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MARRIAGE OR COHABITATION? A SURVEY OF STUDENTS' ATTITUDES IN GREECE

Kostas Rontos – Myrsine Roumeliotou – Luca Salvati – Maria-Eleni Syrmali

ABSTRACT

In recent decades, family patterns have been (more or less rapidly) transformed in all Western societies. This is also the case for Greece, whose society was frequently considered one of the most traditional among European countries, since family stereotypes, secular social norms and – in some ways – religion occupied (and still do) a prominent position. Based on a survey of students' attitudes towards marriage (or cohabitation), an exploratory data analysis allows the identification of specific factors shaping beliefs and attitudes toward marriage in Greek society. In particular, it is demonstrated that female students are overcoming traditional boundaries and prefer more modern forms of companionship. The results indicate that female students tend to postpone their decision to marry, as traditional family stereotypes seem to have lost their influence on the life course decisions taken by young women. Additionally, a large proportion of female students use cohabitation as a precursor to marriage. Respondents are found to be more emancipated and independent than in years gone by, while social status and financial independence are sought through education rather than marriage. Another important factor is the lack of state policies supporting families and the lack of incentives to have children.

Keywords: marriage, cohabitation, attitudes, university students, Greece

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INTRODUCTION

Although among the most traditional cultures in Europe, Mediterranean societies have undergone important modifications in terms of their marriage patterns, including postponement of marriage and alternative (mainly informal) forms of companionship. The historical change in family forms has been less thoroughly explored in Southern Europe than in the rest of the continent. This study contributes to this worthwhile issue by investigating attitudes to marriage and cohabitation using a sample of female students in Greece, with the aim of revealing the motivations underlying a possible shift towards less traditional patterns of family formation – mainly outside marriage.

Young people especially – and particularly college and university students – explore new trends and alternative ways of companionship, such as cohabitation, in order to discover whether they can deal with conflict with, as well as commitment to, another person (Glick and Spanier, 1980). Nevertheless, cohabitation does not constitute a sufficient preparation for marriage (Olson, 1972; De Moor and Van Zanden, 2010; Beaujouan and Ni Bhrolchain, 2011; Carmichael et al., 2016). Rather, it is an alternative to marriage, as premarital sexual activity has led to an increase in the proportion of couples who live together and share a home out of wedlock. Only 5% of women in Great Britain cohabited in the mid-1960s, whereas the figure was 70% in the 1990s (Haskey, 1992). Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, cohabitation rates increased even more, by 40% throughout the world (Fincham and Beach, 2010).

The benefits of cohabitation have to do with the fact that one can have the advantages of intimacy, without the drawbacks and constraints of commitment (Pagnini and Rindfuss, 1993). In research conducted by Scott et al. (1993) on attitudes to marriage or cohabitation, younger age groups were more likely to be in favor of cohabitation. More specifically, adolescents intended cohabitation as part of their future life trajectories (Martin et al., 2003); but they rarely envisaged cohabitation as a replacement for marriage – instead it was a step on the road towards marriage (Manning et al., 2007). Moreover, cohabitation is not an alternative to marriage, but merely a precursor to it, since most couples marry after cohabiting (Rindfuss and VandenHeuvel, 1990; Kiernan, 2001; Kalmijn, 2007). However, it has been demonstrated that cohabitees hold different values from those who marry directly, and have a different understanding of commitment and permanence (Reynolds and Mansfield, 1999). Perelli-Harris et al. (2014) argued that the increase in cohabitation has not devalued the concept of marriage, but has become a way to preserve marriage as an ideal for

long-term commitment. Furthermore, in some countries (especially advanced economies), partnership can be made official, without the need for marriage. This may take the form of a civil union or a registered partnership. Civil unions allow two people who live together as partners to register their relationship with the relevant public authority in their country of residence.

Theoretical background

Shifting trends in marriage and its intimate nature have stimulated an in-depth investigation of the changes over time in attitudes towards marriage and cohabitation. It is often perceived that marriage is not an outdated institution, and is still the norm. A survey carried out in European countries revealed that, for the majority of respondents, marriage indicated a commitment to be faithful to one's partner, as well as an intention to have children, to safeguard their legal rights, and to form a nuclear family (European Values Study, 2008). In the United States, Campbell and Wright (2010) stated that perceptions of marriage have remained rather stable over time, with people getting married because they believe in monogamy and fidelity; the main purpose of marriage is love and satisfaction.

Significant differences have been observed in the areas of permissiveness and family formation values between young people who have relatively short-term marital intentions (i.e., those who desire marriage in their early 20s) and those who have longer-term intentions (i.e., those who desire marriage in their mid-20s or later) (Carroll et al., 2007). Therefore, one of the aspects of marriage that have changed most in recent times has been the age at first marriage (Mencarini and Tanturri, 2004; Gjonca et al., 2008; Tanturri and Mencarini, 2008). Earlier studies revealed that people are tending to put off marriage to a later age, resulting in a systematically higher age at first marriage than among older cohorts. In 2010, the mean age at first marriage was over 27 and 29 years, respectively, in Asia and Africa. The mean age at first marriage among women increased by 1.0–4.5 years between 1990 and 2000 in European and North American countries (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2003). In advanced economies, mean age at first marriage was 25 years in 2005, while in some European countries – such as Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Switzerland – it was over 30 years, according to Eurostat data.

Traditional attitudes to marriage are positively related to religiosity and negatively related to good practical skills in childhood and to smoking (or

drinking) in adulthood (Flouri and Buchanan, 2001). At the same time, attitudes towards marriage are greatly influenced by parental and family patterns, determining the success (or failure) of marriage (Trotter, 2010). Earlier research also explored the association between age at first marriage and socioeconomic status, gender, and place of residence (van Poppel and Nelissen, 1999). More recent studies have shown that financial security, which was one main reason for getting married in the past, no longer figures among the priorities of women (e.g., Gavalas et al., 2014).

Scholars have tried to explore gender differences in marital attitudes and the experience of marriage. Women's entry into the labor force and their tendency to go on to higher education have also influenced gender norms of marriage, and have changed attitudes towards marriage and the roles within it. Education is another factor associated with marriage trends. Studies carried out in European countries have shown that education results in higher age at first marriage and first child birth (Blossfeld, 1995; Liefbroer and Corijn, 1999). In this regard, it has been demonstrated that women find it more difficult to reconcile their roles as spouse, mother, and employee, which often leads to postponed childbearing, falling marriage rates, and a rise in divorce rates (Chafetz, 1992). Moreover, Abowitz et al. (2009) investigated differences between male and female students in the way they view relationships, and found that males are more likely to believe in the benefits of cohabitation for a better marriage than are females.

As a consequence of these dynamics, marriage – which has traditionally been regarded as an important pathway into adult life – has lost much of its centrality and essence in structuring the lives of young adults, and has gradually been replaced by cohabitation as the first stage in family formation (Bumpass and Lu, 2000; Smock and Manning, 2004). Whereas in most societies, marrying without prior cohabitation is not the norm (Kiernan, 2001), the notion of cohabitation has spread particularly slowly in the Mediterranean countries. Based on the Fertility and Family Surveys, only 7% of Italian females born in the years 1960–1964 chose cohabitation as a prelude to marriage. The figure for Spain was 11%. A steady trend towards marriage postponement has been in evidence since the early 1980s, and the current female age at first marriage is well above the EU-28 average in Italy (29.5%), Spain (29.4%), and Greece (29.9%). Nevertheless, the decline in marriage rates has not been counterbalanced by a concurrent rise in cohabitation rates (Díez Medrano et al., 2014). By contrast with Northern Europe, the percentage of women aged 25–29 who have not yet entered their first family union reaches 63% in Spain and 59% in Italy (Domínguez et al., 2007).

Relevance and goals of this study

Greece is considered one of the most traditional cultures in Europe as far as marriage and family formation are concerned. However, research into marriage patterns in Greece shows a distinct falling trend in marriage rates. More specifically, the average number of weddings during 1961–1970 was 73,500 per year, decreasing progressively to 70,540 in 1971–1980, 62,260 in 1981–1990, and 56,876 in 1991–2000. The number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants fell from 9.7 in the aftermath of World War II to about 5.5 in the most recent decades (National Statistical Service of Greece, 2005). The proportion of the population aged 20 and over who had ever been married in Greece was estimated at 62.4% in 2011. Mean age at first marriage for women increased by 1.9 years between 1990 and 2000, when it was nearly 27 (United Nations, 2000); the rate was over 30 in 2016 (National Statistical Service of Greece, 2005). For males, the figures were 29, 31, and 33 years in 1990, 2000, and 2016, respectively.

The marriage rate per 1,000 residents was 7% in 1960, declining slightly to 6.5% in 1980. By 2016, the figure had fallen to 4.6%. As for the distribution of people getting married by previous marital status, single persons who had never previously been married were estimated at 95.4% of the adult population in 1960, declining to 93.9% in 1980, and to 87.8% in 2016. The percentage of previously divorced people was 2.4% in 1960, 4.3% in 1980, and 11.5% in 2016. The respective statistics for those widowed were 2.2% in 1960, 1.8% in 1980, and 0.7% in 2016.

According to the OECD family database, in 2011 the proportion of the adult population (aged 20 and over) cohabiting was 1.7%, reaching 3.9% for young adults (20–34). Based on the level of educational attainment in Greece, cohabiting people with low education make up only 0.93% of the total population, while people with medium and high levels of education who were cohabiting were estimated at 2.12% and 2.63%, respectively. Cohabiting households without and with children were estimated at 2.42% and 0.41%, respectively.

However, the World Values Survey carried out in 1999 revealed a highly positive attitude towards marriage among respondents in Greece (Gavalas et al., 2014). In particular, 84.3% of respondents disagreed with the statement that marriage is an outdated institution. Age did not seem to affect attitudes towards marriage, with only slight differences observed for the age group 30–49, who were more likely than other age groups to agree with the statement (18.9% vs 15.7%). One factor that plays a role in attitudes towards marriage is level of education (Rontos, 2009). More specifically, 15% of respondents with higher education responded that marriage is an outdated institution; the corresponding percentage was 9% for

Greeks with the lowest educational level (European Values Study, 2008). A specific survey carried out in Greece (Rontos, 2007) also revealed a high proportion of young educated females in favor of marriage (81.8%).

Based on these premises, this study explores the attitudes of a sample of female students towards marriage and cohabitation in Greece. A specific investigation of attitudes towards marriage and cohabitation is particularly appropriate in order to reveal the possible shift towards less traditional attitudes and patterns of family formation (Abowitz et al., 2009). Selection of this particular student population with the aim of exploring changing trends towards marriage was a common practice in earlier studies addressing life course decisions (Johnson and Jaccard, 1981); expectations of future career, marital, and parental identity (Kerpelman and Schvaneveldt, 1999); and perceptions of future marital patterns of work-family integration (Forste, 2001). Men's attitudes were not included in this study, since it has been demonstrated that currently women's marital attitudes change with the evolution of the labor market and social conditions (Rontos, 2009). The analysis seeks to identify factors that shape attitudes towards marriage (or cohabitation), and to explore beliefs and values towards marriage, as well as feelings and dispositions that influence short-term and longer-term marital intentions.

METHODOLOGY

Definition of attitudes

The present article is an attempt to explore the attitudes of female students towards marriage and cohabitation. By attitudes, we use here the sociological definition: "a mental position with regard to a fact or state" or "a feeling or emotion toward a fact or state" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary). More specifically, in this study marital attitudes refer to the situation of being in favor of, or against marriage. The aim is to explore beliefs and values towards marriage, as well as feelings and dispositions (Rontos, 2009). For this reason, a primary survey was carried out and the related results were analyzed and discussed.

Target population and sampling design

This study investigates female students' attitudes towards marriage and family formation, considering a sample of women studying at various universities

across Greece. This particular section of the female population was selected as the most appropriate for the study: women in further education were given an opportunity to voice their aspirations for the future. Furthermore, as they were likely to have been aware of the current new labor market conditions, they were asked for their views about the role of the state and other institutions regarding family and employment. In seeking to infer more general demographic patterns from local ones, this study assesses the role of a number of socioeconomic factors underlying preferences for marriage or cohabitation.

The study was conducted in 2012, during the economic crisis in Greece, by interviewing university students attending various academic years. The sample consisted of 194 female students studying in various university departments. A stratified, random sampling was used, with department and year of study being the main stratification criteria. The Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling technique was used to determine the number of respondents in the strata. The size of the sample means that the sampling error at a confidence level of 0.05 lies in the range 1.4–7.0 for percentage estimates derived from the survey's questions. Students were asked to complete an anonymized, self-administered questionnaire consisting of 43 closed-type questions concerning attitudes to marriage, divorce, fertility, and family formation. Attitudes towards marriage (or cohabitation) were measured by the following question and answer:

What is your attitude towards the institution of marriage?

1 - In favor of marriage

2 - Against marriage

Additionally, preference for cohabitation was measured by the question:

Would you choose cohabitation instead of marriage?

1 - Yes

2 - No

We also asked "What does cohabitation mean to you?" with values presented in *Table 2*.

This questionnaire was tested for reliability and validity (Rontos, 2007; 2009). Data were digitalized and analyzed in house, using a spreadsheet and the SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) software. The total response rate was 67% - a percentage accepted by the sampling theory, provided non-respondents are not concentrated in a specific part of the population, but are spread across the population (which was the case in this survey) (Graves, 2006). Based on these premises, non-response bias has a negligible influence on data quality.

Data analysis

Descriptive statistics were used to provide information about the sample profile, as well as female students' demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Moreover, chi-square tests were applied, in order to explore pair-wise associations between the "attitude towards marriage" dependent variable (see above for the exact wording) and other explanatory variables that expressed the sample's characteristics or views. Explanatory variables included age, family type, father's educational level, mother's educational level, type and size of income, a preference for cohabitation over marriage, readiness for marital commitment, living with parents, the student's opinion about the negative impact on her career, the influence of no permanent work on the marriage decision, and, finally, the student's opinion about measures taken by the Greek welfare state. These variables were selected according to earlier evidence from empirical research mentioned in the introduction.

In order to construct a more complete and more accurate model, a multivariate logistic regression model was run, adopting the Maximum Likelihood approach and the Conditional Forward Stepwise procedure (Bishop et al., 1975; Nerlove and Press, 1973; Cox and Snell, 1989). An additional attempt was made to explore factors affecting female students' attitudes towards marriage through the application of Classification and Regression Trees (CART). CART is a nonparametric statistical methodology introduced by Breiman et al. (1984). This type of classification method presents many advantages over other classification methods (Kitsantas et al., 2007). To define dendrograms, a Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detector (CHAID) method, one of the oldest tree classification methods (Kass, 1980; Antipov and Pokryshevskaya, 2009), was preferred to other common procedures.

RESULTS

Students' characteristics

The female students participating in the study ranged in age from 18 to 37 years, with a mean age of 22.1 years. The majority of them were aged 22–25 years (50.2%) and studied at the University of the Aegean, the University of Crete and Panteion University of Athens; their main residences were spread all over Greece (*Table 1*). Most of them were studying Sociology (26.6%), Geography (18.8%), Psychology (12.5%),

and Cultural Technology and Communication (10.4%). The vast majority of them were undergraduates (92.1%) and were single (94.3%), so they had no personal experience of marriage. However, they came from a variety of parental family structures (single parent, extended, and nuclear), which means that they had varying indirect experience of marriage. As far as their family educational background is concerned, 52.6% of their fathers had attended university or a higher technical university, while 44.3% of their mothers had completed high school. The students' monthly income was rather low (301–600 euro for most of them), and 67% depended completely on their parents from the economic point of view.

Table 1: Variables describing students' personal characteristics and socioeconomic background

Variables and values	N	%
Age (years)		
18–21	83	42.8
22–25	97	50.0
26+	13	6.7
No answer	1	0.5
Total	194	100.0
University		
University of the Aegean	131	67.5
University of Crete	47	24.2
Panteion University of Athens	14	7.2
No answer	2	1.0
Total	194	100.0
Field of study		
Sociology	51	26.3
Social Anthropology and History	11	5.7
Psychology	24	12.4
Business Administration	6	3.1
Geography	36	18.6
Cultural Technology and Communication	20	10.3
Environmental Studies	14	7.2
Marine Sciences	16	8.2
Economic and Regional Development	14	7.2
No answer	2	1.0
Total	194	100.0
Level of study		
Undergraduate	176	90.7
Postgraduate	15	7.7
No answer	3	1.5
Total	194	100.0

Table 1: Variables describing students' personal characteristics and socioeconomic background (continued)

Variables and values	N	%
Marital status		
Married	6	3.1
Single	183	94.3
Cohabitation agreement	3	1.5
Divorced	1	0.5
Engaged	1	0.5
Total	194	100.0
Number of children		
None	190	98.0
1	3	1.5
2	1	0.5
Total	194	100.0
Parental family structure		
Single-parent type	13	6.7
Nuclear	169	87.1
Extended	12	6.2
Total	194	100.0
Father's educational level		
Did not finish elementary school	2	1.0
Elementary school	15	7.7
Junior high school	24	12.4
Senior high school	48	24.7
University or higher technical school	102	52.6
Postgraduate studies	3	1.5
Total	194	100.0
Mother's educational level		
Did not finish elementary school	1	0.5
Elementary school	15	7.7
Junior high school	42	21.6
Senior high school	86	44.3
University or higher technical school	47	24.2
Postgraduate studies	3	1.5
Total	194	100.0
Source of income		
Work	25	12.9
From parents	129	67.0
Both	39	20.1
Total	194	100.0

Table 1: Variables describing students' personal characteristics and socioeconomic background (continued)

Variables and values	N	%
Monthly income (euro)		
< 300	46	23.7
301–600	111	57.2
601–900	21	10.8
> 900	15	7.7
No answer	1	0.5
Total	194	100.0
Reading religious books		
Rarely	7	3.6
Quite often	27	13.9
A little	74	38.1
Not at all	72	37.1
No answer	14	7.2
Total	194	100.0
Frequency of going to church		
Never	11	5.7
2–3 times per year	68	35.1
1–2 times per week	78	40.2
Almost daily	23	11.9
No answer	14	7.2
Total	194	100.0
How religious life affects their decisions in daily life		
Very much	2	1.0
Fairly much	31	16.0
A little	77	39.7
Not at all	70	36.1
No answer	14	7.2
Total	194	100.0
Importance of ceremonies in their life		
Very important	12	6.2
Fairly important	61	31.4
A little	83	42.8
Not at all	24	12.4
No answer	14	7.2
Total	194	100.0

Source: Primary survey conducted by the Sociology Department of the University of the Aegean, Laboratory of Social Informatics, Statistics and Research Infrastructure, 2012, n = 194.

Religiosity among the sample is rather weak: in the main they did not read religious books or only a little (median value: 'a little'). Their daily life was not affected or was affected a little by their religious life (median value: 'a little'), and ceremonies were only fairly important in their life (median value: 'a little'). However, 56.1% of them went to church at least 1–2 times a week.

Students' attitudes towards marriage and cohabitation

As far as students' attitudes towards marriage are concerned, the majority of female students seemed to be in favor of the institution of marriage (71.1%), while 28.9% were against it. However, when asked if they would opt for cohabitation instead of marriage, most of them (73.7%) replied that they would choose cohabitation over marriage (the latter chosen by only 26.3%). In case of cohabitation, 64.4% would choose cohabitation without an official agreement, while 35.1% would choose to formalize their cohabitation with an official agreement. Regarding attitudes towards cohabitation (*Table 2*), 41.7% of students believed that cohabitation is a prelude to marriage, while 22.4% regarded it as an initial stage in the marriage process. Only 14.1% of respondents regarded cohabitation as an alternative to marriage, and another 14.1% found it indistinguishable from marriage. The cohabitation options were selected on the basis of respondents' answers to the associated questionnaire. Based on the categorization of Heuveline and Timberlake (2004), only 22.4% of female students regarded cohabitation as a stage of marriage, which is certainly going to happen.

Table 2: Female students' replies to the question "What does cohabitation mean to you?"

Type of cohabitation	%
Marginal and random fact	2.6
Alternative to marriage	14.1
Prelude to marriage	41.7
Stage in the marriage process	22.4
Alternative to single	5.2
Indistinguishable from marriage	14.1
Total	100.0

Source: Primary survey conducted by the Sociology Department of the University of the Aegean, Laboratory of Social Informatics, Statistics and Research Infrastructure, 2012, n = 194.

According to the female students' views, the most suitable age to get married is 25–29 years (54.1%), while for 41.8% of the students the most appropriate age was 30–34 years. Most of the students seemed to find the age groups 20–24 and 35–39 quite inappropriate for marriage (*Table 3*).

Table 3: Female students' opinion about the ideal age at marriage

Age class (years)	%
20–24	2.1
25–29	54.1
30–34	41.8
35–39	2.1
Total	100.0

Source: Primary survey conducted by the Sociology Department of the University of the Aegean, Laboratory of Social Informatics, Statistics and Research Infrastructure, 2012, n = 194.

As for the most important reasons leading to marriage, the students thought that women should get married mainly in order to protect their children legally (25.8%), while the second main reason for marriage had to do with sentiment (24.2%). A third motivation was a desire to cement a relationship (21.6%). Conversely, social recognition and financial security came low on the list of reasons mentioned by students (2.6% and 1%, respectively). Family pressure and religious reasons seemed to be of greater importance (*Table 4*).

Table 4: Most important reason for women getting married, according to female students' opinion

Reason	%
Protecting children legally	25.8
Sentimental reasons	24.2
Cementing a relationship	21.6
Religious reasons	11.9
Family pressures	8.2
Legal rights	4.6
Social recognition	2.6
Financial security	1.0
Total	100.0

Source: Primary survey conducted by the Sociology Department of the University of the Aegean, Laboratory of Social Informatics, Statistics and Research Infrastructure, 2012, n = 194.

Factors associated with attitudes towards marriage

The association between factors and the female students' attitudes towards marriage was investigated using chi-square tests (*Table 5*). The differentiation in the students' responses was found to be statistically significant in relation to their opinion about measures taken by the Greek welfare state (p = 0.010), source of income (p = 0.045) and living (or not) with parents (p = 0.05). Statistical significance was found in opinions about the negative impact of having a family on one's career (p = 0.002) and in students' opinions about measures taken by the Greek welfare state to promote marriage (p = 0.010). High statistical significance was observed for preferring cohabitation to marriage (p = 0.001) and for readiness to undertake marital commitments and obligations (p = 0.001). No statistical significance was found for the association between attitude towards marriage and all other factors, such as family type, father's educational level, mother's educational level, and the influence of no permanent work on the marriage decision.

Table 5: Chi-square tests between "attitudes towards marriage" (in favor of marriage/against marriage) and categorical explanatory variables

Variable	Chi-square value	Degrees of freedom	Significance
Family type	1.764	2	0.414
Father's educational level	0.912	3	0.823
Mother's educational level	2.860	3	0.414
Source of income	6.212	2	0.045
Cohabitation preference over marriage	14.892	1	0.000
Readiness for marital commitments and obligations	28.701	3	0.000
Living with parents[a]	3.759	1	0.050
Students' opinion about negative impact on career	15.122	3	0.002
Influence of no permanent work on marriage decision	4.630	3	0.201
Students' opinion about measures taken by the Greek welfare state to promote marriage	6.722	1	0.010

Source: Primary survey conducted by the Sociology Department of the University of the Aegean, Laboratory of Social Informatics, Statistics and Research Infrastructure, 2012, n = 194.
Notes: For variables' values/ranking, see *Table 6*.
[a] Or thinking of living with them when they return from their studies.

Students who were earning their money from work were more in favor of marriage than the other students, probably because of their financial

independence. Students living with their parents were more likely to be in favor of marriage. Conversely, a higher proportion of those who believed that their career would lead them to postpone starting a family were against marriage than among those who did not believe that.

Modelling attitude towards marriage and cohabitation

A logistic regression model was applied with the aim of exploring the factors affecting female students' attitude towards marriage. Logistic regression was used in addition to x^2 tests, as causal factors in x^2 tests work independently of those that offer univariate inference. The independent variable in the logistic regression model was the "attitude towards marriage" dichotomous response; those factors tested with the model are presented in *Table 6*.

Table 6: Variables of the logistic model, its values, and absolute frequency

Variables and values		Frequency
Will a flexible form of work influence your decision to get married?	Fully	39
	Partially	87
	A little	40
	Not at all	27
Father's education	Primary school or less	17
	Junior high school	24
	High school	48
	University/technological education	104
Might your career lead you to postpone a decision about starting a family?	Fully	18
	Partially	93
	A little	63
	Not at all	19
Mother's education	Primary school or less	16
	Junior high school	42
	High school	86
	University/technological education	49

Table 6: Variables of the logistic model, its values, and absolute frequency (continued)

Variables and values		Frequency
Readiness for marital commitments and obligations – Would you mind facing the obligations and commitments of marriage and family formation (resources for household, reduced time for fun, etc.)?	Fully	57
	Partially	72
	A little	53
	Not at all	11
Monthly income (euro)	1–300	46
	301–600	111
	601–900	21
	901 and more	15
Source of monthly income	Work	25
	Parents	127
	Work and parents	41
Family type	Single parent	13
	Nuclear	168
	Extended	12
Has the Greek welfare state taken active measures to promote marriage among young people?	A little	56
	Not at all	137
Do you live with your parents (or are you thinking of living with them when you return from your studies)?	Yes	120
	No	73
Cohabitation preference instead of marriage (Will you choose cohabitation rather than marriage?)	Yes	142
	No	51

Source: Primary survey conducted by the Sociology Department of the University of the Aegean, Laboratory of Social Informatics, Statistics and Research Infrastructure, 2012, n = 194.

A Conditional Forward Stepwise procedure was adopted, and the model was completed after three steps (*Table 7*). The model was statistically significant at all steps (for the last step: $x^2 = 54.56$, df = 5, $p < 0.0001$) and explained 35.3% of the variance in marital attitudes among the sample (Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.35$). This value indicates a moderately strong relationship between the predictors and the dependent variable. Model goodness-of-fit was also reflected in the non-significance of the statistical test of Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) at all

steps (for the last step: $x^2 = 1.16$, df = 6, $p = 0.979$); -2 log likelihood fell from 196.185 in step 1 to 176.111 in step 3, a value indicating that the last model's step 3 fits the data better than steps 1 and 2.

The model correctly classifies 71.5% of the cases. According to the model's step 0 (constant), the students as a whole were 2.5 times more likely to be in favor of marriage than to be against it. The variable "readiness to undertake marriage commitment and obligations" entered in step 1. During step 2, the same variable was kept and "cohabitation preference over marriage" was added. Step 3 kept the variables "readiness to undertake marriage commitment and obligations" (Wald = 16.15, df = 3, $p = 0.001$) and "cohabitation preference over marriage" (Wald = -2.0, df = 1, $p = 0.001$), and introduced a variable concerning the view of the state's policy to promote marriage (Wald = 3.81, df = 1, $p = 0.05$).

Those female students who said they were ready to undertake fully the commitment to (and obligations of) marriage appeared to have a higher positive *b* coefficient ($b = 3.89$), showing that students who were ready to undertake the obligations and commitments of marriage were also more likely to be in favor of marriage. Actually, the stronger the readiness to undertake the commitments and obligations of marriage, the higher the probability of a student revealing a positive attitude towards marriage, as indicated by the value of b coefficients for this variable in model 3. The odds ratio of a student - fully ready to undertake the commitments and obligations of marriage - being in favor of marriage is 49 times higher than the other items.

Those students who seemed to prefer cohabitation to marriage were less likely to be in favor of marriage ($b = -1.998$ and $e^b = 0.136$). The odds of being in favor of marriage were 7.36 times higher among those female students who did not prefer cohabitation to marriage than among those who did. Finally, those students who believed that the Greek welfare state had taken active measures to promote marriage were 2.6 times more likely to be in favor of marriage than those who believed that the state had undertaken no action at all (b = 0.964 and $e^b = 2.622$). It is worth mentioning that not a single respondent in the sample expressed the view that the state had taken comprehensive measures to promote marriage among young people.

The methodology also predicts the probability of an individual in the sample having specific characteristics (values taken from the variables in the model) and may define the profile of an individual who has a specific probability of being in favor of marriage. The highest score (99.6%) in favor of marriage was attributed to female students who (i) said they were ready to undertake the commitments and obligations of marriage, and (ii) expressed the feeling that

the Greek welfare state had taken some active measures to promote marriage among young people. Conversely, the lowest probability of having a positive attitude towards marriage (20.9%) was attributed to female students who said they (i) preferred cohabitation to marriage, (ii) were not ready to undertake the commitments and obligations of marriage, and (iii) felt that the Greek welfare state had taken no active measures to promote marriage among young people.

Table 7: Results of the logistic regression model

Step	Variables (values)	B	S.E.	p	Exp(B)
Step 1	A7			0.000	
	A7(1)	3.874	0.954	0.000	48.125
	A7(2)	1.130	0.673	0.093	3.096
	A7(3)	1.060	0.688	0.123	2.888
	A7(4)	(ref.)	-	-	-
	Constant	-0.560	0.627	0.372	0.571
Step 2	A2(1)	-1.932	0.570	0.001	0.145
	A2(2)	(ref.)	-	-	-
	A7			0.001	
	A7(1)	3.923	0.989	0.000	50.541
	A7(2)	1.126	0.721	0.118	3.082
	A7(3)	1.110	0.736	0.131	3.035
	A7(4)	(ref.)	-	-	-
	Constant	0.997	0.819	0.223	2.711
Step 3	A2(1)	-1.996	0.579	0.001	0.136
	A2(2)	(ref.)	-	-	-
	A7			0.001	
	A7(1)	3.891	0.991	0.000	48.984
	A7(2)	1.340	0.733	0.068	3.819
	A7(3)	1.359	0.750	0.070	3.893
	A7(4)	(ref.)	-	-	-
	A17(1)	0.964	0.494	0.051	2.622
	A17(2)	(ref.)	-	-	-
	Constant	0.664	0.830	0.424	1.942

Source: Primary survey conducted by the Sociology Department of the University of the Aegean, Laboratory of Social Informatics, Statistics and Research Infrastructure, 2012, n = 194.

Legend:

A7: Readiness for marital commitments and obligations [A7(1): fully, A7(2): partially, A7(3): a little, A7(4): not at all];
A2: Cohabitation preference instead of marriage [A2(1): Yes, A2(2): No];
A17: Has the Greek welfare state taken active measures to promote marriage among young people? [A17(1): a little, A17(2): not at all].

Notes: Variables not in the model are age, family type, father's educational level, mother's educational level, type of income, size of income, living with parents, students' opinion about negative impact on career, and influence of no permanent work on marriage decision.

Classification tree analysis of factors affecting attitude towards marriage

The "attitude towards marriage" dependent variable was tested with the same independent variables analyzed with the logistic regression model (see above). Application of a CHAID on the dependent variable (*Figure 1*) revealed that the best predicting factor for female students' attitude towards marriage was their preference for cohabitation instead of getting married ($x^2 = 14.892$, df = 1, $p = 0.001$). For female students answering that they would not choose cohabitation instead of marriage, this seems to be the terminal node of the tree, representing the most predictive factor of their positive attitude towards marriage. More specifically, 92.2% of the students who responded in the negative to the question of whether they preferred cohabitation stated that they were for marriage, and only 7.8% were against it. Among those students who replied that they would choose cohabitation over marriage, 63.6% had a positive attitude towards marriage and 36.4% were against it. For those who said they preferred cohabitation, the second important predictive factor seems to be monthly income ($x^2 = 11.121$, df = 1, $p = 0.013$). Students with a monthly income of up to 300 euro and above 601 euro were mainly in favor of marriage (80%), while only 53% of those with a monthly income of between 301 and 600 euro were in favor of marriage. Overall, the predictive model performed relatively well, with low risk estimation (0.289, standard error = 0.033) and correct prediction and classification in 71.1% of cases.

Figure 1: Classification tree on attitude towards marriage



Source: Primary survey conducted by the Sociology Department of the University of the Aegean, Laboratory of Social Informatics, Statistics and Research Infrastructure, 2012, n = 194.

DISCUSSION

Over the past three decades, family patterns have been transformed in all Western societies (Billari, 2005). In this study, the attitudes of female students are analyzed, with the aim of exploring the patterns of marriage and the decisions to form a family in the shorter and longer term in Greece. Sample characteristics cover a broad spectrum of socioeconomic conditions and a relatively large geographical area.

Most of the female students seemed to be in favor of marriage, in line with the traditional patterns of the society where they grew up. Nevertheless, when they had to choose between cohabitation and marriage, the majority of them would opt for cohabitation. New trends and changes in socioeconomic conditions have affected students' views, which show up as a preference for more practical and economic solutions to being with another person, rather than marriage (Bumpass and Lu, 2000; Abowitz et al., 2009; Fincham and Beach, 2010). This finding is extremely important, as Greece is generally considered to be a traditional society, where family patterns and religion play a dominant role (Gavalas et al., 2014). Despite this, the students appeared to go beyond the traditional boundaries and preferred "modern" types of partnership. Hence, the research findings revealed that marriage has not lost its essence and importance, but a great proportion of the female students regarded cohabitation as a precursor to marriage. In some cases, students actually prefer cohabitation and are indifferent to marriage (Campbell and Wright, 2010). Comparing the results of attitudes towards marriage in this survey with those collected in an earlier study (Rontos, 2007), we notice that the positive attitude of young educated Greek women towards marriage is still high, but declined between 2007 and 2012, from 81.8% to 71.1%. This variation may reveal a changing trend regarding attitudes towards marriage. However, it should be emphasized that the majority of young educated people are still in favor of marriage, despite the rapid socioeconomic changes observed in Greece.

As for the reasons for getting married, the young female students believed that the most important was to give their children legal protection, and a large and relatively stable proportion of the young people believed that marriage and family life are important for having and bringing up children. For some other respondents, marriage is still of symbolic value, as it cements their relationship with their partner (Carroll et al., 2007). Interestingly, the motivations stated nowadays by young women differ from those reported in the past. Therefore, the institution of marriage is no longer considered a means by which women enter

the adult world and attain a certain social status (Cherlin, 1992). On the contrary, the young female students in the sample seem to be more independent, as their responses indicated that religious reasons, social recognition, and financial security were all of low importance (Rontos, 2007). Apparently, social status and financial independence are sought through education, rather than marriage (Díez Medrano et al., 2014).

However, it should be noted that the sample considered in this study consisted of highly educated women (i.e., university students) who have recourse to education rather than marriage for their personal and professional development. A study applied to the total female population would be required in order to generalize the shift in attitudes towards marriage among Greek women as a whole. Nevertheless, the empirical findings of this study are indicative of the latest trends in marriage patterns in Greece, as shifts in attitudes and views are reflected in this particular portion of the Greek female population (Gavalas et al., 2014).

Moreover, within the sample there were certain socioeconomic factors that affected students' attitudes towards the decision to marry. Female students on a low monthly income seem to be more hesitant to marry, as revealed by the classification tree analysis. As a matter of fact, economic and professional instability seems to lead to a postponement of the marriage decision, as a great percentage of female students think that marriage may have a negative impact on their careers (Flouri and Buchanan, 2001). An important factor related to the positive attitude towards cohabitation, as opposed to marriage, is that young female students nowadays often have to move and live away from home when they pursue their studies in different cities. Thus, living independently encourages the idea of cohabitation with their partner, in a way that is at variance with the experiences of those who live with their parents while studying (Heuveline and Timberlake, 2004). Furthermore, the lack (or limited provision) of social protection measures by the Greek welfare state may constrain the preference for marriage.

Particularly important factors associated with attitudes towards marriage include the readiness of young women to undertake marital commitments and obligations, their predisposition towards cohabitation, and their opinion about the role of the state in promoting marriage among young people. In addition, family formation means that more time and money are spent on the household, childbearing, and child care, instead of one's personal life. Individualism and today's ego-centric and consumerist mentality of non-commitment deter young people in Greece from moving towards marriage and its commitments

and obligations, as earlier studies have shown (e.g. Kiernan, 2001). A change in attitudes can also be noticed regarding the preferred age of marriage, as stated by respondents. The most suitable age of marriage was reported to be 25–34 years. This period of life almost coincides with the completion of studies, as well as with professional and financial security. In this way, a delay in the decision to marry was noticed among Greek female students, as they probably prefer to complete their studies, find a job, and establish a career before forming their own family and household.

CONCLUSIONS

Religious and family stereotypes seem to have lost their topical influence on life decisions taken by young, educated women in Greece – more emancipated and independent than in the past – resulting in more heterogeneous attitudes towards marriage. For this reason, marriage is a decision they take for personal reasons, such as emotional bonding or the legitimization of their offspring. Nevertheless, the alternative to marriage (i.e., cohabitation) seems to be gaining ground over marriage, as it is less restrictive and does not seem to threaten independence. Therefore, the institution of marriage is jeopardized by the new social role of women, who aspire to higher and postgraduate studies, rather than to get married and start a family. In this way, marriage is delayed until later, when biological constraints mean that the chances of having a large family are restricted. In addition to negative attitudes to marriage, and amidst the difficult economic situation caused by the economic crisis, the incentives for childbearing and family formation offered by the Greek state are considered too limited. Taken together, these results make the case for a rethinking of family policies in Greece – something that is increasingly required to adapt to both rapidly changing local contexts and more general demographic trends on national level.

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GLOBAL ORGANIZATION, HOME CARE: THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE MIGRANT CARE SECTOR[1]

Tünde Turai

ABSTRACT

Globalization consists of various interactions between structural and individual level factors. It is a process that determines social structures, and thus the framework of individual level decisions and action, while some of the actors are actively engaged in shaping them. There is a demand for migrant care work in health and elderly care services and is formed at the intersection of multiple spheres of actions (of the state, private sphere, families). The cheap and flexible human resource capacities, providing partly professional and partly familial-type care with long working hours (even around the clock) on a long run, can be recruited among women coming from abroad. The reproduction sector that has been integrated into the global labor market, and has become a notable section itself, raises several new questions, compelling us to examine the interference of three aspects: gender, migration and care. In my paper I aim at demonstrating how women from Eastern and Central Europe got involved in the global care sector, how they contribute to its functioning, and what work regimes have been established within the sectors covered by them.

Keywords: migration of women from Eastern and Central Europe, care work, commodification of care work, globalization

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INTRODUCTION

The Janus-faced globalization is the cause and effect of inestimable positive and negative dynamics, bringing both solutions and constrains. It is both a blessing and a curse, as Arlie Russel Hochschild puts it, as it opens up new opportunities and new problems at the same time (Hochschild, 2000, p. 142). It is a process that determines social structures, and thus the framework of individual decisions and actions, while some of the actors are actively engaged in shaping, producing and reproducing them. Apart from blending, interdependence is also an important feature of the system built on relations and inequalities between nations and regions. The dynamic relationship between transnational geopolitics and economic changes continues to reshape (and partially reinforce) the map of the world, exerting influence on the hierarchical order of countries. The events that took place at the end of the 20th century and fall of the socialist regimes led to the integration of large new regions into a global system. With the collapse of the Soviet influence, Central and Eastern European countries joined the global capitalist system (Koser and Lutz, 1998; Melegh, 2007). At the beginning of the 21th century not only we could witness the deeper and more intensive integration of some regions in the Middle-East and Northern Africa, but we could also observe the intensification and the acceleration of the globalization process. This system is built on multi-layered (sometimes hidden) order of inequalities, such as social gender, social class, the hierarchy of countries and regions, along with the structure of the labor market. However, there is a delusion here. While the national characteristics of economies are fading and global ideology is still at the forefront, the rise of nationalist political forces gain strength, immigration systems increase their regulation on entitlements, movement and residence conditions of foreign citizens, thus introducing new stratification among individuals, with larger units integrated into the system (see also Düvell 2006a). Pei-Chia Lan observes that we live in a globalizing, yet a more and more divided world (Lan, 2006, p. 240).

The reproduction sector has been integrated into the global labor market and has became a notable section itself. This change raises several new questions, compelling us to examine the connection and interference of three schemes:

gender, migration and care (Lutz, 2008). The organization of domestic and care work on global scales indicate the transformation of strategic economic sectors and their reproduction, according to Saskia Sassen, who writes about 'global cities' being formed in imaginary, international dimensions, within which new patterns can be observed specifically along female migration tendencies (Sassen, 2006). Annie Phizacklea emphasizes the eminent inadequacy of defining the phenomenon of women being forced into institutional forms of dependence as an international instead of a global mutual dependence (Phizacklea, 1998). Nicola Yeates boldly defines the global care chain and the globally organized reproductive labor division in general as a migration-industrial complex (Yeates, 2009, p. 86). Pei-Chia Lan observes stratification based on social class, ethnicity and social gender in the hierarchical world-system, which is a result of cooperation and mutual dependence, but along the lines of sustained inequality, structural and stratified diversity formation (Lan, 2006, pp. 29–58). Rhacel Salazar Parreñas studies the sector's largest source country, the Philippines, form where mass female migration has originated and migrated to the developed world since the 1960s, into its reproductive sector: doing housekeeping, baby sitting and elderly care. Therefore, she calls the women from the Philippines the servants of globalization. She believes that on an international level, the division of reproductive labor is defined by global capitalism and gender inequalities both in the source, and in host countries. According to Parreñas, the global system treats the Philippine population as an economic resource of export and defines mass migration as an outcome of this positioning (Parreñas, 2001). Helma Lutz carries this same line of thought when studying Eastern European women joining the global housekeeping sector. Due to the post-socialist political and economic processes, the Eastern European region is being repositioned, which is causing new migration dynamics. After the initial male migration, a feminization has taken place, showing new characteristics of migration. When analyzing the cooperation within society's unseen, hidden zones (households), she concludes that the 'new servants' are not the casualties of a system (of the global labor market), and neither are they the sufferers of the consequences of their own individual activities (agents), rather participants of the tendency formed by the interaction of these two factors (Lutz, 2011).

A new household industry and care system seems to be taking shape. Even though it functions mostly in the shadow economy and the informal sphere, it is an integral part of the global economy, with unique characteristics due to the following factors: the intimate nature of the jobs' social aspect, the social structure that endows care work with gender content, the unique relationship

between the employers and employees – that is strongly emotive with personal and mutual dependence – and the logics of care work which are different from any other areas of employment (Lutz, 2008). Consequently, care work has been marketized, became a commodity, received a monetary value, shifting from the reproductive to the productive sector, reconfiguring economic areas (Anderson, 2000, pp. 112–114; Ungerson, 2004; Parreñas, 2006; Zimmerman et al., 2006).

COMMODIFICATION OF CARE WORK IN THE GLOBAL AREA

Migrant care work fits into the health and elderly care service and is formed at the intersection of multiple spheres of action. A breach has formed in the cooperation of the state, the private sphere and the family. The cheap and flexible human resources, providing partly professional and partly familial-type care with long working hours (even around the clock) on a long run, can be recruited from women coming from abroad. The need for this kind of labor is greatly influenced by the host country's general concept of the family, namely, the idea of its scope of responsibilities and the tasks that can be delegated to institutions. Within Southern European countries, various forms of domestic care are typically prevalent, one alternative being the hiring of a migrant care provider. Italy, Spain and Greece are leading countries in this, but the phenomenon is much more widespread; for example the comprehensive EUROPHARMCARE research reports of 2003 and 2005, involving 23 countries, give account of 17 countries mentioning migrant care providers.[2] The tension generated between cultural standards and moral expectations that support personal, familial, domestic care on the one hand, and the increased female workforce presence in the local society on the other, can be eased by the purchase of reproductive labor.

This enables the traditional model to suffer the least harm, while the female members of the families are turning from care providers into care managers (Degiuli, 2010, p. 774). Involving external labor improves/sustains the quality of life for the families, the elderly can keep their independence and do not lose control over their own lives, while members of the second generation can go on with their usual lifestyles. This latter group can minimize the extra burdens, their time management does not change substantially, they can keep their jobs

[2] https://www.uke.de/extern/eurofamcare/publikationen.php?abs=4 (Downloaded, 7/3/2016), also di Santo and Ceruzzi, 2010, pp. 3–5.

and private life at more or less the same levels they had before the need for care arose. The concept of care constructed by state actors is also a significant factor that forms the well-being of those in need of care. The social and health care system and policies of individual countries also form and control the possibilities, while affecting the mentality on the provision of care by defining preferences and forms of support and by governing and supervising the cooperation of actors within the system. Several researchers have analyzed this, I will mention some of them below. Clare Ungerson specified the following models when studying five European countries, entirely marketized 'informal' care (Netherlands, Austria), regulations and quality control (France), direct payment (United Kingdom), complementary income for households (Austria, Italy), and care providers in the gray economy (Italy) (Ungerson, 2004). Marina Izzo compared the care policies of Italy and Spain and studied their impacts on domestic care (Izzo, 2010). Emmanuele Pavolini also studied Italy and examined the whole social care system, the change of regulations and their far-reaching consequences from the 1980s, until the present day (Pavolini, 2001). Howard Litwin and Claudine Attias-Donfut compared France's conservative-corporatist welfare system to Israel's traditionally social-democratic system that is now turning into a neoliberal one (Litwin and Attias-Donfut, 2009). Hila Shamir studied the models of welfare states and family policies in terms of the United States and Israel (Shamir, 2010). In addition to regulating the care system, the principles of migration-policies should also be considered, as the governments of host countries set up preferences on certain migrant groups, on the labor sectors that are being kept open for migrants, and on the residence of foreigners and on their prospects to legal-administrative integration (Düvell, 2006a, 2006b; Lutz, 2011, pp. 154–184). Consequently, the state regulates the migrant care sector, together with all of the above.

In the Central and Eastern European region, the following political, economic and legal changes were influential:

- Following the 1989 regime-change, borders opened up and, although only to a limited extent, people could travel freely, and working abroad became possible upon conforming to the appropriate administrative regulations and obtaining the necessary permits.
- The period of catching up with the European Union simplified the legal conditions of mobility, somewhat closing the borders with countries that were lagging behind in the catching-up process (e.g. Ukraine), even when the neighboring countries formerly had tight economic and social relations.
- Joining the European Union brought benefits to the post-socialist countries

between the employers and employees – that is strongly emotive with personal and mutual dependence – and the logics of care work which are different from any other areas of employment (Lutz, 2008). Consequently, care work has been marketized, became a commodity, received a monetary value, shifting from the reproductive to the productive sector, reconfiguring economic areas (Anderson, 2000, pp. 112–114; Ungerson, 2004; Parreñas, 2006; Zimmerman et al., 2006).

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on several levels. Barriers to traveling to the Union's countries for shorter on longer periods of time disappeared; the labor market of the Western countries – gradually, and with certain checks – opened up to people coming from the East. Some migrant channels became both intensified and shorter, and new ones were formed. The transnational networks became even more modulated and stratified and the change of the source countries' geopolitical situation and their 'promotion' within the global hierarchy had a somewhat beneficial effect on their social image in the host environment.

- Border crossing within Europe became simpler and faster with the extension of the Schengen zone.
- The economical path and potential of countries in the post-socialist region (and their power relations) have changed in the last thirty years, especially during the 2008 global economic recession, which partly modified the migration map of the region. For example, the number of migration channels and the intensity of their utilization decreased, and new groups started to utilize transnational resources.
- The national politics of Hungary and the transborder regulations based on it, the national visa, and the expansion of the circle of the those entitled to citizenship have all influenced the area's migration aspirations and patterns.

In my paper, I aim to demonstrate how women from Eastern and Central Europe have gotten involved in the global care sector, how they contribute to the functioning of this labor market segment, and the systems they have established in the sectors covered by them.

METHODOLOGY

I have been doing ethnology fieldwork covering a number of women from Eastern and Central European countries ever since 2009. First, I examined how women arriving to Hungary from Transylvania (Romania) and Ruthenia (Ukraine) join the care system, how they integrate into the host families, how these parties cooperate, and how all of these influence their life course and self-identity. I conducted in-depth interviews with care providers, clients and employers in both the source and the host countries. I extended my research to include a study on mass female migration from Romania and the Republic of Moldova towards Italy, doing several months of fieldwork in these countries. Since 2010, I have included into the researach care providers' migrating from

Hungary, revealing mobility towards Austria, Germany, Switzerland, America and Israel. In this research phase, I also had a chance to conduct fieldwork in almost all of the countries mentioned above.

During my research, I conducted in-depth interviews for the most part. The language of the conversation was the native language of the respondents, so I used Hungarian and Romanian. The fieldwork yielded a substantial corpus, where a total of 199 interviews were conducted. This has been complemented by an extensive field diary, rich with data, spontaneous conversations, stories not included in the interviews, and other observations. As the labor done in the household sector is illegal in most cases, partly legal in rare cases (I only met one case where the labor was completely legal), the conversations took place right at the sensitive borderline of trust and publicity, and, despite of the anonymity, a great deal of information only could be documented in the field diary. In addition to all this, I also used opportunities offered by the cyber space. The women doing domestic care tend to break their physical isolation with the Internet and virtual associations. They are very active on Facebook, write many emails and chat a lot on various platforms. They introduced me to several of such circles, enabling me to be present in the transnational world they create for themselves in this global virtual social space.[3]

FORMS OF LABOR IN THE MIGRANT CARE SECTOR, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL SYSTEM

Besides cleaning and baby-sitting, providing care is also part of the household industry sector. Many similarities exist among these jobs, and in some societies, the passage between them is flexible (this is the most obvious in the case of the United States of America, with the Hungarian immigrant women's occupational mobility). At places I examined, certain activities were predominantly done by distinctive groups, and the passage between the care providers for the elderly and cleaners were more substantial. In most examples however, care providers do cleaning for additional income. Transition takes place upon moving in with family members following a family reunification, since they can synchronize their new lifestyle more with a cleaning job (Italy), or when their residence permit expires, and they can no longer work with the elderly as an illegal migrant, but

[3] I outlined the problems of research on the online sphere in more detail at a comprehensive methodological study (see Turai, 2016).

they can do cleaning going from house to house, like as seen in the case of Israel. Thus, there are many similarities in these activities due to the work frames and the reproduction content of the activity, but care work also has some unique characteristics. For example, it has a unique internal structure, stratifying the society of migrant care providers and forming a hierarchical order. Below I shall outline these, along with their benefits and difficulties, and how they collaborate with other welfare services in practice. Significantly, classification is not based on the type of work, but on how the lifestyle is organized (see also Anderson, 2000, p. 28). Discovering the system's internal logic also helps us understand the migrant path of these employees, their dynamics of their residence abroad, their returning to home or their integration into the host country's society, which many – mistakenly – explain with the legality or illegality of their status.

LIVE-IN CARE

The prototype of migrant care work is the so-called live-in care; namely the work organization form when a care provider moves into an elderly person's apartment with a permanent work schedule, and the sole obligation to be with the person being cared for all the time. This type of work is typically done by foreigners, as they do not have their own household or family of their own in the host country where they could go home to after work. Very few local employees would be willing to put aside their private life for longer or shorter period of time to move in with an elderly client for weeks or months. Therefore, a live-in care provider is almost a synonym for an immigrant female employee.

In comparison to other possibilities in the care system (e.g. nursing homes, rehabilitation centers, private *hospices*) live-in care is more than a cheap solution for the care of the elderly. It fits in with the system of expectations at family-oriented societies, which consider keeping the elderly at home more beneficial in comparison to the institutional forms of care. In this sense, domestic care is associated with personal concern, a familial atmosphere, a loving emotional environment, while institutionalization, besides being professional, means impersonality, lack of emotions, and some kind of an abandoned state. The cultural norm suggests certain moral imperatives to the parties concerned, enabling the widespread expansion of live-in care work.[4] This tendency could

[4] Francesca Degiuli (2010) and Elisabetta Zontini (2010) made detailed analyses on how live-in care done by migrants fit into the South European countries' system of norms.

be intensified or weakened by the national welfare care system by declaring its principles of support in benefits and the conditions attached to them, and the elderly care solutions preferred by the administration. When analyzing the practice in Europe, Clare Ungerson places the types of care observed in various countries on a paid-unpaid, and regulated-unregulated axis (Ungerson, 2004). According to the logic of this system, and based on my own findings, I can state that the poorly regulated monetary support or the lack of funding from the state, from the insurance companies (or their minimal role,namely creating family, i.e. informal resources) contribute to the wide-spread expansion of live-in care mostly provided by migrants.

In Italy, in reaction to the great need for care providers, the state gives financial support to the elderly to solve their own care needs, without monitoring the use of benefits (unlike the regulations in Spain, for example). In reality, this is outsourcing the labor, and supporting the privatization of care for the elderly in their own homes, with individual work expectations, ideas and 'protocols'. The financial support system is based on national and local government resources: it consists of a provisional benefit (*Indennita di accompagnamento*), that is given by the state to individuals unable to look after themselves, and an allowance (*Assegno mensile di assistenza*), that is calculated by the local authorities, based on a special assessment.[5] At the time of my fieldwork (2010) the first one was 480.47 Euros, the latter was 256.67 Euros in Ancona (Marche region) where I carried out the research. At that time, the Eastern European live-in care providers' salaries started from 750 Euros, the average was 800 Euros, and the highest one that I had come across was 1200 Euros (but that was for looking after two people). Thus, it is easy to see that employing migrant care providers for permanent presence is comparatively easily accessible even for the broader population. The Austrian support system is similarly permissive. The *Pflegegeld* system introduced in 1993 enables individuals in need of care to receive financial support from the state which they can freely spend (Österle and Bauer, 2011). The monetary transfers and the system of regulations thus opened a favorable setting for employing foreigners in the care sector.

The support system in Israel consists of several components. The elderly in need of care can submit their claim to the National Pension Fund (*Bituah Leumi*) that sends a committee to assess the elderly person's condition, and assess their financial situation. Based on this, they decide how many hours of care is needed

[5] For a more detailed analysis of the Italian support system, see also: Bettio et al., 2006; Simonazzi, 2009; Izzo, 2010; Di Santo and Ceruzzi, 2010; Santini et al., 2010.

a week, which is maximized in 18 hours even for patients who are unable to look after themselves; which obviously does not represent the real need associated with this situation, but the maximum sum that can be granted. Several of the elderly people today are former deportees, and thus they can request additional support from Germany in order to employ a care provider. In addition, there are insurance companies that provide pensions to the elderly based on their contributions. The way the allocated support is spent is partly supervised by the state, as the care providers receive their salaries through a recruiting agency. The initial monthly salary of migrant domestic helpers – not negotiated by the employee and the employer, but defined centrally – was 3200 shekels at the time of my fieldwork (2011), plus 100 shekels of pocket money for the week-end and days off, or 231 shekels in case they worked that day, with additional payed holidays with 351 shekels per day. Naturally, the basic salary and the number of days off increase every year. If state support is not enough for the prescribed salary, it should be complemented with own resources by the elderly.

No state welfare allowance was mentioned to be available for employing a care provider in the other countries examined that can be directly attached to this form of support. In Hungary, care provider allowance can only be claimed by a relative, and it is only a very low amount (net 26,550 HUF in 2016), much lower than the salaries of the migrant domestic care providers (approx. 120–160,000 HUF, depending on the patient's physical condition and the agreement of the parties). Thus, the pension of the patient, along with the contributions of his or her children make up the fund that enables the outsourcing of the care work. The elderly in countries of the 'global West' mostly finance the cheapest form of care available in their country (the Eastern and Central European women are available for employment for about 800–900 Euros) from their own resources, using their pensions.

I only found one example where care was not based on direct monetary transfer; a woman from Vista (Romania) looked after a childless elderly man in Budapest in the confines of a traditionally known contract of support in exchange of an apartment in a condominium.

In addition, they need to provide accommodation for the live-in care provider, that is expected to be a separate room, rarely with separate bathroom, but in practice it is sometimes reduced to a sofa in the hallway or in the shared lounge. According to the agreement, the employer has to provide for full board as well. The individual needs of the care provider are typically not included in the agreement, so how much their different eating habits (e.g. needing ingredients for home-made meals) are taken into consideration depends on the elderly

persons' and the families' goodwill. The benefits beyond payment mentioned above are given in addition to the salary, except for Israel, where the employer can retain a certain amount as a rent; which can depend on the type of housing and its location within the country (for accommodation between 115 and 210 shekels, plus 77 shekels for utilities). Further benefits are subject to individual agreement: The travel expenses of care providers visiting Budapest from across the border are usually paid for; in Israel it is a common practice to pay for the Internet; telephone bills are occasionally covered partly or entirely; and there may be gifts given at special occasions.

Live-in care has both implicit and explicit (defined in the agreement) frames, which can provide the employee with entitlements and protection, as well as obligations. Defining or limiting the private sphere and time-off have an influence on the quality of everyday life. It is a common inconvenience that the space or the room the care provider is provided with is also used by others. In Israel, Marta's[6] client regularly visits her room when she is not at home, as the landlady keeps her money in the only drawer with a lock that is located in that very room. Iza's room (which is an open space) is next to an elevator, where everyone passes by. She did not have room to put her clothes in a wardrobe, but she ended up reorganizing the landlady's belongings, in order to create some space of her own. Andi's room is not entirely private either. The landlord keeps his medication and paperwork there, so he goes there regularly. She was only given a small cabinet and a bookshelf to store her belongings. After living there for two years, her items have piled up, so she took over another shelf for storage, which she received a lot of scolding for. She and her client's daughter recently sorted out the landlady's clothes, who passed away a few years ago, in order for her to be able to entirely unpack her suitcase at last.

Taking some time off is also difficult. Sanda, working in Italy, can only go to church on Sunday morning if she prepares lunch beforehand, at the break of dawn. Hajni can take a break of a few hours when her client's daughter arrives, so if she is late, she has to wait, and if she cannot come, she needs to stay home, missing her break altogether. Mirela looks after an elderly lady with dementia, who is in the confines of a wheelchair, so she cannot be left alone at any time. Despite her labor contract saying otherwise, she does not have any time off. The family members do not take over and they do not provide a substitute carer either. On her day off, she goes for a walk with her wheelchair-bound lady, with whom she is not able to relax, and it is also physically demanding, as she needs

[6] I used fictive names in the study to protect the identity of my respondents.

to push the wheelchair uphill in the evening, which kills her back. The family gave her permission to get a substitute occasionally, but only at her own expense.

Respecting basic human rights can also run into difficulties when living together. The different legitimacies with the shared flat obviously create a legal hierarchy between a care provider and a client. But this does not entitle the owner to check and to go through the personal belongings of the care provider working there. Gabriela, after her experiences in England, came to work to Ancona. She is subject to continuous harassment: the landlord shakes her bedroom door at night, which she keeps locked; he goes through her clothes, including her underwear; checks her bag when she leaves the house and when she comes back; and she also has to show him the receipts of the goods she buys for herself, which he checks thoroughly with a loop. When she tried to stand up for herself, her client replied that the house was his property, and he could do whatever he wanted to.

The level of vulnerability is quite high with this type of live-in labor. The care provider's physical safety is endangered by their client's mental state or aggressive personality. Betti, living in Israel, reported waking up at night with her client pointing a knife at her belly. Sara was hurt by the lady she looked after, she unexpectedly kicked her in the bust and in the belly due to her unprocessed Holocaust memories. Rózsika, working in Berettyóújfalu (Hungary), was exposed to the aggressive attacks of her landlady, who had Alzheimer-disease: she threw a knife, a hack, clippers at her on several occasions, and one night she hit her head so badly that Rózsika had to be taken to hospital.

The care providers' physical dignity is not protected either. In addition to verbal sexual abuse, physical sexual abuse can happen as well. In Italy more, in Israel less cases were mentioned, where an elderly male client took advantage of physical closeness, touching his care provider's intimate body parts when she passed by, or when she helped him with moving or with personal care. These initiations can be accompanied by propositions or blackmailing. In Israel, sexual abuse comes into conflict with firm religious and social standards, therefore female care providers can expect immediate protection. As soon as they came to the recruiting agency with a complaint, they were transferred to another elderly person without inspecting the case in particular, in order for the care providers to not have to go through derogatory or humiliating proceedings of justification and other considerations. In Italy, no authorities get involved in the relationship of a client and a care provider on this level. The trade union, where labor contracts are being made, only provides a formal set of principles, and does not deal with anything but their misuse. Personal difficulties are to

be sorted out within the family, relying on their own judgement and resources. With such circumstances, feelings of shame are certainly a serious barrier of bringing up the subject openly. This, and the expected denial of the elderly person, in addition to the uncertainty of whom the family will believe, motivates the decision to repress reporting on such cases. Timidity and the feelings of vulnerability are enhanced by the narratives on migrants that circulate within the community about some ill-fated Romanians. During my fieldwork, the women repeatedly told me a story about a Romanian woman. Her client went into her bedroom at night, molested her, and when she pushed the elderly man away in defense, he fell on his back and died. The Italian court then gave the woman a prison sentence. Each time the story was told, it was followed by a long, baffled guessing about the adequate dealing with the situation: how much can you push an elderly person? How does one make him leave? How can one block the door at night, etc.? They were all certain in thinking that the Italian society and judicial system will not guarantee any defense for the foreigners in such cases, rather it will favor its own citizens instead. This narration practice can be viewed as evidence to the process of suffering and the generation of vulnerabilities for case providers, which accompanies the occupation, and the construction of the lower level in the social hierarchy.

Being enclosed, loneliness and isolation are inherently part of this type of care, and they also pose the biggest challenge. Staying indoors 24/7 for a longer period of time – for weeks, months, even years – takes a toll even on a healthy psyche. Witnessing an elderly person's physical and mental decline day by day also adds to this burden. Loneliness is enhanced when looking after a client with dementia, as communication is not possible in that case. This state of life substantially reduces the care provider's opportunities for quitting the current employment: there is no time to find other alternatives, build a network of relationships, and it also hinders the acquisition of the local language. In Italy, the strategy for easing loneliness is to talk on the phone with other providers: the female Romanian care providers have contracts with the same phone company, so calling each other is free. In Israel, besides telephone, the Internet also plays an important role: they are active on Facebook, they frequently use chat and e-mail. Klarissz, one of the most experienced Hungarian care providers, with 15 years of previous experience has witnessed a wide range of illnesses and various situations in her clients' homes and families. She has a rich repertoire of strategies for dealing with difficulties, but she also struggles with loneliness.

'My lady has osteoporosis, and uses this walker at home. She doesn't want to be healthy at all... I tell you. But her husband has Alzheimer-disease,

and he's very difficult to handle. I've got everything here that a metapelet (care giver in Hebrew) can wish for. Enough money, time off, but the time in there is awful. Awful. And the man doesn't have a metapelet, they didn't request one for him. Well, he doesn't need any, he looks after himself, but his nature is like, ... ouch. [...] The thing is that when I started my placement with them, I was already exhausted physically, mentally in every way. I weighed 72 kg, then I lost weight ..., I'm not skinny, to be honest, but I've lost about 8 kgs without doing any diet. I used to go running, did exercises and everything: jumping, I bought a trampoline for myself in case I cannot go out. Now without doing anything, I still keepon losing weight.'

Mirela, living with her client with dementia in Ancona, talks about this problem as well:

'You know what? This confinement in the house, sitting by myself... They only provide a TV with three channels, that's all we can watch... there's nothing to watch, but you have to sit there... I can't watch TV in the morning. How about the afternoon? You just sit there. She's shouting, and I just sit. Can't go anywhere, you sit there with her, and she's shouting. That's what is killing you, this confinement, and ... you cannot have a conversation, no, not with her.'

Bori, who has done live-in care for the elderly in several countries, sums up her views in a catchy way:

'Well, it is awful, non-stop, day and night, 7 days a week. I just couldn't ... not even in good-health... I wouldn't even want to be together with my lover for seven days, seven nights.'

Besides making you lonely and bored, being enclosed also means social isolation. As a migrant care provider's entitlement in the apartment does not amount to much, they cannot receive any visitors, they can only have a social life outside of the house, where they however can spend very little time. The employer controls their private sphere, the employee is only partly integrated into the life of their employer, thus their private relationships are not open to them, only in cases where the employer's social network and their own network are somehow linked or their needs for building relationships meet in some way. There are a few exceptions though, in general they are more permissive within their own ethnic group (e.g. the friends or family members from Transylvania can occasionally visit the care provider in the apartment of

the client in Hungary; and in Israel, in case of a Hungarian Jewish family, the care provider can sometimes receive a visitor from Hungary), or if the visitor is another care provider for the elderly person's own circle of friends. Obviously, during the course of living together, the client's situation can become vulnerable as well. The largest difficulty usually comes from the appearance of a new stranger in their everyday living-space. Due to their age, change is more difficult for them to handle, and as a matter of fact, it is usually not the clients themselves initiating the employment of a care provider, but rather their children. Contrary to my expectations, after accepting the constant presence of a care provider in their private sphere, a change/turnover of care providers is not burdensome for them anymore. From that time on, the real problem is if there is an uncertainty in the arrival, a permanency in stay, or the question of continually of their work there. The human quality of a care provider may also lead to vulnerability. Handling the intimacy, being together around the clock, the deteriorating health and fitness of the client, witnessing the illnesses, dementia, the course of passing away etc. Anticipating the inevitable arrival of death with empathy and competence requires patience, perseverance, flexibility, mental and emotional intelligence, qualities that each care provider has at varying degrees.

The power relations between the parties are easy to observe through the dynamics of adjustment. Live-in care is not only work, but a unique way of life. The carer and the employer(s)' cohabitational habits and every-day functioning are somewhat mutual, but it is not a partnership, as the new arrival needs to attune and adapt to the elderly person's way of life more. This includes adopting to the daily routine, like getting up, the times of meals, shopping, walking, etc. It also includes consumption habits: when and how many times can the care provider have a shower, how much and what they can eat, how and what can they cook, the settings of the heating and the temperature of the apartment, what programs they watch on TV. Furthermore, fundamental question also may be: when do care givers have time-off, the schedule of daily tasks, how often, when and how long can the care provider stay in his or her own room, etc. The people I interviewed told me the following about this situation:

'You must swallow the bitter pill again and again.'

'You have to conform to everybody. Keep quiet, endure.'

'On the one hand, it is a responsibility, 'cos working with such a patient is a responsibility, but I had, I had to endure a lot, 'cos, well, I needed the money.'

The extent of adapting is defined by the personality of the client and the number of people living together and the burden of adapting falls on the employee for the most part.

'I lived with my lady. Well, we went downstairs by half past seven, as they lived in this villa, and then I had a room upstairs with Katinka. We didn't have to look after her at night. She didn't need any care at night, so... [...] And then we had to go downstairs by half past seven, and from that time on, up to...well, as long as the family required it, as they usually went to the theater, to the opera, to see her children, and when they got home, we went upstairs, so from that time on we were free, something like from 9, 10 [pm]. [...] Auntie Anna was the grandma to them, and uncle Sándor was her son. He had seven children. They also had a grandchild living with them. Well, they built an annex attached to the front of the villa, a so-called apartment, and they also used that for living. And the others... Wait a minute. The other children were in Budapest. And there was a son and a daughter, who were divorced, and they also lived there indeed, and their 26 year old daughter did teaching, she was a singing tutor, she also lived there with them as well. [...] But how I got there, to that big family, you know it was a little bit like that. Oh, when I went upstairs, my God, I felt so tired, really! Well, you know, adapting to so many people' – said Ida, who is from the

Partium (Romania) and used to go to work in Budapest.

Besides the difficulties, live-in care also has its benefits. First of all, no expenses, the whole salary can be saved up and can be sent home to the family left behind. Right at the beginning of the care provider's career, it is possible to start repaying the amount borrowed for going abroad. It also makes the commencement easier because it only requires a minimal amount of work organization, one contact person is enough. Also, it only requires a minimal amount of life-organization: no need to look for accommodation or work-opportunities. It gives a certain stability for every-day life: as long as the elderly person is alive, there is a job and a salary.

There are a wide range of tasks associated with this type of labor: surveillance, vigilant presence through day and night, entertainment, keeping company, emotional attention, housekeeping, shopping, health-care and health-management, hospice, personal care, managing relationships within the family, gardening, looking after pets etc. This type of labor has the most flexible work condition, but also it is the most difficult one to keep the boundaries of, consequently, there is significant room for exploitation.

There are two forms of live-in care: permanent and rotation-based.[7] In the course of my fieldwork I met the form of permanent live-in care in Italy and Israel, there are only a few examples of this in other European countries. It means being away from their own family, and living with the employer for a longer period of time. The benefits include getting as much as 12 months' salary when working continuously.

Rotation-based live-in care has been introduced to the global market by Eastern and Central European migrants. It did not have a precedent in the labor patterns of Filipinas and Latin-American women, neither in the labor practice of foreigners from Asia or Africa. With shorter distances, and in the transnational regions where the migration policies allow frequent border-crossing, commuting enables maintaining both a foreign income and managing life at home in parallel. The length of the shift usually ranges from one week to one month, but it can also be longer (only occasionally though for the most part). It might come with a lower income per year, but its advantage is that the time invested is less. On the human side, one important aspect is that it does not take that much toll on the care provider's family relations. They can maintain their life at home, they have a chance to regenerate and to have a more balanced lifestyle. Hanneli Dohner and her co-authors have an important observation considering this: in such cases migration supports staying at home rather than migrating (Döhner et al., 2008, p. 6). From the perspective of work quality, we can observe that burn-out comes slower with this form of labor, the care providers can deal with conflicts more easily, and they are not burdened as much physically as the care providers that work continuously. Rotation-based care work is considered to be closer to non-work then it is to work on that scale, and has less characteristics of institutional labor: no day-off, no regular free hours in the afternoon, there is no defined practice for sick-leave, and the presumptive work protocols are more flexible. Therefore, the employee's rights depend more on individual negotiations and on the actual personal interactions. The feeling of being enclosed and isolated is more intense, and not only for the lack of free hours, but also due to the nature of doing shifts; the care providers do not have an established community, they are not always able to keep track of who is at work or who is at home at any given time.

[7] Literature reports mostly on permanent live-in care, mainly because it is much more common globally. The situation of the migrant laborers working in rotation is studied less; the most important expert studies in this field are done by Helma Lutz (e.g. Lutz, 2011).

Erzsi started her career as a care provider in Italy, she started her work in Sicily. As her mother's health started to decline, she felt the need to be closer to her, and to be able to go home more often. So, now living in Budapest, she goes to Székely Land (Romania) every month, she spends a lot of time with her family, but she feels very lonely in Hungary.

'No friends here, which I really miss. [...] None. Masses of Romanians in Italy. Not just many, but masses. When I walked the streets, I could hear people talking in Romanian, wow, I said, I'm at home, I couldn't believe it. And many working like me, with the elderly. Well, usually women did, different from the men. We took breaks at the same time, synchronized them, like here. They had to provide two hours every day, and then you would agree with the landlady the landlord or the family when you want to go out (on your break), from 5 to 7, 5 to 7... As dinner is from 8 there as well. Interestingly it was at 8, same as here. And then I arranged it with my friends as well. Either from 5 to 7 or 6 to 8. And then we could go together and spend those two hours together. It didn't matter if we spent that time in a park, under the palm trees, walking, going to the cinema, whatever, but we were together, and got used to each other. Like you do after two years, don't you? [...] It's different here. I have no idea who lives here.'

The ethics of handover is a well prescribed part of the system of doing rotation-based care, with formal characteristics. Regardless of the employer, the care providers usually do handover between themselves, they record the proper mode of practice, and a collegial relationship is formed. There are certain pairs that are familiar with each other. Sisters, or other relatives can work together better from the very beginning due to their standing relationships, or they put more effort in synchronizing their activities that are the source of their income from abroad. Working together without being acquainted previously can also be a well-functioning collaboration. Difficulties may arise in this system however if there are several alternates, or if the alternating person gets to be changed often, or if in some cases rivalry occurs, namely if one wants to edge the other one out, or they presume this of each other, which might start a jealousy-driven dynamic.

The ethics of handover, according to the women working in Hungary, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, are the following:

'Because before... well, before I came, she did a deep cleaning, before she came, I cleaned everything really thoroughly, I treated her with lunch, this is how it was agreed.'

'Well, then I was there at Easter for example. Christmas more or less at home. We scheduled the holidays this way, that's how we agreed. The landlady couldn't be left unattended. She wasn't bed-ridden, but, well, she couldn't be left alone.'

'As she has to look after her grandchildren, she said: »Évi, could you please stay here for two weeks, because I can't come, as I need to look after the grandchildren. « I said, all right.'

Breaching the ethics of handover:
'[...] I'd call at the end of the month, and transfer. I already knew because I saw that lady being everything. The one I was with earlier dropped out, and the old man was fighting for her, for that lady, while his son was fighting for me. But the old man only wanted this Annuska, and that's it. The other who dropped out was a very good lady, Margitka. She left the fridge stuffed for me, so we'd have something to start with, and so did I. When I worked with this Irénke, I did the same, but when I come back, I found the fridge and the freezer completely empty! No meet, no sugar, nothing. He says: »Marika, let's not forget about that half of pork trotters«, the old man loves stew made from it. And I say: »There's nothing to forget about, since that's all there is in the freezer box?! « What could I forget about then?! And this lady... she was like that. His son saw it as well. Well, I don't know. But she took the money. He (the son) said much money was spent, neither me or Margitka spent that much, not once, and still she left the boxes empty. But the old man still wanted her, nobody could do anything about that.'

'No, the alternate is not always the same person, unfortunately, not like with Erzsike. Those two have been alternating each other for years. With us, it keeps changing. I don't know the reason, every time there is someone different, the old ones don't come back. [...] It's very difficult for me, because I have to do the handover, which is peculiar. I do the explaining from morning 'till night, and I write down everything. And I'm doing all that to make her job easier, and to make it easier for the old man as well. [...] Well, I don't want to talk about what I can find there. [...] You can't call this inconvenience. It was inconvenient for me, as I didn't find several things the way I would have liked to find them, same way I have left them. But if that person was like that, she was there for the first time,

and never came back, then that was it. I did my job, the way I used to do it before, and that's it.'

PART-TIME AND LIVE-OUT CARE WORK

The strategy of splitting work and private life means separating workplace and residence. As a result, care gets closer to formal work, even though it is done in the informal economy sector (I did not find any example of this kind of care providers working legally).

Visiting support may target one or more clients at the same time. It requires capital expenditure, since accommodation and all other living expenses need to be covered individually. A migrant also needs to have sufficient funds in a social sense to gather enough working hours. An extensive network of relationships is needed, both in their own group and in the host society, and they also use several advertisement platforms (Internet, written media, shops, streets, etc.). Work organization requires good logistics and time-management.

The working hours are defined, with a clear starting and finishing time. There is some flexibility here as well, but there is no endlessness. The more specifically defined framework allows for less abuse. Care is more task-centered, work-negotiations are clearer and more direct, and as it is for a shorter period of time, there is less room to go away from it. If the task requirements change, the negotiations are revisited. This type of labor does not assume the continuity of the care provider's willingness to work. Work tasks generally include the following: surveillance, keeping company, personal care, feeding, partial health care, and household chores.

Working hours are flexible but can be difficult to predict, which also makes the income less predictable. Finding and securing work opportunities for the near future requires significant time and energy. People cannot rely on this type of income on the long run, as there are too many uncertainties in this setup. Hence, the migrant care providers usually include this type of work in their careers in two ways: as a temporary job or as an additional income. It can be a temporary job between two live-in placements, when they cannot find a proper place for a longer period of time, and they take on some work wherever the opportunity arises in order to survive through a difficult time period. It can also be managed in a work-structure with multiple pillars, or as an additional income in the family-system: in parallel with live-in care on day-offs, besides institutional care work to increase income, complementing self-employed work

with tax-free income, or doing it occasionally as a member of a migrant family. It means more freedom, private life, and less control. Live-in care is feasible for single women living on their own, there are only a few examples of hiring care providers and accommodating them together with a family member (with a child, husband). Family members' visits are limited, especially if they also need overnight accommodation. If a care provider conceives, she needs to go home to give birth, and she can return to work when she is alone again, leaving her child with relatives or family members. Part-time care work allows more for a private sphere, and can be better synchronized with family life. Thus, family reunification leads to quitting live-in care or the other way around. If a care provider can establish herself as a live-out laborer, even temporarily, she can reunite with her child, and can invite family members to the host country.

Angelica's care work ranges somewhere between live-in and part-time labor. She came from Romania to Israel. She had several migrants in her immediate family. One of her sisters works in France, another in Spain. She went to Israel in 2006, paying 2500 dollars to an employment agency. As her own mother became seriously ill she could only stay for a year. She went there again in 2008, after her mother died, when she had to pay again, this time 2800 dollars. She worked then as a live-in care provider, but she could not bear being enclosed and being with her client around the clock. She managed to find a solution to this problem: now she is working with a seriously ill patient, which puts a strain on her both physically and psychologically, but she only spends 10 hours a day with the client. The family employing her is understanding and supportive, they even give her 500 shekels on the top of her salary, as a contribution to her rent. Her accommodation is not very good, and she does not really have a proper private sphere, as four of them rent a two-bedroom apartment in Jerusalem. However, she could at least secure herself some time for recreation by separating her workplace and her residence.

'Do you know what the benefits are? There is a little break. This is the only benefit. That you are not stressed that much, because when you're there, they wake you up day and night... Because I, as Anni's husband working for the state department, he is...a consul... for the state department, and he travels a lot, he is sometimes away for weeks, visiting countries in Europe, in Asia, he goes everywhere, for a week at a time. Those times I'm there around the clock. You see? [...] Then I live there. And... I'll be honest with you, after living there for a week I'm so exhausted, and so tired that I'm dying to have some sleep.'

Anna from Transylvania (Romania) did care work to get additional income. Her husband fell ill, could not provide for the family anymore, meanwhile their son got admitted to the university in Cluj-Napoca. Anna, as a mother, felt obligated to support his son's higher education, so she came over to Hungary and took up an assistant position in a hospital in the capital city. As the salary of this type of labor is relatively low, she took the opportunity to look for additional income. She asked for a permanent night shift, which made it possible for her to look after her private client until 6 pm. Work became too much for her, but the old man understood her overcommitment, and let her rest during the afternoons, by choosing not to listen to the radio, nor to watch TV during that time. There were three of them working for him, two of them in shifts, and there was a permanent substitute; all of them from the same hospital department, thus they were co-workers, in a dual sense.

'So this lady at work, from Transylvania, already looked after uncle Jani. And there was another, from Ukraine, they took turns, 15 days one, 15 days the other. You see, he didn't need permanent supervision, he was a mobile patient, as he still is today. [...] And then she left for Debrecen to work, even enrolled into some university, and then one more person was needed for uncle Jani. Since we worked at the same place with Sárika, at the department of internal medicine, she asked me if I wanted to fill in Ida's position. It was like that. [...] With an automatic washing machine, once a week we washed his clothes, the underwear one load, the colored ones another, and we mopped the floor in his bedroom every day. One of the next-door ladies did the cooking and brought food every second or third day. [...] He was alright by himself all day. He watched TV, listened to the radio, read books – you know he had a PhD degree in liberal arts, so he was a real gentleman. And I prepared some cold cuts for him around 3-4 o'clock, whatever he requested, and a cup of tea, then I served them to him in his room, so that was it.'

In Italy, there are many more examples and variations for migrant women to do part-time employment. The reason for this is that the migration system allows one to stay in the country even without any income or with unstable or temporary work. Also, Eastern European migrants stay there continually, unlike the ones on a rotation-base, who stay in their source countries while waiting for work-opportunities (as they do not have any problems of accommodation when they are off-work), and they only go the location of their work when they receive a job offer.

Felicia has a family, her husband arrived from Craiova (Romania) to Italy five years ago, and she followed four years ago. First, she worked as a live-in care provider, but they decided to bring their two children over as well, so they moved in together, rented an apartment. Ever since then Felicia has been doing part-time care work. In comparison, the two types of work have the following differences:

'For those who are single, with no family live-in care is much better. The difference between a permanent and an hourly job is that the hourly job provides more free-time, I mean it doesn't... no, but more freedom, because you are still running around all day. Let's take me for example, I have 3 hours with a woman this morning, when I finish these 3 hours, I'm going somewhere else, because I have 3 hours there as well. But you know what? You can go outdoors! But with a permanent job, you are indoors all day... You may have 2 hours one day, and you run around, work 3 here, 3 there, 3 somewhere else. You see? I now sit there in a fixed job, in the house, imprisoned . And that's why they say that it is difficult to do permanent care, but it suits someone who is not married, who doesn't have a family, because with a permanent job, you don't have to pay for water, for gas, electricity, nor rent.'

Michaela needs to find solutions for more difficult problems. She is from the same town as Felicia, but she is divorced, which makes the whole situation more sensitive. She came to Italy back in 2007, first she earned her living as a live-in care provider. They have five children, she took the youngest one, her 9 year-old daughter to live with her, one and a half months ago. They live in one of her cousin's place. Presently she is working 4 hours a day, but that is not enough to make ends meet. She does not know what to do yet; she does not have any resources or connections.

'I still want to be a live-in, because... How should I put this? You don't consume that much, you don't pay any rent, and things like that. You can save money, you can save money there. As you don't spend on anything, only if you have a phone, or the ones at home need you to send some money, or something like that. [...] She [her daughter] likes it, because she wants to be with me. You see the situation? She doesn't want it... she says: »Mum, I still want to be with you, even if we only eat once a day.« And I can't be far from her either, because she's suffering a lot in this situation I am in.'

CARE-WORK AS PRIVATE CONTRACTING

In the migrant care provider sector, I found an example of private undertaking-based work in Italy.[8] The state's employment structure and migration policies make it possible for citizens of the European Union to establish a contractor status with a care profile, and some Romanian migrants take this opportunity. They can follow through with the necessary legal and administration procedures, and have adequate funds for its maintenance and operation – this type of labor is a private undertaking. Those with less resources join employment agencies and they also work as private assistants – this is what they are called – but the working hours are organized by the agencies, in exchange they pay a percentage from their income to them.

The criterion of becoming a contractor carer is to acquire professional care provider qualification, and in Ancona, the certificate can only be issued by a hospital specialized for the elderly care (INRCA[9]). Many changes have occurred in the recent history of the course. It was not even a criterion for the individuals that came here before. As the number of migrant female care providers grew, the need for regulation arose. The training started with a one-day instruction, which already grew into three months by the time of my fieldwork; which obviously needs to be self-financed, but which only a few can afford. But those who obtain this license can join the most important care work organization circle: they can register on the hospital's lists. This is the primary care network that the relatives of the patients turn to, consequently, the ones on the list always have placements. In addition, they also use their network of relations, and in their case, their Italian contacts have priority, as they already have many acquaintances even within the host society.

According to the official protocol, their task is to give spiritual and emotional support. In theory, the division of labor should be like this in a hospital environment: the official staff of the hospital tend to the patient's physical needs, and the private assistant only provides psychological support as a substitute of the family. In practice, it is different: if a patient has a private care provider, the hospital staff visit him or her much less, and only does the tasks that cannot be done by the care provider who is paid by the family. So, it is a common practice for the private care provider to provide personal care and do the feeding; it is often them who turn off the infusion, and they also administer medication.

They have the highest need for specialization, in the aim to acquire professional competency. They act as professional care providers in the structure of migrant

[8] Other countries also provide legal opportunities for this type of labor for migrants (except for Israel), but the sample only contains examples from Italy.

[9] Istituto Nazionale di Riposo e Cura per Anziani. http://www.inrca.it/inrca/home.asp (Downloaded: 10/19/2016.)

care, they are at the top of the hierarchy. Like the previous group, their way of life also has expenses, and it is hard to calculate the number of working hours per month and the income, but, thanks to the hospital lists, they almost constantly have work-offers, and they earn far more than their fellow care providers. They can steadily maintain their migrant lifestyle, and they are able to bridge the shorter breaks (e.g. with health problems). They have a private life, several of them have family here. They are planning their work in Italy for the long term, many of them plan to take up permanent residency, and they do not think about moving back to their home countries.

In spite of them being contractors, their work is not fully part of the formal economy. One strategy of increasing their income is reducing the amount of tax they pay. On several occasions, the work they start in the hospital continues in the patient's home, where the informal content of their relationship magnifies, allowing them to not give invoices, thus avoid taxation. They already have some experience on how much tax they need to pay in order to avoid the inspection of the authorities and how they can maintain their fine-tuned earning strategy on a long-term basis.

SUMMARY: THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE MIGRANT CARE WORK

The various care forms described above are all part of a migrant care structure. Each of them has benefits and difficulties, each provides solutions to different situations in life, each developed in various migration policy systems, and can be operated along different setups. They have a relationship of hierarchy, but one can move between the individual employment types/statuses. All that has been written here can be summed up in the chart below, with the most important aspects highlighted.

The structure shows a rather mixed pattern in relation to integration into the economy. The dominance of informal practice is evident, and even if they step into the formal sector, it is only a partial integration. Several permanent live-in care providers have a work-contract, but, as I have mentioned, everyday work is not done according to the contract and permanent care providers sometimes do part-time labor as well, that is solely done in the shadow economy. With live-in care providers working in rotation, work contracts do not come into the picture, even when simplified legal administrative methods are available in the national regulatory system (in Germany and in Hungary as well) in order to legalese the sector (I have only found one exception). Part-time employees

are workers doing temporary jobs in an unregulated form. When formalized, they become private contractors, which makes an invoice-based payment possible, so the working hours that change every day can be officially traced. However, this method of work could only be observed in Italy from among all my research fields covered, as this is the only country where the national economy regulations make these possible for foreigners, thus this is where it was integrated into the migrants' employment practice.

Table 1: Work types of migrant care workers and the structure of these activities

Type of work	Integration into the labor market	Work duties	Features
Permanent live-in	Partially legal Informal	surveillance, vigilant presence day and night, entertaining, emotional work, housekeeping, shopping, health-care and health-management, hospice, personal care, managing relationships in the family, gardening, looking after pets	– dependence, control over the use of personal space and time – relative stability, income that can be saved up entirely – obstacles in the way of promotion (in time, in being informed, sometimes language barriers, preconceptions about opportunities)
Rotational live-in	Informal Very rarely legal		– maintaining double residency, psychical protection – income that can be saved up entirely, no full yearly income – control over the use of personal space and time
Part time/live-out	Informal	surveillance, keeping company, personal care, feeding, partial health-care, household chores	– partial independence – opportunity over the use of personal space and time – instability – financial burdens of maintaining lifestyle
Private contracting	Grey economy: combination of formal and informal	surveillance, keeping company, personal hygiene, feeding, health-care, rarely: infusion, medication	– opportunity over the use of personal space and time – material support for lifestyle establishment – funds for organizing work (financial, social) – social and economic integration

The organization and categorisation of different work types also demonstrated how live-in care providers integrate the least into the host society. Their social networks are only confined to people in their home country and within their diaspora, while the private contractors show significant aspirations towards local communities, and their integration is usually quite advanced. If we compare this to what was said before, the conclusion is evident: the foreign care providers' integration into the host societies do not depend on the legality (or illegality) of their labor in essence, rather on their place within the internal structure of the migrant care system. Planning to immigrate and the practice of returning home confirm this statement: live-in care providers (despite the high number of employees with contracts) are contemplating to return home, the ones that are planning to stay are usually contractors. The ones I met and returned home were all live-in care providers.

There can be some social mobility within the system, and some go through all of the stages. Joining the migrant care sector usually starts as a live-in care provider. The factors that determine whether one leaves this position or not are: the migration policies, the openness of the host society (discrimination), the individual's positioning in the given country and in the labor market structure (self-discriminative ideas and habits), resources (economic, social, intellectual), and the relationship and ties with the family and the society left behind (income being sent home regularly). Permanent live-in care can be modified to rotation-based (and the other way around), changing countries, or when the relationship with the client or with the family changes. Part-time labor is usually at times of a transition period between two live-in placements or between live-in care and the status of a private contractor.

On top of the structure is the private assistant position, but most people work as live-in care providers. These work types have several similarities with respect to tasks, but their position on the work or non-work, emotional work or professional work, reproduction work to production work, informal or formal attitude axis differ significantly and they also differ in terms of assessment and wages.

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SELECTION OF MIGRANTS AND REALIZATION OF MIGRATION INTENTIONS: LESSONS FROM A PANEL STUDY[1]

Irén Gödri – Gábor Attila Feleky

ABSTRACT

We examined the selection of emigrants and the relationship between migration intention and actual migration, using the two-wave panel survey *Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania*, which was carried out in 2006 and 2009 among the Hungarian-speaking population of Transylvania aged 20–45. This type of follow-up survey, dealing with migration intentions and subsequent behavior, is rare in the field of migration research. On the basis of prior intentions and actual migration, four groups could be discerned: *stayers*, who had no migration plans and did not move; *expected migrants*, who previously reported their intention of moving and who carried it out; *dreamers*, who planned migration but did not realize it; and *unexpected migrants*, who initially had no migration plans, but nevertheless moved. Our results indicate a negative selection of migrants in the dimensions related to living conditions and work, and a positive selection regarding subjective state of health and anomie. Those who expressed an intention to migrate during the first wave were almost three and a half times more likely to move than were those who had no such plans. Using Ajzen's theory of planned behavior, migration-related expectations were measured by the assessment of advantages and disadvantages associated with migration, while

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subjective norms were gauged by the perceived pressure from significant others (friends, parents, relatives) to migrate. Our findings confirm that migration-related attitudes and subjective norms influence migration behavior only indirectly, via migration intention.

Keywords: international migration, migration intention, migration-related attitudes, subjective norms, panel survey, selection of migrants

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INTRODUCTION

In order to identify the individual factors that influence migration decisions and behavior, and thus to map the drivers of migration, it is important to track the selection of migrants from the start of the process. Follow-up surveys carried out in source countries in the population of origin (first wave prior to migration) are well suited to this purpose. These surveys collect information about individual life situations, living conditions, motivations, attitudes, preferences, and expectations at the time when the intention of migrating is taking shape; therefore, these data are more reliable than those collected retrospectively.

From the point of view of individual decision-making and behavior, migration is a multi-stage process (De Jong and Fawcett, 1981; Kley and Mulder, 2010; Kley, 2011). The process begins with consideration of migration; this is followed in some cases – depending on individual preferences, goals, and perceived opportunities – by the formation of a concrete plan to move; and then finally – depending on the facilitators and constraints – part of the plan is actually put into effect.[2] So there is a decision-making phase in the migration process, which is subdivided into considering migration and planning migration; and there is a realization phase (Kley and Mulder, 2010).

The data collected in the decision-making phase of migration allow us to capture the roots of selection: individual socio-demographic characteristics, attitudes, expectations, and perceived external norms that go to influence the migration decision. Migration plans, however, are not realized in every case, and some planners will never put intention into action. Along with lack of resources which can facilitate migration (financial, social, and psychological capital), various obstacles can get in the way of realization – such as unforeseen costs, legal obstacles, or unexpected events. Migration flows, particularly in the case of labor migration, are mainly determined by the demand for labor in the destination countries, and this therefore often prevents the realization of plans.

Thus, further selection takes place between planning and realizing migration. This can only be explored by a panel study – by tracking potential migrants. By comparing the profiles of migration planners and movers (those who actu-

[2] Fawcett (1985) refers to two works dated much earlier, in which the authors separated, within the decision-making process of migration, the stages of inclination to move, intention to move, and movement behavior (Rossi, 1955), as well as desire for migration, consideration of migration, and expectation that movement will occur (Goldsmith and Beegle, 1962).

ally migrated within a given period), and by contrasting the factors underlying migration intentions and realized migration, we can better understand why certain plans remain only dreams (Van Dalen and Henkens, 2008), and what explains the shift in selection between the two stages of the migration process (Chort, 2012). In fact, analysis of the relationship between planning and realizing migration will also reveal how well migration intentions predict action – i.e., subsequent migration.[3]

In the light of the above, this paper has two goals. It aims, first, to provide an insight into the selection mechanism of emigration from Transylvania (a historical region in today's Romania), and secondly, to reveal the relationship between migration intention and the realization of migration. Our analysis is based on the two-wave panel survey *Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania*, which was conducted in 2006 and 2009. It addresses the following questions:

- to what extent and by whom were migration intentions (measured in 2006 during the first wave) realized by the time of the second wave in 2009, and what type of migration plan (short- or long-term working abroad, or emigration) was mostly followed by actual migration?
- what individual factors determined migration behavior during the period under survey, and what role did previous migration intentions, migration-related attitudes, and subjective norms play?
- what individual factors explain the selection between planning and realizing migration – i.e., what factors facilitate or hinder the realization of migration intentions?

The paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly review the theoretical considerations and lessons from previous research, which help us understand the factors underlying the selection of migrants, as well as the relationship between migration intentions and behavior. Next, we present the source of data used in the analysis, the construction of the panel database, the handling of sample attrition, and the estimation of migrants and returnees. Then we attempt to answer the questions set out above, using descriptive and multivariate data analysis. Finally, we summarize the main results and draw some conclusions.

[3] In this respect, of course, it is important to keep in mind that the different types of migration potential (from general to concrete plans), and the survey techniques that are used to measure it, can result in different rates of realization.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Selection of migrants – cross-sectional versus panel studies

Migration is a selective process, during which those who leave their country of origin are "selected" by certain characteristics, so their composition does not reflect that of the population of origin (Borjas, 1987; Brücker and Defoort, 2009; Ambrosini and Peri, 2012). Selection results from the fact that the incentives and constraints, the costs of, and the expected "returns" on migration all change according to age, education, and other individual characteristics. The composition of migrants may have many economic and demographic consequences for both the country of origin and the country of destination.

Empirical data mostly underpin positive selection[4] (Borjas, 1987; Hunt, 2004; Van Dalen and Henkens, 2008; Brücker and Defoort, 2009), but there are examples of negative selection, too (Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, 2013); and sometimes migrants are no different in terms of education or age from those who remain at home (De Jong et al., 1985). It is also possible within the same population to have positive selection in certain groups simultaneously with negative selection in other groups.[5] Selection can also be shown by other dimensions with no direct economic relevance: compared to non-migrants, a significantly greater share of migrants have prior migration experience (De Jong et al., 1985; Fuller, Lightfoot and Kamnuansilpa, 1985; Kley, 2011), a family member or friend living abroad (De Jong et al., 1985; Kanaiaupuni, 2000), or a community of origin that is more accepting/supportive of migration (De Jong et al., 1985; Van Dalen and Henkens, 2008, 2013). In addition, marital status is also an important selective factor (De Jong et al., 1985; Kanaiaupuni, 2000; Kley, 2011), while certain attitudes, personality traits, and psychological dispositions are more common among migrants (Van Dalen and Henkens, 2008, 2013).

Larger costs of, and more significant barriers to, migration also result in positive selection (Brücker and Defoort, 2009). Also of crucial importance is how widespread migration is in the given community of origin: communities

[4] Positive selection is when, regarding some important criteria – mostly education, labor market position, income, and/or financial status – migrants have a more favorable composition than the total population of origin; negative selection is the opposite.

[5] For example, negative selection was observed among Mexican migrants on the whole, but positive selection predominated among those living in the countryside (Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, 2013). Another Mexican study identified negative selection among men and positive selection among women by educational attainment (Kanaiaupuni, 2000).

with large emigrant networks send out new migrants in negative selection, while there is positive or neutral selection by education in the absence of such networks (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010). This is explained by the fact that the existence of a migrant network can reduce the cost of migration, and so there are higher expectations of benefits or "returns," even with lower educational attainment.

Findings concerning the selection of migrants are primarily based on cross-sectional surveys conducted either among those who have actually moved to the destination countries, or else – in the countries of origin – among those who are planning to migrate. The former examine composition on the basis of so-called "revealed preferences," while the latter do so on the basis of "stated preferences" (Van Dalen and Henkens, 2013). However, while post-migration surveys reflect the selection effects by destination countries – i.e., due to migration regulation or demand for labor force (and moreover, it is problematic to collect retrospective data), in the case of migration planners, it is uncertain to what extent and among whom intentions will later be realized. In order to track the whole selection process – from the formation of intentions and plans to their realization – longitudinal panel surveys are needed.

The need for longitudinal studies in migration research has been understood for several decades (Gardner et al., 1985; Coleman and Salt, 1992), and it has been pointed out that only such surveys make it possible to explore the relationship between migration intentions and actual migration, as well as to put migration in the context of other life-course events. So far, however, there has been little research in which the exploration of migration intentions is followed by examination of their future realization.

The first follow-up survey that examined the explanatory factors of migration intentions and behavior in the case of international migration took place at the beginning of the 1980s in a Philippine province (Gardner et al. 1985; De Jong et al., 1985). According to this, among those intending to move within two years, 44% realized their plan. The results indicate that regarding intention and action, there were more similarities than differences between key factors of selection (prior migration experience was the only factor that explained the migration behavior, but not the intention itself).

More than two decades later, there was another study, which (based on a nationally representative longitudinal survey) examined migration intentions and subsequent actions, and the selection process of migrants from Mexico to the United States (Chort, 2012). The results showed that the realization of migration is mostly determined by sex: controlled for migration intention measured in 2002, by 2005 women were much less likely than men to migrate. As explained

in the study, migration opportunities for women were far more limited by financial and social constraints – misestimated at the planning stage – than for men. At the same time, the role of external factors – "unexpected shocks" (e.g., illness, unemployment, natural disaster) and "misevaluated costs" – explaining this discrepancy between migration intentions and actions was also revealed. The survey confirmed a negative selection at the intention stage, and a positive selection of actual migrants.

In the 2000s, a Dutch panel survey also attempted to understand selection during the migration process, by comparing emigration intentions and subsequent behavior in the Netherlands (Van Dalen and Henkens, 2008, 2013). About 24% of those who had an emigration plan in 2005 had implemented it by 2007, with the figure rising to 34% by 2010. In this case, the existence of a previous emigration intention proved to be the main explanatory factor of actual emigration. Besides this, only the age of the respondent had a significant effect in the model of emigration behavior, which suggests that age explained the discrepancy between intention and behavior (Van Dalen and Henkens, 2013). Within the group of migration planners, the only difference found was in state of health: healthy people were more likely to realize their migration intentions.

In Hungary, studies on migration potential have been conducted on a regular basis ever since 1993, in an effort to explore the number, the destination countries, and the socio-demographic composition of potential migrants (Berencsi, 1995; Sik and Simonovits, 2002; Hárs, Simonovits and Sik, 2004; Sik, 2006, 2012; Gödri and Feleky, 2013). These have made it possible to explore changes over time in the intensity of migration intentions and the choice of destination countries (Nyírő, 2013); but the realization of plans has not been tracked. The only exception to this is a study in which the sample of the 2003 Labor Force Survey run by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) was used in 2007 to interview again those who, in 2003, had intended to go to work abroad (Hárs, 2008). The findings showed a relatively weak connection between migration intentions and subsequent migration: although the survey covered a four-year period, 10% of those who had planned to work abroad were actually doing so at the time of the second interview, and a further 7% had worked abroad in the intervening period and had then returned home. The rate of realized migration was almost 20% for men, but only 12% for women.[6]

[6] The shortcoming of this survey is that it was not the total first-wave sample that was interviewed again in 2007, but only those who previously had migration plans. The analysis of selection was therefore limited to migration realized within the group of planners.

As can be seen from the above examples, longitudinal surveys – if they are based on tracking the total first-wave sample – offer an insight into both stages of the selection process. In some cases, the composition of migration planners indicates the composition of migrants; in other cases, however, there is a significant shift in selection. This is due to the fact that, whereas migration intentions are based on various push, pull, and restraining factors (and their subjective perception), as well as on a calculation of the costs of and the expected returns on migration, the realization of those intentions is primarily facilitated by various human, financial, social, and psychological resources (Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Palloni et al., 2001) and is hindered by external barriers (e.g., social norms, expectations, legal obstacles, unforeseen costs, etc.). It can be assumed, therefore, that the groups better equipped with certain individual resources that can be utilized during migration have a better chance of realizing their migration plans.

The relationship between migration intention and behavior

On the basis of the few longitudinal surveys available, it would appear that in some societies and communities, migration intentions can be considered to be reliable predictors of future migration; but elsewhere they are less reliable. There are many examples (although mostly concerning internal migration) showing that migration intentions are important indicators of future migration, because migration planning is one of the main explanatory factors of subsequent migration at the individual level (De Jong et al., 1985; Lu, 1998; De Jong, 2000; Kley and Mulder, 2010; Kley, 2011; Van Dalen and Henkens, 2008, 2013). However, the longitudinal studies reviewed fail to provide a clear answer as to how well the trend and composition of future migration can be estimated on the basis of migration intentions or plans. In the case of international migration, the barriers and obstacles are obviously larger; and so – depending on factors such as who is planning to migrate, from where, to where, and why – intentions may be a good predictor of future emigration (Van Dalen and Henkens, 2008, 2013); but equally, even though they are reasonable, informative indicators, they cannot always be considered to be a direct indicator of actual migration (Chort, 2012).

To study the relationship between intention and action, most of the empirical research starts from the assumptions of the *theory of reasoned action* developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and the later *theory of planned behavior*

(Ajzen, 1991).[7] The theory of reasoned action attempts to understand action through intentions: it claims that action is directly influenced by intention, and the appropriate assessment of intention allows the precise prediction of action. It is based on the assumption that intentions are determined by attitudes toward action, as well as by subjective norms (beliefs about the expectations of other people) related to action. An attitude is the individual's positive or negative evaluation of an action's likely outcomes, i.e., an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of migration. Subjective norms are external opinions and expectations, as perceived by the individual in relation to the specific action (i.e., how "significant others" would judge their migration).

In addition to attitudes and subjective norms, the theory of planned behavior includes a third factor (*Figure 1*), which suggests that perceived behavioral control also influences the formation of intentions (Ajzen, 1991). This determinant of intentions expresses how easy (or difficult) the individual feels it will be to perform the specific action, and how capable of doing so he or she feels.[8] It is related to the sense of self-efficacy or ability (thus indirectly to self-confidence).

Based on the above, migration intention is formed by an *assessment of the advantages and disadvantages* of migration, by *perception of external expectations* related to migration (pressure from significant others), and by beliefs about the feasibility of migration. By exploring these factors that influence intentions, we can understand the behavior/action itself (i.e., migration). (In what follows we test the influence of the first two components; the third is not included in the current analysis.)

At the decision-making phase of migration, however, one cannot anticipate all the factors that may influence action by facilitating or constraining the realization of intention, and unexpected barriers may also emerge. The higher the costs and risks implied by the action (as with international migration), the more likely it is that factors will arise that were disregarded by the planner. However, the theory of planned behavior fails to take all of this into account, and therefore in certain cases the model based on this theory is unsuited to predicting the future trend and composition of migration.

[7] Although the role of subjective factors – attitudes, preferences, intentions – in migration decisions has been recognized since the 1950s, the systematic application of conceptual frameworks of contemporary psychological and socio-psychological theories in migration re-search only began in the eighties (Fawcett, 1985).

[8] If the individual's perceived and actual control over action is more or less the same, there can be a direct connection between perceived behavioral control and behavior/action – marked by a dotted arrow in the figure (Ajzen, 2005, p. 119).

Figure 1: Theory of planned behavior, as applied to migration decision



Note: The figure is based on Ajzen, 1991, 2005.

The empirical findings demonstrate well that, although the chances of future migration are greater among those with previous migration plans, a significant proportion of migration planners do not realize their plans, despite the strong connection between intention and action; meanwhile, many people do migrate, even though they had no prior plans to do so (Gardner et al., 1985; Simmons, 1985; Kan, 1999; Lu, 1999; Van Dalen and Henkens, 2008).[9] There may be various reasons for this discrepancy.

On the one hand, migration intentions and plans may change over time. The potential migrant may encounter obstacles, costs, and risks after developing the intention that result in abandonment of the migration intentions, or postponement of their realization. Both internal factors (such as lack of information or adequate skills and abilities) and external factors (such as lack of opportunities or dependence on others) can hinder the realization of planned action (Ajzen, 2005), and can lead to the abandonment or postponement of plans. The intention may also be modified by an unexpected turn of events before the realization of the intention, or a by change in circumstances, which may alter the individual's motivation.

On the other hand, an insufficiently "serious" intention may also underlie a failure to realize the plans. The different measurement techniques applied to assess intentions capture people at different stages of the decision-making process (those disposed to migrate; those who are considering migration; those who have a migration plan; or those who have already taken steps toward mi-

[9] Besides the failure of realizing migration, we can observe a discrepancy between intentions and action in terms of timing and destination country of migration (Gardner et al., 1985).

gration), and so "intentions" involve both general desires and specific, concrete plans (Fassmann and Hintermann, 1998). In the case of the former, however, the chances of realization are slight. The better we can capture real, actual migration intention, rather than just desires and dreams, the more reliable will be the predictions based on migration potential.

Another form of inconsistency between intention and action is when migration occurs in the absence of previous plans. This so-called "surprise move" (Gardner et al., 1985) or "unexpected move" (Lu, 1999) can occur due to changing circumstances, the emergence of new information, or an unexpected turn of events after the measurement of intention. It may also occur even if the individual interviewed had no personal intention of migrating: according to the new economics of migration, migration-related decisions are usually made by families or households, in order to increase their income or reduce their risks (Taylor, 1986; Stark, 1991). Thus, it is possible that a family decision or some other family member's intention influenced the migration, even though the individual interviewed had had no thought of migrating.

Both the change in intentions over time and the inaccuracy of their measurement reduce the predictive power of this indicator. Intentions could be more accurate indicators when they include concrete plans that refer to the timing of migration and destination. However, we cannot ignore the role of different individual and structural background factors; nor the external constraints and barriers that influence the realization of migration along with (or sometimes in spite of) intentions.

DATA

The database of the panel survey *Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania* provides a unique opportunity to examine selection during migration, as well as the factors influencing migration behavior.[10] The first wave of the survey was conducted in 2006 on a representative sample of 2,492 persons from the Hungarian-speaking population of Transylvania aged 20–45. In the first wave, migration intentions were measured by a standard set of questions. These addressed the respondent's plans for short-term (a few weeks or months) or long-term

[10] The survey was conducted by the Hungarian Demographic Research Institute, in cooperation with the Max Weber Social Research Foundation (Kolozsvár/Cluj-Napoca) and the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities (former Research Institute of Interethnic Relationships).

(several years) employment abroad, or emigration (permanently settling down abroad).

The second wave took place at the turn of 2008–2009, when respondents interviewed in 2006 were contacted again. For those who could not be re-interviewed, the reason was registered on the address card; if they had moved, their new place of residence was also recorded (whenever possible). The questionnaire for the second wave also contained questions relating to those who had returned after a period of time spent abroad (at least three months) between the two surveys (and so we also have information about their experience of working abroad, as well as the reasons for their return). By linking the data from the two waves and the address cards, it was possible not only to analyze the selection process of migrants, but also to test the realization of migration plans explored in the first wave. This reveals how well prior migration intentions predicted future migration.

Given the fact that there is little empirical information from panel surveys on the selection of international migrants and the relationship between migration intention and actual migration, the panel database of the research *Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania* is particularly valuable. As far as we know, in the Central and Eastern European region – despite the relative abundance of studies on migration potential – this is the first study to analyse the total first-wave sample (not just the planners), allowing a detailed exploration of the explanatory factors of realized migration, with particular attention to the role of previous migration intentions.

Another novelty of the survey is that it is possible to apply Ajzen's theory of planned behavior to migration decisions. First-wave data include migration-related attitudes (assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of emigration), as well as subjective norms (beliefs about the external expectations of friends, parents, or relatives). These data enable us to analyse how these factors influence migration behavior.

HANDLING SAMPLE ATTRITION, ESTIMATING THE PROPORTION OF MIGRANTS AND RETURNEES

In panel studies, attrition is usually relevant because of sample distortion, i.e., the representativeness of the sample in subsequent waves. However, when the topic involves the realization of migration plans, or the occurrence of migration between the two waves, sample drop-out may be viewed in a different light, since

one of the reasons for attrition may be migration itself. In this case, if the residence of non-respondents in the second wave can be determined (at least whether they are in the home country or abroad), then they are not "missing" for the purposes of migration analysis (despite their failure to fill in the questionnaire).

Of the 2,492 persons[11] who comprised the first-wave sample of the survey *Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania*, 1,690 were interviewed during the second wave; the whereabouts of an additional 410 people were identified by the interviewers; and 7 people were no longer alive at the time of the second wave. Thus, we have sufficient information on the whereabouts of 2,107 persons in total; no data are available on 385 people. *Table 1* contains the detailed attrition data from the second wave.

Thus, it is clear that about two-thirds of the total first-wave sample were interviewed in the second wave (attrition was 32.2%); however, overall (completed with data from address cards) 84.6% of first-wave respondents were successfully located. According to data from the address cards, 5.0% (106 persons) of those with "known whereabouts" (2,107 persons) were living abroad at the time of the second wave, and 14.4% (304) were living in their home country (at their original address or elsewhere), but were not interviewed. Using the weight of the first wave (which ensured the representativeness of the sample by sex, age group, level of education, and "ethnic microregion"), these proportions change slightly: at the time of the second wave, 5.5% of those with "known whereabouts" lived abroad,[12] 15.5% lived in the home country, but did not respond to the questionnaire (response rate was 78.6%), and 0.4% were no longer alive.

Those about whom no information was obtained during the second wave (385 persons) could have included persons located either in the home country or abroad; but it can be assumed that the rate of migrants among them is slightly higher than in the total sample. This is also suggested by the fact that among those with plans to migrate at the time of the first wave, the rate of those with "unknown whereabouts" in the second wave was much higher: whereas it was 16% among non-migration planners, the rate was 21% among planners of short-term migration, 24% among planners of long-term migration, and 26% among emigration planners.

[11] It is important to note that among those included in the first-wave sample, less mobile persons (reachable at their home address) were already likely to be overrepresented, and those "on the move" (Horváth, 2003) – who were already involved in some form of migration, either as temporarily absent or as commuters – were underrepresented.

[12] The rate of those living abroad (for the group with known whereabouts) was much more significant among persons who had previous migration plans: 9.6% among planners of short-term migration, 11.6% among planners of long-term migration, and 14.8% among emigration planners.

Table 1: Sample attrition between the two waves

	First wave (2006)	Second wave (2009)	% of first-wave sample	% of first-wave sample (weighted)	% of those with known place of residence	% of those with known place of residence (weighted)
Respondent	2,492	1,690	67.8	64.7	80.2	78.6
Non-respondent but place of residence is known		410	16.5	17.3	19.5	21.0
Lived abroad		106	4.3	4.5	5.0	5.5
Moved elsewhere in the country		78	3.1	3.2	3.7	3.9
Refused to respond		130	5.2	5.4	6.2	6.6
Other failure (failed to contact the person, unable to respond)		96	3.9	4.2	4.6	5.0
Deceased		7	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4
Sum		*2,107*	*84.6*	*82.3*	*100.0*	*100.0*
Nothing known		385	15.4	17.7	–	–
Total		2,492	100.0	100.0	–	–

Source: Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

Based on models that take account of the rate and composition of groups known to be located abroad or in the home country, we made an estimation of the place of residence for the 385 persons with unknown whereabouts.[13] Accordingly, people with unknown whereabouts were distributed among the groups of those with foreign residence, non-respondents with domestic residence, and the deceased. Using these estimated data to complement the group of people living abroad based on their address cards (106 persons), it can be assumed that 129 individuals from the first-wave sample were living abroad at the time of the second wave (see *Figure 2*), which means 5.2% of the unweighted sample, and 5.8% of the weighted sample.

[13] For a detailed description of the estimation and weighting procedures, see the annex in Gödri and Feleky, 2017.

Figure 2: The effective and estimated distribution of first-wave respondents by place of residence in the second wave (unweighted)



Source: *Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania* (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

As mentioned above, in addition to those living abroad at the time of the second-wave survey, some respondents had lived abroad for a period of time (at least three months) between the two waves of the survey, and had then returned: 48 of the 1,690 persons, or 3.2% of the weighted subsample of respondents. Assuming that a similar proportion of those who were in the home country at the time of the second wave, but failed to respond to the questionnaire, had lived abroad for at least three months between the two waves, then the number of returnees among them can be estimated at 21. In summary, the number of returnees from staying abroad was probably 69 persons from the total first-wave sample, making up 2.8% of the unweighted sample and 3.0% of the weighted sample. Our analyses took into account the estimated rates of those staying abroad and those who had returned, but used only the weighted subsample of persons with known whereabouts (2,107).

In order to examine the realization of migration plans, it would be useful to take into account the actual length of the sojourn abroad (if any) of those individuals who had planned for different durations of migration (a few weeks/months, a few years, or permanent stay). In most cases, however, there is insufficient information available on this. Some of those living abroad at the time of

the second wave had "emigrated"; others were "working abroad," according to their address-card data. The date of departure is not known for either of these groups; and in the case of the latter group, the expected duration of foreign employment is also unknown. (Moreover, people from the "emigrated" group may also return later.) Similarly, in the case of returnees, the length of time spent abroad is not always known (only that it was at least three months).

In sum, our analysis regarded as a migrant everybody who was living abroad at the time of the second wave, or who had spent at least three months abroad between the two waves and had then returned. (A similar definition was used for migrants in previous panel studies; see Chort, 2012; Van Dalen and Henkens, 2008, 2013). For those who had been planning migration at the time of the first wave, the realization of those plans was also evaluated on this basis, although we are aware that this may imply some inaccuracy.[14]

REALIZATION AND CHANGE OF MIGRATION PLANS BETWEEN THE TWO WAVES

According to data from the first wave in 2006, almost one-third of respondents (30.3%) representing the Hungarian-speaking Transylvanian population aged 20–45 were planning some form of migration: 24.7% planned short-term employment abroad; 15.2% planned long-term employment abroad; and 7% planned emigration (Gödri and Kiss, 2009).[15] Some 40% of the planners had various plans for the time they would spend abroad. About three years later, at the time of the second wave, 10% of earlier planners were living abroad, and 7% were return migrants (who had stayed abroad for at least three months after the previous interview, and had then returned home). In summary, about 17% of migration plans were realized more or less in some form (*Table 2*). This is in line with an earlier – already mentioned – Hungarian survey on the realization of employment intentions (Hárs, 2008); it, however, measured the realization rate after four years.

Plans made for long-term work abroad and for emigration were actually followed by migration slightly more frequently than were plans made for only short-term employment abroad. At the same time, far more of those who had

[14] Realization of migration plans can actually be examined only with certain limitations, since what can be stated in many cases is only the start of realizing the plan.

[15] Since then, the rate of persons within the Transylvanian population planning employment abroad has increased further, in particular in the younger generations (in 2013, 43% of those aged 18–35, and 51% of those aged 18–29 planned to work abroad), and the move toward Western Europe has further strengthened in migration intentions (Kiss and Barna, 2013).

been planning emigration in 2006 were living abroad at the time of the second wave (15.8%) than was the case for those who had been planning longer or shorter foreign employment. The rate of returnees, however, was higher among the latter: 48–53% of those migrating for work returned, compared to 12.5% of those who had moved with plans to emigrate. This latter group comprised persons who made plans for work, in addition to emigration. Migration was realized to the greatest degree among those who, in 2006, were considering all three types of migration plans: 23.4% of them had migrated, and most of them (22.1%) were also living abroad at the time of the second wave.

Taking into account the planned destination country for migration, it would seem that rather more migration plans were realized that primarily targeted Hungary (18%) than other (mostly Western European or overseas) destination countries (15%). Realization of plans was lowest among those who mentioned several migration plans and associated destination countries (9%); however, it was remarkably high among those who did not name a destination country (27%). Although the low sample sizes in both cases require us be cautious in our conclusions, this would indicate that the more "desperate" the planners were (i.e., they had various migration plans), the more likely they were to realize their intentions, even if they had no specific destination country; whereas if the plans involved a variety of destination countries (suggesting a kind of uncertainty), migration was less likely to occur.

The above table also shows that, while migration occurs over three times more frequently among those with previous plans than among non-planners, a relatively large proportion of migration plans did not come to fruition between the two waves of the survey. However, there were cases of migration in the absence of any previous intention – albeit less prevalent: 5.3% of non-planners still migrated later. Taking previous migration intention and realized migration together, four groups can be distinguished: *stayers*, who had no migration plans and did not move; *expected migrants*, who previously reported their intention of moving and who carried it out within the three-year follow-up period; *dreamers*, who planned migration, but did not realize it within three years; and *unexpected migrants*, who initially had no migration plans, but who moved nevertheless (*Table 3*). The highest proportion (two-thirds of the total sample) is made up of stayers; the rate of dreamers is also significant (a quarter of the sample); meanwhile the rates of expected and unexpected migrants are relatively small (5% and 3.8%, respectively).[16]

[16] In the Dutch survey mentioned earlier, the rate of stayers was even more significant (86.5%), while that of dreamers was only 8.3%, expected migrants made up 4.2%, and unexpected migrants (termed "unintended movers") accounted for only 1% (Van Dalen and Henkens, 2013).

Table 2: Occurrence of migration between the two waves by previous migration plans

Existence, type, and destination country of migration plans during the first wave	Occurrence of migration between the two waves				Total	N
	Did not live abroad	Lived abroad (for at least three months), and then returned home	Lived abroad during the second wave	Lived abroad total		
Total population						
Migration plan in 2006***						
did not have	94.7	1.3	4.1	5.3	100.0	1,477
had	82.9	7.1	10.0	17.1	100.0	608
Total	91.2	3.0	5.8	8.8	100.0	2,095
Migration planners						
Type of migration plan in 2006 (longest planned duration)***						
short-term only (a few weeks or months)	84.3	7.5	8.2	15.7	100.0	266
long-term at most (a few years)	81.0	10.0	9.0	19.0	100.0	210
even emigration	82.0	2.3	15.8	18.0	100.0	132
First mentioned destination country*						
Hungary	81.7	8.2	10.1	18.3	100.0	279
other country	84.8	7.0	8.2	15.2	100.0	270
mixed	90.9	4.5	4.5	9.1	100.0	22
no destination country	73.0	0.0	27.0	27.0	100.0	37
Total	82.9	7.1	10.0	17.1	100.0	608

Notes: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05 (chi-square test). It was possible to name two destination countries (if various migration plans existed, then two in each case); "mixed" category stands as the first mentioned destination country if another destination country was mentioned, besides Hungary, in the case of various plans.
Source: Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

Of the four groups, stayers and expected migrants behaved in accordance with their plans (72%), but there is inconsistency between intention and action in the other two groups (28%). For dreamers, this may reflect the possibility that their plans had not yet been realized – either because they had been postponed, or because they were planned for a later date. There is, however, no informa-

tion on this latter possibility, as the first wave contained no question about the planned timing of migration. The failure of planned migration may also result from the fact that the structure of the supply side (potential migrants) did not meet the demand of the destination countries. In this case, some of the dreamers can actually be regarded as having failed in their plans.

Table 3: Groups formed by previous migration plans and actual migration

		Migration between the two waves	
		yes	no
Migration intentions in 2006	yes	Expected migrants 5.0%	Dreamers 24.2%
	no	Unexpected migrants 3.8%	Stayers 67.0%

Source: Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

In the case of unexpected migrants (who made up 43% of all migrants), migration intention may have been formed after the first wave of the survey (because circumstances changed in the meantime); however, as Hárs, Örkény and Sik (2006) point out, it cannot be ruled out that the intention of migrating could sometimes have been concealed during the previous interviews. Whatever the cause of unexpected migration, it indicates that migration may occur in spite of the lack of previous intentions.

In the second wave of the survey, migration intentions were reassessed. In that round, it was possible to interview those who had not moved (whether in accordance with or despite their earlier plans) and those who had returned following migration. This can be used to examine the change in migration intentions for the various groups – e.g., we can learn if dreamers had abandoned their previous migration plans, or had postponed them. The results show that in 2009, barely a third (32.8%) of those who had not realized their previous migration plans (measured in 2006) were still planning some type of migration, while 67.2% had given up their earlier plans (*Table 4*).

A reverse change can be observed in the case of stayers: although they had no previous intention of migrating, in 2009 a tenth of them mentioned migration-related plans (mainly for short-term employment). In 2009, the largest proportion of migration intentions was found among return migrants (a third of all migrants): two-thirds of them planned new migration (84.8% of returnees after expected migration). This also confirms the well-known relationship that prior migration experience

increases the occurrence of new migration plans. Based on migration intentions measured in 2009, it can be assumed that the rate of migrants within the surveyed population, estimated at 8.8% during the second wave, continues to grow over time.

Table 4: Migration plans in the second wave (in 2009) by groups formed on the basis of previous migration intentions and actual migration

Types	Migration plan in the second wave		Total	N
	yes	no		
Stayers	10.1	89.9	100.0	1,154
Dreamers	32.8	67.2	100.0	408
Returned migrants	66.2	33.8	100.0	71
Total	18.2	81.8	100.0	1,633

Note: The group of returned migrants includes returnees following both expected and unexpected migration; these have been combined due to low sample size. Based on chi-square test, significance: $p<0.001$.
Source: Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

COMPOSITION OF MIGRANT AND NON-MIGRANT GROUPS

An important question – which perhaps may bring us closer to understanding the nature of migration intention and action – is what socio-demographic characteristics can describe the four groups distinguished by previous migration plans and realized migration. Is there a clear difference in composition between the two groups of migrants (i.e., expected and unexpected migrants) and between the two groups of non-migrants (i.e., dreamers and stayers)?[17]

Along with the basic socio-demographic characteristics of these four groups, *Table 5* contains some additional criteria, mainly related to financial status, employment, and housing conditions. It is clear that in both groups of migrants, there is a slightly higher rate of men, while women predominate among stayers (those who did not plan migration). Within the group of dreamers, however, the rate of men is extremely high, suggesting that – though men were more likely to move than women – there were even more men who planned migration, but failed to realize it. In terms of average age, expected migrants and dreamers are the two youngest groups, while the group of stayers is the oldest. Among the former groups

[17] The results for the unexpected migrants are to be interpreted with caution, due to the small group size.

(particularly among expected migrants), the rate of those with at most lower secondary education is higher than in the total sample, and the proportion of those who were unemployed or otherwise inactive is also larger. While approximately only half of expected migrants and dreamers were employed (employees or self-employed) in 2006, this figure reached two-thirds among unexpected migrants and stayers. The differences are also shown in terms of marital status and number of children: the rate of unmarried and, in part, cohabiting people and of the childless was extremely high among expected migrants, but it was also above average in the groups of unexpected migrants and dreamers. By contrast, married people and those with children were overrepresented among the stayers.

Table 5: Socio-demographic characteristics of groups formed on the basis of previous migration intentions and actual migration, %

Socio-demographic characteristics in 2006	Expected migrants	Dreamers	Unexpected migrants	Stayers	Total
Sex**					
male	53.8	58.1	55.0	47.6	50.7
female	46.2	41.9	45.0	52.4	49.3
Age (mean)***	29.6	30.2	31.5	33.5	32.5
Educational attainment**					
at most lower secondary (8 classes or less)	31.1	23.4	21.5	17.4	19.7
vocational training school (10 classes)	22.3	17.5	19.0	23.7	21.9
upper secondary	35.9	47.2	50.6	47.7	47.1
higher education	10.7	11.9	8.9	11.3	11.3
Employment status***					
employee	50.0	44.5	60.3	58.0	54.4
self-employed	2.1	5.8	6.4	7.8	7.0
unemployed	12.5	15.2	1.3	5.8	8.2
student	4.2	7.8	3.8	6.1	6.3
other inactive	31.3	26.7	28.2	22.3	24.0
Marital and partnership status***					
unmarried (single)	50.0	37.8	33.7	25.0	29.7
married (lives with married partner)	33.7	49.3	56.2	63.8	58.5
cohabiting	14.4	8.7	6.3	6.5	7.4
divorced, widowed (single)	1.9	4.2	3.8	4.7	4.4

Table 5: Socio-demographic characteristics of groups formed on the basis of previous migration in-tentions and actual migration, % (continued)

Socio-demographic characteristics in 2006	Expected migrants	Dreamers	Unex-pected migrants	Stayers	Total
Number of children***					
no child	54.8	50.8	49.4	36.6	41.4
one child	15.4	20.7	25.3	26.5	24.5
two or more children	29.8	28.5	25.3	36.9	34.1
Have a household member living abroad**	7.8	8.2	10.3	4.1	5.5
Have financial problems month after month***	34.7	26.3	26.0	18.8	21.7
Unemployment experience ***					
never	37.5	41.9	63.3	56.0	52.0
once	33.7	32.9	16.5	27.4	28.6
several times	28.8	25.1	20.3	16.6	19.4
Dissatisfied with job***	30.4	14.3	23.0	9.8	12.4
Poor housing conditions*	24.5	16.2	19.5	14.9	15.8
Absolute (material) deprivation**	34.3	28.2	29.1	22.7	24.8
Relative deprivation***	28.4	25.0	25.6	17.4	20.1
Anomie**	33.3	47.1	28.2	40.7	41.5
N	104	504	79	1,398	2,085

Note: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05 (chi-square test).
Source: Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

The proportion of household members who had been living abroad for at least one year – as a factor contributing to the formation of migration intention and to migration itself – was almost double in the groups of actual migrants or dreamers than among stayers. Adverse financial and labor market status, housing conditions, and correspondingly relative deprivation were all more characteristic of expected migrants than of the total population, and even more than of stayers.[18] Some of these disadvantages (such as previous unemployment) occurred at a higher rate among dreamers; others (such as job dissatisfaction and poor housing conditions) were also high among unex-

[18] The indicator for poor housing conditions (or housing poverty) takes into account the crowdedness and lack of comfort of the residence (Kapitány and Spéder, 2004); absolute (material) deprivation considers the material components of life circumstances, while relative deprivation sees them as shortage ("would need it but cannot afford").

pected migrants. Financial problems and absolute (material) or relative deprivation were also more common in both groups than among stayers. Anomie,[19] however, characterized movers (both expected and unexpected migrants) to a lesser extent, and dreamers who did not realize their plans to a greater extent than stayers.

In summary, it can be stated that the two groups who acted in accordance with their original plans – expected migrants and stayers – show a sharp separation from each other in terms of all the characteristics examined. The composition of dreamers, however, is in most respects closer to that of expected migrants than it is to stayers, indicating that selection is already in part completed even while the intention is being formed. In the case of dreamers, however, a number of characteristics (e.g., a high rate of low educational attainment, singles, and the childless, as well as those with financial problems and the deprived) are less marked, and job dissatisfaction and poor housing conditions are also no more typical of them than on average. The absence of these push factors probably contributed to the fact that their migration was not realized, despite their earlier intentions.

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND AND SELECTION OF MIGRANTS

Following the first wave of the survey, analysis of the social profile of migration planners and the explanatory factors of migration intention indicated that in 2006, in the examined age group of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, the social status of potential migrants – contrary to the previous trend – was generally more negative (Gödri and Kiss, 2009). The data from the second wave suggest that this negative selection continued: expected migrants – as opposed to dreamers – were characterized in 2006 by lower educational attainment, more unfavorable financial and labor market status, and deprivation. For unexpected migrants, job dissatisfaction, financial problems, and deprivation also occurred to a greater degree than among stayers, although by no means as much as among expected migrants. The question arises as to what factors explain migration between the two waves of the survey, and what role previous migration intentions play in

[19] In our analysis, the variable for anomie comprises the variables for lack of trust in the future, lack of control over everyday things ("I have no influence over my everyday affairs"), and the so-called orientational disorder ("life is so complicated nowadays that most of the time I don't know what to do"), i.e. feeling "lost."

them. Is it possible to estimate the composition of actual migrants based on the composition of potential migrants?

The previous findings have also shown that, in accordance with Ajzen's theory of planned behavior, both the assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of emigration, and perceived external norms influence emigration intentions (Gödri and Kiss, 2009). But what role do migration-related attitudes and subjective norms play in migration behavior? Do these factors affect actual migration directly, or only indirectly, through intentions?

To answer the questions above, we first examine the selection of migrants using a bivariate analysis – both in the total sample and in the group of planners; we then explore, using multivariate logistic regression models, the explanatory factors of actual migration (in the total sample), paying particular attention to the role of previous migration intentions, migration-related attitudes, and subjective norms.

Descriptive results

While the rate of participants in migration between the two waves was 8.8% in the total first-wave sample and 17.1% among those previously planning migration, certain socio-demographic groups moved or realized their migration plans to a higher degree (*Table 6*).[20]

There is no significant difference by sex in the occurrence of migration, either in the total sample or among migration planners.[21] Migration occurred at above average among those aged under 25, as well as among those with at most lower secondary education. Educational attainment shows a significant correlation within the group of planners, too: both those with lower secondary or vocational education realized their migration plans to a much greater degree than those with upper secondary education or higher education graduates. Migration was twice as frequent among unmarried singles and cohabiting partners as it was among married people. This was not simply because a greater proportion of them had initial plans: we can see that this selection continued during the reali-

[20] In the bivariate analysis, significance was cross-checked by the chi-square test; for ordinal variables we used Spearman's rank correlation (denotations are indicated below the tables).

[21] Although we found significant variations by sex in the composition of migrant types, the high male surplus of dreamers and the female surplus of stayers not planning migration led to the result that the rate of occurrence of migration was not significantly higher in either sex.

zation of plans. The childless also moved more frequently; but in terms of realizing migration plans, there was no significant difference in this respect.

Although it seems that the highest percentage of migrants originated from South Transylvania and Banat (where the occurrence of migration plans measured in the first wave was also most common, and where the percentage of Hungarians within the population was lowest), variations by region did not prove significant either in the total sample or within the group of planners. In terms of settlement size, migration mostly occurred from settlements with a population of between 10,000 and 100,000, while it was least common from big cities with over 100,000 people. Presumably, this was also due to fewer economic constraints on residents living in larger cities, as a result of a booming local economy in the early 2000s. The Roma population was also characterized by higher rates of migration, but Roma origin does not show a significant connection with the realization of migration plans.

In the dimensions related to livelihood, work, and housing, the negative selection already mentioned predominated: the rate of migration was significantly higher in groups that were characterized by deprivation, job dissatisfaction, and poor housing conditions. In particular, a large proportion of those dissatisfied with their job moved – and the same was observed within the group of planners – suggesting that migration is in many cases a strategy to improve labor market prospects. In terms of home ownership, the higher migration frequency of non-owners (or their relatives) often mentioned in the literature cannot be observed. The larger degree of movement shown by other members of the owner's family is presumably connected with the more intense migration of young people (such as the owner's children).

Among those with a household member who had been living abroad for at least a year (i.e., had enough social capital to reduce the costs and risk of migration), the overall rate of migration was higher; but this selection was generated already at the formation of migration intention, because the group of planners showed no significant difference in realizing their plans in this respect.

Besides the above characteristics, the individual's psychosocial well-being and state of health can also influence migration or the realization of migration plans. Although a long period can pass between the collection of these data and the occurrence of migration – during which time these indicators of subjective well-being may have changed – it is worth looking at which earlier characteristics imply a major degree of movement.

Table 6: Occurrence of migration between the two waves in the total sample and among those having planned migration, by different socio-demographic groups, %

Socio-demographic characteristics in 2006	Total sample		Migration planners during the first wave	
	Occurrence of migration between the two waves, %	N	Occurrence of migration between the two waves, %	N
Sex				
male	9.4	1,063	16.1	348
female	8.2	1,032	18.5	259
	***			
Age group				
–25	14.1	375	19.4	170
25–29	8.4	395	17.8	129
30–34	8.6	421	14.0	121
35–39	6.9	475	17.0	100
40–45	6.8	429	16.3	86
	*		*	
Educational attainment				
at most lower secondary (8 classes or less)	12.2	411	21.3	150
vocational training school (10 classes)	8.3	457	20.7	111
upper secondary	7.9	989	13.5	275
higher education	7.6	238	15.5	71
	***		***	
Employment status				
employee	8.5	1,128	17.8	270
self-employed	4.9	144	6.5	31
unemployed	7.6	170	13.6	88
student	6.1	132	9.3	43
other inactive	10.5	495	18.4	163
	***		**	
Marital and partnership status				
unmarried (single)	12.5	625	21.5	242
married (lives with married partner)	6.6	1,223	12.4	283
cohabiting	12.9	155	25.4	59
divorced, widowed (single)	5.4	92	8.7	23
	**			
Number of children				
no child	11.1	867	18.4	310
one child	7.1	507	13.4	119
two or more children	7.3	710	17.9	173
Region in country of origin				
Székely Land	9.6	698	21.1	161
Partium	9.0	624	15.3	190
North Transylvania	7.1	622	14.4	201
South Transylvania and Banat	11.3	150	21.8	55

Table 6: Occurrence of migration between the two waves in the total sample and among those having planned migration, by different socio-demographic groups, % (continued)

Socio-demographic characteristics in 2006	Total sample		Migration planners during the first wave	
	Occurrence of migration between the two waves, %	N	Occurrence of migration between the two waves, %	N
Settlement size	*			
below 1,000	9.4	331	19.8	111
1,000–10,000	7.8	842	15.4	260
10,000–100,000	12.0	474	22.5	120
above 100,000	6.7	447	12.9	116
Ethnicity	**			
non-Roma	8.1	1,855	17.1	505
Roma	13.9	194	15.4	91
Living conditions	**			
lives without problems or acceptably well	7.3	771	15.7	172
barely makes ends meet	8.0	846	15.1	259
has financial problems month after month	12.3	447	21.2	165
Unemployment experience				
never	8.2	1,085	15.7	249
once	8.1	596	17.5	200
more than once	11.5	408	19.2	156
Job satisfaction	***		***	
satisfied	6.6	1,046	14.5	234
dissatisfied	19.3	254	30.7	101
not working	8.4	712	14.4	257
Housing poverty	*		*	
not in poor housing	8.0	1,740	15.6	495
poor housing	12.0	325	23.6	106
Home ownership	**			
owner	6.5	713	13.6	177
owner's partner	7.8	308	16.9	65
owner's other family member	11.2	932	20.2	322
other	6.9	131	9.3	43
Household member living abroad	*			
does not have	8.5	1,954	17.2	551
has	13.9	115	16.3	49
Total	8.8	2,095	17.1	608

Note: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Source: Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

It can be seen (*Table 7*) that among those who did not feel that there was always someone to rely on (which can be interpreted as the absence of social capital), who were concerned about the economic situation in the country, and who believed that they deserved much better living conditions than they currently had, migration (and also the realization of migration intentions among planners) occurred to a greater degree.

Table 7: Occurrence of migration between the two waves in the total sample and among those having planned migration, by different variables of psychosocial well-being, %

Psychosocial well-being in 2006	Total sample		Migration planners during the first wave	
	Occurrence of migration between the two waves, %	N	Occurrence of migration between the two waves, %	N
Can always rely on someone if needed	**		*	
completely true	7.4	1,376	14.4	388
not true or only partly true	11.4	711	22.1	217
Health satisfaction	*			
dissatisfied	4.5	154	11.1	45
moderately satisfied	7.8	566	18.1	144
very satisfied	9.4	1,353	17.2	413
Anomie	**		*	
(rather) not characteristic	9.9	1,159	20.0	320
(rather) characteristic	6.3	823	12.3	260
Concerned for the future of child	***			
not at all or little	4.6	409	14.5	62
very much	8.9	903	17.2	261
not relevant	11.6	723	18.6	263
Concerned for the country's economic situation	***			
not at all or little	8.0	1,492	16.1	410
very much	10.9	551	18.9	185
Current and expected living conditions	*		*	
deserves current	6.7	343	11.6	95
deserves somewhat better	8.5	918	15.3	236
deserves much better	10.6	734	21.0	252
Total	8.8	2,095	17.1	608

Note: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Source: Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

Those concerned about the future of their children moved to a higher degree than those unconcerned, but only among the childless was there an above-average rate of migration, as we have seen. While dissatisfaction with one's living conditions or job resulted in higher rates of migration, dissatisfaction with one's own health had the opposite effect: those very satisfied with their health moved the most, and those who were not (or were less) affected by anomie. Lack of anomie implied a higher rate of migration (i.e., more successful realization of plans) within the group of planners, too.

Factors influencing migration behavior – multivariate models

In order to examine the net effects on migration behavior of the socio-demographic characteristics previously presented – and thus to explore the explanatory factors of selection – we built logistic regression models. The dependent variable was migration behavior between the two waves of the survey (i.e., the variable had a value of 1 for all who were living abroad during the second wave or had spent at least three months abroad between the two waves).

The first base model involved four variables (sex, age group, educational attainment, and employment status), and controlling for them we checked the effect of previously surveyed variables one by one.[22] Only those variables were built into later models whose univariate effect, controlled for the variables of the base model, proved to be significant. The second base model contained two additional control variables (settlement size and marital status), and then two groups of variables were added separately: one included variables for living conditions, unemployment experience, job satisfaction, housing conditions, and household member living abroad (*Model 1*); the other comprised indicators of subjective well-being (*Model 2*). Finally, we included both previous groups of variables in the final model.

The odds ratios of the models show that, while age and in part sex (in the case of work-related migration) were key determining factors of migration intentions (i.e., younger age groups and men were more likely to plan migration), sex had no significant influence on migration behavior, and we can observe a significantly greater chance of movement only among the youngest (aged under 25) (*Table 8*).

[22] Although the variables of the base model are important also in terms of selection (and in this sense, they are non-neutral control variables), we still treated them as control variables for the exploration of additional factors explaining selection, as we were keen to find out whether financial and subjective well-being show a further selection effect along with them.

Table 8: Odds ratios of migration behavior between the two waves (logistic regression models – migrants versus stayers)

Explanatory variables (characteristics in 2006)	Base model 1 (B1)		Base model 2 (B2)		Model 1 (B2+living conditions, work, housing)		Model 2 (B2+subjective well-being)		Final model	
	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)
Sex										
male (ref.)		1		1		1		1		1
female		0.840		0.921		1.016		1.046		1.217
Age group	**				+					
under 25	***	2.587	*	1.796	*	2.080		1.650		1.715
25–29		1.340		1.115		1.295		1.246		1.393
30–34		1.360		1.233		1.282		1.324		1.344
35–39		1.072		1.018		0.887		1.021		0.805
over 40 (ref.)		1		1		1		1		1
Educational attainment			*							
at most lower secondary (ref.)		1		1		1		1		1
vocational training school		0.664	+	0.619		0.879		0.673		0.953
upper secondary	*	0.638	*	0.560		0.859	+	0.625		0.899
higher education	+	0.588	*	0.439		0.719	*	0.439		0.684
Employment status										
employee (ref.)		1		1		1		1		1
self-employed		0.671		0.731		0.995		0.610		0.703
unemployed		0.710		0.778		1.008		0.787		1.079
student		0.536		0.543		0.796	*	0.335		0.529
other inactive		1.152		1.189		1.431		1.114		1.441
Settlement size			**		*		**		**	
under 1,000				1.294		1.353		1.497		1.516
1,000–10,000 (ref.)				1		1		1		1
10,000–100,000			**	2.051	**	2.080	***	2.389	**	2.357
over 100,000				1.169		1.224		1.138		1.211
Marital and partnership status			*				*			
married (lives with married partner) (ref.)				1		1		1		1
unmarried (single)			*	1.747	*	1.584	**	2.438	*	1.986
divorced, widowed (single)				0.826		0.700		0.674		0.720
Cohabiting			*	1.808		1.316	**	2.305		1.357
Living conditions					+					
lives without problems or acceptably well (ref.)						1				1
can barely make ends meet						1.049				0.995
has financial problems month after month					*	1.686			+	1.646

Table 8: Odds ratios of migration behavior between the two waves (logistic regression models – migrants versus stayers) (continued)

Explanatory variables (characteristics in 2006)	Base model 1 (B1)		Base model 2 (B2)		Model 1 (B2+living conditions, work, housing)		Model 2 (B2+subjective well-being)		Final model	
	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)
Unemployment experience										
never (ref.)						1				1
once						1.010				1.139
more than once						1.344			+	1.600
Job satisfaction					***				***	
satisfied (ref.)						1				1
dissatisfied					***	2.834			***	3.031
not working						0.758				0.746
Housing poverty										
not in poor housing (ref.)						1				1
poor housing					+	1.590				1.553
Household member living abroad						1				1
no (ref.)						1				1
yes						1.550				1.123
Can always rely on someone if needed								1		1
completely true (ref.)								1		1
not true or only partly true							*	1.524	*	1.491
Health satisfaction										
satisfied (ref.)								1		1
moderately satisfied								2.060		2.187
very satisfied							+	2.541	+	2.571
Anomie										
(rather) not characteristic (ref.)								1		1
(rather) characteristic							**	0.506	***	0.421
Concern for the future of child							+			
not at all or little (ref.)								1		1
very much							+	1.756	+	1.755
not relevant								1.050		1.192
Concern for the country's economic situation										
not at all or little (ref.)								1		1
very much							+	1.451		1.417
Current and expected living conditions										
deserves current (ref.)								1		
deserves somewhat better								1.236		
deserves much better							+	1.644		
Nagelkerke R^2	0.031		0.054		0.095		0.106		0.141	

Note: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1.
Source: Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

In terms of educational attainment, migration behavior was more likely among those with lower secondary education (at most eight classes): compared to them, all three of the other educational groups – but mostly higher education graduates – were significantly less likely to move. This suggests that in the second half of the 2000s – contrary to the trend of the previous decade, and particularly the years immediately before and after the change of regime – emigration from Transylvania was no longer typical of professionals, but was rather the "coping strategy" of the lower educated. This is also suggested by the fact that, although there was no significant influence by employment status, the degree of move was greatest among "other inactive," and this group (almost a quarter of the total sample!) was likely to include the hidden unemployed. At least a third of the movements were temporary,[23] which presumably served to increase the income of the household in the home country.

The interesting selection by settlement size was also confirmed by multivariate analysis: the chances of migrating from a settlement with a population of between 10,000 and 100,000 were about double those of migrating from a town with a population of between 1,000 and 10,000, and this remained significant in all models. It can be assumed that small-town residents had a better chance of obtaining the information needed for migration than those living in smaller settlements (villages), while their labor market opportunities lagged behind those of people living in larger cities.[24]

In terms of marital status, the greater chances of migration for unmarried singles and cohabitees proved significant both in the base model and in the model of subjective well-being; but in the model comprising variables for living conditions, employment status, and housing conditions, the significance for the latter category (cohabitees) disappeared. This suggests that the greater chance of cohabitees migrating is partly attributable to their less-favorable situation. Nevertheless, the unmarried group was more mobile, controlling also for the above-mentioned variables (possibly rather due to fewer constraints).

Roma origin, based on the bivariate analysis, implied a higher rate of migration intensity, but one that was not significant, controlling for the first base model; but it brought an interesting change in the influence of employment status. Controlling also for Roma origin (alongside sex, age group, and educational attainment), the unemployed and students were significantly less likely to move than were employees. This may suggest that the rate of these two groups was

[23] In the case of those staying abroad during the second wave, the rate of returnees is still unknown, and we have no data about the circular character of temporary moves.

[24] Based on this, we would expect that migration was less likely in the smallest settlements with fewer than 1,000 people, but our data did not confirm this.

higher among those with Roma origin;[25] and because Roma were involved in migration more intensively, it obscured the fact that both the unemployed and students were less likely to move.

Regarding the dimensions of living conditions, work, and housing conditions, the negative selection observed in the bivariate analysis was confirmed by the logistic regression (*Model 1*). People struggling with financial problems, dissatisfied with their job, living in poor housing conditions – even after controlling for the variables of the second base model – were more likely to get involved in migration than those living "without problems" or "acceptably well," satisfied with their work, and not living in poor housing. These effects, except for housing poverty, can be observed in the final model, too, with the additional effect of unemployment experience (i.e., migration was more likely to occur among those who had repeatedly experienced unemployment earlier in their lives). However, the most significant effect was observed in job satisfaction: those dissatisfied with their work were three times more likely to move.

Household members living abroad significantly increased the chances of migration, controlling for variables of both base models (80% and 70%, respectively); but this effect was lost in the extended model (*Model 1*). It has to be noted, however, that this accounts for only part of the possible social capital, since other close family members (e.g., a sibling who is not a household member), or a relative, friend, etc. may be part of the social network living abroad that can contribute to increasing the chances of migration. However, we do not have information on that.

Variables reflecting subjective well-being and psychosocial condition (involved in the analysis) also showed significant effects, controlling for the variables of the second base model (*Model 2*). The inability to mobilize network capital in the community of origin increased the chances of migration: those who felt that they had no family members or friends they could rely on if necessary moved more easily, while having such a network could be an important restraint.[26] Migration behavior was also more likely among those who were concerned about the future of their children or about the country's economic situation, and also among those for whom there was a major gulf between their actual living conditions and those that they believed they deserved. Of these factors, satisfaction with state of health contributed most to the migration behavior: those very satisfied with their health were two and a half times more likely to

[25] Indeed: of those of Roma origin, 21% were unemployed and 12% were students, while among non-Roma these groups represented 7% and 5.5%, respectively.

[26] Concern for personal relationships (with partner and parents) proved to be the strongest restraining factor, also at the forming of migration intentions (Gödri and Kiss, 2009).

migrate than were those dissatisfied with their health. By contrast, some level of anomie reduced the chances of migrating by half. In the final model, the majority of these variables – with the exception of concern for the country's economic situation – retained their impact, although with slightly weaker significance.

Regarding the final model, it might be claimed that although the effects of variables dealing with living conditions, work, and subjective well-being were also visible, the role of job satisfaction and anomie was the most significant overall; meanwhile, the effect of settlement size and marital status as control variables also remained significant. Therefore, small-town residence, unmarried marital status, and job dissatisfaction clearly increased the probability of migration; anomie, however, reduced it.

The role of previous migration intention, migration-related attitudes and subjective norms

The present study endeavored to explore what role previous migration intentions play in actual migration, and how migration behavior is determined by previous migration-related attitudes and perceived external norms. Migration-related attitudes were measured as the respondents' perceptions of the likely outcomes (i.e., advantages and disadvantages) of migration – in other words, the assumed effects of possible migration on various aspects of their lives. The question about the assumed effects of migration measured expectations in 10 dimensions, focusing on whether a deterioration or an improvement is expected in the given area in the case of migration; we only took into account eight of these in generating combined variables.[27] Subjective norms appear as emigration-related expectations by friends, parents, and relatives: i.e., external pressure – as perceived by the individual – towards emigration.

The results clearly show (*Table 9*) that those who, in the first wave, expected an improvement in various areas of their lives – and especially those who assumed positive changes in most of the areas listed – migrated at a higher rate. Among migration planners, however, the realization of plans did not show a significant connection to those previous attitudes. Similarly, the expectations of significant others (and in particular of parents) implied a significantly higher rate

[27] How would emigration affect 1) your employment prospects, 2) your financial status, 3) the opinion your relatives and friends hold about you, 4) your happiness and satisfaction with life, 5) you having a quiet and balanced life in your old age, 6) the relationship between you and your parents, 7) you preserving your Hungarian identity (your mother tongue and culture), 8) you being free to do what you want? (The items concerning the relationship with the partner and the partner's work prospects have been omitted to have an adequate sample size.)

of migration (almost double); but in case of the planners this kind of external pressure did not contribute to the realization of their plans. This suggests that both migration-related attitudes and subjective norms played a role in selection back when the intention to migrate was taking shape; later, however, these factors no longer played a role in the realization of the plans.

Table 9: Occurrence of migration between the two waves in the total sample and among those who planned to migrate, by migration-related attitudes and perceived external norms, %

Explanatory variables (characteristics in 2006)	Total sample		Migration planners during the first wave	
	Occurrence of migration between the two waves, %	N	Occurrence of migration between the two waves, %	N
Expectations about the outcomes of migration				
How would emigration affect ...	**			
expects rather a deterioration or both a deterioration and an improvement equally	6.5	857	15.0	140
expects only (or rather) improvement	10.3	1,238	17.9	469
Positive expectation (assumed improvement)	***			
in 0–2 areas	6.9	1,137	15.4	201
in 3–4 areas	9.8	583	18.5	211
in 5–8 areas	13.3	376	17.8	197
Perceived external norms				
Friends suggest emigration	**			
no	7.6	1,639	16.6	374
yes or partly	13.0	347	17.1	199
Parents suggest emigration	***			
no	8.0	1,743	16.4	450
yes or partly	16.0	187	19.3	114
Relatives suggest emigration	**			
no	7.8	1,762	16.7	430
yes or partly	13.7	242	15.5	148
Expectation by friend, parent, or relative	***			
perceived	7.4	1,601	16.6	355
not perceived	13.0	437	16.3	241
Total	8.8	2,095	17.1	608

Note: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01.
Source: Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

In order to find out what role previous migration intentions and plans (or migration willingness at all) played in actual migration, we added the related variables separately to the final model presented above. Our findings show that migration willingness itself – which can be considered a "weaker" indicator than migration intention – significantly increased the chances of migration: those who previously showed a willingness to move abroad to improve their living and working conditions were twice as likely to migrate in the surveyed period (*Table 10*). Those who had any kind of migration plan during the first wave were even more – almost three and a half times more – likely to move; and looking at the type of plan, it is clear that migration was most likely to occur in the case of longer-term plans for a few years of working abroad, or even for emigration.[28] Considering the increased explanatory power of the model, as well as the level of significance of odds ratios, it can be concluded that migration intention is a statistically significant predictor of migration. However, two variables in the final model – job satisfaction and anomie – also retained their influence at a very high level of significance ($p<0.001$), even with the involvement of migration plans; and another five variables (marital status, settlement size, housing poverty, lack of social support, and health satisfaction) likewise had an influence, albeit with lower significance. This indicates that previous migration intentions and plans are important, but are not the only explanatory factors for migration behavior. The factors which continue to have an effect on migration behavior – even with the involvement of previous intentions – are those which actually affect the migration directly, not only through intentions.

And finally: do migration-related attitudes and perceived external norms have a role in migration behavior, or – in accordance with Ajzen's theory – do they influence migration behavior only indirectly, via intentions? To answer this question, the variables of "attitudes" and "perceived external norms" were added to our existing models; and then, if the effect was significant, the model was further expanded with the variable "previous migration plan," thereby testing whether the direct effect remained.

[28] The joint inclusion of migration willingness and migration plans in the model also indicates that plans explain migration behavior with a higher significance and greater odds ratio (2.904 versus 1.737) than does willingness.

Table 10: Role of previous migration willingness and migration intentions in migration behavior (odds ratios of logistic regression models)

Explanatory variables (migration willingness and intention in 2006)	Final model + migration willingness		Final model + migration plan		Final model + type of migration plan	
	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)
Migration willingness (ref.: did not have)	***	2.299				
Migration plan (ref.: did not have)			***	3.474		
Type of migration plan (longest planned duration)					***	
had no plan (ref.)					1	1
short-term at most (a few weeks/months)					***	3.126
long-term at most (a few years)					***	3.752
even emigration					***	3.849
Nagelkerke R^2	0.158		0.189		0.190	

Note: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05.
Source: Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

Table 11: Role of migration-related attitudes in migration behavior (odds ratios of logistic regression models)

Explanatory variables (attitudes and migration plans in 2006)	Model 1 + expectation		Model 1 + expectation + migration plan		Model 2 + expectation		Model 2 + expectation + migration plan		Final model + expectation		Final model + expectation + migration plan	
	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)
Positive expectation (assumed improvement)					*							
in 0–2 areas (ref.)		1		1		1		1		1		1
in 3–4 areas		1.235		1.037		1.052		0.828		1.032		0.831
in 5–8 areas	*	1.635		1.142	**	1.912		1.358	*	1.607		1.101
Migration plan (ref.: had no plan)			***	2.896			***	3.415			***	3.474
Nagelkerke R^2	0.101		0.135		0.116		0.163		0.146		0.191	

Note: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1.
Source: Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

Of the migration-related attitudes, only positive expectations (i.e., the assumed advantages of migration) proved to have a significant effect. Those who expected a positive change (i.e., assumed an improvement) from migration in more than half of the areas listed were more likely to move (controlling for a number of other background variables presented earlier) (*Table 11*). After including "previous migration plan" in the model, however, this effect disappeared in all three models.

Perceived external norms (pressure from friends, parents, relatives) only had an influence on the model containing variables for subjective well-being (*Model 2*), increasing the chances of movement by one and a half times (*Table 12*). (Expectations of both parents and relatives proved slightly stronger; of friends it was not significant.) After involving "previous migration plan," however, the effect disappeared in this case, too.

Table 12: Role of perceived external norms in migration behavior (odds ratios of logistic regression models)

Explanatory variables (perceived external norms and migration plans in 2006)	Model 1 + expectation		Model 2 + expectation + migration plan	
	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)
Expectation of friend, parent, or relative (ref.: not perceived)		1		1
perceived	*	1.486		1.037
Migration plan (ref.: did not have)			***	3.322
Nagelkerke R^2	0.111		0.156	

Note: External norms influenced only Model 2. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05.
Source: Turning Points of Life Course - Transylvania (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

All of the above confirms that although the subjective factors examined - both migration-related attitudes and perceived external norms - influence migration behavior, their influence works through migration intentions. Those who assume positive change (improvement) from migration in most areas, and who experience social pressure to migrate, are more likely to develop migration intentions, and thus have a higher chance of moving abroad. Our data therefore underpin Ajzen's theory of planned behavior, although we managed to test only two of its components: attitudes and subjective norms.

EXPLAINING THE REALIZATION OF MIGRATION INTENTIONS

Factors influencing migration behavior among planners – multivariate models

Although intentions are statistically significant predictors of migration behavior, they are not perfect, since in many cases there is a clear discrepancy between migration intention and subsequent behavior. As suggested by the bivariate analysis, the selection of migrants cannot be observed solely by considering the population of origin; we also need to look within the group of migration planners and compare those who realized their plans (expected migrants) and those who did not (dreamers).

In order to examine explanatory factors of selection in the realization phase of migration – and thus to reveal those factors that facilitate or hamper the realization of intentions – we also used logistic regression analysis. The models were constructed in the same way as described in the previous chapter, but in this case using the population of migration planners. The dependent variable was migration behavior between the two waves of the survey, and it had a value of 1 for those who realized their plans (expected migrants) and 0 for those who did not (dreamers).

Although sex did not have a significant effect in the base models, taking into account job satisfaction and housing conditions (*Model 1*) women were about 65% more likely to realize their migration plans (*Table 13*). This suggests that job dissatisfaction and poor housing conditions, being more typical of men, increased the chances that they would realize their migration plans, and thus obscured the fact that otherwise – controlling for these factors – they lagged behind women in realizing their migration plans. The influence of age group did not appear at all, and educational attainment was only partly manifest: those with upper secondary education were less likely to realize their plans than were those with lower secondary education (however, this relationship disappears once job satisfaction and housing conditions are included). Even employment status failed to influence the realization of plans: only after involving variables for subjective well-being (*Model 2*) can we observe lower odds among students.

Settlement size – an important selection factor in migration behavior in the sample as a whole – also underlay the realization of plans: small-town residents were more likely to migrate than were those living in smaller settlements – not only overall, but also among planners. Marital status was significant, too: not only

were migration plans more common among unmarried people and cohabitees, but their plans were also more likely to be realized than in the case of married people. In particular, unmarried status significantly increased the chances of the plans being realized (by more than five times in the final model, too).

Table 13: Odds ratios of migration behavior between the two waves among planners (logistic regression models – expected migrants versus dreamers)

Explanatory variables (characteristics in 2006)	Base model 1 (B1)		Base model 2 (B2)		Model 1 (B2+work, housing)		Model 2 (B2+ subjective wellbeing)		Final model	
	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)
Sex										
male (ref.)		1		1		1		1		1
female		1.253		1.451	+	1.649		1.495	+	1.687
Age group										
below 25		1.805		0.901		0.743		1.181		0.823
25–29		1.381		0.927		0.799		1.447		1.188
30–34		0.973		0.789		0.671		1.229		0.987
35–39		1.322		1.223		1.025		1.444		1.161
above 40 (ref.)		1		1		1		1		1
Educational attainment										
at most lower secondary (ref.)		1		1		1		1		1
vocational training school		0.929		0.857		1.043		0.748		0.948
upper secondary	+	0.564	*	0.493		0.631	*	0.427		0.577
higher education		0.648		0.511		0.654		0.463		0.593
Employment status										
employee (ref.)		1		1		1		1		1
self-employed		0.457		0.550		0.691		0.156		0.155
unemployed		0.656		0.756		1.120		0.728		1.008
student		0.489		0.493		0.726	*	0.210		0.304
other inactive		0.955		0.974		1.109		0.785		0.970
Settlement size					+				*	
below 1,000				1.268		1.557		1.259		1.452
1,000–10,000 (ref.)				1		1		1		1
10,000–100,000			*	1.852	*	2.359	+	1.961	*	2.626
above 100,000				0.913		1.191		0.769		0.911
Marital and partnership status			**		*		**		**	
married (lives with married partner) (ref.)				1		1		1		1
unmarried (single)			**	2.751	**	2.847	***	5.835	**	5.453
divorced, widowed (single)				0.697		0.781		0.670		0.962
cohabiting			*	2.736	*	2.573	*	3.073	*	2.686

Table 13: Odds ratios of migration behavior between the two waves among planners (logistic regression models – expected migrants versus dreamers) (continued)

Explanatory variables (characteristics in 2006)	Base model 1 (B1)		Base model 2 (B2)		Model 1 (B2+work, housing)		Model 2 (B2+ subjective wellbeing)		Final model	
	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)
Job satisfaction					*				*	
satisfied (ref.)						1				1
dissatisfied					**	2.425			*	2.462
not working						0.841				0.883
Housing poverty										
not in poor housing (ref.)						1				1
poor housing					*	2.056			*	2.084
Household member living abroad										
no (ref.)						1				1
yes						0.908				0.719
Can always rely on someone if needed										
completely true (ref.)								1		1
not true or only partly true							+	1.641	*	1.760
Health satisfaction										
dissatisfied (ref.)										1
moderately satisfied										2.816
very satisfied										3.122
Anomie										
(rather) not characteristic (ref.)								1		1
(rather) characteristic							**	0.452	**	0.448
Concern for the future of child							+			
not relevant (ref.)								1		1
not at all or little								2.547		2.042
very much							*	3.049	+	2.395
Concern for the country's economic situation										
not at all or little (ref.)								1		1
very much								1.413		1.322
Nagelkerke R^2	0.035		0.085		0.124		0.181		0.226	

Note: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.5; + p<0.1.
Source: Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania (2006, 2009), authors' calculations.

The negative selection observed regarding employment status and housing conditions was also confirmed by multivariate analysis: those dissatisfied with their job and with poor housing conditions were at least twice as likely to migrate, even within the group of planners (*Model 1*). Living conditions (as a proxy indicator for income status) and experience of unemployment, however, did not

influence the realization of plans (not even controlling for the variables of the first base model, and so they were omitted from *Model 1*), although migration intentions were significantly determined by both factors. Similarly, household members living abroad only increased the likelihood of developing intentions, and had no effect on their realization.

Among variables with respect to subjective well-being, lack of social support and concern for the future of one's children increased the chances of realizing migration plans, while anomie reduced them (*Model 2*). The impact of all three factors – most significantly that of anomie – can be observed in the final model, too. It is worth noting that anomie has different effects in the two stages of the selection process: it increases the likelihood of forming migration intentions; however, it reduces the probability of realizing those intentions. Health satisfaction did not imply a greater chance of realizing the plans (though in the whole sample it increased the probability of migration behavior); concerns about their own state of health, however, kept some of the planners at home (though this effect was only significant when controlling for the first base model).

Although the realization of migration intentions is explained by fewer factors (compared, in particular, to the explanatory factors of migration intention itself), the explanatory power of those factors taken together is greater than that of the factors explaining migration behavior in the whole sample (the Nagelkerke R^2 in the final model is 0.226 here, contrasting with the value of 0.141 in the case of the whole sample).

However, migration-related attitudes (such as expectations about the outcomes of migration) and perceived external norms have no influence at all on the realization of plans (not even controlling for the variables in the first base model). Although a number of studies point out that expectations related to the advantages and disadvantages of migration[29] play an important part in the decision-making process of migration (Fawcett, 1985; Simmons 1985; De Jong et al., 1985; De Jong, 2000), and although moreover, in the case of internal migration, the influence of perceived external (mainly family) norms – controlled for intentions – have also been shown (De Jong, 2000), our analysis confirms that these factors affect only the development of migration intentions, and not subsequent behavior (i.e. the realization of intentions).

[29] These expectations appear in the works of several authors as the utility of different (current and alternative) places of residence, ranked in terms of reaching individual goals (place-utility) and as a result of considering the advantages and disadvantages of moving.

CONCLUSIONS

In our study, we examined the selection of migrants and the relationship between migration intentions and the realization of those intentions, using the two-wave panel survey *Turning Points of Life Course – Transylvania*, conducted in 2006 and 2009 among the Hungarian-speaking population of Transylvania aged 20–45. This is the first follow-up survey on migration potential in the Central and Eastern European region in which the exploration of migration intentions was followed by tracking each of the first-wave sample's respondents (not only the planners), and recording the place of residence of persons who had migrated. Thus, a detailed analysis of the explanatory factors of migration on the supply side became possible, as did clarification of the role of migration intentions in predicting migration behavior. Data collected during the first wave also allowed us – by applying Ajzen's theory of planned behavior to decisions on migration – to study the influence of migration-related attitudes (beliefs about the advantages and disadvantages of emigration) and of subjective norms (the perceived expectations of significant others) on migration.

The findings show that 17% of migration plans were followed by actual migration in the three-year period between the two waves of the survey; however, migration also occurred among those who had not planned to migrate – though at a relatively low rate (5%). Overall, nearly three-quarters of respondents acted in accordance with their previous intentions. *Expected migrants* (i.e., those who previously reported their intention of migrating) are not only younger, less likely to be married, and with lower educational attainment, but are also more likely to be characterized by poor finances, housing conditions, and labor market positions, compared to *stayers* (who did not plan to migrate at all). The composition of so-called *dreamers* (who failed to realize their migration plans) is, in many respects, similar to the composition of expected migrants, suggesting that selection partially took place in the phase during which intentions were formed.

The negative selection of migrants was also confirmed by multivariate analysis: in the second half of the 2000s, those who struggled with financial difficulties, experienced unemployment repeatedly, were dissatisfied with their job, and lived in poor housing conditions were more likely to be involved in some (even temporary) form of migration. Psychosocial well-being was also of key importance: lack of social support, as well as concern for the future of one's children, increased the chances of migration behavior, as did satisfaction with one's own health; anomie (lack of trust in the future, feeling "lost"), in turn, significantly reduced it. In summary, there tended to be negative selection in the dimensions

influence the realization of plans (not even controlling for the variables of the first base model, and so they were omitted from *Model 1*), although migration intentions were significantly determined by both factors. Similarly, household members living abroad only increased the likelihood of developing intentions, and had no effect on their realization.

Among variables with respect to subjective well-being, lack of social support and concern for the future of one's children increased the chances of realizing migration plans, while anomie reduced them (*Model 2*). The impact of all three factors – most significantly that of anomie – can be observed in the final model, too. It is worth noting that anomie has different effects in the two stages of the selection process: it increases the likelihood of forming migration intentions; however, it reduces the probability of realizing those intentions. Health satisfaction did not imply a greater chance of realizing the plans (though in the whole sample it increased the probability of migration behavior); concerns about their own state of health, however, kept some of the planners at home (though this effect was only significant when controlling for the first base model).

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related to living conditions and work, and positive selection regarding the subjective state of one's health and anomie.

Previous migration intention proved to be the most important factor in increasing the chances of migration behavior: those who had any kind of migration plan at the time of the first wave were almost three and a half times more likely to migrate between the two waves than were non-planners (while the explanatory power of the regression model also increased considerably). Therefore, it can be stated that migration intentions are statistically significant predictors of actual migration. Nevertheless, besides previous intention, the influence of job dissatisfaction and anomie remains strongly significant: the former fosters migration, while the latter hinders it. Although migration-related positive attitudes and (in part) perceived external norms related to migration (controlling only for variables of subjective well-being) also increased the chances of migration, these effects disappeared when previous migration intentions (plans) were included as an explanatory variable. These findings confirm Ajzen's theory that migration-related attitudes and subjective norms influence migration behavior only indirectly, via migration intention.

The results indicate a negative selection of migrants not only compared to the population of origin, but also in the realization phase between expected migrants and dreamers. Job dissatisfaction and poor housing conditions at least doubled the chances of migration within the group of planners, too, as did concern for the future of their children and lack of a supportive social network. Anomie, however, reduced the likelihood of migration intentions being realized, although it did contribute to their development. In summary, it may be concluded that in the process of the emigration of ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania, the negative selection earlier identified (Gödri and Kiss, 2009) in the phase of planning for migration was also followed by negative selection in the realization stage, too, in several dimensions. Our assumption – that those groups which are better equipped with certain individual resources that can be converted during migration stand a better chance of realizing their migration plans – has failed in terms of age, level of education, and financial capital. Only the lack of anomie (i.e., trust in the future, control over everyday things, and the subjective sense of orientation in life) formed the "capital" that fostered the realization of migration plans.

Although previous migration intention is the primary determinant of migration behavior at the individual level (it contributes most to the likelihood of migrating), it is also clear that, based on intention alone, one may significantly overestimate the volume of actual migration; and estimations regarding the

composition of migrants are also likely to be biased. In order to use migration intentions as more appropriate indicators for predicting future migration, it is important to "refine" the measurement of intention. The influence of a migration plan on migration behavior proved to be stronger than the influence of migration willingness. This also indicates that the more accurate the assessment of individual "determination" to migrate, the better the predictive power of the indicator. Thus, it is important to identify "serious" plans (with additional questions, e.g., about timing and steps already taken) within migration plans. It is assumed that this approach could produce an indicator of migration potential which predicts the volume and composition of future migration more accurately.

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