post-World War II era, it was stressed that the imposition of a new internationalist ideology would remove or at least alleviate the national

antagonisms of the region. Given the extent and depth of nationalist sentiment this did not and has not happened, but two consequences of the somewhat altered nationality situation in post-war East Central Europe must be noted nonetheless. First of all, the peoples of the region suffered a similar fate under native Stalinist regimes. Secondly, the Hungarian minority in Rumania obtained more autonomy, especially in educational and cultural matters, than during the Ceaușescu years. It was undoubtedly the situation of the Hungarian minority, especially during the past few years, which led to the decision on the part of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (with the necessary consent of the government) to proceed with the publication of this work.

In a preliminary unpublished review of this work, Nándor Dreisziger noted that the publication of these volumes was a "debt paid in Budapest,"⁵ after more than forty years of official silence about Transylvania. One might extend this observation by noting that the historical consciousness of the elder generation had not forgotten about Transylvania, but had no forum to express its concern. The younger generation, meanwhile, generally only knew about Hungarians living in Rumania and was mostly unaware of the historical connection between Hungary and Transylvania. It was the joint activity (still mostly unrecognized) of Hungarians in the western world and the writings and activities of writers such as Gyula Illyés and Áron Tamási on behalf of the Hungarian minorities which awakened the consciousness of many Hungarians and brought about a renewal of interest and concern with Hungarians beyond the borders of Hungary in the early 1970s.⁶ Hungarian writers and scholars in the western world had not been affected by caesura of official non-concern for Transylvania and the Hungarian minorities generally and had kept alive in their consciousness the historical connection of Hungary and Transylvania, even if not always with the necessary critical spirit. One could thus argue that the confluence of concern for Transylvania by Hungarians throughout the world was united by the rising intolerance of the Ceaușescu regime toward its minorities generally and the Hungarian one specifically. The most recent manifestations of this concern were the huge demonstration at Budapest on June 27, 1988 and the ongoing activity of the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation and other such organizations in the United States and elsewhere.⁷ All of these and other activities are tied in with the renewed interest of Hungarians with Transylvania and the publication of these three volumes is also tied in with this, even if only indirectly, with the consequences of its publication, and certainly not with the intentions of its writers who consistently maintained a sense of scholarship and a moderate tone in their work. In spite of the extent and quality of the three volumes (and the large number

of copies sold and distributed), for many people it still remains a mostly unread symbol of care and concern resting on their bookshelves for others to see. It should be noted that the scholarly level and sometimes turgid style ill suits this work for a popular audience. For academics and scholars, however, it is and remains an essential and latest component of an on-going tradition of historical writing on Transylvania....

* * *

Even a cursory examination of the development of Hungarian historiography will confirm that the history of Transylvania has always been a significant component of it. From the earliest chronicles, through the writings of the Renaissance and humanist scholars, the accounts of seventeenth century memoir writers, and extending into the era of modern and contemporary historical scholarship, Hungarian and Transylvanian history have generally been treated as parts of an integral entity, even when some parts were independent or under foreign rule at different times in a more or less common past. One should also add that this common history included the past of the non-Magyar peoples who also live in Transylvania.

These historical writings before the eighteenth century generally dealt more with the monarchy and aristocratic and military elements of the society and did so generally without sharply distinguishing ethnic or national background; that was not their primary consideration. With the eighteenth century — and accelerating in significance — there commenced a great interest in the past which resulted in the formulation of national histories for the various peoples of Europe generally, but especially for those who lacked a distinct historical tradition of their own. It was thus during the late seventeenth and mostly during the eighteenth century that there developed distinct historiographical traditions in Transylvania among Hungarians (in addition to the already developed currents of Hungarian historiography), Rumanians (in conjunction mostly with the Moldavians and Wallachians), and Saxons (also distinct from other German historical developments). Needless to say, these emerging traditions could best be described as incipiently self-conscious, leading eventually to a fully developed romantically inspired nationalism.

Some examples of this development can be pointed out here, but it is not possible to provide a comprehensive account of these historiographical traditions.⁸ Nor do these volumes discussed in this review provide more than an episodic and scattered historiographical account — one of their most obvious shortcomings. A distinctive historiographical tradition emerges from

the writings of Gábor Bethlen, prince regnant of Transylvania in the early seventeenth century, including especially the writings of Bethlen himself, that of his court historian Bojthi Veres Gáspár and also János Kemény among others.⁹ This tradition was continued apace during the balance of the century and even beyond. A few examples may be noted: Péter Apor, *Metamorphosis Transylvaniae* (1736); Péter Bód, *Magyar Athenas* (1766); also the historical writings of Mihály Cserei, Pál Ember Debreczeni, József Benkő, and János Kénosi-Tőzser. Among the Saxons one must take note of Marton Schmeizel who taught a generation of Saxon historians in Transylvania. Hence in the centuries during which modern historical scholarship developed, the Hungarian and Saxon scholars of Transylvania produced valuable work.

Rumanian scholarship in Transylvania also began to develop in the early and mid-eighteenth centuries and found support among the Rumanian aristocracy and clergy. Especially significant was the political and scholarly work of Inochentie Micu-Klein and his activities were significant for the subsequent development of Rumanian historical consciousness,¹⁰ specifically the first formulation by him of the theory of Daco-Roman-Rumanian continuity in 1735. There were hardly any other significant formulations before this time.

The ongoing interest in and concern with the past of the various peoples who populated Transylvania through the centuries received an obvious impetus from the gradual extension of nationalism to more and more elements of the population. Historical writings increased in number and became the foundation of those historically based ideologies which became and continue to be significant for shaping and influencing the historiographical tradition and historical-political consciousness of these peoples. The more strict devotion to scholarly canons characteristic of many (by no means all) eighteenth century works gradually gave way to historical writings and attitudes characterized by a sense of romantic nationalism; this may have been helpful for the development of literary and cultural life in a national context. It was certainly not favourable for the maintenance of the commitment to finding out what happened, so essential to the continued writing of sound history. Indeed, the historical works of the first half of the nineteenth century (with very few exceptions) were characterized more by a love of nation than dedication to historical truth. A romanticized version of the history of the peoples of East Central Europe became — and continues to persist in some form — as a component part of the respective historical mythology of these peoples. This has not been salutary for either scholarship or the promotion of understanding among these peoples. The political history

of Transylvania is certainly a telling and instructive commentary of this situation.¹¹

Late nineteenth century historical writing (and this historiographical tradition continued certainly until 1914) found itself ensnared in a political-cultural conflict. As it moved away from many of the illusions of romantic historiography toward a more positivist and scientific historiography, the historical consciousness of their readers (the educated public generally) was still informed — indeed captivated — by prior vision. Thus scholarship, while moving away from that vision found itself out of touch with a nationalist inspired political system. The activities of scholars and writers such as Sándor Szilágyi, Henrik Marczáli, and Imre Mikó among others, thus did not always mesh with popular ideals and aspirations about past, present, and future. Rumanian historical scholarship also became substantially more nationalistic (cf. Xenopol, Iorga, etc.) for the reason that historical studies and consciousness emanating therefrom served well Rumanian nationalist aspirations.

This politization of historical scholarship led to mutual recriminations and fostered attitudes of hostility and misunderstanding. All of this was then caught up in the throes of World War I and its all too well-known consequences, specifically the division of Austria-Hungary by the peace treaties of St. Germain and Trianon.¹² Nor did this fail to have an impact on scholarly life generally and historical writing specifically. While some attempts were made to maintain the necessary dedication to the principles and moral demands of historical scholarship, the shock of Trianon — probably the greatest tragedy in the history of the Hungarian nation¹³ — was simply too much and the revisionism born of the dismemberment of Hungary acted as an impetus to politicians and very many scholars and historians to point out the injustices of the changed situation of Hungarians in this region of Europe. Thus, a new revisionist historiography was born and while in the hands of competent historians (such as Gyula Szekfü, Bálint Homan, Sándor Domanovszky, and Imre Lukinich among others) it retained a sense of qualified professionalism, qualified, however, only in the context of revisionist attitudes; the other characteristics remained on the same high scholarly level as previously.

Revisionism became the central concern of the political and cultural life of inter-war Hungary and resulted in some very obvious dislocations in the historical consciousness of very many Hungarians; often it led to highly unrealistic political and cultural attitudes and fostered the acceptance of catastrophic and radical historical and political visions.¹⁴ For example, at the time of the second Vienna Award (1940), when a part of Transylvania was restored to Hungary, a commemorative album entitled *Erdély* (Transylvania)

was published with the participation of many of Hungary's most esteemed scholars and politicians and this undoubtedly reflected rather evidently the revisionist program and its attitudes.¹⁵ However, even this volume still exhibited a substantially more moderate tone and was characterized by more respect for the standards of language and scholarship than the most recent (since the mid-sixties) Rumanian government sponsored historical or other writings on Hungary.¹⁶ Needless to say, not all writings produced by Rumanian and Hungarian writers and scholars about each other are characterized by such invective. It is precisely these three volumes which provide numerous examples of understanding and cooperation among the various peoples inhabiting Transylvania.

Movement away from excessively revisionistic attitudes on the part of Hungarian scholars and historians can be noted by the early 1940s; one must mention the establishment and work of the Teleki Institute; also, Gyula Szekfű's book *Etat et Nation* (1942) represents a movement away from revisionism as did the writings of László Gáldi and László Makkai; the latter wrote a number of books including *Erdély története* (1946) and edited the second volume of the work under review.

The changed attitude was in no small measure the result of World War II; revisionism — or, at the very least, its most outspoken version — was tempered by the crucible of war and defeat, the consequence of which was the reconfirmation of the Trianon frontiers at the Paris peace conference of 1947. The imposition of Soviet hegemony over East Central Europe after the war engulfed both Rumania and Hungary and this common condition caused more concern for the Hungarians and Rumanians respectively than the nationality disputes; immediate post-war relations between the various peoples were better, though by no means free of conflict and controversy. Hungarian historians in post-war Transylvania carried out some historical work characterized by sound scholarship and a somewhat more conciliatory spirit, especially the work of Lajos Kelemen and his students, but this nonetheless remained the work of a tolerated minority; the same is true with regard to the work of Imre Mikó.

The Rumanian historical attitudes were mostly maintained, but marked gradually by an ever increasing Marxist character. This also occurred in the case of the scholarly work of the national minorities; Marxist hegemony became the order of the day. Although hampered by the restrictions of this ideology, the internationalist attitudes of the Soviet imposed regimes somewhat attenuated nationality conflicts, at least until 1962. Since that time the increasingly intolerant nationality policy of the Ceaușescu regime has weighed ever more heavily on the nationalities, especially the large Hungarian

minority. Indeed, there has been and continues to be a strongly chauvinistic tone to Rumanian political and cultural policies. This was also evident in the planning and execution of the International Congress of Historical Sciences held in Bucharest in 1980.

On account of the close connection between some elements of Hungarian revisionism and Nazi Germany, most manifest in the German role in the two Vienna awards, the post-war regimes were not particularly receptive to the revisionism of the pre-war years, but were nonetheless somewhat concerned with the fate and future of the Hungarian minorities. This changed abruptly with the imposition of the Soviet-backed communist government in 1948 and revisionism — and even nationalism — became in effect taboo subjects. Hungarian nationalism and concern with Hungarian populations in the so-called former succession states were neglected and proscribed. The struggle against nationalism and its manifold manifestations occupied the time of many historians and ideologues. Although there remained some minimal evidences of concern with the minorities, the issue continued to be neglected and even actively discouraged until the early 1970s, at which time a few studies on Hungarian minorities once again appeared and some public attention was once again focused on these issues.¹⁷ With the exception of a few relatively minor and highly specialized historical writings on the minorities, the three volume *Erdély története* published in 1986 was the first comprehensive history of Transylvania produced in Hungary since the volume entitled also *Erdély története* by László Makkai some forty years earlier. His scholarly activity thus provides the only continuity of writing on Transylvania in Hungary today....

[*Erdély története*]... [had] angered and provoked the Rumanian government; thus this history of Transylvania not only became a scholarly concern but entered the political arena. Rumanian government reaction to these volumes has been virulent in the extreme and the academic and cultural media have taken their cue from the government response.

* * *

In this connection it may be useful to examine the motivation of Hungarian historians for producing this work; it should be evident from the amount of work and effort that went into it that it has been in the planning and writing phases for a number of years and thus could not have been motivated by strict political considerations alone. In another sense, however, it represented an ongoing concern which had been kept under political wraps for quite some

time; the history of Transylvania, after all, has always been a part of or intimately related to the history of the Hungarian peoples for a thousand years and has always been studied or written about by Hungarian historians as they dealt with the history of Hungary. The publication of a separate or specific history of Transylvania, however, has been subjected to political restraints for many years since 1946. Hence, the publication of these three volumes now is not totally unrelated to either the political vicissitudes of the last forty years in Hungary specifically and the Soviet bloc contextually; nor is it unrelated to the much longer tradition of Hungarian historical writing about Transylvania.

The reasons motivating the publication of these volumes were stated and specified in a lecture given by Zsigmond P. Pach (academician and director, Institute of History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences) entitled "Why do we write the History of Transylvania," presented to a professional conference devoted to this topic and published in the literary-cultural weekly *Élet és Irodalom* (Life and Literature).¹⁸ Pach makes three key points in his lecture.

First of all, he rejects any association with prior Hungarian nationalism and revisionism, stating in the process that they as Marxists are opposed to all kinds of nationalism and also reject nationalist Hungarian historical writings. Secondly, Pach rejects with equal vehemence the older, newer, and most recent formulations of Rumanian nationalist historiography as well, specifically the theory of Daco-Roman continuity and the related "historical rights" of the Rumanians to Transylvania. This brief critique is then concluded with a third point, namely the unwillingness of Hungarian historians to engage in a nationalist dispute, stressing instead that the history of Transylvania forms an integral part of both Hungarian and Rumanian history and that historical scholarship should not be used to deny the existence or rights of the other.¹⁹

This statement, while undoubtedly academic in tone, and not dealing specifically with the political dimension of the conflict over Transylvania and the human and national rights of the minority populations, nonetheless stands out in bold relief from the bulk of the Rumanian statements and reviews of these three volumes. The reaction of the Rumanian party and political leadership, as first formulated by Ceaușescu and repeated by numerous others on many levels and at different forums, accused the Hungarian government of fascist tendencies, Horthyite revisionism, and the utter falsification of history, among other similar charges and characterizations. Many of the statements were then repeated in not only the popular, but also the professional and academic media and official government publications in foreign languages. The vehemence and tone of these responses and reviews have even been noted by western scholars who have reviewed these volumes in literary and professional reviews. Herewith are but two examples. Norman Stone, writing in the

Times (London) *Literary Supplement*, concludes as follows: “Meanwhile, the sheer hardship of life, in terms of hunger and cold and darkness, is the one thing that has remained genuinely internationalist in present-day Rumania. That darkness, to judge from the over-reaction of the Rumanian Academy of Sciences to a scholarly work of high standard, goes far.”²⁰ Another reviewer, Martyn Rady, writing in the *Slavonic and East European Review*, writes the following: “Nevertheless, despite the evident scholarship of its contents and the impressive — and hitherto unsullied — reputation of its individual contributors, *Erdély története* has been roundly condemned in Rumania as a mischievous work which deliberately falsifies the historical record.”²¹ It should be noted that this review attempts sympathetically to understand the Rumanian version of Transylvanian history and their point of view.²²

Professional reviews of this work inevitably praise its scholarly tone, comprehensiveness, organization, and the conscious effort to incorporate the history of the Saxons and Rumanians. While written from a Hungarian perspective, its discussion of the Rumanian role in the history of Transylvania is quite detailed and balanced; there is no denial of their role and place in Transylvania and the chauvinism expressed by some Hungarian statesmen and writers in the latter nineteenth century is as roundly condemned as the formulations of Rumanian historical mythology. There is evident some disagreement on the interpretation of the role of the Rumanians in the 1848 revolutions, but then Hungarian historians are not agreed on similar issues concerning 1848 in other parts of Hungary either. There is a very detailed discussion and analysis of the early settlements which conclude, on the basis of archaeological and historical analysis, that the theory of Daco-Roman continuity is not tenable; it should be stressed that some Rumanian archaeologists also dispute that point on the basis of archaeological and historical evidence.²³

It may be instructive to point out that the periodization and some of the discussion is based upon self-confessed Marxist categories, but this is generally subdued and thus only marginally evident. Furthermore, the books are supplemented by comprehensive bibliographies; further documentation can be found in the notes which are not as extensive as one is used to in historical monographs. However, this is not so much a monographic study than a synthesis and if viewed in that context the documentation can be judged as sufficient. There is one disturbing element and that is the excessive role assigned to the history of economic affairs and the vast amount of such detail; this is especially evident in the third volume covering the period since 1830. Intellectual and cultural affairs are not given as much prominence as one would have desired and the role of the churches is mostly limited to their

political role. The rich spiritual and theological heritage is not given its proper estimate. These comments notwithstanding, the work achieves its major goal of presenting a synthesis of the history of Transylvania.

Having previously noted the response of Rumania's political leadership to this work, a brief characterization of the reviews and statements of some Rumanian scholars may also prove instructive. Sadly, however, these statements in their essentials follow the lead and tone of the political declarations; indeed it was expected, even mandated that this be so. The work under discussion is generally characterized as a malevolent work which deliberately falsifies history in the service of Hungarian revisionism. An essay by Titus Popovici entitled "Deliberate Falsification of History: Method and Style" manages to gather more invective — punctuated by personal insults against one of the major authors, László Makkai — and distortion into fifteen pages than most writers. Just one example, and by no means the most offensive, is the following: "I shall endeavor to describe the content of *Erdély Története*, a still-born product of a gang-rape of history, showing no leniency to the 'intellectual' stature of the authors of this hybrid concoction which displays a distressing simplicity and lack of sophistication even in the use of nuances."²⁴ One should add that the description of the content assumes the work to be a cheap pulp novel, a characterization varied and repeated any number of times. Obviously, this kind of writing is best left without comment.

Another such critique, while somewhat more subdued in tone, discusses mostly the first volume, specifically the archaeological chapters written mostly by András Mocsy. Not satisfied with disagreeing with Mocsy's conclusions, which is after all a right any reviewer and critic possesses, they constantly characterize it as tendentious and non-scientific; however, the constant repetition of charges without substantial other or contrary evidence does not qualify as a critical assessment.²⁵

The attribution of ill will, obvious chauvinistic attitudes, the falsification of history — charges constantly repeated — is also typical of an article entitled "A Conscious Forgery of History under the Aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences."²⁶ After a brief review of some contested points typical of most Rumanian critical observations on these themes, the authors, including Stefan Pascu, a leading Rumanian historian specializing in the history of Transylvania, assert "that the national question has been fully and finally settled,"²⁷ thereby denying even the very existence of minority populations in Rumania. After this political assertion, the review goes on to castigate some of the writers personally and bemoans the lack of attention to twentieth century developments, specifically noting that the volume does not

mention what the reviewers characterize as the “great” industrial accomplishments of socialist Rumania.

While it is correct that the history of Transylvania published by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences treats the history of Transylvania beyond 1918 only very briefly in a postscript type of chapter, even that fact may be explained by other considerations. The historical sources and the necessary critical analysis of those has not as yet been completed and finalized, but more to the point; these events are still too close in time to allow the necessary perspective for a nuanced, sound, and balanced analysis. The events of World War II, the passions engendered by human rights issues, the current situation of the Hungarian minority there, are all factors which make it emotionally difficult to achieve the necessary scholarly striving for some semblance of objectivity.

The history of twentieth century Transylvania still remains to be written. In this connection, it should be stated that the publication of these volumes has already engendered a renewed interest in the past and present of Transylvania. This interest must be maintained and it is surely to be hoped that cooperation with historians from Rumania, and especially, the involvement of historians from Transylvania's minorities in the future will be possible once the tone changes and the minorities in that country can once again continue to develop their cultural identity. In spite of the hope here expressed, the prospects appear even dimmer if one examines the future of education and cultural life for the minorities there. The destruction of villages planned by the Ceaușescu regime, which elicited a huge demonstration in Budapest, also pushes the possibility of intellectual and cultural cooperation further into the future. Even in this context, one of the marchers in the Budapest demonstration carried a sign which read: “We do not wish the return of Transylvania, but rather the restoration of a more human life in Transylvania.”²⁸ This sentiment should be read in the light of the statements cited from the reviews published in the Rumanian media....

NOTES

¹ Statement of the Hungarian government as given in *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), April 2, 1987.

² See for example a review by Norman Stone "Bad blood in Transylvania," *Times Literary Supplement*, October 2-8, 1987, p. 1066.

³ These were probably the most sensitive issues in the eyes of the Rumanian reader. The reviews to be cited later tend to confirm this.

⁴ A judgment shared by most reviewers; cf. Stone review cited in n. 2.

⁵ Preliminary, unpublished review by Nandor Dreisziger.

⁶ The writings of Gyula Illyés were instrumental in awakening interest in the fate of Hungarian minorities. Some of his essays and poems encouraged many others, such as Sándor Csoóri and István Csurka.

⁷ The Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, and organization of mostly young Hungarians in the U.S. and Canada has been involved in the political arena, relief work, and publications. It has issued a number of reports on the situation of Hungarian minorities, and established a broad base of support. There are also numerous other organizations active in the support of human rights in Transylvania in the western world.

⁸ Two articles by the current writer may be of some interest in connection with these matters: "Hungarian Historiography and European Currents of Thought," in *Society in Change: Studies in Honor of Béla K. Király*, ed. S.B. Vardy (Boulder, Co.: *East European Quarterly*, 1983), 391-411.; "Inter Arma: Reflections on Seventeenth Century Educational and Cultural Life in Hungary and Transylvania," in *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary*, ed. Béla Király and János Bak (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982), 315-334.

⁹ László Makkai, ed., *Erdély öröksége* (Budapest: Franklin Társulat, 1941), vol. 4.

¹⁰ *Erdély története*, vol. 2, pp. 1030-1034.

¹¹ Much of the historical mythology can still be found in the public consciousness.

¹² Trianon formed the basis of the Hungarian revisionism and the attempt to undo some of it was the basis of inter-war Hungarian revisionism.

¹³ The comment that Trianon was the greatest tragedy in Hungarian history was once made to this reviewer by John Lukacs. It is certainly comparable to Mohács. Hungarian historians are finally coming to terms with it once again. See the text of a radio interview conducted with a number of Hungarian historians by András Gerő, "Trianon a történelemben és a történelmi tudatban," *Világosság*, April 1988, pp. 219-237. It should be stressed that only 3 pages deal with Trianon in the three volume *Erdély története*, which is almost shockingly disproportionate.

¹⁴ Some of these would include the various theories about the supposed Turanian and Sumerian origins of the Hungarians; also evident were the number of right radical political organizations.

¹⁵ *Erdély* (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1940). The volume was also published in a number of foreign languages.

¹⁶ Compare with some of the Rumanian reviews of the *Erdély története* cited later in this review.

¹⁷ It is only now that there is ready acceptance of books on minority issues in Hungary.

¹⁸ *Élet és Irodalom*, Oct. 23, 1987 as reprinted in *Látóhatár*, Jan. 1988, pp. 147-152.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 151-152.

²⁰ Stone, review in *Times Literary Supplement*, cited in note 2.

²¹ Review of *Erdély története* by Martyn Rady, *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 66, 3 (July 1988), p. 482.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 484-485.

²³ *Erdély története*, vol. 1, p. 301.

²⁴ Titus Popovici, "Deliberate Falsification of History: Method and Style," *Romanian Review*, vol. 41, no. 5, p. 87.

²⁵ Dumitru Berciu *et al.*, "Fallacious Theses on the Making of the Romanian People and Language," *Romanian Review*, vol. 41, no. 7, pp. 74-88.

²⁶ Stefan Pascu *et al.*, "A Conscious Forgery of History under the Aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences," *Romanian Review*, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 3-21.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²⁸ *Tüntetés a Hősök Terén* (Budapest: Eötvös, 1988), p. 15.

The Székelys: Ancestors of Today's Hungarians? A New Twist to Magyar Prehistory

Nándor Dreisziger

Székely szülte a magyart
[Székely begot the Hungarian]
József Thury (1861-1906)

Vékony Gábor. *Magyar őstörténet – Magyar honfoglalás* [Hungarian prehistory – Hungarian conquest]. Budapest: Nap Kiadó, 2002. 224 pages.

Gyönyvér Tömöry, Bernadett Csányi, Erika Bogács-Szabó, Tibor Kalmár, Ágnes Czibula, Aranka Csósz, Katalin Priskin, Balázs Mende, Péter Langó, C. Stephen Downes and István Raskó. "Comparison of Maternal Lineage and Biogeographic Analyses of Ancient and Modern Hungarian Populations." *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*. 134 (2007). Pp. 354-368.

Bernadett Csányi, Erika Bogács-Szabó, Gyönyvér Tömöry, Ágnes Czibula, Katalin Priskin, Aranka Csósz, B. Mende, P. Langó, K. Csete, A. Zsolnai, E. K. Conant, C. S. Downes and I. Raskó. "Y-Chromosome Analysis of Ancient Hungarian and Two Modern Hungarian-Speaking Populations from the Carpathian Basin." *Annals of Human Genetics*, 72 (2008). Pp. 519-534.

Bogács-Szabó Erika *et al.* "Genetika és (magyar) őstörténet" [Genomics and (Magyar) Prehistory]. *Magyar Tudomány*, 169, 10 (2008).

In recent years a new science has become available for the study of prehistory: genomics, the study of human inter-relatedness through the examination of DNA. Genomics is sometimes also described as the science of deep ancestry.¹ Genomics was introduced to Hungary just about the time Gábor Vékony's book, *Magyar őstörténet – Magyar honfoglalás*, went to press.²

Because the results of the first genomic inquiries into the Hungarian past did not become public until years later, Vékony was not able to use them to support his theories. Since Vékony died in 2004,³ he never had the chance to find out that the results of these inquiries lend emphatic support to the most dramatic and probably also the most controversial of his conclusions.

The first purpose of this review will be to acquaint the reader with Vékony's book and its unconventional arguments. The second and perhaps more important aim of this review article will be to outline the results of the recent genomic research in Hungary which reinforce Vékony's extraordinary theories regarding the role of the Székelys in Magyar ethnogenesis.

The writer of these lines is not a historian of the pre-modern age. He is not a geneticist by training. Nevertheless, his long-term interest in pre-modern Magyar history and his passion about the new science of genomics hopefully offer some justification for his bringing this book to the attention of an audience that has no knowledge, or has only a limited knowledge of Hungarian, and cannot read Vékony's book in the original Magyar.

Many Hungarians are intensely interested in their national origins and ancient homeland. Not surprisingly, in the past few centuries, and especially in the past several decades, many books appeared dealing with these subjects. Some of these were written by people who had no training in any or most of the relevant disciplines of history, linguistics, archaeology or anthropology — and the conclusions they came to were often exotic or even fantastic, especially as to the question of the ancient Magyar homeland's location. Academics better trained in the relevant disciplines were more reluctant to endorse unconventional theories, but some of them did. In Vékony's book we have a work from an academic who was not reluctant to come to conclusions that most readers will regard as dramatic or even provocative.

We must say in advance that Vékony, a former member of the faculty of the Institute of Archaeology at Budapest's Eötvös Loránd University, does not belong to that very numerous camp of mostly amateur writers who deny the Magyar language's linguistic affinity to the other Finno-Ugric languages and trace the ancient Hungarian homeland to the land of Sumer. He is an ardent believer of the Uralic linguistic ancestry of the Magyar language. Regarding Sumerian, he proclaims that it has no connection to any known tongue, let alone Hungarian. Vékony's unconventional conclusions are made in connection with other aspects of Magyar prehistory.

In his lifetime Vékony published numerous books, mostly in Hungarian but also in English.⁴ He wrote the one at hand late in his life, and it sums up many decades of his researches. It begins innocuously enough, with an outline of the beginnings of Hungarian interest in Magyar prehistory in the 13th

century, in particular with the circumstances of Dominican friar Julianus' travels, in what is now European Russia, in search of the ancient Magyar homeland and "relatives left behind". He then continues with descriptions of the works of the 13th century priests Anonymus and Simon Kézai as well as of the lesser-known Franciscan friar Plano Carpini, Benedictus Polonus. The writings of Anonymus and Kézai have served as the chief sources of information for generations of Hungarian historians on the occupation of the Carpathian Basin by the Magyars at the end of the 9th century. Later in his book Vékony will tell us that he, in writing his version of the "conquest" story, refused to use these works, since much of what they say has been proven erroneous. The unreliability of these sources should come as no surprise to anyone. They were written centuries after the events, and they were also influenced by the political views, one might say the propaganda, of the masters (King Béla III and King László IV respectively) whom these authors served.

Vékony then continues with the historiography of the "Hungarian conquest" in the post-13th century period. He notes that attention to the uniqueness of the Magyar language was first paid in the 15th century by Galeotto Marzio, a courtier in King Matthias Corvinus' entourage. Vékony also traces the evolution of knowledge of Hungarian prehistory outside of Hungary, mainly at the Vatican and some European (including Russian) royal courts.

There is not much to write about Hungarian historiography during the age of Ottoman occupation. Scholarship declined in much of Hungary during this age, as did the study of history. Nevertheless it was in this period that the comparison of the Magyar language to other languages garnered increased interest, and the first language to be focused upon became Hebrew. Similarities between these two languages preoccupied scholars into the 19th century. In time Magyar became compared to other Near Eastern and Asian languages as well. It would not be long before attention would be shifted to the relationship of Hungarian to other Finno-Ugric languages.

According to Vékony, the first writer to proclaim the similarity of Magyar and Finnish, and even some Samoyed languages, was the 17th century scholar Georg Horn. Other Germans who followed were Martin Fogel and Johann Georg Eckhard, and then in Hungary, Dávid Cwittinger and György Pray. The most influential of the non-Hungarians were Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Philipp Johann von Starhemberg. The latter's work prompted József Torkos, the Lutheran minister in Győr, to conclude in 1747 that the Vogul language was closely related to Magyar (Vékony, p. 25). Though a few Hungarian scholars were aware of the studies of their German colleagues, according to Vékony in the 18th century the study of Finno-Ugric linguistics,

and even to some extent Hungarian prehistory, was primarily a “German science.” It remained so for many decades, despite the fact that in the 19th century interest in Hungary in Hungarian linguistic relationships and in the ancient Magyar homeland (*őshaza*) increased, as illustrated by the travels of Sándor Kőrösi Csoma in Tibet and India. The age of the French revolutionary wars, Napoleon’s conquests, the reactionary regimes that followed the Congress of Vienna, all contributed to a decline in interest in research about prehistory not only in Hungary but in the German world as well. The exceptions were the Hungarian legal scholar Antal Reguly and the Finnish researcher Matthias Alexander Castrén. These two men, according to Vékony, founded the modern science of Finno-Ugric comparative linguistic studies (pp. 30-31).

Reguly’s researches were evaluated and presented to the scientific world by Pál Hunfalvy, mainly in his book *A vogul föld és nép* [The Vogul land and people] (1864). By the end of his career, Hunfalvy had come to the conclusion that the Magyar language was closest to that of the Voguls (better known today as the Mansi) and the Ostyaks (the Khanti or Hanti). József Budenz, a professional linguist, also came to a similar conclusion, abandoning gradually his earlier belief that Magyar was closest to Turkish (pp. 31-32). Vékony next describes the prolonged debate that took place in Hungary at the turn of the century and early during the 20th, regarding the advocates of the Turkish or Ugric linguistic connection, pointing out that the Orientalist scholar Ármin Vámbéry at one time was on one side of this debate and later on the other.

In the meantime the search for the ancient Hungarian homeland continued. Numerous individuals including Miklós Révai advanced their theories concerning the whereabouts of this land. Most of them placed it west or south of the Ural Mountains, while a few in South-Central Siberia. The last to do so was Erik Molnár, the 20th century Marxist scholar (pp. 34-35). Later historians began using the methods of paleo-ontology and linguistic analyses to determine the place of the ancient homeland. By analysing names of plants and animals in various Finno-Ugric languages, and comparing these to the estimated homelands of these, they sought to gain insights into prehistory and the prehistoric homelands of these peoples. The conclusions they arrived at varied greatly.

In the chapters following these essentially historiographical descriptions Vékony outlines the similarities that can be observed between Hungarian and other Uralic languages. He concludes that the Magyar language is related only to these tongues, since the existence of non-Uralic loan words in Magyar, and Magyar loan words in non-Uralic languages, is no proof of their being

related (pp. 40-49). He then gives his version of the Uralic linguistic family tree and next offers descriptions of the peoples that speak or have spoken these languages (pp. 49-90). This part of his book offers few surprises to believers of the Uralic nature of the Magyar language. Vékony devotes his next chapter to an outline of the methodologies used for the research of prehistory.

The next chapter Vékony covers the history of the ancient homeland of the Uralic and then the Finno-Ugric peoples — which he places on the plains southeast of Moscow, roughly between the present-day cities of Riazan and Tambov.⁵ He also describes life in these lands as it can be reconstructed by archaeologists and historians today. Most of this area was a part of the Middle Volga River basin and was characterized by numerous lakes, meandering rivers, and wetlands. Not surprisingly, Vékony speculates that fishing constituted an important activity for the land's inhabitants, second only to hunting. He also suggests that Finno-Ugric peoples were introduced to agriculture and animal husbandry already in this homeland of theirs, by their Indo-European neighbours.

Vékony's next chapter deals with the "Ugric" age, the time after the separation of the Finnic (Finno-Permian) and Ugric peoples. The reason for this separation is not known to the author. He also has to speculate rather than to say with any degree of certainty that the Magyars and their Ugric relatives continued to live together for quite some time after this separation. One great change in the lives of the Ugric peoples came when they became familiar with horse breeding and the use of the horse as a daft animal as well as a means of transportation. This new, now horse-focused Ugric community lived on the lands south, south-east and east of the previous, the Finno-Ugric homeland — while the ancestors of the Finnic peoples had moved to the north, north-west, and west. Ugric unity in the lands between the Donets Basin and the Ural Mountains continued till about 2,000 b.c. when it gradually began to disintegrate — with the ancestors of the Magyars remaining in the lands between the Don and the Dnepr Rivers, while the ancestors of the Ostyaks (Khanty) and Voguls (Mansi) moving further north.

Vékony's next chapter is devoted to what he calls the "Dark Ages" the early age of Hungarian pre-history. This age lasted from about 1,300 b.c. to the 5th century a.d., that is till the time of the ancient Magyars' increased interactions with Turkic-speaking peoples. This is another age about which we know very little, and we don't even know from what languages some of the loan-words that entered Hungarian had come from, as these languages (and their speakers) have since disappeared. Archaeology also fails to throw much useful light on this period. Still, according to Vékony, there are some glimpses of evidence that makes a cursory outline of this age possible. These

speak of interplay and interaction with numerous peoples, including some Finno-Permiens, Iranians (Skythians, Sarmatians, Alans) and Indo-Europeans. All of these left larger or smaller imprint on the Hungarian language, mainly in terms of loan-words. In the beginning of this age the ancestors of the Hungarians lived in the Donets River Basin. Where they lived at the end of this period Vékony is reluctant to guess, as the arrival of the Huns rearranged the ethnic map of Eastern Europe which fact makes it impossible for the students of this age to track peoples for about two centuries (p. 166). Nevertheless Vékony speculates that the earliest forms of the name that Hungarians later began to call themselves, in its various forms (the Slavic *skul*, *sikulu*, *sikülü*, *sakul*, and the Germanic *Zokel*) which eventually gave rise to the name *Székely*, originated in this period (pp. 169-170).⁶

Vékony's next chapter deals with the last phase of Hungarian prehistory, a period that lasted from the middle of the first millennium a.d. to its end. For the author what characterizes this period most, were contacts and relations with Turkic peoples. In fact, such contacts continued well into the 13th century. The Turkic peoples with whom the Hungarians of the age had the most contacts, judging from the number and kind of Turkic loan-words in the Hungarian language, were the Bulgars. In this connection Vékony remarks that most of these words must have been borrowed in the Carpathian Basin (pp. 174-177). Did Hungarians live there before the end of the 9th century? Vékony answers this question by saying that as far as Hungary's public is concerned they did not, but he adds that the majority of historians who studied this age have come to the conclusion that Hungarians probably did live there. As to the question of the ethnogenesis of Hungarians (how they eventually became a people) however, Vékony argues, there has been no agreement among historians (p. 177). The reason for this, according to the author, is the existence of two kinds of source materials that made for two differing versions of Hungarian prehistory.

The “Hungarian conquest”

When carefully considered according to Vékony, these sources actually tell the history of two different peoples: the ancestors of the Hungarians and the ancestors of the people who entered the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century. Vékony next outlines the history of each of these as he sees them (pp. 178-185). In connection with the history of the people who moved into the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century — who were known to their Muslim contemporaries as *Madzsgirs* — he speculates about the language they

spoke. It was not a Bulgar Turkic language, but one related to the language of the Bashkirs (p. 185). Vékony is not sure about the language of the Madzsgirs' Kavar (Kabar) allies, but believes that it was another Turkic language, one of the several spoken in the empire of the Khazars (pp. 187-188).

The chapter's last pages speculate among other things about the relationships between the newly-arrived Madzsgirs and the autochthonous Székelys — as well as those between the latter and the region's Slavic populations. In connection with the former Vékony guesses that the Székelys interacted and intermarried with the newcomers only or mainly after these became assimilated (p. 189). Indeed, early interaction was probably difficult between the rulers and the ruled, that is between those who lived a primarily nomadic, marauding life, and the locals who were settled and were probably less warlike.

The book's last chapter is entitled "A honfoglalás kora" [the age of the conquest] and deals first of all with the historiography of the so-called "Hungarian conquest" of the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century. Here the author outlines the shortcomings of the works of the 13th century chroniclers Simon Kézai and Master P., better known as Anonymus. He notes that no one has ever found any solid evidence that would support these two scholars' linking of the Huns and Árpád's people. In fact Vékony blames the continued acceptance of the old theory of the conquest on the fantasy-laden myths presented by these two men. When faced by such historical evidence, Vékony feels obligated to reject these stories in their entirety, even if that makes Hungarian history less colourful and thinner, i.e. more *vékony* [thin], to use the pun he favours.

Next Vékony reminds his readers of the massive movements of peoples Europe experienced from the 4th century to the 9th. In the early decades of this age it was the still existing Roman Empire that acted as a receptor of this migration. By the time of the 9th century, it was often the Byzantine Empire. Vékony argues that the arrival of Árpád's people should also be seen as part of this same phenomenon. These people — whom (as has been mentioned) contemporary Muslims called Madzsgirs, the Byzantines Turks, and most Europeans Ungrus or Hungarus — from their early 9th century location east of the Urals began their migration westward and by the second half of the century they turned up, always on the go, in various places in Central Europe. Their behaviour was typically nomadic: they engaged in marauding expeditions to all corners of their known world, and they "rented" their armies to anyone who could pay for them handsomely. As to the size of their army Vékony gives the estimate of "approximately" 5,000.

While Árpád's people were nomadic and Turkic-speaking, the majority of those living in the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century were agriculturalists and Finno-Ugric, i.e. Hungarian speaking. Their descendents would be known as Magyars, a name that was originally that of the newcomers. Such name-change can also be observed in the case of the Bulgarians, a Slavic-speaking people who inherited their name from their nomadic, Turkic-speaking conquerors, and the Russians who got their name Rus from the Scandinavian, i.e. Varangian elite that founded their first ruling dynasty (pp. 213-214).

The ancestors of today's Hungarians, Vékony reminds us in his conclusions, had an earlier name and that name eventually transmuted into the word Székely. Today it denotes the culturally but not linguistically distinct Hungarian ethnic group living in the easternmost counties of Transylvania in the Republic of Romania. In the 9th century the ancestors of these people, and of all Hungarians, lived in various regions of the Carpathian Basin. Further evidence of their presence, in particular in western Transdanubia, was discovered shortly before Vékony wrote his book. This was an inscription found written in Székely runic script dating from the 860s a.d. (p. 214).

While most of Hungary's present-day population descends from these pre-895 inhabitants of the Carpathian Basin (as well as the great variety of peoples who had joined them as immigrants since the 9th century), the Székelys we know today are a distinct group. Vékony suggests that their cultural separation from the rest of Hungarians had started with the Carolingian conquest of the western regions of their lands. Later, as we know, the country's early Árpáadian kings invited those among the Székelys who had been guarding the kingdom's western frontiers (roughly the region known today as the Burgenland), to settle in Transylvania to help consolidate the new, Christian and feudal order in that part of their realm and to guard its by then more threatened eastern approaches.⁷

The conquest of the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century did have significant impact on the future history of Hungarians. In Vékony's opinion the most important of these was the establishment of a dynasty, under whose members, in particular Prince Géza and King St. Stephen, a Christian medieval kingdom could be established and the entogenesis of the Hungarian people could be completed. In this process the rulers, the "conquerors" and their immediate descendents, first became the same as the community they ruled in their language, and later in other aspects of their existence as well (p. 215). They became the elite of a settled, Christian nation — linked to their subjects by their new, common religion and their new, common language.

Vékony adds a postscript to his book in his comments on his sources. Here he says that while his book was in preparation for printing new evidence had come to light — through linguistic, historic, anthropological and demographic research — that should finally put an end to the false interpretation of history that places the arrival of the Magyar language in the Carpathian Basin only at the end of the 9th century, with the so-called “Hungarian conquest”. He continues by saying that the people who arrived at that time made up only about one percent of the region’s total population, and, according to “every piece of evidence” were Turkic in speech, Turkic in their ethnicity, and nomadic in their lifestyle — while most of the ancestors of today’s Hungarians had been living in the Carpathian Basin for three or four centuries (p. 219).⁸

Not surprisingly because of the radical nature of these conclusions, reactions by the Hungarian scholarly community to Vékony’s theories were highly sceptical. Journalist-historian István Riba devoted an entire article to Vékony’s claim, made on various occasions even before the publication of his book, that the inscription found in Transdanubia (mentioned above) was written in the Székely runic script (and pre-dated the conquest). He concluded that there was no consensus among Hungarian archaeologists that this indeed was the case.⁹ In another publication archaeologist László Kovács, disputed Vékony’s estimates (given in this book and in some of his previous publications) of both the pre-895 population of the Carpathian Basin and the number of the “conquerors”. In connection with the latter Kovács remarked that 5,000 armed men would not have been able to accomplish the conquest and keep the subjugated population down, enemies out, *and* part-take in the newcomers’ military expeditions outside the region.¹⁰ What Kovács seems to forget, is that the Varangians had managed to impose themselves and keep themselves as Kievan Rus’ rulers with fewer armed men, and William the Conqueror of England defeated Harold I *and* founded the beginnings of centuries of Norman rule with an army that was not more numerous. Nor is it likely that the previous rulers of all or parts of the Carpathian Basin, the Bulgars in the south-east, the Franks in the West, Svatopluk in the north-west, or even the Avars who for some time ruled all these lands, had larger or better armies. We have to keep in mind that Árpád’s warriors were veterans of many campaigns and battles, and were much-feared horsemen who rode horses superior in toughness to those available to most of their enemies.¹¹

In any case, the conquerors of the Carpathian Basin held on to their lands long enough to see the rise of a Christian feudal kingdom under Árpád’s successors in which they could count on the support of large sections of the local population to defend what by then became “their” country. This was so until the 13th century when internal dissention and an extremely powerful

enemy, the Mongols, brought disaster to the country. By then the legacy Árpád's nomadic horsemen had been forgotten and the new Hungarian army of knights in medieval armour was no match for the light cavalry of the Mongols and their Tatar allies.

The new genomic research

We have no idea what Vékony referred to when he talked about the “new evidence” supporting his conclusions that had surfaced while his book was readied for publication. But we know that a few years later such evidence did come to light. This happened when the results of the genomic research mentioned in the introduction of this review began to be published. There were several publications, both academic and popular, that outlined the findings of this project, but we focus mainly on two, the two most detailed and as a result, most important ones. Both of them are in English and both appeared in internationally-renown journals. Both are available on the internet.

The one I would like to discuss first is the study that examined and compared the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) of conquest-era women with the mtDNA of present-day women in Hungary and the Székelyföld. Mitochondrial DNA is passed on by women to their children, but it is not passed on by men to their offspring. It is, accordingly, a means of studying the blood-lines of women. The researchers, Gyönyvér Tömöry and her associates, extracted mtDNA from two groups. One of these was made up of slightly over one hundred women living in present-day Hungary along with 76 women from the land of the Székelys in Transylvania. The other group was made up of post-conquest age women. In their case mtDNA was extracted from bones of women buried in post-conquest era graves. This group was further divided into two categories. Some bones came from graves of the elite, presumably wives and daughters of the “conquerors.” These graves were identified by the rich grave goods they and adjacent graves contained. The other group represented commoners whose bones were found in graves of the common people, as identified by the lack of rich grave-goods and/or by their location in places reserved for poor people in cemeteries.

When the mtDNA of the modern Hungarian (including Székely) populations were compared to the two groups of the ancient ones, interesting results emerged. It became evident that the variance between the present-day populations' mtDNA and that of the occupants of graves of the elite was considerable, while variance between the mtDNA of people found in common graves and the mtDNA of modern Hungarians was “negligible.” This suggests

that modern-day Hungarian and Székely women are not descendants of the “classical conquerors” as the researchers call the post-895 elite, while no significant distances exist between the mtDNA of women in post-conquest age commoners’ graves and the mtDNA of modern Hungarian and Székely women. Since most of the occupants of commoners’ graves must have been members of the subject peoples (they made up the vast majority of the Carpathian Basin’s population in the 10th century), these findings clearly indicate a genetic link between the region’s pre-conquest population and its present-day people.

The finding that many present-day women in Hungary and the Székelyland are related by blood or may even be directly descended from the common people of the Carpathian Basin in the 10th century is significant. It means that immigration into this part of Europe in the last millennium, however substantial it had been at times, did not result in a complete replacement of the region’s population. “Genetic drift” to use the scientific jargon of genomic research, in the Carpathian Basin in the last eleven centuries was by no means total.

The other article under consideration resulted from the research that examined the DNA of men. In this project the researchers looked for the incidence of Tat polymorphism, i.e. the marker Tat C allele, in the Y chromosomal DNA of two populations: male occupants of 10th century elite graves and modern-day Hungarian and Székely men. It should be noted here that Y chromosomes are passed on by men to their sons and as such are sources of study for male blood-lines. In the case of the ancient DNA, extraction took place from the bones of men resting in “rich” graves identified by grave goods (often weapons, horse harness or even the head or all of a warrior’s horse). In the case of present-day residents, DNA samples were collected from nearly 200 Magyar and Székely men. The results of the investigation were startling. The research revealed that while in the ancient DNA the Tat polymorphism was common, among the modern samples it was virtually absent. Only one man, a Székely, carried the Tat C allele.¹²

The researchers also described the nature of the Y chromosome DNA found in the modern samples. They concluded that their research allowed the classification of today’s Hungarian and Székely male populations into a large number of haplogroups, most of them typically European. These were the groups E, F, G, I K, N3, P and the R1 group, the last one being the most common. They also noted some differences between the Y DNA of men living in present-day Hungary, and those living in Transylvania’s Székely counties. The most notable is the difference between the frequency of R1b1b2

(formerly R1b1c, R1b3) haplotypes in the two populations. In the Hungarian sample this frequency is 15%, while in the Székely it is close to 20%.¹³

It should be explained that frequency for most R1b subclades is much higher in Western Europe, including the German lands, than in Eastern Europe. The greater frequency of the R1b1b2 haplotype among the Székelys is surprising as it was Hungary proper that had received massive influxes of Western and Central European settlers throughout the ages and especially in the three centuries of Habsburg rule. The exception to this was the 12th century when a great many German-speakers (later called the Saxons) immigrated to Transylvania, at the invitation of King Béla III. Is the unusually high frequency of Rb1 types among Székely men due to this particular migration or is it a legacy of their prolonged proximity to western European peoples during the time they lived in western Transdanubia under Frankish rule? It is difficult to say. We do not know the social circumstances of the Székelys' lives during their stay on the western frontiers of the Carpathian Basin. We know however that in the centuries since the arrival of the Saxons in Transylvania the two groups lived in social isolation from each other. They had no common language. The Székelys were agriculturalists while the Saxons were predominantly urban dwellers. Since the Reformation, furthermore, the two peoples belonged to different religions.¹⁴

The most important of the findings of Professor István Raskó's team is emphasized in all of their reports, namely that their research points to the fact that the "conquerors" who arrived in the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century were not numerous. In one of the studies the team concluded that, once they established themselves there, the "invaders" made up only a "small fraction" of that land's total population.¹⁵ We have to keep in mind that this interpretation is not new. More than a century ago, the internationally renowned archaeologist József Hampel (1849-1913) came to the same conclusion, i.e. that the conquering Hungarians were "only a small minority" of the Carpathian Basin's population.¹⁶

Despite the opinion reached by Raskó and his associates that the invaders of 895 were few in numbers, the team did not come to Vékony's conclusion that the conquerors were not Hungarian-speaking. Raskó and his team-mates assumed that, because of their superior position as rulers, the conquerors were able to impose their language — or more exactly one of their languages as they were a federation of tribes of assorted ethnicities — on the vastly more numerous local population. But this is not how societal evolution worked in the 9th and 10th centuries. There was no mass media or schools to implement such a drastic socio-cultural change, even if the conquerors cared what language their subjects spoke. The contemporary examples of the

Scandinavians in north-eastern England, or those in northern France (the future Normans of Normandy), the Varangians in ancient Rus, the Bulgars on the Lower Danube, and somewhat later the Normans in England, speak to this point. In all these cases the conquerors sooner or later “melted into” the more numerous, indigenous populations. True, at least two of them, bequeathed to the ethnic groups they subjugated their name: Rus (Russian) in the first instance and Bulgar (Bulgarian) in the second. The conquerors of the Carpathian Basin did the same: the peoples they conquered became known by their name: Magyar. They also bequeathed the Hungarian nation their first dynasty of rulers, as Vékony pointed out — and much of their mythology, including the myth that they, the conquerors, were genetic founders of the Hungarian nation.¹⁷

The main title of this review article is slightly misleading. It suggests that the Székelys were the ancestors of today’s Hungarians. What really happened, however, according to the evidence outlined in this study, is that the ancestors of today’s Hungarians were known as Székelys before they came to be known to themselves as Magyars, and to others as Ungari, Ungar, Hungarians, etc. The subtitle of the article also has to be qualified. Vékony did not give a new twist to Hungarian prehistory. He gave numerous twists to the old version of the story — which culminated in his new explanation of the “conquest” of the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century.

Few authors of radically novel historical theories received such massive endorsement as a result of new research within a few short years of their passing as Vékony did. This happened when the genomic research project, that had started probably just at the time his book *Magyar őstörténet* went to press, was completed. Only time will tell whether this fortuitous circumstance will be enough to elevate Vékony’s theories from relative obscurity to the limelight. We have to keep in mind that what he had suggested, that Hungarians had lived in the Carpathian Basin before the so-called “Hungarian conquest,” is not new. The people who said so, however, are unknown or forgotten. Not only foreigners such as the Italian paleo-linguist Mario Alinei but Hungarians as well, including the teacher and museum worker Lajos Marjalaki Kiss (b. in 1887) and the writer and amateur archaeologist Ferenc Móra (1879-1934) — and we do not even mention the supporters of the “dual conquest” theory such as Gyula László, his predecessors and followers, since their ideas are not endorsed by Vékony and are not supported by the researches of István Raskó and his team.¹⁸

Old theories, once endorsed and cherished by entire nations, do not die easily. Nevertheless, we hope that, at the very least, this review of

Vékony's book and of the evidence that had surfaced since its author's passing will foster a new debate about the subject.

Prehistory is a complex field of study. It involves numerous disciplines none of which can do much to elucidate the past. As Csanád Bálint warned us, it is full of insurmountable difficulties and innumerable pitfalls.¹⁹ This warning should be kept in mind when we search for new explanations to old, time-honoured theories. This admonition, however, should also apply to the sources that had been the building blocks of the old theories. In the science of genomics we have a new instrument to do this, yet we have to keep in mind that this tool too, has shortcomings and imperfections — that might not be eliminated for some time, perhaps never. Only much new research, in this new field — as well as in the traditional disciplines — can bring us a little closer to the truth.

NOTES

¹ Spencer Wells, *Deep Ancestry, Inside the Genographic Project* (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic, 2006). A massive volume of what might be called applied genomics is Stephen Oppenheimer, *The Origins of the British* (London: Robinson, 2007). This book suggests that the ancestors of the English were not the Angles, Saxons and Jutes who invaded Britain in the Dark Ages, but West Germanic-speaking migrants who had started to settle in that land before the Roman Conquest.

² The background to the research projects that resulted in the studies on genomics reviewed here is described in Csanád Bálint, "Az ethnos a kora középkorban (a kutatás lehetőségei és korlátai)," in *Századok*, 140, 2 (2006): 277-348. I am indebted to Dr. Bálint for sending me an electronic draft of this study. See also Mihály Szolláth, "Gének és nemzetek" [Genes and nations] in *PR Herald* available at http://prherlad.hu/cikk_print.php?idc=20081109-164345

³ Gábor Vékony was born in the village of Csengőd on 15 December 1944. Csengőd is in the heartland of the Carpathian Basin, on the Great Hungarian Plain. During the final phases of World War II his small settlement was occupied by the Red Army just before he was born, which means that he might have been the first child in the village to come into existence after the passing of the "old order" in Hungary. He finished his grade school in the nearby village of Tabdi, and his secondary schooling in the town of Kiskőrös, which happens to be the birth-place of Hungary's favourite lyrical poet Sándor Petőfi. Vékony continued his studies at Budapest's Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) in the field of prehistory and archaeology. After a two-year stint as a museologist in the city of Tata, he returned to ELTE to teach these subjects, and remained in that position until his untimely death in 2004. He was a prolific author. In many of his publications he disagreed with previous commentators as well as his contemporaries, especially in the fields of his specialization: the evolution of Magyar

runic scripts and the ethnogenesis of the Hungarian people. *Magyar őstörténet...* was the last of his volumes to appear in his lifetime, two more of his books saw the light of day after his death. *Magyar őstörténet* has no footnotes. An annotated version of this manuscript had been at one point deposited with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (private information from István Erdélyi).

⁴ One of his books is available in English translation: *Dacians, Romans, Romanians* (Hamilton ON: Corvinus, 2000).

⁵ Traditional interpretations of the Uralic and Finno-Ugric homelands place them further east, in some cases east of the Ural Mountains. László Kontler, *Millennium in Central Europe: A History of Hungary* (Budapest: Atlantisz, 1999), 35-37. Also, László Makkai, “The Hungarians’ Prehistory, Their Conquest of Hungary and their Raids to the West to 955,” chapter II of *A History of Hungary* ed. Peter F. Sugar, Péter Hanák and Tibor Frank (Bloomington IN,: Indiana University Press, 1990), 8-14. For another, much more detailed treatment of the subject in English see András Róna-Tas, *Hungarians & Europe in the Early Middle Ages: An Introduction to Early Hungarian History* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999). For a shorter work by the same author, available in large part online, see “The Migration and Landtaking of the Magyars,” *The Hungarian Quarterly*, 37 (winter 1996): <http://www.hungarianquarterly.com/no144/p37.shtml>

⁶ For those not familiar with Hungarian: the sz in the word Székely is pronounced as the s in English (and not as the sz in Polish!), the é as the é in French, the k as the k in English, the e as the e in the English word men, and the ly as the y in the English word yet.

⁷ From about 907 to the early 1040s, for example, the western frontier was not threatened. The arrival of the Székelys in Transylvania is usually dated to the first part of the 11th century. See László Makkai and András Mócsi, *Erdély története, A kezdetektől 1606-ig* [The history of Transylvania from earliest time to 1606] (Budapest:Académiai Kiadó, 1986), 293. The authors of this volume stress that different theories exist regarding the Székelys’ early history. The suggestion that the transfer of the by then largely Christian Székely population from Pannonia to eastern Transylvania was motivated more by considerations of internal power politics than external threats is made by József Kolombán-Antal, *Székely honfoglalás* [Székely conquest] (Székelyudvarhely: Litera-Veres, 2008), see the conclusions.

⁸ Vékony’s precise words are “a VI-VII század óta,” which suggests from 500 a.d. to the end of the 690s, that is, at least 200 years before the conquest. This vagueness about the Székelys’ arrival will probably elicit critical remarks, but it is not surprising in view of the lack of evidence. The movements of peaceful settlers did not make much news in the 6th or 7th centuries. Yet, the influx into the Carpathian Basin in the 670s of unidentified peoples is noted even by such stalwart believer of the traditional version of the Hungarian conquest as István Fodor, “A népvándorlás és honfoglalás kora Erdélyben” [The age of the great migrations and the Hungarian conquest in Transylvania], in *Tanulmányok Erdély történetéről* [Studies about Transylvania’s history] ed. István Rácz (Debrecen: Csokonai, 1988), pp. 47f.

⁹ István Riba, “Reading the Runes: Evidence of the Dual Conquest?” *The Hungarian Quarterly*, 41 (no. 157, spring 2000), accessed at the website <http://forums.skadi.net/showthread.php?t=105291>

¹⁰ László Kovács, “Remarks on the evaluation of the 10th – 11th century cemeteries of the Carpathian Basin,” in *Research on the Prehistory of the Hungarians: A Review*, ed. Balázs Gusztáv Mende (Budapest: Institute of Archaeology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2005), 352, n. 5. This is a very informative volume, written often in very awkward English. Another critic of Vékony is Ferenc Makk who emphatically disagrees with Vékony’s claim that the Carpathian Basin’s autochthonous population greatly outnumbered the conquerors. See Makk’s review of Vékony’s book in *Századok* 139 (2005): 459-476.

¹¹ On the subject of the superior horses ridden by Árpád’s warriors see the interview with István Raskó in *Élet és Tudomány* 47 (2007): 1478-80, the last part.

¹² According to the article’s authors, this finding, i.e. the virtual absence of this C allele in modern Hungarian populations, is consistent with the findings of several other research teams, which they cite. Tat polymorphism, that is the Tat C allele, is the diagnostic marker of a subgroup (N1c) in the y-chromosomal haplogroup N. On this group see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haplogroup_N_\(Y-DNA\)#N-Tat](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haplogroup_N_(Y-DNA)#N-Tat).

¹³ In this connection see the Hungarian report on this research: Erika Bagácsi-Szabó, *et al.*, Genetika és (magyar) őstörténet [Genomics and Magyar prehistory], *Magyar Tudomány*, 169, 10 (Nov. 2008) (table 7 on p. 1212) accessed in June 2009 at <http://epa.oszk.hu/00600/00691/00058/05.html> This report differs substantially from the reports that the same team of researchers published in English.

¹⁴ In any case the “Saxon” men in Transylvania are more likely to be members of the R1b subclade R1b1b2a1a1. On the matter of the Székelys’ DNA, in the study of mtDNA by Tömöry *et al.*, the researchers conclude that there is more evidence of Asian genetic imprint among Székely populations than among Hungarian ones, suggesting that the Székelys are of even more varied genetic background than the Hungarians. Indeed, an ongoing genomic Y-DNA study of Bukovinian Székely men has so far concluded that this Székely sub-group, which was selected for study because it was believed to be geographically quite isolated, is of very mixed “deep” ancestry. The scores of individuals tested for this study belong to fourteen different haplogroups. I am indebted to Dr. Elizabeth Long, the study’s leader, for her periodic reports to me on this project’s progress.

¹⁵ In the study of the female bloodlines (mtDNAs) by Tömöry *et al.*

¹⁶ Hampel’s work and views are discussed in Péter Langó, “Archaeological Research on the Conquering Hungarians: A Review,” in *Research on the Prehistory of the Hungarians: A Review*, ed. B. G. Mende, *op. cit.* pp. 202-205.

¹⁷ According to Hungarian-American historian Denis Sinor of Indiana University, “Hungarians, . . . have always considered themselves the descendants of the conquerors. . . .” Denis Sinor, “The Outlines of Hungarian Prehistory,” *Journal of World History*, 4 (3): 513-540, accessed online in June 2009 at <http://forums.skadi.net/showthread.php?t=105291>. The list of peoples who conquered lands but failed to

“impose” their language on the local population could go on. It would include some of the Germanic tribes of the age of great migrations during the late Roman period. Especially interesting is the case of the Visigoths. Driven by military events into the Iberian Peninsula, they imposed their rule in the late 460s, accepted Christianity, formed a medieval kingdom complete with a code of laws, and gradually exchanged their Germanic vernacular for the proto-Romance language spoken by their subjects. Their kingdom fell to the Moors in the early 8th century, who were also unable to impose their language on the local population. Another example is that of the Germanic-speaking Lombards who, in the decades after their arrival in northern Italy around 568 a.d., assimilated to the local population.

¹⁸ Mario Alinei’s book, originally published in Italian, is available in Magyar: *Ősi kapocs: A Magyar-etruszk nyelvrokonság* [Ancient link: the Hungarian-Etruscan linguistic relatedness] (Budapest: Allprint, 2005). Alinei places the arrival of a proto-Hungarian population in the Carpathian Basin in the 9th century B.C. Lajos M. Kiss concluded in one of his studies of place-names in the Carpathian Basin that the “population” of this region “at the time of Árpád’s conquest could only have been Hungarian.” See the website <http://www.acronet.net/~magyar/english/96-07/kisshist.html>. For Móra’s comments on this subject, see his work entitled *Igazlátók (karcolatok)* [Truth seers (sketches)] (Budapest: Móra Ferenc könyvkiadó, 1979), pp. 20-31 *in passim*. While the “Double Conquest” theory is not supported by the results of recent genomic research, some of the evidence marshalled to support it also underpins Vékony’s arguments. After Gyula László’s retirement of from active academic life the most articulate supporter of this theory became János Makkay. See his “Embertannal kapcsolatos adatok a ‘kettős honfoglalás’ vitájához” [Anthropological data concerning the debate about the ‘dual conquest’], *Anthropológiai Közlemények*, 35 (1993): 213-219. The research of Raskó and his team also doesn’t support the theory, advanced by Adorján Magyar (1887-1978) and others, that Hungarians have been living in the Carpathian Basin since the end of the last Ice Age but groups of them had migrated to the East. According to these writers, Árpád’s people were the descendents of one of these groups — who had come “home” in 895. On Magyar’s writings see the website http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/magyar_a/adorjan_index.html

¹⁹ Bálint, *op. cit.* See also Bálint’s essays in the 2008 no. 10 issue of *Magyar Tudomány*, pp. 1166-1187, 1217-1218. Much of this volume is devoted to genomics, with other essays by Gusztáv Mende Balázs, István Raskó and his team, and Péter Langó (co-author). The volume is entitled *Genetika és (Magyar) Őstörténet* [Genetics and (Magyar) prehistory] and is guest-edited by Csanád Bálint.

P.s. Since this review was written I published a summary of my views: “The Lessons of Genomic Research,” *Hungarian Quarterly*, 50 (winter 2009): 50-55. It is available in part at <http://hungarianquarterly.com/no196/8.shtml>

Obituary

Mária Krisztinkovich **(1918-2008)**

Mária Krisztinkovich was an art historian, writer, librarian, art collector and, together with her second husband Eugene [Jenő] Horvath, a generous patron of artistic and scholarly causes. She was born in Budapest where she attended the prestigious preparatory school of the Angolkisasszonyok [English Ladies] and later the Academy of Commerce. An important part of her education was language training. As an adult, Mária spoke four of Europe's major languages: English, German, French and Italian.

Several of Mária's ancestors were involved in what she would value in life: art collecting and writing. György Ráth, a great-great-uncle of hers, founded a museum; István Ráth-Végh was a writer. Béla Krisztinkovich, her father, was an avid collector of Anabaptist-Hutterite pottery. He introduced Mária to this activity — that later became her passion as well.

The young Mária's life was full of unexpected turns. In 1946 she moved to Bucharest where her first husband, István Gyöngyössy, became the head of Hungary's post-war diplomatic mission to Romania. During the height of Stalinist rule in Hungary Gyöngyössy was imprisoned while Mária and her infant daughter were exiled to a small Hungarian village. In 1959 she managed to leave Hungary, immigrated to Canada where she found employment at the University of British Columbia's Library in Vancouver. While at UBC she pursued her earlier scholarly interests and continued her research into the history and artistic legacy of Central Europe's Hutterite (Anabaptist) communities. In this work her knowledge of the relevant languages served her very well.

She, often in collaboration with J. Eugene Horvath, published numerous bibliographies and papers on these and other subjects. The latter appeared in learned journals such as *Kerámos*, *Mennonite Quarterly Review*, *Ungarn Jahrbuch*, as well as in this journal, in which her work appeared twice. Her first paper was on "Historical Hungary as Background for Hutterite Needlework in Canada" (Vol. 8 [Spring 1981]: 11-23); while the second was entitled "Prince Rupert, Godson of Gábor Bethlen" (Vol. 13 [Fall 1986]: 11-19).

There can be little doubt that her scholarly *magnum opus* was *An Annotated Hutterite Bibliography* (1998) on which she worked for three decades. This 312-page volume contained some 2,600 entries. With the help of Professors Werner Packull and Peter C. Erb, as well as the Reverend Olivér E. Szebeni of Hungary, the work was made into an electronic database. Another of Mária's major contributions to knowledge was her compilation of a Dukhobor bibliography. Still another of her major works, produced in collaboration with J. Eugene Horvath, was *A History of Haban Ceramics: A Private View* (2005).

In the realm of *belles-lettres* her writings included poetry, some of it written during her exile from Budapest in the early 1950s. Her favourite volume was *Nevetek Sírva* [I laugh crying] published in 2006 (with drawings by Ildikó Lansonius and a CD of readings by actress Györgyi Hegedős). Mária also wrote a book-length novel entitled *Híd a víz alatt, 1937-1945* (Budapest, 1996). Its English version appeared first, *Bridge Under the Water* (1993).

Mária was a persevering member of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada, from the organization's beginnings until old age and illness made visits to the HSAC's annual conferences difficult. She was also a member of our journal's editorial staff — who sometimes bemoaned the fact that few if any papers were submitted to the journal in her fields of expertise.

The last decades of Mária's life were filled by her struggle with ill-health but such an adversity did not break her spirit and prevent her from her writing, artistic and art-collecting pursuits, nor from keeping her home's grounds in magnificent horticultural order as well as being an engaging host mainly to the members of Vancouver's — and the North American Pacific rim's — Hungarian artistic and intellectual community. As one visitor to the Krisztinovich-Horvath home, the Hungarian poet György Faludy remarked, Mária was a woman with expertise in everything, from writing poetry to preparing scrumptious meals from a newly-slaughtered pig. The latter art, as well as that of vegetable gardening, Mária no doubt learned during her exile in the Hungarian countryside.

Mária Krisztinkovich, or Mári as she was known to her friends, lived a long and eventful life. Through her work and activities she had enriched the lives of others — from the members of her family, to her circle of friends, to the artistic and scholarly communities of North America and Central Europe. She will be missed by many — in the city where she had lived for half-a-century, in her post-1950s homeland, as well as elsewhere.

Nándor Dreisziger

Obituary

László László 1925-2008

László László was known to his English-speaking acquaintances as Leslie while his Magyar friends called him Laci. He was born on 6 May 1925 in Kőszeg, westernmost Hungary, to Antal Jesztl and Etelka Kelemen. He was the third of four children. His father was an inn-keeper first in Kőszeg, then in Szombathely and later in Sopron. In 1950 he changed the family name from Jesztl (originally Jestl) to Lászlói. Young László received his early education mainly in these towns, in the local Benedictine schools. In good *burgenlander* tradition (his mother was from Alsópulya, after 1920 known as Unterpullendorf) for some time he also attended a school where the language of instruction was Croatian. From western Hungary his studies took László to various schools scattered in Hungary. He completed his secondary schooling with the Premonstratensians of Keszthely. For some time he was an aspirant member of the Carmelite Order. In the meantime he attended various post-secondary religious schools in Budapest, and in 1948 and after, in Vienna and Innsbruck. In the latter place his studies focused on law, political science and history.

In 1950 he emigrated to the United States. At first he took on odd jobs and saved his money to continue his schooling. During the mid-1950s he studied at Columbia University in New York. In 1956 he won a Ford Fellowship to study in Europe. While in Europe he did research but also worked for Radio Free Europe. He obtained his M.A. degree and the diploma of the Institute on East-Central Europe from Columbia University. Next he taught at various American military bases in Europe and North Africa. After returning to New York he completed his doctoral studies. For a while he taught political science at the University of Virginia. Next he became a member of the Department of Political Science at Montreal's Loyola College, and when that institution became a part of Concordia University, in that institution's Political Science Department. He continued teaching there till his retirement from academic life in 1988. The two sabbaticals he received there, in 1975-76 and 1983-84 respectively, he spent in Paris, France, and in Rome, Italy. During the latter occasion he did research at the Vatican Archives.

Before his retirement from teaching Dr. László made arrangements for the continuation of his training as a priest of the Roman Catholic Church. He completed his theological studies at the Université de Montréal and St. Paul's University in Ottawa. He was ordained a priest in January of 1991. He was appointed chaplain of Ottawa's Blessed Sacrament Church, as well as the priest in charge of the city's Hungarian Roman Catholics. Later for some time he became the administrator of the St. Ignatius Parish while continuing to serve Ottawa's Hungarian community at St. Elizabeth Church. In 2004 he retired from St. Ignatius but continued his work at St. Elizabeth. For his work among Hungarians and on behalf of Hungarian causes, in 2008 Father László was awarded the Republic of Hungary's Knight's Cross of the Order of Merit.

Dr. László was active in academic publishing throughout his academic as well as his ecclesiastic career. He published numerous papers including some in our journal. One of these was "Fighting Evil with Weapons of the Spirit: The Christian Churches in Wartime Hungary," in vol. 10, nos. 1-2 (1983), 125-143; while another appeared as recently as two years ago: "A Sign that Communism Is Not an Inevitable Destiny: The Revolution and the Churches," in vol. 34, nos. 1-2 (2007), 55-80. The crowning achievement of his academic career was the publication of the book, a revised and expanded version of his doctoral dissertation, *Church and State in Hungary, 1919-1945* (Budapest: METEM, 2004). The volume also appeared in a Hungarian edition. In this work, as well as many of his other publications, László defended the record of Hungary's Christian Churches in the interwar, post-war and especially, the war-time period. He kept reminding those who accused the Churches of remaining "silent" during the Holocaust that the deportation of Jews to Nazi concentration and death camps was halted at one point and the majority of the Jews of Budapest in the end survived — and that in this development the Churches played an important role. At that time and especially during the last few weeks of 1944 when life became very perilous for the Jews of Budapest, Church institutions sheltered thousands of them, as did the Christian population at large, contributing to the fact that close to 200,000 Jews lived to see the end of Nazi rule in Hungary, the largest number in any country where that rule existed during the war. To this he would add that the men and women responsible for these efforts put their freedom or even lives on the line, while politicians in the free world who could have done more to save Jews, did precious little.

László László died Christmas Day 2008. He will be missed by his Magyar parishioners in Ottawa as a priest, by Hungarian Christians as a spokesman for their country's religious institutions, and by the Hungarian scholarly community as a church historian.

Béla K. Király
1912-2009

in lieu of an obituary, a biographical essay:

**Improving the Image of Hungary in the
English-Speaking World:
Béla Király's Lifelong Passion**

Mario Fenyo

In North America hundreds of people of Hungarian descent have taken upon themselves the mission of speaking on behalf of Hungary and Hungarian culture. These self-appointed spokespersons, scholars or otherwise, keep track of any and every “home-boy and home-girl” with claims to celebrity, of everyone with a Hungarian surname, of everyone whose surname is an anglicized or Americanized version of what may have been a Hungarian name at one time. After all, they have to try harder; persons of Hungarian descent are outnumbered by Polish-Americans, by American-Jews who do not have a Hungarian background, by so many other ethnic groups who began crossing the Atlantic in large numbers as part of the immigration “revolution” at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.¹

In the 1920s the United States adopted, in stages, an immigration policy where there had been none; this policy, based on quotas, resulted, for all practical purposes, in the exclusion of East Europeans.² Except for a smattering of displaced persons (DPs) in the aftermath of World War II.³ There was no major shift in the patterns of immigration or in the pertinent federal policies between the 1920s and

the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Then the government of the United States, perhaps prompted by feelings of guilt,⁴ and more likely by propaganda considerations, realizing it had done little or nothing collectively to assist the freedom fighters in their fight, relented and admitted over thirty-five thousand Hungarian refugees out of turn,⁵ beyond the so-called quota, in one “fell swoop” — about two-thirds of whom settled permanently in the country. At the risk of alienating several colleagues of Hungarian background who have legitimate claims to the same title, this brief essay focuses on the person who, in my opinion, has done the most for the cause of promoting and disseminating Hungarian culture, including a knowledge of Hungarian history, in the United States and in English: namely General and Professor Béla K. Király.

Perhaps the crowning achievement of Király's career, as scholar and as sponsor of Hungarian causes and culture, are the two series of publications he initiated twenty years after his arrival in the United States, starting in 1977: the “Brooklyn College Studies on Society in Change,” soon renamed the “Atlantic Studies on Society in Change,” including the sub-series “War and Society in East-Central Europe.” The series was printed at first at Lisse by the Peter de Ridder Press, but was soon taken over and distributed by the more prestigious Columbia University Press. Retroactively, all of it is part of the undertaking of Atlantic Research and Publications, headed, of course, by editor-in-chief Béla K. Király. At the same time, many of the volumes are part of the series “East European Monographs” published by the historian and scholar of Romanian background Stephen Fischer-Galati.

In conversation, Király summed up the objectives of the series — especially applicable to War and Society in East-Central Europe⁶ — as follows: “to cover all aspects and periods of Hungarian history for the benefit of the English-speaking public” (personal communication, Béla Király to author). His *published* statement is somewhat more circumspect: the Preface to one of the more recent volumes notes that the “series intends to present a comprehensive survey of many aspects of East Central European history”⁷ a variant of which reads “a series which, when completed, will constitute a comprehensive survey of the many aspects of East Central European society.”⁸

Of course, there is no such thing as the definitive history, or even a “comprehensive survey,” of anything, for (a) historical interpretations are subject to revision, in accordance with the spirit of the age (sometimes in spite of it), and (b) hitherto unnoticed gaps become visible, as ever-new fields and specialties cater to fresh perceptions of the human condition. Scholars who have chosen history, or some other social science, as their discipline often feel the urge to justify their choice by challenging the latest interpretations and by uncovering, then covering, previously unimagined gaps.

If we assume that 1990 was the year of regime change in Hungary (as in much of the region), we may break down the topics addressed in the series as follows: from 1977 until that year 32 of the 65 volumes sponsored by Király *do not* deal with Hungary or East-Central Europe in general. Of the 63 volumes that have been published since that year only three do not have Hungary as the protagonist country. The volumes were printed in seven hundred to one thousand copies, albeit only about half of these were sold within the first year of printing (personal communication, Peter Pastor to author, April 8, 2007). As is the case with scholarly monographs in general, apart from some of the major public libraries, most copies were purchased by universities, which means that the readership — more precisely, the perusal — goes far beyond the number of copies sold.

As an experiment, I picked a volume from the series, more or less at random, to ascertain the availability over the internet. Eva Haraszti's *Kossuth as an English Journalist* is available for purchase, possibly as a second-hand copy, as are most of the other volumes in the series, for \$69.00. It has been reviewed as a blog 537 times (www.allbookstores.com/book).

It may be argued that there was greater interest on the part of the West, and funding was more readily available for publications on East-Central Europe, during the Cold War. Yet the numbers above belie that assertion. Whether or not Király considered himself a cold war warrior (probably not, in the later stages of that war), he was able to organize and find subsidies for the series at a time when the region — at least the region north of the Balkans — was no longer the focus of Western and international interest and preoccupations. Peter Pastor confirms that Király deserves most of the credit for the fund-raising and for the painstaking organizational work involved in publishing such a long series of books, on topics which may not have been particularly topical.

In all fairness, it must be noted that such a gigantic undertaking cannot be the work of a single individual. Stephen Fischer-Galati took on the responsibility of printing most of the series under the aegis of “East European Monographs.” Indeed, many of the volumes receive a number as part of that series. Istvan Deak, the head of the East-Central European Institute at Columbia University for many years, used his power and prestige for the cause. Peter Pastor played a major role in recruiting and recommending Hungarian authors; Pastor and Király have parted ways since, and Pastor has launched yet another series of scholarly monographs. The translators, myself included, deserve credit, for making many of the Hungarian works available to the public at large, and turning them into readable products, sometimes more readable than the original, for minimal “material reward.”

Not surprisingly, the quality of the scholarship and writing is consistently high in these monographs, most of the authors being American and Hungarian

scholars of distinction. To mention some of the distinguished Hungarian scholars in random order, there are works by György Péteri, Domokos Kosáry, Géza Perjés, György Borsányi, Ignác Romsics, János Mazsu, György Csepeli, András Gerő, Tibor Glant, Tibor Frank — half of which I had the privilege of translating.⁹ My name appears on the title page of several of the 120 or so monographs, and it would appear on a few more if Béla *bátyám* — as he permitted me to address him — had not forgotten to mention it in a few more of the publications, including his rather successful history of Hungary;¹⁰ indeed, he was somewhat casual in his approach to attributions (in my case, justifiably so, on the grounds that I did get paid, what more could I expect?). On the other hand, it may be simply that Király attached less importance to the work of the translator as opposed to the creative contributions of an editor.

Many of the authors involved in the series are not of Hungarian extraction. Thus, volume 30 of the series, entitled *The First War between Socialist States: The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its Impact* has an array of distinguished international contributors such as Hannah Arendt, Albert Camus, Milovan Djilas, or Jean-Paul Sartre.¹¹ The same authors' contributions are reprinted in the monumental volume dedicated to the revolution of 1956 and issued at the time of the fiftieth anniversary, in 2006.¹² On the other hand, the *Festschrift* in honor of Király, published under the title *Society in Change, Studies in Honor of Béla K. Király*,¹³ is a collection of unrelated essays written by thirty-five scholars, the majority Americans of Hungarian descent. The latter volume includes a short biography of Király by Béla Vardy and a bibliography of his works by Agnes Vardy. It is part of the East European Monographs series but, appropriately enough, does not figure among the series edited by Király.

I recall only one exception to Király's norm of high standards: volume 66, a posthumous work by Sándor Biró, entitled *The Nationalities Problem in Transylvania, 1867-1940* was an error in judgment on Király's (and my own) part.¹⁴

Apparently the manuscript had been submitted to one of the state publishing houses in Hungary during the previous regime and was duly rejected. Presumably, it was a case of censorship, or at least we jumped to that conclusion. After announcing, in the introduction, that his intention is to "finally" restore balance and objectivity to the treatment of the subject, Biró proceeds to exonerate the Hungarian governments of any discrimination vis-à-vis the Romanian ethnic group during the period of the Dual Monarchy, while castigating the Romanian government for its maltreatment of the Hungarian minority after 1919. I do not know how Ceausescu's media reacted to this rather crude and wordy diatribe. One American reviewer apostrophized — somewhat unfairly — “when will this ever stop?” Obviously, the fact that a book has been censored is no guarantee of high merits.

Biró's analysis was a distortion of historical reality; this does not mean

that Király is remiss for meaning to safeguard the good name of the Hungarian nation. When I suggested that he should sponsor my father's diary, written during the German occupation in 1944 and published in 1946, but only in Hungarian,¹⁵ he remained silent. Clearly, my father's perception of Hungarian subservience to Nazi Germany, from one of his many hiding places during that *annee terrible*, would not redound to the credit of the nation.

Béla Király was born in 1912 at Kaposvár, the son of the stationmaster. Pressured by his father, he competed for and won a scholarship to the Ludovika Military Academy (which bears a distant resemblance to West Point). He was an officer of the Hungarian general staff during most of World War II, although he spent several stints on the Eastern Front. At one point, he was in a position to intercede on behalf of the Jewish conscripts serving in the so-called labour battalions (for which he would eventually receive a commendation from Yad Vashem in Israel). In early 1945 he surrendered to the Red Army at Szombathely, was taken prisoner, escaped from POW camp, made his way back to Budapest and returned to military service. Appointed commander of a new Military Academy, he was arrested in 1951 and sentenced to death on trumped-up charges. Although his sentence was commuted, he was not informed of the commutation, and sat on death row until late in the summer of 1956, a few weeks before the revolution broke out.¹⁶

During the October 1956 revolution Király was appointed Commander of the National Guard by Prime Minister Imre Nagy. As Soviet forces re-entered Budapest he fled westward with some troops, and crossed the border into Austria a few days later, where he was “debriefed” by the Americans.¹⁷ Upon his arrival in the United States he continued to study English and soon enrolled at Columbia University, to pursue a doctorate degree in history. His dissertation, *Hungary in the Late Eighteenth Century; the Decline of Enlightened Despotism*, was published by Columbia University Press.¹⁸ At the same time he took up the cause of the freedom fighters, relentlessly denouncing Soviet intervention. Sponsored by the Department of State (and, possibly, other agencies of the United States government), he traveled on speaking tours across the United States, and in Asia. Eventually, he became a spokesperson not only for the revolutionaries, but for the Hungarian nation. “None is more distinguished” as a cultural ambassador, writes Béla S. Várdy, who is a cultural ambassador in his own right.¹⁹

Thus, in the aftermath of 1956 Király played an important role — perhaps the most important among all-time Hungarian refugees since Lajos Kossuth — as speaker and teacher. For many years after his arrival in the United States, he was the foremost spokesperson for the revolutionaries — at least those revolutionaries who found refuge abroad — at the United Nations and other venues. I recall his account of an address he was supposed to deliver to an assembly of high school

and middle school students in an auditorium, somewhere among the yellow cornfields of Kansas undulating in the summer breeze, in the middle of America. Confronting several hundred rowdy teenagers who had little incentive to listen, much less to learn, he was nevertheless able to find the right tone, thanks in part to his imposing physical stature. The students came away from the session, knowing what Hungary is, knowing that Hungary mattered.²⁰

Király taught European and military history to several generations of students at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, and elsewhere. I am sure he impressed them with his commanding, yet fatherly appearance: he was well into his sixties when he started to teach. He brooked no indiscipline. When he hired me to teach a summer course, he told me in no uncertain terms to make sure I met my classes regularly and on time. His staff, who eventually received medals of knighthood from Király and the new Hungarian government, perceived him as a taskmaster.

Király was also a founder of the Association for the Advancement of the Study of Hungarian History, recently and more elegantly renamed the Hungarian Studies Association. The Association has a distinguished record as a lobby for Hungarian history, within the confines of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.²¹

It should redound to the credit of Király and of the Association that they have gone out of their way to preserve or establish positive relations with sister historical organizations of Slavic and Romanian scholars.

In 1990 Király returned to his homeland. While the common assumption is that politicians (and generals) in exile rarely affect the course of events, because it is those who stayed behind who suffered the brunt of persecution, he proved that there are exceptions to this rule. He ran for a seat in Parliament in the district of Kaposvár and won.

I hope I may be permitted some autobiographical notes to help explain and justify my claim of “expertise” on the subject of Király's contributions. I had met Béla *bátyám* shortly after his arrival in United States, in the apartment my parents occupied on Madison Avenue at 91st Street, in Manhattan, New York City. I am not sure why Király came to visit, unless it was to “pay his respects” to old-time, so-called liberal politicians in exile, such as my father.²²

I was to meet Király again a few years later, at his home in Highland Lakes, New Jersey, and remained in touch almost till his death.

At one point single, homeless and unemployed, I abused his hospitality for two months at a stretch. I have fond memories of Béla *bátyám* and his cozy abode. Apart from his memorabilia and the valuable pieces of art and keepsakes sent to him by his admirers, the place was modest. The plumbing never worked. Béla kept a pail of water next to the commode, which I and other guests

were expected to use to flush the toilet, military style (and refill the pail after each use). He owned no dishwasher; I was instrumental in introducing him — after he became an outstanding chef in his own not-for-profit restaurant — to the kitchen utensil known as a dish-rack, which facilitates the draining of water from dishes still wet. I gained his respect by expressing curiosity about his collection of beloved pigeons and doves, one of his areas of interest since early childhood — which he was forced to relinquish upon his return to Hungary from the United States.

I went back to Highland Lakes many times over the years, to discuss the translation of monographs or some other subject. When I found myself in exile at the University of Khartoum in the Sudan, he invited me for a summer term to Brooklyn College, where he became chair of the History Department, not long after receiving his doctorate from Columbia University. I was staying free of charge at the Roters' nearby. Since Király's return to Hungary in the aftermath of the change of regime in 1989-90, I was able to visit him — and abuse his hospitality again — in his old-new home in Budapest. I encouraged him to write his memoirs, and he rewarded me by asking me to translate it into palatable English; the truth be told, I incurred his displeasure by repeatedly mixing up the English equivalents of Hungarian military ranks.

These memoirs constitute volume 127 in the series. Another volume has been issued since. Although the entire series is in English, some of the recent volumes have also appeared in Hungarian. A complete multi-volume history of Hungary (in English) is in the offing, co-sponsored by the Hungarian Academy of Arts and Sciences.²³

It is not easy to assess the reputation of Hungary and of Hungarians in the English-speaking world. It would be even more difficult to tell how much of the positive reputation can be traced to the contributions of Király and his publishing ventures. Obviously, Hungarian exiles disagree with one another; so do some of their children and grandchildren. There were plenty of Hungarian chauvinists, and others who may be described as right-wingers, who were incapable of appreciating what Király was doing for their motherland. When the Congress of the United States was debating whether to return Saint Stephen's Crown into the custody of the Government of the People's Republic of Hungary, he was one of only two witnesses to testify and advocate the return (this was long before the change of regime) against several dozen die-hard “conservatives” who claimed to represent the Hungarian ethnic group in America.

Király's voice was always one of moderation and tolerance. Perhaps all we can conclude for certain is that, were it not for his efforts, the country's name abroad would have suffered even more than it has.

NOTES

¹ The literature on immigration is almost as vast as the bibliography of American history itself. As regards the Hungarian ethnic group, see Elemér Bakó, *Magyarok az Amerikai Egyesült Államokban* [Hungarians in the United States of America] (Budapest: Magyarok Világszövetsége, 1998); Desi K. Bogнар, *Hungarians in America, a Biographical Dictionary* (New York, 1971); Gyula Borbándi, *A magyar emigráció életrajza, 1945-1985* [A Biography of Hungarian Emigration, 1945-1985] (Munich: 1986); Istvan Mocsy, *The Effects of World War I, the Uprooted. Hungarian Refugees and Their Impact*, which constitutes Vol. 31 in the series on Atlantic Studies on Society in Change; Julianna Puskás, *Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Államokban* [Immigrant Hungarians in the United States] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1982); Miklós Szántó, *Magyarok Amerikában* [Hungarians in America] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1984); Béla Várdy, *Magyarok az újvilágban: az észak-amerikai magyarság rendhagyó története* [Hungarians in the New World: An Unorthodox History of Hungarian-Americans] (Budapest: A Magyar Nyelv és Kultúra Nemzetközi Társasága, 2000).

² For good analyses see Tibor Frank, "Patterns of Interwar Hungarian Immigration to the United States," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 30, 1-2 (2003): 3-27; also the chapter by the same author, "Az amerikai Kongresszus és bevándorláskorlátozó politikái, 1879-1924" [The American Congress and Its Policies Curtailing Immigration, 1879-1924] in *Gyarmatokból Imperium* [From Colonies to Empire], ed. T. Frank (Budapest: Gondolat, 2007).

³ For instance, the posthumous novel of Miksa Fenyo, *Jézus is DP volt* [Jesus Also Was a DP] (Budapest: Argumentum, 2006).

⁴ See, for instance, Paul Nemes, "The Welcome Refugees," *Central European Review*, 1.19 (1999): 1.

⁵ The estimates regarding the number of refugees admitted into the United States vary from 30,000 to 80,000, perhaps because the authors use different time frames. See, inter alia, S. A. Weinstock, *Acculturation and Occupation: A Study of the 1956 Hungarian Refugees in the United States*, or Ferenc Cseresznyés, "The 56 Exodus to Austria," *The Hungarian Quarterly*, 40.154 (1999). Even Borbándi's latest contribution, "Hungarian Emigrants and the Revolution" published in the memorial volume to the Revolution of 1956 (pp. 672-95), does not provide specific figures other than "40,000."

⁶ The term East Central Europe is the one used by most Hungarian scholars, while American social scientists tend to lump all of Europe east of Germany into the "Eastern Europe" basket.

⁷ See for instance, "Preface" to Tibor Glant, *Through the Prism of the Habsburg Monarchy* (New York: Columbia UP, 1998): vii. and "Preface" to Eva H. Haraszti, *Kossuth as an English Journalist* (New York: Columbia UP, 1990): 5.

⁸ Appendix to each volume in the series Atlantic Studies on Society in Change.

⁹ Vol. 35, *Effects of World War I: War Communism in Hungary* (New York:

Columbia UP, 1984); Vol. 48, *The Press During the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-1849* (New York: Columbia UP, 1986); Vol. 56, *The Fall of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohács, 1526, Buda 1541* (New York: Columbia UP, 1989); Vol. 75, *The Life of a Communist Revolutionary, Béla Kun*, (New York: Columbia UP, 1993); Vol. 83, *Istvan Bethlen: A Great Conservative Statesman of Hungary, 1874-1946* (New York: Columbia UP, 1995; the title is somewhat awkward, inasmuch as the term "statesman" implies *eo ipso* greatness); Vol. 89, *The Social History of the Hungarian Intelligentsia, 1825-1914* (New York: Columbia UP, 1997); Vol. 91, *National Identity in Contemporary Hungary* (New York: Columbia UP, 1997); Vol. 92, *The Hungarian Parliament, 1867-1928: A Mirage of Power* (New York: Columbia UP, 1997); Vol. 95, *Through the Prism of the Habsburg Monarchy: Hungary in American Diplomacy and Public Opinion During World War I* (New York: Columbia UP, 1998); Vol. 105, *From Habsburg Agent to Victorian Scholar: G. G. Zerffi* (New York: Columbia UP, 2000).

¹⁰ Béla K. Király, *History of Modern Hungary, 1867-1999* (Boston: Krieger Publishing, 2001).

¹¹ No. 30. Béla K. Király, Barbara Lotze, Nandor Dreisziger, eds. (New York: Columbia UP, 1984).

¹² 1956: *the Hungarian Revolution and War for Independence*, ed. by Lee Congdon, Béla K Király and Karoly Nagy (New York: Columbia UP, 2006).

¹³ Edited by Steven Béla Vardy and Agnes Huszar Vardy (New York: Columbia UP, 1983).

¹⁴ No. 66, Sandor Biró (New York: Columbia UP, 1992).

¹⁵ Fenyő Miksa, *Az elsodort ország* [The country swept away] (Budapest, 1986); 1st ed., 1946.

¹⁶ See Chapter V in *Wars, Revolutions and Regime Changes in Hungary, 1912-2004. Reminiscences of an Eyewitness*, (New York: Columbia UP, 2006). An earlier version was published in Hungary and in Hungarian, entitled *Amire nincs ige: visszaemlékezések, 1912-2004* (Budapest: HVG Kiado, 2004).

¹⁷ See Chapter 6 in *Wars, Revolutions and Regime Changes in Hungary*.

¹⁸ *Hungary in the Late Eighteenth Century: The Decline of Enlightened Despotism* (New York: Columbia UP, 1969). For a fair assessment of Király as historian, see also his other works, including his study of Deák as a public figure: *Ferenc Deák* (Boston: Twayne, 1975).

¹⁹ Vardy and Vardy, eds., *op. cit.*, p. 4. Although his assessment is in measured terms, Steven Vardy refers to Király's "prodigious achievement" given his age (this was in 1983, a quarter of a century ago).

²⁰ See Chapter 7 in *Wars, Revolutions and Regime Changes in Hungary*.

²¹ Its goal is to further interest and to encourage research in Hungarian history, politics, and cultural affairs." It issues a bulletin or newsletter four or five times a year, and co-sponsors *The Hungarian Studies Review*, produced in Canada, under the editorship of Nandor Dreisziger.

²² Both Király and the Vardys described my father's politics as "monarchist." With all due respect this borders on the ridiculous, albeit it is true that both my father and I

attended a dinner in honour of Otto von Habsburg at the Dupont Hotel in Washington, D.C.

²³ Personal communication by Király to author, April 28, 2007.

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